

THE TRANSKEI: CONFLICT EXTERNALIZATION AND BLACK EXCLUSIVISM

by

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Racial conflict in South Africa stems from the determination of the white population to perpetuate its power and privilege (by means of political domination), and African opposition to this control. This African opposition derives, over time, from the common values which a mission-based education and urban-industrial society have created over time, and which lead Africans to assert their common right to equality and economic opportunity. (1) During the nineteen-fifties and early 'sixties, the escalation of political conflict between the races was the result of intensified efforts by the whites to entrench their position, and increased black efforts to challenge and resist this hegemony. (2) Whites became increasingly dependent on coercion as a means of conflict resolution. The policy of separate development is a white attempt to broaden the range of choices for conflict resolution open to them, and thus lower this dependence on coercion. Through territorial Balkanization of the country, it is hoped to expel racial conflict from the areas of white privilege (conflict has been concentrated in the main urban centres of the country) and orient African aspirations towards rural "homelands" or "Bantustans". (3)

The Bantustan policy rejects racial integration, which would end the white monopoly of privilege, and seeks instead to implement a system of "political independence with economic interdependence". (4) To this end, Africans are expelled from the towns when they cease to be employed by whites (5); a special system of education aims to keep Africans as a low-paid proletariat (6); industrialization of the borders of the Bantustans rather than inside them ensures that capital resources will remain in white hands while labour resides in "another country" (7); and Africans are granted Bantustan citizenship while their status as South African nationals is legally abrogated. (8)

But conflict in South Africa is closely related to African aspirations and their perceptions of deprivation. Unless the Bantustans can satisfy such aspirations, and unless Africans cease to utilize white privilege as a referent of grievances, the attempt to expel conflict from "white areas" is likely to fail.

Conflict Externalization

From 1943, the claims put forward by Africans, mainly in the cities, for a "common society" took an increasingly militant form, and were strongly resisted by the government. For the whites to accept the common society would mean the abandonment of privileges. The extension of citizenship rights to black South Africans would erode and destroy the pattern of exploitative social relationships developed over two centuries of racial contact. (9) To maintain such privilege, segregation, the denial of a common citizenship and common values, is propounded and stubbornly defended.

The rationale for the policy was explicitly stated as early as 1922, when the Stallard Commission laid down that the African "should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister". (10) This view was incorporated into much subsequent legislation, with regard to passes in particular, and was the basic principle underlying the Hertzog Acts of 1936. (11) But the African who came to minister remained to minister: the African urban population grew rapidly (particularly during the early 'forties) and became increasingly rooted in the towns. In many cases individuals had no experience of rural life.

The proliferation of shanty towns around the main cities, as a result of the wartime migration from the Reserves, caused the Smuts government to appoint a Commission under Justice Fagan to re-examine the "problem" of urban Africans. The Fagan Report, in essence, refuted the Stallard dictum, stating that the view of Africans as temporary visitors to the towns was no longer founded in reality. (12) The election of the Nationalist Government under Malan in 1948 constituted a rededication to the Stallard principle and ensured that Fagan's views were never considered.

The 'fifties indicated that little more was conceived of apartheid than a rigid intensification of traditional segregation and repression of African demands for civil rights. But the intensification led to a rapid escalation of urban protest until, by the early 'sixties, the government was almost totally dependent on coercion to maintain itself in power. (13) Concomitant with this escalation of conflict (and an intensification of international hostility to white domination) came the rapid definition of the apartheid policy, most particularly those aspects dealing with police control and with the conversion of the Native Reserves into Bantu Homelands or Bantustans. By creating Bantustans, it was hoped that African political aspirations could be shifted from the urban areas to the fragmented tribal environment. The essential feature of this strategy was the attempt to expel conflict from the areas of white affluence; it can thus be designated a strategy of conflict externalization.

The plan is based on the fact that South Africa is still a society in transition - a triad of social structures (the subsistence, rural economy; the commercial platteland; and the urban industrial centres) can be crudely but usefully identified. The urban, industrial society (comprising some 40% of the population) is the centre of the conflict system. There the aspirations shared by the different races

are increasingly broadened by economic integration, while those values peculiar to each race narrow in scope over time. (14) But it is a society in which shared aspirations cannot be acknowledged in a common citizenship because of ethnically based patterns of privilege and deprivation. On the other hand, the subsistence economy of the eroded, overstocked and overcrowded reserves (housing another third of the population) is devoid of racial interaction and of white economic resources (or any other kind for that matter). The main export of this economy is cheap labour, and this supply is guaranteed by the poverty of these areas. (15) Hence whites do not feel economically or politically threatened by the subsistence economy. This sector becomes, in consequence, the "traditional homeland" of the African population; here it is allowed rights of citizenship.

But while the ultimate political prospects for the Bantustans have purposely been kept vague by white politicians, government spokesmen have made clear that the traditional pattern of labour relations is to be retained. The African is to continue to minister; his grievances rather than his labour are to be externalized. (16) Further, within the Bantustans, the strategy seeks to restore power to the traditional aristocracy at the expense of the educated middle class which led the articulation of African grievances throughout this century.

The constitutional arrangements in the Bantustans are heavily weighted to ensure control of local affairs by the chiefs (who are all paid by a government which ultimately sanctions their accession); at the same time, great pressure is being exerted against the urban middle class to leave the towns and settle in the Reserves. (17) In this way it is hoped that conflict between the races will be replaced by competition among Africans for the limited resources of the Bantustans. Just as attempts were made in colonial Africa to resurrect the traditional aristocracy, in the face of the modernization process instituted by colonialism, so in South Africa, where social change has progressed to a far greater degree, the same attempt is being made - but with the determined application of an enormous coercive machinery as an important additional factor.

