SEGREGATION AND THE CAPE LIBERAL TRADITION

by

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The development of segregation in South Africa has most commonly been perceived as representing the emergence of a racial-caste society that overthrew the values of Cape liberalism. According to this thesis, the creation of Union in South Africa in 1910 marked a central political hiatus from which the successive political decline of the "Cape liberal tradition" can be traced. (1) Segregationist ideology, therefore, owed more to the influences of the northern Boer Republics, governed by the implicitly anti-liberal doctrine of "no equality in church and state", or else to the conservative policies of Theophilus Shepstone in Natal and the careful preservation of Zulu tribal structures (2), than it did to the society of the Cape, which has been seen as developing a very different system of social organization. Thus Phyllis Lewsen has argued that, while the protectionist land policies in the Eastern Cape from the time of Sir George Grey mark a certain similarity with the twentieth century creation of Bantu "Homelands", nevertheless, by the time of Union, there was an identifiable "conservative liberalism" in the Cape marked by a "determination to hold on to its principles of government" and which "had a hold in both parties and language groups, and was linked with institutions, which gave it growing tenacity". (3) Union itself, therefore, becomes the central factor in the explanation of the course of twentieth century South African history and the impression is left that, if a somewhat different political system had been created - on the lines, for instance, of a federation rather than a Union - then the Cape "liberal" institutions would have been able to survive. (4)

Such a political view of the evolution of South African history can be traced to a wider view in much liberal South African historiography of the impact of the frontier. From the early 1930s such historians as Eric Walker, I. D. MacCrone (though he was essentially a social psychologist), C. W. de Kiewiet and S. H. Frankel(5), developed an explanation for the development of racial segregation in twentieth century South Africa in terms of the legacy of the frontier. Much of this accrued from the earlier work of the historian Frederick Jackson Turner and his school in the United States, though the differences between the American West and the South African frontier were acknowledged. "It was not a romantic frontier [in South Africa]", wrote de Kiewiet, "like the American West or heroic like the North West Frontier of India. Legend has denied the Pondos, for example, a place beside the Pawnees or the Pathans. The stuff of legend is not easily found in a process which turned Ama-Xosa, Zulus, or Basuto into farm labourers, kitchen servants, or messengers." (6) Nevertheless, "the frontier was the stage where, more spectacularly than elsewhere, was taking place the great revolution of South African history ... As the Europeans advanced, they did not succeed in driving the Kafirs back into their hinterland. The Kafirs were crowded into areas which steadily grew less able to maintain them, or lived as squatters and labourers upon the land that had fallen to the Europeans. This was the pattern of every subsequent frontier of contact between Europeans and natives". (7)

This impact of the frontier, so the liberal school has argued, becomes in turn the central causative explanation behind the generation of segregationist ideology in the twentieth century and its overthrowing of liberalism in the Cape. In effect, the strong political and cultural legacies of racial stereotyping from the days of the frontier are sufficient to explain the resilience of racial ideology in the increasingly urban society of South Africa in the wake of the diamond and gold mining revolutions at Kimberley and on the Witwatersrand in the 1870s and 1880s. Thus Francis Wilson has written that the pressures towards segregation arose from "the platteland":

> In the towns the interaction was different from that
> on both reserves and farms. Not only were the
> relationships between the diverse groups more
> impersonal, but also the process of urbanization came
> too late to influence the norms by which the
> politically dominant, white, group judged and to which
> it sought to mould social interaction as the country
> became institutionalized. (8)   (emphasis added)

Similarly, David Welsh has argued that, despite the fact that "urbanization undermined the master/servant relationship between white and non-white that had been established in the pre-industrial era", nevertheless "industry was forced to defer to traditional white attitudes and, with the consolidation of segregation from the 1920s onward, the traditional pattern was re-established through, it is suggested, on a more insecure foundation". (9)

The assumptions of this argument can be seen as owing a great deal to the legacy of nineteenth century liberal and radical thought on the nature of capitalist industrialization in the metropolitan context and which has survived in a considerable amount of writing in the social sciences in the twentieth. This "technologico-Benthamite" view, as Leavis called it (10), rests essentially on the inherent rationality of capitalist accumulation and a belief in its ultimate ability to transcend the cultural and ideological legacies of the pre-industrial era. The view, therefore, reflected the essential optimism of the early writers on industrialization, such as St Simon and Comte in France, Jeremy Bentham and the two Mills in England, and later Brentano in Germany, in what was perceived as an "age of progress". However, with the development of a much more pessimistic outlook in the twentieth century, with its legacy both of total war and economic depression, this optimism has become tempered by a somewhat more cautious assessment of the inherent logic of capitalist industrialization. Following in particular the thesis of Herbert Blumer, that the industrialization process can be seen as accommodating itself to, rather than transcending, the values and ideology of the pre-industrial order, the liberal school has had to be somewhat less grandiose in its claims than many of its predecessors. Nevertheless, even if some of the most strident of the school's contemporary followers, such as Michael O'Dowd, admit that capitalist industrialization will not result in a society exactly on the European or American pattern, but will rather verge towards one of "pluralism" (11), the essential optimism remains. Welsh's remark on the essential insecurity for the foundations of urban segregation suggests that an alternative model can be created through the logic of the present industrialization process in South Africa and lead to the emergence of a society resting to a considerable degree on liberal values. (12)

