CHARTEED AFRICANS:
COLONIAL OFFICE, SETTLERS AND BSA CO., RHODESIA, 1890-1923

by

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The chartered company period of Rhodesian history is now well charted territory. The rich resources of the National Archives of Rhodesia are high-paying ore whose excellent historical assay figures have been demonstrated again and again. The proximity of the University of Rhodesia, despite all its vicissitudes, has ensured constant activity. Company and settler politics, African primary resistance, land policy, labour policy, external relations, culture contact: all have been adequately examined. But there has been a high degree of compartmentalization. No one has attempted to examine in general terms the tripartite relationship among settlers, Company and Colonial Office in "native policy" over a range of issues, and utilizing a combination of Company, Colonial Office, settler, and Rhodesian administrative sources. There has, moreover, been insufficient attention to regional variation in Rhodesia. This paper clearly cannot hope to do this: it simply embodies some suggestions for further enquiry.

A number of periods have been distinguished in white-black economic and political relations in Rhodesia in the period 1890-1925. These can be roughly tabulated in the following way:

1. 1890-1898: A period of unfettered Company activity, coupled with the abdication of Colonial Office responsibility, resulting in settler discontents, and culminating in the Shona-Ndebele rebellions of 1896-7. Land alienation is rapid; a reserves policy is less than half-hearted; and black-white economic relations constitute what Herman Merivale 50 years earlier might have called "amalgamation" (1), though in this case of the crudest sort.

2. 1898-1908: This period sees the growth of settler influence, and a restructuring of the economy from mining to farming. Reserves are extensive and diffuse. Through lobola, increased poll tax, and other taxes, cash demands upon Africans are considerable, and their response includes a great deal of cash cropping and sale of stock. "Imported" labour becomes the norm.
3. 1908-1916: Because of growing and excessive cash demands, African movement from alienated and unalienated land to the reserves develops, carrying Africans further from opportunities for marketing, further from lines of communication, further from white employment. The labour response internally remains static (2), and the reserves prove in the short term poor suppliers of labour. Among the settlers the farming interest seems to be in the ascendency. The Colonial Office becomes conditioned to the possibility of reduction of the reserves (3) and this duly occurs with the report of the Coryndon reserves commission in 1916. The reserves are reduced by more than a million acres nett, but, more important, exchanges of territory increase their concentration, their remoteness, and their poverty of resources.

4. 1916-1925: African movement continues. Overpopulation and overstocking make African entry to the cash economy by means other than labour increasingly difficult. A static labour supply is transformed into an over-abundant one. The Privy Council decision of 1918 on the status of unalienated land virtually destroys the Company’s position, unwittingly gives the settlers their head, and leads to the headlong rush to the "leap in the dark" of Responsible Government. Settler rule, despite imperial reservation of native affairs, proves rather less amenable to control by the Colonial Office than the Company had been. Paradoxically, as the sole legitimate entry to the European economy becomes paid labour, the "drive to segregation" proceeds. (4)

The progression seems clear: economic integration, together with African multiple response to the cash economy, shading into a developing reserves policy of growing exclusiveness, coupled with the long march of settler influence. Put another way, the development is from a situation in which the capitalist economy is dependent upon the surplus of the indigenous economy to a situation in which the capitalist economy is self-sufficient, and opportunities for surplus are stifled by land hunger. The cash nexus becomes restricted to paid labour, and labour hunger is transformed into labour abundance. From the settler viewpoint, it is an attractive development, producing social and political separation out of economic necessity, and pressed forward by a series of carefully calculated policies like the Company rent on unalienated land in 1900, the Private Locations Ordinance of the same year, and the contraction of the reserves in 1916.