In sum, then, conflict externalization seeks to (a) displace conflict from its traditional pattern of confrontation between the races to one of competition within each racial group; (b) introduce an element of non-realistic conflict (18) so that Africans struggle against each other for the political goods of the Bantustans, instead of for those of the whole country; (c) relocate conflict geographically, narrowing the scope from the total, multiracial and multiethnic society to the racially and ethnically exclusive confines of the Bantustan; and (d) change the "leadership class" of African society from the urban- and mission-created élite, with its essentially urban perspective, to the chief, with his rural, tribally fragmented perceptions.

Creating the Transkei

The official blueprint for the Bantustan strategy is the Tomlinson Commission Report. In fact, government has been extremely selective in accepting its recommendations. (19) Instead, the

institutional structure of the Transkei is based largely on the old Bunga system (20), as elaborated gradually over a decade in response to mounting internal and international pressure on the government.

In 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act returned to the chiefs powers which they had previously lost to white Native Commissioners and Magistrates. The previous system had legally recognized white domination (and the erosion of tribal society through social change) by implementing direct white control over rural Africans. The Bantu Authorities Act not only attempted to turn back the clock by recreating indirect rule, but also sought to obviate the process of social change which had yielded a new black elite and undermined the value of the old one. This was done by making chiefs local administrators implementing government policy. The chiefs flexed their new muscles somewhat zealously and, since many of these affected the traditional use of land and the traditional judicial role of the chief (by giving the chiefs a role in land rehabilitation policies and widening their jurisdiction over local offences subject to penalties of a fine or banishment), peasant violence and protest almost inevitably followed in many parts of the country. In the Transkei there was a major revolt through 1959 and 1960, during which several chiefs and headmen were killed while others fled. The revolt was eventually quelled by a major police and army operation. (21)

When introducing the Act, Dr. Verwoerd strongly denied that it would ever result in the creation of autonomous African states, or that it implied the Balkanization of the country. After much rural protest, however, Verwoerd stated (during the debate on the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, which set up the constitutional machinery for the creation of "autonomous Homelands") that African self-government was a moral necessity as well as an alternative to the need to share central power structures. (22) Although he did not foresee the need for such Bantustans for a long time, Verwoerd found the matter more urgent only two years later. In 1961, after the Transkei revolt and the Sharpeville crisis, with international pressure mounting steadily, he stated categorically that the Bantustans could develop into independent black states (which had previously not been contemplated), although "this is not what we would have preferred to see". (23) In the following year, he introduced a bill into Parliament which created the machinery for "local autonomy" for the Transkei. This, stated Verwoerd, would hopefully provide Western nations with the grounds to reject Afro-Asian pressures regarding South Africa's policies. (24)

The Bantustan policy thus evolved not only in response to long-term dangers perceived by the white polity but also on an ad hoc basis, in response to immediate pressures.

The Transkei Constitution Act of 1963 created a Transkei Legislative Assembly comprising 64 chiefs (sitting ex officio) and 45 members elected by universal adult suffrage. The act also authorized a Cabinet of 6 holding the portfolios of Chief Minister and Finance, Education, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, and Roads and Forestry. Control of defence, foreign affairs, the police and magistracy, information, posts and telegraphs, health, railways, criminal justice, and white residents of the Transkei, remained with the Republic. Since the budget was allocated by Pretoria, education is governed by the Bantu Education Act, agriculture is based on Tomlinson dogma, and all resolutions of the TLA require the signed assent of the State President

to be legally valid, basically the Transkei has been given a mere constitutional apparatus. The Bantu Authorities Act and the composition of the TLA gave the chiefs a tight hold on Transkei politics, and the government retained its tight grip on the chiefs. The elected minority of the TLA depended on the chiefs if they hoped to operate at all effectively, even within the narrow confines of the Act.

In addition, the state of emergency declared during the rebellion in 1960 remained in force and has never been lifted. This gave the police arbitrary powers of search and detention, while chiefs were given control of the right to hold meetings in their districts, and were also empowered to banish people from their areas. (25)

Politics in the Transkei, 1964-1970

The 1963 election in the Transkei, for the 45 elected seats in the TLA, was fought without formal political parties. The campaign, to the extent that there was one (the police and the frightened chiefs applied emergency powers rigorously), polarized around the contrasting personalities and outlooks of Chief Kaiser Matanzima, of the Emigrant Tembuland region, and Paramount Chief Victor Poto, of Nyanda region. (26) Most candidates declared themselves as supporters of one or other - Matanzima supporting separate development, and Poto insisting on a multi-racial Transkei within a multi-racial and unitary South Africa. In the event, Poto supporters won 33 of the 45 seats. (27) Nevertheless, Matanzima was elected Chief Minister by the TLA, as a result of the overwhelming support of the chiefs, many of whom were "influenced" by the government.

The election demonstrated the great bitterness of the populace against local apartheid policies and against the collaboration of most chiefs with the government in the implementation of these policies. The polarization of allegiance in the TLA, in the form of a broad split between the elected members and the traditional élite, dramatized this division between chief and subject. Further, the Poto supporters tended to be well educated (most in mission schools and several at University), articulate, and strongly sympathetic to the aspirations of African urban protest. (28) Matanzima's supporters tended to be less educated (many chiefs were uneducated) and to have a largely rural life experience.

