#### **Institute of Advanced Legal Studies**

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The Impact of Money Laundering on Economic, and Financial Stability and on Political Development of Developing Countries

LLM 2011-2012
International Corporate Governance, Financial Regulation and
Economic Law (ICGFREL)

# Institute of Advanced Legal Studies School of Advanced Study University of London

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Abstract.

Money Laundering is indeed a global phenomenon which undermines the economic and political stabilities of States. The devastating effect and impact of the phenomenon has raised national and international concerns. In response to these concerns, along with the perceived threats to national and international economies and political process, there have been various international and national initiatives and measures to combat the menace of the phenomenon. As much as money laundering is a global phenomenon, over the last decade, it has been apparent that development countries have been more exposed and vulnerable to its exploits. In this regards, it is argued, with evidence, that money launderers, along with other economic and financial criminals have found most developing countries as havens for their criminal activities due to the lax regulations and enforcement mechanisms. As such with the increasingly infiltration of money laundering into the economic and political structures of developing countries, this work will attempt to examine the concise impact of money laundering in the economic and political structures of developing countries. It shall also examine the legislative measures that are being

taken in combating the menace of money laundering the effectiveness of these

measures.

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#### INTRODUCTION

In developing this research, emphases will be been placed on primary sources of information and references to secondary sources of information where relevant. The work evaluates, specifically, the impact of money laundering on Economic development, financial stability and also political development of 'Developing Countries'. The objective is to critically analyse the large scale and concise effect and impact of money laundering practices that hinder economic and political development in developing countries in contrast to the developed countries.

Over the last two decades, since its criminalisation, there has been an increasing interest in the phenomenon of money laundering globally. However, most of the study has focused on money laundering from the perspective of developed countries. Accordingly, international opinion, policies and legislation aimed at combating money laundering have also been designed mainly on the needs of the developed countries. However, money laundering is indeed an international phenomenon and its impact and effect reflect on all the facets of the global society. In particular, money launderers, most often, look for ways of to disguise their wealth, which is the basic component of money laundering practice. As such, most developing countries have characteristics and attributes that the money launderers find attractive to carry out their act. Consequently, this impacts on the economic,

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political and social facets of such countries. Therefore, understanding the economic,

political and social settings of these developing countries is fundamental ingredient

in the war against money laundering.

The work is divided into five further chapters. Chapter one will evaluate the

phenomenon of Money laundering in relation to the main activities and practices in

global context. Furthermore, the chapter will analysis the critical perceptions of

money laundering globally and seek to explore its impact in the society. Further, the

chapter will evaluate the global response to the menace of money laundering. Much

has been said of the devastating impact of money laundering in all facets of the

developing countries; hence the chapter will evaluate the hidden benefits of money

laundering particularly to developing

Chapter two of the work will focus explicitly on the various impact of money

laundering on the economic and financial stability in developing countries. The

chapter will initially evaluate the attribute and characteristic of the economy in

developing countries. The chapter will then identify and analysis the effects of

uncurbed money in developing countries with main focus being Nigeria. Chapter

three will examine explicitly the impact of money laundering on political development

and governance of developing countries. The chapter will analysis the correlation

between money laundering, organised crime and corruption, being the three vital

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components of economic and financial crimes. The impact of these three in political

structure of most developing countries will be identified and again Nigeria being the

main reference.

Chapter four of the work will analysis the legislative development in combating ML in

developing countries with Nigeria as a case study. The work then closes with

analytical conclusions and suggests measures of combating effective the menace of

money laundering in the developing countries, with Nigeria as a case study.

The work will conclude by reiterating the essence of money laundering on the global

stage and literally account for the basis of the spread of money laundering, along

with other economic and financial crimes, to developing countries and how

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**CHAPTER 1** 

The Phenomenon of Money Laundering

1.1. Overview of Money Laundering

Money laundering, in essence, means 'making money dirty money look clean. The

modern term of Money laundering was first used in a legal context in 1982 in

America in the case US v \$4,255,625.39, relating to the confiscation of laundered

Columbian drug proceeds<sup>1</sup>. However, historically, the concept of money laundering

was originally used by the American enforcement officers in the 1920s. The concept

was used in reference to the mafia ownership of Laundromats in America during

Prohibition. During this period, the notorious mobs earned vast sum of money in

cash from their criminal enterprises. Hence, in their quest to legitimise the proceeds

made from their criminal enterprises, the gang ventured into buying out rightly

legitimate businesses, thereby, laundered the illicit proceeds from the criminal

<sup>1</sup> Bantekas I. & Keramidas G, International and European Financial Criminal Law: Lexis Nexis –

Butterworths 2006. Pg.22.

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enterprises with proceeds made from the legitimate business they acquired<sup>2</sup>. This

particular practice, the legalisation of illegal proceeds, is very significant as it

represents the common component in regard to the various definitions of money

laundering. Thus, the aim of money laundering is to cover up the predicate offences

from which proceeds are derived and to ensure that the criminals can enjoy their

proceeds, by conserving or investing them in the legal economy<sup>3</sup>.

Following the criminalisation of the phenomenon of money laundering and the

legalisation of the term, the term has been defined in various contexts by various

stakeholders. As mentioned earlier, the common basis of the various definitions is

such that relates to the legalisation of the illicit proceeds of criminal activities. As

such, the American President's commission on Organised Crime in its interim report

in 1985: The cash connection: Organised Crime, Financial Institutions and Money

Laundering, defined Money Laundering as the process by which one conceals the

existence, illegal source or illegal application of income, and then disguises that

income to make it appear legitimate<sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, the Financial Action Tasks Force

defines money laundering as 'the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their

<sup>2</sup> Alastair N Brown, *Money Laundering*: Thomson Reuters Publishing 2009. Pg.2.

<sup>3</sup> Guy Stresses, Money Laundering: A new International Law Enforcement Model, Cambridge

University Press, 2000. Pg.82.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. Pg .83.

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illegal Origin<sup>5</sup>. The International Monetary Fund, also defines money laundering as '

a process in which assets obtained or generated by criminal activity are moved or

concealed to obscure the link between the crime and the assets'6.

In practice, the act of money laundering entails a highly complex process that

consists of three main stages. These stages include placement, layering and

integration. At the placement stage, money launderers move the proceeds of their

criminal enterprise to an area where the proceeds could be changed to a less

unwieldy form or simply hidden from authority inquiries. Once this is achieved, then

the capital is integrated into the financial system. At the layering stage, after the

capital has been integrated into the financial system, it is then moved in a sequence

of complicated financial transactions so as to distance the money from the illicit

source. The technological advancement in today's world has made movement of

funds across the globe an easy task. Hence, funds are moved through accounts,

banks, countries or mixture of the three. The process of money laundering is

<sup>5</sup> FATF definition of Money Laundering at http://www.fatf-

gafi.org/document/29/0,3746,en\_32250379\_32235720\_33659613\_1\_1\_1\_1,00.html#Whatismoneylau

ndering

<sup>6</sup> IMF, Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering-Background Paper, prepared

by the Monetary and Exchange Affairs and Policy Development and Review, Feb. 12 2001. Available

at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ml/2001/eng/021201.pdf

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completed at the last stage, integration. At the stage, money launderer has legalised

the proceeds of his criminal enterprise by integrating them in legitimate business

activities<sup>7</sup>. Hence, the money launderer can move his funds about the economy or

reinvesting the proceeds.

Main activities and attributes surrounding Money Laundering 1.2.

globally

Money laundering, since its criminalisation, remains at the fore front of criminal

activity. This is so as money laundering is the basis of predominantly all other

criminal activities. In essence, money laundering constitutes vital component of any

transnational organised crime, more so as it cannot be distinguished from other

modes of crime<sup>8</sup>. Hence, the transnational criminal groups have resolved to money

laundering in different countries, particularly, the developing the countries, in their

quest to legalise the proceeds from their criminal activities.

Over the last two decades, there has been a surge in international movement of

money. This surge is consequential to the geo-political developments, a surge in

<sup>7</sup> Op. cit., Bantekas I. & Keramidas G, Pg. 24.

<sup>8</sup> See journal on *Analysis of current situation of Money Laundering*. Available at

www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS\_No59/No59\_43RC\_Group3\_Phase1.pdf

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economic globalisation and advancement in technology. Over the decades, the

speedy growth of global financial movements set the platform for the growth of

transnational organised crime, taking the benefits of political boarders and exploiting

the disparity amongst national legal systems thereby maximising their proceeds.

The criminal activities of these highly organised groups have posed to be threats to

the financial stability of the global economic structures particularly in the developing

countries. Considering the fact that the aim of the highly organised criminal groups is

to generate profits, the process of the criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal

origin, money laundering, becomes essential. This allows these criminal groups to

enjoy the proceeds derived from their criminal activities without jeopardizing their

source. Since the activities of organized crime, including drug trafficking, trafficking in

illegal firearms, smuggling, prostitution, etc., can generate vast sum of money, they

create an incentive to legalise the illicit proceeds by the act of money laundering.

When criminal activity generates substantial profits, the individuals or groups

involved must find a way to control the funds without attracting attention to the

underlying criminal activity or the persons involved. Criminals do this by disguising

the sources, changing the form or moving the funds to a place where they are less

likely to attract attention.

Evidently, across countries, money launderers and organised criminal groups have

deployed techniques in laundering money. One of such techniques is investing the

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proceeds from their crime in legitimate business by buying shares in the financial

markets. They also establish companies under bogus identities. Another modus

operandi deployed is depositing money in tax heavens or in banks in countries

deemed to condole money laundering practices. The money is then transferred back

to the host country through normal banking network. Furthermore, the launderers

make use of the underground banking network in transferring their illicit funds.

1.3. Current critical perceptions of Money practices. Bad for whom?

Money laundering is a global phenomenal that has, if uncurbed, a corrosive impact

on a nation's economy and socio political facets. Money laundering provides the

platforms for criminal individuals and groups such as drug dealers, terrorists and

their financiers, illegal arms dealers, corrupt public office holders, to conduct and

expand their criminal activities<sup>9</sup>.

Although, the extent of money laundering is such that is tricky to quantify since it is

an illicit activity for which no precise statistics are available, its effect and impact can

<sup>9</sup> John McDowell (Senior Policy Adviser) and Gary Novis, (Program Analyst), The Consequences of

Money Laundering and Financial Crime, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

US Department 2001. Affairs, of State, May Also available at

http://www.apgml.org/issues/docs/30/Negative%20Effects%20of%20ML\_Economic%20Perspectives

%20May%202001.pdf

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be devastating in any country, be it developed or developing country. The

International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the summative amount of money

laundering in the world could be somewhere between two to five percent of the

world's gross domestic product (GDP). Using 1996 statistics, this would translate into

approximately US \$590 billion to US \$1.5 trillion, which suggests the size of the

problem<sup>10</sup>.

Over the years, criminal activities have become more and more international and

expansive in operation and the financial aspects of the criminal activities have

become more complex as a result of the swift technological advancement coupled

with the globalisation of the financial industry. As such, the global financial services,

more than any other sector, has remain vulnerable to the attributes of and practices

of money laundering. On the economic and financial front of the society, money

laundering, in effect, impairs and erodes the financial structures which are very vital

to economic growth and financial stability of any nation<sup>11</sup>. Particularly, the impact and

<sup>10</sup> Based on 1996 statistics that are available http://www.fatf-gafi.org.

