

THE PAN-AFRICAN POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTH  
AFRICA, 1945-1970: AN INTRODUCTORY OUTLINE<sup>(1)</sup>

by

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Although the policies pursued by the various governments of South Africa since World War II differed from each other, there was considerable continuity and the objectives pursued remained, for most of the period, the same; so there is definitely a sense in which these policies can be regarded as stages in the development of a single, overall policy.

The main aims of that policy were conceived before the political changes which decolonization initiated in Africa. The Pan-African policy, therefore, presupposed the continuation of the imperial political order in Africa more or less as it had been in 1945-46, and even when independence came the residual influence of the former colonial powers remained important for South African Africa policies. Although modifications of the policy were forced upon the South African governments, the basic aim remained what it had always been: to establish in Africa a political context (2) ideologically and organizationally favourable to white minority rule in South Africa, "to preserve Africa for white Christian civilization", or, another way of putting the same thing, white domination.

While this basic aim of the Africa policy was merely expressive of the structure of the society and polity of South Africa itself, and its historical relationship with the rest of the international system, the development of the Africa policy, i.e. its cumulative, directional change, was the product of the dynamic interaction between South African "pan-Africanism" and oppositional forces in Africa and elsewhere. The development of the ideology of black pan-Africanism in the post-war world alongside the diffusion within the international system of an egalitarian, multi-racial ethic engendered a conflict situation in the Africa-South Africa relationship.

The conflict processes involved included the clearer definition of goals and the search for optimum strategies. This involved the creation of new instrumentalities for the implementation of policy (and the expansion and modification of

existing ones), and the mobilization (and functional integration) of latently policy-supportive extra-governmental groups: e.g. some university departments, businessmen and business organizations.

The present paper attempts an exposition of the Africa policies, *ex ante*, of the various Union and Republican governments; terminally, an attempt is made to describe the kind of theoretical framework which might profitably be employed to comprehend the development of the Pan-African policy.

### The Africa Policy of Smuts (3)

Smuts' post-war term as prime minister was brief, but it formed a background against which succeeding governments shaped their own policies. Smuts' Africa policy was conditioned by the political outlook which he had developed over long years in political office, and embodied the distinctive elements of that outlook. Thus, for example, Smuts hoped to achieve his aims in Africa by close collaboration with the British Empire and Commonwealth and by making generous concessions to the British settler communities north of South Africa.

Ever since the days of the Botha government Smuts had believed in the "rounding off" of South Africa's territory by incorporation or annexation of neighbouring territories. In 1946 he restated these sentiments as having been the basis of his whole policy when he said:

"... the whole of my striving has been to ensure the knitting together of the parts of Africa, the parts of Southern Africa which belong to each other; parts that must work together for a stable future on the continent of Africa." (4)

The existence of a common, overall political system for all these territories would have facilitated the achievement of this rounding off. So far as British territories were concerned, they commonly belonged to the Empire and Commonwealth, but its composition in 1945, or at any time for that matter, did not provide an organizational framework for unified control and government of the territories of southern and central Africa. Smuts therefore hoped that at the end of the war the British Empire would be reorganized into regional groups with more power to the regions, although strong links would remain between the regions and the centre. (5) Southern Africa would constitute one such region. What "Southern Africa" would comprise was not quite clear: it might extend as far as Kenya, but it would certainly include Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the High Commission Territories, and the Union.

Beyond these notions Smuts' policy towards Africa was vague. True, he saw Western Europe as having a civilizing mission in Africa and thought of Africa as politically an extension of Europe. North of the Sahara his policy might be expected to be dictated by the plans of the Empire and Commonwealth, as it had been during the war - that area not being a specific preoccupation of the Union Government as such, but of the Union Government as part of the British imperial system, of which Smuts greatly approved.

The greatest setback for Smuts' policy was, of course, the fact that in South Africa itself there were very many questions arising from the British connection which were not solved: such, for example, was the language question, which had been one of the reasons why Southern Rhodesian whites had voted against incorporation in 1923. The language issue was only part of the often acrimonious political competition between Afrikaner nationalists and the pro-British elements headed by Smuts, a factor which may have affected Southern Rhodesian attitudes. (6) Increasingly, after the initial failure, Afrikaner nationalism became, for responsible British and Colonial authorities, a major disincentive to a union of the sort Smuts hoped for. (7) Besides, British governments and administrators had long been developing policies and implementing them in these territories, and there were local matters of government which could not always be, and certainly were not after the 1920s, made to wait for the grand reorganization of the British African Empire. The "solution" of these problems in the Rhodesias tended less and less to be oriented towards the south.

