

THE RESPONSE OF AFRICAN PEASANTS IN THE CAPE TO ECONOMIC CHANGES,
1870-1910: A STUDY IN GROWTH AND DECAY⁽¹⁾

by

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I am investigating the response of rural African society in South Africa to the economic, social and political pressures implicit in a period of modernization and rapid change. Did rural Africans, in the post-mineral years, respond to the quickening of the commercial pace and, if so, to what degree? Was there a deliberate entry by African peasants (2) into the market economy, any attempt to modernize or commercialize their agricultural methods, and how successful were such entry and attempt?

The prevailing consensus answer to these questions is, briefly, that "Africans failed to adapt their tribal economy to the changed circumstances of relative land scarcity or to learn from their white neighbours more modern methods of farming" (3), that traditional social practices and hostility to innovation are root causes of "the economic problems of the Bantu". Monica Wilson has recently queried this doctrine (4) - as, implicitly, does Robertson's 1935 article (5) - but her treatment is brief and lacks systematic description or analysis.

I shall argue that African cultivators responded to economic stimuli and pressures, to a considerably greater extent than has hitherto been realized; that this response took place at two "levels", at the more sophisticated of which it equalled or excelled that of white cultivators. Finally, the response was nowhere maintained or consolidated; on the contrary, peasant progress gave way to privation, shortfall, and failure. I shall attempt to explain this collapse of what seemed, for a generation or so immediately after the mineral discoveries, to portend a small class of well-to-do African farmers, and a larger peasant population that could feed itself. I suggest that the structure of economic and social relations created in the rural areas was not merely the product of penetration by the capitalist economy but that the structure, once established, provided the basis for maintaining that penetration and hence for perpetuating those relationships.

The peasant response took place on two levels. First, the peasant community as a whole, in various regions and at various times, entered the exchange economy and made certain adaptations in its methods of production. Such a community sought to sell its "normal surplus" (6) while retaining communal land tenure; with axe and plough a greater area could be cultivated, and men did the tilling; grain, animal products and (less often) stock were disposed of to meet the demands of taxation and new wants.

Secondly, a small proportion of peasant farmers emerged who responded much more fully to economic opportunities and needs. Often, but not necessarily, "mission" or "school" Africans, they sought to become independent small-scale commercial farmers. Such men (for whom we may adopt the 19th century shorthand term "progressive farmers") exhibited the following characteristics: i) evidence of capital accumulation in savings, houses, walls and fences, dams, wagons, and stock; ii) improved methods of agriculture, including better ploughing, enclosed lands, irrigation, winter crops and diversification, to produce readily saleable items; iii) entrepreneurship in the form of other income-raising activities, especially transport-riding, following harvests (which occupation brought in cash as well as allowed elasticity in market relations); iv) the adoption of a way of life in its material aspects closely paralleling that of solvent and advancing small farmers of other races in South Africa: comments like "Were it not for the colour of the occupants, I should have fancied myself in a European dwelling" (7) stud the late 19th century sources; progressive farmers built square houses, consumed European goods (8), sent their children to boarding schools, employed wage labourers, and leased their lands (sometimes white labourers or tenants). (9) v) The identity was ideological, too: not only did the progressive farmers support the white administration against "reds" and "rebels", but they displayed capitalist values or attitudes diametrically at variance with those of their tribal background. A Queenstown Mfengu farmer criticized "the school kaffir" ("The educated man wants high wages; I endeavour to get the cheapest labour"), while in Xalanga a progressive farmer would "not allow squatters unless they work or are a profit to him". (10) vi) They sought to break with tribal holding practices, to increase their lands, and, ideally, to establish security of tenure by lease or purchase.

The emergence of progressive farmers was conditional upon certain factors. It was more likely wherever chiefly authority had been weakened (cf. the Mfengu) or where chiefs themselves favoured progressive farming (as in Emigrant Tembuland). The presence of missionaries, magistrates, and administrators who actively sought to create a class of landed Africans as potential collaborators (11) sped the appearance of progressive farmers. Then, the enterprise of that class was very evident at times of momentarily propitious economic circumstances - such an advantage might be afforded by the rise of new markets, or it could stem from the inflationary effects of war or troop movements. (12) Fourthly, the availability for any reason of extra land on secure tenure proved a keen spur: put simply, "the enlightened people ... grab as much land as they can get". (13) Instances of swift, shrewd acquisition of land by purchase occurred in the Ciskei in the late 1850s and the 1860s, and in Komgha, where 20,000 acres were bought - largely from struggling white farmers - between 1902 and 1907 (14), including much purchased by progressive farmers unable to expand in crowded areas of Fingoland. (15)

A speech by a progressive farmer (16) gives a clear picture of the formation and characteristics of the class:

"His parents loved stock-raising to a fault, and on the contrary had a laissez-faire attitude towards soil tillage."

