— 16 ai usada, romo calumniosa y difamatoria, pnc los Sres. Jenerules, D, Ignacio Alvaic/., 1). Braulio (^osta, Dr. J> Antonio Rodrigue/., hijo del jcneral l>. Martin, L). Juan Antonio Lezica, I). Manuel Antonio Castro y i). Pablo Goyena, los tres últimos •i iiouibrc también de sus respectivos j>udrcs. / ----,--- , , , ...— Montevideo Impirntn del Comercio del Pinta. » xbe nnsn su iimi. i LüTTER ADDRESSD TO THE NaCÍONAI. , N.° 1953 OP THE 18th June 1845, Translated from toe Spanish. MONTEVIDEO: 1845.THE Mil SITIIATIOIV. Under this head the Gaceta Mercantil of Rosas, of the lOth inst, has published an article ¡n which-more than in any other that has appeared within the last two years-an en- deavour is made to invert the most notorious false-hoods with the appearance of facts, supported by authentic do- cuments. The evident purpose of this publication has been to bias the judgment of the agents entrusted with the paci- ficador! of the Rio de la Plata, by presenting them with a false view of the present state of affairs. The appearance of truth and moderation with which this deception is prepared, renders a refutation necessary to confound its authors. Comroencing with the acts of Rosas, which, according to the* Gaceta, pro ve his respect and interest for the inde- pendence of Montevideo, the first is, that "in 1838 he main- "tained the independence and legal government of the Re- "public, over thrown by a rebellion supported by the French "agents; and continued to acknowledge the legal princi- pie, and to assist the Orientáis to preserve their inde- "pendence." The right and obhgation of the argentine government to interfere in the event of intestine war, on behalf of the Oriental government, had been stipulated in the treaty of Peace of 1828 between that country and Brazil. The right,. and with it the obligation, were to last only flve years af- ter the constitution were sworn to: (art. 4 of the Treaty) this was sworn to in July of 1830, consequenly the rigi>t expired in the same month of 1835. The revolution of 1832, headed by general Lavalieja— 4 — against the first Constitutional government, presided over by general Rivera, had a most active cooperator in Rosas. The Argentine schooner "Invincible" captured near Mal- donado by order of the government in September of that year, was found to have on board sixteen cases of arms and a considerable quantity of ammunition, conveyed from the arsenal of Buenos Ayres for Lavalieja.. The latter having been overeóme, took refuge at Bue- nos Ayres. He there raised men whom he armed, equiped and mounted with means obtained from the same arsenal ; and in 1834 he again invaded this country, embarking from Buenos Ayres for the purpose. Rosas, with characteristic duplicity, ordered by public decree, that an investigation should be iustituted into the jlight of General Lavalleja. Beingagain worsted, Lavalleja sheltercd himself a second time at Buenos Ayres; where, notwithstanding his previous flight, he was received and treated with the highest consi- derations. Rosas was, still then, bound by a Treaty with Brazil to protect the legal government of the Republic; and in lieu of protecting it, he armed Lavalleja against it. In 1838 when the excesses of Oribe provoked a rising in the country, Rosas had neither the right ñor the óbli- gation to interfere in the struggle, for the time stipulated in the convention with Brazil liad concluded in 1835. Nevertheless he took military possesion of Paisandú with a corps of infantry commanded by D. Antonio Toll, and placed it at the service of Oribe against Rivera, jointly with an argentine flotilla. (See the various dispatches of Garzón, Oribe i ofiieer at Paisandú, in wliich he mentions the proceedings of the argentine land and sea forces; pu- blishcd here by Oribe and by Rosas at Buenos Ayres. (1) We see, then, that in 1832 and 1834, when he was bound to protect the legal government presided by Gene- (l) In what waysoever party spirit may persist in con- sidering the isolated &, covert aggression of Rosas in the affairs of the Orientales, or those of Chiefs of this Republic in Rosas', the most unquestionablc fact is, that lhe first act of inlervention, ojficial, public Sf ostensible, carne from Rosas, by the oceupation of Paysandú, & by placing his flotilla in the service of Oribe. Kosa's flag was the one hoisted in those vesscls, & his flag was that of the infantry which oceupied the territory of the Republic. — 5 — ral Rivera, he attacked it openly through Lavalleja; and in 1838, when he no longer had the right to interfere, he did interfere directly with troops by land and water. In 1839 Rosas invaded the Republic with a powerful army, which he did not put under Oribe's orders, for rea- «ons we shall explain presently; but he entrusted it to Ge- neral Echague, a man entirely devoted to him; and, at that time, Governor of Entre Rios. This