MASS POPULATION REMOVALS AND SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT*

by

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The Figures

The South African Institute of Race Relations attempted (1) in 1972 to work out the total numbers of people removed and resettled under the government's plans between 1960 and 1970. Working from official figures, projections, induction and estimates, they were able to reach some rough conclusions. These are that:

- 340,000 people were removed by the abolition of labour tenancies on white farms;
- 656,000 people were removed by laws preventing squatters living on white farms;
- 97,000 people were removed by the elimination of "Black Spots" in the rural areas;
- 400,000 people were removed through being "endorsed out" of the urban areas under pass law offences and other legislation controlling the lives of urban Africans (particularly the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964);
- 327,000 people were removed through the resiting of their urban township in the neighbouring reserve (in some cases this may have involved no removal but rather a redrawing of the boundary).

This makes a total of 1,820,000.

^{*}This paper is based on work done for the Africa Publications Trust's series of studies on Mass Population Removals in South Africa. The first of a series of publications was issued in January, "A Place Called Dimbaza". The second study, an overview of the general phenomenon, and on which this paper is closely based, was published in May 1974, called "Uprooting a Nation".

A later figure (2) for the numbers removed from Black Spots, this time tracing the process since 1948, gave a total of 175,788, with a further 69,000 still to be removed.

In terms of the Group Areas Act, designed to re-zone the urban communities, which scarcely affects Africans, since they have always lived in segregated townships, 362,000 Coloured people, 191,700 Asians, 38,175 Whites, and 1,450 Chinese either have been removed or are still to be removed. (This is based on the rather conservative estimate of 5 persons per family.) The total figure is 593,325. (3)

Further mass removals are involved in the government plans to consolidate the Bantustans, in an attempt to reduce the number of blocks of land (82 at present) comprising the Bantustans. This process obviously involves sizable movements of people. In the final version of the plans published in 1973 it was estimated (4) that the following numbers would have to move: 225,000 in Natal/KwaZulu; 120,000 into Bophutatswana; and 230,000 into the other Transvaal Bantustans - a total of 575,000. Of these, to generalize from the available figures for Natal (5), 94% are Africans and less than 2% Whites.

The final set of figures relates to plans for the creation of massive townships in the reserves to house dependants and migrants who may be travelling anything between a few miles across a Bantustan border or several hundred on annual contracts. The figures here are more speculative since this process is fairly new, although the plans for the future are fairly well worked out. The numbers quoted are based on the estimates for the eventual size of these new townships, which are intended to house those moved through the abolition or running down of the urban townships, but which also contain people removed from the rural areas and people moving from the more remote parts of the reserves to the "border" areas where these townships are situated.

On the basis of the figures available, one can say that the following numbers are planned (6):

Natal/Kwazula	450,000
Durban, Pinetown, Hammarsdale/KwaZulu	600,000
N. Transvaal/Lebowa, Vha Venda, Gazankulu	650,000
W. Transvaal, N. Cape/Bophutatswana	700,000
Pretoria area/Bophutatswana	850,000
E. Cape/Ciskei	600,000
Orange Free State/Bophutatswana, Basotho Qua Qua	150,000

making a total of 4,000,000.

What these figures indicate, very broadly, is that something like two million Africans and half a million others, mainly Asian and Coloured people, have been removed; that over half a million will be removed in the course of partially consolidating the Bantustans; and that there are plans in the process of being acted upon which aim to resettle half the existing number of Africans in the white areas.

Cosmas Desmond estimated that about one million had been removed by the time he finished his enquiry (7) in 1970. P. G. J. Koornhof, then Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, regarded such "elimination of the redundant, non-economically active Bantu in our White areas" as "a tremendous achievement". (8) The process has, if anything, accelerated since then, and the latest proposals for Bantustan consolidation will involve massive removals in the coming period if they are implemented. In terms of the final ideals of the policy, there are currently some 8,000,000 Africans living in the "white" areas (53%) who are ultimately vulnerable, although no one is at the moment suggesting that such total removal should be contemplated.