Despite them,

"he clearly foresaw the benefits of the proper cultivation of the soil, and expressed to his father a desire to buy land".

Undeterred by his father's opposition, he went to Kingwilliamstown, and served in the 1877 War:

"While ostensibly sending home my month's earnings to my father in the usual Native custom, I cunningly opened a private bank account into which I diverted a portion of my wages ... until I had saved £80."

At this, he bought

"a span of oxen with yokes, gear, plough, and the rest of agricultural paraphernalia"

and

"staked his life on farming".

Within five years

"He had made good. He bought a wagon ... and within a short time had accumulated £1,000 ... 'I now purchased a small farm ... and various plots of land at what was considered high prices in those days.'"

He urged his listeners to do likewise - and to adopt "modern methods of profit making".

* * *

By 1870, the peasant response was already clearly evinced in some districts. The Mfengu settled in the Peddie district in 1835 had rapidly become "the chief economic power" among the African peoples. (17) They were dispersed throughout the Ciskei and across the Kei (Idutywa reserve in 1857; Fingoland - districts of Tsomo, Ngamakwe and Butterworth - in 1864). In Peddie, there were in 1865 some 30 prosperous landowners, with farms of 500-1,000 acres, who sold forage, maize and millet, and were buying extra land. In 1864, at an Agricultural Show, it had been "universally remarked that the Fingo exhibition far excelled that of the Europeans, both for the number and the quality of the articles exhibited". (18) Blore, in 1870, found the

progress of the Mfengu remarkable: "Taking everything into consideration, the native district of Peddie surpasses the European district of Albany in its productive powers." (19)

In Victoria East 40 large land-holders (and 760 others who had enough property to qualify for the franchise) sold corn and wool annually, while poultry, pigs and vegetables were also marketed in Alice. Keiskamma Hoek sold "a great deal" of corn and wool each year, and similar reports emanated from other Ciskei settlements. (20) Close behind the Mfengu as agriculturalists and traders were the Thembu, both in the "Tambookie location" (later Glen Grey) near Queenstown and, after 1864, across the Indwe river in Emigrant Tembuland. Glen Grey sold "a very large quantity" of wheat, maize, millet and wool; individual farmers ran from 500 to 1500 sheep, and wealthy Thembu were "frequently" seen in Queenstown land sales. (21) Notable economic gains were also made by peasants before 1870 in a swathe of country straddling west and north of the Ciskei: from Bedford, Somerset and Adelaide, through Tarka, Wodehouse and Herschel to Aliwal North. Finally, a class of market-oriented peasants was also present on certain mission stations further east than those points already mentioned.

The 1870s saw the Cape jerked out of economic depression by diamond discoveries, and the rapid emulation by other groups of the Mfengu/Thembu pattern, started by the eastward migration of the latter in 1864. (22) The Gaikas and Gcalekas entered the exchange economy to meet the demands of the state and the market; Sandili's people owned 25,000 sheep in 1873, hired others, and were selling their "largest oxen" to buy more sheep. (The phenomenal success of John Go, Brownlee's protégé, encouraged other "leading Gaikas" to invest in sheep.) (23)

Peasants in Herschel sold 6,000 bags of wheat, 1,000 bales of wool, and 30,000 bags of corn in 1873. In Kingwilliamstown, 100 progressive farmers held freehold farms of 10-300 acres, while a further 450 owned smaller plots; land sales to Africans were brisk in 1871-72. (24) In Fingoland, some 6,000 heads of family owned 182,000 sheep and 37,000 cattle; they ran the district's transport, and sold wool worth £60,000 in 1870, as well as hides and grain. In 1870, it had been estimated that Ciskei Africans sold produce worth £150,000; by 1875, Noble assessed the purchasing power of Africans in the Ciskei and British Kaffraria at £400,000 and the value of their produce to be £750,000. A Kingwilliamstown trader paid £58,000 for peasant produce in 1873, and a merchant in Port Elizabeth had a turnover in 1876 of goods for the African trade worth £200,000. (25) The number of traders in African areas mushroomed.