The argument of this paper will be that these developments do not constitute a linear progression, that they are produced as much unwittingly as wittingly, that the greatest single influence was the Colonial Office, that the inconsistencies of Colonial Office policy inadvertently, and sometimes overtly, favoured the settler interest, and that certain policies - like the Company rent and the Private Locations Ordinance - produced very different results from those intended. The greatest motivating factor on the Colonial Office side seems to have been an almost obsession distaste for and distrust of the Company, which reached its apogee in the years preceding Responsible Government. Similarly, in a curious side-show, Exeter Hall, particularly represented by the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society, though by no means in consonance with the Colonial Office, likewise carried its loathing of the BSA Co. to the extent even of supporting the Responsible Government party of the settlers before 1923. (5)

There can be little doubt that without the intervention of the Colonial Office, provoked principally by the Shona-Ndebele rebellions, the Company would
have pursued an integrationist economic policy. The nature of the early Rhodesian economy, the fact that many pioneers saw themselves as temporary visitors out to make a pile (6), and the predilections of most expressed opinion in the early years, all point to the levying of labour and the receipt of African produce on a localized basis. African response to marketing opportunities led, it was true, to insufficient labour supply, but many recognized that the "labour problem" was by and large a myth. The fact that there were frequent surpluses proved that the labour problem was not on insufficient population, nor on natural indolence, but upon low wages, enormous disincentives like death rates, defaulting on pay, disease, the ticket system of payment, and the refusal to provide location plots for families. Among the Ndebele, particularly, labour migration was a procedure known from the 1870s (7), and considerable emigration to the Rand and even further afield throughout the period reflected the genuine "pull" of paid labour. (8) Moreover, the interconnections between the two economies were quickly recognized, as the enormous increase in the acquisition of ploughs, broken oxen and development of stockholding testify.

But the Colonial Office insisted on a reserves policy from the start, at least from the introduction of the first tax. In 1894, the Company levied a tax illegally (9); the Colonial Office acquiesced, but insisted upon the institution of reserves as a quid pro quo. It was by now colonial orthodoxy, hallowed by the practice of Shepstone in Natal, despite the opposition of such great colonial theorists as the third Earl Grey and Hermann Merivale. For Shepstone, it had been an administrative expedient; in the future it was to become a means of political and social segregation. That the Company viewed the policy in an entirely half-hearted way is amply reflected in the provision of the Gwaai and Shangani reserves, remote, waterless, a sop to metropolitan opinion, no more. Later, when reserves were demarcated by officials in 1896/97, they were multitudinous and scattered. Again, there is not the slightest hint of segregation. They were in many ways simply confirmations of existing occupation patterns. They were selected and surveyed in a haphazard fashion (10); they were added to and subtracted from almost by native commissioner fiat; their boundaries were lost and found, or stayed lost. (11) They were integrationist, but their untidiness was their downfall. The tidy minds of the Colonial Office mandarins desired a tidy policy settled in perpetuity as an African insurance in a time of growing settler power. It was this yearning for order and permanency which led to the Coryndon Land Commission, pressed upon the Company by the Colonial Office. (12) More will be said about the Commission below.

The Company seemed to remain consistent in its economic amalgamationist policy. H. Wilson Fox, in his memoranda of 1910 and 1912, drawn up for the Board of the Company, attacked reserves and tribalism. He reached the logical conclusion that there had to be a permanent labour policy and quoted with approval a resolution of the farmers' conference of 1911 that labourers from north of the Zambesi should be allowed to bring their families with them and settle permanently. (13) Whenever a differential tax on labour performance was mooted, it was always objected that this would discriminate against those Africans who cash-cropped and would benefit only the employers of labour. (14) This again is scarcely a segregationist policy. Moreover, native commissioners constantly attacked removals to reserves. The NC, Bulawayo, pleaded for the setting up of a permanent labour force around the town, as the African depopulation of a belt 60 miles around the town was seriously damaging its labour supply. (15) The Company bought a farm and attempted to turn it into plots as late as 1920, but was thwarted by a settler hue and cry. (16)

The Colonial Office view was not too far removed from this. In 1915, during discussions on making adultery a criminal offence, Sir John Anderson,
permanent under-secretary, minuted:

The remedy is to let the young men who leave their kraals to work to take their wives with them. (17)

Both Harcourt and his parliamentary under-secretary in 1915, Lord Islington, favoured the establishment of African permanent occupation around Bulawayo on plots. (16) But, when it came to labour immigration from beyond the Zambezi, the Colonial Office believed both in repatriation and in deferred pay. (19) So, while the Colonial Office thought ultimately in terms of permanent labour, it also provided the climate and the means for future segregation.

