

On Being Alienated

Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a case of veridical perception like this very kind of experience that you now have, the experiential episode you enjoy is of a kind which could not be occurring were you having an hallucination. The common strategy of arguments from hallucination set out to show that certain things are true of hallucinations, and hence must be true of perceptions. For example, it is argued that hallucinations must have non-physical objects of awareness, or that such states are not relations to anything at all, but are at best seeming relations to objects. In insisting that veridical perceptual experience is of a distinct kind from hallucination, the disjunctivist denies that any of these conceptions of hallucination challenges our conception of veridical perceptions as relations to mind-independent objects.

More specifically, I assume that the disjunctivist advocates naïve realism because they think that this position best articulates how sensory experience seems to us to be just through reflection. If the disjunctivist is correct in this contention, then anyone who accepts the conclusion of the argument from hallucination must also accept that the nature of sensory experience is other than it seems to us to be. In turn, one may complain that any such error theory is liable to lead to sceptical consequences. A Humean scepticism about the senses launches a challenge about our knowledge of the world through questioning the conception we have of what sense experience is, and how it can provide knowledge of the world. If the conception one has of how one knows something is falsified, then one's claim to that knowledge can seem to be undermined. We seem to be cut off from the world through lacking the kind of contact with it that we supposed ourselves to have.

Note that this sceptical problem is not the same as the more familiar scepticism with regard to the external world associated with

the Meditations. The Cartesian sceptical challenge can be formulated on the basis that it is conceivable that one should be in a situation which seemed, from the perspective one then occupied, to be no different from this situation, even if in that circumstance one cannot know anything about the world because one has been deprived of the conditions necessary for perceiving and coming to know how things are around one. The challenge then made is for one to demonstrate to the challenger's or one's own satisfaction that one does not occupy this situation. The initial hypothesis does not require that one make any assumption about the nature of perceptual experiences, and in particular does not require that one assume that the very same experiential episodes could occur in hallucination as in perception. It would be a mistake, therefore, to suppose that advocating disjunctivism might address directly this kind of problem. The disjunctivist is not concerned with Cartesian scepticism, but rather concerned to defend a common understanding we have of perceptual contact with the world, and hence a naïve understanding of how we in a position to know about and think of the kinds of objects that we perceive and track through the use of our senses. Disjunctivism so conceived is reactive: it blocks a line of argument which would threaten to show we have no knowledge of the empirical world because we lack the kind of perceptual access to it we supposed ourselves to have. This need not be intended to answer Descartes's challenge, so the proposal should not be assessed by how well or badly it does that.

Now one might doubt that this sketch offers a coherent motivation for disjunctivism. For example, one might suppose that some form of intentional theory of perception, which emphasises the idea that we can think of our perceptual experiences as representational states about or directed on the world, is as well placed to articulate our commonsense conception of perceiving as naïve realism. Or, one might question whether the kind of consequence that rejecting such a commonsense conception of experience would have for our understanding of our knowledge of, and reference to, the things around us in the environment: so an error theory of perception is quite acceptable. But for the sake of this paper, I would like the reader to assume that only naïve realism correctly captures the common sense conception of perception; and that rejecting common sense leads to scepticism. For I suspect that there are many philosophers who are inclined to think that even if the disjunctivist could establish these concerns as a serious motivation for the doctrine, still the theory itself would be unacceptable because of the consequences the theory has elsewhere in our conception of the mind; namely in relation to the character of sensory experience and our awareness of that character.

What I want to do here is to try and articulate somewhat more the kind of gut resistance to disjunctivism that many feel (of course I may rather be

too sympathetic to the project to succeed in doing this). Indeed the aim here is to try and locate as best I can what should be the most fundamental point of disagreement between a disjunctivist position and any of the alternatives. From a disjunctivist perspective, resistance to the account will be based on a false picture, either of sensory experience, or of the kind of knowledge we have of it. If we can locate the place of most fundamental disagreement, the disjunctivist will then be placed to try and offer an explanation of why it should seem so counter-intuitive even if true.

In the bulk of the paper I will be taken up with identifying and elaborating the fundamental disagreements here. They will turn on the possibility according to the disjunctivist that someone should be a certain way experientially simply in virtue of their situation being indiscriminable through reflection from veridical perception. This seems to describe a situation, according to the opposing intuition, in which phenomenal consciousness itself has been left out of the picture. In the first part of the paper, though, I aim to present in a compact form what I take to be the fundamental commitments of disjunctivism. In this part I précis and slightly revise material I expand on elsewhere.¹ I then turn to the formulation of this worry about the seeming absence of phenomenal consciousness and its relation to older concerns about absent qualia. In turn this raises questions about the role of higher-order perspectives in characterising disjunctivism. I aim to sketch opposing models of how phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness fit together. In the brief, final section I connect these different models to different reactions to external world scepticism.

Part One

1. We can see the distinctive content of disjunctivism about the theory of perception as comprising three basic commitments.² As I will argue, the commitment which seems most clearly counter-intuitive is the third of these, and our discussion for much of the rest of this paper will focus on what is and is not involved in this final commitment. I'll spell out each of the commitments in turn, setting each in the context of motivations for it, and exploring some of the consequences, aiming to show that the third

1. The bulk of this section is an extremely compressed discussion of the first few sections of; (Martin 2004) and beyond that, Ch. 3 and Ch. 8 of *Uncovering Appearances* (forthcoming).

2. The disjunctive theory of appearances (such labelling, I think, is due to Howard Robinson in (Robinson 1985), is first propounded by Michael Hinton in (Hinton 1967), and elaborated further in (Hinton 1973); the view was then defended further by Paul Snowdon in (Snowdon 1980-81) and (Snowdon 1990); and separately by John McDowell in (McDowell 1982); see also (McDowell 1994) and (McDowell 1995). There are significant differences in the formulation and motivation for each of these approaches. I discuss a little of this in (Martin 2004).

and most problematic commitment flows from the motivations associated with more familiar elements of disjunctivism.

The first commitment reflects the antecedent acceptance of Naïve Realism. Taking as our starting point one of entirely veridical perception, a visual perception, say, of a white picket fence as the thing it is, the disjunctivist's first claim is:

(I) No instance of the specific kind of experience I have now, when seeing the white picket fence for what it is, could occur were I not to perceive such a mind-independent object as this.

We should understand this claim as the rejection of what McDowell calls, 'the highest common factor' view of sense experience.³ A naïve realist view of (entirely veridical) perceptual experience is as that of a relation between the perceiver and objects of perception. Taking sensory experiences to be events, these objects of perception are to be understood as constituents of the event in question. The naïve realist supposes it is an aspect of the essence of such experiential episodes that they have such experience-independent constituents.

Naïve realism is commonly taken to be falsified by the argument from illusion or hallucination. There are various formulations of the argument, few of them valid. For our purposes, we can best understand it as a form of *reductio* against naïve realism. That is to say, one will argue that the existence of naïve realist experience is inconsistent with two further claims which have broad acceptance: what we might call *Experiential Naturalism*, that our sense experiences are themselves part of the natural causal order, subject to broadly physical and psychological causes; the second, *Common Kind Assumption*, that whatever kind of mental, or more narrowly experiential, event occurs when one perceives, the very same kind of event could occur were one hallucinating.

In the context of these two assumptions, we can show that veridical perception could not be a relation of awareness to mind-independent objects, as the naïve realist supposes. Either, along with sense-datum theories, one holds to the thought that sense experience is relational, and accept that its objects must be mind-dependent; or, with representational or intentional theories of perception, one supposes that sense experience itself is not strictly a relation to the object of awareness at all, although typically we characterise awareness as if it were such a relation. The argument moves first through considering what the nature of hallucination must be, given Experiential Naturalism, and then generalising from that to the case of veridical perception, using the Common Kind Assumption.

For, granting Experiential Naturalism, we need simply add the common observation that it is possible to bring about an hallucinatory experi-

3. See the McDowell works cited in the last footnote.

ence through suitable manipulation of brain and mind. Someone who succeeds in producing an hallucination in a subject does not have to induce an appropriate correlation between the subject and any other entities beyond the subject's brain or the mind. Or, if there are such necessary conditions of the occurrence of an hallucinatory experience (that other such entities should exist and be suitably related to the experience), then the causes of experience must also be sufficient to guarantee that these additional conditions obtain. From this we can derive the disjunction either that hallucinatory experiences lack any constituent elements, and hence impose no such necessary conditions on their occurrence, or that the constituent elements they have are themselves constitutively dependent on the occurrence of that kind of experience. In such a situation, the causal conditions for experience will be sufficient for it to occur, since bringing about such an experience will thereby guarantee the obtaining of what are necessary conditions for it.

Now, suppose for the moment that hallucinatory experiences do meet the second of these models: they possess constituent elements which are experience-dependent.⁴ Then, by the Common Kind Assumption, whatever kind of experience does occur when one perceives, the same kind of experience can be present when one is hallucinating. So if an hallucinatory experience must be of a kind which constitutes the existence of its objects, then since the very same kind of experience is also present when perceiving, that too will constitute the existence of its objects. That is, for any aspect of the perceptual experience the naïve realist hypothesises to be a relation to a mind-independent entity, consideration of the corresponding hallucination shows the entity in that case to be mind-dependent, and hence that any experience of that kind to thereby have a mind-dependent object rather than any mind-independent one.⁵ Mind-independent entities cannot then be constituents of the experience, *contra* the naïve realist.

This gives the naïve realist reason to reject this conception of hallucination, a conception familiar from sense-datum accounts, and hence one which generally people might construe as implausible anyway. The alternative is to deny that the hallucination has any constituent elements. What account of hallucination is consistent with this denial? The commonest approach is to embrace a representationalist or intentionalist construal of experience. The denial that the experience has any constituent elements must be made consistent with the evident fact that, from the subject's perspective, it is as if there are various objects of awareness presented as being

4. This is to conceive of hallucinations along the lines discussed by sense-datum theorists from the second-half of the twentieth century on, for example in, (Jackson 1977), (Robinson 1994) and (Foster 1986).

5. I assume here, in effect, that there cannot be constitutive over-determination of the veridical perceptual experience such that it is both a relation to the mind-dependent entity and the mind-independent one.

some way or other. That is to say, whenever one has a sense experience such as seemingly viewing a white picket fence, one's experience has a subject matter (as we might say), there seemingly is a particular kind of scene presented to the subject in having the experience. And it looks as if the description of this subject matter carries with it a commitment to the existence of what the naïve realist thinks of as the constituents of experience in the case of veridical perception. Since we deny that there are any such constituents of the experience in the hallucinatory case, our talk here must be lacking in ontological import. We are treating the hallucinatory experience as if it is the presentation of objects when in fact it is not. Intentional theories of experience take the description of the subject matter of an experience to express the representational or intentional content of the experiential state. The experience has its phenomenal character, according to this approach, in virtue of its possession of this content. In general we take ascriptions of representational content to psychological states to lack ontological commitment.⁶

Again, by the Common Kind Assumption, whatever kind of experience occurs when one perceives, that same kind of event will be present when one hallucinates. So if the hallucinatory experience lacks any constituents, then the perceptual experience, being of the same kind, does not have any constituents either. Although there may be objects which do act as appropriate values for our quantifiers, or referents for our terms, when we describe how things are presented as being to the subject of the perceptual state, none of these should be taken actually to be aspects of the experiential state itself, since such a kind of experience can occur when the subject is not perceiving. On this view, even in the case of veridical perception, when we make mention of the particular objects which the subject is perceiving we do not describe them as parts of the experiential situation, but make mention of them to express the representational import of the experience. Given the naïve realist's commitment to thinking of perceptual experience as genuinely relational between the subject and a mind-independent world, this representationalist construal of hallucination is no more amenable to naïve realism than the sense-datum conception.⁷

So Experiential Naturalism and the Common Kind Assumption taken together rule out naïve realism. The only options we would have left then would be some form sense-datum theory or representational or intentional theory of sense experience, or a combination of the two. To defend naïve

6. Or rather, more precisely, we may take the ascription to a psychological state of a given representational content to lack the ontological commitment that assertion of that content (or of a proposition corresponding to that content if the content is nonconceptual or non-propositional in form) would involve. Some people, however, question whether one can avoid the ontological commitment inherent in the use of some referential terms in this way, cf. (McDowell 1984). I assume that those drawn to intentional theories of perception will posit representational contents for perceptual states which avoid these difficulties. For more on this issue see (Martin 2002).

realism, we must reject one of the other assumptions. If we do not want to deny that experience is part of the natural order, rather than some external condition on it, then we cannot abandon Experiential Naturalism.⁸ Naïve realism can be preserved only at the expense of denying the Common Kind Assumption. And that is what (I) does.

There are ways of construing the Common Kind Assumption on which it is trivially false. If we relax our conception of a kind of event sufficiently then any description of an event mirrors a kind of event. On that conception, it is easy to find kinds which some individual events fall under and otherwise matching individuals fail to. You paint your picket fence white on Tuesday and I do so on Wednesday: mine is a Wednesday painting, yours a Tuesday one. Given the different descriptions these seem to be different kinds of event. Since no party to the debate about perception denies that there are *some* descriptions true only of the perceptual scenario, namely that they are perceptions rather than hallucinations, someone who wants to take the Common Kind Assumption to be a significant addition to the debate cannot be using this conception of a kind of event.

For the Common Kind Assumption to be a non-trivial falsehood, therefore, we need some conception of the privileged descriptions of experiences. For it to be a substantive matter that perceptions fail to be the same kind of mental episode as illusions or hallucinations, we need some characterisations of events which reflect their nature or what is most fundamentally true of them.⁹ So one might simply reject the whole debate at this stage on the basis that there just are no interesting kinds in respect of events; and hence no way to discriminate among the descriptions true of both perception and matching hallucination and those descriptions true of only one. I won't address such pessimism about the state of debate directly here. Rather I will just assume for the sake of this discussion that we can make sense of the idea that there are some privileged classifications of indi-

7. To emphasise again: this is to treat naïve realism as committed to the idea that veridical sense experience is, at least in part, a relation to mind-independent objects. Intentional theories of perception are committed to denying the relational nature of such experience, even if they are inclined to describe experience as if it were relational. The naïve realist's commitment to the relational character of experience cannot be grounded solely in an appeal to the alleged 'transparency' of experience: intentional theorists typically affirm that too. Rather, the commitment to thinking of veridical perceptual experience as relational involves a further commitment – to see how that might be grounded in phenomenology see (Martin 2002) and *Uncovering Appearances*, ch. 7.

8. Experiential Naturalism is here conceived as a methodological or regulative assumption of both empirical work on sense experience and philosophical discussion of it. The assumption was rejected by the early sense-datum theorists (and for that reason the various forms of the argument from hallucination they employed tended to be invalid) and by some phenomenologists, for example (Merleau-Ponty 1942). For a more recent discussion which rejects the principle, see (Valberg 1992).