The nub of this essential optimism of the liberal school can be seen, in part, to rest on an historical interpretation of the Cape liberal tradition, and returns again to the political hiatus view that was seen to occur around the time of Union in 1910. The tenacity of the liberal school, as an ideological world view, rests on a reading of history, and here the appeal back to Cape liberal values rests upon the assumption that they were destroyed by something else. So to this extent a critical examination of the current liberal position in South Africa depends upon an assessment of Cape liberalism in the time before Union.

The Evolution of Cape Liberal Ideology

One of the errors of the liberal school has been the somewhat static perception of the nature of Cape liberalism. It is a false perception, for liberalism in the Cape had its own internal dynamics and substantially reflected the changing nature of Cape society as it passed from an agrarian society dominated by the production and export of wool in the mid-nineteenth century (13) to one increasingly permeated by mining capital in the last decade or so of the century during the premiership of Cecil Rhodes. This transformation, however, has not received sufficient attention from liberal historians, and Phyllis Lewsen, especially, has interpreted the "conservative liberalism" of the Cape in terms essentially of the importation and maintenance of the ideas of mid-Victorian liberalism. (14)

This importation of ideas of liberalism, and their propagation by the churches, press and later universities, was an essential feature of liberalism in South Africa, but it is at the same time necessary to analyse both the meaning and function of such ideas in terms of the dominant class and ethnic relationships in the Cape society of the time. One of the features of the original Cape franchise of 1853, when Coloured men were included on the voters' roll on the basis of a £25 property qualification or a salary of £50, was that it occurred in the context of a transformed relationship between the colony and the British metropolis. The days of mercantilism were over, and the introduction of Free Trade through Robert Peel's repealing of the Corn Laws in 1846 resulted in a changed attitude in Britain towards keeping the Cape as a specific economic asset. The removal of trading preferences meant a decline in the opposition to the idea of granting the Cape representative institutions (15), though the exact nature of these institutions remained to a considerable extent the product of the class relationships inside the Colony.

To this extent, the creation of "liberal" institutions in the Cape can be seen as occurring at a certain historical moment and their exact working resulted from what Stanley Trapido has seen as a "great tradition" at the colonial level, based on financial and commercial enterprises, the opposition to the government, the legal profession and the press, and a "small tradition" which operated at the local level and which incorporated the economic nexus between white merchants and traders and the Eastern Cape African peasantry. (16) By the 1840s, neither the missions nor the dominant commercial enterprises in the Colony sought to expand territorially, and the 1853 Constitution reflected a search for both political consolidation in the wake of a decline in direct imperial control and a growing appetite for speculative ventures. (17) What has been seen as the "heyday" of the African peasantry thus followed, though by the 1870s additional pressures began to assert themselves to both renew territorial expansion in the Eastern Cape and check African farming at the expense of a growing class of white settlers. (18) The beginnings of Afrikaner nationalism in the 1870s and the formation of the Afrikaner Bond in 1880 ended a period when Cape politics had been free of party political divisions, and the original fear of Robert Godlonton and the English-speaking settlers at the time of the 1853 Constitution that they would be overwhelmed by a coalition of Dutch and Coloured voters became transformed to a fear, by the 1880s, that the Afrikaner Bond of "Onze Jan" Hofmeyr would be excluded by a combination of English votes and those of the Coloureds and Eastern Cape peasantry. (19)

By this time as well, a wider change was occurring in the nature of Victorian liberalism which marked a shift away from an ideology of laissez-faire individualism and social Darwinist ideology based on competition within a society between individuals to a more collectivist-orientated imperialism that emphasized competition between nations. (20) This collectivism ushered in a "search for order" (21) and an increasing emphasis upon state regulation of the economic and political spheres. In Britain, the 1867 Reform Act and the enfranchisement of the urban working class marked a renewed upsurge in class-based political action which had been absent since the defeat of Chartism (22), and politics became increasingly defined both by the role of organized labour, marked by the founding of the TUC in 1872, and organized political parties through the founding of the modern Conservative Party in 1867 and the Liberal Party in 1868. All these developments can be seen to have a ripple effect in the colonial environment of the Cape, and political life there in the last two decades of the nineteenth century marked a progressive shift away from the liberal ideas that had

underpinned the original Constitution in 1853.

