Some scholarly attention has now been directed both at the basic integrative processes operative in the formation of large centralized states in Southern and Central Africa during the Mfecane and at the development of segmentary characteristics within them after they were established. (1) However, the collateral problem of pre-Mfecane social and political carry-overs in these new multi-tribal societies has virtually been ignored (2), despite the inherent improbability of complete integration within the lifetimes of people whose basic attitudes and loyalties had been formed before they became incorporated in the newly organized kingdoms. It is curious that the problems of detribalization and national integration experienced by socially heterogeneous African states in our own day have not encouraged more study of earlier parallels, but this too may be a legacy of the long preoccupation with European "penetration" and African "response". The sources are also exceptionally poor because the whole apparatus of kingship was necessarily committed to suppression of pre-existing clan and tribal alignments, and few white observers were afterwards able to identify the diverse ethnic components of the new states. The earlier history of many of these factions has also been obscured by the radical social dislocation of the Mfecane, and it is often very difficult to determine the parent groups and previous relationships of many lineages which exercised great influence in the new kingdoms. This paper is, therefore, merely a preliminary attempt to trace the pre-Mfecane origins of a deeply rooted social and political cleavage in the Ndebele kingdom of Mzilikazi, a Mfecane conquest state in which the socially homogeneous core was extremely small.

Conflicts between the diverse peoples who had been incorporated in the Ndebele kingdom were ordinarily controlled and concealed by the machinery and trappings of royal absolutism. The Ndebele identified themselves as abantu benkosi, "the people of the king" (3), and most of the visible forms and rituals of social and political life were designed to enhance his status and authority. The protocol of relations between ruler and subject (4), the great annual
inxwala ceremonies (5), and the invocation of rain during the dry season (6) were all important examples of ritual behaviour which glorified the kingship. There was also substantial institutional centralization. The national councils in which the chief men were represented could only advise the king and receive his commands under the constitution, and the officers of the regiments and divisions which constituted the principal administrative as well as military units were all formally appointed by the king. (7) He dominated the administration of justice (8), controlled foreign relations (9), and directed the military power which was the rationale and pride of the nation. (10) These prerogatives, together with the hospitality and patronage which made the court the centre of social as well as political life (11), all served to focus public attention on the king and most contemporary white observers concluded that he was an absolute despot. (12)

This concentration of power and prestige in the kingship clearly reflected a strong common desire for the military advantages which discipline and strong leadership provided, but the very fact that such an elaborate system of social control was thought to be necessary in order to achieve these advantages indicates that unity and discipline must have been very hard to obtain. This impression is confirmed by examination of the actual political process (13), which can only be described as anarchic. Although constitutionally subordinate, the powerful izinduna who commanded the regiments and divisions had great freedom of action in practice. They often encroached on royal prerogatives with relative impunity, and there were many instances where they shaped national policy by bringing pressure to bear on the king behind the scenes. (14) Their ability to influence policy was, however, severely limited by their individual ambitions and factional rivalries. Every induna knew that

jealous eyes are upon him. His equals in rank and station covet his possessions, and regard the favours which he receives from the chief as so much personal loss to themselves. Therefore the head men are continually plotting and counter-plotting against one another. (15)

Personal rivalries of this type ordinarily helped to prevent the izinduna from combining against the king (16), but the domestic political situation was further complicated by continuing lineage interests and rivalries which sometimes provided a broad basis for opposition to the ruling Khumalo clan.