The basic aim of the government has been to attempt to reverse the flow of Africans into the "white" areas, particularly in urban areas. The following figures indicate the process of urbanization over the past period, and a future projection.

Urban Population (1000s)						
	1946	1960	1970	2000		
Whites	1,793 (75.6%)	2,582 (83.6%)	3,258 (83.6%)	5,642 (93%)		
Coloureds	580 (62.5%)	1,031 (68.3%)	1,494 (74.0%)	3,967 (87%)		
Asians	208 (72.8%)	397 (83.2%)	539 (86.8%)	1,205 (92%)		
Africans	1,902 (24.3%)	3,471 (31.8%)	4,989 (33.1%)	20,661 (75%)		
	4,483	7,481	10,280	31,475		

The Rationale

Before looking at the reality of forced removals in more detail, we must examine the rationale behind the policy of removals and its relationship to Separate Development as a whole and the migrant labour system.

In a nutshell, the forced mass removal of people stems from the attempt to apply the theory of Separate Development to the reality of a situation of historically interdependent communities which make up the South African population.

The existing migratory labour system is being systematically extended because it enables the theory of Separate Development to be practised without destroying the economic interdependence of the different ethnic communities. Migratory labour is thus the reverse flow of the mass removals: workers who, with their families, are pushed out of the towns for a variety of reasons, are often allowed to come back to urban areas when work is available but, this time, as migrants; they cannot bring their families with them. Thus family life is being deliberately destroyed by legislative and administrative action as an inescapable consequence of the system of migratizing the majority of urban workers.

Separate Development is designed to meet the two dominant needs of the policy of the Nationalist Party Government: an ideological demand for race separation to maintain the status quo of white supremacy; and an economic demand for rapid industrial expansion and future political stability based largely on the

use of cheap and plentiful black labour, which has been the basis of the country's considerable economic growth over the past century. This policy depends for its success on providing the 80 per cent of the population who are black with their own political institutions outside of the white political system, within their own "self-governing Homelands".

This internal balkanization - creating at least ten separate territorial units and attempting to unscramble the population into ethnic categories related to each unit - is clearly a vast and impossible task.

Separate Development is, not surprisingly, under considerable pressures. The political demands are frustrated by the sheer inability to reduce effectively the size of the black population in the designated white areas; the economic demands suffer because of the wastefulness of a system of migratory labour and the artificial restrictions – for ideological reasons – on the training and use of black skills at a time of growing shortages of skilled workers. The Bantustan leaders, instead of becoming willing allies in operating the system, are becoming increasingly vocal and unified in their criticism and rejection of much of the basis of the policy.

What one finds in reality is a much more pragmatic policy than the theorists desire - a policy which accommodates both the political and economic demands, and which seeks to neutralize the black demands. Despite the rigidity of much of the political rhetoric, the actual practice is often inconsistent and ambiguous within the limits set by the maintenance of white domination. Thus many contradictions are evident.

The mass removal of population, being central to the policy as a whole, reflects the way in which the government has been forced to adjust its theories to accommodate some of the practical realities. Official policy in the late 1960s insisted that the black population in the "white" areas should be reduced by 5 per cent per year. This is now regarded as impossible. Permanent black urbanization, while not yet fully recognized, has now been acknowledged in a number of ways.

The general view held by the theorists of apartheid in the 1960s was that economic integration "must of necessity lead to political integration and to eventual political domination", and that it was therefore necessary "to get rid of the non-white proletariat". (10) Although conditions have not changed, the emphasis has changed: "economic integration" is now seen as inevitable; but it is hoped that by creating the two political poles - the white political system and the Bantustans - they will avoid the dangers foreseen by Scholtz. (11)

The officially declared policy is that all Africans working in "white areas" should be regarded only as "temporary sojourners"; hence the thrust of legislation has been to turn the black labour increasingly into migratory workers, either in the traditional pattern of yearly migration over vast distances, or as daily migrants across the Bantustan borders. This pattern of labour migrancy is intended to resolve the contradiction between geographical separation and economic integration.

There are still considerable differences of emphasis within the ruling group about Separate Development and removals. A resolution passed at the 1973 Congress of the Afrikaanse Studentebond demanded that

"All the black women and children in the white area must be shipped back to the homelands and only the men should be left in the white areas for as long as we need them."

