

CAPE WORKERS IN GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA, 1904-1912

PATTERNS OF MIGRANCY AND THE CLOSING OF OPTIONS ON THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN LABOUR MARKET*

by

William Beinart

Between 1904 and 1912, a considerable number of African men from the Cape Colony migrated to work in German South-West Africa (SWA). During this time, there were always a few thousand Cape workers in "Jamani"; in peak years the number probably reached around 10,000 - as many as worked in the biggest Cape ports. They played an important role as transporters and labourers in the German colonial wars against the Herero and Nama (1904-1907). They were also responsible for building much of the railway network that spread out from the ports of Swakopmund and Luderitz. Although their presence has hardly been noted by historians, their experiences are well documented. Cape officials, who felt some responsibility for their nationals in a foreign country, took note of their complaints. The Cape Native Affairs Department (NAD) also handled claims to the wages of deceased workers. In the correspondence over such questions, there are some remarkable statements by migrant workers. It was these, not always the easiest type of material to locate, that initially provided the stimulus for this paper.

Yet, it is not merely to revive a forgotten episode in labour history that this topic is being addressed. The movement of Cape workers to SWA and the eventual curtailment of this pattern of migrancy illuminates important features of the changing political economy of the subcontinent at the time. The episode also serves to underline the point that the subcontinental labour market was increasingly being integrated around the hub of the Rand mines, a process which had implications for patterns of migrancy throughout the area. Moreover, the material opens the way to an analysis of options facing workers and provides a rare though limited glimpse of workers' own perceptions of their position. Studies of the proletarianization of rural communities in southern Africa have tended to concentrate on the way in which such communities became increasingly dependent on income from wage labour without totally losing their access to rural resources. But an understanding of the complex processes of proletarianization also requires an examination of persistence and change in patterns of migrancy, the way in which these affected already semi-proletarianized communities and the consciousness of migrants. Some attempt is made to explore these issues in the paper.

Recruitment for German SWA and the Early Experience of Migrants

A majority, though by no means all, of the workers migrating to SWA came from the Ciskeian and southern Transkeian districts of the Eastern Cape. (1) This was an area in which the experience of colonization was highly diverse, where complex patterns of peasantization and proletarianization had been taking place over the whole

of the nineteenth century. Two brief points of relevance to the story of migration to SWA should be made. Firstly, in comparison with the rest of the Transkeian Territories, where the bulk of the African population of the Colony was settled, these Ciskeian and southern Transkeian areas were more thoroughly colonized. Relationships were more highly commoditized, Christianity, literacy and education more widespread, and migrancy had been well entrenched for a longer period. Secondly, the feature of patterns of migrancy from these districts since the 1870s had been avoidance of farms and mines. (2) Eastern Cape workers moved into employment in the ports and on the railways. Even if wages were not consistently higher in these sectors, migrants were able to maintain greater control over their life at work and bargain more effectively. (3) Especially on the railways, points of production were sufficiently dispersed to make centralized control by employers difficult. (4) Patterns of migrancy were appropriate to workers who were amongst the first on the labour market, were conscious of the alternatives available and the possibility for organization, and whose rights as Cape citizens gave them some freedom to seek the most attractive employment.

Immediately before the South African war (1899-1902) there had been some movement to the Rand mines by Eastern Cape workers. However, the mines closed down during the war and demand for workers in the ports, which had to service large military forces, spiralled upwards. Especially in Cape Town itself, where employers had only started to use migrants on a large scale in the previous decade, wage levels soared. (5) Wage levels declined slightly after the War, as employers in Cape Town took concerted measures to drive down the costs of labour. A segregated location for Africans in the city was established in 1901. (6) But Cape Town still remained one of the most favoured centres for workers from all over the Colony. Between June 1903 and June 1904, nearly 10,000 workers from Transkeian districts alone received passes to work in Cape Town. (7) Ciskeian pass figures are not available but the number may have been comparable. These migrants found their hopes for high wages dashed. For by the end of 1903 the Colony, as a whole, and particularly Cape Town, was plunged into depression. (8) In essence, it was a commercial depression caused by the removal of troops, fall off in imports and redirection of Transvaal traffic to Delagoa Bay and Durban. For a city so dependent on its docks and carrying trade, the effect was immediate. And colonial government revenues, drawn largely from customs and railway tariffs, declined sharply. During the early part of 1904, many African workers in Cape Town, their ranks swollen by the large numbers arriving from the rural districts, found themselves without work.

One of the few bright spots on Cape Town's horizon during the following few years was German South-West Africa. As a journalist noted in 1910:

German South West Africa has been an excellent customer to the Cape Colony, more especially to the West, and statistics show that an enormous amount of trade has been done in recent years with that territory. It is common knowledge that Cape Town, if it had not been for German South West Africa, would have been in a very bad financial position for a long while past. (9)

SWA was also to be the escape route for those Cape workers who were reluctant to follow the logic of their position and go underground in the Transvaal mines. The option opened to them as a result of a specific episode in the violent history of German colonization in that territory which was as unfortunate for its victims as it seemed fortunate for workless migrants in Cape Town.

Prior to the turn of the century, settler economic activity in South-West Africa was largely limited to trade and dispersed pastoralism. (10) Minerals had not yet been exploited; public works programmes and railway development were in their infancy. In 1903, the German authorities had actually agreed to allow recruiting by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association in the territory; a little over 1,000 workers left for mines. (11) But by 1904 the German Colony's needs had been dramatically transformed and the agreement was not renewed. The Herero and Nama chiefdoms of the interior rose in a series of rebellions which took the Germans three years to control. Many imperial troops were called in and, as in the Cape a few years

previously, African labour was necessary to service the military effort. A spurt of railway building further increased demand. Workers could not be raised within SWA: the Ovambo had hardly begun to migrate and the government could not risk using force to persuade them; the Herero were the object of a war of genocide; and those of the Nama groups which were not fighting were locked into labour on the farms. At the very moment that the German Government began to cast further afield, a pool of unemployed workers with experience in military support work, dock labour, railway construction and transporting was building up in Cape Town, the nearest major port. Recruitment was soon set in motion and the first shiploads of a few hundred workers left in June 1904 for employment as ox-drivers and transporters in the German military forces. (12) In 1905, the Koppel company, which had contracted to build a railway to Otavi, began recruiting in the Eastern Cape, but Cape Town remained the most important collection point both for the military and for the railways in the next few years. By early 1906 the Assistant Resident Magistrate of the Uitvlugt location reported that "thousands" of workers had been recruited from his division in the previous nine months. (13)

Migrants to SWA were primarily lured by the wages. In their haste to mobilize military support workers, the German authorities, or at least the recruiters working for them, offered £5 a month (about 3/6 a day) with free transport, rations and clothes. (14) Railway workers were promised similar amounts. Though not as high as the daily rate of 4/6 paid in Cape Town in 1901, such wages were far preferable to the going rate of £3 a month on the mines. Moreover, the employers in SWA did not initially use a ticket system. Yet those workers who arrived in 1904 and 1905 found their position was not without its drawbacks. The contracts may have seemed generous, but they were not always adhered to. Deductions were made for clothing, tobacco, even travel - a passage from Cape Town to Swakopmund cost over £3 - which the workers believed would be free. "I only thought that I had spent £4:15:0", claimed one of the first batch of recruits when he returned in 1905, "I am sure that I did not buy goods to the value of £20:0:0." (15) Workers were paid in Imperial German currency which they had to exchange for sterling, and pay commission, when they returned to Cape Town.