Colonial societies, though, are much more insecure in the foundations of their structures than metropolitan ones, and changes that are frequently capable of being absorbed in mature industrial societies such as Britain and America, through "co-option" and the institutionalization of formerly antagonistic classes, are much more difficult to control in the setting of peripheral capitalism. John Foster, in a recent study of Oldham, Northampton and South Shields, has concluded that much of this co-optation and "re-isolation of the working class vanguard" in Britain had occurred by the end of the second quarter of the nineteenth century and was further assisted by the development of the last phase of imperial expansion in the late 1870s and the 1880s. (23) A similar phenomenon can be seen to occur at the Cape, though it was structured on racial lines and took place later on in the century, in the 1880s and 1890s. At the time of the 1853 Constitution such co-optation had not, for the most part, been necessary, owing to the absence of organized labour: in Cape Town, for instance, the first trade unions were formed only in 1881, with the foundation of the Typographical Society and a branch of the English Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners. (24) Control was maintained on the most repressive terms, and in 1856 the Cape parliament passed the Masters and Servants Act that applied to both ex-slaves and the African peasantry, as well as Coloured and African farm labourers; breaches of the Act resulted in one month's imprisonment for a first offence and six weeks in solitary confinement on a spare diet for subsequent offences. The Act's legacy, however, was to ensure the perpetuation of racial divisions within the working class in the era of industrialization after the Kimberley diamond discoveries, a phenomenon ably assisted by the isolation of African workers on the De Beers Mine in compounds. Thus, when trade unionism did develop in diamond mining in the 1890s, it was confined to white workers, who formed the Knights of Labour in 1891 and attacked both monopoly capital and "the insidious attack of cheap labour competition". (25)

It was in response to this growth of trade unionism and the progressive decline of the liberal laissez-faire model that there developed an increasingly racially exclusive ideology in the last decade of the nineteenth century in the Cape. As in Britain, liberal ideology based on the unit of the individual no longer acted as an effective mechanism of social control in an economy increasingly shaped by the assertion of collective class interests. Though the operation of Cape liberalism and the growth of mission education, especially in the Eastern Cape, had produced a class of African political leadership exemplified by such figures as John Tengo Jabavu, the editor of Imvo Zabantsundu in King Williams Town, and Walter Rubusana in East London, who had been prominent in the foundation of the South African Native Congress in 1887, such a petty bourgeois class was incapable of acting as a strong enough political intermediary to control the emerging African proletariat on the diamond mines. Restrictions of the franchise had been passed in 1887 and 1892 to ensure the exclusion of the "blanket kaffir" from the voting process; the 1892 legislation raised the landed property qualification from £25 to £75, eliminating a £25 wage qualification and adding a literacy test. Thus only the mission educated Africans who owned larger plots in the Eastern Cape remained, hence decreasing rather than increasing the African petty bourgeoisie's political effectiveness. Much of this can be attributed to the growing political assertion of white settlers and organized white labour as well as the desire politically to neutralize non-kholwa African migrants on the mines. But this left the question of what alternative mechanisms of social control over the emerging African proletariat were available to the white polity in the Cape. The answer, in the form of the Glen Grey Act in 1894, partially indicated the nature of the later strategy of segregation.

The Glen Grey Act and the Development of Segregation

The development of territorial or "possessory" segregation in South Africa has been closely identified by scholars with the system of colonial rule evolved by Theophilus Shepstone in Natal, based on institutionalized tribal structures. (26) This identification between segregationist ideology and tribalism has led, more recently, to the suggestion by Shula Marks that, in comparison to Natal, in the Cape

there was"little material base for an ideology of segregation",because the "forces of colonialism" were "far stronger" and "the disintegration of precolonial structures more thorough-going", to sustain a segregationist system based on large tribal units. In comparison, Dr Marks suggests, on the basis of earlier work by Stanley Trapido, that the Cape developed an "assimilationist ideology" which "emerged out of the dominance of the mercantile class, interested in fostering a stable and prosperous African peasantry: a peasantry which could only be prdduced by a partial restructuring of pre-colonial society, though the Mfecane and the flight into the Cape of the Mfengu and later the 1867 cattle-killing undoubtedly facilitated the process". (27) This view of Cape liberalism closely coincides with that of Phyllis Lewsen in its emphasis upon the mid-Victorian legacy of the 1853 Constitution and the incorporation of the African peasantry by the "great tradition" of Cape mercantile capital. However, it overlooks the changes in the Cape liberal ideology in the last decade or so of the nineteenth century, when the emergence of the ideology of assimilation of an educated African class of kholwa took place in response to the decline of the earlier ideology of incorporation of individuals as opposed to classes. This later ideology developed substantially out of the decline of mercantile capital's dominance in the Cape and the emergence of mining capital as a powerful political force with the premiership of Cecil Rhodes in 1890.

