

AFRICAN POLITICS AND THE CAPE AFRICAN FRANCHISE, 1926-1936

by

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The study of African political initiatives in South Africa has been influenced, in greater or lesser degree, by the historiography of African nationalism in the rest of Africa. With a growing radicalism in this historiography as it reflects the era of post-colonial pessimism in "development" and "nation-building", looking instead towards a theory of "underdevelopment", it is not surprising that a number of writers have begun a cautious reassessment of the meaning of nationalism in South Africa. As this reassessment develops, it is probable that there will be a strong focus on the exact significance that can be attached to the group of ideas denoted by the term "nationalism" and how and in what way this ideological construct develops out of, and acts back on, the underlying stream of political consciousness within the African population. Such an approach contrasts markedly with the earlier "Whig interpretation" of African nationalism in South Africa by such writers as Leo Kuper and Peter Walshe, who have tended to read back into African political history in South Africa a nationalist interpretation developed at a much later date. (1)

Contemporary liberation struggles in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, continue to exert a powerful influence on the historiography of the region, and the symbolic appeal of national identity is such that it is highly unlikely that the historical reassessment of nationalism could go in quite the same direction as it has in other parts of Africa. To this extent, it is not immediately conceivable that many writers would share the view of Issa Shivji that there has not been a genuine nationalism in Africa because the structures of economic dependence left the struggle for national independence in the hands of a petty bourgeois elite whose "slogans of nationalism, freedom, equality, etc. ... were merely echoes of the ideology of the metropolitan bourgeoisie without their social or economic content". (2) Such a view reduces nationalism in Africa to a mere charade perpetrated by various petty bourgeois interests (or, as Richard Rathbone would have them, "businessmen") (3) in order to seek state power for their particular political or economic interests. This view, which can be christened the "conspiratorial" view of African nationalism, places little emphasis on the symbolic appeal of nationalism at a mass level and the various mechanisms by which cultural symbols are taken and redefined in order to acquire political saliency as nationalist ideology. (4) While it is clearly necessary to locate the socio-economic basis of a nationalist movement, it is also essential to explain how and in what manner it acquires ideological hegemony in order to take over state power.

In this respect, the recent work of Mahmood Mamdani on Uganda proves of immense interest since, while making as thorough a class analysis of Uganda as Shivji does of Tanzania, he argues that there are precise class configurations which necessitate a nationalist rather than a tribalist political organization. (5) The distinction is based upon the argument that "in the commodity-producing regions of the

country, where there were significant kulak formations, political organization took a predominantly tribal expression" (6), while, on the other hand, "where kulak formations were absent but commodity production was carried on by peasant farmers, traders provided the political leadership for organizations that were nationalist in orientation" (7) (emphasis in original). The reason for this is that kulak interests tend to be regionally defined and thus readily lend themselves to tribalist ideologies, thus reinforcing what a non-Marxist writer like John Duncan Powell would call a "clientelist" model of politics (8), while trading interests among the petty bourgeoisie tend (as in the case of Afrikaner nationalism) to be on the scale of the nation-state since they directly conflict with the demands of international capital.

This distinction can be illuminated in the case of African political organization in South Africa, with a marked shift in the politics of tribalism towards one of a national dimension in the period of the fight to defend the Cape African franchise. Though the issues involved all four provinces of the Union, this paper can only focus on the Cape and the Transvaal, which represent, in a very general manner, the corner-stones for the two types of political organization under scrutiny. The Cape, in fact, with its longer tradition of direct involvement in government through the African franchise, represented the interests of the Eastern Cape kulaks under D. D. T. Jabavu and the Cape Native Voters Association. The Transvaal, on the other hand, though also sensitive to the issues of land rights and the interests of peasants, lacked strong kulak political leadership since this, as in the Orange Free State, had been severely attacked by the 1913 Land Act. Much more importantly, as this paper seeks to show, the Transvaal became the province where the urban trading interests among the African petty bourgeoisie were able to organize, centred as they were on the Rand. This latter group, loosely organized until the early 1930s, were able to take over political hegemony in African political organization once the basis for the Cape political hegemony had been destroyed by the 1936 Representation of Natives Act, which put the African voters in the Cape on a separate roll. The leader of the trading interests was to emerge in the 1940s as Dr Xuma, President of the ANC from 1940 to 1949.