Some of the early groups of railway workers were clearly rooked by recruiters. A group recruited in Kingwilliamstown at 3/6 a day were told when they arrived that their pay was to be 3/-. (16) Moreover, in the first couple of months, they received even less.

About the middle of September [the fourth month, a spokesman related in Cape Town] the whole body of us made application for the settlement of our back pay being the balance for the months of June and July and the full amount for the month of August and we were told by the paymaster of the company that we were not entitled to any money, as we were indebted to the Company ... We made an attempt to lay our grievances before the German authorities but were prevented from so doing by armed German soldiers. We were asked whether we still intended working and as we all replied in the negative, we were told that we had better clear out, and get home best we could and if we considered that we were entitled to any money to get it from those persons who recruited us. (17)

The recruiters, of course, had disappeared. As most of the early contracts were not attested by Cape magistrates, the workers had no legal rights to fall back on. Further, the nature of the country constrained effective action against employers. It was not only that the military was called in to obstruct bargaining. Workers had very little opportunity to desert or switch jobs in the barren, sparsely populated and often waterless wastes of the interior of SWA. As Magwayi Masarwa wrote home: "there is only one way from here, it is by the sea." (18) Some of this group managed to find their own boat and rail fares to the Eastern Cape at upwards of £5 a head. Others, stranded in Cape Town and Swakopmund, had little alternative but to go back to work on the employers' terms

The general conditions in SWA made a deep impression on Cape workers; it was a very different country from the one they had left. In another of his letters, Magwayi Masarwa described his new environment.

This is another country, and it is German South West Africa. I was in Cape Town before but I could not find work there ... This country I am in is another country and there is not grass in it, and we can live a whole month without water and get some water in the second month. It is hard on me with these white men, Germans. (19)

Mati Nyamana (alias Jan Motte) painted a similar picture and ended a letter to his wife on what seems a desperate note. (He did, in fact, die shortly afterwards.)

I have noticed that the money in Cape Town don't do any good to me. I am in the war in German West ... We touched the pen and went on to the front. It is very heavy, the Hottentots are stubborn very much... This place where we are is a desert ... this place is very sad and the country is dead (in war) ... It is very hot here. If I had known it was like this here I could not have come here. You must speak with your God and pray for yourself and ask from Him and He will help you ... Remember me to the old man and to mother and to all those alive. Goodbye my wife and lover, without any other in my heart.

J. Motte. don't reply (20)

The heat and the lack of fresh food and water resulted in many deaths among the workers. What records there are about the causes of death suggest that scurvy and "heart disease" - owing to the strain of hard work in the heat with insufficient nourishment - were the major killers. (21) Many complained about the inadequate hospital facilities.

My friend Henry Poswayo is still in hospital. He is lying in an open yard without any cover, and the only food he gets is a little rice. I used to send him food myself. The rice he had to cook himself. He is very ill. There were 10 men in this open yard when I went to see my friend. (22)

But there could be as many dangers from treatment as from neglect. Jacob Qaula was thought to have been "killed by an overdose of pain killer which burned his internals". (23) Workers received no pay while in hospital; in some cases they were forced to go on working even when they reported ill.

Over and above the difficult conditions of work, the workers in military employment faced physical danger at the front, especially in the campaign against Hendrik Witbooi, who had much more success than the Herero in keeping the Germans at bay. "The Hottentots", as Mati Nyamana noted, were "very stubborn". When a worker claimed full compensation for clothes and money taken by the Nama, he was considered "fortunate not only to have escaped with his life but to have obtained some compensation for the loss incurred". (24) Some did indeed meet their deaths at the hands of the Nama or Herero. The position of non-combatant labourers was, as Peter Warwick has noted in relation to Africans serving in the South African war, ambiguous. (25)

Workers did not elaborate in their letters and statements on the ambiguity of their position in helping the Germans fight a merciless colonial war. They were clearly not oblivious to the situation in SWA. A medical officer who examined recruits in East London commented in 1905 that

while they were awaiting examination in the yard of the court house, the other natives standing by were chaffing them, saying they were going to fight for the Germans. They appear to have perfectly understood where they were going to ... (26)

But they probably did not know exactly what was planned. The German authorities called the workers "Kaplevies". (27) Yet they were not levies in the sense that the term was generally used on the Cape: volunteer armies organized by collaborative chiefs and headmen to fight against rebellious chiefdoms. The Cape migrants saw themselves essentially as wage workers who had faced unemployment in an acute recession, and made little comment about the ends to which their labour was being used.

Whatever the dangers from lack of water and the Nama, the greatest threat to the workers was undoubtedly from their own employers. It is not within the scope of this paper to explain the character of German colonization. Certainly at the turn of the century, when the Cape's wars and rebellions were over, SWA seemed a very violent society from the viewpoint of both officials and workers in the Cape. Africans received little protection from German courts. Many were employed by a government engaged in the urgent task of fighting the most serious rebellions which it had yet encountered, and "discipline" was the order of the day. Although German military officers were in ultimate control of the workers, immediate supervisory control was usually exercised by non-military personnel. Both they, usually Afrikaners, and the soldiers used a considerable degree of violence to keep control. The best descriptions are in the words of the workers themselves; there is no shortage of material from which to choose.

Isaac Magadi, formerly of Ndabeni (Uitvlugt) location, recalled in 1905:

There were four Dutchmen in charge of the cattle, the senior in charge was called Maritz, another was called Darnnie ... We were ill treated on the way up. I myself was thrashed three times. One of these times I caught hold of the sjambok. The Dutchman I called Darnnie put up his pistol and shot me just under the right eye ... I met the senior conductor Maritz and asked him when my case was going to be tried, and he said that the case would not be tried. He said you natives from the Colony are giving trouble, you should have gone and fetched the water when the conductor told you to ... (28)

Jan Tusi described the fate of his foreman, Robert Honose.

There was a German conductor in the tent. He was making a noise with some coloured boys saying that they had taken his hat. As he did not find his hat he went out to the German soldiers who were on guard that night and told them he wanted to get his hat. Robert being the foreman ... was called out of the tent ... The guards ... asked if Robert knew the German language. I heard Robert say no in Dutch ... Whilst Robert was trying to talk to the guards I heard a shot and Robert fell to the ground. After Robert fell down the two German guards stabbed him on the right and left side with their bayonets. Robert managed to crawl as far as the tent and was helped inside ... the German soldiers started firing at the tent ... This was Saturday night and I heard Robert was dead on Monday morning. (29)

He went on to recount an equally grisly episode of control by firepower, but Mbandazayo's account of the death of Bushula perhaps captures the milieu more fully. They were working around the northern line of rail near Okahandja when "Bushula alias Passenger got ill suffering from a sore leg". (3) He was taken into hospital, but Mbandazayo heard that his condition did not improve.

