In 1903, Thomas Welsh explored what he called "contrasts in African legislation" in an article in the Journal of the African Society. What particularly intrigued Welsh were some of the differences in the law governing the sale of alcohol to Africans in various parts of the empire. More specifically, why was it that there should be one law for the thirty years old colony of Lagos and another, radically different, for the recently acquired Transvaal territory? "Now, what puzzles one", wrote Welsh, "is why the 'coloured person' on the West Coast of Africa should get as much absolute alcohol as he liked ... while the one in the Transvaal gets clapped into gaol if he procures a glass of beer or spirits ...?" (1)

Welsh's question of over 70 years ago was only partly rhetorical, and it deserved an answer from the imperial authorities of the time. It still merits a serious reply from the historians and sociologists of colonialism. For, underlying Welsh's seemingly superficial query, are several issues of considerable interest to scholars. Who advocated colonial liquor legislation and who benefited from it? What principles governed these decisions and how and when were they arrived at? Why did the imperialists adopt different strategies of social control in various parts of Africa?

This paper will not attempt to answer these questions within the framework of a comparative study embracing Lagos and the Transvaal. To do that would require a lengthy and sophisticated examination of the differences between mercantile and industrial capital when, on the one hand, it seeks to exploit peasant producers spread throughout the countryside and, on the other, a working class concentrated in urban areas. Instead, this analysis will be largely confined to the Transvaal. It will seek to answer some of the questions raised, and to demonstrate the complex interaction between alcohol, black workers and capitalism during the period between 1886 and 1903.
On the 4th October 1881, the Volksraad of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) passed article 44. This granted a Hungarian mining engineer, Alois Hugo Nellmapius, a concession "for the sole right to manufacture from grain, potatoes, and other products growable in the Transvaal, excepting tree-fruits and grapes, and the right to sell in bulk and bottle free of licence" such spirits. (2) Nellmapius, a close friend of State President Kruger, was granted this original concession for a period of fifteen years, on condition that the distillery was operational by at least the 1st of July 1882. (3) Weeks before this, however, on 7th June 1882, Nellmapius, in return for a 20% share, ceded the concession to a partnership comprising himself, the cousins Isaac and Barnet Lewis, and Barnet's brother-in-law — Samy Marks. (4) It was this partnership which gave birth to De Eerste Fabrieken in de Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek Ltd, and in June 1883 a proud President Kruger personally opened the new distillery and christened it "Volkhoop".

A director of the distillery at a later date, Hugh Crawford, was therefore largely correct when he noted that: "The distillery was established, and its operations commenced before the goldfields of either Barbeton or the Transvaal were discovered, and at a time when the country was poor, its population small, and business very limited." (5) These early business realities, however, did not prevent the Volksraad from continuing to perceive the factory as "Volkhoop". As the economic climate in the Transvaal changed in the mid-1880s, so the "hoop" of the "volk" grew. When asked to modify and confirm the terms of the concession on 23rd June 1885, members of the Raad took the opportunity to make additional demands for development. In return for extending the monopoly for a period of thirty years, until 30th June 1912, they insisted on the state receiving an annual payment of £1,000 and a guarantee that a glass factory and cooperage works would be erected at the factory. (6) In return, the company was to continue to benefit from an exemption from any other form of taxation.

These additional development requirements specified by the Volksraad extended the company's resources - none more so than the glass factory, which was ultimately constructed only in 1894. (7) The dramatically changed economic conditions in the Transvaal from the mid-1880s, however, assisted the company. In particular, the rapid growth and development of the Witwatersrand goldfields transformed the likelihood of business success for "Volkhoop" from probability to certainty. In May 1889 it was noted of the distillery that, from "a very modest beginning on a tentative scale, its success has become unprecedentedly rapid, and it is now developing itself into a great industry". (8)

The tangible proof of the emergence of a "great industry" was to be found on the 4,000 acre site of the distillery on the banks of the Pienaars river, some 10 miles east of Pretoria. On what was formerly Samy Marks's Netherley farm there arose a reservoir with a capacity of 170,000 gallons of water, a thirty-horse-power plant for electricity generation, a four-storey central distillation plant, a boarding house for accommodating white workers, houses for married European employees, and suitably prestigious separate house for the distillery manager. (9) The buildings most likely to attract the attention of the Transvaal burghers, however, were the three large grain stores, each with a capacity of 5,000 bags. These stores, and indeed the entire factory site, could be viewed from managing director Marks's "splendid residence" some 1½ miles away at Zwartkoppies. (10)

By 1889-90, the factory had in its employment at least fifty white and over one hundred African workers. (11) In mid-December 1889, the German distillation plant was working at full capacity and producing 1,000 gallons of proof spirit per day from grain supplied exclusively by Transvaal burghers. Even this output, however, was insufficient to maintain stocks, and the management embarked on a programme of expansion. (12) New boilers, kilns, malting floors, stills and storage space were all being added to the factory when a fire broke out and disrupted production in mid-December 1889. (13)
The setback caused by the fire proved less serious than it might have been and the company merely lost two months' production. What concerned Marks and his colleagues more, however, was the fact that the distillery had been left uninsured and that the fire was considered to be the work of an arsonist. (14) The owners of the factory were sufficiently convinced of this theory to offer "a £2,000 reward for the apprehension and conviction of the person or persons implicated in this fiendish act". (15) In the months after the fire the reward remained unclaimed, the distillery was insured, and the owners took the opportunity of making a change in the factory management. Thomas Strachan, a man with experience "at one of the largest distilleries in the world", replaced the previous manager, Stokes. (16) Under Strachan's management the business experienced steady improvement and expansion. The resources of the company were again stretched, however, when a second fire broke out in the four-storey distillery building on the 29th May 1891. But, since the plant had been insured for £6,000 and the maturing stock carefully isolated from the distillery proper, the effect of the fire was again perhaps less serious than it might have been. (17)

Nevertheless, these setbacks, when combined with the excellent prospects of the company and the need for expansion, left De Eerste Fabrieken in de Zuid Afrikananse Republiek Beperk relatively starved of badly needed capital. Marks's solution to this problem was to allow the company to go public. In November 1892, in exchange for £122,000 and shares, the holders of the concession made it over to Eerste Fabrieken Hatherley Distillery Limited. (18) With the advantage of a listing on the London Stock Exchange, Hatherley Distillery was able to attract international as well as national capital, and the company was on the threshold of a period of spectacular expansion.

Seldom, if ever, could ambitious plans for industrial expansion have been launched into a safer or more sympathetic business environment. What more could capitalists ask for than a government-granted monopoly in a rapidly expanding market? As the sole local producer of cheap spirits for African consumption, Hatherley Distillery found itself catering for a market of 14,000 black miners in 1890, 88,000 in 1897, and an enormous 100,000 by 1899. Privileged access to a market that expanded by nearly ten times in as many years was an important part of the Hatherley success story.

It was not only the size of Hatherley's market that was important, but its quality. In particular, the fact that the majority of the 100,000 strong work-force was drawn from Mosambique was of the utmost importance. For at least several decades prior to the industrialization of the Witwatersrand the peasants and workers of Mosambique had been sold large quantities of wine and spirits - inferior quality alcohol that flowed from the vats and economy of metropolitan Portugal. There is substantial evidence to show that the more proletarianized Africans of southern rural Mosambique, and the black workers of the urban areas along the coast, were considerably addicted to alcohol by the early 1890s. (19) In 1894, the British consul in Mosambique, W. A. Churchill, noted how large quantities of spirits were sold in "up country stores", and that black workers "spent the greater part of their wages in alcohol, known as 'Kaffir rum'". (20) In the following year, Churchill noted in his annual report that landing agents often experienced the greatest difficulty in finding sober black workers in the ports. This problem became so well known that ships from South Africa brought their own African dockers with them, to off-load cargo in the Mosambique ports. (21)

The link between black alcohol consumption in Mosambique and African miners on the Witwatersrand was also clear to observers in the 1890s. The syndrome of rural underdevelopment and peasant indebtedness meant that the canteens of the countryside were invariably good recruiting grounds for the Transvaal labour agents. (22) The more proletarianized status, as well as the poverty of an isidakwa (drunkard), were easily recognizable on the mines: "In a store where the boys' belongings were handing a drunkard's sack was generally noticeable by its age, and leanness of aspect." (23) Similarly, African miners returning to Mosambique were at least as likely to be carrying back gas piping for use in domestic distilleries, as they were to be taking a gun. (24) All of this meant that the Pretoria Distillery was not only catering for
an expanding market but for one in which the largest percentage of consumers already had a well developed liking, if not addiction, to its product. Every black worker on the Rand mines was a potential consumer of Hatherley products. Every African consumer who spent his income on Hatherley products was set for entry into the working class. In the 1890s the black worker was a consumer, and the fact that he was a consumer enhanced the chances of his remaining a worker - as opposed to a migrant labourer operating from a peasant-based economy.

Not many of these market realities escaped the attention of investors when the Hatherley Company went public late in 1892 and £350,000 worth of £1 shares became available. (25) As possibly the only other large-scale investment opportunity in a Transvaal industry, the Distillery attracted local mining capital that sought to spread and diversify its holdings. A significant proportion of the shares were subscribed to by South African mining capitalists, and throughout the 1890s the depth and extent of their holdings were reflected in the directorships of the company. Besides Sammy Marks, the board of Hatherley Distillery during the 1890s included, at various stages, the following mining capitalists: J. N. De Jongh (Executive Member of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines 1897-1909, President of the Chamber 1906-07), S. Evans (mine manager, associated with Eckstein & Co after 1896 and made a full partner in 1902), L. Ehlich (before 1894 director of the Ferreira, Modderfontein, Knights, Wolhuter, Main Reef and other Transvaal companies of the S. Neumann Group), and A. Epler (Executive Member of the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines 1899-1909, and later Managing Director of Transvaal Goldfields Ltd). (26)

Where national capital went successfully, international capital was not long to follow, and Hatherley also had a significant number of English, French, Austrian and German shareholders. (27) The interests of these European investors were safeguarded by individual members of the Hatherley board, who acted as the agents of international capitalism. Director J. H. Curle (Mining Correspondent for the Economist) held an informal brief for English shareholders, while the Bavarian Ludwig Ehlich looked after the interest of German investors. During the 1890s the Austrian Adolf Epler undertook this task, not only at Hatherley but in other concerns as well, and was candidly described as "a representative of Foreign Capital in South Africa". (28) The French investors in the Distillery looked for their protection to yet another director, Henri Duval, who was also the manager of the Banque Francaise de l'Afrique du Sud in Johannesburg. (29)

With the benefit of some of the most astute managerial talent available in the Transvaal, and the financial muscle power provided by national and international capital, Hatherley Distillery set course for a period of spectacular development between 1893 and 1896. This expansion is clearly evident from Table A. (30)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gallons sold</th>
<th>Net profit or loss</th>
<th>Dividend declared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>272,616</td>
<td>+£47,404</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>316,046</td>
<td>+£48,399</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>266,281</td>
<td>+£38,274</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>298,130</td>
<td>+£69,569</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>64,192</td>
<td>-£46,386</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>153,594</td>
<td>+£10,450</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>86,998</td>
<td>+£ 2,137</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the early 1890s in particular, Hatherley Distillery was the undisputed master of the Witwatersrand liquor market.
Any industry which could yield dividends ranging from 12% to 20%, however, was likely to attract the envious attention of competitors, and the large new market in the Transvaal had not passed without notice amongst other spirit producers. In theory, Hatherley's monopolistic position was secure. Besides being the sole producer of grain spirits in the ZAR, the company, through its privileged exemption from excise duty, was in a position to undercut any imported spirits. "Cape Smoke", for example, the notorious cheap brandy produced in the Western Province, could not compete on the Rand market because of the high import duties. (31) Through diligent reading of the small print in inter-state treaties, however, one group of spirit producers in southern Africa did find a weakness through which they could attack Hatherley Distillery's dominant position. The Treaty of Commerce entered into by the Transvaal and Portugal in 1875, ratified in Pretoria in 1882, and due to expire in 1902, made provision for the produce of Portugal to enter the ZAR free of duty. (32) It was this chink in the legal armour of Kruger's Republic that producers in Mozambique exploited fully in the mid-1890s. After 1894, and more especially after 1895, once the railway line from Delagoa Bay to the Witwatersrand had been opened, Hatherley's firm hold on the Transvaal market was seriously undermined by cheaper spirits that originated from two very different sources. (33)

First, rum, "which was distilled at a fraction of the cost at which grain spirit is produced", under cut Hatherley products. (34) In Mozambique, producers, such as the Companhia do Assucar de Mozambique, turned their attention to the profits that could be made from rum distillation. In 1894 the companhia's distillery at Mopea specifically produced 5,000 gallons of rum for the Rand market. (35) The following year saw such an expansion in the manufacture of rum that the companhia exhausted its supplies of sugar. (36) With excess distillation capacity on hand, the Companhia do Assucar approached the Portuguese government for permission to import additional quantities of sugar from Natal. (37) The fact that the president of the companhia, Frederico Ressano Garcia, was also a minister in the Portuguese government no doubt helped ensure that this permission was granted. With members of the Portuguese ruling class personally involved in the manufacture of spirits, and the ZAR's rail outlet to the sea at stake, it is perhaps not surprising that the Transvaal government did not object to this trade because of "high political considerations". (38) In the following years the companhia consistently manufactured spirits from sugar that was not only drawn from Mozambique but from Natal and Mauritius as well. (39) By 1896 the companhia was still expanding rum production and sharpening its competitive edge through price reductions—the latter being achieved through the replacement of European personnel at the Mopea distillery with African artisans. (40)

The pattern of expansion to be seen in the Companhia do Assucar's activities was repeated at other distilleries throughout Mozambique. In 1895 the distilleries of Portuguese East Africa exported 84,528 gallons of spirits to the South African Republic, in 1896 this rose to 255,157 gallons, in 1897 to 357,260 gallons, and by 1898 it had reached 456,000 gallons. (41) This business bonanza, perhaps without precedence in the economic history of Mozambique, saw the ownership of several distilleries change hands. (42) New capital was attracted to distilleries that could produce alcohol at 3 shillings a gallon, and command a wholesale price of 9 shillings a gallon on the Witwatersrand. (43) Profit margins of this order also warranted investment in new plant and equipment, and the large French company at Lourenco Marques, the Société Française de Distilleries, expanded its activities in 1895. The company built a large new distillery on the banks of the Inkomati river, 100 yards from the Transvaal frontier, at the border village of Ressano Garcia. (44) Again, this venture received the blessing of the Portuguese government.

The second source of alcohol which undermined the sale of Hatherley grain spirits in the 1890s was Germany. So cheap were the German spirits that they even undercut the sugar based imports from Mozambique. (45) The story of how and why German potato spirits came to be sold to the black gold miners of the Transvaal reveals further features of the operation of international capitalism before the South African War.

During the last three decades of the 19th century there was, for a variety of reasons, a substantial increase in the average yield of potatoes per acre, in
Prussia and Germany. (46) This phenomenon was especially noticeable in the rye-and-potato economy to be found in the lighter soil areas of Prussia. (47) The increased yield, however, was something of a mixed blessing, since it came at a time when the consumption of the potato as a vegetable was declining in the domestic households of Prussia and Germany.

The Junkers, confronted with an increased potato crop and a declining demand for the vegetable, decided to resolve the problem through the large scale distillation of potato spirits. In itself this decision was hardly startling - the commercial distillation of spirits from potatoes dated back to at least the 17th century. What was new, however, was the sale of the operation and the specialized "distillation domain" that came into being. (48) In addition, the feasibility of this solution had been guaranteed by the invention of a special steam apparatus for the mashing of silo potatoes in 1873. (49) Fundamentally, it was this invention which enabled potato spirits to be manufactured commercially, and which lay at the heart of the German distillation industry between 1870 and 1900. (50)

The Junkers found, however, that their problems did not end with the large scale conversion of potatoes into spirits. From 1880 onwards, the domestic markets of Prussia and Germany showed an increasing preference for the superior quality alcohols that were being distilled from grain. By the 1890s producers were finding themselves with large stocks of potato spirits that sold extremely slowly in domestic European markets. It was largely for this reason that the producers anxiously sought out the less discriminating colonial export markets, and Africa became the outlet for enormous quantities of potato spirits. (51)

Because of the high import duties in the Transvaal, the German potato spirits could not penetrate the market directly - like "Cape Smoke", it simply would have ceased to be cheap if imported in the orthodox manner. Both Prussian producers and Transvaal importers, therefore, had to find a way around this problem if they wished to share in the profits that could be made in the ZAR. Well aware that this customs barrier had already proved itself vulnerable on the eastern border with Mozambique, international capitalists set themselves to work, weaving the sort of legal magic by which the potatoes of Prussia became converted into the "produce of Portugal". It was under this latter guise that thousands of gallons of German and Prussian potato spirits flooded into the Transvaal from 1894 onwards.

