Peruvian Labour and the Military Government since 1968

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by Alan Angell

University Lecturer in Latin American Politics, Oxford, and Fellow of St. Antony's College.

University of London
Institute of Latin American Studies
31 Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9HA
A two-day conference on labour movements in Latin America since 1930, supported by a grant from the Nuffield Foundation, was held at the University of London Institute of Latin American Studies on 9-10 March 1979. The organisers were Leslie Bethell, Reader in Hispanic American and Brazilian History at University College London, and Juan Carlos Torre of the Instituto Di Tella, Buenos Aires and Visiting Scholar at the Institute of Latin American Studies. The conference was attended by more than 30 university teachers, visiting scholars, research fellows and graduate students - historians, sociologists, political scientists and economists - from ten British universities. Almost half the participants were from Latin America (mostly from Brazil and Chile). Papers were presented by Juan Carlos Torre (on Argentina), Alan Angell (on Peru), Regis de Castro Andrade (on Brazil), Gonzalo Falabella (on Chile) and Ian Roxborough (on Mexico). Because of the unusual quantity of new material they bring together - each constitutes the most important single work available in English on its subject - and because of their common theme - the experience of organised labour under a military regime - the Institute has decided to publish the papers on organised labour in Peru since 1968 and Chile since 1973 as Nos. 3 and 4 in its Working Papers series.

Leslie Bethell
Popular protest, both urban and rural, has a long and often violent tradition in Peru. But the style and organisation of such protest bears the characteristics of the traditional forms of popular agitation in societies before the formation of social classes based on the development of a capitalist system. Such agitation is often local or regional rather than national, unites disparate social groups, lacks persistent organisation, can sometimes be very effective as a defensive force, employs violence, tends to flare up and as suddenly to die away, and is open to manipulation by politicians and coercion by the state. Yet the root causes of such protest lie dormant, unless positive social and economic change removes them, and can flare up again at times of economic distress.

Protest organised by trade unions, when such organisations are strong and account for a large part of the active labour force, takes a different form and calls for a different response from the government and the dominant class. Such protest is organised, is often limited to a small sector but a sector of considerable economic weight. Grievances tend to be more specific, even predictable, and there are well developed forms and institutions to cope with most though not all expressions of trade union discontent. An intelligent government will attempt cooperation rather than coercion as a cheaper and potentially more successful weapon.

Although the Peruvian labour movement has its origins in the early part of the twentieth century, amongst the usual groups of bakers, port workers and textile workers, and with the then influential ideological covering of anarcho-syndicalism, it cannot be said that the labour movement was much of a threat to government and employers for most of its history. In a society where the vast majority of the workers were poor agricultural labourers of one form or another, and where industry was only weakly developed it could hardly be otherwise. There were sectors where labour had some influence but that influence was local and often channelled through a party, the Apra, that, at least from the 1940s, intended to use what little power labour had in a game of opportunistic politics without any real commitment to social reform.

The last two decades however have seen considerable changes, one of which has been the growth of a national labour movement of some importance. Yet this development has taken place alongside and in conjunction with the survival of more traditional forms of popular protest. My argument is that the combination of these two forms of social protest, popular and trade union, is a potent political weapon in the hands of the urban and rural poor at a time of economic crisis. Such a combination of disparate social forces makes it difficult to
coordinate effective action, and even more difficult to put forward some common 'project'. But it also creates problems for any government concerned either to coerce or to coopt the popular masses and the trade union movement.

At first sight, perhaps, it seems odd that the Peruvian military government, at least in its first phase from 1968 to 1975 could not control the labour movement either by a policy of coercion or of cooptation. Other authoritarian governments in Latin America have curbed labour movements far stronger than that of Peru. Brazil saw virtually no important strikes between 1968 and 1978; the Mexican labour movement, perhaps a little unfairly has become a by-word for the passivity of the rank and file and the corruption of its leaders; and the Chilean labour movement, the most politicised on the continent was initially demobilised and decapitated after the 1973 coup. But even these governments are discovering limits to the extent of control over labour; Brazil has witnessed massive strikes in the São Paulo area, and the Chilean labour movement, in spite of extremely fierce anti-union legislation and some equally fierce illegal repression, has shown remarkable capacity to survive and regroup.1

The policy of the Peruvian military government was distinct.2 The government embarked on a process of reform and wanted the collaboration of the labour movement. Initially, repression would not have been too difficult. The Peruvian labour movement in 1968 was weak, poorly organised (with a few exceptions), not extensively politicised but extremely sectarian where it was, and the most numerous force in the labour movement, the CGTP was dominated by the Communist party, a party of almost unswerving loyalty to President Velasco and indeed to his successor until 1977.

Extensive repression of the labour movement did not take place until 1975, though there were some examples of earlier repression; notably against the schoolteachers, the miners, and the pescadores. But the history of government-labour relations in the period of cooptation shows that a policy of encouraging labour organisation does not necessarily entail labour gratitude, that official labour organisations do not necessarily remain on the rails laid down by their creators, and that beyond a certain point sheer economic and social desperation can turn formerly quiescent sectors, (notably schoolteachers) into militant and even violent opponents under the banner of the most unlikely ideological groups.3

Hostility from organised labour was not the only problem facing the government in its attempt to construct a social base. Indeed, it is difficult to identify any significant social support for the government (as opposed to the political loyalty given by the Communist party, and to some extent and for different aims and, more or less secretly, from the Apra).4 Entrepreneurs objected to the creation of the Comunidad Industrial, and private investment fell sharply. The agrarian reform benefited a considerable proportion of the peasantry, but still only a minority and not the poorest minority. The inhabitants

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of the pueblos jóvenes saw a mushrooming of neighbourhood committees and an improvement in basic facilities and services, but there was no increase in regular, secure and reasonably paid employment.  

Did opposition from the labour movement matter a great deal? It did, both positively and negatively. Negatively, for the government embarked upon a process of repression and control that undermined its credentials to be launching a true Peruvian revolution. Positively, in the sense that of all groups likely to benefit from the style of economic modernisation proposed by the government, organised labour would be amongst the most favoured. If therefore the government could not gain the support of that group, what hope was there of generating support amongst other less favoured sectors? A more socialist redistributionist policy might have attracted widespread popular support outside the ranks of organised labour, but the number of military men prepared to push through such policies were too few and too powerless.

But when the government switched from cooptation to coercion, it proved equally unsuccessful, perhaps because it had left it too late. It is always easier to coerce from a position of strength than from one of weakness. Schoolteachers took to the streets and became the focal point for numerous local, regional and national demonstrations of hostility towards the government. The copper miners endured severe repression but remained loyal to their ultra-left leaders. The pescadores threw off the corrupt leadership imposed by Fisheries Minister General Tantaleán. The manufacturing unions in CONACI moved to the left as the government moved to the right. Even the government's own labour creation, the CTRP, deserted in Lima to join with the majority of the labour movement in opposition to the government. Arrests, deportations, repression and suspension of constitutional guarantees - all on admittedly a much smaller scale than in Chile or Uruguay - failed to halt mounting resentment as the working class, both white collar and manual, faced a sharp drop in living standards as the economic crisis was tackled with IMF style austerity policies.

In July 1977, Peru witnessed a massive and national general strike. The labour movement had come a long way from its weakness and relative political unimportance in 1968. How did this come about? To start to answer this question, we have first to look at the size and structure of the movement.

The structure of employment.

Although the number of unionised workers has increased quite sharply since 1968 (though not as sharply as the number of unions), nevertheless, the limits on trade union organisation imposed by the structure of the active labour force are quite considerable.
Table 1
Evolution of the structure of the labour force by economic sectors. %.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRIMARY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECONDARY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERTIARY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic services (transport, electricity, gas, water)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-specified activities</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Excluding agriculture from the figures, it is clear that the occupational structure is one heavily weighted towards employees (mainly in commerce and services) and towards so called independent workers (in effect many of whom are underemployed).
Table 2

Economically Active Population, excluding Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961 Nos.</th>
<th>1961 %</th>
<th>1972 Nos.</th>
<th>1972 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>employers</td>
<td>23,194</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>10,401</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wage labourers</td>
<td>517,080</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>561,998</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>salaried employees</td>
<td>327,691</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>701,981</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independent producers</td>
<td>429,985</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>550,535</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unpaid family workers</td>
<td>22,702</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>29,443</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>household servants</td>
<td>175,196</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>143,444</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, inc. unspecified</td>
<td>1,569,019</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,052,169</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The existence of such a large 'independent' sector of the work force places limits on the extent of trade union growth. In 1955 the Central Bank estimated that, overall, 55% of the labour force consisted of independent workers and 45% of salaried workers; by 1972 the figures were the reverse. Nevertheless it should not be assumed that the independent workers cannot organise. In certain sectors they are indeed quite well organised - market workers and choferes for instance. Moreover the urban poor can and do participate in mass mobilisations, either with the leadership of the trade union movement, as in the general strike of July 1977, or without them, as in the riots following the police strike of February 1975.

Even that sector of the work force classified as manual labour is dominated numerically by the artisnalan sector, a sector that rather than diminishing is in fact increasing in size both relatively and absolutely.
### Table 3

**Manufacturing labour force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nos. in thousands.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong></td>
<td>405.7</td>
<td>620.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>factory sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5 workers or more)</td>
<td>164.3</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artisanal (1 to 4 workers)</strong></td>
<td>259.4</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


But even most factories are very small; 44.3% of factories in the manufacturing sector employ between 5 and 9 workers; only 10.3% employ between 50 and 199; and only 1.9% employ 200 or more workers.¹⁰

Sulmont proposes a threefold division of the work force in the manufacturing sector.¹¹ Firstly, there is a traditional factory sector with a majority of workers of long professional and union experience, but whose firms are being rendered marginal, or being dominated or absorbed by the newer enterprises linked to the foreign companies that expanded so dramatically in the last two decades. This sector is one of longstanding Aprista influence. Secondly, there is a more recent high technology sector, employing younger skilled workers, but without much union experience. This sector is more combative and more radical, with the predominant political influence coming from the Communist party and more recently the ultra-left groups. Thirdly, there are a large number of unstable workers in small enterprises with a low level of union experience and little independent possibility of forming unions. This was a sector in which the government's CTRP made inroads. Howarth's research in Arequipa shows that the modern sector of the manufacturing economy is associated with support for radical unionism.¹² Modern large scale employment is found not only in manufacturing industry. If are included in this sector the large agro-industrial complexes (mainly sugar), the fishing and fishmeal processing industry, the major mines and the large construction companies, (in addition to manufacturing industry), then it has been estimated that the 'modern' sector of the economy employs about 400,000 workers (out of a total labour force of some four million).¹³

What kind of working class is produced by this occupational structure and labour market? The answer to this question is
difficult, and the necessary research on, for example, the recruitment of labour has hardly begun. One striking feature is the extent of underemployment. In 1974 the Ministry of Labour estimated the level of underemployment at 41.9% of the labour force and the level of unemployment at 4%, (compared with figures of 46.1% and 5.9% respectively for 1969). Even for those in employment the spread of wages (and conditions) is very great and can hardly help working class unity. As Richard Webb writes, 'Enormous vertical distances characterise more than Peru's geography. Almost any subdivision of the population is a sample with a high degree of income dispersion. 'Social classes' such as the city wage earner or the sierra peasant turn out to be extremely heterogeneous with regard to incomes. City wages for instance range from about 5000 soles p.a. to 40,000 soles p.a. spanning three quartiles... The city self employed are even more spread out; 15% are in the bottom quartile and 22% in the upper; 8% reach into the top decile.'

It is hardly surprising that labour turnover is fairly low. Holding a secure job is a relatively privileged position that workers are anxious to defend. One study found that only 13.6% of workers in industrial firms in Lima and Callao had worked in their place of employment for a year or less, a comparatively low figure of job turnover. This explains why the issue of legal guarantee of job stability has been such a burning issue for the labour movement, for employers generally try to avoid legal restrictions by hiring workers for short term period of less than three months before the legal guarantees come into effect.

