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Carmelo Furci

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Carmelo Furci

Honorary Research Fellow
Institute of Latin American Studies, London

University of London
Institute of Latin American Studies
31 Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9HA

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Dr. George Philip
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Introduction

After Chile's military coup of September 1973, the Partido Socialista de Chile (PSCh) almost disintegrated; and the disputes of the various underground centres that emerged after the coup did not help to restore the credibility of the party. By 1979, through a series of splits, expulsions, and disagreements between the organisation underground in Chile and the segment of the party in exile, the PSCh went through the most serious crisis of its history, which had already been dominated by many divisions and disagreements over its political strategy.

From 1979 to the present, the existence of a variety of Socialist 'parties', with only one having a solid underground apparatus in Chile — the PSCh led by Clodomiro Almeyda, former Foreign Secretary of Allende — prevented a more successful and effective unity of the Chilean left, and thus a more credible political alternative of power to the military regime of General Pinochet.

This paper will focus on the process that took the PSCh to its deepest crisis, in 1979, attempting a reconstruction of the schisms and disputes in organisational as well as political terms and an explanation of the reasons behind them. Answers will also be sought to the following questions: what is there left of the traditional Socialist Party yet another federation of groups and ideological tendencies or a more homogeneous organisation? Where should we place the origins of the political crisis of 1979? The conclusion that the PSCh suffered an irreversible process of atomisation must be a tentative one. Yet it could be said that it would be very difficult to imagine a pre-coup style PSCh.

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The PSCh in the period 1933-1973

The PSCh was founded in April 1933 and was the result of the fusion of various political groups of Socialist inspiration, the most important of which were *Nueva Acción Pública* led by Eugenio Matte, Carlos Martínez and Marmaduke Grove; *Acción Revolucionaria Socialista* led by Eugenio González and Oscar Schnake; *Orden Socialista* led by Arturo Bianchi; *Partido Socialista Marxista* and *Partido Socialista Unificado*.¹

Two main factors contributed to the emergence of the PSCh: on the one hand, the military coup of 4 June 1932, led by Marmaduke Grove, with the proclamation of a 'Socialist Republic' that, even if it lasted only twelve days, had important effects on Chilean politics. On the other, the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh),² heavily dependent on the Soviet Union, implemented policies that isolated the party from the masses and at the same time was going through an internal crisis produced by the split within the Soviet leadership, namely the dispute between Stalin and the leadership of the October revolution.³ By 1937 a group that separated from the PCCh, the *Izquierda Comunista*, joined the PSCh.⁴ In short, the vacuum left by the sectarian policies of the PCCh — during the so-called 'third period' — and the enthusiasm created by the 'Socialist Republic' contributed to the emergence of the PSCh.

In the first *Declaraciones de Principios* the PSCh stated that it accepted Marxism as a method of interpretation of the constant social change, thus implying the rejection of Marxism as a political *credo*.⁵ But, as Drake has pointed out, the PSCh at its beginning was influenced by different ideological approaches: from European Marxism to populism, from Haya de la Torre and his APRA to the writings of Peruvian Marxist José Carlos Mariátegui.⁶ The different ideological approaches influenced the PSCh at the early stage, but throughout its history the PSCh would be more subject to political fashions than any other Chilean political party. Indeed, it was to be influenced by Titoism, Maoism, Castroism. And after the coup d'état of September 1973, because most of its leaders would be living in exile in Europe, part of it was to adopt an ideological approach very similar to Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism. This last influence played a considerable part in the split of 1979.

The tendency to redefine its political strategy and ideological orientation has been the result of the different ideological trends always present within the PSCh. And although this freedom of 'intellectual debate' among various ideological tendencies attracted many left-wingers who rejected the strict and pro-Soviet orientation of the PCCh, it also produced a continuous weakness in the political action of the PSCh. This practice of continuous redefinition of the political strategy within the PSCh may be shown to be one of the reasons for the separation of one group from the party.

The variety of ideological tendencies within the PSCh is reflected in the different political alliances which the party joined or implemented. Three main periods can be traced in the history of the PSCh between 1933 and 1973. First there was the PSCh participation in the Popular Front. This political alliance was initially suggested by the VII Congress of the Third International in 1935, which in view of the growing danger of fascism recognised the need for unity among all political and social forces in capitalist countries in order to prevent the authoritarian trend which threatened to spread beyond Italy and Germany.⁷ Within this strategy, the PSCh joined the Popular Front with the Radical and Communist Parties, and in 1938 a Radical President, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, was elected.

Although with the Popular Front the PSCh became a major political force and in 1941 obtained 17.9% of the votes, in that year, because of its rivalry with the Communists, the PSCh retired from the government. The dispute concerned the PCCh's dependence on the Soviet Union and its pro-Soviet stand in World War II. When the PSCh's proposal that the PCCh be excluded from the Popular Front was rejected, the Socialists left the government. From 1941 until the early 1950s the relationship between Socialists and Communists was so tense that they reached a moment of armed confrontation.⁸ According to Drake, because of the growth of the PSCh in electoral terms, this period represented the 'institutionalisation of the PSCh'.⁹

The second period in the history of the PSCh could be situated between 1942 and 1956, when it joined the *Frente de Acción Popular* (FRAP) with the Communist Party. In this period, after the Presidential defeat of the Party's candidate, Bernardo Ibáñez managed to keep the name of PSCh, one reason why the majority group adopted the name of *Partido Socialista Popular* (PSP).¹⁰

The period in which the Socialist Party was led by Rául Ampuero is one of the most controversial in its history. By 1952, the PSP formed an alliance with ex-dictator Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, who ruled Chile between 1927 and 1931 with an authoritarian government. Once again, because of the division resulting from differences regarding the question of whether or not to support Ibáñez, the PSP suffered another damaging split. A minority of the party led by Salvador Allende, who categorically refused to support Carlos Ibáñez,¹¹ joined the *Frente del Pueblo* alliance with the PCCh, by then underground because of the *Ley Permanente en Defensa de la Democracia* introduced in 1948 by the Radical President González Videla.

Drake suggests that the period 1941-1952 was one of decline for the

PSCh; yet it was not surprising that a party uniting such different ideological tendencies would suffer from splits, and the adoption of different political strategies. This 'peculiarity' of the PSCh has to be taken into account if we are to understand the division that took place in 1979.

In 1956, after the failure of the alliance with Ibáñez — who persecuted the left and the labour movement, including the Socialists — with the formation of the *Frente de Acción Popular* (FRAP), the PSCh started its alliance with the Communist Party, an alliance which originated the political process that was to take Salvador Allende to the presidency in 1970. At the same time, from 1956 to 1970, the PSCh underwent a process of radicalisation of its policies, and, after the presidential defeat of the FRAP candidate in 1958 and 1964, the Socialist Party reached what has been described as the most controversial congress of its history, that of Chillán in 1967.

