In the late nineteenth century the Afrikaner frontier expanded dramatically. Boer settlements were established in several places along the great arc of highland territory which runs from southern Namibia through Angola to Zimbabwe. The Kalahari became a kind of "Boer Lake", crossed in all directions by the ponderous ox-waggons of the trekkers. This process has been obscured by the attention given to colonial partition, which divided the lands of the Kalahari basin between several powers, and yet this new Boer frontier posed problems of considerable interest. This is particularly true in the case of the Angola Boers, for here the trekkers encountered a similarly expanding Portuguese frontier of settlement, based on Mossamedes and Benguela. The interaction between two culturally dissimilar groups of settlers, and between the white settlers and the autonomous African polities, provides an illuminating case study for many of the problems raised by Martin Legassick in his paper on the frontier tradition. (1)

But before turning to these problems it is worth rapidly sketching out the general history of the Angola Boers, and their place in traditional South African historiography. (2) The first Thirstland Trekkers left the Transvaal in three groups between 1874 and 1877, and wandered about in the Okavango Delta and the Knoekoveld for several years, suffering considerable losses. The 270 survivors finally arrived in the Huila highlands of Angola in early 1881 and settled at Humpata, on the road inland from Mossamedes. Dissatisfaction with this area soon arose, and in 1884 roughly half the trekkers moved off again. A few returned to the Transvaal, but the majority set up the "Republic of Upingtonia" in the Grootfontein region of northern Namibia. The "Republic" soon collapsed, and in 1888 most of the Boers returned to Humpata.

Between 1892 and 1895 a much larger trek arrived from the Transvaal in several groups. The Humpata settlement was reinforced, and two new settlements were founded, at Caconda and Bihé, on the road inland from Benguela. Many of the new arrivals wished to trek on further, and proposals from King Leopold to settle in Katanga were considered. (3) Plans were also made to set up a colony in the Lake Ngami region. (4) Both these schemes fell through, so in 1895-1896 30 families trekked south to settle around Grootfontein. Portuguese statistics for 1900 show a little over 1,000 Boers in Angola, compared with about 2,500 Portuguese settlers in the same area. (5) Yet another wave of Afrikaners entered Angola after the Boer War, so that by 1905 there were about 1,500 of them all told. This was the last major influx, and in 1928 nearly 2,000 Boers trekked out of Angola to settle in Namibia. A few remained behind, and in the 1950s the Boer population of Angola was estimated at about 500 souls. (6)

In traditional South African historiography, the Thirstland Trek is treated as a single episode, the later and larger treks being more or less completely ignored. It is assimilated to the stereotypes of the Great Trek, as in this quotation which L. G. Green attributes to a veteran of the Thirstland: "A drifting spirit was in our
hearts, and we ourselves could not understand it. We just sold our farms and set out north-westwards to find a new home."

(7) Fear of British encroachments, and the desire to preserve religious and cultural identity, are added for good measure. The actual activities of the Boers in Angola are treated as the calm life of a big happy family, interspersed with heroic expeditions against African tribes. And the 1928 move to Namibia is presented as a return to the Afrikaner fold, away from the domination of a foreign power. (8)

In contradistinction to this romantic stereotyped story, I would like to focus on five specific problems: responses to economic stimuli; social stratification and political divisions within the community; relations with other white groups; relations with autonomous African groups; and relations with African servants and clients. The responses to economic stimuli can be subdivided into a "push factor" and a "pull factor", and I shall first try to determine the economic reasons that impelled the Boers to leave the Transvaal.