Emigrant Tembuland exported wool, grain, and hides worth £57,000 in 1876; progressive farmers in Xalanga had by 1878

"advanced in wealth and material prosperity ... they are patterns of industry; ... they are better clothed, better fed, and better housed ...".

Thirty-five farmers had more than 500 acres. (26) By the end of the '70s, East Griqualand also emerged as a centre of peasant prosperity. 90,000 acres of land had by 1881 been bought in Umzimkulu by Africans; Gatberg sold grain to Queenstown, Tarkastad, Butterworth, Aliwal North and Basutoland. (27)

In the 1880s, Fingoland and Emigrant Tembuland continued to prosper. In Ngamakwe, in May 1880, prizes at a show were awarded for wheat, barley, oats, potatoes, forage, maize, millet, tobacco, cabbages, turnips, beetroot, wool, bread, butter, dried fruit, ham, bacon, and handicrafts; 500 progressive farmers attended an Agricultural Society meeting in Southeyville in 1882 - where 5,000 bags of wheat were reaped. Umzimkulu, Herschel, and the Kamastone location (near Queenstown) produced large amounts of grain. Peasants around Kingwilliamstown supplied markets in East London, Queenstown, Adelaide, Somerset East, and Cradock; Merriman, after 15 years' absence from Kingwilliamstown, noted "a perfectly surprising amount of prosperity", and that land values had risen 500 per cent. Engcobo won mention in the late '80s as a thriving centre of agriculture and trade, and an agricultural society was formed. (28)

Nor was the response confined to the level of the progressive farmers: the 1883 Commission on Laws and Customs has evidence of crop diversification and wider cultivation under communal tenure in the Ciskei, Glen Grey, the Eastern Cape, and parts of the Transkei. Queenstown's magistrate mentioned in 1882 that

"all of these people ... are turning their attention to the growth of peas, beans, and fruit trees - in fact all that is saleable - these latter having a few years ago been quite unregarded by them".

The Bhacas, of Mount Frere District, also displayed a "marvellous change" in the 1880s. By mid-decade it was reported that they "always" exported a "considerable surplus" of wool, grain, and hides. (29)

In the 1890s, wool became more important in the Transkeian economy, particularly as proportionately less agricultural produce was being sold than in the 1870s and 1880s. Herds and clips grew; wool became the chief agricultural source of cash for taxes and traders, especially as it was the only product that could bear the cost of carriage to the Colony and still leave a fair profit. (30) In Pondoland, annexation (1894) brought an abrupt end to a state of tribal subsistence, largely outside the cash economy. Taxes were levied; surpluses were sold (by 1900, Bizana Flagstaff, Lusikisiki and Tabankulu were exporting grain); traders moved in - and Mpondo moved out, to sell their labour in Johannesburg and other centres.

So it can be seen that in certain areas the response of the peasantry to economic change was extremely positive, so much so that the prosperity of these areas derived largely from the prosperity of the African peasants there. There is good evidence that Kingwilliamstown's food was supplied almost entirely by African peasants, and that, in

turn, their purchases supported the town's many traders. (31) (The often noted eclipse of Kingwilliamstown by East London must be due, in part, to the decline in the fortunes of the Ciskei peasantry - see below.) In Queenstown, African peasants were described in 1881 as

"the largest producers of grain in the division; without them the trade of Queenstown would not be anything like what it is at present". (32)

Emigrant Tembuland, especially Xalanga division, had a notably wealthy group of peasant farmers, members of which owned property worth well over £1,000 and who cultivated on irrigated lands a large number of grains, vegetables and fruits. (33)

Moreover, in the areas mentioned immediately above, and elsewhere, the response by African peasants was more sensitive, the methods more efficient, the production greater, than that of their white neighbours. "Comparing them with Europeans", insisted Hemming of Queenstown,

"taking man for man, and acre for acre, the native produces more from a smaller extent of ground, and with more primitive appliances, than the Europeans."

