"Latter-day civilization", argued Eric Walker in 1930, "has only been proceeding for sixty years; it has not, it could not hope to have, obliterated the deep marks which frontier conditions had impressed on European South Africa throughout two long centuries." (1) In some form or other, this sort of hypothesis is a persistent one in South African thought. "Mr. Vorster probably spoke for many", editorialized the Rand Daily Mail in 1970, "when he said some time ago that South Africa would never become a welfare state because it undermined a man's character if things were done for him. This is the philosophy of the frontierman ..." (2)

"Twenty-five years after the landing of van Riebeeck", so the thesis goes, "a cattle and hunting frontier had already come into existence. The sons of the first generation of free burghers [the settlers established by the Dutch East India Company in 1658 to cultivate crops more expeditiously than the Company could itself do] became, some of them, genuine frontiersmen." (3) Isolated from Cape Town, isolated from Europe, isolated from government, isolated from markets, isolated from the influences of "civilization", isolated from each other, they evolved a new way of life. The "far-wandering vee-boer", the "trekking Boer" thus brought into existence has, it is argued, been "the most active maker of South African history": he "was to determine the form of the South African society to be". (4) Threatened in the nineteenth century by the "social revolution" (5) instituted in the Cape Colony by the British regime, the frontiersmen fled further into the South African interior. This movement, the Great Trek, was "the central event in South African history"; "all that had gone before led up to that; most of what has happened since has been a commentary on it". (6) In the Transvaal at least, and, it is sometimes argued, in the Orange Free State and Natal as well, the frontier tradition was perpetuated. (7) The Conventions signed by the British with the Trekker Republics in 1852 and 1854 "made it possible for Transvaal attitudes and policies to dominate a far larger area of Southern Africa and thereby radically influenced future history". (8) And, with the growing integration and economic development of South Africa, the frontier tradition returned to spread its spell and its hegemony over all South Africa: "the habits of mind of the Trekkers ... in the course of time, flowed back into the Colony whence they had come, setting the stamp of their thought upon the whole of South Africa." (9) Or,
the Union Constitution, in native policy at all events, represented the triumph of the frontier, and into the hands of the frontier was delivered the future of the native peoples. It was the conviction of the frontier that the foundations of society were race and the privileges of race. (10)

It is, indeed, the influence of the frontier on racial attitudes which has been its most persistently argued effect: the frontiersman regarded the non-white only as a servant or enemy. It was the frontier tradition which was responsible for the job colour-bar in industry, for opposition to African urbanization, for opposition to the common non-racial but qualified Cape franchise, for hostility to African "squatters". But this question interwove with others. The frontier tradition was individual and anarchic, suspicious of and hostile to the authority of government: it explained the anti-war rebellions of 1914, the Rand Revolt of 1922, and the performance of Afrikaner nationalists in opposition or in power. (11) It was associated with an acute and restless land-hunger, a wasteful attitude to land: "inherited from the days of unlimited space" (12), it inhibited Afrikaners from the practice of intensive agriculture which, with their disdain for "Kaffir-work", made more difficult their transition to the new South Africa of industry and land-shortage. Moreover, the very land-hunger of these frontiersmen, their indifference to African land-rights and land needs, had deprived non-whites of the possibility of subsistence on the land and made inevitable that economic integration which the frontiersmen were now resisting. Frontier conservatism, moreover, aggravated all these questions and made more difficult the ending of frontier influence.

Thus baldly summarized - and perhaps even caricatured - the argument might not be supported by any who have written of the frontier tradition. Qualifications are usually made, other factors introduced as explanations. Moreover, the limits of the frontier tradition expand and contract with the argument and the author. Sometimes - particularly with respect to land-hunger - it extended to all colonists. "It is a tradition that plays its part wherever advanced and backward races come into contact with each other ... For the British settlers in the Eastern Province of the Cape Colony and in Natal, to go no farther afield, soon learnt the rules of the game that all men of Western civilisation have played... in touch with tribal natives whose land and labour are desirable." (13) As such, the frontier process was "the gradual subjugation of uncivilised native peoples and the absorption of their lands ... by the remorseless advance of white agricultural colonisation". (14) It was only missionaries and officials - and other men who had "learnt to value reason as a check on the emotions" (15) - who opposed themselves to this process. Eric Walker, W. M. Macmillan and C. W. de Kiewiet set out to rescue missionaries and officials from the onslaughts of G. McCall Theal and George Cory, historians with the "frontier point of view".

The story of the nineteenth century, said de Kiewiet, was not of "the struggle for settlers for self-expression against a
"Latter-day civilization", argued Eric Walker in 1930, "has only been proceeding for sixty years; it has not, it could not hope to have, obliterated the deep marks which frontier conditions had impressed on European South Africa throughout two long centuries." (1) In some form or other, this sort of hypothesis is a persistent one in South African thought. "Mr. Vorster probably spoke for many", editorialized the Rand Daily Mail in 1970, "when he said some time ago that South Africa would never become a welfare state because it undermined a man's character if things were done for him. This is the philosophy of the frontiersman ..." (2)

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misunderstanding and interfering Home Government", but of the contact between white and black in which the British government, though penurious, overly pragmatic and indecisive, had nevertheless sought to protect African rights and African land. (16) In two influential books Macmillan strove to rescue the reputation of John Philip; far from being an idealistic and meddling political missionary, he argued, Philip was a statesman whose policies of "protective segregation", practised towards the Cape Coloured and comparatively successful, could have alleviated the problem of South Africa's twentieth-century "Colour Problem". (17)

Sometimes, however, the frontier tradition was more confined in its influence. It was restricted to Transvaalers - or to the inhabitants of the Republics - or to Afrikaneers alone. "The development of a separate South African racial policy", wrote W. K. Hancock,

can be regarded from three points of view. It can be looked upon as the progressive 'elimination of the imperial factor', or as a victory of the northern provinces over the liberal Cape, or as the outcome of an inner struggle which was, and is, being fought out everywhere in South Africa - not merely between north and south, or between Britons and Boers, but inside the two European communities. (18)

Hence the alternative tradition could be found not merely in missionaries and officials but in colonists as well. Here a number of strands of thought can be traced. At first there was the notion of those who had "learnt to value reason as a check on their emotions", the "less highly-strung", those who did not follow "their instincts rather than their intelligence". (19) British rule at the Cape, it was the implication, had fostered among some at least of Cape citizens a sensible and moderate approach to racial questions and politics in general. Eric Walker's two subjects for biography are significant: Lord de Villiers who, with his "central and detached position", was able to see all sides of a question: "I would ask any reader, especially any South African reader ... to read that statement into every page." (20) And W. P. Schreiner, who underwent "a process of conversion [the word is his own]" on matters of race: "that is a pilgrim's progress less rare in South Africa than many would have us believe nowadays." (21) As Lewis Gam has pointed out, this argument is based on a philosophy which postulates that there is a necessary, underlying harmony, a sort of 'invisible hand' making for good. All conflicts are ultimately due to misconception of interest. Provided certain economic, social and political institutions, founded in reason itself, can be enforced, and provided men can be made to realise their 'true' interests, universal happiness must result. (22)
More recently the philosophy of Cape liberalism has been rooted in the western Cape (or Cape Town) of the eighteenth century: the atmosphere of town and port created greater fluidity, greater
tolerance and benevolence, and this "Cape paternalism" became, "with
an injection of British nineteenth-century humanitarianism", Cape
liberalism. (23)

Hence the "frontier tradition" thesis imposed a dichotomy -
sometimes the dichotomy of missionaries and officials versus
colonists, sometimes of Afrikaner nationalists against their (largely
British) opponents, sometimes of Cape Liberalism against Republican
frontierism. More recently, I would argue, the "frontier tradition"
argument has interwoven with the hypothesis of the "political
factor": that South African economic development has been plagued
by the interference with the "logic of the market" in the pursuit of
ideological goals. Here it is the industrialist, the capitalist,
the entrepreneur, who finds himself opposing the forces of the
frontier. But the "logic of the market", as several recent papers
have suggested, is as much a specious abstraction as the necessary
underlying harmony of interest which Gunn argued has been the
assumption of South African liberal historians. The very existence
of these several dichotomies suggests that the situation is rather
more complex. It suggests, indeed, that we should pay much closer
attention to "the frontier" itself: What is the frontier, what are
its specific influences, and how does it produce and perpetuate
them - if indeed it does at all? I propose to do this with respect
to two important aspects - race and land.

Race and Class

The origins, nature and significance of white racism have
been receiving a great deal of attention in recent years. The
profusion of terminology - racism, racial prejudice, racial
discrimination, race relations, institutional racism - and the
debates engendered - racism and slavery, racism and abolition,
racism and industrialization - suggest a great deal of conceptual
confusion. There is, however, increasing convergence in the belief
that "race is only a special case of more general social facts ... 
[and] there can be no general theory of race and that race relations
must be placed within the total institutional and cultural context
of the society studied. (24) Nor can it be doubted that the
essential matrix of ideas from which institutionalized racism grew
already existed in Europe - perhaps more prevalently in Protestant
Anglo-Saxon Europe - at the early stages of overseas expansion.
"Group differences in physical traits ... considered [as] a
determinant of social behaviour and moral or intellectual
qualities", van den Berge's definition of racism, characterized the
European perception of the Negro in Elizabethan England, for
example, as the monumental study by Winthrop D. Jordan, amongst
others, has shown. (25) In the societies generated by overseas
expansion such attitudes hardened rapidly: "previous ideological
conditioning made possible a racially based slavery, and the
growth of that kind of slavery transformed the conditioning from a
loose body of prejudices into a virulent moral disorder." (26)
Racist attitudes became a racist ideology which justified black subordination and oppression.

