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Common Security in Latin America

The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco

Mónica Serrano

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Mónica Serrano

Institute of Latin American Studies
31 Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9HA

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Mónica Serrano was Research Fellow at the Institute of Latin American Studies in 1990-91. She now teaches in the Centro de Estudios Internacionales at El Colegio de México.

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War has brought to the fore the question of the future security structure of the international system. The events accompanying the retreat of the Cold War have raised speculation about its impact on regional stability and the need for new security arrangements throughout the world. By the end of the 1980s the new international détente was accompanied by a shift in superpower behaviour with a new emphasis on de-escalation and non-violent resolution of regional conflicts. These changes have not only highlighted the role of indigenous factors in regional conflicts and the potential relaxation of important constraints on such conflicts, but also the likely attenuation of previous patterns of tension and violence, as military assistance and expenditures diminish.¹ Although attempts to draw a mechanical association between the end of the Cold War and regional instability could be seriously questioned, the concern with new approaches to security has been further reinforced by the impact of the Gulf War. The dramatic events in the Middle East have led to the focusing of attention on the role of collective security arrangements and regional approaches to security, as well as to the pressing problem of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, Moscow's withdrawal from its previous status as a world superpower has unleashed a period of significant reflection about the control of and the role to be played by nuclear weapons.

This paper attempts to assess the extent to which the concept of common security could be applied to Latin America and in particular to the regional non-proliferation regime. Although the notion of 'security regime' refers to the condition by which states observe and expect others to respect certain norms or rules of restraint in their military relations, the unique character of nuclear interdependence highlights the central role of common security. Consequently, it could be stated that both the global and the regional non-proliferation regimes represent important mechanisms for common security.

Since the early days of the nuclear age the prospects of nuclear annihilation have captured the concern of successive generations. Even though the possibility of a future free of nuclear weapons has become increasingly difficult to envisage, the process of coming to terms with the reality of nuclear weapons has proved equally complex and painful. The immensity of the stakes involved for humanity in an eventual use of nuclear weapons forced attention to focus

on new concepts and approaches to provide for national and international security. As Michael Howard has pointed out, in a world of sovereign states defence continued to be a necessity and nuclear war a ‘terrible possibility that nothing can now eradicate but of whose horrors we must never lose sight’.² Reactions to this dilemma have varied from absolutist arguments against nuclear weapons, which tend to assume the desirability and the possibility of the elimination of all means of warfare, to less ambitious but more successful efforts aimed at subjecting these weapons to various types of restraint and limitations, and finally, to more cynical attitudes in which the existence and the role of nuclear weapons are optimistically or pessimistically taken for granted.

The idea of the nuclear-free zone (NFZ) lies between the first and the second set of responses. According to one view, NFZs should be seen as the first step towards total and complete disarmament. This approach dominated the literature on arms control during the 1950s and provided the background for the discussion of the first set of nuclear-free zones. The view of arms control efforts as leading to total disarmament proved to be seriously flawed, not only for its low feasibility but above all for the untenable nature of its implicit assumptions. The fundamental problem of disarmament in the sense of the elimination of all means of warfare is not so much the impossibility of achieving such a goal as the inherent lack of meaning: ‘as long as men have hands with which to pick up stones war cannot be made physically impossible’.³ An alternative and more recent view sees NFZs as belonging to the wider arms control effort which is no longer considered as an end in itself but as a means towards the achievement of security against the nuclear danger. This posture recognises arms control as crucially important to the preservation of security, and above all, to the prevention of nuclear war. This version of NFZs acknowledges the reality of a nuclear world but it moves towards the goal of reducing and limiting its scope. It involves a change of emphasis from nuclear to non-nuclear forms of defence.

This shift in the perception of the potential role to be played by NFZs is closely linked, on the one hand to the events leading to the emergence of a nuclear dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, geared to managing their strategic relation, and on the other to the gradual emergence of a wider debate about alternative approaches to security. After a decade of unsuccessful negotiations, the focal point was shifted from measures designed either to remove nuclear weapons from world affairs or to maintain a nuclear monopoly, towards attempts to make their presence more tolerable. This latter approach enabled both superpowers to share responsibility for nuclear matters. Nuclear-free zones not only belong to this approach but they are also an exception to the pattern whereby concern with and the pursuit of nuclear arms control have been mostly been addressed by and delegated to the superpowers. In the idea of NFZs the goal of preventing an increase in the number of nuclear states is shared by both nuclear and non-nuclear states. This concept, therefore,

provides a basis for the conciliation of conflicting interests between the spheres of national and international security.⁴

Although Latin America has not been directly exposed to the dilemmas of extended nuclear deterrence, it has been widely acknowledged that the impact of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 made regional states aware of the risks involved in a nuclear crisis. What seems clear is that the Latin American NFZ has contributed to the renewed interest in the concept of NFZs from three main angles. Firstly, and to the extent that the Latin American non-proliferation regime has offered a framework to manage the impact of nuclear technology inroads on regional stability, it has highlighted the advantages of such schemes when compared with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Secondly, the Latin American example has also indicated the potential of NFZs for the development of common security postures. And thirdly, it has made clear the advantages of regional non-proliferation agreements over the NPT, to states reluctant to surrender nuclear development but willing to consider non-nuclear postures.

Following the Cuban missile crisis the Latin American states embarked on a regional denuclearisation effort. While it is true that the origins of this enterprise were, to a considerable extent, the result of the impact of the missile crisis throughout the region, the history of the negotiations leading to the signature of the 1967 Treaty of Tlateloco makes clear the support of both superpowers for the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone. It is possible to identify the Cuban crisis as providing ground for common interests in security both between the superpowers and between nuclear and non-nuclear states. This experience helped shift the superpowers' attitudes towards nuclear proliferation from bi-polar rivalry to gradual cooperation and also strengthened the positive value of non-nuclear status. The crucial point is that this event served as a catalyst for the setting up of a non-proliferation regime as a communal framework for security.⁵

The Latin American NFZ became the first denuclearised region embracing a significant number of states. The absence of either previous or subsequent successful negotiations in other parts of the world, together with the apparent impasse underlying its implementation during the 1970s, raised doubts as to the viability of NFZs as an effective model for arms control. Several reasons account for such general mistrust. Initially most of the proposals remained entangled with Cold War rivalries, but the inherent complexity of arms control negotiations was magnified by the fact that nuclear strategy was in a formative period. Besides, structural problems such as geostrategic location were further complicated by the lack of clear evidence as to the advantages of non-nuclear postures. The more favourable conditions generated by the state of détente between the United States and the USSR, of which their mutual interest in a non-proliferation regime was both expression and cause, were mostly employed in the *quid-pro-quo* approach of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was then

assumed that non-nuclear status could be made attractive through regulated access to ‘peaceful’ nuclear technology and effective arms control. As a result, most nuclear-free zone proposals were gradually abandoned and efforts concentrated on convincing the new nuclear states – China and India – to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, the transition from the ‘idealist’ towards a less ambitious view of arms control complicated any assessment of the actual potential of NFZs. Lastly, high levels of tension or the simple lack of sufficient conditions and/or necessary mechanisms precluded the materialisation of other initiatives.

Although it would be wrong to suggest that no obstacles have hindered the implementation of the Tlatelolco Treaty, it would be equally erroneous to deny those steps indicating clear progress in the direction of its original goals. Such progress has been the result, firstly, of the continued efforts of those parties explicitly convinced of the advantages attached to non-nuclear postures; secondly, of the concurrence of interests between those states and the superpowers’ concern with nuclear proliferation; thirdly of the presence of an international consensus favouring nuclear non-proliferation; fourthly, of the security dilemma inherent in the nuclear option; fifthly, of the favourable ground provided by NFZs for the development of common security interests; and finally, of the particular characteristics of NFZs which give such schemes the necessary flexibility to allow for adjustment as international circumstances change or require.

While it is true that there is no absolute consensus as to the proper meaning of common security, and some would argue that it remains an idea still in the process of being thoroughly clarified, several core elements are identifiable. Common security is devised to begin or encourage a process that will eventually contribute to stability and the reduction of tension. This is primarily sought through the stimulation of alternative thinking to that which has often accompanied arms races and conventional conflict, by encouraging the change of threatening habits and promoting the common interest in cooperative dynamics.⁶ In addition, common security not only departs from the assumption that, in the nuclear age, nuclear interdependence reveals the preeminence of nuclear survival over nuclear strategy, but emphasises the link between such interdependence and common interests. Common security also maintains that states seeking protection through unilateral zero-sum decisions are unlikely to achieve security. The security policies of states should take into account the position of opponents and should even contemplate eventual cooperation with adversaries. Finally, implicit in the idea of common security is the belief in the possibility of reversing the spiral of arms races associated with the security dilemma both through the adoption of a range of arms control, disarmament and confidence building measures and through non-threatening military strategies.⁷

To what extent is this notion of common security applicable to the Latin American non-proliferation regime? Which were the main elements providing a feeling of common insecurity, a sense of common endeavour and an eventual drive to common military cooperation? What have been the origins and tasks of Confidence Building Measures within the region?⁸ This paper will identify the factors leading to the adoption of common security postures in Latin America, within the context of the two main regionalist currents. The two dimensions of regionalism in the Western Hemisphere refer on the one hand to regional cooperation among Latin American states, dating back to the times of independence, and on the other to the Inter-American regionalism which originated in the 19th century and was soon associated with an indisputable US hegemony.

The underlying motivations leading to the creation of a non-proliferation regime in Latin America could be traced within the two traditions. On the one hand, such a regime was seen as enabling the Latin American states to set limits to US nuclear hegemony and to reduce the nuclear danger within the region, and on the other, its potential to buttress the virtual nuclear monopoly of the United States within the Western Hemisphere not only became clear to some of the participants, but most importantly, it provided a main source of opposition to the agreement. Despite this, the support of the United States was a crucial element in the successful completion of the agreement.

Responsibility for regional security and defence of the hemisphere had gradually been transferred to the United States. This process originated in the projection of American power over the region following the formulation of the Monroe doctrine in 1823. The 1898 Spanish War and the construction of the Panama Canal, at the turn of the century, laid the basis for US naval supremacy over both the Atlantic and the Pacific, and led to the Caribbean basin and the Mexican Gulf being seen as the ‘American Mediterranean’. During the 1930s, through its ‘Good Neighbours’ policy, the US had expanded its aegis over the whole of Latin America, asserting its responsibility for defending the region against foreign threats. By 1939 the perception of expansionist action by the Axis powers led to the adoption of a hemispheric strategy of collective responsibility. This strategy identified the Axis powers and their regional sympathisers as the fundamental threat, until the Cold War, when this threat was replaced by the Soviet Union and its Latin American affiliates, the communist parties in the region. In 1945 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff identified the following military-strategic objectives for Latin America: military cooperation for continental defence, securing the availability of strategic raw material, maintaining access to main air bases and ports, establishing military missions in all Latin American states and training Latin American military personnel in US war colleges.⁹

The postwar security regime was not only established under US leadership but it also reflected the hegemonic position of the United States in the region. It was embodied in the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Charter of the Organisation of American States and a number of bilateral military agreements.¹⁰ Although the Rio Treaty was unanimously ratified by all regional states, some of the Latin American states had not only maintained a cautious position *vis-à-vis* this agreement, but also opposed a 1957 US plan to establish closer relation between NATO and the OAS, a plan which sought to tie up the net of regional security pacts characteristic of that decade.¹¹ Increasing differences between the US and Latin American states gradually undermined this regime and the issue of nuclear non-proliferation was no exception to the general trend. In fact, the intersection of an increasing Latin American perception that the US presence in the region was acquiring hegemonic proportions – particularly after the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala – with a number of localised regional rivalries and suspicions, provided the context for the discussion of the initiative for regional denuclearisation.¹² Yet, as will become apparent, concern about nuclear non-proliferation cut across Latin American and inter-American regionalism and revealed the potential for the development of significant areas of common interests. Most importantly, the creation and the relative positive performance of a regional non-proliferation regime has highlighted, on the one hand, the scope for common security in the region, and the potential of nuclear-free zones to deal with the nuclear threat, and on the other, it has also contributed to revitalising the interest in arrangements for regional security.

Nye's expression 'Peace in Parts' conveys a clear idea about the role of regional organisations in world order. Although these organisations do not provide 'a master key to peaceful world order' they contribute 'small but useful pieces to the puzzle of peace'.¹³ Regional organisations have been regarded as those entities occupying the middle ground between states and global organisations. Although collective agencies, including regional organisations, have not been particularly effective and it is also true that significant factors have often inhibited fruitful regional cooperation, 'the regional level hypothetically represents the primary arena for cooperation and mutual security arrangements'.¹⁴ In fact, simple physical proximity engenders more security interaction among neighbours than among states located in different geographical areas.¹⁵ Traditional arguments favouring regionalism for the purposes of world order have often stressed, firstly, the weight of consensus and common interests – more likely to be found in regional contexts – in providing unique frameworks for regional order and stability, secondly, their positive impact on order at the global level resulting both from relatively accepted norms aimed at limiting power competition, and from their contribution in easing the tasks of negotiation and the international surveillance of regional security agreements.¹⁶ Regionalism could normally be the result either of decisions freely agreed among regional states or of different levels of

hegemonic imposition, ranging from annexation to more benevolent forms of influence.¹⁷ Whatever their origins, in most cases the underlying rationale to regionalism contemplates the reduction of superpower dominance, the limitation of external intervention, restraints on the resort to war among regional states, and the limitation of conflict among regional states.¹⁸

Europe excepted, the record of regionalism over the past two decades has not been particularly outstanding. Although currently subject to considerable pressure, the postwar European political order gradually evolved to the status of a 'security community'.¹⁹ Drawing on the European experience, regionalist peace models have often emphasised the likely positive impact of economic cooperation on the security of states. Not surprisingly, these functionalist arguments have been subsequently criticised for a basic misconception, which assumes that increasing economic ties would automatically translate into regional cooperation, and for the underestimation of the weight of political considerations in the success or otherwise of regional endeavours. Although economic, political and organisational links may highlight the potential and likely features of regionalism, equally important are the perception and interpretation of these factors by politicians and their relationship to the wider foreign policy goals of regional states. It is possible to foresee a revival of interest in regionalism as the Cold War fades away creating new room for regional autonomy, and as the United States proves either unwilling or unable to play a global role.

In this scenario, the Latin American experience in both regionalism and common security postures provides interesting insights and a more positive record. Not only has regionalism, and in particular its Latin American version, provided a solid basis for dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation, but it has also offered a framework for efforts aiming at a peaceful settlement in Central America and at Cuba's rapprochement to the region. With regard to common security elements, the Latin American case, and more specifically the regional non-proliferation regime, has revealed the existence of significant elements of common security, and equally important, their potential to limit the scope for differences in critical areas. It would be unrealistic to expect total convergence among views of what would best promote confidence. Yet the replacement of previous important differences, with respect to nuclear proliferation, by what increasingly emerges as a common posture offers a clear example of the potential of the regional non-proliferation regime to deal with a particularly sensitive issue such as technology transfer. Nonetheless, this example also demonstrates the need to incorporate proper mechanisms that enable the parties to maintain the delicate balance between the perceived needs of national security and regional security cooperation. It is particularly important to emphasise the non-permanent nature of regional security cooperation and the extent to which its viability could be affected by abrupt changes in national agendas and unfavourable international environments.

Consequently it could be rightly stated that the prospects for the Latin American non-proliferation regime will be significantly influenced by the combination of incentives, including access to sensitive technologies and the desire to avoid the potential costs of nuclear options, with measures for nuclear restraint at both the regional and sub-regional levels.

The idea of the nuclear-free zone

The idea of nuclear-free zones was first introduced by the Soviet Union in 1956. It had its historical precedent in the concept of demilitarised zones in conventional warfare, in which a partial or total ban on the deployment, production or use of particular weapons or troops was established. Most demilitarised zones were temporary and limited in scope, in most cases encompassing only parts of the territory of member states.

The nuclear environment leading to the formulation of the first denuclearisation proposals created the need for an explicit renunciation and the complete banning of nuclear weapons by signatory nations. In principle, therefore, NFZs include groups of countries and delimited areas of the globe. As Hedley Bull states with reference to ‘zones of peace’, and applying this scheme to the notion of nuclear-free zones, a NFZ could be understood as a geographical area in which the complete absence of nuclear weapons has been ensured, and the danger of nuclear war has therefore been reduced or contained.²⁰ In an international environment in which the political, economic and strategic dimensions of interdependence cannot be denied, in which the presence of nuclear weapons reinforces this interdependence, no zone can remain completely free from the dangers of war started outside it. Even so, measures such as the creation of NFZs could help to reduce or contain internal and external nuclear threats.

The concept of nuclear-free zone rests on four main pillars. Firstly, the participatory countries must undertake a legal obligation under international law not to produce or deploy nuclear weapons in their territories, nor to permit other countries within their zone to carry out such deployment. This obligation must be equally valid in times of war and in times of peace. Secondly, the nuclear states, for their part, must undertake to respect the status of the NFZ and to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against states within such a zone. Thirdly, an international control apparatus or system must be set up in order to ascertain that the parties to a NFZ, as well as the nuclear states, comply with their commitments. Fourthly, nuclear-free zones must be so established and administered that they enhance international peace and security.²¹

Like any other arms control proposal nuclear-free zones serve ‘strategic’ and ‘political-psychological’ as well as diplomatic and foreign policy objectives. In the case of both continental and tension NFZs, the strategic objectives include the improvement of the national and regional security of the states party to the agreement. Such improvement is achieved by removing nuclear weapons from the area, by sparing states from the threat of nuclear attack or involvement in nuclear war and by containing the military presence and influence of regional hegemonic powers. Political-psychological objectives are served by the mobilisation of opposition against provocative policies by any of the nuclear powers. The diplomatic objective, as in the case of all proposals, ‘is the attempt to identify common interests with other states in the field of military policy and to devise means whereby these common interests may be advanced’.²²

In relation to wider objectives of peace and security, NFZ proposals might strengthen international peace and security in several ways: firstly, by preventing and controlling the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and the emergence of regional arms races. Secondly, by removing the danger of nuclear war arising out of an incident involving nuclear weapons in the area. Thirdly, by providing a framework for international cooperation in the complex and controversial field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Fourthly, by reducing tensions and rivalries within the area as well as restricting the involvement of external powers. Fifthly, by contributing to the construction of an international regime in which the political and strategic utility of nuclear weapons could be minimised. Sixthly, by setting an example which might demonstrate the feasibility of insulating certain geographical areas from the risks associated with nuclear deployment.

The first proposals concerning NFZs were initially the expression of Soviet-US controversy in Central Europe. The context underlying their formulation emerged as a result of successive decisions among which the admission of Germany to NATO in 1955, the 1957 decision of NATO’s Council of Ministers concerning the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe, the introduction of Polaris submarines and the debate begun in 1961 over a multilateral nuclear force were the most important.

A second round of proposals in the 1960s, including the Latin American initiative, partly reflected the aversion of a number of non-nuclear states to nuclear weapons and/or their determination to avoid nuclear testing by foreign powers in their territories. The linkage between these initiatives and the process of decolonisation, particularly in Africa, made clear that a full exercise of sovereignty would be required for the setting up of a nuclear-free zone. Such an agreement represented an attractive option to forward desires for national independence. These proposals were aimed at the long-term preservation of the non-nuclear status of recently decolonised states and at ensuring their disengagement from the East-West conflict.

By contrast, a third stage was in fact subsumed in a world-wide non-proliferation scheme accompanied by a decreasing interest in unilateral denuclearisation initiatives. A fourth and most recent revival of NFZ initiatives represents a reaffirmation of the parties' interest in remaining non-nuclear, in limiting or even avoiding the risks involved in military alliances, but most importantly, in preventing the emergence of regional nuclear powers.

Although NFZs, emerging in a context of continued nuclear proliferation, have not enjoyed an absolute international consensus, nuclear powers and some non-nuclear states have generally shared the view that nuclear proliferation poses a serious threat to international security. The danger springs fundamentally from the implications of nuclear proliferation for the management of the central strategic balance and its tendency to increase the probability of accidents.

It is difficult to deny that non-proliferation policies serve to rationalise and legitimise the existing distribution of power favouring the nuclear powers. This has been the claim of most non-nuclear states opposing non-proliferation policies, on the basis that these policies are aimed at the 'disarmament of the disarmed'. But it has gradually become clear that in confronting the international security dilemma, a discriminatory international framework might be the trade-off for avoiding the overwhelming dangers of a war between the major nuclear powers. This recognition has become the basis on which the control of nuclear proliferation has been widely accepted as a universal interest.

As would become clear, the spread of nuclear weapons is greatly influenced – positively or negatively – by the military policies and broader political postures of the nuclear powers themselves. In the particular case of NFZs at least the tacit support of nuclear powers is a fundamental requirement for effective negotiation. In confronting nuclear proliferation the United States and the Soviet Union had to deal with conflicting objectives and policies: on the one hand, maintaining a distance between their central balance and the rest of the potentially increasing number of nuclear powers, and on the other, pursuing a public policy of minimising the political and military relevance of nuclear weapons.

The only alternative to this dilemma has appeared to be the simultaneous and balanced pursuit of a stable mutual deterrence and of policies aimed at reducing the utility of nuclear arms such as restraints on both their own armaments and the political use of their nuclear arsenals. Following this line of analysis, it could be said that the first signs of mutual interests in controlling the nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation were not a simple coincidence. The alternative of nuclear-free zones as a means of dealing with the latter problem, where it was perceived that geostrategic circumstances allowed for it, has been basically supported by both superpowers.

The emergence of a proposal for a Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone

Latin American participation in arms control during the 1950s was mostly restricted to occasional appeals to the United States and the Soviet Union to enter into effective negotiations. Despite the designation in 1951 of the Mexican diplomat, Luis Padilla Nervo, as president of the VI United Nations General Assembly, which was devoted to disarmament, throughout the region disarmament was seen primarily as a Soviet-US dialogue about the nuclear question.²³ This partly explains the lack of Latin American proposals for regional arms control during these years.

Several factors had contributed to a more active Latin American role in arms control negotiations by 1958. These included: 1) the acceptance by both superpowers of the widening of disarmament agencies; 2) the increasing pressure of international opinion for real achievements in the field of disarmament; and 3) the shift from general and complete disarmament to limited schemes in which regional disarmament, particularly for non-proliferation purposes, played a significant role.

Latin American disarmament initiatives in the postwar years took two different routes: one within the OAS, and the other in the United Nations within both the General Assembly and the 18 Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC). The first initiatives taken to the regional forum explicitly shared the interests of the United States and could even be considered as US schemes put forward by Latin American proxies. Latin American reactions to these proposals ranged from open opposition to abstention or proposals to defer their discussion.

The 1958 Costa Rican plan for regional denuclearisation

In January 1958 at the Overseas Writers Club in New York, the Costa Rican ambassador and vice president of the Organisation of American States suggested the establishment of a special disarmament commission within that organisation to elaborate a disarmament project for the Latin American nations. G. Facio's proposal was actually based on a suggestion by US Secretary of the Treasury, Robert B. Anderson, that Latin American military expenditure be reduced. Initially, the US took a cautious attitude claiming that nuclear proliferation in the region, was 'out of proportion' and, in fact, avoiding addressing this question directly.²⁴

The Costa Rican plan addressed a number of issues. Notably, it sought to impose an obligation on Latin American states neither to manufacture nor to

acquire nuclear weapons. The United States would commit itself not to sell or transfer nuclear weapons to Latin America and not to cooperate in the manufacture of such weapons. However, this commitment would not deny to the United States the right to negotiate the deployment of nuclear weapons if they were considered essential to hemispheric security. The Latin American states would also commit themselves not to buy any conventional arms outside the continent, while the American government would not allow any transfer of armaments beyond the minimum required for internal security. This quantity would be defined according to the size, population, borders and geographical characteristics of each country. Finally, Latin American countries could rely on the ‘effective mechanisms’ provided by the Rio Treaty in the event of an armed conflict.²⁵

It is understandable why the Costa Rican proposal was warmly received within the American Congress. Clearly, the initiative was fully consistent with US foreign policy towards the region in so far as it sought to prevent and exclude any external power from establishing a military presence in the hemisphere. Moreover, increasing evidence of Argentine and Brazilian efforts to develop a national nuclear capability had begun to awaken the concern of the US government.²⁶

At the time Senator Hubert Humphrey stated that Latin America could serve ‘as an example to the world’. But largely as the result of these enthusiastic expressions of American interest in the proposal, the suspicion of Latin American states about US motives was awakened. The political preponderance of the military in many Latin American countries impeded the acceptance of the proposed restrictions on domestic military policy. Moreover, despite the fact that a positive reading was possible among certain circles, many questioned the implications of the Costa Rican plan for the overall relations between the United States and Latin American countries.

In a letter to Padilla Nervo, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Mexican ambassador to the OAS explained that the Costa Rican plan had been hastily sent to the various delegations in order to ensure that it coincided with the ordinary session of the Council of that organisation. Ambassador Quintanilla not only questioned the capacity of the Council to deal with issues with global implications, such as disarmament, which ought to fall under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, but emphasised the risk of dividing the OAS into two groups of states with different obligations. In a second letter Quintanilla concluded that such a division could lead to the failure of Latin American efforts both to defend the principle of legal equality among states and to contain the interventionist trends which had characterised American diplomacy in the region.²⁷

On 2 March 1958, three days before the presentation of the plan, the diplomatic battle had already started. The Mexican ambassador to the OAS began to mobilise Latin American opinion against the Costa Rican initiative, which was seen as a plan to ‘weaken the weak, strengthen the strong’ and ultimately reinforce US hegemony over the region. Similarly, the plan’s presumption of Latin America’s inability to produce nuclear weapons, together with its suggestion that actual or potential nuclear budgets be allocated to economic development, were interpreted as recognition of a *potential* regional capacity to develop nuclear weapons.²⁸

This potential capacity probably had already been envisaged both by the United States and by certain Latin American States. In the early 1950s Argentina had launched its nuclear programme, orienting it in 1957 towards an independent route to the development of nuclear energy.²⁹ The Argentine nuclear programme had been inaugurated as early as 1950 by President Perón in accordance with earlier national policies aimed at the achievement of a strong military posture.³⁰ Relations with the United States had been characterised by tensions originating in the policy of neutrality pursued by Argentina during the Second World War, a policy which not only reduced Argentina’s access to US military aid but also reinforced the domestic position of the military seeking the development of a national arms industry.

Only with the outbreak of the Korean War did Argentina begin reluctantly to reapproach the United States. The change of administration in the United States, together with persistent economic problems at home, led Perón to moderate his ‘anti-American’ policy and to ratify the Rio Treaty in order to become eligible for foreign aid. Nevertheless, this shift did not affect the traditional nationalist attitudes of a large number of military officers in Argentina.³¹

Argentina’s nuclear programme had accelerated after 1955 with the signature of agreements with the United States under the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme which gave Argentina access to scientific information and training of nuclear scientists. However, from the early stages Argentina began steadily to pursue an independent nuclear route by developing natural uranium methods which enabled it to limit international control over its nuclear programme.