H. G. Elliot and J. W. Sauer both attested that Africans produced more from the land in the Transkei than whites did; in Alice, Africans ran sheep successfully where white farmers had failed. In Xalanga, the wheat was pronounced by competent judges to equal any grown in South Africa. (34) The German peasant settlers in the Ciskei offer a useful comparison: in the 1860s and 1870s, reports on their progress and industry read for all the world like those on their African counterparts; by the 20th century, however, they struggled to eke out an existence - despite the assistance of the State, the advantages of larger land grants than most African peasants, and greater proximity to markets. (35)

Finally, another group of progressive farmers should be mentioned: those who prospered by farming on the halves - a practice widespread in the Eastern Cape districts of Komgha, Peddie, Stutterheim, Albany, Alexandria, Bedford and Adelaide. These men were "virtually partners with the [white] farmers ... [They] would sometimes cultivate land in a better way than was done by the white farmers themselves".(36)

In district after district, however, complacent and optimistic reports began to be hedged with qualifications, or to contain signs that not all was well. On the subsistence level, communities that had enjoyed - if not prosperity - self-sufficient solvency were reduced, abruptly in some cases and more gradually in others, to stagnation, falling productivity, and poverty. Murmurs of disquiet from the Ciskei in the 1870s became more insistent in the '80s: the confiscation of the Gaika locations after the 1877-78 war was a turning point after which overcrowding, land disputes, a young landless group, indebtedness and a large wage-seeking group are perennial motifs. Peasants in Alice

in 1875 had sold agricultural produce worth £19,273 and spent £21,073 in the town stores, £4,289 of this on food; by 1925, the agricultural sales had fallen to £10,376, the amount spent in shops was slightly down (£20,048), but of this £12,748, or 63%, was spent on food. (37) MacMillan's figures for Herschel, which had been so prosperous in the '70s, and had a vigorous export trade in the '90s, tell the same grim tale. (38) Henderson and MacMillan both stress that the districts they describe are no worse off than the rest of the Ciskei.

Fingoland began to show similar symptoms in odd drought years during the late '70s and early '80s, but it is in the 1890s that the pattern of deterioration really emerges. As an experienced official said in 1893, "these man are far worse off than 20 years before", and the Nqamakwe magistrate, in the same year, deplored "indications of retrogression and a rapid relapse into barbarism". The process was summed up by the magistrate in Tsomo:

"There are headmen and others who 15 years ago had fine square houses, fine enclosed gardens with fruit trees ... Today ... you will find the men living in huts, the garden wall has fallen down, and the trees eaten down by the goats. Fingoland has gone back tremendously in the last four or five years. It is not in the progressive state in which it was 15 or 20 years ago." (39)

Emigrant Tembuland showed similar symptoms at the same time. In Cala, "there was no question about it", said the Chairman of the Municipality: "In this district they are becoming poorer than they were." And in Xalanga the magistrate wrote: "During the past 25 years I think degeneration has taken place The natives as a body are growing poorer" (40)

In the Transkei as a whole, reports after 1900 saw the dependence of the territory on American maize in 1903, the desiccation and erosion of the land, indebtedness, and a mounting flow of migrant labourers. The syndrome of deterioration, once in progress, was self-perpetuating: one can gauge the extent of the deterioration in the body of evidence that chronicles the creation in the Ciskei and the Transkei of teeming rural ghettos, with declining yields and with chronically low standards of living. (41)

In explaining the checking of the peasant response, I can, in the space available, merely enumerate what seem to be the most significant causes, and stress their inter-relation.

(i) The fundamental, most telling single cause was the expropriation of land, the peasantry's basic means of production. As has been written in another context, "This shortage of land is undoubtedly the key to their status of inferiority, exploitation, poverty, lack of culture, and in a word the status of underdevelopment of ... [those] who participate all too fully in the social process of capitalist development". (42)

(ii) In circumstances of land shortage, conservative agricultural methods and social mores inhibited productive farming: the effects of monoculture, the retention of cattle for non-economic reasons, responsibility for indigent kinsmen, and subdivision of land, all braked individual enterprise. (43)

(iii) Physical/natural factors such as drought and stock diseases took their toll, the more harshly as the traditional subsistence economy had been replaced with greater needs and smaller resources.