Nevertheless, although the resentment over Bantu Authorities was obvious, it did not necessarily indicate that chieftaincy had lost its institutional legitimacy in the Transkei. (29) Philip Mayer (30), for one, felt that the chiefs could still rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of their subjects, if only they could rid themselves of the image of being government stooges, implementing unpopular land policies and extorting fines. He noted that the Matanzima-Poto polarization represented not only apartheid against multi-racialism but also the harsh, "bad chief" against the dignified, responsive "good chief". In addition, the election had shown a surprising voter adherence to the wishes of the chief in many places - where such wishes had been made explicit.

After the election, the two groups rapidly formed themselves into political parties, the Matanzima group calling itself the Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP), and the Poto bloc the Democratic Party (DP). The new Transkei Cabinet included Matanzima's brother, George, the only other University graduate in the party. The other four Cabinet members (who all had strong links with the traditional élite) proved, with one exception, largely incompetent, and the TNIP remained, in consequence, very much a two-man party until the 1968 election.

By contrast, the DP boasted a large group of astute and personable politicians. Its core was a number of well educated, liberal Christians, led by Mr. Knowledge Guzana, a popular lawyer, a Fort Hare graduate, and a fine speaker. Guzana and Poto were very similar in character and outlook, and Guzana soon replaced the Paramount Chief as leader of the DP (in terms of party policy which opposed the inclusion of chiefs in the TLA and hence obligated the DP to choose a commoner as leader). (31) But the DP also included a militant wing which used the TLA to express the grievances felt nationally by all Africans. This group was exemplified by C. M. Nogcantsi and J. D. Nkosiyané, who repeatedly introduced motions condemning police powers, brutality by the chiefs and influx control and advocated the desirability of granting political asylum to refugees from the rest of the country. (32) The militants were not as well educated as, and definitely less rooted in the professional middle class than, the liberals. (33) Linking the two wings was Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyébo of Tembuland (34), an outspoken critic of the government, who constantly referred to the Transkei venture as "a chicken-run" but was nevertheless prepared to participate in the TLA in opposition.

From 1964 to 1966, the political process in the Transkei appeared to confirm government hopes (and the predictions of those who regarded the Transkei as a fraud and a bluff). The TNIP repeatedly praised the government, asserted its support for separate development, attacked "Ghana communism", proclaimed the right of the chiefs to rule, and expressed the hope that eventual independence would be achieved after the suitable economic development of the region had been realized. Matanzima repeatedly stated the need for the races to live apart. The police moved swiftly against militants - an agent provocateur, for example, entrapping Nogcantsi and Nkosiyané. (35)

The DP, for its part, vehemently rejected separate development, opposing the possible Balkanization of the country, and objected to the new role which the TLA gave the region's traditional aristocracy. In the latter instance, Poto insisted that the traditional dignity and role of the chieftaincy was degraded by the need to indulge in the political manipulations of the TLA; a firm believer in the role of the chief as developed in tribal custom, he moved that a consultative Upper House of Chiefs should be created, with the TLA becoming a wholly elected body. Matanzima rejected what would have been the loss of his political support, and even the DP chiefs (Poto and Sabata excepted) dragged their feet about relinquishing their new powers. The debate on the role of chieftaincy became an annual ritual of the TLA.

Thus, for the first three years, Africans angrily accused each other of selling out to the white man, debated the administration of an impoverished rural labour reservoir, allocated a miniscule budget, and employed the "separation or integration" debate in a separatist context,

within segregated institutions. They were forced to debate the morality of apartheid - an issue long resolved for Africans - in institutions which were the creation of such a policy. In addition to this non-realistic political conflict, the basic inability of the TNIP membership to operate the new machinery of government effectively resulted in the white officials, seconded from Pretoria to occupy senior civil service positions, remaining effectively in control of all local administration.

Nevertheless, a few events indicated that the TLA did have the ability to embarrass Pretoria. The most important of these was the almost unanimous vote to abolish Bantu Education in the Transkei. The intensity of popular dislike for this system, and the centrality of education to African aspirations, were such that the TNIP supported a DP measure to end it and create a new syllabus for Transkei schools. The refusal of the State President to give the measure his assent (which has not been given to date) led the TLA to decide to abolish the system, in practice anyway. (36) Matanzima also showed willingness to oppose the government on another issue which had resulted in widespread suffering - influx control. He repeatedly called on urban Africans to remain in the towns because there was no work for them in the Transkei, despite government pressure to force those Africans who did not work for whites to leave. In addition, though land rehabilitation schemes continued officially, there was growing evidence that many chiefs preferred to shelve them quietly rather than excite reprisals from their constituents. (37)

In 1967 the TNIP Chief Whip, Shadrack Sinaba, resigned from the party after it had refused to support his calls for immediate independence for the Transkei. Sinaba, an urban African who had won a seat in 1963 as a Poto supporter but had joined the TNIP immediately, was joined by a DP backbencher, Cromwell Diko, in the creation of the Transkei People's Freedom Party (TPFP), which demanded immediate independence for the Transkei and characterized government policy as the perpetuation of oppression. (38) This development left Matanzima vulnerable on both flanks: he was a stooge because he supported apartheid, said the DP; and he was a stooge because Africans suffered oppression while he supported "white" rather than "black" apartheid, said the TPFP.

The result of the TPFP attack was to force the TNIP to defend its separatist constituency more militantly and "radically". Matanzima became publicly more hostile towards the Pretoria government. He rejected immediate independence, calling for economic development first, and supported a 1968 motion in the TLA (from the new TNIP Chief Whip, M. H. Canca) demanding rapid development and independence for the Transkei "in the shortest possible time". (39) Although the motion was curtly rebuffed by the government, Matanzima continued to call for rapid development, and also for the removal of all whites from the Transkei, the transfer of "their" towns to the Transkei administration, and the Africanization of the Transkei civil service. He condemned whites for holding "baasskap attitudes" (40), which would no longer be tolerated by Africans in the Bantustans, and he pictured the DP's insistence on a unitary South Africa as a reactionary preference for continued white domination.