Yet the different slave systems created by European expansion and the growth of the capitalist world market produced patterns of race relations which were not identical over either space or time. Much of the comparative work to date has concerned itself with the extent to which these patterns were the produce of the differences in European inheritance or of the immediate social and economic conditions of the colonies - what Genovese has called the "idealistic" and "materialistic" tendencies. (27) Yet it is possible to subsume these opposites, as Genovese himself has tried to do:

I should prefer to assume both [ideology and economics] within a synthetic analysis of social classes that avoids compartmentalising their constituent human beings. Social classes have historically formed traditions, values, and sentiments, as well as particular and general economic interests ... If historical materialism is not a theory of class determinism it must accept two limitations. Certain social classes can only rise to political power and social hegemony under specific technological conditions. The relationship of these classes, from this point of view, determines the contours of the historical epoch. It follows, then, that changes in the political relationship of classes constitute the essence of social transformation; but this notion comes close to tautology, for social transformations are defined precisely by changes in class relationships. What rescues the notion from tautology is the expectation that these changes in class relationship determine - at least in outline - the major psychological, ideological and political patterns, as well as economic and technological possibilities. (28)

The essence of this synthesis is, in fact, a relocation of focus. Genovese is insisting that one must study not race relations but class relations: "modern slavery and the white-black confrontation form part of a single historical process, but it does not follow that slavery can best be understood as a race question. No major problem in the socio-economic transformation of Western society, apart from the pattern of race relations itself, could possibly be resolved on such grounds." (29) The approach can be illustrated by the question of slave treatment, provided we recognize that what has been debated under that category includes at least three
distinct phenomena, largely independent: day-to-day living conditions, general conditions of life (family security, opportunities for an independent social and religious life, nature of slave culture), and access to freedom and citizenship. (30) To assess the significance of race in this question, as others besides Genovese have pointed out, we need comparisons of the treatment of whites in similar positions: European indentured servants or sailors on ships (slave-trade), European peasants, and, more generally, "the attitude not only of industrial but of pre-industrial owners of wealth toward the poor, especially in the period 1540-1750 in Europe". (31) Indeed, treatment - in all three senses - inter-relates with attitude, as does each with the separate matter of degree of exploitation which, in Marxist terms at least, is objectively calculable. (32) "She had", wrote George Eliot of Esther in Felix Holt, the Radical, "a native capability for discerning that the sense of ranks and degrees has its compulsions corresponding to the repulsions dependent on difference of race and colour." Hence one finds in all systems of slavery, and probably in all systems in which political coercion rather than the market is used to create an adequate labour force, induced irrespective of race, certain stereotypes: the "slavish personality". (33) Hence one finds that the notion of the "proper relations between master and servant", and of the political community as the community of masters, existed in situations other than racial ones (34); and such a notion, as Philip Mason points out, hardened under challenge. A lady would happily share her bed with her maid in the eighteenth century, but not in the early twentieth. (35) This had its effects on social mobility: it is again Mason who points out how social attitudes and marriage patterns in nineteenth century Britain were formed in terms of what might be called "class heredity" rather than class status. (36)

The economic basis of modern slave systems, it has been argued, was the need to bring into production tracts of fertile land available at little cost in a situation where free labour was dear. The budding entrepreneur could neither derive rent from (scarce) land nor appropriate profit from employing labourers at market prices, since potential labourers had equal access to the means of production unless coerced. (37) During the nineteenth century such systems, at least in their formal sense, were abolished, sometimes violently and sometimes without violence. The manner in which abolition occurred, Genovese has cogently argued, was not simply a matter of the character of race relations, nor a mechanistic matter of economics. Nor did it depend, in the narrow sense, on the question debated in the United States for over a hundred years, of the profitability of slavery. (38) What was crucial was whether abolition "became a class question - a question of life and death for a whole class and therefore for a world view and a notion of civilisation". (39)

A concentration on slavery and its abolition, however, does not, particularly in the South African case, go far enough. If one accepts the argument that race relations are at bottom a class question into which "the race question intrudes and gives ... a special force and form but does not constitute its essence" (40), then a similar argument must be extended to post-formal-slavery periods. Where slavery was ended "too soon", it has been argued by
W. Kloosterboer - that is, before independent access to the means of production for potential labourers had ceased - it was replaced by various arrangements of forced labour: what Barrington Moore has called labour repression. (41) I have suggested elsewhere that this fact is integrally related to the linkage of the societies concerned to the world capitalist economy. Bearing in mind, with Andre Gunmar Franck, that this is characterized, at the colonial level, by monopoly, we see here a certain congruence with Barrington Moore's argument about the U.S. Civil War:

Labor-repressive agricultural systems, and plantation slavery in particular, are political obstacles to a particular kind of capitalism, at a specific historical stage: competitive democratic capitalism we must call it for lack of a more precise term ... If the geographical separation had been much greater, if the South had been a colony for example, the problem would in all probability have been relatively simple to solve at that time - at the expense of the Negro. (42)

Yet, even in the American South, labour-repression persisted to a certain degree or was revived after the end of Reconstruction; but, significantly, it was revived in a form which united "poor whites" with plantation owners in a much more explicit defence of white supremacy and white privilege than had ever characterized their relationships before the Civil War. (43)

Such social systems as I have been describing, the slave and post-slavery systems of labour repression thrown up by the capitalist world market, can be characterized, though by no means fully encompassed, by the relationship of master to servant in differing forms: master to slave, state or enterprise to coerced labourer, etc. (44) (There is often a strong co-existence, which requires full study in order to examine its connection or difference, of the relationship landlord-tenant, owner-sharecropper, perhaps one should even include commercial company-peasant producer.) (45) As many analysts have noted, however, there is a quite distinct "type" of race relations, characterized by competition - most usually between white workers and black workers. (46) At first appearance, this "type", which is prevalent in conditions of urban industrialization, seems purely "racial". However, I would suggest that there is no problem in analysing this, too, initially in "class" terms. Owing perhaps to labour-repression, perhaps to the possibilities of survival outside the industrial economy, perhaps to lower economic expectations, perhaps to compulsions of the sub-subsistence rural economy, black labour under these conditions is willing to accept lower wages than white labour. This is a structural fact, determined by previous history, and not a simple ideological issue: the "class interests", in Genovese's sense, of white and black workers are different, and the structures serve to maintain and perhaps exacerbate that difference. Research on the determinants of that structural condition is an urgent task; economic analysis which argues in the abstract rather
than in terms of particular interests and world views has shown itself unable to deal with it.

Race and the Frontier

But let us turn more explicitly to South Africa and the frontier, in the hope that this schematic presentation has indicated the complexity and subtlety with which the problem of racism is now being tackled. This is hardly true in South Africa. By and large, slavery, Calvinism, and the frontier between them suffice to "explain" present-day race attitudes in South Africa. Little chips have been made in the edifice. As Hancock, amongst others, pointed out, none of these served to explain the racial attitudes of immigrant white workers at Kimberly and the Witwatersrand. (47) Frederick Johnstone has made explicit the racial discrimination, in terms of the wage colour-bar particularly, practised by mine-owners. (48) Alf Stadler, already mentioned, has pointed out other ways in which the master-servant patterns were transformed by industrialization. (49) Shula Marks has vividly portrayed the exaggerated fears and over-confident wishful thinking of the settlers of Natal, with respect to non-white revolt in particular. She provides a variety of explanations: Natal was "a frontier society" (50), a "divided society"; "there is, it would seem, a natural tendency for the white settler to become authoritarian and despotic in his relationship with conquered colonial people". She refers to studies on the nation-states' "image of the enemy", to the stereotype of the African "enemy" created in the days of Shaka and Dingane and unshifted by any white military defeat of Africans, to "innate distrust" of the strangers, to the differing institutions of the Cape. (51) The anxieties and tensions, indeed, parallel those of North American slave systems. (52) But there are questions which remain unanswered. Let us, for example, examine the contributions of the frontier to the pattern of race relations.

