

**DEVELOPMENT OR DOMINATION:  
TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT THEORY IN SOUTH AFRICA**

by

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Introduction

For the duration of the past ten years (and particularly the latter five of these), there has been in South Africa a proliferation of what has popularly been labelled "development thinking". During this period "development" has become a catchword among academic and quasi-academic researchers, consultants, state and parastatal ideologues, and the media; it has, in effect, become a growth industry with its own professional hierarchy and career structure.

The emergence of the concept "development" in this manner can be ascribed to the changing needs of the South African state - in particular the need for different forms of legitimation - and in that respect it can justifiably be depicted as an "incorporative apparatus" of contemporary apartheid ideology. However, given the preliminary nature of our research and the complexities of deciphering the form and legitimating functions of ideology in South Africa's system of race/capitalism, discussion in this paper will be focused on one dimension of the phenomenon "development": the categories of development "experts" and their attempts to create an indigenous methodology of development. (1)

The concept "development", like the concept segregation in the earlier part of the century, is of an amorphous nature and has different meanings to different people - a property which undoubtedly contributes to its pervasiveness in many sectors of the politico-academic arena. As a concept, moreover, it has historically been conflated with the concept of separatism to the extent that "development" has been largely the implementation of the policies of separate development in all its multifarious forms.

What was once the "Native Problem" or "Native Question" - an issue which predated the formation of the South African state and which was the subject of endless debate by Whites in state and civil society - has assumed a new form. As currently described, it is "the inter-group problem", "the problem of multinational development", or "the development problem"; in this there is little change in the nature of the "problem": it is, in essence, the final outplaying of Verwoerdian apartheid. The "development problem", in somewhat less euphemistic terms, is that of Black/separate "development".

The section which follows aims briefly to show that, while the programmes and policies of development - which are mostly (and significantly) preoccupied with the homelands - may have changed in form, the essentially segregationist and repressive nature of the South African state still remains. What is striking in any

review of the burgeoning literature on "development" in South Africa is the ahistorical stance of many of the writers. Few seem to have an awareness of their progenitors, and fewer acknowledge that development policies to date have generally reinforced rather than ameliorated the plight of the majority of homeland inhabitants.

#### Historical Antecedents of "Development"

Territory occupied by the "independent states" and other homelands is usually taken as given by planners, academics and state ideologues. This territory - constituting a thoroughgoing spatial polarization of inequality among Whites and Africans - with some deletion and small-scale pending and actual "additions" (consolidations is the favoured term), conforms to the area demarcated by the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act. This area - taking the highest estimate - amounted to only 13.7% of the total land mass of the Union of South Africa, approximately 2 million hectares less than that recommended by the Beaumont Commission almost twenty years earlier. The consequent gross shortage of land, exacerbated by increasing population and a repressive labour system, made peasant - or even capitalist - agriculture difficult if not impossible. (2)

State policy regarding development in the reserve/homelands - in so far as coherent theories and patterns can be observed - can be roughly divided into four phases. The first phase, which extended from 1932 to 1948, was initiated by the 1930-32 Native Economic Commission (NEC). The Commission was significant in that it highlighted the deleterious effects of land shortage and its consequent impact on the ecology of the homelands. The NEC was not the first state commission to draw attention to the situation in the reserves but it was the first to stress the need for "development". The Commission argued, *inter alia*, that "in the economic development of the reserves must inevitably be sought the main solution for the Native economic problem. Our problem is therefore not only as it is in agriculture to teach the Natives how to use their land more economically, but is also a race against time to prevent the destruction of large grazing areas, the erosion and denudation of the soil and the drying up of the springs". (3) The Commission felt that the basis for development lay less in the provision of more land than in the more effective utilization of existing areas.