<sup>11</sup> Brent L. Bartlett, *The negative effects of Money Laundering on Economic Development*, report for

the Asian Development Bank Regional Technical Assistance Project No.5967 Countering Money

Laundering 2002. in the Asian and Pacific Region., May Available at

http://www.adb.org/documents/others/ogc-toolkits/anti-money-

laundering/documents/money laundering neg effects.pdf

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cost of money laundering is felt on legitimate business enterprises<sup>12</sup>. In this sense, where a money launderer uses an enterprise as a front in concealing his illicit acquired funds, there is the possibility of the enterprise being subsidized. Thus, this can allow the enterprise to carry out its business at or below cost thereby swindling legit competition out whist the front enterprise expands its business ventures. Therefore, as the business expands, it provides more opportunity for the launderer to move even more illicit funds. However, it should be acknowledged that in this instance, the money launderer does not share mutual goals of legitimate business vendors, who desire to attain maximum returns of their business ventures through the profitable, ongoing process of their ventures. In contrast, the money launderers in this instance are concerned about hiding the origin as well as ownership of the money he controls. As such, it is this practice that leads to the concern of economic distortion. Often this economic distortion can result to misguided economic data by government economic policy makers. This is in the sense that without proper analysis of the economic trends, there is that risk of making vital economic decisions and projections that are not necessarily in the interest of the society. In an economy that has been infiltrated with laundered money, the impact and cost can be of devastating proportions. A good launderer is not going to expose just his own money when he can use that of financial institutions and other investors.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

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Evidently, the costs and impact of money laundering extend beyond economic and

financial sectors of the society. Thus, there are significant socio political costs

associated to money laundering. The sheer magnitude of the economic power that

accrues to criminal organizations from money laundering has a corruptive effect on

the socio political elements of the society<sup>13</sup>. The economic and political influence of

criminal organizations can weaken the social fabric, collective ethical standards, and

ultimately the democratic institutions of society. Organized crime can infiltrate

financial institutions, acquire control of large sectors of the economy through

investment, or offer bribes to public officials and indeed governments<sup>14</sup>. In extreme

cases, it can lead to the virtual takeover of legitimate governments. Furthermore, in

countries transitioning to democratic systems, this criminal influence can undermine

the democratic transition. Most fundamentally, money laundering is inextricably

linked to the underlying criminal activity that generated it. Laundering enables

criminal activity to continue.

1.4. Hidden benefits of Money laundering for developing countries?

Undoubtedly, the evidence illustrates the damaging effect of money laundering in

the economic and socio political spheres of a country. However, as devastating as

the act of money laundering can be, there is an argument for short term economic

<sup>13</sup> See http://www.scribd.com/doc/57004765/8/Dark-side-of-Money-Laundering

<sup>14</sup> http://www.fatfgafi.org/document/29/0,3746,en\_32250379\_32235720\_33659613\_1\_1\_1\_1,00.html

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benefits of money laundering to the developing economies. For once, the

International Monetary Fund studies suggest that developing countries can become

favoured from large scale money launderers for short periods of time causing a

sharp surge in financial activities<sup>15</sup>. In this context, money laundering funds flow

from the developed countries to the developing countries, thus, resulting into surge

in the flow of capital to developing economies. In other words, cash transfers can still

be a useful channel for investment in developing countries. Cash paid to corrupt

political exposed persons, (PEPs), can be used to purchase products, such as

agricultural products which can be sold officially in agricultural markets thereby

accumulating official wealth. Also, laundered funds can be used to acquire shares in

under

value companies or those in the early stage of development, thereby generating long

term proceeds that may not mature for a number of years to disarm models of

suspicious conduct that may rely on the demonstration of immediate linked

benefits<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> Manual on Countering Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, published by Asian

Development Bank, January 2003. Available at

http://www.adb.org/documents/manuals/countering\_money\_laundering/countering\_money\_laundering

.pdf

<sup>16</sup> Michael Levi, The Impact of Anti-Money Laundering Measures within Developing Countries against

Proceeds of Corruption, Sept.2009. Draft paper for the World Bank Seminar. Also available at

www.publicpolicy.umd.edu/.../Levi final world bank paper 310809.doc

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On the whole, as most of the developing countries are characterised by ailing

economies, such economies tend to benefit, at least for short period of time, from

money laundering practices with the infiltration of the illicit proceeds into the

economy. Thus, there is the instant creation of wealth and upright in financial status.

However, the negative effects of money laundering far outweigh any benefits derived

from money laundering practices, even in the developing the countries. For a fact,

these hidden benefits are usually in the short term with long terns devastating effect.

The sharp surge in financial uprising and wealth creation are usually followed by an

equal sharp decline there thereby leading to severe macroeconomic instability.

1.5. Development of Anti Money Laundering Laws

Unsurprisingly, the last two decades has seen an outburst of regulatory measures, at

the global, regional and national levels, aimed at combating money laundering. Most

of these measures were initiated by the developed countries in their quest to reduce

the impact and effect of money laundering practices. On the global stage, two of the

most fundamental international instruments combating money laundering are the

United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

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Substances 1988, the 1988 Vienna Convention, and the United Nations Convention

against Transnational Organized Crime 2000, the Palermo Convention<sup>17</sup>.

The 1988 Vienna Convention contains detailed anti-money laundering measures

against drug trafficking. The Convention further requires member states of the

United Nations to make money laundering illegal, adopt measures to enable the

tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of the proceeds, cooperate with other

countries in identifying, tracing, freezing and seizing those assets, and to provide for

bank, financial or commercial records to be available to investigators,

notwithstanding bank secrecy<sup>18</sup>. Of more importance, the 1988 Vienna Convention

is the first international instrument to deal with the issue of the proceeds of crime and

require states to criminalise money laundering and take measures to curb it. As

such, the convention can be seen as a prototype of the typical AML legislation that

has emerged in recent times. The Palermo Convention deals with transnational

organised crime in general as well as some of the major operations engaged by such

groups such as money laundering, corruption and the obstruction of investigations or

<sup>17</sup> UN Response, *Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism*, excerpts from the main legal

instruments and resolutions against money laundering and financing of Terrorism adopted under the

auspices of the United Nations. Available at http://www.imolin.org/pdf/imolin/UNres03e.pdf

<sup>18</sup> See http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime cicp convention.html

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prosecutions<sup>19</sup>. To supplement the Convention, 3 Protocols also tackle specific areas

of transnational organised crime that are of particular concern to UN Member States

- the Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children Protocol, the Smuggling

of Migrants Protocol and the Trafficking in Firearms Protocol.

Following suit, regional jurisdictions and financial institutions within the major

financial centres also responded to the menace of money laundering by establishing

Anti Money Laundering Regimes. The Council of the European Communities, in

June 1991 adopted a directive on the "Prevention of the Use of the Financial System"

for the purpose of Money Laundering." This directive was issued in response to the

new opportunities for money laundering opened up by the liberalization of capital

movements and cross-border financial services in the European Union<sup>20</sup>. The

directive imposes an obligation on member states: (1) to outlaw money laundering.

(2) They must require financial institutions to establish and maintain internal systems

to prevent laundering. (3) To obtain the identification of customers with whom they

enter into transactions of more than ECU 15,000. (4) To keep proper records for at

least five years. (5) Member states must also require financial institutions to report

suspicious transactions and must ensure that such reporting does not result in

liability for the institution or its employees.

19 See http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a res 55/res5525e.pdf

<sup>20</sup> Peter Lewisch, Money Laundering Laws as a Political Instrument: The Social Cost of Arbitrary

Money Laundering. Online publication, Springer science & business media, LLC 2008.

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In December 1988, the G-10's Basle Committee on Banking Supervision issued a "statement of principles "with which the international banks of member states are expected to comply. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a Committee of banking supervisory authorities founded by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1975. The Committee consists of senior representatives of banking supervisory authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. These principles cover identifying customers, avoiding suspicious transactions, and cooperating with law enforcement agencies. In issuing these principles, the committee acknowledged the risk to public confidence in

However, the leading international organisation in both setting and implementation of AML standards, over the last decade, has been the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). FATF was founded in 1989 by the G7 summit in Paris. The rationale behind the formation was to develop and promote policies both at national and international levels, to combat money laundering and terrorist financing<sup>21</sup>. As such FATF

banks, hence, their stability, that can arise if they involuntarily become associated

with money laundering.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> J.C Sharman, The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime and Developing Countries: Damned if Damned Do, if Don't?, 2006. Available they they at

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published a report in 1990, in which the widely know 40 recommendations, revised in

1996 and 2003 were made to tackle the menace of money laundering. The

recommendations are aimed to be of global application. From October 2001, FATF

mandate includes terrorist financing. Subsequently FATF issued 8 Special

Recommendations against Terrorist Financing in October 2001<sup>22</sup>. A ninth Special

Recommendation was also added in June 2004. In addition, in 2003, terrorist

financing issues were added to the scope of the 40 FATF Recommendations, where

appropriate.

In strict terms, FAFT is not an international organisation, being an ad hoc

international rather than a treaty organisation. Rather, FAFT has a largely

overlapping membership with the OECD. However, over the years, it has expanded

and incorporated some strategically important developing states. As of today, the

FAFT consists of 34 member states and 2 regional organisations, representing most

financial centres in the world. FAFT also has associates that include The Asia/Pacific

Group on Money Laundering (AP), Caribbean Financial Task Force (CFATF),

Eurasian Group (EAG), Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group

(ESAAMLG), Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America

http://www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/document/literature/nd%20Sharman%20Damned%20if%20they%20do%2

0and%20dont.pdf

<sup>22</sup> FAFT IX Special Recommendations, Oct 2001. Available at http://www.fatf-

gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf

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(GAFISUD), Inter Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West

Africa (GIABA), Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force a

(MENAFATF) and Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti

- Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONERVAL)<sup>23</sup>.

1.6. Implementation and adherence of Anti Money Laundering

Laws; a case for converged global standards.

The landmark of the Vienna convention arguably laid the foundation for a global

comprehensive anti-money laundering framework .The multitude of broad and

interrelated international, regional and national initiatives against money laundering.

once led to a call for 'no more laws'. It was asserted that after the problem of

harmonising legislation, implementation and compliance may be the most important

task<sup>24</sup>. However, the achievement of what the UN called a' global strategy for a

global problem' continues to pose a herculean task, thereby raising the question of

achieving converged global standards of Anti-Money Laundering legislation.

Diverging legal cultures, economic, social and political conditions amongst countries

arguably render the globalisation of anti-money measures a mere utopia.

<sup>23</sup> See http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en\_32250379\_32236869\_1\_1\_1\_1\_1,00.html

<sup>24</sup>Ernesto Savona, Money Laundering, the Developed Countries and Drug Control: the New Agenda in

Dorn, Jepsen and Savona, eds., European Drug Policies and Enforcement, Pg 224 - 225

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This situation becomes further complicated with on-going advancement in the

international arena. These result largely from a mirror effect produced by the

interaction of transnational criminality with the laws to counter it<sup>25</sup>. In this respect, the

evolution of money laundering countermeasures has led to significant changes in

typologies, with the increasing professionalization in the phenomenon being coupled

with the use of mechanisms and professions not covered by the existing legislation.

This trend, along with the increasing use of technological developments beyond

conventional transactions methods has the potential to render the existing

countermeasures obsolete.

Comparatively, diverging economic and socio political attributes and priorities

between the developed and developing nations complicate the attainment of global

regulatory standards. The globally encompassing nature of the Anti-Money

Laundering laws was pioneered by international organisations. However, it has come

about in spite of lack of evidence as to whether the anti-money laws that were

designed for the developed countries would be appropriate for developing countries,

considering economic and socio political status. Money laundering activities are

being pushed into developing countries due to tighter regulations in the developed

world. To complication the dilemma, in contrast to the developed countries,

<sup>25</sup> Ernesto. U. Savona, *Mafia Money Laundering versus Italian Legislation*, European Journal of

Criminal Policy and Research, 1993, Vol. 1, No. 3, Pg 51-52

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developing countries face a much broader slate of challenges in curbing these

activities. Virtually all developing countries have Anti Money Laundering laws in

place; however, they are not as advanced as those in developed countries<sup>26</sup>. In

some cases, increasing population and governments' inability to provide to basic

welfare needs of people have resulted in illegal activity of different sorts.