(iv) In addition to land expropriation, African peasant prosperity was menaced by countervailing class interests of the white settler communities, as expressed in land policies. The policy of creating a rural class of collaborators, to "counteract the influence of the chiefs" (see note 11) became less and less relevant after 1870, as greater and greater areas of potentially hostile African territory fell under white control. And while the wars of 1877-78 and 1881 saw the last military resistance in the Cape, the post-mineral years also saw the steady rise in the demands from mines and white farmers for black labour. Administrative and legislative efforts were increasingly bent towards enlarging the flow of labour: this involved, inter alia, weakening the tribal structure, increasing economic pressures and wants, and settling African land-holders on smaller units of land, with the deliberate creation of a landless class who would have to go out to work. In the earlier part of the years under review, most officials applauded the progressive farmers; by 1900, though, many in the Cape were hostile to the "wealthier class": the Beaufort West magistrate who railed against "wealthy natives", each of whom "looks upon himself as an independent farmer", is typical. (44) In addition to their want of plentiful cheap labour, both mine owners and farmers - as Martin Legassick has suggested (45) - found it advantageous to diminish the competitiveness of African peasants; the farmer would benefit in the market place, while for the mines African labour would be both more forthcoming and have a reduced bargaining base.

In short, the effect of Cape policy by about the turn of the century was to maintain a rurally-based class, with a falling overall productivity, sliding from subsistence to a sub-subsistence level. Richard Rose-Innes outlines his plan for creating a concentrated peasant population near to industrial centres, explaining:

"I would not make the ground ... sufficiently big to enable a man to become a farmer, and to live on the soil or out of the plot, but I would allow him an opportunity of cultivating a small plot, where he could leave his wife and children while he was labouring ..." (46)

The sub-subsistence population would retain its base on the land, thus cutting down on wages, housing costs, etc., and obviating the growth of an urban proletariat. And wherever the Cape administrators could influence the matter, individually owned land units shrank. Mfengu in the Ciskei had been given 40 to 80 acres each in the 1850s and 1860s; the Tembuland Commission of 1882 set 700 "loyal natives" on 1-15 morgen. The Glen Grey Act went further: limiting all grantees to four morgen, it also imposed the principle of one man one lot, effectively precluding the accumulation of land. After 1910, Cape policy blended more

comfortably than is usually suggested into that of the Union, whose land policy was deliberately slanted against progressive farmers. (47)

(v) Migratory labour, the obverse or complement to the subsistence rural population, was a product of, and also a factor perpetuating, rural degeneration: it deprived the land of its adult male labour for much of the year. My next point was made in 1893 by an official report: "These territories appear to produce labour for work outside them somewhat in proportion to the length of time their inhabitants have enjoyed good government ..." (48)

(vi) Price fluctuations and bouts of commercial depression hit the African territories particularly hard (illustrating, incidentally, the inadequacy of the dualist model for the South African economy). Each depression brought reports that traders would not pay cash for grain; that stock had to be sold to pay taxes; that traders were foreclosing on their debts; and that food prices had climbed.

(vii) Two linked disadvantages facing the African peasant were the distance from markets and the monopoly enjoyed by traders. With the advent of rail, black-white agricultural competition was sharply altered: "To locate the native reserves, it is no bad rule ... to look for the areas circumvented or entirely missed even by branch railway lines" (49), and competition between steam-engine and ox-wagon proved one-sided. On the diamond fields, American wheat railed from Cape Town could undercut wheat from Basutoland, until then the chief supplier. By 1900, crops grown in the Transkei were increasingly difficult to sell because of freight costs: many reports indicated underproduction because of lack of markets. (50) W. E. Stanford summarized it thus: "The easy access to the labour market ... contrasts with the difficulty or absolute lack of transport for agricultural produce ..." (51)

The market that was close at hand - the ubiquitous trader - was far removed from a free market. The trader could buy cheaper and sell dearer than the urban merchant; in Maclear, in 1903, grain was sold at 55/- a muid until transport riders brought in grain from outside, slashing the price by 50%. (52)

(viii) Mention of rail leads to the lack of private or public investment, and the absence of an infrastructure to sustain economic development. In addition, human capital was drained from the reserves in the form of migrant labour, while the lack of social investment (education, health, etc.) served to maintain underdevelopment.