The significance of the Cape African franchise, therefore, extended beyond the issue of mere political symbolism, which has been the interpretation attached to it by some liberal historians. Though it may be true, as Peter Walshe has pointed out, that "the Hertzog Bills became the central stimulus in African political thought" (9), it is necessary to see in what manner this change in political thinking reflected a transformed set of social structures in which the African elite operated. Though all African leadership in South Africa worked within the constraints of "dependency", these were by no means static. Thus the leverage exerted by the Cape African elite was lost through the 1936 legislation and new avenues had to be sought: it was this that was to be the stimulus towards a growing nationalist consciousness that was to grow up under Xuma's leadership after 1940.

It could, of course, be argued that the fight to defend the Cape African franchise came only after a series of much earlier issues which had also served to unite African political leadership on a national basis. The very formation of the South African Native National Congress in 1912, for instance, came only a year before the attack on African land tenure via the Natives Land Act of 1913. Similarly, there had been the post-war campaign in 1919, followed by the issue of urban areas segregation in 1923. All these issues and others had undoubtedly played a significant role in helping to bring the African political elite together in South Africa to resist attacks by an increasingly coercive state dominated by an alliance of mining capital and agriculture. (10) But, on the other hand, this ostensible unity remained tenuous before the publication of the four bills by the Pact Government in 1926, which included two on land and the franchise. (11) In terms of the ANC, for example, divisions had continually occurred to reflect the continued saliency of "tribal" and regional divisions among the kulak elite, which tended to have a dominating say in the organization. After 1917, for instance, there had been continual divisions between the Transvaal and Natal after John Dube resigned as president over the issue of land segregation. (12) Similarly, in the Cape in the 1920s, "Professor" James Thaele had espoused a version of Garveyist ideology as president of the Cape African Congress, whilst at the same time editing a paper, The African World: but such a political stance had also admirably suited certain business ventures, including a proposed land company which Thaele had sought to establish in partnership with S. M. Bennett Ncwana. (13)

After this had failed, Thaele eventually vanished with the funds of the Cape African Congress derived from the sale of the Congress Hall in Cape Town. (14)

In this context, it was not surprising that many of the ANC's urban intelligentsia and aspirant trading class were beginning to despair of seeing unity in the organization. Thus, when in 1928 the controversial Josiah Gumede became President of the ANC, Selby Msimang was to write despondently that nothing was being done to counteract the four Native Bills. "Except for pious resolutions passed at meetings here and there", he wrote, "nothing is being done to mobilise the whole force of Bantu public opinion to protest against the most iniquitous provisions of some of them." (15) Little was to be done in the next few years either, mainly because of severe ideological disputes in the ANC as Gumede tried to draw the movement closer to the ICU after his return from the Brussels meeting of the League Against Imperialism in 1928 and his visit to the Soviet Union. (16) Eventually, Gumede was to be removed from the presidency in 1930 and replaced by the reactionary Pixley Seme, who tried to restore the ANC's organization through strengthening the Upper House of Chiefs, whom he saw as being potentially the basis for economic regeneration of the Africans through the fostering of trade concerns. (17) But the growing urban African petty bourgeois leadership was dissatisfied with Seme's efforts also. By 1931, there were various efforts on the part of the disaffected elements in the ANC to start trying to reorganize African political leadership. A "Unity Movement" was founded in the Orange Free State by Selby Msimang with R. A. Sello and Keable Mote, which complained of lack of loyalty to the ANC which, it now declared, consisted of six separate parts. (18) This disaffection was to persist throughout the early 1930s but was unable to challenge Seme's leadership of the ANC with any great effect, principally through the general weakness of any African political initiatives at the height of the economic depression. But the groundswell of opposition remained, and indicates that an urban intelligentsia was seeking to transform an organization which was seen as politically outmoded. "It has to be admitted", Selby Msimang argued at the end of 1933, "that the African National Congress has never at any time considered economic problems. As an organisation it had the misfortune at its very inception to meet with a bait thrown by the government of the day in the form of the Natives land Bill in consequence of which a Union-wide agitation began. From that time onward the leaders opposed any leader who attempted to draw attention to bread and butter politics ... Congress had no time for a more progressive policy established on the principles of self help and self development, for its whole weight was thrown against laws and government policies generally acknowledged to be inimical to African progress." (19)

