Property relationships and the mode of production in the South African Republic present a number of interesting historical and conceptual problems. A market in land existed from the beginning of White Afrikaner occupation of the territory north of the Vaal river, which led to rapid accumulation among Afrikaner notables and landlessness among their clients. The major source of profit from agriculture (and the source of support for both notables and clients) lay in the various forms of rent paid by African producers who had often been the cultivators of the land prior to its seizure by Afrikaner settlers. The state which emerged from these property relations was created by the dominant, quasi-feudal notables who, with their functionaries, used their dominant position to acquire more land. In addition to the accumulation of land by Afrikaner notables, speculative land companies owned by South African-based entrepreneurs with European financial connections contributed to the proletarianization of sections of the Afrikaner population. Partly in an attempt to alleviate intra-Afrikaner conflict, Afrikaner notables who controlled the state used their position to make irregular exactions upon the internationally financed deep level gold mining industry which was established in the last decade of the 19th century. Because profits from gold mining investments were delayed, these exactions caused intense anxiety about costs. In addition, the system of land holding (determined by custom or speculative ownership) led to under-utilization and made it impossible to meet the gold mines' need for cheap food. The systems of agricultural production and gold mining production were incompatible, and after the South African War of 1899-1902 property relationships in agriculture swiftly changed. But, while the notables were transformed into capitalist farmers, the proletarianization of their former clients continued to its ultimate conclusion.

In 1850, ten years before the final unification of the four major Voortrekker communities north of the Vaal, the White settlers were a relatively homogeneous population, committed to providing large tracts
of land for members of their maatschapij. The leaders of the several parties of pastoralists were comparatively wealthy and, as a result, they and their kind were in an advantaged position when the original distribution of land took place. Nevertheless, the relationship of a leader to his followers was such that his power and prestige depended upon their support, and, although inequalities were present, if gross advantage had been taken of these, links - tenuous as they were - would have dissolved. The major factor reinforcing what was in effect a client-patron relationship was the creation of a number of forced labour and tributary relationships between Afrikaner groups and African peoples. These relationships were the result of partial military conquest and were only uneasily maintained and expanded by force. The maintenance of the burgher militia - commandos - was both very expensive and made necessary the use of foreign currency. Commandos had not only to be fed while they were in the field but their imported arms and ammunition had to be paid for in negotiable foreign currency. It is probable that an important source of power for the notables was their ability to provide foreign currency. (1) The administrative machinery of the embryonic state was incapable of collecting sufficient revenue to finance both military expenditure and the barest essentials of civil administration, including the collecting of taxes. Between 1850 and 1876 the cost of acquiring and defending land was far more than the republican exchequer could pay, and payment was therefore made by securing land against debts. This, in its turn, involved the state inevitably in the search for new land with further expenditure which was again secured by the provision of land against Republican currency, land used to secure debts was no longer available for burgher occupation and provided a further reason for the conquest of more land.

In an attempt to solve the financial problems caused by military expenditure and the initial inability to raise revenue, two related sets of financial manipulations were attempted. Within the first set of proposals the simplest aspects involved providing land in lieu of salaries for administrators and directing creditors to taxpayers who were in arrears. More complex was the issuing of exchequer bills or Mandaaten for services rendered to the state. Mandaaten were not legal tender but were secured by government farms. (2) The next measure, taken in 1865, five years after all the Transvaal burgher communities had combined to form the South African Republic, was the issuing of paper currency. The notes also were secured by government farms and were intended to recall the Mandaaten. The number of Mandaaten issued exceeded the notes issued by the Republic, and a further issue, again secured against government farms - 300 on this occasion - was made in 1867. These notes were insufficient to meet new government expenditure and in 1868 a finance commission was established which proposed, among other things, the issue of more notes against no less than 1000 farms or 3,000,000 morgen. It is extremely difficult to summarize the variations of these schemes which were introduced not only by the Volksraad but by Landdrosts, who issued an unrecorded number of Mandaaten and failed to recall either their own or the state's issue when required to do so. In addition, clergymen, traders, and private individuals issued good-fors because of the monetary chaos. It is hardly surprising that the Republic's currency was unacceptable in most commercial transactions and there were occasions when even government departments refused to accept currency which was supposedly legal tender. (3)
The second set of financial proposals concerned attempts to establish a bank among the burgher communities and had less impact than the monetary programme, but they help to illustrate the use to which land was put. The earliest proposal was made by a Hollander, Jacobus Stuart, who had very close connections with Amsterdam merchants involved in the South African trade. (4) Stuart's proposals, accepted by the Potchefstroom Volksraad in 1853, involved his being given the right to sell a hundred 3,000 morgen farms in Holland for £450 each. The capital raised by the sale of these farms was to be invested in the Landsbank and the Dutch settlers Stuart hoped to attract were to be invited to subscribe additional share capital to the bank. Stuart had no success in Holland. Whatever chances of success he may have had were in any case reduced by the scepticism of rival Dutch merchants. (5)

