

THE EMERGENCE OF LIBERALISM AND THE MAKING OF "HOTTENTOT NATIONALISM", 1815-1834 [1]

Stanley Trapido

Liberalism was the improbable political ideology which began to emerge in the Cape in the decades between 1800 and 1834. Improbable not from the vantage point of the present, but from that of the age which preceded its advent. The eighteenth century Cape had been an age dominated by autocratic mercantilism and yet, within three decades, the struggles between an incoming British colonial administration, a local slave-holding Dutch gentry and a new rising commercial class, had brought the beginnings of liberalism into being. The Cape's social and economic system was being transformed and a new ideology was emerging. But it was not only the conflicts between these interests which began to construct a new order. Essential to the making of Cape liberalism were the activities of a handful of independent journalists, a small number of radical missionaries and an increasingly politically-conscious group of Khoisan-descended people who were in the process of evolving a "Hottentot" nationalism.

The oligarchic-commercial system which preceded the liberal decades was a creation of the expansion of Europe - one more variation of the colonies of the Atlantic world. Established in the mid-seventeenth century, on the southern tip of Africa by the *Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC), the Cape was ruled by an autocracy throughout the eighteenth century whose primary purpose was to further the mercantile interests of the *Compagnie*. These interests were served, firstly, by provisioning *Compagnie* vessels which called at the Cape on their journeys to and from Europe and south Asia, and secondly, by an increasing military presence calculated to deter the territorial designs of other metropolitan powers. Although it was slaves and Khoisan who were exploited and dispossessed by *Compagnie* and settlers, it was the latter who made claim to establish representative institutions. As elsewhere, settlers began to question a colonial system which gave them no political representation and whose mercantile powers limited local economic opportunities.[2] They also questioned the Company's attempts to regulate settler control of slaves and Khoisan servants. Thus, in their 1779 *Patriot* manifesto - a faint echo of the Dutch bourgeois movement of the same name - they called for the right "to allow the burghers to punish their slaves themselves".[3] An attempt in the 1790s by officials in the Graaf Reinet district to restrain settlers in their treatment of Khoisan servants, and also to prevent them from provoking a war with the Xhosa, led some frontiersmen to reject VOC authority. In a parody of contemporary events in France, a handful of frontiersmen proclaimed the rule of the *algemene volkstem* (the general will) and raised the tricolore.

These events, all easily contained, nevertheless foreshadowed later struggles between colonial power and settler interests, as the latter increasingly asserted rights to self-government in order to determine for themselves systems of exploitation and control of slave and indigenous populations. Conversely, alternating colonial administrations whether that of the British who occupied the Cape between 1795 and 1802, the Batavian Republic which restored Dutch rule from 1803 to 1805, and the British who regained control after 1806 - were all concerned to circumscribe settler behaviour in the interests of maintaining order. This was achieved - most notably by the British - partly by incorporating the Cape Dutch as economic collaborators, but also by encouraging an ideology of paternalism as a mechanism for controlling slaves and servants.[4]

To a degree paternalism seems already to have been in existence in the late eighteenth century, though only evident in master-slave relationships, not in relationships with dispossessed Khoi labourers.[5] Increasing attempts had been made to extend paternalism to

the Khoi, particularly in the pacified western districts after 1800. At the same time the colonial authorities, in particular the British after 1806, reinforced the power of the well-established Dutch settler elite, extending their economic opportunities, but none the less continuing to limit the role of the market. These were the conditions under which paternalism flourished, but economic growth and political change in the 1820s and 1830s began to weaken its social basis and replace it with an emerging liberalism.

There is much about the form of liberalism established under British colonial rule which is paradoxical. Whereas the American variety of liberalism espoused the social fiction that, slavery notwithstanding, "all men are created equal", no such general belief was put forth in the British system. In Britain, let alone in the British empire, social and economic equality did not exist although political rights were about to be extended. Even so this extension was to be limited to property owners. Only legal equality can be said to have existed, though even this statement requires qualification. In the empire there was the further question of racial equality. One historian has attempted to pre-empt this by observing that, "the question, 'does a black man equal a white man?' had little meaning in an age when few thought all white men deserved equality." [6] Social and economic equality did not exist at the Cape but the period saw the construction of a legal equality and the hint that the political culture would soon accept notions of political equality for property owners. While this observation should not conceal from us the existence of racism which had evolved in the Colony - and which provided its own justifications for inequality - by the eighteen thirties such racism was far from being the caste-like structure which it became in the mid-twentieth century.

Cape liberalism, like British liberalism in the era of the first Reform Act, limited equality to property owners and it functioned to maintain social and political inequality, not to overthrow it. But, at the same time, the British Empire was to evolve another social fiction which would be extremely potent in the Cape: equality before the law for British subjects. This not only made "class" (i.e. race) legislation difficult, but an unintended consequence was that, at the heart of their accommodation to colonial rule, indigenous people were provided with the ideological means to defend themselves against its harsher implications. This contradiction was to evolve with the Cape's liberalism.

Another contradiction common to paternalism and liberalism was that both simultaneously permitted harsh and benevolent treatment. Thus Eugene Genovese has observed of paternalism in the US South, that it "grew out of the necessity to discipline and morally justify a system of exploitation. It did encourage kindness and affection, but it simultaneously encouraged cruelty and hatred." [7] And James Oakes has observed that both paternal and liberal societies have had "tendencies towards ... cruelty and kindness, ... benevolence and oppression". [8] We must, therefore, go beyond notions of treatment to discover the social basis of paternalism and liberalism in the Cape and try to comprehend the forces which brought about the transformation from one to the other.

I

In the nineteenth century the Cape's strategic value to its controlling imperial power grew as British trade with Asia expanded from 7 per cent of domestic exports in 1804-06 to 34 per cent in 1824-26. [9] This is reflected in the considerable rise in the number of ships calling at the Cape, and the tonnage they carried, in the decades after the British occupation had begun. [10] The next thirty years were to see a wide range of reforms which reflected the increasing importance of the colony as British commercial interests turned from the Caribbean to India. It also created the opportunity for independent trade at the Cape. In 1809 the *Cape Almanac* could only boast forty persons engaged in mercantile activities in Cape Town. By 1830 the number had grown to 223. [11] Whilst Cape Town had the greatest concentration of colonial merchants the small towns of the Western Cape also saw a growth of a commercial class. Similarly, the arrival of the British settlers in the Eastern Cape led to a considerable rise in the Colony's trade. Yet, in spite of this growth of commerce, restraints on

trade continued until the 1830s. Remnants of the old system continued to profit concessionaires, most of them notables of the older settler community. Concessions involved controls and regulations about which there was much complaint. The new British merchants, particularly those in Cape Town, maintained a persistent lobby for the eradication of these restrictions on trade until the last of them was finally eliminated by an 1832 Order in Council.

The Cape's free traders did not have an easy task and their campaign was obstructed by conservative and autocratic Governors, Lord Charles Somerset in particular. The coming of the British colonial state left the administration of local government, including labour relations, in the hands of the Cape Dutch notables. Somerset presided over a political system dependent on patronage and old fashioned corruption.[12] So essential were these aspects of his government that they stood in the way of attempts to reform the commercial infrastructure. In some cases entrepreneurs found themselves thwarted by the judicial and administrative powers of officials. Cape notables who benefited from this system were a further obstacle to commercial modernisation, but not surprisingly they stood by Somerset even as he became the *bête noire* of the new commercial class.

Somerset managed to alienate the new British settlers who, in 1820, had been brought in to colonise the Zuurveld, now renamed the Albany district. That ill-conceived settlement scheme was intended partly to initiate the process of anglicising the Colony by introducing a would-be gentry, with its own dependent work-force. The settlement was also intended to have effect as a barrier against Xhosa attempts to regain lost territory and to generate a white labouring class. However, amid much acrimony, many of the new settlers abandoned agriculture, became traders and began the transformation of the Colony into an area of widespread commercial activity.

In the course of his conflicts with the British settlers, Somerset had castigated them as Radicals and had used his administrative machinery to thwart the new colonists' ambition. But, with a handful of important exceptions, the new settlers were not in fact Radicals and their leading members were soon accepting both the governor's patronage and his political direction. In many ways their leading men were soon behaving in much the same way as the Dutch notables. [13] Of those humbler British settlers who remained in agriculture, virtually none were willing to work for others and, since the new colonists were prohibited from owning field slaves, they became understandably anxious to acquire Khoisan labour. Here again they were thwarted because the Caledon code, and other immobilising statutes ensured that Khoi labourers were largely restricted to Boer employers. Thus, while agriculturists among the new British settlers saw it as very much in their interests to reduce the hold which older colonists had on Khoi labour, it was manifestly not a free market in labour which they sought.

Ultimately Somerset faced not only the opposition of a still evolving commercial class, but also that of a reforming Colonial Office. In 1822, without having a specific Cape concern, the Under Secretary for the Colonies announced the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the judiciary in the recently acquired Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon and Mauritius. Under the influence of settler pressure, the Commission quickly broadened its scope in the Cape and its recommendations, where they were enforced, were to have a far reaching and conclusive impact. Yet, if the Commissioners determined the timing of changes, local voices and local political forces pointed them to grievances and obstacles in the way of social and economic change. The "Imperial factor" (if that term is not an anachronism) was not some disembodied force acting as an international invisible hand to transform the colonial empire into a world fit for commercialism. It was prompted and guided by local forces.

