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THE MARKET OF POTOSÍ AT THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY*

Even before the emergence of a specialised economic historiography for colonial Latin America, the issue of trade already occupied a central place in the studies of the period and for the area. The commercial relations that connected the colonies to their metropolitan centres were studied from the point of view of the latter, in that they assumed that the exchange responded to the dynamics of the metropolitan economies, as well as postulating that the eventual consequences should also be sought in their analysis. America produced goods — fundamentally, precious metals — by virtue of European entrepreneurial activities, and overseas trade permitted shipment to Europe. During the decade of the 1960s, a complementary interpretation — ‘dependency theory’ — was joined to this traditional vision. Dependency theory concerned itself with the negative consequences of this process for Latin America, emphasising even more that the explication of the colonial system’s dynamism should be sought in the metropolis. The sectors of the Latin American economies that produced export goods — mines and plantations — were seen as ‘enclaves’ that prolonged the European dynamic in the colonies without fundamentally affecting the totality of the dependent societies. Recently Latin American economic historiography has called these suppositions into question, analysing in concrete form the production, mining as well as agriculture and manufacturing, within the colonies themselves. Current research postulates a process of commercialisation of the colonial societies that results in regional specialisation and the development of internal markets in America with considerable dynamism of their own.¹

Nonetheless, concrete studies that focus in detail on the colonial urban market are few and far between. In this paper we present the first results

of ongoing research on the market of Potosí at the end of the 18th century. The primary source used is the complete series of Libros de Alcabalas (tax records) of the Royal Customs House of Potosí from 1779, the year of its establishment, to 1810. These documents are now deposited in the Archivo General de la Nación in Buenos Aires. The richness of the source permits a detailed analysis of the traffic imports to the mining centre, the total values and volume of merchandise as well as the regional origins, contributing to an evaluation of the effects of the mining economy on the whole of the colonial social formation. Moreover, the frequencies of the operations and their average values will indicate the possibilities of market access for individual producers and traders.

On entry into Potosí, the Royal Customs House should have registered all merchandise whose future sale was subject to the *alcabala*, an *ad valorem* tax which had gone up from 4 to 6 per cent in 1776, to great protestations on the part of diverse sectors of the colonial economy. In practice, the Royal Customs assigned a value to the incoming merchandise, independent of other previous customs or merchandise evaluations, calculated the import tax and granted the importer a period of time in which to pay it, without taking into account whether or not a sale in the city had by then been completed. It was this time lag between the entry of the merchandise and the payment of the *alcabala* that led the Customs to be so meticulous in the recording of debts to be collected and all the details of the entries that occurred. This explains why today we have available the following information for each entry into Potosí: the name of the trader, occasionally the name of the merchant who despatched the shipment from another part of America or even from a Spanish port; the date of the entry; the place in which the *guía*, a form of customs declaration that circulated with goods in the territory, had been granted; at times the geographical origin of the goods as distinct from the *guía*'s place of issue, the value of the merchandise and the corresponding 6 per cent tax record.

Most of the entries for *efectos de Castilla*, or goods imported from Europe or Asia, refer to undifferentiated shipments; but, in contrast, we do have available a precise enumeration of each *efecto de la tierra*, or American product, entering the Imperial City together with its name, unit of measurement, quantity and unit value appraisal. With regard to the processing of this information, the unit of analysis is defined as the *operation* or *transaction*, consisting of the introduction of a shipment or undifferentiated shipment into Potosí. Therefore, when a merchant presents goods to the Royal Customs House we shall register it as one or more operations on the same date, according to the distinctions made by the source in terms of the respective entries for distinct products.

In this first close look at the material we shall limit ourselves to an analysis of the information for the year 1793.² We have selected this year because it was also the year in which Indalecio González de Socasa, the

most important merchant of the period, put together his annual trade estimates. These figures have been published repeatedly and used at times in the historical literature.³ The major coincidences between these statistics and our results serve as confirmation of the reliability of the source, while some of the partial discrepancies will merit specific commentaries in the course of this paper.

Another justification for choosing 1793 is its representativeness for the last quarter of the 18th century in Potosí. By that time, *alcabala* earnings almost exactly equalled the average for the interwar period (1788–1795) and, at the same time, are very close to the theoretical value derived for this year from the 1776–1800 trend.⁴

The data from the *alcabala* permit us to understand only a part of the total effective trade destined for Potosí, since certain goods and certain traders were exempt from payment of the tax. In this way, livestock, seeds and tubers, vegetables and mining inputs escaped the control of the Royal Customs. In addition, the Church, its members and its dependencies were not subject to the tax. Further, the families of the forced labourers who arrived every year as part of the *mita* (the system of forced labour applied in the Andean region) were also exempted. Less clear is the question of Indians in general whom the legislation exonerated from *alcabalas* when trading their own goods or goods that had been acquired from other natives. This exemption was based initially on the ‘poverty’ or ‘rusticity’ of the natives and, as such, formed part of the tutelary regime put into effect by the Crown during the 16th century; in the 18th century, however, the legal commentaries emphasised the utility of the exemption in promoting agriculture, industry and commerce among the Indians.⁵ Nonetheless, our detailed analysis of the import tax records of Potosí leads us to the conclusion that in that city during the last half of the 18th century Indians did not benefit from this exemption. We shall return to this subject in the final section of this paper.

Table 1 shows the totals calculated on the base of our primary source. In Table 2 we have tried to locate the traffic subject to the *alcabala* payment within the total entries into Potosí. In this table there are obvious absences such as tobacco — an American product monopolised by the Crown — and African slaves. In spite of this, we believe that the table’s estimations are reasonably accurate.

Analysing both tables, we can verify that the traffic controlled by the Customs Authority for the payment of the import tax is only 35 per cent of the total movement, while that portion of 65 per cent exempt from the quota is made up of approximately 40 per cent food products and 25 per cent mining inputs. As such, the great majority of exempted products are of American origin. The proportions between *efectos de Castilla* and *efectos de la tierra* change radically between taxed and exempt transactions. Thus, in Table 1 the *efectos de Castilla*, plus some ‘mixed’ ship-

ments, represent some 45 per cent of the value traded, while the percentage is reduced to 24 per cent in Table 2.

These data confirm the general lines of the interpretation of Carlos Sempat Assadourian in regard to the high degree of self-sufficiency in the area of the Peruvian economy. His conclusions were presented with reference to a table based on the year 1603 showing the traffic entering Potosí according to estimates from a contemporary document.⁶ This table showed that only 9.5 per cent of goods entering for that year came from outside America. Almost two hundred years later the percentage had risen to only 24 per cent, a very slim increase given the great Spanish commercial offensive of the second half of the 18th century. These statistics reintroduce the question by implying, yet again, a reduced local impact made by the increase in intercontinental commerce after the 1778 decree sanctioning Comercio Libre in American markets given that they were saturated with fast-falling product prices.⁷ The figures are more surprising if we note that almost half the difference in the percentages for the *efectos de Castilla* entering Potosí between 1603 and 1793 is accounted for by a single product which changes columns. In effect, in both years the estimates coincide in according to mercury, the auxiliary element essential for the production of silver, 6.7 per cent of the total.⁸ In 1603 this quicksilver or mercury came from Huancavelica and was, therefore, an American product. By 1793 the production of Huancavelica is totally absorbed by the mining boom in Lower Peru, and Potosí consumes European mercury, which then figures among the *efectos de Castilla*.

Origin of the merchandise

Concentrating on the whole area of traffic controlled by the Royal Customs, it is as important to distinguish the varied origins of the *efectos de Castilla* as of the *efectos de la tierra*, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.

The data show that by 1793 there was a clear resolution of the multi-secular conflict between the Pacific and the Atlantic in supplying Upper Peru with imported goods. Combining the waybills of Buenos Aires with those of Salta and Jujuy, obvious redistribution points for goods imported from the Atlantic, a total of nearly 80 per cent of the entire value is reached. Adding the 20 per cent represented by the *efectos de Castilla* arriving from Arica permits two observations. The first is to deny the validity of the information presented in 1792 by the intendant of Arequipa, Alvarez y Jiménez (whose jurisdiction included Arica) according to which it was Potosí that supplied some of the Pacific ports with Spanish articles and not the reverse.⁹ The second observation is that Arica maintained a not inconsiderable access to Potosí's market. More precisely, one can speak of an intermittent market with few transactions of high value. The average value of each one of these transactions more than duplicated those originating in Buenos Aires (see Table 3). In addition, eight of the

nine operations with registration in Arica for the year 1793 were handled by different merchants but on two consecutive days — the 17th and 18th of September — which surely indicates the arrival in port of a single ship.