One morning Bushula was going to relieve nature and one of the German nurses threw a tin at him, which struck Passenger on his sore leg. On feeling the pain, he returned and pointed to the nurse with the stick he had, talking, and immediately after he had done that they caught him, saying he was cheeky and beat him twenty five strokes on his back and shoulders. After receiving these strokes he was taken to the gaol where they kept him for ten days. When his time was finished they, before letting him out, beat him another twenty five strokes on his back. The same day in the afternoon he came to our tent, his back being all covered with blood, which was still oozing very fast. He did not sleep that day, and he was suffering from pain very much. His stomach was also affected. The next day about noon he died. We went and reported to the managers, who denied that he died from the cuts. The man received altogether 50 cuts. They then asked us to give them the dead body - we refused until they came to us armed and threatened us that they would shoot the whole company of us. We then gave the body to them ... (31)

Persistent Migration to SWA and the Choices Facing Cape Workers

Despite their early experience of difficult conditions and violence, Cape workers continued to migrate to SWA and take employment with the military, up to 1907, and the railway companies for the next few years. In these years Ndabeni, far from being merely a labour pool for Cape Town, became a reservoir for SWA. Cape Town's location housed an increasingly floating population (32) Many settled residents took work in SWA, while a constant influx of workers arrived from the Eastern Cape and southern Transkei to survey local possibilities or contract for SWA. The local branch of the Native Affairs department was able to derive considerable revenue out of the rents of one shilling a week charged to temporary residents, and the railway company agreed to pay the arrear rents of permanent residents and take them off wages. The new function served by the location also tended to ease the implementation of urban segregation.

But by the end of 1906 the German military and the railway company had recruited most of the labour force they needed and had only to top up with irregular batches. In 1907, the ARM of Ndabeni mentioned that "owing to the scarcity of work about here and the fact that only a limited number is required in German South West Africa, a great number [of recent arrivals from the Eastern Cape] are disappointed and ultimately return to their homes or reluctantly decide to proceed under contract to the Transvaal Gold mines". (33) Yet, despite the risk of unemployment, and the expense of keeping themselves in Cape Town, the stream of workers continued. When a recruiter was offered a contract for one thousand workers early in 1908, he was able to fill his quota almost immediately from the men available in Cape Town and "turned away hundreds". (34) By October 1908, the Secretary of Native Affairs in Cape Town found it necessary to circularize officials in the Ciskei and Transkei informing them that "large numbers of Natives" based in the city were unable to find work and asking them to discourage migration. (35) During 1907 and 1908, many magistrates in the Ciskei and southern Transkei, acting on requests made by local headmen, enquired about the possibility of sending up batches for SWA and had constantly to be refused. (36)

In October 1908, reports also came to the SNA that workers from the eastern districts of the Colony had for some months been obtaining passes signed for SWA itself and making the c.700 mile journey to the German colony overland, partly by rail and partly by foot over some of the most inhospitable country in the sub-continent. (37) At first they were able to get across the border and find work on the southern line of rail from Luderitz, although at rates of pay lower than those received by contracted workers. But by October German border guards were turning

them back. A group of thirty migrants who had left Idutywa (Fingoland) in August arrived in Cape Town in October, having walked the 500 miles south from the border. The SNA circularized magistrates again warning them not to issue passes for SWA either, unless workers could show that they had already entered into contracts before leaving home. In 1909, however, the Germans again opened their borders. Clearly the supply of "voluntary" workers, who were prepared to pay their own way to and from SWA and work for lower rates saved the Koppel company a considerable sum in recruiting expenses. Even if workers had to leave their home districts without passes and dodge the border guards they were not discouraged. One man at least was returning for a second spell.

The above evidence leaves little room for doubt that the military authorities, and the railway company after 1906, had no difficulty in meeting their demand for workers with increasingly little effort by themselves. This stark contrast between the stories of atrocities and wage irregularities which the early migrants brought home, and the evidence of continued preference for SWA, demands some explanation. In addressing this problem, both the conditions governing recruitment and work in SWA and the specific character of the workers who continued to migrate there will be explored for the period 1906-1910.

Cape officials were not unmindful of injustices that unscrupulous recruiters and touts could perpetrate on workers, if only because such practices threatened future labour supply. (38) Legislation had been passed in 1899, though not universally implemented, which specifically attempted to control recruiting by enforcing the licensing of agents and runners and the attestation of contracts by magistrates. In 1906, when complaints about misrepresentation in recruiting for SWA reached their height, this act was implemented in Cape Town. (39) As in other areas of the Colony, it had the effect of eliminating some of the smaller, undercapitalized agents. By 1908, all recruiting for SWA had come under the control of one leading commercial firm with German connections. Until 1910, complaints about misrepresentation were fewer. The Cape Native Affairs Department also set up a system to handle wages due to the kin of workers who had died in SWA. (Claimants had to approach the authorities, not only with evidence of their own identity but of their link with the deceased worker; letters written home by workers were often the best means of showing this.)

There was little that Cape officials could do about conditions of work in SWA. For the reasons mentioned above, they were prepared on occasion to make representations. Their general view of the German colonial effort, which they felt lacked the finesse and liberal sensibilities of their own, persuaded them that some of the workers' stories could be true. However, the routes of communication to German officials in SWA, through the British Colonial Office, the British Foreign Office, the German Foreign Office and back again, were so tortuous that messages tended to become diluted and there was plenty of scope for delay. (40) German consciousness that they were being watched by the Cape and Britain hardly affected their conduct of the war, though it may have led them to be a little more wary about Cape nationals. It was only after 1909, when an able British consul was stationed in Luderitz in direct communication with the Cape government, that representations and enquiries could be made more quickly and effectively. (41)

Limited intervention by the Cape government may have palliated some of the features most disliked by Cape workers. But the fact that most workers were employed by Koppel, rather than the military, after 1906 was probably far more important in assuring the popularity of SWA as a labour centre. There was nothing intrinsic to the operations of the company that made it more a humane employer. Some of the incidents described above had taken place on the railway works, and the events of 1910, described below, confirm that too stark a contrast should not be drawn. Nevertheless, the urgency of meeting war requirements had passed, and with it the military-style discipline of workers. The company was anxious to get the best out of an expansive and specialized group of workers and kept tighter control over its supervisors. From 1907 to 1909 there were far fewer complaints about physical violence and, according to the number of cases dealt with by the Cape authorities, far fewer deaths.

