Institute of Advanced Legal Studies

School of Advanced Study University of London

Haseeb Ur-Rehman

The Convergence of Anti-Money laundering Laws: legitimacy and Effects on Offshore Centres

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Abstract.

Globalisation and technology have resulted in an increase in international commerce, capital flows and the movement of goods and services across borders. Such factors have also increased opportunities to launder money and reintegrate the proceeds of crimes into the legitimate economy. In response to such developments, as well to perceived threats to their national economies and tax-bases, the G7/G8 and the OECD have created various International initiatives, to combat money-laundering, which have targeted jurisdictions offering limited financial regulation, bank confidentiality and low levels of taxation. These initiatives, however suffer from a legitimacy gap, owing to the vertical unilaterality of the regimes they seek to institute. This work will attempt to examine the origins and purposes of the homogenising global anti-money laundering regime. It shall also examine its legitimacy and effectiveness, with emphasis on Offshore Financial Centres.

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Table of Contents:

Title	e Page. 1
Abs	stract. 2
Tabl	le of Contents. 3
1	The Crime of Money Laundering. Is money laundering a universal crime or secondary crime? 5.
2	Offshore Centres and the Effects of Money Laundering. 20.
3	The Anti-Money Framework: Structures and Regimes. 34.
	 3.1 The Global Framework 3.2 The Regional Framework 3.3 The National Framework 49.
4	The Anti-Money Framework: Globalisation, Homogenisation and Legitimacy. 52.
5	The Effects of Regulation on Offshore Centres. 67.
6	 6.1 Observations. 76. 6.2 Conclusions. 79. 6.3 Recommendations. 82. Bibliography. 85
Figu	ure 1 The Entrenchment of Money Laundering. 27. ure 2 Levels of Regulation. 36. ure 3 Reporting Structure and Governance Chain for OFCs. 77.
Tab	ole 1 Analysis of FATF member states. 55. ole 2 OFCs Assets. 66. ole 3 OFCs; Relationship with Regulation 75.

"Vectigalia nervi sunt rei publicae."

Marcus Tullius Cicero.

"In medio stat virtus."

Quintus Horatius Flaccus.

Chapter 1:

The Crime of Money Laundering. Is money laundering a universal crime or secondary crime?

Money laundering is the basis by which, the perpetrators of criminal or illegal acts seek to exert control over the proceeds of their activities without drawing attention to the underlying criminal acts ¹. In the UK and other common law jurisdictions as well in the EU ² money laundering generally amounts to taking action with any form of property ³, derivative of a criminal act that will disguise the fact that that property is the proceeds of a crime or obscure its beneficial ownership ⁴. In other jurisdictions, such as the US money laundering is engaging in financial transactions to conceal the identity, source, or destination of illegally gained money, whereas in other cases the offence of 'handling' the proceeds of crime suffices to include money laundering ⁵. It has been estimated that laundered monies account for between 2 and 5 percent of the world's gross domestic product ⁶.

¹ Deitz.A. & Buttle. J., Anti-Money Laundering Handbook. Sydney: Thomson Lawbook Co. 2008. Pg.4.

² As under the definition given under Art.1 of Council Directive 91/308/EEC money laundering is "the conversion or transfer of property derived from criminal activity for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity in evading the legal consequences of his action..".

³ Including intangibles as under Art3(3)2005/60/EC.

⁴ Under the Common Law, although this definition is extensively expanded upon under the Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002 Part 7 and the Money Laundering Regulations 2007.

⁵ Deitz.A. & Buttle. J., Loc. Cit.

⁶ Although the FATF-GAFI state that it is absolutely impossible to produce a reliable estimate of the amount of money laundered and therefore does not publish any figures in this regard. From FATF-GAFI., *Money Laundering FAQ* 2010.

The motivations of the perpetrators of predicate offences ⁷ to present the money, as having been acquired otherwise than by crime are *prima-facie* founded in the possibility, that the illicitness of the proceeds, would link the authors of the offence, to the initial criminal act. The offenders must nevertheless bridge the gap between themselves and the rest of society to benefit from the proceeds of their offences and thus must present them as licit ⁸. Other motivations include tax avoidance or evasion ⁹ and the avoidance of the seizure of criminal proceeds.

The motivations to illegalise money laundering are to target the profitability of predicate offences and those who render such activity profitable, rather than the person committing the predicate offence alone ¹⁰. This is thought to mitigate the overall adverse effects of the predicate offence and indirectly disincentivises and deters criminal activity ¹¹.

⁷ The primary offence by which the proceeds to be laundered are generated. Article 1(e) of the *United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances* (1988) (Vienna Convention) limits predicate offences to drug trafficking offences. Article 2(2) of the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime* (2000) (Palermo Convention) extends money laundering to the "the widest range of predicate offenses" as does the FATF in its 40 Recommendations of 2003. From Schott. P.A *Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism*. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006.Pg. I-3. The scope of Predicate offences is also very wide under European law. Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA Art1(b) refers to offences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more than one year as a minimum.

⁸ Hinterseer.K., *Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal Context.* The Hague: Kluwer Publishers. 2002. Pg.11.

⁹ A predicate offence in the UK and other common law jurisdictions.

¹⁰ Ormerod.D.C., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law. 12th Edition. Oxford University Press.2008. Pg.951.

¹¹ From Ormerod.D.C., *Op. Cit.* Pg.954. Also from the dicta of Lord Wolf CJ in *R v Sekton* [2003] 1WLR 1655. Alldridge however states that the idea that prevention of the perpetrators from profiting from the predicate offence will deprive them of an incentive to commit it, is based on 18th century notions regarding the handling of stolen goods, created in situations where 'the courts had foreclosed the natural avenue(s) of complicity that the new offence was created'. Alldridge.P., *Relocating Criminal Law.* Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd. 2000. Pg.170.

Money laundering activities imply and necessitate interaction with the legitimate economy and thus have been described as the 'Achilles heel' 12 of organised crime as although they expose criminals to the possibility of being caught, they are necessary for the continuation of their operations¹³. From a regulatory point of view, an anti-money laundering infrastructure primarily allows authorities to confiscate the proceeds of predicate offences to which they would otherwise not have access to under normal market conditions¹⁴. Criminalising¹⁵ laundering techniques over and above the predicate offences provides a means for confiscating the proceeds as well as the 'value' such proceeds may have been converted into. Similarly this allows for money laundering as an offence to extend to persons other than the perpetrators of the predicate offence. The Crown Prosecution Service in the UK ¹⁶ divides money laundering into 'own proceeds' where the perpetrator launders the proceeds of his own offending and secondly into laundering by a person other than principle offender. Both forms of laundering can be charged as secondary counts to the principal offence, or charged separately without the jury considering the principal

¹² Froomkin.S.M., *Offshore Centres and Money Laundering*. Journal of Money Laundering Control. Vol.1 No.2. 2007. Pg.167.

¹³ Stessens.G., *Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.86.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* Pg.85. In the UK, in *R v Cuthbertson* [1981] AC 470-86 an appeal was allowed against the forfeiture of the proceeds of drug offences exposing the limitations in forfeiture laws. This led to Hodgson Committee 1984 inquiring into the vacuum created in the law by the Cuthbertson case and subsequently to the *Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986*; the first UK statute to categorize money laundering as a criminal offence.

¹⁵ Although recovery of laundered assets or the proceeds of crime is possible in civil law. In the UK under the *Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002*. ss.240 to 288 it is possible to possible to recover property acquired though "unlawful conduct" without the need for a criminal conviction. This is parallel to the FATF's Recommendation 2(b) where civil liability should be sought where criminal liability is unavailable and Recommendation 3 requiring Countries to consider adopting measures that allow such proceeds or instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction. Civil forfeiture is also possible in US law. *18 U.S.C.* § 981 (2000).

¹⁶ Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002. s. 340(4).

offence¹⁷. The criminalisation of money laundering also provides a means for high level criminals to be brought to account, who though normally are not directly involved in the committal of predicate offences are nevertheless beneficiaries and exposed to the proceeds¹⁸.

The common analysis ¹⁹ of money laundering generally comes from earlier ideas about the integration of the proceeds of narcotics trafficking ²⁰ into the financial system, and although relevant is not necessarily "borne out in reality" ²¹ This model breaks down into three stages; placement, layering and integration. The placement stage is the moving of the funds away from their source. This involves detracting from the illegal origins of the proceeds of the predicate offences, typically by use of bank deposits, currency smuggling or exchange, conversion to negotiable instruments etc., use of legitimate and front/shell business vehicles or through some compliant third party such as a banker, accountant or lawyer who 'places' the proceeds through use of their client accounts ²².

Layering involves creating the semblance of legitimate financial activity by dividing the total sum and passing its constituent monies, through sets of complex

¹⁷ CPS Legal Guidance. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Part7 - Money Laundering Offences. 2010.

R6703. Dissertation. Sept.2010. -

¹⁸ Stessens.G., *Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.86.

¹⁹ Schroth.P.W., Bank Confidentiality and the War on Money Laundering in the United States. In BLANCHIMENT D'ARGENT ET SECRET BANCAIRE. Paolo Bernasconi. 1996. Pg.290. This basic model accepted by the British CPS, the UN, FATF and other organisations and is reflected in UK law under Part 7 of the *Proceeds Of Crime Act* 2002.

²⁰ Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008. Pg.438

²¹ Mwenda. K.K., *Can insider trading predicate the offence of money laundering*. Michigan State University Journal of Business and Securities Law. (2006) 6. 127. 2006. Pg.148.

²² From Lilliey, P. Asian Money Laundering Explosion, Fighting Corruption in Asia - Causes, effects and remedies. Singapore: World Scientific Co. Ltd. 2003.

transactions. This has the purpose of disguising the source and ownership of the money as well as making detection of laundering activity through accounting and audit methods much harder ²³. Money launderers are attracted to offshore financial centres (OFCs) during the layering stage, as it allows them to move money between jurisdictions with little impediment, as well as to receive money in their own jurisdiction from seemingly legitimate sources. OFCs reciprocally provide money launderers with confidentiality and bank privacy, limited withholding ²⁴ and other taxes and lax corporate and financial supervision, as part of their attempts to attract money into their jurisdictions. Similarly OFCs provide adequate corporate and financial infrastructures to facilitate laundering ²⁵.

Integration of the laundered money, involves bringing it back into the normal economy, to be used as capital or for the purposes of consumption by the perpetrator of the predicate offence/money launderer. This may be achieved by a wide variety of methods such as the receipt of remuneration, as the officer of an OFC based front/shell business vehicle, the use of financial instruments ²⁶ such as letters of credit, bonds, bank notes, bills of lading and guarantees to repatriate the money or using the resultant proceeds of real estate transactions, gambling, stock purchases or corporate loans etc. as the means of reintegration ²⁷.

The 'three stages' analysis model of infusing the proceeds of crime into the financial system is not necessarily the only money laundering model and not all predicate offences are detectable from their audit trail. The yields from insider trading, undiscovered non-disclosures or false disclosures/misrepresentations in

²³ Buchanan.B., Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility: Combating Money Laundering in the Asia-Pacific Region. Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 2005. Pgs.439-440.

²⁴ Whereby payers of certain amounts, especially interest, dividends, and royalties, to foreign payees withhold income tax from such payment and pay it to the government.

²⁵ FATF-GAFI: Money Laundering FAQ. 2010.

²⁶ Buchanan.B., Loc.Cit.

²⁷ From He.P., *A typological study on money laundering*. Journal of Money Laundering Control. Vol. 13 No. 1, 2010.

securities issues and other unjust enrichments or undue influence are normally easily integrated into the financial system without third-party payments, withdrawals or layering or placement activities²⁸.

Since 2001, regulators have increasingly associated money laundering with terrorist financing. Even prior to 9/11 ²⁹ law enforcement agencies were equating the threat from organised crime with terrorism³⁰. The United States had already announced the creation of the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Centre (FTATC) a year before 9/11 ³¹ and in 2002 the US Department of the Treasury followed by describing terrorist financing as a part of money laundering ³². The United Nations in 1999, addressed terrorist financing in the *Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism*, and followed in 2001 adopting Resolutions 1267 and 1333 to sanction suspected perpetrators of terrorist events ³³. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) prior to 9/11 acknowledged the lack of consensus regarding the relationship between terrorist finance and money laundering but following 9/11 adopted nine special recommendations to provide

²⁸ Mwenda. K.K., *Can insider trading predicate the offence of money laundering*. Michigan State University Journal of Business and Securities Law. (2006) 6. 127. 2006. Pg.148. Also see Stessens.G., *Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.83.

²⁹ Describing the terrorist events perpetrated in New York on the 11th of September 2001.

³⁰ Alldridge.P., Relocating Criminal Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd. 2000. Pg.171.

³¹ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., *Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.253.

³² The 2002 Strategy seeks to deny terrorist groups access to the international financial system, to impair the ability of terrorists to raise funds, and to expose, isolate, and incapacitate the financial networks of terrorists. From US Department of the Treasury: *The 2002 National Money Laundering Strategy*. 4. 2002.

³³ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., *Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.253.

international standards for specifically combating terrorist financing as part of its overall anti-money laundering framework ³⁴. Currently the link between terrorist finance and money laundering is generally well established and the former is thought to be a specialised form of the latter.

Commentators ³⁵ drawing parallels between terrorist finance and money laundering refer to a process known as 'money dirtying'. This is the process of concealment for the purposes of separating channelled funds from their destination to enable acts of terrorism, where the flows of funds across borders, increases the probability that the terrorism will be discovered ³⁶. In effect, this suggests that terrorist financing is the reverse of money laundering. Funds, rather than originating as outputs from predicate offences, are following a layering process, ultimately employed as inputs for the purposes of committing a criminal offence ³⁷. In recent terrorist events, such processes took the form of avoidance of internet communications and bookkeeping systems and reliance on informal alternative remittance systems ³⁸. The perpetrator in the case of terrorist financing requires anonymity to avoid criminal responsibility and to protect his ability to engage in the same activity subsequently ³⁹.

³⁴ FATF-GAFI: 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Financing (TF). 2004.

³⁵ Such as Masciandaro. D., Economics of Money Laundering: A Primer. Paolo Baffi Centre Bocconi University Working Paper No. 171.2. 2007, Compin.F., The role of accounting in money laundering and money dirtying. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 19 (2008) 591–602. 2008 and Deitz.A. & Buttle. J., Anti-Money Laundering Handbook. Sydney: Thomson Lawbook Co. 2008.

³⁶ Masciandaro. D., Op.Cit. Pg. 22.

³⁷ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Op.Cit. Pg. 309.

³⁸ An informal (often oral) banker's draft, used in transmitting currency from one country to another employing extensive use of connections such as family relationships or regional affiliations. It makes minimal (often no) use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Compin.F., *The role of accounting in money laundering and money dirtying*. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 19 (2008) 591–602. 2008. Pg.599. Cuéllar. M.F., *The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance*. 93 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 311-465. 2003. Pg.335.

³⁹ Cuéllar. M.F., *Op.Cit.* Pg. 334.

The central idea behind equating terrorist finance with money laundering comes from the anglo-centric ⁴⁰ notion that crime prevention relates to the containment of subsequent criminal activity through exerting control over the finances and proceeds of criminal activities ⁴¹. The only anti-money laundering mechanisms, which would be pertinent to anti-terror initiatives would invariably be preventative diligence alerting to the possibility of a terrorist event, such as identifying the perpetrator ⁴². Even these however are likely to have little effect if the funds are legitimate in origin. This is exacerbated by the fact that the amounts employed in money dirtying operations are insignificant compared to those dealt with in narcotic and other laundering offences ⁴³. Terrorists and indeed criminal financiers of any kind, do not seek to directly enjoy the gains of their activities in the same manner that money launderers might. As a result money dirtying operations do not require the reintegration of funds into the mainstream financial system as such, except for the perpetration of the ultimate criminal event. Yet again the amounts in question detract from the likelihood of detection.

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⁴⁰ This may possibly be owing to the fact that jurisdictions such as Belgium, France and the Netherlands etc. have normally not accepted an extraterritorial jurisdiction over attempts or other inchoate offences, which do not have "effects" (discussed below) in their jurisdiction unlike the US and the UK. Wolswijk.H.D., *Locus Delicti and Criminal Jurisdiction*. Netherlands International Law Review (1999), 46:361-382 Cambridge University Press.1999. Pgs. 270-276. Notably though, knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element money laundering offences may be inferred from objective factual circumstances under Article 1(5) of Directive 2005/60/EC.

⁴¹ Alldridge.P., *Relocating Criminal Law*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd. 2000. Pg.170. Cuéllar. M.F., *Op.Cit.* Pg. 381.

⁴² Such as the "Know Your Customer" requirements, ascertaining customer identify, typically through comparisons with lists of known offenders. See Financial Services Authority. *Reducing money laundering risk - Know Your Customer and anti-money laundering monitoring*. DP22. 2003.

⁴³ Compin.F., *The role of accounting in money laundering and money dirtying*. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 19 (2008) 591–602. 2008. Pgs. 599-600. Also see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. 2004.

Unlike money laundering terrorist financing is far less financially sophisticated and can be sourced from both legal and illegal activities ⁴⁴. The 9/11 Commission identifies the use of legitimate charitable organisations and NGOs as the primary source of terror financing, ⁴⁵ whilst other commentators point towards legitimate businesses and criminal activities ⁴⁶. Terrorist financiers, nevertheless irrespective of the source of funds, unlike money launderers have the advantage of not requiring to place the money in question as such, and their deposits can, at least on the face it, have a *bona-fide* commercial or personal reason. Similarly money dirtying enjoys the lack of an immediate financial victim who has an incentive to report ⁴⁷.For such reasons, and generally low success rates ⁴⁸, contrary to the view of the FATF ⁴⁹ money laundering and money dirtying operations are thought not to be closely related and it seems unclear whether anti-money laundering or the private sector are the appropriate fora for dealing with terrorist finance ⁵⁰.

