I propose to examine in this paper the general context of what Africans experienced in towns and industry until 1910. My approach to the question is disputable, for it is still argued today in South Africa that only birth in the towns, or thirty years' continuous residence or employment, made for urbanization. (1) Yet South Africa is not "unique" - even its colonial order is chiefly peculiar in having survived to the present - in possessing towns without root-giving and urbanizing effects.

What criteria are posited for urbanization? A definition of "urban" should indicate what "town" and "city" mean, and whether "urbanization" is separable from "urban" or from "industrialization". To use a shifting occupational and urban typology (2), or to treat as coterminous "urban", "urbanization", "industrial" and "industrialization" (3) is implicitly to exclude the problem of pre-industrial and pre-colonial urbanism in Africa. (4) In the case of Southern Africa, a definition of "urban" should take account of historical change in situations as diverse as Dithakong, Kokstad, Thaba Nchu, Aliwal North, Mochudi, Kimberley, and Johannesburg.

Some criteria advanced are too cast in the image of Bruges and Florence. Variables of the transition from medieval town to renaissance city in Europe are not necessary to the general process of urbanization. For example, the concept of a continuum of development, with the scribe marking the point of transition to the "pre-industrial city" (5), omits to consider the scope of strictly non-written records and centralizing institutions. Besides oral record-keeping, there are cases of non-literate yet elite-generating institutions - like the quipu (knot-records) of Inca cities (6), which lacked the wheel and thus another supposed criterion of urbanization - which should be placed in a universalizable theory of urbanization. An orthodoxy anchored in three Rs and a market economy, however, finds such cases merely anomalous. (7)

Another criterion advanced for urbanism, that of lacking self-sufficiency in food supply, excludes, with Yoruba towns, medieval French and English market and cathedral towns. Moreover, just as there were scribe-pivoted, non-urban societies (8), manorial units were sometimes, though wholly non-urban, not self-sufficient even in staple foods. It has been argued that the
absence of exclusive craft and trade specialization indicates conclusively that true towns were absent in pre-colonial Southern Africa. (9) Among the criteria for urbanism is scale in population or area. (10)

I consider scale of population the most fruitful single criterion, and suggest that a concentrated settlement of 5-35,000 souls is a town, and a larger settlement a city. (11) If scale — and some craft and trade specialization — determines urbanism, Dithakong was a pre-colonial and pre-industrial town and Lunda a pre-colonial and pre-industrial city. Attitudinal change and social stratification, considered below in the context of the industrial and colonial cities of Kimberley and Johannesburg, were contingent upon urbanization rather than necessary conditions of it. Demographic scale seems the most applicable of the criteria for urbanization; scale also defined the industrial context.

Industry flourished before colonization, whether copper near Windhoek or the metal specialization of BaFalon or Lombe. Not colonization but metropolitan capital brought about the replacement of pre-colonial crafts and industry by manufactured, imported goods bought with wages. (12) "Industrial society" was built, and pre-colonial industries fettered (13), through a qualitative change in the scale of applied technology.

Implicit in the unitary South Africa was a kind of export substitution. New consumer goods were purchased only by wages, and were manufactured in the metropolis or, much later, in the African-worked colonial economy. Existing African industry lost its political and economic base with its market. The transition might be illustrated by Chaka's expectations of macassar oil in the 1820s, and Moroka's bed from Heal's at Thaba Nchu some fifty years later. (14) A century after Chaka, Johannesburg slum-dwellers' first purchase was often a bed.

We should next consider what range of towns existed on the eve of Union. If the criterion of scale is accepted, pre-colonial settlements were not swollen villages. Given a resource (water) and a strategic site, these were centres of agriculture, metal-working, fortification and administration, and perhaps also foci for craft and trade specialization linkages, and for inter-African diplomacy. Population varied probably from 3-25,000. Such places as Dithakong, Kaditshwena and Moiepololo were pre-colonial and pre-industrial towns, if scale is accepted as the determinant.

During the transition to colonial and metropolitan hegemony, African towns combining market, strategic and administrative functions were more populous and extensive than colonial dorps sited often not for any pre-existent church or store but in the line of a judicial circuit. Kokstad and Thaba Nchu, and perhaps Bloemfontein, exemplified this transitional urbanism, while the dorps were more hamlets than towns.
Cape Town represented a different urbanism through its role as port and metropolitan outpost, as a centre of trade and of formal political/ideological and military power. Cape Town, like the ports of East London and Durban later, presupposed a non-urban hinterland producing raw materials. Here was an urban outpost of metropolitan Europe, not an industrial city. Cape Town's urbanism, and paternally assumptive and less harsh social relations, were not a model for urbanization inland.