Bley's book on SWA suggests that more systematic repression was imposed in SWA after the military victory. (42) The labour and vagrancy codes of 1907 tend to confirm this. However, it is of little use to equate the position of the indigenous population in SWA with that of the Cape workers. They worked in specialized sectors and were to an extent divorced from the rest of the work-force. Their wages were two to three times higher. And they were employed in an area of work which gave them, at least in the slightly changed milieu of 1906-1909, some of the freedom over their own life and work which they had fought to retain in the Cape. It would be misleading to paint a rosy picture, but the company and workers did reach a modus vivendi and until 1910 the "Transkeikaffern" (Cape workers) were described as "usually patient and willing". (43) "In the construction of the southern railway, they behaved themselves and did not come into serious conflict with the overseers." This assessment contrasted with those made earlier by German employers.

But if conditions in SWA, now slightly improved, did not actively dissuade Cape migrants from working there, continued migration should be located firmly within the context of the options open to migrants. The recession in the Cape deepened. Import and revenue figures continued their steady decline until 1908, when they were at half their 1902 level; the subsequent upturn was marginal. (44) Very few opportunities were available in the ports unless migrants had a firm footing in a particular sphere of employment. This picture has to be placed against one of an uneven, but ongoing, process of proletarianization in the rural areas from which workers came. Between 1904 and 1910 there was a substantial overall increase in the number of workers migrating, particularly marked in 1904 and 1908, years of drought. (45)

As has been hinted in the above sections, the only alternative readily available was underground work on the mines. In 1904, mine wages could not compare with those offered in SWA, although the actual wages in SWA, considering that workers did not get the promised £5, could barely have exceeded the £3 offered on the mines. And for the rest of the decade wage rates in SWA steadily declined; the exigencies of war passed and the railway company found that it needed to pay rather less to secure its labour. By 1908, contracted workers received around 2/9 a day (perhaps £4 a month); in 1909, voluntary workers received 2/- a day, equivalent to the general mine wage; and in the next year the contract wages had declined to the same level. (46) Certainly towards the end of the decade wages levels alone probably cannot provide the sole reason for the continued migration to SWA.

Indeed, as evidence from magisterial reports, Transkei General Council debates, and more especially from a deputation of Cape headmen to the Rand in 1903 confirms, Cape workers had a highly unfavourable perception of the mines. (47) It was a perception specifically related to conditions after the war; one headman mentioned that "we are disappointed when our people said that the work was better in the time of the Boers than now". (48) The reasons for this attitude cannot be elaborated here (49); briefly, they related to the system of recruiting, the nature of underground work, with possibly an even higher death rate, and, notably, fear of physical violence from the "Tshaka guards", the Zulu mine police. Nevertheless, from 1904 onwards, declining employment opportunities in the Cape, on the one hand, and increases in mine pay, on the other, led to a wholesale switch in the direction of migrancy from the Colony in general. Between 1904 and 1908, the number of Cape workers on the mines increased from under 4,000 to over 50,000; they became the second largest group, after Moçambiquans, in underground work. (50) But it is important, again, to disaggregate the term "Cape Colony Native". Whereas migrants from most Transkeian districts switched rapidly over to the mines in 1904, those in certain specific districts of the southern Transkei and the Ciskei held out for much longer.

The historic patterns of migrancy from the districts in question, and the spheres in which workers from these areas had developed skills, have been illustrated. The choice such migrants faced in 1904-1912 was not particularly pleasant. On the mines, they would not only have to work underground, live in highly controlled compounds and be subject to the same kind of physical violence as in SWA; they would also lose their position as an elite of workers. Having avoided the mines for so long, they were not in a position to obtain control of more favoured jobs there. They would

become merely one group among the mass of underground workers. SWA seemed to offer a number of the advantages which had been important in previous years, and a chance to capitalize on their specific skills. Those involved in recruiting for SWA noted that the migrants to SWA were a discrete group.

My experience is that natives who work on the Mines as a rule do not go to German South West Africa but only those who object to working underground and thus are not available for work on the Rand and prefer to sit at home doing nothing unless they can obtain work above ground. (51)

Clearly they could not sit at home endlessly, and indeed when recruiting for SWA and Cape Town slowed up in 1907 and 1908 there was a marked switch to the mines by workers in these districts. Nevertheless, while SWA recruiters' comments, in justification of their own activities, should be approached cautiously, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the migrants to SWA were a discrete group with a specific tradition.

Though migrants from the Eastern Cape may have wanted to keep out of the mines, their desire in itself was not sufficient to secure them the limited number of jobs in the ports and SWA. The question of how they managed to keep this option open to themselves must also be addressed. The specific pattern of migrancy, especially when it involved trips to Cape Town or self-financed passages to SWA itself, was only possible for migrants from areas where relationships were monetarized and where families had built up reserves of cash. Few workers from areas such as Pondoland had these resources. But those who actually got the jobs needed to have access to networks in the recruiting towns. Although many migrants came to Cape Town from Pondoland, East Griqualand and Thembuland during the South African war, they were newcomers and it does not seem they were able to establish such firm roots. It was workers from districts with long established contacts in the ports of the Cape who were able to hang on. The techniques used were various. Most effective was to organize replacements from the home district. (52) Employers and contractors were often prepared to accept such arrangements for they provided a continuity in their work force, and ensured their labour supply with little cost to themselves. But, as suggested in the section on recruiting, it was also important for migrants to have access to individual African runners who could exercise discretion in placing names on lists. What the evidence suggests, though does not clearly show, is a network of links particularly from Mfengu rural districts through to urban communities which, at this stage, were largely from these districts in the rural areas. It was not an exclusive network, but seems to have been important.

The Mining Industry, Wilhelmsthal, and the Closing of the SWA Option

The over-supply of workers for SWA was rapidly taken up in mid-1910. As German control of the interior was more securely entrenched and as mining activities had begun, the SWA authorities decided to expand the railway system, link the southern and northern networks, and rebuild the old railway between Swakopmund and Windhoek, which dated from the 1890s. The contract was given to the same German firm, now Bachstein-Koppel, with the proviso that they complete the work within three years. Again, the company had to raise a large amount of labour within a short space of time; again, internal sources were insufficient, and again they had to rely on the experienced workers of the Eastern Cape for the core of their work force. From about March 1910, orders were sent out to the firm which supervised recruiting for SWA; it was expected that at least 9,000 workers would be needed. (53) The firm agents in East London and Cape Town set to work.