The Ndebele nation had been forged within living memory from more than thirty-five distinct groups of Nguni, Sotho, and Shona speaking peoples who had little else in common except the kingship and the military successes it had achieved. (17) Many of the Nguni peoples were refugees from formerly independent polities which had been broken up during the Mfecane, while a numerical majority of the population were probably captive Sotho and Shona speakers who had been incorporated by force. During the formative period of the eighteen twenties and thirties, Mzilikazi and his heavily outnumbered Khumalo clan tried to forestall challenges to their dominance and to minimize the
danger of anarchy by eliminating potential rivals in the leadership of
the high status Nguni refugee groups which amalgamated with them, and
by forcibly assimilating only the children of Sotho and Shona
captives. (18) These preliminary measures were followed up by a
thorough-going programme of linguistic, social and political
integration which continued throughout the history of the nation. (19)

This programme of national integration worked well enough to
ensure that rival factions sought satisfaction by struggling for control
of the kingship instead of through secession (20), but pre-existing
factional interests were never eliminated. The king's own hereditary
followers were so swamped by amalgamation with large and sometimes
still fairly cohesive groups of Nguni refugees in the eighteen twenties
and thirties that the rapidly expanding kingdom soon lost most of its
original Khumalo identity. Many of these newcomers had no previous
connection with the Khumalo, and it was probably due to their influence
that the name "Amasiligazi", used by Mzilikazi's followers in the
eighteen twenties, was eventually abandoned in favour of the impersonal
descriptive term "Ndebele", coined by their Sotho victims and
captives. (21) The need for political co-operation and rapid
organisation meant that many of the refugee bands had to be
incorporated into the military and administrative structure of the
rapidly expanding kingdom en masse, despite the long-term danger to
Khumalo supremacy and national integration. As a result, pre-existing
social groups and alignments often seem to have been perpetuated in
the early Ndebele regiments (22), many of which retained their identities
and fighting strength throughout the subsequent history of the nation.(23)
Anthropological evidence shows that the old social and political
associations were not forgotten (24), and the traditional hereditary
principle seems generally to have ensured that command of the
regiments remained in the lineages of the headmen who were originally
confirmed as izinduna, despite the king's formal power of
appointment. (25)

These traditional ties and loyalties were often superseded by
new political interests and relationships which developed after the
kingdom was re-established in south central Africa in the early
eighteen forties, and lineage connections alone do not seem to have had
any consistent influence on behaviour beyond the third or fourth
generations. (26) These variables, together with the failure of most
white observers to distinguish between different factions, make it
extremely difficult to reconstruct the politics of kinship and corporate
interests in the Ndebele kingdom during the later pre-colonial period.
It is, however, clear from the evidence available that pre-existing
social and political alignments were at least partly responsible for
the development of a factional cleavage which permanently polarized
Ndebele society and profoundly influenced the pattern of black-white
relations during the decisive years between 1869 and 1889.

This cleavage had its roots in the early years of the
nineteenth century, when the section of the northern Khumalo ruled by
Mzilikazi's father, Mashobana, were forced to acknowledge the
overlordship of the powerful Ndwandwe king, Zwide. One of his
daughters was installed as Mashobana's chief wife in order to cement
the vassal relationship and protect Ndwandwe interests, but the
Khumalo were subsequently suspected of intriguing with Zwide's great rival Dingiswayo, and Nashobana was executed about 1818. Zwide attempted to retain control by confirming Mzilikazi as the new chief of the Khumalo and giving him another daughter as chief wife, but Mzilikazi rebelled soon after and allied himself with the rapidly rising Zulu kingdom of Shaka. (27) This was evidently merely a tactical manoeuvre because Mzilikazi defied Shaka and fled north into the Transvaal at the first opportunity, about 1823, in order to become independent. (28) The nascent Ndebele kingdom was never again in range of Zwide's armies, but other manifestations of the Ndwandwe threat were not so easily avoided. When Zwide's successor, Sikunyana, was defeated by Shaka in 1826, "Mzilikazi reaped a rich harvest in this final break-up of the Ndwandwe clan; for large numbers of its men and women, knowing nowhere else to go, betook themselves to him and added considerable strength to his ever-growing tribe". (29) But they also brought serious problems because they came in great numbers (30) and because some of them, at least, were still well enough organized to form complete regiments in the new Amnyama division, then being raised in the Transvaal. (31)