This weakness of the urban intelligentsia related in a very strong way to the failure of the African petty bourgeoisie in the urban areas to acquire an independent economic base. The reasons for this lay in a variety of factors: the migrant labour system and the absence of a stable and secure urban black population through which to mobilize capital (a problem which did not hamper Afrikaner capitalism) (20), restrictions on the access by African businessmen to credit facilities and the low level of entrepreneurial skills which was reinforced by a mission-dominated education system that encouraged "industrial training" for either farming or semi-skilled industrial jobs. The implications of this, though, were to be profound politically. The absence of an independent economic base made the creation of an independent black press well-nigh impossible. There were attempts to run African newspapers in the early 1930s, but these were short-lived. Pixley Seme's Ikwezi le Afrika was taken over by The African Leader, which emerged after the collapse of the ANC-owned Abantu Batho in 1931. The Leader's editor was T. D. Mveli-Skota, who had various projects for the establishment of African businesses, none of which came to fruition. But the depression made running a newspaper very difficult, and, with the establishment of The Bantu World in 1932 by white commercial capital, the African Leader faced strong economic competition and it collapsed by 1934. (21)

The important point about these economic failures of the African petty bourgeoisie was that they were to drive them into political dependency on white liberal organizations. To some extent, this had already occurred long before the early 1930s, since the Johannesburg Joint Council had been formed in 1921, a year after the African Miners' Strike, at the same time as the Chamber of Mines-owned Umteteli wa Bantu. Many African opinion leaders had been forced to write through Umteteli's columns for want of any other medium, and both Selby Msimang and R. V. Selothe Thema were to be

active, too, in Joint Council circles which represented the only available channel for the African elite's political aspirations in the absence of an independent economic power-base. This dependence on liberal organizations was, however, to be increased after 1929, with the foundation of the South African Institute of Race Relations, with funds from the Carnegie Corporation. The Institute, together with the Joint Councils, was to become the target of Africanist attacks by the early 1930s, since it was seen as depriving African political leadership of an independent basis of authority. One of the most prominent of these attacks was through the columns of Umteteli wa Bantu by an anonymous writer called "Enquirer". Suggested by some to be Harold Mbelle, who was the brother-in-law of Sol Plaatje (22), "Enquirer's" articles did represent a powerful case for African political leaders to free themselves from Joint Council domination, and the influence of his articles may well have contributed to the later cleavage between the ANC under Xuma and the Institute in the early 1940s. As "Enquirer" wrote in 1933: "... the Natives have been helpless victims of all sorts of exploitation by European individuals and European bodies or groups. The Joint Council movement ... is one intended to be established as the only agency or medium through which the Natives could air their grievances or make their representations to the Government or local authorities concerned. In working towards this objective this movement has, directly or indirectly, destroyed or rendered ineffective all purely African organizations, and has arrogated to itself the right to control and direct all matters Bantu." (23) While such an argument was couched in the language of a conspiracy theory, undoubtedly "Enquirer's" articles did have quite a powerful impact. Selby Msimang, caught in a difficult intermediate position, was stung into claiming that "Enquirer" was "suffering from helplessness and an inferiority complex" (24), while the Institute of Race Relations commissioned Edgar Brookes to tour several areas to sound out opinion on "Enquirer's" articles (he found that they received little support). (25)

But "Enquirer's" arguments did, nevertheless, represent a potential ideological basis for a growing urban ethnic consciousness which would have been able to expand if it had been able to acquire an economic base for itself. In 1934, for example, "Enquirer" attacked tribal rule and argued for the emergence of a new set of values in the urban context.

