The Church of England and 'Religions Division' during the Second World War: Church-State Relations and the Anglo-Soviet Alliance

by Dianne Kirby

1. The Church of England, the established church of the English people, was expected to play an active role in the life of 'the nation'. The responsibility of the Church of England was to play a Christian role within a state that earned the support of Christians; to approve of its policies if they were deserving, to advise reform if they fell short of Christian standards, and to protest if a particular political course violated its principles. (1) These perceived obligations to principle, state and nation were tested during the Second World War when the state required Christian endorsement of the British war effort in the national interest. 2. Although the Church of England supported the war against National Socialist Germany uniformly and powerfully, and regarded it as, self-evidently, a righteous war, with some clergy unhesitatingly pronouncing it a crusade, (2) there remained the question of its institutional participation. This was answered in the autumn of 1939 by George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester. In an article 'The Function of the Church in Wartime', he wrote: 'There are some who take it for granted that where the nation leads the Church must follow, and there is no question worth discussion.' Insisting that the Church was not the State's 'spiritual auxiliary', Bell argued that the churches must rise above the clamour to bless and sanctify the war and transcend their respective nationalities to 'strike the universal note'. The morality of the Church must be independent of the wishes and attitudes of national power. (3)

3. Although church-state relations are too deeply rooted in human nature to conform to a single formula or rule of politics, it was Christ's coming and his fateful command to render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to render also to God the things that are God's, that engendered a distinction between religion and politics. The debates within the Ministry of Information on the correct approach to the churches, and the trepidation with which it initially dealt with religious issues, plus the inherent caution with which the churches responded, indicated the extent to which church-state relations were an area of immense ambiguity in wartime.

4. The Establishment of the Church of England in the twentieth century is difficult to define. In the nineteenth century the Church had progressed from a virtual department of state to a 'highly self-conscious religious denomination, disdaining the limitations, legal insular, and ethical, which history had created, and deliberately organising itself as the centre of a federation of self-governing churches, acknowledging in England their spiritual home. But jealously regardful of their individual autonomy.' (4) Such was the opinion of Herbert Hensley Henson, Bishop of Durham, who thought the formal connection by Dianne Kirby

5. Andrew Chandler has effectively examined how and why the Anglican hierarchy supported appeasement and concluded: 'At Munich the Church of England quite innocently gave a strong impression of acting as the state's 'spiritual auxiliary'; adding: 'If the role of the established church in society was to offer an appropriate and distinctively Christian response to political affairs, a response which affirmed the moral independence which Anglicans claimed, its leaders had to fashion a more appropriate, self-conscious and sophisticated application of that principle.' (5) Owing to the impression it had inadvertently conveyed over Munich, it was important that a similar impression not be conveyed in relation to the war itself. However, an examination of Anglican relations with the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office suggests that the affirmation of Anglican independence assumed more importance in appearance than in actual application.

6. The Ministry of Information was an innovation which existed in shadow from 1935 to 1939. While it is nowhere explicitly stated, the early decision to create a Ministry of Information was clearly a response to the example of Goebbels's Ministry of Propaganda. Similarly, the decision to create a 'Religions Division' was undoubtedly influenced by indications that religion was integral to Hitler's plans for conquest of the Continent. Worried that there existed a popular distaste in the twentieth century for the admixture of religion and politics, there was concern in Religious Division that religious propaganda could prove counterproductive and even identify Britain with Nazi methods. Nonetheless, the very existence of what was originally called the 'Religious Relations Branch' revealed, if not a determination to make use of religious propaganda, a recognition that this was too important an area to neglect.

7. To prevent the appearance of an exercise in cynical exploitation of religion, the willing cooperation of the churches was essential. For several months prior to war being declared, Religious Division worked in informal consultation with the leaders of the churches. The work was under the general direction of Mr. Kenneth Maclean, formerly General Secretary of the Conferences of British Missionary Societies. The reports he prepared indicated that relations with the churches would have to be handled in an entirely different way from other sections of the Ministry of Information's activities.

8. It was pointed out that by their nature the Churches were ecumenical in outlook and supranational in their objectives, and delicate questions had been raised as to whether it was possible or desirable that they should be used as channels of publicity. It was concluded that it was of the utmost importance that the churches and missions, which were themselves international, were not suspected of being used as channels of propaganda by one side in an international struggle. Confidential consultations with church and missionary society leaders made it clear that these could not be identified with the normal propaganda work of the Ministry of Information. The purpose of the Religions Section of the Ministry was, therefore, presented simply as the promotion of friendly cooperation, the passing of reliable information to the different churches and missions, and helping missionary societies to deal with problems arising out of the war. (8)

9. During the First World War religion had been crudely exploited and Christians had failed miserably to be the Church still united as one Body of Christ. As the Second World War approached, religious circles perceived it as a test for the viability of the ecumenical movement, whose raison d'être was Christian unity. In the run up to the war the World Council of Churches in Process of Formation, the institutional expression of the ecumenical movement, prepared documents to guide the attitude of the churches. In particular, it was stressed that the churches should never present the war as a holy crusade, brotherly...
relations should be kept between churches and it was a duty to prepare for a just peace. (9) Church of England Archbishops, Cosmo Lang at Canterbury and William Temple at York, were deeply committed to the ecumenical movement, the latter being widely regarded as one its leading lights. (10)

10. Within government circles, it was feared the overt manipulation of religion was as likely to lose as to win public sympathy. Church leaders and the Ministry thus agreed that the response of the churches to the war must retain an aspect of moral independence. This would also serve to preserve the Ministry from allegations of using the churches as channels of propaganda. Relations with the Church of England as the established Church were a matter of particular sensitivity. To avoid charges of collusion, Anglican leaders strategically applied a useful distinction proffered by the Ministry at the beginning of the war. This differentiated between clerics acting as churchmen and clerics acting as individuals. As Lord Macmillan, the first Minister of Information, explained to a select group of church leaders summoned to a meeting at Lambeth Palace under the auspices of the Archbishop of Canterbury:

I realise that the Christian Church cannot be considered as an organ of propaganda. It is in its essential nature ecumenical and supranational. But I trust that as individuals you will be ready and anxious to help us’. (11)

11. Individual churchmen, acting in their individual capacities, and not as churchmen, it was reasoned, could be brought into consultation with the Ministry. This device enabled churchmen to work with the Ministry without, in theory, compromising their ecclesiastical status or the Ministry's propaganda. At the beginning of the war there were no Anglicans on the staff of Religions Division. By the end of the war Anglican churchmen had not only made a substantive contribution to the success of Religions Division, they numbered significantly among an initially non-Anglican staff.

