

THE FABIAN COLONIAL BUREAU AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1940-1955

by

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Introduction

Writing of the relationship between the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the Colonial Office under the Labour Government of 1945-51, Margaret Cole claimed that "its influence had played no small part in formulating policy which was actually carried out" (1), while Goldsworthy has written that "here was one of the most remarkable instances of sustained and creative interchange between a minister and a pressure group which recent political history is able to provide". (2)

In this paper I shall argue that, while Goldsworthy's statement holds true where the Colonial Office is concerned, writers on the Bureau have underestimated the fact that when Fabian plans conflicted with government priorities, as frequently they did, they were overruled. I shall attempt to illustrate this through an examination of the Bureau's activities on South Africa between 1940 and 1955. Here, during the Attlee government, they came up against a markedly less sympathetic response, reflecting a government policy of maintaining good relations with South Africa. Failure here also serves to throw the Bureau's tactics and philosophy into somewhat sharper light than a study of the Colonial Office only.

Between 1940 and 1955 perspectives on South Africa in Britain underwent rapid change, and a study of the Bureau's activities serves also to illustrate this process. Before 1950 they were almost the only group on the left concerned with African issues. Thereafter, the Bureau's importance declined as other groups (which gained much of their impetus from events in southern Africa) took the centre of the stage with new policies and methods to which the Fabians sometimes found it hard to adapt.

The Bureau, 1940-45

The origins of the Fabian Colonial Bureau were closely connected with South Africa. The Labour Party had never devoted any serious attention to "The Empire", but in the 1930s two small groups, with an overlapping membership, functioned as pressure and study groups on race relations in Africa. The "Friends of Africa" had been set up by Winifred Holtby and Arthur Creech Jones to support the activities of William Ballinger, researcher and trade union activist in South Africa who had originally been sent out by them to aid Kadalie's Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union in 1928. The membership of this group overlapped with Frederick Livie-Noble's "London Group on

African Affairs", set up to study race relations and the Empire in 1930 at the suggestion of Rheinallt Jones of the South African Institute of Race Relations. Both groups' activities centred on South Africa and the three British-ruled Protectorates.

In 1940 both ceased to function owing to wartime pressures, but in the same year some of their Labour Party activists formed the Fabian Colonial Bureau. For some time the need had been felt for an organization which could engage in co-ordinated research and activity on colonial issues, while it was felt that continued activity on South Africa was less worthwhile owing to that country's independence from British control. (3) The initiative was taken by the South African-born Rita Hinden, who gained the support of the Fabian Society for the establishment of a Colonial Bureau whose main task would be to formulate colonial policy for a post-war Labour government.

The Bureau started, with very limited personnel and resources, in October 1940. Its perspective fell within the Fabian tradition of empirical research into specific problems, through information gained mainly through official sources and through correspondents, mainly "white liberal" contacts in the Empire. They maintained the common view that African colonies would not be ready for independence until many years of training had passed, and held a strong hostility towards Marxism and radical African nationalism.

From 1940 until 1945, the Bureau's main work was in producing a series of "general" pamphlets on colonial problems. Secondly, they built up links with all interested Labour MPs, and a wide network was created. Questions in Parliament were used to gather information and also kept Ministers on their toes. By 1945 the Bureau had grown to the stage where it was the immediate source of reference for all those concerned with Empire matters in the Party. (4) This process of influencing the party through "expert" advice reminds one in some ways of the tactics of "permeation" of political parties advocated for the Fabians by the Webbs in the early years of the century. The type of "permeation" employed by the FCB, however, was very different - theoretical, not organizational. It relied on persuasion of those responsible for formulating party policy - and was based on the premise that they would listen.

#### The Bureau and South Africa, 1940-45

The Bureau's first Chairman and Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones and Rita Hinden, already had regular contacts with South Africa, with the Ballingers and with the Institute of Race Relations. There was, also, a "Cape Fabian Society" which, in the 1940s, initiated a correspondence with the London Bureau. Asked by Hinden to outline their policy on race, their secretary replied: "Politics in this country is based mainly upon a racial struggle ... I have always advocated that the Cape Fabian Society should endeavour to alter this and put politics on a social and economic basis rather than the present racial one." (5)