It was I. D. MacCrone who, in 1937, first formulated in detail the thesis on the frontier which has since become widely accepted. (53) In the original Cape refreshment station, he argued, attitudes towards non-whites were shaped by those of Europe, which saw a religious dichotomy between Christian and heathen rather than white and black: baptism was the key to non-white entry to the white community. As white settler numbers grew, however, transforming the refreshment station into a colony, and even more with the growth of a frontier isolated from the parent colony, continues MacCrone, the centre of gravity of influence on social behaviour shifted. Each shift, he claims, intensified racial prejudice, so that the gulf came to be between white and non-white rather than Christian and heathen. (54) But, in view of Jordan's claim, we must impose an initial qualification on this argument: in England - and it would seem to apply to other Protestant and Anglo-Saxon situations -

the concept embodied in the word Christian embraced so much more meaning than was contained in the specific doctrinal
affirmations that it is scarcely possible to assume on the basis of this linguistic contrast that the colonists set the Negroes apart because they were heathen ... From the first, then ... to be Christian was to be civilised rather than barbarous, English rather than African, white rather than black. (55)

The historical inheritance of South Africa — perhaps, as Genovese argues, because of the bourgeois rather than seigneurial nature of the parent regime (56) — had greater inherent tendencies towards rigid racial definition than in the Catholic Latin American situations. Calvinism, as so many have stressed, with its two-class conception of man, was an extreme form of this. And, as Jan Loubser points out, the "situations in which Calvinists were confronted with a large population of different cultural background, defined as less civilised", and where two-class categorization was prevalent, were not defined to those of colour; Prussia provides another example. (57)

The notion of inheritance is further illustrated by the "children of Ham" justification of black inequality, which South African historians have implied to be a prevalent, curious, and well nigh unique feature of South African racism. As an explanation of Negro blackness, in fact, this argument can be traced to early Jewish texts, with casual references in St. Jerome and St. Augustine; it re-emerged in Christian writings in the first century of overseas exploration. According to Jordan, the first specific connection of the "curse of Ham" with slavery is to be found in 1621, with subsequent seventeenth century reference by Dutch writers. (58) The first reference I have as yet located in South Africa is in 1703, not, significantly, by frontiersmen but by the Church Council of Drakenstein. They wrote to the Convocation of Amsterdam that they wished to convert Khoi "so that the children of Ham would no longer be the servants of [or?] bondsmen". The Convocation approved and hoped that "one day God would lift the curse from the generation of Ham". (59) In America, notes Jordan:

The old idea of Ham's curse floated ethereally about the colonies without anyone's seeming to attach great importance to it; one Anglican minister asserted that Negroes were indeed descended from Ham ... but much more often the idea was mentioned by antislavery advocates for purposes of refutation. (60)

At some stage, undoubtedly, the "curse of Ham" became a central part of South African racial ideology. But this, I would argue, was predominantly in the later nineteenth century. Although I have not investigated the subject fully, it may be important to note that the main prior references to the question are in the writings of "antislavery advocates" or the equivalent, such as John Campbell, Janssens, De Mist. Even here it seems hardly an entrenched part of
belief: "A brother of Thomas Ferreira who pretends to have some literature, has made the discovery that the Hottentots are the descendants of the accursed race of Ham..." (61)

A similar aspect of ideology which equally needs more study is the notion of the non-white - and, so far as I know, exclusively the Khoi - as a "schepsel": "according to the unfortunate notion prevalent here, a heathen is not actually human, but at the same time he cannot really be classed among the animals. He is, therefore, a sort of creature not known elsewhere." (62) Far from being a strange idea of the unlettered frontier, this also has a lengthy intellectual history, deriving from the idea of the Great Chain of Being. Creation, from the inanimate things through forms of life to man and thence to the myriad ranks of heavenly creatures, was conceived as a ranking, but one without gaps, so that the gradations between ranks were merely subtle alterations. Man himself, or rather men themselves, could be ranked on this scale - though there were ambivalence and confusions. But, inevitably, one method came to be racial. Thus we find William Petty, one of the mid-seventeenth century founders of the Royal Society, writing that, though there were differences between individual men,

there be others more considerable, that is, between the Guiny Negroes and the Middle Europeans; and of the Negroes between those of Guiny and those who live about the Cape of Good Hope [the Hottentots], which last are the most beastlike of all the Souls [Sorts?] of Men with whom our travellers are well acquainted ... (63)

For, of course, the lowest "men" on the scale were separated from the uppermost "beasts" by only the most subtle gradation, an argument which leads naturally to the notion of the "schepsel". (64)

The ideas, then, were present from the beginning. They hardened into an ideology, I would argue, in response to the nineteenth century challenge to the system of social relations. There is no reason to suppose they were more prevalent on the frontier. Nor is the ideology as such directly related to behaviour. Clearly, however, the "European inheritance" was strongly influenced by local circumstances, and if we are to make meaningful initial comparisons, these should be with other areas where the inheritance was similar, i.e. the United States and the Anglo-Dutch Caribbean. What, in particular, were the possibilities for freedom from slavery? (And, since the Cape was a slave society, it seems most useful to suppose that the "normal" position of the Khoi was seen as slavery, and any other status in that light.) And what was the status of such free non-whites?

It is hard to produce figures, particularly for the Khoi. Of slaves themselves, it is estimated that 893 were emancipated between 1715 and 1792, in a slave population grown from c.2000 to c.15000. (65) There were no population figures that I know of for
free non-whites in the eighteenth or early nineteenth century. In contrast, in 1820 in the Southern United States there were 233,634 free Negroes to 1,536,000 slaves and 7,866,797 whites - some 16% of the black community and 2% of the total community. In Brazil the free men of colour numbered perhaps 30% of the total coloured community, and about 17% of the total community. (66) In the Caribbean, free men of colour also were a sizable number, though, in contrast to Brazil, there was a clear separation at the top between "white" and mixed black persons. In Brazil and the Caribbean, it has been argued, the mulatto/free black was encouraged to serve as a middle class and provide a political and military establishment, a task performed by the white yeomanry in the South: the previous inheritance led to the Caribbean "compromise" of Brazilian fluidity. (67) What occurred in the Cape, and why?

The limited nature of the Cape government, the limited Cape economy, in fact provided little need for such roles, and where they were needed slave labour, given certain incentives, was able to fill them: Malay slaves developed in this period the artisanal monopoly they preserved in the western Cape for some time. Khoi supplemented military forces, both on the frontier and in the western Cape, and the British, in the nineteenth century, relied heavily in wars against the Xhosa on this supplementing of military force. (68) Furthermore, the frontier - it is far from the usual argument - in fact provided opportunities to non-whites to which they had no access in the capital. The lack of manumission may be compensated partly, from the slave's point of view, by the opportunities for escape into the interior, of which they availed themselves from earliest times. (69) The free black burghers of whom MacCrone speaks may, as he implies, have become subordinated once again, but it is just as likely that they moved onwards on the fringes of settlement. (70) Groups of "Bastards" were landholders in the Graaff-Reinet district in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in the inaccessible Cedarberg, as well as in the north-eastern Cape beyond the Colony border. From these emerged the so-called "Griqua" of the nineteenth century - and it is very significant that in the 1820s the Bastards of Graaff-Reinet moved either to the Kat River Settlement or across the Orange to "Griqualand". Clearly such people were not regarded by white frontiersmen uniformly as equals, and their claim to land was increasingly challenged; but they did hold it, and on occasion gave help and protection to destitute whites. (71) Thus, in terms of opportunities, as well as ideology, the distinction between the frontier and the western Cape appears to break down, or, if anything, to make the frontier appear in the better light. Indeed, when MacCrone cites examples to demonstrate the denial of opportunity to non-whites, these are, strangely enough, chosen from the western Colony and not the frontier. (72)

Moreover, if in the areas where governmental authority could be enforced legal measures were important in determining non-white status, then the Colony itself played a major part in determining the pattern of race relations. In 1675 it was discovered - as a result, no doubt, of the shortage of white women - that three-quarters of the children born in the colony were "half-breeds" (73); ten years later Commissioner Van Rheede forbade
marriages between whites and full blacks. (74) At about the same
time the freeing of heathen slaves was effectively proscribed, and
even the "natural" right of "mulatto" children to freedom was
limited. (75) In 1708 manumission was prevented unless the owners
gave a guarantee that the freed men would not be a charge on the
public funds for ten years (increased to twenty in 1783): it has
usually been assumed that this was because of the poor economic
performance of freed slaves, but it is equally likely that masters
would manumit only slaves incapable of work. (76) These measures in
themselves qualified the relationship of baptism to freedom, though
the confusion that persisted in the minds of slave owners in fact
meant that Christianization of slaves was discouraged by them. In
the United States the slave-owning colonies had all, by the end of
the seventeenth century, passed laws asserting that conversion did
not entail freedom - with the co-operation of British officials. (77)
Perhaps greater church activities in the United States necessitated
such laws; in any case, in the Cape such was not clearly understood
by the colonists until the late eighteenth century. (78) Finally,
apart from the Graaff-Reinet case, it does not seem that the Company
was willing to accord land-rights to individual Khoi save in
exceptional cases, so that the only way in which non-whites could
maintain some title to land was by accepting staffs of office as
Khoi chiefs. (79)

Nevertheless, on the frontier, argues MacCrone, the
attitudes and practices of the Colony itself were "stiffened" and
accentuated "almost to a morbid degree". (80) Why? The key to
MacCrone's argument is an assumption about social behaviour: group-
consciousness implies greater hostility to those outside the group,
greater group-consciousness implies greater hostility, greater
hostility fosters greater group-consciousness. (81) The argument
is in a sense circular, and rests as much on the claim that the
white frontiersmen developed a group-consciousness as on evidence
about their racial attitudes per se. And the question of group-
consciousness involves a further assumption: that the "frontier" as
an environment has distinctive effects on human behaviour. This is
a thesis which MacCrone, and the other historians with whom I am
concerned, drew explicitly from F. J. Turner, whose essays on The
Frontier in American History had been published in book form in
1920. (82) But, in fact, both in America and in South Africa
assumptions about "the frontier" had been implicitly present almost
from the beginning. It is important to recognize, moreover, a
confusion in the notion of "the frontier". When Turner spoke of it
as "the outer edge of the wave - the meeting point between savagery
and civilization" he was concerned primarily with the frontier as
isolation from a parent society, as an area where the natural
environment had a greater shaping influence on behaviour. The
Indians, for him, were "to be regarded rather as one more savage
obstacle than as a constituent element in frontier society". (83)
For all the influence of the Indian on American society and
character, this is not, in the case of the United States - or Canada
or Australia - a significant elision in considering frontier
influence: for these frontiers were frontiers of exclusion, of near-
extinction. (84) In South Africa, in contrast, the frontier from
the start involved inclusion as well as exclusion: in whatever
capacity, non-whites became integral parts of the total society.
It was indeed one of the merits of such historians as Macmillan and
De Kiewiet to emphasize this point: "it is of the greatest importance to remember that the settlers in South Africa did not, as in North America, sweep the native population away from their path; here alone ... [the blacks] have persisted as an ever-present factor in the life of what the dominant whites would fain see develop as a 'White Man's Country'." (85) This is clearly a process to which, in its most general sense, one should be wary of applying the concept of "frontier": Would the Norman conquest of Great Britain be termed a frontier movement? Yet in the South African situation there has been a tendency to move between the idea of frontier as isolation from the parent society and the frontier as meeting-point of black and white cultures, peoples, and societies. The two are not necessarily the same. Moreover, there is an implication that it is to the effects of inclusion rather than exclusion, which former are not of their nature "frontier" effects, which we should look as influences on subsequent behaviour. De Kiewiet quite correctly points out that the South African frontier wars have accorded no romantic place to black South Africans comparable to that of American Indians. (86) Yet the period of Indian warfare in the United States produced attitudes of hatred towards the Indians comparable with those attributed to white South Africans; if this is not the attitude which has survived - and for the Indian as opposed to the Negro it is not, as a study by R. H. Pearce has shown - this was precisely because the Indian was exterminated and the black South African was not. (87)