Similar proposals were made a decade later in 1865 by a Scottish adventurer, Alexander McCorkindale, who advocated the establishment of a Bank der Z.A. Republiek. McCorkindale had previously undertaken to establish the London and South African Commercial, Agricultural and Mining Company which was to purchase two hundred farms from the government at £40 each and settle these with European immigrants. Eventually eighty farms were purchased - in all, about 110,000 morgen - in an area of the eastern Transvaal named New Scotland. McCorkindale made a variety of industrial and commercial proposals to Pretorius and the Volksraad. He proposed building a harbour on Delagoa Bay and making the Maputa and Pongola rivers navigable. In addition, he proposed constructing roads, improving the postal service, and attracting engineers, mechanics, doctors and teachers from Europe to the Republic. To undertake these schemes he required that the government provide him with a hundred farms as security for the raising of a loan of £250,000 and for his services he proposed that the government give him two hundred farms. Nothing came of these later proposals but they indicate the profligate way in which commercial adventurers were ready to dispose of land. (6)

The Republic failed to establish a bank of its own, but its new President, Francois Burgers, was able to negotiate a favourable loan with the Cape Commercial Bank and the state was therefore able to redeem its outstanding debts. The bank was heavily involved in supporting the Burgers' regime for what de Kiewiet describes as "political and not financial" reasons. (7) Burgers' attempt to raise a further European loan was apparently intended to free himself from the Cape Bank's tutelage. It was also intended that capital be raised for building a railway from Delagoa Bay to the Republic, which would have freed the Republic from dependence on the ports of British colonies; but no sooner had Burgers made these attempts than the Republic was involved in another and very costly war against the Pedi. The Commercial Bank despaired of recovering its loans and the Republic's creditors played an important part in persuading the British Government to annex the territory, which was, of course, part of its wider political programme. Annexation did not save the Cape Commercial Bank, which went into liquidation in 1881, claiming land worth £400,000 which it had been given as security for its loans. (8)

The administration of the Transvaal (as the annexed Republic was called) was placed under Theophilus Shepstone, the Natal
administrator. Shepstone made J. C. A. Henderson his honorary financial Commissioner, which promised little for a change in the Transvaal's property relations. The latter had been a banker, was one of the prime movers in attempting to raise capital for a railway from Durban to the Transvaal, which left him hostile toward Burger's Delagoa Bay proposals, and while in Shepstone's service established what de Kiewiet has called "one of those land-jobbing companies". Henderson's Transvaal Board of Executors and Trust Company included the Government secretary, two managing officials of the Cape Commercial Bank, and George Moodie, "the entirely dishonest promoter of the Lebombo Railway Company". (9) Before the Cape Commercial Bank went into liquidation, Henderson had appropriated British funds to give its claims preferential treatment. His activities undermined British policy and went a long way toward creating the conditions which rallied republicans to overthrow the regime, but his association with the Transvaal was not to end there. In 1900 Henderson's Consolidated Corporation Limited owned 80 farms in the Transvaal, and it is very probable that he was himself a director of other land companies. (10) In 1900, when the Lands Settlement Commission took evidence, it was told that 1400 farms were owned by land companies. Intelligence reports, however, indicate that at least another 700 farms were owned by companies. J. S. Marais reports that in 1899 the Colonial Office received a letter from a committee claiming to represent companies who owned over eight million acres in the Republic. The view that these land companies were merely ancillary to mining activities is not well founded. The prospectus of the Oceana Land Company, published in London in 1891, offered 105 farms suitable for agricultural purposes, and by 1900 the Company owned 224 farms. (12) Many of the Transvaal Consolidated Land Exploration Company's 656 farms were acquired before 1883, and it offered for sale in 1894 a large number of farms suitable for agricultural purposes. For its part, the Republic continued to use land to secure its debts; Paul Kruger was reported to have given "a large amount of land" to, among others, the Netherlands Railway Company. (13)