army - which never passed beyond Cagancha, was approaching Montevideo when Rosas, writing to General Echague on the 26th of Sep- tember, and still putting forward the farce of legality and liberty of elections, makes use of literally the follovving words: "On the departure of General Oribe we have conferred together as to what may be most suitable and desirable when the exercise of his legal authority shall be reestablished in the Oriental Republic. And with the satisfaction that is a consequence, I acquaint you that he goes determined to cali together the Legislative Power and to hand over to them, in due form, the staff without stain, in order that they may, with perfect liberty, elect the person who shall preside over the state. And as you are at this mo- mmt in the best situation to know, or to form a correct judgment, as to the person whom it will be advisable they should select, so he (Oribe) is well disposed to exert him- self in this sense, so soon as he speaks to you, or before, if necessary, in favour of the candidate whom in yoür opinión %you esteem best adapted ; as considering advantageous his elec- tion und elevation to the Presidency. This letter, the original of which signed by Rosas was taken among the papers of Echague at the battle of Cagancha, reveáis, at one view, the desiíjns of Rosas and of Oribe. The candidate for the Oriental presidency when Echa- gue had taken Montevideo, was not to be the one chosen by the Nation, but the person Echague himself, Governor of En- tre-Rios, Chief of Rosa's army, should. in his opinión, consi- der best adapted ; and Oribe was well disposed to exert himself in favour of that candidate. after consulting with Echague, or before if necessary. This is the respect and interest of Rosas for the in- dependence of Montevideo. Not one of these recorded faets can be denied. "In 1840"—continúes the Gaceta—he remembered it (the independence of Montevideo) in the convention of the 2ÍHh of October, with Prancc. What means to remember the independence of one— 0 — eoimtry ín a Teatry with another ? That of Montevideo was an establisted fact since 1828, guaranteed by the Argentine Republic, and Brazil, and by Great Britain as mediator. Rosas in the Convention with Fránce only said, "that he continued to consider this country in a state of perfect inde- pendence" (art. 4) But in no manner could he avoid doing this; and that article was therefore nothing more than a deception practised on the French negociator ; and acknow- ledged to be such by the universal opinión of the press and the Tribuno of France. "In 1843, he maintained it in opposition to the preten- sions of the Brazilian governraent, by refusing to ratify the treaty of March, in which the Ministry of Rio Janeiro pro- posed an interfering alliance during and subsequently to the war." (The Gaceta.) That treaty is a foul and indeJible stain upon the Brazi- lian Ministry that proposed and signed it. Deceit, imprevi, sion, and complete abdication of the dignity of the Empire, a childish fear above all, presided overthe celebration of that compact, from which at this day Señor Carneiro Leaó would fain detach his ñame, but that is now imposible. The deed and the ñame of its author are bound together with a ring of Iron, to appear together before the tribunal of Brazilian pu» blic opinión. The duplicity of Rosas was nevertheless still greater in re- fusing to ratify that compact. Before we proceed to prove this, we have to make an important observation as to the respect paid by the Dictator to the legality of Oribe. f The latter had been sheltered at Buenos Aires since Oc- tober 1838. In July 1839 Rosas invaded the Oriental territory, con- fiding his army to Echague and not to the legal President.— The reason was very cogent. Oribe had not then yet contrac- ted the obligations by which Rosas binds men to his system; obligations of crime and blood. Without this apprenticeship Oribe could not hope that Rosas would support his legality. Consequently, on the 27 th of September 1839, when Echa- gue was near Montevideo, Oribe sallied forth for the first time from Buenos Ares, " at the head of a brilliant división composed of five hundred men well armed, uniformed and equiped.... to engage the Unitarian Savage Lavalle, either alone, or incorporated with the forces of Entre Rios and Santa Fe." (1) Then it was not designed that Oribe should come to (l) Letter from Rosas to Echague of the 26th Septem- ber 1839 taken at Cagancha, rnaintain his legal government, ñor the independence of his country, so much respected by Rosas; he was to go and fight against Lavalle and the unitarians in Entre-Rios for account of the Dictator. He has answered me ( says Rosas in his letter) full of enthusiasm and corformably disposed, bur- ning. as is natural, in the most carnest desires to assist with his troops, and even to march himself and assist in fighting against such unitarian savages." So it fell out.