Alison Scott has drawn attention to the extent to which recruitment of labour is organised through the kinship system. She writes that 'the continued stability of a young labour force in jobs with bad working conditions and low incomes clearly requires explanation. Is it a reflection of an oversupply of labour which makes workers hold on to any job they can get, or are there institutional factors intervening in the market? How much is due to coercive as opposed to volitional elements? My argument will be that the kinship system promotes labour stability partly because of its provision of cheap labour power within petty enterprises, partly because of its control over the recruitment system in capitalist as well as petty enterprises and partly because it is able to mobilise subsistence goods and services for urban workers both in the city and countryside.' And she quotes examples of the capture of occupations by kinship groups in such diverse sectors as parts of the local administration in Cuzco, the mining smelter complex in La Oroya, and on some of the sugar plantations - with the support of the local trade unions.

Such examples draw attention to the traditional patterns of behaviour that characterise even those sectors of the working class that enjoy industrial employment. Any study of the Peruvian working class must conclude by emphasising the rural or community background of many of its members; by the enclave nature of much of Peru's economic development and the consequent lack of articulation between the various sectors; and by the
numerical preponderance of the artisanal and petty bourgeois sectors. A typical left wing analysis of the composition of the working class is

'En nuestro país, en el movimiento obrero, además de ser bastante jóvenes algunos de sus sectores más dinámicos, existe una marcada influencia de ideas propias del campesinado, el artesanado o la pequeña burguesía empobrecida, a la vez que algunas capas obreras, sin integrarse al Estado Búrgués Semicolonial, sirven de soportes sociales a la dominación de clase enemiga. No constituyen 'una aristocracia obrera' sino más bien una pequeña burguesía mercenarizada y burocrática. En los sindicatos todo éste se expresa con marcada nitidez, haciendo que sea limitado el número de trabajadores organizados que se reproduzca constantemente el caudillismo anarco sindicalista y que sectores burocráticos se apoyen en las fuerzas intermedias en su desarrollo de conciencia como pasa particularmente con el revisionismo.'

There is obviously some truth in this analysis, even if it seems to be inspired by the failure of left wing groups to win control over the unions from the Communist party, and in particular, of this left wing group (the Partido Comunista Revolucionario) to match the influence of other left wing groups (notably the maoist Patria Roja party). But if the tone of such comment seems to imply that the Peruvian working class has disappointed its self-appointed leaders, one could with equal justice point out that such left wing groups have been more conspicuous in trying to use the working class for their own sectarian ends than in attempting to forge any kind of unity.

The Growth of the Unions.

The development of unions does not mechanically reflect the structure of the economy. Political factors are of great importance and there is no doubt that the Velasco government encouraged unions. As one author puts it 'the most striking fact is that the total number of recognised unions almost doubled between 1968 and 1975, and that the number of unions in manufacturing more than doubled'.

8
Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>all sectors</th>
<th>industry alone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unions recognised</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>before 1968</td>
<td>2152</td>
<td>776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recognised 1968-1975</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>4172</td>
<td>1707</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nevertheless, the number of unionised workers remains a minority of the labour force, concentrated in certain sectors. The Ministry of Labour estimated that in 1975 the percentage of manufacturing workers in unions was 12%; and in the construction industry 22.7%.

Most unions in Peru are small, and collective bargaining tends to be a function of the plant union. Above this level there exist basically three types of federations, the central political federations, regional federations, some but not all of which are affiliated to the central organisations, and the sectoral federations. As the functions of the central national federations are political rather than narrowly union, they will be dealt with separately. Regional federations tend to be most active when a central economic activity of the region runs into industrial conflict. The regional federation then mobilises mass popular support; for example in the case of the Federación Sindical Departamental de Trabajadores de Ancash (FESIDETA), with its support for the fishing workers of the Federación de Pescadores in Chimbote, or for the steel workers of SIDERPERU. The Federación Departamental de Trabajadores de Arequipa (FDOTA), affiliated to the CGTP has been active in defence of local interests.

A federation can be formed by five or more unions in the same sector, and ten or more unions can form a confederation. More than one federation can exist in the same sector, and as there is no obligation for an individual union to join a federation, and as federations do not normally engage in collective bargaining, a large number of unions are not affiliated to any federation or confederation. According to Stephens, the 'functions of the federations and confederations are primarily to provide legal assistance in collective negotiations or individual grievances to affiliated unions'. However there are a number of powerful federations, such as the Federación de Pescadores (FPP) which organises many of the 21,000 fishermen and the 10,000 fishmeal factory workers; or the Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos del Perú (FNTMMP) associated with
the ultra-left confederation, CCUSC; or the Federación de Trabajadores Azucareros, (FTA), still under Apra's influence via its CTP; or the Federación de Trabajadores de la Industria Metálica del Perú (FETIMP) affiliated to the communist CGTP; or the Federación de Trabajadores de Construcción Civil del Perú, affiliated to the CGTP. The two most powerful white collar unions are the bank employees Federación de Empleados Bancarios (FEB), which organised most of Peru's 30,000 bank workers and which is affiliated to the CGTP; and the schoolteachers SUTEP which commands the loyalty of most of Peru's 120,000 public schoolteachers and which is the mainstay of the CCUSC.

Federations use solidarity strikes to help their constituent members, and this form of activity has intensified in recent years. Federations also press for more general political demands for their members and were prominent in protests against such government measures as the dismissals of strike leaders and the loss of trade union rights with the suspension of constitutional guarantees in 1976.

Unions and the law.

State regulation and control over unions is not as extensively embodied in legal statute or a labour code to the same extent as in many other Latin American countries. According to Sulmont, Peruvian labour legislation is a collection of scattered measures dictated by oligarchical regimes to favour the arbitrary action of the employers, or as a response to populist pressures. There would seem to be two reasons for this lack of systematic incorporation. In the first place, the labour movement was not seen until recently as so powerful a force that it could not be dealt with by ordinary methods of control by the police and the Ministry of Labour. Secondly, until recently the major political force in the labour movement was the Apra party, a party which had increasingly moved away from any serious commitment to social reform. Moreover, given the occupational structure of Peru, the very fact that the minimum number of workers needed to form a union is twenty, effectively excluded the majority of the labour force from forming unions.

The Ministry of Labour does enjoy very considerable power over the formation and registration of unions and over the process of collective bargaining, though it is less influential in its ability to interfere with the internal functioning of the unions. Union leaders are in theory and almost certainly in practice scrutinised by the police to try to prevent 'undesirables' attaining office. And collective bargaining demands have to be presented to the Ministry of Labour. Union finances are not closely controlled by the state, but given the poverty of most unions this is not of great consequence. But what matters less than the letter of the law is the way that it is applied, and it has rarely been applied in such a way to favour organised labour.

The military government did want to introduce order into the labour sphere. Apparently Minister of Labour Sala Orosco
proposed a thoroughgoing revision of the labour code in 1973 to permit extensive state control, but other members of the government regarded the possible outcome - prolonged conflict with the unions - as less desirable than any gain in control. However the government did introduce several new decrees in the labour field, one of which, regulating stability of employment, in 1970, was welcomed by labour. But most of its initiatives were not so welcome. In response to waves of strikes in 1971 the government attempted to regulate collective bargaining, insisting that agreements should be binding for two years. Further decrees in 1975 attempted to curtail union powers to strike,reactivating measures that had been passed in 1913. But these efforts were not successful.

As usual in Latin American labour law, state employees in general are not supposed to form unions. School teachers were exempt from this provision (though SUTEP was not granted legal recognition till its victorious strike of 1978). However, as is again often the case, state employees can and do form ‘associations’ that in effect act as trade unions. Even so crucial an element of the state apparatus as the police went on strike for a few very turbulent days in February 1975. (The factors behind such a dramatic decision are a microcosm of the problems facing Peru: the police objected strongly to their low wages and tough conditions of work; they felt a grievance against the way that the army had far surpassed them in those respects and in political power; and, it is strongly suspected, the Apra had a hand in creating and profiting from the trouble).

Perhaps the greatest controversy in the field of labour legislation has been centered around the issue of stability of employment, and the government's 1970 decree, the Ley de Estabilidad Laboral. This is naturally a sensitive issue in an economy with a large labour surplus. However, opposition to provisions for job security have not come just from business elements who resent any interference with their right to dismiss workers at will - though this is undoubtedly the strongest source of that opposition. Other arguments have stressed the negative impact of labour stability on employment. It is claimed that entrepreneurs will prefer to increase capacity by adding to machinery rather than employing more labour; that entrepreneurs will contract short term labour to avoid the provisions of the law, and hence unduly increase labour instability and deny themselves the advantages of a skilled and stable labour force; and that the 1970 decree weakens labour discipline, reduces incentives and contributes to worsening income distribution.

The 1970 decree allowed dismissal for workers who had served a three month probationary period in their enterprise on two grounds only - a grave misdemeanour (falta grave), or in a general reduction of personnel that had previously been authorised by the authorities. Moreover the onus of proof was now to fall on the employer. This decree was enacted not simply out of concern for the workers. Perhaps more important was the government's intention to prevent the continuance of the wave of dismissals that had accompanied the announcement of the Ley de
Industrias with its provision for a Comunidad Laboral. The government feared that such dismissals would undermine the whole projected reform.

Moreover the 1970 decree was not going to affect the whole work force. It would not apply to that half of the work force classified as underemployed or unemployed; nor to the 19% classified as self-employed (por cuenta propia); nor to 13% of the state labour force (including schoolteachers); and neither to the 5% of the labour force 'bajo régimen especial' such as construction workers. In fact it has been estimated that the law would apply only to about 15% of the labour force, mostly in the private manufacturing sector and to some state employees (of Petro-Peru and MineroPeru). And there were still numerous ways in which the employers could evade the law and use it as an instrument against trade union leaders or militant workers. The question of how strictly the law would be applied was clearly as much a political matter as a legal one.

The decree was modified by the decision in 1976 to allow for the immediate suspension of employment in the case of an illegal strike (whereas previously it had been only after three days of strike and had rarely been used). This decree was used effectively against the fishing strike in 1976, the mining strike in 1976, and the general strike in 1977. One labour publication claimed that there had been 10,000 dismissals in Lima alone in 1976.

With the change of President in 1975, the decree of 1976, and the severe economic crisis, the Ley de Estabilidad Laboral looked a threadbare protection.

Strikes.

The number, intensity and frequency of strikes increased considerably during the Velasco period, even before real wages started to fall. Labour was responding to a government that was initially not automatically inclined to take the employers side in industrial disputes.

There are several ways of explaining this increase. A fairly obvious one is the increase in the number of unions, though this was less than the increase in the number of strikes. New unions seemed anxious to make their mark by initiating strike action, and the association with the comunidad laboral in some instances was an added factor in labour militancy. The general political climate following the coup of 1968 was probably the most favourable that there ever has been in Peru for industrial action.

Towards the end of the Velasco period primacy has to be given to falling real wages and government repression as an explanation for labour unrest.
Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of strikes</th>
<th>manufacturing only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>191</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>372</td>
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<td>1970</td>
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<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Labour figures cited in Stephens, op.cit., Ch. 6.

Table 6

Duration, workers affected, and man-hours lost through strikes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average length of strike in days</th>
<th>Workers affected</th>
<th>Man hours lost (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nos. % of workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4.8 135,582 7.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5.9 121,232 6.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>4.6 142,282 7.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>5.0 107,809 5.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3.4 91,531 4.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5.3 110,990 5.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>9.4 161,415 8.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8.5 130,643 6.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>14.3 416,251 20.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>11.1 362,737 17.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>11.7 617,120 29.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>258,101 12.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7

Wages, Salaries and Prices; real levels 1968-1975 (for Lima).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>Salaries</th>
<th>Price Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Desco. cited in Sulmont, Historia, p.314. I have rounded off the figures for simplicity.