⁴⁴ Cuéllar. M.F., The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance. 93 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 311-465. 2003. Pg.318.

⁴⁵ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Op.Cit. Pg.171.

⁴⁶ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., *Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.276. Such sources of funds were not used for the purposes of 9/11.

⁴⁷ Cuéllar. M.F., Op.Cit. Pg.335.

⁴⁸ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Op.Cit. Pg.312.

⁴⁹ Prior to 9/11 the FATF had agreed that terror finance should not be included in the anti-money laundering framework. This was supported by FinCEN (the US Financial Intelligence Unit) who post 9/11 showed that anti-money laundering tools can not spot the financing of terrorism. Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Pg.13.

⁵⁰ A view supported in Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008. Compin.F., The role of accounting in money laundering and money dirtying. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 19 (2008) 591–602. 2008. Cuéllar. M.F., The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance. 93 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 311-465. 2003. Levi.M., Combating the financing of terrorism: a history and assessment of the control of "threat finance". British Journal of Criminology. 2010. and Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global

Tax evasion is generally a predicate offence ⁵¹. For the purposes of laundering, money launderers shall trade-off the full returns ⁵² normally expected from the proceeds of the predicate offence, for avoidance of the risk of seizure and confidentiality. In other words they pay for confidentiality by accepting a non-risk adverse investment position or alternatively lower yields ⁵³. Money launderers would thus be attracted by low tax rates that jurisdictions, other than those where the tax is due, may provide in order to offset the return to risk-confidentiality trade-off. Similarly the institution of taxation requires an attachment of the state to the financial affairs of the individual, which is undesirable for the purposes of predicate offenders ⁵⁴. Laxity of tax liability in OFCs (or in this contest tax-havens) makes them attractive to money launderers. They realise more than they would in other circumstances with little lost to tax.

In a wider context, OFCs/tax-havens through strict banking secrecy, opaque corporate requirements, limited information exchanges and low taxation requirements provide tax avoidance opportunities for investors and make themselves attractive to high net worth individuals and multi-national

Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Pg.13.

⁵¹ Such as in the UK, under ss2,3,4,etc. of the *Fraud Act 2006*, or 'Cheating the public revenue' in the common law etc. In the US similarly under s. 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), it is a federal crime for anyone to wilfully attempt to evade or defeat the payment of federal income taxes. It is probable that in countries where the scope of predicate offences extends to "the widest range", tax evasion is a predicate offence for the purposes of money laundering.

⁵² Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.18.

⁵³ Mullineux. A.W. & Murinde.V., *Handbook of international banking*. Elgar Original Reference Series. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003. Pg.553.

⁵⁴ Brittain-Catlin.W., Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy. New York: Picador, 2006. Pg.28.

corporations. Offshore jurisdictions, in order to attract investment, therefore institute, nominally effective or no taxation on corporate activities, dividend payments, capital gains, inheritance, gifts or other large transfers ⁵⁵. Such jurisdictions also 'ring-fence' their domestic taxation regime to exclude only non-resident investors from revenue collection, whilst denying them access to local markets⁵⁶. This approach identifies how such jurisdictions are seeking to attract passive investment activity ⁵⁷ from geographically mobile financial services providers or companies seeking to relocate to benefit from taxation

Corporations with multinational operations, based in high tax jurisdictions, in turn seek to allocate large proportions of their taxable income to OFCs/tax-havens in order to avoid the taxation of their foreign income by their home country ⁵⁸. They achieve this through processes such as 'offshoring' financial services and other operations ⁵⁹ or 'corporate inversion' i.e. converting an offshore subsidiary into the parent company, whilst maintaining manufacturing infrastructure (if any) in the original home state etc. ⁶⁰ Such trends detract from the interests of the home countries of multinational companies, whose infrastructure and financial depth is employed to develop the multinational's businesses, but are unable to benefit from revenue and tax that they may collect from the multinational. Since all corporations and economic actors, in a jurisdiction do not have access to extra-jurisdictional tax avoidance opportunities, and the parties that do are motivated by revenue protection rather than economic efficiency, provision

⁵⁵ OECD Report., Harmful tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. 1998. Paras.52-56.

⁵⁶ Ibid. Para.62.

⁵⁷ Which do not relate to any *bonafide* commercial or industrial activity.

⁵⁸ Desai.M.A. et al *The demand for tax haven operations,* Journal of Public Economics 2006, (513) 515. 2006. Pg.513.

⁵⁹ Brittain-Catlin.W., Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy. New York: Picador, 2006. Pg.42.

⁶⁰ Ibid .Pg.92.

of tax evasion/avoidance facilities by OFCs/tax-havens can create significant market and competition distortions ⁶¹.

Tax evasion is detrimental to the jurisdiction where taxable revenues are generated as money laundering is to the jurisdiction where the predicate offence was committed. Although pursuit of tax evaders in criminal law is possible, it is not entirely possible or desirable by states to prevent the international movement of corporations in order to protect their tax base.

Using a conservative definition of money laundering, this offence generally arises, where the proceeds of underlying 'predicate offences' are sought to be integrated into the mainstream financial system. Money laundering can be seen as a secondary crime entirely dependent on the existence of the predicate offence as conceivably, activities, which would become criminal subsequent to the predicate offence, would not be so otherwise.

Activities akin to those of money laundering 62 are not objectionable behaviour unto themselves but become so as part of wider criminal or illegal activities 63 . This position is apparent in English law as in $R\ v\ Louis\ Everson\ and$ others followed by $R\ v\ Greaves\ and\ others\ ^{64}$ where the Court of Appeal accepted

⁶² Such as 'deep discounting' by supermarkets, achieved by large cross-border flows of goods and funds to minimise the retail price of the goods.

- R6703. Dissertation. Sept.2010. -

⁶¹ From Craig.W.Y., & Kumar,A., *Tax Harmonisations for Europe and the world: could the ECJ show the way*, , I.C.C.L.R., 2007, 18(10), 341-348, Kluwer Law International, 2003.

⁶³ Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.85. Mitsilegas.V., Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union: a new paradigm of security governance versus fundamental legal principles. Volume. 20 of European business law & practice series. European law library. Kluwer Law International, 2003. Pg.33.

⁶⁴ R. v Greaves (Claude Clifford), R. v Botcher (Henrik), R. v Jenkins (Fraser) [2010] EWCA Crim 709; [2010] Lloyd's Rep. F.C. 423.

that the primary crime differed from the money laundering offence for the purposes of sentencing 65.

It would follow that many activities of money launderers would not be illegal but for the illegality of predicate offence. This is demonstrable from the UK *Proceeds of Crime Act* 2002, under which the prosecution must show that the laundered proceeds are 'criminal property' resultant of conduct, which constitutes an offence in the UK ⁶⁶. This means that revenues generated from any criminal conduct, which is an offence in the UK but not in other jurisdictions, and remitted back to the UK would be subject to a reporting obligation under the 2002 Act or to UK anti-money laundering laws.

Creating the separate primary crime of money laundering relates largely to the possibility that money laundering may not be conducted in the same jurisdiction as the predicate offence. This possibility, in turn allows the perpetrators of predicate offences to enjoy the proceeds of their activities, within the jurisdiction where the predicate offences were committed, particularly where the launderers are unconnected third parties ⁶⁷. Whilst the proceeds of predicate offences, within a jurisdiction can adequately become subject to handling offences or forfeiture laws, this may not be true if the proceeds are moved elsewhere. The recipient jurisdiction may be uncooperative or suffer from regulatory laxity or employ deliberate financial opaqueness or secrecy, making the proceeds of crime harder to recover ⁶⁸. The 'effects doctrine' ⁶⁹ has been

65 R. v Louis Everson, Kamalesh Soneji, David Bullen [2001] EWCA Crim 2262 2001 WL 1346987

⁶⁶ As under s.340 of *Proceeds Of Crime Act* 2002. This position is mirrored by Art.3(3) of Directive. 2005/60/EC.

⁶⁷ Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002. s.340(4).

⁶⁸ Such as non recognition of the predicate offences as was the case with the Seychelles in 1995, where the government seeking inward investment enacted the Economic Development Act, whereby those investing US\$10million or more were able to claim immunity from prosecution for criminal offences and security from possible seizure of their assets, as long as they did not commit serious crime in the Seychelles. This "money launderers' charter" was repealed following FATF pressure. Fisher.H.,FATF Lifts its Warning about Investment Law in Seychelles. OECD/FATF-GAFI Oct. 2000.

entrenched into US law for the purposes of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f), where the perpetrator is a US citizen or a non-US citizen operating in the US ⁷⁰. This position is also reflected in Article.1(3) of Directive 2005/60/EC ⁷¹ whereby money laundering is regarded as such, even where the activities were conducted in a third country. Although, potentially foreign corporate crimes may be addressed by the nationality principle ⁷², e.g. in cases of the use of subsidiaries in lax jurisdictions to launder money or ideas of effects, protection⁷³, or passive personality ⁷⁴, the effectiveness of such extraterritoriality is questionable. Such bases tend to lack a sound, legislative or theoretical base and are unlikely to succeed ⁷⁵ (short of sanctions or conflict) if the jurisdiction, where the actual laundering is taking place is uncooperative or has a vested interest in laundering offences ⁷⁶. It is for such reasons that FATF and other international efforts, must

⁶⁹ Applicable in European and American competition cases where domestic competition laws are applicable to foreign undertakings and domestic undertakings located outside domestic jurisdiction where their transactions produce an "effect" within the domestic jurisdiction T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v Commission, (1999) E.C.R., page II-0753, at paras. 89-92. Use of the effects doctrine in a money laundering case was highlighted in United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1511 (S.D.Fla.1990).

⁷⁰ Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.221.

⁷¹ Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing.

⁷² The nationality principle recognizes that a sovereign can adopt criminal laws which govern the conduct of the sovereign's nationals while outside of the sovereign's borders. Under this principle, for example, a sovereign can make it a crime for its nationals to engage in sexual relations with minors while outside of its borders or to pay bribes outside of its borders to public officials of another sovereign.

⁷³ The protective principle emphasizes the actual or possible effects of an offense and provides for jurisdiction over conduct deemed harmful to specific national interests of the forum state.

⁷⁴ The passive personalty principle recognizes that a sovereign can adopt laws that apply to conduct of foreign nationals who commit crimes against the sovereign's nationals while the sovereign's nationals are outside of the sovereign's territory, as in *United States v. Noriega*, 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1511 (S.D.Fla.1990).

⁷⁵ From Felkenes. G.T., Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Its impact on criminal justice. Journal of Criminal Justice. Vol. 21, No. 6, pp. 583-594, 1993.

⁷⁶ Although it may be unfeasible or impractical to extend an extraterritorial jurisdiction over the offence of money laundering, under International criminal law (Article 6(2)(c) of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime) predicate offences for the purposes of establishing liability

rely on bolstering and homogenising the legal and regulatory framework of other jurisdictions, which seemingly are the only vehicle to adversely affect the laundering of the proceeds of predicate offences. The FATF's first recommendation is thus to to criminalise money laundering separately to predicate offences⁷⁷. The offence of money laundering may be a secondary crime, akin to handling offences for domestic purposes but must be constructed as a primary, universal crime in order to make anti-money laundering efforts effective globally.

under the money laundering provisions may take either inside *or* outside the jurisdiction of the regulating state. In the latter case it may only be treated as a predicate offence for the purpose of

money laundering laws if the behavior constitutes a criminal offence in *both* states.

⁷⁷ FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations.

Chapter 2:

Offshore Centres and the Effects of Money Laundering.

OFCs are jurisdictions that attract and oversee a disproportionate level of non-resident financial activity,⁷⁸ with their financial sectors accounting for an inordinate part of their economy. They may represent developing countries or emerging economies; described as 'low capacity' countries by the FATF, ⁷⁹ which exclusively by merits of their legislative competence seek to attract foreign investments. Developed jurisdictions such as Luxembourg or the City of London also exhibit offshore characteristics ⁸⁰. The infrastructure of OFCs generally includes investor incentives such as low taxes, no ,⁸¹ light and flexible incorporation, lax licensing and supervisory regimes, flexible use of trusts and SPVs and high levels of confidentiality. OFCs typically do not offer such incentives to domestic investors or residents with a view to attract foreign investment,⁸² and require a degree of financial framework as well as access to onshore financial markets. The traditional OFCs account for between 3 and 4 percent of the World's GPD and manage up to a quarter of the World's assets ⁸³.

⁷⁸ Rose.A.K. & Spiegel. M.M., Offshore Centres, Parasites or Symbionts? The Economic Journal, 117 (October), 1310–1335. Royal Economic Society 2007. Pg.1310.

⁷⁹ FATF-GAFI: The fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in low capacity countries. 21st Aug 2009.

⁸⁰ Levin. M., 'The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe', CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002. Pg.2.

⁸¹ See Footnote 24.

⁸² Financial Stability Forum., Report of the Working Group on Offshore Financial Centres. 2000. Pgs.9-10.

⁸³ Levin. M., Op.Cit. Pg.i.

OFCs generally also have the characteristics of tax-havens, which have the result of attracting corporate migrations or high net worth individuals. At Tax-havens however are not necessarily money laundering centres in every event. The OECD test for a tax haven is "no or only nominal tax on ...income" as Jurisdictions, which although collecting revenue, allow preferential Tax Regimes' as jurisdictions, which although collecting revenue, allow preferential treatment to result in low or no taxation, for certain kinds of income at Jurisdictions, which only have rates of taxation lower than other countries, yet collect 'significant' revenues are not tax-havens or Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes, under the OECD guidance at The OECD describe tax competition at worst be a "race to the bottom", which is the idea that fiscal measures taken by jurisdictions to attract investments creates a downward spiral in tax revenues, and a 'beggar thy neighbour' rivalry between competing countries at Any advantages gained are offset by competitors, compelling the further creation of tax advantages accountries. In a wider context, capital flight and erosion of the tax base of onshore jurisdictions, incentivised by tax

⁸⁴ Levin. M., 'The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe', CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002. Pg.2.

⁸⁵ Following from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) distinction and According to US Security Agencies. *From Mitchell, D `US Government agencies confirm that low tax jurisdictions are not money-laundering havens'* (2004) 11 J. of Financial Crime 127. In Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008.

⁸⁶ OECD Report., Harmful tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. 1998. Pg.19.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*.Pg.20

⁸⁸ Ibid.Pg.19.

⁸⁹ Tax competition; a form of regulatory competition, exists when governments are encouraged to lower fiscal burdens to either encourage the inflow of productive resources or discourage the exodus of those resources. Often, this means a governmental strategy of attracting foreign direct investment, foreign indirect investment (financial investment), and high value human resources by minimizing the overall taxation level and/or special tax preferences, creating a comparative advantage.

⁹⁰ OECD Report., Op.Cit. Pgs.19-20.

⁹¹ Gurtner.B., The Race to the Bottom. Incentives for New Investment? Tax Justice Network. Oct 15th to 17th, 2008.

⁹² Ibid.

opportunities offshore, is thought to result in increased unemployment onshore, ⁹³ as well as shifting tax burdens from capital to labour ⁹⁴. Other commentators ⁹⁵ point towards the lack of empirical evidence, as tax revenues globally generally remain stable, with little movement from the taxation of capital to the taxation of labour, often cited in the relevant literature ⁹⁶.

OFCs are often portrayed as laundering centres, particularly by the various multilateral or international organizations, particularly the FATF and OECD, owing to perceived laxities in reporting, transparency and taxation. The UN for instance suggests that the common feature of 'all' OFCs is that criminal organisations make use of the opportunities, such financial centres provide in order to launder money and thus impede law enforcement agencies. Money launderers are attracted to OFCs to offset losses they would incur onshore though risk-confidentiality trade-offs. Within the layering and integration phases, money launderers often rely on OFCs which can provide adequate corporate, financial or business infrastructure yet simultaneously provide limited anti-money laundering protections. It has been suggested that the increased confidentiality offshore shall increase the demand for bank deposits which in turn shall increase an OFC bank's loanable funds and reduce its interest rate, which is why OFCs themselves have an interest in attracting the proceeds of predicate offences.

⁹³ Huffington.A., Offshore *Corporate Tax Havens: Why Are They Still Allowed?* Global Policy Forum. June 1 2010.

⁹⁴ Persaud.B., OECD Curbs on Offshore Financial Centres. A Major Issue for Small States. The Round Table (2001), 359 (199–212). Pg.207.

⁹⁵ Levin. M., 'The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe', CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002. Pg.1.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ From United Nations., UN Global Program against Money Laundering.

⁹⁸ Mullineux. A.W. & Murinde.V., *Handbook of international banking*. Elgar Original Reference Series. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003. Pgs. 560-562. Also see Footnote. 53.

The FATF suggests that regulatory laxity by developing countries and OFCs attracts the deposit of the proceeds of crime to be re-integrated into the global financial system. Countries, which source the proceeds (i.e suffer the predicate offence) are exposed to detriment to their economies and financial systems and also bear the costs of any subsequent criminal activity, derivative of the reintegration of criminal money. The FATF and commentators ⁹⁹ suggest that for such reasons global harmonisation of anti-money laundering legislation is imperative to achieve any success in the fight against money laundering. This shall have the effect of 'levelling the playing field' and preventing regulatory arbitrage at the expense of jurisdictions, which have enacted stricter anti-money laundering regimens.