MacCrone is concerned with the frontier as isolation and as meeting-point with other societies. In terms of isolation, he argues that the natural effect of the frontier is the "re-barbarization" of human beings - unless they can develop a means of preventing this:

the extent to which any such radical "re-barbarization" took place was negligible in comparison with the successful preservation of its social and racial identity on the part of a group that became progressively more race-conscious and more determined than ever to maintain its integrity as the dispersion increased in scope ... What [those who believed in necessary re-barbarization] failed to realize ... was the possibility of a new society, with its own group consciousness, being forced into existence by the force of circumstances. For the stock farmer who appeared to be turning his back upon civilised society - as he certainly was in physical or material sense - was taking with him those of its elements that could be reshaped to form the framework of a new society. It was these psychological elements - these social attitudes, prejudices, and beliefs that were already part of the social heritage -
that preserved the social cohesion of
the group in spite of isolation and
dispersion. The new society retained,
as well as discarded, many features of
the old [under the selective influence
of environment]. (86)

What has happened here is the combining of two traditions in South
African historiography. At least since the time of Simon van der
Stel, Company officials and travellers bemoaned the consequences for
"civilization" of the dispersal of pastoral farmers in the
interior. (89) Without the constraints of society, of religion,
they assumed, man degenerated into the "war of all against all". It
was an attitude which survived in the attitudes of nineteenth century
British towards the "Boers" and "Afrikaners", and may even be
detected in some writings of Theal. (90) Similar attitudes may be
detected in the writings of Eastern Americans about the frontier in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries though, in the
differing conditions of America, they were subordinated - at least
from, say, 1830 to 1920 - by a contradictory tendency, illustrated
by Turner's writings, in which the frontier was assumed to have a
beneficial and liberating effect on man: Hobbesian thought,
cruelly speaking, replaced by primitivism. (91) The corresponding
contrary tradition in South Africa was that of Afrikaner nationalism,
whose historians from the latter part of the nineteenth century
celebrated the emergence of the Afrikaner "volk", and gradually
extended its pedigree back in time from the Trek to the eastern
frontier rebellions to the trekboer, and finally to Adam Tas and
Hendrik Biault. (92) Though more systematic treatments of these
events now exist, the explanation of racism in these terms, loaded
with a priori reasoning as they are, survives in those who follow
MacCrone. (93)

It would seem, in fact, that the last thing that can be
said about the eighteenth and early nineteenth century frontier was
that it fostered "group-consciousness". The basic social unit of
the frontier was, there can be little doubt, the patriarchal
family: master, his wife, his children, and his dependants. Among
the emergent Griqua/Bastards there was a tendency for this to shade
off into the "tribe", in which the master became a "chief". Among
white frontiersmen one might find several families living together
or nearby, or an extended family system, or perhaps the local
veldwagmeester playing a role of authority. Transhumance may have
helped or hindered wider social ties. Certainly one cannot ignore
the individualism of these basic units, their quarrels over land
boundaries - which contributed to their desire for isolation from
each other (94) - and the political factionalism. Moreover, though
De Kiewiet argues (and it is central to MacCrone's thesis as well)
that "in the face of the native population their sense of race and
fellowship was exceedingly keen", there seems to be evidence that
their disputes did involve differences in "native policy", not
towards their dependants on whose continued subjection under their
personal rule there was no argument, but towards external groups. (95)

Beyond these basic social units institutions were fragile,
or else closely linked with the western Cape - with one exception.
The western Cape provided the only market, the legitimation of land tenure and baptism and marriage, the home of one's kin (if one was white, at least), and in numerous cases the home of the owner of the land one occupied. (Absentee ownership, with the land occupied by non-landowning whites, by slaves, or Khoi dependants, needs much investigation.) If the family reunion joined frontiersmen together, if the infrequent Naamkraal at a church did too, in most cases this also joined western people and frontiersmen. If some frontiersmen sustained and rigidified their religion, and called for the services of teachers and ministers, others were indifferent to these matters.

The one possible exception was the commando, and the local officials who grew up with it and later extended their functions. In terms of hard evidence, indeed, MacCrone's case rests largely on the commando as it developed against the San, as the source of intensified group consciousness and racial hostility. "An unlimited and unconditional loyalty to one's own fighting group was the dominating idea of the frontier", writes Hancock in summarizing MacCrone. (96) The San, argues MacCrone, "were considered to be so utterly beyond the pale of humanity that they were looked upon as some kind of noxious wild beast, and like wild beasts they were exterminated". (97) Indeed, merciless warfare was waged between colonists and San, particularly from the 1770s to the 1790s, war the more vicious because of the tactics employed by San against the cattle of the farmers, and the measure of San success in inhibiting territorial expansion. Perhaps, as Shula Marks has recently suggested, we should speak more accurately of Khoisan resistance, in which Khoi as well as San participated, so that there is a line of continuity from the wars of the seventeenth century up to this period. (98) This was a brutal period; but let us nevertheless look at MacCrone's evidence dispassionately.

Firstly, though the commando developed as an institution of the frontier when the Company could no longer afford frontier defence, the wars with the San were endorsed by the Company. The "extermination of the said rapacious tribes" was official policy in 1779, and Woeke and the liberal Maynier, Landdroots of Graaff-Reinet, both saw the San as enemies to the Colony. (99) Secondly, and in view of this, the attitude of frontiersmen — as expressed in their letters at least — seems comparatively instrumental. In New England it was the prevailing attitude that the white settlers were instruments of God's will in driving the Indian from a land of which he was not making fruitful use. (100) In South Africa the emphasis is more on actual injuries committed, on the defence of colonial property rights, than manifest destiny: "an assemblage of robbers ... they were put to flight by the powerful hand of the Ruler of heaven and earth"; "heathenish evildoers ... united to oppress and injure us ... Oh! that the almighty and our government might be induced by our sighs and prayers to assist us." (101) That God was on their side seems more a hope than a predestined fact. Thirdly, it is hard to reconcile the "unity of the white fighting group" with the fact that white burghers were wont to send their Bastard or Khoi servants on commando duty in their place; or with the evidence that the Griqua and Bastard frontiersmen of the Orange River valley dealt with San cattle-thieves just as harshly as white frontiersmen. Nor were the San treated universally as enemies.
Further territorial expansion towards the Orange River was predicated on a change of relationships, guided by concerned local officials but implemented by the frontiersmen themselves. The San were given sheep - and were later to be absorbed as labour to some extent, by both white and Griqua frontiersmen: even MacCrone cannot ignore the evidence of these alternatives to the "enemy" status. (102) Indeed, Augusta de Mist, travelling with her father and Henry Lichtenstein in 1803-4, writes of an isolated farmer who "pays a sort of tribute in sheep from time to time, in order to 'buy off' the rapacity of these savages". (103) Gifts, tribute, ransom - the right term may be disputed, but the attitude is instrumental rather than transcendental.

