THE ABORIGINES' PROTECTION SOCIETY AND WHITE SETTLERS IN RHODESIA, 1889-1930

by

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This period in Rhodesian history witnessed a remarkable change in the relationship between white settlers and the Aborigines' Protection Society. (1) From a relationship of mutual hostility and distrust, the two contracted what with hindsight appears an incongruous alliance as a result of which the APS, believing that African interests would be better served by settler democracy than Company rule, gave their full support to the cause of Responsible Government, which was achieved in 1923. This paper seeks to understand why this alliance was originally contracted, what it achieved, and why after 1923 it was dissolved.

The APS considered white settlement in southern Africa in the nineteenth century to be necessary and, indeed, inevitable. When combined with missionary influence, it could provide a civilizing agency, a necessary outlet for the surplus population of Great Britain and Ireland, and a means of utilizing "vacant" and "waste lands" which were bound to be settled eventually. (2) However, in order that African interests, and particularly their rights regarding land and labour, be safeguarded and in order that African tribes might be protected from the sale of European spirits, a certain kind of settler was required and certain conditions of government were necessary. Portuguese and other "adventurers", and in particular Boers, were rejected as settlers by the APS, who felt that their expropriation of land and exploitation of labour were inimical to African interests. What was required were "respectable and capable European farmers and ranchers to be established in vacant parts of the country". (3) As a result of their experiences in South Africa with local legislatures, from the 1880s they advocated direct imperial control through British officials where any extension of British rule was made. Thus they opposed the granting of a Charter to the British South Africa Company in 1889 to rule Rhodesia, on the grounds that the colony should be governed directly by Britain and that a commercial and trading company should not have administrative powers over Africans. Moreover, the BSACo were "gold speculators" and "adventurers" and Rhodes' attitude on native questions was "Dutch" rather than "English". During the period 1889-1896 they attacked the Company...
for obtaining a Charter on the basis of what they saw as spurious concessions, for deliberately provoking a war against Lobengula in 1893, and for maladministration of the country which the rebellions had revealed. (4) In particular, they attacked the Company for the expropriation of African land and cattle and the imposition of forced labour, charges which were made in Sir Richard Martin's Report on the Rebellions. (5)

I. 1889-1914

The hostility of the APS to the Company during this period inevitably reflected their attitude to the settlers. This was because, during the pioneer period, settler and Company interests were indistinguishable. As Professor Ranger has emphasised, from the arrival of the Pioneer Column in 1890 Rhodesia was a colony in which the settler element was of crucial importance, depending for its success on white economic enterprise and white armed support even before the settlers had any say in policy or representation in the Legislature. (6) It was only when these interests separated as a result of widespread settler dissatisfaction with the Company after the Rebellions that the APS were able to define a definite relationship with the settlers and, indeed, only then were they able to obtain local information on the running of the Administration.

To some extent the settlers were seen by the APS as victims of Company policy. Left isolated by Company maladministration, with the Company forces absent when the rebellion broke out, it was the British Government which had had to step in and rescue them from the rebellious inhabitants. (7) Although the settlers had participated in "the merciless slaughter of thousands" in the rebellion, it had been an uprising caused by Company maladministration and the settlers, like Olive Schreiner's "Trooper Halket of Mashonaland", could be made to see the error of their ways. (8) Partly because of their mutual feelings of hostility to the Company at this time, partly perhaps because of the middle class origins of the members of the Society, and partly because of the late Victorian idealization of the English settler, the APS saw the settler for a brief period as the representative of private enterprise, the small man struggling to establish himself against a monopolistic company. (9) However, in spite of these feelings of sympathy, it was recognized by the APS that their views on Africans and, arising out of this, their views on African rights, particularly regarding land and labour, conflicted strongly with settler views.