Furthermore, the developing countries need foreign currency and capital inflow,

hence, they often willingly not acknowledge the source of the capital and avoid as far

as they are able, the imposition of Anti Money Laundering measures. Furthermore,

developing countries are characterised with political instability, Government

corruption, and social unrests. These persistent attributes provide obstacles to an

effective implantation of anti-money laundering measures.

Nevertheless, developing countries, over the last decade, have been making

significant progress implementing Anti Money laundering regimes. In this respect,

developing countries like Nigeria and Naura were delisted from FATF list of non-

cooperative countries in acknowledgement of the progress both countries have

<sup>26</sup> Standard Chartered Journal, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, *The Guide to Working Capital* 

Management 2009/10. Accessed at http://www.infosys.com/offerings/industries/banking-capital-

markets/Documents/laundering-programs.pdf

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made implementing Anti Money laundering regimes<sup>27</sup>. Also, the Caribbean Financial

Action Task Force (CFATF), a FATF-style regional body, comprised of 25

jurisdictions, continues to advance its anti-money laundering initiatives, within the

Caribbean basin.

Combating the menace of money laundering requires a well-coordinated

international cooperation. Money laundering presents the global community with a

complex and dynamic challenge. Indeed, the global nature of money laundering

requires a global standards and international cooperation. It is almost unattainable

for individual jurisdictions to tackle the menace of money laundering alone as money

laundering practices are increasingly transnational. Thus, effective global compliance

of Anti Money Laundering measures reduces the impact of money laundering in the

global financial system and also increases transparency and effective international

co-operation. However, effective implementation of Anti Money Laundering

measures rests upon cooperation of countries around the world. This cooperation is

further depends on other factors other than ideal of preventing money laundering. It

is subject to political pressures as well as differences in national legislation.

<sup>27</sup> FATF Eighth NCCT Review, 12 Oct. 2007. Accessed at http://www.fatf-

gafi.org/dataoecd/14/11/39552632.pdf.

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Chapter 2

Impact of Money Laundering on Economic and Financial

stability in developing countries

2.1. Attributes of developing economy

Developing countries, in particular, have been more exposed to the exploits of

money laundering as a result of the nature of their economies. In practice, the

economies of most developing countries are regarded as informal economies,

characterised primarily with informal economic activities. In broad terms, an informal

economy is the unregulated non-formal component of the market economy that

produces goods and services for sale or for other forms of remuneration<sup>28</sup>. Thus, the

term informal economy refers to the economic activities by workers and other

economic components, in law or in practice, not covered or inadequately covered by

<sup>28</sup> GIABA Report, Threat Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa,

May 201 Accessed at

http://www.giaba.org/media/T\_reports/THREAT%20ASSESSMENT/%20MONEY%20LAUNDERING

%20%20%20%20AND%20TERRORIST%20FINANCING%20IN%20WEST%20AFRICA%20-

%20English%20rev051410%20\_1\_.pdf

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formal arrangements<sup>29</sup>. Hence, in most developing countries, local traders and

vendors work unregistered and unregulated and they constitute as the most

perceptible components of the informal economy<sup>30</sup>.

Traditionally, the informal economy was adjudged to consist of survivalist activities<sup>31</sup>.

As such, different negative attributes were used to portray informal economy, varying

from undeclared labour, tax evasion, unregulated economic and financial ventures.

illegal and criminal activities<sup>32</sup>. However, considerable informal economic activities

supply legally produced goods and services. On the other hand, informal economic

activities are not necessarily carried out with the conscious motive to evade payment

of taxes and infringe legislations and regulations, however, the activities can consist

of confined illegal and legal operations or legal and irregular operators, but no

criminal operators<sup>33</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> Kristina. F. Becker, Fact Finding Study: The Informal Economy, March 2004. Accessed at

http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PapersLinks/Sida.pdf

<sup>30</sup> Op. cit., GIABA Report

<sup>31</sup> Op. cit., K F Becker

<sup>32</sup> OECD Round table on *Competition Policy and the Informal Economy*, February 2009. Accessed at

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/47/44547855.pdf

<sup>33</sup> Op. cit., K F Becker

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A vast size of informal economy in most developing countries goes hand-in-hand

with the cash- and commodity-based nature of the economy<sup>34</sup>. For instance, in the

West African region, the informal economy of the region is virtually cash and

commodity oriented. As such, cash payment is the most common method of

purchasing products and most often services. According to the World Bank, across

Africa more than 80% of households do not use formal banking<sup>35</sup>. For instance, In

Nigeria, the Central Bank of the country declared that just an estimated 23% of the

country's population own bank accounts<sup>36</sup>. This, arguably, is attributed to various

factors such as cultural and religion barriers and lack of trust between the banks and

local customers.

Furthermore, the practices that are norms in the informal sector contradict the basic

standards for banks on transparency of financial operations and accounting

procedures<sup>37</sup>. Consequently, traditional potential customers tend not use regular

bank services. Rather, such customers turn to a decentralized financial system as an

alternative solution. With this financial system, the investors in the informal sector

mobilize savings and benefit from small funds that allow them to generate wealth in

<sup>34</sup> Op. cit., GIABA Report

<sup>35</sup> The World Bank Report, 2009, Africa-Development in the Private Sector. Available at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/The Africa Competitiveness Report 2011

<sup>36</sup> The World Bank Report estimates this proportion at 21%: World Bank

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their domestic economies. With the development of this financially link, substantial

amount of money is infiltrated into the global financial system thereby exposing the

informal sector and its ventures to money laundering exploits.

In analysing the impact of money laundering on developing economies, Bartlett

(2002) specified five directions of money laundering flows in such economies<sup>38</sup>. First,

domestic flow, in which illicit domestic funds are laundered within the country.

Second, returned flow means criminal activities occurred in the developing country,

fund placed outside the country and later on integration occurred in the developing

country. Third, Inbound funds, for which the predicate crime occurred abroad, are

either initially laundered ("placed") abroad or within the developing country, and

ultimately are integrated into the developing economy. Fourth, outbound funds,

constitutes laundered fund originated in the developing country and integrated

outside the economy or capital flight. Fifth, Flow-through funds originate and

integrate in the developed country, by using the financial institution of developing

country during the period of layering.

<sup>37</sup> Op. cit., GIABA Report

<sup>38</sup> Brent L. Brent, *The Negative Effects of Money Laundering on Economic Development. Economic* 

Research Report, May 2002. Available at

http://www.adb.org/documents/manuals/countering\_money\_laundering/chapter\_01.pdf

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2.2. Undermining the integrity of financial institutions and markets

The success of money laundering exploits has far reaching impact on the whole

financial systems of many developing countries. Laundered money eventually flows

into the international financial system and in the course of this process; countries

that integrate into the global financial systems are exposed to the phenomenon of

money laundering<sup>39</sup>. Elaborating on the this fact, the one-time chairman of the

EFCC Nigeria, Nuhu Ridadu, stated that the amount involved in various forms of

transnational economic and financial crimes especially corruption, are often so large

that it affects both the integrity of domestic economies and the global financial

systems<sup>40</sup>. For instance, an estimated amount of \$100 billion was corruptly exported

from Nigeria between mid 1980s and 1999 while more than \$ 1 trillion illicit funds

flowed into the United States annually through the international financial systems

and this includes the proceeds from drug trafficking and other forms of economic and

financial crimes.

In further reference to the Nigeria financial system, between the 80s and 90s, the

reputation of the financial system in the country was at its lowest at this period. This

was primarily down to the damaging status of the nation's financial system attributed

to the negative impact of economic and financial crimes that were rampant at the

time. During this period, most potential foreign investors were reluctant to extend

<sup>39</sup> B. L Brent, op. cit.,

<sup>40</sup> See www.efccnigeria.org

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their commercial ventures to the Nigeria primarily because of the aforementioned

reason<sup>41</sup>. Consequently, the financial institutions in the country relied overwhelmingly

on the ill-gotten capital drained off by corrupt political office holders. Hence, these

financial institutions were unable to endure the tests of market competition. As a

result, many of these financial institutions disintegrated<sup>42</sup>, thus, exposing the

instability of the country's financial system and deemed not to investment friendly.

The situation amounted to hindrance that hampered the surge of investments and

economic development in the country, even to this moment.

2.3. Loss of control of the national economic policy

One time director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Michael Camdessus,

once estimated the scale of money laundering as between 2% to 5% of world Gross

Domestic Product (GPD)<sup>43</sup>. In his this perspective, developing countries are poised

to losing control of their domestic economic policies as illicit capital accrued from

<sup>41</sup> Sharon LaFraniere, Africa Tackles Graft, with Billions in Aid in Play, New York Times July 6 2005.

Accessed at

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804E6DF163DF935A35754C0A9639C8B63

<sup>42</sup> Financial institutions that disintegrated include the National Bank, Bank for Credit and Commerce

International and Allied Bank.

<sup>43</sup> Address by Michel Camdessus Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund at the

Plenary Meeting of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, February 10, 1998.

Accessed at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/021098.htm

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money laundering activities and other economic and financial crimes are capable of

dwarfing government budgets and destabilise domestic markets<sup>44</sup>. Furthermore, an

IMF working paper concludes that money laundering impacts financial behaviour and

macro-economic performance in different forms such as policy mistakes, due to

measurement errors in national account statistics, volatility in exchange and interest

rates due to unanticipated cross border transfers of funds; the threat of monetary

instability due to unsound asset structures; effects on tax collection and public

expenditure allocation due to misreporting of income; misallocation of resources due

to distortions in asset and commodity prices; and contamination effects on legal

transactions due to the perceived possibility of being associated with crime<sup>45</sup>. Thus,

in some developing countries, the illicit proceeds from criminal ventures dwarf

government budgets, thereby, leading to a loss of control of their economic policies.

<sup>44</sup> John McDowell & Gary Norris, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US

Department of State, The consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime, May 2001.

Accessed at

http://www.apgml.org/issues/docs/30/Negative%20Effects%20of%20ML\_Economic%20Perspectives

%20May%202001.pdf

45 Ibid.

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Furthermore, the exploits of money laundering and currency manoeuvring can

harmfully undermine currencies and interest rates<sup>46</sup>, more predominantly, in a

developing economy. This is evident in a developing country such as Nigeria. The

country relies on the acquisition of other currencies so as to fulfil her international

obligations in satisfying local needs. Thus, uncurbed money laundering practice in

the country adversely impinges on currencies and interest rates through

reinvestment of funds where the schemes will be fairly safe from suspicion than

where rates of returns are higher. As profit making is not the stimulating factor for

investing the proceeds of economic crimes in any business<sup>47</sup>, it is always convenient

for money launderers to move the funds around as the situation may demand.

Therefore the economic insinuation is such that the unfounded movement of funds

establishes inexplicable changes in monetary demand and escalate instability of

international capital flows, interest and exchange rates<sup>48</sup>. This is a situation that

works, in return, against sound national economic policy formation and

implementation.

<sup>46</sup> Op. cit., John McDowell & Gary Noris

<sup>47</sup> Paul Freeman, *The Economic and Social Consequences of Money Laundering*' Article published

February 17 2010. Accessed at http://ezinearticles.com/?expert=Paul\_Freeman

<sup>48</sup> Op. cit., B. L Brent

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2.4. Economic distortion and investment instability

Money launderers, in their quest to disguise the source of their ill-gotten proceeds,

divert the proceeds from one economic venture to another without sound economic

reasons. Also, as there is no motive to generate profits, money launderers, most

often, invest their illicit funds in economic and commercial ventures that do not,

primarily, benefit the economy of the country where such illicit funds are situated<sup>49</sup>.