The Government's new Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, Mr T. N. H. Janson, cultivating a more liberal image, put it this way in parliament in May 1973:

"... We should get away from the idea that these homelands could be regarded as dumping grounds for people whom we do not want in white South Africa.... However by the same token and even more so I think it must be realised ... that with 60,000 or 70,000 odd people coming onto the labour market each year from the Bantu reserves, the white areas should not be regarded as the dumping grounds for the surplus labour which comes from the Bantu Homelands. This is a fact which has to be faced. Therefore we are committed to develop these Homelands to the fullest of our ability and to the fullest of these Homelands."

(emphasis AB)

In the same debate, another Nationalist MP and the influential chairman of the Select Committee on consolidation of the Homelands said:

"We [Nationalists] say that these people are only casually here in South Africa; they are only temporary workers here and there is no question of any degree of permanency being given to the sojourn of these people, temporary or otherwise, in the white areas."

Clearly the reality is a mixture of different motivations, tactics and pressures. The many modifications being made do not, however, undermine the basic principle, which is concerned with creating separate political structures for blacks so as to prevent their sharing in the power of the state while furthering their involvement economically, primarily as a controlled cheap labour force but also as a market. This is brought about through the maintenance of separate reserves into which the surplus labour force and their dependants can be transferred.

An important limitation on the extent of the removals is the resistance being shown by communities to being moved and by some of the Bantustans to accepting resettlement in their territories, at least without extra land being allocated. The Transkei has for long refused to accept resettlement camps, although they have not been able to prevent individuals and families being sent into their territory.

But whether the goals of total separation are attainable or not, the logic of Separate Development (and the majority of the white electorate who

support it) demands the removal of Africans from "white" into "black" areas. In 1961 the Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd, explained to parliament that they would have to create

"Separate Bantu states ... thereby buying for the white man his freedom and right to retain domination in what is his country, settled for him by his forefathers."

That sentiment is still very clearly the motivation of the present rulers, even though now economic considerations play a more important part and many of the contradictions of the system are more apparent and pressing.

The Removals

There are six different categories of forced removals, which I will briefly indicate.

Removals from the rural areas, which result from the elimination of squatting and labour-tenancies on the white farms and the eradication of Black Spots - areas of black-owned land or mission land which Africans farmed, surrounded by white-owned land. Such removals have their origins in the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts which restricted black land ownership to the reserves, which were allocated 12:9% of the total land area. The 1913 Act was very much a response to the fears of white farmers as African individuals and tribal communities started to buy land, previously seized from them by force. The needs and pressures of white farmers have always been a significant factor in determining policy in the rural areas. The South African Agricultural Union has for some time advocated the removal of "surplus" workers and families from the farms and the use of migrant contract labour, recruited in the reserves. Although labour shortages are a theoretical possibility, this is guarded against by workers removed from the farms being registered with the labour bureaux in the reserves as "farm workers", and hence ineligible for higher paid work in industry.

During the '60s the process of removals was stepped up dramatically, with over one million involved between 1960 and 1970. Most the publicity, starting with Limehill in 1968, has focused on this category of removals into the squalid resettlement camps, most notably in Northern Natal, Western Transvaal and Eastern Cape.

The strip of Natal from Louwsburg to Ladysmith was settled by whites after the smashing of Zulu power in the 1880s, but with many pockets of black-owned land and hundreds of thousands of blacks living and working on the white farms. They are being systematically removed - the 1970 order abolishing labour-tenancies hit this area particularly severely - and the neighbouring parts of the KwaZulu Bantustan, Nqutu and Msinga districts, are being littered with resettlement camps and communities. A small survey (12) carried out on families whose children attended a hospital in Nqutu showed that, of the 517 families, 73.7% of the breadwinners were working further away than an 80 mile radius (66.7% in Durban or Witwatersrand), 12.7% in the white towns and farms within an 80 mile radius, and 13.6% within Nqutu district.

The same process of removals and migratization of reserve-based labour is operating in the south-eastern part of KwaZulu, around places like Eshowe and Melmoth.