Their activities immediately caused a furor. A complex dispute arose between various factions of traders and recruiters in the Eastern Cape, which soon came to the attention of the Cape government and the Chamber of Mines. By 1910, the Rand gold mines were again facing considerable problems in raising an adequate supply of labour. Chinese indentured workers, who along with Mozambiquans provided the core

of the labour force in the first decade of the century, had left. Their place had to be taken by Africans and, as the most rapidly increasing supply was drawn from the Cape, the mines were particularly sensitive to competition in this area. Further, in the period 1906 to 1910, the Cape government, the Transvaal government and the mines worked closely together to provide and control labour for the mines. The social forces behind this inter-colonial effort cannot be elaborated here (54); in essence, the Colony had resigned itself to a more peripheral role in the economy of the subcontinent. In the couple of years prior to 1910, the number of migrants leaving for SWA had been relatively small, and most had left "voluntarily", but now the labour supply within South Africa was significantly threatened. By May 1910, Schumacher, the Chairman of Rand Mines, had intervened to demand that the Transvaal Government approach the Cape with a view to stopping recruitment for SWA. (55)

The Cape government was caught on the horns of a dilemma. While they wished to meet the demands of the Transvaal, they had no legal power to remove recruiting licences that had already been granted, except for gross misconduct. (56) The Cape government, therefore, took the line that they would discourage recruiting for SWA, and would grant no further licences, but that the legislative power needed to stop migration would have to be authorized by enactment of the new Union parliament, soon to come into being. At least some members of the Cape administration, it should be added, felt that they should interfere as little as possible with the principle of a "free market" in labour. This view was strongly supported by Eastern Cape commercial interests which stood to gain from repatriated wages: it was expected that £400,000-£600,000 would come into circulation. By November 1910, 3,000 Cape workers, recruited at short notice in Kingwilliamstown, East London and the southern Transkei, had left. (57) It seems that Bachstein-Koppel received, in ensuing months, the bulk of the workers they needed.

The rapid response to recruiting advertisements affirms that this was the opportunity that many workers in the Eastern Cape had been waiting for. The wages offered to the new recruits - £3 a month all found - were much the same as those on the mines at the time. But rations seemed generous by contemporary standards and, as has been illustrated, other factors influenced workers' preferences. Yet all was not as well as it seemed. Bachstein-Koppel Company had overreached itself. They had assured the Cape government that conditions would be good and that they had a new batch of overseers; they had promised generous rations, housing and hospital facilities to the workers. But when the workers arrived they found few of these facilities. The company faced not only time constraints; in order to realise more than the minimum profits guaranteed by the German authorities, it cut corners in order to save costs. "The tendency", noted the British consul, "has been to effect economies at the expense of the labourers and in all its arrangements the firm seems to have been impervious to those elementary feelings of consideration for its native employees which ordinary business prudence should dictate." (58) In a long and sensitive report the Consul outlined specific complaints; a number of statements by workers have also survived. (59) These touched on almost every aspect of life and work: food was inadequate and sometimes bad, not even tents were provided nor time given for workers to build their own shelters, supervisors were armed - "the schachtmeister threatens to shoot us if we do not do what he tells us"; dynamite was exploded close to groups of workers; hospitals were again as described in 1904/5. Worst of all, there were serious disputes over wages, methods of payments, and deductions.

The Cape workers were not slow to take action. When they made complaints to their supervisors they were told: "You are getting tiresome now and you will get lashes and be shot because this is not Englishman's country ... This is not English territory where you sit down to the table with them." (60) Their response was to organize strikes and go-slows. (61) A company report published in the newspapers described the position in the months preceding October 1910.

In most cases, where we refused to accept unjust demands of some of the men, a general strike ensued, due to the inciting speeches of some agitators as you will find in any large group of workers. Therefore the payment of wages hardly ever took place without an unreasonable partial strike in some of the gangs. (62)

"Ethiopian missionaries" were accused of stirring up strife. (63) As the conflict escalated, the company intensified its repressive techniques. "Water and food were withheld as a means of breaking strikes." (64) As the consul mentioned, "the significance of this action can only be realised by those who know the country". Some workers deserted, trying to find their way back to the ports by following the line of rail; some apparently attempted to find their way to farms, miles away from the line of rail, in order to get water. (65) In October, one group of about 80 workers on the northern line near Wilhelmstal attempted to walk to Windhoek to make direct contact with senior company officials, to whom they felt they had been purposely denied access. They were stopped at Okahanja by soldiers and told by the local government official that they should go back to work and their case would be investigated. In the next couple of days little changed, and the workers - about 100 were in the camp - made further approaches to their supervisors. The latter responded by calling in unarmed soldiery who had been detailed to assist in railway work, and demanding that the workers surrender their leaders. Accounts of events following differ slightly in their details, but not in their major features.

The soldiers came and said we want those three men ... We had come up with sticks and the soldiers picked up bottles and sticks. We came with sticks because we were afraid of the soldiers. If the soldiers did not touch us we would not touch the soldiers. The officer did not say anything about laying down our sticks ... There was a great uproar and no one could understand anything ... We sent three of our men to ask the soldiers that remained what they wanted the three men for ... Many of us did not hear what answers the Lieutenant had sent. [Meanwhile the soldiers had returned to their base to collect arms and reinforcements.] They left the train, fell in and came towards us. Engineer Hansen ... demanded the surrender of the three men. We wished Dubulla our own interpreter to come and parley with the engineer but when he came out the engineer said: I no longer require an interpreter. (66)

Workers could not give a rounded account of the action to which they were subsequently subjected, but a company official had a bird's eye view:

CAPTAIN gives the order to fix bayonets and to encircle the boys. After the encircling has been done by the soldiers, the latter are told to advance with levelled bayonet. At last the boys stand so pressed together that they cannot get any closer to one another, but the soldiers still advance and start now to prod the boys with their bayonets. I myself have seen 30 till 40 boys with wounds of 3 and 2 inches in the BACK. The outer ranks had thrown away their sticks by that time. For me and some of the white men ... present it appears as a wonder that the boys stood that sort of treatment as long as they did. At last the boys were so terrorised that they broke through the soldiers and then it was that the first shot fell. Then all the boys fled and the soldiers shot after them trying to kill them indiscriminately. There was a motorman ... who was quite proud to tell me that he himself had POTTED three ... The doctors told me that all the wounds were from the back. (67)

At least fourteen died, close to twenty were seriously wounded, of whom two died soon afterwards. Many others received bayonet prods or more minor wounds.

Some of the workers were sent home or to hospital. Those that remained were apparently keen to get back to work. What is more surprising is that the Wilhelmstal "riot" or "occurrence" did not frighten off prospective migrants from the Eastern Cape despite the fact that some of the wounded soon returned to the area and that letters were written home about deaths nge zulu le zandla - by the thunder of

the hands. (68) It does seem that in the wake of Wilhelmstal considerable pressure was brought to bear on the company to improve conditions and that in fact it responded to recommendations from the British consul and others. £750 was paid in compensation to the families of the dead and wounded. (69) A commission of enquiry independent of either of the governments, which included Dr Rubusana, the only African member of the Cape Provincial Council, and Enoch Mamba, headman in Idutywa (Fingoland), ex-labour recruiter, and a leading African politician, visited SWA in 1911. (70) They were well received by the company and, in the circumstances, returned a favourable report, although they listed the difficulties encountered by the workers. There is little doubt that conditions had improved, and Rubusana claimed that his visit produced immediate further action by the Company. His report suggests that the workers he met in SWA very much wanted to keep the SWA option open.