The domestic political implications of the Ndwandwe influx into the Ndebele kingdom first became evident when the nation migrated north from the Transvaal into South Central Africa in the late eighteen thirties. The host split into two sections in northern Botswana as Mzilikazi began a two-year odyssey north along the fringes of the Kalahari desert with the Amlopho and Igabha divisions, and Gundwane Ndweni and Mzilikazi's heir, Nkulumana, started directly towards the high veld of South Central Africa with the Amnyama and Amakhanda divisions. There are many apparent contradictions in the surviving accounts of this period of migration and resettlement, but most sources agree that Gundwane and a number of the other izinduna of the Amnyama division, together with Mzilikazi's chief wife, decided to install Nkulumana as king in his father's absence. (32) It is possible, as some of the accounts suggest, that these king-makers acted in the belief that Mzilikazi was dead, but it seems more likely that pre-existing clan and tribal interests, which had no traditional links with the Khumalo, were simply taking advantage of an apparently favourable opportunity for throwing off what the Ndwandwe at least must have regarded as a humiliating yoke.

If there were really solid grounds for believing Mzilikazi to be dead, all the groups with Gundwane would presumably have supported the candidacy of Nkulumana, who was unquestionably the legitimate heir, but several regiments of the Amnyama and Amakhanda divisions evidently refused to go along with Gundwane's plans. The opposition of these unconvinced regiments, most of which seem to have had izinduna who were directly connected with the Khumalo (33), suggests that Gundwane and his associates were playing a deeper game. The key to the problem would seem to lie in the genealogy of Nkulumana, who shared the Khumalo isibongo because the Nguni were patrilineal, but who also had close connections with the Ndwandwe through his mother, a daughter of Zwide. The prince's own views are unrecorded, but it seems likely that his mother's attitudes had a dominant influence on him because he was apparently still living at her kraal, surrounded by her people, whereas he must not have seen his father for at least the last two or three of his twelve or fourteen years. (34) Direct information about his
mother's motivations is lacking, but the circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that she was eager to substitute her Ndwandwe son for her Khumalo husband. She was said to have been actively involved in the decision to promote Nkulamana as king, despite the opposition of the Khumalo izinduna, and it seems that she and her kraal were afterwards purged along with Nkulamana and Gundwane's group. (35) This evidence appears to be confirmed by the account of Mzilikazi's reappearance collected by Thomas Morgan Thomas in the eighteen sixties:

> Umzilikazi, unable to forgive or forget Uswiti [Zwide] for killing his father, Umatjobana, was determined not to allow the grandson of the murderer to become his successor. When therefore Unkulamana arrived at about twelve years of age, and those families who would be mostly benefited by his accession to the sovereignty began to speak of him as the heir apparent, he was put to death by order of his father. (36)

Mzilikazi met the challenge to his authority by secretly purging all the princes of Zwide's lineage along with their Ndwandwe mother (37), and by executing the izinduna who had "spoiled" Nkulamana. (38) Subsequent communal conflict was suppressed during Mzilikazi's lifetime by ruthless use of the judicial and police powers of the kingship (39), as well as by his unparalleled personal influence and prestige as a great warrior king and founder of the nation. (40)