9. Note that this is not the same thing as to assume that the events we are here interested in are themselves part of the fundamental furniture of the universe. It is quite consistent with what is claimed here that there is a more fundamental level of reality out of which the mental is somehow constructed, or out of which it emerges. All that is rejected is that we explain the salience of this level of reality merely through appeal to an inclination on our part to describe some things as similar and others as different.

viduals, both concrete objects and events, and that our talk of what is essential to a given individual tracks our understanding of the kinds of thing it is. That is, I will assume the following: entities (both objects and events) can be classified by species and genus; for all such entities there is a most specific answer to the question, 'What is it?'¹⁰ In relation to the mental, and to perception in particular, I will assume that for mental episodes or states there is a unique answer to this question which gives its most specific kind; it tells us what essentially the event or episode is. In being a member of this kind, it will thereby be a member of other, more generic kinds as well. It is not to be assumed that for any description true of a mental event, there is a corresponding kind under which the event falls. The Common Kind Assumption is then to be taken as making a claim about the most specific kind that a perceptual experience is, that events of that specific kind can also be hallucinations.¹¹

In rejecting the Common Kind Assumption, the disjunctivist might be seeking to deny that there is *anything* really in common with respect to being an experience, or being a mental state, which perceptions, illusions and hallucinations need have in common. This would be to deny even that the idea of a perceptual experience defines a proper mental kind, since all parties to the debate agree that this is a notion we can apply equally to veridical perceptions, illusions and hallucinations. Yet given that disjunctivism seeks to defend naïve realism, the rejection of the Common Kind Assumption only requires that one claim that the most specific kind of experience one enjoys when one perceives not occur when having an illusion or hallucination. This claim is the minimum needed to block the entailment from the claim that hallucinations cannot have mind-independent objects as constituents to the claim that the same is so of veridical perceptions. In this manner, the disjunctivist preserves naïve realism through affirming (I) and thereby denying the Common Kind Assumption.¹²

10. The most developed recent treatment of this kind of Aristotelianism about essence and nature is to be found in, (Wiggins 1980), and (Wiggins 2001); see also (Wiggins 1996). For more on the question of essence see Kit Fine's discussions of these matters in (Fine 1994) and (Fine 1994).

11. Can one formulate the argument, and the resistance to it, by avoiding mention of kinds? The argument from hallucination is often presented in terms of the causal conditions for bringing about a given instance of perceiving. That is, it is sometimes suggested that the issue turns on whether a given perception could have occurred without being a perception (cf.) (Valberg 1992). But there are many reasons for denying that the very same event could have occurred in a different causal context which have nothing to do with the debate about the nature of perception. (Consider Davidson's original criterion of identity for events in (Davidson 1969).) If we do not assume that an individual event of hallucinating a picket fence is identical with a given perception, some additional principle must be appealed to in order to indicate that what is true of the one must be true of the other.

12. As should already be clear from the naïve realist commitment to having entities as constituents of perceptual episodes, the disjunctivist must reject any kind of physicalism which identifies kinds of mental episode with kinds of physical events in the subject's brain. In rejecting The Common Kind Assumption, the disjunctivist does not take a stance on whether the very same kind of local physical conditions can accompany veridical perception and hallucination.

2. The commitment to naïve realism is probably not shared by most readers, but this is not to say that the idea that some sense experiences should be relations to objects in the world around us is in itself a bizarre, or counter-intuitive, suggestion. The endless disputes about externalism and internalism in relation to psychological states should teach us that there is no clear starting point, independent of philosophical conviction, which tells us the general form that mental states must take. If one finds something puzzling in disjunctivism, then, it is not so much the commitment to naïve realism as the consequences that such a commitment imposes on one in relation to other cases of sense experience: illusion and hallucination. But what is the disjunctivist committed to in relation to these other cases? At first sight, it may appear that all that the disjunctivist has to say is something entirely negative: that these are not cases of having the specific kind of experience one has when veridically perceiving. And hence one might think that disjunctivism avoids saying anything general about the nature of sense experience. In fact there is something more to say here which derives from what ought to be common ground to all parties to the debate.

Michael Hinton began the debate about disjunctivism by focusing on a certain kind of locution, what he called ‘perception–illusion disjunctions’, for example, ‘Macbeth is seeing a dagger or under the illusion of so doing’.¹³ Hinton’s strategy is to argue that there is no good reason to think that these disjunctive statements could not do all the work that our normal talk of appearances and experience do. That is, that there is no good reason from our ordinary ways of talking to suppose that we are committed to the existence of some special kind of experiential event which may be present equally in cases of perception and hallucination. Now this strategy prompts a question: Why pick on these disjunctions, then, rather than, say, ‘Either Macbeth is seeing a dagger, or under the illusion of seeing twenty three pink elephants’? The answer, I take it, is that the disjunction Hinton highlights has the same evidential profile as self-ascriptions of perceptual experience. Someone in a position to make a warranted judgement about their experience can also put forward one of Hinton’s perception–illusion disjunctions, but not so the alternative that we suggested. One can gloss this, I suggest, by highlighting the connection between our talk of perceptual experience and the epistemic position a subject is in with respect to his or her perceptions and certain illusions or hallucinations, that they are indistinguishable from the perceptions through introspective reflection.

Suppose you start out only with the notion of veridical perception, what could introduce you to the idea of sensory experience more generally, to include illusion and hallucination? Even if we are not engaged with Car-

13. See the works cited in above in footnote two.

tesian scepticism, the context of that debate offers us one route to introducing the idea. Consider your current perception of the environment around you. Perhaps you are staring out at a late spring evening; or lying in summer grass; or sitting in a dusky office reading a philosophy paper. It is quite conceivable for you that there should be a situation in which you could not tell that things were not as they are now: so it might seem to you as if you were then staring at a white picket fence, or taking in the smell of new mown grass, even though you unknown to you in that situation you were not doing so. Your perspective on the situation would not, in that situation, distinguish how things were from how they are now. Now we might say that how you are in that situation is a matter of having a sense experience which is not a case of perception. And surely it is at least cases like these which we have in mind when we think about examples of sensory experience which are not cases of veridical perception. We have a broader conception of sense experience than this, of course. For we allow that we can have illusions and hallucinations which are not veridical perceptions but which are not indiscriminable from perceptions: their character may vary wildly from what the corresponding perception would be like. But for the sake of this paper, I want to work with the simplifying assumption that throughout we are to deal with what we might call perfect hallucinations. And for the case of perfect hallucinations, one could get someone to track the relevant cases in just the way suggested here.¹⁴

It is this idea, I suggest, that disjunctivists such as Hinton use in order to explicate their preferred notion of sense experience in general, i.e. that which generalises across veridical perception, illusion and hallucination. For in using this Cartesian methodology, one can introduce, at least as a first approximation, the range of cases in dispute among the parties, without yet having to admit that there is something of the sort common between perception, illusion and hallucination of the sort that Hinton wishes to dispute. And hence this gives us the second commitment of disjunctivism:

(II) The notion of a visual experience of a white picket fence is that of a situation being indiscriminable through reflection from a veridical visual perception of a white picket fence as what it is

We should immediately note three points about (II). First, the acceptability of (II) turns on how we are to understand the notion of indiscriminability here. And the relevant conception of what it is for one thing to be indiscriminable from another is that of not possibly knowing it to be distinct from the other.¹⁵ To be somewhat more precise, since here we are concerned with knowing of individual experiences whether they are among the veridical perceptions or not, we can gloss it as:

14. For a (too brief) discussion of how we can generalize away from the case of perfect hallucination to cover illusions and hallucinations more generally see. (Martin 2004)

$\neg\Diamond K_{[\text{through reflection}]} \neg x$ is one of the V s

(That is, x is such that it is not possible to know through reflection that it is not one of the veridical perceptions of a white picket fence as what it is)¹⁶

This condition is met whenever x is one of the V s, but if there are truths which are unknowable through reflection, then the condition can be met in other ways. It should be stressed that it is no part of this discussion that we can analyse or reduce the truths concerning indiscriminability, modal facts concerning the possibility or impossibility of certain knowledge, to claims about the sorting behaviour of individuals, or the functional organisation which might underpin such behaviour. As we shall see below there are delicate questions for the disjunctivist concerning the link between a subject's failure to treat differently two situations and the claim that the two are indiscriminable for that subject.

Second, the restriction 'through reflection' is an important and central addition here. When we describe the original Cartesian thought experiment, we are considering a case in which we unknowingly find ourselves in a situation which we can't know is not one of staring at a white picket fence. But we equally have a conception of sense experiences occurring where one has been tipped off about their non-perceptual status. If I take you into the bowels of William James Hall and subject you to an expensive visual-cortical stimulator so as to induce in you the hallucination of an orange, it seems quite conceivable that I should put you in a situation which in a certain respect is just like seeing an orange. In one important respect it is not: I have told you the experiment you will be subject to. Since you have that information from my testimony, there is something you know which rules out your situation from being one in which you see the orange. Since we don't want to deny the possibility that this is a case of perfect hallucination, we need to bracket the relevance of the additional information you have acquired through testimony. This is what the appeal to 'through re-

15. This approach to indiscriminability is developed in greatest detail in. (Williamson 1990) Williamson principally focuses on the case of knowledge or lack of knowledge of identities and distinctness, that $x = y$ or $x \neq y$. As I note in the text, we are concerned with the plural form of whether x is one of the V s. This form even more obviously than the case of individual identities and distinctness raises questions about intensional versus extensional formulations.

16. Jim Pryor and others have suggested to me that in our normal usage of 'phenomenally indiscriminable' this phrase should *not* be interpreted according to the above schema. The schema is not symmetrical that hallucinating is not discriminable through reflection from perceiving does not entail that perceiving is indiscriminable from hallucinating (cf. (Williamson 2000) ch. 6 and (Williams 1978) appendix). But, the complaint goes, it is just obvious that as we use talk of 'phenomenally indiscriminable', this relation is symmetrical.

In response, I would suggest that we should be more respectful of the etymology of the term which would support the more complex form suggested in the text. That this should lead to a symmetrical relation in the case of phenomenal states is readily explicable without supposing it analytic of the notion. For the vast majority of philosophers in this debate do make further substantive assumptions about the nature of psychological states which would allow experiential states to be indiscriminable in our sense only if they are identical in phenomenal character. And it is just these substantive assumptions that the disjunctivist challenges.

flection' is intended to do. The situation in which you are knowingly having an hallucination of an orange is like a Cartesian situation in which you don't know of the hallucination, because, if we bracket that additional information, then what is available to you otherwise, i.e. what is available to you in simply reflecting on your circumstances, does not discriminate between the two situations. As we shall see in Part Two, the import of this restriction and the consequences which flow from it are central to understanding what disjunctivism is committed to, and how one should characterise one's objections to that picture of experience.

Third, we should note that condition (II) just taken by itself ought to be interpretable as at least extensionally adequate on all theories of perceptual experience. Of course, the disjunctivist's opponent will not think that this properly gives an account of the nature of sense experience, and nor, for the matter, may it really articulate the concept or conception that we all have of what sense experience is. Nonetheless, the condition cannot fail to count as a sense experience anything which genuinely is one. For according to someone who accepts the Common Kind Assumption, the relevant condition for being an experience, being a *P*-event we might say,¹⁷ will be exemplified by both perceptions and perfect hallucinations. In both cases, then, the *x* in question will be one of the *V*s, namely a *P*-event, and so it will not be possible for one to know that it is not one.¹⁸ The only way in which the extensions of our concept of sense experience and what is defined by (II) may fail to coincide is if (II) really is too liberal: that is, if it will include as instances of experience episodes which fail to be *P*-events. Now, as we will see below, the full import of this possibility is a delicate matter. But at first sight, this is not a possibility that a theorist will wish to countenance. For after all, if in meeting (II) we describe a situation which from the subject's own perspective is just as if one is seeing the white picket fence (as the Cartesian thought experiment suggests), then how could it fail to count as a visual experience of a white picket fence? For example, if the preferred account of experience is one in terms of sense-data, then this fact is not one entirely evident to us through initial reflection on our experience. As both intentional theorists of perception and naïve realists insist, at least some objects of awareness are presented as the mind-independent objects of perception. Of course the disjunctivist is moved to go further in this and claim that it seems to us as if we have a non-representational relation to the mind-independent objects of awareness. So, a description of how our experience is drawing solely on the need to get its introspective

17. That is, an event of being aware of an array of sense-data with such and such characteristics; or being in a state of mind with such and such representational properties or content.

18. Note also that, as formulated, (II) takes no stance on whether perceptions ever occur, or whether a subject need believe themselves ever to have perceived anything. All that it requires is that we accept that sense experiences have the character at least of seeming to be perceptions.

character correct would favour a naïve realist description of it over others, and this the same for veridical perception and for illusion or hallucination (in as much as these cannot be told apart from veridical perception). Therefore there could be nothing that a non-veridical perception *P*-event would seem to possess to the subject which a non-*P*-event which was still indiscriminable from a veridical perception would thereby lack. Given this, someone who wishes to rule out such a case because it is not a *P*-event (whatever the particular account of experience is in question) seems to be offering us too restrictive an account of sense experience; for they seem to be interpreting what should at best be a sufficient condition for having a sense experience as a necessary condition. The catholicism of (II) in this case would suggest not that the account is too liberal in conditions on what is to count as experience, but rather that the theory in question (be it a sense-datum account, or some form of intentionalism) is just too restrictive in what it countenances as possible ways in which the kinds of sensory experience we have can be realised.

This suggests that the defender of the Common Kind Assumption should agree that there can be no case of one of us being in a situation indiscriminable through reflection from veridical perception which is not a case of sense experience, whatever exactly the substantive account of sense experience the theorist thereby favours. The consequence of this is to accept certain constraints on the nature of sense experience and our knowledge of it. It is common for philosophers to suppose that conscious states must be (at least to self-conscious beings) self-intimating; such states will indicate their presence and some of their properties to the subject who is in them. What is required here is much more: that there should be no circumstance in which we are awake and there be no possibility for us to detect the absence of such states. As we shall see in Part Two, this extra epistemological condition bears on the conception one has of introspective awareness of sense experience; read in the way that the Common Kind theorist requires, it is liable to introduce the need for perfect mechanisms of detection.

The disjunctivist's opponent need not reject (II) itself, or think of it as obviously implausible. They may even agree that our initial understanding of what sense experience is is as (II) dictates, but then offer a more substantive account of what it takes for something to be an experience and so meet the condition in (II). On the other hand, they may think that the condition laid down in (II) itself is too thin, or modest, as an account of our understanding of sense experience. Still, for the reasons we have rehearsed above, they are unlikely to complain that (II) gets the extension of our concept of sense experience wrong. So (II) itself is unlikely to lead to any counter-intuitive consequences and on its own can hardly be considered a particularly controversial commitment of the disjunctivist. The

same is not so, though, for the combination of (I) and (II). (I) commits us to thinking that there are some sense experiences which have a distinctive nature lacked by others, while (II) insists that all of these can nonetheless be indiscriminable from each other introspectively. Together this suggests that the phenomenal characters of two experiences can be different even while one of them is indiscriminable from the other. Many have supposed that what we mean by the phenomenal character of an experience is just that aspect of it which is introspectible, and hence that any two experiences which are introspectively indiscriminable must share their phenomenal characters, even if they differ in other ways.¹⁹

Now while some such complaint may have widespread support in discussions of phenomenal consciousness, it is not clear whether it should be taken as a primitive claim which is somehow obvious, and the rejection of which is incredible. After all, we can make at least some sense of the idea that distinct individuals, distinct events, and distinct scenes can all be perceptually presented to us and yet be perceptually indiscriminable from each other. That is, suppose that the individual experiences we have of the various individuals, events and scenes we perceive thereby have as part of their phenomenal natures the presentation of those very objects; each of these individual experiences will be different from each other through featuring one object or event rather than another. Since distinct objects can be indiscriminable perceptually, it is plausible that these perceptions should be indiscriminable from each other introspectively. If so, distinct experiences will be different in ways which is not necessarily detectible through introspective reflection.²⁰ It may be right in the end to dismiss such theories of perceptual experience as incorrect. But if there is an incoherence here, it is a subtle one, and not so glaringly obvious a contradiction. So this throws doubt on the idea that we should view the principle that sameness of phenomenal character is guaranteed by phenomenal indiscriminability as an evident truth. If we think the conjunction of (I) and (II) generates a counter-intuitive position, then there must be some further principle at work behind our thoughts which forces us to accept this strong condition.

Once one accepts that (I) and (II) are both true, then one must also deny that two experiences, one of which is indiscriminable from the other, must share phenomenal character (that is, one denies: any phenomenal character the one experience has, the other has too). But it is consistent with accepting these two principles that one hold that such experiences

19. In effect, this is to press what I called principle (IND) in (Martin 1997): 'If two experiences are indistinguishable for the subject of them then the two experiences are of the same conscious character' (p.81).