Rhodes's premiership, in fact, brought to a head a long debate in the Cape on the exact role chiefs and tribal institutions should play in the political process. Some governments had been considerably well disposed to the idea of extending the power of chiefly structures under British imperial hegemony on lines quite similar to Shepstone in Natal. In 1881, for example, the government of Gordon Sprigg had been replaced by Thomas Scanlen, who appointed General "Chinese" Gordon to look after native affairs. Gordon's "solution" was the granting of greater powers to African chiefs and the sweeping away of "a great many of the present officials from the Transkei" (28), and this he succeeded in doing with respect of Basutoland, which reverted to British control in 1884 and later became a model for some of the segregationist ideas of the Commissioner for Native Affairs in the Transvaal under Milner, Sir Godfrey Lagden. (29) But he failed with respect to the Transkei, and a coalition of Upington, Hofmeyr and Sprigg defeated him in 1884 after he attempted a similar policy in Bechuanaland. (30) Scanlen's policy, however, had been backed by many missions in the Cape, and his defeat came as a disappointment to James Stewart who concluded that "the prospects of the natives were never blacker than they are at present". (31) Given such pressures for racial separation, it is difficult to conclude, therefore, that, even before the moves for racial exclusion in the 1890s, all the groups in the "great tradition" in the Cape were necessarily in favour of assimilation.

With respect to those areas in the Eastern Cape of Mfengu and Thembu settlement, it is certainly true that a growing process of political incorporation had taken place in the decades following the 1853 Constitution. In some respects, this process resembled patron-client relations that are characteristic of peasant politics (32), and the essential political figure at the local level, in the absence of tribal structures as a result of the Mfecane, was that of the headman. He it was who was responsible for land allocation through the control of a small council, and the Cape administration increasingly focussed on the role of the headman while the powers of the chiefs declined. (33) However, at the same time there was a marked increase by the latter years of the century in the political activities of the mission-educated kholwa, who tended to eclipse the influence of the headmen. In the case of elections, there was a growing dependence on a class of what Trapido has called "semi-professional politicians" and African election agents which broke through barriers of race, language and culture. (34) This phenomenon was escalated by the growth of party politics in the Cape and the alignment of factions behind different political parties: by 1904, for instance, the Tembu leading paper, Izwi La Bantu, edited by Alan Soga, supported the Progressive Party founded by Cecil Rhodes, while its rival, Imvo Zabantsundu of John Tengo Jabavu, supported the Bond. (35)

It was this growth in the political influence of the kholwa and "modern" African petty bourgeoisie that the Glen Grey Act sought to stem. In many cases, it was used to check the political and economic aspirations of the "modern" petty bourgeoisie who had been able to turn the location boards to

their advantage. The Civil Commissioner in Glen Grey, for instance, strongly backed the appointment of headman Solomon Basmeni in Mkapusi Location, even though the location board were "working against him", on the grounds that his control needed to be restored: the board was reported as persuading local Africans not to attend meetings called by the headman, while anyone wishing to build a hut on the commonage was charged 3% by the board "and no-one knows what happens to the money". (35) Much of this opposition, furthermore, was a result of the fact that Africans were not consulted on appointments made in the location.

This struggle for control at a local level was further illustrated in the case of the Fingqutu Location in Lady Frere, where a number of "registered owners of allotments" drew up a petition at a public meeting in May 1904 with the assistance of the Queenstown labour agent, and later a leading figure in the Bantu Union, Meshach Pelem. The allotment holders' reliance on such a leading kholwa as Pelem illustrated the balance of political forces and the use being made by the administration to exclude certain land-holders from title rights. Of the forty who signed the petition, it was later claimed that nine were "dead", one had no allotment in his name, eight were "at work", and one had been "gone a long time", which, if correct, left only twenty-one with any legitimate claims. (36) The claimants, however, clearly preferred to work directly via Pelem rather than the location headman, who was reported as having heard nothing about the claims. (37) The petitioners, in particular, sought their land claims by survey "with the exception of [acting headman] Mqikela and a few others who hold and cultivate several allotments which are in names of persons of doubtful existence and who if they do exist at all[sic] have their existence only in the imaginations of those who hold the allotments". Furthermore, Pelem claimed,