Falling real wages were only part of the story of worsening conditions for labour. Unions began to react strongly to government manipulation through such creations as the CTRP and the MLR. Reaction in the provinces was very marked in 1973 with bitter strikes in SIDERPERU which led to a general strike in the province of Ancash; and in Arequipa where a regional strike was sparked off by the arrest of several leaders of the local SUTE. Simple figures of days lost disguise the intensity of these local reactions to the policy of the government, the extensive and intense involvement of local non-urban labour sectors, and the violence of police and military reprisals.36

According to Stephens' impressively careful study 'most strikes are called by blue collar unions; together with mixed unions (which are mostly dominated by blue collar workers) they account for 90% of all strikes. White collar strike activity is relatively unimportant, varying between 6.7% and 8.7% of all strikes, but 1.8% and 5.1% of total workers involved and 2.5% and 4.6% of total man hours lost. Federations account for roughly 2% of the total number of strikes, but they mobilise a third or more of the total number of workers involved'.37 Most strikes, as one would expect, are about wages and working conditions, but solidarity strikes are increasingly important accounting for almost one third of man hours lost. The manufacturing sector accounts for almost half the number of strikes annually; next in importance is the mining sector (especially between 1969 and
1971) and then the construction sector (especially between 1973 and 1975). These three sectors, which constitute only 18% of the labour force, account for 80% of man hours lost through strikes.

There are also available figures on the man hours lost in strikes by unions affiliated to the major confederations.

Table 8

Man-hours lost according to central federation. %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federation</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CGTP</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTRP</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No afiliados</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Apart from being the most active confederation in supporting strikes the CGTP affiliated unions also have a success rate almost equal to that of the government sponsored CTRP. 'In over 50% of the CGTP strikes the unions obtained full or at least partial satisfaction of their demands'.

However, it would be incorrect to ascribe too offensive a nature to this increasingly high rate of strike activity. According to one report, about 90% of strikes are a response to employer failure to meet legal or collective bargaining obligations. Moreover, many unions though they may be legally registered, in practice hardly function at all. Stephens draws the conclusion that 'the main function of unions in Peru is a defensive one, mainly against firings, transfers, changes in work rules, in bonuses, reduction of wages etc.. Not all unions engage in collective bargaining; eg. in 1971 a total of 701 collective contracts were concluded, and in 1972 another 922; if we assume that most unions who do conclude collective contracts renew them at least every other year - and many do it every year - we can estimate that only 48% of the recognised unions in 1972 did engage in collective bargaining.'

While this argument is undoubtedly true, it misses a dimension. It underestimates the 'aggressive' nature of many large strikes in Peru, strikes which because they are 'illegal' may escape official tabulation. For example, SUTEP strikes often involve a large proportion of Peru's teachers and mobilise many local groups in support. And SUTEP's strikes are certainly
aggressively political even if they are inseparably linked to the economic grievances of the teachers. Local and regional mobilisations like those of Chimbote or Arequipa in 1973 are almost certainly underestimated in the official figures and the sheer size and intensity of such strikes poses a sharp challenge to the legitimacy of the government.41

As the government moved towards a policy attempting to control union affairs more closely than in the past, worker protests expressed a more profound rejection of those attempts and the strike demands reflected this in their more obviously political content. One commentator claims that 1975 saw greater unity of the union movement in coordinating strikes at the federation level and in coordinating demands for greater worker participation in control over working conditions.42

What is also notable about worker mobilisation from 1975 onwards is the way that it seems to be in advance of the trade union leadership. The weakness and reluctance of the national leadership, notably the CGTP, failed to provide the necessary central coordination to articulate the various regional or sectoral protests into a national movement.43 Indeed the parallel with the development of poder popular in Chile emerges, especially in cases as that of the manufacturing sector of Vitarte, on the Carretera Central to Lima, where a popular mobilisation in defence of striking workers brought out an estimated 10,000 inhabitants establishing control over the sector for a few days in defiance of the military.44 The state owned steel works at Chimbote were the scene of a fifty two day strike in late 1977 and early 1978. Of considerable importance in securing the victory of the strike (including a demand for the reinstatement of 240 workers dismissed for their role in the strike) were the popular mobilisations in Chimbote and Ancash province, including three provincial general strikes and mass meetings with participation of over 20,000 people.45 However, one must not exaggerate their political strength. As with similar movements in Chile there is a large gap between popular anger and effective political strategies, and between momentary popular unity and long term unity on the left, for the Peruvian left is particularly sectarian. Even Hugo Blanco has warned against reading too much into these apparently embrionic forms of poder popular.46

The most dramatic mobilisation occurred on July 19th 1977, when even the CGTP lent its support to the call for a one day general strike in protest against the government's general economic policy and in particular against the attack on trade union rights. Even though it must have been clear to union leaders that there was immense popular support for such a move, not all the parties of the left agreed to take part. The miners of Centromín for example argued that as the CGTP was taking part the strike would serve only to strengthen 'social imperialism' (that is Moscow communism). As the government hastily proclaimed a school holiday, the teachers in SUTEP were not officially involved, though it is doubtful whether their leadership would have given more than lukewarm support. Moreover, the CGTP was only persuaded reluctantly into the strike and broke with the
organisation set up to run the strike, the Comando Unitario de Lucha, soon after the strike, thereby impeding the possibility of developing a long term unity strategy for confronting the government. Even the Lima branch of the government's own CTRP supported the strike, and indeed played an active role.\textsuperscript{47}

It would have been fatal for the union movement not to have organised some kind of mass protest against the government's policy.\textsuperscript{48} Yet it is claimed that the union national leaderships did little more than set the date for the strike, and that the actual organisational initiative was very much a spontaneous response often from people with no previous trade union experience. How far that is true is difficult to tell, but it was certainly a very impressive mobilisation for such a relatively weakly organised labour movement. What is undoubtedly true is that the political differences between the various confederations lost what advantage might have been gained from such a display of strength.\textsuperscript{49} The inability to recreate such a level of unity has led to several failures in the attempt to organise subsequent general strikes; notably that for the 20th September 1977 which was organised by sectors of the extreme left without the support of the CGTP, or the CTRP Lima which was a flop; the strike timed for 28th January 1978 which was aborted when the CGTP withdrew in deference to the government's call for national unity in the (unlikely) event of a war with Ecuador; and that for January 1979 when the CGTP refused to cooperate fully with the left's call for a strike on the grounds that it might provoke a coup from the extreme right.\textsuperscript{50}

Although the government has occasionally conceded the economic demands of the strikers (as in the case of the SUTEP strike of mid 1978) its normal response has been that of repression; dismissal of striking workers, arrests and deportations of union leaders, and suspension of guarantees. This response is understandable. The present economic crisis does not allow much leeway for concessions. Nevertheless, the government's response throughout has been primarily political. This is undoubtedly a reflection of the style and policies of the government itself, but it is also a response to the high level of politicisation of the trade union leadership at the national level, and it is to this area that we must now turn.

Unions and politics: the central federations.

At the central level unions are highly politicised. Table 9 shows the division between the various central organisations of those unions which are affiliated to such confederations (which does not include all unions, though it does include the largest, and most of the important federations).
Union Affiliations to the Confederation: 1976. %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federation</th>
<th>Industrial Sector</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGTP</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTRP</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No afiliados</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCUSC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X included in CGTP and non-affiliated.

Sources: for the industrial sector, Ministerio de Industria y Turismo; for national figures, SINAMOS. Cited in Sulmont et al. Informe Sindical, p.29.

a. The Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP)

The largest confederation is the CGTP founded in June 1968, and recognised by the government in July 1971. In 1972 it had affiliated 43 federations and 170 unions, an estimated membership of around 400,000 workers. In 1973, four more small federations joined. But there were also desertions of important federations; that of the Pescadores in 1969; SUTEP in 1972 took away most of the teachers from the communist organisation; in 1973 the miners' FNTMMP also left. In spite of these desertions the CGTP retains affiliates in most sectors of the economy, and amongst many regional organisations of labour. Its strength has been clearly shown by recent general strikes in Peru; when the CGTP participates, the strike is successful, when it does not, the strike fails.

Yet one should be careful in identifying in too straightforward a fashion the CGTP and the Peruvian Communist party, or in assuming that the individual unions affiliated to the CGTP are uniformly communist. The Peruvian Communist party is much weaker than was the Chilean party up to 1973. It does not command the same number of disciplined cadres, nor count on the same degree of loyalty from union members. The Peruvian labour force is much less highly politicised and class conscious than, for example that of Chile or Argentina. Whilst this gives an advantage to a small tightly knit group in taking over the direction of the union, it also means that the amount of power or control that that group has is variable. This is seen, for example, in the number of defections from the CGTP, and in the way that the CGTP has been pushed into militant action at the local level, as in the FETIMP strike in 1974, and the strike in Arequipa in the same year.
Left wing analysis possibly exaggerates the tensions inside the CGTP, but there is nevertheless indication that the leadership of the CGTP, in line with Communist party policy, pursues a more conciliatory policy than many of its individual adherents, not all of which are communist-led unions. The left tends to ascribe the continuation in control over the CGTP of conciliatory PCP members to the lack of political development of the Peruvian work force, to their organisational dispersion, and the lack of unity amongst the most advanced sectors of the labour movement.

But the non-Communist left finds it difficult to organise some alternative to the CGTP, which still evokes the powerful tradition of the CGTP of Mariátegui's time. It organises such a large part of the labour force that any attempt to split it would incur the charge of sectarianism, and would be likely to be unsuccessful. Thus most of the extreme left groups opposed the idea of creating the CCUSC as a quinta central, arguing that the correct tactic was to fight inside and outside the CGTP for clasista policies.

The CGTP benefited initially after its rebirth in 1968 from widespread dissatisfaction with the labour policies of the Apra and of Belaúnde's Acción Popular. Many unions felt that they had been used as pawns in the party games practised by those two parties, and were anxious to find a confederation more representative of workers' interests. Thus the bank workers' federation, the FEB, felt that it had been betrayed by the Acción Popular leaders in its great strike of 1964, but that the Aprista leaders who replaced them had done little better. A powerful reason impelling white collar workers into a leftist confederation like the CGTP was the feeling that their social position and salary levels had been reduced to the position of capas medias pauperizadas.

Part of the explanation for the continuing dominance of the CGTP has to lie in the lack of alternatives in the labour movement. The Apristas are discredited, the government created CTRP has little hope of developing a really independent national following, the vaguely Christian Democratic CNT has never had much impact and suffers from the political weakness of the party, and the various left wing groups are very divided and quarrelsome and still hope to reconstitute the CGTP. Yet the elections for the constituent assembly did not show very widespread support for the Communist party. It obtained only 207,612 votes electing 6 members, compared with 433,413 votes and 12 members for the extreme left (and largely trotskyist) FOCEP, and 160,741 votes and 4 members for the maoist UDP. (In comparison the Apra gained 1,241,174 votes and elected 37 members). The power of the CGTP does not therefore rest on the widespread popularity of the Communist party; rather, the power of the party rests on its influence in the labour movement.