20. I discuss this option for an intentional theory of perception in (Martin 2002). There are delicate questions to be raised here about the inter-relation between the phenomenology of individual experiences and the ways in which experiences are similar or different from each other.

would nonetheless share a phenomenal character. One way of construing this would be to suppose that (II) fixes for one a determinable notion of phenomenal character, one which is realisable in a number of different ways. As (I) specifies, this phenomenal character is realisable in a manner specific to veridical perceptions, a manner not shared with illusion or hallucination. The sense-datum theorist and the intentionalist each offer accounts of different ways in which the same determinable can be realised. This is consistent with the rejection of the Common Kind Assumption as long as the particular manner in which the phenomenal character is realised in the case of veridical perception could not occur in either cases of illusion or hallucination. This model also captures the thought expressed above in relation to (II), that we should not suppose that there need be a unique way in which a given phenomenal character can be realised, at least with respect to illusions or hallucinations.

Although this position would share much with disjunctivism, this does not yet capture the key thought behind disjunctivism. To employ this model as an expression of disjunctivism would be to adopt an unstable position. In addition to (I) and (II) disjunctivism requires one to take on a further commitment. Put in the most general terms, the model so far sketched leaves open both the status of the common phenomenal character among perception, illusion and hallucination, and whether this can be conceived autonomously of veridical perception, and it leaves open the conception of the ways in which that character can be realised. As we shall see, the disjunctivist needs to take a stand on both of these things, and the resulting account is more radical than anything so far sketched.

3. The easiest way to develop this is to proceed through a particular line of reasoning related to the argument from hallucination. But the main moral I want to draw is one which can be generalised away from the commitments of this argument. One formulation of the argument from hallucination focuses on questions about the causal conditions for bringing about hallucinations, and in particular works with the thought that it is possible that a hallucination can be brought about through the same proximate causal conditions as a veridical perception – what I shall call a causally matching hallucination.²¹ In its standard form, this argument relies on some principle of ‘Same Cause, Same Effect’. To draw a conclusion from the case of veridical perception about that of causally matching hallucination, the principle requires us to suppose a commonality among all cases in which proximate causal conditions are the same. In such a form, the

21. See for example, (Robinson 1985), (Robinson 1994), (Foster 1986), Ch.II sec. X, (and for a repudiation of his earlier acceptance) (Foster 2000); for critical discussion see (Pitcher 1971) and (Hinton 1973); cf. also (Merleau-Ponty 1942) and (Valberg 1992).

principle is unsound, or so I would argue. For the principle so conceived rules out the possibility that relational states of affairs or events can form part of the causal nexus where relational state of affairs may differ purely in their distal elements.

A modified form of the argument concerns the reverse direction, from what must be true of cases of causally matching hallucinations to what is must thereby be true of the veridical perceptions they match. A weakened form of 'Same Cause, Same Effect' that requires similarity of outcomes where local causal and non-causal conditions are the same seems to require that similar effects are present in cases of veridical perception as in causally matching hallucination. For since we pick out the cases of hallucination through their lack of the required conditions for veridical perception, it is unclear that any non-causal condition required for the occurrence of a specific hallucination is not thereby also present in the case of veridical perception it matches. In this case, therefore, whatever effect can be produced in the case of the causally matching hallucination, the same effect will have been produced in the case of veridical perception.

Accepting this conclusion is not in itself tantamount to affirming the Common Kind Assumption. That demands that whatever is the most specific kind of experience occurring when one has a veridical perception, the same kind of experience can occur when one has an illusion or hallucination. The most that this argument could show is that whatever is the most specific kind of effect produced when having a causally matching hallucination, that same kind of effect occurs when one has a veridical perception. But that this is the most specific kind of effect that occurs when one has an hallucination does not entail that this is the most specific kind of effect that occurs when one is veridically perceiving. Nonetheless, it does raise two pressing questions for the disjunctivist. First, what character can the hallucinatory experience possess which could also be possessed by the veridical perception without thereby being the most specific kind of mental event that the veridical perception exemplifies? Second, if there is a kind common to the veridical perception and its causally matching hallucination, what shows that what is relevant to the explanations we want to give is ever the kind of event peculiar to veridical perception rather than what is common to veridical perception and causally matching hallucination?

In answer to these two questions, one can propose the third commitment of disjunctivism:

(III) For certain visual experiences as of a white picket fence, namely causally matching hallucinations, there is no more to the phenomenal character of such experiences than that of being indiscriminable from corresponding visual perceptions of a white picket fence as what it is

As we can see from the logic of indiscriminability, no veridical perception can be known not to be a veridical perception. So veridical perceptions are

guaranteed to meet this condition and hence exemplify the kind in question.²² In relation to the second question, it is clear that meeting this condition cannot screen off the property of being a veridical perception from any explanatory role that the naïve realist supposes that only veridical perception experiences exemplify. At the same time, we can see the answer to the first question. As those attracted to disjunctivism in the theory of perception have often been tempted to say, and those attracted to the idea of object-dependent thought, in cases where the relevant conditions for such a state of mind are absent, then there must be something intrinsically defective or lacking about the state. This is made explicit in the thought that while there is a positive specific nature to the veridical perception, there is nothing more to the character of the (causally matching) hallucination than that it can't be told apart through reflection from the veridical perception.²³

This condition is definitely forced on one if one accepts the reasoning above involving a form of the 'Same Cause, Same Effect' principle. Although the principle there employed is sufficiently weakened to allow for the existence of (partially) externally individuated effects, some may still question whether we have any such commitment to causal principles which bridge between mental phenomena and their physical antecedents. Even in that case, I suggest the disjunctivist should be wary of holding back a commitment to (III). Once one allows that there is a more substantive characterisation available across a wide range of cases of what it is for mere appearance to occur, the question arises whether such a state can also be present in the case of veridical perception. The reasons that the naïve realist offers for supposing that a distinctive state is present when so perceiving do not readily translate to show that nothing else could also be occurring in such circumstances. Yet once one is deprived of grounds for denying the presence of some such common element between perception and hallucination, then a threat of explanatory pre-emption of the common feature overcomes the claims of that which is peculiar to the case of veridical perception. The reverse causal argument demonstrates the existence of a potential explanatory competitor for the veridical perception and hence makes clear the need for a disjunctivist to specify what form of common mental kind between perception and hallucination would be consistent with disjunctivism. If one rejects the relevant weakened form of 'Same Cause, Same Effect', then there is no such direct demonstration of the ex-

22. This is to move too quickly. The condition of being indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a white picket fence does not necessarily specify a property or kind of event, rather than specifying a condition that individual events may meet. One might take the alleged non-transitivity of just noticeable difference to show that there cannot be kinds of experience defined in this way. For more on this see (Martin 2004).

23. There is a longer exposition of both this problem and how (III) offers a solution in (Martin 2004) pp 52–70.

istence of a common element. But that is not to say that any argument has been offered that there cannot be some such mental kind in common, that what some hallucinations exemplify can also be present in veridical perception. The concerns about explanatory exclusion or screening off do not derive solely from the 'Same Cause, Same Effect' principle, and so cannot be ignored simply by rejecting it.

It is instructive to compare and contrast the situation here with the discussion that Timothy Williamson has launched over the case of knowledge and belief. Williamson argues that it is a mistake to think that the state of knowledge is decomposable into the presence of belief with further conditions, as the 'traditional' approach supposes. But Williamson also argues against the idea that we should endorse a disjunctive approach to belief, taking belief to be either knowledge or purported knowledge. Instead, Williamson suggests that knowledge and belief may co-exist (accepting the common thought that knowledge entails belief) but play distinct explanatory roles.²⁴ Williamson's strategy in arguing his case for taking knowledge as a primitive mental state is precisely to argue for its having a distinctive explanatory role which could not be taken by belief. This is quite consistent with the idea that belief has its own explanatory role untouched by that of knowledge.

The dialectical position is different in the case of debate about perception and sensory appearance (*contra* Williamson). For while there are aspects of psychological explanation where one can conceive of a division of explanatory spoils between an appeal to perceptual states on the one hand (i.e. those not common to perception and hallucination) and an appeal to sensory experience as something common across the cases, there is also a central area of concern where the two notions are bound to be in competition. For consider the subject's stream of consciousness, that temporal extension of episodes and conscious processes which make up a central core of his or her biography. We can avoid the question of explanatory exclusion here if it makes sense to suppose that both perceptual episodes (peculiar only to perception) and sensory experiences (common to perception and hallucination) can occupy locations within this stream. Yet such does not seem to be the case: if we are intending to give the most determinate and specific account of how things are with a subject at a given time, thereby picking out their conscious state, either what we pick out is the perceptual episode, as the naïve realist supposes, or the common sensory experience, as defenders of the Common Kind Assumption suppose. So allowing for explanatory independence of notions of perception and experience in other realms of the psychological would not settle this question where competition cannot be avoided.

24. See, (Williamson 1995) pp 558–563 and, (Williamson 2000) pp 41–48.

The same pressure does not seem to arise for the cases of belief and knowledge. It is questionable whether either phenomenon actually belongs within the stream of consciousness (in part that turns on the relation one hypothesises between active judgement and belief or knowledge). And, however one settles that question, we have a handle on the explanatory role of these notions within psychology independent of questions about phenomenal consciousness. While we do have a conception of how perceptual states may explain things about a subject beyond an immediate concern with phenomenal consciousness – for example explaining how they are in a position to have some of the beliefs they have and to act as they do – the presence of such an explanatory role is already common ground before the debate about perception arises. So the focus of dispute really is over the status of the experiential episode present in conscious perceiving, and all parties are committed to supposing that there are competing accounts to be given of this. So extending the Williamson strategy into the debate about sensory experience is of no avail.

Hence, we can see that the way of combining (I) and (II) suggested earlier is not really available for the disjunctivist. If we suppose that (II) fixes for us a determinable notion of phenomenal character which has a variety of determinations, then we must suppose that it has some characterisation as a determinable independently of any of its determinations (as we have a conception of red independent of knowledge of what it is to be scarlet or vermillion). (II) itself does not give us any such specification, since it fixes the range of cases relative to the case of veridical perception, one of the supposed determinations. Moreover, the case of causally matching hallucination gives us an example of an experience which satisfies (II) but fails to give us a determination of phenomenal character more specific than this determinable. In general we suppose that determinables to be instantiated require that some specific determination or other is realised. On the other hand, if we seek to remove these disanalogies and posit an appropriate determination for the case of causally matching hallucination, or seek some characterisation of phenomenal character in substantive terms independent of veridical perception, then we are faced with the problems of explanatory exclusion or screening off. The disjunctivist consistently can hold on to veridical perception as a special case only through denying that the notion of sensory experience, and any specification of it which can occur in the case of causally matching hallucination have any explanatory role autonomous of that of veridical perception itself.

Another way to put this point is to highlight that there are two sides to the disjunctivist's original conception of perception and sensory appearances. On the one hand is the thought that there is something special about the 'good' case, the presence of veridical perception and the apprehension of the mind-independent world. What holds essentially of the

mental state or episode present in this case is not reduplicated across illusion and hallucination, so we can hold to the intuition that such states in themselves relate us to the mind-independent world. On the other hand, though, is the thought that in the 'bad' cases, the cases of illusion and hallucination, one is in a situation which fails to be the way that good cases are, but which purports to be the way that the good case is. Were a positive characterisation always possible of the bad cases independent of their relation to veridical perception, were the notion of perceptual experience construable independent of this relation, then that these cases were bad would not be something intrinsic to them. This would not be a matter of us seemingly being related to the world but failing to be so, but rather being a certain way which we might also confuse with being perceptually related. So the disjunctivist thinks that there are cases of phenomenal consciousness which are essentially failures – they purport to relate us to the world while failing to do so. Commitment (III) makes this additional element clear in a way that (I) and (II) alone cannot do.

Part Two

4. I've argued that a disjunctivist had better endorse (III), if he or she wishes to be consistent in their position and respect the other commitments which lead one to adopt disjunctivism in the first place. But is one left with a coherent position in accepting (III)? The disjunctivist claims that sense experience in the case of causally matching hallucination is nothing more than the obtaining of certain negative epistemological conditions and what follows from them: that it is not possible to know through reflection that this is not a situation of veridical perception. But this seems to suggest that there is nothing positive to the character of the experience in itself. Could having a sense experience be nothing more than this?

Complete incredulity at this thought is voiced by A.D. Smith when he complains:

To say simply that our subject is not aware of *anything* is surely to under-describe this situation dramatically. Perhaps we can make sense of there being 'mock thoughts', but can there really be such a thing as mock sensory awareness? Perhaps there can be 'an illusion of understanding', but can there be an illusion of awareness?... The sensory features of the situation need to be accounted for... If we take as our example subjects who are fully attentive and focused, we need to do justice to the fact that such subjects in some sense take cognizance of, indeed fully attend to, sensory presentations. But if so, what else can we say other than that the subject is, as the Argument requires, aware of a non-normal object?

...What, however, is it for someone to *seem to confront* something? Unless more is said, we are left without any means of distinguishing the hallucina-

tory cases we are interested in from such quite different states as post-hypnotic suggestion, gross mental confusion, inattentiveness, jumping the gun and so on. ((Smith 2002), pp. 224-5.)²⁵

In fact, Smith's intended target here is broader than the disjunctivism we have here been discussing. Smith is concerned to reject any view according to which a particular object is sensorily presented in veridical perception, while no corresponding object is presented when one has the matching hallucination. One could hold such a doctrine and yet insist that there is something appropriately common across the two cases – that there is, for example, a common representational content which in the one context secures an object, but in the other fails to.²⁶ On such a view, there is something common between a case of perception and hallucination which makes both a sensory occurrence; and it is by reference to this common element that one can contrast a genuinely experiential situation with any occasion in which there is nothing sensory occurring at all, that is that there is common representational sensory feature. If Smith insists that that is not what is required (if he insists that what one needs is a common *object* of attention), then the complaint swiftly becomes an expression of the conviction that sense-datum theorists have, that things cannot be sensorily so unless there really is something thus and so for one to be sensing. That is hardly an intuition that many now share. Rather, those who endorse the Common Kind Assumption may well agree that there has to be *something* in common between perception and hallucination, that there must be a common way of sensing between the two which requires a unified account. What they will deny is that what is common need be thought of as any kind of object of awareness, rather than the sensory basis of attention to the environment.

Therefore, Smith's complaint seems best targeted at the disjunctivist position we have elaborated above. For affirming (III) does seem to lead to the kind of position that Smith finds incredible. Smith emphasises the distinction between sensory and mere cognitive aspects of the mind. The specification of a situation as one in which it is not possible to know that it is not perception seems, like the condition 'seems to confront' which Smith discusses, a cognitive and not a sensory condition. In contrast to the representationalist just discussed, the disjunctivist does deny him or herself the resource of some positive element of the situation, an element

25. Compare also Valberg's criticisms of Anscombe on the intentionality of sensation in (Valberg 1992).

26. One might consider the approach developed by Tyler Burge in a number of papers (in particular, (Burge 1977), (Burge 1983) and (Burge 1993)) as offering such accounts. I discuss such possibilities for an intentional approach to perception in (Martin 2002). Note, in addition, that though Smith takes Evans as a target of his discussion, Evans's own view of perceptual experience is not disjunctivist. The brief account Evans gives in ch. 5 of (Evans 1982) develops an account of information states on which it is possible for an information state to exist while lacking a proper object.

which is both sensuous and common to perception and hallucination in contrast to the cases of mere intellectual disorder.