This phase was characterized by an emphasis on reclamation and rehabilitation of the reserve areas. This was to be achieved through consolidation of the population ("betterment") and limitation of stock. Thus, while Native Affairs Department officials were increasingly aware of the conditions in the reserves, they believed that the causes were primarily technical, and of these the "bad farming" of the peasants was the most crucial. It was a classic manifestation of a "blame-the-victim syndrome". (4)

The second phase of state policy regarding reserve/homeland "development" lasted for the first ten years or so of National Party rule. This period saw a bolstering of "betterment" legislation and a greater incorporation of chiefs into the state's administrative machinery via the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act. In fact, the restoration of tribal life and the authority of the chiefs (in effect their power to dissipate or control resistance) was one of the terms of reference of the Tomlinson Commission, which travelled extensively through the "native reserves" during the early 1950s. (5)

The Tomlinson Commission took cognizance of the extent of deterioration in the reserves, but still clung to the notion of distinct African economies which, they imagined, could be restored by relieving pressure on land. (6) As a consequence, they recommended the abolition of communal land tenure, urbanization of half of the peasantry, and an intensive industrialization programme within the

reserves. The majority of the Commission's recommendations were nevertheless rejected and there was considerable resistance to voting sums of money to implement Tomlinson's plan. Tomlinson had estimated the finance for the first ten years in his scheme at £104.5 million, but by 1957 the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development had reduced this estimate by two-thirds to £36.6 million. (7) Thus, the first decade or so of National Party rule, if anything, saw even less development (or rather maintenance) of the reserves than under United Party rule.

The third phase of development in the homelands was opened by the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act and the establishment of the Bantu Investment Corporation, and conditioned by heightened rural and urban resistance and increased international opposition to apartheid. As a consequence, it was believed that if the South African government were to proceed with the separation of the "races", a "competitive alternative" to integration was imperative. Such a plan entailed the allocation of "a sufficient and coherent territory to serve as a basis for the national life of the Bantu" and the provision of "a radical economic development providing for industries and economic growth within the Bantu territory ... of sufficient scope to bring about the voluntary return to the territory of those now earning their living in other parts of the Union". (8)

From 1959-60 onwards there was a discernible semantic shift from apartheid to the notion of "separate development". Verwoerd, for example, informed the National Party faithful that "separate Bantu development" would be "in line with the objects of the world at large". (9) Increasingly, reference was made to "nations", "peoples" and "ethnic groups" rather than to race.

The deployment of "separate development" was, however, largely an updating of early apartheid. Its primary aim was to divide the Black, especially African, opposition by offering a more substantive role to their elites. But the policy shift did contain a new element: a passage from direct to indirect rule. An administrative petty bourgeoisie drawn partly from the chiefs, and small entrepreneurial class, would, it was hoped, provide law and order for a small stake in the economy. In this respect the 1963 Transkei Constitution Act, which supposedly accorded self-rule to the Transkei region, was to prove a crucial touchstone for the South African state in its approach to the issue of homeland "independence".

However, even in terms of its own priorities the state failed to grasp the nettle during the 1960s. During this decade, when the South African economy was generating a surplus, funds were not invested in the homelands. Only in 1968 were the homeland authorities and white industries able to allow direct private (White) capital investment in these areas. Even then, it was on an agency basis. At the same time the Bantu Investment Corporation had little impact on development. Poorly funded by the state, it concentrated on loans to enable Africans to acquire from Whites or Indians general dealerships, garages and other small-scale enterprises. Such investment was not meant to increase production or create jobs, rather to perpetuate the idea that the various homelands had their "own" economies.