The CNT founded and legally recognised in 1971 is of Christian Democratic inspiration. Its origins lie in the Movimiento Sindical Cristiano del Perú (MOSICP), a group of limited
importance in the labour movement, but one whose ideas influenced
the military radicals on labour matters. In July 1969 members of
the Juventud Política of the Christian Democratic party, union
leaders and members of the military government met to discuss
the formation of the CNT as a way of promoting a union movement
sympathetic to the ideas of the progressive military leaders.
But although the CNT was legally recognised only two months
after its founding as a counterweight to the CGTP, the division
in the Christian Democratic party (with the departure of many
members of the Juventud Política) weakened the force of the pro-
ject. And in 1973 the CNT divided into two. Although it still
retains the loyalty of some federations, it has not emerged with
any mass impact. Nevertheless, it still commands a certain
amount of influence through its ideological affinity with the
progressive phase of the Velasco government.

c. The Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú (CTP)

The CTP is the Apra confederation founded in May 1944 and
recognised officially in 1964. Until the development of the
CGTP it was the major political force in the labour movement.
Its major strength lay in the northern provinces, and to a lesser
extent in Lima and Callao. It has never had the same level of
influence in the Acrequía region partly because the labour move-
ment there was shaped by returning miners from Northern Chile,
and by port and railway workers also connected with the Chilean
labour movement, whose ideas and attitudes were much more wor-
king class based than those of the Apra party. The Apristas
were strongest in those sectors of the economy that developed
early in Peru, in the sugar plantations, the copper mines of the
central sierra, amongst textile workers, printing workers, bank
employees, teachers, commercial employees, choferes and so on.
With the development of alternative confederations the Apra lost
many of its former adherents. Amongst the defectors were the
bank employees, the printing workers (Federación Gráfica), the
departmental federation of Ancash, the schoolteachers and the
miners of Centromín. Its peasant affiliate, the FENCAP, also
lost much of its support, and its control in the textile sector
is subject to considerable challenge. It remains strong never-
theless amongst the sugar workers, the choferes and the empleados
particulares.

More clearly even than in the case of the Communist party,
the labour movement attached to the Apra party is subordinated
to the political ends of the overall movement. The new develop-
ment after 1968, is that the labour movement now has a choice.
Before that date it was primarily a question of being with or
against Apra; now there are other alternatives. However, it is
a little too easy to characterise Apra as an opportunistic move-
ment of the depressed petty bourgeoisie, ready to use force when
necessary. Most left wing analysis of Apra (and indeed that of
the military government) tends to adopt such a line of inter-
pretation. But Hugo Blanco provided a more satisfactory inter-
pretation of its support. He stated that,

'...we can't characterise the Apra as fascist.'
Certainly it has fascist tendencies, and it might split into a social democratic wing... and a fascist wing. We have to understand why Apra gained a plurality in the elections. It is the oldest party in Peru, and the best organised. It has the longest tradition of struggle and has suffered the most murders, the most deportations, and the most torture victims. It has been persecuted by many dictatorships.

The Communist party has always called the Apra fascist and has always had a very sectarian attitude. But on many occasions the Communist party has actually stood to the right of Apra. ...And the Apra has suffered more persecution than the Communist party. So this has something to do with the Communist party's great hatred towards the Apra. The rest of the left has inherited the Communist party's anti-Apra prejudices...

The Apra party has a long tradition of using its union movement for political purposes. Apra's political influence with the Bustamante government from 1945 to 1948 allowed it to consolidate its hold over the union movement and to displace the communists. In 1948, the secretary general of the CTP, the textile leader Arturo Sabroso, declared that 'the CTP which has replaced the antiquated theory of the class struggle with a legal nationalistic and democratic orientation more closely conforms to the general reality of our countries.' And he noted proudly that the CTP had declared no strikes during its three years of association with the Bustamante government.

Julio Cotler has argued that Apra's control over labour was crucial in the political project of the Peruvian bourgeoisie in its development up to the coup of 1968. Apra played the indispensable role as intermediary between the dominant sectors and the popular masses. Certainly the Apra exerted its influence in the labour movement to restrain pay claims following the devaluation of 1967 and the subsequent price rise. But the short term advantages of this temporary alliance with the Belaúnde government were eroded as the expected elections were superseded by the 1968 military coup, and labour resentment at the policy of Apra turned into desertions to the newly established CGTP or at least into disaffiliation from the CTP.

Apra has been reduced to its areas of traditional strength. In the metalurgical sector for example the recent development of that industry meant that it escaped the union hegemony of the Apra party, and its young work force has adopted more radical forms of political expression. In Lima itself the Apra never had the support that it aroused in the 'solid' north, partly because the greater opportunities for social and economic advancement in the capital reduced the resentment that fueled the displaced middle sector groups of the north, and partly because the inhabitants of the capital were more open to the general political persuasion and occasional populism of the national
political leaders.65

The military government wanted to woo labour from its commitment to the Apra party, and by encouraging the formation of rival confederations and removing the uniqueness of legal recognition for the CTP, it did encourage unions to secede. Stephens argues that the relatively low number of strikes called by the CTP after 1968 reflects the CTP's low mobilisation and influence potential over organised labour rather than a purposeful strike avoidance policy. In fact the central CTP leadership called several strikes between 1972 and 1976 many of which were very sparingly followed and passed without noticeable effect.65a However, it is far too early to dismiss the CTP's influence. The Apra was careful to keep open its lines of communications to the military government and supported, with reservations, many of its reforms. It did oppose the proposed pensions legislation of 1973; but when the government modified its proposals the CTP was loud in its praise. Perhaps for this reason the Minister of Labour stated that the major problem of the labour movement was the lack of experienced and trained leaders - with the exception of the CTP.66

Although many unions have deserted the Apra, this does not mean that class consciousness had developed to such a level that the populist or paternalist attractions of Apra are irrelevant. On the contrary, the move of Apra back into the centre of the political stage might well coincide with a revival of the fortunes of the party in the union movement, even if not on the same scale as before.67 Apra showed its potential for influence in the 1978 SUTEP strike. When it was clear that the strike was popular and the leaders determined to carry on, Apra threw its weight behind the strike and the government almost immediately capitulated.68

The last major redoubt of the Apra in the manufacturing sector is in the textile industry, for the Apra was instrumental in passing a decree which gave an automatic wage increase in line with the cost of living; and during the convivencia period (1956 to 1962) textile workers also received favourable treatment from the state.69 But when the crisis of the textile industry hit the workers in the 1960's, the Apra leadership concluded agreements which allowed employers to dismiss workers, and many individual unions left the federation, and an alternative left wing Comité de Lucha Textil was created.70 At least a quarter of the textile workers left the Apra federation between 1968 and 1973 to join the CGTP.71

The firmest control that the Apra exercises in the union field is amongst the sugar workers. Apra has always had its major support and organisation in the north, and amongst the workers of the sugar plantations. The military government clearly hoped to erode the influence of the Apra by expropriating the large sugar plantations and turning them into cooperatives.72 The Apra leaders had been in close collaboration with the plantation owners, and indeed the owners supported Apra against possible rivalry by the Communist party amongst the workers.73
But if the government assumed that this indicated Apra unpopularity amongst the sugar workers it was to be proved wrong. The cooperatives were in many cases captured by the former unionists. Many of the leaders of the sugar workers' federation the FTAP became the leaders of the cooperative movement, including the National Central of Sugar Cooperatives (CECOOAP). As Stepan points out, 'instead of the cooperative system becoming, as the government intended, the sole channel for participation of the sugar workers, the Aprista activists have retained all their old structures as well as becoming the major forces within the new cooperative structures' Given the way the government structured power within the cooperatives, giving overwhelming weight to the government appointed technicians and administrators, it was hardly surprising that the workers should think that the maintenance of trade union activity was as necessary as before to defend their interests. As Stepan writes,

'Much of the reason for the intense resistance by the workers to the state's attempt to incorporate them into rigidly chartered institutions was the threat that such incorporation posed to their own ideology and organisation. Intrinsic to the government's vision of the cooperatives was that they were apolitical... The official position eventually became that as the cooperatives assumed all the vital functions of sugar production and management that the unions would wither away. However, before 1968 labour gains had been closely tied to labour unions, most of which were in turn linked to political parties or movements such as the Apristas. Thus in the midst of the state intervention period when the government was making its argument for cooperatives without unions, a poll was taken at one of the cooperatives which showed that 78% of the workers wanted the unions to remain. In addition to the electoral prohibition, trade unionists' anxieties and resistance were heightened by clear indications that members of the state apparatus were trying to hasten the withering away of the unions by removing some of the key institutional supports that the unions had won in their collective bargaining pacts with the haciendas.'

The government's proposals for the cooperatives did not noticeably improve the lot of the seasonal workers who did not enjoy the benefits of union membership. As the cooperative structure was not really intended to democratise labour relations on the sugar plantations, the proposals aroused the hostility of organised labour without gaining the gratitude of the unorganised workers.

Although there are only some 24,000 sugar workers by 1969 (compared with 46,197 in 1940), they control the fate of a key export sector. In certain regions the government recognised the hold of the unions, and in La Libertad, the area of 45% of coastal sugar production, according to Scott, 'the Apra agreed
not to sabotage the CAPs, nor to mobilise the plantation proletariat against the state, so long as party and union members obtained access to power within the CAPs and CECOAAP, and the material living and working conditions of the labour force continued to improve. The military were relatively content with this arrangement which appeared to promise political stability in the industry, and allow the flow of foreign exchange, tax revenues and agrarian debt payments to the State. In this way the sugar CAPs would be paraded as model examples of self-managed enterprises in an economic system that was "neither communist nor capitalist".76

Apra remains the most popular single party in Peru. It is quite possible that in union elections workers vote for left wing candidates, while in national political elections they will cast their vote for the Apra. Apra's strength does not, therefore, lie in its union base as is the case with the Communist party. Its undoubtedly popular following and powerful machine do provide resources, however, that the party can mobilise to maximise its appeal to the labour movement. And its membership of the ORIT and its close association with American trade unionism is useful in providing funds and in training leaders. It is not averse to the use of violence in union matters; and it is not unknown for the Apra bufalos to dislodge union leaders physically from their headquarters, seize the union offices and install a new leadership. While this tactic may bring only short term advantages, its impact should not be minimised in situations where, as at present, Apra's influence with the government is increasing.

d. The Comité de Coordinación y Unificación Sindical Clasista (CCUSC)

The CCUSC was formed in 1974 as an attempt to unify the forces of the 'clasista' left in the union movement. It was not entirely clear whether the CCUSC was intended to displace the CGTP or to renovate it from within. This uncertainty of purpose tended to weaken the CCUSC; but probably more damage was caused by the sectarian attitude and undemocratic tactics of the controlling maoist group associated with the party Patria Roja, and influential amongst the teachers of SUTEP and the miners of Centromin.77

The first assembly of the CCUSC in 1974 appeared to have been reasonably successful (at least a lot more successful than the second). Several federations were represented including the FNTMMP, SUTEP, and Centromin; in total there were delegates from 6 national federations, 6 regional federations, 9 departmental federations, 1 sectoral federation and 129 base unions (of which 77 were affiliated to the CGTP, 2 to the CTP, 1 to the CNT, 3 to the CTRP, and 74 not affiliated). The organisers claimed a rather exaggerated 50% representation of all organised labour.78

The initial spirit of unity was not to last very long. The differing political ideologies and ambitions of the various maoist, trotskyist and marxist groups that came together to form the
CCUSC could not bury their differences for long. The groups were united in their hostility to the government, but could not decide whether it was fascist, semi-fascist or representative of the national bourgeoisie. It was alleged against some groups notably the Patria Roja, that they were confusing the nature of the political party with that of the union, and that by using the unions for activities that were properly those of the party, they were exposing the unions to direct attack by the government and endangering the fragile unity of the union movement.

The second CCUSC congress was marked by undemocratic tactics of the Patria Roja group which awarded itself the lion's share of the delegate places and excluded the Confederacion Campesina del Peru in order to retain its control over the CCUSC.

The result was defections from the organisation and a relapse into the vitriolic bickering that is so strong a feature of the Peruvian left.

However, the fate of CCUSC is more important than an account of its turbulent internal conflict might suggest. It does represent an attempt not just to unite unions, but also to bring into union movements those sectors of the petty bourgeoisie that are organised. It is a tenet of the maoist left especially, that the petty bourgeoisie has a fundamental role to play in the revolution. As one maoist party declared, 'Historical experience shows that the petty bourgeoisie has played a positive role in the revolutions of those countries that have achieved independence and that are constructing socialism'. This emphasis on the role of the middle sectors is one that Apra made its own for so long. In a way the maoist parties are the heirs to the Apra tradition, (though not to the organisational discipline that also characterises the Apra). It was a commonplace of government criticism of the ultra-left that they were simply the shock troops of Apra, wittingly or unwittingly serving Apra's ends. Although this is an exaggeration and does little justice to the hatred of Apra amongst leaders of the left, it is understandable that the government might see a collusion in what was a coincidence of aim - all out opposition to the government.