While the focus of Smith's complaint is basically an assertion of the inadequacy of the view he opposes, he does, in addition add towards the end of the passage a briefly sketched argument through which I think we can articulate more the kind of resistance that Smith offers. Smith notes that there are cases which no one would think involve sensory experience of the relevant sort: cases of post-hypnotic suggestion or inattention. Our intuitions for such cases are that while a subject may possess some of the cognitive concomitants of sense experience, the relevant sensory state is lacking: at best the subject matches a normal subject only with respect to the cognitive consequences of sense experience, not in sense experience itself. If causally matching hallucination is assimilated to these cases, then it would seem, as Smith complains, that the possibility of hallucination is really being denied by the disjunctivist, rather than being accommodated through appeals to (II) and (III). For surely, the complaint continues, our basic commitment is that (at least some) hallucinations are examples of genuine sense experience even if they fail to be cases of veridical perception. We suppose that there is something defective in the subject's relation to the external world perceived; and not that there is merely a defect in how they relate to their own states of mind.

Smith is owed an account by the disjunctivist of how we are to distinguish cases which intuitively do not involve a visual sense experience of a white picket fence, such as when one is under the post-hypnotic suggestion that that is what one can see, from cases in which one does have such an experience but does so only through meeting the condition in (III). But, as we shall see below, there is in fact much that the disjunctivist can and would say to contrast the two kinds of case. Yet even if an answer can be given to this, Smith may complain that it doesn't locate the difference in the right place. For Smith has in mind what the most satisfying account of the difference should amount to, and that kind of account the disjunctivist cannot offer. It is tempting to say of someone under the influence of post-hypnotic suggestion that they simply lack a mental state with the relevant phenomenal characteristics, whatever cognitive states they also possess in this situation. So the only difference that really matters between the subject of a causally matching hallucination and a post-hypnotic suggestion victim is the presence in the former case (and absence in the latter) of these phenomenal characteristics. If the disjunctivist can point to a difference between the two kinds of case which is consistent with (III), then that will relate to the kinds of condition mentioned in (II) and (III), namely the sense in which the one situation is or is not knowably distinct from veridical perception. But such a condition seems itself to be cognitive, since it talks of what one can or cannot know. At the same time, affirming (III)

seems to rule out any appeal to any further mental condition which could be present in the case of the causally matching hallucination. Hence, the disjunctivist would seem to deny the intuition that the difference here must be one of the presence or absence of the phenomenal state of mind. And it is this thought which makes Smith, or someone moved by his complaints, suppose that the disjunctivist cannot be giving an account of sense experience at all.

Now a swift riposte to this would be to point out that the disjunctivist requires that a perfect hallucination be one which is indiscriminable from a veridical perception. What more could be required of how the subject is than that this condition is met? Surely the condition of introspective indiscriminability guarantees that phenomenal consciousness is present. So the disjunctivist is not assimilating the hallucinating subject to the victim of post-hypnotic suggestion. Although I think it is right for the disjunctivist to resist Smith's characterisation; as it stands, this response is too swift to be adequate. Compare the concern here with the more familiar discussions of absent qualia and philosophical zombies in relation to functionalism and the conceivability argument for dualism. When a critic complains against a functionalist account of the mind that it is quite conceivable that a creature should satisfy all of the functional conditions for mentality and yet lack phenomenal consciousness, the complaint made is one external to the terms of the functionalist theory. The critic claims that we can both imagine that some creature satisfies the functionalist definition and yet lacks phenomenal consciousness as we commonly conceive it. To this the functionalist may respond that, by his or her lights, if the functionalist conditions really are met for mentality, then there is no possibility of the absence of phenomenal consciousness. What the critic puts forward either is not really possible, or has been misdescribed.

Whether the argumentative position of the initial complaint against functionalism, or the robust response to it begs the question given debate in the area is a delicate question. Matters seem more straightforward in the current case, though. For when we turn to our more limited troubles about sensory experience, the challenge seems rather to be internal to the disjunctivist's concerns. While it is true that disjunctivism need not attempt to offer a general account of sentience as such, the disjunctivist clearly does suppose that sensory experience in certain cases amounts to more than the meeting of the negative epistemological conditions. For the disjunctivist does not suppose that veridical perception as such should simply be a matter of meeting certain epistemological conditions. Given a commitment to naïve realism, the disjunctivist claims that veridical perception involves standing in some relation of awareness to the various objects of awareness. This additional condition is not present in the case of causally matching hallucination. So, it appears as if, by the disjunctivist's own lights, there is a

positive additional characterisation to be had of certain, central cases of phenomenal experience, which positive element is lacking in the case of causally matching hallucination, though unknowably so. It is this aspect of what the disjunctivist him or herself says which seems to justify the characterisation of the position above, which lies at the basis of Smith's complaint. Treating the disjunctivist's account of causally matching hallucination as a case of absent qualia, therefore, seems to be to offer an internal critique of disjunctivism.

The swift response to this challenge is simply to claim that the objection misses that since the hallucination is indiscriminable from veridical perception phenomenal consciousness must be present. But that misses the burdens of argument. The disjunctivist who responds this way leaves untouched the worry about the coherence of his or her position: whether commitment (III) is really consistent with this alleged entailment. For, of course, it is not that Smith thinks it actually possible (or even coherent to suppose) that one should be in the same cognitive position as a subject who possesses phenomenal consciousness and yet lack such consciousness. Indeed, Smith's complaint seems rather to be that when we focus on the kind of experience we all enjoy, when we exploit our own self-awareness of that experience, we can see that it is impossible for someone to be this kind of way (the way required equally for genuine hallucination as for perception) and yet lack any positive phenomenal character. So Smith, too, would agree with the disjunctivist that if the situation really is one of being indiscriminable through reflection from a veridical perception, then matters will be phenomenologically just as in the case of veridical perception. But this is precisely because, in addition to the facts that the disjunctivist appeals to, some positive phenomenal characteristics must also be present, guaranteeing that this is a genuinely sensory occurrence. This is to contradict the claim in (III) that there is no further positive characterisation to be given of the situation than that which follows from the negative epistemological properties.

The debate here is then not over whether both sides should agree that the subject genuinely has sense experience in the case of causally matching hallucination, in contrast to the case of post-hypnotic suggestion. Both sides should agree with that. The question is whether the disjunctivist can show that one can coherently claim this while also affirming (III). Appealing to (II) or (III) alone does not show this. Rather, if Smith's complaint mischaracterises the situation by the disjunctivist's lights, then there must be some mistake in the reasoning which has got us to this point. There must have been something wrong in the thought that the disjunctivist is simply appealing to cognitive and not sensory features of the situation when the causally matching hallucination is taken to fulfil the condition specified in (III). But how can that condition indicate anything about the

sensory character of the subject's situation? Wouldn't that be to pick out some positive feature which either will or will not be common with the case of veridical perception?

We need to identify which elements in Smith's line of thought about the situation the disjunctivist will have to reject. Now, the characterisation that we extracted from Smith of the causally matching hallucination is forced upon us, I suggest, if we accept a certain picture of the relation between phenomenal consciousness on the one hand, and self-awareness of our cognitive states of response to phenomenal consciousness on the other. That is, one may conceive that the facts about phenomenal consciousness are fixed independently of whether a subject has any perspective on his or her own conscious states and is thereby self-aware of them. In general, then, it should be possible for us to settle whether someone is phenomenally conscious or not without having to make any appeal to the subject's own higher-order perspective on these conscious states. In turn, that suggests that adopting the higher-order perspective on one's phenomenal consciousness, coming to be self-aware and attentive of it, is thereby to put oneself in a position to acquire knowledge of something independent of this perspective itself. In coming to make judgements about how things phenomenally appear to one, one makes judgements about a subject-matter that obtains independently of one's being in a position to make those judgements.

At the same time, we are inclined to view this higher-order perspective as one of self-awareness and self-consciousness. It is not clear that we can quite conceive of the cognitive aspect of such a state of mind as other than awareness of one's mind, and hence a form of, or ground for, knowledge. In which case, one could not be this way cognitively (i.e. with this range of judgements, formed in this way) without being self-aware and self-knowing: phenomenal consciousness would have to be present. On this picture, although the facts about phenomenal consciousness obtain independently and prior to any facts about our knowledge of it, our introspective cognition of phenomenal consciousness need not be independent of that consciousness: seeming awareness of one's conscious mind will always be genuine self-awareness.²⁷

Now, in this context, it is plausible to argue that the negative epistemological properties the disjunctivist appeals to belong at the level of higher-order awareness or self-knowledge, rather than at the level of phenomenal consciousness itself. In that case, the presence or absence of the negative epistemological property will not determine the presence or absence of phenomenal consciousness, but will rather simply fix whether or not the subject is aware of these facts, and hence is self-aware or self-conscious. In

27. This is an intuition to which we will return below.

the case of causally matching hallucination, the conditions specified by the disjunctivist fix only facts on the cognitive side of the divide. Where the disjunctivist claims to be characterising sense experience without awareness of the environment, the complaint here is that they can only be describing the absence of experience with necessary ignorance of this fact. Although the claim is localised just to the case of causally matching hallucination, still the disjunctivist seems to be describing to us the case of absent qualia, or the philosophical zombie, the alleged possibility of which have plagued functionalist theories of the mind and various forms of physicalism. Since it is commonly taken to show that a theory is inadequate as an account of phenomenal consciousness if it could equally be true of a philosophical zombie, it would seem to be a failing in the disjunctivist account if it ends up claiming that in cases of hallucination we are no better off than such mythical beings.

If the disjunctivist is to resist Smith's characterisation of the situation, the disjunctivist must, at the very least, reject this picture of the relation between phenomenal consciousness and our awareness of it. What alternative is there? I shall suggest that the disjunctivist needs to stress the connection between phenomenal consciousness and having a point of view or perspective on the world. The negative epistemological condition when correctly interpreted will specify not a subject's cognitive response to their circumstances – and hence their knowledge or ignorance of how things are with them – but rather their perspective on the world. This is sufficient for it to be true of a subject that there is something it is like for them to be so. In that way we can say of the subject of causally matching hallucination that they must indeed possess phenomenal consciousness precisely because, in meeting the relevant condition for the negative epistemological property, they thereby possess a point of view on the world, in this case not extending beyond how things are with them at that moment, since *ex hypothesi* perfect hallucination does not provide one with any awareness of the environment. So the subject, in this case, would possess subjectivity and thereby be conscious since there is something it is like for them to be so. Appeal to further facts over and above those which provide for their subjectivity and for there to be something it is like for them to be so would thereby be redundant.

In developing the alternative account here, we need first to start with a seemingly more limited problem with the disjunctivist's appeal to (II) and (III). For as these claims pick out sense experiences which are not veridical perceptions by reference to introspective reflection. So it is natural to ask: How the disjunctivist's account can be extended to account for the sense experience of creatures which lack self-consciousness, self-awareness or any introspective capacity at all? We can give a satisfactory answer to this question only after rehearsing some familiar considerations for contrasting

introspective self-awareness with ordinary observation. Once we have done that, we will see that the restriction ‘through introspective reflection’ must work rather differently from how the model sketched above supposes. In turn this will lay bare for us what the deeper disagreement really amounts to.

5. Suppose that dogs are sentient but lack any interesting theory of mind. In particular let us suppose that they lack the cognitive sophistication to entertain thoughts about their own experiences and the similarities and differences among them. Note that this is not to deny them thoughts about the objects of perception and the similarities and differences among them. The disjunctive theory can make sense of the thought that a dog’s visual perception of a bunch of carrots is different in character from the dog’s olfactory apprehension of a bowl of meaty chunks. The first experience, after all, may have among its constituents visually manifest objects and qualities such as carrots, the orange of their flesh and the green of the leaves; while the latter experience involves the smelly presence of jelly and wet cooked meat. So far this fits with our intuitions that the world can be a relatively varied place for the dog, even if it lacks the sophistication to think about the world in as many rich ways as we can.

If we move from the case of perception alone to ask how the disjunctivist is to think of dog sensory experience including illusion and hallucination, then the answer is presumably to be supplied by (II): that the dog’s experiences should be the same or different to the extent that they are discriminable or indiscriminable through introspective reflection. Yet if we are asking of the dog’s own knowledge of the sameness or difference of his or her experiences, then we already have the answer that the dog does not know of the distinctness of any of their experiences. For the dog lacks all knowledge that any given experience is of this or that kind, lacking the conceptual resources to make any such judgement. From this it seems to follow that by (II) each experience the dog has is of the same kind as any other experience that the dog has. Thought of one way, one might then suppose that the dog simply has just one kind of experience. But given that we can make sense by the disjunctivist’s lights of the various perceptions that the dog has, one may equally argue that each experience would have to exemplify every possible kind of experience that the dog could enjoy. Each experience would exemplify all, and indeed contradictory, phenomenal characteristics at once. Either way, we seem to be landed with an absurd picture.

How can the disjunctivist avoid this unfortunate conclusion? We arrive at the conclusion if we suppose that (II) is talking about the knowledge

that a given individual could or could not have about the identity or difference of psychological states. Is there any other way of reading (II)?

The first move to make in response is to consider a slightly less aggravated version of the problem. (II) read in one way will generate problems for us even if we stick to self-aware human beings. Imagine the case of John who has normal sensory sensitivity but is very much in a world of his own and inattentive to things he sees or tastes. Let's suppose that John doesn't do well at telling scarlet from vermilion. Just as he is bad at telling apart samples of these shades of red, so we may suppose him inattentive at telling apart the visual experiences of these samples. In such cases it seems perfectly appropriate to say not only that John doesn't discriminate the samples or experiences, but also that he can't. But this seems to commit us to saying that the experience of scarlet and the experience of vermilion are indiscriminable for John, and hence by (II) that the experiences should be the same. Yet it was no part of our initial commitment that the experiences should have to be the same: we were making an observation about John's inclination to attend and the judgements he is liable to make; nothing need be included in this about how he will or will not experience the world to be.²⁸

In response to this worry, we should note that there are different ways we can be talking about someone's inability or incapacity to do something. Often when we note not only that someone has not done something but that they could not have done it, that they lack the ability or the capacity, then we indicate that there is some particular ground present which is operative in their failure. When Nancy stumbles on the dance floor, one might say not only that she is failing to dance the tango but that she simply can't dance it. In saying on this occasion that she can't dance it, one might not mean that there are no circumstances in which she succeeds in dancing the tango, or even that normally she is able to. Perhaps Nancy is a dance instructor, and the tango is her speciality; however, this evening given how much she has had to drink, there is just no way that her limbs can coordinate successfully to produce a tango.

When we talk about particular individuals' incapacities or inability, therefore, we often have in mind some specific condition obtaining in them in virtue of which the failure is bound to be present. That one person could not do something on a particular occasion, does not mean that they couldn't do it on some other occasion, or that others cannot, or that a different range of people could not do that thing. We can, therefore, by suitable shift of context get claims about someone's inability to come out true

28. Note that this is not to prejudge the question how the presence of phenomenal consciousness and the possibility of attending to a phenomenon fit together – for example, I take no stance here on the proper interpretation of inattentive blindness (see) (Mack and Rock 1998) or change blindness (see, among other things (McConkie 1979) and (Dennett 1991)).

or false, depending on what counts as appropriately grounding a capacity or preventing them from exercising it.

However, sometimes we have ways of talking which aspire, as one might say, to greater impartiality. For example, if you take a suit to the tailor's for invisible mending, the tailor will not have lived up to his or her advertisements if they mend the clothes with thick, bright red thread but then pluck your eyes out. If clothes genuinely have had invisible mending, then the mend should not just not be visible to you, but must not be visible to anyone. Moreover, in saying that it should not be visible to *anyone*, one may well intend no restriction on this at all: it is not just not visible to the average English person who has learnt not to pay too close attention to others' attire, it is also not visible to Italians, or Americans, more used to admiring the fine textiles with which the human form can be clothed. Pushed to the limit, then, we seem to have an appeal to an impersonal talk of inability or incapacity: we are talking about what sight can discern for you, or of some aspect of the object in question, rather than some way a given individual or group of individuals is such that they can't succeed in a particular task.