Table 4 reveals the hegemony of the port of Buenos Aires in the overseas supplying of Potosí as contrasted with the dispersion of the sources of provisioning for the *efectos de la tierra*. Potosí confirms its position as a great mining centre whose production attracted traders from the whole of the Peruvian area who came to the market with the objective of exchanging their goods for money. The production of Potosí silver doubled in the half-century before 1793 and in this evolution merchant capital, local as well as from other zones in the Viceroyalty, played a very small part. As a result, the silver circulated inside and outside the city without any form of monopoly.¹⁰ This situation contrasts sharply with that of Cerro de Pasco in Lower Peru during these same years. The control exercised by the Lima merchants in Cerro de Pasco explains why between 1782 and 1819 81.8 per cent of the trade entering the city, *efectos de Castilla* as well as *efectos de la tierra*, originated in the viceregal capital.¹¹

Potosí, on the other hand, maintained in general outline the kinds of ties with the Peruvian economic area that had developed during its period of maximum production. Naturally, the effects of this influence had diminished since that era. One indicator of its decline can be found in the relation between commercial turnover and the total amount of mining production. In 1603 Potosí received goods valued at 56 per cent more than the annual silver production of the Cerro and the regional mines.¹² In contrast, the annual movement that we have estimated for 1793 coincides exactly with the amount coined by the Royal Mint during the period.¹³ Thus the capacity to foster this converging commercial traffic appears to have diminished relative to silver output. This conclusion fits well with what we know of the modalities by which the increase in mining production was obtained. In effect, the intensification of forced labour with insufficient wage levels for the maintenance of the *mita* families did not contribute to the development of the internal market but, rather, increased the burdens that weighed upon the indigenous communities that had to assume the task of feeding the migrants. Moreover, the division of the mining surplus between absentee owners and tenant entrepreneurs did not encourage either mining investment or trading activities.¹⁴

Nonetheless, it bears emphasising that Potosí continued to attract a wide range of trade. A first observation suggested by Table 4 is that the separation in 1776 of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, in whose territory Potosí was located, and the Viceroyalty of Peru, in no way signified the institution of frontiers that discouraged commerce. The Lower Peruvian intendencies of Arequipa, Cuzco and Lima accounted for more than 50 per cent of the trade in *efectos de la tierra* destined for Potosí in 1793. Contemporary sources stress the fundamental role of this articu-

lation between the productive Peruvian areas with the mining zones of Upper Peru which, in return, brought to the Viceroyalty in Lima earnings in metal that alleviated the acute commercial deficit that the region had accrued with the Spanish metropolis.¹⁵

The remaining 50 per cent of the trade in *efectos de la tierra* was commercialised within the limits of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, but it is necessary to distinguish here between the regions of Upper Peru and those that later formed part of Argentina. While the former (Puno, La Paz, La Plata, Cochabamba and Potosí), including the entries 'without *guía*' that we assume originated in the areas surrounding the Imperial City, come close to 45 per cent of the total, the intendancies of Salta, Córdoba and Buenos Aires barely account for 5 per cent. A comparison between the commercial value of the *efectos de Castilla* coming from the Río de la Plata ports and the sparse traffic in products from the Argentine regions, points to the peculiar relation between Potosí and the entire territory that had its capital in Buenos Aires. Nonetheless, Paraguayan *yerba* and mules, products of the Río de la Plata of some importance, occupied sixth and thirteenth place in the statistics listing values for *efectos de la tierra* (see Table 10).

The trade between the regions of Upper Peru and Potosí is of importance not only for its value, close to 45 per cent of the total of *efectos de la tierra*, but also for its enormous volume, 79.5 per cent of the number of transactions in *efectos de la tierra*, which indicates a very fragmented participation in these categories. An exception is the relatively low figure for Cochabamba found in Table 4. For the same year, 1793, we have the estimates of Intendant Viedma for the exports of the region, according to which Cochabamba sent out 102,706 pesos per year in merchandise subject to the import tax (excluding 490,000 pesos estimated for corn, wheat and flour).¹⁶ The 17,457 pesos for this year shown in the figures as coming from Cochabamba cannot represent the true amount of Potosí's participation in the total as claimed by Viedma. There is no question that a major part of the merchandise originating in Cochabamba entered Potosí 'without *gula*', which is to say, the shipments had not acquired a customs declaration before beginning the journey. Confirmation that this practice was common in Cochabamba and the estimation of its importance in the market of Potosí remain open to question.

The merchants

In 1804 the Consulado of Buenos Aires tried to obtain the information necessary for preparing a merchant's roster for the whole of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. The deputy of the Commerce of Potosí affirmed that within the jurisdiction of Potosí there were more than 400 *pulperías*, but that the city's commerce was in the hands of 33 merchants of *efectos de Castilla*, 7 owners of 'casas de bodega', 15 traders in *efectos*

de la tierra, plus some other 'neighbouring Indian traders in coca, etc., not to mention the transients, which are not few'.¹⁷ The import tax records of 1793 reveal that this report was clearly distorted with the intention of presenting a merchant community much smaller than actually existed, a practice which guaranteed greater institutional control on the part of the more powerful sector which expressed itself through the Consulado and its delegations.

Our source in fact presents for the single year 1793 a total of 743 individuals who brought in goods subject to the payment of the *alcabala*. Table 5 lists them according to the total amount registered for the year, grouped in regular intervals.¹⁸ It will be useful to distinguish four groups of traders. The first, the large merchants, includes the three upper levels in the table, who handled transactions of over 10,000 pesos in the course of the year. The second group is the medium-sized merchants who comprise the next two tiers with total annual amounts of between 1,000 and 10,000 pesos. The third, the small traders, includes the next two levels with monetary limits of between 100 and 1000 pesos. Finally, the last two tiers, with amounts below 100 pesos for the year, are the occasional traders.

There is a remarkable asymmetry represented in the distribution by the 26 large merchants. Of the individuals who operated in the import market of Potosí, 3.5 per cent account for 15 per cent of the transactions and 55 per cent of the value traded. Furthermore, this group is not principally identified with the commercialisation of *efectos de Castilla*. On the contrary, 8 of the 26 dedicated themselves exclusively to importing *efectos de la tierra*, including Gabriel Iglesias and José de Echavarría, who occupied fifth and seventh place in the general statistics with annual totals of 47,000 and 45,000 pesos respectively.

Negotiating in *efectos de Castilla* was, however, the preserve of a small group of merchants; 43 individuals out of a total of 743 were responsible for almost 10 per cent of the transactions and 49 per cent of the total value traded. In addition to the 18 large merchants referred to above, this group included 21 medium-sized merchants and even 4 small traders. This circuit of wholesale commerce was generally separated from wholesale traffic in *efectos de la tierra*, as evidenced by the fact that only 18 of the 43 merchants took part in any operations involving American products and that these never weighed heavily in their total activities. The exception was Indalecio González de Socasa, the largest merchant in the market and the only one whose operations totalled over 100,000 pesos during the year, trading in *efectos de Castilla* and *efectos de la tierra* in similar proportions.

The comparison between large and medium-sized merchants is completed by the information found in Table 6. Thus it can be seen that the latter took part in a smaller average number of operations per merchant

annually, and, more obviously, those operations were of much smaller average value than those carried out by the larger merchants. It should be emphasised, however, that it is this group which is most obscured in the controversial statistics recorded by the *Diputado del Comercio* of Potosí, given that they account for a quarter of the traders for the year, responsible for one-third of the transactions and one-third of the total value of imports.

The small merchants, for their part, constitute almost 57 per cent of the individuals with 44 per cent of the operations but with only 11 per cent of the total value. Finally, those whom we refer to as occasional traders — 15 per cent of the individuals — account for 8 per cent of the operations with a total value of less than half per cent. If we compare the information in Table 6 on these last two groups and take into account the definition given for an operation as a unit of analysis, it seems probable that the great majority of the small merchants, as well as almost all the occasional traders, appeared only once with their goods in Potosí during the course of the year. The difference here is that the small merchants supplied the Potosí market with one or two products while the occasional traders only brought a single product. Note in the case of the latter the low average value of the transactions and their relatively low variability.

Our source provides very few elements for a more precise identification of each merchant group. The *guias* that correspond to the transactions for 1793 suggest that the *efectos de Castilla*, as well as the products of the *haciendas* and *obrajes*, were sent to Potosí in consignment to one or more merchants, one of whom accepted the shipment and declared it in Customs but who was not always the person who paid the tax. One example will serve to show the bonds that clearly existed among the large merchants. A certain Aranzabal sent four shipments of sugar from Cuzco to Potosí, equivalent to more than 20 per cent of the total sugar shipments that entered the city in 1793. The *guias* and the tax registry show the following detail:

Quantity of sugar	Consignee	Manifested at Royal Customs	Alcabala payer
231 arrobas	F.A. de la Canal	N. de Ponte	J.I. Carbajal
121 arrobas	F.A. de la Canal	J.I. Carbajal	J.I. Carbajal
478 arrobas 9 lbs	F.A. de la Canal	J.I. Carbajal	J.I. Carbajal
460 arrobas	J.J. de Toledo	J.J. de Toledo	J.I. Carbajal

Francisco Antonio de la Canal did not conclude any transaction in 1793 but he had brought merchandise into Potosí in other years. José Joaquín de Toledo's sugar operation was the only one he made that year and was traded for a sum of 2,300 pesos, which places him among middle-sized

merchants. Juan Ignacio Carbajal's two transactions, which amounted to 5,000 pesos, make him a middle-sized merchant while for Nicolás de Ponte the transaction in sugar was one of eight operations in *efectos de la tierra* which total more than 10,000 pesos and place him among the large merchants.

