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Abstract

Moral Fictionalism, the Frege–Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference


One advantage of a fictionalist noncognitivism is that is not subject to the same semantic difficulties that the Frege–Geach problem poses for standard noncognitivism. But some, Matti Eklund prominent among them, have argued that the Frege–Geach problem arises in a new form for moral fictionalism. I argue that this is less of a problem than a reasonable query—a query that the account in Moral Fictionalism has the resources to answer.Lecture

Kalderon, Mark (2007) Moral Fictionalism, the Frege–Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference. In: St Andrews Metaethics Workshop, 5 May 2007.


Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item (Lecture)
Subjects:Philosophy
Keywords:Fictionalism, Non-cognitivism
Divisions:Institute of Philosophy
Collections:London Philosophy Papers
Deposited By:Repository Administrator
Date Deposited:08 Oct 2010 12:01
Last Modified:11 Jan 2011 13:49
ItemID:612
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