12. The British were not alone in seeking to harness the power of religion. Reports received by the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations (henceforth CFR) suggested that Hitler was well advanced in his plans to manipulate religious forces to secure control of the Continent. (12) CFR was convinced it could help promote resistance to Hitler in the vital Balkan region. Integral to Hitler's thinking was the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church had become a Church without a country when irreligion was proclaimed a fundamental law in the Soviet Union and excluded from any participation in public life. Hitler, unpersuaded in promises when he wished to secure the allegiance of powerful forces, cultivated the synod of émigré bishops who had established a headquarters at Karlovci under Metropolitan Anastassy and claimed to be the true representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian Orthodox Bishop in Berlin was appointed by the Karlovci Council and by 1937 Hitler had obtained effective control of the machinery of the Karlovci jurisdiction in Germany and the warm sympathy of the Karlovci Council of Russian Bishops by the granting of considerable subsidies, certainly to the former and probably to the latter. A strong well equipped Russian Orthodox Church of Germany would be a useful instrument for the permeation of the Balkans and ultimate domination of Russia. As part of the preparations for the collapse of the Soviet regime and the winning of the Russian people's confidence through restoration of their Church, it was thought to be Hitler's intention to make Germany a great Orthodox centre outside Russia where all the Orthodox of the Balkans would naturally gravitate. There was to be an Academy for the training of Orthodox priests and a new Patriarchate at Breslau, the capital of Silesia. A Russian Orthodox Cathedral was actually built in Berlin. The plan was supposedly for a Unified Orthodox Church which would include the Churches of Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Greece, the Ukraine, White Russia and Central Russia. (13)

13. Leading Anglicans, concerned by these reports about Hitler's activities in the religious sphere, urged counteraction. Bishop Bell and Oliver Tomkins suggested Religious Division give financial support to the Paris Theological Academy for Russian émigrés. This would be to enable it to meet the rivalry of the proposed Russian Orthodox Institute at Breslau under the control of Seraphim Lade, the Orthodox Metropolitan of Berlin, appointed by the Karlovci Council, with allegiance to Hitler. (14) The Foreign Office indicated support by advising the Ministry of Information in April 1940 that, in view of the political factors involved, it might be possible to supplement from official sources the funds already supplied to the Academy from Britain and the USA. (15) A.C. Don, Secretary to the Archbishop of Canterbury, had doubts that a subsidy to the Paris Academy was really the most effective way of countering the activities of Seraphim Lade. (16) Nonetheless, the Foreign Office considered the Academy's activities worth protecting, proposing in June 1941 that it be moved from Paris to either Britain, Portugal or the USA. This was questioned by J.A. Douglas, General Secretary of CFR, who felt matters had been left too late to take effective action. (17)

14. The Ministry of Information, although in friendly relations with the Paris Academy, considered that more effective opposition to Hitler resided within the Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe, and ecclesiastical circles there were suspicious of the Academy. This view accorded with that of CFR. CFR considered that, whatever might be done along directly political lines to counter German activity in the Balkans, approaches to the Orthodox churches, as churches, were important because they exercised a profound influence upon both public opinion and government policy. The Bishop of Gibraltar pointed out that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could put two and a half million men in the field. Douglas had received letters expressing surprise that nothing was being done to put the Allied cause before the Yugoslav Church leaders.

15. The Anglican Chaplain in Belgrade, P. H. Sitters, believed that the exercise or non-exercise of Anglican influence could turn the scale not only in Yugoslavia but in Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece. Several Serb Bishops had written to Douglas requesting an Anglican visit. (18) Douglas himself was convinced that, whatever might be done along directly political lines to counter German activity in the Balkans, approaches to the Orthodox churches, as churches, were important because they exercised a profound influence upon both public opinion and government policy. The Bishop of Gibraltar pointed out that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could put two and a half million men in the field. Douglas had received letters expressing surprise that nothing was being done to put the Allied cause before the Yugoslav Church leaders.

16. Dr. W.A. Visser't Hooft, the Dutch General Secretary of the World Council of Churches and a recognised friend of Britain, pointed out that the churches in S.E. Europe were threatened not only by the Nazis, but also by the advance of Bolshevism. (20) He considered the latter threat would make them receptive to British overtures.

17. At the outbreak of the war Dr. Jack, head of the Ministry of Information’s Department for the Balkans, asked Douglas, a known expert on the Orthodox church with a long list of valuable contacts, if he personally would be ready to advise and help the department. Douglas immediately volunteered his own services and recommended the Bishops of Gloucester and Lincoln and Mr. Philip Usher, assistant secretary to CFR. Subsequently the Balkan Churches were assigned to the Religions Division whose second in charge, Hugh Martin, a Baptist minister, suggested that a group of Anglicans with first-hand knowledge of the Balkan Churches should form an advisory body for the Division. (21)

18. These proposals were subsequently approved and recommended by Dr. Jack’s Department following a discussion on 5 October by the Regional Specialists on Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece. (22) Immediately afterwards Martin, explaining that changes in the Ministry would mean delay in implementing the urgent measures required by the situation in the Balkans, urged upon the Bishop of Fulham that CFR meet as soon as possible to consider (a) relations with the Orthodox Church of South East Europe, and, (b) the promotion of contacts with the Churches of Scandinavia and Holland. Moreover, he indicated these measures would be better undertaken by CFR than by Religions Division.

19. Douglas opposed this course, even though he doubted the competence of Religions Division as it was constituted to undertake the approach itself. Apart from having no Anglicans on its staff, its outlook was directed to religious opinion in America and Great Britain, influenced by, and using methods to influence, that were derived from the ecumenical movement. Douglas considered this likely to be the reverse of efficacious in approaching the Balkan churches. But he argued that, apart from its deficiency in finance and office staff, CFR could not wisely undertake responsibility for an approach which was...
of the greatest importance and might well effect the course taken by the Balkan nations and especially by the Bulgarian and Yugoslav States in their relations with the belligerents and the USSR. This was a responsibility which rightly belonged to the Government, delegating it to CFR would risk inadequate action and expose the Church to just and serious criticism.' (23)

20. On 19 October an Emergency CFR Executive Committee decided:

This Council does not feel able to undertake the work of putting the British case before the Orthodox Churches of the Balkans and the Orthodox Church generally, but urges the setting up of sub-divisions of the Religious Department of the Ministry of Information, one to deal with the Orthodox Churches of the Balkans and one with the Scandinavian and Baltic Churches. (9)

21. Interestingly, the Committee further agreed that the Chairman should privately send names for these Committees. The names of twelve churchmen, six for a Scandinavian Committee, and six for the Balkan Committee, were subsequently sent to Macmillan by Lang at the request of CFR. Lang made it clear that these clerics were not to be regarded as working for the Ministry, they were Individual consultants whose 'names may be noted and used from time to time as valuable assessors in regard to matters affecting the Scandinavian and Balkan countries.' (24) Following further discussions, a definite proposal emerged that an Orthodox and Old Catholic sub-section be set up within Religions Division to be manned by Anglicans. (25) Initially set up on a provisional basis while the value of its work was assessed, (26) a Division memo on the 'Importance of the Orthodox Church' recognised that: 'No relations that we can develop with the Orthodox Church are to be despised: if skillfully exploited, they might be extremely valuable. This applies to all the European countries south-east of Germany with the exception of Hungary and the Catholic regions of Yugoslavia (Croatia, Dalmatia and Slovenia). (27)

22. The establishment of the sub-section was significant because it revealed that although the Church insisted that 'propaganda of a political character is not in accordance with its purpose', (28) it was not simply eager to support the Ministry's political propaganda, it wanted to be directly involved in making and implementing it. The accumulation of Anglican expertise and contacts was obviously invaluable. Douglas alone offered an immediate list of some five or six hundred people who would be of use to the Ministry's work in the Balkan region. The Division recommended Douglas be made Chairman of the Advisory Committee proposed by CFR, which should also include the Bishop of Gibraltar and his Commissary, R.H. Cragg.