Brazil’s participation in a meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union among those countries with the highest uranium reserves, together with Argentina’s bold incursion into the nuclear field, had awakened both the interest and concern of the Brazilian government. In 1951 the National Research Council was established in Brazil. This Council, together with the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the National Security Council, coordinated and controlled uranium exports.³² In 1953 Admiral Paulo Alberto, president of the National Research Council, met in West Germany with a group

of scientists previously involved in the Nazi nuclear project and arranged for the purchase of uranium enrichment technology and the training of Brazilian scientists in Germany.

This deal was discovered and blocked by American pressure on the German authorities and forced the resignation of Admiral Alberto in 1955. These events, together with the signing of agreements with the United States under the 'Atoms for Peace' plan and the creation of a National Nuclear Energy Commission, marked the end of Brazilian efforts to develop an independent nuclear programme.³³

While Brazil's programme became gradually dependent upon and controlled through US assistance, Argentina continued its silent march.³⁴ In 1957 the National Atomic Energy Commission had decided to ban imports of research reactors and nuclear fuels in order to encourage national production. The rationale behind this policy had been, as Jorge Sábato later stated, not only to make those reactors a 'tool for training and research, but to allow Argentina to develop its own capacity for nuclear engineering'.³⁵ Priority was given to domestic production of reactors and fuel material in order to develop a national nuclear engineering capability and an infrastructure conducive to training and testing. In 1958, as the result of these decisions, Argentina emerged as the first Latin American state to operate a research nuclear reactor.

The 1958 Costa Rican plan was opposed by Mexican Ambassador Quintanilla who questioned the competence of the OAS to deal with what appeared mainly as a Latin American agreement and underlined the implications of such an agreement for the emergence of two different types of American states, 'police states and protected states'.³⁶ Although since 1955, with the establishment of the National Nuclear Energy Commission, Mexico had shown interest in developing a nuclear energy programme, Mexican opposition to the Costa Rican plan primarily responded to what was perceived simply as US interventionism and by no means to fears about its implications for Mexico's nuclear energy autonomy.³⁷

In the United States the failure of the Costa Rican initiative was seen as a lost opportunity for Latin America to 'give a useful lesson to the world', particularly given its favourable situation whereby the United States provided a protective nuclear shield.³⁸

The 1959 arms limitation proposal

A second important Latin American disarmament initiative had its origins in a number of statements made by Chilean President Alessandri in the UN in November 1959. Earlier that year, during the meeting of ministers of foreign

affairs, the United States had requested Latin American states to reduce military expenditure to the levels required by national and hemispheric defence.³⁹

Alessandri's initiative also questioned the potential implications of arms trade for Latin America, which 'should not be the consuming market of armaments beyond the reasonable limits for defence against aggression'.⁴⁰ Alessandri's proposal was immediately supported by the President of Peru, Manuel Prado, who proposed to study means of limiting arms to essential defence needs in order to release additional resources for economic development. Implicit in Peru's support was its interest in avoiding a Chilean-Peruvian arms race.

The Chilean initiative calling for a specialised conference on regional arms limitation, unlike the previous Costa Rican plan, was generally accepted by all the countries of the region. The United States approved these Latin American efforts but, reacting to increasing Latin American arms purchases in the European arms market, hastily began to implement a law to lend or make available to 'friendly nations' destroyers, destroyer escorts and submarines. The main justification for this decision was the urgent need to strengthen hemispheric defence. The countries included within this scheme were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay.⁴¹ Not surprisingly the programme was criticised in several Latin American states on the grounds that it conflicted with the much publicised American interest in curbing Latin American defence budgets so that more funds for economic development could be available. Moreover, the emergence of a wave of democratic reformism leading to the resignation in 1956 of General Manuel Odría in Peru, the fall of Rojas Pinilla's dictatorship in Colombia and that of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela in 1958, as well as the increasing signs that Batista's rule was disintegrating in Cuba, led to the creation of a Latin American front against military regimes. In this context the US decision was perceived as weakening the cohesion needed for a fruitful discussion of limited military budgets in the forthcoming Inter-American Conference.

Latin American participation in United Nations disarmament negotiations

1958 marked Latin America's debut into UN disarmament debates, starting with the intervention of the Mexican representative recommending the creation of a permanent and specialised agency to deal with the problem of disarmament. The underlying purpose was to revitalise disarmament efforts within the United Nations and to break down the East-West disarmament deadlock. The expansion of the Disarmament Commission, to include all UN members, together with the reorientation of disarmament debates in those years to partial disarmament measures – such as suspension of nuclear tests, a

banning on the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and regional disarmament schemes – opened new paths to the participation of non-nuclear states in arms control negotiations.⁴²

In that year the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs affirmed in the General Assembly that disarmament should be a total process encompassing all types of weaponry: conventional and nuclear arms, control systems as well as measures to prevent surprise attacks. In contrast with previous occasions he then recognised that although disarmament depended mainly upon the great powers, to the extent that the survival of all states was at stake it was now a matter of collective responsibility.

In subsequent speeches Padilla Nervo emphasised the need to resume negotiations in the Disarmament Commission and to set up a specialised organ to ensure the continuity of negotiations. These speeches addressed the main issues discussed during the disarmament negotiations of those years: nuclear tests, the risk of nuclear proliferation, and the problems of inspection and verification. What we can see in Padilla Nervo's statements is a gradual change from a view of disarmament mainly as the concern of great powers to one seeing it as the collective responsibility of all states. Yet the role envisaged for most states was clearly limited to that of moderators and promoters of this goal. The idea of the potential disarmament of these states, nuclear or conventional, was scarcely touched upon.⁴³

Responding to the demands of the Disarmament Commission, its elected president, the Mexican ambassador Padilla Nervo, attended the 1959 inaugural session of the newly created Ten Power Disarmament Committee. His presence expressed the increasing interests in establishing permanent links between the two agencies. In that period the agenda of the General Assembly reflected the increasing concern of international opinion about the impasse in disarmament negotiations, the environmental effects of nuclear tests, the use by the superpowers of other nations' territories for nuclear testing, and finally, the risks of wider dissemination of nuclear arms. The increasing pressure of international opinion on both superpowers to show signs of serious commitment to disarmament negotiations, the lack of flexibility of negotiations partly resulting from the Cold War context in which they took place, and the demands of non-nuclear states to participate in disarmament negotiations help to explain the joint superpower decision to expand the TPDC, to continue negotiations in successive and balanced stages and to set the date for the meeting of the Disarmament Commission.⁴⁴

A 1960 Canadian resolution coincided with the Mexican view on the need to preserve and reactivate UN disarmament responsibilities. In both proposals the idea of dealing with disarmament on a regional basis was raised for the first time. The economic implications of disarmament represented the point of

departure of the new Mexican position which, by recognising the need for coordinated efforts towards regional disarmament, significantly contrasted with the one held by Mexico in 1958 within the OAS.

In September 1961 the general economic implications of disarmament were addressed in a UN report on the economic and social consequences of disarmament. This report covered transition and conversion problems, expected benefits and particular case analyses.⁴⁵ In the same month, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint declaration informing General Assembly members of their exchange of views on questions related to disarmament and of their decision immediately to resume negotiations in an appropriate body whose composition had yet to be agreed.⁴⁶

By the end of that year a joint resolution by Austria, Libya, Sweden, and Sudan among other countries again emphasised the urgent need to suspend nuclear tests and expressed their concern about the potential increase in the number of nuclear powers. This resolution included a suggestion to carry out a survey about the conditions in which non-nuclear states would be willing to renounce any military nuclear status.⁴⁷

The composition of the Committee of Disarmament was finally agreed by both superpowers in December 1961. The TPDC would become the 18 Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which included Brazil and Mexico among other new members. The apparent confusion in the selection of new members awakened the dissatisfaction of a number of delegations, like that of Argentina which affirmed its pleasure with the participation of two Latin American nations in the committee, but strongly criticised the discriminatory character of selection procedures.⁴⁸

The ENDC began its work in March 1962. The first intervention of the Mexican delegate took up some of the points of a Soviet-American declaration of 1959 giving clear priority to effective mechanisms for the peaceful solution of international disputes. Padilla Nervo again reaffirmed the role of non-nuclear states within the committee simply as moderators and mediators to encourage the great powers 'not to be dismayed by the magnitude of the disarmament problem'. This limited role had been promoted by the Mexican delegation within the UN Disarmament Commission since 1958, while serious scepticism continued to permeate the Mexican view of partial arms control measures. Mexican opposition to any nuclear experiment for military purposes was used to justify its abstention from partial denuclearised initiatives. Yet the Mexican delegate stated his support for unilateral decisions aimed at preserving non-nuclear status, such as the decision recently taken by the Mexican government to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and to prohibit any nuclear weapon within the national territory.⁴⁹ Rather than offering a means of dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation, the Mexican position revealed

particular interest in the possible links between denuclearisation and national independence.

The sessions of the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament held between March and September 1962, the date of its annual recess, were mainly devoted to the negotiation of a nuclear test ban treaty.⁵⁰ The incorporation of the group of non-aligned nations into the committee was based on the increasingly widespread recognition that nuclear disarmament concerned not only states possessing nuclear weapons, but all nations. However, their performance remained limited to moral appeals to the nuclear powers to suspend nuclear testing and their participation to the establishment of impartial control delegations.

The Brazilian and Mexican delegations, together with those of other non-aligned states, basically played a mediating role between the nuclear powers. By July 1962 the impasse in the negotiations towards a test ban agreement led the Mexican ambassador to propose a change in direction towards ‘collateral disarmament measures’ such as non-proliferation, measures to diminish the risks of surprise attack, and even a partial test ban treaty limited to atmospheric tests.⁵¹ The first period of sessions came to its end in September 1962 with an apparent consensus about the need for a partial test ban treaty to prohibit nuclear tests in the atmosphere, the oceans and outer space, while leaving the problem of underground detections for subsequent negotiations.

On 20 September 1962 the possibility of a Latin American nuclear-free zone was for the first time raised by Melo Franco, the Brazilian representative to the UNGA. Melo Franco affirmed that Brazil would support the establishment of NFZs as long as they remained detached from Cold War rivalries, and concluded his statement by suggesting that Latin America could constitute one such zone. A month later, and few days before Kennedy’s disclosure of the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, Padilla Nervo presented to the UNGA a resolution asking the superpowers to reach an immediate agreement on nuclear tests. This resolution mentioned only the positive effects that such an agreement would have on collateral issues such as non-proliferation, NFZs, and the pacific use of outer space. In responding to the Brazilian proposal Padilla Nervo again followed a cautious line, stating that denuclearisation should be a free and unilateral decision of individual states – as it had been for Mexico – and that NFZs could only be regarded as transitory and partial measures.

Brazil’s proposal came only after a second unsuccessful effort to assert the independence of its nuclear programme. In 1961 the head of the National Energy Commission, Marcelo Damy da Souza, had tried to achieve greater autonomy by looking for French support in the construction of a natural uranium reactor.⁵² This effort had ended with the resignation of President Quadros and with the French decision to give up natural uranium methods in

favour of the American approach.⁵³ In Argentina, although no crucial decisions were taken at the time, the government remained committed to the goal of nuclear independence.

The Brazilian proposal was made a short time after the Inter-American system had experienced a major crisis and just before the Cuban missile crisis. The first owed its origins to the parallel trends leading to Cuba's regional isolation and to its increasing closeness to the Soviet Union. While the events leading to these developments are not essential to this study, the effects and implications of the Cuban position for the Inter-American system provided the context for the consideration of regional denuclearisation by Latin American states.

In August 1960, just after the VI Inter-American Conference had adopted a number of sanctions against the Dominican Republic, the VII Conference adopted a resolution concerning 'communist presence' in the region. This resolution caused a crisis of consensus which was resolved only because of the abstract terms in which its final version was phrased and its avoidance of any direct reference to Cuba.⁵⁴

The impact of the Cuban missile crisis

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco of April 1961 Cuba's pro-Soviet alignment became explicit. Soviet support for Castro had gradually increased to the point of linking Cuba's defence with Soviet nuclear capability once the 1960 U-2 incident had set the limits to a settlement in Berlin. Despite the rhetorical character of Khrushchev's threats, as confirmed by the Bay of Pigs, their significance derived from the fact that for the first time the Soviet Union explicitly committed itself to defend the island with nuclear weapons. In his 1960 nuclear commitment Khrushchev had stated:

Soviet artillery men, in case of need, can with their missile fire support the Cuban people if the aggressive forces of the Pentagon dare begin intervention against Cuba. And let those in the Pentagon not forget that as recent tests have shown, we have missiles capable of striking accurately [. . .] That is, if you like a warning to those who would like to settle international issues by force and not by reason.⁵⁵

Although Soviet statements promising to support Cuba did not constitute a formal commitment to go to war with the United States in case of aggression to Cuba, they clearly carried that implication. The rationale behind this policy was probably linked to both internal and external objectives. If Soviet reassurances appeared effectively to have deterred the United States from attacking Cuba, Khrushchev would have gained political prestige both within

the Soviet Union and in the struggle for the leadership of international communism.

After the abortive Bay of Pigs intervention Soviet statements concerning the defence of Cuba became more frequent, arousing US attention. Evidence of this is provided by the debate about the implications of eventual Soviet deployments in the island. In the summer of 1961 Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, mentioned the possibility of Soviet missile bases and air bases in Cuba:

I suppose we would all be less comfortable if the Soviets did install missile bases in Cuba, but I am not sure that our national existence would be in substantially greater danger than is the case today.⁵⁶

The increasing radicalisation of Castro's regime led the VIII Inter-American Conference of January 1962 to adopt two resolutions calling for the implementation of sanctions against Cuba and its expulsion from the Organisation of American States. This Conference witnessed a realignment of Latin American states towards favouring Cuban isolation. The Mexican position was illustrative of this trend, in which the earlier enthusiastic sympathy for the Cuban Revolution was gradually replaced by an increasingly cautious diplomacy.⁵⁷

The policy of open confrontation with Cuba adopted by the United States and its Latin American allies responded to the internal character of the Castro regime and its alliance with the Soviet Union. Despite the initial consideration given to the implications of an eventual Soviet-Cuban military alliance, up to 1962 American perceptions of the Cuban threat were linked mainly to Castro's support for revolutionary movements in the hemisphere rather than to a significant Soviet military menace. As late as September 1962 the US Intelligence Board continued to consider Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba as a highly unlikely prospect. This estimation helps to explain the apparent surprise with which the Kennedy administration met its first recognition of missile sites on the island on 14 October 1962.

Several tentative explanations for the Soviet decision have been offered, among which the achievement of strategic parity has been considered as the most satisfactory. On the Cuban side explanations have generally referred to both domestic and external purposes of the emplacement. In the domestic arena the decision to deploy missiles could 'reinforce and confirm Castro's defiance of the Northern Colossus, make more persuasive his warnings of an American invasion and distract attention from gathering difficulties at home'. Externally, 'Russian missiles in Cuba . . . would deter the United States invasion and therefore prevent nuclear war altogether'.⁵⁸

The discovery of missiles in Cuba confronted the United States with equally uncomfortable alternatives. Accepting the new status quo, on the basis of no radical increase in vulnerability having occurred, involved the risk of a future reversal in the strategic balance in favour of the Soviet Union. Exerting diplomatic pressure on both the Soviet Union and Cuba seemed unlikely to prove successful. And on the other hand, it was extremely difficult to assess the risks of any use of force, from surgical strikes to invasion.

After assessing each one of these difficult options, a blockade was chosen as the one involving fewest risks. It offered a firm middle course between inaction and attack, it would place on Khrushchev the responsibility for the decision to escalate to the next step, it would enable the United States to take advantage of its local preponderance, and finally to exploit the threat of subsequent non-nuclear steps in each of which the United States would enjoy significant superiority.

The defensive quarantine offered the additional advantage of potential legal support as long as it was authorised by the OAS under the terms of the Rio Treaty. Article 52 of the UN Charter stated that regional arrangements could deal with ‘such matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security as are appropriate for regional action’. The OAS, acting under articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty, could take measures including a recommendation for the use of force to meet a situation that endangered the peace of the hemisphere. One of the considerations often mentioned as inclining Kennedy towards the blockade option was that it could be carried out within the framework of the regional organisation and the Rio Treaty. Having US actions publicly justified in law became a factor ‘operating differentially to favour quarantine’.⁵⁹

On 23 October 1962 the Council of the OAS adopted a resolution calling for individual and collective measures, including the use of force, to achieve the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. The blockade proved successful: it represented a course of action from which the Soviets were able to read US determination. It prevented miscalculations of the firm but limited objectives of the United States government while granting the Soviets an opportunity to retreat with some measure of dignity.⁶⁰ The experience of this crisis enabled both superpowers directly to confront the risks of a nuclear confrontation. As Allison has put it:

The United States was firm but forebearing. The Soviet Union looked hard and then withdrew without humiliation. Here is one of the finest examples of diplomatic prudence. Having peered over the edge of nuclear precipice, both nations edged backward toward detente.⁶¹

The Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone reconsidered

The US proposal for a blockade was the first resolution unanimously adopted by all members of the Organisation of American States. This alignment was possibly the result of the perception of a real threat by all Latin American states. Yet this did not prevent the expression of independence by Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay who raised reservations and even abstained from portions of the resolution. This was particularly the case in relation to the clause authorising further action in addition to the quarantine in case the latter proved ineffective. Mexico expressed its view that support for the American resolution did not expand the constitutional authority of the executive within the OAS to despatch armed forces without the previous consent of their respective legislatures.⁶² Even though the Mexican government accepted the absolute need to react to the threat, it expressed doubts as to the full legality of the blockade.⁶³

On 29 October, only one day after Khrushchev had announced that the Soviet missiles would be withdrawn from Cuba, Brazil again presented its resolution for a Latin American nuclear-free zone. This time the resolution was intended both to offer a solution to the crisis and to prevent future similar risks. It emphasised that ‘the development and evolution of the current international situation seem to favour the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new geographical areas’. By referring to previous efforts it again made an appeal to both Latin American and African nations to consider the creation of NFZs in their respective continents and asked nuclear powers to abstain from using the territorial seas of African and Latin American countries to test, stockpile or transport nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery systems.⁶⁴

The debates that followed the presentation of the resolution took place in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. The Cuban representative defined Cuba’s long term position towards the initiative, namely the expression of sympathy while emphasising the ‘contradictory reality’ granting the United States the privilege to deploy nuclear weapons in key points of Latin America such as Panama and Puerto Rico. The American representative, Dean, affirmed that his government would support Latin American efforts to establish a NFZ as long as verification guarantees were included to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations.

Despite expressions of sympathy a high number of abstentions was expected in the vote on the resolution, including Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela. The Mexican delegation criticised the hasty presentation of the proposal and made its support conditional upon the development of ‘more favourable conditions’. Further evidence of the limited Mexican interest in the initiative was reflected in Padilla Nervo’s speech delivered at the General Assembly the

following day, which was completely centred on the nuclear tests issue and failed to mention the question of regional denuclearisation. This unfavourable climate led the Brazilian delegate, Melo Franco, to recognise that more time was required before proceeding to the vote on the resolution.⁶⁵

The Brazilian resolution was revised and again presented to the General Assembly in November of that year jointly with Bolivia and Chile. Essentially, the main points remained untouched but, as the result of American pressure, the joint demand for NFZs in Africa and Latin America was reduced to a Latin American initiative which vaguely mentioned the 1961 resolution for an African nuclear-free zone as a source of inspiration.⁶⁶

Contrasting with its previous opposition, in January 1963 the Mexican government took up the Latin American initiative. In a letter to the Mexican ambassador in Brazil, Alfonso García Robles, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Manuel Tello sent his instructions for the negotiation of a joint declaration by Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador to declare Latin America a NFZ. In March 1963 a letter from president López Mateos was sent to Brazil's President J. Goulart, to Jorge Alessandri of Chile, to President Arozarena of Ecuador and to Víctor Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia. The letter carried the initiative for the joint declaration and for an agreement among the five states unilaterally or through a multilateral agreement to commit themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons, nor to permit their presence nor the installation of launching bases within their national territories.

The Brazilian reaction was immediate and enthusiastic. The initiative was considered an 'excellent opportunity' and a practical step of great value. In his reply to the Mexican President, President Goulart mentioned the logical and natural identification of Brazil, given its efforts in disarmament, with the Mexican initiative.⁶⁷ President Alessandri shared the Brazilian enthusiasm 'to keep Latin America out of the nuclear struggle' and underlined the consistency of Chilean disarmament policy. Signalling subsequent reluctance to support the proposal, Argentina considered the declaration 'inopportune' and advised the parties to enter into immediate diplomatic contacts.

The Mexican government counted on US support which was signalled by Senator Humphrey's declaration stating that Latin American denuclearisation should have priority in the diplomatic agenda of that region.⁶⁸ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs started diplomatic consultations with the American government through its embassy in Washington. Generally speaking, the initiative was widely supported and few comments were made in relation to the control system, the relation of the agreement with the UN and the OAS, and the question of Cuban participation. With respect to Panama and Puerto Rico, Martin, the Assistant Secretary of the State Department, clearly affirmed that

the United States had no objections as long as the transit of nuclear weapons through the Panama Canal could be excluded from the agreement.⁶⁹

The Latin American states party to the declaration decided to make it public on 29 April 1963. This event was followed by letters to the remaining Latin American states inviting them to adhere to it, though Puerto Rico and French and British Guyana were initially excluded.⁷⁰ The Mexican delegation in the Geneva Committee of Disarmament, headed by Padilla Nervo, received instructions from the Minister of Foreign Affairs as late as 26 April to transmit the text of the declaration jointly with his Brazilian colleague.⁷¹

The resolution was presented in the Committee in May 1963. The Latin American declaration mentioned as motivating factors concern over the propagation of nuclear weapons, the Latin American tradition of peaceful settlement of disputes and regional cooperation, as well as the desire to protect the region from the ‘tragic consequences of a nuclear war’. After pointing to the impasse which had been reached on nuclear disarmament negotiations and the need for a ‘categorical solution’, the declaration announced the decision of the parties to sign a multilateral agreement to commit themselves not to manufacture, accept, stockpile or test nuclear weapons or launching devices and to cooperate among themselves in making Latin America a recognised NFZ.

The declaration was positively received by all parties on the committee. The US representative referred to US support for the efforts of some Latin American states to create a NFZ in the region since November 1962. At the same time, the State Department affirmed that the initiative expressed concern over nuclear proliferation, a problem which had been considered of primary significance.⁷² The official US position towards NFZs regarded these as part of collateral disarmament measures, which under appropriate circumstances could contribute to the avoidance of nuclear proliferation. Concerning the Latin American initiative, US official statements appealed for the immediate crystallisation of the initiative in a multilateral agreement to define the nature and achievement of the project.

The British delegation expressed its support for the initiative but raised doubts as to the usefulness of similar agreements in Europe, where denuclearisation could seriously affect the military balance.⁷³ For its part, the Soviet delegation stated that the initiative reflected the legitimate desire of Latin American states to protect the continent from the risks of nuclear war. In its view the initiative deserved careful examination since it offered a way to deal with the constant threat of further proliferation.⁷⁴ Even though both eastern and western countries expressed their support for the Latin American initiative, a more general scepticism about the possibilities of denuclearisation in other areas was also apparent.⁷⁵

The Latin American response to the declaration was partly conditioned by the perception that it was an initiative coming from the five Latin American nations which still had diplomatic relations with Cuba. Despite this, the place of Cuba within the project was not clearly defined. On the one hand, the declaration was interpreted as having the intention of reopening Cuba's access to the regional system. On the other, the State Department's declarations to the effect that the Cuban regime was incompatible with the inter-American system and that Cuban participation was dependent upon Soviet permission, were intended as diplomatic pressure. This was based on the mistaken assumption that by forcing the Cuban government to define its position towards the initiative its lack of independence would become clear. In the rest of Latin America the relatively strong influence of the military at the governmental level helps to explain the scepticism with which the initiative was received. These groups would clearly oppose any initiative which could restrict their power and influence.

The Central American states sent a cautious reply explaining that their governments had decided to postpone their comments until after joint consultation. Peru expressed its support but made it conditional upon the consideration of the regional pacts and agreements, while Haiti announced its immediate support. The diplomatic approach to Cuba followed standard diplomatic channels and Cuba's reply offered to study the proposal carefully.

The Cuban position was linked to the one taken in relation to the newly agreed Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in October 1963, namely, to an ending of US policies of 'undeclared war'. The Cuban representative stated that his government was not 'on principle opposed to the creation of NFZs' and linked the effectiveness of the Latin American effort to the position of the 'only nuclear power in the continent'. Cuba would not accept any denuclearisation commitment if this excluded Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal, while its support was made dependent upon devolution to Cuba of the Guantanamo military base.

The Argentine official position was made public in May 1963, expressing an uncommitted interest and a clear preference to take negotiations into the OAS in order to establish proper links with the inter-American framework for the defence of the continent.⁷⁶ For its part, the Colombian government declared the need to ensure the superpowers' commitment to respecting the agreement. The decision whether to choose the universal or regional forum in which to conduct negotiations was complicated by the absence of both Cuba and Bolivia from the OAS. Acknowledging these complications the authors of the declaration expressed their interest in the United Nations. This decision was further reinforced by the problem posed by Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Belize, whose juridical links with the regional organisation had yet to be defined. Both the Mexican and the Brazilian Ministries of Foreign Affairs were

conscious of the gradual and slow nature of the negotiations and were therefore prepared to reconcile patience and determination.⁷⁷

By September 1963 the Brazilian representative in the UN clarified the status of the negotiations for the NFZ: the zone would not be the result of a General Assembly declaration but of some sort of agreement reached among the Latin American nations themselves. García Robles, the Mexican Ambassador, stated that the establishment of a Latin American NFZ would represent an affirmation of the independence of those nations, and that in the current strategic conditions, with the dominant role of intercontinental missiles, it would not affect the strategic balance and could even contribute to stability by preventing new risks of the magnitude of the Cuban crisis.

The decision to present the declaration to the General Assembly expressed the desire of Latin American states for the support of that organisation and their interest in encouraging similar measures in other regions of the world. A slight change stressing the genuine Latin American origins of the initiative was the result of a US suggestion of November 1963. In that month the United States had clearly stated that its conditions for the acceptance of the regional agreement were that the decision rested with Latin American states themselves and included all nations in the area, and that adequate verification measures were provided.⁷⁸ The prospects of French support were complicated by its refusal to play an active role in any resolutions concerning nuclear arms or tests, while the Soviet Union made its support conditional on the willingness of the United States fully to endorse the resolution, namely, to remove nuclear weapons and military bases from the area.⁷⁹ Despite its traditional support for NFZs the Soviet commitment to the initiative was clearly constrained by its support for the Cuban regime. Evidence of this was provided by its decision to abstain in a UN resolution to initiate a study for the denuclearisation of Latin America. On 27 November 1963 the General Assembly finally adopted resolution 1911 (XVIII) on Latin American denuclearisation with 91 votes in favour, no vote against and 15 abstentions including Cuba and Venezuela.

There is little doubt that the Cuban missile crisis was the catalyst leading to a collective Latin American denuclearisation effort. US interest in the initiative was unquestionably reinforced by this event, but, as mentioned earlier it can actually be traced through US diplomatic concerns dating back to the late 1950s. The negotiation of the Tlatelolco Treaty was a complicated process which took place in the context of the rise to preeminence of a new generation of military regimes influencing the position of key parties.

