

THE NATAL SUGAR INDUSTRY, 1849-1905: AN INTERPRETATIVE ESSAY

by

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During the 19th century the cultivation of grass and root crops for the production of raw sugars was associated with some of the most important developments in the international economy. The burgeoning demand for cheap foodstuffs from the industrial centres of Western Europe and the United States led to an enormous increase in demand for cheap sugar along with other agricultural and industrial commodities. Thus, per capita consumption of sugar in the United Kingdom rose from 19.08 lbs per year in 1830 to 71.09 lbs in 1890. (1) Elsewhere in Europe a demand for raw sugar was met not by imports of cane sugar but by the extraction of the sucrose content of domestically grown sugar beet. Between 1853 and 1882 the proportion of world sugar production derived from beet root sugar rose from 14 to 47 per cent. (2)

Such an increase in demand and expansion of production had many effects. In the tropical agricultural colonies of the Caribbean it tended to reinforce traditional patterns of metropolitan and colonial trading with a geographical specialization and a world-wide division of production and manufacture. The intensified competition which these developments implied in turn increased the demand for cheap sources of labour to facilitate profitable production in times of falling prices and slave emancipation. A new international circulation of labour to work on the sugar estates, and elsewhere, thus reflected and underpinned the production and circulation of raw sugar for exchange. This demand for labour was satisfied predominantly by Asian countries. (3)

These developments in the tropical sugar colonies took place in the context of growing complexities within the world sugar market. As demand rose and the scale of the international economy expanded, so did production diversify. Thus, although the rise of the beet-growing areas of central Europe posed the greatest threat to the survival of the old sugar colonies, the emergence of new and competitive areas of production was not confined to the temperate zones of the world. In the course of the 19th century there emerged several new major cane-growing countries, whilst long established slave-grown sugar producing areas underwent major expansion. Some of these new areas produced almost exclusively for the world market, whilst others grew in response to a more regional demand. This regionalism was itself a reflection of the expansion and growth of the world market. Patterns of labour utilization in the new cane sugar areas also bore a remarkable resemblance to those in the old. The prosperity of the Peruvian sugar industry between 1849 and 1873 was largely dependent upon indentured Chinese labour (4), whilst that of Queensland depended upon the contract labourers of the Pacific Islands. (5)

The emergence and development of the sugar industry in Natal owed something to all these influences. Throughout the 130 years of its existence the controlling

power in the industry has resided with the white settlers and their descendants or successors. As such, the founding of the industry was strongly influenced by the upsurge of international European emigration which was a feature of the middle decades of the 19th century in Natal. (6) Such influences also sustained the industry, for as it outgrew its tiny domestic market in its early years the demand for Natal sugar in the Cape ports provided the largest single source of export for the Natal growers until the development of the Kimberley and the Witwatersrand mines in the later decades of the century. Moreover, the entry of a local supplier of cane sugar into the lucrative Cape trade also ensured that the nascent South African industry would grow or founder in the face of fierce competition from Mauritius, itself competing in other markets against a background of falling prices. (7) Not that competition between Mauritius and Natal ended in the produce markets. Mauritius after 1838 and Natal after 1860 were increasingly dependent upon labour markets of the Indian sub-continent to provide the necessary labour to run their estates. They thus not only competed with each other but with other Caribbean, South East Asian and Pacific Island sugar colonies for labour. (8) From the point of production, therefore, to the point of sale, Natal sugars were grown and manufactured in the face of direct and indirect pressures which resulted from the incorporation of the sub-continent into the world market.

II

Sugar cane, or the sweet grass saccharum officinarum, although not indigenous to Natal, was certainly known and used by Africans for domestic purposes from the 17th century onwards. Nevertheless, commercial exploitation of sugar was not initially favoured, even by the proponents of the closer settlement movement on the Natal coastlands in the 1840s. Byrne actually warned potential emigrants from England against cultivation of the crop, not on scientific grounds but on economic ones, because of the proximity of Mauritius. (9) The failure of commercial cotton and other tropical crops amongst the early settlers, however, led to experiments with the cultivation of cane in the late 1840s and early 1850s. Consequently, in the following twelve years between 1854 and 1866, the industry registered its fastest rate of growth ever recorded. The acreage of cane cultivated increased from only 338 acres in the three counties of Alexandra, Durban and Victoria to 12,781 acres in 1866, before registering its first contraction in the following year. The manufacturing capacity of the industry increased similarly fast. (10)

How was such a rapid development possible? The facts suggest that Natal sugar grew to such prominence as it possessed as a result of a combination of favourable prices, reasonably low wages and a protective tariff structure. To these advantages were added subsequently a partially controlled labour market and the short-lived benefits of financial speculation.