Here, too, there can be different ranges of possibility we have in mind. The difference between two objects may be invisible given the normal spectrum of light that we are sensitive to. Perhaps there is a surface blemish of one which turns up only when one is sensitive to infrared or ultraviolet light. In asking about what vision can reveal to us, we can ask in terms of how vision actually is, or ways in which vision could be. In turn, the most extreme claim of incapacity to tell apart here would concern the impossibility of knowing through any way that vision could be of the obtaining of a certain fact.

Applying this to the case of introspective reflection and the case of John, we can see that in that case any appropriate claim of indiscriminability turned on incapacities specific to John – his inattention or carelessness – grounds which prevent John in particular from exercising the relevant discrimination. But when we are comparing experiences as relevantly alike or not, we are not concerned with whether John himself is particularly attentive to the subtle variations in colour appearance, or whether he has a good visual memory, rather we are interested in whether with respect to the mode of introspective reflection the situations can be discriminated or not. So we are interested in the impersonal notion of inability or incapacity here. That is we are interested in the claim that John is in a situation for which it is impossible *simpliciter* and not just impossible for John to tell apart through introspective reflection from a veridical perception of a patch of scarlet. In this case, the experience of a swatch of vermilion will not count as indiscriminable from this perception because although John himself might fail to notice the difference, there is a difference between the

two situations which one could through reflection come to attend to and notice. And, the disjunctivist wishes to claim, it is our understanding of this fact which grounds our recognition that John's experiences can differ from each other. Although attention typically does lead to differences in sense experience – and according to some empirical hypotheses makes for all the difference between presence of phenomenal consciousness and its absence – we do have the conception that it is possible for experience to be a certain way whether focally attended to or not. And in this particular instance, we find quite conceivable that there was a way things were for John had he but directed his attention. In appealing to the impersonal sense of indiscriminability the disjunctivist can make sense of this conception.

Earlier we noted that Smith presented a challenge for the disjunctivist: for the account to be adequate it needs to make sense of the intuitive contrast between a victim of hypnotic suggestion, or mental confusion, and someone genuinely having an hallucination. We can now see how the disjunctivist will answer this challenge. In such cases, while there may be grounds for the particular individual why he or she will fail to know of the difference between the situation that he or she is in, and the visual perception of a white picket fence, it won't follow from this alone that his or her situation is objectively, or impersonally, indiscriminable from a veridical perception. We intuitively track the difference in contrasting how we imagine things to be presented to them, or how we conceive it as not being presented, with the individual's failure to appreciate that difference. The contrast between a case in which the subject fails to distinguish their situation from one of perceiving the picket fence and one in which their situation is such that it is impersonally indiscriminable from one of perceiving makes space for just this contrast. However, as we already remarked, to highlight the difference in these terms is not to answer the challenge in the way that Smith supposes the intuitive one. According to him, the only plausible answer is to say that the difference between the two kinds of case turns simply on the presence or absence of phenomenal consciousness, independent of any facts about what is or is not knowably different about the cases. But that is to raise again the more fundamental disagreement to which we shall return later.

In summary, while some talk of the impossibility of acting or sensing in a certain way focuses on the specific limitations that an agent or group of agents may possess, we also have ways of talking of the impossibility of doing, sensing or knowing which is not grounded in the specific capacities or incapacities of agents. It is with reference to this notion that the disjunctivist will claim that what proponents of the Common Kind Assumption suppose are phenomenally the same are really instances of things not possibly being knowably different. Our ascription of such a psychological state to John or to the individuals involved in Smith's examples does not thereby

commit us to these agents possessing any specific psychological capacities or incapacities in respect of the judgements they make over and above the experiential state so ascribed. When we ascribe such a state to someone, the focus is not on the actual psychological states that they go into in response to having an experience, or even on what states they would or might go into were conditions other than they are. To talk of the impersonal indiscriminability focuses on the mode of what is to be known about, or what is to be known about itself. It is to talk about the experiential situation.

6. But it really is not clear how establishing the possibility of impersonal claims of indiscriminability will help with our initial problem in respect of the dog. While we do use such claims without singling out any specific defects of agents, the example of invisibility still suggests that they are focused on certain aspects of agents which will not carry over to the case of the dog. For example, where we do praise the mend as being invisible, even if we need not then speaking of any specific failing in Jones's sight, still we do seem to be talking about sight, a psychological capacity, and what can or cannot be known through its use. For example, suppose that the thread used for the mend happens to be one which reacts differently to infrared radiation from the surrounding textile. Then, while the mending is indeed invisible for us, we can conceive of possible ways that sight could have been such that the mend was visible after all. So our talk here of invisibility seems just to be talk about what it is or is not possible to know through the use of sight.

The parallel in the case of the dog is to suppose that our talk of what is or is not knowably distinct from perception by introspective reflection is to talk about the use of introspective reflection. It is to talk about the means or faculty or mechanism, or source of knowledge that introspection provides and what is or is not knowably distinct through its use. But if it is to talk about that, then it is to talk about something which is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the case of the dog. For the dog, *ex hypothesi*, lacks the power of introspection, no less than an insentient stone does. So whatever introspection could or could not tell one about the situation the dog is in, it could not be telling the dog that, since the dog is not in a position to use it. And, one add, it hardly helps to talk of what one could know through introspection were one in the situation of the dog. That would raise two obvious problems: what would it be about the situation which would make one's introspective judgements in that strange counterfactual situation relevant to how things actually are with the dog? And, what is it about the dog's situation that would have to be held fixed into the counterfactual situation where one introspects? Surely there is no plausible candidate other

than how the dog is itself experiencing; yet we are allegedly seeking to explicate what it is for the dog to experience in terms of this counterfactual condition.

In fact, this construal of indiscriminability talk raises another problem, entirely independent of the issue of the dog. When we suppose that talk of what is or is not invisible is to talk about the power or capacity of sight with respect to certain objects or circumstances, we should also note that it is to talk of certain features of the objects of sight. This is particularly notable when we consider the invisibility of distinctness: i.e. when objects are indiscriminable through the use of sight. It is natural for us to move from talking of things being indiscriminable (where that is not tied to some specific incapacity of the judge in question) to them thereby sharing something, a look or appearance. And if this transition from talk of indiscriminability to sameness of appearance is warranted in general, then the disjunctivist's commitment to hallucination being impersonally indiscriminable from veridical perception will lead us to talk of them sharing an appearance, in conflict with commitment (III).

For example, suppose someone presents you with a cunningly crafted bar of soap which looks just like an Amalfi lemon. Sometimes people craft soap to look lemon-like while still obviously being nothing other than soap; but we can imagine a master craftsman of soap sculpture making a soap lemon so perfectly that there is no way to tell the bar of soap from a genuine lemon, just with the naked eye. In this case the bar of soap and a real lemon may well be visually indiscriminable. And in saying this, I don't mean merely to be saying that I, with little interest in the particular ways in which the surface of lemons are textured when waxed and when not, cannot tell them apart, but rather than one just couldn't tell them apart. This impossibility of telling things apart comes with a certain objectivity attached to it. It is a fact about the two items that they are not to be told apart through sight alone. Someone would be mistaken if they thought that they could so discern them. For example, we might imagine an over-confident television chef convinced that he can spot the real lemon from the bar of soap. Moreover we may suppose that, purely by chance, what he picks as the real lemon is indeed the genuine article. In explaining his success the chef might claim that there was just a special way that the lemon looked which the soap did not, and which keyed him in to the right answer. Now even though the chef happened on the correct item, still this claim is wrong, if the two genuinely are indiscriminable through sight. The chef is lucky in his choice, but his success is not grounded in how anything looked or how anything appeared to him, given that he was seeing things as they were.²⁹

29. Charles Travis insisted on this point to me. Cf. also (Austin 1962)Ch.5.

What the chef is mistaken about are not only his grounds for the judgement (or lack of them) but also something about the objects in question: in being visually indiscriminable they share something: the same appearance, or look. What is true of looks and lemons is true too of smells and tastes: if two wines just could not be told apart by use of the palate, then the two wines do share a taste; if two rags cannot be distinguished by the nose, then there will be a smell in common between them. In general, then, with respect to the senses, indiscriminability of objects of sense correlates with a shared appearance, or shared object of sense.

Now this observation, no less than the last, poses a problem for the disjunctivist. For suppose that the impersonal talk of indiscriminability allows us to talk of the objects of possible knowledge, just as we can talk of the lemon and the soap. Then as when we say that two objects indiscriminable through sight must share a look or appearance, it seems as if we should say the same will hold for introspective indiscriminability. If the hallucination really is indiscriminable through introspective reflection from the perception, then the hallucination has something detectible in common with the perception, an inner appearance, or (one may feel the temptation to say) a phenomenal character. Note that this would give us *a* phenomenal sameness between the two, as proposed by the alternative response to commitment (II), but it would not yet give us what the Common Kind Assumption requires, that the most specific character of the veridical experience is shared with the matching hallucination. But, of course, to grant this would be to give up on commitment (III). For that claimed that all that need be in common is that the hallucination is indiscriminable from the perception. But what the above line of reasoning suggests is that the way in which objects may be so indiscriminable is really only through sharing an appearance, and hence that will be an additional feature over and beyond the merely negative epistemological property of being not knowably distinct from the perception.

We have two problems here at either end of the claim of indiscriminability. First, if we take the claim of impersonal indiscriminability about introspective reflection to be parallel to that for sight, then such ascriptions will only be significant in relation to the sense experience of creatures which possess such a mode of coming to know. So unless the disjunctivist can offer some other interpretation, conditions (II) and (III) will be inapplicable to the case of the dog. Second, when we consider the use of such judgements in relation to the senses, such as sight, then we see that when impersonal indiscriminability holds, so too does such a sharing of a property detected through that sense: if the lemon and soap are visibly indiscriminable, then they have in common their visual appearance. Now I want to suggest that the two problems are linked. We are led to posit a common appearance in relation to sight because we think of sight as a

mode of coming to be aware of a realm independent of it. But we have reasons, already partly gestured at in passing, for not thinking of introspection in this way. This gives us a reason to deny that indiscriminability requires a common appearance property in the case of introspection. But, in turn, it forces us one step further. If we are not to think of introspection as a mode or source of knowledge along the lines of claims about the visibility or invisibility of objects, how are we to construe them?

Recall that claims of indiscriminability are to be read as claims about the impossibility of knowing relative to some mode that two things are not identical, or that one thing is not a member of a given kind. So in general there is no entailment from something's being not possibly knowably not an *F* to its being an *F*, or even some other *G*. There is no entailment from not being able to know through sight that the bar of soap is not a lemon to the claim that there is thereby something both the bar of soap and the lemon are which one *can* know through sight. What more need the two objects have in common than just that sight isn't a way of telling that the one is different from the other?

Yet, having underlined that point, we should also note that the move to the positive claim that there *is* an appearance that the bar of soap and the lemon share is one which is entirely natural for us to make. Moreover this is not just the observation that the most obvious way for something to be a fake lemon is for it to have such visible properties in common with lemons as shape and colour. Rather, it seems as if a mild form of verificationism is called for in this area, even if it is applied only within a very limited purview. In the case of visually observable phenomena, our use of sight in good viewing conditions is an appropriate way to come to know of the presence, or absence, of such phenomena. Vision, at least in optimal circumstances, is a way of coming to know things about one's environment, which things being those that vision is appropriate to tell one about. When one fails to tell apart the lemon and the soap, the failure is not a matter of the breakdown of the visual system or the conditions for viewing these objects. So if vision is normally a way of telling whether things are thus and so within the visible world, then the fact that vision cannot tell our two objects apart suggests that there is something that it does detect in common between them.³⁰ And that fact, that there is something to be picked up on here, we mark with talk of the look, the visual appearance or just the appearance which the two things share.³¹

30. We should note one extra complication here. It is not clear that we would talk of a distinctive look that lemons have if we lived in an environment in which there were many non-lemons which also looked just the way that lemons look. So that we talk of a distinctive look of lemons may require that the bars of soap we talk about here are something of an anomaly.

31. Compare here Crispin Wright's discussion of observational knowledge in, (Wright 1982) and Christopher Peacocke's various accounts of observational concepts in, (Peacocke 1983) Ch.4, (Peacocke 1986), Ch.1 and (Peacocke 1992).

If this is the right account of why the move is legitimate in the case of vision (and, one might also suggest, in the cases of taste and smell³²), then the move is natural to make where we suppose that we are using a source of knowledge in relation to a realm which exists independently of any one perceiver's exercise of the relevant faculty. We talk of the objects having something in common when not distinguished by one's senses because the use of one's senses is a way of determining how things are in the world independent of that exercise. We can then mark that it is not some particular limitation, or failure, on one's part, or a failure in one's senses by treating the objective indiscernibility as a positive appearance. The same story will apply to the case of introspection, therefore, only if we suppose that in self-awareness or the exercise of introspective reflection also one is detecting features of some realm of facts given independently of one's introspection, such that there can be a failure to tell apart which is not a matter simply of a subjective failing on the part of the individual enquirer.

7. This seems to raise a broader and more familiar question: To what extent is introspection like perception or observation? If we should think of introspective contact with phenomenal conscious as relevantly similar to perceptual observation of objects, then the same move will be natural to make concerning a common appearance to introspection. It has become fairly popular to insist that introspection is not a form of inner observation, and to point out that there are key disanalogies between introspection and perception.³³ A more specific question concerns us here, though: Do any such disanalogies undermine the reasoning from indiscriminability to sameness of appearance? Rather than rehearse general grounds for contrasting introspection and perception, I want to present a line of reasoning which derives from the considerations we already expressed on behalf of the disjunctivist in respect of commitment (II) above.

One familiar observation is that introspection contrasts with the sense modalities in allowing of no seems/is distinction. For when we employ our senses to find out about the world around us, we acknowledge the possibility that things may seem a certain way to us visually or tactually without

32. The case is somewhat more complex for these senses, though, for we consider smells and tastes to be the proper objects of these senses, in the way that a visual appearance of an object is not. To put the thought somewhat picturesquely, we can imagine an olfactory world inhabited solely by smells, with the smells in question linked only extrinsically to any of the common objects in the world around us; we don't conceive of the visible world as primarily occupied just by visible appearances (although perhaps some sense-datum theorists have been seduced into thinking this). Rather we suppose visible objects which possess visual appearances occupy a visual world.

33. For some flavour of the varieties of discussion here see Sydney Shoemaker in, (Shoemaker 1984 (originally published *Journal of Philosophy* 1968)), (Shoemaker 1995); (Shoemaker 1994); also compare (Anscombe 1975); (Burge 1996); (Wright 1989); (Wright 1998); (Moran 2001). For those who still favour something like an observational model, however, see (Armstrong 1968), (Chisholm 1969) and (Macdonald 1998).

necessarily being that way. In the most favourable circumstances, proper employment of a mode of sensing can deliver knowledge of some subject matter – the use of one’s eyes, or one’s nose, or one’s palate is a perfectly proper way to know of the size or colour of something, how it smells, whether a wine is ready to drink. But in disfavourable circumstances a subject can unwittingly go wrong in judgement through attempting to use his or her senses as they would in the best possible circumstances. In such a situation a subject may be mistaken in judgement but not at fault (epistemically) in the judgement he or she makes. When that happens the subject conforms her judgement to how things sensorily seem to her, even though how things seem is not how they are.³⁴ Since there are objective conditions for the correct functioning of our senses, we can conceive of the possibility of circumstances in which both things seem a certain way to the subject and the subject lacks knowledge because the conditions are not optimal for the operation of their senses.³⁵

The idea that no such contrast can be drawn with respect to the inner realm is sometimes put by saying that we have direct or immediate access to our own phenomenal states.³⁶ But that is a somewhat misleading slogan. A naïve realist about perception will insist in the case of veridical perception that one does have direct or immediate access to the environmental objects and facts which one perceives. The possibility that there can be cases in which one is subject to illusion and hence liable to error is not ruled out by the fact that in certain other cases one has direct access to the objects of awareness. So we can express the key idea in its simplest form just by ruling out the relevant parallel story for introspection that we tell for sense perception. That is to say, introspection is not like this: There are optimal circumstances for the exercise of one’s introspective faculty. When such circumstances obtain, one can acquire knowledge about one’s phenomenal consciousness through exercising the faculty. In less than optimal circumstances, however, attempting to employ the introspective faculty will not issue in introspective knowledge. In such circumstances a subject who does not know that the situation is disfavourable may well be reasonable in making the introspective judgements that he or she does, for such judgements will match the way that things intro-

34. The discussion here is intended to remain neutral on the question whether we should say a subject uses the same methods of enquiry across favourable and disfavourable circumstances – whether we should say that a subject uses the same methods of enquiry when really seeing as when merely having a visual hallucination.