—Oribe went through four years of appren- ticeship, making merit with Rosas before he invaded his conu- try in January 1843.. In those four years he fought in Entre-Rios, Santa Fé, Córdova, Tucuman, and Salta, whilst Rosas, whom he served, never had regard for any purpose to the legal Presidency of the Republic of Uruguay. But af- ter Oribe had laid waste the Argentine Provinces as far as the Bolivian frontier, when he had beheaded Colonel Vilela, the Governor Avellaneda whose head he set up in the mar- ket place, Colonel Borda, whose ears he sent salted, as a present to Buenos Aires; when he had sacrifíced all the pri- soners taken at Tucuman, Catamarca and every where else; when he had given orders tofollow the scent of the dead bo- dy of General Lavalle, that he might cut off its head; when Ro- sas had published all these deeds in the Gaceta, authenticated with the signature of Oribe, then it was that he had him for ever bound to his cause, and only then did he conñde to him the invasión of the Oriental State, five years after his expul- sión from it. To return to the treaty with Brazil. The complete triumph obtained by Rosas at Arroyo Grande (December 1842) was, in the opinión of many, the infallible precursor of the submission of the Oriental Republic. The Brazilian minís- ter Carneiro Leao saw it invaded by an army comparatively formidable, when there was not a soldier in the Oriental terri- tory, and feared that the latter being subjected, the conque- ring army would fall on Rio Grande : this dread overéame him ; he had not courage to face the dangér as brave nations do, and chose rather to begof Guido to celébrate that treaty, from which he was destined to reap no other fruit than sha- me and the repulse of Rosas. (1) - i (1) There is á curious fact that shows how much the mind may be distracted by an action that conscience con- demns. The treaty was signed on the 24th of March 1843, and its preamble says, that the plenipotentiaries exchanged their respective full powers, Notwithstanding, three days af- terwards, that is, on the 27th of March, the same day onA repulse that any one must have fweseen, inasmuch as it was a neccssary consequence of the Dictator's designa upon the Oriental territory. In march 1843, the date of the treaty, Oribe had just arrived in front of Montevideo with that formidable and victorious army. The news-papers of Rosas, his ofncial do— cuments, all his acts display his perfect conviction that re- sistance was impraticable. He was thus assured by Oribe by Maza and by Pacheco; and the surrender of Montevideo was considered a matter in which nothing was doubtful but the day on which it was to take place. Rosas, as master of Montevideo and of all the Montevi- dean territory, which he then occupied with an army of 17000 men entirely his own, woiild have attained what he sought since 1838, when he sent Echague to reduce the country ; he would have been in a situation to have named the candi- date whom in his opinión he considered best adapted ; in a word, he would have been the absolute lord of the country «ubjected to his army. In these circumstances, the proposal of a treaty in which Brazil invoked " the solemn obligation to defend the politi- cal existence of the Oriental Republic, in accordance with the 3d article of the Preliminary Convention of Peace ": a treaty by which Brazil was to have the same number of troops .and the same influence as Rosas in the country; was to deprive him at a blow, of the longed for fruit of his victory; it was to give him an importúnate companion, when he might sieze the prize alone. He alone, without the help of any one,thought to have subjected the Banda Oriental; how can it be imagincd that he would give up a part to Brazil, who had rendered him no assistance, and that he should, mo- reover, take upon himself the obligation to go and fight on behalf of the Empire, against the Rio Grandenses? It was folly to think it; the whole of the política! life of Rosas was there to prove that he would' reject such a pro- posal with contempt; and Carnciro Leao shewed little jud- gement indced when he hoped the treaty would be ratiíied. which the Emperor ratified the treaty, a protocol was drawn up and signed, in which the same plenipotentiaries declarcd, that Guido was unprovided with special powers to sigñ the trea- ty; that he would ask them of Rosas, and so soon as he recei- ved them they should be exchanged with thosé of their Excel- Icncies the Minísters Plenipotentiary of His Imperial Majes- ty. AVhat were, then, the powers which, in the treaty, are s.ud to havebeen exchanged? "E cosi vazoppicando il mondo." — O — - Rosas spurned it with the gesture of a sovereign: and he was right. Meanwhile that wa3 the clear and evident motive of Ro- sas in rejecting the treaty. Of course when Brazil brought