In addition to all these factors there was the apprehension always felt in the Colonial and Dominions Offices about the native policies of white settlers and the disapproval of the Union's native policies, symbolized by the British refusal to hand over the High Commission Territories to South Africa. The "Native Question" more than anything else would, even if the plans had become otherwise practicable, have created enormous difficulties for the realization of Smuts' plans, though one supposes that those difficulties need not have been decisive. (8) In the event, however, the Smuts plans never really neared implementation, and there is reason to believe that Smuts was sensitive to the difficulties over native policy and would not have pressed the imperial government on a matter on which it could not yield. After 1945, Smuts himself would probably not have favoured the opening up of the question of native policy which any precipitate demand or agitation for colonial reorganization would have necessitated. Besides, he was under severe criticism from Afrikaner nationalists for allegedly conspiring to create a Kafir State merely to thwart their republican aspirations. (9)

In the last three years of his premiership Smuts restricted his African diplomacy to the co-ordination of services between South Africa and British territories, leaving the question of political co-operation out of the reckoning for the while, although there were loud voices in favour of it in Rhodesia. (10)

At any rate, so soon after the war there were more urgent tasks for imperial statesmanship. Previous experience, too, had shown that the idea of uniting territories should be approached with great circumspection.

With respect to South West Africa, the same difficulties did not arise. In the uncertainties created by the demise of the League of Nations, Smuts could take advantage of the collapse of the German Empire (11) to seek international sanction for the incorporation of South West Africa in the Union. British support for Smuts' plea for incorporation was perhaps explicable by the very good relations between Britain and South Africa at the time. Also, while all sorts of problems might arise with the transfer of colonies where Britain was exercising the functions of "trusteeship", the South West Africa question was one of foreign policy and was perhaps not considered to be subject to the sorts of conditions attending the transfer of colonies. It was not a "territory in which British rule had definitely been established" - in the language of earlier British colonial diplomacy.

Smuts obtained British support for the incorporation of South West Africa, but his request was turned down by the United Nations.

When Smuts went in 1948, after an electoral defeat, his Africa policy had failed for it depended on the special relationship between South Africa and the British Empire and Commonwealth, which, among other things, Afrikaner nationalists had, by implication at least, asked the white South African electorate to reject.

#### Malan and the African Charter

The policy towards Africa which Malan pursued differed from Smuts' in important respects. Although Malan hoped to use the Commonwealth connection to achieve his aims in Africa (12), he had no time for the political unification of British territories. He had long expressed his disapproval, as a nationalist, of being imprisoned in the British imperial kraal.

Malan also "objected" to the imperialist politics which Smuts seemed to represent, and had regarded the Treaty of Versailles (which gave South Africa the South West Africa mandate) as a Treaty of Wrong ('n Traktaat van Onreg). (13) Yet, with Germany out of the way and in the face of opposition to South Africa's policies, Malan changed his position after the war and favoured the annexation of South West Africa. Against critics of his government's policies in South West Africa, he later complained that they violated South Africa's rights under the Treaty of Versailles (albeit 'n traktaat van onreg)! (14) By the South West Africa Representation Act of 1949 he took the first step towards incorporation, in defiance of the U.N.



Like Smuts, he believed in the white mission civilatrice in Africa - a heavenly mandate, to be fulfilled whether Africans liked it or not - but his attitude was more openly racist. He sought to make Africa secure for "white Christian civilization" by keeping power firmly in white hands (15), and he much regretted the speed of developments in West Africa where Kwame Nkrumah was made Leader of Government Business in the Gold Coast. (16) As the movement towards decolonization gathered pace, Malan reflected:

"There will have to be a psychological revolution. One finds in the world today, and especially in England, that there is a sickly sentimentality in regard to the black man. Someone in authority told me in England ... that one can say with truth that they venerate a black skin. The position is that under these circumstances I fear that the people of Europe, the white nations of Europe, are becoming decadent. (17)

Malan hoped to persuade the European powers with possessions in Africa to strengthen the position of the white man by excluding from Africa all Asians and communists. This, he claimed, would be in the interests of the blacks as well. (18)

In addition to the aims already stated, Malan hoped to prevent the arming of natives and their use in European wars, to prevent them from being a danger to themselves and to other nations in Africa. (19) For the purposes of his "African Charter", Malan divided Africa into two parts: Africa south of the Sahara, which was "undeveloped" and where the notion of the civilizing mission had particular relevance, and where as far as possible he sought to achieve unity of purpose among the powers and to harmonize their native policies; the rest, North Africa, was important as the "gateway to Africa" and should therefore be protected against the communist peril. (20)

Like Smuts and his followers, Malan and his supporters conceived of South Africa as the giant of Africa and wished for it a role of importance in African affairs. The idea that South Africa would be very important in a future war because of its geographical position, and that, because of its industrial power, it would be the workshop of the West in a future European war, was a widely held belief among Afrikaner nationalists at the time.