The Congress of Chillán, 1967

The XXII General Congress of the PSCh in Chillán, 24-27 November 1967, represented a complete turn in the political strategy of the Party, and what could be described as the third period in its history. In fact, in our analysis of the crisis of 1979 we will refer to the political resolutions of Chillán as the starting point, in historical terms, of the crisis itself. As we have seen, between 1933 and 1967 the PSCh expressed different political strategies, according to the leadership it enjoyed, and the last was always the result of much compromising between the various groups within the party.

At the Congress of Chillán, the strategy of armed struggle was officially adopted:

Revolutionary violence is inevitable and legitimate. It stems from the armed and repressive character of the State. It represents the only road to economic and political power, and to its defence and consolidation. Only by destroying the bureaucratic and military apparatus of the bourgeois State is it possible to consolidate the Socialist revolution. The peaceful road does not itself lead to power. The Socialist Party considers it as a limited instrument of action, incorporated within the political process that will lead to armed struggle.¹²

This stand opposed completely the PCCh strategy of the peaceful road in the struggle for Socialism, and if one considers that by 1967 it was in alliance with the PSCh, one can imagine the consequences of such a statement. In adopting the strategy of armed struggle the PSCh was greatly influenced by the Cuban revolution and the guerrilla movements which developed during the mid-1960s in Latin America. Moreover, the PSCh always supported Fidel Castro, and in fact it had better relations with Cuba than with the PCCh. However, later, with the progressive alignment of Cuba and the Soviet Union, friendly relations

developed between Fidel Castro and the Communists of Chile. The failure of the FRAP alliance in the presidential elections of 1964,¹³ the new wave of revolutionary hopes created by the Cuban revolution, and the unsuccessful attempt of Ernesto *Che* Guevara, influenced the PSCh considerably, although the second failure of the FRAP in the presidential elections should be considered as a major reason for disillusionment with the peaceful road.

Another important stand taken at the Congress of Chillán was the rejection of any possible alliance with the centre-left, represented by the Radical Party. This issue was important because the Communist Party always insisted on the need to include the Radicals in the FRAP alliance as the only conditions for the success of the alliance of the left. In view of the 1970 presidential elections, the PSCh declared that

The incorporation of the Radical Party into the political front directed by the FRAP...would weaken the left, and reduce the chances of provoking a revolutionary process that could lead to power.... These attempts to incorporate radicalism within the left represent an artificial guarantee for the survival of a party in decline, and do not express any socially or politically progressive force.¹⁴

This position was particularly important because of a by-election for the Senate in the provinces of Bio-Bio, Malleco and Cautín. The FRAP considered supporting the Radical candidate Alberto Baltra. The PSCh decided against this but, in spite of Party's directives, Salvador Allende, in a speech in the province of Cautín, declared his support for Baltra.¹⁵

The agreements of Chillán, which set out the strategy of armed struggle and defined the PSCh as a Marxist-Leninist organisation, had unanimous support from within the party, although this was more a formal than a substantial unanimity. As stated by a Socialist leader at the time, the revolutionary verbalism of the resolutions of Chillán were followed by the election of a political leadership that expressed the more realistic sector of the Party;¹⁶ in fact the General Secretary elected, Aniceto Rodríguez, was well known for his moderate ideological convictions and was often referred to as a Social Democrat, within the complicated geography of the PSCh.

The Congress of Chillán has an historical importance. First, there emerged a new generation of leaders, such as Carlos Altamirano, holding very radical views — he was to be elected General Secretary at the PSCh Congress of La Serena in 1971. They supported the guerrilla movement and argued very strongly against the moderate line of the Communist Party. Secondly, it was the beginning of alliances and agreements between groups within the party, sometimes expressing opposing ideological tendencies, such as the alliance between Carlos Altamirano and Aniceto Rodríguez. Thirdly, the former General Secretary of the PSCh, Rául Ampuero, was definitely pushed out of the PSCh.¹⁷ Finally,

there developed the dichotomy between official declarations and their actual implementation in political activity, with contradictions between the political strategy as expressed by one leader or the other. For example, in spite of the official line of the PSCh — armed struggle — the alliance of the left in 1970, Popular Unity, included the Radical Party and other small groups which emerged in the late 1960s.¹⁸ This is even more surprising if we consider that, in June 1969, the PSCh launched the proposal of a *Frente Revolucionario* as an alternative to the PCCh *Unidad Popular Democrática*.¹⁹ The *Frente* was to include all the parties and revolutionary organisations on the basis of an anti-imperialist struggle, and on the agreement to replace the capitalist regime with a Socialist one.²⁰ Yet at the beginning of 1970 Popular Unity was formed and the Radical Party was in it.²¹

The victory of Salvador Allende in 1970, supported by Popular Unity, was to be a test for the whole strategy of the Socialist Party. The government headed by Allende worked on a strategy of transition towards socialism along the peaceful road.²² It is relevant to consider this because from 1967 the PSCh was stating that only a strategy of armed struggle would result in the installation of a Socialist society. Thus, on the one hand the PSCh was actively taking part in a political alliance that intended to act within the parliamentary rule of a liberal-democratic society; on the other, it was stating the need for armed struggle. This dichotomy was always present during the 1970-1973 period and represented one of the reasons why, by 1972, there emerged within Popular Unity a duality of strategy that weakened the alliance of the left and represented one of the fundamental reasons for the defeat of September 1973.

During the Allende period, the Socialist Party supported a more radical strategy than that pursued by Allende and the Communist Party. While the latter worked within the framework of the Popular Unity programme,²³ i.e., nationalisation of the mines, land reform, redistribution of income, validity of parliamentary rules, necessity to carry out political reforms by peaceful means, the Socialist Party stated that only by destroying the State apparatus and creating a new *poder popular* would it be possible to carry out the revolutionary process successfully. At one stage, by 1972 within Popular Unity, there was an almost vertical division in tactics and strategies that prevented a more incisive action by the government. At the same time, not all the Socialist Party was committed to such a radical strategy. Within the Party there were sectors that supported the strategy advocated by Allende and the PCCh. Thus the PSCh stand was also weakened by its internal divisions; and this internal lack of homogeneity in ideological and strategic terms has prevented the party from being more successful in Chilean politics.

By the time of the coup in September 1973, owing to its lack of a tight organisation and its divisions into factions and groups, the Socialist Party

was almost destroyed. Only in late 1974 were there signs of some sort of reorganisation underground in Chile.

If we wish to understand what followed after the coup within the PSCh we have to take into account three basic assumptions. First, as has been said, the PSCh has historically been a political organisation with a variety of ideological tendencies and expressed contradictory political strategies. Secondly, it was a party without a centralised party structure, resulting in differences in political actions as expressed by one leader or another. Thirdly, at the Congress of Chillán in 1967 the PSCh declared that only a strategy of armed struggle would successfully carry out the revolution in Chile while at the same time it declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party. To these peculiarities we should add the failure of 1973, with a party defeated in its political strategy as well as in organisational terms. These form the background to the crisis of 1979, with the consequent atomisation of the PSCh.