When making the investment decisions, money launderers apparently pay high

premiums on the investments that will allow the illicit proceeds be protected from

suspicion. In other words, money launderers do not necessarily pursue high profits

generated investments but for investments that simply allow the recycling of their

illicit proceeds even if it entails taking a low rate of return<sup>50</sup>. Consequently, the

situation rises in which there is the movement of capital from countries that produces

higher rates of returns to countries with poorer economic policies and low rates of

return, thereby infringing the law of economics.

According to Vito Tanzi, a renowned international economist, at the domestic stage,

large capital inflows or outflows artificially accentuated laundering process would

adversely affect exchange rates and interest rates thereby fundamentally influencing

<sup>49</sup> Op. Cit., John McDowell & Gary Norris

<sup>50</sup> Vito Tanzi, Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering" in Responding to Money

Laundering, International Perspectives, edited by Erenest U. Savona, Malaysia: Harwood Academic

Publisher, 1997. Pg.96

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the process of particular assets towards which the capital is invested<sup>51</sup>. With the exchange rate left to fluctuate unhampered, the inflow of vast amounts of capital into a country would lead to its appreciation and to an expansion of the country's money base due to capital inflow therefore resulting to increasing the demand for domestic money which would be contented by the monetary authorities of the countries that are affected<sup>52</sup>. According to Vito Tanzi, the inflation of the exchange rate would result to the situation in which traditional exports lose competitiveness to the imports while domestic prices rise up as a result of the pressure from the country's monetary base. Vito Tanzi describes this economic nature as "Dutch disease" and will incite the country's economic policy makers to "tighten its fiscal policy in order to create a budgetary surplus to use to sterilize the money effects of the capital inflows<sup>53</sup>. Vito further declared that a country undergoing a capital outflow would have reverse effects of the above explanations<sup>54</sup>. In practical terms, the artificial inflow and outflow of capital and investments from one country to another would have weakening

effects on the international financial markets due to its integrated nature<sup>55</sup>. Therefore,

a distortion of this nature means that financial difficulties arising from one financial

<sup>51</sup> Ibid

52 Ibid.Pg.97

<sup>53</sup> Ibid

<sup>54</sup> Ibid

55 Ibid

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centre can easily spread to other financial markets and therefore stall economic

growth and create financial instability.

In this context for instance, the Nigerian economic policies in the 80s and late 90s

endured serious economic distortions channelled predominantly by money

laundering activities as well as other economic and financial crimes through

diversion and redirection of capital from sound to low quality investments<sup>56</sup>. It was

not for a while for the consequences of these criminal activities to reflect on the

financial system of the country<sup>57</sup>. Major financial institutions in the country, primarily

banks, collapsed midstream and were officially liquidated as a result of diversion of

funds<sup>58</sup>. Also, many other financial institutions endured untimely distress and in some

cases, total collapse as deposits of the illicit proceeds of money laundering activities

lodged in these financial institutions disappeared ceremonially and within a short

period of time.

<sup>56</sup> Central Bank of Nigeria Banking Supervision Annual Report, 2000. Accessed at

http://www.cenbank.org/out/Publications/reports/BSD/2001/bsdar00.pdf

<sup>57</sup> Ibid

<sup>58</sup> Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) 2003 Annual Report & Statement of Accounts for

the end of the year December 31, 2003. Accessed at http://ndic.org.ng/files/Sec0ar2003.pdf

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2.5. Undermining the Legitimate Private Sector

One of the most serious microeconomic impacts of money laundering, particularly in

many developing countries, is felt in the private sector<sup>59</sup>. Money launderers often use

front companies, to fuse the proceeds of their illicit activities with legitimate funds, to

hide their illicit proceeds<sup>60</sup>. With access to substantial illicit funds, these front

companies are able to subsidize their products and services at levels that are well

below market rates<sup>61</sup>. In some instances, the front companies offer products at prices

that are below what it costs the manufacturers to produce<sup>62</sup>. Therefore, the front

companies, in this instance, usually have a competitive advantage over legitimate

companies or manufacturers that draw capital funds from financial markets. This

makes it difficult, if not impossible, for legitimate business to compete against front

companies with subsidized funding<sup>63</sup>. As a consequence, the private business

sectors of many developing countries are, often, overcrowded with criminal

<sup>59</sup> Bangladesh Bank publication, *Managing Core Risks in Banking*: Guidance Notes on Prevention of

Money Laundering. Available at

https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Bangladesh/Bangladesh\_Guidence\_Notes\_on\_Prevention\_of\_Mone

y Laundering.pdf

60 Noris, Op. Cit., John McDowell & Gary

61 Ibid

62 Ibid

63 Ibid

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organizations<sup>64</sup>. Clearly, the management principles of these criminal enterprises are

not consistent with traditional free market principles of legitimate business, which

results in further negative macroeconomic effects<sup>65</sup>.

2.6. Risks to government privatisation efforts

Seemingly, the concept of privatization in many developing countries, with the aim of

promoting economic growth, attracts money launderers<sup>66</sup>. This is attributed to the

'legitimacy' that a money launderer is able to acquire by purchasing into a previous

government corporation and/or by being linked to the high volume of transactions<sup>67</sup>.

As a result, government corporations are ideal vehicles for laundering money<sup>68</sup>.

Money launderers are also able to bid higher prices for these corporations, a practice

<sup>64</sup> Ibid

<sup>65</sup> Ibid

66 Ibid

<sup>67</sup>Maiendra Moodley, The extent and security implications of Money Laundering in South Africa',

Strategic Review for Southern Africa, November 2008. Available at

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi hb1402/is 2 30/ai n31607812/

<sup>68</sup> Ibid

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that undermines fair and legitimate competition<sup>69</sup>. Legitimate buyers who believe that

the bidding process has been compromised are unlikely to bid in future. In this

regard, money laundering activities threaten the efforts of many developing countries

to reform their economies through privatization, thereby stalling economic growth<sup>70</sup>.

Organised criminal organizations are capable of outbidding legitimate purchasers of

state-owned enterprises<sup>71</sup>. When illicit proceeds are invested in this manner,

criminals increase their potential for more criminal activities and corruption, as well

as deprive the country of what should be a legitimate, market-based, taxpaying

enterprise<sup>72</sup>.

In reference to Nigeria, over the two decades, different government administrations

have embarked on structural reforms of the nation's economic and financial systems,

in response to the country's economic and financial instability. The reforms were

intended to stabilise the country's economic and financial sector. One of such

<sup>69</sup> Celarier, M, *Privatization: A Case Study in Corruption*, Journal of International Affairs, Vol 50, No 2,

1997, Pg 531-543.

<sup>70</sup> Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti- Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of

Terrorism, Second Edition and Supplement on Special Recommendation IX, World Bank & IMF,

2006. Also available at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/3965111146581427871/Reference\_Guide\_A

MLCFT\_2ndSupplement.pdf

71 Ibid

72 Ibid

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reforms has been the privatisation and deregulation policy. In essence, the policy permits the private business enterprises and individuals to be involved in the vital facets of the economy such as the midstream and downstream in the oil and gas, communication and energy sectors, with the goal of attaining economic and commercial growth<sup>73</sup>. In this regard, many of the state owned enterprises have been bought up by private business enterprises and individuals. However, the exploits of money launderers along with corrupt officials have threatened the effective implementation of the policy. In other words privatisation exercise has been usurped by individuals and corrupt public office holders with financial ability to outbid legitimate and prospective purchasers of formerly state owned enterprises. Furthermore, while deregulation and privatisation policy initiatives are often economically beneficial in term of efficiency, better services delivery, job creation and so on, the policies if not properly monitored, can also serve as a venue to accommodate and integrate illicit drug funds and ill-gotten wealth from corruption and embezzlement of public funds. So much so that EFCC Nigeria in a report stated that the privatisation exercise in Nigeria was being threatened by the involvement of funds from questionable sources<sup>74</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> See memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 2000

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Kola Ologbondiyan, Sufuyan Ojeifo & Funsho Muraina, 'Senate Probes Obasanjo, Atiku', Thisday Newspaper, 27 September 2006.

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2.7. Reputation Risk

With the increasingly infiltration of money laundering activities in the economies of

the developing countries along with lack of transparency and high level of

corruption, developing countries having been finding it difficult to attract foreign

investments which are contributory factors to economic development and financial

stability. The negative damaging reputation attributed to these activities reduces

legitimate international opportunities and sustainable economic growth and, on the

other hand, drawing international organised criminal groups with undesirable

reputations and temporary goal, therefore diminishing development and economic

growth<sup>75</sup>. On this basis, most developing countries characterised with high level of

corruption, insecurity, economic and financial instability and social unrest, have

persistently failed to attract adequate foreign investments to boost their economic

and financial growth. In practice, international financial markets as well as investors

only extend their ventures and investments to an economic environment perceived to

be investor friendly<sup>76</sup>.

In this context, as a case study, Nigeria today is struggling with the huge task of

providing an investor-friendly economic environment short of market manipulation,

insider trading, money laundering, advance fee fraud, insecurity and other forms of

<sup>75</sup> Op. Cit., John McDowell & Gary Noris

<sup>76</sup> Hans Geiger & Oliver Wuensch, The fight against Money Laundering: An economic analysis of a

cost-benefit paradox, Emerald, Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 10 No. 1 2007.

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corruption and financial abuse practices, in its quest to attract adequate foreign investments. The dominance of economic and financial crimes in the country has been, to a degree, liable for this lack of adequate foreign inflow of investments. In its report, the World Bank alleged that the Nigerian government misappropriated about sixty five billion Naira (N65 billion) out of the \$ 458 million repatriated to Nigeria by the Swiss government<sup>77</sup>. This was the money hidden in Swiss Banks by the country's late head of state, General Sani Abacha. Furthermore, The 2002 Report of the Accountant General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the management of the country's finances in year 2001 was sated with copious occasions of financial irregularities, non- compliance with standard financial procedures varying from lack of audit inspection, over invoicing, non- retirement of cash advances, payment for contract not executed, double debiting, lack of receipt to back up purchases made, and release of monies without prior approval from the appropriate authority<sup>78</sup>. The

<sup>77</sup> 

To See The Nigerian Tribune, "FG Misused N65bn Abacha Loot". Tuesday December 19th, 2006.

Note that the report was made public by the Nigeria Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review (PEMFAR), African Network for Environment and Economic Justice (ANEEJ) and the Nigerian Network on Stolen Assets (ANSA). These bodies were initiated by the World Bank to execute reform in budget spending of the Federal Government of Nigeria by analysing the use of the repatriated Abacha loot in implementing the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) in support of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) priorities of education, health and basic infrastructure

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> The Auditor General's Report, The Guardian Nigerian News Magazine, January 16<sup>th</sup> 2007.

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cumulative effect of the above development has been attributed as one of the

reasons why the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), until May 2006, retained

Nigeria in the list of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs)<sup>79</sup>.

2.8. Loss of revenue

Money laundering, amongst other economic and financial crimes, is a source of

reduction of government revenue<sup>80</sup>. In essence, the phenomenon of money

laundering, together with other economic and financial crimes, reduces government

tax revenue. Maiendra Moodley in her article stated that money laundering and its

predicate offences are factors that contribute to the tax gap, as these activities

decrease the amount of tax collected in South Africa<sup>81</sup>. The tax gap in Africa is has

been estimated to be over 40 percent<sup>82</sup>, while South Africa loses an estimated sum

R30 on from tax invasion and other tax related fraud<sup>83</sup>. The South African Revenue

79 Op.cit.,FAFT eighth NCCT Review

<sup>80</sup> Op. Cit., Maiendra M

81 Ibid

82 United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, The Millennium Development Goals in Africa:

Progress and Challenges, New York, 2005.

83 Op. Cit., Maiendra M

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Services (SARS), in its review in 2006, declared that that between 25 and 35 per

cent of all domestic businesses did not pay income tax, and that a large number of

individuals were not registered as taxpayers<sup>84</sup>. These businesses and individuals

would then need to launder the income that they received, and/or hoard this income

to avoid being detected by85. As a result, government revenue was reduced due to

tax evasion, therefore impeding service delivery.