The APS had been strongly influenced by the nineteenth century missionary tradition, which tended to denigrate African institutions and customs in order to emphasise the need for Christianity. Africans were "primitive" and "savage": they were weak and had to be protected from exploitation. None the less they had rights, particularly the right to ownership of land in their own country and the right to sell their labour at the best market price. When divested of their natural habits and mores they could be raised to the level of European civilization and they could achieve social equality through education. As the Chairman of the APS said in 1901, "The difference between a white man and a black
man was simply one of education and heredity and in the course of not many generations given equal educational opportunities with white men the natives would prove their equality. (10)

Rhodesian settler attitudes to Africans, although more thoughtful after the rebellions, according to Professor Ranger, were none the less motivated by fear. (11) The rebellions, in which Africans had unexpectedly turned on their white masters, had proved that Africans were unpredictable and must be ruled with a firm hand in future. They must be made to work within the white economy and not allowed to idle away time on the land provided for them. Social equality was out of the question, and Africans who wore European dress and boasted European education were being pretentious.

On the issue of land these different attitudes to Africans showed themselves most clearly. The APS had condemned the Company's wholesale alienation of land in the 1890s to European farmers and companies, and the Company's failure to provide adequate land for Africans as enjoined on them by the Charter. The land provided for Africans in the 1894 settlement was inadequate and unsuitable, and after the rebellions they pressed the British Government to require the Company to make a more generous land settlement. (12) Although the APS welcomed the major allocation of land to Africans in 1902, as far as they were concerned it did not solve the predicament of over half the African population who were living outside these areas. They therefore concentrated their efforts on obtaining security of tenure for Africans living on European farms and for African ownership of the land still unalienated.

The settlers were against the provision of any more land for Africans. As Arrighi has shown, the settlers were in economic competition with tribal economies as agricultural producers, and in this competition ownership of land was the key factor. (13) In any case, Africans must be made to work, and this became a crucial issue because of the permanent labour shortage during the early years of the colony. Higher pay offered by the mining companies within Rhodesia and on the Rand, and the need for quantity rather than quality of labour required by the settlers, led them to press the Company to provide a Secretary for Labour and to increase the hut tax as a means of making Africans work. The APS, to whom forced labour was a vital matter because of their origins in the Anti-Slavery movement, pressed the British Government not to allow an increase in hut tax, not because they were against a hut tax as such but because they would not accept that it could be used as an incentive to labour. "The idea in the minds of all the white men in South Africa is how best the natives could be employed merely as cheap labour" (14), reported the Aborigines' Friend. "With these misguided enthusiasts there is no medium between idleness and slavery: honest toil under the guiding and protecting hand of their own fellow countrymen is strictly condemned", stated Rhodesia in 1898. (15) The success of philanthropic pressure on the British Government in causing it to take a firmer line with the Company over labour recruitment and the hut tax increased the Company's intense dislike of the APS and, anxious to reduce imperial interference, they did their best to represent to the colonists that it was them that the APS was attacking. (16)
During this period, therefore, although the APS saw the settlers to some extent as victims of Company policy, they were none the less potential exploiters of Africans. The settlers, for their part, saw the APS as sentimentalists and negrophiles. "The ignorant mob that persists in venerating an ideal of the Kafir races is set to ride colonists to their destruction", said the Rhodesia Herald of 24th October 1901; the APS were "theorists" and "canting visionaries": "those who live alongside the native know; those who have only seen show specimens at a circus or at missionary fund raising meetings do not know". (17) Such was the hostility of the APS to the settlers that Milner rebuked them in 1901 for their "tone of unjustified suspicion and almost of hostility towards their fellow countrymen in South Africa", and added "most especially would I raise a warning voice against the fatal doctrine that the Imperial Government is to deal with the native question regardless of colonial sentiment" for "the time must come before many years when the native and other local affairs pass under local control". (18) In the meantime, as long as settler and Company interests clashed with African interests, the APS urged continuing British control in matters affecting Africans. (19)