It was in the port of Hamburg that German liners took on their cargoes of potato spirits during the 1890s. (52) From there they would fan out into two large southward-arcs that embraced the west and east coasts of Africa respectively. The German West Africa liners, Thekla Boben, Hausa, Bida and Ilorin, worked the Atlantic and discharged their cargoes in ports from Lagos in the north to Luanda in the south. (53) The ships of the German East Africa Line, however, worked with a slightly different routine. After taking on their cargoes, the liners Konig, Kanzler, Herzog, Admiral and Reichstag would first make for the port of Lisbon. There, they would lie overnight with their cargo of Prussian potato spirit. Then, after a suitable number of hours had elapsed, they would receive a certificate of naturalization from a port official and from then on the cargo would be considered the "produce of Portugal". (54) Thereafter, the ships would head eastwards through the Suez Canal, and then south into the Indian Ocean. In the 1890s the most important port of call on this southwards voyage was Lourenço Marques. It was there that the liners discharged the bulk of their cargo of potato spirit - spirit that was partly destined for local consumption within Mozambique, and partly for the Witwatersrand. (55) The extent of this traffic between 1894 and 1903 is evident from Table B, below. (56)
TABLE B

Imports of Plain Aguardente through Lourenço Marques, 1894-1903

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quantity in Litres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>195,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>182,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>517,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>215,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>195,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>123,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>32,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>28,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>15,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: Large quantities of the same "fire-water" were also off-loaded at the ports of Inhambane, Chinde and Quelimane.)

The Transvaal liquor consumer of the 1890s was thus likely to be drinking spirits that came from one of three basic sources: Hatherley, any one of several Mozambique distilleries, or Germany. Seen in another way, the consumer could, in order of declining cost, be drinking either grain, sugar or potato spirits. He would also, however, be drinking a good deal more than plain alcohol and, in terms of the cost to his health, he was likely to be paying a good bit more than he bargained for. Even in their "pure" form, direct from the distilleries, these spirits contained a high proportion of amylic alcohol. This latter form of alcohol, also known as fusel oil, was a poisonous by-product of the fermentation process. Samples of Hamburg potato spirit taken in West Africa in 1902 revealed a proportion of fusel oil by weight which varied from 1.26% to 4.4%. (57) When a Transvaal chemist analysed spirits from the same source in 1895, he declared it to be "unfit for internal use". (58) Spirits that started their life as being unfit for human consumption in their "pure" form did not improve markedly as they passed through the hands of various other intermediaries in the Transvaal.

Most of the spirits that entered Johannesburg first found their way to the wholesalers, firms such as Meskin & Davidoff, Vogelman & Friedman, Kantor Ltd, T. Friedman Ltd, I. Herzfeld Ltd, or Blum & Co. (59) A couple of these firms, Kantor and Blum, dealt only in bulk supplies of spirits which they sold directly to smaller bottling concerns. (60) The majority, however, opted for the higher profits that could be made through processing the raw spirits into the fiery commercial brands that seemed to satisfy the tastes of white and black consumers on the Rand.

Firms involved in the processing business, such as Meskin & Davidoff, required three things in addition to raw spirits: a large supply of bottles, various chemicals and essences, and a stock of forged cork tops and bottle labels. The first was obtained through the endless collection of "empties" from the canteens and back streets of Johannesburg. (61) It is also possible that at a later date some of these bottles were manufactured at the Hatherley glass works. The second was purchased from a local firm of wholesale chemists, P. J. Peterson & Co. (62) The third requisite, forged labels, were ordered from the firm responsible for printing the Standard and Diggers' News - Matthew & Walker. These forgeries, often making use of well known brand names, suggested that spirits were manufactured in Holland, France, Scotland, etc. Several different forgeries were printed on a single sheet, and the customer could then cut out the label which he considered appropriate to his product. (63)

Armed with these pre-requisites, the firms then set about manufacturing various brands of liquor, according to recipes that were fairly widely known in the trade. "Kaffir Brandy", price 16/6d per dozen bottles in 1899, was prepared according to the following formula: 15 gals. Delagoa proof spirit, 15 gals. water, 1 gal. cayenne pepper tincture, ½ lb. mashed prunes, ½ oz. sulphuric acid, and 1 oz.
nitric ether. This "brandy" was coloured through the addition of a suitable quantity of burnt sugar. (64) "Kaffir Whisky", price 14/6d per dozen bottles in 1899, required the following ingredients: 100 gals. of Delagoa Bay proof spirits, 1 gal. tincture of prunes, 3 lbs. glycerine, 1 pint green tea, ½ oz. acetic acid, 20 drops creasote, and 12 drops oil of cognac. (65) "Dutch Gin for Kaffir", price 15/6d per dozen bottles in 1899, required the following: 100 gals. Delagoa Bay proof spirit, 1 gal. sugar syrup, 1 lb. tincture of orange peel, 4 ozs. turpentine, 1 oz. Juniper oil, and ½ oz. oil of fennel. To this concoction was added bead without colouring (an additive that was partly composed of sulphuric acid), and then the entire quantity of "gin" was filtered through charcoal. (66)

For the benefit of the European consumers in the working class some of the recipes were varied slightly and the processing was made a little more sophisticated. Whisky, for example, was prepared exactly the same way as "Kaffir Whisky", but was filtered more frequently. Further, a layer of oak sawdust, when available, was added to the whisky in order to impart to it a distinctive flavour. (67) The Transvaal Leader warned its Johannesburg readers in 1899: "Do not be a-st at the prospect of drinking sulphate of copper and green tea, acetic acid and oil of Neroli as Martell's Five Star Liqueur Brandy; you have done it often enough." (68) Basically, white and black workers were invited to drink the same poisonous concoctions. The white workers, however, were required to pay slightly more for their "refined" taste. Whereas "Kaffir Ginger Brandy" sold at 16/6d per dozen bottles, the same quantity of "White Ginger Brandy" cost 22/6d. (69)

The fact that these different types of "liquor" were sold in vast quantities, at public places, was well known at the time. As early as April 1890, the Standard and Daily News devoted an entire editorial to the subject. It pointed out how, in a neighbouring colony (probably Mozambique), Hennessy and Martell's Brandy had been analysed and found to consist of: potato spirit, fusel oil, burnt sugar, spirits of nitre, and oil of cognac. The editorial continued:

"We cannot prove that what is drunk here as retailed is like these samples, but he would be a bold man who would bet on the purity of the liquor ordinarily retailed in Johannesburg. A public officer is absolutely needed to deal with such matters." (70)

This plea for a public analyst fell upon deaf ears, as did further appeal two months later. (71) Although the liquor laws subsequently did make provision for the appointment of such a state official, there was still no public analyst in 1895, and by as late as 1898 the situation was still unremedied. (72) The government of the ZAR knew only too well that, if an analytical chemist started probing the composition of Rand liquor, the finger of guilt would point ultimately not only to the wholesalers in Johannesburg but to influential capitalists in Hamburg and Lisbon as well. That was a price which the Transvaal government was unwilling to pay. The liquor was thus allowed to pass unchallenged from the wholesalers to the retail outlets spread across the Witwatersrand - the canteens.

There was no shortage of canteens in the industrializing republic. Of the 393 licensed canteens in the Transvaal in September 1888, 147 had been granted in the more concentrated Witwatersrand area. (73) It is estimated that, at the zenith of the liquor trade in 1895, between 750 and 1,000 canteens could be found in the area between Krugersdorp in the west and Nigel in the east. Even by 1896, when the licensed retail liquor trade had declined considerably, there were 495 recognized outlets in the magisterial districts of Krugersdorp, Johannesburg and Boksburg, and in the same year the Licensing Board had to deal with 165 new applications. (74)

Numerically significant from an early date, this petit bourgeoisie was quick to recognize its class interests and to organize accordingly. As early as 1888 the canteen-keepers in the various mining districts had got together to form the Witwatersrand Licensed Victuallers’ Association (WLVA). (75) By March 1890, WLVA had one hundred members, and the executive was considering the applications of forty prospective members. (76) As the professional association for liquor retailers, the
WLVA undertook those functions that were normally expected of trade organizations. It protected members when their licences were threatened, it petitioned the state to liberalize the liquor laws in an attempt to expand the size of its legal market, and it sought to limit the numbers of those entering the retail trade. (77) While the canteen-keepers were without the international connections or power that the liquor producers enjoyed, they were a local and national force to be reckoned with.

While this organisational muscle-power of the retailers was undoubtedly impressive, it should not be forgotten that the liquor trade operated within a wider context as well and that this produced its own constraints. A colonial ruling class which had established a state by conquest, and which held out hopes for an industrializing economy, was never likely to subscribe fully to a laissez-faire system. In theory, the right and ability of canteen-keepers to sell unlimited quantities of spirits to the growing number of black workers was severely circumscribed. According to the regulations, the Liquor Licensing Boards strictly vetted all new applications for licences, and they issued only those that were considered to be in the public interest. The liquor law of 1889 made it clear that canteen-keepers could only sell alcohol to Africans on the production of a permit signed by a white master, and that the police and the courts would enforce these requirements. Other, less onerous constraints, derived from the wrath of employers or the hostility of "public opinion", which objected to an unfettered trade that produced large numbers of drunken, noisy, and at times violent, black workers. The barriers that these supposed constraints erected, however, were less than formidable in the harsher light of practice.

The attitudes of the Witwatersrand Liquor Licensing Boards to the scores of applications which confronted them throughout the 1880s and the early 1890s can euphemistically be described as being "open" or "flexible". In the first decade of mining development virtually any applicant who could raise the necessary fee was granted a retail liquor licence. Strong petit bourgeois representation on the early Licensing Boards ensured that there was a considerable degree of overlap between what was perceived as "business" and "public" interest. In July 1889, the Boards were taken to task by the local press for not balancing the number of retail outlets in Johannesburg against the "public interest":

"In one corner of this town, within two minutes of the Exchange, there are no less than from 10 to 12 licensed drinking shops. If the whole town is looked over it will be found that purely drinking dens are out of all proportion to the requirements of the people, and outside the town the conveniences for Kafirs in procuring drink are legion." (78)

Occasionally, it is true, objections were made to the granting of canteen licences. Although framed on the grounds of "health" or "social nuisance", the objections of complainants usually concealed the more real fear, which was a dread of declining property values in the vicinity of canteens. But even in such cases, if the applicant could get the support of a local notable such as Mr Jeppe, Sr, then there was a good chance of the objection being overruled by the Board. (79) Before 1896, one canteen-keeper could thus look towards a basically sympathetic Licensing Board, and up to that time the granting of retail licences on the Rand, at very least, kept abreast of the expanding population. The aspirant canteen-keeper of the period, however, did not have to rely solely on the power of the petit bourgeois in a growing mining town. He could also exploit the deep-seated ambivalence to be found in the attitude of the mining capitalists during this period.

Mine owners were aware that alcohol helped them secure and control black workers, and they were therefore most reluctant to support any attempt to close all canteens. In fact, the mining capitalists found that they had to act as a brake on "public opinion" that tended to demand total prohibition for Africans. At a large public meeting held in 1891 to discuss the liquor traffic, the mining capitalists and their spokesmen were conspicuously unsuccessful in persuading the audience that total prohibition for black workers was "premature". (80) Similarly, a Mining Commissioner could state in court in the same year, without fear of contradiction in capitalist
circles, that "nearly every one is agreed that total prohibition would be disastrous to the native labour position". (81) As late as 1895, the Annual Report of the Chamber of Mines made it clear that, while the capitalists wanted stricter control of the liquor traffic, they did not favour total prohibition. (82)

This apparently tolerant attitude of most mining capitalists towards the canteens did not stem from the casual thoughts of a laissez faire boardroom philosophy. Far from it - the mine owners took their cue from the hard school of practical experience in the lower echelons of the industry. (83) In particular, they were guided by their mine managers, the men who had the most immediate experience of the problem of obtaining and controlling African labour. It was the mine managers who were most aware that alcohol could "attract" labour to the miserable compounds and that it assisted in the proletarianization of the migrant labourer - all without direct cash cost to the company. In fact, a significant number of mine managers actually operated an industrial variant of the Cape "dop system" on the Transvaal mines in the early 1890s. When the use of alcohol in the control of black workers was debated in the Standard and Diggers' News in 1891, it was noted that:

"... familiarity with the glass has built moderation in the black man, while it is admitted that better work is got out of him when he sees the prospect of a cheering glass at the end of the day's labour. That is very generally admitted on these Fields also, where the permit system is largely taken advantage of by employers of coloured labour. At not a few works permits are regularly issued for supplies to the native hands, the reasonableness of the request for stimulating refreshment being amiably admitted on the grounds that the 'boy' so humoured and so refreshed is the better labourer." (84)

The mine managers' attitudes towards the canteens might have crystallized around the issue of labour control, but several of them also had a more personal interest in the success of the retail liquor trade. In 1889 it was reported that one could "see the names of managers of gold companies attached to the applications for canteen licences near the claims, and in recommendation thereof". (85) While the number of canteens close to the compounds was relatively small and the competition limited, the mine managers could expect fairly good returns from their shares in the liquor business. As the number of canteens grew, however, so competition increased, and the managers had to act more vigorously to ensure that "their" canteen still got its share of the trade. By 1895 some of their methods, and those of their compound managers, aroused the resentment of the WLVA. A deputation from the WLVA to the Chamber of Mines complained that "on some mines natives are ordered to go to a particular canteen in which some employee of the company has a pecuniary interest ...". (86) From this and other observations, it is clear that it cannot simply be assumed that there was invariably, and inevitably, conflict between the mine-manager and the local canteen-keeper.

If the attitude of the Licensing Boards and the actions of many in the mining industry gave the liquor retailer space within which to manoeuvre, then valuable additional elbow room was provided by the state. As long as Hatherley Distillery "provided a ready market for large quantities of the burghers' grain", many of the Afrikaner ruling class, and Kruger in particular, were hardly hostile to the canteen-keepers. (87) As the canteen-keepers saw it, Pretoria was sympathetic or, at worst, indifferent. The WLVA was no more reluctant than any other body to join the endless stream of petitioners to the Volksraad. In 1889, they were even confident enough to petition the government for changes in the "trapping" procedure used by the police. (88)

In the early 1890s it was not simply a question of the state being unwilling to act against the liquor retailers - often it was unable to do so. Johannesburg had
a population of about 25,000 people in June 1889. The entire population of this magisterial district, spread over a considerable area, was served by a police force of thirty-five men - of which only half were on duty at any one time. (89) Besides the small number of policemen, there were also problems with the liquor law. A decision handed down by the High Court made it extremely difficult to obtain a conviction against any canteen owner who sold liquor to black workers without permits. By 1891 the Court had held that only licensees could be prosecuted for this offence and, since most canteen-keepers had employees who undertook the actual serving of alcohol, convictions were relatively few and far between. (90) In the lower courts, at least one magistrate took the opportunity, while passing sentence, of severely criticizing the law which made it so difficult for the police to set up successful "traps". (91)

The canteen-keepers were not slow to exploit any of these weaknesses, or to open up others. They approached the badly paid policemen of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek - the Zarps - and succeeded in bribing a significant number of them. (92) The business insurance provided by bribery was supplemented by other practical safety precautions. Most canteen-keepers employed "a gang of spies to watch the approach of the police from every possible corner and frustrate their movements". (93) These "spies" and "sentries" were the early rudiments of a petit bourgeois business army that was to assume a more organized form, and adopt a more aggressive posture, during the class war of 1897-1899.

Because of the weakness of the state, the ambivalence of the mining capitalists, the studied indifference of the Afrikaner ruling class, and the sympathy of the petit bourgeois dominated Licensing Boards, the retail liquor trade boomed before 1896. The boom, however, was not without its costs. It killed hundreds of workers - black and white - who consumed the working class poison that passed commercially as liquor. (94) The Superintendent of the Johannesburg Cemetery was more than familiar with notices of interment that listed the cause of death as being "alcoholic poisoning". He was reported to have surveyed one such corpse and said: "Several of these every week - the cursed stuff burns their insides, and they never recover after a drinking bout." (95) This liquor also contributed to the many murders in the mining town, as well as the large scale "faction fights" that broke out amongst black workers of different ethnic origin. (96) It was also responsible for the enormous social problem of drunkenness, or, as the idiom of the day had it, it created "hordes of drunken Kaffirs". (97)

All of these costs, the human costs of the liquor industry, left the alliance of class interests in the ZAR relatively unmoved. There was, however, another cost which moved them more - the cost to capital. Thus, while no business or industrial leaders were willing to complain or protest at the number of working class deaths caused by alcohol, they were more than ready to abhor the cost that capital had to pay in terms of efficiency and lowered productivity. In the short term, the deaths of the workers did not matter to the capitalists: the dead miner of today was bound to be replaced by the German, Cornishman, Zulu or Shangaan of tomorrow. What did matter was that those who were alive should form the core of a productive and efficient labour force. Given the level of alcohol consumption, however, not even that could be achieved, and this unnecessarily increased the capitalists' wage bills. In 1895, the Chamber of Mines complained that:

"... drunkenness was on the increase at the mines, and that, in consequence, the scarcity of labour was intensified, as companies able to get them had to keep far more boys in their compounds than were required on any one day to make up for the number periodically disabled by drink." (98)

The percentage of the black labour force "disabled by drink" each day was officially estimated by the mine owners to be of the order of 15%, but others put it as high as 25%. (99) Either way, it obviously added significantly to the item that was already the single largest mining cost on the Rand - African wages.
By 1895-96 it was becoming clear to mine owners that a massive contradiction had found its way into the capitalist development of the Transvaal: namely, that any further expansion in the large and very profitable liquor industry would be at the expense of the very motor of capitalist development - the gold mines. This contradiction was not without irony, since individual mining capitalists themselves had helped create the Hatherley liquor machine which now jeopardized their long term profits. Two authors of the time put their finger on the irony and the contradiction when, in a neat and incisive passage, they noted of the Pretoria Distillery:

"This is the temple [Hatherley] where are distilled those nectars which goad the Kaffirs of the reef to deeds of derring-do, and it would certainly have paid the present concessionaires, who have large mining interests, far better never to have started it could they have secured instead a concession for 'total prohibition'." (100)

But, although the contradiction itself might have become most visible in 1895, there is no doubt that mining capital, as opposed to individual mining capitalists, had for some time taken cognizance of its long term profitability requirements. It was this second strand in the thinking of the mine owners, the recognition of the longer term need for a sober and efficient working class, that underpinned the "ambivalence" of mining capital noted earlier. Thus, from an early date the Chamber of Mines, while not in favour of "total prohibition", undertook a series of actions which attempted to ensure that the liquor consumption of their black workers was controlled. At the very time that Hatherley, individual mining capitalists, mine-managers and the canteen-keepers were allowing a contradiction to develop whereby the black man on the Rand was primarily a liquor consumer, capital, as embodied in the Chamber of Mines, was establishing those footholds from which it could ultimately destroy the developing contradiction, and ensure that the African was primarily a worker. It is to this latter set of actions that we now turn.