35. Matters could be formulated slightly more carefully here. A subject could have knowledge in such circumstances, if on the basis of ancillary information they can know that in such circumstances, the environment can only be a certain way. For example, one can imagine an individual who knows that they are induced to have a visual hallucination of a pink elephant only in the presence of pink elephants and so comes to know that there is a pink elephant nearby when it seems to them a pink elephant is nearby. If we focus on cases of demonstrative knowledge (‘That is a pink elephant’) and knowledge only derivable from demonstrative knowledge, then the complication may not be required.

36. E.g., (Sturgeon), (Chalmers 1996).

spectively seem. But how things seem introspectively will not be how things are phenomenally, and hence the judgement in question will not be knowledge.³⁷ Were this a genuine possibility, we could always significantly contrast how a subject's inner life seems to her with how it actually is: there would be the possibility (or at least conceivability) that things might merely seem to be the way she judges them to be. In denying that there is a genuine seems/is distinction we are saying that we do not conceive this as a genuine possibility, and hence that the story told is to be ruled out.

Now in ruling this out as a coherent possibility, one denies that there are any situations in which, from the subject's perspective on her situation, her mind seems one way to her, and yet is another. It does not require one to take a stand on whether one can make mistakes in one's self-ascriptive judgements. There is no reason to claim that these must be incorrigible or even infallible. Nor need one rule out the possibility that a subject may be entirely deluded about his or her own mind, just as one can be deluded about the world. Part of the point of Smith's examples discussed earlier is to highlight exactly how one can be so afflicted: through hallucinogenic medication, schizophrenic delusion, or simply hypnotic suggestion. Rather than rule these cases out, though, the insistence that there is no seems/is distinction highlights the epistemological irrelevance of these cases. A subject who is deluded into supposing that he now experiences angels talking to him need not be rationally responding to how things sensorily seem to him. That is, it need not be the case that the subject has a sensory experience as of angels, and is rationally responding to that.³⁸ Rather it may be that, regardless of the actual way in which the subject experiences the world, he responds in the non-rational way of judging there to be angels there. Likewise, we do not have to suppose that someone deluded about the state of his or her own mind, for example as to whether he is having a particular kind of experience, is misled by how his mind appears to him to be. Rather, the subject is deluded in the way that he forms his judgements in the first place, and these are not properly constrained by any grounds. When we deny that one can make sense of the seems/is distinction in this realm, all that need be denied is that we can make sense of a subject's situation being this way: describing how things seem or are from the subject's point of view characterises his phenomenal consciousness one way; attending to how things really are, requires that we describe it another way.

There is widespread (although not universal) support for the idea that there can be no interesting distinction here between how one's phenome-

37. This description sounds much like the scenario which Smith attributes to the disjunctivist concerning hallucination. So one might explain the intuitive force of Smith's rejection of that picture with the conviction that for the inner realm there is no seems/is distinction.

38. Of course, it is an open question whether any psychotic or pathological delusions do involve a form of sensory illusion or hallucination. That they do so, is one active hypothesis in response to certain pathologies of belief, cf. (Davies and Coltheart 2000).

nal consciousness seems to one to be and how it is.³⁹ But agreement about why this should be so is not so widespread. I want to contrast two explanations. One holds onto an aspect of the idea that introspection is a particular kind of source, or mechanism, for knowing about an aspect of the world, just as the senses are. It may not have any visible organ, and it may not involve a particular kind of mental state which we would call introspective experience, but still it is a means by which we can come to track an aspect of reality and know things about it. That is to say, with the senses we suppose not only that there are physical processes which underpin their operation, but that we can conceive of a privileged set of such processes whose correct operation is required for a given sense to be operating properly. Introspection will be, or rest on, a particular mechanism, if the processes which subserve it allow for the same distinction between the conditions for proper operation and their absence. The other approach takes the collapse of the seems/is distinction to indicate that there can be no such mechanism of introspection. I shall argue that the disjunctivist is implicitly committed to this latter model.

One might suggest that what those who claimed that our introspective knowledge of phenomenal consciousness is direct or immediate intended by this talk is to rule out the possibility of certain kinds of error; perhaps on the assumption that such errors would arise only if some intermediary of some form played a role. Recall the point we stressed in relation to commitment (II): the impossibility of one's experience merely seeming a certain way without being so is not established solely by supposing that phenomenal states have the distinctive property of being self-intimating, by which I mean: being such that a subject who is in such a state is thereby in a position to know that she is in it.⁴⁰ The self-intimating nature of phenomenal states would rule out the possibility of its seeming to one as if one was presented with a pink square, when really one's experience presented solely a red triangle. For in having an experience as of a red triangle and nothing else, one would thereby be in a position to know that one's experience was that way. But being in a position to know one's experience is that way rules out not knowing that one's experience is not a way incompatible with being that way. Hence it cannot seem to the subject as if the experi-

39. However, it should also be noted that the denial of a seems/is distinction is in tension with the claim that, given introspective support for naïve realism, the only consistent sense-datum or intentional theory of perception will have to adopt an error theory of phenomenal consciousness. For that seems to require that how our sense experience seems to us to be, namely naïve realist, does not match how it really is. That this is indeed the best way to read the history of the debate about the problem of perception, I argue in (Martin 2001). I'll mention below how the disjunctivist can reconcile this tension. For other theorists, I suggest it indicates not the lack of introspective support for naïve realism, but the failure of theorists to face up to the cost of endorsing a theory of perception in conflict with appearances.

40. See (Williams 1978) appendix; and also (Alston 1989), for attempts to tease out the competing theses about the special epistemological access we have to our own minds.

ence is in fact one of a pink square. The parallel reasoning will not carry over to any case in which the subject is failing to experience the world as being any particular way at all. In such circumstances, there would be no way experientially the subject would be which could intimate to the subject that he or she was that way. Rather we simply have the absence of any experiential state. So if it is not going to be possible for the subject to be in the error-inducing situation of its seeming as if he or she is experientially a certain way when not, then the explanation must trace to the means by which this seeming can be brought about. Hence it must trace to the means one uses in forming introspective judgements.

Given this, the claim of directness of introspective judgement adds an explanation here only if it is interpreted in one of two ways. First, it may be supposed that the means for coming to a judgement on experience is such that it is never possible for it to go wrong. If one employs it to determine whether one is having one kind of experience or another, or not having sense experience at all, then this means will have to give the right answer. Alternatively, one may claim that, even if the introspective mechanism itself can go wrong, and so potentially deliver the wrong answer, still the operation of this mechanism is something epistemically transparent to one: one can know when one attempts to use it whether one is succeeding in using it correctly. So in that circumstance, there couldn't be a situation in which a subject was not in a position to know that he or she couldn't know whether things were a certain way introspectively. This alternative allows introspective mechanisms to be ordinary mechanisms within the world, prone as anything to breakdown and to improper use. But it hypothesises for the rational agent one level up a means whose operation is, at least in principle, perfect: one just couldn't fail with due attention to determine whether one was doing things right.⁴¹

Now many writers have been suspicious of the positing of any such perfect means of coming to know about the inner realm. So it has been common to suppose instead that the denial of the seems/is contrast here indicates instead that introspective access cannot be by some distinctive means or mode of coming to know one's mind. Again to stress: this thought cannot be captured simply by the claim that our access to our phenomenal states is direct or immediate: that might help explain in the good cases, when we are confronted with phenomenal reality why we are bound to get it right; but it doesn't by itself help explain why there are no bad cases, why there shouldn't be situations in which we are not properly

41. Strictly speaking, this is not the only alternative hypothesis. For, of course, one could hypothesise that this mechanism too is potentially faulty, but that a third mechanism is perfect and so indicates to one when the second mechanism fails. One would thereby never be in a position not to know that introspection does not reveal things the way that they are. This account, too, posits a perfect mechanism. There is an infinity of such accounts, each of which posits as its limiting mechanism a perfect one.

hooked up to phenomenal consciousness as we normally suppose, but we are unable to detect why not. The requirement of super-mechanisms comes only at this stage. Rather, the alternative strategy must question how we are to understand the favourable case in which there is no question but that the subject is in a position to have introspective knowledge.

Consider again the parallel with sense perception. Suppose that the subject is in a position to make judgements because of the correct operation of some mechanism, and that the mechanism in question is an ordinary part of the world whose workings can be investigated as any other. Then there is a conceivable situation in which such investigation reveals the mechanism not to be operating correctly, but in which a subject is still liable to make judgements about his or her own state of mind. If the subject's judgement has the status of knowledge in virtue of the correct operation of the mechanism, then in such circumstances the subject would merely be making an introspective judgement and would not possess knowledge. If the subject is a rational being in this situation, then the less-than-knowledgeable judgement would conform merely to phenomenal consciousness's seeming some way to one, and not to how it really is. Since, by hypothesis, this is ruled out, there are only two possibilities: the one we have already canvassed, that the mechanism is such that it cannot fail or can only fail when it is knowable that it has; and the other that there is no such mechanism in the first place. In denying that there is a mechanism of introspection, one need not deny that there are certain physical conditions under which someone makes an introspective judgement. One need not deny that there are sufficient conditions for introspective knowledge. In the case of the senses, we add to this a contrast between circumstances in which the sense operates correctly and situations in which it does not. What is ruled out here is the possibility of specifying a mechanism, such that there could be a way that it goes wrong. In contrast to the sense modalities there is no particular means, or set of means, which are the introspective ones by which one derives knowledge of the inner realm. However things seem from the subject's perspective with respect to her phenomenal consciousness is how phenomenal consciousness must be, regardless of whether that seeming issues from a specific set of mechanisms that we had otherwise picked out as the introspection supporting ones.

There is a parallel here with the original moral we drew concerning commitment (II). Recall that when we fix on a circumstance as one of possibly having a visual hallucination of a white picket fence, we are concerned with things being not knowably distinct from seeing a white picket fence from the subject's point of view. Given a modest conception of sense experience, this condition does not require that one's normal means of gaining visual knowledge has actually been employed, or that it has resulted in a mental state with exactly the same characteristics as normally occur

when one sees a white picket fence. All that is required is that, from the subject's perspective, things shouldn't appear any different from a situation in which one has used one's powers of sight appropriately and thereby come into visual contact with the world. Any of the various means for bringing about visual experience will, from this conception, give one sufficient conditions for having visual experience, and not any necessary condition independent of commitment (II).

In relation to phenomenal consciousness itself and introspection, the lesson is that we take 'from the subject's point of view' as, so to speak, a fixed point. If it seems to the subject as if it seems to the subject that there is a white picket fence before her, then it seems to the subject as if there is a white picket fence before her. So there can be no privileged mechanism which is required for her to be able to get right the judgement about how things seem to her. The subject's perspective on her own sense experience constitutes sense experience being that way for her.⁴²

Hence, the disjunctivist has every reason to reject the idea that introspection is like perception. Introspective judgement cannot result from the correct operation of a specific mechanism of introspection without the possibility of one's phenomenal consciousness merely seeming some way to one. Since that is not possible, specifying how things seem to the subject does not introduce a perspective the subject occupies independent of the subject matter she thereby takes an interest in. Now this conclusion bears directly both on the case of common appearances and on our understanding of how dogs can be credited sense experience in the light of the disjunctivist's commitments.

8. In the case of the lemon and the soap, we move from visual indiscriminability to a shared look via the further observation that the two objects cannot be told apart is an objective feature of them which one's use of sight tracks. But, as we have just seen, unless one wishes to posit a perfect mechanism of introspection (or tracking the use of mechanisms), we cannot suppose that one's take on how things are experientially is independent of what it is a take on, rather these two must coincide. The impersonality of one's incapacity to distinguish the two situations of veridical perception

42. Various authors have discussed theories of self-knowledge positing constitutive relations between the self-ascription of thoughts and the thoughts so self-ascribed. See, for example, (Heal 1994), (Wright 1989). A common concern with such theories is that they deprive the higher-order ascription from having a rational ground in the subject matter it concerns, cf. (Peacocke 1998). The same concerns are not in play here. The constitutive connection is between the subject's perspective on his or her own mind, how it seems to be, and how his or her mind then is. This need not be identified with the judgements he or she actually makes. As we have already noted, an agent may be inattentive or even deluded in their judgements even about the inner realm, so the connection drawn is consistent with supposing that self-ascriptive judgements of experience are both cognitive achievements and grounded in how things seem and are.

and hallucination is not matched by an objectivity tracked through introspection. For when we say that things seem a certain way to the subject, now with respect to her own state of mind, we are not hypothesising that she is in the best possible circumstances to tell how things seem to her, and yet still cannot find a difference between this situation and the one of veridically perceiving. The hypothesised situation is simpler than that: if she really is in a situation in which from her perspective it is as if she is having an experience as of a white picket fence, then that constitutes her being in the situation of having an experience as of a white picket fence.

And, in turn, this shows us that the impersonal ascription of introspective indiscriminability cannot be used to talk about the limitations of a given faculty or mechanism of introspection, as the parallel claims about indiscriminability through sight can be. There is no relevant mechanism of introspection to be talked about unless there can be super-mechanisms, incapable of going wrong. One cannot show the irrelevance of these claims to the case of the dog, therefore, by pointing out that the dog lacks the relevant mode of introspective access, for if our reasoning is correct, the difference between us and the dog cannot be put down to the presence of any distinctive mechanism of introspection anyway.

What then, do we do when we ascribe sense experience to the dog? In ascribing consciousness to a creature, we are thereby ascribing to it a point of view or perspective on the world. This is a feature which the naïve realist about perception in particular will want to stress, although its claim on us is recognised far more widely. From a subject's perspective experience is a matter (at least in part) of various objects being apparent to it, some part of the actual world making an appearance to one. The naïve realist, at least in the case of veridical perception, wishes us to understand this way of talking literally: veridical perceptual experience is constituted through one standing in a relation of awareness to the objects of perception. The same won't carry over to hallucination, though. So in general there is a question how experience being a point of view on the world, and the non-necessity of the actual world being present to the subject are to fit together.

The disjunctivist is moved to claim that the kind of apprehension that one has of the object of sense in the case of veridical perception is entirely absent when one has a causally matching hallucination. It is not that one fails to apprehend some aspect of the physical world and yet still latches on to something else, some inner object or sense-datum. Rather, in such cases, the subject has experience yet fails to apprehend anything at all. So if having conscious experience involves having a point of view on the world, then having such a point of view cannot require the actual apprehension of anything. This suggests that when we grasp the idea of there being a situation which from the subject's point of view is just as if one is veridically perceiving but in which one is not, no commitment at all need be made in

granting that idea to the thought that the subject *must* be aware of something, even if they are not aware of, for example, a white picket fence.