The first industrial and colonial town, or arguably city, was Kimberley, though there were earlier, abortive attempts at extractive-industrial towns. (15) Kimberley was urban throughout its four glamorous decades. Clearing boisterous mythology (16), we find a town shaped by "natural" resources (17), African labour and metropolitan capital. Capital spoke of labour as "temporary", yet presumed its permanent availability: the labour "pool" or reservoir of the reserves seemed to justify the contradiction.

How may the urban historian assess colonists' perceptions of Africans, and African self-perception in towns? In defining the context of urban and industrial life in Kimberley and Johannesburg, we must look at pre-colonial African societies - and, to a lesser extent probably, at the slender impact of agrarian colonist per se - as the points from which the transition to industrial and urban life occurred. Thus, in many areas, pre-colonial African stratification, for example, was real and complex. While that reality is relatively unstudied, it is a truism that the hierarchies and apparent rigidity were observed by missionaries and Shepstonians already inured to inherited and class inequality.

In metropolitan Europe, the transition was from feudal to urban life. But pre-colonial social "arrangements" in Southern African societies were not as sealed, mystified by the rulers or closed as the stratification of pre-industrial Britain (18) and France (19). To compare extremes, in 1780 the "slave" status of a MaSarwa was not as irrevocable as the life-expectancy of a Nottingham foundling. The permeability and resilience of pre-colonial stratification perhaps eased the transition of Africans to the new society.

Men in Southern Africa were subjected to an industrial and urban order itself subsumed in a colonial order. The break was not from feudal to urban society but from complex pre-colonial societies to industrial urbanism with a colonial - even bastard-feudal - framework.

By 1910 Africans constituted the pays réal and essential infra-structure to the pays légal of the colonist. Most of the pre-colonial infra-structure was shattered or fragmented, although elements of its supra-structure continued into the industrial-urban and colonial order. Chiefs, for example, were not necessarily "traditionalists" or pawns of the imposed colonial order. Before 1878, Sekhukune's BaPedi worked in Kimberley to buy guns for wages (20),
and chiefs' influence, sometimes control, over industrial workers in towns was still evident after Union in Natal (21), Kimberley (22) and Johannesburg (23). Further, there were "natural alliances", frequently of marriage, between chiefs and the emergent urban intelligentsia. (24)

The chiefs' continuing role, like "home boy" associations, could serve not to divide Africans but to integrate them into urban life. The ambiguous supra-structural continuity was matched by a substitution, among seemingly "independent" urban industrial workers, of street community for kinship. The sentiment of fraternal help accompanying kinship was transferred from kin networks to the wider African community of the industrial-urban milieu. The transference under way was visible, for example, in job-sharing during economic depression (25) or in the taking of city orphans into neighbourhood families.

Kimberley of the 1880s presaged Johannesburg's air of cosmopolitanism and awakening African nationalism of 1910. Johannesburg, like Kimberley, was born of mineral extraction, African labour and metropolitan capital. The scale of population, however, as ultimately of capital investment, was greater. The 1904 census recorded 59,788 Africans in Johannesburg, and the 1911 census 102,411. (26) Unlike East London, or to some extent Kimberley, no reserves adjoined Johannesburg for convenient use as a de facto urban "location" or dormitory area. As a result, the city may have seemed more open to workers and intelligentsia. For example, the total insulation of miners in compounds, introduced by the magnates from Kimberley, was easier to escape from in Johannesburg.

How did the industrial towns affect African attitudes and social strata? Attitudes changed in adaptation to the tide of colonial and urban society, at first to survive and to learn, then in synthesis of the messages of the new society. In the towns, as for more than a generation before the 1880s on mission stations, "new people" experienced and developed new attitudes to formal education and mass literacy (27), relations between the sexes, consumer goods and time. Repressive legislation notwithstanding, the towns diffused relative mobility and openness.