The development of the Natal industry occurred at a time of unusual price strength and stability. By contrast, other tropical crops such as coffee, cotton, arrowroot, tobacco and indigo suffered from severe price fluctuations, which curtailed their development. (11) At the same time, despite an upward trend between 1852 and 1860, Natal sugar production began at historically low wage levels for unskilled African labour within the colony. Even this upward trend was ameliorated by the introduction of Indian indentured labour after 1860. (12) The margin of profitability in these early years must have been considerable as labour traditionally formed the largest single item of current expenditure on the sugar estates. (13)

The extent of state intervention in constructing a tariff policy favourable to the planters reflected to some degree the limited financial options available to an impoverished government. It also reflected the results of important political conflicts within the colony. Thus, the Colonial Government was able and willing to intervene to protect planters against foreign competition without incurring any great financial sacrifice or extended executive commitments. As a result Natal was able to operate a tariff policy more or less consistently favourable to the sugar interests.

Thus, in 1856, 1867, 1876 and 1886 important alterations were made to the sugar duties in the Colony to protect the planting interests. (14) Positive discrimination in favour of the sugar planters was further extended through "free import schedules" which operated from 1856 onwards. (15) Similarly, rum - an important and lucrative sugar by-product - was subject to increasingly favourable protection. No less than four times between 1846 and 1867 the protective duty on proof spirits was raised from 2/- per gallon to over 8/-. (16)

State intervention in the labour market was determined by a fundamental inability of the colonial state to confront and destroy the existing mode of production amongst African producers in the 1850s. (17) This was the reality behind the policy of creating African reserves within the colony after 1846. (18) The attempts to promote an African labour supply from within the colony were limited by this fact and attempts to promote Tsonga and Indian immigration to satisfy the labour demands of the cash crop farmers were similarly determined by it. In these circumstances indentured immigration became the means by which this conflict was avoided and the labour requirements of the coastal belt farmers were satisfied. Of the two sources of immigration, that from India was both more expensive and of greater long-term importance for the industry. Between 1860 and 1866 and 1874 and 1911, no fewer than 152,814 indentured Indian labourers were introduced into Natal, the majority of whom, particularly in the 1860s, 1870s and 1880s, worked on the sugar estates. (19) The establishment of Indian immigration was essential to successful commercial sugar planting and the demand for continued immigration was the platform of the planting interest until the end of the first decade of the 20th century. (20)

Other state policies which favoured the sugar industry also developed out of the clash of interests within the white polity over the distribution of the surplus extracted from the land and its African occupants. From this struggle in the early years of the sugar industry, planters were only limited and irregular beneficiaries. Thus, the predominance of rentier capital in the early history of white settlement in Natal encouraged a land and labour policy which was to have profound effects upon the sugar industry. (21) The land grant policy of the colony led to a substantial growth of speculative land holdings which had a two-fold effect upon the coastal industries. On the one hand, it laid early limits on the political and economic power of the planter class based on the ownership of land. However, by creating a market in freehold property with security of tenure as a negotiable asset against loans and mortgages, it created an essential precondition of capitalist agricultural production. On the other hand, by alienating large stretches of land for so-called "kaffir farming" and by refusing to operate a free land grant policy, the government raised the scarcity value of sugar properties, already affected by geographical and climatic factors. By so doing it increased the initial capital required to promote sugar enterprises. In 1876 it was estimated that a sugar plantation capable of producing more than 300 tons of raw sugar annually required an initial investment of £11,845, of which 42 per cent went on land purchase costs. (22)

On a more short-term basis, the predominance of rentier interests did encourage an in-flow of speculative capital into land holding which spiralled over into sugar in the late 1850s and early 1860s. Two very large areas of sugar land were floated in this way, on the Tongaat river in the north and on the Umzinto river in the south. (23)

III

The sugar economy which emerged during this formative period in Natal history was based on plantation production. This was essentially a decentralized system of capitalist agricultural production which incorporated two production processes within the ownership of one unit. One such operation was agricultural, based on the cultivation and harvesting of cane. The other was industrial, involving the crushing of cane and the boiling and treatment of juice in the mill. (24) The plantation was, of course, the predominant organizational form of capitalist agriculture accumulating

surplus on the basis of the production of raw sugar for international exchange in the 19th century. Nevertheless, the particular form in which its productive components, land, labour and capital, were combined permitted a considerable degree of adaptability to local circumstances. The difference from one plantation area to another thus reflected the conditions under which capital accumulation took place in separate areas. The Natal plantations, which enjoyed their heyday between 1854 and 1878, were no exception to this pattern.