Money laundering, amongst other financial crimes is thought to systemically threaten banking 100 and economic stability internationally 101. It results in the misallocation of resources towards socially disruptive, criminal and non-productive activities 102 rather than towards legitimate investments and

⁹⁹ Such as Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Also Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006.

¹⁰⁰ The Basel Committee holds that public confidence in Banks is undermined by inadvertent association with criminals as well as exposure to undesirable customers, who simply by association with the Banks' officers can corrupt them. From Mitsilegas.V., *Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union: a new paradigm of security governance versus fundamental legal principles.* Volume. 20 of European business law & practice series. European law library. Kluwer Law International, 2003. V.33.

¹⁰¹ Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International Regulation of Systemic Risk. Oxford University Press. 2006. Pg.31.

¹⁰² The UK CPS, the UN, FATF etc. identify the illegal arms and drugs trade, people trafficking, prostitution and other organised criminal activities, a general lack of transparency and economic and political corruption, the disintegration of financial and governance systems, the distortion state revenues and misallocation of resources, competition problems and financing of terrorist activities as direct consequences of money laundering.

potentiates further criminal activity ¹⁰³. It also corrupts financial markets and generally lowers public confidence in the International financial system ¹⁰⁴. Money laundering results in the distortion of the corporate governance structures of financial institutions both internationally and in money laundering jurisdictions, as well as the loss of government revenues, where tax evasion is the motivating factor to launder money ¹⁰⁵.

Commentators ¹⁰⁶ suggest that money laundering has particularly adverse effects upon developing economies, including tax havens and OFCs. A jurisdiction, which identifies as a haven for money laundering shall see increases in corruption ¹⁰⁷ and crime, particularly in the form of bribery to facilitate money laundering efforts as well as a loss of confidence in its financial sector ¹⁰⁸. Financial institutions, both domestic and foreign, operating in high risk

¹⁰³ Commentators have sought to demonstrate that money laundering acts as a multiplier of the volume of the economic endowments that concerns to criminal and illegal agents. Masciandaro. D., *Economics of Money Laundering : A Primer. Paolo* Baffi Centre Bocconi University Working Paper No. 171.2. 2007. This is a view supported by the FATF who maintain that "...money laundering is inextricably linked to the underlying criminal activity that generated it. Laundering enables criminal activity to continue." (FATF-GAFI: *Money Laundering FAQ.* 2010.) as well as the World Bank and IMF. Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. *Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism.* Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg. II-2

¹⁰⁴ Stessens.G., *Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.87.

¹⁰⁵ Mwenda. K.K., *Can insider trading predicate the offence of money laundering*. Michigan State University Journal of Business and Securities Law. (2006) 6. 127. 2006. Pg.149.

¹⁰⁶ Such as Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. *Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism.* Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Also Stessens.G., *Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model.* Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

¹⁰⁷ Including lawyers and bankers, seeking to reduce estimations of the extent of money laundering, so as to dilute anti-money laundering measures. Stessens.G., *Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.87.

¹⁰⁸ Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. *Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism*. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. PgII-3

jurisdictions shall in turn be exposed to the markdown or devaluation of their assets, as well as difficulties in raising legitimate capital owing to increases in operational and reputational risks ¹⁰⁹ Foreign financial institutions may limit or end relationships with high risk jurisdictions or impose extra costs or scrutiny, reducing access of legitimate businesses, in such jurisdictions to foreign capital markets ¹¹⁰. This subsequently can weaken legitimate businesses and reduce the value of the mainstream economy, particularly where front/shell companies can cross-subsidize their activities, with illicit funds at the expense of domestic competitors ¹¹¹. Foreign development aid or foreign private investments are also likely to be very limited for high risk jurisdictions ¹¹².

The large amounts of money involved in money laundering activities, rapidly entering and exiting the market can result in an increase in concentration risk, particularly for emerging economies, as loans are not rationally distributed 113 with excessive credit or loan exposure to individual borrowers. Deposits from money launderers cannot be employed adequately as bank funding as they are subject to unanticipated withdrawals, which thus causes liquidity problems for the financial institution in question 114. As launderers seek confidentiality rather than yields and higher rates of return, money laundering distorts foreign exchange and interest rates, particularly where the amounts involved are globally significant 115. Other costs of money laundering activities to developing economies can include asset seizures, legal risks and the costs of increased

¹⁰⁹ Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., *Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International Regulation of Systemic Risk.* Oxford University Press. 2006. Pg.31.

¹¹⁰ Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund., Loc.Cit.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* Pg. II-6. Also in Mwenda. K.K., *Can insider trading predicate the offence of money laundering.* Michigan State University Journal of Business and Securities Law. (2006) 6. 127. 2006. Pg.149.

¹¹² *Ibid*. Pg. II-3.

¹¹³ Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., Loc.Cit.

¹¹⁴ Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund., *Op.Cit.* Pg.II-5.

¹¹⁵ Mwenda. K.K., *Can insider trading predicate the offence of money laundering*. Michigan State University Journal of Business and Securities Law. (2006) 6. 127. 2006. Pg.149.

regulation and intervention as well as those of penalties and fines. Such developments create a symbiosis between jurisdictions with offshore infrastructures and the illicit economy. Laundering incentivises and necessitates the influx of illegitimate funds to sustain the markets of jurisdictions, which facilitate money laundering activities, by requiring affirmation of its reputation of regulatory laxity ¹¹⁶. This, thus makes the jurisdiction more reliant on the proceeds of criminal and other illegitimate activities. The FATF similarly suggest that given that launderers rely on jurisdictional arbitrage; failures by developing countries to reduce differences between theirs and more robust anti-money laundering systems shall entrench organised crime ¹¹⁷.

¹¹⁶ Masciandaro. D., *Economics of Money Laundering : A Primer. Paolo* Baffi Centre Bocconi University Working Paper No. 171.2. 2007. Pg.381.

¹¹⁷ FATF-GAFI: Money Laundering FAQ. 2010.



Figure 1: The Entrenchment of Money Laundering

In contrast to the FATF model, commentators ¹¹⁸ suggest that relationship between onshore and offshore financial centres, is a trade-off between positive and negative externalities, where although they facilitate money laundering and tax evasion by lowering costs, they also offer benefits, in terms of competitive pressure on onshore banks and jeopardise onshore banking oligopolies, causing them to modify their behaviour ¹¹⁹. Legitimate offshore activities allow International companies to maximise profits and operating performance, issue securitised products flexibly and protect their assets from claimants ¹²⁰. For such reasons large multinational corporations such as Apple Computers Inc., General Motors and Swatch A.G. amongst others, all have a historical and consistent track-record of operating through OFCs, with a view to avail corporate flexibility and tax benefits that OFC's provide ¹²¹.

A symbiosis ¹²² between onshore and offshore may be argued to exist, as OFCs do not operate in an economic vacuum, independent of external economic structures ¹²³. Onshore patronage of OFCs, is the result of the demand for respite, from inhospitable tax regimes and the inability to efficiently invest domestically (such as was the case with the petro-dollar surplus of the 1960s). Growth of onshore banks and multinationals over the past few decades is directly linked to the ability of such organisations to profit maximise offshore. OFC's also focus on developing liquidity and are at the *avant-garde* of the use of electronic commerce

¹¹⁸ Rose.A.K. & Spiegel. M.M., *Offshore Centres, Parasites or Symbionts?* The Economic Journal, 117 (October), 1310–1335. Royal Economic Society 2007. Pgs. 1312-21. Also see. Persaud.B., *OECD Curbs on Offshore Financial Centres. A Major Issue for Small States*. The Round Table (2001), 359 (199–212).

¹¹⁹ Rose.A.K. & Spiegel. M.M., *Op.Cit.* Pg. 1329.

¹²⁰ Persaud.B., Op.Cit. Pg. 205.

¹²¹ Brittain-Catlin.W., Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy. New York: Picador, 2006. Pgs. 49-51.

¹²² Rose.A.K. & Spiegel. M.M., Op.Cit. Pg. 1329.

¹²³ Donaghy.M & Clarke.M., *Are offshore financial centres the product of global markets?* A sociological response. Economy and Society, 32: 3, 381 — 409. 2003. Pg.390

and financial innovation. Other products such as insurance and re-insurance, fund and trust management, hedging and shipping are all constituents of legitimate industries, which OFC's can efficiently provide as ancillaries to their financial markets ¹²⁴. The existence of OFCs with adequate anti-money laundering infrastructure such as Jersey and other Crown dependencies ¹²⁵ begs the question as to whether international concern over money laundering, is at least partially based on revenues losses through the leniency of OFC tax regimes.

An alternative view comes from commentators ¹²⁶ who argue that there is sparse evidence as to the impact of money laundering on International growth and development at all. The primary drivers to internationally criminalise money laundering come from an attempted conflation of International development with good global governance ¹²⁷. Notably earlier ideas originating from the OECD, prior to the inception of the FATF, considering the economic effects of money laundering, in a given national economy gave far greater significance to the laundering offence rather than the predicate offence ¹²⁸.

¹²⁴ Persaud.B., OECD Curbs on Offshore Financial Centres. A Major Issue for Small States. The Round Table (2001), 359 (199–212). Pgs. 205-207.

From Rosdol.A., "*Are OFCs leading the fight against money laundering?*", Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 10 Iss: 3, pp.337 – 351. 2007.

¹²⁶ Such as Hülsse. R., Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a Global Money-laundering Problem. Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 2. Routledge Publishers. April, 2007. Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Williams.D., Governance, Security and 'Development': The Case of Money Laundering. City University Working Papers on Transnational Politics. CUTP/001. February 2008.

¹²⁷ Williams.D., Op.Cit. Pg.2. In 2009-2010 approximately 42% of the World Bank's resources were dedicated to the creation of governance systems in member countries reflecting international standards of good conduct; governance-enhancing and anti-corruption initiatives including anti-corruption measures, public services and judiciary reforms, tax and administration policies, decentralisation, and public services supply.

From Hinterseer.K., An economic analysis of Money Laundering. Journal of Money Laundering Control. 1. 1997.

The harm to developing countries, identified by proponents of a homogenised anti-money laundering regime does not adequately account for the benefits to such countries from the attracted investment. Becoming an OFC may be seen as a rational development strategy for smaller states. In effect such states attract investment and expertise and improve local employment and wages ¹²⁹, by offering global financial markets, multinational companies and investors, an investment avenue, with lower tax, fiscal and judicial risks. This may be particularly useful where, as is the case with small island nations there are limited resources and few opportunities, ¹³⁰ or where nations are underdeveloped for lack of infrastructure and thus need to incentivise foreign investment.

It has been suggested that a motivator against the influx of business to developing countries is against the interests of developed economies ¹³¹. Money laundering "in and of itself" per empirical evidence ¹³² does not have substantial negative repercussions for an economy, and furthermore laundering reintegrates at least portions of untaxed funds from the illegitimate to the legitimate economy producing wealth and revenue ¹³³.

Arguably the illegalisation of the proceeds of crime is the result of a failure in the criminal law to address the committal of predicate offences. Similarly the investment of the proceeds of crime into legitimate businesses or other unlawful investments does not detract from the mischief in the predicate offence ¹³⁴. The

¹²⁹ Levin. M., 'The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe', CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002. Pg.4.

¹³⁰ Brittain-Catlin.W., *Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy*. New York: Picador, 2006. Chapters 1 and 2. Describing the situation in the Cayman Islands.

¹³¹ Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008. Pg.447.

Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.304.

¹³⁴ Alldridge.P., *Money Laundering and Globalization*. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008. Pg.451.

idea that international money laundering potentiates or acts as a multiplier for further criminal activity is also largely unfounded. It seems in this case that "the crucial hypothesis (being made) is that both legal and illegal investment (at least part of the latter) need to be financed by 'clean' liquidity" 135. It is more likely that the proceeds of criminal activity are employed locally within a jurisdiction to further criminal purposes, in the case of more minor criminal activity 136 and is a problem more pertinently addressed by municipal laws dealing with receipt, handling or dealing with stolen goods 137 rather than top heavy anti-money laundering laws. Commentators have for such reasons described the UK *Proceeds Of Crime Act* 2002, which itself develops from handling offences as 'draconian' 138 as the *mens-rea* for laundering offences is diminished to mere suspicion 139 or objective tests of fault with no requirement to prove dishonesty, as under the

¹³⁵ Masciandaro. D., *Money Laundering: the Economics of Regulation*. European Journal of Law and Economics. No.7. Kluwer Academic Publishers.1999. Pg.227.

[&]quot;...money laundering, in a 'given economy' with legal and illegal sectors, can play the role of multiplier" [Emphasis added]. From Masciandaro. D., Economics of Money Laundering: A Primer. Paolo Baffi Centre Bocconi University Working Paper No. 171.2. 2007. Pg.2.

with money laundering and earlier handling offences. Under s. 22 of the *Theft Act 1968* handling stolen goods is an alternative charge to theft, where a person handles stolen goods if knowing or believing them to be stolen goods he dishonestly receives the goods, or dishonestly undertakes or assists in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the benefit of another person, or if he arranges to do so. *The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002* ss. 327 to 329 offences are generally quite similar. The 2002 Act like the *Theft Act* maintains the idea of equity's darling; the *bona fide* purchaser (From Shaw.N., *Tax and the Proceeds of Crime. GITC Review VolII.No.2. 2003).* and s.4 of the *Theft Act* 1968 defines property is generally parallel to the *Proceeds of Crime Act 2002* definition of "criminal property" including money and all other property, real or personal, including things in action and other intangible property with the exclusion of real estate unless stolen in the capacity of a trustee, personal representative or attorney etc.

The increased draconianism of the *Proceeds Of Crime Act* 2002 has been argued to result from the increased threat of money laundering. (Millington.T. & Williams .M.K., *The Proceeds of Crime, Law and Practice of Restraint, Confiscation, Condemnation and Forfeiture*. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press. 2007. Pg.9.) Alternatively in *R (on the application of Wilkinson v DPP)* [2006] EWHC 3012 (Admin) *and R v Whitham* [2008] EWCA Crim 239 the High Court and the Court of Appeal respectively accepted that handling should be charged rather than money laundering in less serious cases, but also maintained that the court could not cause the prosecution not to charge under POCA 2002.

¹³⁹ R v. Da Silva [2006] EWCA Crim 1654.

Theft Acts of 1968 and 1978. Subsequent criminal activity does not required laundered or integrated funds in order to occur, however the *Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002* allows for prosecution without conviction for the predicate offence ¹⁴⁰. The criminalisation of money laundering, in fact incites criminals to yet more surreptitious means to hide and reintegrate the proceeds and creates a secondary criminal industry to do so ¹⁴¹. Local decriminalisation of more minor predicate offences or more effective mechanisms to address them ¹⁴², may in fact be more effective and efficient than attempting to institute a homogenous global antimoney laundering regime.

The primary drivers behind an increased interest in International money laundering are the 'problemisation' and 'securitisation' of failures in governance in developing countries, which are perceived to be threat (if only potentially) to developed nations following the events of 9/11 in 2001, with a view to integrate developing countries into harmonised and standardised international

¹⁴⁰ R v. Sabaharwal [2001] 2 Cr App R (S) 81.

¹⁴¹ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., *Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.298.

¹⁴² Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008. Pg.451.

Williams.D cites the works; Buzan.B, Waever.O and de Wilde.J Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner, Boulder.Co. 1998. Waever,O., 'Securitization and Desecuritization', In Lipschutz.R., (ed.), On Security. Columbia University Press,1995, and Waever.O., Buzan.B., Kelstrup.M., & Lemaitre.P., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1993. etc. known as the "Copenhagen School" the work of which has been subject to some controversy. "Securitization... involves an investigation into the ways in which issues, processes and events become seen as matters of 'security', and thus cast as existential threats that require special measures to address". (From Williams.D., Governance, Security and 'Development': The Case of Money Laundering. City University Working Papers on Transnational Politics. CUTP/001. February 2008. Pg.3.) Hülsse draws parallels between securitisation and "problemisation" which he describes as an analysis of "discourse" of money laundering as compared to an analysis of its "institutional frame" and security outcomes. Hülsse. R., Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a Global Money-laundering Problem. Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 2. Routledge Publishers April, 2007.Pg.168.

governance regimes,¹⁴⁴ and "to relieve competitive pressures from specialised and offshore financial centres" ¹⁴⁵, The 'moral panic' of money laundering has similarly been argued to been employed to "advance enforcement powers, redraw the depositors relations with his... bank and embed international interdependence in(to) criminal law enforcement ¹⁴⁶" It is perhaps for such reasons that money laundering has been associated with terrorist financing and steps have been taken against hawala/hundi and other aspects of informal economy.

¹⁴⁴ Arnone.M. & Padoan.P.C., *Anti-money laundering by international institutions: a preliminary assessment*. Eur J Law Econ (2008) 26:361–386. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008. Pg.362. Also Williams.D., *Op.Cit*,Pg.2.

¹⁴⁵ Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Pg.2.

¹⁴⁶ Alldridge.P., *Relocating Criminal Law*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd. 2000. Pg.169.

Chapter 3:

The Anti-Money Framework: Structures and Regimes.

Cooperation between national judicial authorities on the basis of treaty has been previously been posited, as the basis to collect evidence abroad ¹⁴⁷. This model has been superseded by 'new modes' of international cross-border evidence gathering, and enforcement ¹⁴⁸ founded in unilaterality, both in terms of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the profusion and promulgation of international paradigm and standard setting.