23. The object of the advisory groups was to insure that the policy of the Division had the confidence of the responsible leaders of the churches. It was also to insure, as far as possible, the implementation of Division policy of remaining 'as anonymous as possible and to stimulate the Churches to do the work.' Certain that the success of Religions Division required Anglican participation, but determined not to be implicated in purely political activities, CFR personnel were placed in the Ministry's service in their Individual capacities. Significantly, it was the Church which took the initiative in this direction, manoeuvring Anglicans into important staff positions.

24. For example, Philip Usher readily undertook the direction of a proposed sub-section on a voluntary basis, but he made it clear to the Ministry that he would not be able to give his services indefinitely without a salary. He was subsequently appointed as a half-time salaried specialist to the Religions Division. Cosmo Lang approved his resignation, 'on the understanding of course that it is purely temporary', from his CFR post and advised that he sever all official connection with the organisation. It was explained to Usher that: 'It is, in the Archbishop's judgement, of some importance that the public should not get the impression that the Church of England through one of its official Councils is taking part in the Ministry of Information.' (29) Lang was nonetheless 'glad to think that the Religious Relations Department will now include an Anglican Priest with a knowledge of the Balkan Churches.'

25. The services of Miss Wallace, CFR's office secretary with expertise in the area of religious relations, were offered to the Ministry which was also advised of her willingness to accept a lower salary than normal. An even greater incentive for the Ministry to employ Miss Wallace was that she could provide unrestricted access to all CFR information and documentation. The manner in which Miss Wallace was employed as a Research Assistant in the newly formed section was illustrative of the lengths to which the Church was prepared to go to ensure Anglican influence within Religions Division while seeking to avoid the charge that the Church was working for the Ministry:

When Miss Wallace was engaged, the Branch was discussing with the ecclesiastical authorities the kind of relationship which should be established with the Archbishops' Council on Foreign Relations of the Church of England. It is essential for the work of the Section that the Branch should maintain close contacts and that the body of information in the office of the Council should be at our disposal.

The Archbishop, however, is naturally anxious that the Council should not be regarded as an auxiliary of the Ministry, but he has acquiesced in a suggestion that its members might be consulted in a personal capacity and as in no sense representing the Church of England.

With regard to documents and references, it is suggested that Miss Wallace (who has been on the secretarial staff of the Council) should continue to act for one fourth of her time in that capacity and that no restriction be imposed on her use of the body of information in the Council's office. The remaining three-fourths of her time would be at the disposal of the Ministry - her salary being borne in corresponding portions. (30)

26. In May 1940 an Anglican delegation, including Douglas, visited Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria. Arranged by the Bishop of Gibraltar, Harold Buxton, with the approval of Lang and the assistance of the Ministry, the purpose of the visit was to counter German propaganda aimed at winning support from the Orthodox faithful. (31) In Yugoslavia the delegation visited the King and the Orthodox Patriarch and the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The delegation was deemed a success, not least owing to the strength of the virulent and persistent indictments from German wireless and press which condemned it as an 'English spiritual offensive'. The positive outcome and the absence of public criticism contributed toward overcoming the 'extreme, even excessive sensitiveness' of the early planning memoranda which reflected the fear that the Division would be seen as a department for exploiting religion and using the churches for merely political ends. (32) It also confirmed the value of religious propaganda.

27. Staffed by clergymen and advised by church leaders, Religions Division was naturally aware of the dangers inherent in presenting God as a national champion. However, as Maclennan explained to the Director General, Lord Perth, in August 1940: 'the Nazi regime has openly derided Christianity and announced that it is setting up a new religion. The Christian issue has therefore become much more important than in previous wars, where both sides invoked the same creed.' (33) It became more important still when, following Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Britain became allied to a 'godless' state. British propaganda responded to aspersions on its sincerity and spirituality by maintaining that the alliance with the Soviet Union in no way altered British opposition to communism nor the claim to be 'fighting to retain the spiritual heritage of the Christian West'. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Information felt their task to be severely undermined and complicated as Religious Division was confronted with a difficult situation. (34) Notably, the Church of England played a crucial role in helping to resolve this complex dilemma.

28. Within the Ministry the creation of a favourable religious situation in Russia was considered an invaluable way of justifying the British war effort to the international community. Although a degree of ignorance characterised Ministry awareness of Russia's religious life, as indeed was common generally within Whitehall, they knew it had been steadily improving in recent years, confirmed by the failure of the massive German efforts to win Russian ecclesiastics to their side. In Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, newly incorporated into the Soviet Union, the Catholic and Lutheran clergy, generally pro-German and always anti-Bolshevik, welcomed the invasion and hoped it would help them in some instances. But in the Uniate and Orthodox Polish Ukraine the clergy were either neutral or
frankly favoured the Soviet Government, despite the Germans establishing a special Orthodox hierarchy in the parts they occupied. German propaganda transmitted religious broadcasts, scattered religious leaflets, re-opened churches and organised solemn services of thanksgiving in occupied towns. The German failure to attract Russian clergy can be partially explained by the steady improvement of their position under the Soviet regime. Since 1936, when civil rights were restored to the clergy, the Soviet Government had been obliged to make many concessions to the Church, which culminated in the restoration of the Christian week and the compulsory observance of Sunday in June 1940, against all protests of the Godless Union. Such concessions by no means meant the conversion to Christianity of the Soviet State, which remained officially godless. (35)

29. The Ministry wanted to use evidence of an improved climate for religion in their propaganda and cabled the British Embassy in Moscow for the latest information, asking: 'Are there signs of greater official leniency? Is the anti-God campaign active? What signs of popular religious revival have been manifested? In reporting please differentiate between what should and should not be used for publicity purposes.' (36) The reply from the Ambassador, Stafford Cripps, declared the subject impossible to pronounce upon for a foreigner, although, with regard to Moscow itself he doubted there was a real religious revival, seeing no significance in increased church attendance other than war-time stress and attributing the inactivity of the anti-God campaign to a preoccupation with war matters. He thought it inadvisable to make religion in Russian a propaganda issue:

Opposition to religion being notoriously an integral part of the Soviet ideology, I question the wisdom of any officially-inspired propaganda purporting to show - even if it were true - that the regime was going back on its principles (with the inevitable implication that it was doing so for reasons of self-preservation). The Soviet Government would not thank us for such propaganda, since they have no more wish to renounce their principles than have His Majesty's Government to renounce theirs. The only thing which might conceivably cause them to welcome this propaganda line would be evidence of such a lack of public sympathy in Great Britain for the Soviet war effort as might seriously embarrass His Majesty's Government in their practical efforts to assist the Soviet Union. No such evidence is afforded by anything I have seen or heard since the war, and plenty is available of His Majesty's Government's determination to assist this country regardless of ideological differences. (37)

30. Church leaders of all kinds, from the Archbishop of Canterbury downwards, had made it clear that Russia was the victim of aggression and was entitled to the fullest support from Britain. Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, tried to alleviate Christian misgivings about the religious situation in Russia through an address delivered at an American Chamber of Commerce luncheon. It proved far from adequate, consisting mainly of an account of the legal means meant the conversion to Christianity of the Soviet State, which remained officially godless. (35)

31. The Ministry's main concern was public opinion in those nations which remained uncommitted. Fear and dislike of Russian religious policy had proven an important reinforcement for Axis sympathisers on the Continent. Britain's alliance with Russia led to bitter criticism in Finland, and doubts in Sweden. Countries like Switzerland and Hungary appeared adversely affected, also South America, South Africa and the Dutch East Indies. All Axis controlled wireless stations made play daily with the Soviet's religious record, using it in an attempt to prove Britain's hypocrisy when she spoke of spiritual values. Above all, the Ministry was extremely disturbed by attitudes within the USA: 'In America this is a serious question. "Shall we fight for Russia" - sums up the attitude of unfriendly Catholics and Protestants.' (39) A sense of frustration marked policy-making in Religions Division:

The Religions Division have not felt it wise to emphasise items of news giving apparent signs of religious activity in Russia, feeling that this would give a false impression of the facts. Sir Stafford Cripps has expressed the conviction that the Russians would not welcome publicity on these lines.

