

PEASANTS, CAPITALISTS AND FARM LABOUR:
CLASS FORMATION IN THE ORANGE RIVER COLONY, 1902-1910

by

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This paper is mainly concerned with one aspect of the agrarian transition to capitalism: namely, the use of political power in the restructuring of class relations in the countryside. The accumulation and control of capital, together with the reshaping of productive relationships, account for the startling transformation of Free State agriculture in the decade following the Anglo-Boer War; and this was essentially the result of the imperial intervention. The transfer of large quantities of capital into the settler economy and the establishment of a more effective coercive apparatus were necessary preconditions to the transition to capitalism; and these were effected by the extension of imperial sway. Although the transformation was delayed by the reconstruction after the war-time devastation, and although it stopped short of thorough-going proletarianization of labour power, the experience of the Free State during these years was nevertheless traumatic.

In the aftermath of the war, the devastation of Boer farms and herds and the shortage of liquid capital in the settler economy contrasted sharply with the accumulations of stock and agricultural equipment in African hands. (1) Agricultural prices and wage levels were inflated during the war as a result of the greatly augmented demand. Great quantities of stock, having been dispersed throughout the countryside, were gathered together and herded over the border into Basutoland with ease. Looting of abandoned farm-houses was widespread. Thus blacks, although uprooted from the farms, had unprecedented opportunities for capital accumulation. However, Basutoland, where the bulk of Free State Africans settled when hostilities began, had been experiencing population pressures for some years. Deforestation and overgrazing, together with the very considerable influx of population during the war, led to the rapid spread of dongas throughout the territory. The war probably saw the peak of Sotho prosperity, but also the acceleration of the processes of class differentiation and soil deterioration. (2) The consequence was that, once peace had returned, the ravaged Free State, denuded of stock and crops, seemed to many Sotho to be the natural area for expansion. Hence a form of colonizing movement across the Caledon set in. The economic leverage of black peasants was much greater than before the war. The white farmers welcomed with open arms any black family with stock and equipment who could plough and sow. In return for a share of his crop, the African cultivator had opportunities that were closed to him in overcrowded Basutoland. Thus the share-cropping system became the predominant feature of farming throughout the arable districts of the Free State. Although conditions of tenure were, at least at first, highly favourable, the white farmers regarded the system as a temporary expedient in the wake of the war and the subsequent prolonged drought, in anticipation of the rehabilitation of demesne farming and the recapitalizing of the settler sector.

Moreover, in the immediate post-war period, when the countryside was still very unsettled, when farmers' preoccupations were naturally with compensation payments, relief grants and military receipts, many farms, in all districts, that would normally have been owner-occupied, were left unsupervised for considerable lengths of time. Share-cropping, a system which required no organizational control, thus suited all parties in the countryside. In this, the ORC experience is strongly reminiscent of the American South after the Civil War. Further, farmers who had roots outside the colony, of whom there were a great many in the more fertile districts, and who had family connections or private finances available outside on which to fall back, were slow to return to the colony after the end of hostilities. These landowners frequently nominally let their land to a white bywoner, who would then act as a "front" while the independent black peasants cultivated the soil, and handed over a share of the crop as rent to the owner's representative, perhaps the local trader. The same system was followed (as it had been before the war) by landowners with more than one farm - but in such cases the rentier farm was used as often as a labour reserve as for share-cropping, although frequently for both purposes.

A marked feature of the post-war situation, however, was the rapid proliferation of small white-owned farms. The number of farms in the colony was largely augmented by some 700 to 800 British land settlers on state land, much of which was newly acquired. During the post-war boom in land prices, many land speculators chose to sell out to the Government, whose land evaluators were themselves landowners, and inclined to inflate valuations. (3) Also, many large-scale farmers, faced with a shortage of liquid capital, were obliged to sell off portions of their holdings to provide themselves with investable funds. Further, there was a sudden spate of sub-divisions of holdings in the wake of the war, as the sons of those who had died in combat apportioned the inheritance in accordance with Boer custom. (4) All these factors served to accelerate the process, evident for some years, whereby the sizes of white-owned farms tended to diminish, and the number of farms to proliferate. The implications for labour demand and for squatter communities were considerable, as we shall see.