The current international anti-money laundering regime has both preventative and repressive aspects ¹⁴⁹. The *ex-ante* preventative model exists under municipal and international law, which relates to processes such as reporting, customer due-diligence and preventative interaction with the financial institutions and economic actors, which may potentially facilitate money laundering activities. The *ex-post* repressive model under the criminal law is retributive and involves investigation, prosecution, conviction and confiscation of the laundered and launderable proceeds. Other mechanisms can have preventative and retributive elements, in different contexts, such as international sanctions.

¹⁴⁷ Such as Alldridge.P., *Money Laundering and Globalization*. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008 and Berman,P.S., `The Globalization of Jurisdiction'. 151. University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 311. 2002.

¹⁴⁸ Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

¹⁴⁹ Alldridge.P., *Op. Cit.* Pg.442, Stessens.G., *Op. Cit.*Pg.109, and Arnone.M. & Padoan.P.C., *Antimoney laundering by international institutions: a preliminary assessment.* Eur J Law Econ (2008) 26:361–386. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008. Pg.361.

Commentators ¹⁵⁰ indicate that models of regulation within the international anti-money laundering framework are 'uploaded' by influential parties including the G7 and the US to a global level and diffused horizontally through regional and central bodies such as the IMF, the EC and the FATF. The 'downloading' actors are mostly developing countries, OFCs, newer members to the EC and other treaty based organisations ¹⁵¹.

¹⁵⁰ Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005, following Lutz.S., 'Convergence within National Diversity: The Regulatory State in Finance' in Journal of Public Policy, 24/2, 169- 197.2004.

¹⁵¹ Tsingou.E., Op.Cit.Pgs.7-9.




Figure 2: Levels of Regulation

3.1: The Global Framework.

The FATF was established in 1989 by the leaders of the ¹⁵² states and under the auspices of the OECD ¹⁵³ with a current mandate to extend through to the end of 2012¹⁵⁴. Its formation was amidst a general sense of a global governance deficit ¹⁵⁵ and perceived threats to global financial stability from money laundering. The FATF is the foremost, ¹⁵⁶ most successful ¹⁵⁷ and only international body, which solely deals with money laundering and more recently terrorist financing ¹⁵⁸. It currently has 36 member states ¹⁵⁹ and seeks to cooperate in international anti-

¹⁵² The meeting of the finance ministers from a group of seven industrialized nations. It was formed in 1976, when Canada joined the Group of Six: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.

¹⁵³ The FATF claims to be fully independent of the OECD, although is highly representative of the such countries. The FATF previously was an exclusive club of which membership was limited to only OCED members until the late 90s. (Hülsse. R., Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a Global Money-laundering Problem. Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 2. Routledge Publishers April, 2007. Pg.170.) Exceptions to OECD membership are the ex-soviet eastern European countries which the FATF describes as present(ing) an increasingly attractive target for money launderers as they liberalise their economic and financial systems. See Table 1 below.

¹⁵⁴ Damais.A., *The Financial Action Task Force*. Paris. 2007. Pg.72. In Muller.W.H.. Kälin.C.H. & Goldsmith.J.G., *Anti-money laundering: international law and practice*. John Wiley and Sons, 2007.

^{155 &}quot;The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the diffusion of democracy, globalization of markets, and the development of internet and information & communication technology made possible an incredible flow of information, goods, and money. This resulted in increased difficulties for the authorities, equipped only with nation-wide only preventive and repressive powers, to limit the growth of illegal financial activities internationally." Arnone.M. & Padoan.P.C., Anti-money laundering by international institutions: a preliminary assessment. Eur J Law Econ (2008) 26:361–386. Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008. Pg.362.

¹⁵⁶ Para. 5 of Directive.2005/60/EC

¹⁵⁷ Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International Regulation of Systemic Risk. Oxford University Press. 2006. Pg.73.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. Pg.67.

¹⁵⁹ FATF member countries are: Argentina, Australia, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Gulf Co-operation Council, Hong Kong, China, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kingdom of the Netherlands: Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles and Aruba., Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of

money laundering efforts. It operates by issuing regularly updated recommendations, which are targeted at its members as well as other countries, with a view to lead states to implement necessary legal and regulatory measures to prevent use of their financial systems for criminal or terrorist purposes. Its mandate is purely policy based and it seeks to generate the necessary political will to bring about national legislative and regulatory reforms to combat money laundering.

The FATF has also assisted in the creation of regional affiliated bodies known as FATF Style Regional Bodies ¹⁶⁰ to which regional oversight is delegated and which assist in regional FATF compliance reviews. The FATF currently has Forty Recommendations on money laundering creating a framework for detecting and preventing money laundering, which are intended for universal global application across the World. These recommendations include repressive elements such as the criminalisation of money laundering, ¹⁶¹ the seizure of illicit funds and proceeds ¹⁶² and dissuasive criminal or civil sanctions ¹⁶³ as well as preventative elements such as limiting the negative effects of bank secrecy and confidentiality ¹⁶⁴, customer identification and record-keeping rules ¹⁶⁵ and the adoption of increased diligence by financial institutions ¹⁶⁶ Following the terrorist

Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States.

¹⁶⁰ There are currently eight such FSRBS which are the Asia/Pacific Group on combating money laundering (APG), Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism of the Council of Europe (MONEYVAL), Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), Intergovernmental Action Group against Money-Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), and the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF).

¹⁶¹ FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations. 2010. Recommendation 1.

¹⁶² *Ibid*. Recommendation 3.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*. Recommendation 17.

¹⁶⁴ FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations. 2010. Recommendation 4.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*. Recommendations 5 to 11.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*. Recommendations 5 to 6 & 8 to 11.

attacks in 2001, the FATF issued a further nine recommendations focusing on the combating of terrorist financing ¹⁶⁷.

The recommendations are not legally binding, however are effective as non-compliance can potentially result in what effectively constitute international sanctions¹⁶⁸. These 'countermeasures' can include restrictions by FATF members (and via FSRBs) on financial institutions operating in jurisdictions the FATF's deems 'Non Cooperative Countries and Territories' (NCCTs) (popularly known as the Blacklist) ¹⁶⁹ or restrictions by member states on other members, that insufficiently apply the FATF recommendations ¹⁷⁰ As of the 13th of October 2006, however all NCCTs have officially been delisted ¹⁷¹. Under normal circumstances the FATF relies on peer pressure and a 'name and shame' policy to convince countries to comply and maintains the ultimate resort of suspension from the FATF for non-compliance ¹⁷². Blacklisting has the effect of creating a disincentive for potential investors to patronise the blacklisted jurisdiction, in effect creating an indirect sanctioning mechanism¹⁷³. Countries, thus voluntarily commit to the implementation of the recommendations, with about 130 jurisdictions

¹⁶⁷ FATF-GAFI: 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Financing (TF). 2004.

¹⁶⁸ Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International Regulation of Systemic Risk. Oxford University Press. 2006. Pg.68 and Persaud.B., OECD Curbs on Offshore Financial Centres. A Major Issue for Small States. The Round Table (2001), 359 (199–212). Pg.200.

¹⁶⁹ Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. *Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism*. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg.iii 11.

¹⁷⁰ FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations. 2010. Recommendation 21.

¹⁷¹ FATF-GAFI: High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions. 2010.

¹⁷² Schott. P.A, Op.Cit. Pg. iii 9.

¹⁷³ Picard. P.M. & Pieretti.P., Bank Secrecy, Illicit Money and Offshore Financial Centers. "Paolo Baffi" Centre Research Paper Series No. 45. 2009. Pg.2.

representing over 90 percent of global economic output having made some political commitment to implementation¹⁷⁴.

The OECD in parallel to the FATF blacklist, maintains a 'grey-list' of countries, which are non-compliant with OECD tax cooperation rules, and through the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Proposes (inter-alia) seeks to provide guidance on the adoption of norms or administrative practices in response tax or economic issues. The OCED promotes transparency and information exchange, between jurisdictions so as to prevent tax evaders from relying on regulatory laxity to hide their assets, and to prevent jurisdictions from adopting measures which encourage low taxation, harmful tax competition, bank secrecy and financial and corporate opaqueness It operates with a view to level the playing field for competing jurisdictions and corporations by setting guidelines for dealing with tax havens and harmful or preferential tax regimes ¹⁷⁵. Countermeasures in response to non-compliance with OECD tax cooperation rules, in parallel to FATF, relies on the threat of sanctions (supported by the G-20) 176 although the OCED has generally been reluctant to employ such measures¹⁷⁷. Countermeasures on a national level are more widely and successfully employed ¹⁷⁸.

¹⁷⁴ Shehu, A.Y., *International initiatives against corruption and money laundering: an overview*. Journal of Financial Crime 2005, Vol. 12, Iss. 3, p.221-245.2005. Pg.231-232.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁷⁶ From OECD., Promoting Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Proposes.

¹⁷⁷ Sharman.J.C., *Havens in a storm: The struggle for global tax regulation*, Cornell University Press 117.2006. Pgs.54-56.

¹⁷⁸ Tax deferral by placing income in OFC corporations can be regulated by employing Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules on a national level, although distinguishing between acceptable and harmful deferral. (Mccann,H., Offshore Finance, Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pgs. 112-14.) The practice of 'transfer pricing' (i.e. the non-arm's length sale of goods/services between international

The Financial Stability Board (FSB), which is also essentially a G7 body with links to the OECD, operates so as to bring all OFCs in line with international standards of regulation, supervision, disclosure, diligence and information-sharing. The rationale to this agenda is that OFCs attract large volumes of financial activity and do not meet international reporting standards and thus pose a risk to overall financial stability ¹⁷⁹.

The Wolfsberg Group of Banks is a private sector initiative consisting of large global banks ¹⁸⁰ It seeks to institute international standardised preventative policies for financial services and products, know your customer requirements as well as anti-money laundering and terrorist finance. It came about in 2000, in response to a perceived need for greater harmonisation ¹⁸¹ The Wolfsberg Group operates sets of principles related to anti-money laundering in private banking, inter-bank relationships and client quality whilst endorsing the FATF recommendations on money laundering and terrorist finance.

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divisions or subsidiaries of a parent company, to the end of either achieving a tax arbitrage or engineering the product price to limit taxation.) (Brittain-Catlin.W., Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy. New York: Picador, 2006. Pgs.47-53.) has been addressed widely by local measures. Other measures can include thin capitalisation rules and limits to tax deductibility of certain kinds of coupon/interest payments.

¹⁷⁹ Levin. M., 'The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe', CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002. Pg.17. Information also available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/

¹⁸⁰ Banco Santander, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Société Générale and UBS.

¹⁸¹ Pieth.M & and Aiolfi.G., "The Private Sector becomes active: The Wolfsberg Process". Wolfsberg Group of Banks. 2005.

The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units 182 is an informal association of FIUs, representing 108 jurisdictions by 2010 and an observer member of the FATF 183. The Egmont Group is led by the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Unit (FinCEN United States), and seeks to support its member governments in addressing financial crimes, including money laundering 184. Agencies of various governments, (subsequently FIUs) tailored to combat financial crime came together in 1995, to create the Egmont Group and was followed by its acceptance of financial bodies from many other jurisdictions. This may in some cases have been prompted by Recommendation 26 of the FATF promoting the creation of national FIUs so as to report suspicious transactions and information related to terrorism or money laundering 185. For the purposes of money laundering, the Egmont Group provides support for national money laundering initiatives in dealing with international crimes ¹⁸⁶. Each FIU operates through interaction with domestic financial institutions, as well as local judicial and law enforcement authorities, whilst being able to rapidly communicate and exchange information with external FIUs to deal with international aspects of financial crime 187. This is facilitated by the Egmont International Secure Web

¹⁸² A FIU defined by the Egmont Group is a central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analyzing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information: (i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime and potential financing of terrorism, or (ii) required by national legislation or regulation, in order to counter money laundering and terrorism financing. From http://www.egmontgroup.org/ This definition is entirely consistent with the requirements of the Forty Recommendations. Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. *Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism.* Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg.VE-32.

¹⁸³ All observer members of the FATF are required to endorse FATF standards. From FATF-GAFI: *Policy on Observer Members*. 2008.

¹⁸⁴ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., *Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.43.

¹⁸⁵ FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations. 2010.

¹⁸⁶ Schott. P.A, Op.Cit. Pg.IR-30.

¹⁸⁷ From Egmont Group., Information Paper on Financial Intelligence Units and the Egmont Group. 2004.

System, which is used to communicate trends, analytical tools and financial intelligence between FIUs internationally 188 .

The International Monetary Fund is an intergovernmental organization of 187 countries, which primarily oversees macroeconomic stability and growth as well as offering leveraged loans to developing countries. The IMF and the World Bank (the second Bretton Woods organisation) both have parallel and identical goals for the purposes of anti-money laundering¹⁸⁹. Both bodies are able to influence the way a country deals with the proceeds of crime or other illicit monies; the IMF through monitoring and the World Bank through conditions attached to development and other loans¹⁹⁰. For such reasons the IMF is quite important in the diffusion and homogenisation of anti-money laundering laws, as after the FATF it is the only global organisation that can take *ex-post* enforcement action. The IMF defers to the FATF, in as much as endorsing the Forty Recommendations as the key set of standards in the global anti-money laundering regime 191. The World Bank is an observer member of the FATF 192. The IMF has also established a Multi-Donor Trust Fund to which its members have pledged over US\$30 million for the purposes of developing global anti-money laundering infrastructure 193. In addition the IMF provides technical support and inspects

¹⁸⁸ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., *Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.43.

¹⁸⁹ Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. *Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism*. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg.X-1.

¹⁹⁰ Alldridge.P., Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery. Criminal Laundering & Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime. Oregon: Hart Publishing. 2003. Pg.104.

¹⁹¹ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Op.Cit. Pg.46.

¹⁹² FATF-GAFI: Members and Observers. 2010.

¹⁹³ International Monetary Fund Factsheet: *The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism*. April 5, 2010.

anti-money laundering targets into its macroeconomic surveillance and global operations ¹⁹⁴.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has a global anti-money laundering programme, which covers terrorist finance and the proceeds of crime. It creation came about in 1997 by mandate given to UNODC through the UN Convention against *Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances* of 1988, followed by the extension of its ambit, to all serious crimes in 1998 ¹⁹⁵. The UNODC has observer status with the FATF ¹⁹⁶. The United Nations as a whole, subscribes to the Forty Recommendations ¹⁹⁷ and on an operational level seeks to aid Member States implement measures against money-laundering and terror finance as well as in detecting, seizing and confiscating criminal proceeds ¹⁹⁸.

Other global bodies, which mainly diffuse and contribute to the *ex-ante* preventative anti-money laundering model, within the framework of the Forty Recommendations, as well as against harmful tax competition, include the Basel Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions amongst others.

¹⁹⁴ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., *Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.47.

¹⁹⁵ From UNODC., UNODC on money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.

¹⁹⁶ FATF-GAFI: Members and Observers. 2010.

¹⁹⁷ Resolution 1617 (2005) of the UN Security Council: "Strongly urges all Member States to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force's(FATF) Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and the FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing;" Resolution 60/288 of the UN General Assembly (20 Sept 2006): Annexed Plan of Action: 'To encourage States to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Forty Recommendations on Money-Laundering and Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force, recognizing that States may require assistance in implementing them;"

¹⁹⁸ From UNODC., UNODC on money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.

3.2: The Regional Framework.

Aside from the FRSBs discussed above, the most important regional actor in the International money laundering framework is the European Union. The European Union operates a single common market and the institutions' directives; the principal legal basis to the Union's money laundering regime are binding, in as much as the result to be archived but with discretion upon the members states' as to the means of implantation ¹⁹⁹. Money laundering is seen as an impediment to economic integration and a significant threat to the integrity of the common market 200. The first money laundering directive (91/308/EEC) was based on the Forty Recommendations. This was followed by then Directive 2001/97/EC which extended the definition of predicate offences to those beyond drugs trafficking and both directives were consolidated into Directive 2005/60/EC ²⁰¹. This 'third' directive implements the revised FATF Recommendations and also those related to terrorist finance,²⁰² and has the main purpose of aligning the anti-money laundering systems of the European member states with the FATF ²⁰³. Article.21 requires the establishment of FIUs by the member states, in parallel to both the FATF and Egmont Group's requirements and definitions 204. Article 1(3) of 2005/60/EC 205 creates the possibility of the European institutions exerting an extraterritorial jurisdiction, regardless of whether the activity was criminal in the

¹⁹⁹ Art. 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

²⁰⁰ Levin. M., 'The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe', CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002. Pg.25

²⁰¹ Directive 2005/60/EC European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing

²⁰² From Euractiv Network., *Money Laundering*. 27 May 2005.

²⁰³ Katz.E., Implementation of the Third Money Laundering Directive – an overview. Pg.207.

²⁰⁴ See Footnote 185

²⁰⁵ Money laundering shall be regarded as such even where the activities which generated the property to be laundered were perpetrated in the territory of another Member State or in that of a third country. OJ 25. 11. 205. L309/15.

country where it occurred ²⁰⁶. The directive implements a 'parent' form of extraterritoriality, where European undertakings must subject their subsidiaries in third countries to the customer due diligence and disclosure requirements ²⁰⁷.

Although there seems to be a drive towards harmonisation across the European Union, there are tensions as to the implementation of the third money laundering directive between member states ²⁰⁸. The UK, France, and Germany, which are G7 members are strongly in favour of harmonised implementation. EU jurisdictions, which have an established offshore status such as Luxembourg and the British Crown Dependencies, as well as non-EC European States Lichtenstein and Switzerland etc. are subject to the territorial and extraterritorial scope of 2005/60/EC mainly through pressure from other members.