Varieties of attitudes and instrumentalism are even more evident in the relations of frontier colonists with the Bantu-speaking peoples. South African pro-colonist historians, English or Afrikaner, have presented here a picture of the upright frontiersmen engaged in relentless defensive warfare against implacable Bantu cattle-thieves. The historians under discussion here - Walker, Macmillan, de Kiewiet and their followers - demurred. Writing at a time when segregation, the "reserves", and African land rights were of acute political concern, they viewed the main struggle as one for land (or, as crucial, water rights): "in describing frontier affairs it is easy to lay too much stress on cattle. Cattle-stealing and reprisals were a perpetual harassment and at times a casus belli; but land and water were the fundamental factors in the problem ... of the frontier." (104) But whether it was cattle, land or water, conflict was seen as the essence of the relationship; to see conflict as the essential factor seemed to explain the continued existence of that conflict in the urban and industrial situation of the early 'twenties: "that is the story of nearly every native war in South Africa from that day to this, and if for 'land' you write 'industry' it is the story of the present struggle in South Africa's urban areas." (105) As South African liberals turned away from ideas of protective segregation, however, to believing that the road to African "civilisation" lay in participation in urban industrial society, a new element entered the analysis of the frontier. Where before there had been a tendency to see the entry of non-whites into roles of servile labour under whites as an unfortunate consequence of frontier conflict which had to be recognised, this process was now seen in another light:

The frontier was the stage where, more spectacularly than elsewhere, was taking place the great revolution of South African history ... these men of opposite race were doing more than quarrelling with each other. Even though they did not know it, they were engaged in the formation of a new society and the establishment of new economic and social bonds. (106)

The change in perception dates, perhaps, from two articles by H. M. Robertson in 1936, whose essential assumption is that "a directly cooperative aspect [of contact] emerges when members of each race jointly take part in the production of commodities. This
usually takes the form of the employment of Native workers by Europeans" - and the theme survives in the new Oxford History. (107) This changed perception has subtly shifted value judgements on key "liberal" figures in South African history in a manner which suggests a need for reappraisal. John Philip, once viewed as the first protective segregationist, became South Africa's first "liberal". (108) The Treaty State policy of 1837-1846, once seen as a laudable attempt to check white land-grabbing, now "maintained a dangerous fiction and staved off the inevitable day when the pretence of a dividing line between black and white would have to yield to the truth that the natives were as much a direct responsibility of government as the colonists themselves". (109) Sir George Grey, once castigated for transforming the Ciskei into a "chequer-board of black and white", now became the great civilizer, while Shepstone in Natal fell in historical estimation. (110) By and large, however, it is the British policy-makers who still retain the credit for the "co-operative" aspects of the frontier, while, moreover, the element of class conflict created by the white employer-African employee relationship has virtually been dismissed.

Yet the early frontiersman in contact with Bantu-speaking societies did not view the African solely as enemy or as servant. Firstly, although subsistence appears to have played a larger part and for longer in the South African frontier economy than, say, the American, S. D. Neumark's seminal study has demonstrated the presence of a strong market element: slaughtered stock, sheep's tail fat, soap, as well as such natural products as ivory, hides and skins, ostrich feathers and eggs, and berry wax were the elements of this trade. (111) Prior to frontier expansion, it would appear from recent evidence, Khoi communities acted as middlemen in the circulation of goods between the Cape entrepôt and the Bantu-speaking communities. (112) Frontier expansion, on this interpretation, was not primarily to acquire land but to displace first the Company and then the Khoi in this trade. But trade shaded into patently unequal barter, unequal barter into theft, and theft into the organized raiding by commandos which characterized the first "frontier wars". On the Bantu-speaking side, unfair trading or raiding by whites provoked reprisals, while - and it is here that land and water enter - in so far as the whites insisted on exclusive occupation of any land they claimed, they provoked response from peoples used to communal pasturage.

Trade and war, therefore, were but two sides of the same coin: so-called co-operation and conflict both entered simultaneously. (113) Racism may have encouraged more unequal trade and raiding, but it would seem probable that factors of comparative power entered equally. Moreover, as I have illustrated in my dissertation, a similar trading-raiding syndrome existed on the northern "Griqua" frontier as well. The paradox is equally illustrated by examining the careers of the so-called "frontier ruffians" - those lawless characters who are presumed to be integral to any frontier (of isolation or societal contact). Men like Coenraad Buys, the Bezuidenhout family (Coenraad Frederick, Frederick Cornelius, Johannes and Wynand), the Prinsloos, Lucas Meyer, Carl Trigard, Christoffel Botha and others, occupy a curious position in South African historiography. (114) Afrikaner
nationalist historians have viewed the rebellions in which they played leading parts as essential formative phases in the Afrikaner character, even if they have often down-played the role of these dubious people: Frederick Cornelius Bezuidenhout was the hero of the Slagter's Nek rebellion, the man who stood up to the impudent British who dared tell him how to treat his dependants. Liberal historians have examined the harshness of frontier treatment of non-whites - and the "frontier ruffians" were amongst the most notable of the villains - and seen here the morbidity of frontier racism. Indeed, these men were involved in brutality, murders, forced concubinage of African women. But many of them also lived for periods in Xhosa territory under the authority of African chiefs. And in the rebellions in which they participated against colonial rule they called for assistance from Xhosa rulers such as Ndlambe and later Ngqika. Sheila Patterson finds it strange that the Bezuidenhouts "were somewhat illogically prepared to make an ally of Caike the Xhosa chief although he was their erstwhile enemy and a Kaffir in addition". (115) But it is not at all strange. Ngqika was not an erstwhile enemy, as some of the lesser Xhosa fragments of the frontier area had been. Enemies and friends were not divided into rigid, static categories; non-whites were not regarded implacably as enemies.

On the extreme frontier, indeed, the family-plus-dependants structure of white society shaded off, even among whites, into the "petty chiefdom". The activities of the Kok family or the Berends or Afrikaner families among non-whites are paralleled amongst white "frontier ruffians". These men acquired followings of "clients", "dependants", "wives", "concubines", and operated in this area of ill-defined authority. Coenraad Buys, who did this kind of thing in the Xhosa frontier area in the 1790s, moved later, when British authority was extended effectively to the area, across the Orange to continue the pattern there: other whites, such as Jan Bloem, had indeed preceded him. The Cape-Xhosa frontier, I would argue, ceased to be a "frontier" in the complete sense of societal isolation, with the establishment of British military authority after 1812. Conflict and co-operation became differentiated more sharply, and the attitudes of "frontiersmen" - now simply men living on a frontier dividing two societies - were shaped by a new total situation. (116) Meanwhile, the frontier of isolation had moved across the Orange, where the Griqua, Jan Bloem, Coenraad Buys and others, were followed by a steady trickle of settlers and then by the Great Trek. Even in the Trek itself it may be profitable to examine different groups of participants. Louis Trigard (son of Carl Trigard) (117), for example, had lived outside the Colony with Ngqika for several years before the Trek. (118) And while his journey far north into the Transvaal may have been partly to seek a new outlet for trade, and undoubtedly involved some notions of white superiority, yet the fact that he should have gone so far and established himself so deep in African territory hardly suggests that he viewed non-whites as uniformly hostile. (119) Even in Hendrik Potgieter and, more equivocally, in Andries Pretorius, one senses a conflict between their self-conceptions as African "chiefs" and as white colonists. Part of the perennial conflict amongst the Voortrekkers over the rights of the charismatic leader against the rights of the representative Volksraad may be traced to this. (120) And when some examination is undertaken, it is surprising how often Trekkers -
more particularly Potgieter and Pretorius - were willing to try and obtain the assistance of African societies not only against other Africans but against whites, thus continuing the pattern of the Cape frontier rebels. In the early 1850s, for example, there is some evidence of the intrigues of Orange Free State farmers and Pretorius in the Transvaal with Moshweshwe against British rule in the Free State, and even in 1857 Marthinus Pretorius may have hoped for the assistance of Moshweshwe against the Free State. (121) Hendrick Potgieter is reported to have attempted to enlist Sekwati of the Pedi on his side in his struggles with the Andries Ohrigstad Volksraad in the 1840s: indeed, Potgieter, with his successive moves from Potchefstroom to Ohrigstad to the Zoutpansberg, with his continual commandos, stands clearly in line with Trigard and with Coenraad Buys, with whose Bastard son, Doris, he was indeed in close association. (122)

The stereotype of the non-white as enemy, therefore, does not seem to be explicitly a frontier product, whether one examines the San frontier, the Xhosa frontier, the pre-Trek northern frontier, or the frontier that developed predominantly in the Transvaal (the most "isolated" area) after the Trek. Moreover, we must be careful not to equate the greater violence, brutality and harshness of treatment of dependants in such areas, with greater racism. White frontiersmen expected all their dependants (save their families) to be non-white: they did not expect all non-whites to be their servants. Just the same, Griqua and Bastard frontiersmen expected Kora and San and, later, Bantu-speakers to be their dependants. As in the case of slavery in the United States, the sociology and economics of the "master-servant" relationship in South Africa has been clouded in partisan polemics since the early nineteenth century. Up until the Trek, Cape colonists in general expected to employ labour in a slave capacity. Most of the accounts of mistreatment in Khoi refer, in fact, to efforts to retain Khoi in service, often by withholding the expected wage payments in kind, after completion of the "contract". In other respects, particularly the question of physical violence and assault, it would be hard to determine whether the frontier areas were in fact more violent than the western Cape rural areas. (123) After the Trek, particularly in the areas where the penetration of the cash and market economy was weak, whites continued to expect the same forms of labour. The supply of Khoi labour had been supplemented (particularly in agriculture) by Bantu-speakers from the fragmented Xhosa groups, from the late eighteenth century - a supply which, on the whole, appears to have been voluntary. (124) Now, in view of British and missionary watchfulness, unable to practise slavery as such (and indeed their relationship with the Khoi was different from slavery, at least in degree), they turned to "apprenticeship" for full-time labour and to the labour-tax, negotiated with African chiefs, for sporadic labour. Most of the initial wars in the Transvaal, indeed, appear to have been over questions of cattle or hunting rights, or labour questions (procurement of labour, African resistance to the labour-tax) rather than over land as such. (125) But such violence must again be differentiated both from violence within the master-servant relationship and from the intensity of racism per se.
It is my argument, then, that it was not the frontier, seen as a social system distinct and isolated from a parent society, which produced a new, or even intensified an old, pattern of racial relationships. Indeed, as Owen Lattimore has written, "frontiers are of social, not geographic, origin. Only after the concept of a frontier exists can it be attached by the community that has conceived it to a geographical configuration. The consciousness of belonging to a group, a pattern that includes certain people and excludes others, must precede the conscious claim for that group of the right to live or move about within a particular territory ... In large measure, when he [Turner] thought he saw what the frontier did to society, he was really seeing what society did to the frontier". (126) The pattern of racial relationships established in the eighteenth century Cape must be seen in the light of the formation of the Cape colonist as a whole, the form of his inheritance from Europe, and the exigencies of the situation he had to face. If there was a trend in class relationships, indeed, it was a trend away from master-slave towards chief-subject or patron-client on the frontier. Of course, such a formulation opens new problems. Why did some colonists Trek and some not? Why were some able to accommodate themselves to a new pattern of social relationships and some not? Or did the nineteenth century Cape indeed establish a new pattern of social relationships? How did the introduction of new patterns or relationships affect the situation, and affect it differently in differing areas: I refer particularly to the rule by the state as opposed to the master over non-white subjects, and also to the landlord-tenant relationship (squatting) that developed over wide areas of South Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century? (127) If the stereotype of the African as enemy cannot be traced to the eighteenth century, when and why did it in fact come into existence?