One such force which was to have an impact beyond its size and strength was the Commercial Exchange. Established in 1817, it met every day, serving as a businessman's alternative to representative government. The Exchange represented the immediate interests of merchants and traders but it was also concerned to elevate their position in society. So

successful was it that within two decades of a merchant class coming into being, its members were ranked as equal to the much older landed elite. The Exchange also petitioned and lobbied on such matters as the reduction of tariffs, the establishment of private banks, the duties on wheat, East India Company monopolies, a Table Bay breakwater, control of paper money and slave emancipation.[14]

The developing commercial class was fortunate in having as allies three most potent advocates of reform. These were John Greig, who began publishing the *South African Commercial Advertiser (SACA)* in 1824, and John Fairbairn and Thomas Pringle, the paper's editors. Fairbairn and Pringle (who was to leave the Cape in 1826) began their South African journalistic careers earlier in 1824 by editing the monthly *South African Journal*. Greig also became the proprietor and editor of the long existing *Cape Almanac* in 1827, transforming its contents in the process so that it provided a comprehensive survey of facts and figures relating to the civil service, commerce, agriculture, the Church, and similar institutions and had its statistics regularly revised.[15]

As important, the *Almanac's* prefaces were a fount of progressive opinion. It advocated new crops and methods of farming so that, when the wine industry collapsed in 1832, it was ready with technical advice on alternatives such as wool and tobacco. It also offered the optimistic prospect of the Cape as some kind of new Jerusalem.

As Education shall expand the mind of the Rising Generation, as Civilisation shall go steadily rather than rapidly onwards, and as Liberal Sentiments and Knowledge shall come to bear upon the Colony's Capabilities, an entire change will be wrought in the aspect of the country. Every acre of cultivatable land will be brought into use; every tree and herb, and almost every green leaf, will be rendered subservient to the use of man, as it was meant by the Creator to be. [16]

Fairbairn, who was soon to become the sole editor of the *Advertiser*, and Pringle were both products of the Scottish enlightenment. Even more than the *Almanac*, the *Advertiser* was to be the colonial embodiment of enlightenment thought and middle-class confidence. Most important was the fact that at its inception it became a critical channel of information and opinion for the Commission of Inquiry. The Commission's presence in the Cape during the early part of the newspaper's life meant that much of what was being written in the years between 1824 and 1827 had not only the commercial classes in mind, but also the Commissioners, and the Commission's presence in the Colony must have given the paper a degree of licence. The *Advertiser* must have been an important stimulus in prompting the course of the Commission.

It would be wrong, however, to see Fairbairn as the mere mouthpiece of the merchants.[17] On a number of occasions he opposed their immediate interests. Thus in 1826 he supported the wine farmers when they considered by-passing the merchants and exporting their own wine. "The objects we have in view", he wrote, "are the interests of the Colony at large, not that of any class to the exclusion of others." [18] On another occasion, after praising the liberal outlook and public spiritedness of the Commercial Exchange, he nevertheless warned that without representative government it could constitute some kind of "pernicious" danger. "Who does not see in so small a body of Merchants & Dealers," Fairbairn wrote, "a weapon and a shield, under which a skilful Governor might defy the disjointed and feeble remonstrances of the whole population." [19]

Fairbairn was fired by a political ambition of his own and he had a far wider vision than the weak commercial classes whose interests he constantly advocated. Above all he championed representative government to ensure a free market in commodities and, in these decades, a free market in labour. For Fairbairn, a legislature elected by "the People" would have the same effect on society as he supposed the free market would have on the economy.

Fairbairn's definition of "[t]he People", drew explicitly from Ricardo's arguments for a reformed House of Commons. The People, the *Advertiser* asserted, consisted of those classes in the community who alone had an interest in being well governed. Those of "high or low" position, aristocrats or paupers, had interests separate from society in general and should be excluded from the franchise. "[T]he People" would then elect "a controlling body whose sole business and duty it would be to obtain good government." [20] There can be no doubt that at this juncture Fairbairn would not have expected "the People" to have included anyone drawn from either the "free black" or the Khoi-descended population.

Somerset's patronage system angered Fairbairn, not only because it was a drain on the Cape's revenues, but because its salaries went to "strangers" sent from England. Fairbairn was, it can be seen, developing a local particularism, as he combined his call for a representative government with his own emerging Cape nationalism. The Cape's system and Somerset's government was, he argued, worse even than an hereditary despotism because such a regime had at least to live with its mistakes. The Cape's government was neither hereditary nor elective and feared only enquiry and exposure before the Home Government to which it was solely responsible. "The people", Fairbairn declared, must be given a legislative assembly to impose a "constant check on the Executive." [21]

If England is determined to use us only as a depot for the dregs of her Aristocracy - if her surplus Idlers are to be quartered upon us at this rate - we would ... advise our countrymen to avoid these shores.

Fairbairn believed that an autocratic government which was "originally bad, arbitrary, expensive ... and rotten from its foundations" had inhibited the formation of capital in the Cape and had left it economically backward by comparison with the colonies which had formed the United States. Continuing aspects of mercantilist restrictions, combined with Somerset's use of patronage, reduced Fairbairn to outbursts of impotent sarcasm. [22]

Were the whole of the Colonists lunatics Government could not manifest a more minute care in the regulation of all their temporal concerns than it has hitherto shown. Nothing could exceed the zeal of its paternal watchfulness. It weighed our bread, tasted our wine, smelled our medicines, examined our chimneys, swept our streets and performed a million other endearing little tendernesses without end. [23]

Fairbairn's view had been coloured by the Governor's attitude to the press. To begin with, Somerset had been unwilling to allow either the *South African Journal* or the *SACA* to be published at all and he had permitted them only at the Colonial Secretary's insistence. When, shortly afterwards, the administration and the courts sought to suppress challenges to monopolies and official corruption, the *SACA* had not only published the judicial proceedings in the face of Somerset's opposition, but had challenged the colony's judicial and administrative system. Every one, insisted the *Advertiser*,

desires to know ... the Laws by which we are to be governed in future, and to see them administered by an independent, as well as an enlightened and impartial Bench of Judges ... [24]

Somerset then tried to force unacceptable conditions upon editors and publisher and there was to be a considerable struggle before freedom for the press was finally guaranteed, again at Whitehall's insistence. [25]

Very soon after the inception of the *SACA*, Fairbairn began to advance the cause of representative government as a solution to all the Colony's ills. Believing the support of the Dutch elite to be essential in this, he took a very conciliatory attitude toward this

group on the issues both of amelioration and abolition. Though he favoured the abolition of slavery, he believed in the primacy of property.

So great a mass of property [the *Advertiser* announced] cannot suddenly be transferred from the Masters to the Slave by any Government which pretends to guide itself by the principles of Justice and Mercy, nor was such an act ever contemplated by that of Great Britain.[26]

To abolish slavery without compensating the owners would both undermine a fundamental tenet of society and threaten the economic ruin of the Colony.

His attitude was clinical, and dispassionate, as he himself reflected in 1831:

In treating this question [slavery] we have from the beginning (1824) carefully abstained as much as possible from touching on the moral and religious grounds from which so many able writers have drawn their arguments in favour of Liberty. Not that we overlooked or were insensible of their paramount importance, or slighted the authority which the sanction of our Holy Religion sheds over every great design. But in discussing the propriety of Political arrangements we prefer, for ordinary use, the more generally intelligible principles of Political Science. The Ten commandments, with the New Testament addition of Universal Benevolence, may be employed by others; we are content with the Multiplication Table.[27]

While political opportunism may well have played a part in Fairbairn's attitude to abolition and compensation he none the less continued to insist on compensation to the very moment of abolition, long after thoughts of a political alliance with Dutch notables had passed. Nor was his campaign for compensation narrowly motivated by a belief that British merchants were involved to any great extent in providing credit and mortgage facilities for slave-owners. For the most part this credit came either from traditional sources of financing such as the orphan-chamber and church councils or, to a much lesser extent, from the small number of traders and merchants close to the Cape Dutch population, particularly those in the wine-trade.[28] Fairbairn was motivated both by his views about property and by his conviction that compensation would provide the Colony with the much needed capital for investment. In this belief, in spite of the claims of an older historiography, from Cory onwards, Fairbairn was to prove correct.[29]

II

If Fairbairn believed that "good government" would not only transform the economy but that it would also make men free, there were others less convinced that the servile classes of the Colony should be left to the mercy of a settler legislature. The Colonial Secretary, and the not unsympathetic Commission of Inquiry, made the existence of slavery an explicit reason for withholding representative institutions from the Cape until abolition. The slave uprising of 1825, in which Khoisan people also participated, indicated that the colonists were still not capable of maintaining order. [30]

While the condition of the slaves concerned the Abolitionists in general, the Khoi, who had taken advantage of such protection as the Colony's system of justice offered, continued to find an ally in the London Missionary Society. Increasingly this Society gave "Hottentot" emancipation the same, if not greater, priority than that given to the *de jure* slaves. On a turbulent frontier, hardly pacified after rebellion and war, Johannes Van der Kemp, the Society's first representative in the Colony, had attempted to defend Khoisan-descended

people on the Cape's eastern reaches, close to his mission station at Bethelsdorp. Van der Kemp had died in 1811 and James Read, his close associate, continued his work as missionary and defender of the Khoi. There had been an abatement in brutality as British and settler rule was asserted in the east, but not an abatement in coercion. As we have argued previously, the paternalism of British rule went hand in hand with coercion, made legitimate in the Caledon Code. It was the perceptiveness of John Philip, the LMS's Director in residence at the Cape after 1819, which recognised that particular wrongs could be continually redressed without this transforming the actual position of the Khoisan. There would be no progress in improving the condition of the Khoi, he held, "so long as it is believed in England that all evils with which it is accompanied have their origin in the unauthorized aggression of the farmers." [31] And he attempted to transform the system.