These measures restrained the opposition but they could not eliminate it. The Ndwandwe faction was much too large and important to be destroyed root and branch, and Nkulamana's adherents remained strongly entrenched in the regiments of the Amnyama and Amakhanda divisions. The most fervent of these irreconcilables were associated with the elite regiments of a sub-section of Amnyama commanded by Mbiko Masuku, an extremely ambitious man with close Ndwandwe connections. Mbiko was said originally to have joined Mzilikazi with an organized regiment, the Umangaela, which was afterwards purged for its part in Gundwane's scheme. (41) By that time Mbiko had evidently become induna of the Zwangendaba regiment, to which Nkulamana was attached, and both Zwangendaba and another Amnyama regiment, called Induba, were said to have been present when Nkulamana was acknowledged as king. (42) The Induba and several other regiments were also connected with Nkulamana's cause through their izinduna. Tshukisa Mafu, induna of Induba some time before 1870, was apparently of the same lineage as a man named Dolo Mafu who was executed with Gundwane. Tshukisa Mafu was also a brother of Dambisamamziba Mafu, induna of the Godlwo regiment of Amnyama division, who was sentenced to death in 1840 but escaped to the east where another group of Ndwandwe refugees under Soshangana had become established. (43) The personal and political ambitions of these men and the regiments they led depended on Nkulamana's claim to the kingship and they continued to believe, or at least assert, that the prince had merely been sent into exile until Mzilikazi's death. (44) These claims could not be pressed while the old king lived, but they were kept in readiness for the time when his dominating presence would be removed and the Ndwandwe faction would have another chance to wrest control of the kingdom from the Khumalo. That this was no idle threat became clear during the succession crisis of 1869-70, when the old
cleavage reopened into an unbridgeable gulf between the faction which "represented the house of Uswiti [Zwide], or that to which Unkulumana belonged, and the others [who] consisted of the houses of Umkumalo and Umzwayi, with which Ulopengula was connected". (45)

Thomas' conclusion that political alignments during the succession crisis of 1869-70 were largely determined by lineage connections appears to be borne out by detailed examination of the behaviour of individual regiments and izinduna. A number of the regiments in all of the divisions were evidently influenced by calculations of political expediency. But it is striking that nearly all of Nkulumana's supporters apparently belonged to a few lineages like Mafu and Masiuku which had a long history of political dissidence, while practically everyone in the lineages connected either with the Khumalo or with Lobengula's maternal kin seems to have given him unhesitating support. (46) The proximate cause of this somewhat surprising adherence to traditional patterns of political alignment, despite the intensive and in many ways highly successful nation-building of the previous decades, was probably the kings' continuing inability to resist the claims of vested lineage interests and hereditary right in exercising their prerogative powers of appointment. (47) The possibility of accumulating power along with wealth implicit in the treatment of public offices as heritable property seems to have prevented any substantial devaluation of lineage interests and connections as the basic currency of political calculations, despite the fact that the regiment had replaced the chieftain as the principal unit of administrative organization. This does not mean that pre-existing lineage rivalries were the basic cause of domestic conflict in the Ndebele kingdom. There is abundant evidence that questions of office and influence, precedence and perquisites, distribution of military spoils and imported manufactured goods, and changes in the domestic as well as foreign balance of power were, in fact, the dominant issues which divided the nation throughout its history in South Central Africa. But close examination of the actual political process in the Ndebele kingdom suggests that these issues generally continued to be defined in terms of lineage interests and connections because there was still no convincing alternative. Dissident factions in Ndebele society did attempt to exploit the missionary message for domestic political purposes, and there were already occasional signs of class tensions arising from the new economic opportunities engendered by contact with the European commercial economy, but neither development had gone far enough to permit effective political organization on an ideological or class basis. The continuing weakness of the new social, territorial, and corporate loyalties meant that lineage claims and connections were still the principal criteria by which social and political interest groups in Ndebele domestic politics were defined. This principle was modified somewhat at the national level by the effects of the patronage system, but the major factions which sought to influence and control the kingship continued to be organized around the networks of lineage relationships which linked them with the legitimate hereditary claims of one or other of the senior branches of the royal family. More research will be needed to determine just how common a pattern this was among the Mfecane conquest states, but there seems to have been a remarkable parallel in the Swazi kingdom, where Ndwandwe claims and lineage connections also reportedly acted as a focus of opposition to the ruling lineage and its allies. (48)
Notes


(4) Iye, "Ndebele Kingdom", pp. 97 and 98 n. 59.


Hereafter cited as IMS, Papers...


Thomas, p. 154.