This much, I take it, even an intentionalist about perceptual experience will be inclined to accept. For the intentionalist both wants to agree that we should characterise experience when perceiving in terms of the actual objects of perception, and yet deny that any other objects fill this role when we hallucinate. So both the intentionalist and the disjunctivist will agree that in the case of hallucination it is as if the subject is being presented with objects which are not in fact there. The intentionalist wishes to add a further claim, one that the disjunctivist will deny – namely that this fact about the situation holds in virtue of the hallucination having a certain property which the veridical perception shares, namely having a certain representational content. The disjunctivist denies this (in committing to (III)) since the disjunctivist insists that the veridical perception is a genuinely relational state, as the naïve realist claims, and not something of a kind which could equally be present in the case of hallucination. But the key point remains for both: that we cannot capture how things are from the subject's point of view without reference to what is only true in cases of veridical perception. The disjunctivist's commitment to (II) can be read, therefore, as articulating this thought: that we can only characterise how things are from the subject's perspective by reference to the veridical circumstance. In turn, the commitment to (III) indicates that in the case of hallucination we need not commit to the subject successfully picking up on anything beyond being in this circumstance of its being just as if one is in the case of veridical perception.

A consequence of the formulation of (II) and (III) is that to articulate properly what is involved in being in this situation, we must make mention of perception (a kind of mental state) and one's ability to discriminate one kind of situation in which one has a point of view on the world from other such situations (it is for the dog as if there are sausages there, not carrots). And for creatures such as ourselves, self-aware and self-conscious human beings, having such experience, with such a perspective on the world puts us in a position to articulate our plight. Any of us, suitably linguistically sophisticated, can move back from judgements about the environment surrounding us to judgements which simply concern our experiential position. As Strawson observed, experience must make room for the thought of experience itself.⁴³ Yet that is not to say that when we ascribe such experience to other creatures, we must thereby assume that they too are self-conscious or self-aware, even though how we conceive of their experience is such that, were a creature so to experience and be self-conscious, they would thereby be able to articulate judgements just as we in fact do.

43. (Strawson 1966) p.101.

For, as we noted above, introspection cannot be a mechanism. There is therefore nothing which has been added to phenomenal consciousness and through which we come to be aware of how the character of phenomenal consciousness when we contrast our situation with that of the dog. It seeming to the subject that things seem a certain way to her can constitute things seeming that way to her. So for a self-aware subject, phenomenal consciousness can thereby exemplify self-awareness in itself. That which in us is simply a mode of self-awareness is what we attribute to other creatures even when we do not take them to be self-aware. So the conditions in (II) and (III) attribute experience to the dog through attributing a specific take on the world, without thereby presupposing that the dog is self-aware.

In sum, although there is a temptation to suppose that when we look to what must be true of different creatures when they all enjoy a sense experience of a kind of scene, and not just a veridical perception of some particular instance, that there must positively be some phenomenal characteristics as such which they all share, the disjunctivist denies this and can do so quite consistently. For the disjunctivist what they must all have in common is just that their situations are impersonally indiscriminable through reflection from a veridical perception. What it takes for a creature so to satisfy this condition may well involve levels of similarity other than at that of experiential sameness – the same neurological organisation and functioning may be nomologically required in order that creatures genuinely be indiscriminable from each other from the perspective of within. This may thereby make true broadly similar functional truths by which certain approaches to the mind have sought to define mental kinds. Where the disjunctivist sticks is with supposing that these commonalities must sub-serve or define an experiential commonality where that requires more than the sharing of the negative epistemological condition.⁴⁴

9. We have now rehearsed the various grounds for the disjunctivist to resist the characterisation of his or her position that Smith sketches. The picture of causally matching hallucination as a case of unknown absent qualia is forced on the disjunctivist where we have to accept that one's introspective focus on experience is from a perspective on one's phenomenal experience, where the status of the latter is fixed independent of one's appreciation of

44. Likewise the proposal here should not be read as claiming that to ascribe experience to the dog is to say that were it self-aware it would not be able to tell its situation from one in which it perceived a bunch of carrots; or to say that were an ideally reflective agent to be in the dog's situation then it would not be able to know it is not perceiving a bunch of carrots. Both of these claims may be true (though it is easy to see also how they may be falsified – perhaps dogs would be insensitive to carrots if self-aware; perhaps ideally reflective agents have very different experience from dogs). But neither can be what we mean to talk of when we ascribe experience to dogs, at best they would trade on that understanding. The counterfactuals in question might be intended as part of a reductive account of what it is to have experience, but then, apart from the worries to which we have already gestured, the disjunctivist would also be liable to resist the account since the applicability of the counter-factual condition would be liable to seek for a common grounding in dogs across cases of perception and hallucination specified in terms other than drawn from (II), and hence would be inconsistent with (III).

that fact. If we think of awareness of experience in this way, conditions (II) and (III) are naturally read only as conditions on that awareness, not conditions on experience itself.

In contrast, in discussion of the contrast between introspection and observation, and the application of this to the case of the dog, we can see that conditions (II) and (III) are rather intended by the disjunctivist as the means of characterising what a subject's perspective, either on the world, or on her own experiential situation, can amount to. Or, more exactly, the disjunctivist offers this characterisation within the context of making no further assumptions about the necessary existence of objects made apparent to that subjective perspective.

The dog, the soap and the lemon together indicate why Smith's picture does not capture the situation as conceived by the disjunctivist. First, when we say of a victim of causally matching hallucination that his or her situation is one of not being knowably distinct from veridical perception of, say, a white picket fence, we need not there be talking of the specific intellectual capacities or incapacities possessed by that very individual; we need not be saying that this person is quite capable or rather incapable of exercising capacities for coming to know things about the world. Rather, our focus is on the impersonal fact that the subjective perspective, that of introspective reflection, cannot discern the difference between a situation of causally matching hallucination and that of veridical perception. This fact is what is common between the dog, which lacks any powers of self-conscious judgment, and us, in as much as there is anything experientially in common between merely sentient creatures and self-aware agents such as mature human beings.

Second, this subjective perspective on the situation does not pick out an independent vantage point from which two possible objects of comparison are to be told apart, or treated as in some respect the same. It is common to deny that one's phenomenal consciousness could merely seem some way to one without being so – that, after all, is part of the grounds of incredulity in Smith's objection to the disjunctivist proposal. In accepting this, the disjunctivist points out that the perspective we have on our own phenomenal consciousness cannot, then, be grounded in some specific mode or source of knowing about something independent of that perspective. If it is true of someone that it seems to them as if things seem a certain way, as if they are having a certain sense experience, then they are thereby having that experience. Our reflective standpoint on our own experience cannot stand outside of it.

So given this, the disjunctivist can point out that in characterising the subject's circumstance in a case of causally matching hallucination as one of not knowably not being a case of veridical perception of a white picket fence, one has thereby characterised how things seem to the subject, and so

characterised the course of his or her experience. If the subject is conscious, then there is something that it is like for him or her to be so. That there is something that it is like for the subject is given by the fact that we are characterising how things seem to them, namely that they seem in just the way they would seem to him or her were he or she veridically perceiving a white picket fence. What more could be required in order to specify a way that one can be experientially?⁴⁵

At the same time, in spelling out how the disjunctivist seeks to rebut Smith's complaint, we are better placed to see what the deeper disagreement is between the two views. To resist Smith's characterisation of the case of causally matching hallucination is not to deny that there is a significant disagreement here, and one which connects with many people's intuitions about the case of phenomenal consciousness and our knowledge of it. Rather, it is to suggest that the disagreement relates not to any denial or affirmation of the presence of phenomenal consciousness in the case of some hallucinations, but rather the kind of self-awareness or introspective knowledge that one can have of phenomenal consciousness. The disjunctivist can take (III) to characterise sufficiently the subjective character of a subject's state of mind because they suppose we have no reason to claim that the only possible way in which one can come to have sense experience is through actually apprehending some object.

Return to Smith's complaint. As initially stated, it seems to affirm the kind of position familiar from early sense-datum theorists: how can things be this way if there is no object of awareness for me to sense? One can happily endorse Smith's objection here, only if one does think that what is distinctive of sense experience in any circumstance of occurrence is the presence of some actual object of sensing: that one can only be sensuously a certain way, where a genuine object of sensuous attention is provided for one's focus. That, of course, is not Smith's intention. Although he does think that there are actualised aspects of sense experience, the sensuous object of attention is not one of them.⁴⁶ So the complaint of absence here cannot literally be taken to be that of complaining that hallucination can involve the absence of an object of awareness. All theorists apart from sense-datum theorists accept that fact: they accept that there is something about the situation in the case of veridical perception which somehow is not reflected in the case of hallucination, even if otherwise we are to say that the two are experientially the same.

45. In this way, too, we can see how the disjunctivist can consistently agree that there is no seems/is distinction for sense experience, and yet that there is something essentially deceptive about the case of perfect hallucination. The essentially deceptive element relates to the subject's seemingly being in a position of awareness without in fact being aware of anything.

46. (Smith 2002), Ch.9.

So, if the complaint against the disjunctivist is one of a supposed absence in the case of hallucination, one which a Common Kind Theorist can avoid, then the absence must be, so to speak, one level up, an absence purely at the level of how things are experientially with the subject, and not with the objects of such experience. Here, I suggest, is where we do find a deep disagreement which it is difficult to articulate arguments for or against.

What pushes the initial worry we started out with, I suggest, is the conviction that there must be more to causally matching hallucination. In reading this, you are not currently hallucinating. The disjunctivist agrees that there is more to your experience than just the negative epistemological property of being indiscriminable from this veridical perception, there is the positive character of the veridical perception itself. But now, one wants to say, just as I can tell that there is more in this case, so too I would be equally placed in the case of causally matching hallucination, so there must be something I am picking up on, the phenomenal character which has been left out by the disjunctivist. To adopt this position, I've suggested, is to suppose that we can fix the facts of phenomenal consciousness independently of the higher-order perspective on it, in as much as we think of the latter as correctly reporting or reflecting these additional facts.

And once we acknowledge this, then we must think of the phenomenal facts that we pick up on in this way as being independent of the experience being a veridical perception, for the properties in question will have to be common to the causally matching hallucination and the veridical perception it is indiscriminable from. So it could not be that one's experience being this way in itself (as opposed to being this way in certain circumstances) constituted the kind of contact with one's environment which would explain one's ability to think about things around one and come to know how they are. Moreover, if the naïve realist is right that we do conceive of our sensory experience in cases of perception as providing such a contact with the world, and we are inclined to understand our ability to think about and know of these things in terms of such experience, then recognising our experience as only a common element to perception and hallucination comes at the cost of losing that understanding.

At best, if the disjunctivist has established that naïve realism best characterises how our sensory experience seems to initial reflective intuition, the position we end up in here is one of clashing intuitions. For on the one hand there is the thought that experience's being so, as it is now when I veridically perceive is a matter of my standing in an appropriate relation to the world around me. On the other hand, there is the intuition that in this circumstance I am able reflectively to pick up on how my experience is and the subject of a causally matching hallucination would equally be so placed

– so the phenomenal character of both experiences must be shared, and hence cannot be relational in this way.

I say that this second claim is something we find intuitive, and apart from indicating that we find this plausible, I think it adds two further elements. The first is that, even if there is something more for us to say as to the truth of the relevant condition, we do not immediately appeal to those further considerations in order to support the claim. The appeal of the thought is more fundamental than that – one can't really conceive either of what experience, or more exactly the kind of perspective we have on experience could be, if it is not a matter of responding to what is there. The second is this. If this is the right place to identify the basic disagreement with disjunctivism, one which does not turn on either slips of formulation in disjunctivism, or misconception of its consequences, then in as much as the objection just seems intuitive, the appropriate strategy for the disjunctivist at this stage is not so much to offer any particular argument against it (for after all it is a claim which we accept independently of the further elaborations we try to give of why we are so committed) as to explain why the principle seems so attractive to us, given that it is false. At this point what the disjunctivist needs to do is to engage in philosophical pathology.

In the closing section, I want to begin the sketch of how that might go. For, I want to suggest, one way forward is to see a connection here between the intuitions here and external world scepticism, although not quite of the form that people commonly indicate in these debates.

Part Three

10. I've suggested that the root disagreement here relates to the epistemology of sense experience and introspective awareness of it, and that this may be connected to a response to a sceptical challenge about the external world. Now in the introductory section, I suggested that disjunctivism is properly seen as connected to a Humean challenge of scepticism with regard to the senses, rather than the more commonly discussed Cartesian challenge raised about our empirical knowledge as a whole. I do not intend to take that contrast back here, but rather to suggest that a certain kind of natural response to the Cartesian challenge may lead us to reject disjunctivism and so have to face the Humean problem head on.

First I want to spell out a bit more the gap between the Humean problem and the Cartesian one, before spelling out the link which may explain the counter-intuitive element in the disjunctivist's picture of experience. It is quite common when discussing empirical knowledge as a whole and its reliance on the senses, or in discussing the Cartesian sceptical challenge to talk of sense experience as introducing a veil or barrier between one and

the world. For example, towards the end of the first chapter of *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*, Barry Stroud reflects on the situation one finds oneself in when taking seriously the sceptical challenge to be found in Descartes's First Meditation:

What *can* we know in such a predicament? We can perhaps know what sensory experiences we are having, or how things seem to us to be... We are in a sense imprisoned within those representations, at least with respect to our knowledge...

This can seem to leave us in the position of finding a barrier between ourselves and the world around us. There would then be a veil of sensory experiences or sensory objects which we could not penetrate but which would be no reliable guide to the world beyond the veil. ((Stroud 1984), pp. 32-3.)

Stroud suggests that when one is faced with the sceptical challenge, and has as yet no satisfactory answer to it, one cannot know, or at least take oneself to know, anything about the ordinary world around one, although one can know certain things about one's own mind. In turn, he suggests that in being in this predicament, one finds sense experience to be a kind of barrier or veil between one and the world. So a sceptical doubt which starts from a hypothesis about whether one knows oneself to be dreaming or not seems to deliver a negative verdict about the nature of sense experience itself.

Although Stroud's prose offers a smooth transition between the two thoughts, the move from external world scepticism to concerns with a barrier between the subject and the experienced world is not as obvious or straightforward as it might first appear. Suppose it is true that we have no answer to the sceptical challenge, and suppose it also true that in those circumstances we still possess certain self-knowledge of our own states of mind, and of the character of our sense experiences in particular. Why should it follow from this alone that sense experience would act as a kind of barrier between us and the world?

Consider the following analogy. You have recently moved into an old Boston house and in the attic discovered seemingly a journal from the wars of independence. This is an intimate record, and from its close and somewhat obsessive detail, it now seems to you that you know things about the day-to-day life in late eighteenth century Massachusetts that you could not otherwise have happened on: the journal seems to give you a contact with that world. But now add that a malicious neighbour falsely, but seemingly authoritatively, informs you that the previous owner of your apartment was a fantasist and forger, given to constructing such fancies as the journal. The document you possess is not, he claims, a record of that past turbulent time, but is rather a cunning and recent fiction imagining how things must have been. Under the sway of his disturbing story, you may now feel cut off from the contact you seemingly had with the eighteenth century. It need not be that you are convinced by his story: you have some sense that he likes to deflate people in their pleasures. But with the doubt about the

provenance of the journal having been put forward so forcefully, you now need some further evidence to indicate that this is not a matter simply of fiction. And in this situation you cannot enjoy the journal as once you did. Even if the journal is genuine, you are no longer in a position, without some further evidence, to exploit the privilege it affords you of looking back into the past. You have lost the contact with that time that you found so pleasurable.

