LIBERALISM IN THE CAPE IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES

by

S. Trapido

The central theme of this study is the impact of political liberalism on the Cape Colony and then on South Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is usual but misleading to write of Cape Liberalism: misleading because Cape Liberalism has acquired the properties associated with myth. It is often given the accolade of the great but lost traditions, so that it has come to be separated from contemporary liberalism in South Africa. This can readily be explained because, in the judgement of polemicists and historians, the shortcomings of historical liberalism are accounted for in terms of individual hypocrisy, political naivity and betrayal. In this way the conditions which made liberalism in the Cape possible, the purpose which different liberals gave to the institutions which were created, and the changing circumstances which made liberalism in the Cape possible have come to be disregarded. To write of liberalism in the Cape would help to free us from the ahistorical treatment of apologists and critics. Apologists of Cape Liberalism describe it as a continuous process with all its inconsistencies ironed out, while the critics, in laying bare these contradictions and inconsistencies, neglect the social relationships which produced them. (1) To point to the liberal sentiments expressed by a variety of politicians, administrators and journalists between 1850 and 1910 leaves the critic to assert that Cape Liberalism is no more than a catalogue of rhetoric. The critic can produce an alternative catalogue of anti-liberal sentiments expressed during the same period, and, as often as not, by the same individuals. But rhetoric is rarely insignificant and its presence helps to uncover the social relationships which call it forth. Since these relationships were changing it is important that the apparent sameness of the rhetoric does not disguise for us the changing alliances and purposes of liberals in the Cape during these sixty years. Equally, an inventory of inconsistencies brings us no nearer to an understanding of the social relationships which at different times and for different reasons modified liberal institutions. Liberalism in the Cape is best known for the suffrage it created, more particularly the suffrage which allowed people of African origin, initially
Khoi* and then Nguni, to participate in colonial politics. But it also permitted the much wider enfranchisement of Afrikaners which (though it is taken more for granted by historians than the enfranchisement of Africans), when compared with the franchise then applying in Britain, requires as much explanation as African enfranchisement. This enfranchisement of African and Afrikaner peoples was intended to restore stability and British authority. (3)

But the need to incorporate Afrikaners and first Khoi and then Nguni Africans was made necessary and possible by the significant changes which took place in the Cape economy under British hegemony. These changes - both in the kind of economic activity and its scale - brought new relationships into being not only among British immigrants but also among older, non-British and non-European populations. The restrictive political and administrative institutions which had served a small-scale economy designed to provide meat and grains for ships of the East India trade became, as a result, totally unsuited to an economy geared to large-scale wine and wool production and whose need for growth led to the demand for more facilities necessary for the opening up of the interior, whether for further pastoral enterprises or for the more hazardous mineral exploration which marked the eighteen fifties. (4) In addition, the new entrepreneurs, both within the colony and beyond its borders (5), small-scale African producers - first Khoi and then Nguni - provided substantial opportunities for commercial gain. (5a) The arrival of the trader and his merchant connection not only coincided with missionary expansion; the Christianity of free trade hastened the process of creating the market-oriented peasants which had begun with earlier settler conquests and economic expansion. (6)

Previously, in the autonomous tribal economies the cultivator's surplus had been appropriated by the chief, and while some of the surplus was redistributed a part was retained to maintain the power and to undertake the religious and administrative functions of the chief. But the unequal exchange of European trade and the 'new wants' which this trade created were incompatible with the chiefs' roles. Trading not only by-passed the chief (or, if the chief were involved in the trading, reduced redistribution) but created inequalities between members of the same clan. Chiefs, or their diviners, in attempting to maintain their own power, sought to restore inequality by "smelling out". This brought the charge of "barbarism" and "injustice". It strengthened the resolve of the advance guard of settler society, the missionary for whom Christian compassion and economic individualism were essential components of the civilization which they sought to spread. "Smelling out" also hastened the arrival, even before colonial annexation, of the new administrators with concepts of justice and

"The descendants of the Khoi-Khoi have become known as the "Coloured" people and it is usual for outsiders to describe their origin as the result of unions between Khoi, slaves and white settlers. Although there were important Afrikaner-Khoi unions of which the Baster communities of the north-west Cape and South-West Africa are the most prominent to have survived, the most significant structural factor which relates the "Coloured" people to white Afrikaners is not race but class. Because Khoi-cum-slave descended groups became proletarians (i.e. a group separated from their land and with only their labour to sell) in an area dominated by Afrikaner landowners, this African people (for the overwhelming majority of slaves were of Malagasy, Mozambique and West African origin) adopted a working class variation of the dominant Afrikaner culture. Although Afrikaners do have Khoi ancestry, those who refer to the "Coloured" people as "brown Afrikaners", or even as "onse bruin mense", make a genetic rather than a structural analysis which confuses rather than clarifies the role and place of the "Coloured" people in South African society.
civilization based on private property. (7) The expanding Cape economy was in the process of creating free peasant communities. The process was often quite self-conscious and, where possible, missionaries and administrators sought segments of societies where chiefs were weakest.