II. 1914-1923

In 1914 the Organizing Secretary of the amalgamated Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, John Harris, went to Rhodesia to collect affidavits from Rhodesian Africans whom the APS were representing through their solicitors in the dispute before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council concerning the ownership of the unalienated land in Rhodesia. He found the influence of the Company everywhere. "The Company either commercially or administratively has an interest direct or indirect in every enterprise whether it be the land, bank or the gold mine, the railway system or missionary enterprise, the cathedral or the bacon factory, tobacco cultivation or ranching; its influence is all pervading and holds men in a thraldom they resent but from which they see no immediate chance of escape." (20) Although he had been given limited support for his mission by Lord Buxton, the High Commissioner, Harris was forbidden by the Company to approach Africans. Once the Company's attitude to Harris was known, no solicitors wanted to be involved in the preparation of the native case. As for the majority of missionaries, "from the day that they heard that the Board (of the British South Africa Company) had stopped us we have been cut dead and might have leprosy the way they have treated us", wrote Harris to Travers Buxton. (21) In this isolated position Harris was extremely relieved to discover "a few strong and trusty counsellors in that little band of honest men who have for years fought the Company against overwhelming odds". (22) From these contacts, initiated in 1914, with Sir Charles Coghlan (first Prime Minister of Rhodesia) and H. U. Moffat (son of the missionary J. S. Moffat), J. McClery and H. Longden, members of the Legislative Assembly, grew the alliance which was to culminate in the APS's support for Responsible Government.

There were, I think, four main reasons for this alliance between the APS and the settlers. Firstly, their mutual hostility to the Chartered Company which brought them together initially; secondly, the APS's failure to make contacts with other sections of the population
in Rhodesia and thus to obtain local information essential to the effective operation of the APS as a pressure group in England; thirdly, the failure of the APS's attempts to secure African interests in land as they saw them during this period, and their consequent commitment by 1920 to some form of segregation which brought them into line, although for quite different reasons, with settler thinking on the land issue; fourthly, the settler desire to convince the British Government that they would safeguard the "Trust" in the event of self-government.

It was on the basis of their mutual hostility to the Company and the APS's need for contacts within Rhodesia which would provide them with the essential local information to inform their campaign in England that the alliance between the settlers and the APS originated. Harris augmented the criticisms of Company rule of the Fox Bourne era with an almost paranoic hatred of the Chartered Company, originating partly from the philosophy which he brought with him from his contacts with E. D. Morel in the Congo Reform Association, with its condemnation of monopolistic companies exploiting colonial populations, and partly from his own experiences with the ABIR Company when a missionary in the Congo. (23) On their side, the settler feelings of hostility arose from their desire to free themselves from a commercial company which, they felt, was exploiting the country and expropriating the land for its commercial advantage. These feelings became stronger when, in 1914, they achieved a majority of elected members over Company nominees in the Legislative Council, and in the same year the Supplemental Charter conceded their ultimate right to self-government. It became clear that, although the Company would retain its commercial interests, it would now keep its administrative expenditure to the minimum. This hostility united the APS and the settlers over issues in which their interests were very different. For instance, in the dispute over ownership of the unalienated land in 1914, the APS claimed the land on behalf of Africans as the rightful owners while the settlers claimed the land as the property of the future administration, but both opposed the Company's claim to commercial ownership. Both condemned the pro-Chartered personnel of the Reserves Commission and its recommendation that the Reserves be cut down by almost a million acres, the APS because they would not agree to any further cutting down of African areas and the settlers because they believed that the Company was trying to appropriate the land for its own commercial advantage. Similarly, they were united in their opposition to the Company, but for different reasons, over the appointment of the Cave Commission in 1918 and on the issue of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia. This feeling of standing together against the Company was very strong. As Mrs Tawse Jollie wrote to Harris in 1917, "Personally I believe what you say is true - the rights of the natives and the white man are inextricably interwoven and together constitute a barrier to the claims of the Company". (24)

