

## THE NATAL LAND AND COLONISATION COMPANY 1860-1948

by

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My research is concerned with trying to unravel the changing pattern of economic and social relationships operative in the rural areas of Natal during the period 1820 to 1913, as a first step towards a political economy of this particular region of southern Africa. In this paper I have chosen to look at just one element in this changing situation, the operations of the formidable London-based Natal Land and Colonisation Company, which was formed in 1860 as the product of a meeting between South African speculative holders of Natal lands and representatives of British finance capital.

The origins of the colonial landowning class, whose representatives participated in this meeting, lie in the structural conditions prevailing during the earliest years of the colonial era in Natal. Land speculation had begun even before the commercial expansion of the Cape had culminated in the voortrekker Republic of Natalia being annexed as a British colony in 1843. (1) Much the same process may have attended Imperial expansion elsewhere. The land speculation which preceded the annexation of New Zealand in 1840 is one example which comes to mind. (2)

In Natal, a combination of circumstances favoured the subsequent development of this process. These included the particular policy the Imperial Government chose to apply to land in Natal; the eagerness of the majority of the Dutch colonists to dispose of their land claims cheaply in order to migrate across the Drakensburg away from the evils they associated with colonial rule; the close relationship between some of the speculators and government agencies (3); and the difficulty of realizing a cash surplus from farming in the face of few market opportunities and their monopoly by African producers who alone controlled the labour power necessary for the economic production of surplus crops at that time. The consequence was that the market, in the land resources of Natal claimed by the colonizers, continued to be flooded with vast acreages offered at very low prices at a time when relatively few men controlled the necessary capital resources to purchase and hold land. A small group of Natal and Cape-based merchants were able, by cash purchase or in settlement of commercial debts, to build up substantial holdings of Natal lands. By 1847, 13 mercantile firms claimed 62 farms totalling 230,000 acres, for which payment at about 2d an acre had been made. (4)

The same structural conditions which had favoured the emergence of a class of large landowners in Natal, alongside and partly drawn from the ranks of the merchant class, inhibited their replacement by a successful class of capitalist farmers. Compounding the problems of market conditions and African competition were those of labour supply and the absence of local capital. An important theme in the early history of Natal is the struggle of the landowning class to overcome or circumvent these problems.

The initial strategy of the landowners was to present Natal as a favourable field for immigration from Europe, particularly of small capitalists prepared to undertake farming. Immigration along these lines would widen the market for local produce, provide the necessary capital for farming, and push up the value of land adjacent to the areas of such activity. Eulogistic accounts of the colony's farming possibilities and of the successes of early settlers were published in Europe, crop experiments were run to give credence to the claims, and other means used to create the illusion of a flourishing farming community of White colonists.

For a time it seemed as though the landowners' efforts would prove successful. Natal did come to be regarded as a possible field for the settlement of European emigrants. The interests of the Natal landowners coincided with those of powerful British shipping interests. At the same time, the British Government, together with influential private parties such as the Methodist movement, was interested in emigration as a means of checking the revolutionary potential of the "Hungry Forties". Under various schemes which were the product of this unholy alliance, some 5,000 British emigrants settled in Natal between 1849 and 1852, a tiny number compared to the North American and Australasian emigrations of the same period. By this means the tiny colonial population of Natal was increased from 3,000 in 1846 to 7,629 in 1852.

The acreage allowed to each settler under the majority of the Natal schemes was sufficiently small for the speculators to have reason to hope that immigrants would purchase further lands on the open market. Though a few did so, the majority sought an income from trade with Africans or with the Dutch pastoralists of the interior, from the transport industry which developed around this trade, from hunting, from woodcutting, or from various urban occupations. It was usual, in fact, for one man to combine or alternate a number of these activities. Some would add to their range of interests the slow and painful development of small-scale mixed farming. As their correspondence reveals, not a few of the early British settlers were kept afloat by a subsidy from relatives and friends in the metropolis. (5) Only a handful of men sought to extract a living solely from the land, and then in plantation crops such as cotton, coffee, arrowroot and sugar, which would not place them in competition with African producers of the basic foodstuffs of maize, kaffir corn, vegetables and, perhaps, livestock. African dominance of the market in these items is a feature remarked upon in letters and other writings of the time. (6) By 1860, however, the activities of the colonial planters had yet to bear fruit, largely owing to African resistance to measures designed to force them into labour for White employers. It was to be some years before agricultural produce was to overtake the production of hunters and pastoralists in Natal's export statistics. In these circumstances the market in land remained depressed, and the leading 15 speculators remained in possession of 700,000 acres. (7)