The *Documento de Marzo*, 1974

After the defeat of the Popular Unity, in March 1974 the Central Committee of the PSCh — underground in Chile — launched a document analysing the reasons behind the fall of Allende and at the same time produced the most controversial debate that the PSCh has ever experienced, which contributed decisively to the split of 1979. This document was a fierce attack upon the history of the PSCh, a violent criticism of the party organisation, style of work and programme; in short, a complete break with what the PSCh had been historically from the time of its foundation in 1933. Various leaders and militants of the PSCh took the view that the document was an attempt to liquidate the party, but in reality it was a criticism of the party and an attempt to re-establish it on the basis of a traditional pro-Communist type of organisation. At the same time, from March 1974 to April 1979 the group that supported the document gained control of the underground apparatus in Chile and a consistent percentage of militants in exile. The PSCh headed by Clodomiro Almeyda after 1979 was the expression, in political and organisational terms, of the *Documento de Marzo* 1974.²⁴

All the parties in Popular Unity have elaborated various official documents to explain the defeat of Allende,²⁵ and the document of the PSCh in 1974 is an attempt to give the party's views on the failure of the 'Chilean Road to Socialism'. According to the PSCh, the defeat of September 1973 was determined by the isolation of the working class and the absence of a 'real' leading force able to use — with possibilities of success — the revolutionary potential that was present within the masses and in the constitutional powers controlled by the government. The absence of those elements showed, according to the PSCh, the lack of a revolutionary strategy in the political process of the Allende period. According to the

document there was not a clear political line, but only petty bourgeois influences, evolutionist tendencies, conciliation without principles, anarchist extremism. The possibility of compromises with other political forces was approached in a contradictory manner: on the one hand, the ultraleft tendencies rejected any compromise, qualified as conciliation, treason. And on the other, there was the tendency of superstructural political agreements, without the backing of correct mass politics.²⁶ One of the themes present in the document was the criticism in relation to the lack of a 'proletarian line', a firm revolutionary vanguard,²⁷ only a solid, homogeneous, revolutionary line could have turned the destiny of the Allende government and avoided the defeat of September 1973. The document is an attempt to justify the main conclusion of the text, by analysing the causes of the defeat of Popular Unity, as if the analysis were given *a posteriori*, in order to stress its conclusion: the re-establishment of the Socialist Party on a different basis, to the point of asserting that 'the party was — by and large — the main representative...of the political dispersion that prevented the consolidation of the hegemonic role of the working class in the leadership of the revolutionary process'.²⁸

After listing the various reasons for the coup (the lack of a revolutionary vanguard, the intervention of the U.S., the offensive of the right, the hostility of the Armed Forces), the document states that the Socialist Party must exercise a criticism of its principles and organisation, and this analysis must be massive, from the simply militant to the national leadership, in order that self-criticism 'will help the party in the process of its reconstruction, *proletarianising* it in its ideology, political strategy, organisation and in its concrete practice of the class struggle'.²⁹ Various reasons are given in the document for the need to reconstruct the Socialist Party on a new basis. 1. The party emerged with a project of revolutionary changes of a very general kind, of a petty bourgeois character. 2. The definition of the party at the ideological level was not reflected in a 'Leninist tactic', flexible and coherent. 3. Within the organisation converged militants with a general approach to Marxism, different ideological tendencies, and Marxism-Leninism had a very weak influence within the party. 4. In its organisational structure,³⁰ the PSCh presented its ideological contradictions and the influence of the petty bourgeois revolutionaries. 5. The organisation of the Party did not develop from a Leninist point of view, although from the Congress of Chillán in 1967 the PSCh adopted the definition of a Marxist-Leninist party. 6. The party was disorganised, without any consistency, suffered a power struggle, and division into various ideological tendencies. In short, it was an insufficient instrument for revolutionary changes.³¹

On the basis of the above criticism, the *Documento de Marzo* concluded by suggesting the kind of party the political circumstances of Chile needed: an organisation based on Leninist democratic centralism, homogeneous in its ideology and programme, a party that must constitute the disciplined and homogeneous revolutionary vanguard of the masses,

with very strict unity in its rank and file.³² There is no doubt that this document, in its substance and form, was a severe swing towards pro-Communist lines, in terms of organisation and ideological conceptions. At the same time, it proposed a style of party that is not possible for the PSCh. Historically, the strength of the Socialist Party has been its capacity to attract to its ranks all non-Communist left-wingers, and so it is understandable why the pro-Altamirano sector of the PSCh rejected the *Documento de Marzo*.

But questions arise from the document, namely, who inspired it, and more important, why create a party on those outlines when such a party already exists in Chile: the Communist Party. This question is of considerable importance and raises doubts about the origin of the document. According to the pro-Altamirano PSCh, the *Documento de Marzo*, 1974, was the initiative of a pro-Communist faction within the Party, and what happened after 1979 demonstrated this, while the pro-Almeyda PSCh maintained that, being underground, and in the light of the defeat of September 1973, the PSCh must reconsider its history and become a homogeneous, disciplined party.

1973-1979; the process of division of the PSCh

At the beginning of April 1979, the clandestine Central Committee of the Socialist Party met in Chile at an unknown venue. The session was very important, mainly because of the *Resoluciones Orgánicas*, i.e., the dismissal of Carlos Altamirano as General Secretary of the party and the appointment of Clodomiro Almeyda as the new leader of the PSCh.³³ But this change in leadership was given publicity only at the end of April.³⁴ Chilean politicians and political observers were taken by surprise. However, Carlos Altamirano not only maintained that he did not recognise the resolution of the underground Central Committee, he actually stated that he was still in charge of the PSCh. Because of his refusal to accept his replacement he was expelled from the party. Altamirano stated that he had not been expelled, and 'according to the wish of the overwhelming majority of the militants I continue to be its General Secretary'.³⁵ The change of General Secretary which, in normal circumstances, would have been the usual procedure, became a major issue under conditions of clandestinity, and with a considerable sector of the party in exile. To understand the emergence of various groups and 'parties' which followed after April 1979, it is therefore necessary to try to reconstruct what happened within the PSCh from 1973 to 1979. This reconstruction is based on interviews and internal documents.

Following the expulsion of Carlos Altamirano and his refusal to accept it, or, as the pro-Altamiranos say, following the take-over of the party by a group of Stalinists, there emerged two Socialist 'parties': one led by Clodomiro Almeyda and the other by Carlos Altamirano. Each launched

a document to explain the crisis and seek the support of the militants, most of them in exile; the underground apparatus followed Clodomiro Almeyda. It has to be taken into account that during the first months of the military government the PSCh was severely damaged by the repression.³⁶ Its lack of internal discipline, the ideological disputes that always dominated it and the massive repression had devastating effects for the PSCh. The militants remained isolated, no political directive was available, even the leaders were obliged to escape from the repression, and the disintegration of the party organisation was widespread.