forward the obligation binding on both cóuntries to protect the lndependence of Montevideo, Rosas w9s forced to simú- late respect for that independence, in the language he made use of, but in nothing more than in language; and it is absurd to pretend that his own and solé wond is a proof that he re- jected the treaty out of respoct for the legality of Oribes go- yernment and the independence of the Republic, when all the acts we have mentioned demónstrate his repeated attacks against it. No : it was the reverse : he rejected it because that trea- ty prevented him from disposing at his will of the Republic, and gave him a companion in his conquest. The Gaceta goes on to say, that Oribe now governs fre- ely throughout the territory, and that moreover he comman- „ des upwards of Eight thousand Orientáis, who have taken arms to sustain him. " This is the utmost to which the want of respect for truth can be carried. The forces that Oribe cmrnands are those in front of Montevideo, and those which undur the orders of Urquiza triumphed at India Muerta. / In order not to presunt stateinents so false as those for- ged by the Gaceta, we will omit mentioning the forcé of each battalion of those that are ¡n front of Montevideo, But we will give their ñames and whence they procecd. Ñames of the Corps. Commanda'*. Procedurc. --„-> v---' *-v-- Libertad..............Maza............Buenos- Ayres. Independencia..........Costa............ do. Libres de Buenos-Aires.. Ramos............ do. Rebajados..............Ramiro........... do. Volunteers of Oribe..... Artagaveitia......Basques. Libertad Oriental.......Lasala..........j ^J3?\° bc^1'en" Defenders of Oriental \ u-nn ( Entrerrianos Co- T , , > Kincon..........\ * Independence.......) ( rrentinos <*e. Comp. Defenders of ) « qribe \ Canariaus , far- Oribe...............) ' ( mers &. National Guard........ Sienra, Areta. . ^ „ . ) Arechacay Bal- > Orientáis. Four compan.es.......j ^¿f....... J— 10 — These are the corps of infantry that Oribe has in front of Montevideo ; of these there is only one buttalion and four compontes of Orientáis, lt'may be that among the Defenderá of Oribe there are also a few.; but it is no less certain that many of the soldiers of Rincon's battalion are from Buenos Ayres, Entre Ribs and other places; for many of the pri- soners taken at Arroyo Grande and elsewhere have been drafted into his battalion and that of Lasala. In respect to the cavalry forcé, the greatest number of Orientáis ought to be found there; for all our country people are cavalry soldiers, and it ís not known that Oribe has orga- nized any battalion of infantry composed of Oriental pea- sants. Well, then. Let us take the most unimpeachable do- cument—U rquizas report of the battle of India Muerta. According to that account, the forces that fought there on the 17th of last March were the following : Right wing—lst. división—Entre Riano. six squadrons. One company of the Entre-Riano battalion. Flanks.—One squadron Entre-Riano Dragoons. Lancers No. 1. ° of the line, Buenos Aires. No. 1. of the 9th Entre-Riano división One squadron of Orientales Reserve—First squadron Escort of Liberty (we do not know if it is Oriental but we allow that it is) N. ° 2 and 3 of Florés división (all of Buenos Ayres). Centre— 2nd company and chasseurs of the Entre Riano squadron. A piquet of artillery, of the same. Left wing—Srd Entre Riano división : four squadrons > 3rd Company Entre Riano battalion One squadron Orientales. Flanks — N. ° 3 of Buenos Ayres vvith one company Volun- teers of Colonia Two Companies Volunteers of Colonia and So- riano. N. ° 4 of Buenos Ayres Dragoons of Buenos Ayres Reserve. — 6 th Entre Riano División, 4 squadrons and two companies from Minas and Maldonado. From this minute slatement made by Urquiza in his dispatches it results that the cavalry army in campaign con- sists of— 17 squadrons Entre Rianos 6 do Buenos Ayres ; 3 do Orientales. And besfdcs, five companies of Oriental volunteers. As to the infantry, Urquiza neither mentions, ñor was there a single piquet of Orientáis. Three squadrons and fioe companies of cavalry, and one battalion and four companies of infantry, are all the forces composed of Orientáis that Oribe has under his orders. If anything may be added it can only be some straggling parties that can amount but to very little. Can these corps form upwards of eight thousand Orientáis in arms. The falsehood is so glaring that it appears probable an error of a cypher has been made. and iha-t the Gaceta intended to say 800, for the corps mentioned do not reach even to that number. There is another demonstration of this ridiculous falsle- hood that leaves no room for reply. The forces of Rosas that crossed the Uruguay commanded by Oribe, werc, accor- ding to their own documents, (1) as follows Infantry. Cavalry. Under the immediate command of Oribe 7,000 Under that of his