One response of the landowners to this continuing picture of stagnation in the colonial sector of Natal's rural economy was to seek to remove the key obstacle to which the planters constantly referred, "labour shortage". The landowners joined forces with those colonists who sought to put their farming operations on a commercial footing in demanding, preferably under the

control of the colonists themselves, a "native policy" which would have as its object the forcing of Africans into White employment. In the short term, the Government should import labour from outside to meet the planters' needs. Jonas Bergtheil and Adolph Coqui, by 1860 the two largest landowners in Natal, with 106,100 and 62,165 acres, respectively, were amongst the men who chose to use their position in the Natal legislative council to campaign for such a policy.(8) They were successful in pressuring the Imperial representatives in Natal into sanctioning a scheme for introducing indentured labour from India, but, for reasons which I discuss later, they were less successful in the field of "native policy".

A second strategy of the landowning class involved circumventing the shortage of local capital by drawing upon the capital resources of the metropolis itself. Bergtheil and Coqui were the men at the centre of the main scheme. At a meeting of large landholders held in Natal in April 1859, Bergtheil guided through a proposal which envisaged the setting up of a joint stock company that would purchase some of the speculative lands in Natal and, by expediting immigration, push up the value of the remainder. The Canada Land Company was to be the model for the operation. Landowners who sold land to the Company would be compensated in the Company's shares. (9) By July 1859, 196,471 acres had been pledged to the scheme and Coqui hastened to London to open up negotiations with British financiers. A board bristling with prominent metropolitan names was recruited, and in August 1861 the Natal Land and Colonisation Company finally went public with a nominal share capital of £225,000 in £10 units. It now claimed to control 247,000 acres of Natal lands. (10) Offering the tangible asset of nearly a quarter of a million acres of land in a "developing" colony, together with various other seemingly lucrative income possibilities, the Company was floated successfully, joining the ever-spreading network of London-based land, commercial, railway and mining companies whose interests reached to the far corners of empire and beyond. A final problem remained to be overcome. To enable the Company to hold land in Natal on such a scale without the intervention of trustees, special legislation would be required. But with powerful friends in London, and with several Company men in the tiny Natal legislative council, this seems to have posed little problem. Goodricke, the Company solicitor, moved the first reading of the necessary bill, and Coqui hurried back from London in time to pilot through the second. (11)

Over the following few years, in a gentlemanly stampede led by Coqui which the Company only just managed to control, the handful of Natal speculators interested in the Company unloaded on the London stock market the shares with which the Company had purchased their lands. (12) The nature of their profit lay partly in the price the Company chose to pay for their lands, an average of 7/6 an acre upland and £2 an acre coastland (13) compared to the local prevailing price of a few pence per acre, though this was probably offset by the need to resell the shares at something less than their par value. It lay more especially in the fact that a market had been found at all and that capital had been freed to reinvest in more productive operations, or, as in Coqui's case, for the settlement of outstanding debts. By 1870 almost the whole of the Company's share capital was firmly in the hands of small private British investors, amongst whom members of that popular Victorian profession of "gentlemen" were dominant. (14) Only Behrens, Coqui's erstwhile commercial associate since the days of the Republic of Natalia, and Bergtheil retained a direct interest in the Company. Behrens became the Natal manager and Bergtheil was soon to join the London board.