Matanzima developed this manipulation of symbols of black exclusivism further during the 1968 Transkei election campaign, which

followed the Canca motion. His main theme was that the DP had a slave mentality, preferring to remain subordinate to the whites rather than free in an independent Transkei, in which whites would have no rights. He also took to stumping the region with an old map of British Kaffraria which, he stated, represented the true land area of the Xhosa people; those parts which were in white hands (substantial and rich farmlands of the Eastern Cape) should be "returned" to the African. In addition, he said, all Transkeian towns should also be returned to the Africans, including Port St. John, the region's only harbour, which had deliberately been excluded for all time from the Transkei by the government. Matanzima's claims also incorporated an old wish he had expressed that the Ciskei should be united with the Transkei; such a claim raised question marks against white towns like Queenstown and East London. (41) In addition, Matanzima continued to attack the whites living in the Transkei, calling for their departure, and the Africanization of the civil service. He accused the white civil servants of aiding the DP campaign. (42) The TNIP also placed great emphasis on the need for government to develop the area and create employment (43) more effectively than it had in the past; this, it was hoped, would undercut the TFPF platform of immediate independence.

Matanzima made a determined effort to recruit educated Transkeians as candidates for his party. He also pressured members of the Transkei chieftaincy to stand for election (rather than take their ex officio seats), reasoning that the people still felt great loyalty towards them. (44) And where the DP leadership was reluctant to expel rebels who stood as independents, the TNIP did not hesitate to expel such rebels, thus minimizing voter confusion. In addition, the chiefs used their local powers to help the TNIP, preventing DP meetings in some areas, the police harassed opposition organizers, and the TNIP used the resources of power, such as they were, to aid its campaign - Transkeian civil servants receiving a 35% pay increment just before the election.

Nevertheless, the DP was not expected to lose its majority of the 45 elected seats. The TNIP, by winning 28 seats to the DP's 14, thus scored a significant victory. (45) The pattern of results indicated that in almost all constituencies voters returned candidates who had the support of the local chief, where such a chief was not regarded as a government agent or stooge. (46) Thus the core of the DP seats was won in the regions over which Paramount Chiefs Poto and Sabata presided, while the TNIP won all seats in the regions ruled by Matanzima and his closest supporter, Paramount Chief Botha Sigcau. Where the chiefs remained in disrepute, or where candidates had great popularity by virtue of their opposition to white policies, the chiefs' power was less certain. (47)

The DP lost most of its capable front bench. As Mayer has intimated, the chiefs had regained the allegiance of their subjects, partly through their ability to utilize their new powers to dispense local favours and punish recalcitrants, but also, in part, because the TNIP had projected apartheid as the way for Africans to rid themselves of white domination and exploitation. Guzaña, a moderate man, had suffered by appearing, in the Transkei context, to oppose the expulsion of whites - a charge which he was unable to rebut effectively, for personal and technical reasons. (48)

For all that, the TNIP which won in 1968 was not the same party which had been Matanzima's personal machine before the election. In contrast to 1963, several of the TNIP candidates were comparatively young, educated, and had been "conventional" African nationalists. Curnick Ndamse, for instance, was the outstanding new personality in the post-election Cabinet. He had been a teacher at Fort Hare but, though accepting government policy, had been removed for criticizing its implementation, and had been banned. Matanzima had managed to gain the removal of this banning order, to enable Ndamse to stand for the TNIP, but the latter remained embittered by his experience. The most "non-political" of the new Cabinet, Miss Stella Sigcau, was also a Fort Hare graduate, and the daughter of Botha Sigcau. But even she had been a member of the ANC Youth League while at University. The new Chief Whip of the party, T. E. Tshunungwa, had been one of the accused in the early stages of the Treason Trial in 1956. The TNIP thus had far closer links with the urban political experience of Africans than it had had before the election. And this was strengthened in 1969 when Matanzima's son, Mteto, succeeded to a chieftaincy and took his seat in the TIA; he had been a PAC activist at Fort Hare.

Matanzima himself formed a link between the traditional and modern élites which now coexisted within his party. As a law graduate who strongly supported the institution of the chieftaincy, he was willing to "modernize" that institution and cast it in the role of manipulating anti-white and separatist symbols. Matanzima's conception of chieftaincy was an activist one, committed to a political role and the search for popular electoral support - as distinct from rule by coercive support alone. In pursuing this view, he was able to portray the mission-educated DP elite as reactionary and unresponsive to local aspirations, to an overwhelmingly illiterate rural population. At the same time, the Xhosa most likely to support Guzana, those living in the urban areas, showed almost no inclination to vote - repeating their abstention of 1963. (Indeed, the five urban candidates, including Sinaba and a DP front bencher, Rev. B. Rajuili, were all defeated.)