brother Den Ignacio 640 5000 Under Urquiza 500 4000 Total 8140 9000 So the forces óf Rosas that crossed over to this terri- tory numbered 17000 men. Let it be supposed, what Oribe will not be willing to confess, that he has lost 6000 men in the 28 months campaign: he ought still to have more than eleven thousand of all arms, of those he brought from the Argentine Republic. If he has armed upwards of eight thou- sand Orientáis here, Oribe must at this moment have nearly twenty thousand men under his orders. Where, then, is this forcé ? In what part of the territory is it Inciden, that it is neither to be seen, ñor felt. excepting that besieging Monte- video, and what Urquiza commands ? Neither here, ñor on the Eastern coast, so much frequented by neutral vessels till quite lately, ñor in Rio Grande, ñor even in Buenos Ayres are any other forces known than those which oceupy the two points above mentioned. In front of Montevideo, no one, absolutely no one, calcula tes Oribe's forcé to reach five thou- sand men of all arms. Urquiza says in his despatch from India Muerta that he went into action with 3000 men. Allow him to have two thousand more, though it is not known whera they are, and even then we cannot make up the number of (1) See N. ° 862 and 865 of the Briiish Packet of Bue- nos Ayres dated 25th of February and 18th March 1843.— 12 — eleven thousand soldiersfrom Buenos Ayres that ought to be in this territory. Where are then these eight thou'sand Orientáis in arms ? For whose belief does the Gaceta write these absurdities ? It further says; that out of puré consideraron for the grcat number of foreigners comprised within this city has Oribe not attcmpted an assault. This admits of only one answer ; many thanks for the consideration. But this answer ought to be given by the foreigners. We, who are not included in Oribe's kindness, will only ask him ; out of what consideration has Oribe several nights cannonnaded the city, elevating his guns and knowing very well that he could noj touch the Une of fortification ? Those cannonnades had no efFective warlike purpose whatever; why were they ordered? "The foreigners, continúes the Gaceta, constructed the "tronches of Montevideo, some with materials, others with "their daily labour, and the British squadron, commanded by "Comodore Purvis, with its cngineers." No foreigner has given materials for the fortification ; no one has worked gratuitously on them: íf this be untrue let the Gaceta ñame one.—Many have sold mnterials, and many more have worked for hire which was paid them daily. But we have no knowledge of any principia of intcrnational law orgood reason. that prohibits a foreigner, residing in a belli- gerent country, from selling to the government of that coun- try the goods he may have in his warehouses, or manufactured by him ; or from employing his strength'as a day labourer in public works not being forced to do so. With respect to the engineers of the squadron comman- ded by Comodore Purvis, the (faceta has stamped a gratuitous and intentional lie. In the first place, we are not aware that the ships of the British naval station had a single engine- er on board in 1843, and why should they? But we very well know that none was asked for, none was lent, belon- ging to any foreign squadron. The trenches were first opened on the 9th of January 1843, and it is clear that before tbis work was commenced, their lines had beeñ traced. On the lst of February, when the wall was already raised and the ditch dug to nearly the whole extent of the line, one of our Generáis, by especial commission from the govern- ment took upon himself to direct and conclude the works. The Montevideo newspapers of that period shew their daily progress. Well then ; Commodore Purvis dit not come to the River Píate till the 7th of February ; on which day the fortifications were finished, and the platform9 for aríillery were commenced. An undeniable proof of this is, that on — 13 — the Ifith of February, the day Oribe encamped at the Cer- rito, the fortifications were completed, the artillery mounted, ready to receive him ; »and so much so, that he has stood stiíl before them to this day.—The Gaceta, then, has volun- tarily violated truth, and it cannot have done so from igno- rance in treating of matters so.public. With the same degree of truth the Gaceta adds that the authority of Oribe " is recstablished throughout the Oriental territory;" that, -'of the horde of Rivera and other unitarian savages there dóes not exist one man in arms in the Oriental country." The legal authority of Oribe is nowhere cstablishcd in the Oriental territory. But in many places there is es- tablished the militar?