Natal plantations were based on private property in small areas of cane land, thus reflecting the vicissitudes of the Natal land market. Natal planters also had a proportionately high degree of capital invested in the industrial sectors of their estates although milling capacity was generally small, reflecting the availability of land, labour and credit. Most early mills generated between 6 and 15 h.p., although the Reunion Estate of the De Pass, Spence and Co had a mill which could generate up to 25 h.p. Small capacity was not, however, necessarily synonymous with primitiveness. Within a remarkably short time of its founding, the capital invested in crushing and boiling capacity meant that efficiency in the Natal mills increased quite sharply. By 1864, when 60 mills were already operating, 56 were steam driven. (25) Furthermore, the application of steam power promoted the rapid introduction of additional new technology into boiling house operations. The introduction of wetzel pans and centrifugals into the Natal mills began in 1865 and noticeably improved the overall recovery rate of these early industrial establishments. (26) The wage labour plantations of Natal are thus of some interest in that their capital ratio between mill and field operations did not remain constant.

The third major feature of the Natal plantation system was its use of various forms of wage labour. After 1860, the industry was dependent upon indentured Indians for a sizeable, if varying, proportion of its unskilled field and mill labour. In these circumstances, plantations using such labour extracted surplus from an unfree labour force. The essential feature of the indentured system in Natal was its use of a five-year contract of service. This controlled wage costs, subjected the work force to criminal penalties for civil offences and exercised a moderating, if not controlling, influence on other sectors of the labour market. (27) Not that plantations employed exclusively Indian contract labour. A variety of factors such as marginal cost and increased seasonal demand meant that a small proportion of labour employed was African. (28) Skilled work was generally performed by Europeans, some of whom were emigrants from Mauritius. This gave the Natal plantations a racially differentiated hierarchy of skill and control which was common to other plantation areas at the time. (29)

The development of sugar production in Natal on the basis of the plantation system was not inevitable. The predominance of this form of sugar production in the tropical sugar colonies of the new world should not disguise the fact that even in the middle of the 19th century alternative relations of production within the capitalist sugar economy were possible and viable. Broadly speaking, two such alternatives were available to Natal at the time, both of which were tried and discarded in favour of plantation agriculture. One such alternative was the central mill system. This was based essentially upon the division of the agricultural and industrial activities of the plantation into specialized planting and milling activities. (30) Another alternative was some form of peasant production of sugar, either based upon integration of traditional land-owning patterns into the exchange economy or upon some form of share-cropping arrangement. (31)

Of these two alternatives to the plantation system, peasant production in 19th century Natal was confined to African producers resident in the Mission Reserves of the coastal belt. The availability and viability of alternative lands in the main reserves at this time, and the inability of the colonial state to enforce capitalist relations of production upon the resident communities, reduced the potential for sugar cultivation in these African occupied areas. The attractiveness of alternative crops such as maize, and the possibilities presented by stock rearing for African squatters on absentee lands in the European sector, reduced still further the scope for widespread African growth of sugar. Shortage of potential cultivators and relatively small-sized white sugar plantations also mitigated against a form of métayage

production on white land elsewhere in the sugar belt. (32) Thus only Amanzimtoti and Ifumi Mission Reserves in the south and Mvoti and Verulam in the north provided any real potential for African peasant production and this was small in scale and short-lived.