Kimberley attracted a conspicuously urban-oriented, industrious and auto-didactic stratum of intelligentsia. This intelligentsia radiated to workers in the towns, and on colonists' farms and the reserves, new ways of relating. The Methodist church in Kimberley, built through the efforts of the Barolong chiefly family of Molema (28), and Chief Silas Molema's newspaper financing, did not clash with the self-description of Chief Silas' son-in-law, Sol Plaatje, as "a South African native workingman". (29) Sol Plaatje edited the weekly Koranta sa Becoana in Tswana and English from Mafeking, and later Tsale sa Batho ("The People's Friend") from Kimberley. (30) In less overt ways, too, the setting of Kimberley hastened the emergence of a "modern" intelligentsia. For example, the composer Benjamin Tyymashe - his father a Xhosa missionary who had met his British mother while in Scotland - ate, in a Kimberley...
mosque as a small boy, his first curry and sang communally. (31)

For the intelligentsia and the workers they aspired to represent, Johannesburg by the eve of Union had outstripped Kimberley as meeting place and market of standards and ideas. The universalist message of the new techniques acquired was often literally superficial, as with western clothes and cosmetics. Yet a girl of sixteen in a Johannesburg slum grasped the force even of surface change. "The town is better than the farm. Here we eat bread and drink tea. At the farm no money to buy these things. At the farm you can sit with one dress for six months without changing because we have no money to buy another one. In town sometimes you put on your nice dress and go out for a walk. At the farm Sundays it is quiet ... On the farm they don't wear dress like ourselves in town. They don't know what is a shoe. They never see shoes in their life. And for hats they use the top of stockings." (32)

The African voice is heard, and the "social and economic history of the African" (33) to be found in the towns, only if we take account both of the majority at the centre of the stage and of the imposed framework of their existence. Thus bread, tea, and the pass were part of the urban and industrial context for all. The "tin cow" (the substitution of timned milk for fresh milk) and patent medicines accompanied the ostensibly self-chosen attitudinal and ideological changes of the transition to the South African industrial city. The statutory regimentation of pass legislation was not complete, nor yet extended to women, but its arbitrary enforcement - part of which were sparingly bestowed certificates of exemption - impinged most upon urban Africans. The "tin cow" and the pass - as later the "nylon" (34), the tight-filled grey police pick-up vehicle of the locations - helped to condition African responses.

The colonists regarded Africans as excluded from political decision-making (35), even, after the end of African political independence, as outside the historical process. In fact, the world-view voiced by, say, Plaatje was hardly heard by 1910 beyond the "secret cities" where the majority he conceived of as his constituents lived and worked. Did the majority, in locations, "kitchens" (domestic service), and compounds, receive from the intelligentsia a world-view attuned to the industrializing, colonized society?

Certainly the intelligentsia recognized the loss of political independence and resisted further "expansion of South Africa" to the High Commission territories. (36) Plaatje claimed still to hope, after the Boer rebellion of 1914, for metropolitan ("Imperial") sovereignty or protection in South West Africa and even Zululand. (37)

Religious independency was an assertion of African capacity for self-help and not yet a safety-valve for African political frustration. The founder of the African Congregational Church,
Gardiner E. Mvuyana, was one of scores of articulate, universalist preachers who came to the Rand (often walking far) to become independents there. (36) Spiritual or religious independence appeared a viable aim. As "Ethiopianism", colonists feared it as much as a direct declaration of political independence.

The issue of economic independence was unresolved. A. K. Soga and Plaatje saw that the colonists' political priority of "eternal" hegemony could not allow a dual or vestigially independent African economic power. But the mirage of "business achievement", perhaps with injections from United States missionaries (39), divided the urban intelligentsia for another generation.

Political, religious or economic independence was not practicable because of the unitary nature of political control in South Africa. The division between the rulers and the ruled ensured that independence - however compartmented - was a non-starter until the dependence, heightened by urbanization and industrialization, of the ruling whites on the rightless, black workers was effectively realized by the representatives of the blacks.

We have briefly considered African attitudes and stratification, together with the intelligentsia's world-view as transformed by the urban, and especially industrial-urban, context. Two non-African views of the time in part shaped the imposed framework, and perhaps even African, responses.