/ authority of the General in Chief of the Argentine army; because those places are militarily oc- cupied by him. The authority that heads all its ofiieial aets, with the words ¡viva la Confederación Argentina, death to the unitarian savages! neither is, ñor can be, a legal au- thority, of the Uruguay Repubüc, where there are neither federation, unitarian;;, ñor savages. The authority that receives the salaries of all its chiefs and officers, of all the troops it commands and even of the corps deno- minated Orientales, from the public treasury of Buenos Ay- res, is not the legal authority of this Republic. And it is from that treasury all the forces commanded by Oribe are paid, equipped, armed and provided. If there be any one who doubts it, let him apply to that same number of the Gaceta containing the article we are now answering, and he will there find among the payments from the General treasury of Buenos Ayres, on monday the 9th of June 1843, the following entries— Dollars. Assignment to the "Defenders of Oriental indepen- dence."..................................... 4324 Chiefs and officers of the Oriental state.......... 2536 Assignment to the same........................ 46314 Assignment to the army of the vanguard (which is that commanded by Oribe)....................277063 Pay of the battalion " Defenders of Oriental inde- pendence," for the vear 1843.................. 4216 Do. of the same for 1844........................ 4488 We see then, by this ofiieial document of Rosas, that all the troops commanded by Oribe, Argentines and Orien- táis, all the Oriental chiefs and officers, receive their pay, and that part of it given to their families, from the publie— 1.1 — - treasury of Buenos Ayres. And the Gacela calis thosc peopíe a legal authority of the Oriental State, in the sanie number in which he publishes that docurnent. That of the national forces, which the Gaceta styles unitarians, " there does not exist one man in arms in the Oriental country," is another extravagant falsehood. Colonels Flores and Camacho are at the head of divisions of Orien- táis, and although the incommunication between the capital and the interior does not allow us to point out with pre- cisión the other chiefs who are acting similarly, it is well known that several have combined, and maintain a consi- derable portion of the forces that were beaten at India Muerta. But alowing that the assertion of the Gaceta were strictly true; who has declared that the fací of losing a battle decides irrevOcably the right, and the independence of a country ? If the victory obtained by Urquiza with an entirely foreign army, is, in the opinión of the Gaceta, tantamonnt to the establishment of Oribes authority throughout the Republic, why does he maintain that Oribe is still a Legal President, after the several victories obtained over him, in 1838, by arms altogether Oriental, which expelled him from the territory fron which he was five years absent and to which he has only returned wben supported by the bayonets of Rosas. As a-proof of its veracity, the Gaceta publishes a curious statement of the forces of our garrison, active and passive, on the 24th May last; and makes them amount in all to three thousand six hundred and twenty six men, including the garri- son of the Cerro &c, His statement has come to hand very opport'unely, as-on the 12th instant, a review of the army of the Capital was held, at which the entire population sawr and counted. one by one, more than four thousand active sol- diers, who marched along the Calle de Sarandi to the new mar- ket place, at a distance of twenty four hundred yards from the inner lines, and more than three thousand from the outer fortiñcatibns; and this without an attempt on the part of the terrible army of Oribe, increased by Eigth thousand Orien- tales in arms, to attack our lines whilst their defenders were so far away from them, and went through their manoeuvres under the eye of Oribe who regarded from his strongholds. This plainly proves that while those four thousand men passed in review, the interior and exterior lines remained covered with sufficient forces to defend them in case of an attack of Oribe, whose outposts are not a thousand yards distant from ours.—This was in fact the case : there remained at the lines all the corpa of Dragoons, Sosas regiment, part of Flores, all — 15 — i the garrison artillery ; the respective guards of the troops in review, and the few men attached to the batteries on the sea side of the city. Let the Gaceta add this forcé to the garri- sons of the Cerro (1) and Rat Island ; let him put together that which was reviewed, and he will find the town to have been garrisoned by nearly six thousand soldiers ; whose bea- ring equipment armament and behaviour he may ask for an account of from the innumerable witnesses who were present. What answer is to be given to that of there being only 409 Orientáis inall Montevideo? Without taking into account those that are in the three battalions of national guarda and other corps, the whole of Flores' división, all the