The recollections of an old trekker (9) present the first Thirstland Trek mainly as a reaction to the extremely depressed economic conditions prevailing in the Transvaal in the early 1870s. The elephant frontier had retreated far to the north; the Transvaal had no railways, no industries, no mines; money was in short supply and cattle were the only commodity of trade. But very enthusiastic reports were coming in from Damaraland, where the ivory and ostrich-feather trade was in full swing, and the land was said to be excellent for cattle. And the country was as yet claimed by no European power. (10) The first Thirstland Trek thus appears here in quite a different light, as one of the consequences of the collapse of the early hunting economy of the Transvaal. (11)

If one then considers the second and largest trek (1892-1895), the dominant reasons for leaving the Transvaal had changed somewhat. The flourishing economic situation of the earlier trekkers provided one attraction, but more important seems to have been the land question. It must be emphasized that this had nothing to do with the traditional picture of a fertile and superabundant population, unable to provide lands for the younger generation. The problem was rather one of growing economic differentiation within white Transvaal society, between the large landowners and their tenants. (12) Resentment at having to rent land, and the attractions of abundant freehold land in Namibia and Angola, were powerful factors leading the Boers to trek across the Kalahari. The rumour that three English land companies were buying up land in southern Angola to rent it out to the new Boer immigrants created a small panic, and the Portuguese authorities had to go to considerable lengths to deny it. (13)

The third trek of the early 1900s is that on which I have found the least material. On the face of it, these were Boers escaping British domination. (14) It would seem probable, however, that important economic factors also underlay these treks, particularly the renewed possibilities of mercenary service in Angola (1902-1907), to which I shall shortly return, and the aggravation of the land problem in the Transvaal. (15)

Once in Angola, the trekkers did not set up the isolated subsistence pastoral communities dear to the frontier tradition. On the contrary, they reacted aggressively and shrewdly to the market forces operating on the Angola frontier. (16) They always maintained rural bases, where the women indulged in a little cereal cultivation and African herdsmen tended the cattle. But in the main they concentrated exclusively on the most lucrative forms of economic activity that their skills permitted. They had come in the first place to perpetuate the hunting economy of the Transvaal, but they quickly adapted to the new conditions, becoming primarily transport riders and mercenaries, and keeping hunting as a subsidiary though important activity.
The arrival of the Boers in Humpata initiated a minor transport revolution. Hitherto everything had been carried by head-porters. Now, in the whole southern third of Angola suitable for oxen the Boers opened up wagon tracks, built and repaired two major roads inland from Mossamedes and Benguela, set up artisanal workshops to build and repair wagons, and tenaciously defended a transport monopoly which was not seriously breached till about 1910. The real boom in the transport business began in about 1890, when the road inland from Benguela was built and large quantities of root rubber began to be exported from Angola. Although the Boers never managed to wrest more than a part of the rubber carrying business from the Ovimbundu porters, it was nevertheless extremely lucrative, and the 1890s influx from the Transvaal seems to have been closely correlated to the rubber boom. Indeed, van der Merwe states quite clearly that the sole reason for founding the Bihé settlement (in country not very suited to cattle) was to profit from the rubber carrying possibilities. (17)

Mercenary service on Portuguese expeditions was even more lucrative than transport riding, but was much more irregular. Large scale expeditions into the interior occurred between 1883 and 1890, 1902 and 1907, and 1914 and 1915, on an almost yearly basis. But in between were lean years, in which military activity was very much reduced. The Portuguese appreciated the Boers' skill as wagon-drivers, essential for the logistics of military expeditions, and their extraordinary accuracy in tracking and shooting, gained from their hunting activities. They were paid a fixed daily wage, sometimes doubled during the actual days of fighting, plus extras for every horse and wagon, and 50% of all cattle looted. Any horses, oxen or wagons lost were compensated, and ammunition was provided free. Rifles were issued to those who had ancient models. (18) Much haggling always took place over the exact terms, and the Boers were quite prepared suddenly to leave the Portuguese in the lurch, at the mercy of the Africans, if the agreed number of days were over and the Portuguese would not negotiate a new agreement. (19)

By the time the Boers reached Angola, the great days of elephant and ostrich hunting were almost over. A few Afrikaners continued to specialise in elephant hunting, but the majority of them hunted partly for their own subsistence but more often to trade the meat with the Africans. They developed a quasi-monopoly on the trade for meat in exchange for cereals, often buying cattle at the end of the process. (20) However, they never seem to have branched out beyond this form of petty trade, large scale trade remaining in the hands of the Portuguese and foreign merchant community.