Within this context we should place the origins of the disputes over the legitimacy of one or other underground apparatus that emerged in Chile after the coup of September 1973. Now, the interesting aspect is that each group underground existed before, because both represented tendencies within the PSCh, and obviously, in the difficult circumstances of being underground, each claimed to be *the Socialist Party*. This is of considerable importance because, as stated above, the functioning of the PSCh took the pattern of a movement rather than of a disciplined party. It was thus natural that, once underground, each of these groups tried to take over the party organisation. Only the segment of the PSCh in exile presented a certain unity, not in terms of ideological homogeneity but apparently in terms of organisation. An exiled centre of the party was established in Berlin, but of which group existing in Chile before the coup did it recognise the 'legitimacy' and historic continuity? This question is at the root of the crisis of 1979.

According to the pro-Almeyda PSCh,³⁷ one of the problems which until 1976 the *Dirección Interna* — the leadership underground in Chile — had to face was the 'conflictive relationship' with the General Secretary, Carlos Altamirano, and a sector of the *Secretariado Exterior* — leadership in exile. At the origins of this 'conflicting relationship' was the fact that the *Dirección* was not fully recognised as the legitimate underground PSCh, but the same status was given to another underground group, the *Coordinadora Nacional de Regionales*, an 'anti-party' group that according to the pro-Almeyda PSCh had existed before the coup, although it was apparent only after 1973.

In the session of the Central Committee of the PSCh in 1975 in Cuba,³⁸ of the nine members of the *Secretariado* four were in favour of the *Dirección* and four supported the *Coordinadora*, leaving the General Secretary, Carlos Altamirano, sometimes inclined to one underground group, sometimes to the other. It seems that financial help went to both underground organisations in Chile.³⁹

In September 1976, the underground PSCh held a session of the Central Committee in which the political resolutions were in no disagreement with the views of Carlos Altamirano. At the same time, the *Dirección* decided to ignore the other underground group, the *Coordinadora*,

'because only a correct political strategy' would decide which of the two underground groups represented the continuity of the PSCh.⁴⁰

In the same month, Carlos Altamirano launched an appeal to the militants and urged them to recognise as the legitimate underground centre of the PSCh, only the *Dirección*, which after the disappearance of Carlos Lorca and Ezequiel Ponce had new leaders.⁴¹ According to the pro-Almeyda PSCh, from then until 1978 there was a process of mutual trust between Carlos Altamirano and the *Dirección* underground.

The position of the pro-Altamirano PSCh is different, and even without mentioning the support for both, the *Coordinadora* and the *Dirección*, it explains why it did not fully recognise the *Dirección* as the legitimate PSCh underground in Chile until 1976. The core of their analysis is a rejection of the *Documento de Marzo*, 1974.⁴² According to the pro-Altamirano PSCh, that document represented the initiative of an 'anti-party' group, which took advantage of the difficult circumstances of being underground, with no direct communications with the militants, took the initiative of analysing the party structure and functioning under Allende, accusing the PSCh of being responsible for the *coup d'état*. The document, according to the pro-Altamirano PSCh, tried to change the ideological inspiration of the party and to reformulate it on the basis of a Stalinist swing.⁴³

To what extent the document of March was the reason why Carlos Altamirano did not support the *Dirección* fully until 1976 and until then supported the *Coordinadora* as well, is a matter of discussion. We have to take into account that Altamirano was elected General Secretary of the PSCh on the basis of an alliance of various factions and ideological tendencies within the party. Thus the only possibility for his survival as leader of the PSCh was as the 'referee' of the various groups, a sort of *primus inter pares*. And we suspect that the reason for Altamirano's support of the two underground organisations was not so much the disagreement over the *Documento de Marzo* — which of course was strong — but, rather, his belief in the historical continuity of the PSCh as the expression of different ideological tendencies. It is clear therefore, that, from 1973 to 1976, while the sector of the *Secretariado* headed by Carlos Altamirano recognised both underground centres, Clodomiro Almeyda and others fully supported only the *Dirección*, and this could explain why later Almeyda was put in charge of the party in bizarre circumstances.

After the statement by Carlos Altamirano in 1976 urging the militants to recognise only the *Dirección* as the legitimate representative of the PSCh underground in Chile, between August and November 1977, there took place a series of meetings between members of the *Secretariado* (Carlos Altamirano, Clodomiro Almeyda and Rolando Calderón) and members of the *Dirección*. The disagreements of the previous years were

resolved, even if the *Dirección* would not accept the reasons given by Carlos Altamirano on why he did not fully support them until 1976.⁴⁴ Apparently, however, the problems were solved, and there was an agreement on the need to stage a plenum of the Central Committee elected at the Congress of the Party in La Serena (1971), provided that the General Secretary would guarantee that the members of the Central Committee would support the *Dirección* on the basis of a 51% majority. In March 1978 the assembly took place in Algeria, on those terms.⁴⁵ All the participants of that event maintained that the session of the Central Committee in Algeria represented a historical act for the PSCh: all the resolutions were approved unanimously. There was unanimity on the political strategy and agreement to recognise the *Dirección* as the legitimate underground PSCh in Chile. Carlos Altamirano was confirmed as General Secretary, although he insisted on leaving the post.⁴⁶ New members within the *Secretariado* were elected and, most important, there was a statement that the PSCh had only one *Dirección*, of which a sector was in Chile and another was in exile.

What happened between March 1978 and April 1979 is as confused as the whole internal life of the PSCh before the coup. It is useful to analyse the versions by the two sectors, and then try to arrive at some conclusions. But it is clear that, apart from serious political differences, a strong personal struggle for the leadership took place as well; otherwise, how could it be explained that the unanimity of views expressed in the plenum of the Central Committee in Algeria in 1978 turned out to be a split over the 'historical project' of the Socialist Party in 1979?

The pro-Almeyda version of the division

After the session of the Central Committee of Algeria, the unity of the PSCh was 'evident'. Even more, in August 1978, a meeting of the *Secretariado* took place which, according to all participants, was a very useful meeting, and again there was unanimity of views. Yet, fifteen days later, Carlos Altamirano called another meeting of the *Secretariado*, claiming that there were 'serious problems' within the leadership in exile, that there existed 'minority and majority' within it, and that the majority developed a sectarian, Stalinist practice.⁴⁷ Thus, Altamirano urged the *Dirección* to intervene and solve the problems; in the meantime he would leave his role as General Secretary, without formally relinquishing the post. In yet another meeting of the *Secretariado* that lasted for days, there was no agreement at all, and the intervention of the *Dirección* was urged. The document of the pro-Almeyda PSCh does not explain in detail the positions of the participants in those meetings, although by the accusations made by Altamirano it is clear that there were disagreements on political aspects as well as on method of work. According to the pro-Almeyda PSCh, the *Dirección* was surprised at what was going on within the *Secretariado*. Only in November 1978 the *Dirección* sent a delegation

to meet the leadership in exile. Carlos Altamirano renewed the accusation of 'sectarianism and Stalinism' to the group led by Almeyda and declared that he wanted a majority within the leadership or he would resign as General Secretary and, according to the pro-Almeyda PSCh, concluded his intervention by saying: 'The *Dirección* must consider everything I did for the party, it must analyse what the party is in exile', and added: 'with me, everything; without me, very difficult; against me, impossible'.⁴⁸

The representatives of the *Dirección* tried to cool down the situation and, upon their return to Chile, the *Comisión Política* of the underground apparatus proposed a meeting of the Central Committee in order to seek a solution. They proposed that the General Secretary should be situated in Chile, a proposition that implied the replacement of Carlos Altamirano.