The increase in the Union's African trade which the war had brought about encouraged the belief that the African market was of great importance for the Union's developing industries. Accordingly, it was generally agreed by most white opinion leaders that the African market should be nursed. (21) As Africa's industrial giant, the Union would export manufactures in exchange for raw materials from the rest of Africa. (22)

In practice, the African Charter would be implemented by the creation of an organizational framework for consultation and co-operation among the powers. (23) Thus Malan gave diligent support to such scientific and technical organizations as the C.C.T.A. and the C.S.A. (and their various subordinate organizations), while the defence of Africa would be secured by means of a defence organization analogous to NATO and SEATO - an idea which failed to gain support outside South Africa, Malan's defence minister, Mr. Erasmus, having to content himself with the then much less meaningful Simonstown Agreement. (24)

The Union Government failed to gain agreement on the banning of Africans from military training, the South African Minister of Economic Affairs, as though by studied demonstration, being provided with a "native" guard of honour during his visit to the Belgian Congo. (25)

The Union Government, traditionally nationalist and republican, found itself advocating imperialism in Africa and eager to exclude all anti-imperialists. Of these, the U.N. was among the worst culprits, for it was the organizational expression at the highest level of those aspects of articulate world opinion to which Malan so objected. It was interfering "directly and indirectly"

"by simply regarding all people as equal and all nations, whether they are ripe for it or not, must have certain human rights, as they call it, including the franchise ... That is why one has this unrest in Africa ... because people were brought under the impression by UNO that they were oppressed". (26)

While seeking British co-operation in implementing his Africa policy, Malan was concerned to reduce British influence in southern Africa, in fulfilment of his nationalist obligations but also to ensure that similar native policies were pursued in the territories which were so close to South Africa. He argued with vigorous rhetoric for the transfer of the High Commission territories because of the condemnation of South African race policies which the refusal implied (27), but perhaps also to impress Afrikaner nationalists who were worried by, what seemed to them, his hesitancy on the question of the republic. (28)

The African Charter was never adopted by the imperial powers, and when Malan's term ended the trend of events in Africa was contrary to what he had wished. The question of race relations had been fundamental to Malan's Africa policy, but the racial practices of the Union Government were, for Malan as for Smuts, a disabling factor in their attempts to influence policy in Africa.

Après Malan. Growing Isolation

In the Strijdom government which succeeded Malan's, Eric Louw was given the portfolio of external affairs. Like Strijdom, he was a lawyer. Louw also had long experience in international affairs and, having been economics minister in the previous government, he took particular interest in the Union's trade with Africa. As minister of external affairs Louw took great interest in the Africa policy. He had himself visited a number of African territories in 1949. On assuming office he reorganized the external affairs department and developed its African section. In the same spirit he took considerable interest and pride in the role South Africa was playing through the C.C.T.A., the C.S.A. and F.A.M.A., in the affairs of the continent. (29)

Strijdom, for his part, was regarded by most as an extremist republican and was completely against a soft native policy. He it was who championed the white baasskap element in Afrikaner nationalism.

Eric Louw's term at the Ministry of External Affairs coincided with the rapid changes brought about by decolonization, and the earlier idea of leadership in Africa which had been part of both Smuts' and Malan's vision gave no clear mandate in the rapidly changing conditions. South African politicians called for more leadership by the Union Government in Africa, but it was unclear what this should mean beyond a few attempts to expand trade here and open a mission there.

Strijdom's republicanism was tending, too, to isolate South Africa from the rest of British Africa, and the anti-Afrikaner sentiments which Huggins had earlier exhibited were given a new relevance. There was no doubt, in the early years of Strijdom's ministry at least, that the South African Government and the Federation Government and Britain took their differences on native policy seriously. Afrikaner nationalists were therefore glad about the setback to "partnership" which the Kafue electoral result of 1955 represented, Die Burger calling it "a scandal in the family" - the British family. Hopes were somewhat revived that South Africa could still obtain co-operation and solidarity among whites - at least in southern Africa. (30)

In keeping with the African Charter, Louw was determined to counteract what he called Indian infiltration in Africa, deciding to reopen the South African consulate in Madagascar, which had earlier been closed because there was not enough work, in order to counter Indian "activity" there. (31)

As far as defence was concerned, the Union Government still hoped to achieve an African defence alliance, although it soon became apparent that neither this nor the ban on "native" armies could be achieved. Defence, however, obsessed the defence minister at this time, particularly on account of the

developments in missiles perhaps, so that between 1955 and 1957 he pursued his alliance policy with considerable diligence.