> since the return of the petition which was sent to
> Acting headman Mqikela he has been unusually very
> busy holding meetings and misleading the people by
> telling them that if they have their building lots
> surveyed they would have no grazing rights in the
> commonage and the Government would at once take
> possession of it and let it to the farmers and the
> natives would be required to graze their cattle
> within the limits of the lots surveyed as building
> sites for them and they would be further compelled
> by Government to push up strong substantial dwelling
> houses which they would not be able to pay for. (38)

The case illustrated how the government's support for headmen thus worked against the further surveying of allotments under the Glen Grey Act while also contributing to the exclusion of land holders, who were forced (in the case of those reported "at work" and "gone a long time") into labour migrancy. Thus, though the Glen Grey system was extended almost immediately after the passing of the Act from Glen Grey itself to the Transkeian districts of Butterworth, Idutywa, Nqawakwe and Tsomo in 1894, while Kentani came in voluntarily in 1899 (39), for the most part the administration acted with extreme caution in implementing the policy. Magistrates of other districts evinced concern as possible opposition to the spread of individual tenure, from the very headmen on whose support the system of colonial clientelege depended. In 1902, Kalanga was not considered a suitable district, owing to "some opposition on account of objections to the land tenure system" (40), while the Chief Magistrate of Tembuland, Transkei and Pondoland urged that "it would be unwise to force the provisions of the Glen Grey Act upon any of the districts under my care. To do so would be regarded by many as a grievance against the Government, but ... there are indications in some of the districts of a desire amongst the people to have the Proclamation applied, and I think it is far better to wait until it is asked for, then it could be granted as a concession, than to force it upon them unwillingly" (emphasis added). (41) This policy of caution had the result of considerably delaying the creation of a class of free peasants under the Act, and, though some observers as late as the 1920s were optimistic as to the Act's gradually being extended (42), it became increasingly clear that only a small minority of peasants were going to be established under the Act. In 1922 a Location Surveys Commission indicated that settlement under the Act had not had the effect of establishing anything like a secure peasantry, for 40% of Glen Grey allotments had passed into hands different from their original holders (43), while by 1925 it emerged that only 7 of the 27 Transkeian

districts had been surveyed, with a total of 50,000 land titles registered in Umtata at a cost to each holder of £4.5s. (44)

On the other hand, the ideals implicit within the Glen Grey system left a lasting legacy on liberal thinking in South Africa in the twentieth century and formed a considerable basis for an ostensibly liberal "alternative" to the ideology of territorial segregation. This was particularly noteworthy in the council system involved in Glen Grey. Under the Act, a system of district councils were established together with a Transkeian Territories General Council, covering the four original Glen Grey districts. This Council, or "Bunga" as it was more commonly called, was gradually extended beyond the initial quit rent areas of Glen Grey to incorporate seven Transkei districts by 1905, and in 1911 a separate council was established for Pondoland,called the Pondoland General Council. Eventually the two councils merged in 1931 to form the United Transkeian Territories General Council,and the model of a separate "consultative" body incorporating both chiefs and headmen and the traditional elite, on the one hand, together with the "modern" petty bourgeoisie, on the other, was used to form the Natives Representative Council in 1936, when the Cape African voters were removed from the common roll. For many liberals this council system represented a mechanism for "advanced" Africans to become involved in the political process as well as including "traditional" or "red" Africans under the control of chiefs. In 1908, for instance, a deputation sent by the Natal government, consisting of Frederick Bridgman, Martin L. Luthuli and P. J. Gumede, praised the Transkeian council system and noted its extension beyond the kholwa and educated class:

> In most of the Council districts, there is but a
> sprinkling of adult natives who may be classed as
> civilised. It was most difficult to realise that
> it was the raw Native who was supplying the bulk
> of the £50,000 with which the Council finances its
> operations, and that, therefore, it was the 'blanket
> kaffir' who holds the larger share in the proprietor-
> ship of the 'Bhunga' roads, wattle plantations,
> dipping tanks, agricultural institution, with its
> prize livestock etc. These considerations are all the
> more surprising when we recall the fact that the
> Proclamation providing for the Council system is, as
> with the tenure, only permissive: and that the
> Council system, with its 10s rate, only becomes
> operative in a given district when the Natives of
> that district express a desire for the extension of
> the Proclamation to that area. (45)

These conclusions were of considerable significance in Natal in the wake of the Bambata Rebellion and led one of the members of the 1907 Native Affairs Commission, the segregationist Maurice Evans, to take up the council idea as part of a native policy for a United South Africa in his book Black and White in South East Africa, which appeared in 1911. (46) This fascination with an ostensibly "voluntary" adherence by "raw" Africans to the Council system when, as we have seen in the case of the Glen Grey land policy, it was by and large an extension of ties between the colonial administration and "traditional" elements of chiefs and headmen, leads in fact to the conclusion that the Cape "liberal tradition" of native policy contributed in no small measure to the evolution of policy after Union in a segregationist direction. This tradition acted in particular on the thinking behind the Native Affairs Act of 1920 introduced by Smuts in the wake of a wave of strikes and urban unrest after the first world war.