Nevertheless, after the war there were still large absentee-landlord estates to be found, particularly, but not exclusively, in the north-eastern districts. A steady (indeed increasing) income from highly competitive and prosperous peasants was for many, in terms of opportunity cost, a more attractive proposition than the sinking of capital into what was still an unstable market. Much Natal capital was tied up in this area in the nineteenth century, and, with the commercial boom of the 1880s, much of the land had been turned into summer grazing land for Natal farmers. However, large squatter communities remained on rentier estates despite the widespread clearances of the 1880s, and many of the displaced people had taken the opportunity of the war to return from Zululand to land they regarded as their own. (5)

In the Transvaal after the war, the British soon found that there were still very considerable barriers to the effective capitalization of agriculture. Huge tracts of land were still in the hands of powerful land companies and land speculators; the pressing need to hold food prices down lent to black cultivators a degree of immunity from harassment; the prevalence of animal diseases after the war had debilitating effects on the recovery of settler agriculture; and the importation of labour, particularly from China, for the mines made the mobilization of internal labour supplies less pressing in the eyes of the mining houses. The so-called alliance of maize and gold was indeed slow in materializing north of the Vaal. The eastern half of the Free State, on the other hand, was the natural maize belt of the regional economy, and, if it could be turned to full-scale capitalized production, the great expense of importing American grain would be avoided. But, despite the favourable conjuncture of factors in the Free State during the Reconstruction era, such a transformation takes time, as the British administration was to discover.

Clearly, the existence of free squatter-peasant communities was an obstacle both to the optimum distribution of labour resources and to the capitalization of plantation agriculture. Those interests which had most vociferously (and successfully) opposed the implementation of anti-squatting legislation in the 1880s and 1890s were the large landowners, who regarded the limitation of tenant communities to five heads

of family per farm as damaging to themselves. These included the rentier landlords as well as capitalizing farmers with considerable estates and large labour demands, who had sufficient land to maintain private labour reserves on which to draw. The British, while anxious to restructure the productive relations in the countryside, were careful not to stand on the toes of large landowners, for whom squatter communities were an invaluable source of labour and income. Clearly it was the large landed interest which the British relied on for support and collaboration, and they were most sensitive to pressures from that quarter.

At first, with the optimism of the uninitiated, the British set about attempting to enforce the 1895 anti-squatting law. However, they soon came up hard against the stern dissent of the vested interests. For example, one Sir John Swinburne, who farmed a considerable estate of 9,368 acres near Albertine Station, launched a vigorous correspondence with the Colonial Office, alleging that squatter families on his land had been given notice to quit. He alleged that

natives from Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and the Portuguese Territories on the east of the Transvaal, are prevented from settling in the Orange River Colony, and consequently the country, and farming, cannot be developed owing to the want of labour. (6)

The truth was that only large landowners, like Swinburne, had the land resources to maintain their own private labour reserves. Nevertheless, his complaint did touch on a matter of no small significance. One of the major obstacles to the squeezing of black peasants into rendering labour-service was the black cultivator's capacity to pull out his roots and trek on to land that offered him more independence from excessive rent exactions. Thus, when Swinburne alleged that blacks were simply declining to settle in the Free State as a result of anti-squatting laws, he was using a powerful argument. But what he might have added, and what was becoming increasingly evident to the black cultivator, was that the mobility of blacks was drastically declining. The land frontier was soon to be reached; the alternative land available to blacks who chose not to sink to proletarian status was being filled up; and much of it was already overgrazed and overexploited to the point of declining productivity and declining living standards for those who relied on it.

Given the fact that the land was rapidly filling up with white farmers, that the number of white-owned farms was increasing faster than before and the average size of such farms was diminishing, it was inevitable that free tenant communities would come under increasing pressures. Further, when more and more land was being turned to productive use by white farmers, where land freely at the disposal of black graziers was being enclosed, where black tenants' access to the means of production was beginning to be seen by the landowner as an obstacle to the more intensive use of labour power, then white resistance to anti-squatting legislation was likely to decline and the pro-peasant lobby was likely to disintegrate. But none of these factors was immediately apparent or effective in the confused years following the War. By 1913, when the greatest assault yet on independent black peasants was launched, the situation had altered; but immediately after the war the barriers to effective enservment (7) of blacks in the Free State were still formidable, although much more favourable than in the Transvaal. While white farming was still under-capitalized, while share-cropping was still widely resorted to by landowner lacking resources to exploit the land themselves, while so many nominally resident landowners were away from their land for lengthy periods, while the powerful large landed interest prospered from the fruits of black peasant enterprise, the British administration was bound to be frustrated in its efforts to effect a transformation of Free State agriculture.