II

It should be apparent that the usual explanation for "landlessness" in the Transvaal is unsatisfactory. It is not enough to posit a group of unprogressive farmers lacking initiative, but set on providing a landed inheritance by subdividing land until it was no longer economically viable. Rural impoverishment should be set against land accumulation and the relationship between the two should be noted. (14) The process by which land became the Republic's major resource in its dealings with outsiders was initiated in its dealings with its own officials. Land accumulation began among officials who were given land in lieu of salaries and thereby gradually encouraged to perceive land as a marketable asset. To begin with, this may have created hardship. (15) But it was ultimately perceived as gain when land values increased. When we ask what kind of people within the various communities became officials, we see that the situation was one which provided opportunities for certain members of the community to consolidate already existing advantages. Most officials were elected and the landdrost - the only appointed official - was dependent upon local approval for the confirmation and retention of this appointment. (16) The field cornet who had most local authority was almost invariably elected from a family of local notables. Status
was acquired from wealth in cattle, and wealth in cattle made men sedentary. With large herds, activities were centralized, and kin and others were employed to take cattle to widely dispersed pastures. In a community where there was constant movement among burgher farmers, some of them abandoning old and seeking new pastures, few people were settled long enough to acquire local status.

The field cornet - the most pivotal official of the burgher state - played interchangeable military and civil roles. He was responsible to the Krijgsraad (Military Council) and to the administrative and judicial authority of the landdrost. In his military role he was entrusted with maintaining a list of combatants in his ward and for summoning these for military service. But, above all, the field cornet was responsible for inspecting claims to farms to enable them to be transferred from the state to citizens of the republic, and for "placing" in "service" every "coloured person" not "subordinate to any of the native captains". (17) It is apparent, therefore, that despite the rules of the constitution (and the fact that he was usually a benign paternal figure) (18), the field cornet, having so much within his power the apportionment of land and African labour in a community of constant flux, was well placed for accumulating landed property. The landdrost, who was responsible for putting up for sale land for which taxes had not been paid, had access to valuable information about land on the market. His responsibility for the issuing of licences to "shopkeepers, itinerant foreign traders, auctioneers" and his role as chief judicial officer enhanced his authority. It is probably fair to say that officials formed a class, since about half of those who had been field cornets between 1839 and 1870 became members of the Volksraad between 1845 and 1880. (19)

In the two decades between 1850 and 1870 the burghers of the Transvaal were relatively prosperous and one should not equate the condition of the state's finances with that of its citizens. Ostrich feathers, ivory, cattle, hides and wool provided substantial exports, particularly from the Potchefstroom district. (20) The traders who came originally as smouses to nagmaal remained to establish permanent stores. They exchanged their goods for agricultural products or products of the hunt, which they sold or passed on to their principals in the coastal ports. Despite their hinterland Transvaal dorps had a solid core of English businessmen, who were joined or replaced at the end of the 19th century by Jews of East European descent. (21)

The combination of President Burghers's loan, the discovery of gold in the Lydenburg district, and the experience of administration made for greater efficiency, and by 1870, for example, officials were receiving their money salaries. In the main, however, an improvement in administration meant primarily an improvement in tax collecting. It coincided with a general decline in prosperity among the republic's citizens which was intensified by relatively efficient tax collection. Game was now a wasting asset, and those who had primarily been hunters abandoned or sold farms and followed the diminishing elephant herds. Between 1850 and 1868 various Volksraads attempted to raise taxes by exhortation, fines, proclamations and hectoring instructions to landdrosts, with little or no effect. (22) By 1873 the situation had changed dramatically. It is significant that the Volksraad found it necessary to pass a resolution instructing landdrosts not to sell
freehold farms of debtors for less than the owners owed the state. (23) For those who owed the state money and were faced with having to leave their farms, to sell was more to their advantage than merely to abandon, and who was better placed to know that an owner wished to sell (or barter) his farm than local officials involved in tax assessment and collection? Although the imminent auction of abandoned farms had to be advertised in the Staats Courant, and later also in the local papers, local officials were in the best position to know whether land was coming onto the market. (24) As a young field cornet, Paulus Kruger is said to have acquired several farms "by barter" before 1846, and before he became president he acquired much land at a time when it "went begging". The future Commandant-General of the Republic, Piet Joubert, as a field cornet had acquired over a dozen farms by 1871. A field cornet and native commissioner in Vryheid, Louis Botha, acquired or purchased six farms, in all 16,000 acres, before he was elected to the Second Volksraad in 1895 to begin a political career which culminated in his being the first Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa. (25)