The Glen Grey land system, however, can also be seen, in its original formulation presented by Cecil Rhodes in 1894, to contribute to liberal thinking in the period after Union. For many analysts and critics, the idea of settling a freehold (or quit rent) African peasantry on the land as a block to continuing urbanization acted as a key means for preserving some liberal values in the face of a growing agitation for a colour bar in the urban areas from the white petty bourgeoisie and working class. Despite the fact that the provision in the original Glen Grey Act for a labour tax of 10s per annum was removed in 1905, the model of rural settlement

implicit within the Act was represented as forming an effective mechanism of social control for the needs of mining capital. In 1913, for instance, in the aftermath of a "Black Peril" scare on the Rand, when the issue of liquor and assaults on white women reached new heights (47), the Act was defended as an effective means to control the spread of liquor among rural Africans. C. G. Bird, for instance, an official in the Native Affairs Department in the Cape, wrote that no new liquor licences could be granted without prior approval by the district council and that such councils represented an important means of control over migrants until "conditions on the mines receive closer supervision". (48) Similarly, Edgar Brookes, in his segregationist work published in 1924 with the blessing of Hertzog, The History of Native Policy in South Africa, argued for the extension of the Glen Grey system of individual tenure for "advanced communities of Natives in other Provinces" as part of a wider scheme to ensure the exclusion of Africans from permanent participation in the urban industrial economy. (49):

> Industrialists? It is neither for their good nor
> ours that they should become industrialists
> permanently or on a large scale. They are far
> happier, far more moral and in a far more natural
> state on the land than in the big towns - that no
> one denies. (50)

This idea led Brookes to encourage Hertzog to espouse a scheme of neutral areas on lines similar to the Glen Grey scheme in the Cape and the Native Purchase areas in Rhodesia, as part of his "solution" in the 1926 Bills. Though Brookes later moved away from these ideas in recognition of the growth of a permanent African urban working class, the idea survived even into the 1940s, with the proposals of R. F. A. Hoernle, who began his teaching career in Cape Town in 1912. Hoernle, too, argued for the settling of a peasantry as a means of resisting total proletarianization and, to this extent, agreed with much of the trusteeship proposals of George Heaton Nicholls. (51)

The Glen Grey Act, therefore, formed an important basis behind a paternalist liberalism in twentieth century South Africa that emerged out of the decline of the individually based liberalism of the Cape from the mid-Victorian era. Its emphasis on individual land tenure was, in a sense, a faint echo of this earlier liberalism in an era increasingly defined by collective racial identities. What, though, were the ideological assumptions behind this liberalism as the Cape moved into the era of union with the northern states? Most liberals in South Africa who traced their ideological roots back to the Cape specifically denied being overtly segregationist in the sense of supporting the destruction of the common Cape franchise, the rights of Africans to land-ownership in urban areas and the confining of African land-ownership to specific locations and reserves. This "possessory" segregation, as opposed to total "residential" segregation (52), most South African liberals by the early 1930s disclaimed. In fact, by the time of the 1932 report of the Native Economic Commission, the archetypal liberal position was represented by Alex Roberts, the former teacher from Lovedale, who specifically opposed the Commission's ideological stance of adaptation, based on a view close to the British colonial practice of indirect rule, that sought to "adapt" African "traditional" institutions to dominant "European" ones. Instead, Roberts championed the alternative ideology of assimilation which, by the early 1930s, had grown considerably in western liberal thought as a result of the work of the Chicago School of Sociology, founded by Robert Ezra Park in 1915. (53) This formulation of assimilation, however, can be seen as emerging out of a liberal response to the rise of segregation in both the American south and South Africa and rested on collectivist premises, in contrast to the essentially individualist and laissez-faire premises of nineteenth century liberalism which had been engrained in the classical "Cape liberal tradition".

Summary

This paper has only partially developed arguments that I am seeking to develop in a much larger study of ideologies of social control during the period of

South African industrialization. However, in summarizing the thrust of this paper, three basic points emerge:

1) The Cape cannot be seen as standing outside the thrust towards segregation in the early years of the twentieth century. In fact, the Glen Grey Act and ideological debate in the Cape reflected a closer convergence with American segregationist practices than did the tribally-based model in Natal. Furthermore, the Shepstonian legacy from Natal formed only <u>one</u> possible model of segregation while the Cape verged more towards Southern practices of control based on a rural squatter-peasantry and an ideology of Tuskegee-type industrial training.