This flourishing economic system began to be increasingly eroded after the First World War. The completion of the Benguela Railway, the arrival of the Mossamedes Railway in the Huila highlands, the building of motor roads and the increasing use of lorries, all combined to ruin the Boer transport industry, already challenged since about 1910 by the growth of local Portuguese waggoning competition. (21) With the final defeat of the Kwanyama in 1915, opportunities for mercenary service came to an end. And hunting was made increasingly difficult by tighter Portuguese legislation, particularly regulating the possession of rifles and hunting licences. It is in this light that one must view the 1928 trek into Namibia, although the Portuguese attempts to "nationalise" the Boers also played their part. (22)

The evidence for social stratification corresponding to this strong market orientation is fragmentary but suggestive. Portuguese statistics for 1902-1903 show a very uneven distribution of land, labour and horses in the Humpata settlement. Ten years later, land concessions in the Huila highlands vary from 2 hectares to 600 hectares, the average being about 50 hectares. (23) Jan Hans Robbertse, the largest landowner, also engaged in large scale hunting for ivory, in road building, cattle ranching and fruit farming and had an important stake in the Cassinga gold mines. (24) Associated with Robbertse one constantly comes across about a dozen men who are prominent in various fields, and are referred to as "influential" or "respected". (25) It is interesting to note that the "exceedingly wealthy" Lucas van der Merwe did not trek across the Thirstland, but loaded his wagons and horses on a ship at Cape Town and came by sea with a few companions to Mossamedes. (26) At the other end of the
social scale, there are occasional references to impoverished families, and to "elements of little or no respectability". (27) More interesting is the fact that a sizable proportion of the Humpata Boers could not send their children to the Dutch school because they were too poor to have African labour and needed their children at home. (28)

Political divisions within the Boer community do not seem to have corresponded very exactly to these social divisions. Wealthy Boers led changing factions, which coalesced over an issue, but had no permanence. On the issue of relations with the Portuguese government, however, there was a clear tendency for the richer Boers to be on the government's side. (29) This was undoubtedly related to the fact that access to the administration brought rich rewards, in the form of land concessions, hunting and rifle licences, commissions for mercenary service, contracts for public works and government haulage, and many others. (30)

Rivalries over state patronage seem also to have underlain the tensions between Afrikaner and Portuguese settlers. In the early 1890s, when both Afrikaner and Madeiran settlement were reaching a peak, the economy of the Huila highlands was suddenly affected by a dramatic cut-back in government spending and a very severe drought. The white population competed desperately for what state jobs remained available. (31) It was precisely at this time that fights between Boers and Madeirans became frequent, and that maximum tension between the two groups was observed. (32) The situation calmed down with the trek to Damaraland of 30 Boer families, the repatriation of many Madeirans to their native island, and a slight recovery in the economic situation. (33)

It is important to stress that divisions within the white settler population were not necessarily on national lines. In 1889 the Madeirans and Boers of Humpata combined to protest vehemently that the Lubango settlement was being favoured by the government at the expense of Humpata. (34) Boers and Portuguese united to protest at the government's support of the Mossamedes Company in the Cassinga gold mines dispute in the 1890s. (35) And many non-Afrikaner whites were linked to the Boers by close economic ties, in particular the multinational trading community, which depended on the Boers for transport. (36) Thus, although national cleavages existed within the white population, they were nothing like as prevalent as Portuguese historiography would have it.