If at any time the Soviet Government felt able to relax restrictions on the teaching of religion this would be a real item of news worth disseminating, although to do so now might suggest that Russia was only doing it in desperation.

Religious circles in Britain are prepared to stand by Russia and hope a better day will dawn for religion. They do not want to cash in on Russia's military emergency to extract relaxations under duress.

It must be realised, however, that the whole spiritual presentation of our case is hampered by the Soviet record (especially by the officially favoured Anti-God movement). (40)

32. With evidence accumulating of Germany presenting itself in Russia as the champion of Christianity, even of the Catholic Church, official views conflicted as to whether or not Britain should actively promote religious freedom in the Soviet Union, either through direct pressure on the Soviet Government or covert encouragement of the Orthodox Church. The British Representative to the Holy See, D'Arcy Osborne, reported Hitler's use of religious forces for cultural propaganda in occupied Russia, with an eye to embarrassing the British cause with the Vatican and in Catholic countries and warned of the possibilities of collaboration in the religious field between the Germans, the Poles and the Jesuits. (41)

33. The Foreign Office recognised the importance of being 'able to show to the world that there is not more religious freedom in German occupied Russia than in Soviet Russia itself.' (42) However, Osborne was advised:

Our general conclusion is that we must be, so far as religious propaganda is concerned, on the defensive against Germany - a not very difficult task in principle, in view of the uncompromising anti-Christian attitude of the present German regime. But to go beyond this into an active policy of persuasion of the Soviet Government would at present be useless and indeed harmful. A modification of the Soviet policy in a direction to satisfy the religious sentiments of Christians here and in the Allied countries may come slowly and unobtrusively, and we will certainly watch for any signs of this. But with such a delicate growth the slightest forcing may well prove fatal. (43)

34. Reviewing the situation in June 1942, Herbert Waddams, an Anglican priest and Senior-Assistant Specialist of Religions Division, appointed on the recommendation of Bishop Bell, recalled that the Soviet authorities had many reasons for a deep distrust of Christians outside Russia vis-à-vis their internal plans for their country. Generally speaking Christian opinion had been universally hostile ever since the revolution, and Waddams saw this hostility as being the most important single factor in the present situation. He endorsed the Foreign Office policy of non-interference with the observation:

The paramount consideration is that confidence should be established in the minds of the Soviet authorities that Christians outside Russia have no counter-revolutionary intentions of any kind. This effect can only be achieved by great patience and circumspection. Any interference or suggestions to the Soviets, however well intentioned, are likely to have the very opposite effect of what is desired. The Soviet authorities must first be convinced that a spiritual alliance with world-wide Christianity is entirely to their advantage. When that conviction is established everything else will follow as a matter of course. (44)

35. The wisdom of this policy appeared borne out in September 1942 when the Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev and Galicia, Exarch of the Ukraine and administrator of the Moscow Patriarchate visited the diplomatic corps in Kuibyshev and presented a copy of the newly published Religious Communities In the U.S.S.R., which conveyed an overly positive account, to say the least, of the religious situation. More importantly, in the course of conversation he suggested that an interchange of visits between Church of England and Russian Orthodox Church dignitaries would be welcome. Along with this proposal, the embassy in Kuibyshev conveyed to London its own doubts regarding compliance, reminding the Foreign Office that it was too early to assume any
fundamental change in the attitude of the Soviet Government or the Communist Party towards religion as such and that, without being unduly cynical, one could conclude that the Government and the Church had come to an understanding, tacit or otherwise. (45)

36. The Ministry of Information was informed about the proposed visit, but was advised that it would not be consulted officially until the Foreign Office had examined the political aspects of the proposal and made preliminary investigations. It was stressed that the Metropolitan would not have made such a suggestion without the prior agreement of the Soviet Government. (46) This did not prevent the Ministry from being immediately alive to the advantageous propaganda potential of the proposal. Martin told H.P. Smollett, the Ministry's Soviet Relations officer, that he wanted the Ministry consulted as propaganda issues of the greatest importance were raised, not only in Britain but in America and the world generally. Much might depend upon the handling of the suggestion, and Martin wanted the Foreign Office to recognise the interest of the Ministry before any approach was made to the British churches. (47)

37. Before acting on the proposal, the Foreign Office consulted the Americans who were known to be active on the religious front. For reasons of domestic politics and as part of his long term plans for a postwar international organisation, President Roosevelt hoped to promote religious toleration in the Soviet Union. Although the Metropolitan of Kiev had recently been refused a visa to visit the United States, (48) Washington clearly had no objection as discussions about the proposal subsequently took place between the Foreign Office, the new Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the Ministry of Information and the new Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple. On balance it was decided that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. A major advantage was an offer from the extremely patriotic Archbishop of York, Cyril Forster Garbett, to lead the delegation. Second only to the Archbishop of Canterbury, his high rank and personal prestige would generate considerable publicity and make the visit a notable event from the historical as well as the political perspective. (49)

38. It was deemed preferable for a British delegation to visit the Soviet Union first, with the Orthodox delegation subsequently making a return visit as, it was suggested, a British delegation could emphasise the potential dangers of openly exploiting the exchange for propaganda and reach some agreement with the Orthodox hierarchy, and through them with the Soviet Government, as to the conduct of a Russian delegation. The real concern of the Foreign Office, whose traditional anti-Sovietism remained deeply ingrained, was that the exchange should be so conducted as to maximise the propaganda value for the Allied cause without becoming a propaganda coup for the Soviet Union. They wanted to make the Anglo-Soviet alliance acceptable, not the Soviet regime. In this they received the complete cooperation of Temple and Garbett.

39. The Foreign Office considered that if an Anglican delegation visited the Soviet Union, other Christian denominations might wish to send delegations of their own. The ecumenically minded William Temple had no objection to delegations of other Christian denominations making parallel, but separate, visits. Garbett, however, was totally opposed to the delegation including or being accompanied by ministers of other denominations. He adamantly told Waddams that he would not be prepared to go on with the arrangements unless the visit was confined strictly to one from the Church of England to the Orthodox Church. (50)

40. Like Lang before him, Temple was wary of the Church becoming implicated in purely political activities. He requested that religious priorities be emphasised and submitted for Foreign Office approval a statement about the visit to Russia which he had revised 'to lay a little more emphasis on the fact that this is a visit of the Church of England to the Church of Russia and is not a political move in any sense'. He conceded that 'no doubt it may do something towards helping friendship between the two countries which of course one welcomes for its own sake.' (51)

41. Temple expressed apprehension about the danger of politics being introduced into the proceedings by the Russians as a means of emphasising the necessity of the Anglican delegation maintaining the appearance of religion being their main priority:

I have no doubt that from the standpoint of the Russian Government the interest in any such visit will be primarily political and that as concerns both their own internal situation and the appearance they present to the world. But there must be no doubt about the fact that our interest in it is primarily religious. I imagine this would be understood already but it would have to be quite clear, and I hope the eclesiastics whom our delegation might meet would take the same attitude; but we should have to be patient with them if their interest is quite as much in exhibiting their emancipation from something like solitary confinement as in the promotion of Christian brotherhood. There is all the more reason why we should be quite clear that the latter is our real aim. Of course I know this is what is uppermost in your mind. (52)

42. As Temple no doubt knew, it was not at all what was uppermost in the Division's mind. Martin, moreover, made this clear by defending the legitimacy of the political purpose and in such a way as to intimate that he and Temple alike knew that political and not religious considerations were at the heart of the visit's raison d'être. Nonetheless, he agreed with Temple that the British had to present an appearance of religious interests predominating.