The European Commission is a member of the FATF and establishes by declaration, that the FATF is its reference for money laundering prevention ²⁰⁹. The Commission is instrumental in implementing FATF countermeasures against NCCT's trading with EU members ²¹⁰. The EU Financial Intelligence Units' platform operates under the Commission, which is an organization of the member states FIUs and gathers financial intelligence from the Member States.

Europol and Eurojust (the European law enforcement and judicial cooperation agencies) have observer status of the FATF ²¹¹. The European Central

 208 Demonstrable from the aftermath of the Clearstream Affair Discussed in Robert.D & Backes.E., $\it Revelation\$$. LesArênes, 2001.

²⁰⁶ Zerk.J.A., "Extraterritorial jurisdiction: lessons for the business and human rights sphere from six regulatory areas." Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 59. 2010. Pg.116.

²⁰⁷ Article.31 of Directive. 2005/60/EC

²⁰⁹ European Commission., Financial Crime. 2010.

²¹⁰ Turco.M., Written Question E-3497/01 to the Commission. EU cooperation with countries which do not cooperate with the FATF (Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, established within the OECD). Official Journal 277 E, 14/11/2002 P. 0006 – 0008. 2002.

²¹¹ FATF-GAFI: Members and Observers. 2010.

Bank, which also has observer status, endorses the FATF's Forty Recommendations and convergence of anti-money laundering regulation across the member states ²¹².

Relocation to avoid taxation has also been a concern in the European Union, as has the trend of 'Belgian dentists' ²¹³ relying on European OFCs such as Luxembourg, Liechtenstein and Switzerland to avoid home taxes ²¹⁴. To such ends, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) under the Council of the European Union created a non-legally binding Code of Conduct for business taxation ²¹⁵, which prevents the creation of new harmful tax measures, by member states (including the UK Crown Dependencies) as well as homogenisation, is as much as differences of the policies of member states, with the Code of Conduct ²¹⁶.

Other measures include the automatic sharing of information by member states regarding beneficial recipients of interest income within the EU, under the Tax Savings Directive, ²¹⁷ preventing citizens within the single market from failing to disclose returns on their savings in their home country. Currently structural allowances have been made for Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg in the form of an incrementally increasing withholding tax ²¹⁸.

²¹³ Generic term for the European retail buyer of eurobonds, representing high-income professionals keen to minimise tax and maximise yields. From Carew.E., *The Language of Money*. Allen & Unwin Academic. 1996.

²¹² OJ C 40, 17.2.2005 Para.5.

²¹⁴ Sharman.J.C., Havens in a storm: The struggle for global tax regulation, Cornell University Press 117.2006. Pgs.28-29.

²¹⁵ Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting 98/C2/01.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ (Council Directive 2003/48/EC,

²¹⁸ Paying agents will automatically deduct tax from interest income earned and pass it to their local tax authority, indicating how much of the total amount relates to customers in each Member State. The local tax authority will then keep 25% of the total amount collected and remit 75% to the various tax authorities within the Member States. The receiving country gets a bulk payment preserving

In April 2009 the Commission adopted anon-binding Communication identifying good governance in the tax matters for member states (including transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition) which follows the principles and conclusions of the G20 and OECD concerning uncooperative tax jurisdictions ²¹⁹.

The Council of Europe, although not an institution of the European Union is a political intergovernmental organisation of 47 members states. The Council has had an anti-money laundering initiative since 1977, which in 2002 was developed into the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) ²²⁰. MONEYVAL operates as the regional FSRB for the Council of Europe member countries, which are not members of the FATF, although MONEYVAL itself is an associate member of the FATF, subsequent to its observer status until 2006 ²²¹. The members of MONEYVAL include most non-OECD European countries ²²² and MONEYVAL also cooperates with the Bretton Woods organizations.

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anonymity. The rate of withholding tax will be 15% from July 2005, 20% from 1st July 2008, and possibly 35% from July 2011. Para.1 (Council Directive 2003/48/EC,)

²¹⁹ Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee., *Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters*. Brussels, 28.4.2009 COM(2009) 201 final. 2009.

²²⁰ From Council Of Europe., MONEYVAL in brief. What are MONEYVAL's objectives?

²²² Council Of Europe., Country Profiles. 2010.

3.3 The National Framework.

National enforcement is usually within the jurisdiction of national judicial and law enforcement authorities. For the purposes of the FATF, states are required to create FIUs ²²³ to provide a mechanism for suspicious transactional reporting by financial institutions etc. and international information sharing, ²²⁴ which interact with local authorities in order to act against money laundering and terror finance. The role and functions of FIUs, however are left to the Egmont Group of which, FIUs (via their countries') should seek to become members of upon formation ²²⁵, Although FIUs are basically required to receive, analyse and disseminate financial intelligence ²²⁶, they can vary hugely in terms of both structure and effectiveness depending on the jurisdiction in question ²²⁷.

On a national level, the main actor and initiator of global anti-money laundering and more recently anti-terrorist financing projects is the US. The motivations for such initiatives perhaps come from the fact that the US is estimated to account for more than half of all money laundered globally ²²⁸, of which, according to the US Treasury 99.9% is laundered successfully ²²⁹.

²²³ See Footnote. 185.

²²⁴ FATF-GAFI: FATF 40 Recommendations. 2010. Recommendations. 26 and 31.

²²⁵ *Ibid.* Recommendations. 26. Interpretive Notes.

²²⁶ Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. *Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism.* Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg.VE.32.

²²⁷ Great Britain: Parliament: House of Lords: European Union Committee. *Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism*. The Stationery Office, 2009. Pgs.55-59.

²²⁸ Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Pg.7, citing an FBI Report of 2001. Also in Petras. J., US Bank Money Laundering-Enormous By Any Measure. 9-1-2. New York. Binghamton University Aug.2010.

²²⁹ Ibid.

The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970; an early initiative requires threshold based record keeping by financial institutions, securities brokers and dealers etc. of their customer transactions and accounts, so as to create an audit trail, whilst precluding the necessity for the cooperation of other jurisdictions ²³⁰. This reporting regime was amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, setting the threshold at transactions in excess of \$10,000 ²³¹. In addition the US emphasised the scope of its money laundering regime, taking extraterritorial jurisdiction in a number of cases on the basis that the interests of the US in enforcing the Court's of their courts outweighed the interests of bank secrecy in other jurisdictions ²³². The 1984 Act after further amendments was followed by the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, which criminalised money laundering and the knowing assistance by third parties to acts of money laundering, ²³³ in effect laying down the template for the FATF's 40 Recommendations.

Upon impetus from the events of 9/11, the US *Patriot Act* ²³⁴ was enacted in 2001 to consolidate existing and proposed anti-money laundering regulation and introduced the idea that money and security transfer systems should not be utilized by anonymous persons or persons hostile to the United States ²³⁵. The 2001 Act is implemented by a variety of organisations including FinCEN, the FBI and the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) prohibiting front/shell banks from

²³⁰ Stessens.G., Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.97.

²³¹ Ibid

²³² Such as in *United States vs. Bank of Nova Scotia*, 740 F.2d 817, 823, 824, (11th Cir. 1984).

²³³ From Gurule.J., The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: creating a new federal offense or merely affording federal prosecutors an alternative means of punishing specified unlawful activity? American Criminal Law Review, Vol. 32, 1995.

²³⁴ An act to "Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 2001,"

Muller.W.H.. Kälin.C.H. & Goldsmith.J.G., Anti-money laundering: international law and practice. John Wiley and Sons, 2007. Pg.111.

maintaining US accounts ²³⁶ and also creating further diligence and reporting requirements for 'high risk jurisdictions' ²³⁷ as designated by the FATF ²³⁸. The *Patriot Act*, extending the scope of the *Money Laundering Control Act* of 1986 creates formalised extraterritorial powers for US authorities allowing the ²³⁹ of records, data and other information held by foreign banks, and the right to seize the funds of foreign banks held in US inter-bank accounts ²⁴⁰.

The global anti-money laundering regime is progressively converging and homogenising, primarily as almost all global initiatives rely on the FATF as the principal standard-setting organisation. The FSRB structures derivative of the FATF, are for the purposes of policy, essentially offshoots of the greater body. All other international initiatives, including the Bretton Woods organisations and the UN as well the Egmont Group fully endorse the 40 Recommendations. This position is also true on the regional and national level, with all new-comers to the anti-money laundering regime, necessarily enacting multilateral or domestic initiatives in conformity to the FATF.

²³⁶ s.313.

²³⁷ s.312.

²³⁸ Zerk.J.A., "Extraterritorial jurisdiction: lessons for the business and human rights sphere from six regulatory areas." Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 59. 2010.Pg.128.

²³⁹ Roughly similar to a claim form in the UK. An order directed at persons/corporations requiring an appearance in court to testify/produce documents. The *Patriot Act* etc. allows foreign corporations to constitute persons for such purposes.

²⁴⁰ Zerk.J.A., Op.Cit. Pg.127.

Chapter 4:

The Anti-Money Framework: Globalisation, Homogenisation and Legitimacy.

Money laundering "reflects and energises" globalisation more than any other crime ²⁴¹. The FATF maintain that the globalisation of anti-money laundering regulation is founded in a response to the increasingly International nature of criminal activities, including bribing foreign officials, drug trafficking, corruption and terrorism ²⁴². Such internationalisation of criminal activities has occurred in parallel with the globalisation of the World economy ²⁴³. On this basis the FATF seeks to extend the scope of a normative illegality to money laundering globally. The European Union takes a similar position, such as in Recital. 35 of the preamble to Directive 2005/60/EC, whereby money laundering and terrorist financing are international problems and the effort to combat them should be global. The liberalisation of financial markets, exchange controls, internet based commerce and instantaneous payment systems have markedly increased the volume and flow of international transactions, ²⁴⁴ which in turn provide ample and flexible opportunities to disguise illicit funds ²⁴⁵, as well as detract from any adequate identification of the *locus delicti* of international offences.

Methods to avoid detection of money laundering such as money transfer between jurisdictions through the use of electronic money and wire transfers or

²⁴¹ Alldridge.P., *Money Laundering and Globalization*. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008. Pg.438.

²⁴² FATF-GAFI: Money Laundering FAQ. 2010.

²⁴³ Stessens.G., *Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative law. Vol.15. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pg.90.

²⁴⁴ Hinterseer.K., Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal Context. The Hague: Kluwer Publishers. 2002. Pg.24. Also Alldridge.P., Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery. Criminal Laundering & Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime. Oregon: Hart Publishing. 2003. Pg.92.

²⁴⁵ Stessens.G., Op.Cit. Pg.92.

informal methods such as hundi/hawala ²⁴⁶ as well as reliance on corporate anonymity, attorney-client privilege and banking confidentiality, competitive pressures and regulatory arbitrage ²⁴⁷ opportunities in other jurisdictions all aggravate and indeed highlight the global nature of money laundering. The progressive internationalisation of the global economy ²⁴⁸ necessitates the regulation of that, which can only be regulated by international cooperation and to such ends the FATF maintains that global coverage, implementation of the set principles of the FATF and global compliance are critical to the fight against money laundering²⁴⁹. The effect of these efforts of the FATF is a generally homogenised strategy against money laundering and terrorist financing in its largely OECD member states ²⁵⁰ and beyond.

This is particular as the FATF is the principal diffusing body of anti-money laundering law ²⁵¹. The Forty Recommendations are endorsed and implemented by the various regional FSRBs and implementing states, in what seems like a primarily vertical relationship, through funding and guidance provided centrally by the FATF ²⁵². There is very little (if not any) consideration of local political and economic issues with virtually no input from the affected parties' and stakeholders. The nature of the implementation of the FATF recommendations

²⁴⁶ FATF-GAFI: Report on New Payment Methods. 2006.

²⁴⁷ Regulatory arbitrage is where a regulated institution takes advantage of the difference between its real (or economic) risk and the regulatory position.

²⁴⁸ FATF-GAFI: Revised Mandate. 2008 to 2012.

²⁴⁹ FATF-GAFI: *Towards Global Coverage and Compliance*. Speech by FATF President Paul Vlaanderen to the 8th Ad Hoc GIABA Ministerial Committee Meeting Praia, Cape Verde, 5 May 2010.

²⁵⁰ Cuéllar. M.F., The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance. 93 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 311-465. 2003. Pg.376.

²⁵¹ Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Pgs.7-9.

²⁵² Hülsse.R. & Kerwer.D., *Global Standards in Action: Insights from Anti-Money Laundering Regulation*. DOI: 10.1177/1350508407080311. Organization 2007; 14; 625. Sage Publications. 2007.Pg.636.

remains 'a one size fits all' model and the ambit of the FATF is maintained as an exclusive organisation.

The FATF claim that money laundering occurs across the World, wherever 'money generating crime' can occur ²⁵³. Alternatively other sources such as the US Department of State ²⁵⁴ and commentators ²⁵⁵ show most developing nations are generally (with some exceptions) at lower levels of risk in terms of potential money laundering. FATF non-compliers and non co-operative jurisdictions, do not necessarily constitute countries posing significant money laundering risks, but are rather simply countries which do not implement FATF's guidance and recommendations to adequate levels. A country, for instance, cannot argue that its exposure to money laundering is so low that it need not adopt the FATF's criminalisation of money laundering or establish a financial intelligence unit ²⁵⁶.

²⁵³ FATF-GAFI: Money Laundering FAQ. 2010,

US Department of State., *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Major Money Laundering Countries.* 2007. See Table.1.

²⁵⁵ From Lilliey, P. *Dirty Dealing*. 3rd edition, Kogan Page. 2006.

²⁵⁶ De Koker.L., *Identifying and managing low money laundering risk: perspectives on FATF's risk-based guidance.* Journal of Financial Crime.2009.

FATF MEMBER STATES	OECD MEMBER STATES	Above World GDP(PPP) \$10,500. (WB 2009).	EXCHANGE MARKETCAP \$100bn+ (WFE/Wikinvest 2009).*	MONEY LAUNDERING RISK INDEX RATING †	OECD GDP \$m 2009. (World Bank 2009).\\
Aurautiaa		Υ	Υ	С	
Argentina Australia	Υ	Y	Y	PC	924843
Australia	Y	Y	Y	PC	384908
Belgium	Y	Y	γ‡	C	497586
Brazil		Y	Y	PC	437360
Canada	Υ	Y	Y	PC	1336067
China	Ť	Ť	Y	PC	1330007
Denmark	Υ	Υ	Y	LR	309596
EC Commission	Y Y	n/a. Y	n/a. Y	n/a.	n/a.
Finland				M	237512
France	Y	Y	Y‡ Y	PC	2649390
Germany	Y	Y	Y	PC	3346702
Greece	Υ	Y	.,	PC	329924
Hong Kong	.,	Y	Υ	PC	12122
Iceland	Y	Υ		M	12133
India			Y	PC	
Ireland	Y	Y	Y	С	227193
Italy	Υ	Υ	Y	PC	2112780
Japan	Υ	Υ	Υ	PC	5067526
Luxembourg	Υ	Υ	Υ	PC	52449
Mexico	Υ	Υ		PC	874902
Netherlands	Υ	Υ	Y‡	PC	792128
New Zealand	Υ	Υ	Υ	M	125160
Norway	Υ	Υ	Υ	M	381766
Portugal	Υ	Υ	Υ	С	227676
Rep.of Korea	Υ	Υ	Υ	С	832512
Russian Fed.		Υ	Not Available.	PC	
Singapore		Υ	Υ	PC	
South Africa		Υ	Υ	С	
Spain	Υ	Υ	Υ	PC	1460250
Sweden	Υ	Υ	Υ	M	406072
Switzerland	Υ	Υ	Υ	PC	500260
Turkey	Υ	Υ	Not Available.	PC	617099
United Kingdom	Υ	Υ	Υ	PC	2174530
United States	Υ	Υ	Υ	PC	14256300
Gulf Co-op. Council		Y§	n/a.	C¶	
	Chile	Υ	Υ	С	
	Czech Rep.	Υ		С	
	Hungary	Υ		С	
	Poland	Υ	Υ	C	
	Slovak Rep.	Y		C	
	Slovenia	Y		M	
Total: \\		·			40137264

LEGEND CODES: PC= Primary Concern. C=Concern. M=Monitored Only. LR= Low to No Risk. Y= Yes.

Table 1: Analysis of FATF member states.

^{*} Collectively accounting for 75 % (approx.) of total global market capitalisation. The World Federation of Exchanges. Statistics. WFE.2009.

[†] US State Dept. Data: Major Money Laundering Countries. 2007.

[‡] Including Euronext.

[§] Member States.

[¶] The UAE is of Primary Concern and only Oman is Monitored.

^{\\} Accounting for 70% of World GDP. (World Total \$58,133,309m)

From: The World Bank., World Development Indicators database. Gross domestic product. World Bank. 2009.

Other evidence suggests that although many mechanisms, which promote financial globalisation are in place, the global financial market is in fact far from globalised. The US alone for instance imports about 72% of all global capital exported with a majority originating in Japan ²⁵⁷. Similarly there is a 70% 'home bias' in terms of portfolio diversification for the US and 63% for a sample of developed countries ²⁵⁸. Other indicators include the lack of correlation between savings and investment levels within countries, which should conform globally as investors diversify their portfolios across different markets. It seems that such capital flows are mostly concentrated in the OECD ²⁵⁹ and it is therefore more accurate to say that the global financial system is polarised towards wealthier nations, which suggests that contrary to the FATF's claims, money laundering is more likely to occur in wealthier nations. This is particular if deeper financial integration does indeed motivate deeper financial criminality. ²⁶⁰ Furthermore, many developing nations simply do not have the financial infrastructure to facilitate money laundering,

Most OECD countries and indeed FATF countries are of primary concern as money laundering nations ²⁶¹ however action by the FATF is geared towards non-(G7)G8 member countries although by FATF's own standards, non-compliance is highly evident of its more powerful member states ²⁶².