This was true even in the social and cultural relations between the various white groups. The Boers tenaciously clung to their language, customs and religion, but they were prepared to welcome other whites into their community. Many English traders had Boer wives and were members of the Dutch Reformed Church, and there are two documented cases of Portuguese officials marrying Boer girls in the Reformed rites. (37) This was in part a response to a peculiar demographic problem. As the Boer women remained all the year round in the healthy highlands, their death rate was much lower than that of their men folk, who spent much of the year hunting, fighting and transport riding in the fever-ridden lowlands. (38) As there was a corresponding surplus of single males among the traders and the Portuguese, the pressures towards mixed marriages were strong. Some Boers disapproved of this (39), but it was generally accepted, and the son of one of the Portuguese-Boer marriages was successfully assimilated into the Boer community. (40)

Nor did the Boers reject the Portuguese language or the Roman Catholic mission completely. Many Boers were keen to have a teacher from whom they could learn Portuguese, perhaps for business purposes, and were prepared to send their children to the lay schools. More surprisingly, the Boers even contemplated sending their children to the Roman Catholic mission school. (41) Indeed, the Boers' thirst for education seems sometimes to have overridden cultural and religious prejudice.

The prejudice that the Boers were most loth to abandon was their deep-seated racism. Yet even here certain contradictions were apparent. The conflicts
with the great Ovimbundu and Ovambo kingdoms on Portuguese military expeditions were extremely violent, but were conducive to a form of respect of either side for the other. The Boers almost admired the Ovambo, whom they considered to be the most courageous and warlike Africans in southern Africa after the Zulu. (42) And the Africans still recall today the bravery and skill of the fearsome trekkers. (43)

Relations with the Africans in the areas where the Boers actually settled were far more bitter. The first trekkers expelled large numbers of Mwila from some of the best lands in the Huila highlands, and plundered their herds to replenish decimated stocks. The displaced Mwila retired into inaccessible mountains and forests, and carried on a protracted guerrilla war with the whites, particularly violent in the 1860s and 1890s, but lasting through into the 1920s. (44) A similar picture of hatred and conflict should not be drawn too strongly, for we also find groups of Boers acting as mercenaries for one Mwila chief in his wars with other Mwila. (46) And it is paradoxical that the headman of the Humpata area should have turned himself into an independent king and increased his influence considerably during the period of Boer settlement. (47)

The last aspect of this frontier society that I wish to focus on concerns the Boers' relations with their non-white servants and clients. The labour employed by the Boers fell into two sharply distinguished categories. Unskilled agricultural labourers were slaves, bought in the interior, and "freed" and "contracted" according to the formal requirements of Portuguese law. Sometimes they were also seized by force or by ruse when on hunting expeditions, and some Boers did a little slave trading on the side. These slaves were extremely harshly treated by their Boer masters, and there were several cases of revolting cruelty. It was even said that the Boers treated their animals far better than their slaves. (48)

In clear contrast to this were the Boers' relations with their skilled servants and clients, wagon-drivers, artisans, hunters and others, who formed a very heterogeneous group. Some were promising slave children, whom the Boers trained with great care. Others were servants who had come with them from the Transvaal, the "tame folk". Then there were the clients, mainly Rehobother Basters and Herero, who had come with the traders from Namibia in the 1880s, bringing with them a heteroclite collection of Khoi and Twa dependants, and who had settled in autonomous communities in the Huila highlands. (49) All in all, these various groups were estimated at about 400 adult males in the mid-1890s. (50) These clients had similar skills to those of the Boers, and tended to enter into competition with their patrons on certain occasions. But culturally they were in many ways closer to the Boers than any white group. The "tame folk" were not only Afrikaans-speaking but also members of the Dutch Reformed Church, and the Rehobother Basters were exceedingly similar in all respects to their Boer cousins. The generalized use of Afrikaans by the whole of this group was indeed a source of irritation to the Portuguese authorities. (51)

In view of this close cultural similarity, it is not entirely surprising to see a certain minimal relaxation of the rigid ideological racism of the trekkers. In 1907 we find "On Booi Baster" included in the list of Boer mercenaries by van der Merwe. (52) In the early days William Jordan, of English-Coloured parentage, was accepted as a member of the Boer community, in view of the services he had rendered to the trekkers. (53) In 1897 a Boer girl married a Portuguese chef, who had two mulatto "brothers". (54) There was even a case of a dissolute Boer woman, mistress of a Portuguese official, who organized wild orgies with the African labourers. (55) More important was the provision in the Boer internal regulations of 1890 that no man with coloured blood "up to the tenth generation" could hold office, which suggests that some members of the community did have coloured blood. (56)