In the Free State, the tiny reserves at Thaba 'Nchu (Bophutatswana) and Witzieshoek (Basotho Qua Qua) are being settled with people moved off the farms; and the same thing is happening in the Transvaal into the three northern Bantustans - Gazankulu, Lebowa and Vha Venda.

2. Removals from urban areas. Many of the settlements intended, firstly, to house people from the rural areas are now also being expanded to house former urban dwellers. This process is not as far advanced as the rural removals, much of it being still in the planning stage, but it is clearly spelt out in the intentions of the government and of the local municipalities who carry out the policy.

The policy was expounded in a government circular (13) of 1969 which indicated that, where towns were situated in the vicinity of a Homeland, their African workers must be accommodated in that Homeland with their families; and that where this was not possible the families should still be housed in the Homeland and the workers put in hostels in the town, visiting their families whenever possible.

The planners have been working on the estimate that daily travel to work is possible within a distance of 70 miles, and weekly travel is possible within 400 miles. (14) They are also planning vast expenditure on transport facilities and talking in terms of monorails and aeroplanes.

In some cases this policy is being carried out by the wholesale removal of urban townships and the resettling of their inhabitants in a reserve township (e.g. Newcastle, Mafeking, most of the towns in the Northern Transvaal, East London, and parts of Durban and Pretoria). In others, it is a much slower process, brought about by the municipality not building any more houses in the township. In others the objective has been achieved by redrawing boundaries so that the urban township now falls within the Bantustan (e.g. Umlazi near Durban, Thlabane at Rustenburg).

This pattern - in effect, an extension of the principle of the Border Area - can be seen in operation throughout the whole of Natal, the Cape, east of the "Eiselen line", some parts of the Free State (including Bloemfontein, Bethlehem, and Harrismith), the Northern Cape, and Western Transvaal and most of the Eastern Transvaal. In most cases there is a "twinning" arrangement between the "white" town and the reserve township; some places, like Ezakheni near Ladysmith and Itsoseng near Lichtenburg, are designed to house workers and dependants from many towns. The plans are for townships between 20,000 and 70,000 in size, but there are schemes, as yet not off the drawing board, for huge cities: Heystekrand, north of Rustenburg, is planned as the Bophutatswana capital, to house a population of half a million; Lebowa Kgoma, south of Pietersburg, planned as the Lebowa capital, up to half a million; and Committee's Drift, near Peddie in the Ciskei, is planned for 200,000.

Essentially the same process, but on a larger scale, is taking place in the three major industrial centres which fall into the areas described under 2. These are Pretoria, Durban and East London. Outside these cities, across the Bantustan borders, there are huge concentrations of population caused by removals out of the old city locations and by influx from other parts of the reserve, dammed up at the borders of the reserve by Influx Control legislation applied to the white areas.

In the arc to the north-west of Pretoria, between about 15 and 30 miles away, are a series of townships and squatter areas which contain a population of around 500,000. Two city townships, Atteridgeville and Mamlodi, still remain but are planned to be removed. When the process is complete some 300,000 will have been moved out of the city. Workers from the reserve towns commute across the border to Pretoria on a daily basis (which can involve leaving home at 3.30 a.m.), to the Witwatersrand on a weekly basis, or to the border area industries at Rosslyn or Brits, or to the industrial area on the reserve side of the border at Babalegi. Apart from the sheer size of the population density and poverty in this area, another problem for the Separate Development purists is the fact that 30% of the population of Bophutatswana are non-Tswana - in the "squatter city" of Winterveld 80% of the 100,000 or so inhabitants are non-Tswana.

The African population in the Durban-Pinetown area is in the region of 400,000, 55% of whom live within the Durban municipality, the rest within the borders of the KwaZulu Bantustan. Of the two major townships begun in 1962 and 1958, respectively, Umlazi lies within KwaZulu whilst Kwa Mashu does not, as yet, though it is clearly intended that it should become part of the Bantustan. Each has a population of somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s Africans and Asians were evicted from the city areas of Durban and resettled. For example, when Cato Manor was declared a White Area in 1958, 82,826 Africans were removed officially to one or other of the new townships. Since only those with valid residence permits were resettled, some 30-40,000 "disappeared", presumably either removed into the reserve away from the city or continuing to survive in the township illegally.