... tribalism is fast decaying. It cannot be otherwise: the various administrations of the country are European, education, church work, the impact of European civilisation, the desire on our part to establish ourselves economically, which fact alone endangers individualism, are all powerful factors which operate against tribal rule or administrative tribalism as distinct from social tribalism. The latter is the make-up of the whole fabric of the African code of social life and traditions. Education, Christianity and civilisation have no baneful effect on it, but, on the contrary, strengthen it. I even go so far as to say there is, in the light of our social life as a people, no such thing as 'detribalised Natives'. (26)

Such a perspective contrasted markedly with the integrationist assumptions of most of the African political leadership, influenced as it so often was by liberal ideology from the Cape. (27) But the very fact that "Enquirer" wrote under a pseudonym weakened his influence (28), combined with the fact that there was no coherent political organization in the northern Province to promote his arguments.

Indeed, the dominant theme after the publication of the four Hertzog bills in 1926 is the growth of effective political organization in the Cape, which was to overshadow other parts of the Union. While the Cape ANC under Thaele remained divided throughout the 1920s, Jabavu had sought to organize resistance to any proposed Native legislation on the basis of the Cape Native Voters Convention. After 1926, in fact, this seemed his dominant political objective and, as he wrote to Sir Walter Stanford, "it is now taking us all our time to preserve our old rights". (29) One of the initial strategies was to co-operate with other organizations in the Eastern Cape in order to present a united front of African demands. In February 1926, for example, a meeting was called in King William's Town by Dr Rubusana, together with D. D. T. Jabavu,

and with B. B. Xiniwe as Secretary, to endorse the respective policy resolutions opposing the franchise by the Bantu Union, the Ciskei Native Voters' Convention, together with the Cape Native Voters' Convention. It was further resolved "that steps be taken to invite the executive officers of the abovementioned organisations to confer corporatively as to the best way of transmitting such resolutions to the Government under the auspices of influential delegations and otherwise". (30) The tone of this resolution indicated that the objectives were the traditional ones of seeking to alter government policy through persuasion and petition and no thought was to be given to organizing any form of mass political base. Thus, at its 1928 conference, the Cape Native Voters Convention moved a petition to the government that "your petitioners humbly submit that the solid and undivided opinion of all thinking Natives in the Union uncompromisingly opposes any tampering with the Cape Native Franchise". (31) It was clear in fact that the whole intention behind this strategy was specifically not to seek to develop any mass African opinion, since this was seen as playing into the hands of the Communists, particularly after the start of that party's campaign from 1929 onwards to start organizing farm workers in the rural areas of the Cape. (32) Thus it was not surprising that at the 1929 conference of the Cape Native Voters' Convention Bennett Ncwana moved that the Convention "... resolves to oppose with all its power any effort on the part of the Communist Party to form communist communities in this country". The motion was adopted unanimously. (33)

The exclusive nature of the African organizations in the Cape concerned to defend the franchise might well have rendered their influence ineffective by the end of the 1920s, given the growth of the ICU and the beginnings of newer industrial unions of African workers in the Cape in the late 1920s. (34) However, the onset of the depression in the early 1930s must be seen as undoubtedly aiding the fortunes of the Cape African elite, as the attempts at union formation met with resistance and the passing by Oswald Pirow of the Riotous Assemblies Act restricted the movements of radical activists like Ndobi and Tonjeni (though not before individual Communist branches were established in various localities). (35) In addition, too, the split in the ANC led to some support being given by individual African leaders, who undoubtedly strengthened the Cape organizations. One of the more active of these was Sol Plaatje, who campaigned actively in 1928 to register African voters in the Cape against growing resistance from Nationalist local administrations and who became Vice President of the Cape Native Voters' Convention. Plaatje's undoubtedly charismatic political influence, especially after the publication of his novel Mhudi in 1931 (the first Black novel in English in South Africa), must be seen as giving the Convention an enormous fillip. In December 1931, in the year before his death, Plaatje gave the presidential address to the Convention and was able to show that the voter registration drive had been successful in that, out of 423 disqualifications, over 400 were found to be fraudulent and were dismissed. (36)