In the last two decades of the century the dominant group of Afrikaner landowners had established an informal network which provided them with information which enabled them to accumulate profitable landholdings. Piet Joubert was in a fortunate position since "persone wat hulle vaste einedom wou verkoop het hom dikwels, en selde te vergeefs om' n aanbod genader". (26) The Republic's last Registrar of Deeds said of one of Kruger's close associates, Alois Hugo Nellmapius, who bought a large number of farms at public auctions after 1883, that he "knew the country well himself and obtained good information". (27) But who could have had better information than the very same Registrar of Deeds, Christoffel Minnaar, who was a director of the Transvaal Land Exploration Company, or the Surveyor General of the republic, Johannes Rissik, who was the Company's Chairman? (28) Likewise, Louis Botha "had his connections everywhere". He not only managed a "land syndicate" with his patron, the first Volksraad member for Vryheid, Lucas Meyer, but his syndicate, we are baldly told, "yielded its thousand pounds from time to time". Immediately after the South African War he was able to profit from selling land and "indulging his speculative bent". (29)

III

Because the rich are always with us, so are the poor. The device to which the republic's governments always resorted in an attempt to cope with poverty was expansion into African areas, whether within or beyond the state's customary boundaries. This was never more than a palliative measure, and ultimately made the situation worse. If land acquired from Africans provided a tolerable surplus from agriculture or mining, then it was almost certain to fall into the hands of rich burghers or land companies. If new land did not attract the attention of notables or speculators, then the poor who were settled on it - "de arme klas waar uit onze bevolking grootlyks bestaat" (30) - were unlikely to succeed in getting the necessary attention of the central government. New settlements at the very least need administration to establish access to water and to secure the issuing of land titles. Yet it is evident from the experience of the burghers granted land in the territory known to them as the "Napochs gronden" that, without the ability to influence the President, his executive or the Volksraad,
minimum administration was not forthcoming. The Mapoch settlers, although they owned little property, were not without political energies and it was the unresponsiveness of the administration which wore them down. (31) Their attempts to acquire title deeds were frustrated for more than twenty years, and they were finally granted only after the fall of the republic and the establishment of Crown Colony rule. It took the central administration of the republic ten years to make provision for the issuing of "occupation-farm" title deeds. This was partly the result of the Executive Council's failure to inform the Volksraad of the need to provide for this modified form of tenure. Between 1883 and 1889 the settlers constantly petitioned the Volksraad to look into their affairs. Finally, in 1895, they were asked to provide transfer fees which were beyond their means. These were quickly waived but the Volksraad resolution doing so was not published for another eighteen months. In the meantime, the settlers were asked to pay survey costs, stamp duties, and for title deeds. There were other examples of government inertia and inefficiency which had a debilitating effect on the settlers. Regulations were required for the distribution of water in order to stop disputes which began immediately after the first settlers took possession. The Executive instructed local officials to settle all disputes out of court, but when this was found to be impossible the local field commissioner and the landdrost of Middleburg proposed draft regulations to the Volksraad at regular intervals between 1884 and 1889 - the year in which these were finally adopted. Even then, the regulations were printed but never distributed. It is inconceivable that burghers with large landed and other interests would have been neglected in the way in which the Mapoch settlers were. (32)