This last point, however, serves to underline just how minimal the deviations from strict racism were. This is shown even more clearly by the story of the church split of 1908. In 1884 the Boers had expelled the "tame folk" from the settlement and church community of Humpata. (57) Since then they had lived in their
own settlement, 8 kilometres away, with their own predikants and teachers. But in 1908 a predikant, Dr Pasch, was sent by the Cape synod to serve both communities. This created a furore among the Boers, and when in the heat of the moment Dr Pasch cried out "Whites stink as much as Kaffirs", he was nearly lynched. Only three Boers out of the whole community stood by Dr Pasch. (58)

As for the Portuguese settler community in southern Angola, two different patterns of relations with Africans may be distinguished. In the oases, fisheries and towns of the coastal strip, there was practically no indigenous African population, and the transition from slavery to contract labour in the 1870s meant almost nothing in concrete terms until 1913. The hierarchical plantation structure was all-pervasive, and there reigned in Mossamedes and its immediate hinterland a racism more harsh and systematic than anywhere else in Angola. Indeed, Mossamedes was the only town to practise strict segregation in schools and residential areas. (59) The situation in the highlands was quite different. The Madeiran neighbours of the Boers lived off subsistence agriculture (based on the sweet potato), employment in the state bureaucracy, mercenary service, transport, and trade with the Africans. Relations with Africans were generally relaxed, for the Madeirans treated the few labourers they employed as members of the family, and they possessed few cattle to compete with African herds for pastures or water. Disputes over agricultural land and over sharp dealing in commercial transitions were the major areas of conflict in the economic sphere. In social relations, mulattos were accepted as members of the Portuguese community, and, owing to the slight surplus of white men, mulatto girls were particularly sought for in marriage. Extra-marital sexual relations with mulattos and blacks were very prevalent, and widely accepted, in spite of the fulminations of the Catholic missionaries. (60) Almeida, the major Portuguese trader of the highlands, was extremely proud of his 32 mulatto children. (61)

The difference in Boer and Madeiran attitudes to the race problem strongly suggests that social patterns in the white group were influenced, but not narrowly determined, by economic conditions. If one accepts the notion that economic and social structures are separate and autonomous (62), and that racism is fundamentally a psycho-social phenomenon (63), it remains to be seen how economic and social structures were articulated within the Boer community. Roughly speaking, one can say that the Angola Boers displayed strong progressive and capitalist tendencies in the economic field, while maintaining a static, or even regressive social system. This latter phenomenon can undoubtedly be linked to the Dopper religion of the majority of the Angola Boers, with its reduction of cultural texts to the single bible, and even to the psalms within the bible. (64) The cultural atrophy of the Transvaal Doppers could only be intensified by even greater isolation in the midst of a Latin Catholic culture, which they completely rejected. The disfunctional nature of this social system appeared most clearly at the moment of crisis in the economic history of the Boers. They were incapable of making the crucial transition from wagons to lorries, in spite of the experience and capital built up over thirty years. More generally, they never managed to convert their monopoly over the transport system into a strong position in the process of long-distance trade. They exploited the skills that they already possessed, but seemed incapable of adapting to new situations by acquiring new skills. In the 1920s they were thus left with only two solutions. The majority accepted the charity and feather-bedding which the Union government offered them in Namibia. (65) The rest remained in Angola, and declined slowly into the condition of a degenerate poor white community, despised and rejected by all. (66)
Abbreviations

A de P - Artur de Paiva, ed. G. S. Dias ( Lisbon, 1938).
AGCSSp - Archives Générales de la Congregation du Saint-Esprit (Paris)
AHA - Arquivo Historico de Angola ( Luanda)
AHSB - Arquivo Historico de Se de Bandeira
AHU - Arquivo Historico Ultramarino ( Lisbon)
BG - Bulletin Général de la Congregation du Saint-Esprit
BO - Boletim Oficial de Angola
GG - Governador Geral de Angola
GM - Governador de Mossamedes
J de M - Jornal de Mossamedes ( settler press)
LP - Le Philafricain ( organ of the Swiss Calvinist Mission)