To this extent, the strength of the issue to defend the Cape franchise, and in particular its organizational embodiment in the form of the Cape Native Voters' Convention, must be considered a crucial factor in Jabavu's successful outbidding of Pixley Seme in 1935 to head the campaign to fight the Hertzog bills. It was, in fact, in his capacity as President of the Cape Native Voters' Convention that Jabavu initially called the meeting in Bloemfontein in December 1935 to form the All African Convention. Significantly, too, his alliance with the urban elite was demonstrated by his proposal that the gathering meet "not at the invitation of any particular political organization but as guests of the Bloemfontein Local Advisory Board or some other local competent committee to be decided upon by the Bantu Mayor, T. M. Mapikela, who is acceptable to all of us concerned". (37) This effectively nullified the independent authority of the African National Congress, and, though Jabavu tactfully suggested Seme as Chairman, he indicated that this would not be in his capacity as President of the ANC "but as one kindly asked by all of us to fill this emergency position". (38)

This was a clever tactical move on Jabavu's part, since it deprived Seme of any political initiative. Though he tried to keep the middle ground by writing of his pleasure at getting "the promised help" from Jabavu, it was clear that the ANC by this time stood little chance of being able to maintain the sympathies of the urban African elite. (39) The success of the AAC as a national organization representing the African political elite in South Africa in December 1935 showed that the initiative

had now clearly passed to Jabavu, who, by February 1936, was planning a full-time organizer despite the organization's limited funds. (40) It was becoming clear, too, that the AAC was an organization around which the urban elite could now gather on a national basis. This was a departure from previously, since the ANC under Seme had proved that it lacked the internal cohesion necessary to articulate actively the interests of the urban petty bourgeoisie in alliance with the rural kulaks on any united basis. Thus, though it is true, as Peter Walshe points out, that the ANC right from its very establishment had a strong African middle class element (41), too much can be made of this in terms of actual political consciousness. The African petty bourgeoisie increasingly came to see the ANC as failing to live up to its professed aims and in need of significant internal regeneration. The failure to do this left the field open for the AAC to step in and appropriate the role of articulating a national elite consciousness. The significance of this was, of course, to be profound in the long run. Now that the AAC could be seen as a national organization, so in turn the conception of African political strategy could be planned on a wider basis than the essentially provincial context of ANC politics. The formerly disillusioned Selby Msimang, for example, turned to the AAC as representing a new possibility for African political regeneration. So, too, did other ANC members like Xuma, the Rev. Calata, the Rev. Z. R. Mahabane, and R. V. Selope Thema. Many of these leaders belonged to both organizations and in no way saw them as incompatible, while, on the other hand, some like Dr Xuma belonged to the AAC in the late 1930s before returning to the ANC in 1940, to become its president.

While a detailed analysis of the All African Convention is beyond the scope of this paper, it can be concluded that it represented an important break with the previous trend in African politics. Its wide composition of different African political organizations meant a general opening up of African politics, and it contrasted markedly with the restricted and hierarchical nature of the ANC, dominated as it was by kulak interests. The inclusion of the Communists, for example, opened up a wider political dialogue than previously and evinced the possibility of drawing in some mass support; indeed, there was a growing consciousness amongst the African political elite after the passing of the 1936 legislation that a more mass-based political movement was necessary to bring political influence to bear on the state. To some extent this accrued from the dependence of the organization on funds supplied by the African population, for in April 1936 a Five Million Shilling Fund was established with the objective of getting grass-roots organizations to contribute funds. (42) In some cases, this actually meant going right down to a mass level in order to gain support. In Kroonstad, for example, a "Bantu Day" was held by the All African Convention, though it was dominated by Joint-Council dominated African scout organizations of Pathfinders and Wayfarers who staged plays in the town and the local location. (43) With this greater popular involvement, there developed attacks on the elitist nature of the proceedings of the actual Convention itself. At the second conference of the AAC at the end of 1936, there was criticism of the failure to bring the motion on the Cape franchise, which argued for no compromise, on to the floor for open discussion, while the procedure of nominating candidates for election under the 1936 Act behind closed doors by the Executive Committee was also to be attacked. (44) Similarly, there was to be disillusionment with the actual workings of the Executive Committee itself. Xuma complained, for example, that none of the motions he brought before the committee were discussed since "all peoples' minds were set on the election". (45)