The 'new order' of international regulation against OFCs represents a radical change in accepted banking principles. It exceeds anything that OECD

10111

²⁵⁷ From Stulz.R., *The Limits of Financial Globalization*. Journal of Finance. 1595 LX. 2005.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Scott.H.S., International Finance: Law and Regulation. Sweet & Maxwell 2007. Pg.13.

²⁶⁰ Shown empirically by Picard. P.M. & Pieretti.P., Bank Secrecy, Illicit Money and Offshore Financial Centers. "Paolo Baffi" Centre Research Paper Series No. 45. 2009.

²⁶¹ US Department of State., *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Major Money Laundering Countries*. 2007.

²⁶² Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.41.

countries have achieved amongst themselves in terms of tax cooperation and compliance shall directly benefit OECD countries and their tax authorities at the expense of OFCs and their economies ²⁶³.

The FATF suffers from a severe 'input legitimacy' ²⁶⁴ gap. It is in essence an OECD body, with legitimacy inputs from the IMF and World Bank ²⁶⁵ and is mainly representative of developed economies ²⁶⁶ The recommendations themselves are focused on the US-centric criminal and regulatory enforcement approaches to combating money laundering and disrupting criminal finance, ²⁶⁷ and the FATF has often accepted guidance and funding from the US ²⁶⁸.

In spite of the extent of global commitment to the FATF (130 jurisdictions) only its 33 members were instrumental in framing the Forty Recommendations having the power of final approval with little or no input from the jurisdictions to be subjected to the FATF regimen²⁶⁹ The various regional FSRBs are required to endorse and implement the Forty Recommendations rather than develop any of

²⁶⁷ Cuéllar. M.F., The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance. 93 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 311-465. 2003. Pg.375.

²⁶³ Persaud.B., OECD Curbs on Offshore Financial Centres. A Major Issue for Small States. The Round Table (2001), 359 (199–212). 2001. Pg.206.

²⁶⁴ Input legitimacy describes the understanding that rules are legitimate as rule making has followed some democratic procedures, through representation or inclusion of the affected stakeholders; (those parties' to whom principal entities' 'should' discharge an accountability to. From Standard and Poor's definition. In Bradley.N., *Corporate Governance: A Risk worth Measuring*. UNCTAD/ITE/TEB/2003/3). Scharpf,F.W., *Democratic Policy in Europe*. European Law Journal. Volume 2, Issue 2, pgs. 136–155, July 1996 Scharpf. F.W, *Governing in Europe*. *Effective and Democratic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

²⁶⁵ Drezner.D.W., The Viscosity of Gloobal Governance: When is Forum Shopping Expensive. The Fletcher School. Tufts University. November 2006. Pg.17.

²⁶⁶ See Table.1.

²⁶⁸ From Wechsler.W.F., Follow the Money. From Foreign Affairs, July/August 2001.

²⁶⁹ Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., *Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International Regulation of Systemic Risk.* Oxford University Press. 2006. Pgs.73-73.

their own, and receive extensive technical and financial assistance from the FATF ²⁷⁰. On a national level compliance with the Forty Recommendations consists of extremely intrusive 'micro management', with highly detailed legislative and administrative directives prescribing the nature of 'improvements' that states must enact ²⁷¹. The FATF has thus been described as a deliberately unrepresentative agency attempting to enforce its selected standards globally ²⁷².

Although suggestions have been made as to the possibility of FATF having a degree of 'output legitimacy' ²⁷³ i.e. where enacted policies meet the interests of the concerned stakeholders ²⁷⁴, this can only be the case if jurisdictions, which are non-compliant or are otherwise domestically politically or economically disincentivised from compliance with the FATF are excluded from the class of stakeholders.

The FATF is not created out by treaty and its regimen has none of the legitimacy of the consent of the jurisdictions subject to the Forty Recommendations and countermeasures, which potentially may violate international law ²⁷⁵. Such lack of legitimacy (amidst complaints from the IMF and

²⁷⁰ Hülsse.R. & Kerwer.D., *Global Standards in Action: Insights from Anti-Money Laundering Regulation*. DOI: 10.1177/1350508407080311. Organization 2007; 14; 625. Sage Publications. 2007. Pg.636.

²⁷¹ Such as the case of the Bahamas as cited by Doyle.T., *Cleaning up anti-money laundering strategies: current FATF tactics needlessly violate international law*. Houston Journal of International Law. 2002.

²⁷² Alldridge.P., *Money Laundering and Globalization*. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008. Pg.443.

²⁷³ Such as that the FATF seeks to balance between input and output legitimacy, and thus between legitimacy and effectiveness, whereby output legitimacy increases as parties' subject to the FATF's regime increasingly participate and contribute. Hülsse.R. & Kerwer.D., *Loc.Cit*.

²⁷⁴ Scharpf. F.W, Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pg.99.

²⁷⁵ Such as Art.2 of the UN Charter setting out sovereign equality and non intervention. The General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) of December 1960 on *Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States* holds:

i) No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal affairs or external affairs of another state. The armed intervention and all other forms of interference

World Bank ²⁷⁶ is thought to be why the FATF (temporarily) ceased its practice of blacklisting as subject jurisdictions could argue that FATF being an 'exclusive club' cannot interfere in national internal affairs and competences directly ²⁷⁷. In its pursuit of legitimacy, the FATF wound down its NCCT list, seemingly in exchange for endorsement of the Forty Recommendations by the IMF ²⁷⁸. The FATF, nevertheless recently issued a 'statement' (short of unreserved blacklisting) which listed Iran, Pakistan. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and São Tomé and Príncipe as threats to the International financial system ²⁷⁹. Currently the FATF suggests that "as of 13 October 2006, there are no Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories" although other sources ²⁸¹ suggest that a form of default blacklisting with the threat of sanctions, is a continuing FATF strategy, with a movement away from explicit labelling of jurisdictions as NCCTs.

or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural element, are condemned.

ii) No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to get him to make the exercise of its sovereign rights to away from it advantages of any kind. In addition, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrown the regime of another State, or interfere in civil unrest in another State.

Art.41 of the UN Charter similarly requires the Security Council to legitimise sanctions.

The FATF may also violate International Trade law possibly under GATT. Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., *Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International Regulation of Systemic Risk.* Oxford University Press. 2006. Pg.74.

²⁷⁶ Hülsse. R., *Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a Global Money-laundering Problem.* Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 2. Routledge Publishers April, 2007. Pg.167.

²⁷⁷ Alldridge.P., *Money Laundering and Globalization*. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008. Pg.444

²⁷⁸ Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Pg.11.

²⁷⁹ FATF-GAFI: FATF Statement. February 2009.

²⁸⁰ FATF-GAFI: High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions . 2010.

²⁸¹ Daily Times., FATF blacklists Pakistan for terror financing, Saturday, February 20, 2010. The Anti Money Laundering Network and Group Companies. Sanctions: Not quite FATF NCCT. But close. 19 February 2010. Reuters., Group to reveal laundering, terror funding blacklist 17 Feb 2010.

The blacklisting procedures of the FATF have also been argued to be reserved specifically for non-G7/G8 282 countries, in spite of evidence of noncompliance by more powerful FATF members. The United States, Canada and Luxembourg, although consistently shown to fail to meet the standards required of the Forty Recommendations have had no likelihood of ever appearing on NCCT list or being subject to any FATF countermeasures 283. It has also been suggested that blacklisting may be counterproductive by certifying and signalling the offshore opportunities a jurisdiction provides, to that jurisdiction's benefit ²⁸⁴. Notably regulatory reform alone, subsequent to blacklisting does not in fact detract from a position of non-cooperation (the false friend effect) 285 as jurisdictions simply enact legislative changes etc. to be removed from the blacklist, with significant money laundering occurring in jurisdictions such as the Bahamas and the Caymans long after removal from the NCCT list ²⁸⁶. This may simply be because the extent of pressure exerted by the FATF jurisdictions, is only enough to just compel compliance, and is biased towards domestic profits rather than the elimination of criminality ²⁸⁷.

²⁸² Russia joined the FATF after being delisted.

Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.41, Blickman.T., Countering Illicit and Unregulated Money Flows, Money Laundering, Tax Evasion and Financial Regulation. Crime & Globalisation, Transnational Institute Briefing Series December 2009. Pg.19. Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Pg.4.

²⁸⁴ Masciandaro. D., Money Laundering and Financial Offshore Centres: A Political Economy Approach. Eisevier B.V. 2006. Pg.338.

²⁸⁵ Masciandaro. D., *Economics of Money Laundering : A Primer. Paolo* Baffi Centre Bocconi University Working Paper No. 171.2. 2007. Pg337.

²⁸⁶ From Murphy.R., *The EU money laundering white list*. Tax Research UK. June 2010, and Pinder .M.N., *Bahamas Still A Major Money Laundering Centre, Report Claims*. The Bahama Journal.2005.

²⁸⁷ Picard. P.M. & Pieretti.P., Bank Secrecy, Illicit Money and Offshore Financial Centers. "Paolo Baffi" Centre Research Paper Series No. 45. 2009. Pg.30

The implementation of the Forty Recommendations, as well as FATF and OECD blacklisting and threats to sanction detract from the commitments to the free movement of capital and goods of the OECD 288 in as much as non-OECD members and the EU, with regards to third states. If effect, the FATF acts as the protectionist arm of the OCED, with the purpose of although allowing the OECD to avail all the benefits of globalisation, externalising the externalities of money laundering and domestic tax evasion to poorer nations. The costs of implementation and compliance with reporting requirements and disclosure standards are thought to be much higher for developing countries and may have the effect of actually driving liquidity from the formal market to the underground economy ²⁸⁹. The costs of compliance are disproportionately high on developing countries' financial operations as compared to those in the developed world, which can internalise such costs owing to better national financial infrastructure, market depth and economies of scale ²⁹⁰. Estimates given by FinCEN suggest the figure of \$109million annually in compliance costs alone, without considering training, FIU/institution building and other costs 291. A second global figure, alleged to be from the American Bankers Association cites \$10 billion in overall implementation costs ²⁹².

The FATF's trade-off between democracy and effectiveness and the policy asymmetries that the Forty Recommendations entail, are a clear rejection of

²⁸⁸ OECD., Trade and the economic recovery: why open markets matter. May 2010.

²⁸⁹ Alexander.K. Dhumale.R. & Eatwell.J., *Global Governance of Financial Systems. The International Regulation of Systemic Risk.* Oxford University Press. 2006. Pgs.72-73.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.* It seems that these costs may also be too high, for developing countries, where for lack of any evidence of the general effectiveness of implementing money laundering regulations, in pursuit of "uncertain positive effects" doubts have been raised as to the investment of 400m SEK (\$54m) in improving the anti-money laundering infrastructure of banks and regulators. Magnusson.D., "The costs of implementing the anti-money laundering regulations in Sweden". Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 12 Iss: 2, pp.101 – 112. 2009.

²⁹¹ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., *Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.74.
²⁹² *Ibid*.

economic efficiency and the possibility of regulatory competition, in terms of movement of capital to jurisdictions of least regulation and taxation 293. Hülsse amongst other commentators suggests that the FATF has essentially 'talked' money laundering, as a global problem, requiring a global solution into existence, whilst employing a mixture of coercion and persuasion in order to implement their purpose. In his analysis of the discourse surrounding the issue of money laundering, and active 'problemisation' 294 of money laundering by the FATF, he describes the worldwide nature of money laundering as suggested by the FATF (as opposed to an exclusively Western phenomenon) as 'constructed' by merits of the mandate given to the FATF by the World's richest countries 295. This, along with FATF domination of the institutional framework of the World's anti-money laundering regime and expert knowledge and advice provided by the FATF makes it extremely difficult for other countries, to cast doubts as to the FATF's views. In the course of its problemisation of money laundering, the FATF rhetorically necessitates the phenomenon, as an objective problem through 'raising awareness' about money laundering and by merits of its domination of the institutional framework, does not need to justify its position 296. The FATF has possibly owing to its waning legitimacy, problemised money laundering by 'firmly linking it to other, arguably better established political problems, such as crime and

²⁹³ Doyle.T., Cleaning up anti-money laundering strategies: current FATF tactics needlessly violate international law. Houston Journal of International Law. 2002. Pg.11

²⁹⁴ "(B)y problemisation we mean the way in which experience comes to be organised so as to render something as a "problem" to be addressed and rectified: interpretive schemes for codifying experience, ways of evaluating it in relation to particular norms, and ways of linking it up to wider social and economic concerns and objectives." From Miller.P. & N . Rose, "*Production, Identity, and Democracy*" Theory and Society. 24 1995 Pg. 429. In Allen.B., *Corporate Theory: Jurisprudence's Heart of Darkness*. The University of British Columbia. 1996.

²⁹⁵ Hülsse. R., Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a Global Money-laundering Problem. Global Society, Vol. 21, No. 2. Routledge Publishers April, 2007. Pg.169. ²⁹⁶ Ibid. Pg.170.

terrorism'²⁹⁷ and creating it as a 'meta crime' behind organised crime and terrorism²⁹⁸.

The Egmont Group suffers from issues, between the different forms and architectures of FIUs across the World, with some being closer to law enforcement and thus more effective than others ²⁹⁹ and some FIUs being mere token organisations ³⁰⁰. Not all FIUs are in fact capable of exchanging sensitive information related to policing or law enforcement, which can lead to misunderstandings or miscommunications and ultimately failures in taking action against serious financial crime ³⁰¹.

The US position following 9/11 has been highly aggressive and extraterritoriality under the *Patriot Act* has been seen to conflict with competences in other jurisdictions. This is particular as the scope of the US criminal jurisdiction under the 2001 Act has been extended *exclusively* to cover money laundering though foreign banks. This jurisdiction also extends to foreign account holding institutions in the US for the purposes of penalties even if the questionable transaction, is without of the US ³⁰². The 2006 Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) case demonstrates the potential for conflict originating from the *Patriot Act*. SWIFT a European undertaking with

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.* Pg.173.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid*.

²⁹⁹ Great Britain: Parliament: House of Lords: European Union Committee. *Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism*. The Stationery Office, 2009. Paras. 55 to 59.

³⁰⁰ Such as Saudi Arabia, which was seemingly admitted to the Group to incentivise its efforts in the War on Terror. Dorsey. J.M., *Saudis fail to halt terrorism funding despite minor gains*. Deutsche Welle.20 Dec 2009.

³⁰¹ Great Britain: Parliament: House of Lords: European Union Committee. *Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. Loc.Cit.* Also discussed in Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., *Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.43.

³⁰² Doyle,C., The USA Patriot Act: A Sketch.CRS Report for Congress. April 18, 2002. Zerk.J.A., "Extraterritorial jurisdiction: lessons for the business and human rights sphere from six regulatory areas." Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 59. 2010.

a US presence was subpoenaed by OFAC. Amidst accusations of commercial espionage and of the US seeking competitive advantages, ³⁰³ compliance with the subpoena according to the Belgian Data Protection Authority had resulted in violations of Belgium's enactment of Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) and possibly the right to protection of personal data under the *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* (Article. 8) ³⁰⁴. The European Parliament rejected an interim EU/US agreement data sharing agreement regarding SWIFT on grounds that it did not protect European civil liberties and fundamental rights in February 2010, although the Council did attempt to negotiate an agreement with the US ³⁰⁵.

The OECD by way of its efforts to limit harmful tax practices seeks to 'level the playing field' ³⁰⁶ between competing actors, may be unfounded as the OCED alone accounts for nearly three quarters of the World's wealth ³⁰⁷. The OCED has not included its member states with OFC/tax-haven characteristics in the thirty-eight jurisdictions deemed co-operative by the OCED, which by default therefore escape OECD countermeasures and condemnation ³⁰⁸. Although the interests of onshore citizens who bear the cost of offshore activities are in no way compatible

³⁰³ Levi.M., Combating the financing of terrorism: a history and assessment of the control of "threat finance". British Journal of Criminology. 2010. Pg.659.

³⁰⁴ From Graves.R.J. & Ganguli.I., Extraterritorial Application of the USA PATRIOT Act and Related Regimes: Issues for European Banks Operating in the United States. Privacy & Data Security Law Journal.October 2007.

³⁰⁵ Dretzka.E., & Mildner.S-A., *Anything but SWIFT: Why Data Sharing is Still a Problem for the EU.* American Institute for Contemprary German Studies. John Hopkins University May 2010. Pgs.4-5.

³⁰⁶ OECD Report., Harmful tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. 1998.

³⁰⁷ See Table.1.

OECD., Jurisdictions Committed to Improving Transparency and Establishing Effective Exchange of Information in Tax Matters. 2009.

with money laundering and terror finance, they nevertheless also bear the costs of legitimate capital flight from onshore jurisdictions. The OECD in a similar fashion to the FATF seeks to penalise OFCs/tax-havens for capital flight and corporate migration, which its members (possibly owing to regulatory capture ³⁰⁹) generally fail to address domestically ³¹⁰.