It did not, however, stay open for much longer. Wilhelmstal received considerable publicity in South Africa and provided further ammunition for those arguing the case against migrancy to SWA. By 1912, no further licences were granted although the Native Affairs Department hesitated to ban movement to SWA publicly lest they lose what influence they had on the German authorities in connection with representations on behalf of remaining workers. (71) At the same time, however, the German government and employers were increasingly determined to meet their needs internally. (72) Cape workers were not only more expensive but were considered to have an insidious influence on others in SWA because of their high level of organization. As railway building slowed down in 1912, there was no longer an urgent need for workers. Migrancy from Ovamboland had increased rapidly from the end of the first decade of the century, and although Ovambo migrants had largely been directed to diamond and copper mines, where it was felt that less skill was demanded, significant numbers moved into railway construction. Some Cape workers probably went with the South African armies to SWA in 1915, and there is evidence of Xhosa, Tswana and Sotho workers on the diamond diggings in the 1920s. But after 1911 large-scale migration from the Eastern Cape to SWA was effectively ended.

Migrant Culture and Organization

It has been suggested that migrants to SWA tended to come from specific rural communities which had long experience of migration and had developed a tradition of work in spheres such as transport related employment and railway construction. Nasson has provided a vivid description of Cape transport riders in the South African war, stressing their distinctive dress and organization and relative independence. (73) It is likely that they came from communities where men had since the early days of the diamond fields supplemented income from peasant holdings with such petty entrepreneurial activities. Purkis has stressed that at least till the 1880s railway workers, many of them Mfengu, were also able to forge a relatively favourable position at work. (74) Although evidence on specific families is lacking, it seems that such groups, faced with the acute post-war depression, provided the basic pool of migrants to SWA. Certainly the limited evidence on the cultural background of workers in SWA suggests that a substantial number were from the more thoroughly colonised and assimilated Mfengu and Christian Xhosa communities. The number of letters written home - in different hands - indicates that many were literate in Xhosa. The Native Affairs Department placed notices about deceased workers in the vernacular Eastern Cape newspapers Imvo Zabantsundu (Kingwilliamstown) and Izwi Labantu (East London) which circulated chiefly amongst such communities. (75) In 1910, one of the recruiters used a broadsheet printed in Xhosa, distributed in the locations, as part of his recruiting drive. (76) Such reliance by officials and recruiters on the medium of the printed word would have been misplaced in the less assimilated districts of the Transkei such as Pondoland. The evidence relating to the presence of Ethiopians is also suggestive, for it was these communities that sustained the separatist church movement in the first decade of the twentieth century. Many of the workers seem to have been Christians, and a picture of a solemn group surrounding the bodies of men killed at Wilhelmstal includes one in clerical garb while the others are dressed in the manner of the Eastern Cape "school" communities of the time. (77)

Further and related clues to the nature of the SWA work force lie in their response to conditions in SWA. The question of physical violence and the lack of a legal structure in which they could claim redress was raised again and again in statements made by workers. The communities from which they came were forged in the colonization of the Eastern Cape and assumed at least limited personal and political rights for Africans as well as some protection from the law. This is not to suggest that violence was absent from their experience. "To describe the conditions which made liberalism possible is not to assert that liberal influences prevailed on all occasions." (78) But the SWA experience suggests that it was not only the Eastern Cape elite, the Jabavus and Makiwanes, who had internalized the values associated with the "little tradition" of Eastern Cape liberalism. The point is underlined by the workers' view of the state. To them, the Cape officials were a means of seeking redress and furthering their struggle; they had no hesitation in making representations and expected action. Some became aware that their letters home might find their way to the magistrates and the letters themselves became an instrument of struggle. Although officials were always wary, their explicit stance of paternalist fairness led them to share some of the workers' concerns about conditions in SWA.

Cape workers in SWA had a reputation for militancy. There were cases of lack of co-operation by individual workers, and despairing desertion, but there were severe constraints on such tactics. The background and experience of the workers, coupled with the repressive conditions of employment, stimulated combined actions by whole gangs on a number of occasions. In 1905, at least, one group withdrew their labour completely while the German government accused the Cape workers of combining to drive up the level of wages. The events of 1910, when workers were recruited in a short space of time from particular rural districts, illustrate that the migrants were able to maintain go-slows and rolling strikes through a period of months, despite the fact that they were confronted by the military and separated from each other in camps along the line of rail.

The bases of such organization are by no means clear. The feature of recruitment in the Eastern Cape during the late nineteenth century was the key role played by rural headmen. (79) In Pondoland early migrants were generally mobilized through the networks linking traders and homestead heads, and in the Pedi areas through the chiefs. But in the Eastern Cape it was to the headmen, pivots of rural authority in the absence of chiefs, that recruiters and officials turned. Not only would headmen mobilize men, but they often sent representatives to act as supervisors. These men served both as a means whereby employers could control workers and as a focus for representations by workers from the same rural locations. Patterns of authority in the rural districts and at labour centres interacted on each other; it is likely that the importance of such supervisors influenced the choice of workers from Eastern Cape districts for types of work where direct supervisory control by employers such as that found in the mine compounds was more limited.

By the turn of the century, however, this pattern of recruitment was breaking down, a process hastened by the rush of workers to the urban centres after the South African War. African sub-recruiters in Cape Town did play an important role in mobilizing a work force for SWA, in association with recruiting firms, but they tended to be drawn from the urban petty-bourgeoisie, itself beleaguered by the depression and segregationist measures. In SWA, new patterns of authority seem to have coalesced rapidly. Some of the African recruiters accompanied workers to SWA as foremen and their treatment at the hands of German employers tended to cement their identification with workers rather than employers. New patterns of leadership developed - gangs of workers had their own interpreters and go-betweens who, as at Wilhelmstal, were known to the authorities but controlled by the workers. They may also have had their own Ethiopian ministers, or at least Ethiopian ideologues. Moreover, such patterns persisted when workers returned to the rural areas. At least one group were able to collect funds when they had reached home and send two representatives back to Cape Town and SWA to pursue their claims. (80) For a variety of reasons, the authority of headmen was breaking down in the rural areas and new popular leaders emerging. (31) The experience of migrancy and the intensified process of proletarianization was an important element in shaping new patterns of politics and consciousness. As yet there is no evidence of conscious attempts to form "unions". The form of worker organization seems to have been subsumed in wider political movements.

SWA was a last option for migrants who were trying to defend their particular traditions as workers. SWA itself was a milieu in which they were forced to confront more repressive forms of control and their response contributed to changing forms of organization and consciousness. However, the closing of the SWA option and the increasing rate of migrancy to the Rand mines had even more important implications in remoulding the patterns of organization and consciousness in the area. Migrants were plunged into a world where their skills and traditions were of limited relevance, where life was regimented in closely controlled compounds, where they were at once drawn into an existing, broader working class and migrant culture and yet forced to redefine their position in relation to a new labour process and new ethnic division of labour. How this reorientation interacted with rural politics is as yet unclear. But the acute crisis in the rural areas of the Cape between 1912 and 1914, while triggered by the advent of East Coast Fever and state measures to combat it, needs to be located in the changing patterns of proletarianization in the area if its form is to be understood.