Sharing this antagonism to the Company and seeing the Company as a competitor over land, the settlers were able to provide the APS with valuable anti-Company information, keep them informed of local conditions, and send cuttings from local newspapers, Legislative Council resolutions, Responsible Government Association pamphlets. Any alienations of land made by the Company or sale of blocks of land to companies were immediately reported to the APS. The APS, in return, corresponded frequently with Sir Charles Coghlan, J. McClary, H. Longden, Mrs Tawse Jollie and H. U. Moffat, keeping them informed of APS views,
sending copies of Parliamentary Questions asked, APS pamphlets, and letters to the Colonial Office. Several members of the Legislative Assembly even became subscribers to the Aborigines' Friend. This local information, which to date the APS had had difficulty in obtaining, was essential to their functioning as a pressure group in England, and in particular enabled their parliamentary activities to be accurately informed.

The APS attached great value to this information about local conditions because they had been unable to make contacts either with the missionaries, with the important exceptions of A. S. Cripps, the radical Anglican missionary, and John White, a Wesleyan missionary, who were their traditional contacts in areas where they operated, or indeed with Africans. The majority of missionaries in Rhodesia regarded the APS with hostility. Committed to the Company initially through their belief that Matabele power must be broken before there could be effective Christianity, and by grants of land for mission stations from Rhodes, their dependence on the Company increased during the 1920s for a number of reasons which Professor Ranger has outlined. (25) In addition, Harris antagonized the missionaries from the first by attacking their policy of charging rents to Africans on mission land, and hostility between them grew, culminating in 1920 with a bitter correspondence between Harris and Bishop Beavan of Rhodesia and the attack on Harris at the 1920 Missionary Conference which passed a resolution approving the recommendations of the Reserves Commission.

Neither had the APS made any effective contacts with Africans. They had attempted to approach Rhodesian Africans through their contacts, the African Native National Congress delegates J. L. Dube and W. Rubusana, over the Privy Council Case in 1914, and Harris went to Rhodesia intending to get statements from leading indunas and "heirs of Lobengula" and to claim the ownership of the unalienated land in Rhodesia on their behalf. But this brief flirtation with the ideas of popular sovereignty in the Rhodesian context was ended by the Company's outright refusal to allow Harris to approach the Africans in any way. Lack of an élite class similar to that in West Africa precluded any formation of Auxiliary Societies of the APS, as Dr Nworah has shown were established at Lagos and on the Gold Coast. (26) Henceforth, contacts with Rhodesian Africans were limited to requests for assistance regarding individual grievances such as the Fingoes1 appeals to the APS.

The third main reason for the alliance between the settlers and the APS was the failure of their campaign to secure African interests to land, as they saw them. R. H. Palmer's unpublished thesis on the making of land policy in Rhodesia has shown that, although the major alienations of land to Europeans took place in the 1890s, and a certain amount of land was set aside for Africans on Reserves in 1894 and 1902, these divisions were for several years largely a paper settlement and even in 1914 nearly half of the African population were living outside the Reserves. (27) Africans remained as tenants on European farms, as it was hoped they would provide a ready labour supply and Africans saw no reason to move from land which they had already occupied. However, with increased pressures on land arising mainly from the failure of the Company's mineral expectations and the decision to encourage white settlement and to develop a white agricultural policy, combined with
Africans' disinclination to enter the white economy, attempts were made to implement this original division of the land to the detriment, as the APS saw it, of African interests in land. The assumptions on which this original division of the land had been made were questioned, and the reserves, which had been seen as areas where Africans who did not participate in the white economy might go, now took on a new significance as Africans' share of the land.