At least three other groups of landowners seem to have sought to draw upon metropolitan capital in a similar fashion, but more interesting is one particular speculative manoeuvre which failed to get off the ground. In 1862, that intrepid trio of Coqui, Bergtheil and Behrens, together with the Natal Land

and Colonisation Company, were negotiating through John Dunn (a colonist turned Zulu chief) to buy for £3,000 a sizable portion of the Zulu homeland from Mpande and his successor as Zulu paramount, Cetywayo. (15) In August the directors of the Company had got as far as sending to Bergtheil and Behrens a draft deed of cession with the instruction

"... trusting that you will get the grant secured in the most effectual way possible so as to facilitate our movements in obtaining the recognition and sanction of Government with the view to annexation of this territory to the Colony. The Company will pay half the purchase price, messrs Coqui and yourselves the remainder." (16)

According to Dunn, only the intransigence of the Zulu indunas prevented the deal from going through (17), so we shall never know how effective the Company might have been in shaping the boundaries of the Colony.

Having been launched successfully, the Company now began to look for ways through which to ensure its long term profitability. Promotion of railway development and of further immigration from Europe were two of the means by which the Company hoped to push up the value of its lands and encourage farming in the colonial sector of Natal's rural economy. In both cases the Company envisaged that the bulk of the capital involved would be provided by the state. Both schemes were vetoed by the Imperial Government in London, probably at the instigation of Lt Governor Scott, who was not primarily interested in the future of Natal as a colony of White settlement. Having failed to win this particular round, in 1866 Bergtheil retired from his vantage point in the Natal legislative council, from which he had guided the early fortunes of the Company, to take up a position on the London board, a directorship he was to hold until his death in 1901.

The Company's clash with the Imperial Government on these issues was, in fact, one aspect of a much wider struggle which revolved around the question of the manner in which surplus should be extracted from the colonized population. Whilst some representatives of Imperial authority accepted the colonial farmers' vision of the development of Natal society and sought to evolve a "native policy" designed to meet the labour requirements of this group, others looked to the efforts of African peasant producers to create the export surplus needed to make the Colony pay its way in the Empire. The activities of Lt Governor Pine with his substantial personal stake in the efforts of the colonists (18), and of Lt Governor Scott with his scheme to enforce payment of hut tax solely in cotton, and his running battle with the elected members of the Natal legislative council on the issue of "native policy" (19), were perhaps extremes indicative of the ambivalence in Imperial policy towards the Colony.

The merchant and missionary interests, which in most other colonial situations seem to have leaned towards championing a vision of the colonized as producers of export crops and consumers of imported manufactures, were also, in Natal, more uncertain in their thinking. As we have suggested, a number of the more prominent Natal merchants maintained a secondary or even primary interest in land speculation, and many missionaries included farming amongst their interests. There was to be no coherent voice from these sources in defence of a free African peasantry.

The situation was complicated further as a result of many White landowners reaching the conclusion that the key to wealth lay in the exploitation of the existing "developed" sector of Natal's rural economy based on the kraal as the productive unit, rather than in awaiting a transformation of the prevailing

state of "underdevelopment" in the colonial sector, a transformation which showed little sign of coming about of its own accord. For these men, and the Natal Land and Colonisation Company was to join them, the extraction of rent in the form of cash or crops from African tenants constituted the most attractive form of "farming". The interests of White landowner and struggling colonial farmer, which had once seemed to be in sympathy, now began to diverge, and by the end of the century this had become one of the main axes of conflict within the White community of Natal.

A "native policy" was evolved which took account of these many complications of the situation. The state, through the courts, would defend the right of White landlords to extract rent from Africans living on the land which they claimed to own, but the necessary surplus could be accumulated through production for the market, transport operations, trade or whatever. Labour for colonists would not be insisted upon. If landlords chose to offer only a labour tenancy relationship, the state would not interfere to prevent Africans from migrating onto other lands. At the same time, the embryo capitalist agricultural sector of the economy would not be allowed to suffer. The system of importing indentured labour from outside Natal, which the colonial farmers and their allies had originally envisaged as a stop-gap measure, came to be a permanent feature of the economic system. Labour of this kind was drawn from India, Mozambique, and from refugees of the Zulu state. Only the state itself reserved the right to levy compulsory labour for road construction. Not until the large-scale development of farming in the colonial sector, in the aftermath of the mineral discoveries at Kimberley and the Witwatersrand, did the balance of social and political forces alter in such a way that the state moved to close off those avenues to the means of subsistence open to Africans which were alternative to labour for White colonists.