In order to secure the cheap and sober black work-force which alone could guarantee profits, the Chamber of Mines could, before 1896, choose to fight on any one of three fronts. First, it could go for a head-on confrontation with the producers of alcohol - particularly Hatherley, which was the major supplier. Secondly, it could put pressure on the state to administer the liquor laws more efficiently. Thirdly, it could conduct a campaign against the petit bourgeois which, to an increasing extent, was expanding its control of the canteen business. Of these three fronts, the first was by far the most difficult to fight on. The Afrikaner ruling class, and Kruger in particular, would be most unsympathetic to an attack on the liquor concession at Pretoria. Not only was Hatherley perhaps the most successful example of Kruger's strategy for industrialization, it also provided a large commercial outlet for his burghers' grain. To further complicate matters, Kruger personally did business with the distillery and was a close friend of Sammy Marks. In addition, the Chamber would be faced with the embarrassing fact that several prominent mining capitalists had financial interests in the distillery. Given these realities, it is less than surprising to find that the Chamber concentrated its fight on the second and third fronts.

The Chamber of Mines sought to undermine the canteen-keepers' position at the very source of petit bourgeois power - the Liquor Licensing Boards. Using "public opinion" that showed growing concern about the "hordes of drunken kaffirs", the Chamber attempted to apply the brake to the process of granting retail licences. By April 1890 the state was already on the defensive, and the government agreed that, in future, all licences granted by the Boards would have to be ratified in Pretoria. (101) The great public meeting in 1891 to discuss the liquor traffic saw further maneuvering by mining capitalists. The mine owners and their spokesmen got public support for a motion which demanded that no new liquor licences be granted in mining areas, and that existing licences should not be renewed. They then arranged for this, and other resolutions on the liquor question, to be taken to Pretoria by a deputation led by George Goch. (102)
Through exercising continual pressure for what it chose to term "local representation", the Chamber also succeeded in getting its President appointed to the Johannesburg Liquor Licensing Board in 1895. (103) Delighted with its success in Johannesburg, where it described the new system as "working well", the Chamber tried to expand its power base to include Krugersdorp and Boksburg. (104) The politicians of Pretoria, however, were wary of the expanding power of the mining capitalists, and the government resisted further Chamber of Mines pressure in this direction. By the mid-1890s, the Liquor Licensing Boards were becoming politicised, and they were simply one of the many forums in which mining capital was pitted against the Afrikaner ruling class. This emerged with even greater clarity in the wake of the Jameson Raid. In 1896, the government refused to allow the incoming President of the Chamber of Mines, J. Hay, to replace Lionel Phillips on the Johannesburg Liquor Licensing Board. Instead, the government allocated the seat to H. F. Pistorius, President of the Chamber of Commerce, and by so favouring the petit bourgeois underlined its continued suspicion of mining capital. In general, then, battle honours on this front were shared, since the government tended to play the petit bourgeoisie off against the advances of mining capital.

On the second front - the attempt to get greater efficiency and action by the state against illicit liquor sales - the Chamber of Mines enjoyed slightly greater success. Here, away from the politics of committees and on the open ground of "public opinion", the Chamber could harness more support. In particular, it made use of the ground swell of white annoyance at the amount of public violence and drunkenness amongst black workers. Chamber of Mines activists frequently raised these issues in the columns of the local press, and they were also active at public meetings. At the 1891 meeting they got support for motions which demanded that the government change the rules of evidence as they affected liquor cases, and that offenders be given prison sentences in addition to fines. (106)

This type of Johannesburg residents-cum-Chamber of Mines "public opinion" was not the stuff from which to carve spectacular victories. What was "public opinion" to the Chamber of Mines was not necessarily "public opinion" to the Volksraad. Nevertheless, the ideological offensive of the Chamber should not be underrated. Locally, the effect of "public opinion" could be seen - and nowhere more clearly than in the Court of Magistrate van den Berg. (107) Between September 1889 and June 1891, the average fine for selling liquor to a "native" without a permit increased by five times from £10 or 1 month, to £50 or 3 months. (108) Perhaps more important still was the long term effect of the Chamber's campaign. Their early offensive laid the foundations from which a strong attack could be launched on the canteen-keepers in 1897-99. Before 1895, however, the Chamber of Mines could not lay claim to a general success on this front, and the clearest indication of this was the continuing liquor boom.

From at least 1891 the Chamber of Mines also worried at the state on another front. It attempted to get the government to establish an efficient and corruption-free police force which could deal with the large amounts of gold amalgam that white workers stole, and the large amount of liquor that black workers consumed. On this issue, the tactic of the Chamber of Mines was to exploit the strains of disunity within the Afrikaner ruling class. In particular, the mine-owners attempted to make use of the growing Afrikaner "progressive" opposition to President Kruger.

In 1894 Kruger devised a scheme which he hoped would help him upstage his Afrikaner political rivals. Hoping to take some of the wind out of the "progressive" sails, he appointed a leading progressive, Ewald Esselen, as State Attorney. (109) The gamble which Kruger had taken in appointing this Scottish trained lawyer, who was broadly opposed to his policies, was quickly spotted by the Chamber of Mines. The Chamber noted, with some approval, Esselen's first act on taking office - the separation of the hitherto single post of State Attorney and Head of Police. The mine-owners had long suspected that previous police commandants were personally involved in the illicit liquor traffic, and Esselen's action gave them more room to manoeuvre. (110) With the state departments now more separated, the Chamber of Mines felt freer to approach the State Attorney about the problem of the police. The mine-owners suggested to Esselen that a special force of detectives be established to deal
exclusively with the problems of gold theft and illicit liquor sales. To overcome the old syndrome of low salaries and police corruption, it was proposed that the "specials" be jointly paid for by the state and the Chamber of Mines. Esselen agreed to these proposals and, in order to implement the scheme, he recruited Andrew Trimble, from the Cape Colonial service, as Head Detective.

At this stage the Chamber of Mines had every reason to be optimistic about developments on this front. They had, however, chosen to make an advance into one of the most sensitive areas - intra-ruling class politics. No sooner had Trimble set about his business than opposing groups started agitating for his removal. The canteen-keepers, fearful for their trade in what seemed like a new regime, lobbied against confirmation of his appointment. More importantly, Kruger and his supporters were rapidly becoming disenchanted with the policy of toemadering towards the "progressives". When Trimble's appointment came up for ratification before the Volksraad and Esselen chose to make it an issue of confidence, Kruger saw his opportunity for getting rid of both men. The appointment was not confirmed, Esselen resigned, and Kruger appointed one of "his" Hollanders, Dr Coster, as State Attorney. Coster's first action was to reappoint Commandant Schutte as the head of the police force - the very man that Esselen had sacked.

By late 1895 the Chamber of Mines was faced with this bitter disappointment, as well as the fact that it had, at best, achieved only limited success on its other fronts of operation. The retail liquor trade boomed and 1895 saw an all time high in Transvaal alcohol consumption - the contradiction within capitalist development was at its most acute. Confronted with what it could only consider as a series of unsavoury realities, the Chamber realized that the time was ripe for a more radical approach to the liquor problem. On the 6th July, 1896, the Chamber of Mines called a special meeting to consider the "liquor question", and from it emerged a new stance. The mine-owners jettisoned their old demands for stricter and more efficient control of a system which allowed black workers access to alcohol through employer-issued permits. The capitalists were now willing to abandon any benefits which they might have reaped from the operation of their own industrial style "dop system". Instead, the meeting directed the Volksraad's attention to "the immediate necessity for legislation by which the sale of intoxicating liquors to natives in the mining districts and surrounding fields shall be totally prohibited". In calling for "total prohibition", the Chamber of Mines had finally reached the point at which Johannesburg "public opinion" had arrived at least five years earlier. Slowly, reluctantly, and only after numerous other courses had been tried, was the Chamber of Mines willing to abandon a position which allowed it to exploit alcohol as a means of social and economic control over black workers.

Having achieved ideological fusion with "public opinion" in pursuit of "total prohibition", the Chamber of Mines was in a stronger position to challenge the Kruger government. It again sought out and struck the discordant note within the Afrikaner ruling class - the "progressives". This time it used the local Volksraad member, Geldenhuys, to lobby for a "total prohibition" law. Geldenhuys in turn joined forces with at least two other well known "progressives" - H. P. Steenkamp and J. G. Kotze. These three, together with other Raad members, ensured that when Act 17 of 1896 was passed it contained a "total prohibition" clause. This time, for a variety of reasons, the divisions within Afrikaner politics had been capable of rapid exploitation and had yielded a handsome dividend. Hereafter, the Chamber of Mines clung tenaciously to the "total prohibition" clause under all circumstances.

In general, the Chamber of Mines could look back on the years before 1896 as something of a failure, since their black workers had primarily been treated as consumers for the benefit of the liquor industry and its allies. Equally, however, the Chamber could look forward to the 1st January 1897, when the "total prohibition" clause would become effective. As the last weeks of 1896 slipped by, the mine-owners had reason to believe that they were on the verge of a golden age in which they would have sober, efficient and cheap labour.
In order to appreciate fully and understand the problems of liquor producers in this second period, the years between 1897 and 1899, it is necessary to restate and summarize what had occurred in the months immediately before.

As viewed from Sammy Marks's position in the Hatherley boardroom, 1896, and especially 1897, were not good years for business. Ever since the opening of the Lourenço Marques railway line in 1895, increasing quantities of Delagoa Bay rum and German potato spirits had found their way to the Witwatersrand. The Pretoria Distillery's grain spirit simply could not hold its share of the market against the cheaper imported liquor. In 1896, for the first time in its history, Hatherley found itself with falling sales, and between 1895 and 1896 net profits fell from £98,274 to £69,569. What made matters worse was the fact that the principal producers and wholesalers in Mozambique had become increasingly well organized. In order to protect their own profit margins, the firms in Portuguese East Africa had got together to form an "Alcohol Trust" in 1896. Members of the Trust agreed "to sell only an equal number of gallons each, in proportion to the demand", and, more importantly, "to a uniform price". (116) In effect, two giant competitors were challenging each other for the Transvaal market - a situation far away from the cosy concession that Marks and his partners had bought nearly a decade earlier. Then, as if this picture of business-woes were somehow insufficient, came the growing talk of "total prohibition". No sooner had the rumours of "total prohibition" been circulated than the 1896 liquor act had been passed. When "total prohibition" came into force on the 1st January 1897, Hatherley Distillery was required to make the traumatic transition from being a squeezed competitor to being a producer almost without a market at all. Overwhelmingly dependent on its liquor sales to black workers, Hatherley was totally unprepared for such a dramatic setback. The lowered profit margin of 1896 looked handsome beside the net loss of £46,988 sustained in 1897.

In attempting to overcome this increasingly depressing situation, Marks and his directors could have adopted any one of three basic strategies. First, they could have fought a defensive battle in order to regain what had been theirs in the past - monopoly production for a black retail market unhampered by cheaper imports. In practice, this would have involved getting "total prohibition" lifted, and at the same time stopping the Delagoa Bay trade in spirits. As a supplement to this strategy, the Distillery would continue, to the best of its ability, to supply the illicit liquor dealers who managed to operate despite the nominal "total prohibition". Secondly, by adopting innovative and creative marketing strategies, they could try to redefine what exactly they considered to be "their" market. Here the most logical move would be to try to switch to the European retail liquor trade and hope that this would compensate for the "lost" African market. Thirdly, and most aggressively, Hatherley itself could attempt to get into the rum and potato spirits business - a move that would protect the Distillery from price undercutting, should the African market be resuscitated to its full former strength. In practice, this would mean using "multi-national", and somehow reaching agreement with the powerful "Alcohol Trust" in Mozambique. Given the magnitude of the problems facing Hatherley, the directors could not afford to dismiss any of these possibilities. Making full use of the business brains on his board, as well as their wide range of contacts, Marks chose to work on all of these possibilities.

Four months before "total prohibition" was due to be enforced, the managing director opened his campaign to defend the Pretoria Distillery. He wrote to the government on the 7th August 1896, protesting about the new liquor law and pointing out that it severely damaged the concession which he and his partners had been granted. (117) Six weeks after "total prohibition" came into effect, on the 19th February 1897, Marks again wrote to the government in similar vein. (118) Neither of these initiatives brought any response from an unsympathetic administration, and Marks realised that he would have to approach them yet again. On the 30th April 1897, he wrote the strongest letter yet, containing a final plea, and making new proposals.
The managing director on this occasion first chose to remind the Volksraad of the capital invested in the Distillery, and of the fact that the glass factory had been erected almost solely at their insistence. Marks followed up this rather stinging reminder with yet another telling point. He pointed out to the Raad that the poisonous duty-free spirit that came into the Transvaal made a mockery of their concession to him, and that it hardly qualified as the "produce of Portugal". Having established his case, Marks then proceeded to put forward his proposals. He suggested that the state should undertake more rigorous quality-control measures against the liquor sold on the Rand — a blow aimed at cheap potato spirits. Marks followed this up with a request to be allowed to import duty-free certain blending materials and essences that he required for his business. Finally, he asked that the Distillery be compensated for the losses that it had been forced to sustain as a result of government measures. Virtually all of this April appeal was also ignored by the state.

The absence of a positive government response might have disappointed Marks, but it could hardly have surprised him. After all, it was only a matter of months since the Volksraad had voted for the "progressive" measures contained in the liquor bill. Marks, as well as any man in the Transvaal, knew that Kruger was personally sympathetic to the canteen-keepers and Hatherley, but that he could not muster sufficient support to reverse the clauses contained in the liquor act. If Marks was to get the Volksraad to act, then he had somehow to increase the political leverage of the State President and his supporters. In order to do this, Marks and his Hatherley men set to work on "public opinion". The Distillery books subsequently showed that, during 1897, sums from £20 to £40 were paid to unnamed persons who would organize petitions calling for an end to "total prohibition". In order to avoid raising the suspicions of the most hostile Volksraad members, the petitions were worded so as to make no specific reference to "Hatherley Distillery". Although the fate of these petitions is unknown, it seems probable that they entered the political currency of the time, and that they played their small part in the liquor commissions of 1898 and 1899.

At the same time as he was writing to the government and organizing a petition programme, Marks was also making important changes within the Distillery itself. In particular, he ensured that there was a shift in production emphasis, away from cheap spirits to the manufacture of quality liquor more suitable for European customers. This move neatly supplemented his request to the government for tighter quality control of spirits sold on the Witwatersrand, and he underlined his seriousness in this respect by arranging for the recruitment of top class distillers in Europe. By early 1897 these new distillers — R. van Eibergen Santhagens from the Netherlands, Le Farge from France, and H. Coffey from Scotland — were at work at Hatherley.

Neither of the two broad courses outlined above, however, were in themselves sufficient to place Hatherley on a sound economic foundation. Individually, these strategies were inconclusive, and collectively they had the disadvantage of being time consuming. By mid-1897, it was abundantly clear to Marks and his colleagues that their long term security lay in making a quick and definitive entry into the Delagoa Bay trade, which was continuing to be the major supplier of the now illicit liquor trade in the Transvaal.