Philip was in a good position to undertake this task because, as a Director of the Society, his institutional role differed significantly from that of Van der Kemp. He had links with and insights into British society which gave him a political capacity altogether different from that of the Dutch missionary. Whereas van der Kemp was other-worldly and a millenarian, Philip was nothing if not a man of this world, and the world which was coming into being. According to Andrew Ross, Philip was a product both of the Scottish Enlightenment and the Scottish Evangelical movement. These, Ross contends, blended "to an astonishing degree in the thought of many Scottish evangelicals of the first decade of the 19th century." [32] W M Macmillan, Ross claims, denied Philip's egalitarianism, seeing it as anachronistic and, moreover, inappropriate, in the battles that Macmillan was fighting. Ross insists that Philip's egalitarianism should be reinstated. Thus in a private report to the Directors of the Society, written after two years of considering the much maligned Bethelsdorp, Philip had said

It may seem invidious to compare the Hottentots with the Farmers of South Africa, but without attempting to lessen my Country, I have no hesitation in affirming, that you will find as rational ideas, as large a quantum of intelligence, and as much religion and morality, as much appearance of civilisation as in many villages of the same population in Great Britain. [33]

In an often reported passage in *Researches in South Africa.*, Philip insisted,

We are all born savages, whether we are brought into the world in the populous city or in the lonely desert. It is the discipline of education, and the circumstances under which we are placed, which create the differences between the rude barbarian and the polished citizen - the listless savage and the man of commercial enterprise - the man of the woods and the literary reclusive. [34]

Again, in 1833, in a reply to the executive of the American Board Missionary Society, Philip had noted:

So far as my observation extends, it appears to me that the natural capacity of the African is nothing inferior to the European. At our schools, the children of Hottentots, of Bushmen, of Caffres, and Bechuanas, are in no respect behind the capacity of those of European parents: and the people at our missionary stations are in many instances superior in intelligence to those who look down on them, as belonging to an inferior caste. [35]

What was it, then, that stood in the way of realising Philip's egalitarian ideals if it was not the Cape system? How, we may ask, did he define that system? Not by pointing to its colonial origins, as one writer has claimed. Rather, by demonstrating its failure to erect a set of

political structures capable of securing peace and justice. This could be said to be the cause of inequality. Philip's conviction that political institutions could construct the good society had been reinforced through his attention having been drawn to Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England* in his first years at the Cape.[36] The British constitution, Philip had perceived from that work, depended on a combination of God-given absolute or natural rights, in addition to any man-made prescriptive rights. Among the absolute rights belonging to every Briton were those of political freedom, personal security, personal freedom, and private property. To secure these rights, it was essential to have a constitution which gave the power and duty to Parliament to protect them. It was, in addition, necessary that the power of the monarch be limited, and that the individual have the right to call on the courts to settle disputes and to petition the king and Parliament if rights were infringed. Philip's critique of Cape society was, therefore, established with the yardstick of the Blackstone ideal. "[T]he evils of which he had to complain", Philip wrote, "were not as I supposed the abuses of undefined power in the hands of the local Authorities of the country districts, but a system supported by all the strength of the Colonial govt." [37]

The direct influence of Blackstone is to be seen in the Preface to *Researches*

Independent of printed statute, there are certain rights which human beings possess, and of which they cannot be deprived but by manifest injustice. The wanderer in the desert has a right to his life, to his liberty to his wife, his children, and his property. The Hottentot has a right to a fair price for his labour; to an exemption from cruelty and oppression; to choose the place of his abode, and to enjoy the society of his children; and no one can deprive him of those rights without violating the laws of nature and of nations. If the perpetration of such outrages against the laws of nature and of nations is a crime, the crime is greatly aggravated when it is committed against the *lex loci*, against the written law of the land. The Hottentots, in addition to the unalienable rights conferred upon them by their creator, have prescriptive rights in their favour; they are regarded by the British government as a free people; and the colonial law says, that they are to be treated in their persons, in their properties, and in their possessions, the same as other free people. [38]

It is difficult to say whether Philip gave priority to civil over economic rights. In the pages of *Researches*, with time and space to be discursive, he saw each reinforcing the other. "Man, in his individual and collective capacity", he wrote in his Preface, "is so constituted, that no improvement can take place in any part of the one or the other without diffusing its influence over the whole man, and over the whole frame of society." [39] But when the Colonial Secretary, William Huskisson, said to him in 1828, "Tell me in one sentence what you want for the Hottentots?" Philip replied, "I require nothing for them but the power of bringing their labour to a fair market". Huskisson remarked in response that that "includes everything else". [40]

In the *Researches*, Philip showed how central he thought a labour market was to transforming not only the economy but also the political and social structures of society:

- make the coloured population of your colony free ... [refuse to legalize to the colonists their usurped claims over the services of men, women and children they may have caught in their marauding expeditions] permit the natives to choose their own masters - secure to them, inviolate from the grasp of colonial violence, the right which God and nature have given them to their offspring - allow them to bring their labour to a free market, and the farmers will no longer have occasion to

complain of a want of servants.[41]

Contrary to the growing stereotype, Philip believed that, given the necessary incentive, the Khoi would prove as capable of physical and intellectual achievement as any of the inhabitants of the colony. He believed that if those in servitude were freed and given equal civil rights with British citizens and allowed to own land, follow trades and receive education, then not only would the Khoi and the slaves benefit, but so would society as a whole. Like Fairbairn, therefore, Philip held that the Cape was imprisoned in a social system and that only by freeing it from its fetters could masters as well as servants prosper. But where Fairbairn would first free capital in order that all else might follow, Philip would first free men. In such freedom and prosperity the Gospel would flourish. Yet, although he thought great changes would come with the market, he nevertheless believed that these changes would be circumscribed by historical realities. "Under the most favourable circumstances", he wrote, "the great body of Hottentots cannot be in any other condition than that of labourers for centuries to come." [42] Some would become more efficient farmers, greater consumers of manufactured goods, and, as uncoerced members of society, would lose the grievances which made them a potentially dangerous class. But, above all, increased incentives would make them willing labourers.[43] In this Philip was very close to the hope of the Commissioners of Inquiry when they wrote that the "Hottentot" should "be reconciled to the service of his employer by the same inducements of interest that are operative with other classes." [44]

Philip who had already come into conflict with Somerset over the condition of the Albany settlers, determined to take the Khoisan fight to Abolitionist opinion in Britain and to Parliament. He persuaded the leading Abolitionists, Fowell Buxton and James Stephen, that nothing would be gained from a slave emancipation in the Cape if, in freedom, they were reduced, as the Khoisan were, to being landless and without rights. Khoisan emancipation had to precede or coincide with slave emancipation. His lobbying resulted in the passage, on July 15 1828, of a Parliamentary Resolution to secure the "Hottentots" the "same freedom and protection as are enjoyed by the other free people of that Colony whether English or Dutch. Yet there can be little doubt that this resolution on its own would not have affected the Cape in any significant way.

However, decisions being made within the colonial administration were to give effect to the resolution though not altogether in a way which was intended. As always, the Cape administration was concerned to find additional sources of labour. The British settlement of 1819-20, we have noted, had in part been intended to supplement the Colony's labour supply with white workers but this had proved unsuccessful. On the contrary, the settlement itself soon added to the demand for labour. Somerset never abandoned his ideas for a white labouring class but by 1826 he recognised that the British government would not support another major immigration to the Cape. He therefore proposed an alternative and far-reaching scheme for adding to the colonial labour supply. Since 1823 Somerset had been giving permission for supposed "refugees" from the Colony's hinterland to be settled in the Cape on humanitarian grounds. This was contrary to previous British policy which forbade the admission of extra-colonial peoples into the Cape as workers. It was the dispossessed Xhosa whom successive administrations wished to exclude on the grounds of their potential for undermining Colonial stability. The precise way in which these new labourers found their way into the Colony is a matter of some controversy and the suggestion has been made that the administration and certain missionaries, taking advantage of turmoil in the interior, connived at captives being brought into the Colony.[45] The taking of captives would not have been a new phenomenon on the Cape's frontier, but such a covert scheme could hardly have provided an effective labour source for the Colony, particularly since the Commission of Inquiry was still present in the Colony and expressing its anxiety over such activities.

[I]t has become a matter of importance, to avoid the remotest imputation of interested motives, in the performance of the sacred duties of humanity, or of placing in a state of bondage,

even in its most mitigated form, the victims of the wars of Southern Africa. [46]

In 1826, Somerset returned to Britain and, having failed to persuade the Government to sponsor additional white working-class settlement, he then proposed that the exclusion policy be abandoned. With the "refugees" in mind he proposed that Bantu-speaking Africans be allowed to enter the Colony as labourers and that these people be apprenticed to British settlers.[47] The labourers, he proposed, should

be invited to enter the colony with the understanding that they are to be apprenticed for a term of years (7 or 10) and children until they attain the age of 18, the same as the Hottentots.[48]

To cope with the social problem which such workers would create, employers would be required to support a pension for the aged and infirm by contributing to a fund during the years of apprenticeship. The Colonial Office accepted the scheme and, in addition, in the Cape the new Lieutenant Governor, Richard Bourke - that rare phenomenon a Whig Governor - set about examining the possibility of alternative African labour.[49] Bourke invited the opinions of four Eastern Cape landdrosts on these matters. By July 1825 there were forty-nine refugees apprenticed in the Graaf Reinet district and sixty-six in the Somerset district.[50] Such a source, with all its political complications, was inadequate to satisfy the new settlers' needs and it was now proposed that the labour of cross-border Xhosa be sought. While all expressed some reservation, Andries Stockenstrom of Graaf Reinet was the most hostile both to the apprenticeship system and the proposed new source of labour.

A decision to use African labour from beyond the Colony, Stockenstrom argued, would create problems of security, public order and safety of property. Since the property most under threat was stock, and this was kept on unfenced grazing lands, Stockenstrom warned that the presence of people from a cattle-keeping economy, whose primary objective must be to restore their own animals as a first step to re-establishing their independence, would threaten the well-being and stability of the Colony. The scheme would necessitate systems of control dependent on coercion at the very moment when (he insisted) such a system was unenforceable and a major source of instability. Stockenstrom recognised that the methods of compulsion which had been central to the apprenticeship scheme had been difficult to employ in the past and created their own difficulties which made them inadvisable. In opposing an apprenticeship system for Africans, Stockenstrom pointed to the difficulties which such a system had created with the Khoi. Combining an irascible pragmatism with * morality, Stockenstrom expressed his conviction that what was politic could not be separated from what was just. "[T]he best policy we can adopt relative to the said savages", he insisted, "is not to invite them." But if that were determined upon, then, he wrote, in his convoluted prose,

they should be made to work, unless they can prove that they can live without [working for a master], ... but provided they do work, to apprentice them or their children, if they can maintain them, or to say where, with whom, or for how much they shall work or how apply their earnings, is as impolitic as it is unjust. [51]

Bourke was determined to acquire this new source of labour for the Colony, and he and his new Council of Advice - on to which Stockenstrom was now invited - set out to draft an Ordinance which would permit African employment but at the same time "preserve the equitable relation between Master and Servant". [52] The Council concluded that the apprenticeship system was "compulsory service"[53] and should not be imposed on the future labour force. Instead, a labour contract for a period of up to a year was substituted. An elaborate administrative system was devised to maintain this contract but, given the size of

the Cape's civil service in relation to its vast territory, it was destined to prove ineffective. Nevertheless, the law was no longer a legitimising agent for a system of "compulsory service".