The Natal Land and Colonisation Company was not, of course, only concerned with creating the conditions to ensure its long-term profitability. One of its first moves was to seek to benefit from that same local shortage of capital which had brought about its formation. In February 1862 a debenture issue of £150,000 bearing 6% was authorized, which was to be invested in loans in Natal bearing the colonial interest rate of 12%. The loans would be secured as first mortgages on the lands owned by the borrowers. (20) There proved to be a high demand for such mortgages at the relatively favourable rate offered by the Company, not least by sugar planters anxious to participate in the newly organized Natal Government scheme for the importation of indentured labourers from India. (21) It was not, however, to be long before the Company had a taste of the reason why interest rates in Natal were often as high as 25%. The outbreak of the Basuto/Orange Free State War quickly produced a commercial crisis in Natal, for Natal's economy - or, rather, the colonial sector of it - was very dependent upon the overberg trade with the Boer republics at this time, so that the interruption of this trade had calamitous results. The commercial system had been based on an endless credit network, so that the collapse of the leading merchant firm of Raw and Wilkinson quickly spread. Underpinning the whole commercial system were mortgages on land. A contemporary observer tells us the extent to which the Company had become involved:

"Here I may say that about this period the whole of South Africa was in a state of bankruptcy. From what I could make out, most of the land was mortgaged to the Natal Land and Colonisation Company. This was between 1864 and 1866." (22)

In fact, by 1866 the Company had £220,000 tied up in mortgages in Natal, on the bulk of which interest and repayments had ceased to come in. (23) Its dividend had fallen to 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ %, and by 1868 had disappeared completely. (24) In this year the Company began to foreclose on those mortgagees who had defaulted. Foreclosure

and purchase in the market at relatively low prices continued throughout the years of depression and subsequent uncertainty. By 1874 the Company owned 657,967 acres in Natal, which seems to have been the peak figure reached during its history. (25) Further debenture issues had been necessary to complete this phase of acquisition.

The period from 1870 to about 1890 saw the Company struggling to consolidate its annual income to a point where its heavy debenture debt could be discharged and a regular dividend paid on its ordinary share capital. There were several means used by the Company in order to try to bring about this position, including commercial agriculture (rather half-hearted, and finally abandoned in 1883 after heavy losses), mineral prospecting, mortgage loans and agency operations. But the Company's main sources of income proved to be the sale of lands and the collection of rents of various kinds.

Land sales by the Company brought about a fall in the acreage it controlled, from 657,967 acres in 1874 to 433,343 acres in 1890. The diamond and gold rushes in the interior had broken the grip of the economic depression in Natal and the steady sales of the Company from about 1873 reflected this. But it seems to have been the substantial profits made by many Natalians, both White and Black, during the Zulu War which produced the Company's first real land boom in the period 1879 to 1882. In the four years ending in 1877, 80,000 acres had been sold, but in the year 1880 alone more than 40,000 acres passed out of the hands of the Company, at an average of 16/- per acre. Almost all these land sales were concentrated in the interior counties of Klip River, Umvoti, Weenen, and particularly in Pietermaritzburg. Conditions in all these counties favoured pastoral farming. By contrast, the Company was actually slightly increasing its holdings in the two main coastal counties of Durban and Victoria, whilst its acreage in Alexandra showed little change. Sales slumped in the post-war depression, and income from this source again came to exceed the 1875 figure only in 1890. (26)

It is difficult to work out just what changes in Natal's rural economy were reflected in these sales, though I shall attempt to argue here that they were not primarily associated with any major development of farming activity on the part of the colonists. Cecil Rhodes, a tenant of the Company in Natal (27), was not the only planter to abandon the struggle of trying to make a living from the soil. A bitter outburst made in 1875 by the mother of one struggling colonial family provides, I think, the clue:

"I expect it will be a long time before we all meet again for Ted and Fred have taken a farm overberg. I feel very much their going away so far, but it seems impossible for anything to be done in Natal while everything is managed so badly; there is no labour to be got and there is no competing with the natives as they are large growers, all have wagons and oxen, and having so few wants can afford to sell and treck at a much cheaper rate than the English. Besides which it [the Orange Free State] is a good sheep and wheat country ... I am distressed beyond measure to think that our boys will leave Natal to settle, but I know things cannot long go on in peace here unless great changes are made with the native rule." (28)