Marks's first move was to contact the two Lourenço Marques wholesalers at the very centre of the "Alcohol Trust" — Hutt & Auerbach, and Joost & Gubler. It is probable that the former acted as the wholesale outlet for the Société Française de Distillerie, since the latter certainly acted in that capacity for the Mopea Distillery of the Companhia do Assucar. Through these firms and another intermediary, Baron d’Inhaca, Marks tried to establish exactly how much capital Hatherley would require to get control of the largest liquor producer in Mozambique. By early December 1897, the board of Hatherley Distillery knew that they required at least £50,000 if they were to get a controlling interest in the French company’s distilleries at Lourenço Marques and Ressano Garcia.
The Hatherley directors knew that they had to raise this money if they were not going to be continually vulnerable on their Mozambique flank. Knowing how much to raise, however, was not the same as knowing how to raise it, and it was to this problem that the directors now addressed themselves. In looking for a solution to this problem, Marks and his colleagues would have known that the Paris Bourse was likely to be interested in the prospect of a large company, especially one with a good record like Hatherley, taking over the French company. If they did not know it themselves, then Henri Duval of the Banque de l'Afrique du Sud in Johannesburg would certainly have told them. The directors therefore decided to raise capital through a new share issue. It seems likely that many of the 75,000 £1 shares made available to the public were placed in Paris. At the same time the Pretoria company decided to establish a permanent "Paris Committee" of four members - a structure that already had precedent in the form of a similar "London Committee". (127) By the end of 1897, Sammy Marks was the chairman of a company with listings in Paris and London, and with an issued share capital of close on half a million pounds. (128)

From this stronger base, negotiations for the acquisition of the French company could continue. On the 12th January 1898, the chairman of the French company, Villers, and the secretary of his Ressano Garcia Distillery, Paul Auerbach, were both present at a meeting of the Hatherley board. By this time, the French company's asking price had risen by £10,000 and the deal was finally concluded at £60,000. (129) By the 31st January 1898, Hatherley Distillery was in formal control of the Harmonia Distillery in Lourenço Marques, and the newer distillery at Ressano Garcia. (130)

Ever since 1895, Hatherley had been forced to drop its prices in an attempt to compete with the cheaper imported spirits. (131) Having bought control in the largest company in Mozambique, Marks now had access to the "Alcohol Trust" and he could set to work on the price problem with the interests of the parent company in mind. By March 1898, the "Alcohol Trust" had reached a new price and marketing arrangement that met with Hatherley approval. The new terms effectively limited the competitive power of all the Lourenço Marques distilleries bar one, and that of the Mopea Distillery to the far north. With virtually all the distilleries that catered for the Witwatersrand market in line, the "Alcohol Trust" was ready for a move into Johannesburg. By mid-1898, the "Trust" had established a large depot in Kruis Street, where its wholesale activities were managed by J. F. De Villiers. (132)

All this success in Mozambique still did not satisfy the Hatherley board, who had been stung out of any possible complacency by their loss of £46,000 in 1897. In particular, they remained worried by the threat posed by one of the smaller factories in Lourenço Marques - Dyball's Distillery. It was for this remaining competitor that had not become a member of the "Trust" that Sammy Marks developed a special costless strategy. Marks instructed the firm of Hutt & Auerbach to take out an option to buy Dyball's on behalf of Hatherley Distillery. In practice, however, Marks and his colleagues did not have the slightest intention of buying the distillery. Instead, they merely made use of the option to suspend spirit production at Dyball's, and to prolong the 'negotiations' for as long as possible. This strategy, and its objectives, were made clear to Hutt & Auerbach in a letter from the secretary at Hatherley, J. P. H. Faure, on the 2nd April 1898. (133) Although it cannot be conclusively proved, it seems possible that Marks's scheme eventually worked. Dyball's, on the strength of the option certainly suspended spirit production until at least June 1898, a sacrifice of at least 3 months' output. (134) By 1899, there was no evidence of a "Dyball's Distillery" being in active production in Lourenço Marques. (135)

Capital, business acumen and ruthless determination all contributed to the relative ease with which the Pretoria financial generals had captured Mozambique. Their task, however, had also been made easier by the comparative indifference of the Portuguese capitalists - a surprising development, given the latter's interest in spirit production during the early 1890s.

The recent indifference of the Portuguese capitalists dated back to 1896. During that year not only had the "total prohibition" clause been passed in the Transvaal, but the Cape farmers had experienced a particularly bad wine harvest.
Prominent Portuguese capitalists, and the Lisbon administration, decided that this was an opportune moment to break into the wine market of southern and central Africa. A senior civil servant was sent to tour throughout the region and report on the business prospects. In the wake of his report a large wine depot was opened in Lourenço Marques, and a wholesale business under F. S. Belford was established in Pretoria. Belford not only sold wine reasonably successfully from this base; he also tried to get a "wine concession" from the Transvaal government. (136) To put it at its crudest: Pretoria's capital had succeeded in getting into Mozambique because Portuguese capital was intent on establishing itself in Pretoria. On the one hand, new industrial capital wished to monopolise spirit production for the African market, while, on the other, older mercantile capital hoped to dominate the European wine market offered by settler societies. Whatever the cause of these developments, they suited Hatherley in the short run and, in 1898, the Pretoria Distillery made a profit. Within twelve months Sammy Marks had steered his enterprise from a £46,000 loss to a £10,000 profit.

The battle waged for the ownership of the means of production in Mozambique between 1897 and 1898 revealed several things. For one, it showed the capacity of South African based capital to move into profitable sectors of economies in adjacent countries before the South African War. More fundamentally, it demonstrated that larger capital had to consume smaller capital when the former was faced with a declining rate of profit. Most importantly for present purposes, however, it showed that the capitalists knew that they still had access to a market for their product — why else fight for spirit production in a period of so-called "total prohibition"? The fact that the market continued to be accessible after 1897 was not primarily due to the efforts of the capitalists themselves. For that vital pre-requisite, the owners of the distilleries, the capitalists, had to thank another class — the petit bourgeoisie who owned the canteens.

When "total prohibition" came into effect on the 1st January 1897, at least half of the canteens in the mining areas of the Transvaal closed down. (137) The new law and the stiffer penalties which it provided for simply frightened the more timid half of this sector of the petit bourgeoisie out of business. Many of the other canteen-keepers, however, took heart — what other Rand businessmen could point to a market in which competition had been reduced by 50% at a stroke? Moreover, canteen closures had the effect of reducing supply while demand, at very least, remained constant. In practice this pushed up prices, and profit margins, in the retail liquor trade. In 1898, a bottle of Delagoa Bay spirits cost 6d to produce, the Transvaal importer sold it for 2s 6d per bottle, and the illicit liquor dealer sold it to the African consumers at 5s or 6s per bottle. (138) Higher profit margins, in part a by-product of prohibition itself, ensured that the illicit liquor market on the Witwatersrand persisted.

Some of these liquor sales took place from "kaffir eating houses" and stores in the vicinity of the mines. Frequently the quantities sold here were relatively small, and the trade was organized on a somewhat spasmodic basis. In many cases, an essentially law-abiding storekeeper bolstered his sales through occasional trading in a commodity that yielded a handsome profit. In yet other cases, canteen-keepers would cater essentially for the European trade and occasionally sell the odd bottle of spirits to Africans at the back door. These types of outlets, however, were largely insignificant and they simply constituted the tip of the illicit iceberg. More substantial by far were the large, well organized syndicates that moved into a trade which yielded profits of between 100% and 150%. It was these syndicates, dominated by east European Jews, that constituted the very core of the illicit liquor trade. As early as March 1897, these German, Polish, and Russian Jews ran an illicit trade which the Chamber of Mines described as "rampant". (139) With the passage of time they became even more entrenched, and it was they who formed the nucleus of a petit bourgeoisie army that defied the state and the mine-owners between 1897 and 1899.

It was no accident that east European immigrants came to occupy a dominant position in the liquor trade of the Transvaal in the 1890s. Many of them were drawn from countries in which spirit production occupied a central role in the economy. Indeed, throughout the 18th and the early 19th centuries, alcohol manufacturing had
played a crucial part in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe. In Rumania in the 18th century, for example, the Porte had prohibited the export of corn from any of the provinces. Faced with grain surpluses, the Rumanian landlords took to distilling spirits with which they then paid their labourers. The remainder of the spirits they obliged villagers to buy at the public houses which they opened on their estates. (140) In Russia, liquor leases were widely sold between 1712 and 1863. These leases proved to be "a significant means of primary accumulation of capital", and "were the origin of the later fortunes of the large industrial bourgeois families of the Yakolevs, Zlobins, Saposnikovs, and Kokorevs". (141) The Russian nobility were also not above the liquor trade, and the princes Dolgoruki, Gagarin, Kurakin and Potemkin all earned a sizable part of their income from this source. At very least, east European immigrants to the Transvaal would have been vaguely aware of the fact that alcohol had a part to play in the emergence of capitalist systems.

The 19th century Jewish immigrants to South Africa, however, had no real need for the hazy models of economic history. Many of them had personal experience of the liquor trade, not as members of "large industrial bourgeois families", but as petit bourgeois publicans in Europe. In Russia and the Ukraine, for example, most of the canteens in the rural areas during the mid-19th century were owned by Jewish businessmen. The "korchma", or tavern, figured as a prominent institution in peasant life, and many Ukrainian folk songs of the time bemoaned the peasant's indebtedness to the local Jew. (142) This, amongst many other reasons, made Jewish tavern-keepers prominent targets for local hatred and resentment, and they suffered accordingly during the disturbances and pogroms of the 19th century. Amongst the many Jewish refugees who made their way to the Transvaal, and elsewhere, there must have been more than a scattering of korchma-keepers.

Given this broader context, we can bring at least one new, albeit highly speculative, dimension to our understanding of events in the Transvaal. Now it is perhaps easier to see why the Hungarian, Nellmapius, would have been so quick to appreciate the value of a liquor concession. Similarly, we can appreciate why three Russian Jews - Isaac Lewis, Barnet Lewis and Sammy Marks - were willing to go into partnership with Nellmapius when the opportunity arose. These men, amongst the first European immigrants, came to a Transvaal that was, if not "feudal", then at least pre-capitalist. As entrepreneurs present from the very outset of industrial development in the area, they rapidly established themselves as respected members of the emerging capitalist class. Nellmapius was one of the most prominent and powerful businessmen of his day. Like several of his Russian predecessors, Sammy Marks accumulated a considerable amount of his capital from the liquor business, and he certainly came to head an "industrial bourgeois family".

This small, and occasionally highly successful, first wave of Jewish immigrants to the Transvaal was followed by a second wave of Europeans when gold was discovered in the mid-1880s. The men of this latter period saw their opportunities in the mushrooming towns of the Witwatersrand. Without the means, or the personal access to the Afrikaner ruling class that would enable them to become capitalists, these men sought to accumulate their initial capital as a petit bourgeoisie. In particular, many of them opened canteens, and as korchma-keepers in the pre-prohibition era, they sold spirits to the black peasants who had come to the mines for a spell of wage labour. These men were willing to go into partnership with the WLVA, the chairman of the Witwatersrand Licensed Victuallers' Association, might not have been "respected" in the same way that liquor capitalists like Sammy Marks were "respected", but they were certainly a force to be reckoned with by the state and the mine-owners.

The third wave of Jewish immigrants that entered the ZAR in the mid-1890s, however, was less fortunate than their countrymen who had arrived in earlier migrations. For these prosperous East Europeans, not even the petit bourgeois path to capital accumulation remained open. By 1895 even the Chamber of Mines and the WLVA, for very different reasons, had agreed that no more canteen licences should be issued. (143) This tightening up was followed within months by the liquor act of 1896 which brought with it the blow of "total prohibition". Poor, and with every prospect of remaining penniless, many of these unfortunate immigrants were pushed into the life of the lumpen proletariat. As perhaps the most visible, dispossessed and unsuccessful group
of whites on the Witwatersrand, they were the unhappy recipients of the most vicious
class and race prejudice that society could muster:

"The stranger in Johannesburg cannot but ponder on
the spectacle of a Kafir respectably arrayed in good
European clothing walking in the middle of the street,
with a brass ticket strapped on his arm, while on the
neighbouring footway may be seen, and even smelt,
some representative of European civilization, perhaps
a "Peruvian" from Poland or Russia, who has apparently
not found it convenient to change his clothing or
indulge in unnecessary ablutions since his entry into
the country." (144)

For most of these "very low class of Russian and Polish Jews, "Peruvians"", life in
Johannesburg might have been totally miserable, but it certainly was not lonely. (145)
In 1899, it was estimated that there were over 7,000 "Russian Jews" on the
Witwatersrand. (146)

After 1897, there developed amongst these different classes of Jewish
immigrants various more or less explicit marriages of economic convenience which
ultimately depended on the liquor trade with black workers. The capitalist liquor
producers, Sammy Marks and the Lewis brothers, remained in business largely because
of the activities of the petit bourgeoisie canteen-keepers. The converse was, of
course, equally true. In practice, the producers and the retailers never met face to
face, since both operated through another group, the merchant capitalists who acted
as wholesalers. These were firms such as the "Continental Wine & Spirit Association",
managed by Joseph Mandelsohn, brother to the editor of the Standard and Diggers'
News. (147) The most explicit marriage of economic convenience, however, took place
between the petit bourgeoisie and the "Peruvians" of the lumpen proletariat. Members
of the former group had no wish to jeopardise their liquor licences through being
cought personally selling alcohol to Africans, whilst members of the latter were so
poor that any opportunity to earn money came as an offer which they could not refuse.
The canteen-keepers therefore

"... engaged newly arrived young Russian Jews, at what
might appear to them princely remuneration, agreeing,
in the event of the latter being trapped and
prosecuted, to pay the fines, or, if they were sent
to prison, to pay them a lump sum on release as
compensation." (148)

It was this latter arrangement, the "Peruvian Connection", that came to form the base
line of a hierarchical pyramid of business exploitation.

The exact mode of organisation and the size of the illicit liquor syndicates
varied considerably. A small minority of the businesses were entirely dependent on
the driving force, skill, and organisational ability of one man. H. Max, for example,
kept on the move continually and never sold liquor from the same spot for more than a
day or two. (149) In some cases, this type of "mobile canteen" on a wagon had to be
drawn by as many as ten oxen. (150) Other canteen-keepers, like Tiversky of the "Old
Grahamstown Bar", or H. Joffe of the "Old Kentish Tavern", operated from a single
business base. (151) At most, such men would employ three or four "Peruvian"
assistants.

The majority of medium-to-large businesses, however, were syndicates in the
more real sense that they were a partnership in which two, three, or four "big men"
were involved. The partnership of Judelsohn, Nathan and Cohen, for example, owned the
California Hotel, the "Station Bar", and the "Fernreira's Gate Bar". (152) Similarly,
the partnership of Friedman, Pastolsky and Katzen owned the "Old Park", "Jumpers" and
"Wolhuter" bars. (153) Syndicates of this size had several "Peruvians" and dozens of
other employees on their pay-roll.
The largest of this type of syndicate in the late 1890s was that of Finestone, Lediker, Sacke and Schlossberg. By April 1899, they were reported as having no less than ten illicit liquor outlets on the Rand, with a collective monthly turnover of about £46,000. (154) Out of this, the syndicate had to pay a monthly bill for police bribes of £2,000, and this left the partners with a monthly profit in the vicinity of £8,000. (155) This syndicate, or the one that was reputed to have made £18,000 during three months' trading in 1898, would probably have employed at least a score of "Peruvians" as their front-men. (156) Although its size was obviously important, the Finestone syndicate also had other features which made it important in the financial life of Johannesburg. Like many other criminal organizations in capitalist systems, the syndicate controlled a financial empire which spanned both legal and illegal business activities. Finestone was "a prominent member of the Stock Exchange", and, together with his other partners, held a share in five hotels which were described as "some of the most adequately and expensively equipped establishments on the whole line of the Reef". (157)

The largest and best organized syndicates of all, however, revealed some of the classic hallmarks of organized crime. In the finest tradition of the underground, the most powerful syndicates were "family businesses" which dominated particular territories. Anybody who wished to open an illicit liquor canteen in the Boksburg-Benoni district, for example, would have had to come to grips with one such powerful family syndicate. But, as was explained in 1899:

"The rules are somewhat onerous. Firstly, the consent of the syndicate has to be obtained, without which the new business would not flourish for a week. Then the new-comer has to purchase his liquor at a certain wholesale store in Johannesburg [probably Friedman's]. Finally, the syndicate takes a large share of the profits. So that to start a Liquor syndicate is sowing seed on the hard and unfertile rock of the Syndicate Monopoly." (158)

Just as the Nathanson family ruled this district of Boksburg-Benoni, so the Joffes ruled Krugersdorp and Randfontein, while the mighty Friedmans controlled Johannesburg. (159)

At the head of a family syndicate stood the Liquor "King", and if, like Sam Nathanson, he had sons, then he would be assisted by the "Princes". Immediately below this "royal family", and within the syndicate organization proper, there followed a hierarchy of "Peruvians" who constituted the Kings' "loyal men". It was this business army of "Peruvians" who organised most of the day-to-day activities in the drinking dens - men such as Sol Pastolsky who was described as "General Commanding Officer", of the area around the New Heriot mine. (160) Similarly, the "Peruvian" in control at the Nourse Deep mine was known as Commandant Schutte, a humorous title which his namesake at the head of the Zarps might have found less amusing. (161)

Outside this immediate corps of loyal "Peruvian" assistants, the King could also rely on the vast number of state officials whom he had bribed. The task of these bribed officials was twofold. Firstly, they had to ensure that no state action was taken against the King's syndicate. Secondly, they had to harass the business operations of unwelcome competitors or enemies who had muscled their way into the King's territory. (162) The degree of control which the King had over the state officials within his territory was a matter of considerable pride and prestige, since it reflected the real extent of his power. In Johannesburg, King Friedman publicly claimed that he was the "real boss" of the police "Liquor Department", while King Nathanson "repeatedly declared that he was the Landdrost of the detectives of Boksburg". (163) Apparently Nathanson's boast was not completely idle, since the State Attorney had his doubts about what was happening in the district, and the local press felt confident enough to report that:

"You need no concealment in the Boksburg district; the place is a patch of the blackest villainy in the Republic. There is not one single official connected
with the supervision, licensing, and control of liquor selling, from the highest magistrate to the lowest constable, who does not deserve to be cashiered ..." (164)

The Liquor Kings of the late 1890s used their armies constantly, both to expand and defend their empires. Like Sammy Marks, they worked on "public opinion", paying "Peruvians" and other poor whites to put their signatures to petitions calling for an end to "total prohibition". Their political activities caused them to move constantly between their districts and Pretoria, and, in 1898, State Attorney Smuts described them as "becoming a power at all elections". (165) More important, and equally sinister, was the impressive way in which they could wield power when things went "wrong" for the syndicate. Any "Peruvian" finally trapped by the police and brought to court was likely to benefit from the strange developments that frequently took place. On at least one occasion a bottle of gin that was used in evidence, as if "by some miracle ... turned to water when brought to Court". (166) If the material exhibits in the case did not change, then the "Peruvian" could always look forward to one of the unscheduled disappearances of African witnesses for the prosecution. By late 1899, the police had to protect their "trap boys" from pre-trial syndicate approaches, by imprisoning them until the case was heard. (167) Of course, not all witnesses could, or would, come to agreement with the syndicates. In such cases the witnesses stood the risk of less profitable, and more permanent, "disappearance". On several occasions the syndicates were suspected of organized killings on the Witwatersrand. (168)

There were also, however, limits to syndicate power, and perhaps these constraints were most clearly revealed in the way that the drinking dens were organized. The King would always make certain that he took out wholesale liquor licences only for those stands from which the syndicate could be guaranteed to have access to adjacent properties. He would also take the precaution of warning his assistants that only legal sales should take place from the licensed property. Failure to do this would have placed the licence itself in jeopardy and, in the event of a successful prosecution, ultimately have killed the goose that laid the golden egg.