Financial globalisation is not occurring in parallel with economic globalisation, with the global financial system polarised towards wealthier nations. The global anti-money laundering regime is progressively homogenising although lacking in democratic legitimacy and effectiveness. The OECD and the FATF, seem in effect to be affirming the 'Lucas Paradox' ³¹¹ on the fora of anti-money laundering and harmful tax competition, with a view to protection of OECD financial markets and a disregard for economic efficiency, competition and inputs from countries falling under the FATF/OECD regime.

³⁰⁹ Regulatory capture occurs when a state regulatory agency created to act in the public interest instead acts in favour of the commercial or special interests that dominate in the industry or sector it is charged with regulating.

³¹⁰ From Huffington.A., Offshore Corporate Tax Havens: Why Are They Still Allowed? Global Policy Forum. June 1 2010.

³¹¹ The observation that capital is not flowing from developed countries to developing countries despite the fact that developing countries have lower levels of capital per worker and thus offer greater yields. From Lucas.R., "Why doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?", American Economic Review 80 (2): 92–96. 1990. Also Alfaro.L. Kalemli-Ozcan.S & Volosovych.V., "Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 11901, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 2005.

OECD Members Financial Centre	Ranking by External Assets (June 2008) \$m *	Non-OECD OFC ‡	Ranking by External Assets (June 2008) \$m *	
United Kingdom†	5647300	Caymans	1828000	
United States	5309100	Singapore	484900	
France	2144900	Jersey	442860	
Germany	1986500	Hong Kong	323500	
Netherlands	1631000	Bahamas	247200	
Italy	1436400	Guernsey	184400	
Ireland	1371800	W.Indies(Avge)	128600	
Spain	1252400	Bermuda	104100	
Luxembourg	1057900	Dutch Antilles	74700	
Switzerland	868700	Panama	74600	
Belgium	757800	Bahrain	61400	
Japan	651000	Isle of Man	42500	
Australia	373300	Gibraltar	21100	
Canada	359300	Barbados	19400	
		Mauritius	17500	
		Macao	7900	
		Lebanon	6500	
		Aruba	2100	
		Samoa	1500	
		Vanuatu	120	
Total:	24847400		4072880	

OECD's Largest Financial Centres Ranked by Bank's External Assets. Non-OECD's Largest Offshore Financial Centres Ranked by Bank's External Assets.

Table 2: OFCs Assets

^{*} Data on Financial Assets: Bank for International Settlements. 2008.

[†] Excluding Crown Dependencies.

[‡] Including Crown Dependencies.

Chapter 5:

The Effects of Regulation on Offshore Centres.

Westphalian Sovereignty ³¹² holds that the government of a country is sovereign within its own territory and countries shall not interfere with each others' affairs ³¹³. This position agrees with Article. 2 of the UN Charter ³¹⁴. Commentators have suggested that for the purposes of the OFC's and their regulation (multilateral or otherwise) that either OFCs cannot be abolished without challenging state sovereignty or alternatively that OFCs deliberately abuse or engineer their sovereignty in order to benefit at the expense of other nation states ³¹⁵. OFCs, by merits of their ability to make their own laws, facilitate legal financial services with tax advantages and conversely the opportunity to channel illegal funds ³¹⁶. Since onshore centres are very likely to be tax havens, anti-money laundering actions exerted by onshore institutions may also be (partially) motivated by the desire to reduce tax losses ³¹⁷. It has been suggested that the FATF's blacklisting procedures although *prima-facie* aimed at money

From the 'Peace of Westphalia' denoting a series of European peace treaties signed between May and October 1648.

³¹³ Osiander.A., Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth. International Organisation. 55, 2, Spring 2001. Cited by Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005, and Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008.

³¹⁴ See Footnote. 278.

From Tranøy.B.S., 'Offshore finance and money laundering: the politics of combating parasitic state strategies', Rpt no 11, The Globalisation Project, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway. 2002, and Palan.R., 'Tax havens and the commercialisation of state sovereignty'. International Organisation, 56/1, 151-176. 2002.

³¹⁶ Picard.P.M. & Pieretti.P., Bank Secrecy, Illicit Money and Offshore Financial Centers. "Paolo Baffi" Centre Research Paper Series No. 45. 2009.Pg,4.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

laundering, in fact place too much attention low-tax jurisdictions 318 in parallel to the OCED. This may well be the case, as the FATF is more likely to implement countermeasures, which on a forum of anti-money laundering are far more effective than the OECD's grey-listing and other harmful tax competition efforts. The OCED, which along with the FATF leads the campaign against tax-havens and OFCs accounts for more than 60% of offshore assets by way of its financial centres 319. The extent to which, such funds relate to illicit activity is unclear, however it is noteworthy that the US is estimated to account for more than half of all money laundered globally, 320 The limited implementation of the Forty Recommendations in OCED countries and the dichotomy of symbioses of OFCs, with the licit and illicit economies, cast doubts as to the integrity of constructions of money laundering as a global crime. For such reasons, it is fair to assume the possibility of competition between the OCED and non-OECD OFCs as a driver to the homogenization of the FATF regime. It is also clearly the case that if money is to be laundered at all then a 'rational politician' might wish to have it happen in his own, rather than an adjacent jurisdiction 321.

The effects of the various anti-money laundering campaigns on OFCs is complex and mixed ³²². Although the flow of foreign financial assets to NCCT jurisdictions does not seem to have greatly diminished ³²³ a return to traditional

³¹⁸ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., *Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Pg.71.

³¹⁹ See Table.2.

³²⁰ Tsingou.E., Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime: Opportunities and Tensions in the Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime. University of Warwick: CSGR Working Paper No 161/05. May 2005. Pg.7, citing an FBI Report of 2001. Also in Petras. J., US Bank Money Laundering-Enormous By Any Measure. 9-1-2. New York. Binghamton University Aug.2010.

³²¹ Alldridge.P., *Relocating Criminal Law*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd. 2000. Pg.171.

³²² See Table.3.

³²³ Masciandaro. D., *Money Laundering: the Economics of Regulation*. European Journal of Law and Economics. No.7. Kluwer Academic Publishers.1999. Pg.388.

onshore banking has been observed ³²⁴ as OFCs are seen to be falling behind in terms of asset growth and as it is also becoming harder to hide money in OFCs ³²⁵. A movement away from debts to equities in pursuit of higher yields, particularly in Europe ³²⁶ and the US ³²⁷ as well as lower tax pressures, market depth and increased liquidity have been cited as contributory to the movement away from OFC's, which cannot compete adequately in this area. It is possible that as the traditional markets of OFCs are eroded by OECD and FATF pressures, such centres may in fact attract more illicit funds than before.

Blacklisting alone does not seem to have the desired effects of the FATF, without the possibility of countermeasures to compel compliance ³²⁸. Countries on the first NCCT list ³²⁹ such as the Bahamas and the Caymans ³³⁰ have had much wider and comprehensive compliance results as compared to later additions, whose cosmetic efforts are thought to be the result of 'false friend' ³³¹ or 'reluctant friend' ³³² approaches by such NCCTs to the FATF. The FATF having moved away from open sanctions and blacklisting to a lighter-touch methodology, for its

³²⁴ Levin. M., 'The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe', CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002. Citing a 2001. Report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers. Pg.5.

³²⁵ *Ibid*.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ From Gerson Lehrman Group., Institutional Investors Shifting Toward Equity Market Neutral Strategies. November 25, 2009.

Masciandaro. D., *Money Laundering: the Economics of Regulation*. European Journal of Law and Economics. No.7. Kluwer Academic Publishers.1999. Pg.389.

³²⁹ FATF-GAFI: Review to identify NCCTs: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of AML Measures. 2000. Available at:

³³⁰ As an example, in the Caymans, the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law has criminalised the laundering of proceeds of crime since 1996. The 2007 revision enables the restraint and freezing of the proceeds of crime, the disclosure of information about them and the confiscation or forfeiture of assets. It also establishes CAYFIN, the Caymans FIU, disclosure to which, regarding the proceeds or suspected proceeds of criminal conduct, money laundering or suspected money laundering and the financing of terrorism does not breach Cayman disclosure rules under the *Confidential Relationships* (*Preservation*) *Law* (1995 *Revision*).

³³¹ Masciandaro. D., Op.Cit. Pg.388.

³³²Masciandaro. D., Money Laundering and Financial Offshore Centres: A Political Economy Approach. Eisevier B.V. 2006. Pg.309.

legitimacy gap, mainly seeks to homogenise anti-money laundering regulation in developing countries, as can be seen from recent FATF 'statements' ³³³ regarding jurisdictions subject to money laundering risks. Blacklisting on the other hand has had the effect of inciting OFCs to widen their services such as creating or expanding stock exchanges, as in the Channel and Cayman Islands respectively, or to enter into the electronic banking and online brokerage arenas ³³⁴.

The effects of FATF regulation have been widely different for different kinds of OFCs.

Luxembourg, an OECD and EU member, has maintained its bank secrecy laws, in spite of intense pressure by the OECD and the FATF and has consistently rejected the OECD's regime regarding harmful tax competition ³³⁵. Directive 2003/48/EC, shall make an automatic exchange of information mandatory by 2011, and an incrementally increasing withholding tax is currently in place, until this date. Luxembourg also collects withholding taxes on behalf of the US Internal Revenue Service ³³⁶. As of yet in the both the cases of the EU and US, Luxembourg does not disclose account holders' identities. Luxembourg, has taken steps to abolish its 1929 *Holding Company Laws*, which exempted such companies from taxation by December 2010. This was in response to such laws being held to constitute a State Aid under Article.107 (ex-87) of the *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* ³³⁷. In spite of such measures Luxembourg generally remains a successful financial centre, catering to private wealth unimpeded ³³⁸ and

³³³ FATF-GAFI: FATF Statement. February 2009.

³³⁴ Levin. M., 'The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe', CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002. Citing a 2001. Pg.5.

³³⁵ *Ibid.* Pg.52

³³⁶ Ibid

³³⁷ From Parize.H., Luxembourg in perspective. European Lawyer, Vol. 77, (48) 48.2008.

³³⁸ Parize.H., Luxembourg in perspective. European Lawyer, Vol. 77, (48) 48.2008.

maintaining generally low levels of taxation, including the lowest rates of VAT in Europe ³³⁹.

Jersey, another European OFC jurisdiction has seen a near doubling of its GDP between 2001 and 2010 and foreign bank deposits increasing from £167bn in 2001³⁴⁰ to £212bn in 2008 ³⁴¹. Its financial sector has also grown proportionally. The Bailiwick maintains a low tax regime, with no capital gains or inheritance taxes, but currently maintains a withholding tax regime similar to Luxembourg's and is phasing out income tax reliefs by 2011³⁴².

Caribbean basin based OFCs, possibly for being well within the US sphere of influence ³⁴³ implemented the criminalisation of money laundering, for fear of capital flight, very early on in the anti-money laundering campaign ³⁴⁴. Jamaica, for instance created money laundering and forfeiture legislation in the early nineties ³⁴⁵. The Cayman Islands, which was considered on the FATF's first NCCT report in 2000,³⁴⁶ in compliance tightened it regulations, 'much too fast in its desperation not to fall afoul' of the US and OECD ³⁴⁷. By 2009, its legal framework

³³⁹ International Tax Review., World Tax 2007. Luxembourg, Country Report.2007.

³⁴⁰ Levin. M., 'The prospects for offshore financial centres in Europe', CEPS Research Reports, No. 29. 2002. Citing a 2001. Pg.52.

³⁴¹ Jersey Finance., Quarterly Report. 2008-09.

³⁴² LOWTAX.NET., Jersey: Personal Taxation.

The distance between two jurisdictions for the purposes of offshoring, lowers cross-holdings, characterised as an 'iceberg' cost that diminishes the value of the OFCs holdings. Shared land border, geographical proximity, a common language or currency raises cross-holdings, between jurisdictions. From Rose.A.K. & Spiegel. M.M., Offshore Centres, Parasites or Symbionts? The Economic Journal, 117 (October), 1310–1335. Royal Economic Society 2007.

³⁴⁴ Beare, M.E. & Schneider.S., *Money laundering in Canada: chasing dirty and dangerous dollars.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007.

³⁴⁵ Forfeiture of Proceeds Act 1994.

³⁴⁶ FATF-GAFI: Review to identify NCCTs: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of AML Measures.

³⁴⁷ Brittain-Catlin.W., Offshore: The Dark Side of the Global Economy. New York: Picador, 2006. Pg.217.

was found to be fully comprehensive, to FATF standards ³⁴⁸. However, this was amidst a climate of declining corporate registrations and foreign investments and a generally stifled economy ³⁴⁹. The Caymans have also bi-laterally implemented measures equivalent to Directive 2003/48/EC (Savings Tax Directive) exchanging information on the interest bearing accounts of European citizens. It is thought such disclosure may cost the Caymans up to \$50 million dollars annually from business lost from EU investors ³⁵⁰. The Cayman economy's growth rate has fallen from a consistent 4 to 5 percent through the 90s to 1.7 percent in 2005. It fell again to 1.1 percent in 2008 then to -6 percent in 2009. Growth is expected to fall further ³⁵¹ with increasing unemployment, poverty and crime ³⁵². Similar trends are observable in other Caribbean OFCs such as the Bahamas ³⁵³ and the Turks and Caicos Islands, which according to some commentators is unlikely to survive as a financial centre, following economic crisis and the imposition of direct rule by the UK in 2009 ³⁵⁴. Based on such developments, it has been suggested that only OFCs that are capable of 'adapting to the new order' are capable of surviving ³⁵⁵.

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³⁴⁸ Caribbean Financial Action Task Force., Cayman Islands: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes, FATF Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. IMF Country Report No. 09/324. December 2009.

³⁴⁹ Brittain-Catlin.W., Op.Cit. Pg.218.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid*.

US Department of State., *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Major Money Laundering Countries.* 2007.

³⁵² Brittain-Catlin.W., Op.Cit. Pg.223.

³⁵³ In response to the attack by the OECD, the FATF, and the FSB (then FSF) the Bahamas enacted eleven new anti-money laundering statutes by the end of 2000, and was thought to be one of the most highly regulated, anti-money laundering jurisdictions in the World. The results were economic slowdown and negative competitive effects resultant from 'excessive' tax information demands by OECD countries. From Maynard Counsel and Attorneys., Anti *Money Laundering Law and Practice in The Bahamas*. Maynard Law Publishing. 2004.

³⁵⁴ Hampton.M.P. & Christensen.J., *Offshore Finance Centres and Tax Havens: what next for OFCs in small economies?* Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge.13 November 2009.

³⁵⁵ From PriceWaterhouseCoopers., *A Practitioner's Guide to the FSA Regulation of Banking*. London: City and Financial Publishing. 2002.

Singapore according to the OECD is amongst the top private wealth centres in the World and the third leading financial centre ³⁵⁶ The World Bank have also rated Singapore the World's easiest place to do business for both 2009 and 2010 ³⁵⁷. Although it is an FATF member and endorses the Forty Recommendations, it is not an OECD member ³⁵⁸. Taxation is generally low with no capital gains, dividend taxes and income taxed at 20% after US\$235000. There are also very favourable exemptions and tax reliefs for start-up businesses ³⁵⁹. Singapore is considered a jurisdiction of primary concern by the US State Department, for the purposes of money laundering, ³⁶⁰ owing to bank secrecy, the lack of reporting requirements, ³⁶¹ limited withholding taxes, reliefs for foreign sourced income ³⁶² as well as no defined tax offences under the *Corruption, Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes Act 1992*. It is also a primary destination for capital flight ³⁶³ with high potential for a being a hub for terror finance.

A similar case can be seen with the Russian Federation also an FATF member but not part of the OCED. The Federation is also a jurisdiction of primary concern for money laundering and terror finance,³⁶⁴ and has a flat income tax regime at 13%. Dividend income is at 9% with exemptions and corporate tax is

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³⁵⁶ From Lysaght.B., London Keeps Lead as Finance Center; Confidence Wanes. Bloomberg. March 2009.

³⁵⁷ World Bank., *Doing Business* 2010 Report. World Bank 2010.

³⁵⁸ See Table.1.

³⁵⁹ LOWTAX.NET., Singapore Domestic Corporate Taxes.

³⁶⁰ See Table.1.

³⁶¹ US Department of State., *International narcotics control strategy report: Southeast Asia* and the Pacific. 2007

³⁶² LOWTAX.NET., Singapore Domestic Corporate Taxes.

³⁶³ US Department of State., *International narcotics control strategy report: Southeast Asia* and the Pacific. 2007

³⁶⁴ See Table1.

roughly at 20% ³⁶⁵. In spite of it tax regime, revenue collection is sparse with endemic corruption ³⁶⁶ and the high risk of money laundering and terror finance ³⁶⁷.

The FATF/OECD regime may also have the effect of precluding underdeveloped jurisdictions from providing offshore facilities. The offshore aspirations of countries like the Seychelles³⁶⁸ for instance were more or less extinguished in their inception. Other factors such as the prohibitive costs of reporting, diligence and establishing FIUs make it economically unviable for developing countries to operate offshore operations, within the ambit of FATF guidelines. It is also likely that jurisdictions with OFC characteristics, under FATF pressure, find it more viable and expedient to move towards and specialise in taxhaven activity which as of yet has not been sanctionable by the OECD.

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³⁶⁵ Worldwide Tax. Russia.

³⁶⁶ From Ries.N., Business, Taxes and Corruption in Russia . Colgate University.2006, and Welu.C.M. & Muchnik.Y., Corruption: Russia's Economic Stumbling Block. American and European anti-corruption laws could help solve a longtime problem in Russia. Bloomberg. Aug. 2009.