The proposed Ordinance required the prospective labourer to have written permission, i.e. a pass, to be in the Colony. A worker could be engaged for a month without a contract, but anyone working longer was required to have a contract for a maximum of one year, although this could be renewed. No African from beyond the Colony's borders could be without a pass, or an "honest means of livelihood". In such a case a person could be placed in service or expelled from the Colony. At the same time a seven-year sentence of transportation could be passed upon a master convicted of enslaving a free labourer. There was to be no apprenticing of children, as a means of preventing parents from absconding from an employer. Nor could cattle or other goods be withheld as a way of retaining an employee's services. Nor could liquor or tobacco be provided as an alternative to wages. This draft Ordinance, because it went much further than the Colonial Secretary had suggested in proposing to recruit labour from the cross-border Xhosa and not merely from the potentially much smaller refugee population, was not immediately enacted. Rather it was dispatched to London to obtain the Colonial Secretary's approval.[54]

It took a year from the time when the Colonial Secretary's approval for the draft Ordinance was sought to its finally being placed on the statute book in July 1828. By this time Bourke was on the verge of leaving the Colony and he hurried to complete the reconstruction of labour legislation. It had also been his intention to abolish the apprenticeship laws which imposed "compulsory service" upon the Khoi, but he had postponed taking action, believing that the Commission of Inquiry would provide guidance on this subject. Delay on the part of the Commission, combined with the passage of Ordinance 49, meant that the position of the colonial Khoi was anomalous and untenable. Although they were colonial subjects, they were now to have fewer rights than the extra-colonial Xhosa.

More important, several landdrosts, Stockenstrom most prominently, had pointed to the difficulties of enforcing the new labour laws and the constant potential for instability which they would create. In addition, Stockenstrom came round to the view that releasing Khoisan workers from compulsory labour would help improve the colony's labour shortage. The market, he asserted, would free these people to enter the employ of the more productive masters and the greater reward this would bring would in its turn make these workers more productive. It would end resistance by malingering and potential resistance by more direct action. The market would incorporate the Khoi in ways that an entirely coercive economy could not. [55] These propositions, which were echoed by others, operated on several levels. We should have no doubt that Stockenstrom was convinced of the capacity of market forces to produce objectives which were desirable in principle. But, equally, the argument disguised the fact that it was labour employed by the Dutch-speaking settlers which the administration hoped to free, so that it could work for the new settlers.[56]

Ordinance 50, which was passed three days after the passage of Ordinance 49, altered the status of the colonial Khoi and limited the legal authority of white employers. The law would no longer require Khoi-descended people to have a fixed place of abode, to carry passes when moving about the Colony, and be subject to summary punishments of landdrosts if they were found without passes. Khoi children would no longer be forced into service. Ordinance 50 explicitly stated that Khoi were legally entitled to own land. Immediately after its passage Bourke, advised by Stockenstrom, informed the Council of Advice that

after the passing of this Ordinance [50] and that marked No 49 ... it had now become more than ever necessary that measures should be taken for passing a general Vagrant Act, and His Honour expressed his intention to instruct the Attorney-General to prepare the draft of such an act without loss of time.[57]

At this point Bourke had only three more weeks left in the Colony and his attention was apparently drawn to more pressing considerations by developments on the eastern frontier. He therefore sent Ordinances 49 and 50 to London for the approval of the Colonial Secretary and left his successor to complete his labour reforms. It is clear, however, that a vagrancy law was considered an essential part of a tripartite scheme. [58]

In London, as we have seen, however, Philip's lobbying of Parliament resulted in the simultaneous passage of the Resolution proposing that Khoi be given the same rights as the settlers, but this could not be known in the Cape for some months yet. When news of Ordinance 50 arrived in London, Philip was glad of it but he was none the less anxious that it have greater permanence than a simple colonial regulation. Philip's importance, therefore, lay in his capacity to influence the Colonial Office and Parliament, in the matter of giving the Ordinance permanent legal standing as an Order-in-Council. As a result it was no longer possible for the Cape government to alter the conditions by which Kho-descended people entered the labour market without reference to the British Parliament. The vagrancy law which Bourke's administration had thought to be an essential part of their labour reforms could not be passed and Ordinance 50 was to have consequences beyond the intentions of the original framers of the legislation. Yet even these significant, if unintended, consequences were rooted within a structure. There were no doubt other times when metropolitan and colonial administrations were out of kilter with each other because of the difficulties of communication but without the far-reaching consequences following upon the passage of Ordinance 50. Ordinances 49 and 50 were constructed within the mode of thought and language of the current political economy. They had, as we have seen, general and public, as well as specific but unstated, objectives. Their public pronouncements, which coincided with the growing ideological mood of the time, led them to be hoisted by their own petard.

None of this should make us discount the importance of Ordinance 50. Nor does it support the argument that the administration were too few in number to make it effective and that it had therefore no force what so ever.[59] You have only to read the 1834 defence of Ordinance 50, at a meeting at Philipton to which we will come, to recognise that it was seen as an act of emancipation by those previously subjected to the apprenticeship system. It was, however, an act of emancipation in keeping with a liberal political economy which defined freedom as self-ownership - that is, as in not being a slave. Without the ownership of productive property, in this case land, freedom would be difficult to maintain and there were Khoi who said so.[60] As the missionary W.M. Boyce noted of Ordinance 50, it was "half-baked" because it did not provide the land which was essential for its efficient working. "The Hottentots", he observed "are not satisfied with their present position, neither ought they to be". [61]

Nevertheless, the 1828 legislation, in reducing restrictions on them, allowed some Khoi workers to withdraw from labouring for others. As a result, a significant minority of the Colony's "Hottentots" (5,000 of the 30,000 population) made their way to agricultural settlements, most of them supervised by missionaries. One, at Kat River, was established as a military barrier to Xhosa penetration of the Colony. Despite the over crowding common to all such settlements, these Khoi soon entered upon a period of prosperity, albeit short-lived .[62]

III

John Fairbairn had meanwhile been required to go to London to defend his newspaper and had thus played no part in events leading up to Ordinance 50, but he returned in time to greet it with great enthusiasm. This began his long estrangement from both the Cape Dutch and the new British settlers. The latter wanted a greater share of what they saw as a labour pool and both new and old settlers were hostile to the Khoi engaging in independent economic activities. These groups were soon to be locked into an acrimonious debate with Fairbairn and his new ally, John Philip.

The Cape Dutch elite, which benefited up to now from British economic policy and administrative preferment, had collaborated closely with the colonial regime, particularly that of Lord Charles Somerset, until relations began to cool in 1826. In that year an Ordinance to ameliorate the condition of slaves was imposed by the Colonial Secretary, in spite of opposition from Somerset, who now withdrew from the Colony, never to return.[63] This marked the beginning of the end of the collaboration between slave-owners and the administration. His successor, Richard Bourke, in addition to being responsible for Ordinance 50, introduced a wide range of reforms which were to destroy the basis of Cape Dutch ascendancy. Bourke, acting on advice from the Commission of Inquiry, was to bring about the abolition of the Burgher Senate, the High Court, the courts of *heemraden* and the office of landdrost. English was henceforth to be the language of administration and the law. The jury system, introduced to prevent a repetition of the overbearing behaviour of Somerset's judges, required English-speaking jurors. As important, the remaining monopolies and concessions in the meat, baking and wine trades were abolished. These had all been held by Dutch notables and their abolition was an additional source of resentment to some but much to the liking of free traders. [64]

The passage of Ordinance 50 grieved most colonists, whether Dutch or English, and the demand was soon made for a vagrancy law. As a result, in 1830 Dr Philip and Fairbairn set out on their well known tour of the Eastern Cape where, far from finding evidence of widespread stock theft and "wandering vagabonds", they found, at Hankey, Bethelsdorp and Kat River, industrious, diligent, church-going communities of peasants. Both men were to deny the need for a vagrancy law and, instead, pointed to settler injustice and exploitation - Fairbairn in the *Advertiser* [65] and Philip in his recently published *Researches*. In addition, Fairbairn, having met the Xhosa Paramount Chiefs, accepted their view that many of the disturbances of the previous thirty years were the result of British policy and the power Britain had given to its Xhosa collaborator, Ngqika. The *Advertiser* went further than this, however. Of the Xhosa, it wrote: "Nothing is wanted but Education, to put them on a footing with the proudest people in Europe." [66]

The result was uproar. Fairbairn's reports and Philip's *Researches* drew to them a great deal of personal hostility. In Cape Town there was talk of burning an effigy of the *Advertiser's* editor and the paper's sales declined considerably. Moreover alternative newspapers now began to be published, the *Zuid Afrikaan* in Cape Town, and, in the new settlement, the *Grahamstown Journal*. The *Zuid Afrikaan* claimed that in taking its name it was intent on addressing all colonists, English- as well as Dutch-speaking but, as H C Botha has shown, it immediately defined its constituency by delivering a splendidly vitriolic attack on Philip and Fairbairn.