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Notes


(2) Rand Daily Mail, August 24 1970.


The phrase is used, for example, in Walker, Frontier Tradition 15; de Kiewiet, History, 30-1, 46; Trek, 90.

Frontier Tradition, 12; Trek, 1, 5, 8, 105.

Compare P. Mason, Patterns of Dominance (OUP, 1970), 202: "before Durban became a great commercial centre, the Frontier spirit was influential and Durban grew under the shadow of the Zulu kingdom"; and Sheila Patterson, Last Trek, 23-4, who credits the Free State with "tolerance", "harmony", in contrast with the "unquiet", "opinionated", "factious" inhabitants of the Transvaal, its "anarchy" and "ineptitude".

Patterson, Last Trek, 23-4. Also De Kiewiet, History, 66; Trek, 1.


De Kiewiet, History, 150-151.

See, for example, Frontier Tradition, 23. On the frontier tradition and government, see also ibid., 9, 11, 14, 18-19; Trek, 52, 63-6, 127, 129, 134, 211-2, 228, 244, 254, 329, 353; Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, 19-21; De Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 106-9; History, 12, 19, 32, 41-2, 57, 103; Patterson, Last Trek.

There are important questions here, in the relationship between individualism and co-operation, between anarchy and authoritarianism, between oligarchy (Walker's phrase) or representative government and populism, which I do not propose to discuss.

Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, 13, 22. See also Walker, Frontier Tradition, 19; De Kiewiet, History, 16-17, 41, 57-9, 69, 191-197; Hancock, Survey, 11, 2, 22-3, etc.; H. M. Robertson, "150 Years of Economic Contact Between Black and White", SAJE, Dec. 1934, March 1935, 404-5. There are here two differing problems interwoven: (a) the question of the original extensive use of the land, a fact deplored by numerous contemporary commentators from van der Stel to Philip and onwards, as also by Macmillan - though De Kiewiet and others, somewhat ambivalently, have pointed out that this was in fact an efficient use of the land under existing circumstances (History, 12-13); (b) the perpetuation of this "habit" under changed circumstances of land shortage, implying conservatism - a point which emerges in most studies of the "poor white" problem from at least the Transvaal Indigency Commission (1908) through Macmillan's The Agrarian Problem in SA (1919) to the Carnegie Commission Report and Macmillan's Complex South Africa.

Frontier Tradition, 24, 21; also 5.

Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, 11. Also ibid., 13, 14, 15; De Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy, 7.
(15) Frontier Tradition, 4.

(16) De Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy, 1-8; Imperial Factor, 1-11. Recent interpretations, e.g. Galbraith and Goodfellow, perhaps lay less stress on the "native rights" question.

(17) Macmillan, Cape Colour Question; W. M. Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton (1928).

(18) Hancock, Survey, 5-10.


(20) E. Walker, Lord De Villiers and His Times, 1842-1914 (1925).


(23) P. Van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict, 15-21. Also, Sheila Patterson, Last Trek, 6, 9, 83, 244. The origin of this thesis is in I. D. MacCrone, Race Attitudes in South Africa (1937), 67-8, 80, 131-2.


(25) Ibid., 23. For definitions see also ibid., 11 ("racism is any set of beliefs that organic, genetically transmitted differences (whether real or imagined) between human groups are intrinsically associated with the presence or the absence of certain socially relevant abilities or characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of invidious distinctions between groups socially defined as races"); John Rex, "The Concept of Race in Sociological Theory" in S. Zubaida (ed.) Race and Racialism (Tavistock, 1970), 39 ("We shall speak of a race-relations structure or problem in so far as the inequalities and differentiation inherent in a social structure are related to physical and cultural criteria of an ascriptive kind and are rationalized in terms of deterministic belief systems, of which the most usual in recent years has made reference to biological science."). In a sense these definitions are narrow. For early Europe, see W. D. Jordan, White Over Black (Penguin, 1969), 3-43; G. Shepperson, "The African Abroad or the African Diaspora" in T. Ranger (ed.) Emerging Themes of African History (Heinemann, 1968), 153-6 and his references. Cf. Mason, Patterns of Dominance, 30-32.


(28) Ibid., 249-250. Genovese, explicitly influenced by the writings of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist, has developed his argument in The Political Economy of Slavery (Vintage, 1965) as well as in other writings.

(29) Genovese, World the Slaveholders Made, 103. Also ibid., ix, 4, 14.


(32) As the surplus (total product less wage bill - in the case of the slave his cost of maintenance) divided by the wage bill.


(34) Cf. Peter Lazlett, The World We Have Lost (Methuen, 1965). This fact must also, as J. Plumb points out in reviewing The World the Slaveholders Made (New York Review of Books, February 6, 1970), lead to a softening of the rigid distinction made by Genovese between bourgeois and seigneurial (feudal) social systems. However, the lines of an analysis of the British social system which takes this into account have been sketched, amid much controversy, in Perry Anderson "Origins of the Present Crisis", New Left Review, 23; Tom Nairn, "The British Political Elite", ibid.; Tom Nairn, "The English Working-Class", NLR, 24; Edward Thompson, "The Peculiarities of the English", Socialist Register, 1965; Perry Anderson, "Socialism and Pseudo-Empiricism", New Left Review, 35; Nicos Poulantzas, "Marxist Political Theory in Great Britain", New Left Review, 43; T. Nairn, "Britain - The Fateful Meridian", New Left Review, 60. The New Left Review characterizations, it should be noted, challenge also Barrington Moore's idea of the emergence of British liberal democracy: what took place might be characterized as a "premature" bourgeois revolution.

(35) Mason, Patterns of Dominance, 22-3.

(36) See Mason, Patterns of Dominance, 101-2, 201, referring the reader to such nineteenth century novelists as George Meredith, Thackeray and Surtees and citing also G. O. Trevelyan, Report on India: The Competition Wallah on the similarity of social and racial distinctions.

(37) Cf. Sidney W. Mintz, "Slavery and Emergent Capitalisms" in Foner and Genovese, Slavery, who cites on this point Edgar Thompson, "The Plantation" (Ph.D., Sociology, Chicago, 1932) and H. J. Nieboer, Slavery as an Industrial System (The Hague, 1900). The question of free labour v. slave labour has been an issue in South Africa at least since 1717 (Report of
De Chavonnes and His Council in Van Riebeeck Society, Vol. 1) and has often been discussed, at least implicitly, with relation to free land.


(39) Genovese, World of Slaveholders, 32.

(40) Ibid., 7.

(41) W. Kloosterboer, Involuntary Labour since the Abolition of Slavery (Leiden, 1960), cited by Mintz, op. cit. See Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, especially 434, where he defines such a system as "the use of political mechanisms ... to ensure an adequate labour force for working the soil and the creation of an agricultural consumption by other classes: "particularly where the peasant society is preserved, there are all sorts of attempts to use traditional relationships and attitudes as the basis of the landlords' position", and this is one such political mechanism. He excludes (a) the American family farm type, (b) a system of hired labour where the workers have considerable freedom to refuse jobs and move about, (c) precommercial and preindustrial agrarian systems where there is a rough balance between the overlords' contribution to justice and security and the cultivators' contribution in the form of crops.

(42) Moore, op. cit., 152.

(43) I base this assertion on slim evidence though hope to look at it further: see, for example, Marvin Harris, "The Origin of the Descent Rule" in Foner and Genovese, Slavery, 55-8, and compare with, for example, the position of poor whites in Hortense Powdermaker, After Freedom (New York, 1939; reprint 1968).

(44) There is a central problem here (rather similar to the problem Moore faces in any balance of protection and surplus appropriation in pre-industrial systems - see note 41). Both Genovese and van den Berghe characterise the "ideal-type" master-slave relation as patriarchal/paternal, though both recognize that various factors will influence its "harshness" (but cf. my comments on treatment of slaves). Mason (Patterns of Dominance, 83) distinguishes "paternalism" (colonial powers in Africa generally) from "dominance" (South Africa and Deep South) - Brazil moved from dominant to paternal and Mexico in the other direction: his point is that the relation between father and son is qualitatively different from that between master and slave in that (a) the father hopes the son will be like him, (b) the father expects the son to be independent one day. John Rex, moreover (op. cit., 42-3) rebukes van den Berghe
for calling Latin American societies paternalist - since relations are often brutally exploitative - and substitutes (pp. 39-40) six categories of race relations.