Nowhere were the confusions of chartered company rule and the problems of Colonial Office control more apparent than in labour recruiting policy. Internally, the main concern of the Colonial Office was, of course, to prevent forced labour, while recognizing the great difficulty in distinguishing among "nice degrees of moral suasion". (20) The undoubted and frequent instances of forced labour before the rebellions, when the native administration consisted of - in the deathless words of one native commissioner in his memoirs - a group of "nigger tamers" (21); the apparent attempt at forcing labour in 1899 (22); frequent renewed suspicions in subsequent years; the running battle between the missionary Crimp and the NC Posselt in the Charter district (23); all convinced the Colonial Office that recruitment should never lie in the hands of the native administration. The fear was well substantiated, but the Colonial Office went on from there to insist that there should be no administrative involvement at all. The dilemma was well seen by that shrewdest and most inquisitive of all the Colonial Office's sets of "eyes and ears", Sir Marshall Clarke, the Resident Commissioner. The series of independent labour bureaux, capitalized by their clients, and at first largely unsuccessful, seemed to Clarke to constitute a shirking of responsibility on the part of the Company administration. Considering Clarke's indictment of native commissioner recruitment, the Colonial Office thought Clarke to be indulging in a volte face. (24) The distinction between administrative involvement in organization of labour and administrative involvement in recruiting was made in the 1906 Native Labour Committee of Enquiry, the Native Affairs Committee of Enquiry of 1910-11, and again in the Native Labour Committee of Enquiry of 1921. (25) In any Crown Colony labour policy would have been in the hands of the colonial government. By attempting to remove the Company, which could be controlled by an efficient Resident Commissioner, the Colonial Office was moving the centre of gravity in influencing labour policy to the settlers through the bureaux.

In 1901, when the labour policy was framed, the Colonial Office had the air of panic, mainly because the Boer War had held up Clarke's despatches in Cape Town for over a year. (26) The confusion was compounded when it became clear that the Company administration was to be the protector of immigrant labour (apart from those from Portuguese East Africa: after the Tete Agreement of 1913, the Portuguese sent their own "Protector"). (27) It must have been with a wry smile that Sir William Manning, Governor of Nyasaland, having banned the emigration of labourers to Rhodesia, hinted that he might be more forthcoming in his labour relations with Rhodesia if the Company administration had more direct control over labour. (28)

So far as immigrant labour is concerned, it is clear from all the many immigration and recruiting schemes, open and clandestine, of the Company that it had no fears whatsoever of increasing population imbalance. (29) The Company would have liked, too, Africans from Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Mozambique to have brought their wives and settled permanently. (30) Just such a policy was attempted as late as 1917 when over 11,000 Africans crossed the border from Mozambique during Makombe's rebellion. (31) But no colonial
administration, company (32) or otherwise, was prepared to see such a population drain. The export and constant re-export of labour, together with deferred pay provisions, was a vital sector of the economies of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and, above all, Mozambique. Only in Katanga was there an attempt even before the First World War to stabilize the labour force through permanent immigration, a policy calculated to produce more unskilled efficiency and also a body of skilled African labour. (33) But, with the approval of the Colonial Office, proprietorial instincts were strong enough to thwart permanent migration.

The general animus against the Southern Rhodesia Company administration was particularly obvious in this question of external recruitment. In any conflict with South African interests, Rhodesia tended to lose. For the High Commissioner, Rhodesia was very much a fringe problem, and after 1910 there was of course the added complication that, as Governor-General of the Union, he was subject to the advice of his ministers. (34) In other colonial conflicts the Colonial Office was happy to side against the Company. Curzon, as might be expected, treated the Company with nothing but contempt in all discussions about Indian labour. (35) And the Colonial Office was quick to support Manning in his attempt to cut off labour to Southern Rhodesia in 1911, although the poverty of Nyasaland, and of the policy, were soon made apparent by the extent of illegal migration.