The majority of wholesale merchants did not need a commercial outlet or store open to the public. The tax roll of 1793 lists the 42 proprietors of the city's 45 shops.¹⁹ Only 14 of these also figure in the list of merchants bringing goods into the city; two imported only *efectos de Castilla*; another two traded in *efectos de Castilla* as well as *efectos de la tierra*; and the remaining ten dealt only with *efectos de la tierra*.

The merchandise

Tables 7 and 8 list the merchandise entering Potosí in 1793 according to its value and frequency. In the table of values, alcoholic beverages and coca account for almost 60 per cent of the total value of *efectos de la tierra*, with textiles and food items a long way behind. In the table of frequency, coca comes to occupy first place in spite of a decline in its relative weight. The percentages of aguardiente and wine diminish by less than half and are superseded in number of operations by foodstuffs and textiles.

The percentages do not vary greatly from the scant data that have been available up to now for Andean urban markets of the 18th century, which have been presented in Table 9. Potosí in 1733 and 1793 shows the dominance of aguardiente and especially that of coca in the market, data that fit well with the secular trends for production of both items.²⁰ At the same time, the information confirms the elasticity of the demand for *excitantia* in the mining market. The drop in the percentage of American textiles is more difficult to interpret since it is known that production expanded during the century, apparently always ahead of demand.²¹ Disaggregated figures for the *efectos de Castilla* entering in 1793 are not available, but certainly textiles occupied a dominant place. If this is the case, the most likely hypothesis is that American textiles lost ground to overseas competition in the Potosí market. In contrast, the low percentage of yerba mate can perhaps be explained by the decline in Potosí's role as a centre of redistribution for this and other products to the rest of Upper Peru. The Bourbon fiscal offensive determined, in effect, that the *alcabala* be charged on all merchandise entering Potosí, whether for sale there or redirected to another urban centre. Another import tax was paid on the merchandise at its ultimate destination. Because of the so-called 'double *alcabala*', there was a tendency to send merchandise directly to where it was expected to be sold. This was particularly the case after the rate was increased by 50 per cent, around 1776.

Both aguardiente and coca carried relatively little weight in the contemporary Cochabamba market since that city did not have an Indian population equivalent to Potosí's mining labour force. The high percentage not specified in the Cochabamba totals indicates the importance for that area of cotton imports, the raw material used in the local manufacture of *tocuyos* (a kind of crude cotton cloth). In Cerro de Pasco, on the other hand, aguardiente alone reached a percentage similar to Potosí's total for this and coca together. In fact the low figure for coca is more surprising than the high one for aguardiente. Perhaps this is due to the exemption for Indian trade which results in some under-representation in commercial statistics.

Table 10 details the figures relating to 25 products or groups of products that were traded in Potosí in 1793 for a value of 0.27 per cent or more of the total *efectos de la tierra*, leaving aside another 40 products or product groups. As additional information, the table includes for each product a calculation of the quotient which shows the relation between the average value per operation of the article and the average value per operation in the market for *efectos de la tierra* that year.²²

Aguardiente, of course, heads the list for total value of its operations, followed very closely by coca, and much further down by American clothing. The downward trend in percentages from the fourth product, sugar, is surprising. The table's first three positions confirm, then, the fundamental information based on geographical origin that was presented in Table 4. The aguardiente-coca-clothing triad encompassed the geographical triangle Arequipa-La Paz-Cuzco, which accounted for the overwhelming majority of domestic trade converging on Potosí. There is a notable difference in the quotient values of three products, which express the relation between their average operation and the average operation of the combined *efectos de la tierra*. While coca from La Paz has a quotient of 1.12, that is, slightly above the average of the 65 American products, the transactions in aguardiente were three times this value and those in *ropa de la tierra* more than four times the average quotient.²³

Aguardiente was a relative newcomer compared with the majority of other products in the marketplace of Potosí. It was only after 1701 that aguardiente, previously considered a medicinal beverage, began to be sent in quantity from the Peruvian coast to the altiplano. Peak production was reached towards the end of the 18th century, with 80 to 90 per cent of Arequipa's wine being converted into aguardiente.²⁴ Potosí occupied a prominent place as a market for wines and aguardientes from the coast, but even more so for products from the Moquegua region, which supplied the Imperial City with 86 per cent of its consumption (see Appendix).²⁵

Trading in wine, the ninth most valuable commodity among *efectos de la tierra*, was obviously associated with that of aguardiente. However, it

should be pointed out that, together with the wine trade from Moquegua, which accounted for 59 per cent of consumption with a price ranging from 7 to 9 pesos per *botija*, an inferior wine produced in the neighbouring valley of Cinti entered Potosí with a uniform price of 4 pesos per *botija* (see Appendix).

The relatively low variability coefficient for the trade in aguardiente points to trade operations that were almost always of great value. Potosí's imports of wines and aguardientes was, then, very concentrated. During the year 94 merchants engaged in these transactions, but only seven large merchants sold 46.5 per cent of the total while 44 medium-sized merchants sold over 48 per cent. This was a specialised trade, from which those merchants seldom strayed. Five of the large merchants, who alone were responsible for 42.5 per cent of the total trade, devoted 94.6 per cent of their annual returns to this commerce, while the 44 medium-sized traders had 95.2 per cent of their merchandising activities accounted for by this product.

According to Kendall Brown, trade was channelled from the regions of production towards the altiplano in three different ways. There were the great landowners who owned mule trains and transported their own products, but these were an exception. Other landowners rented the mule trains for transportation, while still others chose to sell their merchandise to owners of the trains which descended from the altiplano to the coast.²⁶ It would be useful to define precisely the participation of this last kind of transport and establish what, in particular, was the role of the *caciques* mentioned by Robert Choque when speaking of this trade.²⁷

The trade in aguardiente was closely followed in total values by that of coca (see Table 10). The frequency of these operations and their average value differed markedly. The peculiar characteristic of the coca trade was pointed out around 1801 by the main trader of the plaza in Potosí:

Many interested parties deal in the coca business of La Paz, and the most involved are the Indians. These never make any effort to keep accounts, either of their personal expenses or of the freight charges on the goods they transport, normally on their own animals; whereas, according to good business practice, all the costs arising from the transaction should be added to the principal. It follows, therefore, that the Spaniard never prospers in any trade in which the Indian takes part.²⁸

In fact, the predominance of Indian names in this commerce is confirmed by the *alcabala* registers. As claimed by Daniel Santamaría,²⁹ this was the classic 'triangular' trade of the Andean world in which Potosí, as one of the major centres of coca consumption, as well as a place where access to cash was relatively easy, formed a vertex. Without doubt, the point of production was situated in the Intendancy of La Paz, where 95 per cent of the coca that entered Potosí originated (see Appendix). Nevertheless,

one must distinguish between the high-quality coca, or *gatera*, and that of inferior quality, called *mercadera*. While 86 per cent of the former arrived with *guías* issued in the city of La Paz, the latter shows a clear predominance of *guías* issued by the tax collector's offices near the production zones in the district of Chulumani.

This implies, at least in the case of the inferior coca, a possible direct link between the Indian producer and the mining market. Table 11 suggests, however, that this was not the case. For different levels of traders the average number of baskets per operation varied between 226 and 12. Herbert Klein has calculated that in 1796 in the district of Chulumani the average yearly production, taken as an average of the sum of three annual harvests, was 12.8 baskets per *yanacona*, and 18.5 baskets per tributary in the *ayllus*, or agricultural communities.³⁰ To conclude, it appears, therefore, that practically all the coca import operations into Potosí exceeded the level of an individual producer trading his own crop.

The 259 individuals involved in coca transactions were almost 35 per cent of the total merchants trading in Potosí during the year. Of these, only three were large traders who seldom entered into the coca market but did so with operations of high average value, which doubled the general average of coca transactions. This did not have a significant effect on the total of their commercial earnings — 2.9 per cent — nor on the total value of the coca traded on the market — 2.5 per cent.

On the other hand, more than 40 per cent of all the medium-sized merchants dealt in coca, which represented more than 80 per cent of their yearly earnings. This group, less than one-third of the coca traders, was responsible for almost 65 per cent of the shipments in the category. The overwhelming majority within this group belonged to the level of traders who dealt with more than 1,000 and less than 3,162 pesos a year, with two shipments of coca on different dates (see Tables 5 and 6). Their average operation, 160 baskets, implied a significant mobilisation of men and animals for transport. The small traders, two-thirds of the coca dealers in Potosí, accounted for one-third of the values traded. Their dedication to the coca trade was almost total — 94.8 per cent. It should be emphasised that, according to the data, only 6 of the 113 merchants who qualified as occasional traders made any coca shipments.