The creation of self-governing and, later, independent black states in Africa called for a response from the Union Government. Attempts were made to adjust to these changes. Louw, for example, sent a telegram of congratulation to Sudan when it gained its independence; and, as self-governing states came into being, their co-operation was sought although the Union Government made it clear that diplomatic representation could not be effected for some time. For, as Louw put it, there were some long-standing conventions in South Africa which could not be changed over-night. (32) The Ghanaian Government, at least, seemed to "understand" these difficulties. (32a) Further, Louw considered that it would be better to establish good relations first and only later initiate diplomatic relations - in order to avoid the replication of the Union Government's experience with the Russian mission. (33)

The adjustment of the Union Government to the changes occurring in Africa was not complete. The Union Government still tried to resist the pressures of decolonization and looked with apprehension at increased U.N. participation in African affairs. (34) For all the difficulties over the British connection, Strijdom hoped that the Central African Federation would become a powerful white state and that the process of abdication would stop further north. (35) Louw hoped the emergent African states would favour the West, and warned them against accepting communist aid. (36) It was hoped that the Western colonial powers would maintain their "influence" and that "communism" should be fought through them in the black world. Accordingly, South Africa under Strijdom (morally) supported the colonial powers in their own difficulties: France over Algeria, Portugal over Goa, and, to a lesser extent, England over Suez.

With growing external (and internal) opposition to the South African regime - this was the era of Bandung - the support of colonial powers for the Union against its detractors tended, however, to become dilatory. Yet Louw, like Smuts before him, continued to believe that South Africa had powerful friends who would, if the worst came to the worst, throw in their weight with her. (37)

Strijdom died in 1958 and his place was taken by his disciple, Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, the self-styled expert on "native affairs". Dr. Verwoerd left external affairs with Eric Louw until the latter's retirement in 1963.

The early years of Verwoerd's ministry were taken up with the Republic and with internal opposition to the government's policies. Increasing criticism of South Africa's internal policies and the Republican campaigns, along with differences over policies towards Africa, focussed attention on the doubtful value of apartheid South Africa as a partner to the Western colonial powers in Africa. British-South African relations became strained, with



difficulties mounting to a climax in 1960 when Macmillan warned the South African parliament of the "wind of change". (38)

The Sharpeville massacre a few weeks later bought the government of South Africa under considerable criticism from the rest of the world, and especially from African and Asian states. What co-operation there had been between South African and African governments came abruptly to a halt and the boycott campaign was under way. (39) The South African government decided to withdraw from the multi-racial British Commonwealth in 1961 rather than make concessions. Macmillan's assertion that if the South African prime minister had been prepared to make concessions rather than adhere steadfastly to dogma elicited from Dr. Verwoerd the embittered rejoinder, which clarified the conflict of policies:

"I see as a result of his [Mr. Macmillan's] policy the white man disappearing from Kenya in the course of time or being submerged ... I fear for the position in the Central African Federation as long as this theory of the British Government [of making small concessions] remains the policy for that country ... the policy that Britain is following in Africa does not do justice to the White man, and ultimately will not be best for the black man either." (40)

Dr. Verwoerd explained that he did not object to Britain's policy with regard to countries "like Nigeria and Ghana", which were "undoubtedly wholly Black man's countries" and should have become free. He wished to do the same "for the Native areas of my country as it becomes possible". (41)

The old question of the High Commission Territories came up again. Verwoerd pointed out that the multi-racial policy was being applied there, whereas South Africa would have made those territories black men's countries.

From 1961 onward, as all the colonial powers except Portugal "abdicated", South Africa would have to find new partners in Africa. The ambitious self-conceptions underlying the Africa policy were now less in evidence and the task of the policy was now less to instruct imperial powers than to defend and secure the acceptability of white South Africa itself in Africa.

Although the hostility of black states was said to be a transitory feature of the political scene, there was more concern to hasten the solution of the domestic native problem which, ever since Bandung - and increasingly in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties - Afrikaner nationalist intellectuals thought a necessary precondition of a successful Africa policy. (42)



The official response was to hasten the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa (Tomlinson Commission) of 1955. Those recommendations included the provision of a degree of local self-government in the reserves. The creation of these "self-governing" units (Bantustans) was accounted the "positive" side of the total apartheid that Verwoerd was introducing. (43)

While South African ministers might dismiss the dangers of isolation from African governments as containing no threat of real harm to white South Africa in the practical future, there was disquiet when it seemed that even the Western powers were joining in the chorus of execration, although the latter were cautious so to "juggle with synonyms" as not to commit themselves to action against South Africa. Verwoerd thought that South Africa should be prepared to accept ideological isolation:

"Our strength lies in isolating ourselves from those policies in which we do not believe, and which we believe will lead to the disappearance of the White man's rule in South Africa ... But that does not mean that we shall be isolated as a state from all those other states." (44)

South Africa had much to offer to the West economically and strategically, it was generally considered, and indeed even the African states would in time become "mature" and "realistic" enough to accept South African co-operation and technical assistance.