The labour bureaux, through which mainly northern recruitment was conducted, were never a great success. The best labourers avoided them; the worst employers used them. Death rates among their recruits were higher, and, despite the advantages of carefully regulated travel, they were always extremely unpopular amongst Africans themselves. Too much success was itself dangerous, as in the period of over-supply just before the First World War. When at one stage Rhodesian employers agreed to take 20-25% of their labour from the bureaux, which were by this time recruiting only North of the Zambezi, it was clear that immigrant labour was to be given precedence over internal. One African chief noted this, and complained to his native commissioner. (36) The Colonial Office fears of Company administrative involvement had led to a concentration on outside labour, which in turn fostered the settler mentality that internal labour was of a similar kind, to be extracted and returned at will. (37)

The development of this mentality seemed to have policy expressions in the Company rent on unalienated land of 1908, a policy introduced primarily to solve a cash shortage of the ever-penurious Company. H. Wilson Fox, as well as noting its revenue possibilities, even suggested that it might encourage cash cropping. (38) The ever present conflict between the commercial and administrative interest of the Company was never more obvious than in this issue. The rent was collected by the native commissioners and went straight into the Company's coffers. (39) In the same year, the Private Locations Ordinance was passed. (40) This measure was designed to regulate "private locations" upon alienated land in order to provide for the administration greater control over the conditions of African tenancy. As it emerged from the Legislative Council, however, much changed by the farming interest, it was clearly directed against large absentee landowners and their practice of "kaffir farming". The motives were mixed, but certainly amongst them was the desire to persuade some of the absentee companies to develop their lands or even to release some of them. So far as working farmers and landowners were concerned, the ordinance was designed to provide them with greater labour control over tenants by permitting "labour agreements". These could be in lieu of rent; they could even be - as in the Melsetter district - in return for payment of tax. Provided no rent was charged, regardless of the scope of the labour agreements, landowners did not have to pay tax on private locations provided for in the ordinance. In the event, however, those who did not levy labour increased the rent: the absentee landowners, subject to a higher tax on their tenants, to a considerable extent. Where labour
was levied, Africans were made all too aware, as native commissioners testify, of their loss of freedom.

In fact, by both these policies, together with the imposition of grazing fees in 1912, the Company and the settlers over-reached themselves. Greater cash demands had acted as a stimulant to labour in the past, and did so temporarily again: until the last few years of the chartered period, reserves tended to show the poorest labour returns. But as the exactions became too great the movement began. Native Commissioners deplored the whole process. Some, trying to divine the confused intentions of the Ordinance, reported that it was not working, by which they meant that labour was not being extracted, and Africans were heading for the reserves. (41) One excellent insight is provided by the NC Mazoe, Drew, who reported in 1913 that the stringency of the agreements under the Ordinance varied according to the proximity to the reserves. (42) Landowners close to a reserve could not risk so severe an agreement as those further away, a clear admission that the motive of many landowners was to extort as much rent as possible consistent with retaining their labour supply.

The best insights that can be obtained into the land/labour nexus and the confused thinking behind measures which appear in retrospect to have had a single end in view lie in a local and regional study of the native administration in Rhodesia. A great deal of work remains to be done in this field. A close examination of native commissioners' reports throughout the period reveals that Mashonaland was a poor supplier of labour compared with Matabeleland. In 1904, the statistical returns of Mashonaland and Matabeleland revealed that 21% of the able-bodied male population in the former province and 46% in the latter had been to work for a minimum of three months. (43) Before this, the discrepancy had been even greater, and it only gradually evened out later. It is clearly unsatisfactory to attribute this - as it was by many contemporaries - to the inherent laziness of the Shona.

The Shona, a predominantly agricultural people, were more closely wedded to the soil than the Ndebele. Moreover, the Ndebele lost far more in terms of cattle and land in the post-Matabele War and rebellions period; there is evidence that their better response to paid labour was prompted by a desire to recoup their herds. The Ndebele had a longer tradition of contact with Europeans and were, in the face of the rigours of the mines, a physically stronger and more resilient people. Moreover, the Shona appear to have been more easily demoralized by the influx of labour from outside. Their attachment to their home territory precluded them from competing with immigrants in the length of time they were prepared to work. There is also some evidence that they found the movement to the reserves a more distressing and unsettling experience.