Durban and the nearby industrial areas, Pinetown-New Germany and Hammarsdale (one of the original border area industrial sites), are situated so as to be able to house all the African population in reserve townships, although this requires skilful redrawing of some boundaries. This means that, in general, the workers live with their families, but it means also that they are crossing the border daily from a separate "nation" in Separate Development terms. It also means that the Pretoria government can shelve some of its responsibilities for its urban workers onto KwaZulu. As in Pretoria, there are also about 100,000 workers (15) who live in single accommodation as migrants from further in the reserves.

Since 1964 the African population of East London's urban township, Duncan's Village, have been removed into the reserve township of Mdantsane, 12 miles from the city, which was intended originally to house workers in the nearby border textile industry. Of the official population of Mdantsane of 82,000 (more realistically estimated at around 120,000), 67% have been resettled from East London and the other 33% from elsewhere, mainly removed from the Western Cape or drifting from other parts of the Ciskei. The future size of the township is envisaged as 500,000 if the proposed industrial developments around East London are implemented. According to Wilson's figures (16), the number of oscillating migrants officially living in single accommodation is lower in East London than in any other city. The overall numbers will increase as the city attracts workers from its hinterland beyond the capacity of the township to house.

4. The Western Cape (in practice stretching as far as the Fish-Kat line, east of Grahamstown - the Ciskei border) falls into a separate category for two reasons: it has been designated a "Coloured Preference Area", which means that employers must use Coloured labour as a priority and Africans only when certain conditions are fulfilled; and the area has been subject to a target of 5% for the annual reduction in the African labour force. These are the objectives which have led to a large-scale removal of Africans out of the Western Cape, from both urban and rural areas, and their resettlement in the camps, such as Dimbaza, Sada and Ilinge, and in the larger townships like Mdantsane and Zwelitsha, near King Williams Town.

The other side of the coin is the increased number of migrant workers in both industry and agriculture. 85% of the African workers in Cape Town are migrants (17), living in single accommodation, with their families hundreds of miles away in the reserves. The total African population of Greater Cape Town increased from 100,000 to 111,000 between 1960 and 1970 but the proportion of the total population declined from 10% to 8% and the proportion of Africans living in family accommodation dropped from 70% to just over 50%. (18)

Migrancy in the rural towns and on the farms has increased, both because of the removal of families and because of the drift of Coloured labour to higher paid work in the cities. Wilson describes (19) the setting up of a farm labour recruitment organization by the Hex River Group of farmers, with agents operating in the Transkei and Ciskei; both yearly contract and seasonal workers are now being recruited from the reserves.

Although the 5% reduction target is no longer taken seriously (it can only affect dependants, not workers) and the Coloured Preference system is not very effective, especially in Port Elizabeth, where the demand for African labour in the rapid industrial expansion is increasing (although the previously stable urban population is being converted into a predominantly migrant population), the pattern has been established whereby the African communities have been destroyed and a migrant labour pattern imposed over most of the economy.

5. The motivation behind the consolidation plans, and the half million or so removals which will result, is almost entirely ideological. The chess-board appearance of interspersed white and black land is in contradiction to some aspects of Separate Development, and it is important to the credibility of the policy - both for the white electorate and the blacks committed to the Bantustans - that an attempt at making them consolidated land units is seen to be made. Naturally, few want to be the ones to move. Since the Bantu Affairs Commission, in its tour of affected areas, consulted white opinion virtually exclusively, it is the blacks who will have to move, often from land settled for generations, to overcrowded and exhausted reserves and, in some cases, for the second time within the last decade.