Once the above concession to the law had been made, the King could set about organizing the rest of his defensive strategy on the stand adjacent to the licensed property. First, the "adjacent stand" - be it house or vacant property - would be linked to the licensed property by means of an underground tunnel. Thereafter, the entrances to these tunnels would be hidden with the aid of elaborate false partitions and trapdoors. Carpenters and electricians would then be called in to arrange for the final protection of the unlicensed property. On vacant stands, high fences would be erected along the perimeter of the property, with strategic "look-out" posts at each of the corners. From these posts "Peruvian sentries" would keep constant watch for the approach of the police. These dens, with an irony that the mine-owners would never have appreciated, were often called "compounds". (169) Many of the "compounds" and houses were also protected through the installation of a system of electric bells on the unlicensed property. This technologically sophisticated system, pioneered by one "Fred Poplar" Cohen and widely used during prohibition, gave swift warning of the approach of any unsympathetic Zarps. (170) In several instances, final precautions were made at the actual point of sale itself. "Peruvian" Silverman, for example, seated himself inside a specially constructed wooden compartment into which had been cut peep-holes and the smallest of serving hatches. This arrangement enabled him to see the customer, receive the cash, and dispense a bottle of spirits while remaining hidden. (171) With these elaborate precautions, it is hardly surprising that many of the illicit liquor dens were called "forts", and that they had to be "rushed" by the police. (172) In a very literal sense, it was the army of the petit bourgeoisie that held the state and mine owners at bay between 1897 and 1899.

This rapid entrenchment of the liquor syndicates after 1897 had not escaped the attention of the state, and the Volksraad realized to its embarrassment that "total prohibition" was "total" in name only. Even if the state had wanted to turn a blind eye to the massive illicit liquor trade, it would not have been allowed to do so. Sammy Marks constantly reminded members of the Raad about their obligations as
outlined in his concession, while the retailers exercised their own particular brands of persuasion and coercion. The mine-owners, for their part, made their bitter complaints well known in evidence to the Industrial Commission of Inquiry in 1897. By the end of that year, these insistent pressures could no longer be ignored, and the administration felt compelled to act. Early in 1898, the State President appointed the Acting State Attorney, Schagen van Leeuwen, and the Inspector General of Customs to a special liquor commission. The appointment of this commission must have removed some of the immediate pressure on the hard pressed administration.

The Volksraad, however, was not the State President, and members of the Raad certainly did not feel or respond to exactly the same pressure that Kruger felt. The appointment of the liquor commission, therefore, offered different opportunities to these two branches of the government. As far as the Raad was concerned, the task of the commission was clear—it had to find ways of defeating the illicit liquor syndicates, and suggest ways of enforcing the liquor act of 1896. For Kruger, personally sympathetic to the liquor industry, the commission offered an opportunity to renew his battle with a Volksraad that basically favoured "total prohibition". If the liquor commission produced suitable findings, then the State President would have valuable ammunition in his fight against the "progressives", and a chance to protect the fortunes of his "Eerste Fabriek". With a two-man commission, one of whom was a loyal Hollander, Kruger had every reason to be confident about the findings of the commission.

By mid-March 1898, the confidential report of the commission had been completed. Basically, its findings represented a compromise between the views of the Volksraad and those of the State President. As the report put it, "The commission is of the opinion that a moderate use of drink by the natives, under control of or on behalf of the Government and the mine managers, must in every way effect an improvement". In order to achieve this "moderate use", the commission proposed the adoption of a modified Gothenburg system—a type of state monopoly that seemed to work most successfully in Sweden. It suggested that liquor should be sold to "natives" in the Transvaal, but that:

"This should not take place by means of money, but by cards, or tickets, which would have been purchased by the companies from the Government, and which after being stamped with the authority of the mine managers, would again be sold to the coloured people; the latter could then, as it were, themselves exercise control over the use of drink by natives." (176)

This scheme was to be supplemented with increased quality controls, better law enforcement, and a chain of state canteens which would be the sole retail liquor outlets on the Witwatersrand. The commissioners must have hoped that this degree of "control" would satisfy the mine owners, that the "progressives" would be pacified by the proposed onslaught on "abuses", and that Kruger and Marks would feel content about the prospects for Hatherley Distillery. On paper at least, the perfect compromise had been reached, and the contradiction which so plagued the development of capitalism in the Transvaal would be shortly resolved.

On the 31st March 1898, the Rand mine-owners were startled to read in the Johannesburg Times "that the establishment of a State monopoly in liquor was under consideration". After this press leak, the state felt obliged to let the mine owners know the hitherto confidential findings of the liquor commission, and on the 14th April Dr van Leeuwen detailed the government's proposals in a letter to the Chamber of Mines.

The mine-owners were most unsatisfied with these proposals. In particular, the Chamber of Mines held two strong objections. Firstly, it felt that there was insufficient "local control" in the scheme—in short, the mine-owners would not have enough power to determine how many canteens there were to be, or where they were to be sited. Secondly, and more importantly, it doubted the capacity of the state to administer the scheme successfully. The bribery and corruption of the police force
were already clearly evident. What would happen when the officials of the ZAR were put in charge of canteens? In fact, the mine owners were so frightened by the prospect of a system developing in which uncontrolled legal sales of alcohol to black workers would take place that they were willing to settle for the unsatisfactory status quo. On the 20th April 1898, the Chamber thus wrote back to the State Attorney reiterating its support for "total prohibition" and calling for the effective enforcement of Act 17 of 1896. (179)

The Chamber of Mines followed this letter with a petition addressed to the Volksraad along the same lines. (180) This was a move calculated to exploit the divisions within the Afrikaner ruling class on the liquor question. The Chamber's uncompromising opposition to the principal recommendations of the liquor commission, as well as the mine-owners' direct appeal to a Volksraad so recently committed to "total prohibition", drastically reduced the State President's room to manoeuvre. When the amended liquor law was debated in the Volksraad later in 1898, the "total prohibition" clause was retained by 18 votes to 8. (181) The recommendations of the liquor commission were never implemented.

These events, however, warned the mine-owners, if they needed reminding, that the State President and his closest allies were deeply committed to Eerste Fabrieken and the liquor trade. The Chamber could therefore expect another move in the same direction, in the not too distant future. The mine-owners were also distressed by these developments because they did not offer them any immediate relief from the activities of the illicit liquor syndicates. Black miners would continue to be good alcohol consumers and bad workers. Faced with this dismal prospect, the mining capitalists decided on a radical initiative which would, if successful, shape the future in their favour.

Early in May 1898, the Chamber of Mines approached van Leeuwen and asked the government whether it had any objection to the mine-owners coming to a direct settlement with Eerste Fabrieken. Such a settlement, it was suggested, would meet the interests of the mine-owners, the government and the distillery. The State Attorney, no doubt with Kruger's full approval, indicated his support for a move that would once again try to circumvent the impasse that had developed around the liquor question. The Chamber of Mines at once set about establishing a "Special Liquor Committee" - the mine-owners' equivalent of the ill-fated government liquor commission.

The Special Liquor Committee (SLC) had every reason to be optimistic about their direct approach to the Pretoria Distillery. Members of the SLC knew that many of the most powerful capitalists in the liquor industry were also deeply involved in the mining industry. As the SLC later put it in their report to the Executive Committee of the Chamber of Mines:

"Your committee recognise the value of the fact that the Directors of the Hatherley Company are gentlemen who are also largely interested in the Mining Industry, and believe that if some reasonable return could be assured to the Company in lieu of that trade which, however unjustifiably, its shareholders had from previous returns come to reckon upon as their due, the Chamber could count upon their loyal support in the direction indicated." (182)

Clearly, in the limited respect outlined above, the contradiction within the capitalist development of the Transvaal was a strength rather than a weakness.

Working along the strength of this particular capitalist linkage, the SLC first tried to establish from the Hatherley board what price they wanted for the outright sale of the liquor concession. The Distillery directors made it clear that the sale of the factory would involve "a very large sum indeed", since the company had every prospect of monopoly profits until at least 1912. (183) Denied this most
desirable solution of all, the SLC tried another approach. It offered to pay the Distillery an annual sum of £10,000 not "to manufacture the spirit now used in the native trade". (184) This proposal — whereby one set of capitalists envisaged paying another set of capitalists not to produce — revealed in stark outline the contradiction that beset economic development in the Transvaal. In fact, it was a contradiction of such a magnitude, and it would cost so much to resolve, that the mine-owners saw no reason why capital should pay for it. Instead, they proposed that the black working class should pay for its resolution! In their report back to the executive committee of the Chamber of Mines, the SLC suggested that the fee that Africans paid for passes should be raised from 1 shilling to 2 shillings. The state, after collecting this additional revenue from the workers, would then pass on the annual solatium of £10,000 to Hatherley. (185)

When it had completed its preliminary enquiries and deliberations, the SLC passed on the above recommendation, as well as others for the reform of the liquor trade, to the state. This time it was the turn of the government and Sammy Marks to be unenthusiastic. The major proposals of the SLC, like those of its predecessor the liquor commission, met with a quick death. The state, the liquor producers and the mining capitalists simply could not reach an agreement that would satisfy all parties, and, by June 1898, it was still a case of "business as usual" in the liquor industry.

While "business as usual" had an obvious appeal for the Liquor Kings, the Volksraad were less than pleased. Members of the Raad were dismayed by the degree of corruption amongst the Zarps, and embarrassed by the flagrant violations of the law on the Witwatersrand. Although feeling somewhat frustrated by these realities, the Volksraad continued to make attempts at solving these problems. When the Raad debated the amended liquor law in 1898, it took the opportunity of calling in Commandant Schutte and severely reprimanding him about the poor police performance. But perhaps the most important step towards solving these problems came when Kruger replaced Dr van Leeuwen with J. C. Smuts as State Attorney. From mid-1898 onwards, Smuts applied himself to the problem of stamping out corruption amongst the Zarps. His immediate efforts were concentrated on the most senior levels of the police force. When Chief Detective Robert Ferguson was caught buying gold amalgam and passing it on to Count Sarigny in November '1898, Smuts arranged for his immediate dismissal. (186) Shortly after this, the officer in charge of the Illicit Liquor Department in the ZARP, Inspector Donovan, was also replaced. These and other changes in personnel followed until, by mid-1899, Smuts was satisfied that he had reliable, efficient and uncorrupt officers at the head of the ZARP. Under the new Smuts regime, the post of Chief Detective was occupied by officer De Villiers, and the illicit liquor section was headed by Detective Thomas Menton. (187)

These reforms, while welcome in themselves, did not go a long way in removing the fears and anxieties of the mine-owners. The changes in ZARP personnel were largely confined to the most senior levels, and in the lower ranks, where salaries were small, police corruption remained a pervasive problem. In addition, the mining capitalists always feared the possibility of yet another Kruger initiative to get "total prohibition" lifted. Most serious of all, of course, was the fact that the Liquor Kings were continuing to undermine the productivity of black workers through the large-scale sale of spirits. These factors, as well as the rapidly escalating political tensions in the Transvaal during 1899, left the mining capitalists feeling decidedly nervous and insecure. Believing that the best form of defence was attack, the mine owners decided to launch a new ideological offensive. In April 1899, the first copies of an Eckstein & CO financed newspaper, the Transvaal Leader, were sold on the streets of Johannesburg. It was this newspaper that became the primary cudgel of the mining capitalists in the open class conflict that formed a prelude to the South African War.

Almost from its very first issue, the Transvaal Leader set out on a "Liquor Crusades" against the business armies of the petit bourgeoisie. Virtually every issue during May, June and July of 1899 contained some or other sensationalist exposure of the illicit liquor trade. No effort was spared in disclosing the names of those involved in the syndicates, and no attempt was made to conceal the hatred and contempt
felt for their "Peruvian" employees. The activities of the firms at the heart of the wholesale trade were well publicized, as were the practices of those who bottled various concoctions under the seal of forged labels. Newspaper readers were treated to detailed descriptions of defensive arrangements inside "Peruvian forts", and told of the exact nature of the linkage with the "adjacent stands". On several occasions, even the activities of mine and compound managers who were implicated in the illicit trade were reported. The Transvaal Leader also took it upon itself publicly to lecture Emmanuel Mendelssohn, editor of the rival Standard and Diggers' News, about his "responsibilities" to the "public".

On the face of it, the Transvaal Leader's campaign had every appearance of a no-holds-barred, full-scale exposé, for the benefit of the new court of "public opinion". Yet, amidst all these revelations about the liquor trade and the inefficiency of the state, there was one most significant omission. Not once, during all the months of the campaign, did the Leader devote so much as a single line to the activities of the liquor producers - the capitalists. At least one shrewd reader, W. S. Cohn, spotted the deliberate omission in the mine-owners' game, and pointedly asked the editor:

"But how is it that you have never shaped your enquiries in the direction of the "Big" syndicate here [Hatherley and the Alcohol Trust], as they are the people who are supplying all these illicit dealers with the liquor?" (188)

Clearly, the mine-owners and their agents were at war with the petit bourgeoisie and not with the capitalists - especially when there happened to be an embarrassing overlap between liquor capitalists and mining capitalists. Eckstein & Co would have known the problem, as would the editor of the Leader (Samuel Evans was a manager in the company and on the board of Hatherley Distillery).

This class war of 1899 was not confined to an exchange of ideological ammunition in the editorial columns of the Transvaal Leader. Certainly, the editor and his principals had reasons for whipping "public opinion" into a frenzy on the "liquor question", but they also wanted action. To this latter end the editor engaged the services of an ex-detective named Baxter. (189) Making full use of Baxter's expertise, the editorial staff of the Leader embarked on a programme of violence directed at the Liquor Kings and their "Peruvians". On Sunday mornings they would set out on carefully planned expeditions, and "rush" the illicit liquor dens. They succeeded in smashing thousands of bottles of spirits, tore down false partitions inside the "forts", and ripped out trapdoors. (190) This pioneering example of violence for the capitalist cause was soon followed by the mine managers themselves, who hired private detectives for the same purposes. (191) All this destruction and disruption placed the Liquor Kings on the defensive, assisted the mine-owners in their quest for a productive black labour force, and made excellent copy for the Monday morning edition of the Leader.

Most of the justification offered for this open confrontation derived from a single incident which, fortunately enough for the Transvaal Leader, came very early on in its "Liquor Crusade". On the 29th April 1899, Mrs Appelbe, wife of the Wesleyan minister in Fordsburg, and a companion by the name of Wilson, were viciously attacked by a gang of men while on their way to choir practice at the local church. (192) The woman's condition remained critical during the following days, and rumour had it that the Kings had paid gangsters to attack her because she had supplied information about their activities. (193) On the 2nd May, when her condition had further deteriorated, the Leader ran a sensational editorial entitled "Blood upon their hands", in which it openly accused the Kantor syndicate of Fordsburg of being behind the assault. (194) The sense of moral indignation which this aroused in the white public was complete when the minister's wife died on the following day. (195)

Despite the offer of a £500 reward by State Attorney Smuts for information leading to the prosecution of Mrs Appelbe's assailants, no substantial evidence was ever offered to the police, and the criminals remained undetected. (196) The whole affair, however, helped stampede "public opinion" in the direction suggested by the
Leader. Within days of the death there occurred a rash of public meetings. Local church congregations passed resolutions supporting the Transvaal Leader's campaign, and on 10th May a great public meeting was held in Johannesburg at which the illicit liquor trade was roundly condemned. (197) At the same meeting, ministers of religion sat astride their highest moral horses, striking out blindly at the enemy, and in the wake of the gathering at least one was sued for criminal libel by Emmanuel Mendelsohn. (198) Perhaps the most important meeting of all, however, took place in Potchefstroom on the 17th May. There the members of the Dutch Reformed Church met in formal session and decided to send a deputation to Pretoria to meet the State President about the illicit liquor trade. (199)

Amidst all this pure-white moral outrage, however, there were also significant signs of black activity. African leaders, perhaps more concerned with the health and welfare of their black kinsmen than Mrs Appelbe, took the opportunity to mobilize their own followers. Amongst the names of these leaders, there were some that were to become prominent in the African political struggle of later decades. Saul Msane, compound manager at the Jubilee mine, and Sebastian Msimang were among the leaders who addressed an 800-strong working class gathering in the Wesleyan Native Church, Albert Street, on the 16th May 1899. Resolutions calling for "total prohibition" and strict enforcement of the law were passed, and, according to the Leader, "It was remarkable that, although the boys working on the mines were largely represented, there was not a single vote against the resolutions". (200) On the following evening Msane was again active, this time as chairman of a meeting of "educated natives" held at the Independent Presbyterian Church in the Bramfontein location. Here a similar set of resolutions were proposed by the Rev. Tsewu and accepted by the meeting. (201) The Transvaal Leader gleefully reported on these resolutions which so accurately mirrored the official Chamber of Mines lines on the liquor trade.