According to the pro-Almeyda document, during the organisation of the plenum of the Central Committee in Chile, 'something' started within the PSCh. Two militants of the party, who had worked for the *Dirección*, went to Europe at the end of 1978 and met Carlos Altamirano. After returning to Chile they opened a campaign among the militants, stating that they had assumed, on behalf of the General Secretary, the organisation of an anti-*Dirección* group in Chile, and they urged the militants to call for a Congress of the Party. According to the pro-Almeyda PSCh, there is evidence of this.⁴⁹

The two militants working in Chile for Altamirano obtained the backing of 38 militants and sent a document to him, criticising the *Dirección*; the General Secretary made this document known to the militants in exile, and on the basis of this, declared the non-validity of the plenum in progress underground in Chile.

One of the strangest aspects of this story is that, having decided to dismiss Altamirano as General Secretary,⁵⁰ the plenum of the Central Committee in Chile did not place the new Secretary in Chile but appointed Clodomiro Almeyda, thus bringing about rumours that the real issue was power within the party, for in fact Almeyda lives in exile. So what happened to the proposal of the Central Committee to transfer the General Secretaryship to Chile? It is a mystery: in fact, no explanation has been given.

On April 27, 1979, a delegation of the *Dirección* travelled to Berlin, and in a joint meeting with the *Secretariado*, Clodomiro Almeyda was officially appointed General Secretary. Carlos Altamirano did not acknowledge his replacement and was expelled from the PSCh, together with his minority within the *Secretariado*.

The pro-Altamirano version of the division

The document issued by the pro-Altamirano PSCh begins by stating that the origin of the crisis must be found in the *Documento de Marzo*, 1974, which, as we have already seen, criticised the party and expressed the need of a 'new' party, ideologically homogeneous, organised on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist structure. In March 1975, the militants and leaders who had taken part in the plenum of Cuba rejected the document, and 'apparently' that statement was abandoned.⁵¹ But, according to the pro-Altamirano PSCh, the group that inspired the *Documento de Marzo* continued to pursue their objective: to create a 'new type of party', with a rigid and dogmatic conception of democratic centralism, a conception that had strong Stalinist elements. The pro-Altamirano version also states that the plenum of Algeria was a good meeting, with a high degree of unity. All the members of the *Dirección* elected at the Congress of La Serena in 1971 resigned, and one third of the members of the new *Dirección* were from Chile (underground), but unknown even to some leaders of the PSCh in exile. At the same time, a majority of leaders that were in agreement with the *Dirección* was elected to the *Secretariado*. But, most surprising of all, the plenum ended without a conclusive political document and, according to the pro-Altamirano PSCh, the process of take-over from the Stalinists in the party increased. As an example of this statement, the pro-Altamirano version asserts that the organisational structure of the party based in Berlin was composed of 50 *funcionarios*, all of them in accordance with the Stalinist majority of the *Secretariado*. In order to achieve their complete dominance over the apparatus, the Stalinists urged 18 *funcionarios* to resign. According to the pro-Altamirano version, the process of take-over by the group headed by Clodomiro Almeyda was followed by a series of disputes, and the group headed by Altamirano accused the Almeyda of three main fallacies: 1. they conceived the structure of the party in exile as an organisation merely supporting the *Dirección*, but without a creative participation in the life of the party; 2. they used paternalistic and anti-democratic methods in electing the leaders of the various structures of the party in exile; 3. the relationship between the *Dirección* and the *Secretariado* was maintained only by the group headed by Clodomiro Almeyda, excluding the General Secretary, Carlos Altamirano.⁵²

On 3 September, Carlos Altamirano sent a letter to the *Dirección* suggesting that, in view of the 'style of working' of the majority group within the *Secretariado*, the whole of the leadership of the PSCh should be placed in Chile.⁵³ In October 1978, the minority group sent another letter to the *Dirección* about the disagreements within the leadership in exile. The majority group did the same, and the schism and non-working relationship within the *Secretariado* became obvious. The *Dirección* was silent about the situation within the *Secretariado*, and only five months later did a delegation from Chile travel to Berlin to meet the leaders in exile. But, according to the pro-Altamirano PSCh, the reason for the

delay was clear: the party underground started a campaign in Chile to remove Altamirano, and the *Dirección* needed time to create a majority in order to bring about his replacement. In February 1979, 'a group of important leaders of the party in Chile' sent a letter to Carlos Altamirano stating that there was a crisis within the *Dirección* and urging the General Secretary to call for a Congress; the letter also accused the *Dirección* of being sectarian, Stalinist and isolated from the masses.

With these claims and counter claims, another member of the *Dirección* went to Berlin to meet with the *Secretariado* and announced the convocation of a plenary meeting of the underground Central Committee in Chile, declaring (according to the pro-Altamirano version) that the 'comrades of the minority can take part if they wish to do so'.⁵⁴ The minority group accepted the 'invitation' but stressed the need for time in order to arrange for a member of their group to travel to Chile.

The plenum of the Central Committee took place without the participation of a representative of the minority group. The group declared the non-validity of that meeting and stressed that only a Congress could solve the problem. Carlos Altamirano was first replaced, then expelled, and then created another PSCh, or, as he would say, he continued to be the General Secretary of the PSCh. Two parties appeared, apart, of course, from other Socialist groups already existing. In addition, when the pro-Altamirano PSCh celebrated its Congress (24th) in 1980, a further division took place in this party, thus confirming it as being formed on the basis of groups rather than on homogeneity of ideological approach.

The crisis of the Socialist Party was, by 1979, at its peak. But is it possible that it was simply a crisis caused by a personal struggle for the leadership? To present it in this way is misleading. It is clear that the history of the PSCh is full of disputes over the political strategy of the party, and its functioning in organisational terms. However, the defeat of the Popular Unity in 1973, and the need of an analysis of what occurred and of the extent to which the PSCh was responsible,⁵⁵ plus the clandestine nature of the party in Chile and the difficulty of communication between the leaders and militants in exile and the underground apparatus, contributed to the crisis, of which the personal struggle is only the visible façade.

The pro-Altamirano PSCh and the other Socialist groups

While the PSCh headed by Clodomiro Almeyda presented (at least until early 1983) a united and homogeneous organisation as well as a political strategy — although recently there have been rumours among the left that this party is going through a crisis — the group that was headed by Carlos Altamirano until 1981⁵⁶ was, and still is, a federation of various ideological tendencies, but united in rejecting the Leninist party style,

and in assuming that the traditional alliance of the PSCh and PCCh, which was the cornerstone of the political strategy of the Chilean left until 1973, is not the right political alliance to offer a political alternative to the military regime in Chile. More important is its rejection of the model of Socialism established in Eastern Europe. Yet the lack of a solid underground apparatus in Chile makes this a party in exile, although between 1981 and 1982 there emerged some groups of militants supporting this sector.