The Bantustan leaders have all criticized the plans, and several have put forward their own. Bophutatswana and KwaZulu, for example, have suggested that they incorporate all the land and towns within the natural boundaries of their extremities. In some cases they have taken up the cases of communities threatened with eviction, such as that of the 100,000 people of the three Drakensberg locations, west of Estcourt, who are planned to be moved to the wasteland of a part of KwaZulu near Weenen. (20)

In the tiny Swazi Bantustan in the Eastern Transvaal, the proposal to remove the Nsikasi reserve will result in the three newly created reserve townships, housing people moved from neighbouring "white" towns, being left as Black Spots.

The process of consolidation, as it is planned, is a very long-term one and both the irrationality of much of it and the resistance of blacks and whites alike to the removals involved will slow it up greatly if not make it totally impractical. Nevertheless, the government has armed itself with special powers (the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of February 1973) to be able to move communities without recourse to parliament (21), and already the removals have begun. (22)

6. In addition to these forms of mass removals there is a constant stream of individuals being "endorsed out" of the white areas and deported to "their" Homeland. Under the pass laws, dating from 1952, 450,373 people had been removed into the reserves up to 1970. (23) In 1970, 34,000 were removed.

Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act stipulates the conditions under which Africans are allowed to stay in white areas (birth; 15 years continuous residence; 10 years continuous employment in one job; "single" migrants through labour bureaux). Since 1964 women have been refused entry unless they qualified independently of their husbands. This, together with the removal of women from the urban areas, is eroding the number who can qualify under the birth or continuous residence clauses.

There is considerable discussion as to whether Section 10 should remain or be dropped, thus removing all permanent rights. Since the loss of a job, conviction of an offence carrying more than R100 or 6 months, or being deemed idle or undesirable, may lead to the loss of Section 10 rights, all Africans in the white areas live under a constant threat of being "endorsed out". The tentacular regulations and restrictions also provide an effective system of bureaucratic control, now facilitated by computers.

Migrant Labour

As indicated earlier, the crucial aspect of this whole policy is the fact of turning the black labour force into rightless, powerless migrants: an attempt to reverse the historic trend in which migrancy gives way to permanent urbanization. There are three aspects of the migrant labour system and the present attempt to universalize it which need to be isolated:

- 1. The social aspects of migrancy have often been concentrated upon family break-up and social disruption, alienation and mental disorders. They also constitute an important way of frustrating the development of class consciousness and solidarity amongst workers.
- 2. The political aspect. A crucial aspect of the modern form of migrant labour (e.g. in Europe and North America) is the crossing of national boundaries thus making the workers aliens who do not enjoy full social and political rights.

This political definition of migrancy is very important in South Africa, since the government is attempting to establish all its internal labour supply on the same basis as its external migrant labour, by setting up the Bantustans as "separate nations". Thus migrant labour perhaps should be termed "Bantustan-based labour". In practice this can mean widely differing things in terms of the distance migrated and on the social effects. Workers in reserve townships like Ga Rankuwa or Umlazi commuting to Pretoria or Durban are migrants by this definition just as much as those from Vendaland or Witzieshoek, or even Malawi or Mozambique.

3. The economic aspects. The rightlessness of migrants leads to their cheapness. They constitute a reserve army of labour. But an important aspect of this system historically has been the ability of the reserves to support its "army of labour" to some extent through supplementing the wages, providing certain aspects of "social security", and effectively reproducing the labour force. The conditions throughout much of the reserves today, and certainly in the resettlement townships and border area townships, where crops or cattle are not allowed, no longer provide this. The implications of this (24) would seem to be that for the system of migrancy and labour control to operate as successfully as previously it will have to be even more systematically forced. The awareness of the dangers created by this for the system lie behind the thinking of those planners and officials who desperately want to see economic development and more jobs created in the reserves.

Conclusion

At one level, the reasons for such massive upheavals described above is the pursuit of an ideological goal, that of Separate Development. But that policy itself is not so much concerned with racial separation but with maintaining the system of white domination and the super-exploitation of blacks. The present Nationalist government sees this aim as being best pursued through Separate Development, and that necessitates the forced removals. Mass removals are a central part of the process of maintaining a controlled and cheap labour supply. Allocating the black population, either physically or notionally (and clearly, in terms of the propaganda and the need for credibility and legitimation, the more the physical aspects can be made to fit the theory the better for the system) to Homelands, as separate nations, is the mechanism through which white political and economic interests can be preserved.