With "public opinion" at fever pitch in a community already deeply anxious about the possibility of war, there was always the danger that the "Liquor Crusade" would get completely out of hand, produce witch-hunting, and lead to indiscriminate violence. Since the attention of the "public" was so ruthlessly fixed on the problem of the "Peruvians", the Jewish community became particularly anxious. Jews knew and understood the syndrome at work all too well, and, on the 5th May, William Cohn wrote a letter to the editor of the Leader, warning him about the possible consequences of his policy:

"In your effort to diminish this deplorable traffic there is a grave danger of creating a large amount of anti-Semitic feeling, a feeling which I may safely say is already beginning to show signs of existence. The mischief caused by articles appearing in the Berlin Kreuz Zeitung and the St Petersburg Novoe Vremja and Grazdanin is well within my memory. Surely there are sufficient existing troubles and disputes in this State without introducing another, which would bid fair to eclipse all others in the intensity of its race hatred." (202)

Within ten days the Chief Rabbi, Dr Hertz, was in the middle of a controversy about Jewish involvement in the liquor trade, and desperately trying to pour oil on increasingly troubled waters. (203)

In several cases, however, the warnings and cautions came too late. At the Rietfontein mine, the manager took it upon himself to administer a thrashing to a liquor seller, and was promptly discharged when the case was brought to court. (204) Egged on by the shrill cries of the Leader, the self-appointed vigilantes elsewhere set about prosecuting the war of the mine owners and also attacked the "Peruvian forts". On Sunday 21st May, for example, the Wesleyan minister in Johannesburg, the Rev. Scholefield, led his congregation in an attack on a neighbouring shebeen. (205) More serious and destructive were the series of not-so-mysterious fires that happened to break out in illicit liquor dens and hotels during May and June. (206) Carried on by the popular wave of hatred, African workers also took the opportunity to settle...
their debts with the nearest and most visible exploiters — the petit bourgeoisie.

"... at one of the mines 600 boys destroyed the illicit liquor store, together with all the elaborate equipment of electric alarms and signals with which the store and adjoining premises were fitted. The reason given by the natives for this action was that the store was too much of a temptation to them, so that all their money was spent on drink." (207)

Again, the mine owners and the Leader must have been pleased with this working class action that tackled the "forts" of the illicit liquor syndicates rather than the factory of the mining-cum-liquor capitalists.

With "public opinion" in high dudgeon, Smuts also saw the opportunity of pushing more strongly in the direction which he had been moving. Knowing that Kruger would be on the defensive, the State Attorney gave his support to the Leader's "Liquor Crusade". (208) In Johannesburg, Smuts's two public prosecutors, Brockama and Mostyn Cleaver, both identified themselves with the newspaper campaign. (209) During the weeks that followed the State Attorney spent much of his time and energy in combating the syndicates, and senior members of his new department set a personal example. When there were no prosecutions forthcoming from the Fordsburg district, the State Prosecutor, Dr Krause, cycled around the area in an effort to establish what was happening on the streets. (210)

Much of the State Attorney's effort, however, was frustrated by the high level of corruption amongst the Zarps. In order to circumvent this problem, Smuts adopted a suggestion that had most recently been aired by the Chamber of Mines at a large public meeting on 15th May 1899. (211) Within Chief Detective De Villiers's department, he set up a special task force under the direction of Tjaart Kruger. (212) Men within the "specials", such as Detective Goldberg, were selected because of their particular knowledge of the liquor traffic. It became the sole objective of this nucleus of uncorruptibles to smash the big syndicates.

The initial response of the syndicates to the "Liquor Crusade" had been one of reasonably confident indifference. In the early days of the campaign the Lediker syndicate had even attempted a confidence trick, by taking representatives of the Transvaal Leader on a public relations tour of their legitimate business fronts. (213) After the Appelbe murder, however, the syndicates were forced into a more aggressive stand and they resorted to their trusted methods of threats, bribery and corruption. (214) Just when these methods seemed to be holding their own, the syndicates were confronted with this new, and most substantial challenge to date, the "specials".

Early in June 1899, Tjaart Kruger received two threats in anonymous letters which warned him to take the greatest care if he intended extending his activities to Boksburg. The leader of the "specials" chose to interpret these letters as coming from King Nathanson himself, and decided to take up the challenge. On Saturday the 3rd June, Kruger sent two of his Pretoria-based detectives, Heystock and Felser, to Johannesburg in the utmost secrecy. At Park Station they were met by Goldberg — a man who had personal knowledge of the way that the Nathanson family ran their business. From there the three detectives made their way to the South Rose Deep mine, where the manager supplied them with three compound "boys" for trapping. From the mine the detectives and their "boys" set out for Nathanson's biggest "fort" — the one behind the Railway Hotel at Germiston, known to African workers as "Pudding". (215)

At the "fort" the detectives supplied the compound "boys" with marked coins, and then sent them in as "traps" to buy liquor. As soon as the "boys" re-emerged with the alcohol, the detectives "rushed" the "fort". They made progress without hindrance until they reached a final door, and there they were confronted not by Smooel himself but by Prince George Nathanson and no fewer than twenty "Peruvian"
assistants. At this point the Prince warned the detectives that, living or dead, they would not be allowed into the heart of the "fort", and a vigorous fight ensued. Unable to get at the masked money, the detectives decided to compromise by arresting the Prince and two of the "Peruvians" on a charge of obstructing the course of justice. The Prince was then dragged off to the local charge office shouting:

"Look here you special bastards from Pretoria, I have more money than you think, I can cover you with money, and I shall go to Pretoria and you will all have to work for me at half-a-crown a day." (216)

The detectives had missed the King, but George Nathanson and two employees subsequently appeared at the Boksburg Police Court, where they were each sentenced to a fine of £20 or 3 months' hard labour. (217) In late June it was rumoured that King Nathanson was so annoyed by the "treacherous" behaviour of Detective Goldberg in his son's case that he was willing to pay £2,000 to get this "special into trouble". (218)

The Kings were put on the defensive by this new, rather rigid arm of the state, and they were wary of the heavier sentences that were now being passed in the courts. (219) On the 4th July 1899, the entire syndicate network was shocked by the news of the latest state action. The sharpest operator of all on the Witwatersrand, the King of the Liquor Kings, Nathan Friedman, had been arrested by Chief Detective De Villiers, following a raid on the Wiltshire Bar. (220) Despite several attempts to pervert the course of justice, Friedman ultimately appeared in court and, in August, was sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment without the option of a fine. (221) This unprecedentedly harsh sentence left the syndicates sorry, the detectives delighted, and the Chamber reasonably content. At the August monthly meeting of the Chamber of Mines, Beekstein, on behalf of the mine owners, paid public tribute to the ceaseless energy and recent success of the State Attorney and his Chief Detective. (222)

The purr of contentment from the Chamber of Mines, however, proved to be somewhat premature. The syndicates might have lost some important battles, but they had certainly not lost the war. Being in the front line they had taken a series of bad knocks, but their hidden allies, Kruger and the liquor producers, had been left relatively unscathed. The deep divisions within the Afrikaner ruling class on the liquor question always left the syndicates with the hope that they would be rescued by government forces that fought behind the lines. From June 1899 onwards, they increasingly placed their faith in those allies. Pretoria might have been the seat of the State Attorney and the hated "specials", but it was also the home of the State President.

In the wake of the Appelbe murder and the public meetings to which it gave rise, several deputations made their way to Pretoria. Of these deputations, the most important was one headed by the Dutch Reformed Church in mid-May. (223) On Thursday 25th May, 1899, the Rev. Louw and 300 members of the church assembled in Pretoria to petition the State President about the liquor traffic. At the state buildings the deputation was met by the noted enemy of Hatherley Distillery, the Chairman of the Second Volksraad, H. P. Steenkamp. (224) Steenkamp thanked the church for the work that it had done in fighting the liquor evil. He also informed the deputation that the Raad had decided to establish yet another liquor commission to examine the whole problem, and that the State President would hear them personally. At this point General Piet Joubert arrived to offer the State President's apologies - his health did not allow him to meet the churchmen on such a cold morning! (225)

Clearly, Kruger was less than keen to meet the anti-liquor deputation. The churchmen, however, were not shrugged off that easily, and that evening they regrouped with several representatives of the mining industry. At 7.00 p.m. the enlarged deputation marched down Church Street towards the State President's home. Unable to avoid the burghers any longer, Kruger met their spokesmen and curtly informed them that he was entirely opposed to the present liquor laws, and that the best way around the whole problem was to create a state monopoly along the lines of the Gothenburg system. (226) These answers apparently still did not satisfy the
churchmen, who then asked to meet the President separately.

Kruger met the churchmen again at the Executive Council Chambers at 9.00 p.m. He told members of the deputation that he sympathized with their good intentions, but that he was still of the opinion that a state liquor monopoly was the best solution to the problem. (227) Somewhat wearied by the whole day's anti-liquor agitation, the State President then proceeded to express his considerable annoyance to the Rev. Louw. He complained bitterly that the deputation had hampered certain approaches that he planned to make to the Raad, and that the Uitlanders in the Transvaal would make great political capital of the fact that they undertook their agitations on the day of the Queen's birthday! (228)

As soon as news of the Raad's new liquor commission got out, the syndicates switched their attention from Johannesburg to Pretoria. Knowing that Kruger and the liquor capitalists favoured a state monopoly in which Hatherley was to be the sole producer, they lobbied to have "total prohibition" lifted. A mere two weeks after Nathan Friedman had been sentenced, the Kings succeeded in getting the information that they had longed for. On 26th August 1899, a disgusted Transvaal Leader told its readers that:

"The syndicates are boasting of approaching changes in the law as if they were as good as accomplished already, and they seem to know the mind of the Raad Liquor Commission before even that body has reported to the Raad. Prohibition, it is said, is to go by the board." (229)

A week later, the commission reported to the Raad. It suggested that prohibition be lifted, that Africans be entitled to two drinks a day - one in the morning and one in the evening - but that nobody should be allowed to sell a black man a bottle of liquor. (230) These findings no doubt delighted the syndicates. The Kings would have known that if the proposals for what amounted to a new industrial dop system ever came into being, then they would be able to expand their empires through the loopholes that they were bound to find in the new legislation.

At the same time, and for the same reasons, these findings must have been bitterly disappointing and deeply frustrating to the mine-owners. As the clouds of war threatened to break the mining capitalists scurried for the protection of Cape Town, they could look back not on three years of "total prohibition" but on three years of total frustration. What the Volksraad and the law had so faithfully promised them in 1896, the Liquor Kings, the "Peruvians" and the Zarps had denied them over the succeeding years. Economic roots which dated back to at least the 1880s had given rise to a political plant whose foliage had become hopelessly entangled. Every time that the stem of the alliance between the Chamber of Mines and the Volksraad was pulled in one direction, that of the State President and the liquor capitalists moved in another - and all the time the parasitic liquor syndicates continued to bloom. The mine-owners knew that, as long as Kruger and Hatherley Distillery lasted, they would be confronted by a stalemate situation in which Witwatersrand Africans would be both liquor consumers and unproductive workers. They also knew that while there was war there was hope.

The Black Worker as Worker: the Spoils of War for the Mine-Owners, 1899-1903

Prohibition, the "specials" and the "Liquor Crusade" of the Transvaal Leader all helped to make 1899 one of the less successful years for Hatherley Distillery. Yet, despite the outbreak of the war in October, which further undermined business, the Pretoria factory continued to manufacture spirits, and at the end of the year managed to show a profit of £2,737. (231) South Africa, financial journal and capitalist mouthpiece in the City of London, assured its readers that, given the circumstances, "this result cannot be regarded as other than satisfactory". (232)
Under Sammy Marks's skilful financial tutelage, the trading year for Hatherley in 1900 was no less satisfactory - again given the circumstances. Catering for the climate of insecurity, Marks arranged for a sum of £25,000 to be taken out of the Distillery's funds, and secured as a special investment. (233)

Even after this had been done, the Distillery still showed a gross profit of over £16,000 for the twelve months, and, although the shareholders were not paid a dividend, they had every reason to be content with an enterprise that could point to a net profit of over £9,000 in such trying times. (234)

A trading year, however, was not the same as twelve months of war, and, viewed from other perspectives, 1900 was not a good year for the Pretoria company. Early in the year there had been a considerable amount of fighting in the vicinity of the factory, and the company was fortunate that very little permanent damage was done to the plant and equipment. (235) But once Pretoria fell to the British forces on 5th June, damage of a more lasting type was done to the Distillery. Under Martial Law, the Military Governor issued a proclamation prohibiting the manufacture and sale of all spirituous liquors. (236) Under the same order, Sammy Marks was forced to close the glass factory at Hatherley and this meant dismissal for all the employees. This latter action involved the company in further losses, since all the skilled workers were on contract and demanded compensation for their enforced redundancy. (237) The Hatherley directors sharply contested these decisions, but their combination of threat and plea left the Military Governor totally unmoved. It was this early proclamation that was to give the first indication of how the imperial authorities were to view the liquor industry and trade in their newly acquired mining colony.

Initially, the liquor capitalists were not greatly perturbed by the long term consequences of this closure. Their ultimate confidence was reflected in the press release which the London Committee issued to shareholders:

"This cessation of business, however, is only of a temporary nature, and when things have settled down there is every reason to anticipate that under the British Flag the Company will have a bright and prosperous future." (238)

Six, sixteen, and twenty-six months later, the Distillery and the glass factory were still closed "in obedience to proclamations issued by military authorities". (239) In the end, Hatherley Distillery never did reopen - a fate which the Transvaal mines certainly did not share, and which will be recounted below. At some point in time between June 1900 and February 1903, British and other shareholders made the relatively painful discovery that the imperial army had fought a war for mine and not distillery owners.

The closure of Hatherley in June 1900 did not dramatically disrupt the liquor trade on the Witwatersrand during the first nine or ten months of the war. Existing stocks, and a much reduced but continuous supply of liquor from the Pretoria Distillery were sufficient to keep the syndicates in business. Black workers continued to buy, at new and even more exorbitant prices, the only "cheap" liquor they could afford - Hatherley spirits, or "Nellmapius" as it was more commonly known. Both the syndicates and the black workers, however, got a foretaste of the imminent new dispensation when the ZAR government took over the running of five mines in April 1900. The wages of the 12,000 black miners were unilaterally reduced from 60 to 20 shillings per month, and the ZAR war administration further illustrated its no-nonsense capitalist approach by cancelling all liquor licences in the vicinity of the mines. (240)

More glimmerings in the capitalist new dawn were to be seen soon after the British forces occupied Johannesburg on the 31st May 1900. Martial Law was declared, and within a month a syndicate leader was arrested and made an example of:

"... a certain Joffe [probably Barry, who was based at Krugersdorp] known on the Rand as the Liquor King, was sentenced to a heavy fine and several years!"
imprisonment, with the result that the whole trade was paralysed." (241)

In fact, the whole trade was not "paralysed", but the Kings had received a near fatal blow. Further problems for the liquor syndicates materialized as the army swept through Johannesburg, rounding up "undesirable immigrants" from Russia, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain and France were unceremoniously bundled onto trains and despatched to Cape Town. There, at least one party of 150 was put aboard the Hawarden Castle and sent to Europe. (242) Amongst these "undesirable immigrants" of July-August there were probably several "Peruvians", and this further undermined the illicit liquor business. In September it was reported that shebeens had "been pretty well stamped out by the heavy penalties imposed". (243) The illicit liquor business, however, was never entirely eradicated - not even under the harsh regime of Martial Law. In February 1901, Colonel Davis, the Military Commissioner of Police, was still having to devote a part of his day to the illicit liquor business. (244) In general, however, there was no doubt that the Witwatersrand was becoming a better place for mining companies.

From their wartime base in Cape Town, the mine-owners watched the achievements of the Imperial army with admiration. The closure of Hatherley, the trial of Joffe and the deportation of the "undesirables" were gifts that only a war could give so swiftly and generously. In less than three months the Military Governor had succeeded in achieving what the Chamber of Mines and the Volksraad had failed to accomplish in three years. The joy of the mine-owners, however, was the joy of caution. They knew that the Transvaal would not always be under Martial Law, and that the British army would not always be there to do the work of the state. What they had to do, therefore, was to ensure that the gains of war did not become the losses of peace. To this end, they spent their seaside days lobbying the imperial administration and building up an ideological offensive against any future legislation which might allow alcohol to be sold to black men in the Transvaal. The ghost of the Raad's 1899 liquor commission continued to haunt the Chamber of Mines in its new home.