Between 1914 and 1923 APS attention was concentrated on trying to obtain adequate land for Africans from land as yet unalienated to Europeans and security of tenure for Africans on land which they were already occupying. In 1914 they disputed the Company's claim to commercial ownership of the unalienated land, and when it was decided that the Crown was the rightful owner, they argued that the British Government therefore had an obligation to provide an adequate amount of it for Africans, particularly land which they were "beneficially" occupying. Ownership of the unalienated land was essential because, as the APS saw it, Africans had no security of tenure anywhere. On European farms and on land claimed by the Company, failure to pay rent led to eviction. Neither did they have security of tenure on the Reserves, in spite of the fact that these were vested in the High Commissioner; the Reserves Commission appointed in 1914 (dominated by pro-Chartered personnel who intended to take from the Reserveland suitable for white settlement) recommended the cutting down of the Reserves by one million acres, and eviction of Africans from areas removed from the Reserves started even before the Order in Council was promulgated in 1920. Public works led to further deductions from the Reserves: the Reserves Commission, for instance, had recommended that a strip 12 miles wide be taken from the Sabi Reserve for the railway. Neither could Africans obtain security of tenure through individual purchase of land, as, in practice, few were able to exercise the right which they possessed under the 1898 Order in Council to purchase land on the same terms as Europeans. As far as the APS was concerned, "no single native of the Mashona and Matabele and kindred tribes owns either personally or through membership of his tribe a foot of land, a spring of water, a sacred graveyard, a patch of garden or even a plot of land on which his native hut is erected". The Rhodesian land case raised "a cardinal issue of colonial policy as affecting native races ... a question which struck at the very roots of British colonial policy ... a turning point in the treatment of the African native". "At the present nothing is secure to the Natives in Rhodesia. Upon good cause being shown they can be turned off the reserves and given areas elsewhere and those who follow native conditions know full well how easy it is to show 'good cause' for the removal of natives." (28)

In repeated letters to the Colonial Office between 1918 and 1920 they advocated an enquiry into the whole Rhodesian land issue, but in spite of this correspondence "every attempt has been met with obstruction, every effort to secure modest reforms has been repelled and thus the Committee has been driven almost against its will to the platform and into the press". (29) Their parliamentary campaign took on a new, vigorous aspect in 1920 when traditional Liberal support was augmented by considerable Labour Party support. In January 1920 an appeal to the Prime Minister was signed by forty-five MPs, religious support was secured from the Anglican Church and the Society of Friends, and the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches sent in nationwide petitions. In writings, such as Harris's book, Chartered Millions, and in pamphlets and articles, the APS urged consideration of the
Rhodesian Land issue. (30) Yet, in spite of this campaign, no Commission of Enquiry was appointed and in 1920 the British Government approved the recommendations of the 1914 Reserves Commission.

By 1920 the APS had come to the conclusion that a certain measure of segregation in the Rhodesian context was inevitable. "... A complete restoration of the land to the natives is impracticable and that however regrettable it may be the rights of natives living on lands sold or given to the white men must be sacrificed." (31) However, in view of the rate at which land was being alienated, there was an urgent necessity to provide adequate reserve areas "secure in title, sufficient in area and suitable in character". (32) At this stage it was a partial segregation that the APS envisaged. They still hoped that Africans would be able to retain their right to purchase land anywhere and to vote on the terms of a Cape franchise. Harris had, in fact, already accepted the principle of segregation in South Africa when he drafted a petition for the African Native National Congress delegates relating to the 1913 Land Act, and he had described General Botha's separation policy as one of the "three constructive land policies in the African continent" of the present generation. (33) However, there is evidence that he did not see segregation as the solution in the Rhodesian context until 1920.

