Cuba in the 1950s was ruled by a brutal dictatorship, headed by Fulgencio Batista. It is common to view this regime as made up of a small clique of army officers and politicians around Batista, whose main intention was to enrich themselves through corruption and who cynically gained the support of the United States by accommodating their anti-communist foreign policy agenda in the period of the Cold War. While this is true, it only tells half the story.

The Cuban economy at this time was faced with a crisis of profitability such that Cuban and US capital would only be able to retain their profit margins if they could increase Cuban workers' productivity. This meant overcoming the resistance of a well organised trade union movement with a long tradition of militant economic and political struggle. It will be argued that the reason the Batista government received strong support from the business community was that it promised to defeat Cuban workers' resistance to measures which would increase profitability. To quote a British Embassy report on Batista's coup of 1952:

I am more and more convinced that the basic reason for the Armed Forces having staged the revolution was their utter disgust at the growing and unrestrained power of Labour.\(^1\)

This paper will look at the conflict over productivity during the 1950s from the perspective of the island's dock-workers, one of the strongest groups of organised workers in Cuba, whose solidarity and resistance placed them in direct conflict with the Batista government. We shall
see that, while the regime was able use authoritarian methods to impose productivity measures on the workers in most of the other sectors of Cuban industry, they were unable to impose bulk loading of sugar in the country's ports. The paper will conclude by offering an explanation for this difference.

**Productivity and the World Bank**
The employers' concerns over productivity are described by the 1951 "Report on Cuba", compiled for the World Bank by Francis Truslow, President of the New York Curb Exchange, who was the chief of a survey mission charged with making a comprehensive survey of the Cuban economy. This report identified the resistance of workers to mechanisation and other productivity measures as the main problem facing the Cuban economy, stating:

> Employees strongly resist mechanisation and cost-cutting methods. "Featherbedding" is encouraged and the discharge of employees for legitimate cause made difficult or impossible.²
> 
> [...] With labor still making wage demands, it is believed that in many cases they have reached the limit that employers will tolerate.³

This opposition to productivity measures was rooted in the island's high levels of unemployment and underemployment, which explains the tenacity with which Cuban workers fought for their jobs and defended the social clauses in the constitution that helped them to do so. The Truslow report sums up the situation as follows:

> In Cuba it is usually easier, quicker and cheaper to divorce a wife than to fire a worker. Under prevailing conditions of chronic seasonal unemployment, it may also be easier to find a new wife than to find a new job.⁴

The report argues that increased productivity would attract investment, promote diversification and thereby produce jobs. Underneath the rhetoric calling for greater co-operation between management and labour lies the concrete proposal to make dismissal of employees simpler, faster and cheaper.⁵ The chronically high level of unemployment deeply affected the consciousness of those in work and job security was always the prime concern of unionised workers.⁶ The Truslow report dedicates a whole chapter to Port Labour, recognising:

> the strategic position occupied by men who load and unload ships, in view of the big investment tied up in ships and merchandise and the ease with which shipping companies can be subjected to important losses by sudden stoppages or delays.⁷
This "strategic position" has been used by dockers all over the world to improve their working conditions, enhance their wages, and maintain their manning levels. However, most employers would agree with Truslow in feeling that this would oblige them to employ more staff than was strictly necessary, thereby reducing business efficiency. In particular, the report identified the main problem as the dockers' refusal to bulk load sugar. The universal nature of maritime productivity disputes at this time is underlined by the contacts established between the dock-workers of Caibarién in northern Cuba, who were opposing the introduction of bulk-loading and the workers in the port of Liverpool in England, who were in dispute over attempts to introduce the fork-lift truck.\(^8\)

