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The limitations of the Arrovian consistency of domains with a fixed preference

Citation: Nguyen, James (2019) The limitations of the Arrovian consistency of domains with a fixed preference. Theory and Decision . pp. 1-17. ISSN 1573-7187

Nguyen-2019-Theory_and_Decision.pdf

Creative Commons: Attribution-No Derivative Works 4.0

In this paper I investigate the properties of social welfare functions defined on domains where the preferences of one agent remain fixed. Such a domain is a degenerate case of those investigated, and proved Arrow consistent, by Sakai and Shimoji (Soc Choice Welf 26(3):435–445,2006). Thus, they admit functions from them to a social preference that satisfy Arrow’s conditions of Weak Pareto, Independence of IrrelevantAlternatives, and Non-dictatorship. However, I prove that according to any function that satisfies these conditions on such a domain, for any triple of alternatives, if the agent with the fixed preferences does not determine the social preference on any pair of them, then some other agent determines the social preference on the entire triple.

Creators: Nguyen, James (0000-0002-6919-1365) and
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09702-x
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-0...
Subjects: Economics
Philosophy
Divisions: Institute of Philosophy
Dates:
  • 7 April 2019 (accepted)
  • 2 May 2019 (published)

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