The free-peasant-merchant relationship brought the need for the small workshops - in the Cape ports in particular - with their Khoi-descended artisans migrating from the mission to the western Cape. (8) At times liberals within the dominant white group whose relationship was with free artisans or labourers rather than with free peasants gained greater prominence - a factor which adds to the difficulty of analysing liberalism in the Cape.

By the eighteen forties neither commercial nor missionary expansion required territorial expansion. On the contrary, both required a period of consolidation. But to the new settlers from Britain territorial expansion seemed essential. Territorial expansion provided the opportunities for acquiring not only land and new labour to work the land; it also provided widespread opportunities for speculation. (9) This expansion disrupted commercial and evangelical activities, and in the second half of the nineteenth century expansionism was generally associated with the lurch towards illiberal legislation within the colony. It was territorial expansion and commercial conservatism which had led to the breakdown of British authority in the Cape, leaving the security of this strategic colony solely to a military presence. (10) It was to rectify this political disaster that the 1853 constitution, with its liberal franchise, came into being.

Liberalism in the Cape created a great and a small tradition. Centred mainly in Cape Town, liberals of the great tradition were drawn from the leading financial and commercial enterprises (11), from the government opposition of the day (12), from Christian missionaries (the London Missionary Society, with its renowned superintendent Dr John Philip, had its colonial headquarters in Cape Town, but after 1860 the major missionary contribution to the great tradition came from Scottish missionaries, with their educational and mission institute at Lovedale and their influential journal The Kafir Express), from the legal profession (13), and the major newspapers of the colony. (14) They portrayed their decisions, their hopes and their fears in terms which would have been clearly understandable in Victorian England.

We have already noted that a particular conjunction of group interests made it possible for liberal policies to be propagated. When those in power placed a restraint on territorial expansion and high value on commercial expansion, particularly if it encompassed peasant production, it usually followed that the view that grievances were best contained through elected Parliamentary spokesmen was given high value. But to describe the conditions which made liberalism possible is not to assert that liberal influences prevailed on all occasions. Nor is it to attribute liberal motivation to all members of the coalition which made for the necessary conditions. Those who represented territorially satisfied groups were not invariably liberals, but liberals drew strength from alliances with them and assumed for themselves a mediating role between the colonial and imperial governments. (15) It is something of a paradox, therefore, to demonstrate that British intervention in South African affairs between 1875 and 1880 produced conditions in which a brief liberal response was possible. (16) Thereafter, Britain's second withdrawal from the subcontinent coincided with a shortage of labour in the colony in the western agricultural districts and beyond the colony on the goldfields of the Witwatersrand. (17) A new alliance of expansionists came into being once more. This was not so much to acquire land as labour, by gaining control over the economy of the Transvaal to inhibit the growth of free peasantries. (18) At the same time, in the older
districts of the colony labour tenancy was restricted in order to force Africans into wage labour. (19) Such conditions favoured an attack on the franchise, and this came in 1897 and 1892 when the qualifications were changed, with the intention of reducing the number of Africans on the voters' roll. The additional factor which hastened the undermining of the franchise was the growth of Afrikaner nationalism.