The failure to develop the Natal sugar industry on the basis of a central milling system was founded on two unsuccessful attempts to promote this type of production under the auspices of the Natal Sugar Co Ltd, between 1853 and 1854, and Umzinto Sugar Co Ltd between 1859 and 1870. The failure of these two enterprises was a watershed in the development of the Natal sugar industry. For, in the case of the Natal Sugar Co Ltd, the absence of a favourable land grant policy and a government willing and able to guarantee a return on invested capital meant that important obstacles to this type of production were highlighted. In the case of the Umzinto Sugar Co Ltd, a more profound reason for the failure to develop central milling was found in the infrastructural obstacles which lay in the way of the successful harvesting and marketing of the large estate's produce. (34)

IV

If capital shortage, land settlement policies and poor infrastructure bedevilled the early history of central milling and peasant production in Natal, the plantations were not without difficulties of their own from these sources - a fact which was strikingly evident in the depression of 1865-1869. The long-term consequences of this depression can be observed in the revolution of sugar estate ownership which occurred between 1864 and 1874. This involved not only a transfer of title but in many cases a reduction in the number of properties through consolidation of holdings. (35) Another consequence of the crisis of the late 1860s was an almost permanent hostility to the sugar industry on the part of banks, some of whose fraternity had failed "through too much to do with sugar". (36) The effect was to drive many planters into the hands of merchant brokers in search of credit and encumber many estates with debts through the high rates of interest and commission that such consignees extracted. Thus, with its encroaching merchant power and growing consolidation of ownership, the Natal industry began to resemble older plantation economies of the West Indies in financial structure and ownership.

Nevertheless, the difficulties of the planters after 1864 did not stem from these causes alone. The market for Natal sugar posed serious problems for them in two respects. Crop disposal was a constant difficulty. Getting cane to the mill in the age of the ox wagon limited both the extent of cane acreages and the economic capacity of the mills. Furthermore, railway development was very backward in Natal. Only the development of the Kimberley diamond fields, the prospects of a rich interior trade and the ravages of redwater fever in the 1870s encouraged the plans for railway development from which the sugar industry stood to gain so much. (37) Even then, the pace was extremely slow. Furthermore, the condition of Durban harbour throughout the 19th century was a major obstacle to inter-colonial trade by sea. (38)

There were three main outlets for Natal sugars in the 19th century, all of which presented serious problems for the planters. By far the most important, until the development of the Witwatersrand in the late 1880s, was the sea-borne trade with the Cape, which absorbed more than fifty per cent by weight and value of all Natal sugar exports between 1852 and 1900. Throughout this period the Natal planters faced serious competition from the Mauritian growers, and in the 1890s from bounty-fed beet sugars, mainly from Germany. (39) This threat was diminished, but not entirely removed, by the enlargements to the South African Customs Union between 1898 and 1903. In the United Kingdom market, in common with many other tropical producers, Natal also faced competition from imports of bounty-fed beet sugars, together with that from new cane-growing areas. Natal also faced a problem of quality in the English markets, for many of her sugars suffered deterioration on the long journey to London for sale. (40) The home market for Natal was also insufficiently large to permit any avoidance of this external competition. For most of the century, Natal was forced to export between

32.2 and 65.5 per cent of its crop and send a growing proportion of its output into the interior. (41)

V

Shortage of capital, relative scarcity of suitable land, marketing difficulties and the relatively limited extent of state intervention, ensured that the 19th century industry remained small in scale, relatively limited in its impact upon the social structure of the Colony and vulnerable to changes in one or several of the influences making for continued capital accumulation on the basis of existing production arrangements. Two features of the industry in the later part of the century derive from this complex of forces: its cyclical and limited pattern of development and the increasing instability of its organizational structure.

After the crisis of 1865-1869, the industry did not experience a period of sustained growth until the opening of Zululand for white settlement after 1905. This uneven growth was reflected in the colony's contribution to British colonial sugar production. In contrast to other new sugar cane growing colonies, the percentage of total British colonial sugar production provided by Natal exports actually fell as a proportion of total exports. In a period of aggregate growth in colonial sugar export producing capacity of 29.3 per cent between 1875 and 1904, the Natal proportion of this output fell consistently from 1.95 per cent to 0.84 per cent. (42)

Some of this uneven growth must be explained by the long-term decline in domestic and export prices which the Natal planters experienced along with all other sugar producers in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. This was a reflection of the growing competition and overproduction of sugar in the world market caused by the extension of cane and beet acreages after the 1850s. Thus, both home and export prices fell every year from 1878 to 1885 and, despite a slight recovery thereafter, a further slide began in 1890/1 and continued until 1894/5 when prices reached their nadir for the whole century. Thereafter, a slight but sustained rise until 1908 ensured some measure of profit, but maintained a constant pressure upon production costs throughout this period. At the same time that there was a growing vulnerability to price weakness, the Natal planters began to suffer perceptibly from declining yields from their estates. The trend, in common with other sugar growing areas, was constantly downwards but began to reach quite serious levels in the 1880s and 1890s. The yield per acre of raw sugar actually fell below one ton for the first time in 1878, and despite a recovery thereafter fell below again in 1885 and in 1890/1. In 1896 an even more dramatic collapse took place owing to a combination of soil exhaustion and locust infestation. (43) Yields remained low until 1902. Thereafter, an improvement became noticeable and was reinforced after the opening of Zululand in 1905. This fall in yields was significant in itself, but its impact was compounded by its combination with the most disastrous years for sugar prices between 1875 and 1896.