(23) Kuper, Hughes and Van Velsen, pp. 66-67; Maund report on Matabeleland, in P.P. 1886, XLVIII, C.4643, pp. 114-16; G. G. B. Woods, "Matabele History and Customs", NADA 1929 (No. 7) p. 44. This perpetuation of pre-existing social groups in the Ndebele regiments may partly explain why they were usually kept up to strength with new recruits instead of being allowed to die out like Zulu and Swazi age-class regiments. Cf. Gluckman, "Kingdom of the Zulu", pp. 30-32; and Kuper, pp. 117-23.

(24) Hughes, p. 66.


(26) Kuper, Hughes and Van Velsen, pp. 84-86; Hughes, pp. 35-37 and 45. The anthropological evidence is confirmed by the frequency with which men with the same clan names or izibongo are found on opposite sides in political disputes during the pre-colonial period.
(27) Bryant, pp. 417-22, 172-75, 102, 204, and 595-96; Thomas, p. 227; Fynn, I, 68; Lye, "Ndebele Kingdom", pp. 87-88.

(28) Bryant, pp. 422 and 596; Lye, "Ndebele Kingdom", p. 88.

(29) Bryant, p. 424.


(31) e.g. the Imbangele regiment, which is said to have fled Natal with Mbiko Masuku, continued to function as an identifiable unit after incorporation in the Ndebele armies. Bryant, pp. 438 and 436. Posselt, Fact and Fiction, p. 175; Edward C. Tabler, The Far Interior. Chronicles of Pioneering in the Matabele and Mashona Countries, 1847-1879 (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1955), p. 107.


(33) e.g. the izinduna of the Uyengo regiment were all Khumalo themselves; the izinduna of Intemba were Mlotshwa, a Khumalo sub-clan. Both regiments came to South Central Africa with Gundwane as part of the Amnyana division, but both were actively associated with Khumalo interests throughout the pre-colonial period.

(34) Vaughan-Williams, pp. 110-12; Lobengula to the Lt. Gov. of Natal, 19 August 1871, in Posselt, "Nkulumanaw", pp. 135-34.

(35) Vaughan-Williams, p. 112; Logengula to the Lt. Gov. of Natal, 19 August 1871, in Posselt, "Nkulumanaw", pp. 133-34; Bailie to the Chief Clerk, Colonial Secretariat, Kimberley, 31 December 1876, in P.P. 1878-79, LII, 0.2220, p. 57.

(36) Thomas, p. 227.

(37) Thomas, pp. 227-28; Lobengula to the Lt. Gov. of Natal, in Posselt, "Nkulumanaw", pp. 135-34; Bailie to the Chief Clerk, Colonial Secretariat, Kimberley, 31 December 1876. It was claimed during the succession crisis following Mzilikazi's death in 1868 that Nkulumanaw had actually been sent into exile, but these claims were strongly disputed and cannot now be checked. The case for execution is strengthened, however, by the general agreement that Nkulumanaw's full brother, Buhlehlo, was in fact killed; by the lack of evidence that Nkulumanaw had any subsequent contact with anyone in the kingdom before 1869; and by the fact that Mncumbatha was retained as regent despite his links with Lobengula.

(38) Mhlagazanhlansi, p. 15; Sigola, "How Lobengula Came to Rule", p. 88; Lobengula to the Lt. Gov. of Natal, 19 August 1871, in Posselt, "Nkulumanaw", pp. 135-34.


(43) Malagazahlansi, p. 15; Posselt, Fact and Fiction, p. 173, n.1; Bryant, pp. 160-61 and 446-49. Mbiko was also said to have looked to Soshangana's kingdom for support. Lobengula to Thomas Morgan Thomas, 1870, quoted in Thomas, p. 409.


(45) Thomas, p. 246.

(46) I regret that space does not permit references to the mass of varied information about individual men and units upon which this interpretation is based.

(47) See above, p. 87, and note 25; and G. G. B. Woods, "Extracts from Customs and History: Amandebele", NADA 1931 (No. 9), 22-23.

(48) Bryant, pp. 332-33; Kuper, African Aristocracy, pp. 232, 102, and 123.