The sentiment of a unitary African "nation" expressed by the intelligentsia and, on occasion, even by mine-workers (40) may have been hastened by the impact of colonial immigration from metropolitan, industrial Britain. There were some 332,000 colonists in 1875, 1,117,000 in 1904. Members of the metropolitan "labour aristocracy" arrived with an arbitrary classification of "skill" (41), a receptivity to social-imperialist slogans, and often a resentful distaste for the majority of "unskilled" workers in metropolitan society. Colonial attitudes were soon shared by these immigrants. (42) Forearmed with an attitude more political, or even psychological than economic in motivation, the "white working class" occupied supervisory posts almost as overseers or guards over African workers. Their wage was never less than 10 times that of their charges. (43)

The colonial agrarian "Kaffir labour" syndrome further defined the British immigrants' privileged status. Their exclusion from all manual work (called "real work" by Xadalie) further excluded the "white workers" from membership of the proletariat. Their inclusion in the franchise, the pays légal, continued another colonial agrarian tradition, that of herrenvolk egalitarianism. (44) Their exclusion from "Kaffir labour" and inclusion in the franchise marked the "ceiling" demanded by the "white workers". In practice, the immigrants, like the pre-industrial bywoner, became propertyless colonists.
In Kimberley and Johannesburg another pre-conditioning attitude towards urbanization influenced propertyed colonists and metropolitan bourgeoisie. Many comfortable and charitable rentiers in Britain were unnerved, like E. H. Brookes in South Africa, by the squalor of unplanned urbanization. They feared the "abyss" (45) of unorganized, combustible, hydra-headed and hereditarily "degenerate" poor. The bourgeoisie saw in the unindividuated new townsmen a lurking threat to his own "security", to the stability of his own order. (46) The poor should be prevented from combining to change their condition; perhaps, if "society" could shake off its practical dependence, prevented altogether by segregation, even sterilization. (47) The applicability of the metropolitan view in the colonizing, industrializing polity of South Africa, where fewer restraints operated vis-à-vis the governed, helped the advocates of segregation.

Trollope, in a more generous phase of metropolitan capitalism, welcomed the burgeoning industrial town of Kimberley, expecting the rise and political incorporation of African labour. Even in 1905 the joker in the colonial pack was still metropolitan social differentiation. Thus John Tengo Jabavu was asked: "Do you know that in certain places in England, like Newcastle for instance, after certain hours miners from the pits are not allowed to walk in the paths in certain thoroughfares?" "I do not know." "Yes, there is [sic]. Take a place like East London, where Mrs. Jabavu may be walking out in her best attire and a man with a red blanket is allowed to spoil her dress in brushing past her. Don't you think that man ought to be put off the path?" (48)

Most non-African observers viewed the new concentrations of Africans as, at best, a tragedy, more usually as a long-term threat to colonial hegemony. The "reserves of the white man" were invaded. The spectre of "detribalization" had destroyed an ideally "organic", truly rural past. As remedy and sole alternative to unplanned urbanization, the prescription of "building up the reserves" spread from the Cape and Natal to Kenya, colouring "rural development" programmes decades later. The morality, realism or acceptability to Africans of either an invented past held up as a static future, or of denying progressive qualities even in urban society as it existed, were unquestioned, still less considered in detail.

The tragic nature of African urbanization and of industrial proletarianization was also viewed by some whites in the light of the theory of urban anomic. This stemmed partly from Maine's postulation of a transition from "early" status-based society with bonds of kinship to "modern" and more impersonal, contract-bound society. (49) From Maine, among others, derived the concepts of role-differentiation in the larger society, of objective and subjective alienation rather than anonymity, of a felt immobilisation fused with the potentiality of a more open society. These concepts exposed the hard integuments of urbanization as it took place, yet looked not to an imposed return to the cottage or kraal but to the transformation of actual towns within the urban and industrial context.
In South Africa, however, the higher theorists of urbanization were as sure as the "white workers" that African townspeople were anomalous and contaminated. Blue books of the 1890s, and E. H. Brookes in their train, grieved in general terms over "the demoralization of the Bantu, resulting from their employment on the goldfields ... the increase of immorality and drunkenness, the loss of respect for elders, the adoption of European clothing and diseases". (50) Twenty years after Union, sympathetic colonists advised Africans unemployed in the towns to work on farms, unless they were town-born, in which case they were often presumed unemployable, "spoilt", "knowing", "cheeky", "location loafers". (51) The exotic conditions of urbanization and immiseration were to be replaced von oben by retribalized villages fuelling labour-hungry agrarian colonists.