Although the subdivision of land and the diminution of game may have left many to eke out a precarious livelihood, it is probable that many burghers never owned land at any time. Not all of these can be described as "indigent". (33) Many who arrived after the initial land grants had been made became tenant or squatter farmers on the land of large owners. The form of tenure by which these tenants held land varied considerably, though it was always informal, and although all tenant-squatters are now categorized as "bywoners" it is probable that a number of relationships are subsumed under this heading. It may well be that the usual description of bywoner is derived from observations made during the crucial period of change when land was being transformed from non-capitalist to capitalist production. Grosskopf reported that "several of the old Transvaalers objected to the word "bywoner". "We used to say"; he was told, "that we obtained 'vergunning' [concession] on the farm." (34) Many who were to become known as bywoners came from the Orange Free State and from the Cape in the last quarter of the 19th century and were men with movable property. They provided the landowner with a share of their crops and added to his status; the landlord was able to call upon his bywoners for commando service and they provided his family with affinal society. The bywoner's status declined and his tenure became more precarious, not because there was a shortage of land but because land became commercially viable. The bywoner, who previously had added to the landlord's status, in a changed situation became an incumbrance. The South African War provided the opportunity for many landlords to refuse to resume patronage for those bywoners who had left the land to serve with Boer commandos. (35)
By the last decade of the 19th century, when capital intensive gold mining was well under way, the dominant class had maintained non-capitalist property relationships for a quarter of a century. The gold mining industry at Barberton, and then on the Witwatersrand, created new entrepreneurial opportunities for this class. In order to raise revenue for the state after independence was regained in 1881, Paul Kruger's concessions policy was brought into being, the intention of which was to encourage those with capital and technical and managerial skill to come to the republic by granting them monopolies to produce industrial goods. It was a revival of McCorkindale's proposals. Kruger initially envisaged that the concessions would provide the state with substantial revenue, create a market for local raw materials, and allow the concessionaire to make a handsome profit from his monopoly position. In practice, the policy did not have this effect. From the very beginning concessions were granted to those who were close to the President's coterie (the so-called "third Volksraad") or were members of it, to members of the Executive Council or the Volksraad (both to those who supported the policy and to those who were its bitterest critics), and to high officials of the government. Without the requisite skills, most concessionaires treated their concessions as one more resource with which to speculate. And speculation brought them into conflict with mining capital.

Speculation, by its very nature, was unproductive and depended ultimately for its own existence on a subordinate productive relationship. The speculator, who was usually a large landowner, could hope for little from his traditional landed clients, whose productive capacity was limited. In any event, their major function as clients was to serve in commandos, acquiring booty or labour from African peoples. Moreover, as the land market improved, client-patron relationships were undermined. Within the agrarian economy the major productive groups were African cultivators who either worked their own lands and paid tribute or farmed rented land, or worked - largely under duress - as labourers where White farmers were engaged in productive activities. This resulted in Africans - who came to the gold fields from outside the Republic - having to run a gauntlet of field cornets set on acquiring labourers for themselves and their fellow burghers. Those who controlled the state in the South African Republic came into conflict with mining interests at every point in their economic activities. The concessions policy (particularly the dynamite concession) added significantly to the cost of gold mining and delayed their becoming profitable. A struggle for power between the governing class and mining capitalists became inevitable, but this is not to argue that the form which it took was inevitable. The weakening of the client-patron relationships and the growing but regionally uneven rural impoverishment might have led to an intra-Afrikaner class conflict. Afrikaners had taken to arms against Afrikaners before, and they were to do so again. The Lichtenburg commando, which took to the field during the 1914 rebellion, was made up of impoverished cultivators, while the Afrikaners of the eastern Transvaal who rallied to Botha's call were from a prosperous region which was benefiting from their Parliamentary leader's agrarian policy. Intra-Afrikaner class conflict was delayed by the mining capitalists who were new men of economic and political power. They were unversed in the pragmatic politics of older capitalist classes, and the extent to which power was concentrated in their hands had given them the belief that they could do anything. The result was the Jameson Raid which, when combined with later agitations,
helped to create a climate which prepared both sides for war, and for a
time reduced intra-Afrikaner tensions.

The results of the South African War were, as we know, many
and far reaching. One of its most important consequences was the
hastening of the change of property relationships in agriculture and a
rapid increase in food production. (36) Milner's land policy (devised,
without success, to create a class of English commercial farmers)
provided the opportunity for large Afrikaner land and cattle holders to
acquire liquid capital, and this, together with the benefits which the
same group derived from compensation granted for loss of property, made
commercial agriculture viable. Because it was only those with large
landed interests who were able to take advantage of Milner's schemes,
intra-Afrikaner tensions were soon revived. This conflict is usually
depicted as having arisen from differing stands taken by Afrikaners
during the war, as being the perpetuation of conflict between hensoppers
and national scouts, on the one hand, and bittereinders, on the other, and
Bothe's policy of reconciliation is accordingly depicted in purely party
political and nationalist terms. But how many scouts and hensoppers
were there that it required Botha to frame his policy around them? That
Afrikaner society was riven with conflict is apparent. Whether these
conflicts were solely the result of positions adopted during the war is,
however open to question, and it would appear that a more satisfactory
structural explanation is available.