The most prominent member of the CCUSC is the SUTEP. Schoolteachers organised in SUTEP became a powerful political force in Peru in the 1970s. They occupy an important, if sectarian, position in the union movement. They have been a constant source of troublesome opposition to the military government. ('Here the choice is clear, either the revolution or SUTEP. They want to overthrow the government. Well let them try if they can and take the consequences' President Velasco). They articulate the interests of an important sector of the urban, often provincial, lower middle class, a class that has expanded rapidly during and since the 1960s and whose expansion has been associated with increasing economic and political frustration and resentment. SUTEP, under Maoist control, has turned that resentment into political militancy with revolutionary overtones. SUTEP's growth has to be related to the central importance of education as a political issue in Peru. Education has been a basic means of social mobility, and an important source of employment. One of SUTEP's strengths lies in the widespread
popular support it arouses. The politics of SUTEP is coloured by the peculiarities of the Peruvian left. The Communist party was badly affected firstly by the Sino-Soviet splits of the mid 1960s and then by its uncritical support for the military government from 1968 to 1977. Few of the many leftist groups in Peru attract much support, though the recent elections demonstrate quite impressive strength. But two groups that did make an impact were the Maoist group Patria Roja, amongst the teachers and the miners of Centromin, and the marxist Vanguardia Revolucionaria in rural areas.

Are schoolteachers maoists? Not in any profound ideological sense. The allegiance of schoolteachers to their union leaders is instrumental. For a number of reasons the maoists are seen by the teachers as the best group to fight for redress of their deeply held grievances.

Three factors need emphasis. Firstly, the political history of schoolteachers' unions. At the same time as numbers expanded dramatically, teachers felt that they had been betrayed firstly by the Apra and then by the Communist party. The number of teachers rose from 64,000 in 1958 to 118,000 in 1968. In 1965 Peru was spending 5.1% of its GNP on education (the highest in Latin America). Belaúnde, for political reasons, in the famous law 15215 promised four annual increases of 25%. But only two increases were granted. Many were attracted into the profession but then angered when salaries were frozen. Neither Apra, by then supporting Belaúnde, nor later the Communists, made great efforts to reinstate the promised increases. Indeed in a couple of notable strikes, the teachers felt betrayed by those two parties. Normal schools and university faculties of education were over-producing. They became agents of socialisation for the ultra-left. Their graduates took the initiative in establishing the local organisations that formed the SUTEP in 1972.

Secondly, there was the impact on the teaching profession of the government's proposed educational reform. Whatever the underlying intention of the reform the reaction of the teachers was hostile. The attack on their teaching methods and the insistence on a complete change was an insult to their professional pride. The demand that they should work harder for no extra pay was seen as a further economic injustice, especially as for many teachers the new system would make more difficult the holding of multiple jobs. The stress on ideological indoctrination was unwelcome to a group that did not share that ideology. Teachers objected to the way that the reform was imposed from above without adequate consultation with the teachers themselves. And they viewed, with fully justified cynicism, the fact that the much hated Ministry of Education was, unreformed itself, going to impose the reform. (This touches on a major problem of the Velasco period; how could one expect a civil service formed in one tradition, with ideas and modes of behaviour characteristic of the social and economic structure of Peru before 1968, to adapt to a totally different policy, without its own internal reform?).

At a time when teachers were being arrested, deported and
imprisoned for pursuit of what they felt were legitimate grievances, they could hardly be expected to collaborate in the educational reform.

Thirdly, the explanation of teachers' maoism has to be related to their complex class position. Education is seen as a classic form of social ascent to the middle class from the upper levels of the working class or the better off peasantry, and from small towns to the provincial capital or to Lima itself. Teachers have the social ambition of those who wish to improve their individual status and the social resentment of those who find that crossing that class barrier amounts to rather little in terms of status, income, or power. The militant teachers appear to be the younger ones, not far removed from training (and political socialisation) in the escuelas normales and the faculties of education, and who work in the provincial towns and Lima. The Lima SUTEP appears to be marginally more moderate than SUTEP nationally (and collaborates with the UDP, a tactic rejected by the national SUTEP).

Although SUTEP declarations are written in the language of Maoism, e.g. that Peru is 'semi feudal, neocolonial and in transit towards dependent capitalism', aided of course by the military, there were two major episodes of 'collaboration' with the system, in contrast to numerous instances of conflict at all levels.

Firstly there were the conversations with Velasco in late 1974. The reasons for the conversations were varied: Velasco himself favoured them (though not the Ministry of Education); the teachers saw this as an important way to secure the release of recently arrested leaders; there was rank and file pressure to accept negotiations if this led to salary increases; perhaps the government saw in the teachers the nucleus of a social base for the regime - as Belaunde had done. After all, teachers were numerous, reasonably well organised, with considerable influence locally in areas where the military had reason to feel alarm about social tension, in the Sierra for example and in the pueblos jovenes; and the social origins (and ambitions) of teachers and military men were not so dissimilar. But the gaps were too wide and the talks collapsed.

Secondly, after constantly denouncing the teachers' cooperatives as a shabby facade to preserve capitalism, SUTEP decided to put up candidates for the elections for the management of the cooperatives. Why the change? Firstly SUTEP argued that they could change the system of obligatory contributions by teachers to voluntary ones and so undermine the cooperatives and gain popularity with teachers; secondly, they wanted to demonstrate in open elections - which they did handsomely - that they and not the government's SERP were the true representatives of the teachers. Thirdly, the money was an attraction for the union and for its controlling group Patria Roja. However, as observers predicted (and as the government hoped?) control of the cooperatives was not an unmixed blessing. Squabbling soon broke out over the
use of funds, the union split, accusations of fraud flew around and the government intervened and closed most of them.

By 1977 it seemed that much of SUTEP's impetus was spent. The union was divided, with SUTELM opposing the national leadership. Control over the funds of the cooperatives had been lost. Patria Roja's attempt to create a quinta central, the CCUSC, after a promising start had fallen into the sectarian ways so common on the left and only SUTEP and Centromin remained in CCUSC in belligerent opposition to the rest of the union world. Government repression had led to the imprisonment of many leaders, police infiltration was common, and the union headquarters had been intervened.

The 1978 eight week strike of SUTEP shows that this conclusion was incorrect. Or at least only partially correct. Government repression eased with the election of the constituent assembly. Popular support for teachers, always strong, has proved to be even stronger, with the church and even private schools coming out in support. The recent austerity measures are severe enough to revive militancy not just in SUTEP but also in other repressed labour groups. And the left has taken encouragement from the results of the constituent assembly elections. But the strike does underline points made earlier; that the grievances of the teachers are deeply felt, that they enjoy public sympathy, that they see militant action as the only remedy, and that the maoist groups are, in those circumstances providing the leadership that commands the support of the rank and file.

The other mainstay of the CCUSC are the copper miners of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, nationalised in 1974 and now known as Centromin. The Peruvian mining sector can be divided into a modern and a traditional one. The southern mines are more recent, more technologically advanced, and the workforce is more urban in origin. The mines of Cerro de Pasco are more backward, situated in the bleak and inhospitable sierra, and the origin of many of the miners is rural. The industry is strike ridden. In 1970 there were 71 strikes in mining, accounting for 29% of national strikes and 69% of man hours lost; and of those man hours lost 80% were accounted for by the miners of Centromin.

Centromin employs about 15,000 workers, 85% of whom were classed as manual workers (52% were interior miners). Many of these miners regard themselves as mineros comuneros; that is to say that they have left their peasant communities for a temporary period to make some money and then to return. Over 90% of the miners come from the central sierra provinces and though they stay on average something like 13 years in the enterprise only a few bring their families. One of their first and fiercest battles was to fight against that proposal of the agrarian reform that would have disregarded miners' rights to participate in the new communities set up by the agrarian reform legislation.

For many years, apart from some intermittent explosions of violence they had been a fairly passive labour force, later to
fall under the control of the Apra party. But as Kruijt and Vellinga note 'Apra's power in the labour movement of the Central Peruvian mining sector had been based at the federation level from the very start. The individual affiliated unions did not always follow Apra policy and were only motivated by pragmatic reasons to cooperate with the Aprista federal and central organisations. It would have been much more difficult to conclude successful collective wage agreements outside of Apra controlled channels'. And they add 'none of the political parties and movements...really had very strong roots among the rank and file and the latter were apt to be quite independent in the long run frequently changing allegiance'. With the change of government in 1968 and proposals for nationalisation, with the decline of the Apra, and with a history of independent political affiliations and occasional use of fierce violence, and suffering from miserable living and working conditions, it is not surprising that maoist groups have been able to steer the protests of the miners.

The government has repressed several strikes in this area very brutally. Teachers' strikes may be irritating but they do not hit a crucial export sector. The annoyance of the government with the copper unions is neatly summed up by the following extract from a government report:

'The trade union movement is led by badly educated leaders poisoned by the defects of underdevelopment whose political motives are frequently contrary to the political line developed by the government. Because of this, the trade union rank and file, composed of workers from the very lowest cultural and educational levels of society have supported their leaders who are adopting the traditional politics of class struggle. Their demands are usually irrational and impossible to achieve and they maintain extremist positions which are irreconcilable with the companies. Because of their low level of education ...the workers ignore the fact that a very large increase in their wages, improvements in their working conditions and a shorter working day will not only weaken the mining company, but will cause damage to the state and to all the Peruvian people'.

The miners continue to be a problem to the government. The difference between their behaviour now and in 1968 is that they are much more politicised, better organised and led by political figures of national prominence, who, unlike leaders of the past have not betrayed the rank and file for party ends.

e. The Central de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana (CTRP).

The CTRP was founded in November 1972 and recognised in December 1972. As the CTRP was created by the government such speedy recognition is not so remarkable.

According to the account of Hector Béjar, a former guerrilla
leader who became a SINAMOS functionary, General Velasco, tired of strikes, especially in the mining zones, became convinced that in the same way as the political parties had their union confederation, so the revolution should have its own. However, SINAMOS had a rather different notion of the function of such an organisation than the more conservative views of the Ministries of Labour, Interior and Industry.

'En SINAMOS creíamos que, si no se atacaba a fondo la corrupción del Ministerio de Trabajo, si no se limpiaba las corruptelas del Ministerio del Interior, si no se 'barría' con los notables que 'fungían' de autoridades locales, si no se corregía radicalmente el comportamiento procapitalista de muchos funcionarios del Ministerio de Industria, no se podía esperar que los trabajadores creyesen en la revolución, por más radicales reformas de estructura que ésta emprendiese'.

However the radicals of the Area Laboral of SINAMOS found themselves outmanoeuvred by the more conservative elements. The dominant group became the MLR of General Tantalean with its control over the Federación de Pescadores, a union that had broken away from the control first of the Aprista and then of the Communists, only to fall into the hands of the group of sinister gangsters who controlled the fishing industry. It is also alleged that behind the MLR were a group of trotskists who wanted to involve it in a 'provocative and cynical anti-communism' and young apristas bent on the same end. Moreover the idea of the MLR and the CTRP as an anti-communist force appealed to the intelligence services of the armed forces and indeed to the entrepreneurs.

The CTRP was quickly built up by a number of measures, not all of them scrupulous. Parallel unions were created, leaders were bribed or threatened, existing unions were 'taken over' whether the members wanted it or not. But the CTRP was not able to make much headway amongst the strongholds of organised labour. It was more prominent in smaller firms with little previous experience of union organisation, and in the commercial and business sectors rather than in industry or mining. There was no other union comparable in size or importance to the 30,000 strong Federación de Pescadores.