The causes of this decline in yields are complex and cannot be dealt with here in any detail. In brief, it seems that it derived from the simultaneous impact of intensive monoculture on the natural fertility of the coastal soils, intermittent natural disasters such as drought, frost, fire and flood, and, of perhaps greatest significance, crop disease. There were two major failures of Natal cane varieties in the 19th century, in the 1860s with China cane and in the 1880s with Green Natal. The replacement ultimately settled upon was the so-called Uba cane, renowned for its combination of frost resistant and fibrous qualities. (44)

The industry responded to these pressures in a variety of ways. In a concerted attempt to lower working costs and increase productivity, the industry enlarged its milling capacity and produced more sugar at lower unit cost. By the 1890s this process of consolidation and technological modernization was very far advanced, the number of mills operating having fallen from 75 in 1877 to 37 in 1898. (45)

In conjunction with this process, the trend towards consolidated land holdings was accelerated. By 1910, sugar produce companies held 53,688 acres of land on both coasts. (46) At the same time additional pressure seems to have been applied to the unskilled work-force through increasing neglect of working and living conditions, and increasing attempts at manipulating the length of the working day. (47)

The industry which emerged from this process of increased technological input in the manufacturing process, enlarged estates and a more intensively exploited work-force was in many respects different from that which emerged in the period of speculative growth in the 1850s and early 1860s. Although the small plantation remained a feature of the Natal industry for another twenty years, its importance declined significantly after the 1880s. By contrast, there began to emerge a more highly capitalized and extensive system of large milling and planting concerns whose domination of their smaller brethren became increasingly noticeable. This was the beginning of the productive unit known today in the South African sugar industry as the miller-cum-planter. (48) The embryonic miller-cum-planter concerns were much more than large estates. Although they involved the element of large landholding and milling capacity, from very early on these miller-cum-planter estates crushed cane for outside growers and thus embodied elements of central mills which mark them as distinct both from the plantations from which they emerged and the central factories of Zululand which they preceded. (49)

Enlarged estate and milling capacity and relations with outside growers were not the only significant aspects of the miller-cum-planter concerns which emerged in the 1880s and 1890s. Two other features of great importance came to play a role in their development. Firstly, these concerns took on an increasingly corporate character. With the founding of Reynolds Brothers Ltd, in 1892, there began an accelerated move towards company ownership of the larger mills and estates. (50) There followed from this process an inflow of foreign, mainly British, capital into the Natal sugar belt. Reynolds Brothers Ltd, Natal Estates Ltd, and Tongaat Ltd were all companies originally incorporated in Britain and a significant proportion of whose share capital was held in the United Kingdom. (51) The emergence of companies also intensified the hold of merchant capital upon certain sections of the Natal industry, again encouraged by the absence of state or private banking finance. Virtually the whole of the milling capacity of the south coast of the sugar industry was in some way directly connected with the C. G. Smith Co by the First World War. (52) Since 1888, C. G. Smith was the fastest growing of the colony's three sugar-broking companies.

Secondly, the miller-cum-planter concerns exhibited an increasingly monopolistic ownership structure. The interlocking directorships of the south coast companies of the Smith Group were but one aspect of this process. The floating of the first refinery at South Coast Junction in 1898 was a joint enterprise whose capital was subscribed by leading shareholders in the Natal Estates Ltd, Tongaat Ltd, and the Smith Group. (53)