Wy beginnen met FREE-PRESS *humbug*, - INDEPENDENT
NEWSPAPER *humbug*, MISSIONARY *humbug*, en vooral
(want dit is de *paramount* of *non plus ultra* van alle *humbugs*)
de PHILIPISH-*humbug*. Vestigt, vooreest uwe geheele
aandacht op deze vier voornamste *humbugs*. [67]

The slave-holders believed, wrongly, that Philip's criticisms were responsible for the ameliorative slave Ordinances which were now applied to the Cape. At the same time they grew increasingly anxious about both their property and the general state of the economy. By now British tariffs had all but destroyed the wine industry and the additional prospect of losing control over slaves left them in a dark mood. Hence Fairbairn's continued advocacy of a slave compensation scheme, and his holding out the prospect of representative government once slavery was abolished, had no effect on the disposition of the western Cape farmers.[68]

The two Slave Ordinances in 1830 and 1831 left the slave owners in a state of resentment which culminated in violent demonstrations. These Ordinances made provision for the regulation of hours of labour, and for the minimum provision of food and clothing. The

flogging of female slaves was prohibited whilst the flogging of male slaves was to be subjected to various restrictions. Whips, moreover, were not to be carried in the fields. Managers of slaves were to keep punishment record books and to make returns twice a year to the Protector of Slaves. A second conviction for cruelty would lead to the perpetrator being legally prohibited from holding or managing slaves. The 1831 Ordinance authorised Protectors to inspect slave quarters at any time and to enter slave dwellings and estates whenever they thought it necessary.

In April 1831 the masters of Stellenbosch turned to direct action.[69] Five days had been set aside for them to travel to the town from the surrounding villages and countryside to hand in their punishment record books. But few came to hand them in. Instead, as the *Advertiser* reported, most joined a "mob ... mounted on horse back". Their purpose was to prevent anyone handing in a book. The few who approached the office of the assistant protector with such intentions were deterred from doing so. The resident magistrate, M Faure, one of the gentry who had benefited from Somerset's patronage, refused to restore order in the face of rioting, which led to the Assistant Protector and the District Surgeon being assaulted and to a Paarl Justice of the Peace being driven out amidst a shower of "rotten eggs, mud, and every kind of filth." [70] Eventually Faure was replaced and seven rioters indicted and convicted, although their sentences were little more than symbolic. The rioters had won the day. As Mason shows, only five slaves owners out of a possible 3024 in the Stellenbosch and Cape district attended the next return of Punishment Record Books. Order was restored by not enforcing the law. In February 1832, an Order-in-Council allowed the Governor to limit the Punishment Books to masters living within twenty miles of Cape Town and Grahamstown, on the grounds that the original Order had not envisaged the great distances which slave holders would have to travel.[71]

The crowd, which played so great a part in European and American political life in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, was also to play a part in Cape developments. It was concerned to re-establish what it considered to be society's moral economy. Nevertheless, the slave owners were fighting a losing battle. A new Order-in-Council gave the Protector and his Assistants the power to visit estates and inspect slave quarters at any time and the working day was reduced to six hours. This so angered the farmers of Koeberg that in a letter to the *Zuid Afrikaan* they wrote that the Ordinance would eliminate all "justice and fairness" and that it expected the "morally impossible". It violated their "sacred right to property", provoked turmoil and threatened the peace and security and total destruction of the country. More ominously, it would "bring the Colonists to such a degree of despondency", they wrote, "that they themselves will look out for measures for their protection". They warned of "the anger of the Boers with their long rifles". Similar declarations were published by a "great number" of slave-owners elsewhere in the Colony and widespread dissent was reported. As a result the Governor banned "seditious" meetings and threatened to deport uncooperative colonists.[72]

A few short months before, in May 1831, Fairbairn, with his irrepressible optimism, had again called for a Legislative Assembly. Now, after the Koeberg incident, he declared that a petition for such an Assembly, after what had transpired, "would be a ridiculous insult to the common sense of mankind". The Fairbairn strategy had finally collapsed. For the time being, he considered that they had best defend the freedoms they had only recently won, for, he wrote,

We dislike the Despotism of One; but we think the Despotism of Fifty Koeberg Boers - or of Fifty who could secure their votes - Fifty thousand times worse. The time will come when a Representative Assembly will be safe and beneficial to the Colony and then we shall renew our Petitions with a certainty of being heard. At present it would be neither beneficial nor even safe.[73]

An Assembly, he foresaw, was a means to putting down

all Societies formed for the improvement of the Colony - to expel the Missionaries - to revoke the Ordinance conferring Civil Rights on the Native - to strip the slaves of all legal protection, and leave him like their other goods and property, entirely to the magnanimity of his owner.

Causing similar concern was Fairbairn's perception that the Koeberg and Stellenbosch Dutch were intent on reviving the "Old Systems of Monopoly and Prohibitory Duties". Not before time, he wrote: "Our faces were, of course, covered with confusions, and our hopes dashed to the ground." [74]

Even as the abolition of slavery was taking place, Fairbairn, the missionaries, and some of the merchants of Cape Town found themselves fighting another battle to resist the restoration of an essential part of the old order. Settlers, both English and Dutch, demanded a new vagrancy law in order to ensure their control over the Khoi and the soon to be emancipated slaves. While Philip and the missionaries sent numerous letters and memoranda to the Governor, the Colonial Secretary and the Anti-Slavery Society, Fairbairn maintained an incessant flow of editorials and other copy analysing the proposed measure. He had previously insisted that a vagrancy law which was not associated with "disorderly conduct" was unacceptable and, in any event, Ordinance 50 would not allow a measure aimed at Khoikhoi and freed slaves. He and his correspondents now presented various arguments showing that a vagrancy law would not achieve its supporters' objectives of securing a labour force. They also insisted that if there were depredations caused by itinerant poor, then a police force was needed to apprehend the guilty rather than a law to remove the liberty of the innocent. Fairbairn pointed to the inefficacy of vagrancy laws in Britain and proposed that the colonists try to solve the social problems which caused the alleged vagrancy. He was also concerned that, at the very moment of the great liberation, the Colony was preparing to add repressive legislation to its own statute books and expressed concern about the effect of this on the Cape's reputation in Britain. When the majority of the new Legislative Council gave their support to the Act, Fairbairn combined his hostility for the proposed legislation with his dislike of a nominated Legislative Council and called a public meeting to draft a petition for representative government. Quite why Fairbairn should have believed that an elected assembly representing settler interests should have been any more protective of the rights of that group becoming known as the Coloureds it is difficult to discover. [75]

By October 1834, Fairbairn was again engaged in organising a public meeting to advance the cause of representative government. Together with thirty-seven members of the English-speaking merchant community of Cape Town, he applied for permission to hold a meeting for the discussion of constitutional matters. When the meeting took place Fairbairn's group was out-voted by a larger group allied to the *Zuid Afrikaan*. Although both parties sought a representative assembly, the vote reflected the hostility which the *Zuid Afrikaan* group felt for Fairbairn and, in not allowing him a place on the committee, they made explicit their support for the vagrancy legislation. Eventually Fairbairn came to the conclusion that this was indicative of the way in which a Colonial Assembly would behave and, again, he withdrew his support for a legislature. "English Inhabitants" he now wrote were united "as one man to resist all further insolence on the part of the Afrikander". [76]

It would be possible to see this conflict simply in ethnic terms but to do so would be to miss the political and social dynamic which was beginning to fuel the division. The confidence exuded by Fairbairn and his fellow progressives was a great source of irritation, and ultimately a considerable threat, to those who did not share their assumptions. For those with conservative assumptions the market and all its works were neither desirable nor inevitable. Furthermore, while the legislation requiring them to give up their language in the administrative and judicial systems was disturbing enough to the Dutch Colonists, the

opinions, voiced by correspondents in the *Advertiser*, that Dutch should make room for the English language in Church must have caused considerable anxiety, particularly to the clergymen who saw a close connection between spirituality, language and their own role. Moreover, that spirituality was now being challenged by the progressive ethos which came hand in hand with the new commercialism. Commenting on the role of Benefit or Friendly Societies, Fairbairn became quite lyrical. Did they not, he declared,

exalt the character of charity by placing it in its natural situation by the side of Reason, and increase its dignity by arming it with the power of foresight, and a rigid calculation of remote consequences.[77]

As Jean du Plessis has observed, a world view, and not merely a financial transaction, was at stake. The institution which was potentially most vulnerable to threat from rationalism was the Cape's Dutch Reform Church. The Cape Church, for all that it had been in place since the middle of the seventeenth century, had only recently, in 1824, been allowed a colony-wide Synod. It continued to be dependent on the state for its finances and was under close supervision from the authorities. Not only did a political Commissioner attend the Synod but the appointment of ministers, clerks, elders and deacons had all to be confirmed by the administration. State funding made for political conformity, and the Synod of 1824 had accepted that the colony's administrative and legal institutions should be anglicized. In 1837 it was to condemn the migration of the Voortrekkers. However, it was not only in the political sphere that the church was being weakened in the face of new social forces. The Cape's new merchant classes discovered that the church, as it formed and extended new rural parishes, was initially better placed than the colonial state to provide them with the administrative and social infrastructure which they required for their commercial activities. As a result, merchants went out of their way to assist in establishing new parishes to advance their own interests.