Cape as well as South African political history has too often been caricatured as a conflict between Afrikaner and British settlers. It is usual to suppose that Afrikaner nationalism requires an inflexible opposition to all aspects of British influence. But in the first phase of this nationalism it was British banks with their control over credit (20), English merchants with their support for peasant economies (21), and the constitutional prohibitions upon the use of Afrikaans in government, limiting Afrikaner recruitment to the civil service, which fostered nationalism. (22) Since the very existence of an African peasantry was under attack by Afrikaner nationalists, the peasantry became involved in the electoral process to greater degree than ever before. (23) The defence of the franchise was closely related to the defence of the peasantry, and although only a minority of English members of Parliament were involved in this dual defence, the conflict was portrayed as being coterminous with a rigid English-Afrikaner divide. (24) This was not the case. English farmers and the Cape English involved in mining were equally opposed to free peasantry and to labour tenancy and sought to limit the franchise. In passing it should be noted that the financially insecure Merriman, with his brief but unsuccessful spell as a Johannesburg mine manager, was more representative of the many Cape English who looked to the Witwatersrand to alleviate their depressed economic condition than the great magnate Cecil Rhodes. (25) The economic decline of the eastern Cape was, moreover, the result of the Witwatersrand siphoning off both capital and white labour. (26) The alliance between the Afrikaner Bond and the English majority was brought to a rude halt by the Jameson raid, and the polarization of Afrikaner and English into opposing parliamentary parties and ultimately into protagonists in the South African war (which was, for the Cape, a civil war) halted the attack on the franchise. This was because electoral arithmetic as much as anything else sent both parties to compete for African votes. (27) Electoral arithmetic accounts for the major rhetoric associated with the great tradition. (28) But if electoral arithmetic was decisive in 1896 and 1904, it was unimportant in 1908, and the rhetoric continued unabated. It is difficult to account for the heightened support which the franchise was given. It is possible that it was aimed at British policy makers who wanted assurances that the outward form of the Cape franchise would be secure in a united South Africa. Such an argument is not negated by the British High Commissioner's open invitation to undermine the franchise. (29) There is evidence which suggests that some major politicians had reconciled themselves to a free peasantry and at the same time were looking with some morbidity at the growing power of white workers in the Transvaal. This power promised to raise the cost of labour, and to the small-scale manufacturers of the Cape employing coloured artisans this represented an ominous threat. (30)

In addition, Cape politicians and administrators pointed to the upheavals in Natal and German South West Africa in 1904 as object lessons of what happened to political systems without direct representation. (31) At the same time there appears to be little doubt that the liberal ideology had achieved a degree of legitimacy. By the first decade of the twentieth century Cape politicians and administrators found it difficult to envisage how franchise rights could be withdrawn. (32) Again, the possibility of misunderstanding arises because, if they could not envisage disfranchisement, neither could they envisage mass enrolment. Equally, they could barely conceive of Africans sitting in parliament. But in holding these views they did not step out of the bounds of orthodox liberalism. To liberals in the Cape, a political franchise was directly connected with property and wage qualifications. Since liberals

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The small tradition was obviously a microcosm of the great tradition, and, without the social relationships which existed in the constituencies, the great tradition would not have been possible. Equally, the small tradition was dependent on the metropolis as a reference for its values and beliefs. (36) The important difference between the two forms of liberalism in the Cape was the volatile nature of the great tradition when compared with the stability of the small tradition. (37) The great tradition could be submerged, if only temporarily, by the fall of the government or a declaration of the changing intentions of constantly shifting alliances. Alliances were more stable within constituencies. The fall of governments had little local impact and the implementation of policies often took a long time to be effective. Social relationships which made liberal economic and political alliances possible remained constant over a long period of time. The small tradition's most sharply delineated form appears in the districts of the eastern Cape annexed between 1847 and 1865, and this meant that liberalism manifested itself in areas where Khoi peasant production played an important part in the economic life of the district. (38) Local liberal alliances which involved those of mostly Khoi origin were fewer in number and far more spasmodic. (39) The Khoi - the coloured people - consisted of so many different groups whose relationships with the dominant white group varied so much in different regions and at different times that no single generalization about their participation in post-1854 colonial politics is sufficient. Khoi resistance to European settlement was long and bloody, and before 1880 it seemed possible that the Khoi would be successful in their attempts to prevent white settlement. (40) Though they failed, the continuous fear of Khoi uprisings meant that the sense of unease among European settlers was sustained in the first half of the 19th century. This settler disquiet was not diminished by the creation of legal equality - the work of those who were guided by humanitarian considerations and the related belief in the greater efficiency of a "fair market" - and the ending of slavery by the British Parliament. The settlers would have to control their labour by means other than direct coercion. Attempts to introduce contracts which would carry penal sanctions if servants withdrew their labour brought Khoi agitation and the possibility of "armed opposition" to many western districts in the twenty years between 1828 and 1848. (41) The rebellion at Kat River in 1851 and the sympathy among western Khoi to this rebellion created a disposition among sections of political and administrative hierarchies to enfranchise propertied Khoi. (42)
Nevertheless, Kat River was the last manifestation of Khoi armed opposition and not, as was thought at the time, one more incident in a long history of resistance. By the mid-century the majority of rural Khoi in the western districts of the colony were tied to settler farmers by a form of debt peonage reinforced by induced alcohol addiction. (43) There were groups of cultivators and rural craftsmen who avoided peonage and remained within the relatively protective orbit of the mission-dominated lands. (44) These groups were generally antagonistic to the Afrikaner farmers who surrounded them, and if occasion presented itself they voted against the candidates who had the support of those farmers. (45) There was, however, no white group which had a vested interest in the survival of these islands of free cultivators, and even the missionaries associated with them were embarrassed by their electoral behaviour, and these Khoi reactions cannot be said to be associated with liberal coalitions. (46) Those rural people who retained a minimum economic and political freedom ultimately found migration out of their districts the best way to retain these freedoms. When the general economic expansion began in the 1870s a steady seepage of labour from the areas of debt peonage began and an effectively landless proletariat, the first in Africa, made its way to the towns. Alcoholism remained a social disease among sections of the urban Coloured population and temperance movements not only became widespread but these ultimately took on a political form, making for a revolt between the Afrikaner Bond supporters and the leaders of Coloured groups. (47) White liberals had an ambivalent attitude to the Coloured population in towns, and for the greater part of the 19th century most liberals of the great tradition were uneasy about Coloured townsmen (48), of whom only a small minority were artisans. Coloured men were recruited to the electoral machines of local candidates by a combination of patronage, corruption and intimidation. (49) Their urban situation, however, was never questioned and reform of electoral practices rather than disfranchisement was the usual response to Coloured participation (although the immediate intention may have been little different). (50) It was only in the decade before Union that white liberals and urban Coloured voters entered into formal alliances. (51) The importance of Coloured artisans to the Cape economy had by then become apparent, as had the possibility that white craft unions, with their higher wages, might seek to protect themselves by preventing employment of lower paid Coloured workers. In Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Kimberley, though sometimes divided among themselves, Coloured workers provided the basis of liberal alliances.