At the start of the 1950s, Cuba had the highest percentage of unionised workers in Latin America, but the main federation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) was highly bureaucratised and dependent upon the maintenance of a good relationship with the government. Most disputes were settled by the intervention of the Ministry of Labour rather than by direct action or collective bargaining.\(^9\) In 1948, Eusebio Mujala, union official who led a faction within the CTC bureaucracy that was linked to the ruling Autentico party, had gained control of the union federation through a mixture of gangster violence and government patronage, removing the previous communist-dominated leadership.\(^10\) The Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), as the communist party was known, did not have sufficient active support to combat this takeover of the CTC by Mujal and his associates and an attempted general strike called by the displaced communist leadership failed, with only the Havana dockers and tram drivers coming out in their support. In areas where government intervention proved insufficient to impose a new leadership, gangsters linked to the Auténticos used violence to enforce the change of officials. This included the murder of the widely respected dock-workers' leader, Aracelio Iglesias, who was shot in the back by known associates of Mujal.\(^11\)

After Batista's coup of March 10th1952, Mujal became Batista's loyal collaborator and, in return for his support, the government gave the mujalistas generous bribes and obliged employers to deduct trade union subscriptions from workers' wages by means of a compulsory check-off, which helped insulate the CTC leadership from rank and file pressure.\(^12\) This measure was to prove deeply unpopular and, throughout Batista's period in office, the demand for the abolition of the cuota sindical appeared on every list of workers'
demands. The Havana dockers, despite police intervention, made such an issue of the matter that the employers eventually paid the money over to the CTC without deducting it from their wages.  

The Truslow report had recommended that sugar be bulk loaded (azúcar a granel). In Cuba at this time, the sugar was placed in jute sacks at the refinery, shipped on trains to the port, then, still in sacks, manhandled using cranes and conveyor belts into warehouses to await the equally labour intensive transfer into the holds of cargo ships. The technology had long been developed to mechanise this process so that the sugar could be poured directly into the bulk carrier ship’s hold, but its use was highly controversial. The economic importance of bulk loading can be seen from the estimation that manual loading normally proceeded at a rate of 800 tons per day, while direct bulk loading could increase that to 400 tons per hour, with half the number of stevedores employed. The dock-workers were bitterly opposed to this measure and, while the previous government had issued decree number 501 authorising the loading of azúcar a granel, they had not dared to enforce it. Batista confirmed the decree early in his rule, but then immediately deferred its application, allowing him to set the agenda for full implementation. He had reached an accommodation with the CTC but could not move too quickly because, if he undermined Mujal’s power base, that accommodation would be useless. However, by the end of 1954, the regime had some pressing problems on their agenda. The falling price of sugar meant that the employers in the industry were demanding wage and job cuts. At the same time, financial problems in the US owned Ferrocarriles Consolidados, the railway company that operated the network in the eastern end of the island, meant that the owners of this company also wished to cut their wage costs and staff numbers.

Railways, Sugar and the Ports
Given these two major industrial problems, the government did not try to enforce bulk loading on the dock-workers in 1955, a year which saw the defeat of most of the other sectors of workers who opposed the productivity drive. Nevertheless, the dockers were under no illusions about the forthcoming attack and, as early as May 1954, Carta Semanal, the PSP's clandestine newspaper, was reporting on mass meetings of dockers in the ports of Nuevitas, Santiago, Cienfuegos and Matanzas, which mandated their delegates to the forthcoming national congress of their union, the Federación de Obreros Marítimos Nacional (FOMN), to vote against accepting azúcar a granel. When the FOMN congress opened in February
1955, it became obvious to Mujal that, despite having persuaded a number of delegates to vote in favour of bulk loading in defiance of the mandate from their home branches, there was still a majority opposed to the measure.\textsuperscript{21} He therefore postponed the decision until he was able to pack the hall with additional, unelected delegates. Despite violent protests from the legitimately elected delegates, bulk loading was accepted by 143 votes to 78.\textsuperscript{22} As a result of this official acceptance at national level, Batista issued decree number 3441 regulating loading and unloading of primary materials, but he was careful not to provoke the dockers further at this stage by specifying reductions in manning levels.\textsuperscript{23} It was one thing to have a formal union policy which accepted bulk loading, it was another to enforce its acceptance at local level. Following an unofficial meeting, the opposition delegates returned to their ports committed to organising resistance locally.