(ix) Economic discrimination against the peasantry went beyond land alienation, the lack of investment, and adverse marketing conditions. Customs dues were loaded against black farmers (53); regressive taxation bit into cash incomes; cash crops could be crippled by direct discrimination (an excise duty was imposed on African-grown tobacco), while, even before 1913, there were ways in which land purchase or leasing could be made very difficult or very expensive.

(x) As it became more difficult to earn a living on the land, so did the more enterprising among the younger generation leave the rural way of life to pursue skills, schooling, and higher wages.

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To summarize: capitalist penetration of the Cape's African areas created the need for a cash income - i.e. the need to transform the pre-capitalist economy. That transformation, after 1870, showed signs of moderate success (with the creation of a stratified peasantry and the successful participation by some of its members in the more active post-mineral exchange economy) until various factors combined to halt it. The nature of his involvement in the capitalist economy, while enhancing the peasant's need for a cash income, distorted and inhibited the means of raising such an income. The peasant increasingly lost control over the disposal of the products of his labour (he could not control their exchange value or their distribution, he had to pay taxes and rent), and he had to produce more while receiving less in exchange: in a word, the degree of his exploitation rose.

Land alienation, taxation, the lack of investment, and economic discrimination were obstacles to production and marketing; this meant that the capacity for accumulation by the peasantry declined. At the same time as possibilities for accumulation were diminished, capitalist penetration raised the demand for a cash income and market production; because the peasantry discovered that its overall productivity had decreased, it had to rely proportionately more upon wage labour. Those employing labour needed cheap and rightless labour - and the upshot was the imbedding in South Africa's economic development of migrant labour. Migrant labour, in turn, depleted the intensity of economic activity in the peasant areas, thereby reproducing the necessity for maintaining itself. (54)

The "growth and decay of peasant communities" (55) in the Cape and in South Africa - the response herein described and its checking - did not happen "outside" the development of the South African capitalist economy. The stifling of the peasant response really meant the suppression of a peasant class (it prevented further stratification, further commercialization, and retained the traditional, non-innovative features described by Hobart Houghton et al.), and the creation in its stead of a "rural-based migrant proletariat" (I use the term hesitantly). This suppression of a peasant class was a central feature of the process of underdevelopment in the rural areas of Southern Africa. That underdevelopment, retaining certain pre-capitalist features of production and linking them to a battery of labour-repressive devices, is an essential condition for the development of the capitalist mode of production in South Africa.

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Notes

- (1) This paper was prepared at a fairly early stage of my current research, and already stands in need of modification. However, as it is being entirely recast for publication elsewhere, it appears here as originally presented.

- (2) By "peasants" I mean "rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers that uses the surpluses both to underwrite its own standard of living and to distribute the remainder to groups in society that do not farm ...". "It is only when a cultivator is integrated into a society with a state - i.e., when he becomes subject to the demands and sanctions of power holders outside his social stratum - that one can speak of peasantry." (E. R. Wolf, Peasants [New Jersey, 1966], pp. 3-4, 11.) In the South African context the term includes cultivators on land under communal or individual tenure, as well as independent producers on white-owned land.
- (3) M. Horrell, The African Reserves of South Africa (Johannesburg, 1969), p. 32. She is summarizing the arguments of D. Hobart Houghton: cf. his "Some Economic Problems of the Bantu in South Africa" (Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1938); "Agricultural Development in the Reserves" (SAIRR 181/1956); "Economic Development in the Reserves" (Race Relations Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 1), et al.
- (4) M. Wilson, "The Growth of Peasant Communities", Oxford History of South Africa, Vol. II, pp. 49-71 et passim.
- (5) H. M. Robertson, "150 Years of Economic Contact between White and Black", SA Jnl. Econ., Vol. II, No. 4, and Vol. III, No. 1.
- (6) See W. Allen, The African Husbandman (London, 1965), pp. 38-41.
- (7) Magistrate of Nqamakwe, Commission on Native Laws & Customs, G4-'83, Vol. II, p. 268.
- (8) cf. Blyth, M., Chief Mag. of Transkei, on Fingland's "substantial" trade in clothing, ploughs, calico, prints, tinware, groceries, medicines, tea, coffee, bread; some of the young men played cricket, etc. (G.4-'83, Vol. III, p. 266); or, magistrate of Herschel, where "blacking, sponges, concertinas, chairs, trunks, lace, ribbons, pomatum, scents, almanacs, date cases, clocks, watches, dictionaries, ready reckoners", etc., were sold. Ibid.
- (9) S.A.N.A.C., 1903-5, Vol. IV, pp. 257, 295; Bryce, J., Impressions of South Africa (London, 1899), p. 353.
- (10) 1893-4 Labour Commission, G.3-'94, Vol. II, p. 21; Native Affairs Bluebook 1894, G.9-'94, p. 63.
- (11) This policy has a clear lineage; it was stated as early as 1820 (and very clearly) by Rev. John Philip ("You increase their dependency on the colony, and multiply the bonds of union ... for the preservation of peace"); it was reiterated by Sir George Grey, and sedulously followed by many officials in my period, one of whom saw the creation of a landed class of Africans as "forming a bond of association among the wealthiest classes; it does much to counteract the influence of the chiefs"; another saw individual tenure as "the very best guarantee for peace and loyalty".
- (12) The Mfengu exploited the economic circumstances after the wars of 1846-7 and 1850-3 (J. Maclean, Compendium of Kafir Laws & Customs (1858), pp. 138-9); the pattern is repeated following the 1877-78 war (Appendix to Bluebook for Native Affairs, 1879, G.43-'79;