2.9. Conclusion

It is quite apparent that the phenomenon of money laundering is not most embracing

economic development Policy. In essence, money laundering stalls economic growth

and financial stability. The phenomenon harms financial institutions that are vital to

economic growth, limits productivity in the economy's real sector by deflecting

resources and encouraging crime and corruption, and often alters the economy's

international trade and capital flows at the expense of long-term economic

development.

As much as money laundering is a global phenomenon, developing countries, in

particular, have been more exposed to the its exploits. In this regards, money

launderers as well as other economic and financial criminals, find the lax economic

84 Ibid

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environment of the developing countries, too conducive to carry out their illicit

activities. As most economies of developing countries are informal economies, the

infiltration of money laundering and along with other economic and financial crimes

into the economies of these countries, has invariably slowed the pace of economic

growth and in some cases, destabilise financial system and structures. This is,

certainly, in contrast to the developed world.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid

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**Chapter 3** 

Impact of Money Laundering on Political Stability and

Governance

3.1. Introduction

Undoubtedly, the impact of money laundering in any society goes beyond the

economic and financial mechanisms of such society. In essence, money laundering

has damaging costs and effects on the political facet of the society<sup>86</sup>. The

phenomenon of money laundering provides the channel for drug dealers, illegal arms

dealers, terrorists, public office holders as well as other classified criminals, to

function and expand their criminal ventures<sup>87</sup>. Its infiltration, along with other

economic and financial crimes, into the political arena of any society can only be

detrimental to such society. Such is the situation in most developing countries. In

other words, the exploits of money laundering, as well as other economic and

<sup>86</sup> Bhure Lal, Money Laundering - An insight into the Dark World of Financial Frauds, Siddharth

Publications, First Edition Jan. 2003.

<sup>87</sup> Angela V Mei Leong, The Disruption of International Organised Crime; an Analysis of Legal and

Non Legal Strategies, Ashgate, 2007. Pg.32

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financial crimes, in the political sphere of these countries, over the years, have

brought about political instability, inept governance, civil and social unrest e.tc., In

essence, organized crime, high level of corruption and money laundering activities

are arguably the integrated attributes of most political processes of most developing

countries. This is in stark contrast to the political features of the developed countries.

3.2. Corruption and Organised Crime: Political tools of Money

Laundering

The infiltration of corruption and organized crime in the political structures of many

developing countries arguably explains the political instability and underdevelopment

that persist in these countries<sup>88</sup>. Corruption and organized crime are more than

phenomenon<sup>89</sup>. Theoretical independent criminal study has shown the

interdependent correlation between the political, socio-economic, criminal justice and

legal domains. 90. One time UNODC director Jan van Dijk identified the bond between

organized crime and "grand" or political corruption and poverty on the one hand, and

<sup>88</sup> Nicholas A. Goodling, Nigeria's crisis of corruption--can the U.N. global programme hope to resolve

this dilemma?, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 36, 2003

<sup>89</sup> Edgardo Buscaglia and Jan van Dijk, 'Controlling Organised Crime and Corruption in the Public

Sector', Forum on Crime and Society, Vol. 3, Nos. 1 and 2, December 2003. Available at

http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/forum/forum3 Art1.pdf

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

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low urbanization, poor development of law and limited judicial autonomy on the

other<sup>91</sup>. Political corruption is an essential characteristic of organized crime<sup>92</sup>. The

two go mutually, organized crime attempts to acquire political influence and to

provide room for or remove blockages to their illicit activities<sup>93</sup>. This relates to bribery

of police, judges, politicians etc., and infiltration of these offices of government by

organized crime<sup>94</sup>. Examples are found in most African countries and as well as

those in Latin America.

Essentially, the act of money laundering allows the criminal activities of the

organized crime worthwhile as it enables criminals to expand their criminal

endeavours such as drug trafficking, arms dealings, terrorism, human trafficking,

etc<sup>95</sup>. In recent times, the exploits of organised crime have become major threats to

political stability and security, of many developing countries. Organized crime uses

many forms of corruption to infiltrate into political process of most developing

<sup>91</sup> Jan van Dijk, The World of Crime, Breaking the Silence on Problems of Security, Justice, and

Development across the World, SAGE Publications 2008.

<sup>92</sup> Op. Cit., Edgardo Buscaglia and Jan van Dijk

93 Ibid

94 Ibid

<sup>95</sup> Op. Cit., Angela V Mei Leong

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countries<sup>96</sup>. Furthermore, the lack of judicial and enforcement tools plays a

premeditated role in the growth of crime syndicates' management of trafficking

drugs, arms, human beings, counterfeiting and money laundering<sup>97</sup>. In essence,

organised crime benefits of impunity when a government is unable to perform its

functions<sup>98</sup>.

Corruption predicates the abuse of Governments' resources by diverting them from

sectors of critical importance such as health, education and development<sup>99</sup>.

Consequently, ordinary people are deprived of economic growth and development

opportunities 100. Furthermore, the cost of public services escalates and the

economically disadvantaged people can no longer afford these services. Thus, the

poor become poorer, whilst corruption feeds the poverty and social inequality<sup>101</sup>.

<sup>96</sup> United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), *Emerging Crimes:* 

Organised Crime and Corruption, Available at http://www.unicri.it/emerging\_crimes/organized\_crime/

<sup>97</sup> See report on *Measures to Combat Economic Crime including Money Laundering*, Eleventh United

Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Bangkok, 18-25 April 2005. Available

at http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/Money\_Laundering\_pdf/MeasuresToCombatCrime.pdf

98 Ibid

<sup>99</sup> Op. Cit., UNICRI

100 Ibid

101 Ibid

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Fragile governance often mutually exits with corruption and a mutually causal

correlation between corruption and frail governmental institutions, often results to a

vicious cycle<sup>102</sup>. This growing socio-economic inequality triggers the loss of

confidence in public institutions<sup>103</sup>. Social instability and violence escalate due to the

increasing inequality, poverty and mass mistrust of political process, therefore

leading to civil and political unrest.

Furthermore, in other situations, corruption weakens the formal processes and

institutions of the state, such that such state nearly becomes nearly non-existent.

There are a number of instances where high-level and systemic corruption has been

a contributory factor in the start of political and civil unrest and in some cases, a

revolution<sup>104</sup>. The current civil and political unrest in the Arab world is a testimony to

this fact.

102 Ibid

103 Ibid

<sup>104</sup> Bryan R Evans, *The Cost of Corruption*: A discussion paper on corruption, development and the

poor. Available at

http://www.tearfund.org/webdocs/Website/Campaigning/Policy%20and%20research/The%20cost%20

of%20corruption.pdf

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3.3. What is corruption?

The word 'corruption' originates from the Latin word 'corruptus' which means to

break. Its origin emphasis the damaging effects on societal structure and includes

circumstances in which private stakeholders and public officers breach the

confidence bestowed to them by the society at large 105. In essence the term

corruption comprises of different activities ranging from petty bribery to grand

corruption, private sector inside trading to public sector embezzlement 106. In

agreeing to a consensus definition of corruption, a group of international

organisations comprising of the Asian Development Bank, World Bank and the IMF,

in 2006, settled to define corruption as the offering, giving, receiving, and soliciting,

directly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of

another party<sup>107</sup>. However, the United Nations Convention against Corruption is the

first international organisation that embraces a wider range of anti-corruption

measures taken at global level. Although the UNCAC did not exclusively define

corruption, rather, it classified and specify actions that generally identified as corrupt.

<sup>105</sup> Colin Nicholls, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Pg.1

<sup>106</sup> David Chaikin and J.C. Sharman, Corruption and money laundering: a symbiotic relationship, New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Pg.8

107 See http://www.adb.org/documents/guidelines/governance-anticorruption-project-

design/governance-anticorruption-project-design.pdf

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These actions include bribery of national public officials<sup>108</sup>; bribery of foreign public officials and officials of international organisations<sup>109</sup>; embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by public officials<sup>110</sup>; trading influence<sup>111</sup>; abuse of functions<sup>112</sup>; illicit enrichment<sup>113</sup>; bribery in the private sector<sup>114</sup>; embezzlement of property in the private sector<sup>115</sup>; laundering of proceeds of crime<sup>116</sup>; concealment<sup>117</sup> obstruction of justice<sup>118</sup>.

In the realm of public sector, the definition of corruption seeks to provide a boundary between politicians and bureaucrats<sup>119</sup>. Hence, in this context, corruption is defined

<sup>108</sup> Article 15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> Article 16

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> Article 17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> Article 18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> Article 19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> Article 20

<sup>114</sup> Article 21

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> Article 22

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Article 23

<sup>117</sup> Article 24

<sup>118</sup> Article 25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> Hope, R. K et al, *Corruption and Development in Africa: Lessons from Country Case Studies*, Macmillan Press Ltd, London. Pg.18

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as the utilisation of official position or titles for personal or private gains, either on an

individual or collective bases, at the expense of the public good, in violation of

established rules and ethical considerations, and through the direct or indirect

participation of one or more public or private officials, whether they be politicians or

bureaucrats. As such, the choice considered during the deliberation of the United

Nations Convention against Corruption, was not to define corruption but to identify

and clarify certain conducts that are generally classified as corruption, criminal and

fraud, extortion, abuse of discretion, favouritism and nepotism, cheating or exploiting,

conflicting interest, and improper political donations 120.

3.3.1. Corruption and Money Laundering Nexus

There have been are perspectives to the connection between money laundering, and

corruption. Some literature has argued for the disconnection between money

laundering and corruption. For instance, according to Levi (2001), 'Without money

laundering, there would still be corruption...... Not all bribes received have to be

laundered: some cash can be redistributed as "grease" payments or simply spent 1211.

<sup>120</sup> Michel Dion, What is Corruption corrupting? A philosophical viewpoint, Vol.13 No.1 Journal of

Money Laundering Control, Emerald Group Publishing, 2010. Pg.45

<sup>121</sup> Michael Levi, *Money Laundering and Its Regulation*, Article, July 2002. Available at

https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app

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However what the argument for the disconnection fails to spot is the close linkage

that exists between money laundering and corruption. In other words, Money

laundering and corruption habitually occur, with the presence of one underlining the

other<sup>122</sup>. In this regard, corruption breeds vast proceeds, the source and ownership

of which need to be covered up through the act of money laundering<sup>123</sup>. Therefore,

money laundering offers the platform for those engaged in corrupt activities as it

allows money launderers to enjoy their corrupt earnings without fear of exposing the

original source of the funds<sup>124</sup>. Confirming this notion, the ESAAMLG in statement

stated that 'Country policy makers should be aware ...... that money laundering is

the flip side of corruption and other criminal activity. Corruption is one of the

predicate offences for money laundering. Cutting off the means to use the proceeds

of crime is a major deterrent..... 125,

As such if corruption can channel the laundering of illicit proceeds from criminal

ventures, then, so too can money laundering facilitate corruption 126. For instance, if a

<sup>122</sup> Philip Gounev and Tihomir Bezlov O, Examining the links between Organised Crime and

Corruption, Article, 2010. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/home

affairs/doc\_centre/crime/docs/study\_on\_links\_between\_organised\_crime\_and\_corruption\_en.pdf

123 Ibid

124 Ibid

125 See http://www.esaamlg.org/documents\_storage/STRATEGIC\_PLAN\_05.pdf

<sup>126</sup> Op. Cit., David Chaikin and J.C. Sharman

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public officer is given a vast cash bribe in return for selecting a particular foreign

investor, the public officer, most often, will hide the illicit origins of the cash bribe,

thus, establishing the nexus between money laundering and corruption. This practice

is very much common in most developing countries with corrupt public officials.