In view of the failure of their campaign in Britain between 1914 and 1920, the APS seems to have come to the conclusion in 1920 that through an alliance with the settlers they would perhaps have more success than they had had so far in urging the APS land programme. In May 1920 the Legislative Council passed a resolution by a large majority in favour of Responsible Government. Harris wrote to Cripps: "The change in the political situation in Rhodesia encourages us very much and we are not without hope that it may yet be possible to secure a general settlement of the land question." (34) In September 1920 the APS wrote to the Legislative Council smoothing out past differences and hoping that the people of Rhodesia would come to see the Society's efforts "in a truer light than the mists of controversy and misrepresentation permit today" and stressing the moderate nature of their programme. (35) In October 1921 the Responsible Government delegates visited London to see the Secretary of State, Winston Churchill, and if Harris had any further doubts about the settler-APS alliance the meeting with the delegates seems to have ended them. "We have had a good deal of discussion with the delegates whilst they were here", he wrote to a correspondent in Rhodesia, "and have come to the conclusion that there is very little ground of difference between us as to what we ought ultimately to secure for the natives." Coghlan apparently agreed with Harris that land should be set aside for Africans but that it would not affect their right to purchase land elsewhere on equal terms with Europeans. However, he insisted that Europeans should not move from where they already lived and that Africans would have to prove that they had been in beneficial occupation for at least twenty years.

As R. H. Palmer has shown, the settlers who had originally seen the Company as their rival regarding land had come to see their relationship with Africans increasingly in terms of competition and to desire a settlement of the land issue on the basis of some kind of segregation. (36) Whereas for the APS segregation was seen as an inevitable solution and the only means of securing Africans adequate land, for the settlers segregation was the solution to competition. Moreover, the settlers had a strong reason for desiring APS support for Responsible Government. The Supplemental Charter of 1914
renewing the Company's responsibilities over Rhodesia had stipulated that Responsible Government would be granted when an absolute majority of the Legislative Council favoured it and when the country could demonstrate its fitness for Responsible Government in financial and "in other respects". This last clause referred to the "Trust" which the British Government had always believed it held for the African inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia. (37) Although the Legislative Council were prepared to concede Imperial responsibility for legislation affecting African interests, it was still essential to convince them that they had the interests of the African inhabitants at heart, and this is where the APS could help them. As Harris wrote to Moffat on 11th June 1920,

It seems to me that you will now have to establish capacity to rule 'in other respects' and of course the principal difficulty here is the question of the Natives. The Colonial Office will want to know what capacity you have for treating the natives properly. It is just here that I am of the strongest opinion we can be very helpful to you. I hope it may be possible for us as a Society to write to Lord Milner and say that from our standpoint we have every confidence in the men who are asking for Responsible Government and that we look forward with pleasure to the early grant of as full a measure of Responsible government as possible. It seems to me that if we write such a formal letter to the Government coupled with an appeal for settling the whole native question along common sense lines in Rhodesia we shall enormously help you. I am anxious that as early as possible and as emphatically as possible our Society should tell the people in this country that there is nothing whatever to fear from you and your successful colleagues. This will rob the government of any excuse for delaying the grant of Responsible Government. I do trust it may be possible for us to work together as I am sure it is for the welfare of Rhodesia and particularly for the welfare of the Natives. (38)

What Harris envisaged was a bargain between the APS and the settlers. In return for "a sound native policy", by which was meant a fair and adequate amount of land being set aside for Africans, acceptance by the Responsible Government Party of Imperial controls over legislation affecting Africans, and the maintenance of native rights to franchise, they would give the settlers the support which they needed for Responsible Government. (39)

As their part of the bargain, the APS wrote to Milner on 21st July 1920. They outlined their proposed native policy, and added:
The speeches of the successful candidates show an evident sense of responsibility towards the natives ... The committee believes that it has put nothing forward in this letter which in its opinion will be refused by the leaders of the Responsible Government Party and further desires to say that from speeches made by some of the unsuccessful candidates and by the public record and character of several members known to them this Society which is solely concerned with the welfare of native races ... looks forward as far as the natives are concerned with hope to an early grant of Responsible Government to the people of Rhodesia. (40)

When the Buxton Report was published in 1920, praising the settlers and recommending Responsible Government, the APS sent a deputation to Lord Buxton reminding him of his past connections with the Society and praising his recommendations. In addition, when the Responsible Government Party delegates came to Britain in October 1921, Harris put them on to the APS' parliamentary and publicity network and introduced them to the Labour Advisory Committee. There is evidence that APS's support for Responsible Government at this time, when the Chartered Company would have liked Rhodesia to join the Union as offering greater security for their mineral investments and the railways, and for financial reasons Britain would have liked to delay the grant of Responsible Government, and APS and settler pressure were important factors in hastening the advent of Responsible Government.