The novelty, particularly in exile, for the future strategy and alliance for a return to democracy in Chile is represented by the movement called *Convergencia Socialista*. The main political force behind this movement is the PSCh headed until 1981 by Altamirano. The proposition of *Convergencia* was made in a seminar organised in Ariccia, Italy, by the Lelio Basso Foundation, under the impulse of former General Secretary of the PSCh Raúl Ampuero. The crisis and division of the anti-fascist forces in Chile, the incapacity of the traditional political groups to offer a way out to the military regime, and the polarisation within the left of the various parties created the political climate for a debate envisaging a long-term battle, for a political project for a real democracy, open to a possible transition to Socialism.⁵⁷

The initiative came about just before the crisis of the PSCh, in March 1979, and was a discussion of Chilean Socialism, its history and perspectives, and had as a primary objective 'to unite in a seminar leaders of the various trends of Chilean Socialism, away from the Communist tendency and from others, such as the Social Democratic and the Social Christian sectors.'⁵⁸ The first seminar was followed by a second in January 1980. This is important, because the Socialist party was already divided. What started as a discussion became the platform for an alternative of all Socialist groups outside the Almeyda PSCh, as well as including other small parties of the Chilean left such as the MAPU, MAPU O.C., the Izquierda Cristiana and sectors of the Radical party. It was to be the starting point of a second alternative within the Chilean left.

By the end of 1979 two distinct sectors could already be observed within the traditional left: the sector represented by the Communist party, the MIR, the PSCh headed by Clodomiro Almeyda, and some of the Radical party, working on a common platform, which by the end of 1980 became, particularly within the PCCh, a strategy of armed struggle.⁵⁹ The other sector was represented by the small parties of the left, the pro-Altamirano PSCh and other Socialist groups such as that led by former General Secretary of the PSCh Aniceto Rodríguez. In reality, there was a vertical division of the Chilean left over strategy and programme. All the forces of this second sector, severely repressed and dispersed and with a weak underground apparatus, had, as the only means of representing a substantial political force, the alternative of uniting. The *Convergencia* is the expression of this second sector which rejected the

axis represented by PCCh-MIR and pro-Almeyda PSCh. The proposal of *Convergencia* is confusing, however, on account of the differences among groups, small parties and individuals that form part of it, from ex-pro-Cubans (like Altamirano and other Socialist members), Socialists of Christian inspiration (Izquierda Cristiana, MAPU, MAPU O.C.), Social Democrats (like Aniceto Rodriguez), to ex-militants of the MIR (which were in favour of the guerrilla). How can these groups, parties and individuals work together and agree on a political strategy? This is one of the reasons for the crisis that the *Convergencia* is already experiencing. On the one hand, the sectors of the Socialist party outside the PSCh led by Clodomiro Almeyda are engaged in the process of reconstructing the 'old' Socialist party and, on the other, they are engaged in promoting the *Convergencia*, which so far is not clear whether it is a union of parties, groups and individuals, or a movement formed outside party structures.

In several interviews with Chileans taking part in the *Convergencia*, the definitions given are various. And the fact that there is no programme but a series of proposals does not facilitate the task of making of the *Convergencia* a clear power alternative. Even the leadership of the *Convergencia* gives very different and confusing definitions. The *Convergencia* is presented as an autonomous political project at the international level and rooted within a new popular bloc.⁶⁰

According to Alejandro Chelén, the *Convergencia* is a phase in the process of unity that by surpassing Popular Unity will lead the Chilean people towards the conquest of its historical objectives.⁶¹ Luis Jerez, one of the leaders of the pro-Altamirano PSCh, defines the *Convergencia* as the expression of the fact that the Chilean left lost its identity as a political subject, but at the same time needs to be reconstructed at a superior level. The *Convergencia*, he says, looks for a national political force able to capture the lead lost by the Chilean left and to offer a coherent alternative that will not disappear in doctrinal definitions, without sectarianism and pretensions of being the vanguard.⁶² Another view — and this contradicts the autonomy of the *Convergencia* at the international level — is that the *Convergencia* should join the Socialist International.⁶³ The vice-General Secretary of the PSCh (pro-Altamirano), Jorge Arrate, asserts that the *Convergencia* has three basic assumptions: i) the creation of *convergencia* at different levels of social and political activity, in Chile and in exile; ii) the promotion of discussion on central issues concerning the strategic perspective of the future; iii) the proposition of a common programme among parties, independents and groups, emerging from the deep crisis of the left and the failure of the traditional political project of the Chilean left.⁶⁴

Although the discussion and elaboration of the project of the *Convergencia* is still in progress and interpretations of it differ and are often contradictory, it is a proposition that has matured, basically, among leaders in exile, within minority groups and parties, and, moreover, with

no solid and consistent underground apparatus in Chile. In short, four basic issues unite the participants of the *Convergencia*: i) the recognition of the failure of the project of the Chilean left known as the 'Chilean Road to Socialism'; ii) the need to reformulate a strategy to Socialism away from that pursued by the PCCh, pro-Almeyda PSCh and MIR; iii) rejection of the model of Socialism established in Eastern Europe; iv) an attempt to unite the Chilean democratic forces in a strategy and programme that, while looking at Socialism, re-establishes certain values of a liberal-democratic society.

There is no doubt that the proposition of *Convergencia* has been greatly influenced by the experience of its leaders in exile. For example, the suggestion of Eurocommunism is present in some writings and speeches of Socialist leaders. Certain approaches resemble the sort of strategy pursued by Felipe González in Spain and Mitterrand in France. Themes of Antonio Gramsci are often used by the adherents of *Convergencia*, such as national unity, relationship between parties and movements and the concept of hegemony.⁶⁵ But it seems that the *Convergencia* lacks support in Chile, where, in the last analysis, any power struggle will take place. On the other hand, the Communist party, the PSCh (Almeyda) and the MIR, although holding 'old' views, still command considerable support within the labour movement. Even the Christian Democratic party, which lost some traditional support because of the position it took in the early days of the military Junta, has regained considerable backing. And the anti-Pinochet demonstrations of May—September 1983 show that the CDP is the main force behind them, apart, of course, from the support the left has in the mining sectors and other trade unions. Thus, the project of *Convergencia*, even if it shows a desire for an alliance with the CDP, will face a political force which has considerable support. But the traditional left has not lost its political appeal, and the *Convergencia* may find itself squeezed between these two political sectors.