#### The later Verwoerd and B. J. Vorster

##### "Un temps dominé par les considerations matérielles"

The withdrawal of the colonial powers from Africa had two complementary effects of which South African governments could not wholly disapprove: it removed the organizational framework for opposing South African pan-Africanism, while at the same time it removed an apple of discord in the otherwise friendly relations of South Africa and the West - in prospect, at least. Just as South Africa could no longer hope to achieve her ends mainly by using the white colonial powers, she could, by the same token, proceed with such of her plans as were still relevant without fear of opposition that really mattered, and without jeopardizing her relations with the white Western colonial powers, who seemed eager to "appease" the "Afro-Asians". Dr. Verwoerd himself remarked apropos of the High Commission Territories:

"I sometimes wonder whether our troubles are not greater while Britain remains guardian, because, by taking into consideration her international interests, she may perhaps act differently from the

course that would be followed by a local government which has only to take its more restricted interests into consideration." (45)

By such considerations Dr. Verwoerd was led to contemplate a multi-racial political and economic commonwealth to which even parts of the disintegrating Central African Federation might belong. It was as if the walpurgnacht of Sharpeville had turned the African Charter on its head, although it was only the strategies which had markedly changed, not the aims.

Dr. Verwoerd was to reveal that, anticipating the failure of the British policy in Central Africa, he had exercised considerable restraint by not giving vent to his views, even though the politicians of the Federation had taken the liberty to say of South Africa what they pleased.

"I always sought to avoid comment on what I regarded as their business ... in order to retain their friendship." (46)

Verwoerd, who had readily collaborated with the short-lived Katanga regime (47), later showed his friendship to an equally unpopular regime (in Africa) by violating the sanctions imposed on Southern Rhodesia when its white government declared it, illegally, independent. South Africa affirmed its neutrality, but it was a neutrality which would be credible only to an extreme Grotian and one who also believed the white Southern Rhodesian cause to be just. (48) Further, as an earnest of his commonwealth designs, he met the African Chief Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho in Cape Town. It was about this time that an internal revolt within the National Party began, but Verwoerd was struck down by an assassin. Verwoerd was widely seen in Africa and elsewhere personally to embody all that to which the black peoples of the world had for so long, and particularly after 1945, objected so much. That image was much sharper among black people in South Africa. In the words of his biographer:

"For South Africa's African, Coloured and Indian population ... Verwoerd was an evil genius, a smooth, imperturbable, relentless despot, driven by his racist obsessions to inflict endless cruelties upon those who were not white." (49)

And yet he was part of a long tradition not deracinated by the hand of a single assassin.

Verwoerd's assassination was merely one of a series of violent acts since Sharpeville. The most distinctive feature of the period of the outward-looking policy is that it is a period in which

violence, official and unofficial, by the state and by its critics has become an intensely present actuality and contingency in South African political life, more perhaps than at any other time since Sharpeville. The intensification of violent activity on the part of the State finds its organizational expression in the expansion of coercive institutions like the police special branch and the armed forces (also in the military preparation of the whole adult white population, and in the increase of the coercive powers of government, symbolized by the 180 Day Act and the creation of the enigmatic but powerful Bureau of State Security). Among the opponents of the State in South Africa and outside, organizations for the violent conduct of political conflict against the Republic have also been formed, the government having provided the exordia pugnae.

This tendency, alongside changes in the economic structure of South Africa, has brought about changes within the white polity the overt expression of which has been the apparent supersession of the cultural-racial solidarity functions of Afrikaner nationalist ideology by a more urgent preoccupation with power (the command of resources and men for practically described [contingent] purposes) as the dominant determinant of policy. Pragmatic power-preoccupations under Verwoerd and his successor, B. J. Vorster, have been actualized in the growth of the totalist gesagstaat (authoritarian state).

If, then, the period has been dominated by material considerations, the spiritual or cultural aspects of ideology have tended to be played down (to the potential material detriment of some Afrikaners). This, among other things, led to the split within the ruling National Party. (50)

Most of Vorster's ministry has been marked by the verkrampste revolt, with the result that Vorster has come to be regarded as "enlightened". The result is that the new policy has been identified with the verligting. (51)

The fact of the matter, however, is that the outward-looking policy is the response to isolation. It may have been a part of the "enlightenment" but it has different origins also. (52)

The response to isolation is to clarify and redefine policy objectives. The emphasis is now on Southern Africa and the strengthening of ties in that area. The "multi-racial commonwealth" has become an ultimate possibility, but in practice the policy, from 1965 onward, has amounted to support, material and moral, for the white regimes in southern Africa and co-operation with black governments there, with a few donations here and there. Some economic aid has been given to the black states (53) and plans are being hatched for an investment programme that will tie the surrounding states to the South African trade, to create, as the slogan goes, "economic interdependence and political independence". (54) "Southern Africa" is variously defined to include Zambia and Congo

and Malagasy, as well as Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and the Republic. Apart from investment in the Cabora Bassa and Kunene projects, and the Oxbow scheme, the investment from South African public funds has been demonstrative (55) while private investment has been disjointed rather than consistent with the stated aim of "systematic co-operation". (56) The economic aid to Rhodesia has, of course, been decisive, while military support for the white regimes against black guerrillas is clearly of the utmost psychological significance.