Dragoons, al Sesa's Regiment, are Orientáis, But this is too ríd i culous to merit reply. Meanwhile we will ask the Gaceta ; what were the 4500 men who, according to Urquiza depatch, fought under the or- ders of General Rivera at India Muerta ? They were all Oriental countrj men under an Oriental chief. What were the twenty six squadrons and the infantry Urquiza fougth with onthat day ? They were all Entre Ríanos and Buenos Ay- reans, excepting three squadrons under an Entre Riano chief. On whick side was the Oriental nationality? The Government reckons in ist ranks, within the city, a large number of foreigners in arms. This is true, and this is the most eloquent denunciation of the atrocious system of Rosas and Oribe, which oblíges even indifferent foreigners to take up arms to defend themselves. But these corps fight side by side with the national corps, and receive their arms, clothing and the rest from the national treasury, since they were armed by the government of the nation. But Oribe cros- S sed the Uruguay with 12500 men all foreigners; a few months afterwards Urquiza joined him with 4500 more all foreig- ners. The Orientáis that have joined him form an insignifi- cant minority ; and even these, like Oribe, their chiefs an d officers, are, and have been, in the pay of Rosas, and the expen- diture is officially publishcd by the Treasury of Buenos Aires. (1) The Gaceta says that Oribe has not attacked the city "out of consideration for the foreigners that are-in-it." And the Cerro, why has he not attacked it? According to the Gaceta it is defended by only "one hundred and fifteen men of Flores división," why has not Oribe taken it ? Because the courage he had to pay the person who should have blown-it up with gunpowder, is not sufficient to put him at the head of a co- lumn of attack.— 16 — On which side is thc Oriental nationality ? Let Oribe himself answer, if sharoe wili allow him to speak. What character does he bear before his country, before the Powers of the earth ? There is in this matter a recent fact which proves, more forcibly than any other, thedetcstation in which Oribe and his hordes are held by the ínhabitunts of this country. The ar- i»iy under the comraand of General Rivera was followed by families, amounting to upwards of six thousand persons, as is confessed by Dionisio Coronel & Urquiza in their dispatches; the first, of the attack of the Cerro Largo; the other, of the battle of India Muerta. On the defeat of Riveraethes, 6000 persons all emigrated to the Brazil, where they are by no means obliged to rémain. Urquiza several times demand- ed that they should be delivered up : Count Caxias has given full liberty to all families to return. Nevertheless not one has relamed to suffer the accidental domination of Ori- be ; & according to an official document, which Government lately received, more than ten thousand moutha ( we copy the original expression) are, now, maintained in Rio Grande, preferring the bitter bread of foreign charity to the domina- tion of Oribe, who says he is surrounded with the love of Oriental nation. This irresistibly eloquent fact proves, that a battle gain- ed by a ferocious conquerer does not signify the establish- ment of his authority by the will of the nation conquered* A battle is a fact. The independence of a country is found- cd on right. In his eagerness to put forward figures, to give a sem- blante of veracity, the Gaceta publishes a list of the foreign naval forces that are in the River Píate; but this list only . serves to give the measure of truth of those who furnish the Gaceta with news. Let us see. He gives the British corvette " Satellite " 22 guns, she only carries 18. He gives the steam frigate Firebrand 11, she carries 6. To the French frigate Africaine.....60, she carries 44. To the Erigone.............».....60, she has.. 44. To the Dassas.....................22, she has.. 20. He mentions two French steamers, while there is only one, and the other, which he calis the " Eilau", has never been in the River Píate. He mentions five Brazilian corvettes and there are only four. He calis the corvette "Uniao" Chuao. the sardinian frigate " Aguila V Arguella, the sardinian brig " Eridano " Esculano. So that the Gaceta supposes 43 guns and two ships that do not exist; and complety alters the ñames of three vessels. By the degree of correetness of the Gaceta's correspondent in this respect, we may judge of his account of the review, as well as in other matters. Arriving at this point, we have nothing more to say. The consequences to be deduced from what we have said are within the comprehension of all.—We will only indícate three which we will recapitúlate. Oribe does not represent any Oriental autorty whate- ver: he possessés no other character, no other representaron than that of General of the army of Rosas, whose troops, arms, equipment, pay, pensions, &c.