But the result was not quite what the government expected. The fall of Tantaleán meant the end of the MLR and its control over the FPP, which under new leadership was to resume an independent role and to mount a massive three month strike against the government in 1976. Many unions, once recognised through their affiliation to the CTRP, switched to join the CGTP. The very encouragement given to unions allowed union leaders to take seriously the rhetoric of the government and to act like unions normally do at times of economic crisis. A gap grew between the leadership of the CTRP, imposed by the government loyal to it, and many rank and file unions which were very critical of the
government. The so-called 100 base unions of the CTRP Lima went so far in 1976 as to censure the top leaders for being corrupt and manipulatory. The CTRP Lima has continued its radical line playing an important part in planning and executing the general strike of 1977.

The government hoped to impede the emergence of a politicised union leadership. CTRP leaders could not be reelected; they had to take turns in leadership positions; and they could not be members of any political party. This was intended to preserve the autonomy and encourage the participation of the rank and file, and prevent the leadership from being captured by any one political tendency. But such provisions proved inadequate. The failure of the government was similar to the failure that Stepan described in the pueblos jóvenes. It was too 'political'. The structure may have been adequate, but what benefits were to be provided? Clearly not enough compared with the benefits that could be obtained from free trade union action in association with other groups in the labour movement.

The major attempt at incorporation of the working class took place through the industrial community and it is to this that we must now turn.

The Comunidad Industrial. (CI)

According to the General Industries Law of 1970 all industrial firms with six or more workers, or a gross annual income of more than one million soles, were to form a CI composed of all the permanent employees. The CI was to receive a share of profits to invest in the firm until it reached the level of 50% of shares. The CI also shares increasingly in the management of the enterprise, and there is some distribution of profits to the workers.

The odd thing is that there seems to have been no particular pressure from workers, and certainly not from management for the proposal, though it was consonent with the major political project of the military, emphasising participation without class conflict. The most detailed study of the CI sees it as the direct expression of the ideology of communitarianism of the military, an ideology of petty bourgeois extraction, anti-oligarchical, nationalistic and above the class struggle. It was to be co-gestión, not auto-gestión, according to Velasco. Earlier Velasco had insisted that it was a gradual process that did not imply the disappearance of private enterprise.

There are many ambiguities in the development of the CI, and in the government's attitude. But one thing is clear. They were intended to be instruments of class harmony, and as such were expected to render redundant the functions of the trade unions. But the planned coexistence of managers, white collar workers and manual workers within the CI, and the limitation of the CI to a firm and not to the sector, also indicated the limits of worker self management. Essentially a vertical chain of command would still operate. It did not seem to be considered
initially that the kind of capital-labour harmony proposed was in contradiction to the past history of such relations or that there were good reasons for such conflict generated by the capitalist system of production rather than by the benevolence or malevolence of the entrepreneurs. Another important reason for the development of the CI was that it was seen as an alternative and better mode of capital accumulation, by stimulating the reinvestment of the funds of the CI. But in this respect as well the achievement fell short of the promise.

However, there were very differing opinions inside the government about the role of the CI. SINAMOS in its first flush of enthusiasm saw the CI as the basis for a widespread participacionista movement, and as the basis of solid worker support for the radical line of the government. But SINAMOS still remained concerned that any such development should not be captured by the Communist party and was always alert to the possibility of such 'infiltration'. The Ministry of Industry on the other hand had a much more limited view of the role of the CI and never favoured the idea of a community of CI. The first conference to train CI leaders organised by the MIT was hurriedly cancelled when it was discovered that some of the organisers were urging the participants to take a radical view of their functions, and such leftist elements were quickly expelled.

The reaction of the trade unionists to the CI ranged from cautious suspicion to downright hostility, which was hardly surprising as they were not consulted about an institution which they were informed would render the activities of the unions irrelevant. The left denounced it wholeheartedly, without seeing how the CI might be used for its advantage. The exception was the Communist party which saw that the CI could in fact be used to strengthen unions, and the party urged its unionists to ensure that they extracted maximum benefit from the law. The Apra gave the proposals a mild welcome, praising those parts that seemed consistent with, if not derived from, their own long standing ideas on the merit of class harmony, and decrying those they felt were a copy of an alien, Yugoslav model.

The reaction of the employers was generally hostile. Small businessmen objected to the CI for they felt it would undermine their traditional personal control over their workforce. Large firms might have welcomed in theory and, in practice at first, the potential that the CI offered for coopting the workforce and raising productivity; but when it became clear that the CI would serve as an instrument for the politicisation of the workforce they also opposed it. Alberti reports the result of a survey which shows that where the employers consider that the CI has a positive integrating function the firms are usually small, with personalist social relationships, and a low level of political consciousness and trade union experience on the part of the workforce. Most employers went to great lengths to evade the legislation and to bring pressure, eventually successful, to modify the provisions of the law.
The CI had grown to include an important part of the workforce. By the end of 1974 there were 3,535 CI (with another 253 in the fishing sector, 74 in mining and 52 in telecommunications) comprising 199,070 workers out of a total of 229,537 beneficiaries. They made up 5.9% of the active labour force and contributed 20.8% to the GNP. The CI by the end of 1974 owned 13% of the capital of their sector, and participation in profits accounted for 4.8% of earnings of the workers. But there were considerable discrepancies between the various CI. Those working in profitable enterprises did well; those in less profitable ones not so well. Fewer than half the workers in the CI received benefits in three consecutive years following the establishment of the CI. Temporary workers were excluded from benefits, and inside the enterprise the share in benefits was proportionate to earnings. Durand gives the example of one firm where the two directors each earned cash benefits from the CI twelve times those of the average of the 149 workers. The CI was not an instrument for ensuring social equality. Participation in the running of enterprises was often an illusion, as employers used various devices to keep workers, who anyhow were in a minority, away from real authority.

If the intention of the government was to promote class harmony, it must have been very disappointed. Especially in the large factories, union and CI joined together in a reinforced effort to secure benefits for their members on a wide variety of fronts, some properly those of the unions, others those of the CI. Alberti quotes the leader of one CI:

'Así poco a poco la CI concientiza. Permite ver a la empresa por adentro. Aquí nunca hubo sindicato y por lo que vimos en la CI, lo organizamos...Pero en la CI tratamos de que se dé cuenta de que la lucha no es por la plata, que en esta CI es muy poca. Es de concientización, es para el futuro'

The relationship between union and CI is not altogether uniform. Generally the bigger the enterprise, the more likely there was a strong union that could combine with a CI to produce a higher share of benefits. The CI is most likely to fall under the influence of the union when there is a manual union with a high and uniform level of political commitment. But there are cases where the union is weak and the CI strong, or when the relations between the two are competitive rather than complementary (when for example the CI is captured by a white collar union that espouses a distinct political line from the manual unions). In some cases the CI can act as an intermediary between the union and the enterprise. In general where there was no union existing before, the establishment of the CI has helped to create a union union.

Whatever the variation in the relationship between union, enterprise and CI, overall the employers used the existence of the CI to attack the government, and the unions used the CI as an instrument for confronting the employers. The government acknowledged the failure of the undertaking, and the success of the
employers, by the modifications introduced to the CI law in 1976 (and by virtual abandonment of the plans to overcome the distributive problems of the CI by the establishment of social property enterprises). President Morales Bermudez confessed that the CI idea was theoretically confused, very idealistic and full of good intentions, but not suitable for the Peruvian reality. The CI was abolished in small firms, the maximum shareholding of the CI was reduced to 33%, shares would be held individually and would carry no voting rights. 'The CI became nothing more than a sophisticated profit sharing mechanism, no longer threatening the capitalists' control of production'.

The CI did not remain without national coordination, and in 1973 there was held the first Congress of the Communities (CONACI). But the move did not arise from the spontaneous initiative of the CI. It was an impulse from SINAMOS, which wanted a national organisation to show how successful it was in its tasks of promotion, to demonstrate that participation was possible in the new Peru, and, more radically, to pave the way for a widespread transference of the CI enterprises to the social property sector. CONACI needed SINAMOS, too, in order to guarantee its existence, to finance its activities, and to act as an intermediary with the highest levels of decision taking. SINAMOS adopted, initially at least, a radical posture that was not shared by other sectors of the bureaucracy; the stance of the original members of the area laboral of SINAMOS became known as the opción de la guerrilla burocrática. But it was not an option that was to be open for very long.

The first CONACI congress showed that the members of the CIs wanted to go even further perhaps than the SINAMOS radicals considered advisable. In the declaration of principles of the congress the 'irreplaceable role of the unions was stressed', which was not really what SINAMOS wanted. The MIT was doubly offended by the radical tone of the congress and declared that its activities were purely negative, sectional and showed the influence of the communists. SINAMOS tried to defend the process by pointing to the emergence of a group of new young workers' leaders who could be won over to aid the Peruvian revolution (though this was an even more dangerous development for most sectors of the bureaucracy). Delegates to CONACI did seem to represent a new generation of leaders, many of whom did not have strong political affiliations. At least there were no solid groups of party members identifiable by the uniformity of their voting, although there were undoubtedly a substantial number of CTP delegates representing the textile sector, and CGTP delegates associated with the metallurgical sector, confecciones, and leather workers. But it was also quite clear that a large number of delegates, from the provinces especially, were controlled by SINAMOS, and that radical denunciations of the whole idea of the CI proposed by the SIDERPERU delegation were roundly defeated in the plenary sessions of the congress.

Although many of the declarations of the CONACI were radical sounding, apart from the emphasis on the need for
coordination with the unions they were not out of line with the general stance of the SINAMOS radicals, even in their insistence that the CI did not represent a decisive break with the capitalist system, but could only be regarded as a transitional step on the road to Peruvian socialism. The resolutions of the congress roundly denounced the CTRP as 'la acción divisionista, anarquizante y amarilla de elementos desclasados que con falsos argumentos y seudo teorías pretenden 'reorientar' al movimiento sindical peruano', though as Pasara is careful to point out, few of these resolutions were debated before they were passed, so that it may be misleading to assume that they reflect the general feeling of the delegates.24

The executive body set up by the congress is equally difficult to pin down in political terms. There is what Pasara describes as a vague ex-CTP air about the body, but it identified itself with the postulates of the government and not with any particular union confederation, and it remained financially dependent upon SINAMOS for virtually everything (and SINAMOS used threats to cut off funds if CONACI stepped out of line).25 The emphasis on the continuing need for unions is a sign of communist influence, especially marked in those CI with more than 100 members.

CONACI was not a particularly strong organisation. Stephens notes that 'the lack of participation from the base was the crucial weakness of CONACI from the beginning because it restricted organisational life by and large to leadership activities and made it heavily dependent on interactions between different personalities.'26 There was widespread ignorance about CI legislation even amongst the leaders of important federations. The problem facing the government organisers at first was not so much opposition as indifference.

Yet the government was forced to divide the CONACI in an attempt to reestablish control. How did this come about? The problem was partly that SINAMOS did its work too well. The radicals of that organisation were taken seriously by the leaders of CONACI and that organisation began to press for the implementation of policies that the government, by now moving to the right, began to find unacceptable. SINAMOS conceived its task as that of creating base organisations that would bring pressure to bear upon the government; unfortunately the government decided to resist such pressures. And the government was seriously worried by those enterprises going into bankruptcy that were taken over by their workers to demand incorporation into the social property sector; a process that was promoted by SINAMOS, and that to right wing government bureaucrats looked too reminiscent of the tomas de empresa of Allende's Chile.27

The government, having by now rid SINAMOS of José Luis Alvarado and his radicals in the área laboral, set up a Comisión Reorganizadora of CONACI, which contained a majority of CIs but because they were the smaller and weaker ones, more subject to government influence, only a minority of members of the CIs.
The effort was not successful. According to Thorndike CR CONACI disintegrated amidst the indifference if not the relief of the working class, and to face the MIT proposed the reuni-
ification of the two CONACI. Yet the main CONACI did not ex-
press opposition to the government; if anything it tended to re-
emphasise its loyalties to the original objectives of the govern-
ment, and though it spent much time on internal squabbles with
the CR CONACI, in public it tended to ignore it.