This paper is one of a series proposed on patterns of migrancy from the Transkeian and Ciskeian districts which, in turn, are designed to serve as a background to analysis of the changing nature of rural consciousness and rural movements in these areas. The material available does not often allow great precision in the linkages between experiences at work and the changing patterns of rural politics. However, if progress is to be made towards this end, it is clear that the general phenomenon of migrancy must be disaggregated. Very specific forms of migrancy arose in different districts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Examples which are being researched, aside from the SWA case, include sanitary and municipal workers from Bhaca districts, sugar plantation workers from Pondoland, Gcaleka workers in East London, and the more widespread migration to the mines. Though the more general nature of capitalist development and proletarianization should not be overlooked in the quest for detail, it is clear that the uneven nature of such developments and particular experiences at work could produce, when coupled with differential processes of colonization, highly distinctive forms of consciousness. Migrants were not atomized labour units. They remained locked into constantly reshaped sub-cultures born out of specific interactions between their life in the rural areas and at labour centres. These must be identified and located within the broader political economy of South Africa as a step towards understanding, on the one hand, ethnic consciousness and, on the other, the wider movements which at times overlaid them and instilled more generalized class and nationalist ideologies.

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Abbreviations: CA NA - Cape Archives, Native Affairs papers
BBNA - Cape of Good Hope, Blue Book on Native Affairs
SAB GG - South Africa, Governor General's papers
SNA - Secretary for Native Affairs
CMT - Chief Magistrate
RM - Resident Magistrate
A - Assistant
CC - Civil Commissioner
CA 1/IDW - Papers of the RM Idutywa

Notes

- (1) No complete lists are available. Some lists of deceased workers, notified to the Cape government, have survived. (CA NA 728/F38 and 729/F38.) As Cape officials attempted to trace their next of kin, districts of origin are often given. Correspondence on individual workers, and especially the recruitment of large batches of workers, gives a fairly good indication of the catchment area from which they were drawn. (See following references.) A considerable number of "Coloured" men also migrated to SWA, but their experiences are not dealt with in this paper.
- (2) On patterns of migrancy from the 1870s, see S. van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa (OUP, 1942); R. F. Sieborger, "The Recruitment and Organisation of African Labour for the Kimberley Diamond Mines, 1871-1888", MA, Rhodes University, 1975; A. J. Purkis, "The Politics, Capital and Labour of Railway Building in the Cape Colony, 1870-1885", DPhil, Oxford, 1978; C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (London, 1979); P. Kallaway, "Black Responses to an Industrializing Economy", paper presented to conference on Southern African Labour History, Johannesburg, 1976. Most of these authors draw heavily on the Cape Parliamentary Papers.
- (3) Kallaway, "Black Responses".
- (4) Purkis, "Railway Building", 342 ff.
- (5) V. Bickford-Smith, "Black Labour at the Docks at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century", paper presented to Cape Town History Workshop, UCT, 1979. For African workers in the war, see P. Warwick, "African Labour during the South African War, 1899-1902", ICS, London, Collected Seminar Papers on the Societies of Southern Africa, Vol. 7, 104-116.
- (6) C. Saunders, "The Creation of Ndabeni, Urban Segregation, Social Control and African Resistance", Collected Seminar Papers of the Africa Seminar, UCT, 1978.
- (7) Cape BBNA, G.12 - 1904, 234.
- (8) For background on Depression, see especially J. Hatherley, "The Effects of the Depression after the Anglo-Boer War on Cape Politics, 1902-1910", MA, UCT, 1953; C. G. W. Schumann, Structural Changes and Business Cycles in South Africa, 1806-1936 (London, 1936); J. van der Poel, Railway and Customs Policies in South Africa, 1885-1910 (London, 1933). Little attention has been devoted to this important period of depression in recent historiography.
- (9) CA NA 722, Poppe, Schunhoff and Guttery to Min. for Public Works, 24.8.1910, enclosing cutting from South African News.
- (10) Helmut Bley, South West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914 (London, 1971), provides this best background to SWA, although weak on economic development. See also J. H. Wellington, South West Africa and its Human Issues (OUP, 1967). R. Moorsom's work deals with economic issues but largely focusses on Ovambo migrancy, which is of marginal importance to this paper. See R. Moorsom and G. Clarence-Smith, "Underdevelopment and Class Formation in Ovamboland, 1844-1917" in R. Palmer and N. Parsons, Roots of Rural Poverty, and R. Moorsom, "Colonisation, Collaboration and Worker Consciousness: the Origins of the Contract Labour System in Namibia", UCT Africa Seminar, 1976; G. Pool, Die Herero-Opstand 1904-1907, deals with the war in some detail.
- (11) CA NA 555, WNLA report, May 1904, 21.
- (12) CA NA 556, Statement by I. Magadi, 22.4.1905, and others to ARM Uitvlugt and following corresp. CA NA 557, Statements by Jacob Mdolomba, 25.9.1905, and others in SNA to CC Kingwilliamstown, 25.9.1905, and corresp. ff. Many of the statements and letters cited below were originally made in Xhosa. The English translations mostly reflect the language of interpreters.
- (13) CA NA 555, ARM Utivlugt to SNA, 15.2.1906.
- (14) For wages, see above correspondence.
- (15) CA NA 556, Statement by Jan Tusi, 20.4.1905, to ARM Ndabeni; for similar experiences, see above references.
- (16) CA NA 557, Statements by Jacob Mdolomba and Jon Qambela, 25.9.1905.