Although the APS fulfilled their part of the bargain, the question which greatly worried the APS's missionary contacts in Rhodesia, Cripps and White, was whether the settlers would honour theirs. Harris, carried away by the positive benefits of the association, wrote to White: "We rejoice in the grant of Responsible Government because we believe we shall get more for the natives through Responsible Government than by any other means." (41) White was more sceptical: "Candidly I am very pessimistic; the new government is not of a kind that will brook a moment's disfavour to gain any reform for the natives ... It is called Responsible Government but it only represents one section of the community. The voice of the native people will never be heard." (42)

III. 1923-1930

Between 1923 and 1930 it became clear to the APS that the scepticism of their missionary allies as to the intentions of the settlers towards Africans had been well founded, and this period was one of increasing disillusionment for the APS.

The Responsible Government Constitution gave them what they had asked for: imperial controls over legislation affecting Africans and the retention of the "Cape clause" pending a full settlement of the
land question. However, the Imperial guarantees proved ineffective to some extent and the APS found it much more difficult to operate as a pressure group under Responsible Government than under Chartered Company rule, while the land settlement - the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 - was a bitter disappointment.

During the '20s the APS developed their ideas on segregation further. A. S. Cripps, in An Africa for the Africans, put the view most forcibly that encroachments of Europeans were destroying traditional African society and segregation would provide Africans with areas where they would be free to develop along their own lines. (43) The original idea of the Cape franchise was abandoned in favour of the concept of Advisory Councils in the reserve areas which would elect European representatives to the Legislative Assembly. It was also felt that in open competition for the purchase of land Africans would not be able to secure enough land and therefore areas should be put aside where Africans alone could purchase land. However, it was still felt that they should be allowed to retain their right to purchase land on the open market as well, but privately it was felt that this should be used as a lever to try and get adequate land set aside for Africans and abandoned if necessary. (44)

The Morris Carter Commission of 1925 recommended that the "Cape Clause" should be repealed, that Africans in return would be allotted seven million acres of land adjoining the reserves, where land was to be held on individual tenure only; Europeans would be given seventeen and a half million acres (in addition to the thirty-one million acres they already had) and a neutral area of one million acres would be allotted where either race could purchase land; the remaining nineteen million acres of land, largely uninhabitable, would remain unalienated and would be used to redress the balance if miscalculations were found to have been made. With the exception of the Neutral Area proposal, which was rejected by the Legislative Assembly, the proposals of the Morris Carter Commission were incorporated into the Land Apportionment Act, which was finally promulgated by the new Labour Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, in 1931.

The APS regarded the Land Apportionment Act as a bitter disappointment to their hopes of an equitable land settlement. They did not regard the land provided for Africans as a good bargain, an adequate quid pro quo for the loss of their purchasing right. They criticized the Commission for giving Africans only seven million acres out of the total of forty-three million acres as yet unalienated, while Europeans were to get seventeen million, as "a monstrously disapporionate proposition to say nothing of its inadequacy as a recompense to the Natives for the surrender of their existing rights to purchase land which is anywhere available". The nineteen million acres of land left over must be held in trust by the Crown for future native acquisition. They criticized the Commission strongly for being opposed to the granting of communal title, which was contrary to native thought and custom. (45) Cripps, who had seen segregation in such idealistic terms, was all the more disappointed by the Morris Carter recommendations, which he described as "a second rate scheme designed with a view to cheapness". The APS carried on their opposition to the Land Apportionment Act right up until the last minute, although by 1929 Cripps and White had come to the
conclusion that the Bill was perhaps better than nothing although it
did not represent what they wanted. By 1929 the APS opposition had
become irrelevant. The British Government, fearing that if it delayed
the settlement would be even less favourable to Africans, knowing that
they could not enforce their opinions if they did not come to an
agreement with the settler government, and pressed by Moffat who
threatened to resign if the measure was not passed, gave their approval
to the Bill.