The 1968 election indicates that Matanzima did not feel he could afford to fight as a creature of the government, even had he wanted to. In fact, the TNIP went to great lengths to distance itself from many aspects of apartheid policy - especially influx control - and posited instead a version of apartheid aimed at the ultimate removal of all white influence from the Transkei. Matanzima has repeated since 1963 that centuries of integration brought only white domination; he hoped to end it for the Transkei. But his insistence on prior economic development appears to have successfully answered the TPFPP, which was eliminated. The election indicated that the Transkei Constitution Act furnished a potential platform for Africans to present their grievances, which, inevitably, broadened to include national issues - such as education, land, passes and influx control, and the allocation of economic resources - in a situation in which other avenues of protest had effectively been sealed. (49)

Although the TPFPP challenge had ended, the debate between the DP and the TNIP did not revert to the pre-1967 ritual. The new middle class in the TNIP tended to accentuate the demands which had been made during the election campaign. The result was that the issues raised did not disappear, but became more intense and assumed a more authentic nationalist symbolism. One reason for this was that the DP remained an effective opposition and, having won over 40% of the vote, continued to

be an alternative focus of popular support. Moreover, the DP concentrated its criticism on the lack of economic development in the Transkei, thus seeking to usurp Matanzima's major platform. The TNIP escalated the tone of its demands to counter this strategy. (50)

During 1969, the TNIP intensified its criticism of white domination. Guzana was forced to condemn it for "fanning the flames of African nationalism" and to deprecate Matanzima's vision of himself wielding the "big sjambok and beating the whites into the sea". (51) Such criticism was used by the TNIP to reinforce the image it had created of Guzana as a time-server for white interests.

But the main impetus in the development of a language of black exclusivism came from Ndamse. In May 1969, he stated that what whites had conceded in the Transkei could never be revoked.

"Go and tell everybody that we are not following Dr. Verwoerd's policy. He gave us a springboard from which to spring to other pastures. ... We will accept no second-hand position ... We are going to get whatever the black man desires without a single shot being fired in the whole of South Africa." (52)

In September, addressing white students at the University of Witwatersrand, Ndamse first praised several white liberals (including Mrs. Ballinger) and then expressed his aims in the Transkei in language reminiscent of African leaders elsewhere on the continent (particularly Malawi's Dr. Banda):

"In accepting the government's good faith, we accept also that Transkei self-government is but the first down-payment on the policy of separate development. We have been promised more land and we accept that the government will keep its word ... Africa is shaking off the shackles of centuries of enslavement ... The Transkei enables us to express the determination that the black man can regain his rightful place in his own land without ... any form of violence whatsoever ... a word about certain extremist politicians among our white fellow countrymen who believe the Transkei is getting too much ... These lovers of secluded privileges, the small frightened men, ... should save their breath. We have no ambition to go to Cape Town anymore - and if we did it would have to be ... along the road that goes via Umtata. In other words, we reject with contempt any suggestion that we should ever be represented by whites ... I take liberty and freedom from any hand as a hungry man would snatch a piece of bread." (53)

Though Matanzima had, by the end of 1969, become jealous of Ndamse (and the attention accorded the latter by the white press), he was under TNIP pressure to continue his demands on the government. On a visit to a Johannesburg location, Matanzima told his audience that if Bantustans could win independence and then "form a federation" they would be able to deal with the whites from a position of strength. He has not repeated this statement, however.

As if to emphasize the problems inherent in any attempt to please both the government in Pretoria and the people in the Transkei, a faction fight occurred early in 1969, in the Flagstaff district, in which 5 people were killed. The fight was the result of an attack on chiefs and headmen who were implementing land rehabilitation policies. The protest, involving the cutting of fences and destruction of enclosures, was led by the TNIP member of the TLA for Flagstaff, Babini Langa, supported by several headmen. (Langa had been elected on a platform of opposition to land rehabilitation in an area which had been the centre of trouble in 1960 and where the chiefs were unpopular.) Langa was detained under Proclamation 400, losing his TLA seat as a result of absenteeism. He was released in 1970, in time to contest the by-election his detention had necessitated, and, despite being forced to stand as an independent, being harassed by chiefs, lacking any resources, and facing vigorous campaigning by Matanzima and Ndamse, he won very easily (defeating also an outstanding DP candidate). The victory once again confirmed the anti-government preference of the voters.

Given the poverty in the Transkei, the TNIP thus lives dangerously. To placate the government is likely to reactivate popular discontent in the area and to increase Matanzima's dependence on the police. On the other hand, to increase criticism of the government could lead the latter to lessen its support for Matanzima (in the form of finance and coercive capacity). This could leave Matanzima isolated if the TNIP failure to achieve real concessions alienates support in any case. On the other hand, the South African government is unlikely to relish being seen to beat its own puppets for asserting the very independence which propaganda promises them - even assuming that it could find a viable alternative to Matanzima, which is unlikely. This would seem to give Matanzima some room for manoeuvre, but it is unlikely that he has equal latitude for the manipulation of the Transkei people - especially since the DP represents an older tradition of protest to which voters can return.

Black Exclusivism and Social Change

The events in the Transkei and the attitudes expressed by its leaders during the TLA's first 7 years reveal the emergence of issues on which Africans hold positions in conflict with the notions of white privilege to which the South African government is committed. Significantly, these positions are not the monopoly of the opposition alone in the Transkei, but are increasingly held by those who profess to support government policy. The DP, protected by the constitutional machinery created by the Nationalist Party government, is able to articulate some of the grievances for which African leaders are imprisoned in the urban areas. Further, the extent of its electoral

support, even in defeat, indicates that such ideas and values do have some relevance, even to the rural population.