When a local union organisation appeared to be escaping from Mujal's control, the Ministry of Labour would "intervene", an expression meaning that they would take over the organisation, at police gun-point if necessary, and impose a reliable bureaucrat to run it. This happened in Santiago in 1955, when the dockworkers, under the leadership of the communist Juan Taquechel, started to organise against bulk loading and held some protest strikes.\textsuperscript{24} The Ministry intervened, although with only limited success, as the dockers still managed to hold their mass meetings.\textsuperscript{25}

Tension was raised further when, in January 1955, the British Ambassador passed a note to the government demanding that, in future, all sugar exported to England must be bulk loaded.\textsuperscript{26} This was considered particularly provocative as Britain held large reserves and was not intending to buy any Cuban sugar that year. Following the British demand, the port-workers of Nuevitas set the lead in resisting \textit{embarques a granel}, by refusing to bulk load a German ship, "Parnas", bound for England and army strike-breakers were used to load instead.\textsuperscript{27} Faced with the undemocratic nature of the official union's acceptance, 78 local unions set up a \textit{Comité nacional contra los embarques a granel} to organise resistance.\textsuperscript{28} The government had other, more immediate, priorities and this rank and file organisation was first to be used to organise solidarity with other workers.
By the end of 1954, financial problems that resulted from the drop in sugar prices in 1953, had pushed the railway company Ferrocarriles Consolidados to announce 1550 redundancies and a 20% wage cut for the remaining workers, to which rail workers responded with a series of strikes. Many of the ports were owned by the railway companies and dockers in Boquerón and Nuevitas struck in support of their railway colleagues, as a result of which, 58,000 sacks of sugar lay idle on the dock. 29 Other port workers in Matanzas, Caimanera and Manzanillo took advantage of the opportunity to publicly demonstrate both support of the railway workers and to express their own opposition to bulk loading. 30 However, the government had managed to delay the final confrontation with the railway workers until after the end of the sugar harvest and won the confrontation by avoiding a possible link up between the railway workers and the sugar workers, who had their own grievances.

Faced with wage cuts and the loss of a traditional bonus, the sugar workers eventually went on strike at the end of 1955 and they found themselves faced with a level of repression only previously used to attack militant students. In response, they set up road blocks, set fire to cane fields and occupied town halls and city centres; actions resulting in hundreds being arrested or wounded, with several strikers being killed. 31 During the sugar-workers' strike, dockers in all the major ports refused to load any sugar; indeed the Economist Intelligence Unit refers to the strike as being; "a strike of sugar and port workers." 32 Despite this, the sugar workers were beaten by the violent repression of the army and police, failing to reverse the wage cut and receiving a much reduced bonus.

The violence used by the state against the strikers produced a bond of solidarity between workers and students as they realised they had a common enemy. Students in particular were not concerned with questions of labour productivity and felt that their prospects would be improved by an economy run in the interests of local industry, which attracted them to revolutionary nationalist politics in considerable numbers. Given that many were educated in fields in which there was scant chance of employment, they shared the experience of economic insecurity with the sons and daughters of workers. The link between students and dockers was particularly strong in Santiago where, as early as December 1954, a joint meeting of students and workers had been organised to oppose azúcar a granel. 33
Police violence against the students had come to a head on 7th December 1955 with an attack on a demonstration in Santiago. In response, the students' union called for solidarity from workers to be shown by a five minute general strike on the 14th.\textsuperscript{34} Despite virulent CTC opposition, this short demonstration was very well supported, particularly in the ports of Havana, Regla, Santiago, Cienfuegos, Nuevitas and Matanzas and Manzanillo, with Ramon Bonachea, in his book, \textit{Cuba in Revolution}, wrote that "dockers simply refused to work for the rest of the day causing chaos in busy ports".\textsuperscript{35}

**Insurrection in Santiago**

During 1955, Fidel Castro had been released from prison and had gone to Mexico to train a rebel force with the intention of returning to Cuba and begin a guerrilla uprising. The plan was to land on the south coast from a small boat, the now famous \textit{Granma}, at the end of November 1956. Frank País, local leader of Castro's \textit{Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio} (M-26-7) in Santiago, was charged with creating a diversion by means of an armed assault on various police and army establishments.