Changes were to come, but not yet. The voice of the colonial farmer was not yet strong enough to overcome that of the powerful colonial and

metropolitan interests who had a stake in the continued income capacity of Natal Africans. It was estimated that in 1874 no less than 5 million acres of Natal lands in the hands of private colonists or land companies were occupied by Africans. (29) A colonist in 1881 thought it quite possible for a rent-paying tenant to make £60 a year from cultivation and improvement of stock. Such men did not retire to the locations, since "on farms they are nearer to the market". Often, however, the landlord insisted on providing the market himself for "most of the farmers make their tenants give them the refusal of their mealie crop" (30), thereby adding to the surplus they derived from African producers in the form of rent. A good deal of the lands sold by the Company to colonists were said to be still occupied by Africans who now furnished their rents to the new landlords. (31) The instalments on the purchase price of Crown lands were also found to be paid by colonists sub-letting to Africans.

African tenants played a major part in the renting operations of the Natal Land and Colonisation Company. Except during the boom years 1879-1882, the Company's rental income in the period 1870-1890 seems always to have exceeded the profits from land sales. It was, in fact, always the Company's aim to reduce sales of its only capital asset, and one which was likely to continue to rise in value, so as to preserve the Company's capacity to produce future income. The total income the Company derived from rents stood in 1880 at nearly £10,000. This figure was more or less equally divided between town rents, rents collected on lands leased in rural areas, and rents collected from Africans primarily on a hut by hut basis rather than on acreage occupied. By 1890 this figure had been pushed up to over £13,000, which should be compared with the profit on land sales for that year of only £2,779. Though all three sources of rental income contributed to this increase, the largest jump was in the hut rents collected from Africans, which now furnished 42% of the Company's total income from rents. (33) Company rents in the early 1880s seem to have ranged between £1 and £3 per hut, with ploughs available at £2 or £3 extra. (34) It was this source of income which, above all, played a dynamic role in the Company's push towards prosperity.

In a remarkably accurate prophecy, Theophilus Shepstone, in his evidence to the 1881/2 Natal Native Affairs Commission, drew attention to the Company's special position in the rural areas:

"I think we have now in the country all the elements which are likely to bring about serious agrarian disturbances ... Suppose the Land and Colonisation Company should find it necessary to remove all the natives from their farms, the Government would be bound to remove them, and what would become of them? I believe such a thing would directly or indirectly affect 70,000 or 80,000 natives, and for such a large number to be capable of being affected by a land question is a very serious consideration, and this shows that we are very much at the mercy of circumstances." (35)

But, before tracing the changes which made Shepstone's prophecy accurate, it remains to examine the Company's position at the end of the 1870-1890 period. As a result of the activities we have described, the Company's debenture debt had been cut from £122,250 in 1883 to a modest £39,000 in 1892, and new renewals were only made at 4% compared to the 8% that had once been necessary. A more significant indicator of the Company's new prosperity was that its beneficiaries had widened from a select group of directors and debenture holders to include its ordinary shareholders. From 1892 the Company began, for the first time since 1867, to pay a regular dividend on its ordinary shares - a tiny 1.5%, steadily

increasing to a peak of 15% in 1903. A third indicator was the growing interest of institutional investors in the Company, the National Provincial Bank amongst them. So far as the directors were concerned, the real cause for celebration was that the increase in the rent roll meant that the Company was at last freed from a dependence upon land sales to meet its commitments. (36) As we have suggested, a good deal of this prosperity derived from the income creamed, with the backing of the state, from the African population of Natal. Moreover, additional to hut rents, part of the Company's income from land sales, and perhaps even from rural leases, was also drawn from this source. But, then, rent was merely the most obvious of a number of ways through which the African farmer provided not only the means of subsistence for his people but also a substantial subsidy to the economic activities of the colonists and certain groups in the metropolis.

Shepstone had been concerned that the Company might one day begin to evict its African tenants. This was, in a sense, what began to happen by the turn of the century, though the mechanism was a little more complicated than he may have envisaged. What actually happened was that the Company, in common with other landowners in Natal, began once more to sell off large acreages, and the heavy exactions demanded by the new landlords from the existing tenants completed the process. Both economic and political forces can be shown to have played roles in bringing about this change, though to separate them for the purpose of analysis is really to mislead. What, in fact, was taking place at this time was a far-reaching change in the structure of the political economy of Natal.