The negotiation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco

Negotiations started in November 1964 with an initial preparatory meeting (REUPRAL) followed by the setting up of a commission for Latin American denuclearisation. The workings of this commission took place over four periods between 1965 and February 1967 when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was opened to signature. The process of negotiations revealed the existence of contentious issues shaping the final text of the agreement, among which, Cuban participation, geographical definition, decolonisation, the right to peaceful nuclear explosions, and the nuclear powers' guarantees were the most important.

Although the Argentine and Brazilian positions endorsed the view that nuclear proliferation endangers international security, they also challenged the existing distribution of power, with a permanent Soviet-US nuclear hegemony. This dilemma was reflected in the text of the treaty in a compromise formula between those who acknowledged the need to accept this cost and those who like Argentina and Brazil made clear their reluctance.

In September 1963, in an informal meeting, the representatives of the states party to the 1963 declaration discussed the main issues in the negotiation of an agreement to establish a NFZ in Latin America. UNGA resolution 1911 (XVIII) of that year had secured UN support and had also reaffirmed the 'free and sovereign decision' of Latin American states.⁸⁰

The background of the negotiation of the treaty was dominated by the interplay of Cuban alignment with the Soviet Union and Kennedy's unveiling, in March 1961, of the Alliance for Progress, which led to Cuban regional isolation. Through the Alliance for Progress the promotion of pro-western democratic institutions and economic development was intended to create the necessary conditions for stability and ultimately for the defence of the continent against internal and external communist threats.⁸¹ During the 1960s the pattern of US-Latin American relations set by the Alliance for Progress, particularly during the Johnson administration, led to the emergence both of an indirect US military presence, and, most importantly, of a new generation of highly politicised Latin American military institutions and personnel.⁸² Perhaps the main influence of the Alliance was the bolstering of the military's self confidence as an institution capable of managing social and economic change.⁸³ As would become apparent this factor strengthened the position of those sectors favouring nuclearisation.

The 1962 military coups against Presidents Frondizi of Argentina and Manuel Prado in Peru had signalled the limits of Kennedy's Latin American policy, yet the actual test came with subsequent events in Guatemala and

Brazil. Whereas in Guatemala the prospect of a right wing military regime was not sufficient reason to persuade the United States to support a reformist leader, in Brazil, Kennedy had already decided that ‘he would not be averse to the overthrow of the elected Brazilian government by forces more friendly to the United States’.⁸⁴ Although pressures on Goulart’s government mounted with the Johnson administration, by March 1963 the CIA was not only aware of plans being prepared by conservative military factions to depose Goulart but had even concluded that the coup’s main figure, Odylio Denis, would need ‘considerably more support than we can now credit to him to bring off a successful coup’.⁸⁵ Goulart’s government was finally overthrown in April 1964 with a US Navy task force approaching Brazilian coasts ‘. . . en route Porto Alegre and Rio Grande to blockade exiting ships’ and to provide oil supplies to the military.⁸⁶ These dramatic events would prove to be crucial in the course taken by Brazil in relation to the development of nuclear energy.

The Cuban factor became a constant source of disagreement between the United States and those Latin American states convinced that Castro’s pro-Soviet alignment could still be reversed through a policy of regional incentives. Yet this posture was gradually undermined, first by Castro’s triumphant visit to Moscow in May 1963, followed by a joint declaration recognising Cuba as a full member of the ‘great socialist community’, and finally by Cuban support to guerrilla movements throughout the region.⁸⁷ Despite this, and partly encouraged by the emerging détente between the two superpowers with the signature of the PTBT, during 1963 and 1964 Castro made several cautious moves aimed at normalising relations with the United States.⁸⁸ The apparently favourable reaction of the Kennedy administration was subsequently replaced by an uncompromising posture accompanied by a policy of intimidation ranging from systematic reconnaissance flights over the island, to plans to assassinate Fidel Castro.⁸⁹

Cuba’s diplomatic isolation was further enhanced in July 1964 by the decision taken by the OAS to impose economic sanctions and to break diplomatic relations with Cuba. With only four votes against – Mexico, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia – and Argentina’s abstention, Secretary of State Dean Rusk concluded that it had been the ‘most important conference ever held in the hemisphere’ and added that ‘Castro has no future in Cuba or in this hemisphere’.⁹⁰

In this inter-American climate the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs decided in November 1964 to send an invitation to Latin American states to participate in a preliminary meeting on Latin American denuclearisation. Earlier, in February of that year, in a meeting between Dean Rusk, Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and Manuel Tello, the Mexican Foreign Minister, Rusk had expressed his disappointment that the proposal for a Latin American NFZ had not prospered. More

significantly, Rusk also informed the Mexican diplomat about informal conversations with the Soviet Union during which the latter had made clear its support for the initiative while admitting its failure to convince Cuba.⁹¹

The question of nuclear non-proliferation remained an international priority throughout 1964. The US considered practicable proposals of non-dissemination, non-reception of nuclear weapons, non-transfer of strategic delivery systems, NFZs and nuclear limited zones.⁹² But also in September of that year the Second Non-Aligned Conference included in its agenda the question of NFZs and the prevention of further dissemination of nuclear weapons. Despite the Johnson administration's unsympathetic view of this conference, instructions were sent to US embassies in Cairo and New Delhi to express US support for the Latin American NFZ proposal and to similar measures designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.⁹³ At the time the superpowers' public discussion of non-proliferation mainly focused on the disagreement over a Multilateral Force, considered by the United States to be a measure designed to inhibit further proliferation in Europe and by the Soviet Union to comprise the actual dissemination of nuclear weapons.⁹⁴

In Latin America, US reconsideration admitting the Panama Canal to the NFZ appeared to be caused by two factors: the apparent deal with the Soviet Union mentioned above, and the ending of diplomatic relations by the Panamanian government in January 1964. Inclusion of the canal was probably considered as a US offer to the government of President Chiari which had demanded the negotiation of a new canal treaty as a condition of the resumption of diplomatic relations.⁹⁵

Despite changes of administration in Mexico in December of that year it seemed that continuity in Mexico's leading role could be expected. Geographical, historical, economic and political factors influenced Mexico's foreign policy giving rise to the priority attached to the bilateral relationship with the United States. This priority was particularly clear during the 1960s, though subsequently there were attempts to achieve greater autonomy. What seems clear is that, given the crucial role played by legality in Mexico's foreign policy, participation in arms control offered a forum free of conflict with the United States, and equally importantly, a significant source of international prestige.⁹⁶ This was particularly the case after Mexico's incorporation into the ENDC in 1962. Moreover, with regard to regional denuclearisation the United States had already expressed its interest and support and had even encouraged Mexican leadership in this direction. To both the López Mateos and Díaz Ordaz administrations the pursuit of this goal undoubtedly offered more benefits than costs.

The four rounds leading to the negotiation of a treaty spread over a four year period in which major changes took place both in the wider international

context and at the levels of regional and domestic politics. A period of relative instability seemed to be on the way with Soviet leadership changes leading to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, together with China's first nuclear detonation and increasing escalation of the war in Vietnam. At the regional level Latin American politics was characterised by convulsive change with recurrent waves of military coups. By the time the Mexican Foreign Ministry launched the formal request to Latin American governments in November 1964, the main obstacles to the achievement of a Latin American NFZ were already clear. Firstly, given the state of US-Cuban relations, it seemed that Cuba's participation in a Latin American NFZ would be highly unlikely. Secondly, earlier Brazilian support for a preliminary meeting disappeared after the 1964 military coup which led to the inauguration of Branco's government. The new government was determined to change Brazil's position in the negotiations for a Latin American NFZ and to follow a more cautious approach based upon considerations linked to Brazil's freedom of action.⁹⁷

The new Brazilian attitude reflected a change of views concerning nuclear issues. In contrast with the traditional role played by the military as guarantors of the Brazilian constitution, the 1964 coup opened a long period of direct military intervention in politics. The Castello Branco government was characterised by its 'apolitical and technical' approach to Brazilian problems. The military emerged as the institution responsible for maintaining political stability so that a new coalition of apolitical technocrats could promote economic development and institutional modernisation. These factors led to a reassessment of nuclear issues which emphasised the use of nuclear energy to meet Brazilian energy needs and its potential to fulfil national security requirements.⁹⁸

Clear symptoms of this pragmatic reorientation of Brazil's foreign policy were soon made explicit by da Cunha who also affirmed that this policy would seek to widen the market for Brazilian exports while relying on a close friendship with the United States. During these years, the belief in the existence of shared interests made relations with the superpower, and expectations of mutually advantageous cooperation, unquestionable. In contrast with Argentina, this position finally tilted the balance in favour of a nuclear energy policy to be conducted under the umbrella of a special relationship with the United States. Yet, as would be the case in many other areas, the nuclear issue gradually disclosed the real limits of the belief in 'shared interests'. During these years Brazil continued to cooperate with the United States and therefore maintained its interest in regional non-proliferation, but in such a way as to leave room for future non-negotiable interests to be expressed.⁹⁹

The Mexican initiative was followed with interest in Washington where it was viewed as an expression of shared interests between the two governments regarding nuclear proliferation. After the 1964 Chinese nuclear test the US

government increasingly acknowledged the need for ‘intensified international action to strengthen the climate of political opinion’ against the further spread of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it seemed aware of the positive impact with regard to the renunciation of nuclear power status of the Latin American proposal on the non-aligned movement.¹⁰⁰

Even though the US government had not yet convinced the Soviet Union that a Multilateral Force in Europe would in fact lessen the danger of additional national nuclear forces being developed, it realised that progress with the Latin American NFZ initiative could give new impetus to efforts to achieve an international non-proliferation agreement.¹⁰¹ This led the Johnson administration to press the Latin American states so that the initial results of negotiations aimed at establishing a NFZ could be announced at the forthcoming UNGA.¹⁰² This appeared particularly urgent in the light of changes in the Soviet leadership following Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964. Putting the Latin American proposal before the General Assembly offered a useful opportunity to assess the interest in arms control of the new Soviet leadership.¹⁰³

Despite Brazilian insistence upon the need to postpone negotiations for a multilateral treaty until ‘favourable conditions’ had emerged the Mexican government stuck to holding the conference so that its results could be announced at that General Assembly. The preliminary meeting for Latin American denuclearisation was held in Mexico City in November 1964 with the participation of 15 delegations. The nominations of García Robles, the Mexican subsecretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Brazilian representative Sette Camara, as President and Vice-President, were based on their experience and participation in the ENDC. As the process of negotiations would reveal the holders of each post embodied the two opposing and competing views that dominated this process. To the Mexicans, compromising national sovereignty on nuclear issues was the essential condition to successful negotiations, while the Brazilians were clearly reluctant to accept unconditional limits on nuclear energy development. The first signs of disagreement were evident in the contrast between Mexico’s determination to focus on concrete issues, such as geographical limits and methods of verification and inspection, with the Brazilian insistence on the lack of power of the preliminary meeting to adopt any concrete resolutions.

There is little doubt that the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion had a significant impact on both the Brazilian and Argentine view of the agreement. Nevertheless, at a time when international estimates of nuclear proliferation were alarming, China’s detonation also provided new impetus to the goal of non-proliferation and raised expectations about the superpowers’ interest and commitment to NFZs.

The ambivalent character of the Argentine and Brazilian postures reflected increasing consideration being given to the nuclear status, while their apparent support for the goal of regional denuclearisation offered hints of what would become a clearly ambiguous policy towards non-proliferation. This attitude resembled the subsequent characteristic ambiguity pursued by potential nuclear powers after the 1974 Indian explosion. The core of this ambiguity rested on the combination of the steady development of nuclear programmes with reassurances about their peaceful character and the avoidance of full commitment to non-proliferation regimes.

The interest expressed by the Netherlands in participating in the negotiations raised the question of the role to be played by states with territorial responsibilities within the region – France, Britain, the United States and the Netherlands – and of the implications of the negotiations for the status of those territories and ultimately for decolonisation. Discussions concerning geographical definitions were influenced by the process of decolonisation taking place in those years. In the case of France it soon became clear that its assertiveness as a nuclear power would have a significant impact upon French decolonisation in the region. France was offering associated states a place in its union while maintaining full responsibility for their foreign affairs and defence.

The first stages of the negotiations led to the setting up of a permanent Preparatory Commission for Latin American Denuclearisation (COPREDAL). The creation of this commission, devoted to the writing of a first draft treaty, together with the establishment of three specialised groups with defined responsibilities, reflected awareness of the need for an institutional structure to negotiate the commitments of nuclear powers and powers with *de jure* or *de facto* control over territories within the region, on the one hand, and to deal with the difficult question of ‘peaceful uses’ of nuclear energy.

The sessions of COPREDAL took place between 1965 and 1967 when the treaty was opened to signature.¹⁰⁴ At this stage Cuban participation seemed beyond any real possibility. After the chilly reception given to a third offer, Castro seemed convinced that, regardless of changes in US administrations, the normalisation of relations with the United States was not a realistic goal. Moreover, American escalation in Vietnam since the summer of 1964, the Cuban leader’s increasing isolation in Latin America after Goulart’s fall and Allende’s defeat in the Chilean presidential elections, as well as the implications of the Sino-Soviet split upon Cuba’s defence, increased Castro’s feelings of insecurity. This time his response was not a peace proposal but the adoption of a confrontational and revolutionary posture in both domestic and foreign affairs.¹⁰⁵ This move back to confrontation was a difficult and risky attempt to maintain a margin of independence between the two superpowers through the simultaneous pursuit of international prestige and bargaining power. This strategy reflected Castro’s disappointment at having failed to obtain the

ultimate Soviet security guarantee and his anxiety in the face of the clear limits imposed by his Soviet alignment on finding alternative means of security. Underlying the rhetoric of Cuban criticisms or its endorsement of Soviet policies lay ‘a reminder of Soviet responsibilities for Cuban defence’.¹⁰⁶

Although the Mexican delegation avoided a definite answer to questions related to the prospects of Cuban participation, it was already clear that Cuban participation had no chance once all Latin American states, excepting Mexico, had complied with the OAS vote to break diplomatic relations with Castro’s regime.¹⁰⁷ Moreover it seems reasonable to suggest that, in the light of Castro’s confrontational posture, the issue of Cuban participation was out of the question for the time being.¹⁰⁸

The lack of clear geographical delimitation and of a geographical concept of ‘Latin America’ was acknowledged during this first period of sessions of COPREDAL. However, the incorporation of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago was agreed. An initiative for inspections to be carried out by unbiased international authorities, such as the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was also endorsed. It was agreed that diplomatic negotiations with foreign powers responsible for territories within the area, including disputed territories, should not affect their political status, nor could they be interpreted as negatively affecting related Latin American interests.

The second period of sessions of COPREDAL, which took place during the summer of 1965, was mainly devoted to the discussion of a first draft. This draft, which had been prepared under the supervision of William Epstein, Director of the UN Secretariat’s Disarmament Affairs Division, included fourteen preliminary articles mainly dealing with verification, inspection and control details. A declaration of principles accompanied the draft which not only acknowledged the *sine qua non* of non-proliferation commitment, the acceptance of limitations on national sovereignty in exchange for international peace and security, but also addressed Latin American concerns with economic and social development at a time when hopes were still placed on the Alliance for Progress.

By this time the number of parties to the conference had grown considerably and included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. The significant increase in the number of observers – including Canada, Denmark, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and Yugoslavia – provided well-grounded evidence of the support that efforts aimed at non-proliferation would elicit.¹⁰⁹

The reluctance shown by France to cooperate was taken into account, but it remained overshadowed by the critical question of Cuban participation. Earlier, in 1965, in a speech characteristic of his confrontational rhetoric, Castro recalled that Cuba ‘did not vacillate . . . in order to strengthen the socialist camp . . . and defend the Revolution in risking the dangers of nuclear war . . . on our soil when we agreed to the installation of strategic thermonuclear missiles on our territory’. It is not difficult to imagine the explosive effect that his concluding remarks had on Latin American audiences when he stated ‘not only did we agree to their installation, but we did not agree to their removal’.¹¹⁰

The official US position was finally disclosed, offering support to those NFZs which included all the ‘important’ regional states, did not have detrimental effects on regional security arrangements and provided effective means for verification. It explicitly recognised the contribution of NFZs to nuclear non-proliferation policies. The Gilpatric Report on nuclear proliferation had already acknowledged the potential of NFZs to halt nuclear proliferation and the crucial role of the nuclear powers’ guarantees in ensuring their viability. The main policy guidelines established by this report were to reduce US reliance on nuclear weapons in order to downplay their political importance, and to involve China in disarmament negotiations.¹¹¹

Further conversations on the question of Cuban participation in the Latin American NFZ took place between US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Mexican Foreign Minister, Carrillo Flores, in October 1965. During this meeting Carrillo Flores told Rusk that his government continued in its efforts to persuade Castro to join the agreement. Rusk informed the Mexican diplomat that in previous and more recent conversations with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko had made clear that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Cuba’s position and had even recalled its failure to persuade Castro to join the PTBT. During these conversations the positions of Argentina and Brazil *vis-à-vis* the agreement were also addressed and characterised by the Mexican Foreign Minister as ‘unfriendly’.¹¹²

The US position regarding COPREDAL’s deliberations was made public when Rusk declared that the United States had not only been following Latin American efforts with deep interest and sympathy but greatly valued their consistency with the ‘best hemispheric traditions’, adding that his government would ‘see with satisfaction’ the success of these efforts. He made clear the difficulty for the United States of denuclearising Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, but announced a decision to include the Guantanamo base and the zone of the Panama Canal on the understanding that ‘it should not affect in any way international transit rights’.¹¹³ The negotiation of a new treaty with Panama had been resolved through bilateral talks between the two governments. The envisaged treaty would grant the United States the ‘necessary rights for the

operation and defence of the canal' and would also recognise Panama's 'sovereignty over the waterway'.¹¹⁴

In that same year the British government announced the presence of a representative at future meetings of the Preparatory Commission. This decision, together with the more active role played by the British government regarding non-proliferation, was probably influenced by the Chinese explosion of the previous year and its particular impact on India. During a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers the British representative had submitted a draft declaration of intent on non-proliferation.¹¹⁵ The British position made clear its readiness to discuss with the governments and authorities of dependent territories their inclusion within such a scheme. Yet, as had been the case with the French government, the British government withheld a formal position.

The Soviet position reaffirmed its commitment to NFZs as long as they were also supported by other nuclear powers.¹¹⁶ On this occasion, no mention was made of Soviet commitment to the defence of Cuba. Yet by now differences with Cuba over this particular issue and more general Third World causes were clear. Contrasting with Cuba's isolation in Latin America, the Soviet Union began to expand its economic links and diplomatic contacts throughout the region. The Soviet Union seemed to be finding its place as a responsible superpower committed to the norms of détente. After Khrushchev's fall in October 1964 the new Soviet leadership appeared to be ready to take a pragmatic and cautious approach. The pursuit of this pragmatic policy was particularly clear on the issue of ideological commitments, the role of communist parties in peaceful change, and equally important, in the field of arms control.¹¹⁷

Previous Brazilian opposition to proposed drafts led to the consideration of a third treaty draft in April 1966. By this time deep differences dividing the parties into two opposing factions became clear. The position led by Brazil, rather than seeing the difficult questions of Cuban participation, peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), and nuclear powers' guarantees as long term problems, used them as a shield to defend particular interests. Underlying Brazilian rhetoric lay the determination to avoid a 'rigorous treaty'. In contrast, the view represented by the Mexican delegation, aware of the complexity of these questions, was to be prepared to face them and most importantly to compromise national sovereignty in order to take the first step in the direction of the treaty's conclusion.

To Brazil the commitment of nuclear powers and Cuban participation had to precede the formulation of any treaty, and on this basis, its delegate simply rejected the second treaty draft. It soon became clear that Brazil would not openly oppose Latin American diplomatic efforts but would insist on detailed requirements in an effort to delay, if not obstruct the course of negotiations.

Moreover, comments made on particular articles hinted at Brazil's determination to keep its freedom of action on nuclear energy matters. These included proposals to eliminate the need for previous authorisation of PNEs stipulated by article 13, and to make substantial changes to article 22 endowing it with universality and reciprocity.¹¹⁸

At the time the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Itamaraty, had just started a special course on nuclear energy indicating its future role in the formulation of nuclear energy policy. By mobilising efforts it would create a dynamic infrastructure, ready to absorb nuclear technology and to coordinate agreements with the leading countries in nuclear technology. The ultimate goal was to accelerate Brazilian nuclear energy development, as expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juracy Magalhaes, the ultimate goal was the achievement of 'Brazil's rapid nuclearisation, access to nuclear energy resources and the wide spectrum of peaceful application of nuclear phenomena'.¹¹⁹

The success of the Brazilian delegation in moving a third, 'Brazilian', treaty draft was obviously closer to Argentina's position, whose delegation had kept a relatively low profile during the negotiations. Even though no critical decisions had been taken by Argentina in nuclear energy policy, its position revealed anxiety over any commitment that could set limits to its independent stance on nuclear energy. Also influencing Argentina's position was the potential implications of the agreement for its long term claim over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. This became clear both with the geographical definition put forward by the Argentine delegation and the adoption of a similar ban to the one adopted by the Inter-American Conference on the admission of 'political entities' subject to territorial dispute. This motion was supported by the Venezuelan, Guatemalan, Brazilian and Uruguayan delegations.¹²⁰ With regard to nuclear tests Argentina insisted that as long as tests were conducted underground, the manufacture of nuclear weapons could be achieved without violating the PTBT.¹²¹

The main issues discussed during the last stages of negotiations were ratifications, the obligations of nuclear powers, the relationship of the agreement to the OAS, and the transport of nuclear weapons. These issues soon led to further disagreements. Firstly there was lack of agreement as to the total number of ratifications required to make the treaty fully binding and to initiate surveillance activities. Although Argentina and Brazil insisted on previous signature and ratification the Chilean attitude offered a middle course which acknowledged the obstructing effects of the Brazilian motion as well as the insufficiency of the minimum of five parties suggested by the Commission. The second source of conflict was caused by the nature of the guarantees to be offered by the nuclear powers. While the Mexican delegation considered such guarantees merely an 'extremely advisable condition', Brazil firmly insisted

that they were the non-negotiable requirement for the treaty to be made legally binding and to prevent the unfair distribution of privileges and obligations.

At the time, the superpowers' support was realistically envisaged. Yet it was also clear that Soviet commitment remained tied to Cuban participation for the time being. Similarly, even though the French government had notified the Commission that it had 'no intentions to carry out nuclear experiments within the territories of its American departments and that activities taking place in the space centre in Guyana were only the launching of satellites', it again referred to constitutional constraints barring it from formal commitment to the agreement.¹²² Finally, the British government's reply announced its willingness to respect the treaty and its decision not to permit any inspection of ships or aircraft within the zone.¹²³

On balance the various responses given by nuclear and external powers offered hints of the wide and genuine sympathy generated by the Latin American initiative. Yet they also made clear that a number of obstacles had to be overcome before fully reliable commitments could be achieved. Taking this view, the 'optimistic' position headed by the Mexican delegation insisted on the need for patience and continued efforts to turn that sympathy into legally binding commitments.

A third source of difference arose from the implications of the US decision to exclude Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and transit through the Panama Canal.¹²⁴ Although the US government had showed some flexibility concerning the zone of the Panama Canal and Guantanamo, this was followed by categorical statements concerning the transit question. US official comments systematically reiterated that it assumed 'that the proposed treaty would impose no prohibition that would restrict the freedom of transit as based on our national security needs and the vital security interests of the Western Hemisphere, and we do not believe that a NFZ needs to, or should, compromise this freedom'.¹²⁵

The United States showed a clear interest in the creation of an institutional framework to regulate the relations between the OAS and the treaty.¹²⁶ This move was part of a wider American attempt to revitalise the regional organisation through the creation of a permanent inter-American peace force. Yet in the aftermath of the Dominican intervention a Latin American consensus firmly opposed to these plans emerged.¹²⁷ Instead, the inclusion was approved, within the text of the treaty, of an article explicitly referring to its compatibility with the rights and obligations emanating from the OAS and the Rio Treaty.¹²⁸

Perhaps the most important issue addressed during COPREDAL's third period of negotiations was the question of the transport of nuclear weapons

within the proposed nuclear-free zone, including transit through the Panama Canal. William Epstein, the UN technical adviser, while stating that in principle it was possible to prohibit transit of nuclear weapons, expressed serious doubts as to the prospects for effective regulation. In his view transport within the territories of the states party to the treaty was already banned by article 1 of the draft treaty, while effective control, particularly over aerial and submarine transit, would be impossible to achieve. In any case, the treaty could be seriously weakened by the inclusion of unrealistic clauses. Since the spirit of the treaty was to avoid the ‘permanent’ presence of nuclear weapons and their introduction by ‘third parties’, their temporary presence could be effectively dealt with by the sovereign decision of each state.¹²⁹

Despite all the differences, by the end of these sessions progress in the formulation of the agreement was clearly perceived. The fourth and last period of sessions was preceded by statements reiterating US support. The future agreement was received by Washington as a ‘deep vote of confidence in the Inter-American defence system’ since only the United States was in a position ‘to offer collectively the nuclear defence that Latin American states would abjure individually’. In this way, US responsibility for the defence of the hemisphere ‘would be eased’.¹³⁰

In relation to Cuban participation, the Mexican view affirmed that it could best be achieved by a ‘front of moral pressure’ embodied in a fully enforced treaty. Nevertheless the Cuban position remained unchanged.¹³¹ In a letter to García Robles Castro reaffirmed the impossibility of Cuban participation as long as the ‘illegal US hold over Guantanamo continued’ and until the United States had ‘withdrawn its military bases and nuclear weapons’ from Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the Panama Canal.¹³²

Acknowledging the efforts of Latin American states and their contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and to hemispheric security, both US and British opinions insisted on the technical impossibility of distinguishing peaceful from non-peaceful nuclear explosions. In their view any state with access to nuclear explosions and some form of means of delivery could immediately attain a military nuclear capability.¹³³ While British comments simply expressed ‘doubts and concern’ as to the utility of such distinctions, the United States explicitly stated that a number of articles ‘should be modified’ in order to prohibit all nuclear explosions.¹³⁴ The Anglo-American view tilted the balance of the two competing interpretations in favour of the one propounded by Mexico.

Behind the US position lay the awareness that only by accepting the eventual distinction between peaceful and military nuclear explosions, dependent upon technological developments, would Brazil and Argentina come to accept a treaty – and that ‘this graceful way out’ was in fact the result of the Latin

American imperative to accommodate to their demands if a final text was to be achieved.¹³⁵ In dealing with this problem the US government tried to reinforce its own view by seeking assurances from the Mexicans 'that they would support our interpretation of the treaty' both at COPREDAL and the ENDC.¹³⁶

Underlying US criticisms lay a clear, though not often public, satisfaction. Explicit recognition was mainly manifested in relation to COPREDAL's decision to adopt IAEA safeguards.¹³⁷ Yet US satisfaction went beyond these formal statements: in a report from the US embassy in Mexico to the Department of State, Freeman acknowledged that the 'views of the U.S. regarding every aspect of this treaty have not only been explained in the most careful detail but have been listened to sympathetically. A significant number of our points are reflected in the treaty; and what has emerged represents the best possible compromise we could have expected'.¹³⁸

The Soviet reply reaffirmed its traditional policy towards NFZs, though it reserved further comments and formal commitments until the treaty had been formulated and the attitude of other nuclear powers made explicit.¹³⁹ In relation to the question of PNEs, the Soviet Union carefully expressed a view similar to the Anglo-US attitude, by affirming that such a distinction could enormously complicate the solution of the non-proliferation problem.¹⁴⁰

The difficult issue of the transport of nuclear weapons was finally addressed during the last period of sessions in February 1967. Despite Argentina's reiteration of the need for the total prohibition of both transit and transport of nuclear weapons a 'softer' line was adopted. Given the lack of references, throughout COPREDAL's sessions, to the contemporary debate over nuclear deterrence, the adoption of a compromise seemed to mark the recognition of the complexity of that issue and of the limited prospects for effective regulation.