Collaboration in southern Africa, if it succeeded, would provide a powerful argument for other states also to seek "dialogue" or co-operation with South Africa, while southern African black leaders can also act as South Africa's unofficial ambassadors in Africa. On the other hand, diplomatic successes in other parts of Africa are intended to encourage willing (and wavering) southern African black governments to accept co-operation. Thus Cillié's boastful remark may have more substance to it:

"I suggest not very much can be accomplished in Southern Africa without South Africa or against her will and interests." (57)

In the many years since the "wind of change" speech, South Africa's relations with Britain and France seem also to have improved. And it now appears that South Africa may at last secure Western commitment to the "defence" of the western Indian Ocean which Erasmus sought unsuccessfully as part of the "defence" of Africa (to which the Simonstown Agreement "committed" Britain). Should Anglo-South African relations continue to improve, as well as Franco-South African relations, then perhaps those powers might be persuaded to use their influence with the less militant (i.e. susceptible to such influence) African states. Surely, it is no mere coincidence that the governments most favourable to "dialogue" are the ones least critical of the former colonial powers: Ghana, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Malawi, Gabon, Gambia and, arguably, Kenya. (58)

The success of the southern Africa policy might also enable South Africa to "solve" the disabling (as far as Africa policies are concerned) "native" or "Bantu" problem. The refusal of the International Court of Justice to adjudicate in the South-West Africa cases, too, has given South Africa a chance to start "solving" this problem in South-West Africa as well. (59) It has been speculated by advocates of the policy that the High Commission Territories might be crucial in this regard - forming the basis of a territorial redistribution of the population of South Africa along the line suggested by the Tomlinson Report. (60) Inter-governmental bargaining could also solve, it has been asserted, the problem of industrial rights for black workers in "white" South Africa, the black governments assuming the functions of trades unions. (61)



All these speculations, however, ignore the fact that there is a war going on between African guerrillas and the white regimes of southern Africa, admittedly very small in scale at present, but replete with the potentialities of considerable complication. Then there are the internal political problems of each of the countries of "Southern Africa" which may at any time undermine the stability on which systematic co-operation must depend. (62)

The search for access points in Africa which the outward-looking policy entails does lead to self-defeating adventures as well, such as the implication of South Africa in Congo and Nigeria on the wrong, i.e. losing, side. There is, indeed, nothing quite conclusive in the art of temporal government.

## II

In this paper a number of foreign policy and international relations issues closely connected with the development of the Africa policy have, for purposes of brevity and clarity, been omitted. The rest of South African foreign policy, the United Nations campaign against apartheid, and international initiatives concerning South West Africa have deliberately been left out of the reckoning. So also have details of the African reactions to South Africa, both in the colonial and in the post-independence periods, been merely hinted at rather than elaborated. The aim was simply to state what South African governments have tried to achieve in Africa.

In view of all these omissions no detailed theoretical formulations can be devised from the foregoing discussion about the nature of foreign policy generally or about the place of foreign policy in the politics of South Africa in particular. Yet certain sledge-hammer assertions are incontrovertibly warranted by the foregoing exposition.

1. The Africa policy was not only what South African governments wanted for themselves (and those to whom they were responsive - their constituents) in Africa, but reflects also what they considered they were entitled to in Africa.
2. Their (apperceived) entitlements related both to a role in Africa and to certain material advantages thought to flow from that role.
3. For most of the period under discussion that role was thought to flow both from the relative power (command over resources) of South Africa in Africa and from the fact that South Africa was a "white" state in Africa.



4. Because it was "white" and a "western state" the Union, and later the Republic, expected a higher degree of responsiveness towards South Africa from key international actors, at least in the West, than was accorded to black states.
5. The quest under Malan and Strijdom (as under Smuts) for virtual partnership in the colonial management of Africa (particularly south of the Sahara) as a preserve for "white Western civilization" is clearly closely associated with the internal racial policies of South Africa.
6. Identifying with the West, seeking solidarity with the West, were both functions of the racial ideology of South Africa, which is primarily a colonial ideology. (63)
7. Colonialism - i.e. both as the condition of relative servitude of blacks and the ascendancy of white Europeans in Africa, and as an attitude to international organization - was the key and necessary condition for the Africa policy of South Africa.
8. The passing of the colonial epoch in Africa, much regretted in South African government circles, meant that colonial self-perceptions and the resultant racial ideologies (of which Afrikaner nationalism is surely one in its racial aspects) were now to be quoted at a discount.
9. In consequence, the emphasis now fell on South African roles (self-ascribed), thought to follow from actual command over resources in Africa.
10. Yet affinity with the West remained a component of the overall international political conceptual structures from which "South Africa" derived its African roles.

From these observations it would seem that the Africa policy must be considered under the category of ideology, but ideology within a definite inter-societal context - the context of Western European pre-eminence in the international system and of the colonial relationships (now in process of change) which it established.