3.4. What is Organized Crime?

The perception of organised crime covers a broad scope of illicit activities and

criminal groups therefore making it difficult to reach a universal definition of the

concept<sup>127</sup>. Historically, the United States President's Commission on Law and

Enforcement and Administration of Justice, in 1967, after asserting the official

position of the Mafia group, also known as 'La Cosa Nostra' described organised

crime as 'A society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people

and their government<sup>128</sup>. It involves thousands of criminals, working within structures

as complex as those of ant large corporation subjects to laws more rigidly enforced

than those of legitimate governments.......The core of organised crime activity is

the supplying of illegal goods and services'.....<sup>129</sup>. The United Nations Convention

<sup>127</sup> Marie Chene, *Organised Crime and Corruption*, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre Publication, May

28 2008. Available at http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm

<sup>128</sup> Op. Cit., Angela V M Leong,

129 Ibid

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against Transnational Organised Crime, adopted in November 2000, prefers a

broader definition of organised crime, thus, defining organised crime as 'a structured

group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in concert

with the aim of committing one of more serious crimes of offences established in

accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly, or indirectly, a financial

or other material benefit<sup>130</sup>. With this definition, the most known forms of organised

crime in current dispensation comprise drugs trafficking, arms and human trafficking

and terrorist financing<sup>131</sup>.

Two of the key elements of organised crime's modus operandi aside corruption, as

identified in some of the definitions of the concept of organised crime, are corruption

and money laundering. In this regard, the criminal organisations operate with some

permanence as a structured group, commit serious crime for profit, using extreme

violence and corruption as part of their modus operandi, and launder the illicit

proceeds of criminal ventures into the legal economy<sup>132</sup>. In this context, organised

crime is described as 'criminal activities for material benefit by groups that engage in

extreme violence, corruption of public officials including law enforcement and judicial

130 Ibid

131 See http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html

<sup>132</sup> Sabrina Adamoli, Andrea Di Nicola, Ernesto U. Savona and Paola Zoffi, 'Organised Crime Around

the World' Helsinki 1998.

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officers, penetration of the legitimate economy by the acts of racketeering and

money laundering, and interference in political process<sup>133</sup>.

3.4.1. Organised Crime and Money Laundering Nexus

Evidently, organised criminal groups frequently obtain their finances through their

criminal adventures, even if economic gain is not their motivating goal. As such, the

organised criminal groups tend to explore ways to secure and safeguard the illicit

proceeds from their criminal activities which are used to acquire power and prestige.

Accordingly, it is said that Money Laundering is the life blood of organised crime and

money laundering basically allows the illicit ventures of the criminal organised groups

and individuals to continue. This notion was reiterated in the case, Bank of Credit

and Commerce International (Overseas) ltd v Akindele<sup>134</sup>. This case up till date is still

regarded as one of the greatest money laundering scandal in the banking history. In

essence, the criminal activities of the organised criminal groups generate vast

proceeds for the groups and since clean money is deemed to worth more than dirty

money, the act of money laundering establishes the spur to legalise these illicit

proceeds by disguising the sources of the proceeds, changing or transferring the

proceeds to environments that are less prone to detection. Thus, with the act of

money laundering, organised criminal groups are able to uphold absolute control of

<sup>133</sup> Op. Cit., Edgardo Buscaglia and Jan van Dijk

134 See case details at http://www.ucc.ie/law/restitution/archive/englcases/akindele.htm

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their ill-gotten wealth, thereby, avoiding the detection or confiscation of the wealth by

regulatory authorities. Furthermore, the organised criminal groups with their money

laundering exploits are able to explore their illicit proceeds from their criminal

ventures without attracting the attention of the authorities to their underlying criminal

activities and most importantly providing a legit cover for their illicit source of

revenue. The ill-gotten wealth is then laundered through the financial institutions and

ploughed to finance legal and illegal activities. Thus, the act of money laundering

allows the organised criminal groups to draw capital from the legal economy as

inputs in their criminal ventures and then aid the diversification of such capital

through investments.

3.5. Money Laundering, Organised Crime, Corruption and Politics:

The correlation and impact in political structure and governance in

developing countries.

As previously stated, the exploits of money laundering, organised crime and

corruption in the political structures and processes of most developing countries

have undermined their political stability, democratic structure and process and good

governance, therefore instigating social and political unrest within the society.

Circumstantial evidence tends to confirm that, in many developing countries, there

are deep interdependent links between money laundering, organised crime, politics

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and the public sector, fostering in extreme cases a form of symbiosis between the state and criminal organisations 135. Criminal organisations need legitimate state structures to sustain and expand their activities 136. Hence, political corruption and state capture by criminal networks are common characteristics of countries with high levels of organised crime<sup>137</sup>. This is particularly factual in developing countries, where the vast profits accumulated by criminal activities including the drug trade make criminals powerful actors in these countries, thereby, allowing them to gain affluence on political process. Bribery of political office holders may be a relatively direct way to penetrate government structures<sup>138</sup>. But financial donations to political campaigns to strategic aspirants are also one of the means used by organised criminal groups or individuals to gain influence over elected political officials 139. Such was the case in Columbia when the President of the Country, Ernesto Samper, was accused of funding his campaign during the 1996 elections, with approximately US\$6million which was donated by the Cali Cocaine Cartel. 140

<sup>135</sup> Op. cit., Marie Chêne,

<sup>139</sup> VictorA.O. Adetula, *Money and Politics in Nigeria*, IFES-Nigeria 2008. Also available at http://www.ifes.org/files/MONEYandPOLITICSinNigeria.pdf

<sup>140</sup> George Henry Millard, 'Drugs and Organised Crime in Latin America' in the Journal of Money Laundering, Volume 1 November 1997

<sup>136</sup> Ibid

<sup>137</sup> Ibid

<sup>138</sup> Ibid

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Furthermore, money laundering would, short of use of violence infiltrate the political

composition within the society. This could be by the penetration of the enforcement

agencies or the political parties by the means of immense financing of political

process. The Inter-American Development Bank estimates the cost of violence

generated by organised crime in Latin America at US\$168 billion - equivalent to 15

per cent of Latin America's gross domestic product (GDP)<sup>141</sup>. The most extreme

cases are El Salvador and Colombia where the cost of violence is calculated at 25

per cent of their GDP for 2007<sup>142</sup>.

The West Africa region continues to be vulnerable to the exploits of organised crime

and corrupt practices due to persistent economic hardship, government deficiencies

coupled with weak governance 143. Consequently, the region has emerged as a

transit point for major international criminal trade such as drugs trafficking, which

remains, considerable, the most lucrative transnational criminal activity. Criminal

groups have also extended their activities to arms smuggling, human trafficking and

<sup>141</sup> Transparency International publication, Keeping Citizens Safe: An Anti-Corruption Agenda for the

Americas. Available at

http://www.transparency.org/news room/in focus/2011/keeping citizens safe americas

142 Ibid

<sup>143</sup> Op. Cit., Marie Chêne

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other illicit activities such as advance fee fraud internet fraud, and money

laundering<sup>144</sup>. As in other regions of the world, criminal groups in the region resort to

corruption to obtain protection from public officials, influence political decisions and

infiltrate state structures<sup>145</sup>.

Also politicians and government officials have been directly or indirectly linked to

criminal and corrupt activities 146. There are instances, in some developing countries,

where high ranking personalities who are in or close to political power, directly

involved in illicit and corrupt practices. For instance, the Nigeria's anti-corruption

agency, the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), once provided

evidence, which estimated the sum of money stolen by past and present Nigerian

rulers and laundered mainly in foreign banks at US\$521 billion<sup>147</sup>. The sum of

Nigeria's funds laundered by the past military rulers alone was estimated at US\$400

billion<sup>148</sup>. The consequence of this corrupt practice has been persistent inadequate

144 Ibid

145 Ibid

146 See http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF rms/no56/56-43.pdf

<sup>147</sup> Nigeria Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, *Military squanders \$400bn in 40 yrs*, May 18,

2005. Accessed at

http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Nigeria's\_past\_rulers\_stole\_\$400\_billion\_in\_public\_money

148 Ibid

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social amenities. Furthermore, the increasing cases of looting of the public treasury

and money laundering by, virtually, all the state governors have been so frightening,

such that one of the country's leading news magazines portrayed the state

governors as "State Exec-thieves" 149. For instance, the governor of one of the states,

Governor Joshua Dariye of Plateau State, was investigated by both the British and

the Nigerian authorities for 13 offences, which included money laundering and

corruption<sup>150</sup>. The investigation was in sequence to, amongst other corrupt activities,

a sum of £80,000 found on him whilst checking in to UK<sup>151</sup>. In another example, an

ex-governor of another state, Prince Abubakar Audu of Kogi State, was involved in

money laundering activity far away Bahamas Republic in the Caribbean<sup>152</sup>. The case

became public when the government of the Bahamas Republic alarmed the Nigeria

EFCC about the lodging of a sum of US\$5million in one of the banks in the Bahamas

by the erring governor 153

<sup>149</sup>see *The Guardian*, Nigerian Daily news magazine, January 1, 2006;

<sup>150</sup> Michael Peel, *Nigerian-Related Financial Crime and its Links with Britain*: An African Programme

Report, Nov. 2006. Accessed at

http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/nigeria1106.pdf

151 Ibid

152 see This Day, Nigerian daily news magazine, March 10, 2007

153 Ibid

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3.6 Conclusion

Corruption and organized crime are immense impediments to political development

and good governance while money laundering is at the heart of all profit-driven

crime. The political influence of criminal organizations weakens the social fabric,

collective ethical standards, and, ultimately, the democratic institutions of a

society<sup>154</sup>. This criminal influence can undermine countries undergoing the transition

to democratic systems, as in the case of some developing countries.

As of today, the infiltration of money laundering, organised crime and corruption into

the political structures of many developing countries continue to shake the

foundation of effective governance and also stalls political development. The exploits

of the drug cartels in the Latin America continue impact, adversely on the political

and democratic process of the region. While in majority of Africa, political corruption

continues to impede political development of the continent as a whole.

154 Accessed at http://www.fatf-

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**Chapter 4** 

Reconciling the conflicting priorities and legislative

developments in developing countries: the case of Anti

**Money Laundering Laws in Nigeria** 

4.1. Introduction

One of the most persistent economic and financial crimes in Nigeria, as of today, is

Money Laundering<sup>155</sup>. Although relatively unknown in the country until the late

1980s, Money laundering is now a veritable companion of the corruption virus which

has permeated every segment of the Nigerian society<sup>156</sup>. So much so, it is often said

that the country is the money laundering centre of Africa and that Nigerians around

the world are engaged in large scale crime and money laundering. 157

<sup>155</sup> Nlerum S Okogbule, Combating Money Laundering in Nigeria: An Appraisal of the Money

Laundering Prohibition Act 2004', Oxford Journals Law & Statute Law Review, Volume28, Issue2

(2007) 28(2): slr.oxfordjournals.org/content/28/2/156.full

156 Ibid

157 see *Vanguard*, Nigerian daily news magazine, October 25, 2005

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Between the mid-1980s and 1999, Nigeria lost an estimated US\$100billion to the

exploits of money laundering<sup>158</sup>. In the so celebrated democratic dispensation,

between 2001 and 2004, the country also lost an estimated US\$25billion to money

laundering. 159 Furthermore, more than 10 ex state governors and political leaders of

the country, who were alleged to have misappropriated public funds estimated at

USD\$250 billion have been arrested and charged to court<sup>160</sup>. Most of these funds

are alleged to be stuck away in western banks and offshore centres, while a

significant amount have been laundered through the acquisition of real estate, luxury

cars and purchase of high net worth shares in blue chip companies. Law

enforcement officials also reported that half of Nigeria's \$40 billion annual oil

revenue is stolen or wasted<sup>161</sup>.