Conclusions (October, 1983)

Since the *coup d'état* of 1973 and the consequent repression of the Chilean left, reorganisation of the structure of the various parties forming Popular Unity has been a very slow process. Even if some sort of underground apparatus has been organised, up to the end of 1982 the left was not an effective opposition to the military regime. The repression of the first months of military rule almost destroyed the organisation of the parties forming Popular Unity, except perhaps the Communist party, which more successfully than others turned from legality to clandestinity. But in general terms the left has not been able to offer any consistent opposition to the coup. In addition, the deep division within the left prevented the organisation of an effective opposition. Only the Christian Democratic Party and the Church were able to 'participate' in politics, mainly because of their moderate opposition; however, since 1977 the

CDP also has been repressed. Although the left has the solid support of the *Coordinadora Nacional Sindical* (CNS), which represents the united structure of the various local and regional unions,⁶⁶ it is too early to assess the possibility of an alternative to the military regime. For example, the demonstrations which took place in 1983, although representing the first major confrontation between the opposition and the military, were met with strong repression. Certainly, the extent of the strikes indicates the general feeling of opposition to Pinochet, particularly when it is considered that even the right is opposing the President and demanding a change in Chile, by means mainly of a government of transition towards democracy. But the manner in which Pinochet is handling the popular protest indicates that he has no intention to go, unless a *coup d'état* in the military dismisses him.

It is within this context that the only viable strategy, according to the MIR, the PSCh led by Clodomiro Almeyda, and the Communist Party, is to work towards an armed insurrection, which implies a long-term solution rather than a short-term way out of the military regime. And on this issue the opposition is divided, a division which of course favours the military. There would be one group, the PCCh, MIR and PSCh (Almeyda), working on a more radical strategy and, in another group, other forces of the left, together with the CDP (*Alianza Democrática*), looking for a more moderate solution, a sort of government of transition towards democracy. In this last perspective the role of the CDP is crucial.

After ten years of military rule in Chile, the opposition has not succeeded in uniting. On the contrary, there now exist two separate anti-Pinochet alliances, the *Alianza Democrática* led by the CDP, and the *Movimiento Democrático Popular* led by the PCCh.⁶⁷ This division does not facilitate a consistent political alternative, and certain crises within the parties have their origins in this political disorientation. This incapacity is reflected within Chilean Socialism, which is now vertically divided into strategies and organisations, although apparently there is some sort of agreement among the sectors outside the pro-Almeyda PSCh. When considering the crisis of the PSCh, we have to take into account the situation of the opposition in general, and if the crisis has been more evident in the PSCh this is because to the difficulties created by the military regime must be added the 'peculiarity' of this party, historically divided and formed as a confederation of groups and ideological tendencies.

One of the questions posed at the beginning of this paper was: In which sector of the divided Socialist party can be found the continuity, in historical terms, of the pre-coup party? The question may seem irrelevant, but reflects important questions for the Chilean left.

If the PSCh is seen as the party that from its foundation in 1933 until 1973 was characterised by divisions, ideological differences and

aggregations of various groups, then there is no doubt that the legitimate Socialist force that would represent a continuity would be the sector headed by Carlos Altamirano. In fact, what that group is again proposing is not a homogeneous party, but a federation of groups. And the *Convergencia* is an attempt to unite all the small groups and parties that independently could not be a relevant political force.

Of course, the pro-Altamirano PSCh claims that it is in that group that the historical continuity is represented, particularly in ideological terms: autonomy from any international centre, a strong accent on the Latin American revolution, rejection of the Socialism established in Eastern Europe, the concept of the party as a body open to society and anti-Stalinist; and, more importantly, the recognition that it is possible to have different ideological approaches within the party. It could be argued, however, that this was the kind of party organisation that caused the crisis of the PSCh. The lack of ideological coherence produced a dichotomy between party policies as expressed in its congresses and their actual implementation, as was the case of the *Frente Revolucionario* in 1969. If it is recognised that one of the major obstacles to a more effective Socialist party has been this lack of unity, then it is strange to propose again that style of party. But the question is more complex than that. We have to take into account that at the moment of the schism in 1979, the entire underground apparatus in Chile supported Clodomiro Almeyda, while in exile the forces were equal. Thus only a unity of the various Socialist groups outside the party headed by Almeyda could represent a political force. In short, although recognising the inadequacy of a party style such as existed before the coup, the Socialist 'dissidents' (as the PSCh of Almeyda say), or (as the pro-Altamirano supporters would say) the groups that represent the historical continuity of the PSCh, had no alternative but to attempt to unite and reconstruct the Socialist party. If they succeed — and to date there is little evidence of this — the PSCh would continue to resemble the pattern of a 'movement' rather than a party.

How the PSCh of Clodomiro Almeyda might be representative of the continuity of the party that existed before the coup is a more complicated matter. Until the early 1960s the Socialist party expressed contradictory political strategies. The decade 1960-1970 was the turning point for the PSCh, and at the same time, the congress of Chillán was at the root of the problem. In that decade, particularly after the defeat of the FRAP alliance in 1964, the PSCh enthusiastically supported Fidel Castro and the guerrilla movements that emerged in Latin America. Disillusionment with the electoral strategy brought about a swing towards one of armed struggle. But, of course, in order to pursue that strategy it was necessary for the party to develop another kind of structure. It is in this context that it adopted the definition of a Marxist-Leninist party. The problem then was that the concept of a Leninist party and the strategy of armed struggle remained as declarations of principle, while the PSCh continued to be what it had been before: a federation of ideological tendencies and

groups. The new strategy and party structure were not assimilated by the party as such, and that is why these policies were never implemented. For example, how could it be explained that, after the declaration of a policy of armed struggle, the leader elected was a moderate — Aniceto Rodríguez? Or that when the *Frente Revolucionario* was proposed in 1969, the PSCh joined the Popular Unity alliance, which included the Radical party? The PSCh led by Clodomiro Almeyda claims to represent the historical continuity of the pre-coup PSCh. In a way, it is. It represents the continuity between the agreements of Chillán (armed struggle and Leninist organisation) with what they propose now. If one compares the agreements of Chillán with the *Documento de Marzo*, 1974, it is possible to discern the continuity in terms of the strategy and conception of the party's organisation.

In sum, if one looks at the Socialist party as it has been historically — a federation of groups and ideological tendencies — the pro-Altamirano PSCh can be seen to be in line with the history of the PSCh. If one looks at the theoretical resolutions, particularly after the Congress of Chillán in 1967, there is no doubt that the party of Almeyda could claim to represent the historical continuity of the PSCh. Although in other circumstances in the past the various factions within the PSCh were absorbed, now it is very difficult to foresee the possibility of a reunion of the two main tendencies within Chilean Socialism, notwithstanding apparent efforts in this direction, and this will not facilitate the task of uniting the left in forming a political alternative to the regime of Augusto Pinochet.