To some extent, this was not surprising. With the failure of the All African Convention to prevent Hertzog taking the African voters off the common roll in the Cape, the prospect of some political avenues of advancement presented by the establishment of the Natives Representative Council and the four Native Senators channelled African political agitation in a different direction. In addition, too, it became clear that, with the failure of the tiny liberal opposition in the House of Assembly to prevent the passage of the Representation of Natives Act, a new strategy was needed. Hofmeyr, for example, who had led the political opposition in the House of Assembly, was to argue by August 1936 that Cape liberalism had "tended to become too largely a thing of sentiment, too readily found satisfaction in warming itself at the fire of the old idealisms, paid too little heed to the need for finding in changing times a new basis for those idealisms". He went on to argue for a "new liberalism" which entailed "the acceptance of, in essence, the same broad principles as those for which the old liberalism had stood, together with the application, to the

working out of those principles, of sympathetic first-hand acquaintance with the Native peoples - or, to put it differently, eager study and thorough-going investigation, with a view to giving form and substance to the otherwise possibly dry bones of idealism". (46) This reformulation of liberal ideology away from the Cape tradition of actual African political representation towards a depoliticizing conception of the "native question" in terms of Institute of Race Relations-orientated fact gathering inevitably had a powerful impact on African political consciousness in the late 1930s and undoubtedly contributed to the growth of a nationalist consciousness as the ties of political dependence with white liberals were transformed. It became clear, in fact, that the old patron-client relations, which had been fostered by the African elite in the Cape and the white liberals, could not be so easily adapted in the aftermath of the 1936 legislation. By November of 1936, Xuma was warning Hofmeyr that "your Government's policy is definitely driving us from membership of the state in a country we consider yours and ours. This policy establishes, with leadership of the State itself, what I choose to call real racialism in South Africa, from which one may expect very serious conflicts and antagonisms between the White and Black races in South Africa, unless better councils ... prevail". (47) Hofmeyr, however, was able to offer little solace, seeing "no alternative to that of accepting the position thus created at least as a foundation on which to build a more adequate structure of race co-operation in the future". (48)

In these circumstances, the transformed structures of white economic and political hegemony after 1936 led to a growing nationalist consciousness among Africans on a Union-wide basis. Though regional differences were to persist into the 1940s, especially in the Cape and Natal, the attack on the Cape franchise in 1936 provided an important fillip for the development of an African political elite with a set of shared values which was to start acquiring for itself a popular basis with the onset of the second world war. In this sense, therefore, it is possible to see the Cape franchise as playing a crucial role in the development of African political consciousness and its growing autonomy from control and influence by white liberals. Though clientelistic structures and relationships of political patronage were to be important features in African politics in South Africa after 1936, especially via the medium of the Natives Representatives, they were no longer so dominant as in the era dominated by leaders like John Tengo Jabavu, D. D. T. Jabavu and Pixley Seme. Moreover, the destruction of an identifiable "liberal tradition" with the disappearance of the Cape African franchise meant that the African political leadership was to become more susceptible to an indigenous political ideology in the form of Africanism. This ideology was to become significant in the course of the Second World War and was to find concrete expression, owing in some considerable measure to the symbolic significance of the failure of the campaign to preserve the African franchise in the Cape.

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- (1) Leo Kuper, "African Nationalism in South Africa, 1910-1964", in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds), The Oxford History of South Africa, Vol. II (London, Oxford University Press, 1971); Peter Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa (London, C. Hurst, 1970). For a critique, see also the recent paper by Neville Hogan, "The Posthumous Vindication of Zachariah Gqishela: some reflections on the politics of dependence at the Cape in the nineteenth century" in The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Vol. 7 (London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Collected Seminar Papers No. 21).
- (2) Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (London, Heinemann, 1976), p. 20.
- (3) R. Rathbone, "Businessmen in Politics: party struggle in Ghana, 1949-57", Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 9, 1972-73.