2) Cape "assimilationism" was not a traditional feature of the "Cape liberal tradition" but rather emerged in response to the rise of segregationist ideology in the twentieth century. Assimilation thus formed a dominant ideological basis behind liberal thinking that sought a shift away from institutionalized racial and tribal controls engrained in segregation towards class ones, whilst at the same time, as in the thought of R. F. A. Hoernle, seeking to resist complete African proletarianization by rooting a section of the African peasantry on the land. (54)

3) The development of assimilation refutes the view of an unbroken "Cape liberal tradition" espoused by liberal historiography that was destroyed by the political creation of Union in 1910. The development of assimilation before then reflected the growing racialization of thinking in the Cape, such that Union was at most a catalyst to an ongoing process that was already taking place. In addition, many Cape liberals played an important role in the formulation of native policy in the period after Union: F. S. Malan was Minister of Native Affairs, Edward Dower the Secretary of Native Affairs after Union, while magistrates such as W. C. Scully and J. E. Moffat shaped the thinking of important commissions on native policy in the first decade of Union.

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(1) L. M. Thompson, <u>The Unification of South Africa</u> (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1960); Phyllis Lewsen, "The Cape Liberal Tradition - Myth or Reality?", <u>Race</u>, No. 1, July 1975; Peter Kallaway, "F. S. Malan, the Cape Liberal Tradition and South African Politics", <u>Journal of African History</u>, XV, I, 1974.

(2) David Welsh, <u>The Roots of Segregation</u> (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971).

(3) Lewsen, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 73.

(4) Thompson, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 482-83.

(5) Eric Walker, <u>The Frontier Tradition in South Africa</u>, lecture delivered at Rhodes House, 5 March 1930 (Oxford University Press, 1930); I. D. MacCrone, <u>Race Attitudes in South Africa</u> (Oxford University Press, 1937); C. W. de Kiewiet, <u>A History of South Africa, Social and Economic</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1941); S. H. Frankel, <u>The Tyranny of Economic Paternalism in South Africa</u>, supplement to <u>Optima</u>, December 1960; see also W. K. Hancock, <u>Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs</u>, 2 Vols (London, 1937-42). For a seminal critique of the frontier thesis, see Martin Legassick, "The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography", <u>The Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries</u> (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1972), pp. 1-33.

(6) de Kiewiet, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 48.

(7) <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 49.

(8)   Francis Wilson, "Farming, 1866-1960", in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds), *The Oxford History of South Africa*, Vol. II. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 104.

(9)   David Welsh, "The Growth of Towns" in Wilson and Thompson, op. cit., p. 242.

(10) F. R. Leavis, *Nor Shall My Sword* (Chatto and Windus, 1972).

(11) M. C. O'Dowd, "The Stages of Economic Growth and the Future of South Africa", in Adrian Leftwich (ed), *South African Economic Growth and Political Change* (London: Allinson and Busby, 1974); paper with the same title in Lawrence Schlemmer and Eddie Webster (eds), *Change, Reform and Economic Growth in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Bavan Press, 1978); see also Wolfgang H. Thomas, *Plural Democracy: Political Change and Strategies for Evolution in South Africa* (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1977).

(12) David Welsh, "The Growth of Towns"; "The Urgent Need for Fundamental Political Change in South Africa", paper presented at the Forth Seventh Annual Council Meeting, SAIRR, Durban, January 1977. For two reviews of the debate, see David Yudelman, "Industrialisation, Race Relations and Change in South Africa", *African Affairs*, Vol. 74, 294, January 1975; Harrison Wright, *The Burden of the Present* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1977).

(13) de Kiewiet, op. cit., pp. 57, 58, 62, 67; Wilson, op. cit., pp. 115-122.

(14) Lewsen, op. cit., p. 69; T. R. H. Davenport, *South Africa: a Modern History* (Johannesburg: MacMillan South Africa Publishers, 1977), p. 76; H. J. and R. E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1830-1950* (Penguin, 1969), p. 15.

(15) Stanley Trapido, "The Origins of the Cape Franchise Qualifications of 1853", *Journal of African History*, V, I (1964), p. 40.

(16) Stanley Trapido, "Liberalism in the Cape in the 19th and 20th Centuries", *The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Vol. 4, (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1975), p. 55.

(17) Ibid.

(18) Ibid.; Colin Bundy, "The Emergence and Decline of a South African Peasantry", *African Affairs*, Vol. VI, No. 285, October 1972.

(19) Trapido, "Origins", p. 54.