Thus, two conditions had to be fulfilled before effective enservment could be imposed on blacks. Firstly, alternative access to the means of production other than on the white-owned farm had to be denied them. Secondly, an unprecedented degree of unanimity had to be reached within the colonial community that wage labour (or, at any rate, serf labour) was a more productive asset than independent agriculture by free peasant tenants. The first condition was rapidly being met by natural demographic and ecological processes. The second could be met only by injections of

capital, of credit, of technology, of marketing and transport facilities, of advisory and technical services, and of protective barriers into the colonial sector; and by the simultaneous decline of the pro-peasant lobby. Within a decade of the establishment of British rule throughout South Africa, these conditions had largely been met in the Free State, where the conjuncture of circumstances was more favourable to thorough transformation than anywhere else on the Highveld. Thus it was that the anti-squatting provisions of the 1913 Land Act were largely inspired by Free State interests and aimed at Free State peasants.

But in the meantime Sir John Swinburne and those other dissentient voices of which he was the most prominent were sufficiently influential to sway the new administration from its course. In July 1904, a letter was sent to the commanding officer of the Constabulary stating:

Strong representations have recently been made to the Government from different parts of the Colony and also in the Legislative Council, that the strict enforcement of law No. 4 of 1895 at the present time is detrimental to the vital interests of a considerable portion of the Farming Community. The Government is satisfied that substantial grounds exist for the view ... it is desirable that the Law shall be administered with greatest tact and discretion, and in fact that as little disturbance of the existing conditions should take place as possible. (8)

This amounted in effect to an admission of defeat by the colonial administration. It had had to learn an old lesson anew: that it was impossible to restructure class relations in the countryside by mere legislative edict or administrative fiat.

By 1908, however, the situation in the countryside had altered significantly. Such was the spurt of capitalization and commercialization that followed the breaking of the drought and the end of the trade recession that once again coercive action aimed at dispersing free tenant communities became politically viable. 1907-08 saw something of a turnabout in the country's trade patterns. Not only were markets in Europe opening up to South African cereals (particularly maize) and citrus fruit, but local markets for the first time were being supplied largely by local produce. The agricultural import trade suffered a collapse in these years, from which it never recovered. (9) Land prices, which had collapsed following the government-induced boom of 1902-03, were rising sharply again.

Thus, by 1908, the share-cropping system had become, in the eyes of a considerable proportion of the white farming population (whose political muscle outweighed its numbers), an intolerable waste of labour-power, and an obstacle to the further development of the agricultural potential of the territory. Now it was the progressive, capitalizing farmers who were in the forefront of anti-squatting agitation, unlike in the 1890s when it bore the unmistakable stamp of the "little man" who felt himself threatened by black affluence and competition. (10) The ideology adopted by the improving farmer was that which the colonial administrators brought with them on to the Highveld, and reflected the perceptions of the enclosing landlord of industrial England. Men's ideas of the putative society in which they live often change faster than the concrete conditions of their existence. Thus a process of ideological osmosis cemented the emerging alliance of interests between Boer landed wealth and English capital that was to characterize the new South Africa. Those who sought a reconstitution of class relations in the Free State, in which capitalist and labourer would emerge starkly and unambiguously from the tegument of pre-industrial society, dominated in parliament, in petitions and in the press. (11)

An important factor in the new situation was the natural increase of the black population. The increasing proportion of children in black communities on the farms was commented on by whites. (12) This was no doubt accentuated by the ongoing colonizing movement out of Basutoland into the relatively fertile and less populated

Free State. By the early years of Union, indeed, labour shortage had ceased to be a matter of burning concern to the farming population. But perhaps of greater significance was the explosion in the numbers of African-owned stock after about 1905. The next half-dozen years saw good rainfall; and the virtual elimination of animal diseases by the administration meant that the natural checks were no longer maintained. Large herds and flocks could no longer be sent across the border into Basutoland; nor could they very easily be distributed amongst relatives and friends on nearby farms, as had previously been the practice. Farmers were also becoming increasingly conscious of stock breeds as a result of the administration's policy of importing pedigree and thoroughbred animals for breeding. Thus they were no longer prepared to allow intermingling of their own stock with squatters'. Not many farmers were prepared to imitate Major Gent of Kroonstad, who hired farms to accommodate his squatters' cattle. (13)