Genovese would term these variously seigneurial or explicitly capitalist, but I think the problem is more complex.

For example, van den Berghe, Race and Racism, 29-34. Alf Stadler, "Race and Industrialisation in South Africa: a Critique of the 'Blumer Thesis!'", Chatham House Seminar Paper, 1971, criticises H. Blumer ("Industrialization and Race Relations" in G. Hunter (ed.) Industrialization and Race Relations (London, OUP, 1965) for failing to recognize that, in South Africa at any rate, the pattern of race relations was transformed and intensified under conditions of industrialization. The same point might be made for almost any of the societies studied in Hunter's book - and the evidence is in the book itself.

Hancock, Survey, II, part 2, 42.


A. Stadler, op. cit.

S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion (OUP, 1970), 16. Dr. Marks appears to be using frontier in the sense of line of geographical separation between black and white, with implications of lack of communication between sections. She also refers on the same page to stock-farmer isolation from large centres of white population. I take up these questions of definition below.

Ibid., 10-17, 21, 26, 144-6, 152, 155, and passim.

See, for example, W. D. Jordan, White Against Black, particularly Chs. III, IV, X, XI, etc.

I. D. MacCrone, Race Attitudes in South Africa (OUP, 1937), 1-35. Amongst those who accept his basic argument are Hancock, Patterson, van den Berghe, Philip Mason, Andrew Asheron, et al. Cf. his 1961 article.

MacCrone, op. cit., 6, 40 ff., 65, 84-5, 95.


Genovese, World the Slaveholders Made, 109: "Wherever we find slaveholding classes with bourgeois rather than seigneurial origins, we generally find a tendency towards more intense racism. It is a happy coincidence for Hoetink's thesis that Protestantism and capitalism first emerged in the Anglo-Saxon countries, in which the somatic-norm image has been furthest removed from black. Coincidence or not, we need not deny some validity to the assertion of a biological-aesthetic dimension to racism to
insist on the greater force of other factors." Cf. ibid.,
34-7, on Dutch society.

Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, 23; Walker, Trek, 64; Edward A. Tiryakian, "Apartheid and Religion", Theology Today, 14, 1957; A. G. J. Gryns, Race Relations and Race Attitudes in South Africa (Nymegen, 1959), 41-2; van den Berghe, South

(58) Jordan, White Over Black, 17-20, 35, 40-1, 54-6, 60, 62n, 84-5. As an explanation of blackness it came to be denied more often than affirmed, and by the 18th century was replaced by other ideas (see ibid., 243, 245-6, 525). One of the Dutchmen was a poet who had lived at a Dutch fort in Guinea before going to New Amsterdam about 1652.

(59) Quoted by F. A. Van Jaarsveld, The Afrikaner Interpretation of South African History (C.T. 1964), 6, from C. Spollstra,

(60) Jordan, White Over Black, 200.

(61) Janssens in Theal, Belangrike Historiese Dokumenten, III, 219. See also Campbell, Travels, 344; A. Van Pallandt,
General Remarks on the Cape ... 1803 (C.T., 1917), 12.
De Mist, VRS, III, 256-7; G. D. Scholtz, "Die Ontstaan en Wese van die S.A. Rasse-patroon", Tydskrif vir Rasse-
aangeleenthede, July 1958, 147, quoting (according to Van Jaarsveld) a Cape Coloniist of the early nineteenth century -
this may thus refer to one of the sources above - I have not been able to check the article as yet. See also De Kiewiet,
History, 20; Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, 23; Walker,
Trek, 63-4; De Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy, 7.

(62) Landdrost Alberti, Uitenhage, to Janssens, June 12, 1805
(quoted by Marais, Maynier and the First Boer Republic, 73).
See also ibid., 68 (M. Gouws to Landdrost, rec. 26 June 1790)
where the commando leader refuses to take only Khoi on a
commando because "I do not think that I have been appointed to
do commandos with Hottentots but with human beings (menschen)".
Also Marais, Cape Coloured People, 5, who says the Genadendal
missionaries found the term "schepsel" in fairly general use
at the end of the eighteenth century. Van Jaarsveld, op. cit.,
6, citing De Zuid Afrikaan, 22/2/1833, 26/8/1833 for references
to Coloureds as "schepels"; MacCrone, op. cit., 126, 130, who
quotes from Barrow, Travels, I, 398 (farmers referring to Khoi
as "Zwarte Vee") and Landdrost of Stellenbosch to Fiscal, April
2, 1810 ("Hottentoten del men in 't generaal in die
Historien voor de ruuste zoort reekend en dus so geregeld
nimmer denken of kunnen denken also Christenen").
Quoted in Jordan, *op. cit.*, 224-5. Also, on European attitudes to the Khoi, see *ibid.*, 226-7, 492-3; MacCrone, *op. cit.*, 47-8.

On the Great Chain of Being, see A. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, 1936), and, in this context, Jordan, *op. cit.*, Chs. VI, XIII. Jordan argues that twentieth century writers have continually asserted that the Negro was seen as a beast but that the matter is more complex: no one denied the Negro had a soul and reason. This needs evaluation in the South African context.

H. P. Cruse, *Die Opheffing van die Kleurling-Bevolking* (Cape Town, 1947), 253. Walker, *History of South Africa* (1957), 71-2, 84-5, claims that manumissions were common, as does MacCrone *op. cit.*, 80. Their main source is H. C. V. Leibbrandt, *Requestin en Memorials, 1715-1806* (1905-6, 2 vols.).


This is based on Genovese's attempt to synthesise the contradictory positions of Tannenbaum/Freyre, on the one hand, and Harris on the other, by drawing on W. D. Jordan's "American Chiaroscuro: the Status and Definition of Mulattoes in the British Colonies" in Foner and Genovese, *Slavery*, 189-201. See Genovese, "Idealism and Materialism ...", 248; *World of Slaveholders*, 106-8. See also Mason, *Patterns of Dominance*, 317-9, who includes South Africa in a discussion of this matter, without much feeling for comparative numbers of population groups at differing periods.

See, for example, Marais, *Maynier*, 53; *Cape Coloured People*, 131-4.

This is a topic which requires investigation, but see, for example, Walker, *History*, 40, 71-2, 96, etc.

MacCrone, *op. cit.*

I deal with these questions in more dissertation, "The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries, 1780-1840: the politics of a frontier zone".

MacCrone, *op. cit.*, 133-4, dealing with the refusal of 3 burghers of Stellenbosch/Drakenstein to serve under a "black and heathen" corporal - though they will serve alongside him - in 1788. In 1787 a Free Corps had been formed to embrace those born not in slavery but out of wedlock and in 1790 it was made clear that this Corps was for those "whose parents had not been born in the state of freedom". See also n. 62.

By Commissioner Van Goske.

The effect of this measure, in relationship to existing attitudes and those which developed, is uncertain. Provided a "half-breed" population continued to develop through
concubinage with whites, marriages would still have been legally possible with these; even if the women were slaves, they or their children could be baptized and freed. Concubinage in itself in these conditions is, of course, a form of sex-race exploitation: see Roger Bastide, "Dusky Venus, Black Apollo", Race, 3, No. 1, 1961, 10-18. In the early nineteenth century both James Read and van der Kemp married "full blacks" - a Khoi woman and a slave, respectively - though another missionary had trouble legitimating his marriage with a Khoi woman. See also Sparrman, Travels, I, 284-5.

(75) The first by Van Goens the elder; the second by Van Rheede. Whereas Van Goske (1675) had said that no half-breed children should be kept in servitude, Van Rheede said Christian, Dutch-speaking half-breeds could claim freedom at 25 for men and 21 for women.


(78) Cf. MacCrone, op. cit., passim; Walker, History, 84. See also, for example, Thunberg, Travels, II, 127; Mentzel, Description, II, 130-1.

(79) This is dealt with in my dissertation.


(81) See, generally, ibid., 249 ff. and specifically ibid., 98-100, 107.

(82) See Walker, Frontier Tradition, 4, 9; Trek, 11; De Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy, 113-4. Cf. Lobb.


(85) De Kiewiet, History, 24; Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, 12. See also De Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy, 2-3, 116; Imperial Factor, 1-2; History, 47-9, 78-9, 178-80; Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, 24, 65. Sometimes it is the strength of African society, sometimes the lack of momentum of white society (with little immigration), sometimes the efforts of the British government or the missionaries, which is stressed in explaining this. What is not stressed, however, is that the
white frontiersmen created an inclusive frontier from the beginning, and non-whites accepted this inclusion more readily than the Indians. The notion of white settler frontiers as inherently exclusive entered European thought, I believe, in the early nineteenth century as the result of American experience of the Indians, and has permeated thought on South Africa via the missionaries (especially John Philip) and the thoughts of British officials. (van Jaarsveld, Afrikaner Interpretation, 7.)

(86) De Kiewiet, Imperial Factor, 2; History, 48.

(87) See R. H. Pearce, The Savages of America (Baltimore, 1953). See also Jordan, op. cit., 22, 89-91, 162-3, 169, 239-40, 477-81. Jefferson's attitude to Negroes, whom he regarded as almost certainly inherently inferior (and was the first American to be so explicit), and to Indians, in whom there are qualities of savage virtue, is classic.