The small tradition evolved most markedly in the constituencies where a combination of peasant and "town" voters could hold one of the two seats in the two member constituencies. (52) The constitutional arrangement which allowed voters to use only one of their votes was an important factor in the development of the small tradition. Before the evolution of the party system there was usually a large number of candidates, and while African voters could be relied upon to support a single candidate, the same could not be said of the white electorate, the majority of whom were opposed to liberal candidates. Moreover, the existence of African voters needs explaining, and the Constitutional Ordinance provides only a formal and legal answer. Where a qualified franchise exists, the adjudicating of qualifications and the method of registering voters are as important as the legal right to the franchise. The constitution divided the responsibility for drafting the voters' roll between locally appointed field cornets and civil commissioners, appointed by the central government. The civil commissioner made the final decision, although appeals to be placed on the roll and objections could be raised by any voters. No one pattern emerges for these eastern Cape districts. In some cases field cornets were sympathetic to African enfranchisement, in others they were hostile, but the existence of registration committees (whose members were African and white) assisted in the final stage in the civil commissioner's court by local solicitors or law agents, went a long way to ensure that Africans would be enrolled. (53) As for the civil commissioners, they showed a disposition to allow Africans on the voters' roll. (54) The field cornet, the members of the registration committee - usually white traders - and the local lawyers had an economic as well as a political motive for aiding the
enrolment of African voters. The prosperity of their districts and their own prosperity depended on the marketable surplus of African cultivators. (55) Attempts to prevent enfranchisement were generally associated with the wider aim of restricting the growth of peasant economies. (56) To white commercial farmers peasants were anathema. Their call on family labour meant that there were only irregular supplies of African wage labourers, and the peasant producer was highly competitive. In these districts two different forms of production competed, not simply for resources but for survival.

Under these conditions antagonisms were deeply felt and expressed themselves in a heightened morality. It was not only in defence of the franchise that the small tradition manifested itself. For the white liberals, any local attack on the free peasantry had to be judged by the standards of a wider liberalism. An attempt to expropriate land denied the rights of property and was to be challenged (56); the failure of a jury to convict in the case of the murder of an African denied the security of the person and was to be condemned (57); the readiness to dispense summary justice against an employee denied the rule of law and was to be opposed. (56) Illiberal actions were equally common, or often more common, in other parts of the Cape and other South African territories, but it was only in these eastern districts that merchants, missionaries and administrators questioned them in any systematic way. This earned them the ambiguous title of "friends of the native" (59), but we would miss a dimension if we saw their compassionate reaction purely in individual religious or humanitarian beliefs acquired in other societies and retained (as a "cultural lag") in an unsuitable environment. The "friends of the natives" responded in the way they did because it was their way of life as well as that of the peasants which was under attack.