The compromise that was adopted was based on the following argument. If the transporter was one of the parties, then transportation had already been included in the general prohibitions stipulated by article 1. But if the transporter was a non-party state, the action would not be transport but transit. Since the treaty made no reference to transit of nuclear weapons, the principles and law of international law should apply.¹⁴¹ This interpretation granted the territorial state the sovereign right to permit or deny such transit. It is clear how this complicated legal argument represented an euphemistic acceptance of the possibility of 'transit-transport' of nuclear weapons within the zone covered by the agreement.

On the question of viable distinctions between peaceful and military nuclear explosions William Epstein shared the British and US view and suggested three prospective alternatives: to prohibit all PNEs, to accept the current monopoly

held by the nuclear powers, or to implement some form of international service or surveillance.

The Argentine delegate reacted strongly, stating that the only way in which a nuclear device could become a nuclear weapon was through the definition of its military utility. Therefore intention should be the core concept in the definition of ‘nuclear weapon’.¹⁴² Following this line of interpretation the Brazilian representative, Correa da Costa, affirmed that the proposed treaty should not obstruct the future development of Latin American peoples, a development that in his view was intimately linked to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. By referring to the difficult and in many cases ‘questionable’ distinction between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ weapons, he admitted that even those states who had developed ‘demolition mines’ would not necessarily be following a military route but could be manifesting a defensive posture. Correa da Costa then affirmed that PNEs could be of significant value in Latin America in the construction of canals, dams, and so forth. By drawing an analogy between other technological developments with potential military uses such as radio and industrial production techniques he criticised the argument that confused the explosion with the actual weapon as obstructing Latin American development.

The Mexican position was the closest to the Anglo-US one. C. Graef stated that the Mexican goal was the prevention of regional nuclear proliferation while ensuring free access to technical and scientific development. He acknowledged the conflict between these two goals and the consequent need to reach a compromise. The Mexicans clearly gave priority to non-proliferation, as expressed in the proposal to accept some form of international control or international service for PNEs.¹⁴³ With respect to the geographical definition of the zone, it was finally agreed that it be based on the Panama declaration of 1939 and on article 4 of the Rio Treaty.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, the enforcement of the agreement reflected the system used within the OAS and the Rio Treaty, in which full enforcement of the treaty had taken place when two thirds of the parties had signed and ratified the agreements.

COPREDAL’s fourth period of sessions ended with the adoption of three resolutions: to open the treaty to signature immediately and to take the final version of the treaty to the UNGA, the ENDC and to the General Director of the IAEA.

As has become apparent the negotiating process not only took place within a changing international and regional context, but reflected their interplay as well as the concern of the parties with the treaty’s potential implications for nuclear energy development. The Chinese nuclear detonation reinforced both the superpowers’ concern over further nuclear proliferation and perceptions of the international prestige to be derived from a nuclear status. Latin America

was no exception to these trends. Brazilian and Argentine participation had offered hints of strong interest in nuclear power. Yet as the Missile Crisis made clear, there was also a regional consensus which acknowledged the desirability of nuclear non-proliferation.

Around the question of Cuban participation converged the need to develop strategies to deal with the ‘Cuban problem’ and the dilemma equally faced by both superpowers between their support for non-proliferation and commitments to their allies. After Castro’s attempts to negotiate a modus vivendi with the United States had failed, it became clear that Cuban incorporation into the denuclearisation process would remain as a long term problem.

In addition, the negotiating process revealed the potential link between decolonisation and the definition of a Latin American NFZ. After the independence of Trinidad and Tobago in 1962 it became clear that other colonies and associated states could follow suit. This situation helps to explain the extent of the compromise that particularly Britain, France and the United States, were prepared to make. Both the British and US positions clearly rejected the idea of a UNGA resolution embodying the nuclear powers’ commitment. In their view such resolutions not only lacked legal force, but above all could set a legal precedent in this direction within the General Assembly. Both Britain and the United States suggested instead the incorporation of additional protocols.

Throughout the negotiating process, the emergence of two diverging views on denuclearisation became clear, the ‘rigorous’ view supported by the Mexican delegation and closer to US interests regarding non-proliferation, and the one shared by both Argentina and Brazil deriving from the incorporation of nuclear energy issues in their respective national security agendas. The critical role played by the military in both countries helps to explain the increasing perception of nuclear issues as vital for their national security. Yet, as would later become clear, active participation in COPREDAL’s rounds enabled both countries to begin the pursuit of an ambiguous posture towards non-proliferation commitments. In contrast, the Mexican case reflected geopolitical conditions which limited the potential role to be played by the military, but which also foreclosed any rational option beyond the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The numerous problems of a procedural character arising throughout the negotiation of the treaty were in fact expressions of a deeper disagreement. Nevertheless, with options narrowing, it was gradually recognised that only with compromise could a final treaty be achieved. One can even maintain that the transport formula and the final, though ambiguous, acceptance of PNEs within the body of the treaty represented a compromise between the US position and that of the Latin American countries reluctant to constrain their nuclear future. The Mexican delegation, sharing the American position, came to accept this compromise as a second best. The rationale behind this posture

seems to be that although the right of PNEs would be in principle recognised, pressure would systematically be exerted through continued reiteration of their unfeasibility. In the meantime nuclear proliferation would be prevented through an effective system of control and verification. Finally, despite Argentine and Brazilian ambiguity, it was probably expected that as soon as they became parties to the agreement, international pressure on their respective nuclear programmes would increase considerably. Even after acknowledging the main weaknesses of the agreement, one could therefore conclude that the treaty adopted in 1967 strengthened the position of those favouring non-proliferation throughout the region, and most importantly, that it significantly raised the costs of violating what was becoming a norm.

The implementation of the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone

The Treaty of Tlatelolco was a unique international instrument not only because it established the first nuclear-free zone over an area embracing a group of states but also because it constituted the first agreement which embodied a legally binding restriction on the use of nuclear weapons. The agreement led also to the creation of one of the first agencies for Latin American collective action. Such action was facilitated by the uniqueness of Latin America as a group of independent states sharing a common history and culture. And it was precisely this characteristic that made Latin America particularly suitable for the establishment of a NFZ.

The relative absence of interstate rivalries and conflicts has traditionally favoured inter-state cooperation such as that leading to the agreement of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Other examples of this cooperation have been present in subsequent efforts aimed at controlling conventional arms within the region and in regional efforts for peaceful settlement of disputes such as Contadora.¹⁴⁵

The success of the Latin American negotiating process leading to the Tlatelolco Treaty could be partly attributed to these favourable conditions which contrast with other areas where similar initiatives have failed. But there is little doubt about the weight of the tacit or explicit support of both superpowers in the success of negotiations.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco: analysis

The body of the treaty comprises a preface, 32 articles and two additional protocols. Its preface refers to the General Assembly Resolutions leading to the negotiation of an agreement: GAR 1911 (XVIII) on Latin American military denuclearisation, and GAR 2028 (XX) which emphasised the need for fair

distribution of responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear states as an essential principle of any arms control agreement. This principle was embodied in Protocol II of the treaty.

Article 1 of the treaty describes the basic obligations of the parties, designed to ensure the total prohibition of nuclear weapons within the region. Despite all its weaknesses Tlatelolco offers a wider scope and stricter regime for the prohibition of nuclear weapons than are to be found in other multilateral arms control agreements. This is the case in relation to the Antarctic Treaty, whose article 5 only prohibits nuclear testing and the dumping of radioactive waste, to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, whose constraints do not apply to intercontinental missiles and satellites, to the Sea-Bed Treaty which excludes regulation of uses of the ocean above the sea bed, and to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, whose coverage was partial. Both Tlatelolco and the later Non-Proliferation Treaty ensure that the number of nuclear states, that is states with sovereign control over nuclear weapons, does not increase – but the NPT's Achilles heel lies in its failure to restrict nuclear weapons deployment in other states' territory.

The definition of concepts as used in the treaty is embodied in article 2, which also defines the parties to the treaty. Article 3 defines the territory of the parties to include the territorial sea, the air space and other areas under their sovereignty. Finally, the concept of 'nuclear weapon' is defined in article 5 as any device capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes.

A group of nine articles is devoted to the setting up of a permanent international organisation and to its responsibilities in the implementation and enforcement of the agreement. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) based in Mexico City, started working in 1969 on setting up a system of control and verification.¹⁴⁶

The Treaty of Tlatelolco creates a system of control which is particularly comprehensive and potentially effective in comparison with other international instruments of a similar nature, including those of the NPT. These characteristics are the result of a dual system of control provided by: 1) OPANAL's regime of verification, which consists of the parties' reports (Art.14), special reports requested by the General Secretary (Art.15) and special inspections (Art.16); and 2) the IAEA system of safeguards as established in article 13 which was later replaced by the standard agreement applied to NPT signatories.¹⁴⁷ Article 12 defines the scope for verification which includes inspection of devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, so as to ensure that none of the activities prohibited in article

1 are carried out.¹⁴⁸ Articles 16 and 20 provide a number of mechanisms to prevent violations of the agreement.

The ambiguity surrounding the treatment of peaceful nuclear explosions represented, until quite recently, one of the main weaknesses of the Tlatelolco Treaty – even though it can be argued that the main advantage of the NPT as compared to Tlatelolco is that its article II prohibits the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or any other ‘nuclear explosive devices’. As the process of negotiation made clear, the apparent permission to conduct PNEs, embodied in article 18, allowed disagreement between conflicting interpretations. An ‘orthodox’ interpretation, led by García Robles, insisted on the need to observe article 5’s definition of ‘nuclear weapon’, and the resulting incompatibility of PNEs with the spirit of the treaty.¹⁴⁹ A second interpretation, based on article 17 and paragraph one of article 18, claimed that the treaty sanctioned PNEs even if they involved devices ‘similar to those used in nuclear weapons’.¹⁵⁰ This ‘ambiguity’ or ‘compromise’ served as a precedent to article V of the NPT which calls for a non-discriminatory availability of all the potential benefits of PNEs.

The negotiations also made clear the lack of consensus regarding the entry into force of the agreement. The solution agreed and embodied in article 28 has been described as a *sui generis* formula allowing for two different alternatives. The ‘conditional’ alternative states that the treaty shall enter into force among the states that have ratified it as soon as an important number of requirements had been met, while a ‘general rule’, stipulated that the treaty shall enter into force upon deposit of the instrument of ratification of the treaty accompanied by a waiver of these requirements. Paragraph 4 of article 28 also foresees the emergence of new nuclear powers by stating that the rise of a new power possessing nuclear weapons shall have the effect of suspending the implementation of the treaty for parties who have ratified it but failed to waive the requirements, or for those who may request it, until the new nuclear power has ratified Protocol II. Finally, this article led to two different interpretations of the zone of application of the agreement: a ‘mobile’ zone and a ‘permanent’ one. The notion of mobility refers to the expansion of the zone as the result of new adhesions, while the latter refers to the fulfilment of all the requirements of article 28. This definition represents another controversial point of the agreement since it embraces the territory, territorial sea, airspace and any other space under the sovereignty of zonal states. The controversy basically arises from the extension of the NFZ over hundreds of kilometres from the coasts of signatory states.¹⁵¹

Until recently, article 25, which deals with the process of signature, included an unfortunate exception which obstructed Guyana’s incorporation, by depriving the General Conference of the right to admit any political entity part or all of whose territory is (prior to the date of the opening of the treaty for

signature) the subject of a dispute or claim between an extra-continental country and one or more Latin American states.¹⁵² Thanks to recent changes in the OAS charter, OPANAL finally decided to remove the clause which impeded Guyana's adherence.

Although article 27 stipulates that the treaty shall not be subject to reservations, COPREDAL tacitly accepted interpretative declarations which had arisen in relation to PNEs (in the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Nicaragua), disputed territories, the question of transit and the definition of the zone of application. Interpretative declarations have also accompanied adherence to both protocols.

The duration of the treaty and withdrawal of the parties are dealt with by article 30. It specifies that the treaty shall be of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely. A party could withdraw 'under circumstances that affect its supreme interests or the peace or security of one or more contracting parties', though any withdrawal should be notified in advance so that it could be automatically reported to all parties, as well as to the UN General Secretary.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco: additional protocols

The preamble to both protocols emphasises the importance of the treaty as a step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the need to consider non-proliferation as a stage in the achievement both of 'general and complete disarmament' and of a 'world at peace based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of states'. It was agreed that both protocols would enter into force on the date of deposit of the respective instruments of ratification and that they would also have an indefinite duration.

Protocol I binds territories under *de jure* or *de facto* extra-continental responsibility to the denuclearisation statute (as defined by articles 1, 3, 5, and 13), though it does not impose upon its parties any of the obligations contained in articles 14, 15 and 16. It was agreed that since the rights of its parties would not be as extensive as those of the parties to the treaty, their obligations should equally be less stringent. In relation to the system of control the parties are only obliged to agree bilateral agreements with the IAEA.

Protocol II requests the nuclear powers to respect the denuclearised status of Latin America and not to contribute in any way to activities against article 1's obligations, and equally important, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties. This protocol embodies the principle of balanced responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

By October 1967 the treaty had already been signed by all the Latin American states party to the Preliminary Commission. Tlatelolco represents the first multilateral treaty in the field of nuclear arms control which includes an integrated system of control. Another important contribution of Tlatelolco lies in its emphasis on the need for an acceptable balanced distribution of responsibilities and mutual obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

Main challenges to the implementation of the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone

Signature and ratification

Eight years after the treaty had been opened for signature it had come into force for 17 of the 22 parties for whom it was open to signature. This meant that those 17 states had not only signed and ratified it, but had waived the conditions attached to article 28 so that the treaty had entered into force for them all. Two states, Cuba and Guyana, had not signed the agreement. Neither Brazil nor Chile had waived the requirements attached to article 28, while Argentina had repeatedly failed to ratify the agreement.

An evaluation of the implementation of the agreement in 1975 could therefore conclude that the balance-sheet was positive. Progress was above all perceived in the adherence of both China and France to Protocol II. This was a significant achievement given their opposition, at the time, to the NPT and the PTBT. From this perspective the problem posed by the achievement of two ratifications, two waivers of article 28 and the incorporation of Cuba and Guyana still seemed susceptible of being gradually solved. Guyana's inclusion became more likely by the beginning of the 1990s as the result of modifications to article 25, similar to earlier changes in the OAS charter, which have removed previous obstacles to Guyana's participation in both organisations.

Having the United States, Great Britain, China and France as parties to Protocol II increased the likelihood of Soviet participation. This appeared particularly feasible given the fact that Soviet isolation continued to contradict its traditional support for NFZs. Its isolation as the only nuclear power not party to the guarantee certainly increased the pressures on it to join Protocol II. Finally, it is important to underline the recent decision taken by the French government finally to ratify Protocol I of the Tlatelolco Treaty.¹⁵³ Not only would the French ratification complete the overall process of signature and ratification of both protocols, but it would also place the islands of Guadalupe and Martinique and French Guyana under the provisions provided by the Tlatelolco Treaty.

Cuban participation

Another source of long lasting pessimism as to the prospects for further progress in the implementation of the regional non-proliferation regime has been Cuba's incorporation to Tlatelolco. For a long time Cuban participation remained the most critical factor in the success or failure of the treaty. Since the first invitation to Cuba to join the effort in 1964, the Cuban government continued to insist on prior US withdrawal from Guantanamo and the incorporation of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands into the regime of absolute prohibition of nuclear weapons. Given its regional isolation, Cuba's participation remained highly unlikely.

The advantages of bringing Cuba within the regime again became evident during the early 1970s when concern about evidence that the Soviet Union was building a submarine base in the island was raised in the region. Yet Castro's confrontational policies, leading up to Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975, precluded any negotiations. Nevertheless this problem was partially solved by reassurances by the Soviet Union to the United States about its tacit commitment not to introduce nuclear weapons into the Western hemisphere. Moreover, this commitment was subsequently formalised by Soviet adherence to Protocol II of Tlatelolco in 1979.¹⁵⁴

Although during the 1980s there were signs indicating Cuba's interest in a change in US-Cuban relations, among which the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the improvement of human rights and the decision to postpone TV broadcasts to Florida were the most important, meetings between senior officials from both governments, held in Mexico and Canada, did not produce tangible results. In addition the impact of the dramatic changes which have taken place within the USSR and Eastern Europe have placed Castro on a defensive position. Despite this, important changes have lately accompanied a significant shift in Cuban attitude towards the agreement. Not only has the island decided to participate as an observer in OPANAL, but Cuba has even affirmed that it would join the agreement once Brazil, Argentina and Chile have fulfilled their recent promises fully to adhere to the agreement.¹⁵⁵

The Falklands/Malvinas crisis

One of the most challenging tests to the interpretation and implementation of the treaty was provided by the Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982. The South Atlantic conflict highlighted the importance of the treaty in terms of its two basic aspirations: that of the guarantees provided by nuclear powers and that of preventing regional proliferation.

The question of the use of nuclear energy for propelling vehicles had first arisen in OPANAL during the late 1960s and early 1970s when the Jamaican delegation put forward the issue. But it was left unresolved by the conference. The report on Naval Weapon states came to the conclusion that given the cost and complexity of this use of nuclear energy, it would be confined to warships. Nuclear energy has been mainly used in submarines and has not only increased their speed but their capacity to remain submerged for longer periods of time.¹⁵⁶ The sinking of the Belgrano during the Falklands/Malvinas war by a nuclear propelled submarine again placed this difficult question at the fore-front of the debate. Moreover, the question was further complicated by the unclear nature of the provisions on transport and transit. Were nuclear propelled vessels prohibited or permitted by the agreement? Argentina claimed that it represented a non-peaceful use of nuclear energy, while Great Britain denied having deployed any nuclear weapon within the zone of application of the treaty, though it officially restated its practice of non-confirmation and non-denial.¹⁵⁷

But beyond the particular issue of nuclear propelled vehicles the real concern was the possibility of the presence of nuclear weapons in the region during the confrontation. This hypothesis has been based on the assumption that given the redeployment of the British North Atlantic and Mediterranean fleet to the South Atlantic, and its previous task within NATO, it was not entirely unlikely that nuclear weapons were being carried on board.¹⁵⁸ Even if one could assume that nuclear weapons were actually introduced the relevant question is whether this involved a violation of the agreement. In order to answer this question we have to look at Protocols I and II, to which Great Britain is a party, to try to determine whether the conflict took place within the zone of application of the agreement.

At the time of the crisis the islands were either under *de facto* or *de jure* British responsibility and since a British declaration accompanying ratification of Protocol I extended its commitment to the islands, it seems clear that the presence of nuclear weapons would have constituted a violation of Protocol I. In the case of British observation of Protocol II the situation does not look so clear. This lack of clarity is the result of Argentina's failure to ratify the agreement and the consequent exclusion of its territory from the zone of application of the treaty. Under this interpretation the claim of British violation has no ground.

OPANAL reacted simply by expressing 'its concern' and by taking note of the Argentine and British claims in its resolution 170 (VIII). The muted nature of this reaction was the consequence of the lack of any other legal instruments and probably also of the indirect pressure exerted by the previous US declaration stating that the actions taken by the British Navy in the South Atlantic were not incompatible with British obligations under Protocols I and II.¹⁵⁹

Whatever the reasons behind OPANAL's attitude its performance revealed its incapacity to take advantage of the legal and political opportunities offered by the instruments provided by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Equally important, this event demonstrated to Argentina the implications and disadvantages of having failed to become a party to the agreement, particularly in relation to its right to participate and therefore to call an exceptional meeting of OPANAL's main agencies. But despite the initial hopes that the transition to civilian rule had awakened, the Argentine government remained reluctant to ratify the treaty. The more recent renunciation by Argentina and Brazil of their claim to PNEs, paving the way to a regional system of safeguards, could have a positive impact on Argentina's views about the ratification of Tlatelolco.

The implementation of Protocols I and II

Protocol I has been signed and ratified by all powers with territorial responsibilities within the region with the sole exception of France. French ratification would bring the islands of Guadalupe and Martinique and French Guyana into the zone. Traditionally France argued its incapacity to ratify this protocol on constitutional grounds. Yet this justification was seriously undermined by previous cases in which France accepted some form of demilitarisation. During the last decade France has maintained a more favourable attitude towards non-proliferation, attending for the first time the 1990 NPT Review Conference and more recently announcing its decision to join the NPT and to ratify Protocol I of Tlatelolco.¹⁶⁰ It is important to emphasise that France's ratification of Protocol I would bring the process of signature and ratification of Tlatelolco's Protocols I and II to its completion.

Great Britain was the first party to sign and ratify Protocol I in December 1969. It was followed by the Netherlands in 1971. Both ratifications were accompanied by declarations stating that any interpretation of this Protocol could not affect the legal status of the territories under their responsibility. US ratification in 1981 included the canal zone of Panama but the incorporation of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands was made dependent upon Cuban participation.

Protocol II was first signed and ratified by both the United States and the United Kingdom with accompanying interpretative declarations. These stated that the concepts of territory and sovereignty embodied in article 3 of the treaty should observe the general principles of International Law. It is important to note that by becoming a party to Protocol II the United States entered, for the first time, into an obligation that restricted its use of nuclear weapons. French adherence to the protocol (1973) took a long time and involved difficult negotiations.¹⁶¹ China's adherence became feasible once it became a UN member in 1971. By June 1974 China had signed and ratified the agreement

and in this way had become for the first time a party to a nuclear arms control agreement.

China had consistently supported the total prohibition of nuclear arms and considered commitments by the nuclear powers not to use them as a first step in this direction. China's adherence to Tlatelolco did not affect its previous criticisms of the PTBT and the NPT.¹⁶² Its opposition was based on the limitations that the PTBT would have imposed on its pursuit of a nuclear capability, while its criticism of the NPT focused on its 'discriminatory character' and its potential to be used by the superpowers to maintain and strengthen their nuclear monopoly.¹⁶³ Its decision to develop nuclear weapons was justified in terms of defence as breaking the nuclear monopoly of both superpowers. The main characteristic of China's policy on nuclear weapons lies in its unilateral pledge not to be the first to use such weapons at any time or in any circumstance.

China's adherence to Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco forms part of a wider and unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states or NFZs. China's signature of Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco was accompanied by declarations about the need to have all nuclear powers undertaking this commitment. In relation to Latin America Chinese comments argued that an effective regional non-proliferation regime should involve the dismantling of all foreign military bases and the total prohibition of nuclear weapons transport.¹⁶⁴ Finally, as mentioned earlier, Soviet ratification came in 1979, putting an end to its previous hesitant attitude.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

The controversial question of peaceful nuclear explosions was an object of most declarations which regarded them as being prohibited by articles 18, 1 and 5 until it becomes technologically feasible to carry out PNEs. But an alternative view represented by Argentina claimed that the right to conduct PNEs formed part of the original intentions of the agreement.

The 1974 Indian explosion and its denomination as a PNE again raised this delicate issue within the context of the implementation of the agreement. Was India a new nuclear power whose guarantee should be incorporated under Protocol II? The Indian explosion brought to the fore the problem of PNEs. It again confronted the Latin American parties with the dilemma of how to deal with nuclear explosions in the treaty. They could either reinforce the guarantees offered by Protocol II or they could maintain their policy of ambiguity in relation to this question.

The problem continued to be postponed for two reasons: firstly, by India's systematic denial of having acquired a military nuclear capability, its insistence upon the 'peaceful' character of its explosion and its restraint in carrying out further explosions, and secondly by the absence of any request for suspension of the agreement from any of the Latin American parties to the treaty. India's behaviour also kept the question open since the definition of nuclear weapon as embodied in article 5 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco does not consider any subjective element of intention. That is to say, beyond Indian intentions the lack of sufficient conditions to distinguish peaceful from non-peaceful nuclear explosions made India a *de facto* nuclear power. More recently the apparent renunciation of PNEs by both Brazil and Argentina, and their acceptance of IAEA safeguards, have not only reinforced the latter interpretation, but highlighted the advantages of NFZs for reconciling greater flexibility with safe regulation.

Brazilian and Argentine nuclear aspirations

When Brazilian and Argentine nuclear aspirations were taken into account the prospects for progress seemed less promising. Domestic political events in Argentina and Brazil, as well as external influences, affected the course taken by their respective nuclear energy programmes and consequently their positions *vis-à-vis* the regional non-proliferation agreement. Delays in Argentine ratification and the shield provided to Brazil by article 28 were soon identified as the main and more difficult obstacles to the implementation of the regional non-proliferation regime.

The 1966 military coup in Argentina differed from previous military interventions aimed at the 're-establishment of constitutional rule' and had laid the basis for a prolonged military rule which granted the military a considerable margin of manoeuvre in carrying out earlier ambitious programmes which had been interrupted by endemic political instability. A new definition of national sovereignty led the armed forces to impose limits on what they considered excessive liberalism in strategic sectors such as steel and nuclear energy. The Atucha nuclear plant project received renewed impetus while the General Direction of Military Manufactures decided to take from the United States the contract for the expansion of Villa Constitution steel mill. These decisions, together with limited access to arms purchases in the United States, created new sources of tension in the already complicated relationship with the hegemonic power. Technical limitations of US military aid and control over types of military weaponry were seen as a deliberate attempt by Washington to transform Latin American armies into 'colonial police forces', adequate for counter-insurgency but without real military power.

These considerations were logically extended to the nuclear energy sector which had already been identified as a target for control on the part of the nuclear powers. US restrictions on transfers of sensitive technology and sophisticated weaponry led the Argentine military to approach Europe.¹⁶⁵ In 1968 the National Atomic Energy Commission (NAEC) announced its decision to grant Siemens, the West German Company, the contract to build the first nuclear power plant Atucha I. NAEC's choice of a system based on natural uranium rather than enriched uranium fuel as in American-designed reactors, enabled Argentina not only to consume its own uranium reserves, but above all to escape obligatory international controls. Official justification for this decision, which discarded American bids, was the avoidance of absolute dependence on the single source of enriched uranium, namely the United States.¹⁶⁶

Beyond considerations of technological and fuel dependence lay a deeper commitment to nuclear energy development. Just one year after the signature of the Tlatelolco Treaty, Argentina's position in relation to non-proliferation policies became clear. In the 1968 UN debate on the NPT the Argentine delegate stated that 'Argentina could not accept remaining subject to a continuing dependence on the great powers for nuclear technology for peaceful ends' and concluded that the NPT would 'disarm the unarmed' while imposing no restrictions on the arms race between the superpowers. This phrase would later become the norm for Argentine opposition to this treaty.