³⁶⁷ Despite a general rating of compliance by the FATF (FATF-GAFI: "Second Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism: Russian Federation," Paris, France: FATF, June 2008.) the Russian Federation remains one of the World's primary laundering centres, (Financial Times, Khodorkovsky "laundered \$23bn" FT. February 9 2007.) with extensive links to US banks and the City of London. Economic & Social Research Council., Bank of New York Linked to Russian 'Mafia' via Money Laundering. Transnational Communities Programme. Oxford University. July 2010.

³⁶⁸ Fisher.H., FATF Lifts its Warning about Investment Law in Seychelles. OECD/FATF-GAFI Oct. 2000.

Members Financial Centre	Indicated as affected by FATF/FSRB or International Regulation. *	Average Real Growth Rate % (2005-2010). Positive/Negative Trends. †	Strength of Alternative (Non- Financial) Industries. †	
United Kingdom	N	1.3 ↔	S	
United States	N	1.75 ↔	S	
France	N	1.1↔	S	
Germany	N	0.7 ↔	S	
Netherlands	N	1.18↔	S	
Italy	N	-1.3↓	S	OECD's Largest Financial
Ireland	N	1.6 ↓	S	Centres Ranked by External
Spain	N	1.8 ↓	S	Assets.
Luxembourg	Υ	1.9 🗸	S	
Switzerland	Υ	1.57 ↔	S	
Belgium	N	1.3↔	W	
Japan	N	2↓	S	
Australia	N	2.6↑	S	
Canada	N	2.2↔	S	
Caymans Singapore	Y N	1.1 ↓ 4 ↔	W S	
Singapore Jersey	N Y	4 ↔ Not Available.	S S	
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong	N Y N	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$	S S S	
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas	N Y N Y	$4 \leftrightarrow \\ \text{Not Available.} \\ 3.4 \leftrightarrow \\ 0 \checkmark$	S S S W	Non OECDIA Laurent
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey	N Y N Y	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$	S S S W	Non-OECD's Largest
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies	N Y N Y Y	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average) } \downarrow$	S S S W S	Offshore Financial Centres
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies Bermuda	N Y N Y Y	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average) } \downarrow$ $5 \uparrow$	S S S W S W	_
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies Bermuda Dutch Antilles	N Y N Y Y Y Y Y	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \checkmark$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average)} \checkmark$ $5 \uparrow$ $1 \uparrow$	S S W S W W	Offshore Financial Centres
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies Bermuda Dutch Antilles Panama	N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average) } \downarrow$ $5 \uparrow$ $1 \uparrow$ $7.4 \uparrow$	S S W S W W W	Offshore Financial Centres
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies Bermuda Dutch Antilles Panama Bahrain	N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average)} \downarrow$ $5 \uparrow$ $1 \uparrow$ $7.4 \uparrow$ $5.7 \uparrow$	S S S W S W W W	Offshore Financial Centres
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies Bermuda Dutch Antilles Panama Bahrain Isle of Man	N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average)} \downarrow$ $5 \uparrow$ $1 \uparrow$ $7.4 \uparrow$ $5.7 \uparrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$	S S S W S W W S W W	Offshore Financial Centres
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies Bermuda Dutch Antilles Panama Bahrain Isle of Man Gibraltar	N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N N	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average)} \downarrow$ $5 \uparrow$ $1 \uparrow$ $7.4 \uparrow$ $5.7 \uparrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$	S S W W S W W W W W S S W	Offshore Financial Centres
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies Bermuda Dutch Antilles Panama Bahrain Isle of Man Gibraltar Barbados	N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average)} \downarrow$ $5 \uparrow$ $1 \uparrow$ $7.4 \uparrow$ $5.7 \uparrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$ $2 \downarrow$	S S W W S W W W W W S S W W	Offshore Financial Centres
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies Bermuda Dutch Antilles Panama Bahrain Isle of Man Gibraltar Barbados Mauritius	N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average)} \downarrow$ $5 \uparrow$ $1 \uparrow$ $7.4 \uparrow$ $5.7 \uparrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$ $2 \downarrow$ $3.5 \leftrightarrow$	S S S W S W W W W W W S S W W W W	Offshore Financial Centres
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies Bermuda Dutch Antilles Panama Bahrain Isle of Man Gibraltar Barbados Mauritius Macao	N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y N	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average)} \downarrow$ $5 \uparrow$ $1 \uparrow$ $7.4 \uparrow$ $5.7 \uparrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$ $2 \downarrow$ $3.5 \leftrightarrow$ $11.5 \uparrow$	S S W W S W W W W W S S W W W W W W	Offshore Financial Centres
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies Bermuda Dutch Antilles Panama Bahrain Isle of Man Gibraltar Barbados Mauritius Macao Lebanon	N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N	$4 \leftrightarrow$ $Not Available.$ $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average)} \downarrow$ $5 \uparrow$ $1 \uparrow$ $7.4 \uparrow$ $5.7 \uparrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$ $2 \downarrow$ $3.5 \leftrightarrow$ $11.5 \uparrow$ $3.5 \uparrow$	S S S W W W S S S W W W W W W S S S S W W W W W W S S S S W W W W W W W W W W W W W W S S S S W	Offshore Financial Centres
Singapore Jersey Hong Kong Bahamas Guernsey West Indies Bermuda Dutch Antilles Panama Bahrain Isle of Man Gibraltar Barbados Mauritius Macao	N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N N N N Y Y N	$4 \leftrightarrow$ Not Available. $3.4 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \downarrow$ $3 \leftrightarrow$ $0 \text{ (Average)} \downarrow$ $5 \uparrow$ $1 \uparrow$ $7.4 \uparrow$ $5.7 \uparrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$ $5 \leftrightarrow$ $2 \downarrow$ $3.5 \leftrightarrow$ $11.5 \uparrow$	S S W W S W W W W W S S W W W W W W	Offshore Financial Centres

LEGEND CODES: Y=Yes. N=No. \uparrow =Growing. \downarrow =Falling. \leftrightarrow = Stationary. S= Strong. W=Weak.

Table 3: OFCs; Relationship with Regulation

^{*} Indicated by domestic/international press, Financial Times or OECD and FATF sources.

[†] From IndexMundi (http://www.indexmundi.com) , US State Department, CIA Factbook and other sources.

Chapter 6:

6.1: Observations.

From a governance perspective, the two main questions to be asked are; who should be served by the financial apparatus of OFCs and how should such purposes be determined. Within the Westphalian framework envisioned by the UN, these questions should rightly be answered by the competences of the OFC jurisdiction in question. States within the OCED/FATF are stakeholders to the activities of OFCs, in as much as money laundering affects them, as much so as OCED/FATF countries are stakeholders to OFC countries, regarding the repercussions for OFC economies from failures within wealthier nations, to control predicate offences. The FATF represents a kind of 'stakeholder activism' through which the OECD via the FATF, seeks to create itself a 'principal' to competing economies, setting itself at the end of the agency chain as the primary beneficiary.

In a wider context, the global anti-money laundering campaign has an intrinsic relationship and parallelism with the War on Drugs ³⁶⁹. The shape of money laundering as a criminal offence originates in the *United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances* (1988) (Vienna Convention), which created the idea of separating the underlying

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³⁶⁹ Following President Nixon's declaration of a War on Drugs June 1971. NPR Frontline Series., *Timeline: America's War on Drugs*. April 2, 2007.

predicate offences from the laundering the proceeds. These in turn were extended, to eventually result in the 40 Recommendations of the FATF ³⁷⁰.




Figure 3: Reporting Structure and Governance Chain for OFCs.

Far from being a problem created exclusively by producer countries such as Afghanistan and Columbia, the drugs and narcotics trade is a response by criminal entrepreneurs in these countries to market demand in more developed countries ³⁷¹. It seems however that governments in the developed World find it more expedient to act against foreign governments ³⁷² rather than seek to

³⁷⁰ Schott. P.A, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. *Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism*. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2006. Pg.I-3.

³⁷¹ Hinterseer.K., *Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in aComparative Legal Context.* The Hague: Kluwer Publishers. 2002. Pg.32.

³⁷² The Mexican War on Drugs, initially prompted by US pressures, has resulted in a situation, where the continuation of the campaign could potentially result in the failure of the state. This has resulted in calls to legalise drugs in Mexico, simply to prevent the spill-over violence originating from traffickers, who seek mainly to smuggle drugs into the US. From Luksza.J.C., *Mexico sees sense in war*

remediate the problem domestically, either through more effective domestic control strategies or legalisation, which mitigates against the problem of the proceeds being laundered³⁷³.

In parallel, it may be argued that jurisdictions, which implement the means to facilitate laundering of illicit proceeds are responding both to the supply of illicit funds to be laundered and the demand for the laundering of such funds. Moreover most funds to be laundered globally originate in OECD countries, which is primarily why the FATF have sought to instigate a global anti-money laundering infrastructure, yet nevertheless externalise money laundering controls to other jurisdictions, rather than concentrate domestic predicate offences. Notably the growing legitimacy gap of the FATF, has seemingly been filled by the US shift from the War on Drugs to the War on Terror ³⁷⁴.

In a further parallel, the international criminalisation of money laundering incites more sophisticated means to legitimise illicit funds, much in the same way that the War on Drugs incentivises the sale and distribution of illicit substances, by giving extra value to the proceeds ³⁷⁵.

The OCED countries collectively account for up to 75% of total World market capitalisation and 70% of the total World GDP ³⁷⁶. In terms of capacity,

on drugs; The Mexican president has finally realised that the legalisation debate could offer his country a better future. guardian.co.uk, Monday 23 August 2010. Also reported on BBC Radio 4. Sunday 29th August 2010

³⁷³ Alldridge.P., Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery. Criminal Laundering & Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime. Oregon: Hart Publishing. 2003. Pg.43. Also discussed in Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008.

³⁷⁴ Williams.D., Governance, Security and 'Development": The Case of Money Laundering. City University Working Papers on Transnational Politics. CUTP/001. February 2008. Pg.9.

³⁷⁵ From Oscapella.E., How Drug Prohibition Finances and Otherwise Enables Terrorism. Submission to the Senate of Canada Special Committee on Illegal Drugs. October 2001.

³⁷⁶ See Table.1. The US accounting for 50% global (See Footnote. 323.) sums laundered, represents about 35% of OECD GDP. (See Table 1) Hypothetically, even if 100% of all OECD assets held by

79

GDP, tax revenues, and financial depth and infrastructure, it is unlikely that non-OECD countries, (other than OFCs) account for any substantial percentage of global funds, resultant of the proceeds of crime or laundering, particularly as the US alone is estimated to account for more than half of all laundered sums ³⁷⁷. The FATF nevertheless does target such countries, simply to instigate legislative change, possibly to preclude potential competition, if not to prevent money laundering.

For lack of legitimacy, the 'War on Money Laundering' may well fail, much as the War on Drugs.

6.2: Conclusions:

Money Laundering, as constructed as a separate crime to its predicate offence, is necessitated owing to the regulatory and jurisdictional independence of OFCs. The progressive internationalization of the global economy, requires the regulation of money laundering, which can only be regulated by international cooperation. National measures alone shall only cause geographical shifts, which is why although OFCs are independent states with their own competences and jurisdictions, as of yet the most successful of anti-money laundering efforts rely on non-treaty based coercive counter-measures.

The extent of globalization reduces the extent of differences between onshore and offshore. Financial globalisation nevertheless remains polarised

traditional non-OECD OFCs, were the proceeds of crime to be laundered through these economies, they would only account for an estimated maximum of 16% to 20% of all global monies laundered. If laundering in other OCED countries in considered, the amounts laundered by developing countries, which do not have OFC characteristics is probably negligible. Extrapolated from Tables 1,2 and 3.

³⁷⁷ See Footnote. 323

towards wealthier nations. The negative effects of money laundering and indeed tax competition are mostly felt in the developed World. The negative effects of such practices on OFCs and the developing World, as suggested by the FATF etc. are overstated, as OFCs are merely responding to market demand for lower taxation, corporate flexibility and indeed venues to launder money. The idea that rejecting illicit funds, in favour of preserving against the entrenchment of money laundering and banking integrity, does not seem to actually be beneficial to the banking infrastructure of developing countries. This is particular, as OFCs are competing with laundering banks in wealthier countries. The non-blacklisting of FATF/OECD members, also problematically suggests that such countries are not accountable for laundering the proceeds of predicate offences, committed without of the OECD, under FATF standards. This is symptomatic of biases towards domestic economies and profits rather than the criminality of money laundering. The FATF/OECD regime, in effect seems to be geared to allow the developed World to take the benefits of globalisation, whilst insulating against competition and costs.

OFCs although conducive to money laundering and other unproductive offshore activities, offer competition to increasingly oligopolistic banking sectors in the OECD, particularly as the OCED itself accounts for a large percentage of global laundered funds. It is also noteworthy that not all OFC activity actually relates to money laundering.

The prevention of money laundering and terror finance, both require exerting control over funds originating outside the OECD, which may form the rationale the FATF to associate the two. Controlling terror finance in the same context as money laundering also allows the FATF/OECD to employ an existent extraterritorial infrastructure and criminal jurisdiction. It is the urgency of the

threat of terror, which currently allows the FATF to bridge its overall legitimacy gap.

Terror finance (at least academically) does not adequately relate to money laundering, although there may be superficial technical similarities between the techniques of cross-border movements of funds, in both cases. The global homogeneity of the mechanisms and structures of the FATF are well suited to prevent terrorist events, however the forum of anti-money laundering is not adequate for such purposes. On the forum of the threat of terror, the US and the FATF have nevertheless hugely extended the scope of the international anti-money laundering framework, with emphasis on homogenisation

The role of the FATF and OECD seem to be inclined against the movement of wealth on certain bases, from developed countries to developing countries, on the fora of anti-money laundering, controlling terror finance and acting against competitive and harmful tax policies of other jurisdictions; all of which are a consequence of financial globalization. The primary basis to achieve these objectives, however have not been to address predicate offences, domestic tax issues, or corporate freedom domestically, but to coercively externalize the costs of crime from wealthier nations to the developing world including OFCs, in parallel to War on Drugs model. Blacklisting and the instigation of FIUs etc. is generally ineffective for the purposes of OFCs and seem mainly to have the purpose of homogenising money laundering laws in developing jurisdictions to FATF standards.

6.3: Recommendations.

The FATF's legitimacy gap is founded in possible contraventions of International law, a democratic deficit and inconsistencies in applied standards with undertones of protectionism and anti-competitiveness. The FATF have resultantly stepped back on their blacklisting procedures, having sought legitimacy through the imperatives of fighting terror and from the IMF.

It is quite commonsensical to assume that criminals should not be allowed to keep their wealth or benefit from their crimes ³⁷⁸. Money laundering *inter-alia* results in corruption, increased social costs and a loss of confidence and stability in the banking and financial systems and for such reasons adequate international controls are quite necessary. These issues, however do not justify externalizing the costs of crime from wealthier nations to the developing world including OFCs. FATF and OECD members should remove their own propensity to launder money and harmful tax regimes before demanding anything of other jurisdictions. It seems that the 'all crimes' model for defining predicate offences, is unnecessary and unjust. Local decriminalisation of more minor predicate offences or more effective mechanisms (such as handling) to address them would be more efficient.

To viably bridge the legitimacy gap, a more liberal, cooperative and multilateral approach is necessary, taking all stake-holding parties, including OFCs and their sovereignty into account, if it is indeed the purpose of the FATF/OCED to prevent money laundering. More practically, the top-heavy model of international regulation is impeded by the inability of regulators to monitor compliance or enforce regulation internationally and is ineffective and prejudicial having no effect on the 'costs and benefits' of regulating states. A more multilateral approach is more practicable and economical.

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³⁷⁸ The dicta of Lord Wolf CJ in *R v Sekton* [2003] 1WLR 1655.

Stricter requirements for client information, with preclusion from access to the market for failing to do so, has been identified as a basis to respect OFC sovereignty and also protect from money laundering ³⁷⁹. This possibly may be unviable owing to the symbioses of OFCs, with both the legitimate and illegitimate economies,

Another possibility is an increased concentration upon the prevention of predicate offences, or reducing the viability of such offences through legalisation, as suggested by some commentators ³⁸⁰. Such measures may only however have any relevance to funds resultant of drugs and narcotic offences.

A third possibility is a basis by which, the value derivative of laundered money is distributed between the jurisdiction of the predicate offence and the jurisdiction processing the money. This may on the one hand, take the form of the FATF instituting a regime of domestic bank charges within its member states, based upon the risk of money being transferred to their jurisdictions, being derivative of criminal acts. Alternatively or simultaneously, employing the existent 'know your customer' principles, OFCs upon identifying the source of money transfers to their jurisdiction can withhold a levy on funds, which demonstrate the risk of being the proceeds of crimes, and remit these back to the jurisdiction the funds originated from. OFCs would be incentivised to do so as they would not need to divulge the identity of their customer and would benefit from some partial decriminalisation of the offence of money laundering. This approach is viable, as it detracts from lapses in preventing predicate offences, for the purposes of the originating jurisdiction, and provides that jurisdiction with at least a percentage of the untaxed monies through reintegration of funds from the

Doyle.T., Cleaning up anti-money laundering strategies: current FATF tactics needlessly violate international law. Houston Journal of International Law. 2002. Pg.13.

³⁸⁰ Alldridge.P., Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery. Criminal Laundering & Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime. Oregon: Hart Publishing. 2003. Pg.43. Also discussed in Alldridge.P., Money Laundering and Globalization. Journal of Law and Society. Volume 35, No. 4, December 2008.



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