This view of race prejudice as an aberration produced by the peculiar historical development of South Africa which must pass away as the country developed economically, a view divorced from any analysis of the workings of a capitalist economy based largely on cheap labour, was the typical ideology of liberal groups in the 1940s in South Africa. The Fabians' other contacts also held during the war years that the advance of industrialism would break down racial barriers. In 1942, after Smuts's statement that racial discrimination in South Africa would be brought to an end, the Institute of Race Relations wrote to Rita Hinden expressing great optimism, a view with which Hinden agreed. (6)

This optimism did not blind the Bureau to the importance for Africa of South African developments, but, despite their antecedents and contacts, they firmly maintained their resolve not to become closely involved with the self-governing Dominions. In 1942 Hinden wrote to one correspondent who had asked for help and advice: "Your problems in South Africa have to be tackled on the spot together with

like-minded persons around you. We in England have no control or responsibility for affairs in the Union, and all we can do is to spread some of the more liberal ideas ..." (7)

After 1945, however, the Fabians did become more closely involved with South Africa, for two reasons. Firstly, a whole series of issues arose affecting not only South Africa but also her neighbours - Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa and the three "Protectorates". These were territories which the Fabians felt were within their purview. Secondly, after 1945 the optimism of the war years regarding South African development collapsed, with the strong post-war unrest and its repression by Smuts, and then in 1948, with the victory of Malan. "Apartheid" threw down a gauntlet to liberalism and quickly became a focus of world attention.

#### The Labour Government and South Africa, 1945-50

The Labour victory of 1945 brought the Bureau's Chairman, Creech Jones, to the Colonial Secretaryship. This was greatly welcomed by the Bureau, who now hoped to see Labour's Fabian-dominated colonial policy commitments put into practice. To a certain extent this was achieved, but only so far as other government priorities were not hampered, and for several reasons the government would not adopt a policy of opposing South Africa's racialism and desire for territorial expansion.

The post-war years saw Britain at an economic crossroads, and the start of the Cold War. These factors affected the Labour government's approach towards the Commonwealth, and especially towards South Africa, in several ways. Firstly, there were strong economic motives for a friendly policy towards South Africa. It was a highly profitable market for British investments and exports and, as a member of the sterling area, figured fairly substantially in financial policy. Secondly, the government placed great store on the role of the Empire in Western defence, and South Africa was important there too.

One must also take into account the lack of interest in or knowledge of African affairs by most of the members of the government: an ignorance no doubt fostered, where South Africa was concerned, by General Smuts in his rôle of liberal world statesman.

Meanwhile, the Dominions Office, unlike the Colonial Office, had a tradition as a "white man's club" and was unresponsive to criticisms of Dominion governments. One concern that it did have was to avoid "interfering" in internal South African affairs, which it felt would encourage the anti-Commonwealth Nationalists. (8)

The Labour Government's trading and financial policies, and its enthusiasm for the Cold War, led it, then, to a view of South Africa very different from that of the Fabians. This was to lead to conflict on several occasions.

#### The Bureau's Links with South Africa, 1945-50

Before examining these conflicts, let us first examine the development of the Fabians' links with, and their views of, South Africa between 1945 and 1950.

While old contacts remained, new ones developed only slowly. Although the Fabians were a natural contact for newer activists in South Africa, such as the Rev. Michael Scott, these links did not develop to any great extent; the Fabians continued to insist that they could not become involved in the internal affairs of South Africa. (9)

There were no links with any black organizations in South Africa. At first sight this may seem strange, for these years saw a burgeoning of activity by Africans and Indians. The African organizations, however, unlike the "white liberals" had neither the finances nor the organizational facilities to forge links abroad. Those black groups who did write to the Fabians - such as the "Non-European Committee", who asked for aid in 1945 - found, like the whites, that their requests could not be granted. (10)

While this approach was understandable - the Bureau was frequently criticized by the parent Fabian Society for involving itself in too much activism at the expense of research (11), and its limited personnel and finances were concentrated elsewhere than South Africa - it is none the less notable that the lack of contacts among African groups in South Africa does not seem to have caused the Bureau any concern.

After 1945, however, correspondence continued with the SAIRR, and with a new white correspondent who was a major source of information in this period, a retired veterinary officer from West Africa, Donald Stewart. This future founder-member of the South African Liberal Party gained the wholehearted approval of the Bureau. A supporter of ending discrimination through a gradual extension of the franchise, his outlook was liberal rather than socialist: socialism in South Africa being identified, for him, with the "white" Labour Party, whose moves towards multi-racialism he dismissed.