(89) On van der Stel, see for example Walker, History, 60-61. See also Van Imhoff (YRS 1; Moodie, Afscribben), 1743; Cloppenburg (Journal, Cape Archives), 1868; Swellengrebel (Journal in Suid-Afrika, Sept. 1932, 9, 131-7), 1739-1751; Van Plettenberg (Belang. Hist. Dok., 1-11), 1778; Beyers, Kaappro Patriote, 12, 230 (citing memorials of 1779, 1784); "Replies of Van Ryneveld ... 1797" (Transvaal Journal of Secondary Education, Sept-Oct 1931); and even Lichtenstein, an explicit "friend" of the Boers in contrast to Barrow. This is an incomplete list - derived from Walker and MacCrone rather than directly - and these sources need to be examined as documents of intellectual history if we are to have a more sophisticated appraisal of frontier life.

(90) See, for example, van Jaarsveld, Afrikaner Interpretation, 117-24.

(91) On these questions, see particularly H. N. Smith, Virgin Land: the American West as Symbol and Myth (Vintage, 1950); R. Welte, "The Frontier West as Image of American Society: Conservative Attitudes Before the Civil War", Miss. Valley Hist. Review, 46 (1959-60), 593-614. Hofstadter, Progressive Historians, esp. 71-93.

(92) See van Jaarsveld, Afrikaner Interpret., passim. See esp. ibid., 133. An interesting example of how this penetrated English-speaking historiography may be seen by comparing Walker on the frontiersmen at the end of the eighteenth century: "their characteristics became still more marked during the two generations of isolation and dispersion which followed the fall of the van der Stels" (History, 1928 ed., 69 - already influenced by writers such as Fouche and van der Walt); "and already the colonial-born in the outlying parts were calling themselves Afrikaners in contrast to the semi-foreign Hollander officials at the Castle" (History, 1962 ed., 66 - based on Franken's article on Hendrick Bibault in Die Huisgenoot, September 21, 1928).

(93) For the unromanticized treatment of these events, see Marais, Maynier and the First Boer Republic (C.T., 1944); C.F.J. Muller, Die Britse Overheid en Die Groot Trek (C.T., 1949); F. A. van Jaarsveld, The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism (C.T., 1961).
On this, as opposed to the romantic wish to avoid sight of the smoke of one's neighbour's farm, see P. J. van der Merwe, Trek (C.T., 1945).

I will be dealing with this below.

Hancock, Survey, II, part 1, 10-11; part 2, 20. On the commando, see also De Kiewiet, History, 19, who argues it was "the sum of individual willingness", 49; Walker, Frontier Tradition, 8, Trek, 53-8, who argues that religion as well as the commando held them together.

MacCrone, op. cit., 101, 122-3, 124. His evidence is Sparrman, Travels, I, 198; Lichtenstein, Travels, II, 25-6, 281-2; and MacCrone's assertion that San he visited in the Kalahari remembered being called baboons by whites and Bastards.

Review in Journal of African History, XI (1970), 3, 443-5. As resistance, the continuity extends to the Khoi revolt of 1799, to the Kat River rebellion of 1851, and even to the revolt in Griqualand West of 1879 - but these were "internal rebellions" in a sense in which the earlier ones were not.

See Moodie, The Record, III, 80; A. van Jaarsveld, cited by P. J. Venter in Die Huisgenoot, March 2, 1834 (MacCrone, op. cit., 123); Marais, Maynier, 28, 36, etc.


Letters in Moodie, Record, III, 53, 82; in MacCrone, op. cit., 105-6, 123.

See MacCrone, op. cit., 124-5, quoting from Janssens in Bel. Hist. Dok., III, 251; Lichtenstein, Travels, I, 141 ff.; II, 76-7; Moodie, Record, V, 3 (Colonel Collins, 1809); and J. Kicherer, Narrative (an LMS missionary). On this question see also P. J. van der Merwe, Die Noordwaartse Beweging van die Boers voor die Groot Trek (The Hague, 1957); Marais, Cape Coloured People (Wits., 1939), 15-25; also my dissertation.

A. de Mist, Diary of a Journey (Balkema, n.d.), 30.

Walker, History, 181. Also ibid., 115; Macmillan, Cape Colour Question, 12, 67; De Kiewiet, British Colonial Policy, 10-11, 16-17, 21, 94-5, 113-4; Imperial Factor, 100, 104; History, 24, 25, 48, 74-8.

Walker, Frontier Tradition, 13. Cf. De Kiewiet, Imperial Factor, 13; History, 89, 91, 166; Macmillan, somewhat ambivalently, tends to emphasize the contempt of whites for Africans, nurtured because of a lack of conflict, embittered by war, and then transposed to the urban scene: see Cape Colour Question, 19, 24.
(106) De Kiewiet, *History*, 49. See also ibid., 19, 64, 66, 78-9, 84, 87, 179.


(111) S. D. Neumark, *Economic Influences on the South African Frontier*, 1652-1836 (Stanford, 1957). See also W. K. Hancock, "Trek", Economic History Review, 2nd Series, X, 3 (1958), 331-9, who disputes the importance of this market factor, suggesting that the proportion of subsistence v. market production is most important. Even if small, however, it might still be crucial in certain respects.


(113) There is a partial recognition of this fact in De Kiewiet, *History*, 25.


(115) Patterson, *Last Trek*, 16.

(116) As Shula Marks points in *Reluctant Rebellion*, the stereotype of enemy is correlated with exaggerated apprehension and exaggerated confidence, and this in turn is correlated with lack of knowledge of the intentions of the opposing community. Such a state of mind did exist on the eastern Cape frontier by the 1790s (see Marais, *Maynier*, 26, for example). However (a) this condition is surely mitigated to the extent that close - even
if hierarchical - relationships exist; (b) Shula Marks fails to recognize that in the case of "masters and servants" the lack of knowledge is more characteristic of the masters than the servants; (c) the syndrome, paradoxically, applies to those with whom one is associated - the Khoi and Khosa fragments of the Zuurveld in this instance, or primarily the Africans of Natal in Dr. Marks's case(?) - rather than those more distant, such as Ndlambe or Ngqika; (d) the fear of the Zulu in the case of Dr. Marks's study may be compared with the "fear of Communist invasion" characteristic of the Cold War: it was the ideological threat of domestic revolution rather than the (illusory) external threat which was the reason for the development of the ideology. It is interesting that the figure now widely regarded as the founder of British pseudo-scientific racism, Dr. Robert Knox, who introduced a new note into racist thought ("Earlier generations had sometimes despised the Africans, sometimes pitied them, but never feared them"), served as an army surgeon in South Africa in 1817-1820, the years in which Xhosa launched, under Maqana, their first real resistance to land dispossession - their expulsion across the Fish in 1812 by British troops. (Curtin, Image of Africa, 377-380. See also MacCrone, 130.)

(117) Walker, Trek, 108.

(118) Walker, History, 184-6, 197, 199.

(119) Cf. G. S. Preller, Dagboek van Louis Trichardt (1917); C. Fuller (ed.), Louis Trichardt's Trek Across the Drakensberg, 1837-8, VBS, XIII (1932); M. Nathan, Die Epos van Trichardt en Van Rensburg (1938); B. H. Dicke, "The Northern Transvaal Voortrekkers", Archives Year Book, 1941, 67-170; W. H. J. Punt, Louis Trichardt se Laaste Skof (1953). These, which I have not consulted, provide a basis for assessing this hypothesis.

(120) See references in note 11. It is significant that Jacobus Burger, one of the Volksraad party leaders both in Natal and Andries Ohrigstad, as well as Retief and (possibly) Gert Maritz, were not really "frontier" types in the conventional sense - they were comparatively wealthy colonists.


(122) C. Potgieter and N. H. Theunissen, Kommandant-General Hendrik Potgieter (1938). This biography "rescued" Potgieter from the relative obscurity and disapproval manifested towards him in other Trekker histories - but rescued him in terms of 1930s' Afrikaans values. However, it is interesting that in the western Transvaal Trekker-missionary, and probably Trekker-African, relations deteriorated from the time when Pretorius replaced Potgieter as chief authority in that area; see, for example, R. Edwards, September 4, 1849 (LMS Archives, 24/1/B).
On treatment of the Khoi, see, *inter alia*, Letters of Janssens in *Bel. Hist. Dok.*, III; Moodie, *Record*, V (Colonel Collins); Marais, *Maynier*, 70-77; Macmillan, *Cape Colour Question*, esp. Chs. III, XII. On this question, there is a great need to escape from the established sources of evidence - early missionaries, travellers in general (Degrandpre and Barrow, for example), and even from the "dramatic" incidents - the Black Circuit, for example, and to consider the question in more detail. Perhaps, after 1812, the Court records would be a valuable new source. Marais is the only person to deal with this (though only in the 1790s) through systematic archival work.

See, for example, *op. cit.*

See, as an illustration of this, K. W. Smith, "The Fall of the Bapedi in the North-Eastern Transvaal", *Journal of African History*, X, 2 (1969), 237-252. Material I have noted, but not yet written up, in the LMS archives on the western Transvaal situation in the 1840s and 1850s supports this argument. To see how this affects analysis, Smith's account of even the 1876-8 Pedi campaigns should be compared with De Kiewiet, *History*, 104; *Imperial Factor*, 100-104.


T. Davenport, *The Afrikaner Bond* (OUP, 1966), 113-118, for example, compares late nineteenth century Cape Afrikaner and British farmer racial attitudes and finds one element of difference in greater Afrikaner hostility to squatting. But, in fact, the squatting was taking place in British farming regions, and for economic reasons (see D. M. Goodfellow, *A Modern Economic History of SA*, 1931, 49-50, 69, 73-4). See also, Marks, *Reluctant Rebellion*, 21.