This situation was exacerbated by the ongoing decline in farm sizes. Subdivisions amongst heirs and lessees were still very common in the northern and north-eastern districts, where most of the larger absentee-landlord estates were to be found. (14) Thus, many large compact African communities settled on rentier estates were being evicted from the land. Now that these districts were in direct rail contact with the Rand, much of the land was being turned to productive use. Farmers who wished to clear land of squatter communities required no law to oblige them to do so. Dr Charles Garnett of the League of Universal Brotherhood claimed, in August 1909, that several of the chiefs of these unfortunate people were being compelled to break up their homesteads "and become wanderers on the face of the earth ... thus making them homeless and exposing them to great hardships and privations". (15) By November, he estimated that nearly 1000 Africans had been "cast adrift by the Boers, on whose farms in the ORC they cannot find work, or a home, or even a resting-place". (16) Interestingly, he quoted Chief Linta Maloi's pass, signed by H. W. Wessels of the farm Parkhurst: "Pass bearer Abram with 220 Goats and Sheep 15 Cattle 4 Horses to go and search for a new master." (17) J. T. Gumede wrote from Ladysmith, Natal, that

Chief Linta is being driven from one farm to another. We cannot find him anywhere now. He left his wives and children and his stock on one of the farms, to look for a place, which I am sure under the present circumstances, it will be very hard for him to find. (18)

The sad story of Linta Moloi, clearly a peasant farmer of some means, was to be repeated innumerable times in succeeding years. Garnett put this treatment down to "victimization", but it was the inevitable consequence of the restructuring of class relations in the countryside. The more cattle and sheep a black farmer had, the more grazing land he required; and, not unnaturally, peasant communities with the greatest accumulations of wealth were the first to be turned off. (19)

Similarly, in 1910, many of the Barolong of the colony began a mass trek off the lands which they had cultivated, and which were increasingly being taken over by white farmers intent on extending their demesne areas. They bought land in the south-western Transvaal by public subscription, for the purpose of establishing reserves on to which displaced families could move their stock and settle. (20) The magisterial reports for this period are full of evidence from all districts of black squatters being ordered to reduce their stock and increase their labour services. Indeed, the Kroonstad RM reported that he had been approached by Africans applying (unsuccessfully) for butchers' licences - clearly considered by those with entrepreneurial skills to be an answer to their dilemma. (21) Simultaneously, sharecroppers were having their land-holdings severely curtailed, and sharing arrangements replaced by labour-services. However, money-wages were still exceptional for labour-tenants, and were to remain so for some years.

Despite the increasing dominance of the improving capitalist in Free State political life, the voice of the "poor white" was far from submerged. The landless pauper, the threatened bywoner, the failing small-holder on his subdivided plot, had greeted the new administration with scarcely-veiled satisfaction, and had especial cause for profound disillusionment. Far from the natural balance between the white farmer and the land that he ploughed being restored, the old solidarity of Boer society

disintegrated more rapidly than before, and the relentless advance of capitalist property relations pressed ever more mercilessly on the lower strata of settler society. (22) Inevitably, resentment was turned on black squatters, and, just as in republican days, popular indignation at peasant independence and affluence was combined with deep-seated hostilities within settler society itself. The frenetic populism and sharp class antagonisms that characterized Boer politics in the 1900s centred, as in the 1890s, on "squatting".

This was a matter of critical concern to the Responsible Government, which felt itself threatened by the dangers to racial solidarity and stability posed by the growing population of indigent whites in and around the towns, swelled by the victims of the post-war spate of land sub-divisions. (23) This problem was tackled vigorously in 1908, with the establishment of agricultural colonies (24); and the campaign against black squatters was seen as playing a vital role in providing a solution. The impulse which caused men to consider squatting as a waste of valuable labour resources was the same as that which determined them to rescue the white race from "demoralizing influences". In a world of capital and commerce, men's place was defined by relations of property; and if that world was to be a well ordered one, class divisions must coincide with the "natural" divide of race.