To what extent was the imposed framework of "native policy" in the towns influenced by the non-African views of urbanization? To assess the question adequately, we need to analyse attempts at policy formulation and implementation. But the conjunction of African political rightlessness and the lack of concern on the part of the ruling whites for the conditions of life and work of the ruled is generally apparent.

Thus, months after the imperial capture of Johannesburg, a metropolitan-proposed municipal franchise along property, not colour, lines was amended in deference to the nominated Johannesburg Council. "The continuance of the old caste system in city government in so far as the distinction between white ruler and black subject was concerned" (52), and a concern to enfranchise all colonists, prevailed.

In 1903 Johannesburg's oldest location was "expropriated at great cost". "In 1904 the buildings on the site were still standing, and Natives and Coloured people were still living there in squalor comparable to that of the worst English or Scottish slums of the same period. Then plague broke out. Within a few hours, the inhabitants had been moved to temporary dwellings near the Klipspruit sewage farm, some twelve miles from the town, and the slums had been deliberately burnt to the ground. This drastic action, and the establishment of a native location at the sewage farm, were almost the only attempts that the council made until 1918 to deal with the question of housing" (53) Africans. The spur of contagion, which, like "unrest", threatened colonial property and life, alone prompted constructive concern. The removal of Africans from a plague spot to the vicinity of a sewage farm came from the same stock of ruling assumptions as the imprisonment and forced labour of 150 "bucket boys", municipal sanitary workers, who had gone on strike in 1919.

Johannesburg was to some extent the laboratory where, in the context of a nominally and statutorily dichotomous society, the future development of the South African proletariat was projected. The industrializing "new country", divided into "nations" of colonists and proletarians by a horizontal class-colour line (54),
was patterned in the experience and attitudes of the majority, as in the assumptions of the ruling minority, on the industrial-urban town. Kimberley passed the first law affecting sex between "the two nations", a law on prostitution in the growing industrial city. Encapsulating the apparent dichotomy, colonists' villas and "mere shanties, often nothing more than hovels, constructed out of bits of old packing-case lining, flattened kerosene tins, sacks and other scraps and odds and ends" (55), were to co-exist, to be served and to serve, in the radiating city.

The extent and early existence of urban and industrial ways of relating among the Africans seem to me underestimated. An effect of this underestimation would be to minimize the preparedness and maturity of the black industrial proletariat in contemporary South Africa. Nevertheless, even if the concept of an urban intelligentsia's world-view on the eve of Union is made concrete by sifting what reaches us of African voices - sometimes, probably, playing to several galleries, as when giving evidence to Commissions - and finding shared concerns, what is the concept's urban and industrial resonance?

An explanation of the present accommodatory policy of some Venda towards the Republic of South Africa indicates a possible answer. Some rural Venda regard "all whites, regardless of political affiliations, as a temporary inconvenience, to be exploited in a special way until they can be dispensed with. They realize, as do few urban Africans, that white people need them more than they need whites". (56) By 1910 the urban and industrial intelligentsia knew of white dependence on the African majority, and that separation masked hegemony. Towns and mines taught this as quickly as a spell in the demuded reserves. But the other premise, that colonists were "temporary", even dispensable en bloc, would not have been stated out loud or even appeared conceivable in the very centres where colonists were also massed. (57) The impression of the inevitability, invulnerability, and even perpetuity, of the colonial order for the majority was enhanced during industrialization. The juxtaposed inequality of shack and villa might have looked permanent to the inhabitants of each dwelling.

Africans were drawn to the industrial towns, which were the chosen terrain of colonists and of metropolitan capital. Legality and usurpation competed in the minds of the African intelligentsia as explanations of their situation. Their belief in progress and unreciprocated good faith encouraged a long view, and hopes of economic if not political rights (58) without decolonization. Petitions, even suffragette-like civil disobedience, were contained with political and industrial organization within the long view. But more "unconstitutional" resistance was appraised as backward, even ungrateful to the colonial order, and in any event quite unrealistic.