By the early 1970s Argentina was already operating six major centres for nuclear research and the proportion of scientists and engineers trained in the United States and Europe had significantly increased. In 1973 the NAEC signed a contract for a second reactor, the Candu (Canadian Deuterium Uranium). The Argentine-Canadian agreement stipulated the peaceful application of the technology and imposed IAEA safeguards. During this period another ambitious programme was announced for the years 1975-1985 to develop large scale manufacturing capacity and to start the construction of a heavy water plant by 1980. Early in 1974 Atucha I, a 9320 megawatt power plant, was being readied for operation. Yet behind the grandiloquent pronouncements of the Argentine government in the field of nuclear energy, persistent political instability continued to obstruct the NAEC's ambitious programme. This was particularly the case during the years of Isabel Perón's government (1973-1976), when bureaucratic obstacles, budget cuts, salary freezes and delays in decision making were commonplace. As a result of this there was a massive exodus of prominent scientists and technicians who found better opportunities in the Brazilian and Iranian nuclear programmes.

By the mid 1970s the interaction between the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear programmes came to the surface. If one could argue that Argentina's nuclear programme had enjoyed a relatively clear direction since its origins, in

the Brazilian case, international events as well as political decisions gradually shaped the course followed by its nuclear energy policy. Goulart's enthusiasm for regional denuclearisation had first been followed by a cautious withdrawal from a leading position after the 1964 military coup and, subsequently, by a more equivocal position. During the Costa e Silva government nuclear issues were considered part of Brazil's national interest. The increasing nationalism which permeated Brazilian foreign policy during these years expanded to the field of nuclear energy policy.

These changes were partly the result of a new ideology developed within the Escola Superior de Guerra which was embodied in a particular doctrine of national security which gave powerful political roles to the military. National Security was broadly defined as encompassing all aspects of economic development and particularly that of nuclear energy. The new policy was made public in Costa e Silva's 1967 speech:

We will thus give priority to the problem of development. The diplomatic actions of my government will aim, at both bilateral and multilateral levels, at widening our external markets, at obtaining fair and stable prices for our products, at attracting capital and technical assistance and, of particular importance, at the cooperation necessary for the peaceful nuclearisation of the country.¹⁶⁷

Even though Brazil had signed and ratified the Tlatelolco agreement, the Costa e Silva government, protected by the shield provided by the provisions of article 28 decided to pursue an independent route for the Brazilian nuclear programme. Evidence of this was provided by the 1967 decision to start working towards an independent nuclear fuel cycle.

The nuclear field was not an exception in the gradual deterioration of US-Brazilian relations. Gradual coolness in the relationship between the two countries was the result, on the one hand, of the new approach taken by Brazilian foreign policy – which was itself influenced by institutional and bureaucratic factors such as the particular identity that Itamaraty, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, had developed over the years – and, on the other, of perceptions of the weakening of US commitment towards the southern partner. The deterioration of the relationship with Brazil was not the only manifestation of the American withdrawal from the region. Vietnam and domestic concerns kept the attention of both the Johnson and Nixon administrations. And, equally important, after a period of close cooperation, a complex pattern emerged linking Latin American nationalism (with an increasing feeling of US overcommitment) to anti-US feeling in the region, to partial US withdrawal and finally, to increasing frustration within Latin America.

The conditions imposed by the United States upon transfer of nuclear technology began to be perceived as too stringent, and most importantly, risking Brazil's permanent dependence on foreign nuclear technology. This redefinition of nuclear energy policy was soon seen by the United States as a symptom of what Walt Rostow called the 'puzzling ambivalence' in Costa e Silva's foreign policy.¹⁶⁸ As part of the new approach to nuclear energy issues the Brazilian National Security Council established independent nuclear capability as a permanent national objective.¹⁶⁹ Domestic support for the new policy was expressed in public concern about the implications of Tlatelolco for 'Brazil's legitimate right to develop a nuclear programme' and for its future security interests. These concerns were also expressed by Itamaraty's criticism of the Mexican 'unconditional denuclearisation' and reaffirmation of its decision not to allow any restriction of nuclear development. While supporting non-proliferation, the Foreign Ministry would also promote foreign cooperation for Brazilian 'peaceful nuclearisation'.¹⁷⁰ In that period the Brazilian government secretly began to work on a 15 year plan for nuclear independence.¹⁷¹

Awareness of Argentine nuclear development may also have played a role in the new direction taken by the Costa e Silva government. By 1968 the Argentine NAEC began the operation, on a pilot scale, of the first chemical processing plant for 'reclaiming plutonium from spent reactor fuel' in the region.¹⁷² In Brazil, the Nuclear Energy National Council was particularly sensitive to these moves. It had reacted strongly against the 1962 denuclearisation proposal on the basis of forecasts about Chinese and Argentine nuclear aspirations. By this time, and taking into account the nuclear policies of both India and Israel, it actively supported Costa e Silva's efforts to resist diplomatic pressures aimed at bringing Brazil into the NPT. In the Council's opinion the crucial element was the development of autonomous sources of nuclear fuel.¹⁷³

Behind Costa e Silva's rhetoric and efforts towards greater autonomy, differences with the United States, including nuclear energy issues, remained manageable. The actual meaning of these differences lay mainly in their long-term implications and their relation with Brazil's foreign policy reassessment of the relationship with the United States.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the United States continued to enjoy Brazilian support in joint opposition both to Venezuela's oil nationalisation and to China's admission to the UN, while anticomunism continued to be strongly expressed in relation to Cuba and by a low profile in its opposition to non-proliferation.

Despite efforts to give the nuclear energy programme some degree of autonomy it remained as dependent as in the 1950s. The attempts made by Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto to take Brazil towards an independent nuclear capability conflicted with the prevailing view that development in the

nuclear energy field could best be achieved through collaboration with the United States.¹⁷⁵ The Mines and Energy Minister José Costa Cavalcante, together with important figures within the military, favoured the latter path and opposed confrontation with the United States. In October 1967 the National Security Council decided that the Foreign Ministry should 'retire from the policy making arena and limit itself to conducting international negotiations'.

In relation to non-proliferation Tlatelolco's potential to justify Brazilian reluctance to join the NPT soon became clear. During the 1967 Conference on non-proliferation Correa da Costa emphasised Brazil's participation in the regional non-proliferation regime while reiterating its commitment to nuclear energy development. Brazil's partial commitment to Tlatelolco proved to be a useful shield against US pressure to adhere to the NPT. The superpower's interest in the latter treaty was regarded as a serious obstacle to Brazil's determination to achieve scientific and technological self-sufficiency. In the nuclear field that goal was increasingly justified by the need to ensure energy supplies.¹⁷⁶

Opposition to the NPT was first manifested at the ENDC when the Brazilian delegate, Correa da Costa, explicitly stated that 'Brazil will not accept any non-proliferation commitment which might lead to a new form of dependency'.¹⁷⁷ During the XXII UNGA Magalhaes Pinto again mentioned Tlatelolco as evidence of Brazil's commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Brazilian opposition to the NPT was then based on the treaty's 'endorsement of a distinction in the technological status of party states'.¹⁷⁸

By the beginning of the 1970s the effects of the lack of a clear and independent nuclear energy policy became clear in the perception of the country's limited technological capacity. All equipment for nuclear reactors was not only imported from the United States but was also installed by US technicians. Despite strong criticism of such dependence, in 1972 Brazil accepted Westinghouse's proposal to build the country's first power reactor. The reactor was to be fuelled by uranium mined in Brazil but enriched in the United States.¹⁷⁹

The lack of a clear and firm nuclear policy could be partly explained by the lack of capacity of the military to foster development. The 1969 succession crisis caused by Costa e Silva's illness put in question the stability and coherence of his long term policies. Furthermore, internal divisions within the military establishment caused serious discontinuities in some of the most important economic and bureaucratic reforms.¹⁸⁰ The nuclear programme was no exception and, like most scientific and technological projects, it was also affected by this general lack of consistency.

Pressures on Brazil's energy policy mounted as it became clear that the economic policy success, 'the Brazilian Miracle', of the Medici years was not only dependent upon favourable external conditions but also upon high and expensive energy consumption.¹⁸¹ The turning point came in 1973. The oil crisis hit the Brazilian economy and revealed its great vulnerability to external pressures in the energy sector, as did the disclosure by the US Atomic Energy Commission that it could not guarantee enriched uranium deliveries, previously agreed with Brazil for the recently acquired Westinghouse reactor. The United States, which until then had maintained absolute control over enriched uranium supplies, began to seem questionable as a reliable source of fuel.¹⁸²

After the 1973 'shock' Brazil began to pursue a new 'responsible pragmatism' in its foreign policy which enabled Itamaraty to regain a policy making role.¹⁸³ New signs of independence were evident in its diplomatic approach towards the Arab states, and in its efforts to diversify its export markets and its sources of energy, technology and foreign investment. The nuclear aspect of energy received a special and renewed emphasis.

The steps taken during the late 1960s served as the basis for the implementation of the new nuclear goals. In 1968 nuclear matters had been briefly discussed during Willy Brandt's visit to Brazil. The German company Siemens had already won the Atucha I contract in Argentina and had awakened the interest of Brazilian military circles. In 1969 a bilateral agreement for scientific and technical cooperation had been signed between Germany and Brazil and in 1971 nuclear cooperation had been formally instituted.¹⁸⁴ But it was only after the 1973 energy crisis and the failure of the United States to fulfil its uranium deliveries that intensive nuclear negotiations actually began.¹⁸⁵

An agreement was reached in February 1975 by which Germany agreed to assist with technology and equipment in the construction of eight power reactors as well as enrichment plants and reprocessing facilities. Brazil was to acquire an independent nuclear power industry and Germany would help to discover further uranium reserves in order to ensure access to them, and would thereby make inroads into the fast-developing international nuclear energy market.¹⁸⁶ These moves marked a change in what Gall calls the geopolitics of uranium supplies, from US monopoly to the spread and diversification of enrichment capacity to other countries. The Brazilian-German agreement was a move towards greater independence for both sides, through which Brazil would become a potential exporter of nuclear fuels.

This agreement also revealed the predominance of those who had advocated nuclear independence over a long period. Even though it could be argued that this shift in policy orientation was largely the result of an international

contingency, the debate underlying the change of direction actually revealed a deeper trend in the course followed by Brazilian foreign policy.

Previous signs of success of its outward-oriented economic policy had increased the self-confidence of the Brazilian government, leading to a new emphasis on Brazil's role as an emerging regional power. While cooperation with the United States had continued, the complex nature of the relationship between the emerging regional power and the United States had also increased the number of areas of potential conflict. The issue of nuclear energy offered the first evidence of a more radical posture. The extent of Brazil's decision to withdraw from its special relationship with the United States, became quite clear with the signature of the Brazilian-German agreement, which showed its determination to achieve nuclear independence. Nevertheless, the reluctant acceptance by Brazil of wide provisions and safeguards accompanying the agreement revealed its decision to neutralise or, when possible, to avoid differences and consequently antagonism with the United States.¹⁸⁷ The main factor behind increasing Brazilian assertiveness was a more fragile international economic posture resulting from the combination of the impact of the oil crisis, a mounting foreign debt, and increasing protectionism in the industrialised countries, exemplified by the US 1974 Trade Reform Act. These trends provided the basis for the emergence of a new foreign policy consensus between the foreign policy and economic policy elites favouring a greater assertiveness for Brazilian foreign policy, including nuclear energy issues.¹⁸⁸

Although it seems difficult to assess the exact role that mutual perceptions about foreign policy and nuclear energy decisions and development played in the course followed by the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear energy programmes, it seems clear that they provided the ground for potential competition. Relations between the two countries had significantly improved after the 1966 military coup in Argentina as a result of increasing convergence of attitudes in ideological and security issues. Yet signs of increasing Brazilian interest in pursuing an independent nuclear policy awakened Argentine concern. This situation came to the surface after the 1974 shift in the Brazilian nuclear programme. In the journal *Estrategia* an article by J.E. Gugliamelli reflected Argentine preoccupations: 'given the available facts it is possible to affirm that Brazil has taken the firm decision to join the nuclear club, that is, to make an atom bomb under the pretext of peaceful uses . . . the decision to manufacture the nuclear explosive and the opportunity are critical for Argentina since our neighbour's nuclear device will affect our security palpably and decidedly'.¹⁸⁹

Most analysts seem to agree that the 1974 Indian explosion, together with the opening in that same year of the Argentine nuclear plant had a catalytic effect upon the latent nuclear rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, reinforcing Brazilian interest in pursuing an independent path after the enriched uranium crisis of that same year. The position of both states towards the NPT and the

Treaty of Tlatelolco could be partly interpreted as a symptom of an erosion of US power and influence on nuclear and regional issues.

In the late 1970s President Carter attempted to redress this situation. His commitment to nuclear non-proliferation put pressure on both Brazil and Argentina while promoting the creation of a group of nuclear suppliers in order to achieve common guidelines for nuclear exports. In his view this problem could only be solved by a multilateral approach. The London suppliers group started its meetings in London during the mid 1970s with the aim of reducing the detrimental effects of commercial competition on safeguards requirements, which had gradually undermined the non-proliferation regime. Disagreement about the application of safeguards, resulting particularly from French and German opposition to full scope safeguards as basic conditions for cooperation or trade, obstructed the achievements of the organisation.

US interest in strengthening non-proliferation in Latin America increased significantly in 1975 when, at the request of Senator Abraham Ribicoff, a US intelligence enquiry revealed the diversion of 50kg of plutonium from the Atucha power reactor in Argentina. Even though disagreement concerning the validity of the results arose between the US Energy R&D Administration, which denied that the incident had occurred, and a number of influential senators who insisted on the need to strengthen the regional non-proliferation regime, Argentina came under constant US pressure to adhere to the NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty.¹⁹⁰

Similarly, concern with the implications of the 1975 Brazil-German agreement led Carter to pursue diplomatic efforts aimed at revoking the agreement.¹⁹¹ In Brasilia Henry Kissinger explained that the purpose of his visit lay in ‘strengthening US-Brazilian friendship, which became increasingly important as Brazil emerged as a new power’.¹⁹² The Brazilian reaction to American pressure was fairly clear. As had been the case during the NPT negotiations, references to Tlatelolco were offered as proof of Brazilian commitment to ‘non-discriminatory non-proliferation’.¹⁹³ Subsequently, in a speech delivered in Washington, Azeredo da Silveira, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, expressed his hope of finding mutually satisfying solutions so that:

misunderstood interests and unfounded suspicion do not lead to fruitless divergences. In this respect I honestly mention the lack of understanding, among certain American sectors, in relation to the Brazilian decision to develop a peaceful nuclear industry.¹⁹⁴

Equally, US pressure led Argentina to announce that it had started the process towards ratification of Tlateloco but this was later halted by the Falklands/Malvinas war.¹⁹⁵ The transition to democracy in that country increased the expectations of a rapid Argentine adherence, but these have not

been fully fulfilled. However, and paradoxically, American pressure on both Argentina and Brazil helped to turn earlier concern over Argentina's nuclear aspirations into cautious cooperation. Argentina's official statements condemning US policies and suggesting the negotiation of a bilateral agreement on nuclear cooperation were warmly received in Brasilia.¹⁹⁶

References to the idea of nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil were clearly linked to US pressure on Brazil's decision to pursue an independent nuclear programme. During the period characterised by tension in US-Brazilian relations Argentina sided with Brazil and what had simply started as a sequence of declarations supporting Brazil gradually evolved towards clear cooperation. In 1977, just after Canada had suspended the transfer of an enrichment plant to Argentina, on the basis of lack of sufficient safeguards, the Argentine ambassador to the United States made public the interest of his country in establishing a common Argentine-Brazilian front to resist US opposition to the construction of enrichment plants.¹⁹⁷ In that same year the first informal talks between the two countries led to a joint communiqué stressing cooperation in nuclear matters. The underlying factors leading to this process were: first, the common interest of the parties in resisting increasing US pressure; secondly, economic incentives at a time when budgetary constraints were first making their impact; and third, the shift in Brazil's main area of interest towards Latin America, which followed Figuereido's accession to power.¹⁹⁸

Although it is always difficult to judge the exact role of personalities, under Figuereido Argentina and Brazil first reached an agreement which not only put an end to the long dam disputes on the Parana River but paved the way to wider cooperation in the energy sector. At the time of the Itapu-Corpus agreement Figuereido admitted in an interview that the two countries could in fact cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.¹⁹⁹ Formal cooperation started in 1980 during Figuereido's visit to Argentina with the signature of four agreements in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The first document contemplated the creation of an organisation similar to EURATOM which would enable the parties jointly to demand full access to nuclear technology in international fora. 'SUDATOM' would also include joint research and development in order to reduce costs and to assess the viability of a South American nuclear industry. Control mechanisms were also envisaged both to ensure the peaceful and environmental uses of nuclear energy, and to enable the parties to resolve differences as they might arise. In the wider context of Argentine-Brazilian relations these agreements highlighted the common interest of the parties in promoting Latin American integration.²⁰⁰

Clearly, these agreements would grant the parties greater ability to oppose suppliers' restrictions and to achieve greater access to advance technology. Equally important was their impact on increased security through a greater

degree of confidence and mutual understanding of the others' actions at a time when Brazil's incursion in the development of nuclear energy provided fertile ground for misperceptions and miscalculations.

These agreements were subsequently followed by a number of contracts by which the parties arranged the exchange of technology and technicians, and the development of joint aircraft and missile programmes. In 1980, 120 tons of Argentine uranium were transferred to Brazil in exchange for equipment and, one year later, three additional agreements were signed between Argentina's NAEC and Nuclebras for technological exchange and the additional supply of 240 tons of uranium to Brazil's Angra de Reis.²⁰¹ Contrary to what some had anticipated, Argentina's achievement of a uranium enrichment capability in 1983 did not inhibit the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement. To this contributed Alfonsín's decision personally to convey the news to Figuereido, as well as the meeting that year between the two presidents which was intended to update the 1980 agreements. Both presidents recognised the ideal stage reached by Argentine-Brazilian relations which allowed the two countries to embark on an ambitious joint enterprise: the construction and export of nuclear power stations to Latin America and other developing countries.²⁰² Although subsequently delayed by financial constraints, differences over designs, and the reluctance of the Brazilian military with regard to joint development of high technology, these initiatives materialised first in the 1986 plans for a joint venture between the Brazilian company Embraer and the Argentine Ministry of Defence for research and production of civil and military aircraft, and secondly in the Argentine-Brazilian Integration Protocols of that year for the co-production of nuclear fuel for test-reactors.²⁰³

It would be wrong to underestimate the role of such cooperation agreements in reducing tensions and uncertainties between the two countries. Yet it is particularly important to emphasise the contribution of a number of measures, specifically designed to reassure the other party, in laying the foundations for what could eventually emerge as a 'security community' between them.²⁰⁴ These have included visits to military installations dating back to the 1980 visit of Argentine generals to Brazil, a number of official decisions and declarations such as Figuereido's references to 'the conciliation of interests and aspirations within a climate of confidence and cooperation', or Alfonsín's personal message with regard to Argentina's capacity to enrich uranium and his decision to place the NAEC under civilian control.²⁰⁵ There is little doubt that one of the most significant steps in this direction was the joint declaration issued during the 1985 Sarney-Alfonsín summit at Foz do Iguaçu which included a security protocol.²⁰⁶ Two factors deserve special attention with respect to this process: firstly, the transition to democracy in both Argentina and Brazil, and secondly, the return of non-proliferation to the US foreign policy agenda. Although responding to distinct circumstances, and following entirely different paths, the fact that both transitions took place at relatively the same time further

contributed to the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement. Equally important was the renewed interest shown by the Bush administration in preventing nuclear proliferation and the associated pressure on the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear programmes.

Following the signature of the Iguaçú declaration, Alfonsín and Sarney embarked on a process of closer cooperation which started with their ratification of the previous agreement on nuclear cooperation. Sarney's visit to a nuclear facility in Argentina was seen as clear indication of the commitment of the two presidents to promote greater confidence between their countries. As had been the case with Argentina's mastery in enriching uranium, Sarney transmitted to Alfonsín, through confidential notes in 1987, Brazil's recently acquired capacity to enrich uranium.²⁰⁷ Elections in 1989 brought Menem and Collor to the Argentine and Brazilian presidencies. In 1990 the two presidents again decided to revive the waning integration process which had been started by their predecessors. Although numerous obstacles persisted, similar to those which hindered previous integration endeavours, and there is little doubt that these moves have been significantly encouraged by wider international trends towards the formation of regional blocs, relations between the two countries continued to take place in a particularly friendly environment.

Evidence since the late 1970s suggests a gradual transformation of Argentine-Brazilian relations from competition to cooperation. Clearly, there is a danger of overstating the lasting character of such transformation as well as of the real scope for integration, but it would equally be wrong to underestimate the positive impact that important decisions and significant events had on former sources of insecurity. Transition to democracy in both countries, together with the successive policies promoting greater trust, particularly in the nuclear field, played a crucial role in this process.²⁰⁸

Undoubtedly these changes have contributed to the enhancement of security in the Southern Cone and the strengthening of the regional non-proliferation regime. Yet it is by no means clear that these conditions will remain static. The long term prospects of stability will continue to depend on the overall balance between the perceived benefits and costs of developing nuclear weapons; between wider incentives favouring non-nuclear postures and those backing the nuclear option. More recently, a sequence of important decisions have offered clear indication of the strength of the Argentine-Brazilian commitment to non-nuclear defence. These include: 1) joint appointment of representatives to the IAEA; 2) their intention to reach an agreement to renounce all military uses of nuclear energy; 3) their participation, for the first time, as observers during the 1990 NPT Review Conference; 4) their public declarations renouncing the military nuclear option; 5) the 1990 nuclear policy declaration of Iguaçú concerning the creation of a common system of 'accounts of critical materials' and the adoption of measures conducive to their full adherence to Tlatelolco;

6) their signature in December 1991 of safeguard agreements with the IAEA; and finally, 7) their joint declaration of that same month concerning their decision to submit a modified text of the Tlatelolco Treaty to OPANAL. Despite all this, important trends remain which could eventually obscure this picture.²⁰⁹

Among the factors which have created some uncertainty about the underlying confidence in Argentine-Brazilian relations in the 1980s, three deserve special attention. Firstly, the lessons of the Falklands/Malvinas war. Secondly, the fragility of the new democracies and the legacy left by military regimes both in relation to dominant doctrines of national security and to the relative autonomy and prerogatives of the military with respect to weapons acquisition.²¹⁰ And thirdly, the impact of new technological inroads by either Brazil or Argentina in their bilateral relations.

The Falklands/Malvinas war and the related arms embargo convinced Argentina of the need to reduce and if possible to eliminate its dependence on external supplies. While it is true that this dramatic experience exposed Argentina's total incapacity to sustain adequate logistical support for combined army, navy and air force actions, it also revealed to Brazil the existence of previously unknown Argentine military capability.²¹¹ Not only did the war have a clear impact on Argentina's decision to rearm, but it also encouraged the consideration of nuclear submarines programmes within the region and it clearly coincided with the acceleration of missile programmes.²¹² Since 1984 Iraq, Argentina and Egypt had joined efforts to develop the Condor missile programme while Brazilian industries currently manufacture a wide variety of rockets some of which seem capable of delivering nuclear payloads.²¹³ Although these missile programmes have serious limitations in the development of reliable guidance and motor technology, they have brought to the fore the new threat posed by missile proliferation in the developing world, and equally important, the extent of the cooperation established among 'threshold nuclear powers'.²¹⁴

Plans to develop nuclear submarines in the region date back to Brazil's 1979 decision to develop secretly a capability to enrich uranium. In that year the Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research started work on ultracentrifuge techniques outside the scope of IAEA regulations. These plans were unveiled in 1987 at the time when the Brazilian government made public its recently acquired capability. Their disclosure made clear the existence of what became known as the 'parallel nuclear programme' through which Brazil achieved secretly and without any external help such technological breakthrough.²¹⁵

At a time of balance of payments difficulties the potential export market for enriched uranium served to justify publicly what many regarded as intended, among other things, for the production of fuel for nuclear submarines.²¹⁶

While unveiling the ‘parallel programme’ the Brazilian president reaffirmed the ‘peaceful character’ of the Brazilian nuclear programme. Yet he left no doubt of ‘Brazil’s firm determination to achieve full access to scientific progress as well as to its practical applications’. At the time the chief of the armed forces, General Paulo Campos, insisted that Brazil should not accept any international restrictions in the field of nuclear energy.²¹⁷

The disclosure of the Brazilian ‘parallel programme’, four years after the transition to democracy had taken place, highlighted the scale of the challenge posed by strong military institutions to both the consolidation of the new democracies and to the current rapprochement between the two regimes. The economic adjustment which accompanied both Brazilian and Argentine transitions to democracy prompted the military to argue that these policies were rendering their countries ‘defenceless’. The ‘parallel programme’, together with previous arms purchases by the Argentine Navy with secret funds, revealed the degree of autonomy of the armed forces *vis-à-vis* the executive and legislative powers.²¹⁸ Although in Brazil the disclosure of the ‘parallel programme’ played a significant role in the decision to incorporate a clause in the 1988 Constitution committing Brazil to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, the definite character of the Constitution is still unclear. Not only are important changes in the 1988 Constitution or even its replacement still expected, but most importantly, the Brazilian legislature – like its Argentine counterpart – has virtually no traditional and routine ways to investigate major defence initiatives.²¹⁹

Nearly a decade after the transition to democracy of both Argentina and Brazil serious doubts remain as to the effectiveness of civilian-democratic control of the military. Alfonsín’s efforts aimed at greater civilian control of the military had no parallel in Brazil and were subsequently abandoned by his successor who has acquiesced to military demands and prerogatives. In this context it seems important to recall the previous critical role played by the military in reinforcing the perception of nuclear issues as vital for the national security of their respective countries. To the extent that the military continue to assert their prerogatives and their control over geopolitical and strategic thinking, the long term prospects of the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement appear less certain.²²⁰

The process started by the 1980 Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation agreement has rightly raised expectations about the role of confidence building measures and policies aimed at the reduction of mutual suspicion by transforming former competition into cooperation, and possibly in setting the basis for an eventual emergence of a ‘security community’. Yet the pattern of events previously outlined also makes clear the presence of significant difficulties still facing the regional non-proliferation regime.