43. Despite insisting that the visit was solely for religious reasons, the Church of England opposed any discussion of substantive religious issues. There was no question, for example, of reunion discussions. Officially the exchange was presented simply as a gesture of goodwill; unofficially it was much more, as an assessment sent to Temple by Martin, examining Soviet motives behind the proposal and indicating British interest, clearly revealed. (53) It included, for example, the results of a survey which covered 'the more intelligent members of all sections of the population' which demonstrated that of all those who felt there were obstacles to a proper understanding between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, 72% named Soviet treatment of religion as the chief difficulty. (54)

44. Temple's caution was partially influenced by his concern that post-war relations with the German churches might be adversely affected should the Anglican Church appear to have been implicated in a purely political exercise with the Russian Orthodox Church. He explained to Martin: '... one of the things to be watched is our relationship with the German Church in years to come: I expect the Russian Church is not very sensitive about the avoidance of its own utilisation for genuinely political ends.' (55) Temple thought the Russian Church too subservient to its communist masters for whom he had a natural aversion, articulated during his preparation of a statement opposing fascism for the Foreign Office: 'I do not think there need be any difficulty about this, apart from my difficulty of distinguishing between Fascism and Communism!' (56)

45. Temple's reservations about certain aspects of Church participation in the war effort were not shared by his co-primate. Garbett appeared largely unconcerned by the implications of the visit or his role. He was well briefed by the Foreign Office which arranged for him to meet significant statesmen whom it was felt would provide him with a clearer, deeper insight into what was expected of him. These included Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, Kenneth Grubb, Controller of Overseas Propaganda and Ivan Maisky, the Russian Ambassador. He also received confidential reports from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Information and the British embassy in Moscow. These papers were provided for the archbishop's information with requests they be returned to source; little therefore remains in his private papers, apart from the instructions for their return. (57) One Ministry memorandum, 'Religion in the Soviet Union', Garbett omitted to return. The guidelines it gave for Ministry propaganda toward this subject notably influenced the content of the speeches he subsequently gave on this question following his return from Moscow. The memorandum stated:

The main purpose of any propaganda by the Ministry in this connection will be to explode the German claim that they are the leaders of a Christian crusade against Godless Bolshevism. Here it is useless and extremely harmful to try to maintain that there has never been any persecution of the Churches in the Soviet Union, or that present day conditions are satisfactory and provide complete religious freedom
according to Western democratic standards. Such efforts can be too easily and convincingly denied, and they also have the effect of offending a great many Christians who know very well that such statements do not correspond to the facts.

The best approach is probably a positive one. Like the Governments of the Soviet Union and Great Britain, Christians in these two countries look forward to an era of more fruitful cooperation and understanding together, and they hope to develop this without the necessity for useless recrimination about the past. For a direct attack on the German claim about a crusade it should be sufficient to insist:

1. Christian leaders in the U.S.S.R. are supporting the war effort there in every way they possibly can.

2. The Nazi regime has been notable for a great many attempts to undermine the Churches and to crush Christian leaders. Many Nazi leaders have associated themselves with a blood and race religion which is nothing more than a return to the worship of ancient pagan German Gods. Open persecution of Christians is one of the typical expressions of Nazi power, and many examples can be provided from Germany, Norway, Belgium, Holland and other countries - notably Orthodox Yugoslavia.

In addition to the two points specified above, the following may also be noticed:

3. It is useful to stress that the Churches in Germany, Norway and elsewhere did not take part in pronouncements in favour of the Anti-Bolshevik crusade although the Nazis did their best to procure their backing.

4. In the long run an important way of countering enemy propaganda about Godlessness in the U.S.S.R., and our implication in it, is to put out material showing that Britain still stands by the European cultural tradition in law and religion. Information about the life and work of the British Churches as going concerns is of great interest and value abroad and should not always be narrowly propagandist. Evidence that Britain is still in some sense a Christian country is quite as valuable in many countries as attacks on Hitler's anti-Christian policy. (58)

46. Garbett insisted there be a formal invitation from the Russian Orthodox Church and deemed it necessary that the Soviet Government express their approval of the visit beforehand to prevent the Soviet authorities subsequently claiming they had merely given in to the requests of the Church and that it was purely a private matter. (59) In contrast with Temple's concern that religion appear paramount, Garbett actively sought to maximise Foreign Office involvement. He stressed to Waddams the importance of constant and close contact with the British embassy, and asked that arrangements be made for an embassy interpreter and liaison officer to be constantly with the delegation in case 'advice' were required. He also volunteered to call on political leaders if the Foreign Office thought it desirable. Subsequently, the British embassy in Moscow was informed by the Foreign Office that Garbett would be very willing to call upon Molotov and would welcome the opportunity of an interview with Stalin, if the embassy agreed. (60) An interview was secured with Molotov but not Stalin who was said to be away at the Front.

47. Garbett's interaction with the various departments of state and officialdom was such that when at one point it seemed possible that medical reasons might prevent his undertaking the venture, there was consternation within the Ministry. Martin confided to Temple, 'If I may express an opinion on the point it would be a great disappointment to me if it was not possible for the Archbishop of York to undertake this visit as he seems to be in every way the ideal person for it.' (61) The Foreign Office were equally impressed with the archbishop. Anthony Eden told him:

I gather from the F.O. that things are moving most satisfactorily for the autumn visit.

They are very pleased with your mastery of the subject! And think you the ideal person.

Let me know if I can help at all. (62)

48. While the Ministry and the churches were now much more relaxed about wartime cooperation, it remained essential to the efficacy of Ministry propaganda that the churches maintain an appearance of acting independently rather than under state direction. This engendered lengthy correspondence between the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office about the matter of under whose auspices Garbett's visit was to be conducted and who was to provide the finance, as the Foreign Office wanted to ensure that the Church appeared 'an independent agent' and not 'under the direction of the Foreign Office'. They were therefore doubtful whether from the Church's point of view, it is wise for H.M.G. to pay the expenses as this 'would give a political colouring to the whole thing'. (63)

49. These considerations were put to Garbett by Martin who advised the archbishop that while there was no difficulty in 'producing the necessary funds', there was concern that Garbett 'might be put in an embarrassing position afterwards if you are asked who paid for the journey and had to explain that the Government did. This might be seen to infer 'that the Church was being used for political ends'. (64) Garbett fully understood the dilemma, which he discussed with Temple, who rather practically responded: 'I do not think we should let the Government pay for us unless it is paying for the other delegations that go out; but if they pay for all those whose visits they facilitate, of course they may as well pay ours also.' (65) Temple was willing to provide some of the cost. Garbett considered the affair of such importance that he was quite prepared to pay his own passage from funds available to him at York if need be. 'The possibilities of the visit are so important that I should not like the question of cost to stand in the way.' (66)