NOTES

1. Paul W. Drake, *Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-52* (University of Illinois Press, Chicago/London, 1978) pp.141-145. On the history of the PSCh, see also Julio César Jobet, *El Partido Socialista de Chile*, Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana (Santiago de Chile, 1971) and F. Casanueva and M. Fernández, *El Partido Socialista y la lucha de clases en Chile*, (Ed. Quimantú, Santiago de Chile, 1973).
2. On the Chilean Communist Party, see Hernán Ramírez-Necochea, *Origen y formación del Partido Comunista de Chile*, Editorial Austral (Santiago de Chile, 1965); and Carmelo Furci, *The Chilean Communist Party and the road to Socialism*, Zed Press (London, May 1984).
3. Jean Elleinstein, *Storia del fenomeno Staliniano*, Feltrinelli, (Milano, 1975).
4. Drake, *op. cit.*, p.139.
5. PSCh, *Declaraciones de Principios* (Santiago de Chile, 1933) p.39.
6. Drake, *op. cit.*, p.145.
7. George Dimitrov, *La classe operaia contro il fascismo* (Bruxelles, 1935).
8. Raúl Ampuero, interview, Rome, February 1980.
9. Drake, *op. cit.*, p.259.
10. *Ibid.*, p.282.
11. Furci, *op. cit.*, p.101.
12. Julio César Jobet, *El Partido Socialista de Chile* (Ediciones Prensa Latinoamerica, Santiago de Chile, 1971), p.131.
13. FRAP was constituted in 1956, resulting from an alliance of the Communist and Socialist parties, Partido Socialista Popular, Partido Demócrata del Pueblo, Partido Democrático and Partido del Trabajo. D.W. Bray, 'Chilean politics during the second Ibañez government, 1952-1958', Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, p.119.
14. Jobet, *op. cit.*, p.129
15. Although the PSCh rejected possible support for Baltra, apart from Allende the entire Regional of the PSCh of that area backed the Radical candidate. Luis Jerez, interview, Rotterdam, 31 July 1981.
16. *Ibid.*
17. According to Ampuero, the process of radicalisation towards a Marxist-Leninist party meant that the 'popular sector' of the PSCh, the historical continuity he represented, resulted in the elimination of his group from the party. He then founded the USOPO, which in 1979 joined the PSCh again. Raúl Ampuero, interview, Rome, February 1980.
18. In 1966 there emerged the Partido Social Demócrata led by Patricio Hurtado, a former MP of the Christian Democratic Party, which included two other small groups, the Movimiento de Rebeldía Nacional and the Partido Democrático Nacional. Also in 1969 there emerged the Acción Popular Independiente (API), formed by ex-supporters of Carlos Ibáñez. Claude Heller Rouassant, 'Política de unidad en la izquierda chilena, 1956-1970', *Jornada* 73, (El Colegio de México) p.117.

19. According to Luis Jérez, who was the author of the report to the Central Committee of the PSCh which launched the Revolutionary Front, not all the PSCh was committed to the new line, only one sector. This could explain why the party agreed later to the inclusion of the Radical party into Popular Unity. Luis Jérez, interview, Rotterdam, 31 July 1981.
20. *Ibid.*
21. On the formation of Popular Unity, see Furci, *op. cit.* p.110.
22. Salvador Allende, *La Via Cilena al Socialismo* (Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1971).
23. Luis Corvalán, *Unidad Popular para conquistar el poder*; Report to the Central Committee of the PCCh, 23 November 1969.
24. PSCh, *Al calor de la lucha contra el fascismo, construir la fuerza dirigente del pueblo para asegurar la victoria* (Santiago de Chile, March 1974).
25. On the PCCh analysis, see Carmelo Furci, 'The Chilean Communist party (PCCh) and its third underground period, 1973-1980', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol.2, No.1, 1982.
26. PSCh, *Al calor de la lucha*, p.55.
27. *Ibid.*, p.60.
28. *Ibid.*, p.63.
29. *Ibid.*, p.55.
30. On the organisational structure of the PSCh, see Benny Pollack, 'The Chilean Socialist Party: prolegomena to its structure and organization', in *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol.10, Part 1, 1978.
31. PSCh, *Al calor de la lucha*, pp.54-55.
32. *Ibid.*, p.69.
33. PSCh, *La opinión del partido sobre un relevo y expulsión* (Santiago de Chile, 8 April 1979), p.18.
34. *Le Monde*, 28 April and 5 May 1979.
35. *Chile-América*, Dossier, No.54-55, 1979, p.134.
36. J.R. Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile* (Greenwood Press, Westport & London, 1978), p.359.
37. PSCh, *La opinión del partido*, p.8.
38. PSCh, *Pleno del Partido Socialista de Chile*, 23 April 1975, La Habana, Cuba; this was the first meeting of the Central Committee after the coup.
39. PSCh, *La opinión del partido*, p.8.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Many people were killed during the coup, and a considerable number of left-wingers were arrested and are *desaparecidos*. While in the case of Argentina the military have admitted that the *desaparecidos* are dead, the Chilean military refuse to give any satisfactory explanation. On the *desaparecidos*, see Arzobispado de Santiago, *Dónde Están?* (Vicaría de Solidaridad, Santiago de Chile, 1978), 7 vols.

42. PSCh (pro-Altamirano), *Itinerario de la crisis* (no place and date given), pp.6-7.
43. *Ibid.*
44. PSCh, *La opinión del partido*, p.9.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*, p.11.
47. *Ibid.*, p.12.
48. *Ibid.*, p.14.
49. *Ibid.*, p.15.
50. PSCh, *Resoluciones del Pleno del Comité Central* (Santiago de Chile, April 1979), p.88.
51. PSCh (pro-Altamirano), *Itinerario de la crisis*, p.7.
52. *Ibid.*, pp.11-12.
53. *Ibid.*, p.13.
54. *Ibid.*, p.18.
55. On this, see Carlos Altamirano, *Riflessioni critiche sul processo rivoluzionario cileño* (I Quaderno CSC, Belgrade, 1974).
56. The new General Secretary is in Chile, and for security reasons his name is not known.
57. See *Comunicado de Prensa* (Rome, 12 March 1979).
58. Raúl Ampuero, *Informe introductorio al Seminario de Ariccia* (Rome, 13 March 1979), p.14.
59. On the emergence of the strategy of armed struggle in Chile, see Carmelo Furci, 'The Chilean Communist Party', *B.L.A.R.* Vol.2, No.1, 1982.
60. Wilfredo Barahona, 'La Convergencia Socialista', *Convergencia*, No.1, Feb.-April, 1981, pp.33-34.
61. Alejandro Chelén, 'Convergencia Socialista y Unidad', *Convergencia*, No.3-4, August-Sept. 1981, p.79.
62. Luis Jérez, *Chile-America*, Dossier, No.78-79, p.3.
63. J. Antonio Vieragallo, *ibid.*, p.10.
64. Jorge Arrate, *ibid.*, p.14.
65. An example of this is the book by Jorge Arrate, *El Socialismo Chileno: rescate y renovación*, Ediciones del Instituto para el Nuevo Chile, Rotterdam, 1983.
66. For a study of the unions under Pinochet, see Gonzalo Falabella, *Labour under authoritarian regimes: the Chilean union movement, 1973-1979*, Ph.D., University of Sussex, 1980.
67. On the Alianza Democrática, see *Manifiesto Democrático*, Santiago de Chile, 14 March 1983. On the Movimiento Democrático Popular, see *Manifiesto del Movimiento Democrático Popular*, Santiago de Chile, 3 September 1983.

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