The establishment of industrial areas on the white side of homeland borders suited industrialists considerably more than the governing elites of the homelands. Border industries, using labour subsidized by the homelands, both in terms of wages and the costs of social production, actually made the homelands poorer. (10)

The fourth (and present) phase of development strategy dates from the early 1970s, when state planners realized the possibility that they were faced, for the foreseeable future, with an increasing labour surplus. A heightened labour surplus, which was already evident in the late sixties, was generated in part by a move to capital intensive manufacture in all sectors of the economy. It was in

the agricultural sector, however, that there was the greatest displacement of labour: Simkins, for example, estimated that between 1960 and 1980 there was a net emigration of 1.3 million people from White farms. (11)

Since 1960, more systematic influx control and resettlement policies actually reversed immigration into urban centres to a slight net emigration at a time when continued immigration might have been predicted by theories of economic development. (12) This retardation of black urbanization, the displacement of farm labour and continuing "relocation" of "black spots" help to explain a "net immigration" to the homelands whose population share increased from 40 per cent in 1960 to 53 per cent in 1980. (13)

The post-1960 system set up pressures which were mostly administratively contained, but by the early 1970s these apparatuses were being placed under increasing strain - a strain which could not be contained solely by a larger bureaucracy. New strategies were needed to (a) legitimize and facilitate increased resettlement in the homelands; (b) ensure that people stayed on the land; and (c) refine the methods of control and co-optation of urban Blacks. It is in this context that the granting of homeland "independence" to Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei between 1976 and 1981 should be viewed.

The central thrust of homeland independence as far as the South African state was concerned thus was to exclude as many urban Blacks as possible from South African citizenship. "As far as political aspirations are concerned", comments the 1983 South African Yearbook, "the Government makes no distinction between urban Blacks and their compatriots in the self-governing national states ..." (14)

As part of an attempt to seek international recognition of the homelands and its discriminating practices in general, the state since 1979 has been talking in terms of an economic constellation of southern African states (CONSAS). Despite the subsequent rejection by the Frontline States of overtures of closer economic co-operation, the existence of CONSAS (albeit largely on paper) helps perpetuate the fiction of the "independent" homelands. In addition, the extensive use of the term "cooperation" in rhetoric associated with these proposals is suggestive of an interaction between two or more parties, that is that the homelands are autonomous entities.

The 1981 Good Hope Plan for Southern Africa is an elaboration of the CONSAS proposals. While there appears to be a shift away from the myth of the self-contained nature of the "independent" homelands, in the emphasis on the notion that "the whole of Southern Africa should be seen as comprising a number of broadly defined development regions which could include segments of various independent states", it is perhaps worth noting that the term "Southern Africa" refers in effect to South Africa and her homelands. (The eight proposed development regions are all parts of South Africa.) (15)

The real thrust of the Good Hope Plan, however, as with previous less sophisticated strategies, is to keep Blacks out of White urban areas by promoting an extensive investment programme in the "independent national states". Even assuming political will on the part of the state to underwrite such a venture, the cost of promoting development programmes in such disadvantaged regions is likely to be astronomical. For example, it has been estimated that the aggregate cost of financial concessions to industries operating in the Transkei during 1982/83 amounted to R13 million or R1,000 a year per worker employed. (16) In view of this, it is doubtful whether the state in its present fiscal crisis could undertake anything more than a holding operation in the homelands.

### The Current Development "Debate"

The contemporary development "debate" in South Africa is thus in reality a chimera, since the parameters of the discourse, as indicated, are still rigidly defined by the apartheid system. No contra-position on development by Blacks is admitted for discussion and they are, for the most part, totally excluded from the "debate". Theory, hence, is not generated by Blacks but for Blacks, and the concept "development" becomes almost by definition "Black development". The boundaries of development activity are thus coincident with those of the homelands, since there is no officially recognized "Black development" outside these regions.

The participants in the "debate" are, however, a heterogeneous group representing the interests of the state, different sectors of the capitalist economy, as well as involving various species of "organic" intellectuals. The complex mobile ensemble of discourses and practices regarding "development" can be loosely delineated into three categories, as follows: (a) ethno-nationalism, (b) liberal-reformism, and (c) technocracy. The categories are not, however, mutually exclusive and the practices and pronouncements of individual actors do not necessarily always coincide with the category in which they would seem most "logically" to be located. Thus, while the objectives of ethno-nationalists and liberal-reformists would not, as a rule, overlap, it is likely that they will find common grounds in technocracy since they both to an extent help constitute and perpetuate this "category".