(20) Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform* (London, 1960). Semmel's thesis has recently been attacked for over-emphasizing the role of Social Darwinism in English social thought and the connection between internal social reform and imperial expansion. See Michael Freeden, *The New Liberalism - an Ideology of Reform* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 11, 80.

(21) Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-1920* (New York, 1967); Freeden, op. cit.

(22) Asa Briggs, "The Language of 'Class' in Early Nineteenth Century England", in M. W. Flinn and T. C. Smout (eds), *Essays in Social History* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 170-71.

(23) John Foster, *Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution* (London: Methuen, 1977), p. 205. Foster's thesis has been critically reassessed in respect of Oldham by D. S. Gadian, "Class Consciousness in Oldham and Other North West Industrial Towns, 1830-1850", *The Historical Journal*, 21, I (1978), pp. 161-72. The "isolation" of the working class vanguard cannot necessarily be seen as inhibiting the growth of a working class movement for "the experience of independent working-class political action itself tended to indicate that working class movements needed to win support from other sections of the community if they were to be successful ... Support for alliances with middle class reformers should not be regarded, necessarily, as evidence of the retarded growth of working class consciousness". (p. 172)

(24) Simons, op. cit., p. 25.

(25) Ibid., p. 44.

(26) Welsh, "Roots"; Edgar Brookes, *History of Native Policy in South Africa* (Pretoria, 1927).

(27) Shula Marks, "Natal, the Zulu Royal Family and the Ideology of Segregation", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, April 1978, p. 176.

(28) Sheila M. Brock, "James Stewart and Lovedale: a reappraisal of missionary attitudes and African responses in the Eastern Cape, South Africa, 1870-1905", PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1974, p. 217, quoting letter from Gordon to Stewart, 7 October 1882.

(29) For Lagden's enthusiasm for the Basuto model, see G. Lagden, The Basutos (London 1909). This book was based on his experience as Resident Commissioner in Basutoland before his appointment by Milner as Commissioner for Native Affairs in the Transvaal in 1901. Lagden was keen to recognise the powers of the chiefs in Basutoland as part of a strategy of divide and rule. This policy was actually favoured by the Scanlen administration in the Cape as opposed to Merriman's proposal to "split the chiefs up" so as "to work with the people as against the chiefs". As a result, though, of the Cape government's ineffectiveness as a result of General Gordon working at cross purposes to the Agent of the Cape Governor, J. M. Orpen, the territory was handed over to Britain. See Leonard Thompson, "The Subjection of African Chiefdoms, 1870-1898" in Wilson and Thompson, op. cit., pp. 269-70.

(30) Brock, op. cit., p. 217; Brookes, op. cit., pp. 104-106.

(31) Brock, op. cit., p. 251, quoting letter of J. Stewart.

(32) John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics", American Political Science Review, LXVI, June 1972, pp. 411-425; Peter Flynn, "Class Clientelism and Coercion: some mechanisms of internal dependency and control", The Journal of Commonwealth and Political Studies, Vol. XII, No. 2, July 1974, pp. 133-156.

(33) Stanley Trapido, "African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910", Journal of African History, IX, I (1968), p. 83.

(34) Ibid., p. 89.

(35) Ibid., p. 97.

(36) NA 730/F25/468, M. Pelem to Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate, Lady
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Frere, 23 November 1904; petition (in Pelem's writing) from "registered owners of allotments in Fingqutu Location No. 8" addressed to Civil Commissioner and Resident Magistrate, Lady Frere, 25 May 1904.

(37) Ibid., memo from B. D. Musgrove, Inspector of Native Locations, Lady Frere, 19 October 1904.

(38) Ibid., Pelem to CC and RM Lady Frere, 23 November 1904.

(39) Brookes, op. cit., pp. 114-115; Howard Pim, A Transkei Enquiry (Lovedale, 1933), p. 32. Three more districts were added by the 1930s.

(40) NA 525/509/02, Schedule I/1721, 22 November 1902.
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(41) NA/509/02, Chief Magistrate, Tembuland, Transkei and Pondoland to The Secretary, Native Affairs Department, 24 April 1902.

(42) Brookes, op. cit., p. 114; Pim, op. cit.

(43) V.G. 42-1922, p. 5; Keegan, op. cit., p. 33.

(44) Raymond Leslie Buell, The Native Problem in Africa (London, Frank Cass, 1965), p. 90.

(45) Report of Deputation sent to Visit Transkeian Territories General Council, 17 July 1908, quoted in Brookes, op. cit., pp. 259-265.

(46) Maurice Evans, Black and White in South East Africa (London, 1911), p. 113.

(47) Charles van Onselen, "The Witches of Suburbia: domestic service on the Witwatersrand, 1890-1914", paper presented at History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand, 1978.