--------oOo--------

Notes

(1) E. H. D. Arndt, Banking and Currency Development in South Africa
1652-1927, pp. 94-121. In 1854, the ammunition used at the battle
of Boomplaats in 1848 had not yet been paid for and the Volksraad
called for public subscriptions. C. J. Uys, In the Era of
Shepstone, noted: "The Sekukuni War had taken a big slice out of
the revenue of the State, and in August 1876 the Government was
obliged to mortgage the private properties of its members to raise
sufficient money for purchasing ammunition.... As [Paul Kruger's]
property had already been bonded for the loan of £19,00 raised by
the Government, he suggested that the members of the Executive
Council should forfeit their salaries to enable the Government to
purchase ammunition." (p. 439)

(2) Ibid., p. 96.

(3) In the three years before 1867 commandos had been called out
against the Pedi in the eastern Transvaal, the Republic had been
involved in a war against the Basuto in 1865 which considerably
undermined the new currency since it cost the government Rds 83,000,
and before the full effect of this expenditure was felt further
commandos against the Zulu and the Basuto resulted in Rds 162,000
being spent on ammunition and clothing for the combatants. There
were further military expenses incurred in the Zoutpansberg in 1867 and the calling out of commandos once more in 1869. Arndt, pp. 98-104.

Arndt noted: "It further appeared while they had budgeted for an expenditure of £15,883 in 1866 the actual expenditure amounted to roughly £46,000. They had budgeted for £1,500 in contributions from the natives and £3,000 for fines, whereas the corresponding receipts were £3,59d. and nil." (p. 104)

(4) Stuart was one of the many Hollanders influenced by U. G. Lauts. For Stuart's merchant connections and his various schemes to raise capital in Holland, see "Jacobus Stuart en die Transvaalse verdeling van 1855-56", Historiese Studies, June 1947.

(5) Stuart's major Dutch commercial rival was Johann Smellekamp, who had arrived in Natal in 1842 to work for the Amsterdam trading-house, J. A. Klijn and Co.


(9) de Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 143.

(10) List of Farms in ... Districts of Transvaal Intelligence Department (Pretoria, 1900). Report of the Land Settlement Committee, Cd. 677, 1901, p. 58.

(11) Ibid., p. 265.


(14) The original land grants were for two 5000 morgen farms, one pastoral, the other for cultivation. VRR. No. 149 of 28/9/1860 (Wordt besloten "dat alle Emigranten in deze staat ingeboren tot en met het einde van jaar 1852 gerechtigd zullen zijn voor twee plaatsen van het Gouvernement te ontvangen, en wel eenzaai - en eene veepaaltje"). The extent of accumulation can be gathered from successive resolutions concerning taxation to be paid on land being surveyed. In 1875 the Volksraad resolved that for all farms "surveyed by land surveyors of a greater extent than one hour this way or that, or 3750 morgen, a tax of 2/6d shall be paid for every 100 morgen over 3750". VRR. No. 118 of 24/5/1875. By 1891 surveyors were provided with a table indicating the state fees for holdings ranging from ten to ten thousand morgen and including a method for easily arriving at the cost of surveying land exceeding ten thousand morgen. Act 9 of 1891, Annexure No. 1. It is of
some interest that Kruger purchased large tracts of land "near Zoutpansberg for poor whites" in the decade after 1890. Cd. 677, op. cit., p. 58.


(16) Ibid., p. 333. "Wanneer veld-kornette egter nie van een van hulle (landdrost) gehou het nie, het geen burger vir hulle gestem nie. Honderd-acht-en-sewentig burgers het in 1853 versoek dat P. J. van Staden landdrost van Rustenburg moes word maar die vier veld-kornette was daarop tee, so dat die aansnelling gekanseller is."


(18) Van Jaarsveld, op. cit., p. 331. "In die oog van die Volk was die veldkornet hulle beskemer, opsinier, vader, en nie in die eerste plek 'n amptenaar op 'n kantoor wat die regeringsbelange berhartig het nie."

(19) Ibid., 341-347.


(21) Agar Hamilton, The Road to the North, South Africa 1852-1886, (London, 1937), p. 247. "... as in the rest of South Africa, the town population (of Vryburg) was predominantly British. It is only of late years that the descendent of the African (sic) farmer has become a dweller in towns, and until the XXth century was some years old even such places as Potchefstroom, Bloemfontein, and Pretoria were markedly British in character." F. J. Potgieter, op. cit., p. 94. The storekeepers in Rustenburg in the eighteen sixties were said to be of English, Dutch, German, and French origin.