Blacks remain essentially the objects of such a policy since they are excluded from the body politic. The effect falls most heavily on the non-productive population, who are the ones physically removed. Workers are either turned into "alien" migrants or live under such a threat.

Whether mass removals will continue at the present rate depends on the blacks' resistance, either through the Bantustans (as the leaders resolved to do at their Umtata Summit Conference in November 1973) (25) or through extrainstitutional means (as with the widespread resistance to the imposition of Bantu Authorities in the 1950s and early 1960s (26), and on the degree to which the government and the white electorate see it as necessary for the credibility of their policy. Whilst constituting an important mechanism of intimidation and for maintaining a controlled supply of migrant labour, forced mass removals are unlikely to be pushed to the point of creating serious social or economic disruption. The system is too pragmatic to allow that. On the other hand, this

process does highlight certain of the areas of contradictions, particularly relating to the Bantustans, the skilled labour requirements of the economy, the credibility gap between rhetoric and practice, and the increasing repression which the state will have to exercise in order to maintain the system.

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Notes

- (1) SAIRR. Fact Sheet on African Population, 14 February 1972.
- (2) Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 16 March 1973.
- (3) Financial Mail, Johannesburg, 2 March 1973.
- (4) Star, Johannesburg, 25 May 1973.
- (5) Dr Bruce Young, Natal University Geography Department, <u>Daily News</u>, Durban, 5 June 1973.
- (6) My own calculations, from SAIRR and other material.
- (7) The Discarded People (Penguins, 1970).
- (8) House of Assembly debate, 4 February 1969; quoted in Desmond.
- (9) From Economic and Social Forces Affecting the Urbanisation of the Bantu Population of South Africa, G. M. E. Leistner (Africa Institute: Pretoria, 1972).
- (10) D. G. Scholtz, former editor of the Nationalist Party paper <u>Die Transvaler</u>, in an editorial, 1964, quoted in Joel Mervis: "A Critique of Separate Development" in N. Rhoodie (ed), <u>South African Dialogue</u> (Johannesburg, 1972).
- (11) There are, of course, still prominent voices who agree with the views expressed by Scholtz. Dr C. J. Jooste, the Director of the government—supporting Bureau of Racial Affairs, SABRA, speaking at the ASB Congress in June 1973, reiterated the view that acceptance of the permanence of blacks in the urban areas inevitably leads to economic, social and political integration, therefore reversing the flow was absolutely necessary and also, he felt, possible. (From a report in the <u>Daily News</u>, Durban, 27 June 1973.) The new Deputy Minister, Janson, however, accepts that blacks will remain for many years in the white areas and therefore it is necessary to establish good relations with them.
- (12) Unpublished survey from Charles Johnson Memorial Hospital, Nqutu.
- Quoted in Muriel Horrell, Housing Schemes for Urban Africans in Municipal Areas and the Homelands, SATRR, January 1972.
- (14) Horrell, op. cit., quoting Deputy Minister of BAD, Star, Johannesburg, 19 May 1971.
- (15) Francis Wilson, Migrant Labour, Ch 4.
- (16) Ibid.
- (17) Wilson, op. cit. He gives the equivalent figure for Port Elizabeth as 20% and points out that accommodation plans will double the number of oscillating migrants.

- (18) Michael Hubbard, African Poverty in Cape Town, 1960-1970 (SAIRR, 1972).
- (19) Wilson, op. cit., Ch 3.
- (20) Daily News, Durban, 6 June 1973.
- (21) Rand Daily Mail, 1 March 1973.
- (22) Removal of a community of 2000 people from near Groblersdal to Sekhukuniland, reported in Rand Daily Mail, 7 September 1973.
- (23) S. Duncan, The Plight of the Urban African (SATRR, 1970).
- (24) Discussed by Harold Wolpe, "Political Ideology and Capitalism in South Africa", The Black Liberator, No 4, 1972.
- (25) Rand Daily Mail, 7 November 1973.
- (26) See, for example, Govan Mbeki, The Peasants Revolt (Penguins, 1964).