Notes


(5) A. E. du Toit (ed), The Earliest South African Documents of the Education and Civilization of the Bantu, p. 34. J. C. Warner to Sir Harry Smith, May 5, 1848: "The evil of the former system of Trade in Kaffirland was that it became almost a monopoly in the hands of a few monied men. Men from the lowest rank of Society were mostly employed to take charge of their numerous trading stations."
The Khoi inhabitants of Zuurbrak were "clad in fabrics of English manufacture", wrote Joseph John Freeman, *A Tour of South Africa* (1851), p. 159. John Philip regarded the increasing sales of the two stores at Zuurbrak as "evidence of progress not known in the previous one hundred and sixty years", W. M. Macmillan, *The Cape Colour Question: a Historical Survey* (1927), p. 177. Helm, the missionary at Zuurbrak, was reported in 1850 as stating: "another proof of the general industry of [his] communicants is the sum realised by persons, who at the request of the people, and in order to obviate the necessity for their resorting to villages where there are canteens, have been encouraged to open shops at the Institution. One has retired having realised in five or six years £600 by his profit on manufactures ... and I have been shown the books of another by which it appears that he receives about £100 per month in cash, and more than twice as much during harvest and sheep shearing months." Freeman, op. cit., p. 25. The Kat River settlement produced 6900 bushels of grain in 1833 and over 22000 in 1845. In the same period it doubled its sheep and horses and increased the number of its cattle fourfold. J. S. Marais, *The Coloured People 1652-1957* (1951), p. 233. The *Autobiography of the late Sir Andries Stockenstrom*, Bart, C. W. Hutton (ed), 2 vols (1887). Vol. II, p. 421. Andries Stoffel of Kat River told the 1836 Select Committee on Aborigines p. 560: "we have ploughing, wagon workers, and shoemakers, and their tradesmen among us." The earliest mission station, Genandendaal, was, as is well known, a substantial producer of agricultural products before it went into decline in the mid century. The productive activities were, however, not limited to agriculture: "one half of the population subsist by working at mechanical arts, cutlers, smiths, joiners, turners, masons, carpenters, shoemakers, tailors, and so on." *Ibid.*, p. 355. Evidence of Reverend Hans Peter Hallback.

John Philip, *Researches in South Africa* (1828), pp. ix-x. While our missionaries beyond the borders of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope are everywhere scattering the seeds of civilization, social order and happiness are "by the most unexceptional means, extending British influence and the British empire. Wherever the missionary places his standard among a savage tribe, their prejudices against colonial government give way; their dependence upon the colony is increased by the creation of artificial wants; so confidence is restored, intercourse with the colony is established, industry, trade and agriculture spring up; and every genuine convert among them made to Christian religion becomes the ally and friend of the colonial Government".

Joseph John Freeman, *A Tour in South Africa* (1851). "It is something to have changed the old kraal into a decent village - the old kaross into substantial European clothing - idleness into industry, ignorance into intelligence, selfishness into benevolence and heathenism into Christianity." The description is of Zuurbrak.

John Noble, *The History of South Africa* (1877), pp. 334-335. "The aim of the policy of the Colonial Government since 1855 has been to establish and maintain peace, to diffuse civilization and Christianity, and to establish society on the basis of individual property and personal industry. The agencies employed are the magistrate, the missionary, the school master and the trader."


Cape of Good Hope 1861-1892, pp. 124-5; 1919-1905, p. 161. Census returns 1891, 1904. The urban Coloured population rose from 106,000 to 183,000 in thirteen years.

(10) T. E. Kirk, op. cit., p. 503. "at this moment the number of the Queen's Troops in the Cape of Good Hope is more than one-third of that which is now in the whole of India."


(12) Innes, F. S. Malan, Herriman, Sauer, Scanlen, Solomon, Sprigg, de Villiers. Herriman and Sprigg embody the contradictions in the great tradition. Herriman wrote in February 1876: "today the Volksblad congratulates Lord Carnarvon on being ready 'to settle native difficulties in a manner agreeable to Africander colonists!', which in plain English means to take their land and divide it among White Farmers. Proude over and over again hinted at Basutoland, with its 150,000 progressive natives, being handed over to the Free State as a balance for the Diamond Fields."

"The Cape Ministry are not, as you know, Solomons; but they do heartily oppose and detest Mr Proude's and Lord Carnarvon's native policy. We are gradually educating the natives. We are introducing individual tenure of land - and European implements. We have four thousand natives at work on our Railways. Gradually the power of the chiefs is being broken up, and our laws introduced, and I hope this session to get a measure for the modified municipal government of locations. Lovedale has three hundred native boys and seventy girls, very many of whom pay for their own education. They learn trades, and to give you an idea of whether they can do so or not, one of our best carpenters in the locomotive shops at East London is a native. [Natives] may earn forty shillings a week as printers."