It is worth noting in parenthesis that, although Stewart does not indicate in his letters how he came to know of the Bureau, the Bureau was known in South Africa, partly through the sale there of its journal, "Venture", and its policies execrated by white South Africans. (12)

Meanwhile, the Fabians, through their correspondents, became aware that Smuts's promises during the war years were not being fulfilled. In 1947 a Bureau pamphlet on South Africa was planned, and, though abandoned as insufficiently researched, it shows Fabian thinking at this time. Written by Ethel Binyon, a former colleague of Ballinger's then resident in England (13), it embodied a strong attack on African conditions before coming to the orthodox liberal solution of plans for a "rational" political economy, involving an increased domestic market for goods encouraged by social welfare measures, education, and the gradual extension of the franchise: "the future salvation of South Africa lies in extensive and mechanised industrial development. For this, far more skilled and semi-skilled labour is needed and leading economists have stressed the view that South Africa's future as a nation can only be assured when the potential energy of the native population is liberated and directed into the highly productive and efficient channels of industry." (14)

Whether such policies could ever have been implemented by a white government is doubtful to say the least; there was, again, no consideration of the possibility that for some sections of capitalist enterprise, notably the mines, "cheap labour" policies were eminently rational in securing profits. A few months later, however, in May 1948, the Nationalists under Malan came into power. A brief piece on the issue of that election by the Bureau shows a gloomily realistic assessment of the position. While doubting Smuts's willingness to initiate reform, they wrote that "The alternative is Dr Malan's complete segregation and repression is likely to build up a dangerous volcano for the future". (15)

Thus the Fabians had come, by 1948, to a position where they had few illusions left about the illiberal direction of South African "native policy". After 1948, however, any last hopes that the situation might be reformed vanished, as the codification of segregation under apartheid made South Africa a focal point for opposition to racialism worldwide. Meanwhile, Malan began to spread acquisitive tentacles towards the Protectorates and like-minded racialists in the Rhodesias. It was becoming increasingly difficult to steer clear of direct involvement with South Africa.

The Bureau and the Dominions Office, 1945-50

Where the Colonial Office was concerned, the Bureau was on the whole satisfied with the government's performance, although it was perfectly prepared to be critical where this was felt to be necessary. (16) Where the Dominions Office (17) was concerned, however, there was far less to defend, and far more to criticize, in a policy which Donald Stewart was quick to call "appeasement". (18)

In late 1946 Arthur Bottomley, speaking as British representative at the United Nations, supported South Africa's claim to incorporate South West Africa, after a "referendum of chiefs" which was widely recognized as fraudulent but which Britain accepted as valid. (19) Not only did the government support South Africa but it had refused to allow facilities for either Chief Tshekedi Khama or Michael Scott to leave Bechuanaland to present the case of the Herero people of South West Africa. Many of this tribe now lived in Bechuanaland, and Tshekedi and Scott felt, too, the danger of "encirclement" if South Africa took full control of a territory which had a long common border with the British Protectorate.

Contacted by Tshekedi and his legal adviser, Buchanan, the Fabians were prompted into activity and took up what cudgels they could on their behalf. Since the issue involved a British Protectorate they felt that it came within their field, but heated correspondence with the Dominions Office and questions in Parliament both failed to alter the government's position. (20) In July 1946, Hinden wrote to Tom Driberg, leader of the Dominions Group of Labour MPs in the Commons: "I feel that it is really scandalous that when the Chief of a Protected Territory wishes to come over here to put his views on a matter vitally concerning the future of his country, he should be held up, and that largely by South African interference. There are one or two questions in the House next week on this matter, but I imagine there will be stone walling replies." (21)

Despite their lack of success, Fabian pressure tactics were not yet exhausted, and in November 1946 the Bureau wrote directly to Attlee, pointing out that "this support to South Africa will undoubtedly have an effect on ... millions of Africans in British colonies", and urging him to oppose any unilateral action to incorporate South-West Africa which Smuts might take in defiance of the UN. (22) This letter, however, was merely passed on to Addison, the Dominions Secretary, who replied repeating Bottomley's arguments favouring incorporation. (23)

The Fabians continued thereafter to make representations against support for South Africa at the UN, but with no success. A joint deputation with the Quakers and the Anti-Slavery Society in 1949 merely produced a reiteration of the old arguments. (24) Fabian attempts to influence government policy over South-West Africa had completely failed. Attempts to change government policy towards the Protectorates were to be no more successful.