By its very characteristic, money laundering is a criminal offence that involves

several persons and entities in its conception, planning, and execution. It has the

capability to distort and corrupt the economic system, inhibit the economic

development efforts of countries and stall political development. It is in recognition of

its adverse consequences on the national and international economic and political

158 Ibid

159 Ibid

<sup>160</sup> Op. Cit., GIABA,

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

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structures that a number of legislative measures have been taken to combat the

menace in Nigeria.

4.2. Development of Anti Money Laundering Laws in Nigeria

On the global stage, the OECD countries facilitated the establishment of Financial

Action Task Force (FATF) to confront the menace of the phenomenon of money

laundering<sup>162</sup>. Since its establishment, FATF has succeeded in instigating proactive

measures in combating the menace of money laundering. Furthermore, the

organization has persistently made solid suggestions on how national legislations

dealing with the menace of money laundering should be constructed. As such,

several countries, in response, have enacted national laws precisely constructed to

address the crime of money laundering within their jurisdictions. The first significant

legislative measure in Nigeria was taken in 1989, with the National Drug Law

Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act, which brought Nigeria into line with the Vienna

Convention. 163 However, in 1995, whilst under the military rule, Nigeria enacted the

Money Laundering Degree<sup>164</sup>. At the time, the aims of the Money Laundering Decree

<sup>162</sup> Op. Cit., Nlerum. S Okogbula

<sup>163</sup> Robert Hull, Jonathan Evans 7 Stephen Davis, *Money Laundering and Nigeria*: Niger Delta and

Security Strategy Working Papers, March 2011.

<sup>164</sup> Section 1 1995.

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were, among others, to make certain that a documentary trail is left in all money

laundering transactions through banks as well as create closer link between banks

and the National Drug Law enforcement Agency (NDLEA) with the goal of preventing

and haunting down money launderers. 165 To this extent, the decree, restricted the

sum of cash transactions, in the country, to N500, 000.00 in the case of an individual

and N2, 000,000.00 in the case of a corporate body. 166

Furthermore, the Decree provided that transactions above the restrictions were to be

disclosed to the NDLEA, in writing, within 7 days<sup>167</sup>. Also, the NDLEA could, in the

quest to identify and locate narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, proceeds,

property, objects or other things related to the commission of a money laundering

offence: (a) place any bank account and account comparable to a bank account

under surveillance: (b) place under surveillance or tap any telephone line: (c) have

access to any computer system; and (d) obtain communication or any authentic

instrument or private contract, together with all bank, financial and commercial

record, when the account, telephone line, or computer system is used or may be

used by any person suspected of performing or taking part in a transaction involving

the proceeds, property or things or when the instrument, contract or record concern

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

166 Ibid

<sup>167</sup> Section 10.

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or may concern the transaction. 168 Also, the decree set up Military style tribunals

under the Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offence) Decree 1984, as amended try

offences under this decree. Further provisions of the decree created severe

penalties for offences relating to money laundering and financial crimes, ranging

from long jail sentences, heavy fines and forfeiture of assets.

However, as much as the decree was intended to resolve the menace of money

laundering practices, there were apparent loopholes that militated against its

effective implementation<sup>169</sup>. In the context of Nigeria, this is not unexpected, because

the typical pattern of legislation in the country hardly takes perception of all the

conditions before a law is enacted. This problem was more apparent during the

military rule where decrees were rolled out after meetings of the military-dominated

ruling councils without legislative debate 170. The ineffectiveness of the decree in

combating money laundering and a presumed conception of the country's political

administration's unwillingness or inability to address the menace led to the country

being placed on the NCCTs list in June 2001. In response, the succeeding

democratic government considerably improved willingness to address the country's

anti-money laundering deficiencies and also cooperate more with FAFT. Thus, on 14

December 2002, Nigeria enacted the Money Laundering Act (Amendment) Act 2002.

168 Section 12

<sup>169</sup> Op. Cit., Nlerum. S Okogbula

170 Ibid

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In essence, the Act improved the scope of the 1995 Money Laundering Decree by

expanding predicate offences for money laundering from drugs to "any crime or

illegal act<sup>171</sup>. The Act also expanded particular AML obligations to non-bank

financial institutions, and extended customer identification requirements to include

frequent transactions of USD 5,000 or more. Furthermore, in December 2002,

Nigeria enacted the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC)

(Establishment) Act<sup>172</sup>. The EFCC was commissioned in April 2003 and was charged

to investigate money laundering cases from predicate offences other than drug

trafficking and in addition to enforce the money laundering legislation of 1995 (as

amended in 2002)<sup>173</sup>.

Flowing from the Implementation Plan prepared by an inter-agency technical

committee, set up by the EFCC in 2003, the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit

(NFIU) was also established. The NFIU draws its power from the EFCC

Establishment Act 2004 and the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004. In

shaping its creation and operation, abundant cognition was taken of

Recommendation 26 of the FATF, Article 7 (1) (b) of the United Nation Convention

against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention), the statement of

<sup>171</sup> Op. Cit., FATF Annual Review of NCCT

172 Ibid

173 Ibid

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Purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, and Articles 14 & 58 of

the UN Convention against Corruption. All these provisions point to the need for

every jurisdiction to create a national central body responsible for the collection and

analysis of data for the purpose of referring financial information on suspected

money laundering activities to the appropriate law enforcement agency and

regulatory / supervisory institution.<sup>174</sup>

4.2.1. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)

The EFCC is a Nigerian law enforcement agency that investigates financial crimes

such as advance fee fraud and money laundering 175. The EFCC was established in

2003, partially in response to pressure from the Financial Action Task Force on

Money Laundering (FATF), which named Nigeria as one of 23 countries non-

cooperative in the international community's efforts to fight money laundering.

According to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act,

2004, the EFCC is the designated Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in Nigeria, which

is charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating the various institutions involved in

<sup>174</sup> Money Laundering in Nigeria and Ongoing Efforts to Tackle the Problem, Paper by Gulf of Guinea

Energy Security Group, Washington, November 2005

175 "The Establishment Act" Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. See

http://www.efccnigeria.org/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=30

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the fight against money laundering and enforcement of all laws dealing with

economic and financial crimes in Nigeria<sup>176</sup>.

So far, the Commission has been able to and still recording successes in several

areas of its mandate. Among others, it has recorded several convictions on

corruption, money laundering, oil pipeline vandalism and related offences<sup>177</sup>. Assets

and money worth over \$11 billion have been recovered from corrupt officials and

their cohorts. The Commission is tenacious with over 65 high profile cases at

advanced stages of prosecution in several courts in Nigeria and over 1500 other

cases in court and secured over 600 convictions<sup>178</sup>. The Commission successfully

prosecuted one of the biggest fraud cases in the world involving about \$242 million

arising from a bank fraud in Brazil<sup>179</sup>. It has increased the revenue profile of the

nation due to its collaboration with the Federal Inland Revenue Service and the

176 Ibid

<sup>177</sup> A paper presented by Dr. (Mrs.) Farida Waziri AIG (rtd), FWC, OFR. Executive Chairman The

Economic & Financial Crimes Commission, at the United Nations Conference on Least Developed

Countries (LDC – IV), Istanbul, Turkey

178 Ibid

179 Ibid

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Seaports and has recovered revenue in excess of N75 billion, (over \$500million US

Dollars) for government 180.

4.2.2. The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Acts

On 29 March 2004, Nigerian national assembly enacted the Money Laundering

(Prohibition) Act 2004 181. The Act essentially superseded and improved upon the

previous versions of the Act. The Act created the framework for a wider STR and

customer identification system<sup>182</sup>, AML obligations for a wider range of financial and

non-financial institutions<sup>183</sup>, and a framework for the Nigerian Financial Intelligent

Unit (NFIU) within the EFCC<sup>184</sup>. The NFIU became operational in January 2005.

Furthermore, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004 makes different

provisions prohibiting the laundering of the proceeds criminal activity 185, and

provides for appropriate penalties for money laundering infringements<sup>186</sup>. Precisely,

180 Ibid

<sup>181</sup> See http://www.nassnig.org/nass/acts.php?pageNum bill=4&totalRows bill=151

<sup>182</sup> Section 3

183 Section7

<sup>184</sup> Section 25

<sup>185</sup> Section 14

<sup>186</sup> Section 16

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the Act provides that any person or corporation or organisation is allowed to make or

accept cash payments of a sum an excess of N500, 000.00 or its equivalent in the

case of an individual, and N2, 000,000.00 or its equivalent in the case of a

corporation, unless such cash payment or acceptance is undertaken through a

financial institution<sup>187</sup>. Also, a transfer of funds or securities to or from a foreign

country in excess of US\$10,000 or its naira equivalent must be reported to the

central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in

the case of a public corporation <sup>188</sup>.

The provisions of the Act, further, stipulates the mandatory reporting of all monetary

transfers to and from outside the country and must indicate the nature of the transfer,

the amount of the transfer, the names and addresses of the sender and the receiver

of the funds or securities that were transferred, and the ultimate beneficiary of the

transfer if different from the latter persons<sup>189</sup>. The federal High Court has the

exclusive jurisdiction to try offences under the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act,

2004. In the trial of offences under this Act, the Federal high Court is authorise to

admit collaborating evidence establishing that an accused person is on possession

of property for which he or she cannot satisfactorily provide an account and which

187 Section 1

<sup>188</sup> Section 2

<sup>189</sup> Section 2 (2)

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property is disproportionate to his or her known sources of income<sup>190</sup>.

However the Act has been repealed by the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act

2011. The Act 2011 was signed by the current Nigerian president, Jonathan Good

luck in June 2011<sup>191</sup>. The Act makes comprehensive provisions to prohibit the

financing of terrorism, and the laundering of the proceeds of crime or illegal acts<sup>192</sup>. It

expands the scope of supervisory and regulatory authorities so as to address the

challenges faced in the implementation of the anti-money laundering regime in

Nigeria<sup>193</sup>. It also makes provision for appropriate penalties for offenders. The Act

places a duty on bankers and other financial institutions to report international

transfers of funds exceeding \$10,000 to the Central Bank from where the records

can be accessed by security operatives<sup>194</sup>.

<sup>190</sup> Section 19

<sup>191</sup> See http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/06/jonathan-signs-terrorism-money-laundering-bills-into-

law/

192 See http://news2.onlinenigeria.com/latest-addition/98547-president-goodluck-jonathan-signs-

terrorism-money-laundering-bills-into-law.html

193 Ibid

Amos Dunia, Senate passes money laundering bill Wednesday, The Sun (Nigerian) online news

magazine March 2, 2011. Accessed at

http://64.182.81.172/webpages/news/national/2011/mar/02/national-2-03-2011-08.htm

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4.2.3. Other Legislative Measures

Another important Nigerian body in the fight against money laundering is the

Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), established in 2000. Its main

tasks are to investigate reports of corrupt practices, to eradicate corruption in public

bodies and to educate the public against corruption. 195 The ICPC also lists amongst

its duties the prevention of corruption through studies of systems, practices and

procedure. 196 Whilst the EFCC is an investigation and prosecution body focused on

financial crime, the ICPC has a broader mandate to tackle corruption in all forms

both by investigation and education<sup>197</sup>.

The amendments made to legislation in 2002 gave greater responsibility to the

Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in dealing with money laundering. In particular, they

allow the governor greater power to intervene in the banking sector in order to

safeguard confidence in the financial system as a whole. The CBN has also been

given a greater role in financial sector surveillance, identifying trends and patterns of

<sup>195</sup> ICPC website, http://www.icpcnigeria.com/

<sup>196</sup> Ibid

<sup>197</sup> Dr David U Enweremadu, 'Anti-Corruption Policies in Nigeria; A discussion paper, No 1, Nov 2010.