In addition, the factor of population growth seems to have been greater in Matabeleland than in Mashonaland. In the crucial years 1902-1912, admittedly using only the most crude population figures, there seems to have been a growth factor of 56% in Matabeleland and of 38% in Mashonaland. (44) With more settled conditions, some good harvests, a vast increase in stock, and rudimentary health provisions, the African population doubled in the period 1898-1914, although it should be remembered that early estimates may have been too low, and the European operations in the Matabele War and the subsequent rebellions slaughtered large numbers of the population. In 1898 the Chief Native Commissioner of Matabeleland reported that females outnumbered males by 4 to 1. (45) The larger factor of growth can to some extent be seen as a re-establishment of the balance. (46)

Possibly as a result of the respective performance of their two provinces, the chief native commissioners of Matabeleland and Mashonaland assumed
somewhat different stances over the reserves issue. W. S. Taberer in Mashonaland was uncompromising in his attack on the reserves system. He regarded them as a means of demoralization, of excluding Africans from "the beneficent influence of the white man", maintaining the position of the chiefs whose substantial power had been taken over by the government. (47) He attacked the imposition of the Company rent, and he wrote of European farmers who threw Africans off their land and then complained about the shortage of labour.

Taylor in Matabeleland, on the other hand, having burned his fingers in the Colonial Office fires over the forced labour issue in 1899, attuned himself more to Company policy as modified by known Colonial Office attitudes. In consequence, when Taberer left Rhodesia in 1913, Taylor became Chief Native Commissioner for the whole territory. He attacked the backwardness of the reserves, but not their existence. In 1912, he wrote to the Administrator: "The development of the reserves, thereby increasing the wants of the natives, is the true solution of the labour difficulty." (48) This was scarcely a realistic policy at a time when the bulk of the African population of Rhodesia were withdrawing further from the centres of European employment, further from the stores and mining compounds that stimulated such wants, further in many cases from the best agricultural land. The process would eventually be reversed by the gross overcrowding of reserves, but in a very real sense it was the moderate party, complying with the Colonial Office desires for a haven for African population at a time when eventual African political power was unthinkable, which most successfully pushed forward the development of land segregation, and the mortgaging of the Africans' political future.

Both in 1901, when the Colonial Office formulated a policy on labour that was to lead to great confusion and much misconception, and in 1916 when it permitted the reduction of reserves without fully appreciating either the extent of exchange in quality, the magnitude of migration at the time, or the fashion in which the reserves were to be used to promote segregation, the Office was distracted by war. That the Colonial Office failed to see the segregationist possibilities of the reserves is clear from reactions to the report of the Land Commission. One official, Betterbee, refused to contemplate the provision of one million acres "reserve reserves", on the grounds that more and more Africans would come out to work and not need reserves. Sir Henry Lambert, Assistant Under Secretary, minuted: Reserves are necessary in the early stages of white settlement when the uncivilised tribal native has neither the habit nor the power of work, but the idea that the native has an inalienable right to vegetate in reserves while the white man has to work does not seem to me to be either just or even good for the native. (49)

When, in 1918, the judicial committee of the Privy Council found that the unalienated land accrued to the Company only in its administrative capacity, the Company's interest in maintaining African settlement upon it vanished. Sale for the highest possible price to offset administrative deficits was now essential. From that moment, settlers, Colonial Office and Exeter Hall all played the game of "get the Company". It had even been asserted in the Colonial Office that, in any conflict between the Company and the elected members, the elected members must be supported in order to avoid strained relations after the end of the Charter. (50) In terms of the African interest, it was a dangerous game.
After the First World War, when African movement to the reserves was being completed, inflationary pressures were making wants more difficult to satisfy (51), and the prices of stock and grain were plummeting, the Colonial Office was again distracted by a succession of crises in Egypt, in Kenya, in Ireland. White settlers got their political heads just when the terms were turning against African participation in the cash economy. The Africans' situation vis-a-vis the land, and the attitude of the settlers towards migrant labour, had been produced by Colonial Office policies that seemed both liberal and protective. In the long term this was not so, but in 1923 no one, and certainly not Exeter Hall, was prescient enough to notice. The problems of the liberal and humanitarian position, based, of course, on a misunderstanding of educational and political development, are no better reflected than in their support for the findings of the Morris Carter Land Commission, and the Land Apportionment Act that followed.