This development in the sugar industry was by no means inevitable. For pressure mounted from the late 1870s for increasing state intervention in the capital structure of the industry to set up a genuine central milling system. (54) However, continuing conflicts within the settler community, culminating in the Responsible Government issue in the late 1880s and early 1890s, ensured that the extent of state intervention remained limited very much along the lines of earlier action. Thus, the colonial government was prepared to negotiate Natal's accession to the South African Customs Union in 1898, and promote a policy of railway construction and preferential railway tariffs with the SAR. It was also prepared to off-set the loss of the colonial subsidy on the importation of Indian labour in 1899 with substantial changes in the laws governing reindenture and the imposition of a poll-tax, to compensate the planters. (55) However, the shortage of Crown Lands in the Coastal Belt and the political impossibility of the state providing loan finance for a central milling system meant that no sufficiently powerful or independent base for smallholding planters was established. The small growers who did emerge did so in a dependent position, unable to resist the conditions imposed by the large estate. Those plantations which did survive the turmoil of earlier years managed to acquire some of

their capital assets at greatly depreciated values. This reduced the burden of overhead costs and freed investment funds for the acquisition of advanced machinery and new land. (56) Furthermore, the ability to control the rate of production and determine the outlets of sale gave the millers the commanding heights of the sugar economy. Close and influential links with financiers and brokers also gave them the power to withstand the vicissitudes of the market. (57)

The emergence of the miller-cum-planter estates was not the only result of this complex process at the end of the nineteenth century in Natal. There was also a perceptible growth in sugar expansionism and demand for new areas of land to overcome the actual and potential restrictions upon profitable production. This occurred in two areas. Firstly, from the 1880s the demand to break up the African reserve lands on the coastal belt, to increase white settlement for sugar production in addition to forcing out labour, gained a new intensity. (58) Secondly, the 1890s saw a marked increase in the pressure to open Zululand to white settlement, again largely to promote the cultivation of sugar cane. (59) The annexation of the areas by Natal in 1897 provided the expansionists with a major opportunity which was only slightly delayed by the War of 1899-1902. Following the publication of the findings of the Zululand Delimitation Commission in 1904, the first tenders to establish a central factory system in the southern coast lands of the territory were received by the Government in 1905. (60) This development substantially reduced pressure for a break-up of the reserves within the boundaries of the old colony, whilst heralding the beginning of a new era in the history of the sugar industry. Thenceforth, with the successful development of Zululand, the industry manifested an increasingly complex and differentiated structure.

Notes

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- (43) "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for Natal in 1897" in Agricultural Journal and Mining Review, Vol. I, No. 12 (1898), p. 367.
- (44) South African Sugar Association, The Natal Sugar Industry (Durban, 1924), p. 58; Union of South Africa, Board of Trade and Industries, Report No. 66: Report on the Sugar Industry (Cape Town, 1926), p. 3.

- (45) Natal, Blue Books, 1877-1893; Statistical Year Books, 1894-1898.
- (46) A. J. Christopher, "Natal: a study in colonial land settlement" (unpublished, University of Natal PhD thesis, 1969), p. 339.
- (47) Tayal, "Indian Indentured Labour in Natal".
- (48) This phrase appears for the first time in the Sugar Act of 1936.
- (49) Not all sugar grown in Natal was crushed on the planters' own estates, even in the early days, although the percentage of growers relative to plantations was small: for an example of this type of arrangement prior to the emergence of the miller-cum-planter, see R. J. Mann, The Colony of Natal: an account of the characteristics and capabilities of this British dependency (London, 1859), p. 73.
- (50) Natal Agricultural Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 7 (1905), p. 664.
- (51) SA Sugar Year Book and Directory for 1930 (Durban, 1930), pp. 37-41; ibid for 1931, pp. 203-4.
- (52) Macmillan, op. cit., pp. 310-11.
- (53) Agricultural Journal and Mining Review, Vol. I, No. 21 (1898), pp. 656-7; ibid., Vol. I, No. 22 (1899), pp. 675-7; ibid., Vol. I, No. 27 (1899), pp. 865-7.
- (54) See, for example, A. Trollope, South Africa, 2 Vols. (London, 1878), I, pp. 267-8; W. Kermode, Natal: its early history, rise, progress and future prospects as a field of emigration (London, 1882), p. 163.
- (55) E. H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal (PMB, 1965), pp. 195-6.
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- (57) Union of SA, Board of Trade and Industries Report No. 66 ..., p. 27.
- (58) NAD/NBB, Report of the Lands Commission with Appendices and Minutes of Evidence, 1902 (PMB, 1902), pp. 4, 28; NAD/NBB, Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1906-7, with Evidence (PMB, 1907), evidence of Wm Pearce, p. 76.
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