The catalyst for the process was the development of the mining industry, notably of the goldfields of the Witwatersrand, but also of the coalfields of the Klip River district in the Natal interior. Natal lay abreast one of the important transport arteries between the coast and the mining areas. A vast internal market opened up for its timber, sugar, maize and dairy produce. Intensive branch-line construction served to link to the main transport routes the rural areas capable of exporting these products. A boost was given to the mercantile activities in the urban centres, and to the beginnings of secondary industry. Development in all these sectors brought about a substantial increase in the price of land and a marked intensification of the demand for labour.

In this context, the commercial farmers and others who bought land from the Company or elsewhere looked upon African tenants as a potential labour supply rather than as a direct source of income. "Rent and Labour" or simply "labour" began to be the form of tenancy insisted upon. Chief Kambi Zulu found that the land on which his people had lived as tenants for a generation had been sold over their heads. The new owner was the Dundee Coal Company, which refused the offer of rent and demanded 800 men a year to be supplied to the Company. Having moved elsewhere, Chief Kambi heard that some "Amanhlenga" from Durban were to be placed on the farm in his stead. (37) Everywhere the existing pattern of relationships was being upset. Chief Ndunge's problem was that

"All the farmers in my district are putting all their land into wattles and will not permit their native tenants to remain on the farms. They are even disposing of their stock." (38)

The Crown land on which Chief Sibanu's people had been living was now taken over by farmers:

"We all own a certain amount of stock and the farmers complain that this interferes with the grazing of theirs, and in consequence are ordering our removal from their lands ... We are all hard pressed by the



farmers, and we appeal to Government to assist us, to give us some place where we can have a little rest." (39)

Pockets of rent tenancy remained, but at heavy cost to the tenants. To meet increasing rents, promissory notes bearing usurious interest rates were commonly given, and when these could not be met creditors confiscated stock or sent debtors under contract to labour - notably at the Witwatersrand gold mines. Bambatha was one chief whose people (scattered amongst White-owned farms in the Umvoti, New Hanover and Lions River divisions, at the heart of the developing wattle and dairying belt of the Natal midlands) were in this desperate position. (40) The Bambatha Rebellion, Shepstone's agrarian disturbances if you like, was to break out in 1906.

Far from the state intervening to ease the situation developing in the rural areas as a result of the economic forces generated by mining activity and its corollary of capitalistic farming, it was already busy seeking to find other means by which a class of relatively independent African producers, furnishing little or no labour to colonial employers, could be destroyed. A political element had been added to the economic. The change had been brought about by a change in the composition of state power. The advent of "responsible government" in Natal in 1893 heralded the advent of the control of the state by the elected representatives of the White colonists. Rural constituencies returned the vast majority of the members of the legislature, and in these, as we have seen, the balance of social forces was moving in favour of the burgeoning class of commercial farmers and its allies, and to the detriment of absentee rentiers. The state moved forward on two main fronts, firstly to prevent Africans from purchasing any more land to add to the quarter of a million acres they had bought by 1905 (41), and, secondly, by means of taxation and compulsory purchase to reduce further the acreage available for rent tenancy. The significance of changes in the availability of private lands to Africans in Natal ought not to be dismissed lightly. In 1905 they carried nearly twice the population of the locations. (42)

The Natal Land and Colonisation Company was painfully aware of its increasing inability to resist the attacks made upon it by the colonial farmers in its capacity as the leading "kafir farmer". By the late 1890s it had embarked on a new phase of its history. Whilst fighting a rear-guard action against the growing power of the farming and mining sectors of the Natal political economy (and, as late as 1908, it was powerful enough to ensure that taxation specifically designed against the Company only remained on the statute book for one year), it switched its attention from African renting to its other profitable and less politically undesirable interest in urban renting. Rural lands were sold off whenever possible, and the capital freed by this means reinvested in the purchase of urban properties or the development of existing urban sites controlled by the Company.