Accessed at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/07813.pdf

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corruption in banks and other monetary institutions. 198 The CBN has directed all commercial banks in Nigeria to report any transaction of a sum over half a million naira (US \$5,000). The CBN then transmits all such reports to the National Economic Intelligence Committee (NEIC). This system is set up to monitor money sources and uses, track spending patterns and generally forestall terrorist activity. Anyone who cannot satisfactorily explain a transaction over a half million naira may be charged under the Exchange Control (Anti-Sabotage) Act, which carries a minimum penalty of five years in prison for individuals, and a fine of N 100,000 (US \$1000) for corporate enterprises. Legal persons can also be charged with money laundering under the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act, which carries a penalty of ten years to life in prison, and forfeiture of assets. If a bank fails to report transactions for amounts over a half million naira, it may carry a penalty of imprisonment, fines, or both. Corporations convicted of such an offense may be

The CBN also has a responsibility to coordinate efforts among financial organisations to increase efficiency in regulatory oversight. This is done through the

Customer," to banks throughout Nigeria, as well as convening seminars and conferences on this issue. The CBN is also working closely with the EFCC to introduce technologically advanced computer systems that can identify trends in untoward financial transactions.

199 http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/NationalLaws/Nigeria.pdf

forced to forfeit its property and assets. 199

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>198</sup> This has been through a variety of ways, including the distribution of a booklet, "Know Your

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Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee (FSRCC), 200 representing a framework for coordination of regulatory and supervisory activities in the Nigerian

financial sector.

Alongside the work of the CBN to monitor the banking sector the Nigerian Stock

Exchange has a number of structures and measures in place to check money

laundering in Nigeria. These include a Central Securities Clearing System (CSCS)

aimed at making transactions more transparent, Administrative Guidelines to ensure

the proper documentation of legitimate capital importation through Nigerian banks, a

Know Your Client Requirement and membership of the International Federation of

Stock Exchanges, which subjects them to international standards and code of best

practice.201

The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act, the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring

and Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree (previously the now repealed Exchange

Control (Anti-Sabotage) Act) and the Money Laundering Act all authorize the

<sup>200</sup> The FRSCC's members are the Central Bank of Nigeria (as chairman), the Securities and

Exchange Commission, National Insurance Commission, Corporate Affairs Commission and the

Federal Ministry of Finance. Observers are the National Board for Community Banks, the Nigerian

Stock Exchange and the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation.

<sup>201</sup> Dr (Mrs.) Ndi Onyiuke-Okereke, "The Role Of The Nigerian Stock Exchange In Combating Money

Laundering In Nigeria", Paper Presented At The Fourth National Seminar On Economic Crimes

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freezing of assets. Freezing accounts may be administrative or judicial, coming from

the Central Bank of Nigeria, or as the result of a judgment handed by an authorized

court or tribunal. Assets can be frozen at the request of another government in cases

where both governments share mutual legal treaties in cases of criminal or civil

matters.<sup>202</sup>

Other legislative measures that Nigeria has taken in response to combating money

laundering and other financial crimes include 1991 Banks and Other Financial

Institutions Act (BOFIA), amended in 2002, 1993 Advanced Fee Fraud and Other

Related Offences Decree, 1994 Failed Banks (Recovery of Debt and Financial

Malpractice in Banks) Act, 1995 Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences

Decree (creating "419" offences), 2000 Corrupt Practices and Other Related

Offences Act (establishing the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission), 2002

Electoral Act (replaced 2001 Electoral Act)

4.3. Conflicting Priorities

Undoubtedly, Nigeria has made significant progress over the last decade, particularly

since the democratic dispensation, in implementing its AML regimes. The country

was placed on the FATF NCCT list in 2002, as well as the US Financial Advisory list

in 2004, due to the presumption of the country's administration's incapability of

<sup>202</sup> See http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/NationalLaws/Nigeria.pdf

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dealing with the exploits of money laundering and other financial crimes  $^{203}$ . However,

over the years, efforts, in forms of legislation and enforcement, have been made to

tackle, particularly, the phenomenon of money laundering. There have been

successes in the prosecution and conviction of highly placed individuals and even

politicians involved in money laundering and corrupt practices. Thus, in

acknowledging the progress made by the Nigerian government in combating money

laundering, as well as other financial crimes, the FAFT in 2006 delisted the

country<sup>204</sup>. Also, the country was also delisted from the US Financial Advisory list in

2007 and was admitted into the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, also in

2007.<sup>205</sup>

As much success as the country has achieved in tackling money laundering, there

are still fundamental problems in Nigeria's AML regime. Predominantly, the lax of the

country's political ruling class towards addressing the menace of money laundering

has always been a course for concern. In this regard, the government has been

criticised for its lack of willingness to adequately the menace of money laundering in

<sup>203</sup> See http://www.fatf-

gafi.org/document/54/0,3746,en\_32250379\_32236992\_33919542\_1\_1\_1\_1,00.html

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/14/11/39552632.pdf

<sup>205</sup> GIABA, Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of

Terrorism7 May 2008. Accessed at

http://www.giaba.org/media/M\_evalu/Mutual%20Evaluation%20Report%20of%20Nigeria.pdf

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the country. This manifests itself in various ways, not least with regard to inadequate

funding of the EFCC and ICPC. For example, in 2003 the ICPC received only half

the funds it was expecting from the Federal Government, causing its Chairman,

Justice Mustapha Akanbi, to declare that little work was possible outside Abuja. 206 In

comparison to a country like Hong Kong, which spends \$12.5 dollars per head each

year for corruption investigation, the N500 million funding received by the ICPC each

year represents 3 to 4 US cents per head each year. 207 Whilst the higher

government funding promised to the EFCC, a figure in the region of N1.1 billion,

remains a frustration for the former chairman of the ICPC, the EFCC has pointed out

that its biggest financial supporters are overseas organisations such as the

European Union and World Bank.<sup>208</sup>

Furthermore, the lack of commitment has also manifested itself, ironically, through

anti-money laundering measures. A good example was the 2003 Corrupt Practices

and Other Related Offences Commission Act, passed by the Senate but later

blocked by the High Court.<sup>209</sup> This law appeared to reflect a resolve to tackle money

laundering, but in fact would have taken away most of the ICPC's powers of

investigation and loosened regulation on public officials who grant contracts. Another

<sup>206</sup> TI report and ThisDay, 23 January 2003

<sup>207</sup> Shola Oshunkeye, "Five Years of Nightmares", in *Tell*, (43) October 2005

<sup>208</sup> Dayo Aieyan, "How the EFCC works", in *Tell*, (24) June 2005

<sup>209</sup> Robert Hull, Jonathan Evans & Steven Davis, op cit.

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example is the 2002 Electoral Act, which empowered the Independent National

Electoral Commission (INEC) to limit donations to political parties by individuals or

corporate bodies. Despite this provision, INEC did not make proceedings against any

party or candidate in the 2003 elections, despite widespread allegations of

corruption<sup>210</sup>. In another instance, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 that

was signed into law in June 2011 was in rapid response to the threat by the FAFT to

re-enlist the country in to NNC list. It took up over two years for the national law

makers to agree to the provisions of the Act.

This concern was highlighted by the FAFT when the organization expressed

dissatisfaction on Nigeria's handling of its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) policies.

Subsequently, Nigeria was classified as a high risk to the world's financial system.

The FATF position on Nigeria's anti-money laundering campaign was contained in a

publication where it said Nigeria, amongst other countries, was posing risk, because

of the way they have been handling issues relating to money laundering. Although

Nigeria has put in place a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and

to address its strategic Anti Money Laundering and combating financing of Terrorism

(IFT) deficiencies, the FATF is not yet satisfied that Nigeria has made sufficient

progress in the implementation of its action plan and that certain deficiencies remain.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid

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4.4 Platform for effective implementation of AML Measures

On evidence, uncurbed money laundering, along with other financial crimes, destruct

the process of effective governance as well as political process, along with economic

distortion. Hence, it is vital to effectively implement AML measures in combating the

scourge. As such, the following recommendations are made in ensuring an effective

implementation of AML measures:

Allocation of more budgetary resources for effective implementation of the

enacted AML laws.

Creation of Special Economic Crime Courts and develop their own stand-

alone infrastructure and statutes.

Prioritise implementation of AML/CFT measures when allocating budgetary

resources to law enforcement agencies, prosecutorial authorities, and other

competent authorities.

Development of the capacity of existing institutions dealing with AML/CFT

matters in terms of additional financial, human, technical resources

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Strengthen and improve national coordination and close cooperation among

law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and other competent authorities.

Development and promotion of mechanisms for effective Cooperation and

exchange of information on AML/CFT matters.

Consulting and engaging with stakeholders in the private sector when

reviewing the national implementation plan.

Allocation necessary budgetary resources to key stakeholders at national

level to promote the integration of AML issues into national development

programmes.

Enactment of legislation that will allow for the prosecution of Nigerians in

diaspora for crimes committed outside the country that breach national and

international laws.

• Creation of an independent body to supervise the work of the enforcement

agencies such as EFCC, so as to attain a high level of transparency.

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4.5 Conclusion

The roots of money laundering and other financial crimes are deeply embedded in

the Nigerian society; therefore uprooting them will require the application of all the

available mechanisms of the constitution, good governance and international

support. Combating and preventing money laundering, has become a sine qua non

for Nigeria's development, otherwise the Constitution and the government will

become meaningless to the existence of the Nigerian citizenry. On the whole,

economic and financial crimes have become a cancerous growth that has gone from

being benign to malignant in the Nigerian society, it is therefore necessary for the

country to rethink the boundary of constitutional and governmental practices to

evolve means to effectively contain, curtail and control financial crimes, so that they

do not terminate the development and existence of the Nigerian nation state.

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**CHAPTER 5** 

Concluding remarks

Indeed, the phenomenon of money laundering is a menace to every nation

irrespective of economic and political status. In essence, uncurbed money

laundering spreads across the economic and socio – political spheres of a nation.

Consequently, over the last two decades, in particular, measures to combat the

exploits of money laundering have become the focus of an intense international

effort. Right at the international stage, the UN initiated the legal framework to

combat the scourge. Subsequently, major international and regional organisations

followed on the initiative of the UN. In this regard the FAFT remains today the

principal agency, internationally, for the fight against the phenomenon. In other

words, the FAFT initiates the regulatory measures in combating money laundering

and these measures serve as the platforms for subsequent national regulatory

measures implemented nationally in most countries across the globe.

Developing countries, particularly, have been more vulnerable to the exploits of

money laundering, amongst other economic and financial crimes. In other words, the

phenomenon of money laundering, amongst other economic and financial crimes

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have had better success in infiltrating into the economic and political structures of most developing countries therefore resulting to economic digression and political instability. Although, developing countries have responded and continue to respond, through legislative measures, to the menace of money laundering, at national level, however, money launders, with other criminals, have exploited the lax regulatory environment, vulnerable financial systems along with persistence civil and political unrest of most the developing countries, Thus, these criminals have found these countries as havens for their criminal activities. Therefore it is paramount for the developing countries restructure, as a priority, their economic and socio political mechanisms of their nations in their quest to fight the phenomenon of money laundering. Furthermore, these countries need to be more assertive and coordinative in the implementation and enforcement of their national AML measures. Also, the developing countries need to adhere efficiently to the international AML measures

Fundamentally, it will continue to require international effort in combating the phenomenon of money laundering. The fact that, over the last decade, developing countries have been more exposed and vulnerable to the exploits of money laundering does not mean the crime is more of a menace in developing countries. For one thing, vast of the money laundered across the globe comes from developed countries. Also the increasing disproportion in the financial and political systems as

and establish a solid working relationship with international AML agencies.

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well as law enforcements between developed and developing countries will continue to cajole the diversion of laundered money to developing countries. Therefore, it is paramount to address the structurally imbalances in the fight against money

laundering amongst other economic and financial crimes.

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