### Ethno-Nationalists

Adherents of the ethno-nationalist school are located largely, but not exclusively, in Afrikaans-medium and ethnic universities and among the ranks of state ideologues. Their theories, which bear elements of "volkekunde" (17), represent the most cogent attempt to develop an indigenous discourse on development. The writings of this group endeavour to refurbish the theories of separate development by the appropriation and bastardization of western sociological theories of pluralism and ethnicity, and lately by the adaptation of international theories of development.

It is from this school of theorists that much of state policy vis a vis Black development is drawn. This in itself is not surprising, since several of the most prominent academic or quasi-academic research agencies are part of the state machinery; these include the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). In addition, the linkage between theory and policy formulation is further assured by a significant Broederbond presence among practitioners of and writers on development. (18)

The attempts of the ethno-nationalists to generate a methodology of development are as much an attempt to legitimize the unfoldings of the policies of separate development. This on occasion descends to the level of subtle propagandizing, as evident in the invocation of the failures of Black Africa in comparison with South Africa and its homelands. Dr P Smit, then Chairman of the Africa Institute, in his annual report for 1981, states, for example:

Both Africa and South Africa today differ greatly from what political leaders expected 21 years ago. Statistical data could be presented in an attempt to show to what extent the average black African is better or worse off than in 1960. Such an exercise, however, would not greatly enhance our understanding of reality. Certainly it is far more difficult and dangerous to travel across Africa today than before

independence, standards of public administration, rural health services, telecommunications and other services have generally declined; almost everywhere one can feel an ominous worsening with respect to food supplies, employment, public indebtedness, balance of payment, rural-urban disparities, availability of consumer goods, and so forth. (19)

The cruder variants of ethno-nationalist theory expand on this idea by alluding to the Christian civilizing role of Whites (and increasingly non-Africans) in South Africa and the continent of Africa. Professor Van Wyk of Potchefstroom University, for example, in referring to the compatibility between the basic needs approach and Christian beliefs, states:

It is a general belief that South Africa has a great number of Christians of all races and in all walks of life. Surely, this will be a matter of such importance to the Christians that they will regard this as one of the opportunities to be of service in the Kingdom of God. The fact remains that it will take a concerted effort by everybody in South Africa to adopt an attitude of responsibility: the rich to help the poor: the poor to accept it but at the same time to be ready to contribute to their own affairs. (20)

Under this rubric there is a strong appeal to "common sense" and to the observable realities of events in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa. Illustrative of this approach are the remarks of Professor Stoffel van der Merwe of the Rand Afrikaans University, who avers that:

If one concedes the slightest amount of good intentions - or at least enlightened self-interest - on the side of the government, a completely different interpretation can be given to the facts. The black areas in South Africa undoubtedly belong to the third world and suffer from the same problems as the rest of Africa. The problems of development encountered in the black areas of South Africa are in all respects comparable to the problems experienced in the rest of Africa. It is a well known fact that despite all efforts to develop Africa the gap between the developed countries and third world continues to widen. (21)

In the absence of any normative paradigm of development (other than that of separation), the contradictory twists of the path towards a theory of homeland development make heavy going for even the most consummate ethno-nationalist theorist. The process has involved a co-option of terminology and concepts which is often antithetical to the objectives of the theories whence they were borrowed. What emerges from this convolution of ideas is a pseudo-theory of development embracing a variety of often divergent perspectives.