It is true that current optimism could take comfort from the renewed international commitment to nuclear non-proliferation which has followed the Gulf War and from clear signs of progress in the Latin American non-proliferation regime. The decision by Argentina and Brazil to adopt measures conducive to their full adherence to Tlatelolco and their signature of safeguard agreements reinforce this view. Similarly, the suspension by Argentina of the Condor II programme since 1990 as well as Itamaraty's apparent inclination towards suspending all nuclear programmes appear, at first sight, to be promising moves.²²¹ Yet both considerations have undoubtedly been associated with international pressures, and most importantly they still lack the unconditional support of the Argentine and Brazilian military institutions. Once Congress had approved Collor's initiative to open the Brazilian computer industry to foreign competition, Brazil's nuclear 'transparence' would clearly remove another source of tension in its relations with the United States.²²² In the case of Argentina, the decision to halt the Condor missile was apparently associated with wider negotiations aimed at re-establishing diplomatic relations with Great Britain. As the Argentine Foreign Minister affirmed in London, 'Argentina was anxious to demonstrate its desire to play a responsible role in international affairs'.²²³ Notwithstanding this, the extent to which the military institutions have shared these decisions was made clear by the dissatisfaction of important military figures in both countries. Menem's suspension of the Condor missile was strongly criticised by the former chief of staff of the air forces, while in Brazil the Navy Minister openly protested at the Foreign Ministry's plans to suspend all nuclear programmes in exchange for US concessions. Admiral Flores arduously defended in Congress the continuation of his service's plans to build a nuclear powered submarine and condemned all plans to negotiate a new military cooperation agreement with Washington.²²⁴

What these events seem to indicate is the persistence of important interests opposed to strict non-proliferation commitments. Yet the signature of the 1991 IAEA agreements has clearly reinforced the position of those who favour non-nuclear postures. Non-nuclear postures, as non-proliferation commitments, are far from being static, and their continued viability seems to be dependent upon constantly updated inducements. Such inducements work at both the internal and external levels and are linked, on the one hand, to measures geared towards effective democratic control of military institutions, upon which the solidity of the final unilateral renunciation of the military nuclear option rests, and on the other, to wider international trends such as nuclear powers' policies seeking to minimise the political and military utility of nuclear weapons. As Iraq's near-nuclear capability demonstrated, challenges to non-proliferation could also arise from international safeguarded nuclear activities. This type of challenge will remain closely linked to the motivations that provide the foundations of the positive value attached to non-nuclear postures and that influence the decision of states unilaterally to avoid the nuclear option. In an international situation in which environmental concern has already led to greater promotion of nuclear

energy, such inducements as well as stricter international safeguards will be decisive.²²⁵

Undoubtedly, the conditions and the progress achieved by the Latin American non-proliferation regime offer a solid basis for the continued viability of the positive value attached to non-nuclear status in Latin America. In this respect the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the permanent control organisation set up by the treaty have made evident their potential to adjust to changes and to reconcile greater flexibility with safe regulation. Equally important has been their contribution to an increasingly favourable perception of the advantages attached to non-nuclear defence. Ironically, Argentina's and Brazil's partial opposition to the Tlatelolco Treaty enabled both countries to exchange views, to better understand each others concerns and eventually to transform their previous competition into open cooperation. It is not clear if in the absence of Tlatelolco, or if faced with a stricter regional non-proliferation regime this rapprochement would have been possible. What one could affirm with some certainty is that Tlatelolco, by offering the South American states a forum to exchange their particular views about non-proliferation policies, encouraged a rapprochement which has clearly alleviated anxieties about the opponent's intentions. The most likely challenges to be faced by the regional non-proliferation regime in the future relate, firstly, to the expected modifications to the treaty which Argentina and Brazil will soon submit to OPANAL, secondly, to the provision of stringent safeguards upon which confidence in non-proliferation rests, and, in the longer term, to the evolution of the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship.

A critical evaluation of the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone

As with the case of the NPT there are strong differences within the international community about the success or otherwise of the Latin American NFZ established by the Treaty of Tlateloco. Opinions vary from strong denunciations of it as discriminatory, in virtue of its maintenance of the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states, to the view that the Latin American NFZ represents a successful instrument for arms control.

Let us first consider the major criticisms that have been made of the treaty. One approach is to ask how the treaty has performed in terms of its own objectives, namely: a) in the prevention of horizontal proliferation; b) setting up a framework for international cooperation on the controversial question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly PNEs; c) limiting the nuclear warfare options of the superpowers; and d) keeping Latin America out of the arena of nuclear competition.

In order to be effective in preventing horizontal proliferation the agreement would have to encompass all the countries and particularly those with nuclear potential or aspirations. The Latin American NFZ has been criticised or indeed regarded as a failure because it has not achieved the incorporation of all the parties to whom the treaty is open for signature. This criticism has been particularly sceptical about the possibilities of Argentina and Brazil becoming full parties to the agreement. The Tlatelolco Treaty is also said to be considerably weakened by the unwillingness of Cuba to join it and that of France to join Protocol I.

One of the most frequent criticisms of the treaty deals with its permissive character, traditionally focusing on its ambiguous treatment of PNEs which were seen as weakening the arms control impact of the agreement. Another category of criticisms concerns the relationship between the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. These criticisms have focused on what they consider an international practice leading to the subordination of Tlatelolco and OPANAL to the NPT. Criticisms have also been levelled at the Tlatelolco Treaty on the grounds that it failed explicitly to prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons and therefore allowed the existence of nuclear targets within the region. This criticism could be linked to the objectives of limiting the warfare option of nuclear powers and that of keeping Latin America out of the nuclear competition.

Before considering the responses to each of these criticisms, a preliminary defence could be made that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is a subtle document reflecting the underlying context of its formulation. It therefore needs to be seen in these terms, allowing for adjustments as international circumstances change. The creation of a permanent organisation, including the Council and the General Conference, is fundamental in this respect, since it represents the best counter-argument to criticisms made on the ground that the treaty has not fulfilled all its objectives.

As far as the question of participation is concerned the failure of certain states to adhere fully to the agreement could be counterbalanced by the success achieved in obtaining all relevant signatories to Protocols I and II, with the sole exception that of France. Secondly, the nature and number of qualifications and criticisms made by these parties could also be seen as evidence of the extent to which they acknowledge both the political and moral value of the treaty, and the costs of violating it. Finally, participation could increase as the result of perception of the advantages of membership. This was particularly clear to Argentina during the Falkland/Malvinas War. Moreover, and as mentioned earlier, the recent renunciation of PNEs by both Argentina and Brazil has removed one of the main obstacles to Argentina's ratification, while the more recent interest of these countries to participate fully in the regional non-proliferation regime are no doubt encouraging. In the case of Cuba, although

acceding to Tlateloco could have been used as a bargaining chip in an eventual attempt to normalise relations both with the United States and the Latin American states, under the current conditions this is hardly the case. Despite this, Cuba's harsh struggle to insert itself in a rapidly changing international environment has underlaid its more favourable consideration of Tlatelolco. The withdrawal of the USSR as a major power and its subsequent disintegration have shaken Cuba's international position and deprived the island of its previous strategic protection. Under these circumstances the Latin American non-proliferation regime could be seen as offering Cuba some form of security. Cuba has recently declared its willingness to accede to the Tlatelolco Treaty as soon as the expected full adherences of Argentina, Brazil and Chile take place.²²⁶

In regard to the second and strongest set of criticisms, relating to Tlatelolco's permissiveness, although the recent declarations by Brazil and Argentina suggesting their renunciation of PNEs could contribute to remove this question from the list of criticisms, Brazilian and Argentine missile programmes as well as their efforts to develop nuclear submarines highlight the permanent challenge of new technological inroads and the need continuously to update the non-proliferation regime. Could a more flexible position, relying both on the regional system of control and on the favourable regional conditions, lead, on the one hand, to the full enforcement of the treaty, and on the other to effective nuclear non-proliferation? Both the outcome of the PNEs dispute, and the positive evolution of the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relation offer insights into the potential of regional regimes for effective non-proliferation.

The criticism that Tlatelolco has been subordinated to the NPT, and that it has therefore inherited its discriminatory character, has been most vehemently put by the Latin American states with potential or aspirations to become nuclear powers. The response to these claims includes the argument that the Latin American NFZ had to acknowledge the reality of the existence of five nuclear powers at the time of its framing and that it even represented the acceptance of the status quo. Acknowledging this was the only way to find a practical solution to further proliferation and to reduce internal and external nuclear threats. Supporters of this position do not always defend the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states as a permanent factor and favour policies aimed at a reduction in the number of nuclear states – even if the prospects for this are minimal or negligible – as the best way to eliminate this distinction.

An analysis of the relationship between NFZs and the NPT should consider them as supplementing each other, rather than as alternative mechanisms. Differences between the two instruments are obvious, and arise from their different origins, motivations, and negotiating processes, which influence the legitimacy attached to them. In this regard it has been stated that one of the strengths of NFZs, when compared with the NPT, lies in the nature of their

negotiating processes which are open to all states party to the agreement, whereas the NPT negotiations took place almost exclusively between the United States and the Soviet Union. This difference also accounts for one particular objective of NFZs: that of containing the military presence of hegemonic powers. In proscribing the presence of foreign nuclear forces in a given geographical area, in addition to prohibiting the possession of nuclear weapons by the countries party to the zone, a nuclear-free zone arrangement is wider in scope than the NPT. However, in certain regions, especially those dominated by deep political tensions, the alternative of a NFZ may prove even more difficult than accession to the NPT.²²⁷ A third advantage that NFZs seem to offer is the incorporation of ‘negative’ security guarantees by the nuclear powers, that is guarantees by these powers that they would not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. The lack of such guarantee in the NPT has been acknowledged and attempts have been made to redress it through ‘positive security guarantees’ embodied in UN Security Council resolution 255 adopted in 1968.

But beyond these differences a natural link exists between both instruments, given that they focus on the same problem: nuclear proliferation. This was acknowledged in article 7 of the NPT. But this article does not assign a subordinate role to NFZs, nor does it consider them as regional appendages. The practice which has been the object of criticism – that of sending reports to the NPT Conference and standardisation of the IAEA system of safeguards – could also be seen as the ‘natural’ consequence of the relationship between a universal and a regional organisation in which the scope of their practices determines the character of the relationship.

Both the global and the regional non-proliferation regimes have been affected by wider international developments in the field of nuclear technology. Beyond the interest of the nuclear powers, economic and security considerations have come to complicate the picture. Some events and developments like the oil crisis and the increasing availability of nuclear technology have eroded the basis of both the NPT and Tlatelolco. Commercial pressures and short-term economic interests threaten international efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons as well as long-term security interests. The creation of the London Suppliers Group represented an effort aimed at the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. This group comprised 15 countries which agreed on a list of materials, equipment and technology which could undermine safeguards. A special system of safeguards for these items as well as for any ‘replicated’ facility was consequently designed.

By 1980 the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) had concluded that although certain measures could delay full access to the nuclear cycle, any method of releasing nuclear energy entailed access to critical fissile materials. In 1984 member states met to consider further measures to strengthen

the non-proliferation regime, in particular measures to incorporate the so-called ‘second tier suppliers’ like Brazil, China and Argentina. Initially Third World countries, particularly those which had systematically emphasised the discriminatory character of non-proliferation policies, claimed that such a club represented a cartel serving the nuclear powers’ economic interests and which in fact denied the right of non-nuclear states to nuclear supplies as embodied in NPT article IV.²²⁸ Although Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela participated in the INFCE, and Argentina was actively involved acting as co-chair of one of the INFCE’s eight working groups on spent fuel management, these efforts did not produce tangible results. Argentina, like other developing countries with growing nuclear programmes, remained sceptical of the relevance of the INFCE.²²⁹

During the 1980s, efforts to control nuclear proliferation faced again the lack of interest of the Reagan administration, which went as far as to suggest US withdrawal from the IAEA. Under the Reagan administration not only was non-proliferation far from being a high priority, but the civilian use of plutonium was openly encouraged.²³⁰ Although Bush had initially shown more interest in halting the spread of nuclear weapons, during the first years of his administration the absence of clear policies was the dominant note. Evidence of this was provided by its delay in appointing the official at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, responsible for the US position in the 1990 NPT Review Conference.

Evidence of the gradual undermining of the non-proliferation regime was first found in the increasing number of countries which had sought to acquire enrichment and reprocessing plants despite the absence of clear economic or technological justification. In Latin America, the regional non-proliferation regime was threatened by the evolution of both the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear programmes which achieved in 1983 and 1987 the capability to enrich uranium. From the second half of the 1980s a sequence of events revealed the magnitude of the challenges currently faced by the non-proliferation regime.

By the beginning of the decade increasing cooperation between threshold nuclear power and the proliferation of missile programmes throughout the developing world signalled the continued consideration given to nuclear defence by developing countries.²³¹ In the Middle East, Mordechai Vanunu’s dramatic case offered significant evidence of an existing Israeli arsenal of approximately 100-200 nuclear warheads.²³² Moreover, Iraq’s rapid advances in the nuclear field first prompted Israel’s bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and after a decade proved to be a crucial element in the events leading to the 1991 Gulf War. These events have provided further evidence of the need constantly to update the non-proliferation regime at a time when rigorous verification, through its confidence building effects, has been identified as the main element underlying trustworthy commitments.²³³

As nuclear power spreads and nuclear technology becomes more easily available, formal adherence to and observance of agreed non-proliferation rules offer the only means of ensuring that these trends will not be accompanied by nuclear weapons proliferation. Even though enforcement of these rules has proved to be a difficult task, it could be said that states do not tend to accept international obligations with the intention of violating them. In fact, countries with nuclear weapons potential or aspiration have chosen to adhere to the NPT rather than to disregard their commitments. In the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as the Brazilian and Argentine cases seem to show, such countries have chosen to obstruct the entry into force of the agreement, rather than to risk open violations. Not only have their recent apparent renunciation of PNEs, their joint declaration renouncing the military nuclear option, and their conclusion of IAEA safeguards agreements removed significant obstacles to their full adherence to Tlatelolco, but these could also reflect a more positive evaluation of non-nuclear status. Yet, as we have seen, the perceived advantages associated with non-nuclear postures have a dynamic character which ultimately depends on the changing balance between the perceived costs and benefits of nuclear capabilities. In the immediate future the main challenges will no doubt relate to the implementation of a safe system of safeguards which ensure that technological progress will not endanger the regional non-proliferation regime. Ultimately, the real tests of both the global and regional non-proliferation regimes continue to depend on their capacity on the one hand to attract those states which have either obstructed or remained outside their regulations, and on the other, to provide a safe framework for the transfer and development of nuclear technology.

Concerning the last criticism, that of transit, it has been argued that the omission of the question does not imply that the treaty had positively legislated in this respect. Moreover, the mechanism through which each party could grant or deny transit could eventually lead to a uniform policy of denial through the working of OPANAL. Nevertheless the prevailing opinion seems to be that transit of nuclear weapons within the zone takes place and will continue, given the role played by the sea arm of deterrence. The extremely complicated nature of this issue has been reflected in the fact that recent negotiations on the Law of the Sea have tacitly acknowledged the legality of nuclear transit. Undoubtedly, the development by either Brazil or Argentina of nuclear propelled submarines would further complicate this picture.

Finally, an evaluation of the Latin American NFZ should confront the main aims of its formulation, comparing them with the present reality. On balance the treaty has so far succeeded in avoiding both the deployment of nuclear weapons in the region by existing nuclear powers, and regional proliferation. It is of course difficult to establish beyond doubt that the Tlatelolco regime itself has prevented these trends: the first, particularly, could also be attributed to tacit understanding between the superpowers after the Cuban missile crisis.

Assessment of Tlatelolco's influence on the prevention of regional proliferation appears to be more complicated. Despite the fact that impasse seems to be the dominant note and that events in Argentina and Brazil tend to suggest that the formula provided by article 28, for the complete entry into force of the agreement, could significantly complicate the achievement of this goal, there are other signs which give some hope for progress. In the first place, and even before the apparent decision by Brazil and Argentina to surrender the right to PNES and to adhere fully to Tlatelolco, the 'rigorous' interpretation of the treaty not only prohibited them but made any country exploding such a device a *de facto* nuclear power. In addition, the fact that the signatories to the treaty, even if they have not ratified it, are obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty works as a basic mechanism of international pressure against proliferation. This obligation has more recently accompanied Brazilian and Argentine plans to submit a modified version of the treaty to OPANAL.

For the time being the question of nuclear proliferation within the region will remain a cause for concern but not for alarm. The balance between the benefits and the costs of developing nuclear weapons, for both Brazil and Argentina, has so far been maintained. Evidence of this balance has been embodied in the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation which started with the 1980 agreement. This agreement also raised expectations as to the possibility of confidence-building measures and policies aimed at the reduction of mutual suspicions, as supplementary means of dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation. The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Latin American organisation set up by the treaty represent a useful forum for these purposes.

A current evaluation of the practice of the agreement, of the extent to which the regional non-proliferation regime has improved the national and regional security of Latin American states, should probably emphasise the absence of nuclear weapons and therefore of nuclear targets within the region. In this way it could be said that the probability of war arising out of nuclear incidents has been kept at a minimum. In regard to the reduction of tensions and rivalries within the area the regional non-proliferation regime has proved helpful. Even though a latent rivalry underpins the nuclear programmes of Brazil and Argentina open competition between the two countries has not arisen, and has even led to gradual and increasing cooperation. Yet, as the Brazilian submarine programme suggests, potential risks remain and serve to remind us of the inescapable need continuously to reinforce the value of non-nuclear postures. It is in this context that the success of the regional non-proliferation regime in minimising the political and strategic utility of nuclear weapons should be assessed.

Conclusion

The process leading to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America during the 1960s offers interesting insights into the strengths and weaknesses of non-proliferation schemes where two set of motivations seem to coincide: the hegemonic interests of the nuclear powers and the independent calculations of regional states. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 provided a common ground for the manifestation of the interest in non-proliferation of both the superpowers and the Latin American states. These interests not only emerged gradually but were also expressed in different ways. This paper has attempted to correct the common view of the Latin American nuclear-free zone as resulting purely from the independent will of the Latin American states. The idea of a Latin American NFZ originated in the 1950s in a plan proposed by the then US Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson and was first put forward as a Costa Rican proposal. It is certainly the case that a second proposal put forward by Brazil was inspired and motivated by Brazilian participation in the ENDC where the questions of nuclear testing and non-proliferation received wide attention. Yet this proposal was abandoned in the confusion brought about by the Cuban missile crisis and was only later taken up by the Mexican government.

Even though Mexico had also participated in the ENDC since early 1962, it had rejected the 1958 Costa Rican proposal and had cautiously responded to the Brazilian proposal. Until then the Mexican position was to insist that denuclearisation should result from the unilateral decisions of states and that NFZs could only be temporary and transitory measures. From the documents and speeches of the period it is clear that the emergence of Mexico in 1963 as the new leading force behind regional denuclearisation cannot be explained in terms of changes of administration leading to significant shifts in foreign policy, and that it took place with the full approval of and constant consultation with the US government.

Although the United States took a low profile *vis-à-vis* the different proposals for regional proliferation in Latin America, evidence of its support for this goal can be traced as far back as the 1950s. This can partly be explained as the result of strong Latin American reaction to signs of intervention on such issues related to national sovereignty. Thus, if ever a promoter of the idea of regional denuclearisation, the US government would perhaps have preferred to make use of suitable interlocutors. Given available evidence it still seems difficult to assess fully the extent to which either Costa Rica or Mexico served as interlocutors of US non-proliferation interests within Latin America. Yet close cooperation with the United States and the use of the forum of the OAS in the first case, and Mexican collaboration with US

intelligence services against Cuba during the mid 1960s, show at least significant convergence of priorities.

The motivations underlying US support for a Latin American NFZ arose from the strong interest of certain Latin American states, namely Argentina and Brazil, in the nuclear option; from the perceived advantage of insulating the region from the dangers of US-Soviet competition which were clearly demonstrated by the 1962 Cuban crisis; from a wider and genuine interest in non-proliferation; as well as from the convenience of maintaining overall US hegemony in the region.

The case of the Soviet Union was complicated by its commitment to the defence of Cuba and by the consequent Cuban alignment. Traditionally the Soviet Union had not only supported but actively promoted plans for NFZs throughout the world. In the case of Latin America since 1964 the Soviet Union distanced itself from the Cuban position, adopting a more cautious and pragmatic posture. Soviet adherence to the agreement became then only conditional on the support of all nuclear powers and it was finally achieved in 1979.

It would be misleading to suggest that the regional non-proliferation regime created in 1967 was solely the result of external pressure. The origins of the initiative need as well to be set within the context of a wider international concern *vis-à-vis* the risks of nuclear proliferation. Moreover, there can be no doubt that the Cuban missile crisis marked a decisive stage in the way Latin American states perceived nuclear proliferation. But it is equally true that this event provided a common stimulus for the superpowers to cooperate in setting up a framework to manage their nuclear relationship and the problem of nuclear proliferation. What we see at this juncture is the coming together of the different interests of the parties involved, that is, a significant convergence of priorities leading to the creation of a regional non-proliferation regime.

Yet the complications which emerged during the negotiating process as well as the difficulties that have accompanied the implementation of the agreement reflected two related sets of tensions. While it is certainly true that most Latin American states must have foreseen significant advantages in a non-proliferation regime, there would be a cost to those which had contemplated the nuclear option. Indeed, for some Latin American states, namely Argentina and Brazil, this situation led to a difficult choice. As we have seen, the dilemma that total renunciation of the nuclear option posed to these countries was partly and temporarily resolved by a complicated formula, embodied in article 28 which regulates the entering into force of the agreement, or simply through non-ratification. It seems important to underline that the advantages of a regional non-proliferation regime when measured against the costs of foreclosing the nuclear option continue to pose a dilemma to these countries.

This was illustrated by the case of Argentina during the Falklands/Malvinas War. On the one hand, its partial commitments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco precluded Argentina's right to take advantage of the legal and political instruments provided by the agreement. But on the other hand, this crisis also highlighted some of the advantages associated with nuclear technology as further consideration of nuclear propelled submarines has demonstrated.

To the second set of related tensions belong the consequences attached to the spread of nuclear technology and the difficulties involved in distinguishing peaceful from non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy as shown by the extreme case of peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear explosions. Even though by the time the Treaty of Tlatelolco was negotiated such difficulties already appeared intractable, in order to cover up this underlying difference the treaty provided ground for both interpretations. As the criteria for distinguishing between peaceful and non-peaceful nuclear explosions became ever more blurred, non-peaceful nuclear explosions became the accepted international norm. This norm has even been reinforced by India's difficulties in conducting a second 'peaceful' explosion and by the more recent Argentine-Brazilian renunciation of their traditional claim to conduct PNEs.

The enforcement of the Treaty of Tlatelolco provides useful insights into the difficult question of international controls over nuclear technology. One of the main obstacles to the implementation of the regional non-proliferation regime has been the standardisation of the system of safeguards with that of the NPT. Although the emphasis of Argentina's reservations have varied from one administration to another, among the motivations that have influenced Argentine reluctance to adhere to the agreement, the system of control appears as predominant factor. Both Argentina and Brazil continue to insist on the need to provide Tlatelolco with a genuinely regional system of control.

As we have seen, the evolution of Brazilian and Argentine attitudes towards the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been strongly influenced by political and economic considerations. If national prestige and security considerations provided the first set of justifications for the development of nuclear programmes, economic considerations have come to play a more significant role. In the case of non-oil developing countries, the need to secure energy supplies led to the perception of nuclear energy as the cheapest and best way to counter energy vulnerability. In addition, and in the light of the continued constraints and demands posed by the debt crisis, the nuclear industry began to be considered as a candidate for the development of new exports and export markets. From this point of view, then, nuclear energy development was placed as a high priority that neither Brazil nor Argentina could or were willing to expose to tight international constraints.

Those considerations have been greatly influenced by the role played by the military in the Brazilian and Argentine political systems. Not only could the military, through the maintenance of important prerogatives and their dominion over geopolitical thinking, alter the current Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement, but also the peaceful character of their nuclear programmes. Until their recent completion of IAEA safeguard agreements, both countries managed to limit international surveillance over their respective nuclear programmes, whilst their position with respect to the sensitive question of 'special inspections' still remains unclear. Moreover, both states continue to oppose the NPT.

As more recent events have indicated, the regional balance between the benefits and the costs not only of developing nuclear weapons but even of keeping the option open have so far been maintained. Had Argentina ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco it would have had a better legal and political basis from which to raise the issue of the presence of nuclear weapons within the zone's limits during the Falklands/Malvinas war. The same applies to the 1980 Brazilian-Argentine nuclear cooperation agreement which suggests that both countries have perceived greater advantages in confidence-building measures than in taking further steps involving the risk of an arms race.

The governments of both Brazil and Argentina have expressed their preference for the Treaty of Tlatelolco and together with Chile they have systematically rejected adherence to the NPT. From an extreme non-proliferation perspective this posture could appear contradictory, yet these states have insisted that it is the standard system of IAEA safeguards that represents the main obstacle to their acceptance of both agreements and have also claimed that such standardisation was the unfortunate consequence of having subordinated Tlatelolco to the NPT. As recent Brazilian and Argentine plans to submit to OPANAL a modified text of the treaty suggest, it could be argued that Tlatelolco would have better chances of entering fully into force if a more flexible system of control, of the kind applied to Germany by EURATOM, were adopted.²³⁴ So long as stringent verification is ensured, OPANAL's system of control and favourable regional conditions could provide a basis for realistic accommodation. These two factors could guarantee sufficient international supervision and thus overcome one of the main obstacles to the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This could in turn open the prospects of consolidation of the regional non-proliferation regime on a basis that would enable most Latin American states to benefit.

The evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco led us to conclude that despite all criticisms Tlatelolco has, first and most importantly, contributed to the absence of nuclear weapons and consequently of nuclear targets within the region. Second, it has had an important role in reducing, to a relatively low level, the risk of war arising out of a nuclear incident within the region. The removal of potential targets as well as the achievement of

nuclear powers' guarantees have been fundamental in keeping this risk low. Third, it has been a significant factor in preventing horizontal proliferation. Tlatelolco has not only provided a framework for dealing with the potential nuclear rivalry between Argentina and Brazil, but most importantly for its gradual transformation into cooperation. In this way the regional non-proliferation regime has also helped to reinforce the positive status of non-nuclearity by downplaying the political and strategic utility of nuclear weapons. Finally, by providing a regulatory framework to deal with the difficult question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it has offered greater prospects for further progress. Evidence of real progress has been recently provided by the Argentine-Brazilian renunciation of PNEs.

The characteristics which seem to explain the achievements of Tlatelolco include its genuinely collective nature and Latin America's *de facto* denuclearised status during the negotiation of the agreement. Similarly, the absence of serious tensions or potential threats leading states within the region seriously to consider the need to keep the nuclear option open. This may have highlighted the potential advantages perceived in non-proliferation compared to the costs of renunciation. Moreover, as previously mentioned, the Cuban missile crisis provided a common ground for a collective perception of the advantages and disadvantages of denuclearisation. Indeed, perceived advantages in creating a non-proliferation regime encouraged negotiators to accept obligations. These conditions in turn stimulated a belief in disarmament and facilitated the emergence of the political leadership and political will needed to keep negotiations going until the conclusion of the respective treaties.

As the decision of both Brazil and Argentina to renounce the military nuclear option – announced during the 1990 NPT Review Conference – seem to indicate, the political benefits expected from the potential nuclear status have proved disappointing while the disadvantages have come to the surface in the form of suspension of nuclear supplies, further regional proliferation limiting expected advantages, covert competition involving potential and costly arms races, the risk of superpower intervention and the limited or non-utility of nuclear power in peacetime.²³⁵

In contrast, the path towards nuclear proliferation clearly illustrates the security dilemma in which the efforts of one state to increase its security can only come about at the expense of others. The security dilemma is a 'structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend automatically (i.e. regardless of intention) to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening'.²³⁶ This dilemma appears at the core of the ambiguity pursued by near nuclear states. The decision to keep the option open has temporarily held the balance between what they perceive as two equally unfavourable alternatives: to become locked into the cycle of arms

accumulation, or, by rejecting it, to become exposed to the risks of military inferiority.