More interestingly, the TNIP, officially committed to separate development, has inverted its tenets to propound a racially exclusive, black "nationalism" (54), in an effort to attract support from its mass public and from sections of the middle class. The constitutional mechanism of the Transkei enables multi-racialism, radical in the urban context, to appear reactionary in the Bantustans. Although the TNIP has largely juggled with vague, racist symbols, it has also made demands which are not easily manageable in terms of the strategy of conflict externalization. This strategy is aimed at an arrangement in which African grievances will be channelled into rural areas, where such conflict does not make white interests vulnerable. In fact, the TNIP platform has evolved into something only superficially congruent with such expectations: it has challenged the white retention of 87% of the land of South Africa, by demanding substantial areas of the Eastern Cape; it has opposed attempts to keep the Transkei a meaningless constitutional arrangement by seeking the rapid transfer of power to the area; and it has linked the demand for independence to internal economic development, as opposed to border industries. Further, by seeking to ease influx control regulations, an end to the dumping of urban Africans in the Transkei, the right for the Transkei to organize its own police, military, information and health services, and by rejecting Bantu Education, the Transkei has in fact challenged several of the structures on which white control rests.

Thus, from the perspective of the Transkei, it would appear that attempts to displace conflict, and reorient it towards a non-realistic squabble between Africans, have only imperfectly been realized. And the fact that urban Africans have basically refused to participate in either the 1963 or 1968 elections indicates that, for them, the Bantustans remain (predictably) a meaningless alternative to a place in a common society. In the urban areas where, despite influx control, the African population continues to grow, the South African government is still basically dependent on coercion as a means of conflict resolution. Bantustans would then appear to provide an additional platform for grievance articulation, rather than an alternative one; conflict externalization may become conflict extension.

Neither the Nationalist government nor its critics who regarded the Transkei as a fraud considered two factors. The first is that Africans in the Transkei (and other Bantustans [55]) might call the bluff: they might demand that the promises of apartheid rhetoric be honoured - as they have begun to do in the Transkei - and so make Bantustan politics meaningful even while they remain economically ridiculous. Second, and far more important, the administrative changes in the area, and the more general process of social change which affects the Transkei as part of South Africa, have led to changes in role structures and relationships which inevitably affect political behaviour.

The nature of the political role of the chiefs has been most affected. Bantu Authorities and the Transkei Constitution add new dimensions to this role. The chief is no longer merely the repository of traditional values and loyalties; the symbolic role, to which the institution had progressively become confined, has been elaborated under this legislation. The chief has been made a local administrator enforcing government regulations and policies on an unwilling public.

He has also become a Transkei politician by virtue of his membership of the TLA and of a political party. His traditional role, involving responsibilities for land allocation, certain judicial functions, and the representation of formal and symbolic values, made him responsive to the needs and feelings of his subjects; he was a mediator between them and the white authorities. By contrast, his duties as a government local administrator under Bantu Authorities require him to implement unpopular policies in his area. In the context of land hunger and poverty, such policies are disruptive of the fabric of tribal life, and it is not surprising that Bantu Authorities arm the chief with coercive powers inconsistent with his traditional role. The third part he is called upon to play, that of legislator and politician, can reinforce either of the first two roles - but not both. The TLA provides an additional forum for his subjects to pressure the chief through their elected representatives - pressure to which the chiefs proved responsive during the 1968 election. The chief is thus forced to manipulate his traditional and local roles in the conduct of his behaviour as a politician. Where chiefs have rejected their Bantu Authorities roles (as in the case of Poto and Sabata) the problem of role conflict does not arise and they remain extremely popular. In the case of TNIP chiefs, however, there is an uneasy mixture of coercion and responsiveness occasionally resulting in popular unrest similar to that instanced in Flagstaff in 1969. Nevertheless, even the government chiefs are finding it easier to reconcile the demands of party politics with their traditional roles rather than with their Bantu Authorities duties. Whereas they relied heavily on the police in their local conduct up to 1963, they have come progressively, under the influence of party politics and TLA needs, to minimize this role - especially in the application of land rehabilitation schemes.

Nevertheless, the modern relationship between chief and peasant remains ambivalent, because it is still in the process of change. As in many parts of colonial Africa, the chief is still regarded by his subjects as a repository of traditional values, especially in a period of social change (in this case, where migrant labour, influx control, over-population and increasing landlessness decrease social stability and individual security), and, paradoxically, at the same time, as a focus for grievances caused by the same process of change, which he is perceived to abet. (56)

The violent response of the Transkei peasantry to Bantu Authorities in 1960 underlines the tension inherent in this changing relationship between chief and subject, and helps to account for the need felt by the TNIP to seek popular support rather than rely on the police and their built-in majority in the TLA. Not only political power, but also traditional authority, is at stake in the relationship.

The small educated élite is not new to the Transkei. But it has been enlarged by Bantustan policy. Educated Africans have been recruited to the Transkei's bureaucracy and to the TNIP; others have arrived in the Transkei after being endorsed out of the towns. Several, as a result of embittering personal experiences, have joined the TNIP to see if Balkanization is a possible means of escape from white domination. Unlike the élite Guzana represents, closely linked as it is to the Christian values of the mission schools, to urban aspirations, and to ideas of multi-racialism, the new additions to this middle class have a vested interest in separatism and black exclusivism - especially where it gives them élitist employment, as in the case of the civil

service. Though very small, the impact of such a group is far greater on a stagnant economic area such as the Transkei than it would be in the towns. The interest of this new group in separatism, allied to mass poverty and frustration, is likely to ensure that pressure on the TNIP chiefs to use the Transkei for a militant, black exclusivism increases. Although embryonic, the process, if it is assumed that policies like influx control persist while internal development remains minimal, is likely to ensure that conflict between the Transkei and the government continues to grow.