Such an approach is exemplified in the following passage by D A Kotze, Professor of Development Administration at the University of South Africa:

Development Administration should take from various disciplines certain aspects that have influence on or are relevant to the subject moulding them and integrating them in this adapted form into its own newly structured field of study. Development Administration accordingly develops its own new field by means of modified and adapted subject content from

related disciplines, in order effectively to examine and deal with the unique development administrative problems of Africans. In this way a single, though complex, yet new and integrated totality is evolved as a field of study from related data. From the inside of this new subject, the various aspects in its subject content are now viewed differently - since they have meanwhile undergone some modification - from what it used to be in the related disciplines as seen from the outside. For the sake of convenience this premise can be typified as an integrated totality approach. (22)

Underlying the ethno-nationalist perspective is a strong current of structural functionalism which reflects itself in a lack of concern with causal (historical) explanations of social systems and social change. The approach tends to view any given homeland as a systemic whole, the components of which are functionally inter-dependent and to an extent self-regulatory. Such causality as is allowed is confined within the system, which tends to react to, rather than be determined by, external forces.

The apolitical stance of the "systems approach" to rural development clearly illustrates this aspect. A recent report (23) on the problems of agricultural development in the Transkei, for example, identifies "three interacting forces which in combination, determine the type of farming system being practised in a given agro-ecological area". These were: (i) physical forces and the environment, (ii) the human, practical and (iii) institutional framework (i.e. agricultural policy, marketing, extension, etc). From the perspective of the "systems approach" thus, the retardation of agricultural growth is determined by constraints within the homelands themselves.

The structural functionalist approach is also interwoven with earlier theories of modernization, which are residual in much of current development thinking. Two facets of the modernization thesis which emerge in contemporary development writing are: (a) the role of the elite (now called "leaders"/professionals) in the process of social transformation, and (b) the dualistic nature of the South African political economy.

- (a) The importance of "leaders" is explicit in the institution of chieftainship previously mentioned, but it is also, and perhaps more importantly, prevalent in attempts to stimulate the growth of a Black middle class of entrepreneurs and professionals.
- (b) The dualistic perspective is evident in the depiction of the homelands as a series of distinct but unitary economies requiring their own course and pace of development. (24) In this connection it must be noted that the introduction of the strategy of inter-regional development (cf The Good Hope Plan) (25), despite its apparent shift away from the notion of independent homeland economies, represents in actuality a reformulation of the industrial decentralization policy (26) rather than a conceptual volte-face.

The notion of dualism, as explicated in much of the contemporary writing, envisages disparate development paths for the homelands and for White South Africa. This is implicit in the propagation of such notions as self-help, informal sector employment and appropriate technology, which are seen as peculiar to the homelands and to Blacks in general.

The ethno-nationalist perspective on development, however, is by no means static and has in recent years shown a considerable capacity to transform (update) itself; it is in part a discourse and has an internal momentum of its own.

### Liberal Reformists

The liberal-reformist perspective on development is far less prevalent than that of the ethno-nationalists. The approach, in essence, emerges from the old school of liberalism, although the proponents of this view in general reflect more social-democratic leanings than did their forebears, C S Richards, S H Frankel, H M Robertson, and others.

Liberal-reformism, which is evident in the research institutes in many English media universities, allows for the possibility of development, and in that its reformism is not markedly different from that of the official parliamentary opposition. The approach, which contains a call for reason, emphasises the importance of gradualism and the power of persuasion to remove obstacles to development.

Whilst the standpoint of this school is not necessarily accommodative of the existing political dispensation, it does for the most part recognise (if it does not accept) the limitations of separate development and attempts to manoeuvre within those parameters. The passage by Jill Nattrass, cited below, is indicative of this general approach:

There are indeed a number of factors in the application of a basic needs approach in the South African context which suggest that enlightened self interest of the white groups as well as that of the Black leaders in the National States will be well served by the introduction of such a strategy. These are:

1. From the viewpoint of the white leadership, a basic needs approach to development is compatible with the cause of separate development. Indeed one must argue that its implementation could act as a justification for the policy in the sense that the basic needs approach requires the identification of the areas in need in the country as well as some decentralisation of the government, both of which have occurred as the policy of separate development has been implemented.
2. From the viewpoint of the wealthier groups who will have to bear the costs of such development, as a result of the emphasis the basic needs approach places upon the mobilisation of local development resources and participation, it is highly likely to yield greater returns in the form of development generated per tax and transferred, than any other alternative development strategy.
3. From the viewpoint of the Black elite in the National States, the strategy is politically attractive since it shows the leadership to be interested in the welfare of the poorest groups.
4. In the South African context, the funds for such development come into the National States in the form of a transfer from the central government so the cost of development to the elites within these States is negligible. Indeed Black

commercial and industrial leaders in these areas stand to gain substantially from the successful implementation of a basic needs strategy.

In terms of these arguments, it does seem that there is no reason why the basic needs approach should not be adopted in South Africa. (27)

A central tenet of the liberal-reformist approach but one by no means universally propagated is its belief in the power of market forces to improve quality of life among the poor of South Africa and the homelands. (28) It is seen as important thus to extend the free market to Blacks and to allow them "equal opportunities" to whites. This line of thinking is also strongly advocated by the English and, to a lesser extent, the Afrikaans media.

### Technocrats

The third identifiable group, the technocrats, is in part a pseudo category, since it is informed by the other two ideological tendencies. Thus, while the technocrats swear allegiance to no specific ideology and hold the promise of neutrality in the development arena, in practice they generally serve one or other camp.

Implicit in their work and assumptions is the feasibility of "development", provided the correct techno-economic mix can be found. This apparently neutral standpoint has in effect created a meeting space for ethno-nationalist and liberal-reformist in an avowedly non-political atmosphere. It is likely as a consequence of this that the technocratic tendency is the fastest growing of the three discussed, including, as it does, the plethora of consultants operating within and without the homelands. Thus, while possessing its own adherents within the ranks of academics, its primary function would appear to be the provision of a forum for disparate interest groups.

The province of technocratic operation is marked by an amalgam of development concepts and a broad lexicon of developmental terminology. The strategies propagated by technocrats which reflect the diversity of the interest groups they represent include, *inter alia*, the concepts of self-help, self-sufficiency, community development, labour intensity (versus capital intensity), settlement on the land, appropriate technology, informal sector employment and basic needs, in addition to a broad range of engineering strategies.

Whilst obviously not all of the above concepts are universally propagated, several of them bear special consideration in that they embody a technocratic belief in the notion of a value-free and depoliticised process of development. For the purposes of discussion it will be of relevance to consider two of these concepts and their intended applications.

### Appropriate Technology

The concept of appropriate technology has become something of a catch phrase in much development literature: a *sine qua non* in many strategies for rural development. Yet, whatever the validity of this approach (and it appears questionable), it is perhaps one of the most misappropriated of all the newly adopted concepts. In the South African context it has become separated from its Gandhian and Schumacherian philosophical origins, which advocate, in addition to simpler technologies, a significant reduction in the wealth and consumption of the affluent and the pursuit

of a less materialistic life-style. The adoption of more appropriate technologies (which cannot merely be seen as forces of production) thus implies the adoption of more "appropriate" lifestyles, which, they believe, would be more conducive to an egalitarian society.

The advocates of appropriate technology in South Africa, however, are amongst the most technocratic in the entire development domain, having depoliticized the concept to an extreme. This is, for example, illustrated in a newsletter issued by the then Centre for Appropriate Technology at the University of Port Elizabeth, which is remarkable for its ahistoricism. Referring to the conditions of underdevelopment and poverty in rural areas, the communication suggests that:

People in the rural traditional areas are indirectly forced out of their self-supportive activities by modern technology over the years. The only alternative for these people was and still is to move to an urban centre or growthpole to be employed in large scale production units. The large scale of modern technology is of such a nature that people are forced out of a self-reliant way of existence to a state of dependency. It is only the rich and powerful who can undertake new productive enterprises on this scale. People of small means are thus excluded from entrepreneurship and reduced to the position of job seekers. This exclusion manifests itself further in the fact that the largest share of government expenditure over the past two decades has been directed to the relatively affluent modern manufacturing and commercial sectors of the cities, while only a fraction has been directed to rural development, where the majority of the poor live. In this way not only the self-reliance of a community is reduced by the expanding activities of the modern sector, but the community is also placed in a spiral that leads to the uprooting of people in rural areas. (30)

The problem of rural poverty in the homelands and its perpetuation thus is reduced to one of an incorrect technological mix, large-scale as against small, capital versus labour intensity.