As has been noted, a large element in Fabian concern with South-West Africa was the effect which annexation might have on Bechuanaland. Ever since the 1920s, Labour's colonial activists had been afraid that the three Protectorates might be transferred to South Africa; they had only a small population and few natural resources, but were important to South Africa for mainly strategic reasons, and successive South African Prime Ministers had campaigned for their transfer. Britain had always refused, but the possibility was always there under the provisions of the South African constitution, and Labour activists had devoted much energy and research to opposing transfer and calling for the Protectorates to be made models of "enlightened" colonial administration with substantial grants of aid, partly to provide a contrast with South African native policy.

The claims for "transfer", dropped by South Africa during the war, were revived after 1945 by Smuts and then Malan. The British response was to repeat the formula that transfer could not be effected until the African inhabitants (who were

implacably opposed) had been consulted in accordance with terms laid down in 1910; but this was done in conciliatory terms, sympathy was expressed for South African aspirations, and Britain refused to give any undertakings as to where the long-term future of the territories might lie. (25) Meanwhile, a visit by Gordon-Walker, Dominions Under-Secretary, to southern Africa at which African leaders were snubbed caused concern to the Fabians' contacts there, and anxious letters to the Bureau followed. (26)

Between 1945 and 1950 the Bureau followed its tactics of letters, deputations and Parliamentary questions over several matters concerning the Protectorates, to the full. Direct correspondence with Attlee was again undertaken in 1946 and 1947, calling on him to transfer the responsibility for the Protectorates to the Colonial Office. He replied that he saw no fault with the existing procedures. (27) A deputation to the Dominions Office in 1949 failed to draw the desired long-term assurances against transfer to South Africa. (28)

By 1950 the Fabians had become extremely angry as one event after another appeared to prove the government's willingness to bow before South African wishes. The disbanding of armed African troops in Bechuanaland in 1948 seemed a particularly disturbing example. (29) Their failure was complete, and, despite the large amount of blame which they laid at the door of the Dominions Office as an institution, they had also failed in appeals "over its head" to Attlee. (30) One very important question - the relevance of Fabian lobbying tactics on issues where the government's priorities were quite different from their own - had, however, not been considered by them when, in 1950, a gigantic scandal blew up in the Protectorates - the Seretse Khama affair.

#### The Impact of the Seretse Khama Affair, 1950-51

In 1948 Seretse Khama, heir to the major chiefdom in Bechuanaland, had offended tribal opinion by hismorganatic marriage to Ruth Williams, a white Englishwoman. The interracial marriage had also horrified southern African whites, and Malan had protested to London. Early in 1950 the British government invited Seretse to London for talks, and a few weeks later suddenly announced that he would not be allowed back to Bechuanaland for five years. Although Gordon-Walker, now Dominions Secretary, denied having received communications from Malan and claimed his action had been taken to preserve tribal unity, no one on the left believed this, and Seretse himself claimed he had been tricked into coming to England. (31)

The result was an unprecedented uproar both inside and outside Parliament, which made headline news (the first post-war African issue to do so). The issue marked a watershed in public interest in colonial affairs, not least among Labour Party members. (32) This was so not least because the issue was the jumping-off point for the activities of two men who were to be very important in the political debates of the 1950s - Michael Scott, recently exiled from South Africa, and Fenner Brockway, who had been returned as a Labour MP in 1950. Both felt (although from very different political standpoints) the need for a new type of organization to deal with African affairs, wider in appeal than the Bureau.

The Bureau reacted to Seretse's banishment with unequivocal opposition. Private discussions with Gordon-Walker were held, and he met a formal deputation two weeks later, but it was unable to move him. (33) Fenner Brockway, however, had reacted even more quickly - within a week he had organized a "Seretse Khama Fighting Committee", which brought together a variety of British organizations in a pressure group which lobbied at Westminster but which also worked to publicise the issue inside and outside the Labour Party. This was altogether a new approach where colonial affairs were concerned, and the wide moral appeal to the public and to party members represented a new approach very different from the research and lobbying of the Fabians. It also awakened in the left of the Labour Party a new interest in colonial affairs. Of the five Labour MPs who voted against the government in a

division over Seretse in March 1950, two (Driberg and Brockway) were left-wing colonial activists who had little connection with the Bureau, while the MPs actively connected with the Fabians voted in accordance with the government whip.