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Notes

- (1) See, for example, H. J. and R. E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa: 1850 to 1950 (Penguin, 1969); Edward Roux, Time Longer Than Rope (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964); Leo Marquard, South Africa's Colonial Policy (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1957).
- (2) Ibid., and also Mary Benson, The Struggle for a Birthright (Penguin, 1966); and Leo Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957).
- (3) Although the term "Bantustans" is not accepted by the South African government, it has come into general usage and is a brief description of the attempt to create tribally defined "national units" out of the old Native Reserves. I use it in preference to the official "Bantu Homelands".
- (4) A term used in a speech by M. C. Botha, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, in 1968, and repeated frequently since then.
- (5) "Resettlement - the New Violence to Africans", International Defence and Aid Fund (London, 1969); and Cosmas Desmond, The Discarded People (Penguin, 1971)
- (6) Leo Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (Cape Town, O.U.P., 1969, revised).
- (7) The speech mentioned in fn. 4. Also Ralph Horwitz, The Political Economy of South Africa (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1967), chapters 19 and 20.

- (8) This legislation would appear to be aimed at creating an acquiescent labour force, making Africans "foreigners" and hence allowing for their deportation to the Reserves. South Africans often remark that migrant workers from Moçambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi are not "trouble makers".
- (9) Simons, op. cit., especially concluding chapter.
- (10) Transvaal Local Government (Stallard) Commission, 1922. Report, para. 42.
- (11) Native Representation Act, 1936; Natives Land and Trust Act, 1936.
- (12) Fagan Commission. Report, p. 20 (Union Government 28/48).
- (13) On the relationship between conflict and coercion, see Kuper, op. cit., and Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa (Yale, 1965), Part I. For a more general treatment of the relationship between conflict, coercion, and relative deprivation, see Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis using new indices", The American Political Science Review, 62 (September 1968), pp. 1104-1124.
- (14) N. J. Rhodie, Apartheid and Racial Partnership in Southern Africa (Pretoria, Academica, 1969) - an analysis of the "blackness" of the urban environment and of the manufacturing industry is contained. Also Simons, op. cit., and Roux, op. cit.
- (15) The following figures may illustrate the poverty of the Transkei. The region's population was estimated to be 1.58 million in 1969, excluding those permanently resident in the towns but "eligible" for Transkei "citizenship". Of these, only 41,626 were employed in the cash economy of the region - 46% by the Transkei administration. In 1970, white doctors working in the area estimated that 20% of Transkeians had tuberculosis, while malnutrition cases treated had increased 600% between 1967 and 1969. The Transkei's 1969/70 Budget was only R23 million, or R1.50 per capita. The population density (in a totally non-industrial region) exceeded 100 to the square mile. Government population projections indicated that this pressure on the land could double over the next 30 years.
- (16) Minister Botha has stated frequently that the economic interdependence to be maintained was of a nature that required the white man to provide skilled labour while the black man provided "less skilled" forms of labour. See Rhodie, op. cit., p. 29.
- (17) See "Resettlement, etc.", op. cit., p. 26.
- (18) Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956), p. 156. Coser characterizes non-realistic conflict as that which serves as a form of tension release on the part of an actor, instead of furthering his interests. In some ways the term implies displaced conflict; at any rate, they are closely linked.

- (19) Almost every work mentioning the Tomlinson Commission Report adds that the government did not spend the money in the Reserves which the Commission held was essential to the success of apartheid. Yet this is hardly surprising. To develop the Bantustans and create job opportunities which do not serve white privilege, but instead compete with it, would have been ridiculous. The government's task was to perpetuate white privilege rather than undermine it. If white domination was to be endangered, integration could be utilized at far less expense.
- (20) See Gwendolen M. Carter, Thomas Karis, and Newell M. Stultz, South Africa's Transkei: the Politics of Domestic Colonialism (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1967).
- (21) Govan Mbeki, South Africa: the Peasants' Revolt (Penguin, 1964).
- (22) Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich (Penguin, 1969, revised), pp. 485-90.
- (23) Ibid., p. 486.
- (24) Carter, Karis and Stultz, op. cit., p. 40.
- (25) For details of the coercive machinery in South Africa, see A. Sachs, South Africa: the Violence of Apartheid (London, International Defence and Aid Fund, 1969).
- (26) Matanzima, a cousin of Nelson Mandela and of Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo, is the leading supporter of apartheid in the Transkei. He played a large part in the formulation of the Transkei Constitution and came to symbolize, to many, the government stooge. A university graduate and a lawyer, he was yet a strong advocate of the chieftaincy, though not of its conventional role. Regarded by many Transkeians as a harsh ruler. Poto, on the other hand, had been a member of the Native Representative Council until its demise under the Nationalists. A quiet, dignified Christian, he was very popular and deeply respected in most parts of the Transkei; not even Matanzima spoke slightly of him.
For a detailed study of the 1963 election, see Carter, Karis and Stultz, op. cit., chapter 5.
- (27) Ibid.
- (28) Ibid.
- (29) For instance, D. Hammond-Tooke, "Chieftainship in Transkeian Political Development", Journal of Modern African Studies (2, 4, 1964), pp. 513-529.
- (30) Philip Mayer, "The Tribal Elite and the Transkeian Elections of 1963", in P. C. Lloyd (ed.), The New Elites of Tropical Africa (O.U.P., 1966).
- (31) This belief represented Poto's firm conviction. He believed that the TIA would destroy the chieftaincy as a traditional force, and thus advocated a wholly elected Assembly.