Thus, not unexpectedly, a Bill was produced before the Legislative Assembly in 1908 designed to prohibit all squatting by Africans other than labour-tenants. The Act which emerged (25) was in fact an almost exact forerunner of the anti-squatting clauses of the 1913 Land Act. Hertzog explained to the Colonial Office that the Act

was passed in consequence of the great necessity which is everywhere felt by the Europeans in the Colony to check the pernicious principle often followed by European landowners and occupiers of lands, who, being prevented by law from letting their lands to natives, allow the latter to cultivate the same on the principle of sharing in the yield of the harvest, a system which is fast resulting in the driving of the landless European class from the country into the towns where they are already forming a considerable class of poor whites dependent on the support of the Government; while the cultivation of land in the hands of natives, the majority of whom came from Basutoland into this Colony, instead of showing progress is more and more retrograding. (26)

Significantly, Hertzog chose to stress the problem of white pauperism - an indication of the seriousness with which growing class dislocation and antagonism in settler society was regarded. Other comment on the Act reflected much the same fear of racial degeneration and its implications for racial solidarity and the maintenance of racial supremacy. (27)

However, despite the strength of the forces calling for a renewed onslaught on peasant independence, it would be misleading to underestimate the significance of the lobby opposing the 1908 Act. The very shrillness of the anti-squatting agitation at that time is evidence of the continuing prevalence of share-cropping arrangements. In certain districts such arrangements were still predominant. When the post-war drought broke, when prices started rising and commerce picked up, and when the grain-line opened up many of the richest arable districts in the colony, many farmers maintained the system as a cheap and relatively efficient way of intensively exploiting the soil without risking capital investment. The share-cropper was generally brought much more closely under the organizational control of the white landowner, or his agent. Many farmers, after restarting demesne cultivation, maintained share-cropping arrangements alongside labour-service, thereby enjoying the best of both worlds. Moreover, share-cropping would often be resorted to by younger sons setting up on their inherited holdings without capital or equipment.

Despite the widespread condemnation of the landowner who went in for "Kaffir-farming" as "physically and morally atrophied" (28), there were many who were prepared to come to the defence of the system. One such dissenter was G. Tylden of Ladybrand, who wrote to Lord Harris:

It is chiefly in the Ladybrand district that the Bill will do harm and both our members voted against it. In theory it is excellent, but in practice half the wheatlands in the Conquered Territory will be thrown out of cultivation. Very few of us Boers ... can afford to keep more than one span of oxen to plough with ... it means too much capital locked up in animals which do not increase. This means that in our extremely short ploughing season we cannot bring a sufficient proportion of our land under cultivation ... He therefore gives one or more of these natives, who own perhaps three spans between them, a certain amount of land to plough. The boy finds the labour and often the seed, and gives the owner of the farm half the crop grown ... The aim of the new bill in abolishing the system is to assist the poor white at the expense of the Kafir. But as the poor white has not the requisite oxen the result will be that large tracts of land must go out of cultivation. Further, great numbers of the better-class natives will be forced to migrate to Basutoland, which is already overfull, and will inevitably lose their stock owing to scarcity of grazing, and must sink lower in the social scale with no chance of improving their position. (29)

These sentiments provide a striking contrast to the increasingly dominant ideology of progressive capitalism, which saw the uprooting of African households from the soil as the only means of saving them from the dead weight of barbarism and moral decadence. But, there was soon to be no more room in the Free State for farmers like Tylden. Large-scale capitalized farming had to replace share-cropping, and the easier access to credit after the establishment of a Land Bank in 1908 facilitated the process. (30)

However, the time was inopportune for the introduction of so crucial a legislative measure as the 1908 Act, as many members of the Government realized when it was first introduced. The National Convention was about to meet, and it was mutually agreed that no major initiatives on the "native problem" should be undertaken by individual colonies prior to unification. The Colonial Office thus persuaded the ORC Government to postpone implementation of the Act indefinitely. (31) After Union, Hertzog, as Minister of Native Affairs, produced a Bill in parliament incorporating substantially the same measures. However, such was the strength of rentier interests in the other provinces that the anti-squatting provisions in their entirety were made applicable only to the Free State in the 1913 Lands Act, and were rendered ineffective in their application elsewhere. It would probably be true to say that nowhere else in South Africa was the impact of capital on the social fabric of the countryside so dramatic in its consequences as in the Free State.

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Notes

- (1) See, for example, the evidence before the African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-05, Vol. IV, passim (Cape Town, 1904).
- (2) See annual Basutoland Colonial Reports (British Command Papers); also CO 417/455, 20th July 1908, re Forestry.