The Africa policy is to be seen as expressive of the conflict between the values and goal-preoccupations of the essentially settler community of South Africa and the emergent values in the international system, of which all major actors in Africa have been, since the war, in varying degrees supportive.

It is my view that the conflict process which ensued can be explained as ideological conflict processes (with the help of the models of Deutsch (64) and Boulding (65) suitably adapted) situated in a specific, historical, international relations context.

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### Notes

- (1) Pan-Africanism is the name that South African governments and politicians gave to their policies towards Africa in the period 1945-1960.
- (2) We use the term "context" rather than "system" to describe the situation of inter-relation in which, although there is some co-ordination, there is no framework for the "authoritative allocation of values" and the inter-territorial or inter-imperial relationship is too "sub-system dominant" to satisfy the Modelski-Parsons criteria, for example (cf. George Modelski, "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International System" in K. Knorr and S. Verba (eds.) The International System: Theoretical Essays, Princeton 1967, p. 123), except perhaps "maintenance of solidarity".
- (3) In the period 1945-1970 South Africa had five prime ministers, and, since we are concerned with policies of governments, we individuate the various stages in the development of the policy by the premiership. Incidentally, shifts in the external political situation, as in the Pan-African policy, roughly coincided with changes in the premiership. The division is, however, mainly for purposes of expositional facility.
- (4) Union of South Africa, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly (hereafter Ass. Deb.), 1945, Vol. 52, Col. 3719.
- (5) W. K. Hancock: Smuts 2: The Fields of Force 1910-1950, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 408-410; N. Mansergh: Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1952, London, 1953, pp. 574-575.
- (6) G. Murray: The Governmental System of Southern Rhodesia, Oxford, 1970, p. 29; L. H. Gann and M. Gelfand: Huggins of Rhodesia, London, 1964, pp. 59-62; Hancock, op. cit., p. 151.
- (7) cf. C. Palley: The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965, Oxford, 1966, p. 322.

- (8) British governments have from time to time shown themselves to be insensitive to Africans' rights: as Chamberlain did when he thought to buy off Hitler with concessions in Africa (see L. S. Amery: My Political Life, Vol. III: The Unforgiving Years, London, pp. 247-248). The creation of the Central African Federation in the teeth of resolute African opposition is also a case in point. The literature on this is extensive; some of it is cited in Palley, op. cit., loc. cit., fn. 2.
- (9) Die Transvaler, 22 November 1944; Die Burger, 11 August 1943; Die Transvaler, 8 May 1943.
- (10) Rhodesia Herald, 7 May 1943.
- (11) cf. Z. Ngavirue: "The German Section versus the Union Section in South West Africa 1920-1939"
- (12) Anti-communism may have encouraged him to co-operate with the Commonwealth: Round Table, March 1949, p. 186. Besides, it pleased English-speaking supporters (and potential supporters) in South Africa.
- (13) D. F. Malan: Wat ons het, Hou ons, Cape Town, 1924(?), pp. 7-8.
- (14) Pretoria News, 13 December 1951.
- (15) The Foreign Policy of the Union of South Africa: Statements by the Hon. D. F. Malan, etc., Government Printer, Pretoria, and Ass. Deb. 1945, Vol. 52, Cols. 3946-3948.
- (16) E. A. Walker: A History of Southern Africa, London, 1957, p. 825; Die Burger, 24 February 1951; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 11438A, 8516C, 10023A, 9448A.
- (17) Ass. Deb. 1954, Vol. 84, Col. 4496. See also 1951, Vol. 75, Cols. 6818-6821.
- (18) See fn. 15 above.
- (19) Ibid.
- (20) Ibid.
- (21) In 1946 a South African Export Trade Goodwill Mission had visited the Rhodesias, Belgian Congo, Brazzaville, Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Nyasaland. "The conception of a trade goodwill mission to the Northern Territories was due to the initiative and enterprise of the Hon. S. F. Waterson, Minister of Economic Development [in Smuts' Cabinet]. The South African Federated Chamber of Industries ... readily sponsored the mission." S.A.F.C.I., South African Export Trade Goodwill Mission 1946. Main Report (Roneoed), p. 1.
- (22) On markets in Africa, cf., e.g., Die Burger, 11 August 1943, and E. H. Louw's speeches in the Belgian Congo, reported in Pretoria News, 30 August 1949.