These attacks, launched on 30th November, were accompanied by a call for general strike in the city where, despite the best efforts of the regime and the CTC bureaucracy, the communist party still had a militant organisation in the port. The PSP national leadership had been in contact with Fidel Castro in Mexico through the ex-secretary of the CTC, Lazaro Peña, and they were aware of the impending \textit{Granma} landing. The PSP thought that the whole scheme was adventurist and wanted no part of it. However, the local PSP organisation in Santiago had cordial relations with the M-26-7 and took a different view. This relationship was particularly important in the port where formal liaison was organised between the two organisations by Sergio Valiente for the M-26-7 and José Pérez García for the PSP. Their co-operation extended to help with distributing each other's clandestine propaganda to reduce the risk of police detection.\textsuperscript{36} So, on the morning of the 30th November, Juan Taquechel successfully pulled the Santiago docks out on strike in support of the insurrectionary movement.\textsuperscript{37} Taquechel, Valiente and three other dockers' leaders were subsequently suspended by the Ministry of Labour in January 1957.\textsuperscript{38}
Fiasco
Frank País, now M-26-7 national co-ordinator of action, was murdered at the end of July 1957 by the Santiago police chief and this resulted in a general strike in the entire province of Oriente. Wherever this strike is mentioned in the literature, it is characterised as "spontaneous" and this spontaneity is frequently used to imply a lack of organisation and political direction. However, this betrays a lack of understanding that the level of organisation required to produce a "spontaneous" strike is far greater than one formally called by the bureaucracy; an interpretation confirmed by interviews with surviving militants.

Miguel Angel Yero, an M-26-7 activist in Santiago, describes how he and his comrades went to Frank País's funeral with the idea of initiating some action. Seeing a large turnout, combined with the fact that very many Santiagueros shared their anger, they started to shout for a strike. The call was taken up and the 60,000 people at the funeral marched through the town, calling workers out of their factories, offices and shops until the town was paralysed in a strike that lasted five days. The road from the cemetery into the town centre passes the port and the dockers were amongst the first to join the action.

Impressed with the impact of the Santiago strike, Fidel Castro called a national general strike on April 9th 1958. This strike, which received almost no working class support, was a complete disaster and cost the lives of many of the movement's best underground activists with Batista's chief of police, Colonel Pilar Garcia, issuing the instruction: "No wounded, No prisoners." The rebel leadership had decided to keep the date of the proposed action secret, only telling militants in Havana on the morning of April 9th itself. If the date was secret, the fact that a strike was planned was not, Fidel Castro having announced his intentions when he made his declaration of "Total War" on 12th March. Thus forewarned, the government had suspended the Constitution and placed the army and police on a war footing, while the CTC bureaucracy had stepped up its anti-Castro propaganda, issuing threats that any worker supporting the strike would be dismissed and that the unions would not support them. To this end, the CTC drew up lists of suspected militants for the police and the employers.

While the authorities were prepared, most workers were taken completely by surprise when the strike call came at 11am on the 9th April and were thereby denied that feeling of
ownership that is so essential to the success of a strike. The police and army, supported by a pro-government militia, the Tigers, rampaged through the streets, discharging their weapons at random. The poorly armed M-26-7 militia were unable to wrest control, indeed most were not even in a position to defend themselves. In these circumstances, most workers found it impossible to leave their workplaces and the strike failed.

In the Archivo Nacional in Havana, there is a typewritten account of the April 9th strike, written by Roger Venegas Calabuch, who was leader of the M26-7 grouping in the port of Havana. He paints a graphic image of chaotic organisation; the first he hears of the strike details is when he is ordered by the clandestine M-26-7 leadership in Havana to "strike the port of Havana" at half past ten on the morning of April 9th. He was astonished and replied that it was impossible to pull out 10,000 workers in thirty minutes. He says they had no weapons, while armed police were everywhere. The leaflets arguing for the strike did not arrive until 2pm. In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the strike failed.