(13) The Cape Law Journal, 1887, pp. 137-147, on the 1887 Registration Act. For the role of law agents, see


(15) APS C122/65, Saul Solomon to Thomas Hodgkin, January 19 1860. Solomon Papers (microfilm), J. A. Proude to Saul Solomon, February 10 1875: "Immediately on my return to England, I reported to the Colonial Secretary my conversations with Mr Molteno and yourself respecting the disposition of Langalibale [sic]." Antony Trollope, South Africa (1878), Vol. 1, pp. 96-97: "It is not too much to say that he is regarded on both sides as a safe adviser; and I believe that it would be hardly possible to pass any measure of importance to which he offered strenuous opposition."

(16) Ethel Drus, "The Political Career of Saul Solomon, Member of the Cape Legislative Assembly 1854 to 1883" (unpublished MA, University of Cape Town), pp. 66-67. After the annexation of the South African Republic and the war against the Zulu nation, Jan Hoffmeyr and the Boerenbeschermings Vereeniging reversed their earlier support for confederation. The Boerenbeschermings Vereeniging therefore supported Saul Solomon's candidature in the 1879 general election. This was done in spite of Solomon's insistence that he would not vote for the repeal of the excise duty on wine, which was the occasion for the formation of the Vereeniging. See also Solomon Papers (microfilm), J. A. de Wet to Saul Solomon, June 4
1879. Percy Nightingale, the liberal civil commissioner whose conflict with the Cape government led to his being relieved of his post, wrote to F. W. Chesson, secretary of the APS, that Solomon believed "the feeling of the country, especially perhaps among the Dutch, is rapidly tending in the direction of humanity and fair play to the Natives all round": APS C143/275. Cf C138/193, J. J. Irvine to Chesson.

(17) Cape Labour Commission, G5-1894.

(18) The Scanlen ministry, which had abandoned Basutoland, also sought to have the Transkei administered by Britain. Scanlen's defeat in the 1884 election by an alliance between the now expansionist Afrikaner Bond and the Uppington-Sprigg faction made this impossible. James Irvine, the Ciskeian merchant and one of the members for Kingwilliamstown, was a supporter of the Scanlen government. Of this expansionist alliance he wrote: "Dutch ascendancy means stagnation in trade and what is worse ceaseless strife between black and white." APS C138/189, July 3, 1884. At the same time the Scanlen government was not opposed to annexation in principle, and when the Cape's commercial interests in South West Africa seemed to be threatened by the possibility of German annexation, Scanlen and Merriman pressed for Cape control. Z. Ngavirue.

(19) Act No. 33 of 1892. The passage of this Act marks the beginning of successful statutory attacks on the market-oriented peasantry, but it had taken more than forty years to get a general anti-squatters act onto the statute books. When it was proposed in 1851, popular Khoi opposition prevented it from being passed. Memoir of P. B. Borchardt (1861), p. 354. In 1860 Saul Solomon wrote: "A bill to prevent Native squatting, based upon a measure submitted by Govt. but made much more stringent by this [Select] Committee, to whom it was referred, was brought into the House, but met with such determined opposition from a few members that I am happy to say it could not be put through the House." APS C122/65, Saul Solomon to Thomas Hodgkin. For squatting measures which were brought before Parliament but failed to get a second reading, or were withdrawn, see No 16-1859, No 15-1871, No 9-1875, and No 38-1875. See also Solomon's and Merriman's successful opposition to a vagrancy bill proposed in 1874: House of Assembly, June 8, 1874. Drus, op. cit., p. 56.


(21) APS C130/214, T. W. Irvine to F. W. Chesson: "We are very largely interested in the maintenance of peace in South Africa, in consequence of our extensive business with those trading with various tribes."


(24) Port Elizabeth Telegraph, June 1886, December 21, 1881; The Journal (Grahamstown), June 1886; Queenstown Free Press, May, June 1887; Eastern Province Herald, May, June 1887; East London Advertiser, March, April, May 1887; House of Assembly Debates 1887, pp. 71-97, 1891 pp. 335-346, 1892 pp. 170-206. The election statement made in 1887 by Richard Solomon (the future Attorney General in the Schorner Government) is typical: "We English in this country depend to a very large extent upon the Native vote, so I hope the constituencies will wake up in the strongest manner and point out to their representatives that they must resist the Bill to the utmost. If the Bill is carried, the English-speaking section of Kingwilliamstown, Victoria East and Port Beaufort constituency would be represented by Bond nominees and that would be a serious thing for these districts. Cape Argus, April 27, 1887.
(25) Herriman told a meeting in Fort Elizabeth: "The question of this country was whether it was going to be a black man's or a white man's country [cheers]. When he saw farmers becoming disheartened or hiring their land out to Kafirs, the Colony becoming blacker and blacker, Natal a large native location helped along by coolies, and Cape Town becoming browner and browner every day, then he felt misgivings in his own mind as to the future ..." Inve, April 16 1891. Cf. note 12.