50. The Treasury subsequently received notification from Warner that Mr. Eden trusted that the Treasury authority would be forthcoming for the Foreign Office to meet the travelling expenses of the Anglican delegation from Subhead 1 (Special Missions) of the Diplomatic and Consular Vote. Included was an air passages being borne out of Foreign Office funds.' (69)

51. An alteration made by Waddams to a goodwill message prepared by Temple for the Russian Patriarch tellingly revealed that propaganda was prioritised with the Church's acquiescence. Temple made no objection to the changes made by Waddams who explained:

In the phrase 'We share with all our countrymen the admiration and gratitude' I have omitted 'and gratitude' at the request of our Soviet Relations Division, as we are anxious not to express too much gratitude to the Soviet Union, because to do so is to play their game. (70)

52. Just prior to Garbett's departure for Moscow, the news was received that Stalin had agreed to the meeting of a Sobor (an ecclesiastical synod, council or assembly of the Eastern Orthodox Church) for the election of a new Patriarch, not allowed since the revolution. Waddams considered this exceedingly significant event and the timing of its announcement to be a consequence of the forthcoming Anglican visit to the Russian Church. (71)
53. Garbett was accompanied to Russia by Waddams and another Anglican cleric, Francis House. Like Waddams, House was also connected to Britain's wartime propaganda machinery. He worked for the BBC. The delegation departed for Moscow on 15 September 1943, carrying a joint message from Garbett and Temple which expressed sympathy and admiration for the Russian Church and people and affirmed the unity of their two churches in the service of the Lord. (72) No mention was made of fascism as the intended joint statement had been abandoned at the request of the Metropolitan Nikolai. (73) Garbett was the first Archbishop of York to visit Russia since the more private and informal visit of Archbishop Maclagan in 1897. Made at a time when the tide of war was turning against the German invaders and the U.S.S.R. was of immense topical interest to the peoples in the West, Garbett's visit was to capture the popular imagination and project him onto the world stage, transforming his ministry from that of pastoral bishop to ecclesiastical statesman.

54. The embassy was delighted by the highly favourable impression made on the Russian Church and the Russian people by the delegation and anticipated long term credit. Indeed, the following year Ambassador Kerr was to report to the Foreign Office that the wider facilities then accorded religion in the Soviet Union were generally ascribed to British influence, a fact which the Foreign Office observed would please the Soviet authorities less than the devout. (74) Remarkng that he saw little likelihood of any set-back in the trend towards allowing a greater measure of tolerance to the Russian Church, Kerr was certain that the Russian authorities would have observed with satisfaction the favourable references to the present attitude of the Soviet regime towards religion which the archbishop's visit had elicited in the newspapers of their English speaking allies. In particular, the visit received widespread coverage in the United States, to which country Garbett subsequently took the message about freedom of religion in the Soviet Union in March 1944, at the behest of Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington, and Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information. Religious groups and institutions in the US were powerful opinion formers and had already set their sights firmly on the postwar world. Roosevelt did not want objections to his plans for postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union, the necessity of which was a major theme in Garbett's addresses to the American people. (75)

55. The one discordant note was that no publicity had been given to a message of goodwill to the Russian nation which, with the permission of Molotov, had been forwarded to the Patriarchate prior to Garbett's arrival. Kerr rather thought that this was perhaps in deference to the susceptibilities of 'the rank and file of zealous party members'. (76)

56. Following his return from the Soviet Union, Garbett was in great demand to broadcast, write and give addresses about his experiences and the conditions he had observed. The extent of the interest in the Soviet Union was such that Garbett found himself inundated with letters and cables. He was even summoned to a private audience with the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. Peers besieged him when he returned to the Lords. The BBC Director of Broadcasting in the Northern Region assured him that his visit had caused the greatest interest in the factories, and that his broadcast, 'Postscript', was one of the most important that they had ever had. Garbett reported to the Archbishop of Canterbury and to the Orthodox Archbishop Germanos on his mission to the Russian Patriarchate. He was invited to lunch at 10 Downing Street, and with Maisky at the Soviet Embassy; he had an interview with the exiled President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Benes, and was informed by the Minister of Education, R.A. Butler, that his visit to Russia had had a great effect on public opinion: it had reassured the timid, and it was good for Labour to feel that the Church had done this.' (77)

57. President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Benes, and was informed by the Minister of Education, R.A. Butler, that his visit to Russia 'had had a great effect on public opinion: it had reassured the timid, and it was good for Labour to feel that the Church had done this.' (77)

58. Garbett met and discussed his experiences with the Foreign Office Research Department. The account given to F.O.R.D. contrasted markedly with that released by the Church of England press bureau for consumption by the general public. For example, Garbett's Presidential address to the Convocation of York struck a defensive note from the beginning, declaring: 'The purpose of the visit was religious and not political.' (80) Garbett also claimed that the correspondence which was to take place between the two Churches was to be 'on matters of theology and religion'. Equally of interest in Garbett's references to his visit was that they conformed to the Ministry of Information injunction that while it was necessary to create support for Russia, it was unwise to generate popular enthusiasm. Garbett took care to distinguish between the Russian nation and the communist regime, in line with Ministry propaganda.

59. There was concern within the British administration that Soviet successes might generate too much popular interest in and too much support for Russia. Conservative quarters feared that a positive view of the Soviet Union would serve to promote the cause of socialism, and even that of communism. Garbett's biographer has implied that his attitude to Russia was sympathetic, but that he was an acute observer of the facts who put forward the best possible interpretation without making unduly optimistic inferences about situations of which he was insufficiently informed. Smyth noted that Garbett was careful to say 'There is complete freedom of religious worship in Russia today': but, though he was sometimes misrepresented by journalists, he was careful not to say, 'There is complete freedom of religion.' Similarly in the life of the Soviet Union he admitted the trend away from the 'early Communist practices, while making it clear that this did not touch the essence of the Communist way of life. (81)

60. Smyth omitted to mention, however, that Garbett offered a differing tone and emphasis according to his audience. In an address to Convocation he should be kept informed of all correspondence and that it would supervise any programme that might be arranged for the Russian delegation. (78) Waddams opined: it had reassured the timid, and it was good for Labour to feel that the Church had done this.' (77)

61. The fact was, as Garbett informed Christopher Warner, that he cut his cloth according to his audience. He told Warner that his public speeches were guarded: 'In speaking privately I have made it very plain that the State is still Atheistic, and there are large numbers of people in Russia who probably do not approve of the attitude of the State towards religion. Publicly I have been saying this rather more cautiously.' (82) Too cautiously for the Reverend J.C. Heenan, subsequently Cardinal Heenan, Archbishop of Westminster, who had himself recently been in Russia. (83) Reflecting the growing alarm caused by Red Army victories within sectors of the Roman Catholic Church, Heenan repudiated Garbett's account of religion in Russia. His response to the large Russian congregations described by Garbett, House and Waddams, was to point out that in a city like Moscow with a large population, where there were very few churches, those that were open would naturally appear full. He also believed that these congregations had been 'rigged' for the distinguished visitors.