Notes

(2) Apart from the archives, periodicals and book listed in the abbreviations, the following are useful to follow the history of the trekkers: P. J. van der Merwe, Ons halfeeu in Angola 1880-1928 ( Johannesburg, 1951); D. Postma, "Einige schetsen voor eene geschiedenis van de trekboeren ..." ( Amsterdam & Pretoria, 1897); G. Trümpelmann, "Angola Boers", in Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, Vol I; Earl of Mayo, Proposed expedition to Ovampoland ... (London, 1882); Amaral & Almeida, "Apontamentos", in Boletim da Sociedade de Geograafia de Lisboa, 1861, pp 304-317 & 456-467; J. Almada, Sul d’Angola ( Lisbon, 1912); H. Galvao, Huila (V.N. de Pamicaco, 1930); J. Esterhuysse, South West Africa 1880-1894 ( Cape Town, 1968); I. Goldblatt, History of South West Africa ( Cape Town, 1971).
(3) AHU - 2R/22P - GG 9/12/1895.
(5) Anuario Estatistico (Angola) 1892-1900 ( Luanda, 1901), quadros 24-36; there were 323 Transvaal Boers in Namibia in 1898-9 ( Foreign Office Confidential Prints - 7420 - Report on German Colonies).
(8) Ibid., pp 113-125; for books in Afrikaans on the Dorsland Trek, see M. J. Greenwood, Angola: a bibliography ( Cape Town, 1967).
(9) C. J. Moerschall (ed), Der wilde Lotrie ... ( Wurzburg, 1912), pp 133-38.
(11) For this process, see R. Wagner, "Zoutpansberg: Some Notes on the Dynamics of a Hunting Frontier", following seminar paper.
AHU - 2R/14P - Postma 26/6/1890; 2R/17P J. van Staden 1/9/1892, GG 14/10/1892; AHA - 41-71-2 - GM 29/1/1894.


Trapido, op. cit., p 61.

Information on the economic activities of the trekkers is scattered through the sources, the most comprehensive account being in Postma, pp 236-48; see also van der Merwe, pp 81 & 85-86; H. Nevinson, A modern slavery (London, 1963), pp 24-25 & 34-9; J. A. Roogadas, Relatorio sobre as operacoes no sul de Angola em 1914 (Lisbon, 1918), pp 131-33 & 232; various articles in LP and J de M.

Van der Merwe, pp 4-5.

Ibid., pp 75-77; Postma, pp 243-44; Galvao, p 229.

Armsida, p 318; van der Merwe, p 4; Pimentel, p 81; R. Delgado, Ao sul do Cabo, Vol 2, p 603.

AHA - 41-185-5 - Relatorio GM 30/9/1912; van der Merwe, p 21; Almeida pp 289 & 308; Roogadas, pp 131-33; Galvao, p 100-04; Guerreiro, p 20.

Van der Merwe, pp 167-217; Galvao, pp 228-29.


Ibid.; AHA - 41-71-6 - GM 5/6/1897; 31-7-4 - Rego Lima 13/10/1898; LP Serie 2, No 2, p 42; A. Gibson, Between Cape Town and Loanda (London, 1905), p 122.

Jakobus Botha, Andries Alberts, Willem Venter, et al.

AHU - 2R/23P - Paiva 8/6/1892.

AHU - 2R/TP - GG 15/6/1894; 2R/22P - Paiva 18/11/1895.


AHU - A-16-6 - GG 24/1/1895; 41-71-2 GM 18/1/1893; AHB - 12 - GM 23/1/1893.

For a conflict over possibilities of mercenary service, see A de P, Vol 2, pp 73-85.

AHB - 12 - GM 8/4/1892.