The state and the expanding merchant community were in a position to encourage those liberal-modernist tendencies which entered some parts of the Reformed Church in the Netherlands at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the early 1830s the distinction between modernists and others would not have been perceptible to the majority of clergymen in the Cape, let alone to their congregations. There was one exception, the newly appointed minister of the Paarl congregation, Dominee G W A Van der Lingen.[78] A man of independent means, Van der Lingen had studied at the University in Utrecht and was to be the minister to the Paarl DRC from 1831 to 1869. Influenced by his anti-modernist and anti-revolutionary mentors in the Netherlands, Van der Lingen adopted a cyclical theory of history. He explicitly rejected the linear theory professed by liberals like Fairbairn. Instead, he saw the history of institutions as a cycle of birth, development, old age and ultimately death, though his theory was not entirely consistent since it allowed for periodic regeneration. [79]

At this juncture his Paarl congregation may not have been aware of the ramifications of his philosophy of history but one thing is certain. They were extremely hostile to John Philip and, when he lost a libel case in 1832, they held a dinner to celebrate this outcome. Fairbairn would have been aware of this dinner, which was reported in the *Zuid Afrikaan*; he would also have been aware of Van der Lingen and his theory of history, because in 1834 the latter gave a novel lecture to the recently created South African College which the *Advertiser* reported with much sarcasm, irony and incomprehension. Van der Lingen's lecture discussed the development of recent western history, pointedly ignoring the British contribution, at a time when the trumpeting of British political, technical and commercial achievement was the commonplace of Cape cultural life. He looked instead at the Germanic offering, which, he observed, had reached great heights. In keeping with his cyclical view of development, however, these heights were also the portents of "the sunset ... of mankind". The Dutch state, too, he foresaw as having little capacity for restoring itself to its former position, and he doubted whether any European nation could replace the Dutch empire. None the less, he was

convinced that there would be regeneration and the candidate he chose to follow in the "footsteps of exemplary Holland" to recreate Dutch power in a new, "equally magnificent historical cycle" was the Cape. In the next decades Van der Lingen was to seek the *Gouden Eeuw* in a *Nederduitser* society devoid of liberalism, modernism, and free trade. For the time being it was enough for him to express his belief in the manifest destiny of the Cape Dutch. [80]

If we can see the roots of a later conservatism in Van der Lingen's lecture, events taking place elsewhere in the Colony offered the prospect of another emerging political consciousness. Various Khoi-related groups had, as we have seen, sought to defend their rights in alliance with missionary allies. The attempt to introduce a vagrancy law saw this defence continued. Two meetings were called at Philipton in August 1834 to protest against the proposed law.[81] A vagrancy law, the first of these meetings was told, would set to nothing Ordinance 50 which they valued so highly. That Ordinance, it was said, had delivered them "from a state of servitude and placed them on an equal footing with other of His Majesty's subjects". If there was a social problem, it was caused by their poverty which could only be set right by the acquisition of more land, not by the introduction of a law forcing them to accept work no matter what the conditions. In addition, letters said to have been written by "Hottentot" correspondents, and appearing in the *Commercial Advertiser* in the previous months, expressed a similar concern that the settlers might restore the coercive system which pre-dated Ordinance 50. What was needed, one writer proposed, was "Hottentot" representation in the new Legislative Council which would prevent any such "class" legislation being passed.[82]

Most of those present at the Philipton meetings were from the group of mainly Khoisan-descended but socially heterogeneous people who had been settled at Kat River under a scheme initiated by Andries Stockenstrom. There were some at Kat River who still spoke a Khoi language, but most spoke a variety of broken Dutch. There were also "Baster" communities of mainly Khoi-settler origin, who were distinguished from other Khoi-related people because they had among them men of substance. They had, according to Kirk, "adopted Dutch clothing, religion, technology and language, and did not associate themselves with their Khoi heritage." [83] But the adoption of the Dutch language and other characteristics was by then merely a matter of degree - possibly related to property - since a version of Dutch was now the language of most Khoi-descended people and many had Boer ancestry who did not belong to Baster communities. In addition, there were also people of Khoi-Xhosa descent, Gona, who were seen by some outsiders as belonging to the former, by others to the latter group.[84] All these groups, and some who seemed to claim San origin, were present at the Philipton meeting.

Early on in the deliberations, Andries Stoffel, who travelled to England in 1835 and gave evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Aborigines [85], announced that "this was the first day and the first time and the first place that he was allowed to speak on behalf of his nation". Stoffel, who must be regarded as one of the intellectuals of an incipient movement, was

able to converse upon all the affairs of the tribes in and bordering on the Colony, and perfectly acquainted with the History of his Nation, and System that has been employed against them and other tribes. [86]

The Kat River meeting, Stoffel insisted was

a small part of the remnant of the Hottentot nation, who originally possessed the country stretching from the Cape of Good Hope to the Kay [sic] River, and who were rich in sheep and cattle, &c but who were reduced to a state of want, servitude, &c and in some respects worse than slavery

itself.[87]

Thirty years earlier, when the Khoi rebelled on the eastern frontier, one of their leaders, Klaas Stuurman, talked about reclaiming their social and economic independence. When challenged to show how this could be done, he had replied: "[R]estore the country of which our fathers were despoiled by the Dutch and we have nothing more to ask." In reply to his questioner, with his British notions of political economy, who could see no advantage in "the possession of a country without any other property, or the means of deriving a subsistence from it", Stuurman had presented a vision of times past.

We have lived very contentedly before these Dutch plunderers molested us, and why should we not do so again if left to ourselves? Has not the Groot Baas given plenty of grass roots, and berries and grasshoppers for our use; and till the Dutch destroyed them, abundance of wild animals to hunt? And will they not return and multiply when these destroyers are gone.[88]

The "Hottentots" assembled at Philipton in 1834 were far more heterogeneous than those whom Stuurman led thirty years before, nor was there anything Utopian about their proposals. Instead, the meeting heard the call for more land to be made available, although this was to be for cultivation as well as for grazing stock and not, as in the past, for the hunting of animals. "If there was vagrancy", one speaker insisted, then it had to be attributed to the "want of more land, low wages, bad treatment ... want of instruction [and] bad diet." A Mr Bergman, "a Bushman" settler brought to Kat River by Stockenstrom, gave a glimpse of the new economic culture. "I expected to become rich when I first came here - but I am still poor ..." As another speaker noted, there were now "'Baases' among us, for when we complained lately[,] one knocked the hat off my head".[89]

Speaker after speaker made clear the sense of desperation about the possibility of a return to conditions existing prior to Ordinance 50. But, in addition to their misgiving about the activities of the frontier Boers, there was also some bitterness expressed, in a letter to the *Advertiser*, about the behaviour of British settlers. When these had first arrived they had been great friends; the Khoi had given them food, "smoked out of the same pipe" and "slept on the same mat". But now that the settlers were "great gentlemen",

They soon saw that it was not the fashion for white people to associate with black men, that white men must be masters, and black men servants, and thus the friendship soon ceased.[90]

Awareness of racial solidarity among whites did not blur the distinction between old and new settlers. In his letter to the *SACA*, "a Hottentot" astutely observed the dynamics of race, nationalism and class. "[T]wo Afrikaners, and two Englishmen have been appointed", to the nominated seats on the Legislative Council, he wrote. That is "four white persons have been appointed for two white nations, (viz the English and the Farmers [Boers?])". This, he supposed, meant that "there was a great difference between the two nations". If there were no differences then "four English or four Farmers[Boers] might suffice for the whole colony." But, he continued,

if each of these nations have its own advocates from their own nation, why can there be none for the others? It is clear that all laws made are proposed by the advocates of those two nations, and for their own particular advantage. Now I leave to others to judge what must become of the other, that is to say the Hottentot nation and the Slaves. From this I deduce that the others must always be suffering persons, because Government cannot get acquainted with their circumstances. [91]

One of the speakers at the Philipton meeting was James Read, junior, son of the missionary by his Khoi wife. He began by apologising to the meeting for having "forced his youth upon a Public Meeting". He did so, he told them, because the "present position of the Hottontot Nation" was one of "great danger". He was aware that he was now speaking out against the most "illiberal" of men who were "particularly hostile against the Aborigines" and that he would "most certainly suffer for it". Yet he felt impelled to participate in their gathering because

we should feel alive to the interests of our fellow men, and ... if ... his principles of doing to others as he should wish to be done unto, should at any future time be changed he would pray that God would shorten his life, he owned and boasted himself to be of Hottontot extraction and as such would stand by them [92]

He noted that even the wisdom of "princes and the sagacity of the best Statesmen" had found it difficult to legislate in such a way as to protect the "interests of the rich" while preventing the "oppression of the poor". It was particularly "difficult to legislate where the people composing the community differed either in origin, colour, circumstances etc". Nevertheless, he brought the authority of an "ancient writer" (could it have been Blackstone?) to support his contention that

the equality of their government was adopted from the equality of their races - all fellow citizens are brethren of the same parents - therefore we regard ourselves not as slaves and masters, as we are in every respect equal.[93]

He insisted, therefore, that the

greatest precaution should be used in framing laws which while they would tend to benefit the rich would affect both the liberty and the condition of the poor.[94]

Several in the audience spoke appreciatively of Andries Stockenstrom, whom they saw as defending their interests. But the loudest cheer was reserved for the solitary settler present at the meeting, Mr Thomas W... This, the *Advertiser* reported, was because "the joy of the Hottentots here was very great at the idea of a settler speaking in their favour". [95] Mr W... expressed sympathy with the meeting because their *forefathers* had "suffered oppression from the African colonists". If there were any who were vagrants it was the trekboers who had left the Colony and were tyrannising Africans beyond its boundaries. It was they who should be "brought in and distributed". The conflation of liberalism with an anti-Afrikanerism also has a long history. What emerged from the Khoi anti-Vagrancy agitation in both the Philipton meetings and the correspondence in the *Advertiser* was the conviction among their leading men that a Hottentot nation existed; that, in having its members coerced into work for the settlers, it had been deprived of its inheritance and that in the process there had been great suffering; that most settlers, though divided by nationality, were united by notions of racial superiority; that a return to the pre-Ordinance 50 system would be intolerable; that the Legislative Council concerned itself only with the needs of the Colonists and, in the absence of "Hottentot" representatives, their interests would not be protected. Those who articulated these propositions were not calling for a return to that utopian past which Klaas Stuurman had evoked at the turn of the century, but for the establishment of their rights in the new society.