So far, the parallel with Stroud's concern with external world scepticism seems close enough, albeit on a smaller terrain. Initially, one seems to have a body of knowledge acquired through a particular source or group of sources. A sceptical doubt questions the probity of that source. One is not deprived of the knowledge of what the source claims is the case about the subject matter in question, but one is no longer in a position to trust the source, unless one can lay the sceptical doubts to rest. But in this case, I suggest, one would balk at the further move that Stroud makes in relation to the senses. There is no inclination to say that one should now see the journal as somehow a veil or barrier between one and those past events whose record one once enjoyed. For it seems, given that the journal is genuine, this indeed does provide a route back to the past, but just one which one isn't now in a position to exploit. Just because one's neighbour sows the seed of doubt about the veracity of the journal, there is no reason to think that the journal thereby becomes misleading or fabrication in itself. So likewise, we might ask of Stroud's discussion, why should the fact that in taking seriously the sceptical doubts mean that my senses now must act as a barrier between me and the world which otherwise they give me contact with, rather than simply being the facilitators of that contact, but in a way which I could not now exploit?⁴⁷

In contrast to this discussion, when we look to Hume, we find a more readily intelligible account of why sense experience might be thought of as a barrier between us and the world. Hume insists in section XII of the *First Enquiry* that there are different forms of sceptical challenge, some such as Descartes's, antecedent to study, science and enquiry and others consequent on it. He associates with the latter form both ancient arguments which trade on conflicting appearances and his own sceptical arguments about the senses which he claims offer a more profound challenge than

47. Tamar Szabó Gendler suggested that the story does not induce the same intuitions because it involves temporal separation from its subject matter, while the intuitions about perception concern our spatial relation to the objects in question. However, it seems to me that a variant story which perceives the spatial elements does not necessarily lead to Stroud's intuitions. While one would have the sense that a barrier is present if one accepts as true the falsification hypothesis (equivalent of the forger), there is no reason to think one's lack of knowledge of its falsity is enough to make one think of the source as a barrier. The main moral of the tale would still remain even if this worry did have some grounds: for it would not be the bare structure of the epistemological situation which led to the result. Some further assumptions have been buried in the move from sceptical quandary to imprisonment behind a veil.

other sceptical modes. The argument Hume in fact offers may not entirely convince. He hypothesises that the vulgar suppose themselves to sense objects independent of them, but that the slightest philosophy will show this opinion to be false, and that they perceive only their own impressions or images. Hume uses the attribution of such a gross mistake in our conception of perception to undermine any argument now introduced to show that we can nonetheless reliably acquire knowledge through perception of the existence of an external world.

Whatever one thinks of the merits of Hume's argument here, he seems correct in supposing that the method of argument is very different from that employed by Descartes in the First Meditation. From elsewhere in his writings, it is clear that Descartes thinks we have only mediated perception of the objects of sense, but that assumption plays no essential role in presenting the dreaming argument or the *malin génie*. All that Descartes requires is that we can conceive of a situation in which from one's own perspective it is as if one is situated as one is now, but in which one dreams, hallucinates or is subject to some external deceptive influence. The hypothesis requires that we have a conception of the difference between normal perception and mere dreaming or hallucinating. But it does not require that we have any particular views about what normal perception must involve, beyond the thought that it would be a source of knowledge, and hence requires us to hazard no view over whether a given sense experience should fail to count as a perception of the external world, if it has not already been hypothesised to be an illusion or hallucination.⁴⁸

So we seem to have at least two styles of argument here, both related to our knowledge of the external world. The one argument focuses solely on the conceivability of a situation in which one is entirely deceived in one's external world judgements, but need not take a view about the nature of sense perception itself. The other argument, in contrast, works by ascribing to us a particular conception of sense perception and then arguing that this is mistaken. Talk of the senses being a barrier or a veil between us and the world seems much more appropriate in relation to this mode of sceptical challenge. For here the implicit contrast is between how we used to believe the senses to be, giving us some kind of privileged cognitive contact with the world, and how we now believe them to be in the light of Hume's

48. Although I am not sure that all parties to the debate would agree. Stroud himself, for example, writes, '[The philosopher] chooses a situation in which any one of us would unproblematically say or think, for example, that we know that there is a fire in the fireplace right before us, and that we know it is there because we see that it is there. But when we ask what this seeing really amounts to, various considerations are introduced to lead us to concede that we would see exactly what we see now even if no fire was there at all, or if we didn't know that there was one there.' (Stroud 2000), p.131. Likewise Wright's reconstruction of the Cartesian reasoning appeals in passing to the assumption that perception and dreaming involve the same 'manifest content' brought about through different dominant causal routes, see (Wright 1991), p.91. However, in neither case can I see that the sceptical argument requires these additional claims about the nature of sense perception.

argument, or some other in its place. The mistake that Hume imputes to the vulgar has sceptical potential because it claims to falsify our beliefs about how we come to know what we take ourselves to know. While there may be no requirement that when one knows something one must also know how one comes to know it, for some cases we do have knowledge, or at least beliefs about how we have come to know something. I know that Warsaw is the capital of Poland. I am not sure how I came to know this, presumably I learnt it at school, or may be just before and either way through reading some authoritative text. But the specific route to that fact is not one I can retrace. When I stare at the white picket fence, though, I not only know that there is a white picket fence there, I seem to be in a position to tell how I can know that fact: it is made manifest to me in what I can see. Suppose, now, though, that I have been convinced by Hume that I am not in the kind of situation that I took myself to be in. It is not the white picket fence with which I am presented, but merely some simulacrum of the fence, an impression or image. In this case, the fact that I was mistaken about how I thought I was in a position to know that that was a white picket fence seems to undermine my confidence in knowing this fact. So my epistemic standing will now be worse than what I took it be before I faced Hume's challenge. I may complain that given the way that Hume claims sense experience to be it lacks the virtues that I conceived sense experience to have, for it does not give me the kind of cognitive contact with the environment that I thought I had (even if it does, in fact, give me an alternative such form of contact). It is this contrast between how I conceived the cognitive advantages of my perceptual situation with how I supposedly learn them to be which warrants describing my newly discovered situation as one involving a barrier.

The simple Cartesian story does not provide the materials to warrant talk of a barrier or veil here, for the simple story in itself makes no claim about the nature of experience. The rather different Humean challenge focuses on perception and contrasts how we believe it to be with how philosophy can supposedly demonstrate it to be. This challenge does make intelligible why one could come think of sense experience as screening off the world from our cognitive contact with it. The two challenges take different forms and draw on rather different resources. There is no obvious move from one to the other.

It should already be obvious that the arguments discussed in Part One belong in a version of the Humean sceptical challenge. The disjunctivist is motivated by the need to block the argument from hallucination offered as an attack on naïve realism. The disjunctivist takes naïve realism to be the best philosophical articulation of what we all pre-theoretically accept concerning the nature of our sense experience: that in veridical perception we are aware of mind-independent objects, and that the kind of experience we

have of them is relational, with the objects of sense being constituents of the experiential episode. If the argument from hallucination succeeds, then no aspect of our experience can be naïve realist. So, we could not be perceptually related to the physical world in the way that we pre-theoretically take ourselves to be. If our pre-theoretical conception plays any role in our understanding of what we know about the environment around us, or that of how we are able to single out and think about the objects we do, then this falsification will threaten the kinds of sceptical consequence that Hume highlights. So we can see the naïve realist as a variation on Hume's vulgar, and the argument from hallucination a development of Hume's slightest philosophy. The disjunctivist seeks to block the challenge by rejecting the Common Kind Assumption.

But whether the disjunctivist can plausibly do this, we saw in Part Two, turns on one's attitude towards the awareness we have of our own sensory states. One might think that in introspective reflection we adopt a perspective outside of phenomenal experience itself, a perspective through which we track or apprehend independently holding facts about how things are with us phenomenally. Conceiving of our awareness in this way, leads to viewing the disjunctivist as claiming that causally matching hallucinations are cases in which a subject lacks any sensory experience but is deprived of the capacity to detect that lack. In rejecting this accusation, the disjunctivist affirms a different picture of how self-awareness and phenomenal consciousness interrelate. Our introspective access to our phenomenal experience contrasts with perceptual access to the world around us. In perception, we have a viewpoint on what we perceive independent of the world we perceive: and hence that we come to know that the world is as it seems reflects a substantive cognitive achievement on our part. Within the mind, on the other hand, there is no such gap to be closed by the subject's cognitive success. A subject's perspective on his or her own experience is not distinct from their perspective on the world. So the disjunctivist does not characterise our lack of awareness of the absence of experience, but rather the way in which experience itself can simply be the lack of awareness. When we consider a case of perfect hallucination, we conceive of a subject occupying a point of view on the world within which they do not succeed at all in latching on to or becoming aware of any aspect, but are rather deceived in a particular way, as if they perceived, for example, a white picket fence.

But should we simply think of our self-conscious knowledge of experience in such a situation as giving us no substantive knowledge of anything independent of our context of enquiry? I've suggested that the fundamental disagreement with the disjunctivist lies in this question. Those who find disjunctivism incredible suppose it obvious that we just recognise introspectively something which must be present in order to have experience,

and so must be present for the hallucinating subject to recognise. It is this commitment that I want to suggest is connected with the Cartesian challenge, and which we might see as at work in the background of Stroud's talk of a veil of sensory experience.

How does this line of thought develop? The first thing to note is that the disjunctivist, in embracing a naïve realist conception of veridical perceptual experience claims that such mental states have as constituents the objects of perception. Secondly, as these are aspects of the veridical perceptual situation, the subject can attend to and form judgements about these as aspects of the experiential situation. So the subject does have knowledge of something independent of just occupying the perspective of seeming to be presented with a white picket fence, say. Moreover, that there is this aspect to veridical perception means that in the case of perfect hallucination it will seem to one as if one occupies the same sort of situation with respect to the world. That is to say, in having an hallucination one is not only deceived with respect to the environment, that it seems as if certain kinds of objects are present in one's environment, but also with respect to one's experience, that seemingly one is in a position of experiencing this objects. In both situations, therefore, it will seem to one as if there is an aspect of the experience to which one can attend and about which one can acquire knowledge independent of the perspective one takes on it. That this should merely be a matter of how things seem and not how they are in the case of hallucination is not evident within the perspective one takes on one's situation.

Turn now to the context of the Cartesian challenge. Before considering the challenge, one can see various items in the world around one, perhaps the fireplace, and the pages on which the challenge turns out to be written. One can not only see these things, but one knows through seeing them how one knows various things about them. Faced with the sceptical challenge, and, as yet without any ready answer to it, the situation that Stroud describes in the passage cited above, one may feel deprived of knowledge both of the elements in the world around one, and also the knowledge of how one's experience can be giving one knowledge of these things. For after all, if the knowledge one has of how one's experience provides knowledge of the world exploits one's recognition that the objects of perception are part of the experiential episode, then one cannot so recognise one's experience when gripped by the sceptical puzzle. The best that one can know of one's experience is just that it is not knowably distinct from the case of perceiving given one's perspective on matters.

While one cannot reasonably exploit one's knowledge of the objects of perception while in the grip of the Cartesian doubt, though, one need not thereby be deprived of the sense experience one has, or the ability to attend to its various elements, and hence attend to the objects of perception. It is

just that, strictly speaking, one cannot take oneself to be succeeding in attending to any object or coming to know anything about it. For all that one can know from this perspective, it might merely be the case that it seems to one as if one is attending without doing so.

Yet, if one surmises that even in the face of the sceptical challenge, one does have access to the knowledge that one is attending to something, and that through so attending one can learn things about it, then one can exploit one's experiential situation to know things, at least with respect to one's experience. Note that this is not merely to surmise that one is in a position to know that it seems to one as if certain objects are present. For, as we have underlined in discussion of disjunctivism, that things are this way with one does not require one to be in a position to discover further facts about some subject matter independent of the perspective of enquiry. But to conceive of oneself as properly attending to some objects and thereby learning about them in having the experience is to suppose that there is such a subject matter which one can learn about even in the context of the sceptical challenge. Of course, so to take oneself to have access to the objects of experience is to suppose that one would have the same kind of access whether or not one is hallucinating. But the only things to which one could have such access, given how we specify the hallucinatory possibility, is if one's occupying this subjective perspective would still guarantee the existence of appropriate objects of attention. The objects in question would then have to be suitably mind-dependent. This, of course, is inconsistent with our starting thought, that reflection on one's sense experience supports a naïve realist construal of the nature of experience. That is, independently of the sceptical challenge, we are inclined to suppose that our sense experience must be a presentation of a mind-independent world.

Indeed, the fact that our experience does manifestly present a mind-independent world, a feature of it immediately accessible to us when not in the grip of sceptical thoughts, may provide a motivation, albeit a self-defeating one, for conceiving of our introspective access to the subject matter of our sense experience as preserved even in the scope of the sceptical challenge would give one a ready and intuitive answer to the sceptical challenge. Before the sceptical challenge is raised, it seems as if there is a simple answer to the question, how do you know that there is a white picket fence there? After all, you can simply see that there is one there, and that you can see that one is there is something that you also have access to.⁴⁹ For such quotidian examples of perceptually grounded knowledge you have a ready, if shallow, understanding of how you come by the knowledge. You seem both to be deprived of the knowledge and your understanding of it when in the grip of the sceptical challenge. So a response to the sceptic which

49. Cf. here (Austin 1962), p.131.

best reflected your ordinary understanding of your knowledge of the perceived world would be one which did appeal to your reflective knowledge of your perceptions – that this just is a case of having a white picket fence made manifest. That it seems to you that your experience has this character is not removed just by engaging with the sceptical challenge. So it is merely in the context of determining what such knowledge would have to be in order to give one an answer to the sceptical challenge that one is led to suppose that one's reflection on one's experience does give one substantive knowledge, but just knowledge of something less than the objects of experience one took it to present.

To tell the story in these terms is to invite the reader into thinking of the sceptical argument as attracting one to something like the sense-datum theory of sensory experience. For we are to suppose that reflective attention to one's experience will provide objects of awareness and knowledge, whether one is perceiving or hallucinating. Indeed, telling the story in just these terms seems to fit best both Stroud's various ways of telling the story, and Smith's original complaint (as we noted at the time). But it is also clear that disjunctivism is not the only alternative to a sense-datum theory of sense experience, one might well seek to deny that there must be objects of awareness when one hallucinates and yet insist that there is something experiential present in cases of hallucination not captured by the disjunctivist's commitment to (III).

At this point, I think, the disjunctivist can challenge back. In insisting that there must be something there in the case of hallucination which the subject can recognise to be present through introspection, and yet denying that it is any object of awareness, the theorist must suppose that the subject is, in effect, attending just to the fact that they are experiencing as such. That is, the intentionalist can differentiate his or her position from the sense-datum theorist only by exploiting the idea that we must have a distinct perspective on our inner lives from that we take in experiencing the world. This invites two comments. First, as we have noted in the discussion above on introspection, this picture is maintainable in conjunction with the widespread conviction that there is no seems/is distinction in relation to phenomenal consciousness only if the theorist commits to the existence of some perfect mechanism tracking the proper operation of introspection. Second, the insistence that there is, after all, something for the subject to know, that he or she is in this distinctive kind of state, still has the element of attempting to rescue some substantial knowledge from the sceptical challenge that the story we attached to Stroud does. Even if the result is described in slightly different terms, the motivation may well be the same. And even though the intentionalist avoids positing entities which could act as a veil, sense-data or images, still the view does not avoid the Humean problem if, as the disjunctivist argues, the conception of experience as

merely representational and not relational conflicts with our initial conception of it.

So, the proposal on behalf of disjunctivism is this. When initially faced with the Cartesian sceptical challenge, and as yet lacking any direct answer to it, we are tempted to re-construe the kind of self-aware knowledge we have of our sense experience such that it is preserved even in the scope of the Cartesian sceptical doubt. This would require us to view the character of such experience in terms very different from our initial pre-reflective stance on it. When we recognise that, we are then subject to the Humean challenge. The disjunctivist succeeds in blocking Hume's concerns only if they can intelligibly reject the Common Kind Assumption. Without a direct answer to Cartesian scepticism, though, the required limitations on our knowledge of our own sense experience will seem counter-intuitive.

The unacceptability of disjunctivism indicates, on this account, not its failure to take seriously phenomenal experience or the nature of subjectivity. Rather, disjunctivism takes as seriously as one could the idea that a subjective perspective on the world need impose no specific objective constraints. Instead, the unacceptability lies in the intractability of certain sceptical puzzles, and our tendency in the face of them to preserve the little knowledge that we could have through reflection on our experience.⁵⁰

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