(26) Rose Innes Papers, 1898, No. 174, n.d. Richard Rose Innes to James Rose Innes: "Kingwilliamstown has been on the decline for some time past and the gold fields have done us nothing but harm - men and money have left for the Transvaal."


(31) Herriman Papers, 1907, No. 111: J.K.R. to Godwin Smith, October 26 1907.


(34) Past and Present, No. 49: Richard Johnson, "Educational Policy and Social Control in Early Victorian England", pp. 96-119. "The teacher of the peasant's child", wrote the eminent educationalist Dr James Kay Shuttleworth, "occupied as it were the father's place, in the performance of duties from which the father is separated by his daily toil, and unhappily by his want of knowledge and skill." The school inspectorate of the 1840s noted that "whereas education for 'our own children' occurred mainly through the 'associations of home', in respect to the children of labouring men, it must be done, if at all, at school..." "The school must be an essentially foreign implantation within a commonly barbarised population." The school teacher was the primary agent of "civilization". Teachers themselves must be emancipated from the local community, made independent of the wishes of the parents, more closely linked to local elites (and particularly the clergy), and provided with the financial means of a cultural superiority. They should be raised, but not too far, out of their own class. pp. 112-113. Cf Kay Shuttleworth's prescriptions in A. A. du Toit (ed), The Explicit British Documents on Education for the Coloured Races. Education for "Coloured races" was to "civilize races emerging from barbarism", to enable them to become a "settled and industrious peasantry" with habits of self-control and moral discipline. Education should provide "the mutual interests of the mother country and her dependencies, the rational basis of their connection, and the domestic and social duties of the coloured race", together with "the relation of wages, capital, labour and the influence of local and general government on personal security, independence and order".

(35) James Wells, Stewart of Lovedale (1913), pp. 216, 217, quotes Stewart in the Christian Farmers. "The gospel of work does not save souls, but it saves people. It is not a Christian maxim only, that they who do not work should not eat; it is also in the end a law of nature and of nations. Lazy races die or decay. Races that work prosper on earth. The British race in all its greatest branches is noted for its restless activity. Its life's motto is Work! Work! Work! And its deepest contempt is reserved for those who will not thus exert themselves."
(36) Saul Solomon (microfilm), various letters to Solomon.
(37) Morris Alexander and Bisset Berry are good examples of "small tradition" members of parliament who retained their liberalism throughout their parliamentary careers.
Port Beaufort: C. W. Hutton, J. J. Yates
Kingwilliamstown: James Irvine, Richard Solomon, William Hay
Queenstown: Bisset Berry, J. P. Orpen
Vlakfontein: J. Orpen, Merriman
Victoria East: James Rose Innes, H. T. Tampin.
(39) Cape Town, with its four seats and its plumping system, enabled "Coloured" voters to help return at least one member in most elections: Namaqualand 1898, Stellenbosch 1904, Caledon 1954-1868.
(41) In 1800 the Khoi joined forces with the Xhosa. In 1836 Fairbairn wrote: "There is no doubt that the clam and agitation caused by Vades Vagrant Law induced the Kafirs to believe that the Hottentots would not be very hearty in the colony's defence" and, as Macmillan noted, "Urbain's action in vetoing the Vagrants Law saved the country from a Hottentot rebellion. Santu, Boer and Britain, p. 145. In 1848 Sir Harry Smith decided against a new vagrancy act, after widespread Coloured agitation. T. E. Kirk, The Colonial Intelligencer, February 1851, p. 147. In 1852 further agitation prevented legislation against Coloured squatters. Boricksee, op. cit.
(42) Porter: "I would rather meet the Hottentot at the hustings voting for his representative than meet the Hottentot in the wilds with his gun upon his shoulder."
(43) Freeman, op. cit., pp. 136-137. "A large number of the members of a Missionary Institution had, so lately as in 1829, been inveigled by a neighbouring colonist to serve him, in consideration of debts incurred for brandy. As a first term was working out, he let the men have more brandy at exorbitant prices, and took from them engagements for forty-nine years - in many others for shorter periods. The wages stipulated were exceedingly low, as the debts were to be paid by the services of the men. The result was great destitution in their families, and general misery." Cape of Good Hope Labour Commission, C39-93, para 4068, Evidence of Johannes April, church warden, Manne. "The man cannot leave the farm because he is in debt to the farmer. The longer he stays the deeper he sinks and frequently has to put his children in the field too, to aid in clearing his liability."
(46) Weber of Stellenbosch was, for a Rheinish missionary, a remarkable jingo: "I was talking to Mr Weber of Stellenbosch this morning", C. A. Owen Lewis, the secretary of the South African League, wrote to Cecil Rhodes, "and I gathered from him that they are anxious to start a coloured Church near Paarl, so as to take the matter out of the hands of the present Missionary who, the Reverend Weber tells me, is a strong Bondeman." Rhodes Papers B2 No. 222, September 29 1899. For Weber's campaigning for the Progressive Party, see Cape Times, July 28 1898, January 8 1904.
(47) The APO conferences of 1906, 1907, and 1912 all considered the social problems of alcoholism but opposed legislation which limited restrictions to Coloured men. Minutes of Annual General Conference, 1906, pp. 27-28, 1907 pp. 6-7, 1912 pp. 36-37. In 1910 the APO, the organization's weekly paper, noted that the Temperance Hall in Cape Town had been renamed the APO Hall. APO, May 7 1910.