Yet there is much evidence that there was nothing inevitable about the emergence of a Hottentot consciousness. Some of the ways in which it came into being become apparent from a reading of J C Visagie's valuable "Katrivier Nedersetting, 1828-1839". In 1835 the Kat River Magistrate, Captain A B Armstrong, pointed to the fact that the elder James Read,

the well known adherent of the London Missionary Society, had "taught the Hottentots to consider themselves a distinct Tribe, to consider their interests as apart from others of His Majesty's subjects in the Colony. [96] He also claimed that Read "encouraged all classes of coloured people whether Bastards, Gonahs or Fingoes to assume the appellation of *Hottentots* ..." [97]

Read was locked in conflict with the government-appointed missionary to the Kat River Settlement, the Reverend William Thompson. Thompson, with his claim to land, authority and status, led a mainly "Baster community" and it was he who observed that Read's congregation "often use and make the ear so familiar with the term 'Hottentot' and 'Hottentot nation'". [98] The conflict between the two missionaries led to the Philipton inhabitants distinguishing themselves from those neighbours who accepted Thompson's leadership. Donald Moodie, noted for his later collection of Cape documents [99], reported that before this time the claim to being a "Bastard" had "always been made with pride". Now, however, there was a

disavowal of the name "Bastard" ... among the ignorant victims of political agitation at Kat River ... since the Bastards of Kat River petitioned in favour of a Law against vagrancy [and this] was accompanied with an appearance of offended dignity [100]

But it was not only "Bastards" who called themselves "Hottentots". Moodie reported the conversation with the children of prosperous ex-slaves who called themselves Hottentots. "I pointed out", Moodie wrote, "that the statement that they were pure Hottentots was untrue." The answer was, "It is true my father was a slave but I look upon myself as a Hottentot." [101] Even Andries Stoffel, according to Moodie, was "a Gonah captain" who had become "the voluntary champion of the Hottentot races" although he could "claim no other affinity than that the first tribe of Caffres encountered by the Colonists were by them called Gonah Hottentots" [102]. The purpose in claiming this new identity, these observers claimed, was political. According to Armstrong, Read sought to "persuade the people belonging to his Institution, that they ought to be governed by their own Magistrates selected by themselves". [103] The witnesses to this process were all hostile but they are not necessarily to be dismissed for that reason. Their reports are consistent with the way in which a consciousness we call ethnic has come into being in other places and at other times. "Hottentot" nationalism was a social phenomenon of some complexity which was to have far-reaching consequences for the transformation of liberalism. We must, however, expand on this elsewhere. For the moment it is sufficient to describe its occurrence.

The emergence of liberalism as a political ideology coincided, as we have seen, with significant changes in the economy. Not only was there considerable economic growth but the structures for a new labour market were put in place. The coercion of Khoi labour was no longer to be sanctioned, but the practices of the new economic liberalism were quite distinct from the discourses of political liberalism. Economic liberalism brought changes in treatment, but in its own way this, too, was oppressive. While the Khoi recognised that the coming of the British administration, combined with a missionary presence, reduced the brutality so common at the turn of the century, they nevertheless pointed to new forms of oppression. Thus Andries Stoffel told the House of Commons Select Committee on Aborigines in 1836 that conditions were "worse than before; there is now another kind of oppression ... they do not murder, but it is like a newspaper that you put in the press and press down. They [the English] oppress them, for instance, in their wages; a man does not earn more than three or five skillings a day. In short they oppress them in every way." [104] The Khoi, it was suggested, sometimes preferred Dutch to English employers because, although the latter paid better wages, they "exact more labour". [105] Harsh treatment, both from Dutch and British, had not ceased but, equally, neither had those kindnesses of which the Boer households were capable. Thus one observer had been told "a variety of anecdotes honourable to some of the boors; and the very natives who are sunk to the earth under general oppression, studiously told of the kindness they sometimes experienced". [106]

Another witness, an Indian army officer writing under the pseudonym of W Poulson, reported, with surprise, that farm servants were "generally well used, clothed and fed, and altogether exercise a freedom totally unintelligible to the 'regular Englishmen' ". [107] These conditions, it would seem, suggest the continuation of the ideology of paternalism among the Cape Dutch employers of Khoi, and at the same time an economic, but not a political, liberalism influenced the culture of British settlers.

Thus it was that Fairbairn, who gave priority to political institutions, began to construct the programme which was to determine liberal political strategy for much of the remainder of the nineteenth century. In the face both of the armed crowd which threatened to resist British rule, and of the neo-Dutch nationalism which denied the value of British institutions, not the least, free trade, Fairbairn finally saw that if he were to continue advocating representative government it would have to be in a form which helped resist both the Dutch mob and the neo-Dutch revival. Moreover, the proposed vagrancy law, he and others argued, would not only reduce the amount of labour available, but would reduce the involvement of the Khoi in church and state. Equally it would create Khoi unrest and bring further instability to the Colony. For the time, he postponed his call for representative government. And it became ever more clear that, when he saw fit to renew it, it would necessarily involve the proposed participation of freed slaves and Khoi. The qualification for voters who would elect members of any future legislative body would, he foresaw, have to be constructed in such a way as to include all the

English, Irish, and Scotch mechanics, the Malays, and freed Coloured people of every description, who pay any taxes. These with the English and Foreign merchants and residents and better educated and more liberal portion of the Afrikaners, will efficiently extinguish the last remnant of the high Dutch Oligarchy. [108]

And, as we shall see, the time was soon to come when a coalition of merchants, "the liberal portion of the Afrikaners", and the "Hottentot" nation would unite to create the 1853 Constitution.

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Notes

- 1 I am grateful to Ian Phimister for arranging for the photocopying of theses held in the the University of Cape Town Library.
- 2 Gerrit Schutte in Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee, *The Shaping of South African Society* (First edition, Cape Town, 1979) pp 198-203; Andre du Toit and Herman Giliomee, *Afrikaner Political Thought: Analysis and Documents* (Cape Town 1983), pp 230-33.
- 3 du Toit and Giliomee, *Afrikaner Political Thought*, p 255 Article 6. Robert Shell, "Family and Slavery at the Cape, 1680-1808" in Wilmot G James and Mary Simons, *The Angry Divide: Social and Economic History of the Western Cape* (Cape Town, 1989), p 21.

- 4 An earlier paper, "From Paternalism to Liberalism. The Cape 1800-1834" (ICS, 1988), discusses the emergence of paternalism. I am also attempting a considerable elaboration of this theme in a paper to be entitled "The Construction of Paternalism".
- 5 Robert Shell, "Family and slavery", *op. cit.*.
- 6 Eric Foner, *Nothing But Freedom. Emancipation and its Legacy* (Baton Rouge, 1983), p 46.
- 7 Eugene D Genovese, *Roll Jordan, Roll. The World the Slaves Made* (New York, 1976), p 5. Nevertheless, paternalism is a notion that needs much greater elaboration. As Herb Gutman observed "no one, including Genovese, has studied how such beliefs and practices developed". See Herbert Gutman, *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925* (New York, 1976), p 310.
- 8 James Oakes, *The Ruling Race. A History of American Slaveholders* (New York, 1982), pp xi-xii.
- 9 Robin Blackburn, *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery: 1776-1848* (London, 1988), p 434. Calculations from R Davis, *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade* (Leicester, 1979), p 88.
- 10 *South African Commercial Advertiser* (SACA), 5 February, 1834. The number of merchant vessels calling at Table Bay increased from 83 in 1808 to 298 in 1833. The tonnage of these vessels went up from 28,373 to 96,577.
- 11 Jaqueline Lalou Meltzer, "The Growth of Cape Town Commerce and the Role of John Fairbairn's *Advertiser* (1835-1859)", MA University of Cape Town, 1989. p 22.
- 12 Basil Le Cordeur, *The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, 1820-1854* (Cape Town, 1981) pp 19-21.
- 13 *Ibid.*
- 14 Meltzer, "Cape Town Commerce", p 32.
- 15 Thomas Pringle, *A Narrative of a Residence in South Africa*. (first published London 1834, republished Brentwood, Essex 1986). H C Botha. *John Fairbairn in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1984. For the significance of the *Cape Almanac*, see Jean du Plessis, "Colonial Progress and Countryside Conservatism. An essay on the legacy of Van der Lingen", MA Stellenbosch, 1988, p 53.
- 16 *Cape Almanac*, 1830: du Plessis, "Colonial Progress", p 54.
- 17 Mary Isabel Rayner, "Wine and Slaves. The Failure of an Export Economy and the Ending of Slavery in the Cape Colony, South Africa, 1806-1834" (Unpublished PhD, Duke University, 1986) p 302. In an otherwise excellent study Rayner dismisses Fairbairn in this way.
- 18 *SACA*, 22 March 1826; Meltzer, p 172. See Botha, *Fairbairn*, p 35, for Fairbairn's contempt of Greig for being scared of merchants.
- 19 *SACA*, 22 January, 1831. Meltzer, p 172.
- 20 *SACA*, 24 March 1824.

- 21 SACA, 19 April, 1826.
- 22 SACA, 17 May, 1826.
- 23 SACA, 26 April 1826.
- 24 SACA, 7 April, 1824.
- 25 Botha, *Fairbairn*.
- 26 SACA, 4 July, 1826.
- 27 SACA, 2 March, 1831. Meltzer, "Cape Town Commerce", p 44.
- 28 Meltzer, "Cape Town Commerce", pp 51,52. Rayner, "Wine and Slaves" pp 211, 212.
- 29 Meltzer, "Cape Town Commerce", pp 55-82.
- 30 Fredrick Madden with David Fieldhouse, *Imperial Reconstruction, 1763-1840. The Evolution of Alternative Systems of Colonial Government*. (New York, 1987), Vol III pp 680-81.
- 31 John Philip, *Researches in South Africa* (London 1828), Vol ii, p 304.
- 32 Andrew Ross, *John Philip (1775-1851). Missions, Race and Politics in South Africa* (Aberdeen, 1986), pp 96, 97.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p 95, citing Philip to Directors, undated, marked "Not for Publication", SA Incoming Letters, Box 1, Folder 1.
- 34 Philip, *Researches*, Vol ii, p 316.
- 35 *Missionary Herald*, Vol XXIX, 1833, p 414; Ross, *John Philip*, p 95.
- 36 P H Kapp, "Dr John Philip. Die Grondlegger van Liberalisme in Suid Afrika", *Argief Jaarboek vir Suid Afrikaanse Geschiedenis*, Vol 48, No 2, p 50. Though, as Kapp shows, Philip could not find a copy of this work and was forced to rely on *An Abridgement of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. in a Series of Letters from a father to his daughter, chiefly intended for the use and advancement of female education*.
- 37 LMS Papers Africa Odds 6/1/B [Philip Papers?], Philip to Sec March 1825, cited in Kapp, "Dr John Philip", *op. cit.*, p 52.
- 38 Philip, *Researches*, Vol i Preface, p xxvi.
- 39 *Ibid.*, Vol i, p vii
- 40 W M Macmillan, "The Problem of the Cape Coloured People, 1792-1842", in Eric Walker (ed), *Cambridge History of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 1963), Vol VIII p 289; John Philip to T F Buxton, 1 July 1828, cited in Macmillan, *Cape Colour Question* (Cape Town, 1969), p 217; Philip *Researches*, Vol i, p xxx, and ii p 329; Pringle, *A Narrative*, p 267.
- 41 Philip, *Researches*, Vol i, p 329
- 42 *Ibid.*, p 379.