Although the two CONACIs re-united, the influence of the
movement declined. It was always dependent upon the government,
and although the government did not succeed in making CONACI the
basis of support amongst the working class, neither could CONACI
with all its structural, financial and organisational limitations,
really hope to achieve any independent autonomous existence as an
instrument of the working class struggle. Nevertheless at the
local level the effect of the CI reform has been to strengthen
worker organisation and to encourage trade union action, even if
the modifications to the CI law means that the community can no
longer hope to control the enterprise.

Conclusions: the military and the labour movement.

The military government miscalculated in its treatment of
organised labour. The Plan Inca's statement about unions captures
both the disdain that the military felt towards organised labour,
and the authoritarian tone of its proposed reforms; it attacked
'politicised unionism with corrupt leadership' and stated that
'reorganisation of the union system (was needed) for the benefit
of the workers themselves.' State control over labour was no
invention of the military government. General Odría created a
modern Ministry of Labour and developed a divisionist and patern-
alist policy, aided by extensive use of police infiltration and
repression (though he, too, had to face massive worker protest in,
for example, Arequipa). But the attempt at cooptation and
coercion was taken much further under the military governments
since 1968.

The miscalculation towards labour is only one of a series
of miscalculations as Peru is in the grip of one of its most
severe economic and political crises. But the effect of labour
hostility towards the government was not merely of secondary im-
portance. As Rosemary Thorp writes, 'The IMF's negotiations with
Peru...have tended to emphasise the relationship between exchange
rate, confidence and short term capital, while the underlying
thinking of the Fund is clearly that a healthy undistorted economy
will attract long term capital. Unfortunately it appears that in
the Peruvian context capital movements, both long term and short
term, are related far more closely to more intangible variables
of confidence in internal policy making, and issue such as the
Comunidad Laboral. Given this, the atmosphere of strikes and po-
litical uncertainty at least partly associated with the stabilis-
ation effort was such as to make sure that movements on private
capital account would not be favourable'.

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The failure of the attempt to incorporate labour has to be situated in the context of the definition given to participation by the regime. The military wanted participation and mobilisation on its terms, not on those of the participants. It mistrusted any mobilisation that it did not directly control, even those that sprang up almost spontaneously in defence of the government as after the riots of 1975. Stepan points out that in all the new ideas expressed by the military in their writings before the coup, the idea of participation was conspicuous by its absence, and when they did turn their attention to the theme, there was very considerable variation in the meaning they gave to the idea in practice as can be seen, for example, in the differing ideas of SINAMOS and the MIT towards the organisation of the CI. As George Philip writes:

'It would be necessary to grant the new organisation (that is, one organised to mobilise support for the regime) enough influence to induce independent civilians to associate themselves with it, but at the same time it could not be allowed to escape military control. Moreover it had to act in a way that was compatible with other government objectives - it could not be permitted to engage in strikes against government owned enterprises or agitate against government policy. Finally it needed to be strong enough to compete successfully with its other potential rivals - the Apristas, the Communists and the parties of the far left. As it turned out these requirements could not be met.'

There was a world of difference between the ideas on participation expressed by General Leonidas Rodríguez, for example, and those of General Tantaleán.

The military failed to coopt or eventually to coerce the labour movement for various reasons. The policy of the military was not clear; it was ambiguous about the role of unions in the new society. Some leaders wanted to work with labour, others to control it in a strict vertical line of command. The military government did however stimulate the growth of labour organisations, but in the absence of economic inducements of the right sort, this growth turned into a source of extra hostility to the government rather than a source of support. The government failed particularly badly in its handling of public sector unions, especially the schoolteachers. Although the peasantry had their agrarian reform, urban labour the CI, and the shanty town dwellers their pueblo joven organisations, the petty-bourgeois civil servants were offered very little, apart from an educational reform about which they had not been consulted and which they did not like.

The very weakness and dispersion of the movement made it more difficult to control. The multiplicity of confederations, regional and provincial organisations, sectoral federations and multiple plant unions meant that power in the union movement was
very diffuse and therefore not so easy to manipulate. Co-optation, through the CTRP, did succeed initially with some of the smaller unions especially in commerce and services, but even that proved to be a temporary gain. The government was not prepared to be tough enough with entrepreneurs to gain the support of labour; it wanted the collaboration of both to build a new moral order. Apart from the historically dubious validity of such an alliance, the economic crisis that hit Peru after 1974 never allowed the government enough room to manoeuvre.

And yet it is difficult to withhold respect from a government which however disastrously it may have ended, did at least start with the intention of improving the welfare and dignity of a notoriously poor and oppressed people. So perhaps it is appropriate to end with some words of General Velasco, words that seem sadly ironical today but that in their time promised generosity and hope.  

For Velasco, the revolution in Peru, 'had as its end the construction in our country of a social democracy of full participation, that is to say, a system based on a moral order of solidarity, not individualism; on an economy fundamentally self-managing, in which the means of production are predominantly social property; and on a political order where the decision making power far from being monopolised by the political and economic oligarchies is grounded in social, economic and political institutions directed, without intermediation or with a minimum of it, by the men and women that form them.'

2. It should be made clear at the outset that any general analysis of the Peruvian labour movement must be heavily indebted to the writings of Denis Sulmont and to the research he has inspired at the Taller de Estudios Urbanos Industriales at the Catholic University in Lima. His two books on the labour movement are *El Movimiento Obrero en el Perú, 1900-1956*, (Lima, 1975); and *Historia del Movimiento Obrero Peruano, 1890-1977* (Lima, 1977). I am very grateful to Professor Sulmont for the help he gave me in Lima.

3. The public schoolteachers, organised in the Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educación Peruana, (SUTEP) is probably the most consistently militant union in Peru since its formation in 1972. There is relatively little on the politics of SUTEP apart from an excellent thesis at the Catholic University by Julio Calderón Cockburn, *El Movimiento Social del Magisterio Peruano 1956-1975*, (Lima, 1976); and an as yet unpublished manuscript by the author of this paper, *Classroom Maoists: the Politics of Peruvian Schoolteachers*, (1978). I would like to take this opportunity of thanking Julio Calderón of DESCO for his kind and considerable help with my research.

4. For a different and positive evaluation of the Velasco government, see the journal *Socialismo y Participación*, published by a group of civilian 'radicals' who worked for that government...'contra lo que se afirma ahora, la revolución peruana no fue exclusivamente un movimiento militar. Tras sus banderas concurrimos vastos sectores populares, campesinos, trabajadores, industriales, habitantes de pueblos jóvenes, intelectuales, profesionales y técnicos. Por tanto la revolución peruana fue la expresión de un movimiento nacional dirigido por las Fuerzas Armadas.' 'Hacia una izquierda socialista, nacional y popular', *Socialismo y Participación*, no. 1, October 1977, p.7.
5. Alfred Stepan devotes a chapter of his The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton, 1978) to the military government's attempt to organise the pueblos jovenes. He argues that the approach of the state has been political - 'channeling of squatters into organisations that allow the state simultaneously to control the situation and respond to some of the squatters' demands relating to their squatter environment. However, this co-optive sectoral approach has not been directly linked to the basic question of creating jobs for new squatters, and the 1973 report shows unemployment in the Pueblos Jovenes had increased.' (p. 186). Stepan's book is essential for understanding the relationship between the government and society in this period.


12. He argues that the 'crucial reason is the nature of the labour processes in which the industrial park workers found themselves. The unity arising out of the cumulative experience of the workers in this highly capitalised, high technology industrial park provided the base for the construction of the FTPA (an 'ultra-left' federation) as the radical response to the policies of the CGTP' Nigel Haworth, Some Notes on the Impact of Changing Industrial Structure on the

14. Ministerio de Trabajo, Situación Ocupacional del Perú: Informe 1975, (Lima, 1976), Part 1, p.1. Underemployment is defined principally by relation to the level of income; anyone earning less than one minimum wage is so defined.

15. Richard Webb, The Distribution of Income in Peru, (Discussion paper 26, Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs, Princeton University, 1972) p.5. The lower half of the national income distribution misses out almost all white collar workers and almost half of the modern sector.


23. This is by no means an exhaustive list. There are powerful federations in other sectors - textiles and choferes for instance. Moreover there are parallel federations of rivalling political affiliations in many sectors. A list can be found in Sulmont et al. Informe Sindical.


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26. Even for the Apra's CTP, W.F. Whyte writes that, 'Finances are a constant problem for the CTP and for its constituent federal unions. The checkoff of union dues is rarely found, and much effort is expended in collecting the minimum funds necessary to keep the unions alive. The local union receives little help from the federation office.' 'Common Management Strategies in Industrial Relations in Peru' in W. Form and A. Blum eds., Industrial Relations and Social Change in Latin America (Florida, 1965), p.50. Another example of union poverty is that of the metal workers' federation FETIMP which at one stage was reduced to holding its meetings in the homes of its executive members. Giovanni Bonfiglio, Antecedentes históricos del movimiento sindical metalúrgico en el Perú (Taller de Estudios Urbanos Industriales, Catholic University, Lima) 1976, p.27.

27. Chaplin points out that a prominent feature of labour law in Peru is the lack of a principle of precedence. 'Each case is in effect unique. The outcome of administrative and most judicial decisions is thus completely 'political' ... In addition, the enforcement by labor inspectors of protective laws is reputedly very corrupt...', op. cit., p.80.

28. Sulmont, Dinámica, p.76.

29. Such as the provisions that three-quarters of all workers affected must vote in favour of strike action, and that names, addresses and identity cards of all workers participating in the strike must be sent to the Ministry of Labour by the union. E. Dore and J. Weeks, 'The intensification of the assault against the working class' in revolutionary Peru', Latin American Perspectives, No. 2, 1976, p.70.


31. These arguments are outlined in Roberto Abusada-Salah, 'Políticas de industrialización en el Perú', Economía (Lima) vol. 1, no. 1, 1977, pp.16-17.

32. See the attack on the decree in Nuevo atropello contra estabilidad laboral (Ediciones Labor, Lima, 1977), pp.16-19.

33. Ibid., p.7.

34. Stephens, op. cit., Ch. 6, p.4.

35. Rosemary Thorp op. cit., p.48 quotes slightly different figures, based on Ministry of Labour estimates for enterprises in Lima with 10 or more employees. These show wages at 76 in 1970, rising to 100 in 1973 and falling to 79 in 1977; and salaries at 86 in 1970 rising to 100 in 1973 and falling to 65 in 1977.
36. This does not imply that violence was a recent innovation in Peruvian labour relations. Recall the opening words of James Payne, Labor and Politics in Peru (Yale, 1965): 'To understand the labor movement in Peru one must grasp the significance of violence. In the Peruvian context violence is not simply a peripheral phenomenon... (it is) a political weapon.' p.3.

37. Stephens, op. cit., Ch. 6, p.7.

38. Ibid., Ch. 6, p.7.

39. La Prensa, 6 May, 1977, citing a Ministry of Labour study.

40. Stephens, Ch. 5, p.1.

41. There is a brief account of these two episodes in La Historia de los Paros Nacionales en el Perú (Ediciones Labor, Lima 1977), pp.64-72.

42. César Germana, 'La situación de la industria manufacturera y la lucha de clases', Sociedad y Política, No. 6, March 1976, p.19.

43. This is the argument of Aníbal Quijano, in 'La coyuntura política', Sociedad y Política, No. 4, 1973, p.21.

44. Quijano, Las nuevas condiciones, Sociedad y Política, May 1977, p.7. It is interesting to note that a central actor in the conflict was the Comunidad Laboral of the firm Manufacturas Nylon, whose dismissal of workers on strike sparked off the conflict. Sulmont, Historia, p.295.