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In July 1900, a mere four weeks after Johannesburg had been occupied, a large deputation of mine-owners and commercial men approached the then Governor of the Cape, Sir Alfred Milner. The mining men outlined the pre-war liquor problem on the Witwatersrand to Milner in some detail, and expressed their wish that "total prohibition" be maintained and effectively enforced. Milner gave the deputation a most sympathetic hearing and assured the businessmen that whoever took over the Transvaal's affairs after the war would probably be capable of clearing up the entire liquor question to their satisfaction within six months. (245)

A nod and a wink from a Governor - even a British Governor - did not completely satisfy mining capitalists who had unsuccessfully fought the liquor industry and trade for at least half a decade. What would Sammy Marks and the producers of "Cape Smoke" do once business was resuscitated and they got access to the markets of a united South Africa? For this and other reasons, the men of the Chamber of Mines threw their weight behind a new organization that emerged exactly at the time that the Transvaal was making the transition from a military to a civilian administration. "The South African Alliance for the Reform of the Liquor Traffic" united "men keenly interested in the moral and material welfare of South Africa, mine owners, mine managers, merchants, ministers of religion and private citizens". (246)

It would appear that within the Alliance the men interested in the "material welfare of South Africa" made considerable use of those interested in the "moral welfare" of the country. It was the ministers of religion who undertook most of the agitation and public relations for the "Alliance" - men like the Rev. Andrew Brown and the Rev. J. T. Darragh, the founder of St John's College in Johannesburg. During June and July of 1901 they wrote articles at home and abroad outlining the aims and objectives of the movement. (247)

First, the Alliance wished to seize the moment and secure the victories that the Military Governor had achieved. As the good Rev. Darragh put it to his
"Reforms which it would be well-nigh impossible to introduce into an old and complex civilisation can now and here be attempted with every prospect of success, and with the minimum of opposition and friction. We are making a fresh start, and it will be some compensation for the sufferings of the last two years if that start is made on sane, well-considered lines. We have perfect confidence in the ability, integrity and honesty of purpose of the Administration, but amid the multiplicity of claims which will be clamouring for attention, it is just possible that this golden opportunity for settling the liquor problem may be overlooked till it is too late." (248)

Secondly, and more fundamentally, the Alliance sought a state monopoly for the production and sale of liquor. (249)

The idea of a state monopoly of this sort was not new to the mine-owners - indeed, it was very similar to the Kruger proposals of 1898-99. This time, however, the mining capitalists knew that it would be in a state where they had greater power, and that it would be backed by an administration that could more effectively guarantee the productivity of their black workers. In fact, the mine-owners had such confidence in the administrative ability of the incoming power that many hankered after the old industrial dop system of pre-1897. With British backing, the use of alcohol as a means of socio-economic control again became a real possibility. The Alliance therefore did not favour total prohibition. Again, the capitalists left it to the churchmen to explain. The Rev. Darragh told an English audience that was perhaps not fully familiar with the history and reality of the industry what exactly the mine-owners contemplated:

"Many thoughtful persons feel that the mining native should be specially considered. His work, especially underground, is disagreeable, monotonous and exhausting. The East Coast natives in particular [Mozambicans], who furnish the largest number of underground workers, are used to stimulants from boyhood, and it seems unfair to deprive them altogether of what they regard as a solace ..." (250)

Like other clergymen in the Alliance, the Rev. Darragh was capable of doing a more than passable imitation of a Minister of Mines.

As the Transvaal moved from military administration to imperial government, the mine-owners had therefore backed two possibilities in a win/win combination that guaranteed dividends. Either they could get "total prohibition", which would secure for them a productive labour force, or they could get the right to use alcohol as a lever of socio-economic control over the workers in a regime backed by an efficient administration. All that remained was the "anxious" wait to see whether their line through Milner, or the one through the South African Alliance, would triumph. In practice, the wait turned out to be less than nerve-racking, and the transitional period was relatively untraumatic for mining capitalists.

In April 1901, within weeks of his arrival in Pretoria as High Commissioner, Alfred Milner was petitioned by the South African Alliance on the liquor question. The Alliance again underlined the benefits that had come with Martial Law, and urged strong government control. For his part, Milner expressed sympathy with the new movement, and suggested that they also approach Joseph Chamberlain. Additional pressure on the Secretary of State for the Colonies would have been a neat supplement to the Alliance's already well advanced public agitation in England. (251) Having yet again expressed his understanding of the mining capitalists' problems, Milner set to work on his task of reconstruction.
In October 1901, Milner set up the Liquor Licensing Commission in Johannesburg to govern the resumption of the retail liquor trade. As chairman of the commission he appointed a Yeomanry officer, Major Macpherson, and to assist the chairman a committee of Johannesburg businessmen. This military-cum-civilian licensing board was designed to produce exactly the type of conservative change that Milner and the mine-owners envisaged. Initially it kept all bars, canteens, and bottle stores closed, and only allowed liquor to be sold in hotels and restaurants between 12 noon and 9 p.m.

This, the most modest of possible starts to the retail liquor trade, Milner made even safer in the best way he knew possible. On the 10th December 1901, he used his powers of proclamation as High Commissioner to gazette the new liquor laws for the Transvaal. This proclamation embodied the principle of "total prohibition" for Africans, and laid down stiffer penalties for the contravention of the law than had existed under the old ZAR government. Milner saw this law as a gift which would benefit all the classes most closely involved in reconstruction on the Rand. As he proudly wrote to Chamberlain:

"... undoubtedly the greatest benefit which it is in the power of the Government to confer, alike upon mine owner and native, is the suppression of the illicit drink traffic." (254)

But, to put the issue beyond doubt, this proclamation was followed by Ordinance 32 of 1902 which prevented the distillation of any spirits for commercial gain within the Transvaal. (255)

Between them, these measures ensured an orderly transition to liquor retailing and limited the opportunities for illicit dealers. When the bars reopened in Johannesburg in January 1902, they had to operate within restricted hours and serve a meal of some sort with any alcohol they served. Liquor licences came under the control of the Imperial Liquor Commissioner, and, except for a brief period of public drunkenness when the bottle stores reopened in mid-1902, there were no major disruptions on the Witwatersrand. In December 1901, Milner noted with pleasure the mine-owners' claim that only one per cent of their black work force was now absent owing to liquor on any one day, as opposed to the 10 to 15 per cent average during the pre-war years. (257) That increased productivity, coupled with the newly reduced wage rates for African workers, left the mine-owners comparatively happy. The Transvaal was becoming safe for mining capitalism.

The happiness of the mining capitalists in this case, however, was the sorrow of the liquor capitalists. The collapse of the retail liquor trade with Africans, the thoroughness of the British "reforms" and the closure of Hatherley Distillery, all left Sammy Marks and his colleagues far from satisfied. Marks's financial acumen, the concession, and the large number of British shareholders in the distillery all meant that Milner could not simply brush the liquor capitalists aside. In mid-1901 South Africa warned Milner that he should not see the Pretoria business as simply another Kruger concession, like the railways or dynamite:

"The Hatherley Distillery has all along been an honest concern, with an honourable management, and as such is entitled to the highest consideration at the hands of the new Transvaal authorities." (258)

To make the new revolution of the mining capitalists secure, the British administration had to eliminate the Pretoria distillery at the same time that it was "reforming" the Rand.

Within twelve months of the outbreak of war in October 1900, the imperial government had appointed the Transvaal Concessions Commission to examine the monopolies granted by the ZAR. In October 1900, Sammy Marks and his colleagues gave evidence before the commission in Pretoria, stressing that the concession had been legally granted and that the company had kept to all the conditions attached to the
When the commission reported in June 1901, it found accordingly and recommended that if the concession were cancelled the owners be compensated. (260)

As soon as the commission reported, Sammy Marks authorized Isaac Lewis to undertake the detailed negotiations leading up to compensation. As a figure less closely identified with Kruger than Marks, Lewis proved to be a wise choice. Between June 1901 and early 1903 he worked ceaselessly in his efforts to extract the best possible settlement for the Hatherley shareholders. In particular, Lewis had two related objectives. First, he aimed to get a settlement as soon as possible—an objective that was basic to the shareholders’ interest. Secondly, he was intent on getting a settlement with the Milner regime rather than the Legislative Council which would follow it—the British might be more generous than the businessmen, given the origins of the capital involved.

By the end of 1902 Lewis had wrapped up his negotiations with the Milner administration, and in February 1903 details of the settlement were printed in the Hatherley Directors’ Report for 1902. From the distillery’s point of view, the settlement appeared to be a relatively generous one. The shareholders were to be paid a cash settlement of over a quarter of a million pounds for the cancellation of the concession. In addition, stocks on hand could be sold exempt of excise duty, and some of the liquor at the Resaano Garcia and Lourenço Marques distilleries was to be allowed to be imported duty free. In London, South Africa told British investors in the distillery that “shareholders are to be congratulated on the result of the negotiations”. (261)

When these basic conditions were confirmed in the Legislative Council in July 1903 not everybody was pleased with the settlement. “Several members severely criticized the bargain, which passed only because the Government was already committed to the terms.” (262) The resolution of the contradiction within the capitalist development of the Transvaal had to be paid for, and not all were happy with the asking price. In this case, however, the mining capitalists’ and tax payers’ sorrow was the distillers’ joy. Why exactly Marks and his colleagues were so satisfied emerged from the detailed analysis of the settlement which South Africa offered shareholders:

"According to the balance-sheet made up to December 31, 1902, the total assets stood at £600,000, against liabilities amounting to £475,000. At this time, the concession and goodwill stood in the accounts as representing £16,319 7s. 5d., which must now, in consequence of the amount the Government has agreed to pay, be increased by £180,555 12s. 7d., or a little over £112s. 6d. per share. In addition to this, the company will, considering the very favourable conditions granted them, undoubtedly make a large profit on the sale of the 320,000 gallons of liquor they have in stock, so that when the affairs of the company come to be finally liquidated, the return made to holders of shares should be an extremely good one. To the fact that they to-day in this very satisfactory position, shareholders are to a very great extent indebted to Mr Isaac Lewis ..." (263)

No wonder that the financial journal could take a broad perspective and conclude: "At this result, holders of shares in this the first industrial company formed in the Transvaal have nothing of which to complain." (264) The owners of Hatherley Distillery went out of business with a smile, if not a chuckle.

Conclusion

The production of an agricultural surplus has always occupied a central role in the historical development of pre-capitalist modes of production into a capitalist
mode of production. At very least, the inhabitants of the new towns and the emerging proletariat have to be fed by the food produced on the land. The capacity to produce this agricultural surplus during the transformation to capitalism, however, has varied significantly, as has the capacity of the emerging social formation to absorb it. In general, though, it would seem accurate to suggest that the economic history of European capitalism is as much punctuated by the absence of an agricultural surplus as by its presence. It is largely, although not solely, for this reason that rising prices, starvation and food riots occupy such an important chapter in European history. (265)

Having noted that broad pattern, however, the economic and social historian should also pay close attention to those cases in which a substantial agricultural surplus was generated. In Europe, as elsewhere, many reasons could possibly account for such a surplus, and often the contributing factors were regionally specific — the cost of labour, technological innovation, land utilization, land distribution, etc. For the present analysis, however, it is not simply the genesis or size of the surplus that should be noted but its quality. Here it is important to realize that agricultural commodities in some respects had almost unique properties during the transition to capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries. Unlike such commodities today, fresh produce could not be stored for relatively lengthy periods, transformed into tinned varieties, or instantly transported across vast distances to assured markets. During the European transition to capitalism, therefore, the producer was faced with a more substantial loss if he could not dispose of his agricultural surplus — the contemporary producer, of course, still suffers from the same problem to an extent. Historically, it was for this reason that producers sought ways of storing the value of their commodities or minimizing the loss they were likely to sustain. In this search, distillation presented itself as one obvious solution.

Through distillation, agricultural surplus was converted into spirits and not only was part of its value maintained but in some cases the price actually increased as the commodity matured. Thus, when the Porte prohibited the export of corn from the Romanian provinces in the 18th century, the landlords turned to distillation and sold their spirits on markets which they created within the country. Similarly, when the Junkers of Prussia were faced with a massive increase in their potato yields, they turned to distilling spirits which they unloaded on the less discriminating colonial markets of the late 19th century. It is within this broad perspective that we have to attempt to understand the emergence and decline of the Transvaal alcohol industry between 1880 and 1903.

By the late 1870s and early 1880s, Transvaal farmers were already capable of producing a sizable surplus of grain and, in the villages and towns of the country, there was a well developed taste for beer and spirits. A considerable number of districts were grain exporting, and the number of liquor licences issued in urban areas could be quite considerable. In 1870, 32 liquor licences were issued in Potchefstroom, 17 in Pretoria, 15 in Wakkerstroom, and 5 in Heidelberg. (266) The presence of this agricultural surplus, albeit periodic and somewhat regionally based, together with a market for alcohol, provided an opportunity for capital accumulation through distillation. When A. H. Nellmapius got a monopoly for the manufacture of grain spirits from Kimber in 1881, there was every prospect of the business being modestly successful, and of the Transvaal setting out on a well trodden path to slow capitalist development.

Unlike Europe, however, the Transvaal did not have to pass through the relatively prolonged and gradual "decline of feudalism and growth of towns" on its way to the objective of national capital accumulation. The discovery of the Witwatersrand in the mid-1880s and the existence of capital in Europe seeking new outlets combined dramatically to compress capitalist development in the Transvaal. In the mushrooming towns of the Witwatersrand, Hatherley Distillery found a market which expanded by at least ten times in as many years. What was going to be a modestly successful business in the early 1880s was a spectacularly successful £½ million industry by the mid-1890s. The motor force behind this accelerated development was gold, and in the end the mining industry both made and broke Hatherley Distillery.
To ensure the success of their capitalist revolution, the mine-owners needed a proletariat. In particular, they needed the service of a growing number of black workers who would labour for the low wages that made gold mining on the Rand economically feasible, and for this they turned to Mozambique. There they found a territory which the Portuguese had economically exploited for decades, and a population which was considerably addicted to the vast quantities of cheap alcohol which the metropolis unloaded on its satellite. The Randlords discovered to their delight that Mozambique was "ripe" for rapid proletarianisation, and that they could use the products of Hatherley Distillery in that process. In 1906, F. Perry, a prominent official in the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, could look back on the 1890s with some contentment and note how capitalism fed on underdevelopment. He observed that black Mozambicans "have always been fond of strong drink", and continued:

"They brew themselves many kinds of native spirits, and the potent liquors of European manufacture threw open to them new vistas of enjoyment. A few of them had found their way to the diamond fields. To the Witwatersrand gold fields, which were nearer to them they came in great numbers, especially after the construction of the Delagoa Bay Railway. Their earnings were spent, not on cattle but on whisky and gin. Thus, a period of work, instead of supplying them with the means of settling down, only gave them a period of drink and idleness. Afterwards they had to return to work in order to earn the coin wherewith to gratify their cultivated taste. In this way they have come nearer than any of the other South African races to supplying the material of an industrial, as distinguished from an agricultural population." (267)

In the light of this, it can be appreciated why it was that during the early years on the Rand many mine managers ran the equivalent of an industrial "dop system" for their workers, and why it was that the Chamber of Mines moved so slowly and reluctantly towards an official policy that supported "total prohibition". It was for this same reason that a considerable number of mining capitalists continued to agitate for the right of African workers to have access to alcohol after the South African War. (268)

It was the presence of large numbers of black miners that ensured the success of Hatherley Distillery, and success attracted capital — including mining capital. As the "Eerste Fabriek" in the industrializing republic, Hatherley presented not only the first opportunity for capital to diversify its holdings but also a most profitable investment. When the Distillery Company went public in 1892, it certainly attracted imperial capital, but it also secured a significant amount of national capital that had been generated in the mining industry and which now sought further local profits. Individual mining capitalists such as Marks, Lewis, Evans, Epler and Erlich, all had substantial investments in the distillery. So too did members of the emerging bourgeoisie — men like F. Dormer who edited the Star and occupied a seat on the executive of the Chamber of Mines. (269) In addition, several of the channels which routed investment from the international money markets to the Reef also directed capital towards the distillery. Many an English and French investor who had holdings in mining also had shares in a profitable distillation business in Pretoria.

The early policy of selling alcohol to African workers, however, contained within it the seeds of a problem for capitalist development which, in time, were to germinate into a full scale contradiction. As a growing market for the sale of spirits, the Witwatersrand started to attract competition in the early 1890s. Liquor capitalists elsewhere, but particularly in Germany and Mozambique, found ways of circumventing Hatherley's monopoly and flooding the market with even cheaper spirits. The Pretoria distillery in turn was forced to lower its prices. Falling prices increased the workers' consumption of cheap alcoholic poisons, and by 1895 it was reaching proportions that were becoming alarmingly counter-productive to the dominant mining industry. Black workers were getting so much uncontrolled access to alcohol that between 15 and 25 per cent of the labour force was permanently incapable of working. This forced the mine-owners to increase their complements by a similar
proportion and escalated mining costs. This contradiction was made even more pronounced and ironic by the fact that several prominent mining capitalists had shares in the distillery. In effect the situation had been reached by 1895 where the left hand of the mine owner sold liquor to the worker while the right hand attempted to restrain his consumption.

The left hand proved to be stronger than the right. In 1896, the Chamber of Mines decided to cut its losses and opt for a new official policy of "total prohibition". The mine owners calculated that the loss of alcohol as a socio-economic lever over the work force would be more than compensated for by the profits that would come from a fully productive and reduced complement of African miners. In its quest for this new policy and the profits it would bring, the Chamber of Mines exploited divisions within the Afrikaner ruling class and in 1896, against the State President's wishes, the Volksraad passed the "total prohibition" law.