- Native Affairs Bluebook 1881, G.20-'81), and especially after the Anglo-Boer War (see Bluebook Native Affairs for 1902, G.25-'02); Report of Chief Inspector for Sheep, G.37-'03; Report of a Departmental Commission on the Occupation of Land by Natives in Unreserved Areas, G.46-1908.
- (13) Evidence of Inspector of Locations for Keiskama Hoek, S.A.N.A.C., Vol. II, p. 593.
 - (14) M. Wilson and M. Elton Mills, Land Tenure, Vol. IV, Keiskamma Hoek Rural Survey (Pietermaritzburg, 1952), pp. 2, 45-7; Cape Commission on Native Affairs, 1865; G.46-1908.
 - (15) See evidence by Mfengu farmers F. Mazwi and R. Joseph in Select Committee on Native Affairs, 1909, A.2-'09.
 - (16) S. Sonjica, "How I became a successful farmer", in Jabavu, D. D. T., The Black Problem (Lovedale, n.d.[1921?]), pp. 113-115.
 - (17) Robertson, op. cit.
 - (18) 1865 Commission on Native Affairs.
 - (19) W. L. Blore, Statistics of the Cape Colony (Cape Town, 1871), p. 137.
 - (20) 1865 Commission on Native Affairs.
 - (21) Ibid., and Select Committee on the Native Question, 1869, C.3-'69.
 - (22) Robertson, op. cit.; Brookes, E. H., History of Native Policy in South Africa (Pretoria, 1927), pp. 388 ff; Correspondence on ... Natives in Agricultural and other labour, C.8-'81.
 - (23) Robertson, op. cit. For Go's career, see C. Brownlee, Reminiscences of Kaffir Life (Lovedale, 1896), pp. 269-302; cf. Go's losses in the 1877 war, and his claim (upheld) for £2,279, in Commission on War Losses, G.76-'81, pp. cxxvii, 304-5.
 - (24) Native Affairs Bluebook 1874, G.27-'74; Report of Surveyor-General, G.30-'76.
 - (25) Blore, op. cit., p. 109; Noble, J., Descriptive Handbook of the Cape Colony (Cape Town, 1875), pp. 230-31; Correspondence re South Africa (Br. Parl. Papers, C.2000), Frere to Carnavon, 13/11/1877.
 - (26) Native Affairs Bluebook, 1877, G.12-'77; ditto 1879, G.33-'79.
 - (27) G.33-'79; Native Affairs Bluebook 1882, G.33-'82.
 - (28) Native Affairs Bluebook 1883, G.8-'83; G.4-'83; J. X. Merriman, Selected Correspondence (ed. P. Lewsen, Cape Town, 1960), Vol. I, p. 112. Engcobo's emergence was probably aided by the settlement there of progressive Thembu in 1881 - see W. E. Stanford, Reminiscences (ed. J. W. Macquarrie), Vol. 1, pp. 176-7.