46. 'Unfortunately these kinds of formations have arisen only conjunctually: they haven't become permanent. Of course we seek to extend this kind of organisation wherever it is possible to do so. But it is not realistic for example to call for such a formation in Lima as an immediate task right now. We raise the idea in a propagandistic way and we also try to see that when these assemblies spring up they become permanent and don't simply dissolve. In any case, I think these formations have played a big educational role. We point to them as examples to explain what kind of government we think should be set up.' 'Interview with Hugo Blanco', Intercontinental Press, 4 September 1978, p.986.

47. See the interview with a CTRP Lima official in El Socialista, No. 9, August 1977, pp.3-4.
48. 'Movilización de masas y fin del mito de nuestro izquierda'
   Prensa Roja, No. 6, 1977, pp.3-4.

49. See the article by Francisco Landa, 'Sesenta días de experiencia: del 19 de julio al 20 de setiembre' in Marka, 27
   October, 1977, p.18. For a general account of the strike see Desco, Informativo Político, July 1977; and the Latin
   America Political Report, 19 August 1977. See also the pamphlet issued by the Confederación Campesina del Perú,
   Balance del paro nacional unitario de todo el pueblo contra la dictadura militar, (Lima, 1977) which notes a low
   level of campesino participation in the strike.

   The article comments that, 'the mutual hostility of the organisations involved led to poor planning and coordi-
   nation, and a series of tactical errors. The far left's belief that a popular insurrection was on the cards led them to
   neglect organisational work and to indulge in fruitless debates about whether or not to summon a people's
   national assembly to pick up the pieces.' However a general strike called in May 1978 was more successful - largely
   because of cooperation from the CGTP. The strike followed days of mounting provincial protest in which at least 12
   people were killed. In Arequipa the strike lasted for 8 days. Latin America Political Report, 26 May 1978.

51. Henry Pease and Olga Verme, Perú 1968-1973, Cronología Polí-
   tica. Tomo 1. (Desco, Lima 1974) p. XLVII. The disaffili-
   ation of the FNTMMP - which organises some 45,000 miners mostly from the southern works of Toquepala and Marcona -
   was seen as a particularly significant loss to the CGTP. Sociedad y Política, No. 3, May 1973, pp.34-5.

52. Quijano, 'La 'segunda fase'', Sociedad y Política, November
   1975, p.8.

53. Aníbal Quijano, 'Las nuevas condiciones de la lucha de clases en el Perú', Sociedad y Política, No. 7, May 1977,
   p.3.

54. 'Las tareas de la centralización clasista y el CCUSC', So-
   ciedad y Política, (Supplement, April 1976), p.10.

55. 'Informe sobre la Primera Asamblea Sindical Nacional Clasi-

56. On the politics of the bank clerks see Enrique Rodríguez
   Doig, Intereses y planes de los trabajadores de la banca,
   (Taller de Estudios Urbanos-Industriales, Catholic Universi-
   ty, Lima) 1975, and Vittorio Scherone et al. Los empleados
   bancarios en el Perú (Taller de Estudios Urbanos-Industri-
   ales, 1974). The class feelings of the bank employees is
   summed up by their then leader José Luis Alvarado, 'Los ban-
   carios no pertenecemos, estrictamente a la clase proletaria.
Nuestra ubicación en la estructura social como la de toda la empleocracia es la de clases medias. Pero somos capas medias pauperizadas. El sueldo que recibimos es equivalente al salario que reciben los obreros. En consecuencia nuestras perspectivas de reivindicaciones inmediatas y nuestras perspectivas históricas, coinciden con las de las grandes masas desposeídas del proletariado y de todos los trabajadores del país. Somos, como se ha dicho, los proletarios de cuello y corbata.' Quoted in Sulmont, Historia, p.137. For an account of the 1968 strike see Jaime Castro Contreras and Jesus Higinio Calonge, Política y huelga bancaria, (Lima 1973).


60. Interview with Hugo Blanco, p.984


62. Julio Cotler, Clases, Estado y Nación en el Perú (Lima 1968). p.339. 'El Apra y la CTP se dedicaron entonces a encapsular y corporativizar el movimiento obrero y en general las demandas populares, favoreciendo segmentariamente a los sectores urbanos capaces de organizarse y presionar efectivamente a los propietarios'.

63. Pedro-Pablo Kuczinski, Peruvian Democracy under Economic Stress, (Princeton 1977) p.184-5. Kuczinski writes that 'The CTP had in the mid-sixties about 250,000 to 300,000 members, or 35-40% of the Peruvian labour force in mining manufacturing, public utilities and transportation. Its membership was about three-quarters of the trade union membership of the country.'

64. Bonfiglio, p.20.

65. Liisa North, Orígenes y crecimiento del partido Aprista y el cambio socio-económico en el Perú (Taller de Estudios Políticos, Catholic University, Lima) n.d., p.37.

65a. Stephens, op. cit., Ch.6, p.10.

Stepan quotes a lawyer who drafted the law on elections to the leadership of the cooperatives - a law which restricted candidates with previous trade union experience - as saying that 'the fundamental reason for the restrictions was to prevent the cooperatives from falling into the hands of A- pra, which was both a traditional enemy of the army and was seen by the army as a group in alliance with rightist forces who wanted the agrarian reform to fail...The restrictions were not against participation as such, but against participation by anti-revolutionary forces...' op. cit., p.201.

Christopher Scott writes of the relationship as one of 'open class collaboration. The union did not fight the unemployment provoked by the field mechanisation in Casa Grande. On the contrary, the financial incentive scheme for voluntary retirement from the plantation put forward by the employers was actively canvassed by top union officials who received a cut for each worker they persuaded to resign.' The Labour Process, Class Conflict and Politics in the Peruvian Sugar Industry, unpublished ms. 1977, pp.11-12.

For a typical attack on the CCUSC from a left standpoint see the article, 'ANSC: duro golpe a la unidad clasista' in Punto de Vista: Informativo Popular, June 1976, No. 15, pp.15-25. See also 'Las tareas', Sociedad y Política, April, 1976, p.16.

'CCUSC: 1 Asamblea Sindical Nacional', Crítica Marxista-Leninista, No. 9, February, 1974, pp.100-1.

Reynaldo Arana Montanez, La Teorfa del Sindicalismo Clasista y Las Tareas del Movimiento Obrero Actual, (Lima, 1975) p.6.

esencia que se oponen a la lucha de masas, han debido recurrir con mayor fuerza a su débil tabla de salvación: el revolucionarismo sindicalismo. Con este estruendo quieren aparecer como de izquierda, como que canalizan la lucha de las masas contra el imperialismo y el reformismo y el revisionismo. Por ello rompen el carácter de frente único de los sindicatos y organismos sindicales de coordinación como el CCUSC y, al estar en minoría y repudiados por amplios sectores de masas y dirigentes, recurren a la imposición burocrática y al divisionismo hegemónico así como a bravucónadas aventureras.' p.25.


82. Bandera Roja, 'La situación política y las tareas del P.C.P' V. Conferencia Nacional, November 1965, p.60.

83. This criticism recurs frequently in Hector Béjar, La Revolución en Trampa, (Lima 1977). 'En nuestros países, el ultraizquierdismo' que señala como fascistas a los proyectos revolucionarios cuando no son dirigidos por él, que evade la realidad en nombre del esquema y reemplaza la acción por las palabras, que siembra permanentemente la división entre las fuerzas progresistas, que se consume en sus propios odios y pugnas de ambición personal, que no vacila en unirse a la derecha para combatir a la izquierda, no es una enfermedad infantil, sino parte de las viejas deformaciones psicológicas y políticas que son consecuencia de nuestro sub-desarrollo. No son sólo el imperialismo y la oligarquía los enemigos de nuestras revoluciones. Lo es también la irracionalidad y la ceguera política.' p.246.

84. This section is a very brief summary of my manuscript on SUTEP. I have omitted all the usual footnotes and references for the sake of brevity.


86. Sulmont, Dinámica, pp.7-8.
87. Laite, op. cit., p.17.
88. Morello Galli, p.86.
89. Ibid., p.102.


92. For a recent report of labour unrest in the mines see the Latin America Economic Report, 15 September 1978. The secretary general of the FNTMMP and its legal adviser are both constituent assembly representatives for the UDP.

93. Béjar, op. cit., p.70

94. Ibid., p.71.

95. On the Federación de Pescadores see, Balance, enseñanzas, y conclusiones políticas de la gran huelga general del proletariado anchovetero en Octubre-Diciembre 1976 (Ediciones Labor, Lima, 1977); on the MRL see Thorndike, No, Mi General.

96. Béjar, op. cit., p.93. Béjar's explanation of the role of the CTRP relies partly on the naivety rather than the malevolence of the military. He accuses the military of confusing ends and means. The end - an independent union confederation - is acceptable, but that end was distorted by the corrupt means used to operate in the labour field.


98. Ibid., p.16. 'A successful effort was made to marginalise the Lima bases from the first ordinary congress in May 1976. This Congress was again subject to strong SINAMOS influence and a new docile leadership is incapable of organizing and holding a union movement together. The little success they have had at all has to be attributed to the material and organizational support supplied by SINAMOS.'

99. Sulmont, Dinámica, p.81. At a national level, there was to be a structure paralleling that of the organisation of the Ministries - a clear attempt to establish a functional dependence of the union on the corresponding ministry.

100. There is not enough space to describe the activities of such coordinating bodies as the Comando Unitario de Lucha, set up to organise the 1977 strike; or the Consejo Unitario de Organizaciones Sindicales formed in 1976 to defend the Ley de Empleo Laboral and to support the radical group in the government; or the Comité Pro-Amnistía Político Laboral (COPAPOL). I have also had to neglect the Confederación Campesina del Perú (CCP) founded in 1947 and reorganised in 1974; and the Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA) created by the military government.


4. Stepan (pp.120-121) quotes the director-general of the Labour Communities Department of the Ministry of Industry 'We want to create structures that do not produce confrontation. We want to reach a point where labour understands that to have a strike will be to strike against themselves. In the not too distant future I think the labour union tradition will decline, but this can only happen if the management tradition of conflict with the workers also disappears.'


7. For a range of quotations from different sectors of the left see Pasara et al., *Dinámica*, pp.96-123.


10. Stephens reports a survey which showed that after 5 years of existence only 42% of the CI had been receiving all three types of benefits (10% in cash, 15% in ownership and representation on the board of directors) whereas 26% had been receiving no more than one of these benefits (general cash participation in profits), op. cit., Ch. 4, p.11.

11. Alberti et al., p.15.


13. Ibid., p.65.

14. Pasara et al., op. cit., pp.31-2. One board of directors for example conducted its proceedings in German!
15. Alberti et al., op. cit., p.300.

16. Stephens, op. cit., Ch. 4, p.6, '75% of enterprises with more than 500 workers had a union established before 1970, as compared with only 4% of enterprises with 20-49 workers'

17. Alberti et al. provide a full discussion of the varying relations between union and CI.


20. Ferner, op. cit., p.53. See Stepan (op. cit., pp.276-7) who draws attention to the revisions of the law affecting the CI in foreign enterprises.

21. Alberti et al., op. cit., p.149.


23. Pásara et al., op. cit., p.216.

24. Ibid., p.222.

25. Ibid., p.197 and 241.


27. Alberti et al., p.156.


29. Quoted in Stephens, op. cit., Ch. 5, p.3. For an officially approved attack on existing union movements and a statement of the theory of the new unionism (convincing in neither aspect) see Hector Huanay, El Sindicalismo y La Revolución Peruana (SINAMOS, 1974).


32. On that episode see Pease, Ocaso, p.142.


34. Philip, op. cit., p.127. Stepan points to the dilemmas facing SINAMOS. It could not function as a monist party capable of recruiting permanent cadres close to the base (as in a system such as China) nor could it work out flexible patron-client relationships with strategically placed brokers throughout the political system (as in Mexico).
Again, because it was a sponsored bureaucratic organisation and not a political party, SINAMOS's mobilisation efforts were constantly supervised and constrained and frequently checked or altered by the national military government and for regional military commanders.' Op. cit., pp.314-5.


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