- (17) CA NA 557, Statement by Katikati Kobe; see also statements by Jim Sondo, Jim Ntsikiyana, Kingwilliamstown, 14.2.1906; and SNA, To whom it may concern, 5.5.1906, letter carried by William and Talbot Mkwenu to SWA. CA NA 727/F38 (ii), SNA to RM. Tsolo, 19.7.1906, and corresp. ff.
- (18) CA NA 725/F981, Magwayi Masarwa to his father, 12.7.1909.
- (19) CA NA 725/F981, Magwayi Masarwa to Mhlusha Mdiyane, 24.1.1909.
- (20) CA NA 727/F38 (ii), Jan Motte to My Dear Lover, 13.4.1906.
- (21) CA NA 727/F38 (ii), German Consul General, Cape Town, to SNA, 19.2.1906.
- (22) CA NA 556, Statement by Jan Tusi, 20.4.1905.
- (23) CA NA 729/F38, Fisha Witbooi to Mr Qaula, June 1908.
- (24) CA NA 727/F38 (ii), SNA to RM Engcobo, 2.10.1907.
- (25) Warwick, "African Labour".
- (26) CA NA 557/A950, Plague Medical Officer, East London, to CC, East London, 16.11.1905.
- (27) See, for example, CA NA 727/F38 (ii), L. Dominicus, Rechtsagent, to SNA, 7.9.1907.
- (28) CA NA 556, Statement by I. Magadi.
- (29) CA NA 556, Statement by Jan Tusi.
- (30) CA NA 727/F38 (ii), Statement by Mbandazayo before RM, Umtata, 25.6.1907.
- (31) Ibid.; for other shootings, see CA NA 728/F38, Statement by Mafaca Mgoqi, 15.1.1906; Statement by John Tiyala Mhlango, 1907; CA NA 725, Statements at Uitvlugt by Jack Seti, John Culayo and others, 11.8.1906; Skeyi Stemela, 8.10.1906.
- (32) CA NA 720/F473, ARM, Uitvlugt, to SNA, 2.9.1907.
- (33) CA NA 720/F473, ARM, Uitvlugt, to SNA, 2.9.1907.
- (34) CA NA 719/F473, ARM, Uitvlugt, to SNA, 2.4.1908.
- (35) CA NA 719/F473, SNA circular, 2.10.1908.
- (36) CA NA 719, RM, Willowvale, to SNA, 22.8.1907; RM, Butterworth, to SNA, 12.11.1907, and many others in this box.
- (37) CA NA 719, Inspector of Native Locations to SNA, 22.10.1908, and corresp. ff, for rest of this paragraph.
- (38) For controls over recruiting at the time, see W. Beinart, "Joyini Inkomo: Cattle Advances and the origins of Migrancy from Pondoland", Journal of Southern African Studies, 5, 2 (1979).
- (39) CA NA 555, Proclamation 79 of 1906, 2.3.1906; CA NA 727/F38 (ii), SNA to eds. Izwi Labantu and Imvo Zabantsundu, 13.11.1906.
- (40) See corresp. in CA NA 556.
- (41) SAB GG Volumes 178 and 179.
- (42) See note 11. For general conditions, see SAB GG 178/4/24, Memo on conditions of Native and Coloured people in German SWA, 30.6.1910. Richard Moorsom has provided me with documents on labour policy in German SWA.
- (43) Translated from Luderitzbuchter Zeitung, 15.10.1910.
- (44) Hatherley, "Depression", and L. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa (Oxford, 1960), have tables covering the period.
- (45) Cape, BBNAs.
- (46) CA NA 725, SNA to ARM, Uitvlugt, 21.8.1908, case of Alfred Sannie; CA NA 719, Inspector of Native Location to SNA, 22.10.1908, and passim, for 1909; CA NA 722, H. Knorr to USNA, 11 and 17.11.1910, and passim.
- (47) See BBNAs, G.12 - 1904; Transkeian Territories General Council, Debates and Proceedings, 1904, 4-5; Cape of Good Hope, Reports by Native Delegates to Johannesburg and Correspondence on Conditions of Labour at the Mines, 1903, G.4 - 1904.

- (48) Ibid., 12.
- (49) Perceptions of the mines and the nature of migrancy to the Rand from the Cape will be explored in a future paper.
- (50) BBNAs; see Beinart, "Joyini Inkomo".
- (51) CA NA 722, J. W. Kurtz to Minister, NA, 1.8.1910.
- (52) For general comment on this, see BBNA, G 24 - 1908, 27, RM Tsomo.
- (53) See CA NA 722 for extensive correspondence on recruiting in 1910.
- (54) This will again be explored in more detail in a future paper on Cape migrants on the Rand.
- (55) CA NA 722, Schumacher to Rissik, 18.5.1910, and corresp. ff; CA NA 710, SNA, Transvaal, to SNA, Cape, 7.4.1910, and corresp. ff.
- (56) CA NA 722 has typed summary of corresp. on these issues; CA NA 710, SNA to Labour Association, Kingwilliamstown, 31.3.1910; to SNA Transvaal, 15.4.1910, 26.6.1910.
- (57) CA NA 722, Knorr to Prime Minister, 17.11.1910.
- (58) SAB GG 178/4/22. E. Muller, British Consul, Report upon the Conditions of Cape Colonial Natives Employed by the Railway Construction Firm Bachstein Koppel, and the Occurrence at Wilhelmstal on October 4th where Natives were killed by the Military.
- (59) Statements by workers are included in and appended to the above. Also GG 178/4/26, Prime Minister's minute No. 37, 13.11.1911, including statements by Sizana Jafta and Bout Ompi.
- (60) SAB GG 178/4/26, Statement by Sizana Jafta, Kingwilliamstown, 25.10.1910.
- (61) Muller, Report.
- (62) Cape Times, 27.10.1910. References in the Cape Times were located by Rose Kingwill.
- (63) Cape Times, 29.10.1910.
- (64) Muller, Report, 10.
- (65) See reports in Cape Times and Luderitzbuchter Zeitung, 15.10.1910.
- (66) Statement by Charlie, in Muller, Report. See also newspaper reports.
- (67) SAB GG 178/4/78, F. A. G. Quandt to Muller, 30.4.1911.
- (68) CA NA 725A, S. J. Dywaru to his brother, 18.10.1910. For continued migration, see South Africa, BBNA, U.G.17 - 1911, 217, 223, 227; CA 1/1DW 20, Circular 24 of 1911.
- (69) For discussions about conditions and compensation, see SAB GG volumes 178 and 179, passim.
- (70) SAB GG 179/4/84, Report on visit to German South West Africa, 18.1.1911, attached to Prime Minister's minute, 29.3.1912; SAB GG 178/4/45 and enclosed cutting, 25.1.1911.
- (71) CA NA 725A/F981, Dower to Mitchell, 14.2.1912.
- (72) For discussions about the internal mobilization and control of workers in SWA, see PTA SAB NA Box (?), File 4994/F1227 (copies obtained from R. Moorsom), and Moorsom, "Colonisation, Collaboration"; SAB GG 178/4/24, memo on conditions in SWA, 30.6.1910, and other reports by Muller in this volume.
- (73) Bill Nasson, "'These Infernal Mahogany Brats': Black Transport Workers and the British Army in the Cape Colony during the South African War", unpublished paper, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, March 1980. See also C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (London, 1979).
- (74) Purkis, "Railway Building".
- (75) CA NA 727/F38 (ii).
- (76) CA NA 722 contains copies of this handbill.
- (77) Cape Times, 31.10.1910. The photograph was located by Rose Kingwill.

- (78) S. Trapido, "'The Friends of the Native': Merchants, Peasants and the Political and Ideological Structure of Liberalism in the Cape 1854-1910" in S. Marks and A. Atmore (eds), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial Southern Africa (Longmans, 1980), 253.
- (79) See references in note 2 and the Cape Blue Books.
- (80) CA NA 557, SNA, To whom it may concern, 5.5.1906.
- (81) See, for example, Colin Bundy, "A Voice in the Big House: the Career of Headman Mamba", pp. 66-76 below.