(48) Again, Merriman provides a typical statement: It was not African voters that were to be feared but "the Cape Town coolie - Abdul was the man to play up to an election, and Abdul was an undesirable element in an election". Cf James Rose Innes's minute in CO 48/521, No. 160, November 1892.

(49) Cape Monitor, February 28, April 1, 1854: "Tenants evicted for voting against the wishes of the landlord". Also Zuid Afrikan, March 20 1856.


(52) Cape Mercury, November 13 1888. Queens-town Free Press, February 2 1894, August 8 1888. James Rose Innes, Autobiography, p. 52. Cape Times reported a meeting in Aliwal North district at which W. J. Orsmond failed to persuade a meeting of African voters to nominate him for the forthcoming election because they felt he would split the African vote and that neither he nor Sauer would be returned.


(55) W. A. Orsmond (NDA for Aliwal North, 1904-1910), who was both a substantial trader and landowner, with a great many African tenants, told a meeting of African voters at Bensonville, Benswkle district, in the Aliwal North Division, in the 1893 election campaign, that they were "valuable colonists who must be of immense assistance in paying the interest on our £25 million debt. Ten residents in the Colony realise the importance as regards the proceeds of your produce in grain, wool, skins and hides and your earning in wages. Your purchasing power is enormous ... the natives are owners of one-sixth of the sheep, a quarter of the goats, half of the cattle and half of the horses. The Natives are very great producers and consumers"). Cape Times, August 5 1893. At a public meeting which discussed the proposal to "break up" the Tambookie Location, the Queens-town general dealer, A. Horun of Horun Bros., said: "The natives cultivated ten times more than the farmers." T. W. Edkins, a Queens-town merchant, was reported to have said: "Gentlemen not in business had no idea of the enormous trade that was done with these natives, nor of the grain produced by them in good season. If the removals took place Queens-town would lose this trade.") Cape Times, November 25 1893. See Colin Bundy, "The Emergence & Decline of the South African Peasantry", African Affairs, 1923, October 1972, 369-88. See also APS 0147/49, G. Silberbauer to F. W. Cheshon, December 9 1893. Of the
correspondence of T. W. and J. J. Irvine of Kingwilliamstown, and Richard Rose Innes's statement: "The native goes in and out amongst us, our commercial welfare is largely bound up with his prosperity. He is an extensive property holder in the district, he is a peasant proprietor and a producer on our markets." Cape Times, February 16 1909.

(56) Commenting on the implications of the 1887 Registration Act, whose prior purpose was the disfranchisement of Africans occupying "communal" land, Jabavu wrote: "The people were alarmed that in first declaring that the lands they hold do not belong to them - as the new Act declares implicitly - it is sought to deprive them of the lands when the supremacy of the Dutch in Parl., sought to be assured by this measure, is assured. This opens up such a stupendous question relating to the settlement of land by natives which ought to go cautiously about giving the Royal Assent to the new Act." APS C139/16, August 29 1887.

(57) "Individual tenure", wrote J. P. Orpen, "has always existed and law and equity equally requires that it should simply be recognised as it exists now."