The process of picking up the pieces began with a meeting on May 3rd at Los Altos de Mompié in the Sierra Maestra. From the point of view of working class involvement in the insurrection, two important decisions were taken, one of which was to give future priority to the guerrilla struggle, the other was to reorganise the workers section of the movement, now renamed the Frente Obrero Nacional (FON). The new FON leadership showed a change of style immediately with the issue of a manifesto in May 1958 that took responsibility for the fiasco, while still maintaining that a general strike was the most efficient way to defend and extend workers rights as well as "curbing the sinister despotism that is strangling our republic.

Rebel Offensive

Faustino Pérez recalls in a later interview that one of the reasons for the failure of the April 9th strike was that workers would not strike without adequate armed support. The turn to a
more militaristic approach by the M-26-7 was not taken with a view to rectifying this inadequacy, but it did have that effect in the long term. Going on strike in Batista's Cuba could be a life or death decision and workers had to feel some confidence in their chances of survival and in the possibilities of successfully gaining a result that would be in their political and economic interests. In the summer of 1958, however, the guerrillas still had to beat the encircling forces of Batista's army which outnumbered them enormously. The army and police, while they had demonstrated ruthless efficiency when shooting down poorly armed students or unarmed striking workers, were not nearly so determined when faced with well trained and politically motivated guerrillas, who rapidly gained the military upper hand in the second half of 1958. There was a parallel growth in financial support coming from workers through late summer and autumn, as well as the increase in membership of the FON, which has been estimated at 15,000 by the end of the year, with cells in all of the major ports.  

In the Santiago docks, the M-26-7 cell had been established by Santiago Casacó, a long-standing and well-established militant. The police tried to clear them out of the port by means of arrests, vandalising the local union offices and similar acts of repression. In January 1958, a person or persons unknown shot and killed Filipe Navea, a well-known pro-government official of the FOMN in the port of Santiago. Colonel Río Chaviano, military governor of the town, responded by killing 5 dockers in their homes and the dockers, in turn, replied with increased sabotage such as the burning of a sugar warehouse in February 1958. Such tit-for-tat violence continued, albeit on a lower scale, up to the end of 1958.

While the M-26-7 had been collaborating with the PSP on the Santiago docks for some time, the communist party nationally did not finally commit itself to supporting the armed struggle until November 1958 when the FON was formally merged with the PSP front organisation, the Comité Nacional de Defensa de las Demandas Obreras (CNDDO), to form the Frente Obrero Nacional Unido (FONU). This new organisation adopted a 12 point programme that called for a 20% wage increase, for opposition to mechanisation along with other measures against unemployment, for an end to racial discrimination, for social protection for women, children and the unemployed, for the reinstatement of victimised workers, for trade union democracy and the end to the compulsory check-off, as well as for the reinstatement of the 1940 constitution.
The archives of the Institute of Cuban History contain a large number of FONU leaflets issued in December 1958, indicating considerable activity as soon as the new organisation was formed. A typical example, aimed at the maritime-workers in the port of Havana, calls for a refusal to transport troops or munitions to the war zone in Oriente.\(^{52}\) During this period there was little or no industrial action, as most workers saw little point in risking their lives and livelihoods in advance of the increasingly likely military victory by the rebel army. The more militant could always satisfy their impatience with sabotage or going to the mountains to join the rebel army. The flight of Batista on New Year's Day 1959, however, would give rise to the need for more active mass participation.

Those members of Batista's general staff who had been left behind were plotting with the US ambassador in a last minute attempt to prevent the rebel victory and, despite swift deployment of the columns commanded by Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos, there was a danger that an army coup could have split some of the middle class support away from the M-26-7 and prolonged the civil war.\(^{53}\) On January 2nd 1959, Fidel Castro called a general strike which proved so successful that the army chiefs quickly abandoned their plans for a military coup and most fled to avoid popular vengeance, a path followed by many CTC bureaucrats.