In total value traded, the group that follows wine, aguardiente and coca is that of textiles. The focus of these comments will be on three textile products — the *ropas de la tierra* (domestic clothing), the *tocuyos* (crude cotton cloth), and *bayetas* (flannel) — which include 187 of the 224 textile transactions, occupying 3rd, 10th and 12th place in the general statistics of the *efectos de la tierra* (see Table 10).

While the definition of the coarse cotton cloths (the crude weaves of cotton supplied traditionally by Cochabamba to Potosí) is clear, the dis-

inction between *ropas de la tierra* and *bayetas* is much less satisfactory. These woollen weaves presented a great variety of qualities, distinguished sometimes by name and sometimes by price. The criteria used by the officials of the different customs houses did not always coincide, so that what was authorised to leave a city as *bayeta* could be regarded as *ropa de la tierra* at another destination or vice versa. However, the dominant criterion in the Royal Customs House of Potosí can be deduced from the Appendix. The data on the geographical origin by means of place of issue of the *guías* suggest that the *ropas de la tierra* were, in general, manufactured products from Cuzco, the region that shipped 92 per cent of that category. The *bayetas*, on the other hand, came directly from La Paz or by way of Oruro, accounting for a total of 87.9 per cent to which 9.6 per cent that entered without *guías* should, perhaps, be added. The *tocuyos* came, without doubt, from the Cochabamba region. To the 90.5 per cent that entered with waybills from that region, a further 8.3 per cent, shipped without *guías*, should be added.

The average operation in *ropa de la tierra* was, as has been mentioned, more than four times the average market operation, although with a relative variability of around 1 (see Table 10). Table 12 confirms that the degree of concentration of the trade was even greater than in wines and aguardiente. Five large merchants were responsible for 63.2 per cent of the total value traded, while 22 medium-sized merchants account for the other 36 per cent, with minuscule percentages for small merchants and occasional traders. In contrast to wine and aguardiente, in which merchants were involved to the almost total exclusion of all other products, *ropa de la tierra* represented only 33 per cent of the trade of the large merchants and 53 per cent of the medium-sized traders. For all of them, the category which most frequently entered with clothing was sugar produced in the same region of Cuzco.

The *bayeta* trade offers the perfect reverse side of the coin to *ropa de la tierra*. Its relationship to the average operation of the market is 0.18 as opposed to a quotient of 4.08 for *ropa de la tierra* (see Table 10). Table 11 shows that 81.8 per cent of the trade was in the hands of small merchants, whose degree of specialisation — 61.6 per cent — suggests that it is among these that the recognised association between coca and *bayetas* becomes apparent. The price of the *bayetas*, it should be stressed, was 45 per cent lower than the average for *ropa de la tierra* and, therefore, the difference in total negotiated values of both products (8,380 and 122,872 pesos respectively) is much less when measured in quantities of cloth (45,695 and 371,483 *varas* respectively).

Using both the statistics prepared by Intendant Viedma for the year 1793, and Brooke Larson's study, it is possible to verify that Potosí absorbed 28.7 per cent of the *tocuyos* shipped from the Intendancy of Cochabamba.³¹ The average operation in *tocuyos*, with a quotient of 0.40 compared with the general average, was much closer to that of the

bayetas than of *ropa de la tierra* (see Table 10). The relative variability that affected the average was high — 1.44 — given that, as Table 14 shows, large, medium and small merchants participated heavily in this trade. The single large merchant, González de Socasa, with only two operations, shipped 22.5 per cent of the total, while four medium-sized merchants traded 30.7 per cent. The control of more than 50 per cent of the trade by five merchants tallies well with the findings of Brooke Larson concerning the shortage of pack animals after 1781 and the control that, as a result, some transport monopolists were able to exert on the Cochabamba trade.³² Nonetheless, the data reveal that more than 40 per cent of the commerce was in the hands of small merchants with a high degree of specialisation in trading *tocuyos*.

Indian participation in the urban market

A quantitative study of Indian participation in colonial markets is hampered considerably by legislation which exempted the indigenous traders from payment of the *alcabala*. Whenever this exemption was applied, the import tax registers — the most complete and detailed source for the investigation of commercial transactions in the colony — provide no information at all about the Indians and their trading connection. It appears to be a much more complicated matter. It involves not only recognised disparities between juridical order and socio-economic reality in colonial Spanish America, but also evidence of discrepancies in criteria applied in specific cases, especially in the 18th century when increasing revenue was the dominant preoccupation of the Crown and its representatives.

A current study of the *alcabalas* in New Spain in the 18th century starts by assuming that their exemption was effective. In spite of this conviction, the authors point to 'situations in which practice implied an ignorance, if not total, at least partial, of the rule of exemption'. Of particular interest are those cases in which 'the Indians were obliged to pay the *alcabala* on determined products, not because they originated in Castile, but simply because they were wholesale traders'.³³ Fiscal concerns are made evident when, in New Spain during 1791, the administrators of the import tax received an order to check 'the fruits and products introduced by the Indians' in order to evaluate the loss that the exemption represented for the Royal treasury. As a consequence, in the village of Tepeaca, Intendancy of Puebla, in 1792 a process was initiated of registering Indian entries that were presented voluntarily. Those inscribed represented 16.4 per cent of the trade that paid the *alcabala*. The *alcabala* administrator estimated that the value of all the Indian transactions could be double that which was voluntarily presented for registration.³⁴

On January 30, 1779, *visitador general* José Antonio de Areche decreed the suspension of the exemption in the viceroalties of Peru and the Río

de la Plata. Areche noted that the original exemption included the clause 'for now' and that, two centuries later, the moment had come to increase Crown revenues by means of abolishing the tax privilege. However, the Council of the Indies rejected the initiative in its resolutions of June 22 and July 13, 1787.³⁵ At the Aduana in Lima, the city from which Areche acted, the decree of 1779 was never applied; in 1780 the Indians were exempted from the *alcabala*, although the Customs Administrator forced them to declare their shipments in detail.

This trade registered up to 3 per cent of the annual total.³⁶ In Cerro de Pasco, a quarter of a century later, the exempt Indian trade was still controlled through 'waybill pardons' which differed from the usual customs *guía* in that they not only identified the merchandise and its carrier but also verified the merchandise as free from the *alcabala*.³⁷

It is especially interesting to consider the possibility that Areche's decree suspending the exemption could have been applied in Potosí. In that year, 1779, Jorge Escobedo, governor of the Royal City and Areche's future successor as *visitador general*, put into effect a new institution conceived as a fundamental instrument for increasing federal revenues. Only four months after the promulgation of Areche's decree, he established the Royal Customs House of Potosí which took charge of the collection of the *alcabalas* from June 1779 onwards. The possibility that the exemption for Indians might be suspended as part of the initial measures included in establishing the Customs House receives indirect support from other sources. In fact, Areche and Escobedo discussed the lifting of other exemptions to the *alcabala* in their correspondence of 1779 and 1780. It was in this manner that exemptions for livestock products such as jerked meat, cured meat, suet, etc. were abolished.

A more significant case is that of the three other products — coal, firewood and salt — which enjoyed the exemption as mining inputs, whose eventual taxation could have represented an increase for the Royal Treasury of around 40 per cent of collections made up to that point (see Table 2). This project was not put into practice because of the opposition of Escobedo, who was worried about possible protests in the city. What is noteworthy, however, is not only the search for means to trim the exemptions, but also that in 1780 there was no consideration of the difficulty represented by the fact, evident to contemporaries, that the trade and production in question was absolutely monopolised by the Indians who came to Potosí.³⁸ The obvious hypothesis is that Areche's decree was applied in Potosí and that the later resolutions of the Council of the Indies did not reverse the situation. In addition, as has been stated above, the information gathered on more than 40,000 transactions subject to the payment of the *alcabala* in the Royal Customs of Potosí between 1779 and 1810 presents an abundance of Indian patronymics (even without counting the dubious cases) which leads to the conclusion that the exemption was not applied.³⁹ The source systematically includes the reference

to merchandise shipped for the personal consumption of the Indian traders and required to pay the *alcabala*. The most common case was that of coca traders who, in addition to the bulk of their cargo, declared an additional basket for 'their consumption' which was then included in the total subject to the tax payment.