- (4) To this extent, scholars of South African history might do well to pay close attention to some of the nationalist historiography in other African states which emphasizes the continuity of a nationalist tradition dating back to before the advent of colonialism. See, for example, Henry S. Meebelo, Reaction to Colonialism: a prelude to the politics of independence in Northern Zambia, 1893-1939 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1971).
- (5) Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda (London, Heinemann, 1976), p. 205. There was also a third category operating in Uganda, namely religiously orientated parties which "were successful in capturing a peasant base in the non commodity-producing regions, where trading formations were in their infancy" (p. 205). Mamdani is also careful to point out that in the tribal parties the leadership did not necessarily solely come from kulaks or in the nationalist parties from the traders, but instead frequently came from the intellectuals. However, it could still be argued that "in the ideologies they produced these intellectuals seldom went beyond the material interests of the class, or the section of it with which they were allied" (p. 206).
- (6) Ibid., p. 205.
- (7) Ibid., p. 206.
- (8) John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics", American Political Science Review, LXIV, No. 2, June 1970, pp. 411-425.
- (9) Walshe, op. cit., p. 127.
- (10) This is not to deny that different fractions of capital had contradictory interests which were often expressed, as in the 1922 strike, in the form of violent conflict. But these contradictions were, as Robert Davies and others have recently argued, "secondary contradictions between the different fractions of the dominant classes" and that, as far as the primary contradiction between the state and black peasants and workers was concerned, these dominant fractions maintained a united front in the form of a power bloc. See Robert Davies et al., "Class Struggle and the Periodisation of the State in South Africa", Review of African Political Economy, No. 7, September 1976, pp. 4-30. See also Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism: economic development and class formation", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, 4 (1976), pp. 597-620.
- (11) For an analysis of this legislation, see C. M. Tatz, Shadow and Substance in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1962).
- (12) Walshe, op. cit., p. 62.
- (13) Peter L. Wickens, "The Industrial and Commercial Workers Union", unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 1973.
- (14) Interview with Joe Nkatlo, Mt Moorosi, Lesotho, June 1977.
- (15) Umteteli wa Bantu, January 7 1928.
- (16) Walshe, op. cit., p. 174.
- (17) Umteteli wa Bantu, November 3 1934; African Leader, February 11 1933. Seme's weakness was increased because he had few links with the urban petty bourgeoisie. Though a small-time lawyer, he did not even have an office in Johannesburg and had to rely on Hymie Basner. By the 1930s, too, he had become addicted to alcohol, and had the support of some prominent African leaders like, for example, Mrs Maxeke, only because of his previous prominence in establishing the ANC in 1912. Seme's main support thus lay in the Chiefs, aided by his connections with the Swazi and Zulu royal families. With a farm at Volksrust on the Natal-Transvaal border, Seme's main aim seems to have been to use the ANC and its urban organization to promote rural land-holdings and increase the landed wealth of the traditional chiefly hierarchy. To this extent, Seme championed specifically kulak interests in opposition to the urban petty bourgeoisie.
- (18) Ikwezi le Afrika, July 25 1931; Umteteli wa Bantu, 16 December 1933.
- (19) Umteteli wa Bantu, 21 October 1933.
- (20) On the issue of Afrikaner capital mobilization, see E. P. du Plessis, 'n Volk Staans Op (Cape Town, 1964); David Welsh, "The Political Economy of Afrikaner Nationalism" in A. Leftwich (ed), South Africa, Economic Growth and Political Change (London, 1974), pp. 249-285; T. Dunbar Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom. Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion (Berkeley, 1974); P. Rich,