- (32) Nogcantsi and Nkosiyane were arrested and charged with attempting to murder Matanzima in 1966. They were convicted and given seven year sentences. Both appealed, Nkosiyane succeeding. Both men lost their seats in the TIA as a result of absenteeism during their detention and trial. In 1968, Nkosiyane contested the Transkei election, as an independent candidate; he had Sabata's support (in defiance of Guzana and the DP leadership) and won handsomely. He rejoined the DP after the election.
- (33) With one exception: Dr. H. Bala, a medical practitioner, was elected in 1963 as a Poto supporter. He was a typical member of the professional élite, but lacked any political background. His experience of the TIA made him increasingly militant and he repeatedly damned the Transkei as an elaborate fraud. He was suspended from the TIA for refusing to stand out of respect when Verwoerd was assassinated in 1966, and finally refused to contest the 1968 election, which he regarded as meaningless. His boycott cost the DP a certain seat.
- (34) A militant chief, with a deep contempt for Matanzima and a great regard, which he stated publicly, for Mandela. Despite government pressure, he refused to be obsequious. From 1968 there were signs that he was dissatisfied with Guzana's leadership - he certainly took to supporting party rebels in his own region.
- (35) The former's trial was the result of a white man, named Dunne, approaching Nogcantsi and suggesting the assassination of Matanzima. Dunne also sought to implicate Sabata, but was unsuccessful.
- (36) But the control over administration exercised by white bureaucrats largely nullified such attempts, leading to DP accusations that Matanzima was scared of his whites - a charge which embarrassed him greatly.
- (37) Even the Minister of Agriculture's district in the Transkei showed such neglect.
- (38) The ability of Sinaba and Diko to unite illustrated the unsettled nature of political parties and alignments in the Transkei - and the fact that the new political institutions did not allow for the easy transfer of urban political attitudes to the Transkeian context.
- (39) Republic of South Africa, Debates of the Transkei Legislative Assembly, Seventh Session (Umtata, 24 April to 14 June, 1968), pp. 230-4.
- (40) The white population of the Transkei, largely comprising traders and farmers, was strongly opposed to the Bantustan policy. As a group, they tended to exhibit the same fears and attitudes common amongst white settlers in other parts of Africa when faced by African nationalism.
- (41) The government has used the idea of a Ciskei-Transkei merger as a carrot for Matanzima, but has never committed itself finally. Such a merger is most unlikely, as it would affect the interests of a vast and wealthy white farming area. The Ciskei is even poorer

than the Transkei, and such a merger would probably increase mass pressure on the Bantustan leaders rather than diminish it.

- (42) While the truth of this claim is dubious, it is true that as the TNIP became more vocal, so did the relationship between the DP and Transkeian whites (especially the seconded civil servants) improve. The fact that Matanzima could make such a claim, especially when it was almost certainly untrue, indicated that he did not feel relations warranted diplomacy.
- (43) While the electorate, to the extent that it holds any opinion about the matter at all, seemed to prefer development to immediate independence, the TNIP has placed itself in a difficult position in opposing TPFPP policy. Economic development is a far more measurable indicator of success than is a struggle for independence - especially to an impoverished and impatient electorate.
- (44) In the event, only his brother obliged, and he was returned unopposed. But many candidates were closely related to the traditional aristocracy, with the TNIP lists abounding with names like Sigcau and Mtirara.
- (45) One TNIP and 2 DP rebels were also returned. All rejoined their respective parties after the election, making the final count 29 for the TNIP and 16 for the DP - and giving Matanzima control of 75% of the TLA.
- (46) The only Paramount Chief whose wishes were not completely obeyed by the voters was the senior one, Zwelidumile Sigcau of Gcaleka. Although strong traditional values prevail in his area, he gives little "guidance" to his subjects on political matters. This is in part because he is widely regarded as a usurper, having been placed on his throne by the government when his nephew, Shadrack Sigcau, the rightful heir, proved to have very strong anti-apartheid views. Zwelidumile, although a member of the TNIP, appears to avoid taking too active a role in politics.
- (47) As in Gcaleka and Fingoland.
- (48) His moderation makes him loth to indulge in Matanzima's brand of electoral competition. But, in any case, Guzana was unable to address voters in the many areas where chiefs did not allow him to hold meetings.
- (49) Inevitably, because the Transkei remained inextricably a part of South Africa and especially of her urban-industrial economy.
- (50) The TNIP opened a luxury hotel for Africans in Umtata. The hotel, devoid of guests, was vividly contrasted with the poverty of nearby marketeers, who were being evicted by the white town council of Umtata, by the DP opposition. Matanzima spoke of black dignity and the privilege of excluding whites, for once, but the issue allowed the DP to take the initiative over economic development - an initiative it was not otherwise able to maintain after the 1968 election.
- (51) Daily Despatch (East London), 2.5.69.

- (52) The World (Johannesburg), 2.5.69.
- (53) The Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 1.2.70.
- (54) It is interesting that Matanzima does not use the term Bantu when speaking English, and that he refers to the people of the Transkei as Transkeians or Africans, rather than as Xhosa. The TNIP has not, thus far, employed tribal symbols or appealed to tribal exclusiveness; its images have all been racial..
- (55) In Zululand, inaugurated as a "Homeland" in 1970 after long resistance by its chiefs, the Chief Minister, Gatsha Buthelezi, has expressly demanded that the government make the Bantustans a meaningful reality in terms of development - or cease their pretence. Chief Lucas Mangope, of the Tswana Territorial Authority, regarded as a government cypher, has condemned job reservation and influx control, and called for rapid Africanization in the reserves.
- (56) See Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State: a Study of the Modernization Process in Sierra Leone (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard, 1966); Norman Miller, "The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership", Journal of Modern African Studies, 6, 2 (1968).