**Bulk loading**

Bulk loading of sugar had reached 11% of exports by 1957, increasing to 25% by 1958.\(^{54}\) However, this was not mechanised bulk loading; sugar cargoes were ferried out in lighters, still in their sacks and then dumped out of the bags into the hold of a ship lying offshore. The only advantage of this for the port employers was that they could thereby comply with the importing countries requirements; apart from a small economy from the reuse of sacks, they saved no money at the Cuban end of the business. The first mechanised bulk sugar loading facilities were not established until the early 1970s with the inauguration of the new dock and warehousing arrangements in Guayabal and Matanzas, followed later by Cienfuegos.\(^{55}\)

The history of Cuban dockworkers' resistance to the government and employers' attempts to increase productivity in the ports poses the question: "Why did the attempt to impose mechanised bulk loading of sugar fail, when the productivity drive was relatively successful
in most other industries?" It is possible to use brute force and corruption to reduce the wage bill in industries such as sugar production, which rely largely on unskilled manual labour, or on the railways, which was already highly mechanised. In both of these sectors it was merely a question of intensifying workloads and paying lower wages. The problem with the docks was that mechanised bulk loading of sugar required considerable investment in new machinery. Before employers were prepared to make such investment, they needed to be reasonably confident that they could make the workers use the new equipment. An earlier attempt to introduce bulk loading of cement had proved a costly failure.

In an article entitled "The Most Expensive Port in the World", the news magazine *Bohemia* describes how, in 1950, the El Mariel cement company spent $100,000 installing bulk unloading equipment in the port of Havana. The Havana dockers used their industrial muscle to force the company to employ as many stevedores on the bulk discharge as would have been required for manual unloading and the company dismantled the equipment.56 Given this experience, the port employers required a firm guarantee that their employees would operate the costly new equipment they needed to install for bulk loading of sugar. Neither Batista nor Mujal could give such a guarantee. This structural difficulty for the employers' was compounded by the dockers own agency, their use of sympathy strikes.

Ever since James Connolly wrote a description of the effectiveness of sympathy strike action in the British seamen's strike of 1911,57 there has been considerable discussion in the literature on this subject.58 Apparently disinterested solidarity action serves as a warning to the strikers' own employer of a general willingness to take industrial action. It also builds up a "debt of solidarity" that enables them to call for a return solidarity in the future. This can be used as a more or less open threat during negotiations and serves to further intimidate the employer and reduce his determination to proceed with measures that will clearly be unpopular.

**Conclusion**

The regime's inability to impose *azúcar a granel*, disappointed the employers whose support for the Batista, as well as their toleration of his brutality and corruption, was based on his ability to control what they saw as the unreasonable demands of labour. On the other hand, the successful imposition of wage cuts and job losses in most other industries, combined with
the obvious corruption of most trade union officials, alienated increasing numbers of workers who needed to protect their jobs and wage rates, as well as wishing to reclaim their trade unions. The military success of the guerrillas presented an obvious possibility of regime change and gave militant workers good reasons to support the revolution.

The support of the formal trade union structures had given Batista a certain legitimacy in its early days, but Mujal’s abuses finally made him the second most hated man in Cuba after the dictator himself. The class struggles of 1955 exposed the inadequacies of the official leadership of the trade unions and won support for the rebels. Nevertheless, that support could not be taken for granted and the workers would not support a strike in April 1958 that they could see was suicidal. Nevertheless, when confronted with a favourable military balance of forces, the organised working class was more than ready to give active support to the revolutionary process and, in so doing, ensured the final victory of the revolutionary forces led by the M-26-7. In this context, the general strike of January 1959 must be seen as the decisive moment in the overthrow of the dictatorship.

Notes

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3. Truslow, Report on Cuba (1951) p.136
4. Truslow, Report on Cuba (1951) p.60
5. Truslow, Report on Cuba (1951) p.388
8. Perez, Interview with Vicente Perez (2008)
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13. Carta Semanal (March 2nd 1955)
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