62. Heenan pointed out that in 1919 the population of Moscow had been two million and there were 560 churches. Now it had a population of four million and there were twenty-two churches. He argued that not until the Russian leaders had given proof of returning sincerely to the supernatural past of their mystical land would there be any real change for the better. Heenan repudiated Garbett's version of religious developments in Russia and he passed a severe indictment on the Anglican delegation: 'Those who, in full knowledge of this fact, still insist there is no religious persecution in Russia are enemies of Christ's Church.' (84) Garbett was most certainly not an enemy of Christ's Church. He was also, however, an ally of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information. For Garbett, Church and State were both instruments of God. (85)
63. During the war the Church of England and the State worked together to ensure an appearance of ecclesiastical independence which preserved the Church's moral authority. This, in turn, added credibility and potency to Britain's religious propaganda. So successful was this strategy that a recent monograph on the resurgence of Christianity was able to state: 'After the end of the Second World War it seemed that the realm of politics had finally broken away from religion.' (86) This was not the case in postwar Britain, nor the United States. (87) In the postwar era both countries put Christian values at the core of their Cold War anti-communist propaganda. (88) This was facilitated in Britain by the mode of operation established in the war between Church and State, circumventing popular twentieth century prejudice which was seemingly suspicious of religious and political collaboration.

64. Influenced by the valuable contribution made by Religions Division to Ministry propaganda, in June 1944 Maclean suggested there were extensive grounds for paying attention to religious publicity after the war:

> In this connection it must be remembered that the Christian Church, Catholic and Protestant, is the oldest international society in existence and although its fabric has been partly weakened by the acids of modernity there remains throughout the world a network of religious contacts of very considerable importance.... It is clearly much to the interest of Great Britain that this world wide, though at present inadequately organised force, should have full scope as an influence for international cooperation for all purposes. (89)

65. Maclean considered the fact that the churches had 'become accustomed to the existence of Religions Division', which on the whole they had welcomed, would facilitate organised church-state cooperation in the international sphere. He suggested supervision of such an enterprise be assigned to the British Council as the churches would not feel the same difficulty about cooperating with the British Council as they might about cooperating with the Government. In January 1945 the Reverend R.R. Williams, a specialist in the Protestant section of the Division, recommended that plans 'should be made for a small office to be opened, preferably at the Foreign Office, which in substance, and perhaps in name could be an Overseas Religious Relations Branch.' (90) Kenneth Grubb, a leading Anglican layman as well as Controller of Overseas Propaganda in the Ministry, supported this suggestion. Stressing the part played in British history and contemporary British thought by religion, Grubb argued:

> the desire of the religious bodies themselves to pursue their own international connections is a spontaneous one and they need, not so much stimulation, as some guidance and help which would seem most naturally to come from the Foreign Office.

66. Grubb was right, as revealed by arguments put to CFR's Peace Aims Group by Waddams. Developing the theme as early as February 1944 that the problem of postwar reconstruction could legitimately be termed a spiritual problem, Waddams posited that:

> Our experience in this war has conclusively shown how political objectives are related to religious beliefs. For purposes of work the two may be separated, but they must go hand in hand and must not be allowed to be contradictory in any particular. The religious and the political must be two aspects of the same activity. (91)

67. Following the war, Waddams replaced Douglas as secretary of CFR and developed a close working relationship with the Foreign Office, in particular with IRD, its anti-communist section. Equally of interest, the Archbishop of York became a renowned ecclesiastical statesman, travelling all over the globe, speaking in support of British policies and, in particular, promoting the anti-communist, anti-Soviet Cold War consensus. Garbett had committed himself to the war effort without qualification and his wartime service on behalf of the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Office profoundly shaped his attitude towards propaganda and to serving his country. In 1945 Winston Churchill described him as the 'Archiepiscopal Ulysses'. This acclamation from the nation's preeminent war-leader gives some indication of the esteem accorded the archbishop in the political realm by the end of the war. (92) For Garbett and Waddams, the war confirmed their perceptions that the secular and spiritual were complementary. In the Cold War which followed the World War, both became Cold Warriors, helping the state resist another enemy of God, this time Stalin instead of Hitler.

68. The nature of the relationship between Church and State was viewed by Garbett and Waddams from a perspective common to the Anglican leadership, not as the subjugation by one of the other, but a partnership equally beneficial to both. (93) The wartime cooperation of the Church of England with Religions Division illustrated the prevalent conviction of its hierarchy that though there are two foci in man's life - God and country - these two apparently separated, but they must go hand in hand and must not be allowed to be contradictory in any particular. The religious and the political must be two aspects of the same activity. (91)

Notes for Article 4

5. Ibid., pp. 33-56. Back
8. Public Record Office (henceforth PRO) INF 1 38, Memorandum on proposed organisation, 6 September 1939. Back
11. PRO, INF 1 403, 'Memorandum for Minister: Meetings Arranged September 1939'. Back
12. Memorandum on the Project of a Nazi controlled Orthodox Church for Central Europe, no date or signature but place in file suggests written during Nazi-Soviet pact; CFR Papers, Lambeth Palace Library. Back
The Church of England and 'Religions Division' during the Second World War... 

44. PRO, INF 1 790, Waddams, 'Notes on the Question of Religion in Russia and its Bearing on Allied Propaganda', 25 June 1942. Back

30. INF 1 38, Proposed by Maclennan to Mr. Aynsley, Establishment, 27 November 1939; Approved by D.B. Woodburn, 28 November 1939. Back


28. INF1 38, K. Maclennan, 'Memo on Contacts with Orthodox and Old Catholics', 25 October 1939. Back

27. INF1 38, Mr. Syme to Mr. Carr, 'Importance of the Orthodox Church', 26 October 1939. Back

25. PRO, INF 1 38, 'Memo on Contacts with Orthodox and Old Catholics', K. Maclennan, 25 October 1939. Back


22. PRO, INF 1 38, Dr. Jackh replying on behalf of Gen. Charles to Lord Hailey, 5 October 1939. Back


18. PRO, INF 1 38, 'Memo on Contacts with Orthodox and Old Catholics', K. Maclennan, 25 October 1939. Back

17. PRO, INF 1 769, Douglas to Martin, 23 June 1941. Back

16. PRO, INF 1 769, A.C. Don to K. Maclennan, 3 May 1940. Back

15. PRO, INF 1 769, Foreign Office to Usher, 27 April 1940. Back

14. Ibid., 'Secret Memo based on intercepts', R 56. This cites 'a Catholic Pole whose summary of the situation appears sufficiently well-considered to warrant an extensive quotation'. CFR papers often contain copies of documents, as is the case in this instance, which appear to have been sent by either the Foreign Office or the Ministry of Information. Back

13. Ibid., 'Secret Memo based on intercepts', R 56. This cites 'a Catholic Pole whose summary of the situation appears sufficiently well-considered to warrant an extensive quotation'. CFR papers often contain copies of documents, as is the case in this instance, which appear to have been sent by either the Foreign Office or the Ministry of Information. Back

12. PRO, INF 1 790, 'Religious Reaction to British Cooperation with Russia', unsigned memorandum, n.d., but obviously soon after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Back