A variant of this theme is that not only must technologies be introduced which are more appropriate to rural communities but the peasants must also be encouraged to simplify their lifestyles. (31) The ironies inherent in this suggestion cannot be overlooked: appropriate technology is principally for Blacks, and in particular rural Blacks who are, in any event, the poorest of the poor in South Africa. Furthermore, if followed to its logical conclusion, i.e. without an equivalent simplification of life-styles on the part of White South Africa, which is advancing rapidly into a world of microchips and automation (32), the existent disparities between urban (White) and rural (Black) areas is likely to grow rather than diminish.

#### Back to the Land

Closely linked to the concept of appropriate technology is the proposition that Blacks should be encouraged (in practice, forced if necessary) to return to the land and remain there. Numerous academic and consultant reports point to the agricultural potentialities of the homelands and recommend the promotion of small-scale farming and self-sufficiency in the production of food. (33) In this, the advocacies of the technocrats and the state are entirely coincident. (It was

intimated previously, for example, that as early as 1936 and the Land Trust Act, it has been the policy of successive governments to encourage Blacks to remain in the homelands and on the land.) Thus, despite increasing levels of rural overcrowding (34) in many homelands, escalating soil erosion, the declining profitability of agricultural yield and the massive outflow of migrant labour, substantial increases in productivity are still forecast. Contemporary attempts, including the removal of squatters, to resettle people, however, in reality are not substantially different from the betterment schemes of the 1950s and early 1960s, with the notable exception that they are couched in the terminology of contemporary development theory.

Where the deterioration of agricultural output is admitted, it is ascribed to socio-cultural constraints within the homelands rather than to external economic-political forces:

More and more experts are maintaining that the development of agriculture in the Black areas is as much a sociological problem as it is an economic or technological one.

These characteristics and the status of the Blacks in their tribal community explains why those Blacks who have worked under the guidance of white farmers for years and often rendered outstanding services fall back into their traditional way of life and low productivity as soon as they return to their homelands. (35)

Both the above concepts find common reference in the international literature of development and have coherence in one or other developing nation. They become particularly contentious when they are deployed (in a purportedly value-free manner) within the economic-political framework of South Africa.

### Conclusion

The attempt to develop an indigenous discourse on development is obviously still very much in progress. What is of note is the fact that the "debate", so-called, is becoming increasingly more sophisticated in comparison to the crude formulations of the early ethno-nationalists. In particular, there is an attempt at reification and professionalization of the concept. This is, for example, evident in the recent establishment of a Development Association for South Africa and an Appropriate Technology Association, which, in the eyes of some, will formalise the entire debate.

The cause of the development movement has also been considerably strengthened by the foundation, in June 1983, of the Development Bank of South Africa. The Bank is not only assuming responsibility for the financing of development projects in the independent homelands (thereby supposedly diminishing direct dependence on the state) but also, more importantly for this discussion, it is providing a focal point for those "interested in development", by producing a development journal and by hosting conferences and funding directed research.