The passing of the Land Apportionment Act led to a complete
rethinking by the APS of their role as protector of African interests
in Rhodesia. As a result of some disillusionment with the APS, Cripps
and White turned after 1930 towards the Africans' Associations, the
Industrial and Commercial Union and the Rhodesian Bantu Voters
Association. Harris, too, turned his attention far more to his work at
the League of Nations in Geneva and looked to such organizations as the
ILO to secure better conditions for Africans in Rhodesia. Generally,
after the passing of the Land Apportionment Act, the APS saw Rhodesian
African interests in a much wider context and looked to Commissions such
as the Hilton Young Commission to provide statements of policy which
they hoped would influence the Rhodesian situation. They repeated that
everything must be done to try and prevent Responsible Government being
brought about in other countries before adequate safeguards had been
secured for Africans.

Notes

(1) Called the APS throughout this paper, although after the amalgamation
of the Aborigines' Protection Society and the Anti-Slavery Society
in 1909 its full correct title was "The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines'
Protection Society".

(2) "The Aborigines' Protection Society": Chapters in its History,

(3) John Mackenzie, "The Expansion of S. Africa", Contemporary Review,
Nov. 1889, p. 769.

(4) H. R. Fox Bourne, Matabeleland and the Chartered Company, 1897.


(7) H. R. Fox Bourne, Matabeleland and the Chartered Company, 1897.

(8) Olive Schreiner, Trooper Halket of Mashonaland, 1897.


(14) Aborigines' Friend, 1901. Annual Meeting. Speech of Sir W. Brampton Gurdon, MP.

(15) Quoted by T. O. Ranger, op. cit., p. 322.

(16) The Company bitterly resented what it regarded as the APS's "meddling" during the concession period. Rhodes called the APS "The Aborigines' Destruction Society". For the influence of the philanthropists on the British Government, see Ranger, pp. 320-22.

(17) Quoted in the Aborigines' Friend, 1902.

(18) Milner to the APS, 6th December 1901 (quoted in the AF, 1902).

(19) APS to Chamberlain, 26th March 1901 (AF, 1901).

(20) J. H. Harris to Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton (President of the APS), "Review of conditions in Matabeleland and Mashonaland". Sent from Bulawayo, Jan. 1915.

(21) J. H. Harris to Travers Buxton (Secretary of the APS), 25th November 1914. ASS Papers. D 5/3.

(22) J. H. Harris to W. Morgan, 1st December 1914. ASS Papers. D 5/3.

(23) Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company.

(24) Mrs Tawse Jollie to J. H. Harris, undated but in answer to his letter of 6th October 1917. Mrs Tawse Jollie was the first woman member of the Legislative Assembly and author of The Real Rhodesia (London, 1924).

(25) T. O. Ranger, State and Church in Rhodesia, Historical Association of Rhodesia & Nyasaland, Local Series 4.


(39) J. H. Harris to Sir Sydney Olivier, 18th October 1920. ASS Papers. G 162.

(40) APS to Lord Milner, 21st July 1920. ASS Papers. G 162.

(41) J. H. Harris to J. White, 5th December 1922. ASS Papers. G 165.

(42) J. White to Harris, 9th October 1923. ASS Papers. G 166.

(43) A. S. Cripps, An Africa for Africans, 1927.

(44) J. White to J. H. Harris, 2nd January 1923, J. H. Harris to J. White, 2nd August 1923. ASS Papers. G 166.

(45) APS to L. Amery, Dominions Office, 7th June 1926. ASS Papers. G 166.