The Company, having successfully negotiated the changes in Natal's political economy which we have described, retained its attraction for institutional investors in the metropolis. In 1948, controlling a mere 9,000 acres but with a rent roll of £73,000, the Company was finally brought within the financial empire of one such organization. Though technically registered in South Africa as British African Properties Ltd, it was now part of the mighty Eagle Star Insurance Company, where it remains to this day. (44)

Many of the Natal Land and Colonisation Company's former African tenants also found their way into the growing urban areas of White South Africa as a result of the same combination of factors which had brought about a revolutionary change in the Company's renting policy. As one observer anticipated in 1914,

their arrival was to be a little less auspicious.

"At that time (twenty years ago) a native worked six months in the year; he was allowed to keep as many cattle as he like. Working for about the same wage on the farm every year, he finds that he is allowed to keep less stock. Twenty years ago nearly every Natal native was a farmer, loyal and contented; in twenty years hence I expect that a large proportion will live in tin houses just outside the towns, and the last state of that man shall be worse than the first." (45)

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#### Notes

- (1) In the course of the first two years of the Republic of Natalia, 1838-40, 2.5 million acres were registered in favour of 254 persons, only 49 of whom seem personally to have occupied their grants: A. G. Hattersley, The British Settlement of Natal: A Study in Imperial Migration (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 46/7. Two of the active purchasers were Adolph Coqui and Carl Behrens. The significance of these two names will become apparent.
- (2) A. J. Christopher, "Natal: A Study in Colonial Land Settlement", unpublished geography PhD thesis, Durban, University of Natal (1969), p. 2.
- (3) Henry Cloete was appointed in 1843 Commissioner of the Imperial Government to investigate voortrekker land claims. His secretary was employed by a prominent Cape merchant, Francis Collison, to buy up claims which had gained Cloete's approval. Collison obtained 14 farms totalling 84,000 acres in this way. British Parliamentary Papers, 1850, xxxviii (1292), p. 154.
- (4) Christopher, op. cit., p. 60.
- (5) See, for example, R. E. Gordon (ed.), Dear Louisa.
- (6) Examples are: A Perthshire Ploughman, First Impressions of Natal (Edinburgh 1850), p. 12; J. C. Byrne, Emigrants' Guide to Port Natal (London, 1850), p. 137; Natal Witness, 23.8.1850; Natal Government, Proceedings of the Natal Native Affairs Commission (Pietermaritzburg, 1852/3), part 5, p. 73, evidence of Fynn; PRO, C.O.179/6, Natal Land Commission, minutes of 25.3.1848, evidence of Shepstone.
- (7) Christopher, op. cit., pp. 190/1. He lists the leading eight as:

J. Bergtheil	106,100 acres	P. Zeederberg	56,487 acres
A. Coqui	62,165 "	P. Van Der Byl	54,969 "
H. Nourse	61,638 "	W. Nosworthy	49,805 "
F. Collison	59,496 "	J. Van Der Plank	47,319 "
- (8) On Coqui, see R. J. H. King, "The Career of Adolph Coqui in Southern Africa", unpublished BA (Hons) thesis, Durban, University of Natal (1973), pp. 54, 58, 71. On Bergtheil, see B. H. Kemp, "Jonas Bergtheil in Natal 1843-1866", unpublished MA thesis, University of Natal (1953), pp. 88/9, 82, 87, 90/3 and 97.
- (9) Natal Witness, 1.4.1859.