- 43 *Ibid.*, pp ix-x, pp 365, 386; Vol ii, pp 32, 33.
- 44 Theal, *Records of the Cape Colony (RCC)* (London, 1905), Vol 35, p 205.
- 45 Julian Cobbing "The Mfecane as Alibi: thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo", *Journal of African History*, Vol 29 (1988), pp 492-95.
- 46 M Donaldson, "The Council of Advice at the Cape of Good Hope, 1825-1834", PhD, Rhodes University, 1974, p 349. CA CO 202, No 13, Bigge and Colebrooke to Somerset, 8 September 1823.
- 47 Donaldson, "The Council of Advice", p 357; *RCC*, Vol 26, p 90, Somerset to Bathurst, 27 February 1826
- 48 Donaldson, "The Council of Advice", p 357; Somerset to Hay 27 July 1826, *RCC* Vol 27, p 160.
- 49 Donaldson, "The Council of Advice", p 358; *RCC*, Vol 35, p 340.
- 50 Donaldson, "The Council of Advice", p 352; *RCC*, Vol 26, pp 293-95.
- 51 Donaldson, "The Council of Advice", p 359; *RCC*, Vol 34, pp 378-81.
- 52 Donaldson, "The Council of Advice", p 368. CO. 48/82, Bourke to Bathurst, 14 July 1826; *RCC*, Vol 27, pp 69-70.
- 53 Donaldson, "The Council of Advice", p 363; CO 51/6, minute, 21 April 1827, Colony. *RCC*, Vol 34, p 399.
- 54 Donaldson, "The Council of Advice", pp 374-75; CO 48/109, Bourke to Bathurst 30 June 1827; *RCC*, Vol 32, pp 53-54.
- 55 Susan Newton-King, "The Labour Market of the Cape Colony, 1807-1828", in Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore, *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa* (London, 1980), p 198.
- 56 *Ibid.*, pp 194-95.
- 57 Donaldson, "The Council of Advice", p 379. CO 51/12, Minutes, 17 July 1828.
- 58 Donaldson, "The Council of Advice", pp 381-82.
- 59 L C Duly, "A Revisit with the Cape's Hottentot Ordinance of 1828", *Studies in Economics and Economic History* (ed M Kooy) (London, 1972).
- 60 Eric Foner *Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War* (New York, 1980), pp 64-65, discusses a similar issue in the United States. "As many historians have observed", Foner writes, "the abolitionists' conception of both slavery and freedom was profoundly individualistic."
- 61 W B Boyce, *Notes on South African Affairs* (London, 1839), p 128. Edna Bradlow, "Emancipation and Race Perception at the Cape", *South African Historical Journal*, No 15, 1983.
- 62 Tony Kirk. "Progress and Decline in the Kat River Settlement, 1829-1854", *Journal of African History*, XIV(1973) p 413.

- 63 Rayner, "Wine and Slaves".
- 64 J B Peires, in Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee, *The Shaping of South African Society* (Cape Town, Second edition, 1989), pp 495-99.
- 65 SACA , 20 March, 1830.
- 66 SACA , April 3 1830.
- 67 *Zuid Afrikaan*, 16, 23 April, 1830. Botha, *Fairbairn* , p 73,
- 68 Botha, *Fairbairn*..
- 69 John Mason, "Slaveholder Resistance to the Amelioration of Slavery at the Cape", unpublished seminar paper, Yale SARP, p 52. When completed, Mason's dissertation promises to transform our study of slave resistance in the Cape.
- 70 SACA , 23 April, 1831. Botha, *Fairbairn*, p 50; Mason "Slaveholder Resistance".
- 71 Mason, "Slaveholder Resistance", p 52.
- 72 Botha, *Fairbairn* , p 87. Rayner, "Wine and Slaves", p 296.
- 73 SACA , June 30 1832.
- 74 SACA, 30 June 1832.
- 75 SACA, 27 September 1834. Botha, *Fairbairn*, p 175.
- 76 SACA , 18 October, 1834.
- 77 du Plessis, "Colonial Progress", p 145; SACA , 10 August 1831.
- 78 du Plessis, "Colonial Progress", p 10.
- 79 *Ibid.*, p 114.
- 80 *Ibid.*, p 115.
- 81 This meeting is referred to by a number of writers from J S Marais, *The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937* (London 1939), to Edna Bradlow, "Emancipation and Race Perception at the Cape", *South African Historical Journal* , No 15, 1983. None of these writers chose to see a "national" consciousness emerging from the Philipton meeting. In the course of writing this paper both John Mason (writing about the making of a Khoi-slave community) and Elizabeth Elbourne have let me know of their rediscovery of the text associated with this meeting. Anyone concerned with historiography and the place of original material will be instructed by this minor episode among the footnotes.
- 82 SACA , 25 June 1834.
- 83 Tony Kirk, "Progress and Decline in the Kat River Settlement, 1829-1854.", *Journal of African History*, XIV(1973) p 413.
- 84 Marais, *The Cape Coloured People*, pp 110, 111. Marais wrote:

In 1825 a Wesleyan missionary working among the Xosa, wrote that the Gonaquas 'have long been completely blended and intermixed with all the tribes in Caffreland, and can no longer be recognised as a distinct race'. Nevertheless in the 1840's the term 'Gona' was still frequently used in the Eastern Colony to designate a Xosa whose colour and general appearance approached those of the Hottentot. (p 111)

- 85 For which he was to be much resented by settlers in the Eastern Cape.
- 86 Cape Archives: ZL 1/3/13 LMS microfilm, letters received South Africa 15/1/A James Read snr - W.Ellis, 26 January 1836, cited in J C Visagie, "Katrivier Nedersetting, 1828-1839", Unpublished DLitt et Phil, University of South Africa, 1978, p 173.
- 87 SACA , 3 September, 1834.
- 88 John Barrow, *Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa* (London 1806, Vol II, p 111. S Newton King and V C Malherbe, *The Khoikhoi Rebellion in the Eastern Cape* , Communication No 5 (University of Cape Town, 1981), pp 16-17.
- 89 SACA , 3 September, 1834.
- 90 SACA , 2 August, 1834.
- 91 SACA, 25 June 1834. Letter from A Hottentot. The paper noted of its correspondent. "The letter below, signed 'A Hottentot,' is the genuine production of one of that nation. The original is in the Dutch language and printed in the Dutch part of the Paper, as we received it. The translation is literal, and done by a Sworn Translator. The writer who resides on the Frontier, is mistaken as to the number of the Members of Council. There are Three Dutch and two English Members, unofficial."
- 92 SACA, 3 September, 1834.
- 93 *Ibid.*
- 94 *Ibid.*
- 95 SACA, 6 September, 1834.
- 96 Cape Archives: CO 4382 Arrear correspondence, miscellaneous: Memorandum of Capt. A B Armstrong, 23 January 1835, n.p. Visagie, "Katrivier Nedersetting", p 174.
- 97 *Ibid.*, citing Visagie, *op. cit.*, p 179. Armstrong continued:
- those Bastards and others who belong to the established Church of the Colony under the Revd. Mr Thompson, he has discountenanced and encouraged a bad feeling towards them on the part of his congregation greatly to detriment of the settlement and highly subversive of good Christian feelings.
- 98 Cape Archives: CO 4382 Arrear correspondence, miscellaneous: Extracts of a letter from the revd. Thompson ..., 1 February 1836. n.p., citing Visagie, p 174.
- 99 Donald Moodie, *THE RECORD or a series of official papers relative to the condition and treatment of the Native Tribes of South Africa* (Cape Town, 1838-1842. Reprinted by Balkema Amsterdam/Cape Town, 1960). Moodie was undoubtedly a propagandist, hostile to the "philanthropists", and therefore to the Kat River people, but despite his bias he was also careful with the record and his work requires respect.

- 100 Moodie, *Afschisten* , Vol 25 (VC 888), p 18. I am grateful to Robert Ross for letting me have a xerox copy of Moodie's manuscript.
- 101 *Ibid.*, p 19.
- 102 *Ibid.*, p 17. V C Malherbe writes: "Andries Stoffel was the son of Stoffel Jager and Eva Stoffels. A Gona (that is of mixed Khoi/Xhosa extraction)." He was to be much resented by settlers for his supposed links with the Xhosa in the 1830s and for his evidence to the Aborigines Committee. See V C Malherbe, "Andries Stoffel", *Dictionary of South African Biography*, Vol IV, pp 623-25.
- 103 Cape Archives: CO 4382 Arrear correspondence, miscellaneous: Memorandum of Capt A B Armstrong, 23 January 1835, n.p. Visagie, "Katrivier Nedersetting", p 171.
- 104 Minutes of Evidence Before the Select Committee on Aborigines, evidence of Andrew (Andries) Stoffel, paras 5057, 5058, 5060.
- 105 Bradlow, "Emancipation and Race Perception", *op. cit.*, p 13, citing C 584, report of the Commissioner on Native Tribes (January 1830) p 6.
- 106 Saxe Bannister, *Humane Policy; or Justice to the Aborigines of New Settlements* (London, 1829) pp 186-87. Bradlow, "Emancipation and Race Perception", *op. cit.*
- 107 N Poulson, *A Subaltern's Sick Leave* (Calcutta, 1837) p 108. Bradlow , "Emancipation and Race Perception", *op. cit.*
- 108 SACA , 18 October, 1834.