11. PRO, INF 1 790, 'The Church and the Regime', report by Serge Bolshakoff, Secretary of the Academy of Christian Sociologists. The usual argument put forward for Stalin's changed attitude to the Church was its support of the war effort and his desire to return something to the people, who had never lost their faith, for all they were enduring. Bolshakoff saw a much more scientific rationale for the changing attitudes toward religion, although he recognised the contribution of the war in hastening the process:

\[\text{The fact is that the now ruling class in Russia consists of two very different groups. The first is the Stalinist party bureaucracy, and the second consists of the technicians and experts upon whom the economic life of the Soviet depends. In this second group nationalist tendencies are very strong, and so is religious belief. The Russians know that the Soviet regime can only be stabilised by intimate cooperation between these groups, or even by their fusion.} \]

The Bulletin, private publication of Bolshakoff. Back

10. PRO, INF 1 790, Osborne to Foreign Office, n.d. but clearly follows German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Copy sent by the Foreign Office to the Ministry of Information. In another file, INF 786, another undated memorandum, marked Sturmheim, clearly from the same period, stated: 'I think it is the right moment to ask the Russian Government to restore religious freedom.... The Bolsheviks... will be more accessible under the present circumstances. At any rate it is worthwhile to make an attempt and to ask the Russian Government to restore religious freedom'. Back

9. PRO, INF 1 790, Memorandum, unsigned, 1 October 1941. Back

8. PRO, INF 1 790, A.W.G. Randall to Osborne, 22 December 1941. Back

45. PRO, INF 1 790, Mr. Baggallay on behalf of the Ambassador, British Embassy Kuibyshev to Anthony Eden, 20 September 1942. Back

46. PRO, INF 1 769, Smollett to Grubb, Secret, 'Religion in Russia', 21 September 1942. Back

47. PRO, INF 1 792, Martin to Smollett, 12 October 1942. Back

48. PRO, FO 371 36961, Warner to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 8 February 1943. In the USA the Russian Orthodox community numbered some 500,000. The situation was complicated, as the Head of the Russian Church recognized by the largest number of Orthodox believers was the Metropolitan Theophile, an adherent of the violently anti-Soviet Karlovci Synod who had done all he could to hinder American aid to Russia. In November 1943, however, the Foreign Office Research Department noted that congregations were going ahead of their clergy in their desire to recognize their affinity with the Soviet Union. One of the largest parishes in Chicago had recently transferred its allegiance from the Metropolitan Theophile to Metropolitan Benjamin, Exarch of the Moscow Patriarchate in North America. Metropolitan Benjamin was, moreover, expecting Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev to be paying a visit once a visa could be arranged. For a detailed study of the Russian Orthodox Church in the United States see Ralph Lord Roy, *Communism and the Churches*, New York 1960, pp. 378 - 403. Back

49. For a detailed account of Garbett's visit to Russia see D. Kirby, *Church, State and Propaganda: The Archbishop of York and International Relations, a Political Study of Cyril Forster Garbett*, Hull University Press, 1999. Back

50. PRO, FO 371 36961, Waddams, Notes of conversation with the Archbishop of York on 24. 6. 43. with regard to proposed visit of an Anglican delegation to the Russian Orthodox Church', Secret, 25 June 1943. Back

51. Temple to Williams, 16 September 1943; CFR Papers. Back

52. Temple to Martin, 27 May 1943; CFR Papers. Back

53. Martin to Temple, n.d. but most probably May/June 1943; Temple Papers, Lambeth Palace Library. Back

54. Ibid. Back

55. Temple to Martin, 20 April 1943; CFR Papers. Temple's attitude toward the Russian Orthodox Church changed considerably in 1943 after he read certain articles suggested to him by Douglas, following which he withdrew his opposition to the Russian Church's publication, *Religious Communities in the U.S.S.R.*, and actually encouraged its publication in Britain. See Temple-Douglas correspondence, 1943, CFR Papers. Back

56. Martin to Temple, 20 April 1943; CFR Papers. Back

57. There are a number of references in Garbett's correspondence to documents and reports which are not among his papers. A letter from Hugh Martin suggests that Garbett was expected to return the confidential reports and official Foreign Office despatches sent to him after perusal. Martin to Garbett, n.d.; Garbett Papers, York Minster Library. Back

58. Undated memorandum; Garbett Papers. Back

59. PRO, FO 371 36961, Garbett to Waddams, 28 June 1943. Back

60. PRO, FO 371 36961, Foreign Office to British Embassy, Moscow, 8 July 1943. Back

61. Martin to Temple, 21 May 1943; CFR Papers. Back

62. Eden to Garbett, 23 July 1943; Garbett Papers. Eden's emphasis (underlining). Back

63. PRO, FO 371 36961, G.W. Wilson, minute on 'Exchange of Visits between leaders of Russian Orthodox Church and Church of England', 10 July 1943. Back

64. Martin to Garbett, 16 July 1943; Garbett Papers. Back

65. Garbett to Temple, 17 July 1943; Temple to Garbett, 23 July 1943; Garbett Papers. Back

66. Garbett to Temple, 17 July 1943; Garbett Papers. Back


68. PRO, FO 371 39629, Correspondence between the Treasury's Mr. Wilcox and Mr. Warner of the F.O. in August 1943. Back


70. Waddams to Temple, 8 September 1943; CFR Papers. Back

71. Waddams to Temple, 'Confidential', 6 September 1943; CFR Papers. Back

72. Following the war, both House and Waddams found roles in the international sphere of religious relations. Waddams became General Secretary of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations and an Honorary Canon of Canterbury. House, formerly a General Secretary of the World Student Christian Federation, became Associate Secretary of the World Council of Churches in Geneva. Back

73. Waddams to Temple, 6 September 1943; CFR Papers. Back

74. Ibid. Back


76. Kerr to Eden, 1 October 1943; Garbett Papers. Back

77. Smyth, Garbett, p. 309. Back

78. Minutes, 16 November 1943; FO 371 36963. Back

79. Warner to Waddams, 2 December 1943; FO 371 36963. Back
80. Press release from Press Bureau of Church of England, 14 October 1943: 'Garbett's Presidential Address to Convocation of York'; CFR Papers. Garbett had stressed the non-political nature of the visit during a press conference in Moscow where he had pointed out that the delegation was from one church to another by invitation and was not a government delegation. House, 'Russian Visit'; Garbett Papers. Back


82. Garbett to Warner, 23 November 1943; Garbett concluded his letter with a reference to how much he was looking forward to dining with Warner. It was during this period that Garbett developed a friendly and close working relationship with the F.O.; FO 371 36963. Back

83. Graham, The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators (London 1973) p. 260. Graham's source was A.A. Informationsberichte über die politischen Kirchen (secret report for the R.S.H.A. chief), no. 82, 16 February 1944. There are some inaccuracies in Graham's references to Garbett's visit. He places it in 1942 instead of 1943 and refers to his being accompanied by the Reverend F Hoare instead of House. See p. 259. Back

84. Ibid., p. 261. Back

85. Kirby, Church, State and Propaganda. Back


89. PRO, INF 1 416, Maclellan, memorandum, June 1944. Back

90. PRO, INF 1 953, Recommendation, R.R. Williams, 12 January 1945. Back

91. Waddams, Confidential Memorandum, 11 February 1944; CFR Papers. Back

92. Kirby, Church, State and Propaganda. See also for a discussion of why, after his valuable wartime service, Garbett remained at York while Geoffrey Fisher was elevated to Canterbury, pp. 18-21. Back

93. For an authoritative discussion of Church-State relations, see Andrew Chandler’s The Church of England and the Obliteration Bombing of Germany in the Second World War, English Historical Review, October 1993, pp. 920-946. Back