The only group, apart from unarmed and militant demonstrators faced by police sticks and guns, which by Union thought in terms of armed resistance were the amaleta gangs. (59) Their use
of guns in the towns was by itself negative, if not meriting the despair with which most Africans regarded it. Joined to the humane and universalist world-view of the intelligentsia, illegal tactics might have worked within the industrial and urban context to transform it. As R. V. Selope Thema remarked: "Lawlessness on the part of Europeans would lead to lawlessness on the part of the Natives." (60) Legal statutes passed by a laager legislature led to the outlawry, half a century after Union, of the Johannesburg solicitor, Nelson Mandela. He could "only live the life of an outlaw because the Government has so decreed to use the law to impose a state of outlawry on him". (61)

We have considered urbanism in relation to Southern Africa before Union, the effect of the industrial town on African attitudes, and colonists' views of African urbanization. By 1910 some Africans, already accustomed to towns and industry, had realized they were the motor of the industrializing political economy.

Notes

(1) e.g. D. Page, The Urbanisation of the Bantu Homelands of the Transvaal (Pretoria, 1966).


(3) e.g. D. Forde, ed., Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization south of the Sahara (Paris, 1956).


(5) G. Sjoberg, The Pre-Industrial City (Glencoe, 1960).


(8) For example, medieval Iceland.

Even after the first simultaneous count in 1904, special problems arise for South Africa from the under-enumeration of Africans, especially in "urban areas" and from "economy", the ground upon which the censuses of 1918, 1926, 1931 and 1941 counted only the white population. In estimating area, de facto African urban settlement was wider than the fluctuating urban administrative limits (Bureau of Statistics, Urban and Rural Population of South Africa 1904-1960 (Pretoria, n.d. [1968]), pp. iii, x-xiii.

E. Stanhope noted in 1886 "the practice adopted by certain Bechuana chiefs in keeping their people crowded together in one town" (E. Stanhope to Sir Hercules Robinson, 29 October 1886, in Botswana National Archives [S.304/6]). The terminology differentiating between metropolitan and African experience was later; in the case of Bechuana, "native town" and occasionally "large native village".

As Sir George Grey had hoped.

cf. "Today we have no blacksmiths. The clever people came and their raw materials were cheap... My grandfather in my mother's line was the proper man to make copper bangles... very light ones... He was doing this only for honourable people of many tribes..." (interview with Amos Kgamanyane Pilane [Mochudi, Botswana], May 1971).


For example, Marabastad and New Smitsdorp. A contemporary example of an extractive-industrial town with its population on one pay-roll is Tsumeb in South West Africa.


The motive continued for "foreign natives" until after Union.


For example, compulsory and regimented labour in Kimberley in 1907; wages from this went to the chief, and built Molepolele's main church.


(25) e.g. South African Institute of Race Relations, Annual Report 1932 (Johannesburg, n.d.), p. 29.

(26) On the continuing issue of under-enumeration, I was told in old Pimville (formerly Klipspruit), Soweto, in February 1971: "You could not know how many people live here unless you tore each house up by its roof."

(27) e.g. R. E. Phillips, The Bantu in the City (Lovedale, 1938), pp. 215, 313.

(28) e.g. Koranta ea Becoana, August 1903.


(34) e.g. R. E. Phillips, op. cit., p. 250; C. D. Themba and G. S. Naransamy, Drum, April 1956.


(36) e.g. R. V. Selope Thema, "From Cattle Herding to the Editor's Chair" (unpubl. MS); speech reported in Star (Johannesburg), 16 May 1934.

(37) cf. the plea for a British mandate over South West Africa in Tshekedi Khama, ed., The Case for Bechuanaland (New York, 1945).


(39) e.g. S. V. H. Muhluli, The Development of the African (Marianhill, 1935), pp. 3, 58.

(40) e.g. "Natives want more ' mali'...", article in Rand Daily Mail, 9 July 1913; "Mine Natives and Strikes: Significant Utterances", article in Transvaal Leader, 23 July 1913.

e.g. O. Doughty, Early Diamond Days (London, 1963), pp. 188, 184.

The differential was to double during this century.


e.g. E. Hellmann, Problems of Urban Bantu Youth (Johannesburg, 1940), p. 130.


Ibid., p. 70.

cf. M. S. Evans, op. cit., p. 15.


Work-songs in African languages sometimes expressed overt resistance, utilizing traditional literary allusiveness and irony.

For some optimists, even loss of the possibility of urban freehold was compensated by the setting up of location advisory boards. Attempts at industrial action and continuous industrial organization before 1910, and "economism" - hopes of a slice of freehold while foregoing the vote - need study.