Could this security dilemma be alleviated by states shifting towards common security and/or non-provocative means of defence? Could voluntary restrictions and freely accepted limitations provide the basis to a transition from national security to common security? Whatever the answers to these difficult questions it seems clear that in the nuclear age common security is essentially linked to common survival.²³⁷

Notions about common security depart from the assumption that the ability to wage aggressive war is often the result of possession of offensive weapons. Common security favours non-provocative defence postures in which the offensive could be limited or if possible avoided. It then follows that to the extent to which states can organise their security policies in cooperation rather than in confrontation, the risk of offensive arms races developing between them could be considerably reduced. Collective organisation of security policies would require that all participants share at least the basic common security assumptions that would demand voluntary restrictions on national defence. These restrictions could involve limitations on armaments, notions of no-first-use, confidence building measures, and so on.²³⁸

In view of the growing international consensus in favour of non-proliferation the principles enshrined in the Tlatelolco Treaty no longer appear so marginal or irrelevant to the global security debate as critics once assumed. Indeed, the Latin American experience indicates that the nature of its negotiating process could offer greater chances to establish the foundations for common security. This is not only the result of the common interests shared by regional states but equally importantly follows from the commitments that negotiators extract from nuclear powers. In addition, this scheme has proved to be significantly effective in providing common ground for dealing with the conflicting interests between nuclear and non-nuclear states. Greater security has been achieved not only by a simple act of renunciation of the nuclear option but also by regulations that prohibit any stationing or deployment of nuclear weapons, as well as by security guarantees from the nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

Finally, the Latin American NFZ has offered a sound framework for the promotion and regulation of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and has therefore contributed to alleviating the dilemma that lies at the core of the non-proliferation regime. Restrictions on transfers of nuclear technology have only enjoyed temporary success and as states showed their capacity to develop indigenous and independent nuclear programmes the long-term failure of this policy became clear. Even if there seems to be no easy way out of this dilemma, the framework of common security offered by NFZs could provide

a basis for the conciliation of nuclear energy development with non-proliferation.

As the Latin American experience indicates, a basis for common security could be an important factor in the perception of a balance favouring the advantages rather than the costs of non-nuclear status. Nuclear-free zones could offer a sound framework for promoting and regulating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the setting up of systems of control better adapted to the interests of regional states, and the development of regional fuel cycle capabilities and regulations for the administration of most critical materials. Finally, as the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement suggests, NFZs could provide the necessary conditions to develop more effective means of cooperation, mediation and confidence building, and control measures over the direction followed by nuclear energy programmes.

APPENDIX I: Abbreviations

COPREDAL	Preparatory Commission for Latin American Denuclearisation
ENDC	Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
INFCE	International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
NFZ	Nuclear-Free Zone
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAS	Organisation of American States
OPANAL	Organisation for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
PNE	Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly

APPENDIX II: Primary Sources

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NOTES

1. The increased UN participation in peacekeeping operations was an indication of this shift. Yezid Sayigh, 'Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing countries', *Adelphi Papers*, No. 251 (Summer 1990).
2. Michael Howard, 'Deterrence, Consensus and Reassurance in the Defence of Europe', in Christoph Bertram (ed.), *Defence and Consensus: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security* (London: MacMillan, 1983), p. 124.
3. Hedley Bull, *Hedley Bull on Arms Control*, selected and introduced by Robert O'Neill and David Schwartz (London: MacMillan, 1987), pp. 27-28.
4. "International Security" implies a common interest in security transcending the particular interests of sovereign states. The recognition of that common interest carries with it the aspiration to create a communal framework to replace the need for unilateral national security measures'. Michael Howard, 'The United Nations and International Security' in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *United Nations, Divided World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 31.
5. The concept of regime has been widely discussed in recent years. The two most commonly accepted definitions are the one provided by Keohane and Nye – 'networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularise behaviour and control its effects' and Krasner's view of regimes as a set of implicit or explicit 'principles, norms rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area'. The Latin American case provides a sound basis to assess the extent to which non-proliferation regimes represent 'agreements to disagree' or whether they could lead to frameworks for common security. For an account of the debate over the concept of international regimes see Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
6. One of the main obstacles to the application of common security approaches to conflict in the developing world is its mechanistic understanding of arms races which overlooks the actual driving forces behind Third World militarisation. While it is true that 'externally generated stimuli' have played a crucial role, especially in the escalation towards higher levels of conflict and in reducing the scope for resolution, equally important has been the widespread sense of insecurity. There is general recognition that the local factor – domestic or regional threats – is the determinant one as without it there is no lasting demand for arms purchases. In the case of nuclear proliferation not only does the external factor seem to play an important role in weakening the drive for regional arms races but, as will be subsequently argued, the prospect of nuclear

arms races incorporates a number of inhibiting factors. For an analysis of arms races in the Developing countries see, Sayigh, *op.cit*, p. 53.

7. Non-provocative defence is the most plausible non-threatening strategy to the extent that it avoids the extreme view that all military developments under the doctrine must be strictly defensive in nature. Barry Buzan, 'Common security, non-provocative defence and the future of Western Europe', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 13, no. 4 (1987), p. 271.

8. For a thorough analysis of the wider debate about alternative approaches to security in the 1980s as well as of the weaknesses and strengths of common security see Geoffrey Wiseman, 'Common Security and Non-provocative Defence: Alternative Approaches to the Security Dilemma', MPhil Thesis, Oxford University, 1987.

9. Antonio Carvallo Rojas, 'El problema de la intervención militar', in Pablo González Casanova (ed.), *No-intervención, autodeterminación y democracia en América Latina* (Mexico, D.F.: Siglo XXI Editores, 1983), p. 41.

10. The measures adopted to ensure a framework for collective defence included the establishment of military missions, the training of Latin American personnel, the formulation of combined joint plans for hemispheric defence and the provision of military equipment. 'Report on the position of the US with respect to the military aspects of the implementation of the Inter-American Treaty of Rio', August 1949, Declassified Document 49-42-C-1977, LC, Washington.

11. The precursors of the Rio Treaty were the 1940 Habana Charter and the 1945 Chapultepec Act. The Rio Treaty introduced the notion of aggression carried out by American states themselves. This modification led to the adoption of the principle of regional solidarity against a 'criminal act', namely that of armed attack. Gómez Robledo states that later interpretations of article 3 equating 'armed attack' with subversion actions organised by other states were not present in the original intention of the agreement. This situation led to two conflicting views about the treaty. Antonio Gómez Robledo, 'El Tratado de Rio', *Foro Internacional*, vol. I, no.1 (1960), p. 53.

12. Before the more recent waves of violence in Central America, Latin America had not been particularly violent or prone to conflict. Prior to the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war major interstate wars in the region had been the 1932-35 Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, the 1941 conflict between Peru and Ecuador involving territorial disputes and the 1969 clash between Honduras and El Salvador. Until recently, Latin America remained relatively unarmed in comparison with other areas of the world. With no incidents becoming lasting conflicts, rivalries with neighbours have seldom dominated foreign policy

agendas. This has been explained partly as the result of relatively clear and well defined borders, the common background and cultural similarities among political elites and finally the role of US influence over the region. Gregory F. Treverton, 'Interstate conflict in Latin America', in Kevin Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (eds.), *The United States and Latin America in the 1980's: Contending perspectives in a decade of crisis* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), p. 567.

13. Joseph S Nye, *Peace in Parts, Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1971), p. 199.
14. Yezid Sayigh, *op. cit.*, p. 71
15. Buzan has introduced the notion of 'regional security complexes', which refers to a set of states 'whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed apart from one another . . . Security complexes embody durable patterns of amity and enmity occurring within geographical patterns of security interdependence'. Quoted in Barry Buzan et al, *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), p. 13.
16. W. W. Rostow, 'The coming age of regionalism', *Encounter* (June 1990).
17. This acceptance could be the result of either a common perception of external threats or expectations as to the benefits to be derived from collaboration and the potential advantages of multilateralism to set limits to the dominant power's hegemony.
18. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: MacMillan, 1977), pp. 305-307.
19. The states belonging to this community neither expect nor prepare for a military attack from any of the others. Although this community evolved from the common military structure of NATO, it has become politically and societally distinct from it, and it is framed by a 'dense layer of overlapping organizations and institutions' which 'locks the European states into a durable and expanding framework of intense cooperation and consultation'. Buzan et al, *The European Security Order Recast*, p. 40.
20. Bull, *Hedley Bull on Arms Control*, p. 265.
21. J. Evensen, 'The establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in Europe: proposals on a treaty text', in S. Lodgaard and M. Thee (eds.), *Nuclear Disengagement in Europe* (London: SIPRI, 1983), p. 172.

22. Bull, *Hedley Bull on Arms Control*, p. 268.
23. Luis Padilla Nervo was the Mexican Delegate to the League of Nations, to the UN Preparatory Commission, and to the Security Council between 1946 and 1952, President of the 1951 General Assembly devoted to disarmament, Secretary of Foreign Affairs from 1952 to 1958 and again representative to the UN between 1958 and 1962.
24. Consistent with the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme a year earlier, the US delegation to the OAS had put forward a resolution for the creation of an Inter-American commission of Nuclear Energy. Extraordinary Session, 21 November 1957, OAS, Verbatim Records.
25. Significant similarities between the Costa Rican plan and US military policy towards the region could be pointed out. Their main common element was the creation of small and better trained military forces capable of maintaining internal security. *Excelsior*, 22 January 1958. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memo CM-488-57, to the Secretary of Defence, 29 May 1957, Declassified Document 151B-1980 and ‘Latin America US policy toward, Security Affairs Records, Policy papers Sub-Areas, 1956-1961’, Declassified Document 333-B-1981, LC, Washington.
26. A study on the prospects for further proliferation of nuclear weapons recognised that in the 1950s the barriers to the development of nuclear weapons by nations of middle size and resources had steadily diminished. It included Argentina among those states which could be influenced by the general course of proliferation and by the desires for national prestige. ‘Memo DC1N10, Prospects for further nuclear proliferation’, no date given, Declassified Document, 18B-1978, LC, Washington.
27. File XII-1039-1, SRE, Mexico, D.F.
28. *El Nacional, Novedades*, 2 March 1958.
29. US assessments underlined the vigorous and independent character of Argentina’s nuclear programme as signs of a strong desire for nuclear weapons as a way to increase its power in relation to Brazil. ‘Memo DC1-N10. Prospects for further proliferation’, no date given, Declassified Document 18-B-1978, LC, Washington.
30. During the years of Perón’s rule the belief in industrialisation as the key to military strength and national greatness had become the general faith, accompanied by the conviction that the military should play a central role in national industrial development. In that period important sectors of the industrial infrastructure, especially those considered as strategic were made the

responsibility of the military. The first unsuccessful Argentine approach to nuclear development by the Austrian nuclear physicist Ronald Richter had already awakened the interest of the government in this field. In 1950 Perón created the National Atomic Energy Commission, placed under the strong influence of the Navy, to promote scientific and technological nuclear development. Margaret K. Luddeman, 'Nuclear Power in Latin America: An overview of its present status', *Journal of Interamerican and World Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 3 (1983) p. 380.

31. Alain Rouquié, *Pouvoir Militaire et Société Politique en République Argentine* (Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques, 1978), p. 415.
32. During this period Brazil followed the guidelines set at the Conference with the superpowers in which it was secretly agreed to limit its thorium exports and to accept American supervision of these exports. Ronald M. Schneider, *Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1976), p. 48.
33. The details of American intervention in the 1950s were widely discussed in the context of subsequent pressures imposed on Brazil after the signature of the 1975 nuclear agreement with West Germany. *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, August 1975, Brasilia.
34. The road towards increasing dependence continued despite eventual recognition of the desirability of higher autonomy, given energy requirements. Evidence of this is provided by unsuccessful attempts to develop enriched uranium methods. See Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, *Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional*, 1958 and 1959.
35. Norman Gall, 'Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for all', *Foreign Policy*, no. 23 (Summer 1976), p. 155.
36. Even though at the time the Mexican government had received a copy of the Rapacki Plan on the basis of its interest and contributions to disarmament, there is no evidence of further interest on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
37. Decisions in Mexico regarding nuclear energy were not articulated around the priorities of a core of nuclear scientists or the military. In contrast with both Argentina and Brazil, the basic strategy adopted in Mexico for the transfer and development of nuclear technology proved to be remarkably fragile. For an analysis of the underlying reasons of this outcome and the subsequent problems faced by the operation of the Laguna Verde facility see Stevis Dimitris and

Stephen P. Mumme, 'Nuclear Power, Technological Autonomy, and the State in Mexico', *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 26, no. 3 (1991).

38. OAS, *Verbatim Records*.
39. Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin*, vol XLI, no. 1069, December 1959.
40. Over this period arms limitation was more cautiously promoted by the US government which perceived the advantages of initiatives coming from the Latin American states themselves. 'Latin American Arms Control. Research Study Bureau of Intelligence and Research', Declassified Document 215B-1981, LC, Washington.
41. *The Times*, 28 December 1959 and US Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. XLI, no. 1069, December 1959.
42. In a confidential meeting between US Secretary of State J.F. Dulles and Padilla Nervo, Dulles asked the Mexican Minister to convince the Soviet Union to continue negotiations within the Committee of Disarmament. Padilla Nervo explained that the Soviet condition was a balanced representation of both blocs within this committee. Interview with Luis Padilla Nervo, *40 años de presencia de México en las Naciones Unidas*, México, D.F., Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1985, p. 35.
43. DC/PV-66-70.
44. On that occasion the Cuban delegate not only criticised both superpowers for their unwillingness to achieve any tangible progress but especially attacked a Soviet proposal for leaving the elimination of nuclear arms to a second stage, after the elimination of launching devices. UN Disarmament Commission DC/PV.66, 16 August 1960 and File XII-658-1, SRE, México, D.F.
45. The limited size and political subordination of the military, which the Mexican delegation continued to emphasise, help to explain the promotion of arms control as one of the constant features of Mexican Foreign Policy since the 1960s. File XII-646-4, SRE, México, D.F.
46. The American delegation to the United Nations had confidentially approached the Mexican representative and explained to him the plans to enlarge the Committee to include both Mexico and India. SRE XII-641-3, SRE, México, D.F.

47. The Mexican delegation conditioned a positive response to non-proliferation to its free and unilateral acceptance and to the formal commitment of nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear arms, knowledge or materials to third parties. File XII-646-4, SRE, México, D.F.
48. File XII-411-11, SRE, México, D.F.
49. Conference of the Committee of Disarmament, Final Verbatim Record, 7th Session, ENDC/PV.7, 22 March 1962.
50. This treaty had been considered a major priority of the committee due to the resumption of nuclear testing by both superpowers in 1961 and to the identification of such tests as the main factor in nuclear weapons improvement. The lack of a comprehensive system of detection led the United States and Britain to propose a ban on atmospheric tests. ENDC/PV.13.
51. In June the Canadian delegation had put forward another collateral disarmament measure which would become the precursor of the Outer Space Treaty. The Mexican delegation insisted on this issue during the last meetings of the committee in September 1962. ENDC/PV 56.
52. Reading through president Quadros's speeches to Congress concern with Argentine achievements in the nuclear field and the desirability of greater autonomy becomes clear. Jânio Quadros, *Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional*, 1961.
53. The preference for enriched uranium over natural uranium was a victory for non-proliferation policies since natural uranium produces more plutonium which can be fairly easily separated and made usable for explosives. Robert Wesson, *The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 77.
54. During this conference the Venezuelan representative resigned as a gesture of disagreement with the partial support given by his government to the resolution, while the Mexican delegation rejected the interpretation of the declaration as a direct condemnation of the Cuban regime.
55. Herbert S. Dinersten, *The Making of a Missile Crisis. October 1962* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 82.
56. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971), p. 231.

57. Despite the controversy about the legality of Cuba's expulsion given the lack of provisions in the OAS charter, this decision was based on the thesis put forward by Manuel Tello, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs stating the incompatibility of 'Marxism-Leninism' and 'Interamericanism'. Cuba was finally expelled from the OAS with the abstention of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Ecuador. Mario Ojeda, *Alcances y límites de la política exterior de México* (México D.F.: El Colegio de México, 1976), pp. 46-47.

58. Castro's explanations of Cuban motives have alternated between the defence of Cuba to contributions aimed at reinforcing 'socialism on an international scale'. Evidence suggests that the Cuban leaders had a limited understanding about the implications of the deployment and that the idea was first raised by the Soviets in May 1962. What seems clear is that it offered an acceptable deal between Cuba's interest in joining the Warsaw Pact and Soviet reluctance to get involved in a sustained conflict with the United States in the latter's sphere of influence. Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, 'Controlling the risks in Cuba', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 17 (July 1965), pp. 4-5 and Philip Brenner, 'Cuba and the Missile Crisis', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 22, no. 1 (February 1990), pp. 124-128.

59. There are two conflicting interpretations of the legality of the OAS resolution of October 1962. Basing their arguments on a 'generous' interpretation of 'armed attack' and legitimate defence as stated in article 51 of the UN Charter, on the nuclear character of the threat, on the functions of regional organisations to maintain international peace and on article 6 of the Rio Treaty which considers threats other than armed attack, Chayes, McDougal and Meeker defend the legality of the decision. The opposite view, shared by P. Jessup and Latin American lawyers, questions its legality in the absence of previous approval by the Security Council. Chayes's defence of the precedent laid by the 1960 Dominican case, in which the Security Council restricted itself to 'take notice' of the OAS decision, has been criticised on the basis of the qualifications, made at the time by 7 of the 8 states voting in favour of the resolution, expressing doubts about the interpretation of article 6. Bernardo Sepúlveda, 'Las Naciones Unidas, el Tratado de Rio y la OEA', *Foro Internacional*, vol VII, no. 2 (July-December 1962), pp. 87-90.

60. The crisis management analysis has been qualified by recent revelations of American documents showing that beyond careful policy management other factors could have played an important and even definitive role in the outcome of the crisis.

61. Allison, *Essence of Decision*, p. 39.

62. Abram Chayes, *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 53.

63. The Soviet deployment was even considered to be consistent with international law since previous American aggressions against Cuba were invoked to justify it in terms of legitimate defence. Moreover, and given United States nuclear superiority, arguments justifying the blockade in terms of an act of 'self defence' seemed out of proportion. Antonio Gómez Robledo, *Estudios Internacionales* (México, D.F.: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1982), p. 171.
64. UNGA, XVII period of sessions, 29 October 1962, A/C.1/L.312
65. File XII-411.11 (XVII) (08)/90, SRE, México, D.F.
66. A final revision came on 15 November. This time the resolution was jointly presented by Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador. UNGA, XVII Period of Sessions, 15 November 1962, A/C.1/ L.312.
67. On this occasion García Robles first appeared as taking effective personal initiatives in the negotiations. He strongly recommended immediate negotiations on the basis of favourable conditions resulting from the regional consensus following the October crisis, the possibility of using the ENDC to present the joint declaration, and finally the use of Brazil's positive reply to promote a favourable impact on other Latin American states. File XII-400-72/8, SRE, México, D.F.
68. Quoted in García Robles's telegramme to Manuel Tello, October 1963. File XII-400-72/8a, SRE, México, D.F.
69. Evidence of this is provided by a letter of Ambassador Carrillo Flores of 30 April, which refers to the results of his contacts with the State Department and the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Moreover, in an interview with Carrillo Flores, Senator Hickenlooper explained his sympathy for an initiative which would clearly highlight the lack of independence and diplomatic freedom of Eastern European states. File X-400-72/80, SRE, México, D.F.
70. Manuel Tello, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained that this decision was the result of the fact that neither Puerto Rico nor British and French Guyana were 'American Republics'. *La Prensa*, Buenos Aires, 7 May 1963.
71. What seems interesting is that Padilla Nervo, who had been the leading Mexican figure in questions related to arms control since the early 1950s seemed to have very little participation in the formulation of this initiative. Reading through available documents it becomes clear that this initiative came from the executive, namely the Presidency and that it was formulated in close contact with the United States. This factor partly explains the lack of continuity with the

previous position regarding regional denuclearisation. File 400/728a SRE, México, D.F.

72. By 1963 American and British advocacy in halting the dissemination of nuclear weapons and the development of independent nuclear deterrents were widely known. *Manchester Guardian*, 1 May, 1963.

73. *Novedades*, 7 May 1963.

74. The joint declaration was announced in Geneva while Fidel Castro was on an official visit to the Soviet Union. *Novedades*, 2 May 1963.

75. Latin America was identified by many as an exception. The initiative raised the interest in other regions like the Middle East, where the Israeli government manifested its curiosity, and Europe. A number of Soviet non-proliferation proposals for Europe were discussed at the ENDC. *Excélsior*, 8 May 1963, *Novedades*, 10 May 1963 and ENDC/PV 118 and 139.

76. The position of the Argentine government was strongly criticised by the Argentine ambassador, Adolfo Scilingo, who stated that Argentina had a responsibility which sprang from its initiative to denuclearise the Antarctic and that this could have easily been extended to the whole of Latin America. *Novedades*, 2 May 1963 and *El Mundo*, Buenos Aires, 6 May 1963, *La Nación*, and *La Prensa*, 16 July 1963.

77. File XII-400-72-8r, SRE, México, D.F.

78. In May 1963, the Mexican government informed the State Department that its official position during the negotiations would favour an inspection system as wide as required. File XII-400-72- 8o, SRE, México, D.F.

79. *New York Times*, 13 November 1963.

80. This time only Cuba and Venezuela abstained, the former on the same basis as before and the latter in response to its territorial dispute with Guyana.

81. For a detailed analysis of the Alliance for Progress see Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, *The Alliance that Lost its Way* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).

82. Between 1950 and 1975 more than 65,000 Latin American military personnel were trained in American war colleges. Carvallo Rojas, 'El problema de la intervención institucional militar', pp. 45-46.

83. Throughout the 1960s military coups were a dominant note in Latin American politics. Although political factors played a prominent role in such events, they were also influenced by the impact of the Alliance for Progress upon the military institution. For an analysis of critical political decisions precipitating latent crisis in Argentina and Brazil see Peter G. Snow, 'The reemergence of the Peronistas' and Thomas E. Skidmore, 'From conspiracy to revolt', in Richard R. Fagen and Wayne Cornelius (eds.), *Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970). Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), addresses the impact of an encompassing concept of security on the military roles as 'nation builders'.
84. Quoted in Laurence Whitehead, 'International Aspects of Democratisation', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 7.
85. Current Intelligence Memoranda, No 1262/62, 8 March 1963, Declassified Document, 63-2-E 1975, LC, Washington.
86. Quoted in Walter LaFeber, 'Latin American Policy', in Robert A. Divine (ed.), *Exploring the Johnson Years* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 72 and Wire, 2 April 1964, National Security Council meetings, vol. 1, L.B.J. Library, Austin.
87. Evidence of this support was provided by the discovery of Soviet arms in Venezuela in 1963 leading to the invocation of the Rio Treaty against Cuba. Maurice Halperin, *The Taming of Fidel Castro* (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1981), p. 10.
88. For discussion of the reconciliation of Cuban and Soviet views on armed struggle in Latin America in the era of Peaceful Coexistence, see Raymond Duncan, *The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence* (New York, Praeger, 1985). For an analysis of the content of the various stages of Castro's peace offensive see Halperin, *The Taming of Fidel Castro*, pp. 94-109.
89. In order to hinder the Soviet transfer of SAM control to Castro and to prevent a major crisis the US government considered notifying the Soviet Union that in the event of Cubans shooting down a U-2 the US government would consider retaliatory action on a purely US-Cuban basis. Memo to McGeorge Bundy from L.E. Thompson, March 19, 1964, National Security Files, Memos to the President McGeorge Bundy, No. 6a, Vol. 2/3/1-31-64, L.B.J. Library, Austin. Also late in 1964, acting with Johnson's apparent consent, the CIA set in motion a plan which contemplated Castro's assassination and a new attempt to invade Cuba. This plans were abruptly cancelled with the outbreak of an

unexpected rebellion in the Dominican Republic in April 1965. Halperin, *The Taming of Fidel Castro*, pp. 164.

90. Demetrio Boesner, *Relaciones Internacionales de América Latina* (México, D.F.: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1982), p. 299.

91. Rusk's statements suggested that the issue of regional denuclearisation had been part of a non-proliferation agenda between the superpowers. Apparently the issue was first discussed during conversations between Rusk and Gromyko in 1963. Outgoing Circular Telegram 632 to US Embassies: London, Paris, Bonn and Moscow. October 1963, satisfied copy, 400-C 1978, LC, Washington. By 1964 the US government had agreed that only its territory would be excluded and that both the canal zone and Guantanamo would be part of the nuclear-free zone. Even though references to a second meeting between Tello and Rusk exist, the attached files and memoranda of conversation are not available. Memo of conversation, 21 February 1964, Memos, Vol. I/12 No. 98b and Memo 2/20-22/64, NSC, Country File, Latin America, L.B.J. Library, Austin.

92. It is interesting to note that the notion of nuclear-limited zones was discussed in reference to a possible nuclear freeze in Europe. Memo from McGeorge Bundy to Secretary of Defence Robert MacNamara, 14 January, 1964, Declassified Document 101-B 1979, LC, Washington.

93. US requirements for acceptable nuclear-free zones were: 1) the independent character of the initiative; 2) the inclusion of all states in the area; 3) appropriate provisions for verification; and 4) that such areas do not require nuclear weapons for their security to avoid upsetting the military balance. An additional remark stated that these proposals may be discussed privately when necessary, which in practice meant that the United States would seek to secure transit, port call and overflight rights. Circular Airgram CA-2861 to American Embassies. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Disarmament matters on Agenda of Second Non-Aligned Conference. Declassified Document, 1-A 1978, LC, Washington.

94. US Delegation to the 34th Ministerial Meeting of North Atlantic Council. Memo of Conversation December 1964. U.S./M C/8 1978 285-A, LC, Washington.

95. In April 1964 the resumption of diplomatic relations took place under the auspices of the OAS. Bilateral talks were aimed at eliminating the causes of conflict in the relationship, namely, the negotiation of a new treaty. Although initially rejected, in December President Johnson expressed his willingness to negotiate a new treaty. In the midst of this dispute the issue of the construction of a sea level canal across Mexico was again considered. 'Panama and the Canal Treaty'. Administrative History, US Department of State, Chapter 6, Inter-

American Relations, and Mexico Cables, airgram, vol 1/12/63-12-65, no 50, 17 Jan. 1964, L.B.J. Library, Austin.

96. The value of legality as embodied in the principles followed by Mexico's foreign policy – self-determination, non-intervention, the legal equality of nations and peaceful solution of controversies – expressed a defensive attitude which was a response to Mexico's historical experience and geopolitical location.

97. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, V.L. da Cunha, clearly considered foreign policy to be an instrument of social and economic development. In relation to arms control he reaffirmed Brazil's participation in the ENDC but only as a mediator, and made no reference to regional denuclearisation. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Textos e Declarações Sobre Política Externa de Abril de 1964 a Abril 1965*, Rio de Janeiro, Departamento Cultural e de Informações, 1965.

98. Reassessment of both aspects of nuclear energy took place within the new political context dominated by the military. The new politicisation of the military was partly the result of the impact of revolutionary warfare on the wide and almost all-inclusive conception of national security, as well as on resulting military roles and military education. In Brazil the Escola Superior de Guerra, influenced by both the US National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, foresaw an active military role in national development. Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, pp. 173-175.

99. Reading through official documents, the increasing importance attached to nuclear energy becomes clear. During the 1960s it came to be seen as one of the main pillars of economic and scientific development. Brazilian challenges to non-proliferation postures would be systematically denied on the basis of the peaceful character of its nuclear programme. Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, *Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional*, 1965-1968.