In fact, the Indians from Upper Peru were not only subject to the payment of the *alcabala* on their trade, but were sometimes liable to charges that only they had to pay in order to engage in commerce. Let us hear from some of the plaintiffs:

'We, Pedro Gaspar Mamani, Nicolás Coca, Xavier Portugal, Basilio Iugra, Diego Anco and Diego Ari, Indians who are natives of the Aylo Chayantacas in the District of Chayant, and now resident in this city [La Plata] ... declare that, needing to maintain our growing families and to fulfil our obligations to the Royal tributes, contemplating at the same time the small return earned from our labours, have undertaken for years the ridiculous trade from the city of La Paz to this one with a little coca and *bayetas*, products which because of their small quantity and the cost of their transportation, hardly yield enough for our subsistence, and also other obligations such as paying for the renovations in this city, paying for altars at Corpus Christi and other small but frequent contributions with which we are burdened in our town ...'⁴⁰

The Indians resident in La Plata who made this declaration in February of 1797 were appealing against the increase of one to three pesos in the contribution they paid towards the cost of bullfights during Carnival. They detail with great care how in their village they complied with their tax duties while in La Plata they contributed to the collective obligations of the whole commercial community; but what they called into question was the amount of a special payment that only they, as merchants as well as Indians, had to pay. The result of the petition was favourable and the tax was maintained at one peso. Ten years later, in 1808, the issue resurfaced. The most well-to-do among the Indian merchants then asked for a total exemption from the charge. They argued that they were 'true merchants' and as such rotated with other merchants in covering the cost of the Feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe. The Audiencia asked the local Junta de Comercio its opinion; the deputy turned to the Buenos Aires Consulado, worried about the implications of 'this incident which, without a doubt, would constitute a general rule for all other districts of this viceroyalty and ... all individuals of Commerce would certainly be sorry to find themselves classed together with those who, whatever their merits in actively supplying the towns, are, nevertheless, socially inferior.'⁴¹

In Buenos Aires it is Juan Larrea, syndic of the Consulado, who expresses his certainty that 'the *naturales* upon whom the petition falls are true merchants, by the type of contracts, by the extension of their money and the quality of the goods which circulate in their negotiations'. The Indians finally saw themselves freed of the discriminatory charge.⁴² But, as the deputy of commerce from Chuquisaca suggested, this was not an

isolated incident. During the whole process of organisation of the Consulados and their delegations, along with the parallel effort to register all the merchants of the Río de la Plata, there appeared obstacles of a similar nature. Oruro, for example, figured in 1804 in the list of cities in which registration was not carried out, so as not to include 'half breeds and Indians'.⁴³

We have seen how the information from Potosí in the 1804 list of merchants was corrupted by the effort to emphasise the importance of the larger merchants and deny a role to the multitude of *mestizo* and Indian traders who operated in the city. The study of the import taxes of 1793 reveals yet another distortion of a document, one that was imperceptible given its appearance of statistical precision. In this document, 'The State of Commerce of Potosí', prepared for the oft-cited Indalecio González de Socasa, it is affirmed that the annual turnover of wines and aguardiente was 1,123,000 pesos while that of coca totalled 106,000 pesos. From the vantage point of the producing regions, Kendall Brown and Herbert Klein have already expressed their doubts about these figures.⁴⁴ The data now under analysis yields the following figures: 274,580 pesos for wines and aguardiente and 234,933 for coca (see Table 7). González de Socasa, therefore, had multiplied more than four times the values of the principal trade of landowners and large merchants, while reducing to less than half the amount of trade in which, as he himself had said, 'the most involved are the Indians' (see page 13).

This quantitative analysis of the market of Potosí in 1793 confirms that the colonial system articulated its own version of the dynamics between colonies and metropolis through trade relations generated inside the American economic sphere by its dominant producing sectors. In particular, the massive participation of Indian and *mestizo* merchants in the urban market throws new light on the complex phenomena of colonial commercialisation. The market is thereby seen not only for its effects in disarticulating the Andean economies and societies, but also in its less recognised aspect: the market 'space' was, also, a generator of positive responses on the part of indigenous individuals and groups that were able to develop within it strategies of survival and even defence of their communities.

NOTES

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1. C.S. Assadourian, *El sistema de la economía colonial. Mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico* (Lima, 1982).
2. The data on the *alcabala* in Potosí for 1793 were found in the Archivo General de la Nación (Buenos Aires), XIII 7-1-3, Libros 2 & 3.
3. The table dated 1794 was published in the *Telégrafo Mercantil* (Buenos Aires) 19 September 1801; Marie Helmer summarised a manuscript copy which is to be found in the Archivo General de Indias (Seville), 'Documents pour l'histoire économique de l'Amérique du Sud: Commerce et industrie au Pérou à la fin du XVIIIe siècle', *Revista de Indias*, X, 41 (July-September, 1950), pp.519-526. The document was later reproduced in María del Carmen Cortés Salinas, 'Una polémica en torno a la mita de Potosí a fines del siglo XVIII', *Revista de Indias*, XXX, 119-122 (January-December, 1970), pp.131-215. A slightly different version dated Potosí, 26 November 1795 was published in Archivo General de la Nación, *Consulado de Buenos Aires. Antecedentes – Actas – Documentos* Vol.1 (Buenos Aires, 1936), pp.522-525. Yet another version, signed by González de Socasa and Manuel de Bulucua on 25 September 1801 in Potosí, can be found in the Archivo General de la Nación (Buenos Aires), Manuscritos de la Biblioteca Nacional, 307, 5024.
4. Our calculations are based on 'Certificación del Administrador de la Real Aduana, Potosí, 22-4-22; Archivo General de Indias (Seville), Charcas, 699.
5. Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias, Libro VIII, Título XIII; Reglamento de la Aduana de Lima, 1773, cap.2; C.J. Díaz Rementería, 'Aproximación al estudio de un privilegio del indio: la exención de la alcabala', *Historia, Instituciones, Documentos* (Universidad de Sevilla, 1984).
6. C.S. Assadourian, 'La producción de la mercancía dinero en la formación del mercado interno colonial: El caso del espacio peruano, siglo XVI', in Enrique Florescano (ed.), *Ensayos sobre el desarrollo económico de México y América Latina (1500–1975)*, (México, 1979), p.233.

7. J. Fisher, 'Imperial "Free Trade" and the Hispanic Economy, 1778-1796', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol.13 (May, 1981), pp.21-56; E. Tandeter and N. Wachtel, 'Conjonctures inverses. Le mouvement des prix à Potosí pendant le XVIIIe siècle', *Annales E.S.C.*, 3 (May-June, 1983), pp.550-554.
8. M. Jiménez de la Espada, *Relaciones geográficas de Indias: Perú* (Madrid, 1881-1885), Vol.I, p.134.
9. J.F. Wibel, 'The evolution of a regional community within Spanish Empire and Peruvian Nation: Arequipa, 1780-1845', unpublished doctoral thesis (Stanford University, 1975), p.81.
10. E. Tandeter, 'La rente comme rapport de production et comme rapport de distribution: Le cas de l'industrie minière de Potosí, 1750-1826', unpublished doctoral thesis, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris, 1980).
11. M. Chocano M., *Comercio en Cerro de Pasco a fines de la época colonial* (Lima, 1982), pp.18-19.
12. Assadourian, 'La producción de la mercancía ...'; P.J. Bakewell, 'Registered silver production in the Potosí district, 1550-1735', *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas*, 12 (Köln, 1975), p.94.
13. Our calculations are based on materials from the records of the Royal Mint deposited in the Archivo Histórico de Potosí.
14. See note 10 above.
15. 'Idea del comercio del Perú', Mss. Egerton, 771, British Museum (London); *Mercurio Peruano*, Lima, I, 24 March 1791.
16. B. Larson, 'Economic decline and social change in an agrarian hinterland: Cochabamba (Bolivia) in the late colonial period', unpublished doctoral thesis (Columbia University, 1978), p.441.
17. G. Tjarks, 'Panorama del comercio interno del virreinato del Río de la Plata en sus postrimerías', *Humanidades*, XXXVI (La Plata, 1960), p.48.
18. The objective was to construct a distribution of frequencies of the merchants classified in accordance with the value of their operations. It was recognised that this variable presented a marked asymmetry to the right, a situation which must be taken into account in the determination of class weight. The methodology used was the following:
 1. From the listing of the merchants ranked according to decreasing values of the variable, the value of the tenth merchant was systematically taken from a selected random starting-point between 1 and 10.
 2. With the sample obtained by this method, using data analysis techniques we proceeded to look for a transformation that would lead to a more symmetrical distribution, and the transformation chosen was the decimal logarithm of the variable that led to the limits expressed in the table.
 3. Note that the transformation used led to the forming of classes which could be defined conceptually by saying that the included values in one class are triple those of the preceding one.
19. Archivo General de la Nación (Buenos Aires), XIII, 25-9-2.
20. D.J. Santamaría, 'La participación indígena en la producción y comercio de coca, Alto Perú 1780-1810' (mimeo); and K.M. Brown, 'The economic and

fiscal structure of eighteenth-century Arequipa', unpublished doctoral thesis (Duke University, 1979).