The Africa Bureau, set up in 1952 by Michael Scott, likewise advocated a new approach to African problems. Those involved at the beginning were mostly South African radicals who, partly through disillusion with the Attlee government's performance there, advocated a non-party approach, appealing to Conservatives and Liberals as well as Labour politicians for economic development and political rights for Africans. Many of those involved, such as Creech Jones, were already connected with the Fabians, and the two co-operated throughout the 1950s, especially on the Protectorates. The approach of the Africa Bureau was similar to that of the Fabians in that its instigators were "capitalists", and they engaged in similar tactics of lobbying and influencing prominent politicians, while feeling that the Bureau's ability to lobby figures outside the Labour Party in some ways enabled it to complement the Fabians' work in the Labour Party. (34)

#### Conclusion - the Decline of the Bureau 1951-55

Considering that after 1951 the Fabians were dealing with a Conservative government and with the rise of militant opposition to white rule throughout Africa, it is perhaps not surprising that they found it hard to adapt; equally, the need for new types of organizations to cope with the urgent problems of the 1950s is not surprising. The Labour Party, meanwhile, expanded its Commonwealth Department, which, inevitably, took on some work that had formerly been a Fabian prerogative.

Nevertheless, and apart from these factors, the decline in the Fabians' influence in the 1950s, until the Bureau was merged with the Fabian International Bureau in 1963, was exacerbated by over-caution and complacency in the early 1950s, and a failure to adapt their ideology in the light of rapidly changing conditions which was, arguably, connected with the nature of "Fabianism".

To begin with, although the Fabians worked with the Africa Bureau, they had far less contact with the extremely important Movement for Colonial Freedom which Brockway formed in 1954. Like the Seretse Khama Committee, the MCF was concerned with propaganda, mainly though not entirely inside the Labour Party, together with a certain amount of lobbying, on the platform of democratic rule everywhere in Africa, including South Africa. The Fabians regarded the MCF as crudely demagogic(35), but this was in many respects unfair. The MCF included a number of activists - Brockway, Driberg, Leslie Hale - who were experts in colonial subjects. Fabian suspicion of "mass" organizations was probably at the root of their hostility to an organization which gave far less priority to attempts to "influence" party leaders as such; together with the traditional Fabian prejudice against Marxism, the MCF was accused, rather unfairly, of sympathy with Communists in Southeast Asia.

The potential conflict between the Fabians and "mass" organizations is revealed in the pamphlet "Socialists and the Empire", published in 1946. Rita Hinden, while making the claim of objectivity for the Fabians, revealed at the same time the particular political bias that did exist when she wrote: "From the start the Bureau determined to work within the Fabian tradition, which has always commenced with research. There are too many organizations in all spheres of public life clamouring for action, denouncing, appealing to public conscience, and too few who base their appeals and denunciations on solid knowledge and a painstaking collection of the facts. (36)

The Fabian commitment to the methods of work they had used in the 1940s was never made explicit by the Bureau, and, complacent about their successes with the Colonial Office, they never analysed their failures at the Dominions Office. When the Seretse case blew up in 1950 they responded with the tactics they had always used, and

failed; but this time a "mass organization" in the shape of the Fighting Committee appeared to take up the slack. It is doubtful whether the tactics of the Committee, or of the MCF, were a great deal more successful in achieving their aims - but they did mobilize party opinion in a way impossible, not only constitutionally but, I would argue, ideologically as well, for the Fabians.

The conservatism of the Bureau in the 1950s is clearly revealed in their relationship with South Africa, where few new contacts were developed despite the rapid changes in the organization of the opposition there. It is true that, unlike the Labour Party which increased its contact with black organizations, the Fabians still had very limited resources for building up new links, but there was also an inertia in their attitude. A striking example of this appears over the Fabian response to a request from the "Committee for a Democratic South Africa" to help with fund-raising for African passive resistance, when the Secretary of the Bureau felt that "no responsible person will be able to sign such a letter as we should be supporting the opposition to the lawful government of a Dominion". (37)

The Fabians remained a significant element in the formulation of Labour's African policies throughout the 1950s - especially over Central African Federation, to which they became strongly opposed. By the end of the decade they had come round to support of rapid independence under majority rule in Africa, abandoning the "social engineering" and gradualism of the 1940s. (38) But, although nobody had anticipated the anti-colonial explosion of the 1950s, the Fabians were, as their record on South Africa indicates, slower than others on the Left to develop their ideas and their strategies.