- (29) G.8-'83; G.33-'82; Bluebook Native Affairs, 1885, G.2-'85.
- (30) H. G. Elliot, in 1893 (Bluebook?); see also Reports by the Chief Inspector of Sheep, 1897, 1898, 1903.
- (31) S.A.N.A.C., Vol. II, pp. 430-3, 565, 608, 623, 787.
- (32) C.8-'81.
- (33) See details of property held by 38 large land-holders and by 700 smaller farmers in Tembuland Land Commission 1882, G.66-'83; and see "Report of a meeting of Native farmers", Cofinvaba, December 1876, reprinted G.12-'77.
- (34) C.8-'81; G.8-'83; S.A.N.A.C., Vol. V, p. 395; G.3-'94; G.8-'95.
- (35) cf. Noble, op. cit., pp. 209-11; Board, C., "Agriculture" in D. Hobart Houghton, Economic Development in a Plural Society, pp. 65-8.
- (36) Goodfellow, D. M., Modern Economic History of South Africa (London), p. 159; cf. G.46-1908.
- (37) South African Outlook, 1/7/27; cf. Bluebook Native Affairs, 1876.
- (38) W. W. MacMillan, Complex South Africa, pp. 144-185; cf. S.A.N.A.C., Vol. V, p. 26. For Ciskei generally, see Bluebooks, 1877 ff.
- (39) G.3-'94, p. 76; G.9-'94, p. 55; G.3-'94, p. 110.
- (40) G.3-'94, p. 71; G.9-'94, p. 63.
- (41) See esp. Report of Native Economic Commission 1930-32; Soc. & Econ. Planning Council Report, Native Reserves and their Place in the Economy; de Kiewiet, C. W., History of South Africa and The Imperial Factor; E. Roux, "Land & Agriculture in the Native Reserves", in Hellman, E. (ed.), A Handbook of Race Relations (1949); SAIRR publications and Journal; more detailed regional studies include Keiskamma Rural Survey (4 vols., 1951); plus useful data in P. A. W. Cook, Education of a South African Tribe (Elliotdale district), NUSAS, The Transkei Survey, 1951 (Butterworth dist.), etc.
- (42) A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, p. 136.
- (43) These seemingly endogenous socio-economic factors were entrenched, even fortified, by exogenous factors: e.g., Mbeki points out that the Glen Grey Act restored to tribal chiefs some of the authority over land matters that they had been losing (Mbeki, G., The Peasants Revolt [London, 1964], p. 34). More broadly, retention of these traditional features in the rural areas was less hostile to white interests than the creation of a numerically small but competitive peasantry and a large proletariat. See below.
- (44) G.12⁺-1904, p. 5; see Ibid., p. 23: Herschel magistrate: "I regret that it appears to have been the tendency to encourage

- and assist these men." See Bluebooks 1906 & 1908 (G.46-1906 & G.24-1908) and especially G.46-1908, cit. supra.
- (45) M. Legassick, "Development and Underdevelopment in South Africa", unpublished seminar paper, Oxford, March 1971.
- (46) S.A.N.A.C., Vol. II, pp. 646-47. cf. C. W. de Kiewiet, Imperial Factor, pp. 159-160.
- (47) S. v. d. Horst, Native Labour in South Africa (London, 1942), p. 309. She cited U.G. 54/39: "The 7 $\frac{1}{4}$ million morgen ... set aside ... was intended to serve the needs of all the people, and not a comparatively small section of advanced natives."
- (48) 1893-4 Labour Commission, Vol. I, p. 5.
- (49) MacMillan, op. cit., p. 212.
- (50) See G.4-'93; G.12-'04; G.7-'92; and esp. G.22-'05, Report on the Trade with Native Territories.
- (51) G.24-1908.
- (52) G.12-1904; in same Bluebook as Glen Grey: traders bought grain at £1 per muid and sold it for £3; cf. Sonjica, op. cit.: prices for produce obtained at traders were "a glaring scandal", etc.
- (53) e.g. European agricultural implements were imported free; hoes for African use carried 25% duty.
- (54) This skeletal synthesis drew in part on K. Post, "Peasantization and Rural Political Movements in Western Africa" (seminar paper given in Oxford, October 1971), and T. Szentes, Political Economy of Underdevelopment (Budapest, 1971), especially pp. 229-250; but neither of these should in any way be held responsible for defects and elisions inevitable in these sketchy remarks.
- (55) As one might retitile Prof. Wilson's chapter in Oxford History, Vol. II.