- "Liberalism and Ethnicity in South African Politics, 1921-1948", African Studies, Vol. 35, Nos. 3-4, 1976, pp. 229-251.
- (21) T. J. Couzens, "A Short History", p. 10.
- (22) T. J. Couzens, "Pseudonyms in Black South African Writing 1920-1950", unpublished paper, Austin, Texas University, March 1975, p. 1.
- (23) Umteteli wa Bantu, 1 July 1933.
- (24) Ibid., 21 October 1933.
- (25) Minutes of Meeting of the Executive Council of the South African Institute of Race Relations, December 20 1933.
- (26) Umteteli wa Bantu, 28 April 1934.
- (27) See, for example, Z. K. Matthews, "The Tribal Spirit among Educated South Africans", Man, February 1935, pp. 26-30.
- (28) T. J. Couzens, "Pseudonyms".
- (29) Stanford Papers, BC 293 F(ww) 4, D. D. T. Jabavu to Stanford, August 5 1926.
- (30) Imvo, February 16 1926.
- (31) Ibid., January 3 1928.
- (32) This was after the establishment of the League of African Rights which had Gumede as President and E. Roux and Albert Nzula as joint secretaries. Though the League was disbanded on orders from the Comintern late in 1929, the Communist Party continued the more radical aspects of the League Programme throughout 1930, involving demonstrations, strikes and passive resistance campaigns. In the Cape, especially, there was radical political activity throughout 1930, including a violent demonstration in Worcester, during May, which led to 5 Africans being shot dead. As a result, Oswald Pirow, the Minister of Justice, used his powers under the Riotous Assemblies Act to attack the Party branches in the Western Cape as well as in Durban, where 3000 passes had been burned and Johannes Nkosi, a Party activist, and 3 other Africans were stabbed to death by Black police. See E. Roux, Time Longer Than Rope (Madison, 1966), pp. 232-255; H. J. and R. E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950 (Penguin, 1969), passim; Martin Legassick, Class and Nationalism in South African Protest: the South African Communist Party and the "Native Republic", 1928-34, Programme of Eastern African Studies, Syracuse University (1973), pp. 17-22. After the collapse of the campaign, the liberal leadership in the ANC started to reassert itself, especially after the ousting of Gumede as President in 1930 and his replacement by the reactionary Pixley Seme. However, as Legassick notes, the response of the SACP was limited since it "was unable to develop a convincing critique of the ANC beyond the perfectly valid denunciation of 'good boy' missionary dependent liberalism, nor to present a coherent and realistic alternative" (p. 19).
- (33) Imvo, January 8 1929.
- (34) On the growth of the "new unionism, see J. Lewis, "The New Unionism: industrialisation and industrial unions in South Africa, 1925-1930", unpublished paper, University of the Witwatersrand, February 1977.
- (35) In Cradock, for example, Elliot Tonjeni had a significant impact on the population in the location where in June 1931 he was arrested for illegally entering the location. As a result of his visit a Communist Party branch seems to have begun flourishing and became a thorn in the flesh of the local Joint Council, whose Secretary, the Reverend J. A. Calata, became General Secretary of the ANC in 1936. He warned that "communism ... has got hold of the ignorant masses and is threatening the church" (Imvo, January 19 1932). See also The Midland News, June 8 and 15 1931.
- (36) Imvo, January 5 1932. To this extent, it was not surprising that Plaatje was bitterly to castigate "Enquirer" and charge that he "defends General Hertzog so persistently against Natives and their leaders", Umteteli wa Bantu, May 11 1929.
- (37) The Bantu World, June 1 1935.
- (38) Ibid.
- (39) Ilanga lase Natal, July 26 1935.

- (40) Xuma Papers, ABX 3602030, Javabu to Xuma, 3 February 1936.
- (41) Walshe, op. cit., p. 36.
- (42) Umteteli wa Bantu, 4 April 1936.
- (43) Ibid., 11 April 1936.
- (44) Letter from H. D. Tyamzashe, Umteteli wa Bantu, March 13 1937.
- (45) Xuma Papers, ABX 3701276, Xuma to R. H. Godlo, 27 January 1937.
- (46) Jan Hofmeyr, "The Approach to the Native Problem", Race Relations, 3rd Quarter, 1936, p. 30.
- (47) Xuma Papers, ABX 361306, Xuma to Hofmeyr, 30 November 1946.
- (48) Ibid., ABX 361202, Hofmeyr to Xuma, 2 December 1936.