21. M. Salas de Coloma, 'Crisis en desfase en el centro-sur del virreinato peruano: minería y manufactura textil'; paper presented to the Economic History Commission of the National Congress of Historical Research (Lima, 1984).
22. The quotient between columns (2) and (6) of the table expresses this relationship by virtue of the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \frac{\% \text{ item's total value}}{\% \text{ item operations}} \\
 = & \frac{\% \text{ item's total value}}{\% \text{ item operations}} \\
 = & \frac{100 \times \text{item's total value}}{100 \times \text{item operations}} \\
 = & \frac{\text{total item value}}{\text{total operations}} \\
 = & \frac{\text{total value}}{\text{total operations}} \\
 = & \frac{\text{average value for operation of item}}{\text{average value for operation of market}}
 \end{aligned}$$

23. The polarisation among these three items, or those similar, was even more accentuated that year in the Cochabamba market, where the quotients were 0.67 for coca, 4.25 for *aguardiente* and 6.82 for *obraje bayeta*. (Our calculations are based on materials kindly provided by Brooke Larson.)
24. M. Brown, 'Viticulture and the Bourbon Reforms in late eighteenth-century Peru', paper presented to the 44th International Congress of Americanists (Manchester, 1982), pp.4-5.
25. Wibel, 'The evolution of a regional community ...'; Brown, 'The economic and fiscal structure ...', pp.108-113.
26. Brown, 'The economic and fiscal structure ...', p.108.
27. R. Choque Canqui, 'Los caciques aymaras y el comercio en el Alto Perú' (mimeo).
28. Archivo General de la Nación (Buenos Aires), Manuscritos de la Biblioteca Nacional, 307, 5024.
29. D.J. Santamaría, 'La participación indígena ...'
30. H.B. Klein, 'Haciendas y ayllus en el Alto Perú durante el siglo XVIII; estudio demográfico de la población aymara en los distritos de Chulumani y Pacajes en 1786', *Desarrollo Económico*, Vol.15, 59 (October-December, 1975), p.440.
31. Larson, 'Economic decline ...', p.441.
32. *Ibid*, pp.260-261.
33. J.C. Garavaglia and J.C. Grosso, 'Consideraciones sobre las alcabalas de Nueva España' (mimeo), pp.31-32 and 34.
34. J.C. Garavaglia and J.C. Grosso, 'La villa de Tepeaca a fines del período colonial: un mercado local en el valle poblano', Centro de Investigaciones

Históricas y Sociales, Instituto de Ciencias (Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 1984) (mimeo).

35. Díaz Rementería, 'Aproximación al estudio ...'
36. Our calculations are based on Archivo General de Indias (Lima) 1219; Archivo General de Indias (Lima) 1181; J.J. Tepaske and H.S. Klein, *The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America*, Vol.1, Peru (Durham, 1982), pp.383-384.
37. Chocano, 'Comercio en Cerro de Pasco ...', pp.29-30.
38. For all of this paragraph, see British Museum (London), Add. Ms., 13893, *passim*.
39. Xavier Albó has indicated the distinction between Andean patronymics and cases considered dubious for a variety of reasons. (Personal communication.)
40. Archivo Nacional de Bolivia (Sucre), Audiencia 1797, No.37, f. 1.
41. Archivo General de la Nación (Buenos Aires), IX 4-6-13, F. s. 163-217.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Tjarks, 'Panorama del comercio ...', p.48.
44. H.S. Klein, 'The impact of the crisis in nineteenth-century mining on regional economies. The example of the Bolivian Yungas, 1786-1838', in D.J. Robinson (ed.), *Social Fabric and Spatial Structure in Colonial Latin America* (Ann Arbor, 1979), p.316, n. 2; Brown, 'The economic and fiscal structure ...', p.101, n. 44.

TABLES

Table 1. Import operations subject to *alcabala* payment, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Type of Goods	Value	% w/o total value	No. of operations	% w/o total operations	Average value
Efectos de Castilla & mixed	685,646	45	103	7	6,657
Efectos de la tierra	852,558	55	1,475	93	578
Totals	1,538,204	100	1,578	100	

Table 2. Total imports to Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

	Efectos de la tierra	Efectos de Castilla	Totals
<u>Goods paying alcabala</u>	852,558 (55%)	685,646 (45%)	1,538,204 (100%) 35%
<u>Goods exempt from alcabala</u>			
Potatoes, frozen dried potatoes, ocas	375,000		
Corn	750,000		
Wheat	360,000		
Table salt	30,000		
Barley & other grains	200,000		
Cows	200,000		
Mining salt	300,000		
Firewood & coal	300,000		
Wood for mining	25,000		
Mercury		292,000	
Iron for mining		75,000	2,807,000 65%
	<u>3,292,558</u> 76%	<u>1,052,646</u> 24%	<u>4,345,204</u> 100%

Sources: See note 2 and Enrique Tandeter, 'La rente comme rapport de production et comme rapport de distribution: Le cas de l'industrie minière de Potosí, 1750-1826', unpublished doctoral thesis, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris, 1980).

Table 3. Imports of *efectos de Castilla* and mixed goods, according to *alcabala* waybills, 1793 (pesos)

Waybills from:	Total value	%	No. of operations	%	Average Value
Buenos Aires	517,168	75.4	82	79.6	6,307
Arica	137,357	20.0	9	8.7	15,262
Salta	24,781	3.6	6	5.8	4,130
Jujuy	2,464	0.4	2	1.9	1,232
Sorata	1,507	0.2	1	1.0	1,507
Arica-Oruro	1,151	0.2	1	1.0	1,151
Cochabamba	1,125	0.2	1	1.0	1,125
Moquegua	93	0.0	1	1.0	93
	685,646	(100)	103	(100)	

Table 4. Imports of efectos de la tierra, according to alcabala waybills, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Waybills from:	Total Value	%	No. of operations	%	Average Value
Int. Arequipa	277,721	32.5	215	14.6	1,292
Int. La Paz	241,526	28.3	414	28.1	583
Int. Cuzco	146,257	17.1	98	6.6	1,492
Int. La Plata	43,078	5.0	136	9.2	317
Int. Salta	22,030	2.6	61	4.1	361
Int. Cochabamba	17,457	2.0	88	6.0	198
Int. Buenos Aires	21,589	2.5	5	0.3	4,318
Int. Lima	6,718	0.8	19	1.3	354
Int. Potosí	5,394	0.6	16	1.1	337
Int. Córdoba	1,132	0.1	2	0.1	566
Int. Puno	180	0.0	1	0.1	180
Without waybills	69,476	8.1	420	28.5	165
Totals	852,558	(100)	1,475	(100)	

Table 5. Statistics on merchants by total values, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Range of Value	No. of merchants	% Merchants w/o total	% Operations w/o total	% Value w/o total
100,000 to 316,228	1	0.13	1.77	8.84
31,622 to 99,999	6	0.81	6.07	22.75
10,000 to 31,621	19	2.56	6.40	23.56
3,162 to 9,999	51	6.86	11.75	18.9
1,000 to 3,161	131	17.63	20.46	14.54
316 to 999	218	29.34	23.08	8.45
100 to 315	204	27.46	21.13	2.67
32 to 99	101	13.59	7.61	0.35
1 to 31	12	1.61	0.79	-
	743	99.99	99.06	100.06

Table 6. Average of number and value of operations by merchant and relative variability, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Range of value	Number of operations		Value of operations	
	Average per merchant	Relative variability	Average per operation	Relative Variability
100.000 to 316.228	28	-	4,854.69	-
31.622 to 99.999	16	0.88	3,645.39	2.22
10.000 to 31.621	5.32	0.81	3,590.79	0.94
3.162 to 9.999	3.63	0.76	1,572.67	0.77
1.000 to 3.161	2.47	9.82	689.37	0.76
316 to 999	1.69	0.70	351.96	0.65
100 to 315	1.16	0.61	114.18	0.58
32 to 99	1.23	0.46	53.67	0.40
1 to 32	1.08	0.30	21.52	0.27

Table 7. Operations in *efectos de la tierra*, ranked according to total values, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Goods categories	Value	%	% w/o total value
Aguardientes & wine	274,580	32.2	17.85
Coca	235,543	27.6	15.31
Textiles	148,948	17.4	9.66
Foodstuffs	104,713	12.3	6.79
Slaughterhouse products	33,818	4.0	2.18
Minerals & metals	20,316	2.4	1.33
Various	16,439	1.9	1.06
Animals	7,513	0.9	0.49
Hides	6,138	0.7	0.40
Fibres	4,386	0.5	0.29
Wax	212	0.0	0.01
Totals	852,606	(100)	55,37

Table 8. Operations in *efectos de la tierra*, ranked according to frequency, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Goods categories	No. of operations	%	% w/o total operations
Coca	361	24.5	22.87
Foodstuffs	281	19.0	17.75
Textiles	224	15.2	14.16
Aguardientes & wine	213	14.4	13.49
Slaughterhouse products	194	13.1	12.27
Various	68	4.6	4.30
Minerals & metals	44	3.0	2.79
Hides	39	2.6	2.46
Fibres	36	2.4	2.28
Animals	13	0.9	0.81
Wax	2	0.1	0.13
Totals	1,475	(100)	93.31

Table 9. Operations in *efectos de la tierra*, Potosí, Cochabamba & Cerro de Pasco, 1733-1798

	Potosí 1733 %	Potosí 1793 %	Cochabamba 1793 %	Cerro de Pasco 1792, 1793, 1796, 1798 %
Aguardiente	21.4	30.6	23.4	55.8
Textiles	32.5	17.4	19.9	11.0
Yerba	13.3	2.7	-	0.2
Coca	9.0	27.8	14.9	3.2
Wine	5.1(*)	1.7	3.4	3.9
Others	18.7	19.7	38.4	25.9
	100	100	100	100

(*) Includes tobacco. Sources: J.C. Garavaglia, 'El mercado interno y la yerba mate (siglos XVI-XIX)', *Nova Americana*, 4 (Turin, 1981), pp. 199-200; colonial sample of the alcabalas in Cochabamba in 1793 generously provided by Brooke Larson; M. Chocano, *Comercio en Cerro de Pasco a fines de la época colonial* (Lima, 1982), p. 74.