An "independent" research group, the Fabian Colonial Bureau saw itself as an "objective" body, but a study of its South African activities reveals that its members were operating with a very specific set of ideas and tactics, in regular contact only with like-minded groups in South Africa whose similar biases they failed to recognize. Their background vision of a slow reform of conditions in South Africa, through the development of economic and political "rationality" among the whites, begged many questions. As an analysis, it ignored the dependence of many South African industries on cheap black labour, and - significantly - no study of British involvement in this process through trade and investment was undertaken.

It must be added, however, that the MCF, with its calls for "freedom now" couched largely in moral terms, succeeded little better in analysing South African society and the links, both strategic and especially economic, which prevented and still prevent Labour governments from challenging apartheid. The MCF, however, did at least manage to avoid the Bureau's basic error; the error which Professor Popper has attributed to the classic historians: "Aiming at objectivity, they feel bound to avoid any selective point of view; but since this is impossible, they usually adopt points of view without being aware of them. This must defeat their efforts to be objective, for one cannot possibly be critical of one's own point of view, and conscious of its limitations, without being aware of it." (39)

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#### Notes

- (1) Margaret Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism (Heinemann, 1961), p. 228.
- (2) D. Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-61 (OUP, 1971), p. 144.
- (3) Letter from A. Creech Jones to F. Livie-Noble, 29.11.37 (IGAA Papers, Box 2, File 2, Rhodes House, Oxford).



- (4) Review of Bureau activities in Socialists and the Empire (FCB Pamphlet, 1946).
- (5) FCB Papers, Box 94, File 1, ff. 218-31. Rhodes House, Oxford.
- (6) FCB Papers, Box 94, File 1, ff. 24-46.
- (7) FCB Papers, Box 94, File 1, f. 6.
- (8) See Cabinet discussion on the attitude to be taken by the UK delegation to the UN over South-West Africa, 1946 (Cabinet Conclusions 91 [46] 3) and memo by Dominions Secretary (CP [46] 394), Public Record Office, London.
- (9) FCB Papers, Box 94, File 1, f. 169.
- (10) FCB Papers, Box 94, File 3, f. 14.
- (11) FCB Papers, Box 6, File 1, f. 67.
- (12) FCB Papers, Box 94, File 1, ff. 274-317.
- (13) Information supplied by Mr Baruch Hirson.
- (14) FCB Papers, Box 38, File 3. South Africa Pamphlet. Abandoned 1948.
- (15) FCB Papers, Box 98, File 2, ff. 363-5. Typescript of article, "The South African Elections".
- (16) See, for example, FCB Papers, Box 91, File 1, ff. 146-61.
- (17) The title was changed to Commonwealth Relations Office in 1947.
- (18) FCB Papers, Box 95, List 4.
- (19) FCB Papers, Box 98, File 1, f. 11.
- (20) FCB Papers, Box 91, File 2, ff. 71-89.
- (21) FCB Papers, Box 17, File 3, f. 101.
- (22) FCB Papers, Box 98, File 1, ff. 38-39.
- (23) FCB Papers, Box 94, File 1, f. 82.
- (24) FCB Papers, Box 98, File 1, ff. 402-3.
- (25) FCB Papers, Box 90, File 1, f. 119.
- (26) FCB Papers, Box 91, File 7, ff. 15-18.
- (27) FCB Papers, Box 91, File 3, f. 69.
- (28) FCB Papers, Box 98, File 1, f. 448.
- (29) FCB Papers, Box 19, File 7, f. 1.
- (30) FCB Papers, Box 4, File 2, f. 193.
- (31) For a fuller account, see Goldsworthy, op. cit., pp. 157-62.
- (32) Ibid., pp. 157-62.
- (33) For a fuller account, ibid., p. 158.
- (34) Interview with Miss Mary Benson, 8 August 1978.
- (35) Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 327.
- (36) R. Hinden, Socialists and the Empire (op. cit.), p. 9.
- (37) FCB Papers, Box 64, File 1, ff. 67-8.
- (38) It is interesting to compare and contrast the approaches in Fabian Colonial Essays (Fabian Publications, 1945) and New Fabian Colonial Essays (Fabian Publications, 1959).
- (39) K. R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Routledge, 1961), p. 152.