Citation: Kalderon, Mark (2007) Moral Fictionalism, the Frege–Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference. In: St Andrews Metaethics Workshop, 5 May 2007.
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Abstract
One advantage of a fictionalist noncognitivism is that is not subject to the same semantic difficulties that the Frege–Geach problem poses for standard noncognitivism. But some, Matti Eklund prominent among them, have argued that the Frege–Geach problem arises in a new form for moral fictionalism. I argue that this is less of a problem than a reasonable query—a query that the account in Moral Fictionalism has the resources to answer.Lecture
Metadata
| Creators: | Kalderon, Mark and |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Philosophy |
| Keywords: | Fictionalism, Non-cognitivism |
| Divisions: | Institute of Philosophy |
| Collections: | London Philosophy Papers |
| Dates: |
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| Comments and Suggestions: | Description/Provenance: Submitted by Mark McBride (mark.mcbride@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-11-05T12:05:05Z
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Previous issue date: 2007. Date accessioned: 2007-11-05T12:05:05Z; Date available: 2007-11-05T12:05:05Z; Date issued: 2007. |