- (10) Kemp, op. cit., p. 120; Christopher, op. cit., p. 373; Companies' House (London) 2066/F.
- (11) Natal Courier 14.6.1861 and 24.7.1861, quoted by King, op. cit., pp. 70/71.
- (12) Companies' House (London) 2066/1.
- (13) Kemp, op. cit., p. 120.
- (14) See share lists of the Company in Companies' House (London) 2066/1, etc.
- (15) Memo of Agreement ... 31.12.1861, Natal Archives (Pietermaritzburg), mss. 209.
- (16) J. T. Mackenzie and F. C. Drummond to Bergtheil and Behrens, 4.8.1862, in ibid.
- (17) D. C. F. Moodie (ed.), John Dunn, Cetywayo and the Three Generals (Pietermaritzburg, 1886), p. 57.
- (18) He was a director of a sugar company formed in London by Coqui in about 1857, and of the Natal Central Railway Company, which was connected to the Natal Land and Colonisation Company. He also came to own land in Natal.
- (19) For an introduction to this subject, see Natal Government, Correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Lt Governor re the £5,000 reserved by the Charter for Native Purposes (Pietermaritzburg, 1859), pp. 3, 5/6, 56/60, 71/74, 81/86, 90/93, 95, 100.
- (20) Times, 27.2.1862.
- (21) Memo of the directors of the Natal Land and Colonisation Company to Carnarvon, March 1876, in Carnarvon to Bulwer, 26.4.1876, Natal G.H. 69, No. 213.
- (22) "Reminiscences of William Leslie", unpublished typescript, Natal Archives (Pietermaritzburg), mss., Bird Papers Vol. III.
- (23) See note 21.
- (24) Times, 16.7.1866, 13.8.1867, 25.8.1868.
- (25) Christopher, op. cit., p. 374.
- (26) Ibid., pp. 374 and 376; Times, 25.5.1877 and 23.12.1880; as note 21.
- (27) Directors' report to shareholders of the Natal Land and Colonisation Company, 22.5.1935, in Companies' House (London), 2066/8; H. C. Lugg, Historic Natal and Zululand (Pietermaritzburg, Shuter and Shuter, 1949), p. 9.
- (28) Letter of Ellen McLeod to Louisa, 31.1.1875, in Gordon, op. cit., pp. 188/9.
- (29) PRO, C.O. 179/116, Shepstone to Carnarvon, 22.9.1874.
- (30) Natal Government, Proceedings of the Natal Native Affairs Commission (Pietermaritzburg, 1882), p. 77, evidence of Nicholson.
- (31) Natal Government, Report of the Commission into the Working of the Land and Immigration Board (Pietermaritzburg, 1885?), p. 4.
- (32) Natal Government, Proceedings of the Natal Land Commission (Pietermaritzburg, 1902?), p. 91, evidence of Robert Parkin; p. 183, evidence of Maynard Mathews.
- (33) Christopher, op. cit., p. 377.
- (34) Natal Government, Correspondence Relative to Eviction from Crown Lands (Pietermaritzburg, 1883), p. 18; Natal NAC, op. cit. (1882), p. 351, evidence of James Ralfe.
- (35) Ibid., p. 286, evidence of T. Shepstone.
- (36) Times, 17.3.1892 and 2.4.1892; Stock Exchange Yearbook for 1900, 1905, 1910 and 1920; Companies House (London), 2066/2 and /4, lists of shareholders on 5.6.1890 and 13.5.1902; Times, 7.5.1891.

- (37) SNA 1/1/324, minute 2121/1905, interview of Samuelson with messengers of the Chief Kambi, 24.8.1905.
- (38) SNA 1/1/321, minute 1428/1905, deposition of the Chief Ndunge, 14.6.1905.
- (39) SNA 1/1/318, minute 1293/1905, interview of SNA with Chief Mibanu, 2.8.1905.
- (40) SNA 1/1/324, minute 1912/1905, private letter of H. Von Gerard, assistant magistrate at Umvoti, to Samuelson, 21.7.1905; memo of civil actions against Chief Bambatha since 1901, 26.1.1906, in SNA minute 78/1906. For the distribution of his people, see Natal Government, Department of Native Affairs Annual Report (1905), appendix No. 5.
- (41) J. S. Marais, "African Squatting on European farms in South Africa with special reference to the Cape Colony (1892-1913)", unpublished seminar paper, London, ICS (1967), p. 5f.
- (42) Native Affairs Dept. Report, op. cit. (1905), p. 152.
- (43) Times, 22.4.1910.
- (44) Companies' House (London) 2066/8; W. S. Wareham (ed.), Register of Defunct and other Companies Removed from Stock Exchange Official Year Book (London, Skinner, 1960); private communication of chief general manager, South African Eagle Star Insurance Co., 21.7.1972; Who Owns Who.
- (45) Natal Witness, 16.3.1914, letter of Trypon-Blue, Estcourt.