AHU - 2R/15P - Paiva 5/11/1894; AGBSp 478-A IV Ruhle (no date); AHU 1R/15P - Paiva 20/12/1894.

AHU - 2R/22P - Paiva 18/11/1895; AHA - 41-84-1 & 2.


Ibid., 1/3/1892; AHA 31-9-1 Relatorio 9/10/1895.

Pimentel, p 85; Gibson, passim.

Gibson, pp 120 & 130; AGCSSp 478-A II Antunes 26/9/1889; Chatelain & Roch, B6i4 Chatelain (Lausanne, 1918), p 208.

P. D. de Carvalho, "Apontamentos dum viajem no sul d'Angola", in Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa 1904, pp 70-71.

Ibid.; AHA - 41-70-2 - Paiva 29/12/1895.

Bartolomeu de Paiva - see van der Merwe, p 78; Roogadas, p 133.

AHU - 2R/35P - Paiva 11/4/1893; van der Merwe, pp 9-11; Almeida, p 396; Galvao, p 229; Arquivo da Missao da Huila, Duparcquet 20/7/1892.

Van der Merwe, pp 94-95; Chatelain & Roch, p 296.

Guerreiro, p 26.

Details of raids and counter-raids are scattered through the sources, particularly in AHA and J de M; for the cattle problem, see H. Schinz, Deutsch-Siidwest-Africa (Oldenburg, 1891), p 346; for the land problem, see...
(45) Chatelain & Roch, pp 208 & 212-18.
(47) AHA - 41-90-4 - GM 10/11/1887 (Mapa); AHEEB - 12 - Settlers Humpata 9/12/1901.
(48) Nevinson, p 39; Almeida, p 318; Chatelain & Roch, p 341; LP Série 1, Rapport 4, p 2; AHA - 2R/7P - Curador 16/6/1884; AHA - 41-71-6 - Paiva 28/5/1897; EG, September 1897, p 725.
(49) Nevinson, p 39 ("training of slaves"); van der Merwe, pp 22-41 ("tame folk"); A de P, Vol I, pp 35 & 60-61, Vol II pp 78-80; AGCSSp 474-B-I Duparquet 27/7/1882; AHA - 2R/6P - Governor Benguela 12/2/1885; (statistics of Eschobotherr); 1R/5P GM 26/12/1885.
(50) AHA - 1R/15P - GG 15/1/1895 (Cape Times article in annexes).
(52) Van der Merwe, p 96 (on page 97 he is no longer included).
(53) Green, p 117; Amaral & Almeida, pp 458-60; AHA - 2R/6P - GM 30/3/1882.
(54) Chatelain & Roch, pp 207-08; LP Série 1, Rapport 5. It is possible that Cruz himself was a mulatto - see Chatelain & Roch, p 257, & Pimentel, p 19.
(55) AHA - 31-7-6 - Governor Huila, September 1903.
(56) AHA - 1R/10P - GG 19/9/1890 (Regulamento in annexes).
(57) AGCSSp - 477-A-VIII - Antunes 28/10/1884.
(58) Van der Merwe, pp 22-41; Almeida, pp 288-90 & 396.
(59) AHA - 2R/4P - Curador 14/9/1890 (and many others in 2P); J. de O. F. Diniz, Negocios Indigenas - Relatorio 1913 (Lunda, 1914), pp 81-83; A Escravatura em Mossamedes (Lisbon, 1912 - Anon); Postma, pp 233-35; M. Samuels, Education in Angola 1876-1914 (New York, 1970), p 53; G. S. Dias, No Planalto da Huila (Oporto, 1923), pp. 91-92.
(61) Pimentel, pp 84-85.
(64) Chatelain & Roch, p 208; Postma, p 12; van der Merwe, pp 22-41; Gibson, pp 119-28.
(65) Goldblatt, pp 229-32; Galvao, pp 229-30.
- South-Western Africa - Scale 1: 10,000,000
- Boer colonies underlined (Angola/Namibia)