- (3) CO 224/25, 2nd May 1907: from Sir Gilbert Parker, MP, re Land Settlement, Revaluation of Farms.
- (4) CO 224/27, 12th October 1908: re Act No. 42.
- (5) As a result of a considerable agitation on behalf of these people (the Batlokoa and Bakhulukhwe), who had been granted reserves in the north-east by the Free State government after the Sotho Wars, the Colonial Office initiated exhaustive enquiries into their claims, and the CO archives for the years 1906-10 contain a mine of oral evidence on their history (and on the history of the north-eastern districts).
- (6) CO 224/16, 20th May 1904: from Sir J. Swinburne, re Law as to Natives on Farms.
- (7) I use this term rather than "proletarianization" in that the process under study is not the replacement of feudal by capitalist productive relations, but the transition from peasant tenants paying rent in kind to labour tenants severely restricted in their rights of movement and of alienation of their produce. Crucial to this process was the extension of masters and servants contracts to all blacks resident on white farms in the Free State (provided for in the 1913 Land Act), with its implications for the legal status of black share-croppers, previously regarded as "partners" of the land-owner. However, the term "enservment" does not imply that we are dealing with a feudal mode of production, but with a feudal mode of surplus expropriation. Morris quite erroneously assumes that if the productive process is capitalist, then the relations of production must also be capitalist, and proceeds to "prove" (with evidence from the 1930s) that labour-tenancy by the second decade of the century was a form of wage-labour. This is clearly not so. (M. L. Morris, "The Development of Capitalism in South African Agriculture: class struggle in the countryside", Economy and Society, V, 3, 1976.)
- (8) CO 224/15, 25th July 1904: re Employment of Natives on Farms.
- (9) See, for example, Reports of the ORC Agricultural Department for years 1907-08, 1908-09 (CO 599/16, CO 599/19, respectively).
- (10) See H. J. van Aswegen, "Die Verhouding tussen Blank en nie-Blank in die Oranje Vrystaat, 1854-1902", DPhil, VOFS, 1969, pp. 554-609. (van Aswegen, however, entirely misses the significance of his evidence.)
- (11) Particularly revealing is evidence before the 1908 ORC Native Affairs Commission (published in 1911 by the Union Government).
- (12) For example, Natives Land Commission, Evidence, UG 22, 1916 (CO 633/77), p. 3. (The Free State evidence was collected in 1913.)
- (13) CO 224/26, 17th August 1908: re Land Settlement.
- (14) CO 633/77, UG 22, 1916, pp. 32, 34.
- (15) CO 224/31, 31st August 1909: from League of Universal Brotherhood, re Treatment of Native Chiefs; CO 224/32, 6th November 1909: from Dr C. Garnett, re Petition of Batlokoa and Bakhulukhwe.
- (16) CO 224/32, 15th November 1909: from C. Garnett, re Treatment of Basutos by Boer Farmers.
- (17) CO 224/31, 31st August 1909: from League of Universal Brotherhood, re Treatment of Native Chiefs.
- (18) CO 224/32, 6th November 1909: from Dr C. Garnett, re Petition of Batlokoas and Bakhulukhwes.
- (19) Actually, Moloi was by no means an unusually large stock-owner; examples of wealthy peasants abound in the pages of the 1911 Union Government Blue Book for Native Affairs, UG 17, 1911 (CO 633/15). However, their fate always appears to be the same: a stubborn refusal to reduce their stock gradually gives way after a period of fruitless wandering to a sullen acceptance of their fate. See, for example, S. T. Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa (London, 1916), pp. 60-61.
- (20) CO 633/77, UG 22, 1916, p. 235.
- (21) Ibid.
- (22) G. B. Beak (The Aftermath of War: an account of the repatriation of Boers and Natives in the ORC, 1902-04 [London, 1906]) provides much evidence of this.

- (23) See evidence before the ORC Poor White Commission, 1908 (CO 599/13).
- (24) CO 599/11, Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, 21st August 1908.
- (25) Rights of Coloured Persons in Respect of Fixed Property Act 42, 1908.
- (26) CO 224/27, 28th September 1908, re Acts.
- (27) For example, see the comments of Acting Governor R. D. Allason: CO 224/27, 12th October 1908: re Act 42.
- (28) The phrase is Governor Gould-Adams': CO 224/27, 12th October 1908, re Act No. 42.
- (29) CO 224/28, 21st September 1908: from Lord Harris, re Bill affecting Ploughing by Natives on "Share System".
- (30) CO 224/26, 31st August 1908: re Bill to raise loan of £1 $\frac{1}{2}$ m.
- (31) CO 224/27, 12th October 1908: re Act 42.