Notes


(2) The 1921 Native Labour Committee of Enquiry showed that internal labour remained static while immigrant labour increased considerably. National Archives of Rhodesia (NAR) A3/18/30/9.

(3) e.g. Gladstone to Harcourt, Nov. 13 1913. CO 417/526.


(5) There is a great deal of evidence for this, but see for example Newton to Coghill, Feb. 14 1923, NAR NE1/1/1.

(6) The Historical MSS collection of the NAR provides ample evidence for this. See for example the papers of H. J. Barrow, 30 11/1/1, and of J. J. F. Darling, DA6/1.


(8) A whole file on this subject can be found in NAR H3/22/4.


(10) See the description of surveying practice in the memoirs of W. I. S. Driver. NAR Misc DR2.

(11) Kitchener to Chamberlain, June 14 1901, CO 417/320, and enclosures.

(12) Minute of Tait, Dec. 6 1916, on Barlow to Bonar Law, Oct. 27 1916, CO 417/578.

(13) H. Wilson Fox, Memorandum on the Constitutional, Political, Financial and Other Questions concerning Rhodesia (printed for the information of the Board, 1912).

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Taylor to Hilton, Feb. 19 1914. NAR N3/22/1/1.


Taylor to Chaplin, Sept. 10 1920. NAR N3/22/1/1.

Minute on Burton to Harcourt, Mar. 27 1915. CO 417/559.

Minute on Burton to Harcourt, Apr. 10 1915. CO 417/559.

Harcourt to Gladstone, Aug. 2 1913, for deferred pay. NAR A3/18/30/8.

And for repatriation Burton to Walter Long, July 28 1917. CO 417/591.

Minute of Lambert, Dec. 29 1917.


This dispute between Cripps and Posselt continued for years, and turns up throughout the records. But see extensive correspondence in NAR N3/22/1/1.


For this report and related material see NAR A3/18/30/9.


Philip Warhurst has been examining the diplomacy of labour recruitment for an Oxford D.Phil thesis. I am grateful to him for permitting me to read parts of his thesis.


NAR A3/18/30/35 has a considerable amount of material on the refugees.

Warhurst has shown how independent the Northern Rhodesian administration was prepared to be from the Southern Rhodesian, despite being subject to the same Company masters.

Burton to Harcourt, Nov. 25 1914. CO 417/543. By 1920, settler fears were being expressed of the "black menace" of skilled African labour. NAR A3/18/30/9.

In the case of the Transvaal, this had already occurred of course, in 1907. See minute by Smuts on WNL to Secretary for Native Affairs, May 14 1909. Transvaal Archives, S/N/A 89.

Curzon to Lord George Hamilton, enclosed in Milner to Chamberlain, May 18 1903. CO 417/372.

Report NC Umtali, enclosed in Burton to Box Law, Aug. 7 1915. CO 417/561.

This can be found, admittedly in an extreme form, in a conversation between the High Commissioner, Selborne, and representative settlers in 1908. Selborne suggested jokingly that Rhodesian settlers might like to see all Africans moved North of the Zambezi. One Brown took this seriously, and talked of the advantages. See papers of F. Eyles, NAR EY/1/1.

Cann, op. cit., p. 191.

Another example of this conflict is the fact that the administrative branch of the Company was sometimes expected to recruit labour for the commercial branch. Commercial Branch to Chief Native Commissioner, June 13 1918. NAR N3/22/1/1.

Cann, op. cit., I am indebted to Mr J. Keith Rennie for permitting me to read an unpublished paper on the Private Locations Ordinance.
The population figures are derived from a combination of BSA Co. annual reports and the native commissioner annual reports. These figures may have been inflated by some permanent migration into the country.

The NO Belingwe even reported that Africans were going back to making clothing from skins because of the high prices. NAR N9/1/22/23.