Table 10. Operations in efectos de la tierra, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Goods	Value (1)	% w/o total value efectos de la tierra (2)	Average Value (3)	Coefficient of relative variability (4)	Number of Operations (5)	% w/o total operations (6)	(2) (6)
Aguardiente	258,954	30.6	1,726	0.71	150	10.2	3.00
Coca	235,543	27.8	656	1.07	361	24.6	1.12
Ropa de la tierra	122,872	14.5	2,275	0.96	54	3.6	4.08
Sugar	31,105	3.6	819	0.81	38	2.5	1.46
Aji	28,874	3.4	278	0.93	104	7.0	0.48
Verba	23,130	2.7	2,891	1.02	8	0.5	5.62
Fat & tallow	18,140	2.1	2,219	1.43	83	5.6	0.37
Copper	17,625	2.0	463	1.31	38	2.5	0.80
Wine	15,625	1.8	248	1.15	63	4.3	0.41
Tocuyos	13,693	1.6	232	1.44	59	4.0	0.40
Cecina and charque	9,488	1.1	158	1.55	60	4.0	0.25
Bayetas	8,380	0.9	113	1.02	74	5.0	0.18
Mules	7,339	0.8	667	0.44	11	0.7	1.14
Añil	6,850	0.8	3,425	0.92	2	0.1	8.00
Honey	5,779	0.6	148	0.71	39	2.6	0.23
Oil	4,528	0.5	566	0.65	8	0.5	1.00
Various	4,404	0.5	294	0.75	15	1.0	0.50
Cotton	4,106	0.4	124	0.67	33	2.2	0.18
Skins	2,952	0.3	268	0.67	11	0.7	0.42
Fish	2,858	0.3	94	1.23	30	2.0	0.15
Tin	2,692	0.3	448	0.70	6	0.4	0.75
Soap	2,618	0.3	90	1.24	29	1.9	0.15
Leather soles	2,575	0.3	151	0.76	17	1.1	0.27
Grana or Magno	2,452	0.2	408	0.53	6	0.4	0.50
Chocolate	2,280	0.2	2,280	-	1	0.0	0.00
	834,832	(97.9)			1,300	(88.1)	

Table 11. Operations in coca, ranked according to merchant group, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Value traded	Merchants No.	Operations %	No. of operations	Avg. No. of operations	Value	Avg. value per operation (%)	Total value traded	Value coca/traded (%)	Baskets of coca (Quantities)	Baskets per operation	Avg. price per Basket			
10,000 to 316,228	3	1.2	4	1.1	1.3	5,781	2.5	1,445	198,389	2.9	906	2.4	226	6.38
1,000 to 9,999	77	29.7	148	41	1.9	150,667	63.9	1,018	180,019	83.7	23,728	63.3	160	6.35
100 to 999	173	66.8	203	56.2	1.1	78,677	33.4	387	82,999	94.8	12,759	34.0	63	6.16
1 to 99	6	2.3	6	1.7	1	417	0.2	70	476	87.8	73	0.2	12	5.72
Totals	259 (100)	361 (100)	1.4	235,543 (100)	652	461,883	51	37,466	(100)	104	6.28			

Table 12. Operations in *ropa de la tierra*, ranked according to merchant group, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Value traded	Merchants No.	Operations %	Avg. no. of operations	Value	Avg. value per operation (%)	Total value traded	Value of Ropa de la tierra/la tierra traded (%)	Varas of Ropa de la tierra (Quantities)	Varas per operation	Avg. price per assess. per vara				
10,000 to 316,228	5	15.6	22	40.7	4.4	77,598	63.2	3,527	233,197	33.3	223,668	60.2	10,167	0.35
1,000 to 9,999	22	68.7	26	48.1	1.1	44,277	36.0	1,703	83,612	53	142,565	38.4	5,483	0.31
100 to 999	4	12.5	5	9.3	1.2	913	0.7	182	2,088	43.7	4,800	1.3	960	0.19
1 to 99	1	3.1	1	1.9	1	84	0.1	84	84	100	450	0.1	450	0.19
Totals	32	(100)	54	(100)	1.7	122,872	(100)	2,275	318,531	38.6	371,483	(100)	6,879	0.33

Table 13. Operations in *bayetas* ranked according to merchant group, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Value traded	Merchants No.	Operations No.	Operations %	Avg. No. of operations	Value	Avg. value	Total value traded	Value bayetas/ Value traded	Varas of bayetas (Quantities)	Varas per operation	Avg. price per assess. per vara			
				(%)		(%)		(%)						
10,000 to 316,228	1	2	1	1.3	1	156	1.9	156	47,362	0.3	500	1.1	500	0.31
1,000 to 9,999	4	8	4	5.4	1	832	9.9	208	8,154	10.2	4,360	9.5	1,090	0.19
100 to 999	34	68	58	78.4	1.7	6,856	81.8	118	11,119	61.6	37,095	81.2	639	0.18
1 to 99	11	22	11	14.9	1	536	6.4	49	610	87.9	3,740	8.2	340	0.14
Totals	50 (100)	74 (100)	74 (100)	1.5	8,380 (100)	113	67,245 (100)	12.5	45,695 (100)	618	0.18			

Table 14. Operations in *tocuyos* ranked according to merchant group, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Value traded	Merchants No.	Operations % No.	Avg. No. of operations	Value	Avg. value per operation (%)	Total value traded	Value traded (%)	Varas of <i>tocuyos</i> (Quantities)	Varas per operation	Avg. price per assess. per vara	
10,000 to 316,228	1	2.8	2	3,081	22.5	1,540	2.3	14,390	20.9	7,195	0.21
1,000 to 9,999	4	11.1	10	4,204	30.7	420	36.4	20,564	29.9	2,056	0.20
100 to 999	18	50	34	5,670	41.4	167	7,079	29,889	43.4	879	0.19
1 to 99	13	36.1	13	738	5.4	57	858	3,944	5.7	303	0.19
Totals	36	(100)	59	13,693	(100)	232	155,420	68,787	(100)	1,166	0.20

APPENDIX

Entries of some products according to waybills, Potosí, 1793 (pesos)

Aguardientes

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
Moquegua	212.859	82.0	102	68.0
Locumba	13.248	5.0	10	7.0
Locumba - Moquegua	6.860	3.0	3	2.0
Ilabaya - Moquegua	2.820	1.0	1	0.6
Ilabaya	2.400	0.9	1	0.6
Arequipa	2.280	0.9	2	1.0
Tacna	063	0.0	1	1.0
<u>TOTAL INT. AREQUIPA</u>	240.530	93.0	120	80.0
Cinti	13.155	5.0	22	14.0
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PLATA</u>	13.155	5.0	22	14.0
Sica-Sica	2.235	0.8	3	2.0
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PAZ</u>	2.235	0.8	3	2.0
Salta	1.890	0.7	2	1.0
Jujuy	512	0.2	1	0.6
<u>TOTAL INT. SALTA</u>	2.402	0.9	3	2.0
Tupiza	442	0.1	1	0.6
<u>TOTAL INT. POTOSÍ</u>	442	0.1	1	0.6
<u>TOTAL WITHOUT WAYBILLS</u>	192	0.07	1	0.6
<u>TOTALS</u>	258.956	(100)	150	(100)

Coca gatera

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
La Paz	171.295	82.5	233	85.3
Chulumani	3.185	1.5	6	2.2
Irupana	16.718	8.0	7	2.5
Pacallo	832	0.4	5	1.8
Suri	4.251	2.0	2	0.7
Yanacachi	1.176	0.6	3	1.1
Irupana-Oruro- Sora-Sora	1.794	0.9	1	0.4
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PAZ</u>	199.251	96.0	257	94.
Oruro	5.956	2.8	9	3.2
Sora-Sora	455	2.2	1	0.4
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PLATA</u>	6.411	5.0	10	3.6
Cochabamba	1.380	0.6	4	1.5
<u>TOTAL INT. COCHABAMBA</u>	1.380	0.6	4	1.5
<u>WITHOUT WAYBILLS</u>	539	0.2	2	0.7
<u>TOTALS</u>	207.581	(100)	273	(100)