Notes

- (1) This paper represents a revision of a paper by C Tapscott and R Haines presented to the Annual Conference of the Association for Sociology in Southern Africa in 1983.
- (2) J Yawitch, Betterment. The Myth of Homeland Agriculture (Johannesburg, 1981).
- (3) Native Economic Commission Report, 29 22/1932, sections 72-73, p 13.
- (4) Yawitch, op. cit., pp 10-11.
- (5) D Hobart Houghton, The Tomlinson Report (Johannesburg, 1956).
- (6) D Moerdijk, Anti-Development: South Africa and its bantustans (Paris, 1981), p 78.
- (7) Yawitch, op. cit., p 30.
- (8) B Urquhart, Hammarksjold (New York, 1972), pp 494-98, and private documents. Quoted in N Muller and H Giliomee, "The Implications of the Homelands Policy for Economic Development and Political Stability in South Africa", unpublished mimeo, 1982.
- (9) Quoted by J Dugard, Independent Homelands: failure of a fiction (Johannesburg, 1979).
- (10) Moerdijk, op. cit., p 80.
- (11) C Simkins, Notes on "Four Essays on the Past, Present and Possible Future Distribution of Black South Africans", mimeo, 1983.
- (12) Simkins, op. cit.
- (13) Ibid.
- (14) The Official Yearbook of RSA, 1983 (Pretoria), p 214.
- (15) The Good Hope Man for Southern Africa (Pretoria, 1981), p 70.
- (16) Ralph Clark, "Transkei Gosplan, 1983-1988", unpublished draft, 1983, p 10.
- (17) See in this connection J S Sharp, The Roots and Development of Volkekunde in South Africa, JSAS, 8, 1, for an exposition of this discipline.
- (18) According to Wilkins and H Strydom (ed), The Super Afrikaners (Johannesburg, 1st ed, 1980), the following senior people are, or were, alleged members of the Broederbond: Dr P Smit and Professor R D Coertze (Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Africa Institute, respectively); Professor W J O Jeppe, Professor of Development Administration, University of Stellenbosch; Professor C Maritz, Director of the Institute of African and Political Studies, University of Potchefstroom; Professor L A van Wyk, Department of Economics, University of Potchefstroom; W Verhoef, Director HSRC, to mention but a few.
- (19) P Smit, "Chairman's Report: Africa Institute, 1960-1981", p 2.
- (20) L A van Wyk, "Priorities of Basic Needs in Economic Development", Development Studies on Southern Africa (DSSA), 4, p 154.
- (21) S Cleary and S van der Merwe, The Homelands Policy - a neo-colonial solution to South Africa's future, SAIRR occasional paper No 1 (Johannesburg), p 32.

- (22) D A Kotze, The Origin of Development Administration and African Politics, UNISA Study Guide (Pretoria, 1980).
- (23) P H Spies, "Community Development in Black Rural Areas", Urban-Rural Interaction in South Africa (Stellenbosch, 1983), p 125.
- (24) BENSO, Black Development in South Africa (Pretoria, 1976), p 9.
- (25) The Good Hope Plan (1981).
- (26) P J du Toit, "Southern Africa Regional Industrial Development Policy for the 1980s: its possible role in regional development", DSSA, 4, 3, p 247.
- (27) J Natrass, "The Research Requirements of the Basic Needs Approach to Development in the South African Context", paper presented to Bophuthatswana Rural Development Seminar, February 1982.
- (28) This viewpoint finds possibly its most confident exposition in the writings of M C O'Dowd, a senior executive in the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa.
- (29) See, for example, M K Gandhi, Village Industries (Ahmedabad, 1960), and E F Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (London, 1973).
- (30) University of Port Elizabeth, Centre for Appropriate Technology, "Appropriate Technology", June 1983.
- (31) P H Spies, Urban-Rural Interaction in South Africa (Stellenbosch, 1983), p 133.
- (32) See, for example, "The Ethics of the Microchip", South African Outlook (March 1983).
- (33) BENSO, op. cit., p 77, and The Official Year Book of South Africa (Pretoria, 1983), p 231.
- (34) Transkei, for example, has a rural population density which, after Burundi and Rwanda, is the third highest in Africa. (Source: 1980 World Tables, World Bank, TDR Vol 1, No 2.)
- (35) BENSO, op. cit., p 80.