- (23) By 1954, however, the idea of a Pan-African Organization was thought dangerous as it was considered that difficulties similar to those experienced at U.N.O. might arise.
- (24) Cmd. 9520 (1955): Exchanges of Letters on Defence Matters between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, June 1955.
- (25) Pretoria News, 30 August 1949.
- (26) Ass. Deb. 1954, Vol. 84, Col. 4493.
- (27) See K.C.A., 11438A.
- (28) cf. Round Table, June 1949, pp. 205-6.
- (29) French initials for Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara, Commission for Scientific Co-operation, etc., Fund for Mutual Assistance in Africa, etc.
- (30) Die Burger, 11 October 1945. See also letter by Dr. A. H. Jonker.
- (31) Ass. Deb. 1955, Vol. 87, Cols. 5072-5073. Preliminary to the reopening of the mission the Governor-General visited Madagascar in 1955. Pretoria News, 22 June 1955, 26 July 1955.
- (32) Ass. Deb. 1958, Vol. 97, Cols. 2371-2372. See also Vol. 100, Col. 5527.
- (32a) Ibid.
- (33) Ibid., and E. H. Louw: "The Union and the Emergent States" in South Africa in the African Continent, South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), 1959, p. 19 et seq. On Louw and the Russian consulate, see Pretoria News, 3 March 1949.
- (34) Louw thought UNECA was "muscling in" on the work of C.C.T.A. Ass. Deb., Col. 2443.
- (35) Die Burger, 11 October 1955. cf. Dönges in Die Burger, 3 October 1955.
- (36) Louw: "The Union and the Emergent States" in SABRA, op. cit., p. 19 et passim.
- (37) Vol. 100, Col. 5520.
- (38) Welensky writes that when Butler visited Rhodesia in 1958 he meant to go to South Africa to give a similar speech but was prevented by the death of Strijdom. See Sir Roy Welensky: 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, London, 1964, p. 101. For an interesting treatment of the Macmillan visit, see the highly tendentious account in F. Barnard: 13 Years with Dr. Verwoerd, Voortrekkerpers, Johannesburg, 1967, pp. 59-70.

- (39) See K.C.A., 17576B, 17528A.
- (40) Ass. Deb. 1961, Vol. 107, Col. 3507.
- (41) Ibid.
- (42) cf., e.g., Die Burger, 23 April 1957.
- (43) Compare Die Burger 28 January 1959.
- (44) Ass. Deb. (Republic Series), Vol. 3, Cols. 3761-3762.
- (45) Ass. Deb., Vol. 6, Col. 4599.
- (46) Ibid. See also J. E. Spence: The Republic Under Pressure, O.U.P., 1965.
- (47) See, e.g., C. C. O'Brien: To Katanga and Back, London, 1962, pp. 193 and 197.
- (48) Cf. Hedley Bull: "The Grotian Conception of International Society" in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds.) Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, London, 1966.
- (49) Alexander Hepple: Verwoerd, Harmondsworth, 1967, p. 238.
- (50) On the "enlightenment" see also S. C. Nolutshungu: "Issues of the Afrikaner 'Enlightenment'" in African Affairs, January 1971.
- (51) cf. Anthony Delius: "International Argument and External Policy in South Africa" in African Affairs, October 1970. The fact of the matter is, however, that decolonization left South Africa with the choice between isolation and an outward-looking policy, and in the H.C.Ts. and Southern Rhodesia provided opportunities for such a policy. cf. G. S. Labaschagne: Suid-Afrika en Afrika: Die Staatkundige Verhouding in die Tydperk 1945-1966, Potchefstroom, 1969, p. 80.
- (52) Ibid.
- (53) E. M. Rhodie, The Third Africa, Cape Town, 1969, pp. 145-185.
- (54) Ibid., and S. A. Lombard, J. J. Stadler and P. J. van der Merwe: The Concept of Economic Co-operation in Southern Africa, Pretoria, 1968.
- (55) cf. R. Molteno: Africa and South Africa: The Implications of South Africa's outward looking policy, London, 1971, esp. pp. 9-10.
- (56) Ibid.
- (57) Report from South Africa, January 1970.



- (58) For an interesting discussion of this topic, see: The Legon Observer, 1-14 January 1971.
- (59) It has been suggested that the Odendaal Commission's recommendations would have been implemented earlier but for the fear that the I.C.J. might, while the matter was sub judice, have issued an injunction, the enforcement of which the U.K. and the U.S. would have been unable to resist. It is doubtful, however, whether the South African Government would have accepted an adverse judgement on the substantive issues of the South West Africa cases.
- (60) U.G. 61/1955, para. 14 et seq. See R. Dale: Botswana and its Southern Neighbour, Ohio, 1970.
- (61) Lombard et al., op. cit., p. 45.
- (62) I have dealt with these matters in a paper I gave to the Africa Society of the University of Keele in November 1970, on "The Political Context of Economic Co-operation in Southern and Central Africa".
- (63) cf. David E. Apter on "Ideology and Discontent" in Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent, esp. pp. 18-21, and R. A. Scalapino, "Ideology and Modernisation - the Japanese Case" in Apter, op. cit., pp. 93-127, on the solidarity and identity aspects of ideology.
- (64) Deutsch's communication model, but especially Chapter 13 "The Self Closure of Political Systems" (read with Boulding [see below]). K. W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, New York, 1966.
- (65) K. E. Boulding: Conflict and Defence: A General Theory, New York, 1963, pp. 277-304.