(22) VRR. 26 Nov. 1864, Article 318. The instructions to landdrosts on the collection of taxes evolved gradually. In outline they required taxes to be paid by the first of July each year. If they were not paid, the landdrost was required to issue a writ to attach movable and immovable goods of taxpayers without judgement, and to sell them for the state treasury. This writ had to be shown to the taxpayer and payment was required before it was executed. If the address of the owner was unknown, the writ had to be advertised three times in the Staats Courant. The execution of the writ could be suspended by a protest accompanied by reasons for the protest. The landdrost could then give judgement but no appeal could be allowed so long as the tax remained unpaid. Law 10 of 1885. Amended by Law 11 of 1896.

(23) VRR. 5 June, 1873.
C. T. Gordon, *The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger 1890–1895* (OUP, 1970), pp. 91-108, has shown that in the case of the Johannesburg stands scandal, the fact that land had to be advertised did not mean that it was advertised. Although local conspiracies for self-aggrandizement may have taken place, it was equally probable that inefficiency on the part of either the landdrost or the office of the *Staats Courant* would lead to the advertisements failing to appear in print.

The Memoirs of Paul Kruger dictated to his private secretary and the former Under Secretary of State in the South African Republic and edited by A. Schowalter (London, 1902), p. 15. C. Jeppe, *The Kaleidoscopic Transvaal* (1906). J. A. Mouton, *General Piet Joubert in die Transvaalse Geskiedenis* (A.Y.B. 1957, 1), p. 201. F. V. Engelenburg, *General Louis Botha* (London, 1929), p. 34. Mouton reports that "In Januarie 1874 het hy deur middel van 'n advertensie in die pers aan immigrante wat te arm was om grond in die Republiek te koop, elf van sy plaase en 'n groot aantal erwe aangebied om te kom bewoon onder goede en billike voorwaarden voor 'n lange reeks van jare, aangesien hy die plasen nooit wil verkopen maar als erfins aan syn kinder, die nog zeer jong syn, wil laten zoodat deze goede kans is".


Cd. 626, *op. cit.*, p. 51. Johannes Christoffel Minnaar. Hellmapius was a Hungarian mining engineer who made his way from Kimberley to Lydenburg. He established a transport service from Lydenburg to Delagoa Bay for which he received "several grants of land". Engelbrecht, *Thomas Francois Burgers*, p. 144. Later, Hellmapius became an associate of Sammy Marks and Frikkie Elof, Kruger's son-in-law.


F. V. Engelenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 35 and p. 121.


Ibid., p. 95.

Ibid., pp. 43-50.

Even within a poor community there was some differentiation. This is brought out by Cillie in his reporting the exchange relationships which the Plotholders had with the neighbouring Pedi. "If a plotholder had cattle he would slaughter an ox and barter the meat to the natives for $25$ to $30$ bags of grain; or he would purchase a bag of salt in Middelburg and barter that for $8$ to $10$ bags of grain. If he did not have meat or salt he would plough for the Natives in Secuniland at the rate of 2 buckets of grain per 1200 square yards ploughed." Cillie, p. 76.

system. In V.R.B. June 5 1869 the word "afstand" is substituted for "vergunning". According to Cassel's Dutch Dictionary, afstand can be used to mean cede, while vergunning is defined as concession.

Cd. 1551, Progress of Administration in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Enclosure 4 in No. 1 states: "During September and October numerous reports received showing the ex-Military Burghers of the poorer class, who had, at an early stage, taken advantage of Repatriation Aid in order to proceed to farms on which they had previously lived as bywoners were finding life upon such farms socially unpleasant. The owners in some cases were returned Prisoners of War or others, whose political feelings were opposed to the residence upon their farms of men who had served on our side during the war. Of actual violence but few cases were reported, and these were unimportant in themselves. But a spirit of unfriendliness, developing in cases of more isolated farms into actual boycott, was common."

Appendix C of this enclosure provides evidence which undermines the assertion that bywoners were less committed to the republican cause than landowners. Of the 127 heads of families settled under Burgher Land Settlement schemes - most of whom had been bywoners or tenants before the war - 12 had been national scouts, 15 had surrendered before the war ended, had been allowed to return to the Transvaal, and can be described as hensoppers, 14 were either invalids or too old to fight and 86 had either fought to the war's end, only laying down their arms in June 1902, or had been taken prisoner. These last had refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the British Crown, and had been held in prisons or camps in South Africa, India, Ceylon, St. Helena and Bermuda.