100. By 1964 the United States was already assessing different policies aimed at general non-proliferation and at particular cases. Incentives were considered as key factors in dealing with pro-nuclear groups in both India and Israel. A formal treaty was also seen as a way to reinforce the position of those resisting nuclear weapons programmes, particularly in Sweden and India. The impact of the further development and availability of nuclear technology was also evaluated, together with the prospects for Soviet cooperation in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. National Security Files on Nuclear Proliferation, December 10/1964, L.B.J. Library, Austin.

101. Restrictions on the receipt and storage of nuclear weapons in the Latin American declaration were omitted in discussions concerning an international non-proliferation formula. This was the precursor to the NPT failure to limit deployments. Airgram, Mexico Cables, vol. 1/12/63-12-65, no. 50, 17 November 1964, L.B.J. Library, Austin.

102. Instructions were sent to the US embassy in Mexico City to convey these views to 'appropriate Mexican officials' while avoiding giving a public 'impression of US interference or pressure'. Through this informal approach the links between the Latin American initiative and an international non-proliferation agreement were established. Airgram, Mexico Cables, vol. 1/12 63-12-65, no. 50, 17 November 1964, L.B.J. Library, Austin.

103. During the UNGA period of sessions the head of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Talks, Tsarapkin, informed the director of the ACDA, Foster, that the basic policy of the Soviet Union remained attached to the principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and gave reassurances that this policy would not be affected by the change in the Soviet leadership. The questions of nuclear proliferation and the Multilateral Force were also discussed in the light of the recent Chinese nuclear detonation. Memo of Conversation, 4 December 1964, US ACDA, Declassified Document 143-D 1975, LC, Washington.

104. Venezuela had recently agreed to participate on the condition of the prior resolution of its territorial dispute with Guyana in the event of the latter expressing its interest in adhering to the agreement.

105. The clearest sign of Castro's confrontational policy was his decision actively to support armed struggle both in Latin America and Africa. Halperin, *The Taming of Fidel Castro*, pp. 112-130.

106. Quoted in Nicola Miller, *Soviet Relations with Latin America 1959-1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 105.

107. The question of why Mexico decided to maintain diplomatic ties with the island remains open. Most scholars have underlined the sympathy towards Castro arising from a common revolutionary past, and the decision's potential as a source of political legitimacy through the promotion of wide nationalistic consensus. Mexican collaboration with US intelligence services in Cuba has been explained as the cost Mexico had to pay to pursue an independent policy. What seems clear is that after the change of government in 1964 Mexico's readiness to cooperate with the United States was not solely restricted to Cuba. Mexico not only provided the legal argument justifying Cuba's expulsion from the OAS but actively cooperated in other areas. In a memo to McGeorge Bundy, the friendly posture of the Mexican ambassador to the United States was acknowledged: 'As chairman of Committee one, Carrillo Flores quietly and

effectively squashed a draft resolution sponsored by Colombia which would have condemned US intervention in the Dominican Republic'. Memo for McGeorge Bundy, Department of State, 21 December 1965, No.195a, Mexico Memos, Vol.I/12-63-12-15, and Memo of conversation, Mexico cables, wire, Vol.1/12-63-12-65. L.B.J. Library, Austin. .

108. This assessment was probably reinforced by the results of a Mexican attempt to ensure Cuban participation. In a conversation between Rusk and Carrillo Flores, previous US policy to Cuba was reaffirmed. When Carrillo Flores asked Rusk about the significance of Cuban support for denuclearisation for US-Cuban relations he replied that it would be recognised as a first step which had to be followed by Cuban willingness to break its military ties with the USSR, changes in domestic politics for instance over human rights and clear suspension of subversive activities in the region. Memo of conversation. Mexico Memos, vol. 1/12/63-12-65, no. 105, 7 October 1965, L.B.J. Library, Austin.

109. Sir Harold Beely was appointed as British delegate, together with the French Minister Jacques Tine, the Soviet ambassador S. K. Tsarapkin and the US ambassador William C Foster. COPREDAL/CN/1.

110. In this speech Castro contradicted Soviet justifications for the deployment of missiles for Cuban defence. He affirmed that they were primarily intended to strengthen the socialist camp and in consequence Soviet offensive capability. Halperin, *The Taming of Fidel Castro*, p. 160.

111. Memo. Senator Robert Kennedy's statements on nuclear proliferation. National Security Files to the President. McGeorge Bundy, 22 June 1965, L.B.J. Library, Austin.

112. Later that year, in a conversation with Freeman, Carrillo Flores stated that talks with the Argentine and Brazilian Foreign Ministers made him fear that both countries would increasingly resist the establishment of a Latin American nuclear-free zone. In his view the influence of the military in both countries was the main factor working against their participation. Memorandum of Conversation. Mexico Memos, Vol. 1/12, 63-12-65, No.105, 7 October 1965, and wire 92a, 9 December 1964, Mexico Cables, Vol.1/12/63-12-65, L.B.J Library, Austin.

113. COPREDAL/CN/1

114. 'Panama and the Canal Treaty'. Administrative History. US Department of State, Chapter 6, Inter-American relations, L.B.J. Library, Austin.

115. Memo of Conversation, R. Faber, First Secretary British Embassy and ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) officials, 24 June 1965. Declassified Document 65-2-B 1976, LC Washington.

116. COPREDAL/CN/1

117. This approach would enable the Soviet Union to avoid costly economic and political commitments that, apart from the case of Cuba, had proved relatively unfruitful. It would also enable the USSR to focus its attention on the questions of strategic parity and the management of the strategic relationship with the United States while limiting its chances of getting involved in regional conflicts.

118. Paragraph 1 requested deposit of ratifications to enforce the treaty and suggested adopting additional protocols embodying the commitment of nuclear powers and of states with territorial responsibilities. Sette Camara suggested that they be signed and ratified before the agreement entered into force. Finally, he envisaged a wide number of circumstances which would justify withdrawals.

119. Report of the Course on Nuclear Energy, Brasília, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 17 May-14 July 1966.

120. COPREDAL/AR/37.

121. COPREDAL/AR/24.

122. COPREDAL/AR/23.

123. *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 August 1965.

124. COPREDAL/AR/23.

125. Department of State, Telegram to Mexico City from W. W. Rostow, 'Official US comments regarding Latin American nuclear-free zone proposal'. 27 August 1966, Mexico Cables, vol. II/1, L.B.J. Library, Austin.

126. The United States suggested subordinating the treaty's agency to the OAS, patterned on specialised organisations. Department of State. Telegram to Mexico City from W.W. Rostow. 'Official US comments regarding Latin American nuclear free-zone proposal', 27 August 1966, Mexico Cables vol. II/1 L.B.J. Library, Austin.

127. Latin American states saw a permanent peace force as a potential instrument to be manipulated by US interests. There were also fears that such a force could intervene in regional and border disputes which they probably

preferred to settle among themselves. LaFeber, 'Latin American Policy', p. 67 and 'Western Hemispheric Security', Administrative History, US Department of State, Chapter 6, Inter-American relations. L.B.J. Library, Austin.

128. During a meeting between L.B. Johnson and the Mexican President, Díaz Ordaz, it was agreed that US support would considerably enhance the probabilities of successful negotiations leading to the signing of an agreement. COPREDAL AR/23 and *New York Times*, 17 April 1966.

129. COPREDAL/AR/32.

130. *New York Herald Tribune*, 19 January 1967.

131. The US low level flights that accompanied the dismantling of missile installations together with subsequent CIA major operations against Cuba between 1963 and 1965 contributed to the view that for the Cubans the October crisis was 'just one of many'. Philip Brenner, 'Cuba and the Missile Crisis', p. 140.

132. COPREDAL/46.

133. The US position on this question had been earlier transmitted to Mexico. The development of any nuclear explosive device, even if intended for non-military purposes, would be essentially indistinguishable from a weapons development programme. It would therefore trigger further proliferation by producing a threatening effect on neighbours. Telegram from Department of State to Mexico City, 27 August 1966, Mexico cables, Vol II/1, L.B.J. Library, Austin.

134. COPREDAL/56, p. 2

135. If Argentine pursuit of an independent nuclear programme had been relatively clear since the late 1950s, the Brazilian case was practically new. Brazilian reluctance at COPREDAL prefigured a longer term posture. This became evident later, particularly during the Costa e Silva administration, starting in March 1967. Brazil's divergent position on issues such as the non-proliferation treaty and soluble coffee, as well as the 'upsurge of nationalism and Anti-Americanism' in late 1967, would become a source of constant friction with the United States. 'Brazil'. Administrative History, US Department of State, Chapter 6, Inter-American relations, L.B.J. Library, Austin.

136. An official message was sent to the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, García Robles, which conveyed the US understanding of the treaty: 'on present and foreseeable technology, contracting parties are forbidden to acquire nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes as well as devices

specifically identified as nuclear weapons. We understand article 18 to permit the carrying out of PNE through appropriate international arrangements with countries possessing nuclear energy devices, or at such time as this might somehow become technologically possible . . .' Wire from US Embassy in Mexico to Lincon Gordon, Department of State, 13 February 1967, Mexico Cables, vol. II/1 L.B.J. Library, Austin.

137. COPREDAL/56.

138. Wire from US embassy in Mexico to Lincon Gordon. Department of State, 13 February 1967, Mexico Cables, vol. II/1 L.B.J. Library, Austin.

139. COPREDAL/60.

140. This was immediately reported to Washington. Wire from US embassy in Mexico to Lincon Gordon, Department of State, 13 February 1967, Mexico Cables. vol. II/1. L.B.J. Library, Austin.

141. COPREDAL/AR/40, p 4.

142. COPREDAL/AR/41.

143. COPREDAL/AR/41.

144. The zone of application would then extend south of parallel 30° North (with the exception of the territory and territorial seas of the United States).

145. A number of factors and events could pose a challenge to the Latin American tradition of peaceful settlement of disputes. These include perceptions about the utility of military action, the impact of potential boundary disputes over access to natural resources, the legacy of the military, in terms of both the 'national security ethos' and arms acquisitions, and finally, the reemergence of the local pattern of security relations which might result from the withdrawal or decline of US hegemony over the region. Yet forces favouring this tradition should not be underestimated: these include the transition to democracy in most Latin American states, the effects of greater national integration, a clearer articulation of national interests, a more professional diplomacy as well as the more recent integration trends. The outcome of most recent regional conflicts such as the 1980 dispute between Colombia and Venezuela over the Gulf of Venezuela, the 1981 armed border conflict between Peru and Ecuador which led to an agreement to disengage forces, the 1984 settlement of the Beagle Channel dispute between Chile and Argentina and the Contadora-Esquiplas process seem to support the optimistic view.

146. OPANAL was created as an independent international organisation aimed at ensuring the fulfilment of the obligations embodied in the Tlatelolco Treaty. Its General Conference elects the General Secretary and the parties to the Council, approves its budget and sets the members' quotas.

147. A Basic Agreement commits the party to accept the safeguards on all fissionable materials and peaceful nuclear activities conducted within its territory or jurisdiction. Its fundamental purpose is to verify that those materials are not channelled to the production of nuclear weapons.

148. The reports carried out during these years have not led to major controversies. Yet Argentina's non-ratification and Brazil's reluctance to waive article 28 requirements have limited the full application of safeguards.

149. This definition includes two elements: the uncontrolled nature of an explosion and the warlike purposes of a device.

150. Article 17 states that nothing in the provision of the treaty should prejudice the rights of the contracting parties in conformity with the treaty, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

151. Jozef Goldblat, *Agreements for Arms Control: A critical survey* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1982), p. 64.

152. This exception has obstructed the incorporation of Guyana in the regional regime despite its desire to become a party in the face of Venezuelan opposition. A commission of good offices was set up in 1969 with the purpose of finding solutions to this problem, which continues unresolved.

153. Declaration sent to the XXV Anniversary of Tlatelolco. Mexico D.F., 14 February 1992.

154. Soviet adherence to Protocol II was also the result of Mexican efforts. In fact this decision was announced during President López Portillo's visit to Moscow. OPANAL, *Zona Libre de armas nucleares en América Latina* (México, D.F., 1979), p. 24 and Cole Blasier, 'Security: the extracontinental dimension', in Kevin J Middlebrook and Carlos Rico (eds.), *The United States and Latin America in the 1980's* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), p. 526.

155. Speech by OPANAL's president, Stempel Paris, during the XXV Anniversary of Tlatelolco, Mexico, D.F., 14 February 1992.

156. Jorge Morelli Pando, 'El transporte de armas nucleares y las naves propulsadas por energía atómica', in OPANAL, *Vigésimo aniversario del Tratado de Tlatelolco* (México, D.F., 1987), pp. 86-87.

157. In the case of nuclear propelled submarines nuclear energy tends to be used for non-peaceful purposes, and this was clearly the case during the South Atlantic crisis. Nevertheless these vessels do not fall under the definition of nuclear weapons provided by Tlatelolco, where the element of intention was avoided (ironically as a result of Argentine and Brazilian interest on the question of PNEs). For these reasons it is understandable that OPANAL decided to avoid the controversy over the legality or illegality of their presence. Héctor Gross Espiell, 'El conflicto bélico de 1982 en el Atlántico Sur y el Tratado de Tlatelolco', in OPANAL, *Vigésimo aniversario del Tratado de Tlatelolco*, p. 75.

158. In 1984 the *New Statesman* claimed to have evidence that a Polaris submarine had been sent to the South Atlantic, while various press reports not only maintained that British ships routinely deploy nuclear depth charges while they are on patrol, but *The Times*, on 3 November 1982, made a categorical statement that some of these were taken south.

159. Quoted in Gross Espiell, 'El conflicto bélico de 1982', p. 71.

160. These decisions were included in a declaration sent by the French government to the XXV Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty. México, D.F. 14 February 1992.

161. France traditionally maintained a reluctant position in relation to partial arms control schemes, on the basis of their negative impact on global arms control. In addition the Latin American case could set a 'dangerous precedent' for Europe. Although there is no evidence of a deal between the French and the Mexican governments, it is clear that the French government took into account the fact that Mexico had not supported the international campaign against French tests in Muroroa. *Le Monde*, 20 and 24 July 1973.

162. In the final Chinese-Mexican joint communiqué announcing China's decision to adhere to Protocol II, it was clearly stated that this decision did not affect China's opposition to the PTBT and the NPT. *Le Monde*, 25 April 1973.

163. For an analysis of the evolution of China's nuclear policy see Wu Xiu Quan, 'Nuclear weapons states not party to the NPT: China', and Reinhard Drifte, 'Nuclear Weapon States not party to the NPT: China', in Josef Goldblat (ed.), *Non-Proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985).

164. *Peking Review*, September 1973.

165. At the time the Navy commandant denounced the Navy's dependence on the United States. A. Rouquié, *Pouvoir Militaire et Société Politique en République Argentine*, pp. 595-596.
166. Luddeman, 'Nuclear Power in Latin America', p. 381.
167. Quoted in Andrew Hurrell, 'The Quest for Autonomy: The Evolution of Brazil's role in the International System, 1964-1985', DPhil Thesis, Oxford University, 1986, p. 98.
168. This ambivalence was expressed on the maintenance of the rhetoric of close identification with US policies, while publicly advocating non-involvement in relation to Vietnam, on Brazilian insistence on the right to PNEs and its critical stand towards the PTBT and NPT negotiations, as well as on the equivocal position 'on our efforts to unscramble the Israeli-Arab problem'. Memo from W. Rostow to L.B. Johnson, 14 June 1967, National Security Files, Brazil, Vol.7, L.B.J. Library, Austin.
169. Schneider, *Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power*, p. 50.
170. *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, April 1967 and Sergio Corrêa da Costa's speech to the Foreign Relations Commission on Tlatelolco, August 1969.
171. Wesson, *The United States and Brazil: Limits to Influence*, p. 78.
172. Gall, 'Atoms for Brazil, dangers for all', p. 155.
173. *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, June 1967.
174. The causes of changes in the nature of US-Brazilian relations were of both an external and internal character. The first category includes doubts about the wisdom of a foreign policy relying on the idea of a special relationship and the emergence of new international alternatives. Domestic factors included firstly, the pressure upon a strategy of economic growth based on exports promotion, caused by its function as primary source for the military's legitimacy, secondly, the character of foreign policy formulation, and finally, the increasing number of foreign activities carried out by numerous state enterprises. Hurrell, 'The Quest for Autonomy', pp. 123-124 and 131-135.
175. A contribution to this view was continued comparisons between natural and enriched uranium methods from the late 1960s until 1974, when the decision to develop a capacity to enrich uranium was finally taken. The decision was based on the disadvantages perceived in the former option, namely, dependence on heavy water supplies and higher uranium consumption. *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, October 1967, September 1972, April 1974.

176. Tlateloco's utility in this respect did not prevent continued concern about its implications, as expressed in statements referring to eventual withdrawal 'if new circumstances affecting Brazil's vital interests arise'. *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, June 1967 and October 1967.

177. Discurso do Ministro de Relações Exteriores, Magalhaes Pinto no Plenário Câmara de Diputados. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Documentos de Política Externa*, Secretaria General Adjunta Para o Planejamento Político, October 1967-May 1968.

178. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Documentos de Política Externa*, October 1967-May 1968.

179. Schneider, *Brazil*, pp. 91-92.

180. This view is held by Stepan who questions revisionist interpretations of the military as the institution best fitted to conduct economic development. Doubts are also expressed in relation to uncritical assumptions of unity, continuity and stability of military regimes. Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*, p. 215.

181. Favourable external circumstances included the 1967-1973 growth in world trade and capital availability (foreign debt and foreign investment) which enabled Brazil to finance its miracle with substantial trade deficits (1971-1972). The Achilles heel of economic success was Brazil's increasing energy vulnerability resulting from economic and industrial policies that assumed the continued availability of cheap imported energy. Hurrell states that this vulnerability was a by-product of the miracle since much of the fastest growth occurred in energy intensive sectors. Oil consumption rose by 120% between 1967 and 1974 and Brazil's dependence on imported sources of energy rose from 23.7% in 1967 to 38.6% in 1974 with the country having to import some 75% of its crude oil requirements in 1974. Hurrell, 'The Quest for Autonomy', pp. 148-152.

182. This cancellation was part of the AEC suspension of all new contracts for enriched uranium. Since the early 1970s commercial demands for uranium were outstripping the capacity of the three AEC enrichment plants. Gall, 'Atoms for Brazil', p. 163.

183. The main policy guidelines of the 'Pragmatismo Responsável' were: freedom of action for diplomacy and 'pragmatic assessment' of converging and conflicting interests within a new 'ecumenical' perspective. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*, Brasília, Divisão de Documentação, March 1975.

184. The 1969 agreement on nuclear cooperation included the following programmes: computer methods of maximising nuclear energy production, uranium exploration, and development of both fuel cycles and advanced reactors. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Documentos de Política Externa*, May 1968–October 1969.

185. Brazilian moves awakened US concern. W. Rostow had stated that Brazil was ‘on its way to becoming a nuclear power, and consequently a danger for all its neighbours’. Quoted in *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, June 1973.

186. The agreements would give Brazil access to technologies of enriched uranium reactors and to all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*, August 1975.

187. Despite this Brazil continued to object to international controls over any ‘independently developed’ processes and technologies. This position was particularly problematic given the difficulties in drawing clear lines between copying and improvement or invention. Moreover, both Brazil and Germany insisted that the safeguard mechanisms, which included IAEA supervision, were even more strict than those of the NPT. Agreements with the IAEA were concluded in January 1976. *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, August 1975. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*, August 1975. Wolf Grabendorff, ‘La política nuclear y de no-proliferación de Brasil’, *Estudios Internacionales*, vol. XX, no. 80 (October–December 1977), p. 543.

188. Other factors behind this consensus were the urgent need to diversify markets and sources of foreign investment and the impact of Geisel’s personality on foreign policy and energy issues. This facilitated an alliance between the President and the Foreign Minister through the National Security Council. Hurrell, ‘The Quest for Autonomy’, pp. 206–209.

189. Gall, ‘Atoms for Brazil’, p. 183.

190. John R. Redick, ‘Prospects for Arms Control in Latin America’, *Arms Control Today*, vol. 5, no. 9 (September 1975).

191. These pressures were first directed at West Germany which reacted strongly to what they considered ‘harsh commercial interests’. *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, December 1976 and Grabendorff, ‘La política nuclear’, p. 541.

192. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Resenha de Política Exterior*, 1975–1976.

193. *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, June 1975.
194. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil*, August 1975.
195. OPANAL, *Zona Libre de Armas Nucleares*, México, D.F., 1979, p. 25.
196. *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, May 1975 and December 1976.
197. *Folha de São Paulo*, 12 August 1977.
198. *The Times*, December 15, 1980.
199. *Jornal do Brasil* and *O Globo*, 19 October 1979.
200. *Jornal do Brasil*, 26 May, 1980.
201. *O Estado de São Paulo*, 12 August 1980 and *O Globo*, 27 May 1981.
202. *Latin American Regional Reports. Southern Cone*, 23 December 1983, RS-83-10.
203. *Latin American Research Reports. Southern Cone*, January 31, 1986, RS-86-00 and 25 December 1986, RS-86-10.
204. ‘Security communities’ exist among independent states which do not expect or fear the use of force in relations among them. Such communities might be seen as ‘resolved or matured security complexes in which basic conflicts and fears have been worked out, resulting in an oasis of relatively mature anarchy within the more fractious field of the international anarchy as a whole’. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), p. 115.
205. *O Estado de São Paulo*, 12 August 1980, *O Globo*, 23 May 1981, *Latin American Regional Reports. Southern Cone*, 23 December 1983, RS-83-10.
206. COPREDAL, G6/296, 31 May 1987.
207. *O Estado de São Paulo* and *Folha de São Paulo*, 5 September 1987.
208. ‘Military security’ concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states perceptions of each other’s intentions. ‘Political security’ concerns the organisational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Other areas

of security include: economic, societal and environmental security. Buzan, *The European Security Order Recast*, p. 4.

209. *Financial Times*, 6 July 1990 and Charles N. Van Doren and George Bunn, 'Progress and Peril at the Fourth NPT Review Conference', *Arms Control Today*, October 1990.

210. In defiance of a government ordered freeze on arms purchase, the Argentine Navy purchased 16 Skyhawk aircraft from Israel in a secret transaction using clandestine funds. The deal revealed that the Navy had a secret budget which allowed them to spend more than US\$100m without any political supervision. *The Sunday Times*, 9 December 1984.

211. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 87.

212. Since the end of the Falklands/Malvinas war the Argentine re-equipment programme included: 20 Exocet missiles, 9 Super Etandard strike aircraft (10 of which were though capable of carrying Exocets) and 30 Israeli A3 Skyhawks to replace aircraft lost in combat. *The Times*, 30 March 1983.

213. Jozef Goldblat and Peter Lomes, 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Problem States', Paper prepared for the joint convention of the BISA and the ISA, London, 28 March-1 April 1989, p. 8.

214. One example of such cooperation was provided in 1980 by Brazilian supplies to Iraq of uranium dioxide which raise international suspicion. Subsequently, Western intelligence sources saw in the Condor missile a copy of the US Pershing 2 missile. Even though in 1985 the United States, West Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Canada agreed on a Missile Technology Control Regime, the development of the Condor missile, of similar programmes in Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa and Brazil, together with the assessment, following the Gulf War, of the advanced state of the Iraqi nuclear programme, raised doubts as to the effectiveness of both the nuclear and missile non-proliferation regimes. Although more recently a renewed commitment has been apparent, up to the Gulf War their survival had been threatened both by export competition and by foreign policy considerations, particularly those of the United States. *Observer*, 28 June 1981 and *Financial Times*, 21 November 1989.

215. *International Herald Tribune*, 7 September 1987.

216. Personal interview with Luis Pinguelli Rosas, Rio de Janeiro, 15 September 1988.

217. *O Estado de São Paulo*, 5 and 10 September 1987.

218. Stepan includes a 'budgetary argument' among the motivations which led the military to adopt a strategy of political liberalisation. As the acting commander of the Superior War College stated at the time '... we have been restricting ourselves in weapons request in order to get a good image as a government ... it will be easier to advance our legitimate claims against a government led by a civilian'. Brazilian military expenditure in the 1970s declined in absolute terms. Stepan finds similarities between the Brazilian and Spanish cases and significant reductions in military expenditures accompanying transition to democracy in both Argentina and Uruguay. Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, pp. 57 and 73-81.

219. There is no evidence of any congressional involvement either in the major modernisation plans of the Brazilian armed forces of 1985, or in the discovery in 1986 of a probable nuclear test site. Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, p. 106.

220. For an analysis of the dimension of military prerogatives in both Argentina and Brazil see, Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, pp. 93-127.

221. At the time of the Condor suspension Argentina's Defence Minister mentioned political and financial considerations. *Financial Times*, 23 April 1990 and *Latin American Weekly Report*, 25 April 1991, WR-91-15.

222. *Latin American Weekly Report*, 25 April 1991, WR-91-15 and 11 July 1991, WR-91-26.

223. *Financial Times*, 10 and 23 April 1990.

224. *Latin American Weekly Reports*, 30 May 1991, WR-91-20 and 13 June 1991, WR-91-22.

225. Such promotion was clearly expressed in the speech given by Hans Blix, General Director of the IAEA during the XXV Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty in Mexico City, 14 February 1992.

226. Speech by the General Secretary of OPANAL, Antonio Stempel Paris during the XXV Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, Mexico, D.F., 14 February 1992.

227. Goldblat, *Non-Proliferation*, p. 14.

228. Goldblat, *Non-Proliferation*, p. 11.

229. John R. Redick, 'The Tlatelolco Regime and Non-Proliferation in Latin America', *International Organization*, vol. 35, no. 1 (Winter 1981), p. 104.

230. Leonard Spector, 'New players in the nuclear game', *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, January-February 1989 and *The Independent*, 30 March 1990.
231. In 1987 Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a joint statement intended to prevent the transfer of technologies that could facilitate missile proliferation. This statement was neither a treaty nor a regime, but a simple declaration of intent. *Newshrief*, Royal United Services Institute, October 1989.
232. For an historical account of Israel's nuclear programme see Ken Coates et al, *Israel's bomb: the first victim: The case of Mordechai Vanunu* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1988), pp. 42-50.
233. *Arms Control Today*, December 1990.
234. At the time of signing the NPT in 1969 Germany made its ratification conditional upon 'tolerable international control . . . based on agreement between the IAEA and Euratom'. Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, edited by H. Bull and C. Holbraad (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1978), p. 288.
235. For an analysis of the limited utility of nuclear threats and the limited vulnerability of non-nuclear powers to nuclear blackmail see Roberts, 'The critique of Nuclear Deterrence', in Christopher Bertram (ed.), *Defence and Concensus: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security* (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 68.
236. Buzan, *Peoples, States and Fear*, p. 3.
237. Other alternatives to the security dilemma posed by the nuclear option could be found in non-nuclear means of defence such as greater reliance on conventional military forces, on militia-territorial type forces, organised civil resistance (guerrilla or non-violent resistance). Roberts, 'The Critique of Nuclear Deterrence', p. 73.
238. For a comparative analysis between common security and collective security and of the way in which common security seems to have avoided some of the latter's worst mistakes, see Wiseman, 'Common Security and Non-Provocative Defence: Alternative Approaches to the Security Dilemma', pp. 53-54.



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