Coca mercadera

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
La Paz	2.172	7.8	4	4.5
Chulumani	17.353	62.0	48	54.5
Ocobaya	660	2.4	3	3.4
Pacallo	3.472	12.4	15	17.0
Suri	150	0.5	1	1.1
Yanacachi	2.050	7.3	11	12.5
Clisa-Irupana	240	0.8	1	1.1
Chulumani-Ocobaya	235	0.8	1	1.1
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PAZ</u>	26.332	94.0	84	95.2
Oruro	1.600	5.7	3	3.4
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PLATA</u>	1.600	5.7	3	3.4
<u>WITHOUT WAYBILLS</u>	030	0.1	1	1.1
TOTALS	27.962	(100)	88	(100)

Ropa

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
Cuzco	23.909	19.4	12	22.2
Accha	11.360	9.3	5	9.2
Quispicanchis	3.166	2.57	2	3.7
Urcos	6.183	5.0	2	3.7
Oropesa	19.328	15.7	4	7.4
Paruro	8.569	7.0	4	7.4
Chamaca	1.773	1.4	1	1.8
Livitaca	11.532	9.3	4	7.4
Quiquijana	768	0.6	1	1.8
Sicuani	1.517	1.2	1	1.8
Cuzco-Livitaca-Oruro	9.084	7.39	2	3.7
Accha-Cuzco	4.160	3.38	2	3.7
Cuzco-Oropesa	1.797	1.46	1	1.8
Oropesa-Pumachaca- Oruro	9.872	8.0	1	1.8
<u>TOTAL INT. CUZCO</u>	113.018	92.0	42	77.4
Oruro	3.000	2.4	2	3.7
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PLATA</u>	3.000	2.4	2	3.7
La Paz	2.247	1.8	8	14.8
Irupana-Oruro- Zora-Zora	509	0.4	1	1.8
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PAZ</u>	2.756	2.2	9	16.6
Huancarqui	4.098	3.4	1	1.8
<u>TOTAL INT. AREQUIPA</u>	4.098	3.4	1	1.8
<u>TOTALS</u>	122.872	(100)	54	(100)

THE MARKET OF POTOSÍ

Ají

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
Palpa	4.985	17.0	8	7.7
El Ingenio	580	2.0	2	2.0
Nazca	310	1.0	1	0.9
<u>TOTAL INT. LIMA</u>	5.875	20.0	11	10.6
Cuzco	50	0.2	1	0.9
Livitaca	2.630	9.0	3	2.9
<u>TOTAL INT. CUZCO</u>	2.680	9.2	4	3.8
Arica	1.085	3.8	2	2.0
Arequipa	7.735	26.8	3.3	31.7
Moquegua	630	2.1	2	2.0
<u>TOTAL INT. AREQUIPA</u>	9.450	32.7	37	35.7
La Paz	410	1.4	3	2.8
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PAZ</u>	410	1.4	3	2.8
Oruro	6.600	22.8	22	21.1
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PLATA</u>	6.600	22.8	22	21.1
<u>WITHOUT WAYBILLS</u>	3.859	13.3	27	26.0
<u>TOTALS</u>	28.874	(100)	104	(100)

Bayetas

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
Oruro	1.404	16.7	21	28.4
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PLATA</u>	1.404	16.7	21	28.4
La Paz	6.291	75.1	44	59.5
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PAZ</u>	6.291	75.1	44	59.5
Juliaca	180	2.1	1	1.3
<u>TOTAL INT. PUNO</u>	180	2.1	1	1.3
Cuzco	156	1.9	1	1.3
<u>TOTAL INT. CUZCO</u>	156	1.9	1	1.3
<u>WITHOUT WAYBILLS</u>	349	4.2	7	9.5
<u>TOTALS</u>	8.380	(100)	74	(100)

Yerba

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
Salta	609	2.6	1	12.5
Tucumán	437	1.9	1	12.5
<u>TOTAL INT. SALTA</u>	1.046	4.5	2	25.0
Córdoba	494	2.1	1	12.5
<u>TOTAL INT. CÓRDOBA</u>	494	2.1	1	12.5
Buenos Aires	21.590	93.3	5	62.5
<u>TOTAL INT. BUENOS AIRES</u>	21.590	93.3	5	62.5
<u>TOTALS</u>	23.130	(100)	8	(100)

THE MARKET OF POTOSÍ

Tocuyos

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
Cochabamba	12.147	88.7	37	62.7
Tapacari	28	0.2	1	1.7
Tarata	215	1.5	3	5.0
<u>TOTAL INT. COCHABAMBA</u>	12.390	90.4	41	69.4
Oruro	37	0.3	1	1.7
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PLATA</u>	37	0.3	1	1.7
La Paz	122	0.9	1	1.7
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PAZ</u>	122	0.9	1	1.7
<u>WITHOUT WAYBILLS</u>	1.144	8.3	16	27.1
<u>TOTALS</u>	13.693	(100)	59	(100)

Cecina and charque

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
Ayquile	520	5.0	2	5.0
<u>TOTAL INT. COCHABAMBA</u>	520	5.0	2	5.0
<u>WITHOUT WAYBILLS</u>	9.969	95.0	38	95.0
<u>TOTALS</u>	10.489	(100)	40	(100)

Sugar

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
Cuzco	19.102	61.5	19	50.0
Chalhuanca	1.817	5.8	1	2.6
Accha	1.315	4.2	3	7.9
Livitaca	1.004	3.2	3	7.9
Cacha	775	0.7	1	2.6
Accha-Cuzco	2.931	9.5	2	5.2
Cuzco-Oropesa	1.140	3.6	1	2.6
<u>TOTAL INT. CUZCO</u>	27.534	88.5	30	78.8
Sica-Sica	775	2.5	1	2.6
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PAZ</u>	775	2.5	1	2.6
Oruro	2.790	9.0	7	18.4
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PLATA</u>	2.790	9.0	7	18.4
<u>TOTALS</u>	31.099	(100)	38	(100)

Copper

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
Conche	250	1.4	1	2.6
Atacama	721	4.1	2	5.3
Conche-Chiuchiu	362	2.0	1	2.6
Lipes	638	3.6	1	2.6
S. Cristóbal de Lipes	2.431	13.8	3	7.9
<u>TOTAL INT. POTOSI</u>	4.412	24.9	8	21.0
<u>WITHOUT WAYBILLS</u>	13.211	75.0	30	79.0
<u>TOTALS</u>	17.623	(100)	38	(100)

THE MARKET OF POTOSÍ

Fat and tallow

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
Jujuy	240	1.3	1	1.2
Tucumán	2.640	14.5	2	2.4
Salta	195	1.1	1	1.2
<u>TOTAL INT. SALTA</u>	3.075	16.9	4	4.8
Oruro	444	2.4	1	1.2
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PLATA</u>	444	2.4	1	1.2
Samaipata	16	0.1	1	1.2
<u>TOTAL INT. COCHABAMBA</u>	16	0.1	1	1.2
<u>WITHOUT WAYBILLS</u>	14.605	80.5	77	92.7
<u>TOTALS</u>	18.140	(100)	83	(100)

Mules

Waybills from	Work	%	Operations	%
Salta	360	4.9	1	9.1
Jujuy	4.284	58.3	5	45.4
Tucumán	737	10.0	1	9.1
Santiago del Estero	720	9.8	1	9.1
<u>TOTAL INT. SALTA</u>	6.101	83.0	8	72.7
<u>WITHOUT WAYBILLS</u>	1.238	16.9	3	27.3
<u>TOTALS</u>	7.339	(100)	11	(100)

Wine

Waybills from	Value	%	Operations	%
Moquegua	8.477	54.2	29	46.0
Moquegua-Tacna	480	3.1	1	1.6
Ilabaya-Moquegua	160	1.1	1	1.6
Locumba-Moquegua	80	0.5	1	1.6
<u>TOTAL INT. AREQUIPA</u>	9.197	58.9	32	50.8
Cinti	2.898	18.5	18	28.6
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PLATA</u>	2.898	18.5	18	28.6
La Paz	924	5.9	1	1.6
Sica-Sica	760	4.9	1	1.6
<u>TOTAL INT. LA PAZ</u>	1.684	10.8	2	3.2
Ayquile	360	2.3	1	1.6
<u>TOTAL INT. COCHABAMBA</u>	360	2.3	1	1.6
Salta	92	0.6	1	1.6
<u>TOTAL INT. SALTA</u>	92	0.6	1	1.6
<u>WITHOUT WAYBILLS</u>	1.394	8.9	9	14.3
<u>TOTALS</u>	15.625	(100)	63	(100)

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