What for the mine-owners promised to be a golden age of "total prohibition" after 1897 turned out to be an era of total frustration between 1897 and 1899. Large and powerful illicit liquor syndicates emerged along the entire industrial spine of the Witwatersrand. Several of the "Kings" and "Peruvians" in these well organized gangs probably had earlier experience of the liquor trade in Europe, and they made certain that black miners continued to get access to the alcohol they desired, albeit at suitably inflated prices. The weakness of the state and the venality of its officials during this period of primary capital accumulation left the empires of the Liquor Kings relatively unscathed — despite a vigorous counter-attack by the government and the mine-owners in late 1899. The frustration of the mine-owners reached such a pitch by 1898 that they attempted to erect a scheme whereby Hatterley Distillery would be paid not to produce spirits designed for African consumption. This plan, however, proved to be unacceptable to the distillery owners and the state.

The single most important obstacle that blocked the advance of the mining capitalists on the "liquor question" was the alliance between the State President and the distillery owners. Both of these parties were completely opposed to the Volksraad sanctioned policy of "total prohibition". The Distillery owners saw it as an unnecessary curtailment of profits, and a violation of the concession that the state had granted them at an earlier date. Kruger had personal business dealings with Hatherley, saw the distillery as an important grain market for his burgher constituents, and felt Eerste Fabrieken to be an important part of his strategy for industrial development. The State President thus appointed liquor commissions in 1898 and 1899 and both recommended that "total prohibition" be lifted. When the mine-owners left for Cape Town on the eve of the war in 1899, they departed with the spectre of legal alcohol sales to black workers haunting them. The contradiction in capitalist development had remained intact.

From their war-time coastal base, the mine-owners lobbied the Imperial authorities about the "liquor question" on the Witwatersrand. In particular, they sought assurances that "total prohibition" would be enforced once British power could make its presence felt. To assist in the achievement of this objective, the mine-owners also took part in a front organization for public agitation, called the South African Alliance for the Reform of the Liquor Traffic.

While the mining capitalists were agitating, the imperial army was acting. Making use of Martial Law, the Military Governor of the invading forces at once attacked the illicit liquor trade on the Witwatersrand. The severe penalties imposed during a war-time situation, and enforced by an occupying army, proved to be a fatal blow to the liquor Kings. The syndicates received their final setback when the army swept through the streets of Johannesburg, rounding up "undesirable immigrants" - some of them "Peruvians" - and arranging for them to be deported to Europe. The most lasting solution of all, however, came when the army occupied Pretoria. Within days of the occupation, the Military Governor ordered the closure of Hatherley Distillery and its glass factory. De Eerste Fabrieken never reopened.
In effect, the war had achieved within months what the Volksraad and the Chamber of Mines had been unable to attain in years of struggle. On their return to Johannesburg, the mining capitalists sought to secure the "progress" made under the military regime. In these attempts they enjoyed the active co-operation of the incoming British administration under Milner. Milner made use of the military presence in Johannesburg to ensure a gradual and extremely cautious resumption of the retail liquor trade. In practice, this transition to a civilian administration of the law was effectively backed by new and rigorous legislation. Milner used his powers of proclamation to issue legislation which incorporated the principle of "total prohibition" for blacks, and which outlined heavy penalties for contravention of the law. This was almost immediately followed by further legislation which effectively prevented the distillation of spirits for commercial gain in the Transvaal. The illicit sale of liquor to black miners never again became a problem on the Witwatersrand on a scale remotely comparable to the pre-war era.

All these developments left the British administration with only one more problem to solve – how to achieve a settlement with the owners of Hatherley Distillery. A commission set up to examine the problem recommended that the concession granted to the owners be cancelled, and that the owners be compensated. By the end of 1902 the terms of settlement between the owners and the government were decided upon, and during 1903 the shareholders were paid compensation that even the financial journals of the City of London considered to be generous.

Within thirty-six months the British administration had closed the Distillery and compensated its owners, passed legislation to prevent any further distilling, smashed the illicit liquor syndicates, and rendered the entire black workforce on the Rand more efficient and productive on their newly reduced wages. The contradiction within the Transvaal's capitalist development had been resolved, and the dominant mining industry had emerged triumphant. The British army and Milner had made the Witwatersrand safe for national and international capitalism.

So, if Thomas Welsh really wished to know why Africans in Lagos were allowed to drink as much liquor as they liked while those in the Transvaal were "protected" by total prohibition, then he need not have asked his question of the imperial administrators. He might have asked in the Rand Club, or in the City of London. Members there would have told him that colonial liquor laws had not to do with morals, but with money. Peasants were not workers. Not yet.

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Notes

No researcher is ever in the position of being able to say, like the pavement artist, "all my own work". This is especially true of this essay, and I am indebted to many people for their help. I would like to thank Martin Legassick, Stanley Trapido and Belinda Bozzoli for discussions with them, and for making research material available to me. My thanks are also due to G. Clarence-Smith, Juan Estebaran, Wolf Mersch and George Bozhik – their excellent Portuguese, German and Ukrainian I have distorted to my own ends.

Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>S &amp; DN</td>
<td>Standard and Diggers' News</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLC</td>
<td>Special Liquor Committee of the Chamber of Mines, 1898.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLVA</td>
<td>Witwatersrand Licensed Victuallers' Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAR</td>
<td>Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek</td>
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2. "Report of Special Liquor Committee" in Chamber of Mines of the South African Republic, Tenth Annual Report for the year ending 31 December 1898, p. 110. (This report runs from page 108 to page 115 and is referred to hereafter as "SLC Report 1898").
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 72.
7. Command 624, p. 75. From 1894 to 1898 the glass factory ran at a diminishing loss each year. By 1898 the loss was down to £2,356 for the year, and the directors expressed every hope of it returning a profit during 1899. See report on Hatherley Company in South Africa, XLII, No. 544, 27 May 1899, p. 482.
9. For detailed descriptions of Hatherley, see S & D, 14 December 1899, and 5 May 1890.
10. S & D, 5 May 1890.
11. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 24 December 1889.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 5 May 1890.
17. Ibid., 30 May 1891.
26. See entries in South African Who's Who 1902, on pp. 107, 147, 139 and 144.
29. Transvaal Leader, 24 August 1899.
30. This table is constructed from data contained in SLC Report 1898, p. 111, and Command 624, p. 73.
These imports did not prevent, and probably encouraged, the smuggling of "Cape Smoke". See, for example, the activities of J. D. Bosman of the Paarl Wine & Brandy Co., as reported in S & DN, 24 January 1891. See also the Goldberg case as reported in S & DN, 15 July 1891.

Command 624, p. 73. Also SLC Report 1898, pp. 109-110.

SLC Report 1898.

Report for the year 1894 on the Trade of the Consular District of Mozambique, p. 15.

Companhia do Assucar de Moçambique, Relatorios e Contas das Gerencias de 1895 e 1896, p. 8.

Ibid. Also Report for the year 1895 on the Trade of the Consular District of Mozambique, p. 18.


SLC Report 1898, p. 110.

Companhia do Assucar de Moçambique, Relatorios e Contas das Gerencias de 1895 e 1896, p. 24.

SLC Report 1898, p. 111.

Compare the list of distilleries as noted in Report for the year 1894 on the Trade of the Consular District of Mozambique, p. 36, with that in The Delagoa Directory for 1893 (Lourenco Marques, 1899), p. 34.

Report for the year 1895 on the Trade of the Consular District of Mozambique, p. 12.

Ibid.

SLC Report 1898, pp. 110-111.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

By 1899 this dumping of spirit in Africa had reached such proportions, and produced such cut-throat competition, that the major European powers were forced to reach agreement. See Correspondence respecting the African Liquor Traffic Convention, signed at Brussels, 8 June 1899 (HMSO, Command 9535, July 1899, Africa No. 7, 1899).

SLC Report 1898, p. 111.

For ships and cargoes to Lagos, see T. Welsh, "Contrasts in Legislation", op. cit., p. 199. For Luanda and the import of potato spirit, see Manoel Jose Martins Contreas, A Provincia de Angola (Lisbon, 1894), p. 11.

SLC Report 1898, p. 111.

For consumption within Portuguese East Africa, see Report for the year 1894 on the Trade of the Consular District of Mozambique, p. 36. (FO, 1895, Annual Series, No. 1537.) For potato spirits on the Rand, see, for example, L. S. Amery (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1900, Vol. I, p. 121.


Report for the year 1895 on the Trade of the Consular District of Mozambique, p. 11.

Transvaal Leader, 25 May 1899.

Ibid.
(61) See the description of the premises of Meskin & Davidoff in the Transvaal Leader, 25 May 1899.
(62) Ibid., 23 May 1899.
(63) Ibid. Complaints about forged cork tops and labels, however, went back to at least the early 1890s. See, for example, S & DN, 11 June 1890.
(64) Transvaal Leader, 25 May 1899.
(65) Ibid., 24 May 1899.
(66) Ibid.
(67) Ibid.
(68) Ibid., 23 May 1899.
(69) Ibid., 25 May 1899.
(70) S & DN, 29 April 1890.
(71) Ibid., 9 June 1890.
(72) See Report of the Chamber of Mines for 1895, p. 76.
(73) F. Jeppe (ed.), Jeppe's Transvaal Almanac for 1889, p. 46.
(75) See S & DN, 30 April 1889.
(76) Ibid., 6 March 1890.
(77) For examples of these activities, see ibid., 19 December 1889, 20 April 1891, and Report of the Chamber of Mines for 1895, p. 76.
(78) S & DN, 23 July 1889.
(79) See ibid., 9 April 1889.
(80) See report of meeting in ibid., 11 June 1891.
(81) Mr Montagu White, in passing sentence on a canteen-keeper who was "trapped", ibid., 24 August 1891.
(82) "It is not, however, contended by the Chamber that there should be total prohibition", Report of the Chamber of Mines for 1895, p. 77.
(83) In this I follow the analysis of Belinda Bozzoli in her Sussex D.Phil., "Ideology and the Legitimation of South African Capitalism" (Sussex, 1975).
(84) S & DN, 20 April 1891.
(85) Ibid., 12 September 1889.
(86) Report of the Chamber of Mines for 1895, p. 76.
(87) "The more censorious declared that it [Hatherley] debauched the native mine-workers, and were only half-satisfied by Kruger's reply that although the factory did unfortunately produce liquor, it provided a ready market for large quantities of the burghers' grain." J. Fisher, Paul Kruger (London, 1974), p. 161. Here it is also important to note that Hatherley bought its grain requirements solely from within the Transvaal. See Command 624 (June 1901), p. 74. Kruger would also have had personal reasons for protecting the Distillery. The State President sold produce from his own farm to the Marks factory. See, for example, S & DN, 30 April 1890. Lastly, there was Kruger's personal friendship with Marks. The State President liked Hatherley enough to spend at least one Christmas there, see C. T. Gordon, The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger 1890-1895 (London, 1970), p. 196.
(88) S & DN, 2 July 1889.
(89) S & DN, 11 July 1889. In 1899 Johannesburg was served by 570 policemen. See South Africa XXIII, No. 545, 3 June 1899, p. 560.
(90) See the report on a Chamber of Mines deputation to the Minister of Mines on this point, S & DN, 5 March 1891.
(91) See the remarks of Montagu White in ibid., 24 August 1891.
(92) See S & DN, 11 June 1891, and L. S. Amery (ed), The Times History of the War, p. 121. For more specific cases and names, see, for example, Transvaal Leader, 8 June 1899 and 11 July 1899.

(93) E. P. Rathbone to editor S & DN, 23 May 1891.

(94) For an example of a European death in Pretoria due to consumption of Hatherley products, see the letter from "R.N." to the editor S & DN, 10 November 1891. After noting that the corpse had been dragged away by the police, "R.N." observed: "Is it not time this poison was officially recognised in the British Pharmacopeia? I would suggest first, that the name remain as it is, that the active principle of the drug be known as Nellmapatine, and that a person under its influence be described as being Nellmapatineised."

(95) J. N. Bovill, Natives under the Transvaal Flag, pp. 36-37.

(96) See, for example, Report of the Chamber of Mines for 1896, p. 115.


(101) S & DN, 28 April 1890.

(102) Ibid., 11 June 1891.


(104) Ibid., p. 74.


(106) S & DN, 11 June 1891.

(107) Landdrost van den Berg consistently fought the illicit liquor dealers, and for this he earned the support of the mine owners and Smuts. See J. van der Poel and W. K. Hancock (eds), Selections for the Smuts Papers, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 194-195 (hereafter Smuts Papers). It is interesting to note that van den Berg was the only republican civil servant to continue in service with the Milner administration. See D. Denoon, A Grand Illusion (London, 1973), p. 45.

(108) Compare the sentence passed in the courts and noted in the following editions of the S & DN: 3 September 1889, 6 May 1890, and 14 July 1891.


(112) J. P. FitzPatrick, op. cit., p. 98.

(113) Ibid., p. 99.


(116) W. S. Cohn to the editor, Transvaal Leader, 5 May 1899.


(118) Ibid.

(119) Ibid.

(120) Ibid. More generally, see Command 624, p. 73.

(122) Ibid.
(123) See Command 624, p. 75.
(125) Ibid., pp. 125-126.
(126) Ibid., p. 125.
(127) For placement of shares on the Bourse, see ibid., p. 126. For the names of those on the Paris and London Committees, see, for example, annual report on Hatherley Distillery in South Africa, XLVII, No. 614, 29 September 1900, p. 612.
(128) Ibid.
(129) For this meeting, see J. Ploeger, "Die Maatskappy", op. cit., p. 125. The fact that the final price was £10,000 more than that noted by Ploeger can be deduced from the figures provided in Command 624, p. 74.
(131) See, for example, Command 624, p. 73.
(132) See W. S. Cohn to the Editor, Transvaal Leader, 5 May 1899. Also J. Ploeger, "Die Maatskappy", op. cit., p. 126.
(133) Ploeger, loc. cit.
(134) Ibid.
(135) See The Delagoa Directory for 1899 (Lourenço Marques, 1899), p. 34 – list of distilleries.
(142) Novi Ukrainski Pnpi Pro Hromadsku Spravu 1764-1880 (Geneva 1881), pp. 111-112.
(143) Report of the Chamber of Mines for 1895, p. 76.
(146) Transvaal Leader, 30 June 1899. Needless to say, this figure is, at very best, probably a crude estimate.
(147) S & DN, 9 October 1891. For Joe Mendelsohn's alleged involvement in the illicit liquor trade, see Transvaal Leader, 19 June 1899.
(148) E. B. Rose, op. cit., p. 49.
(149) Transvaal Leader, 19 June 1899.
(150) See, for example, South Africa, Vol. XI, 11.
(151) Transvaal Leader, 19 June 1899.
(152) Ibid.
(153) Ibid.
(154) Ibid., 29 April 1899.
(155) Ibid.
Rival syndicates could either inform on each other or "arrange" for police raids on unwelcome competitors. See ibid., 29 April 1899, for informers. For a clash between Liquor Kings after a raid, see South Africa, Vol. 37, No. 478, 19 February 1898, p. 350. See also the account of how the syndicates organized in the Transvaal Leader, 30 June 1899.

See Transvaal Leader, 8 June 1899 and 5 June 1899.

It was also the Boksburg district which was of great concern to Smuts. See the State Attorney's strongly worded letter to the Boksburg Public Prosecutor in J. van der Poel and W. K. Hancock (eds), Smuts Papers, p. 192.

See Transvaal Leader, 5 June 1899.

See also South Africa, Vol. 40, No. 517, 19 November 1898, p. 356.

See, for example, South Africa, Vol. XII, No. 522, 27 December 1898, p. 624, or ibid., Vol. XIII, No. 545, 3 June 1899, p. 560.

See, for example, Transvaal Leader, 5 June 1899.

See also South Africa, XIII, No. 546, 10 June 1899, p. 629.

And E. B. Rose, op. cit., p. 48.

South Africa, XL, No. 517, 19 November 1898, p. 356. Also Transvaal Leader, 1 May 1899.

See, for example, Transvaal Leader of 1 May 1899 and 5 June 1899.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 104.

Ibid., p. 102.

Ibid., p. 103.

Ibid., p. 105.

Ibid., pp. 106-107.

Ibid., p. 124.

SIC Report 1898, p. 112.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 109.

Ibid., p. 112.

See J. van der Poel and W. K. Hancock (eds), Smuts Papers, I, p. 191.

See Transvaal Leader, 23 June 1899, 4 July 1899, and 15 July 1899.

W. S. Cohn to the editor, Transvaal Leader, 5 May 1899.

Transvaal Leader, 1 May 1899.

See, for example, ibid., 8 May 1899. More generally, see E. B. Rose, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

See, for example, events at the Jumpers mine described in the Transvaal Leader, 5 June 1899. As State Attorney, Smuts instructed his Boksburg Public Prosecutor: "If the private detective bureau traps a liquor shop, you must do your utmost to assist it." J. van der Poel and W. K. Hancock (eds), Smuts Papers, I, p. 192.
(229) Transvaal Leader, 26 August 1899.
(232) Ibid.
(234) Ibid.
(237) Ibid.
(238) Ibid., XLVII, No. 614, 29 September 1900, p. 620.
(239) Ibid., XLVII, No. 609, 25 August 1900, p. 398.
(240) Ibid., XLVII, No. 614, 29 September 1900, p. 627.
(241) Ibid., XLIX, No. 635, 23 February 1901, p. 433.
(242) Ibid., XLIX, No. 635, 23 February 1901, p. 476.
(243) Ibid., XLVI, No. 591, 21 April 1900, p. 125.
(244) Ibid., XLVI, No. 591, 21 April 1900, p. 125.
(245) Ibid., XLVII, No. 605, 28 July 1900, p. 201.
(247) Ibid. For Brown's piece in the Scotsman, see report in South Africa, L, No. 649, 1 June 1901, p. 457.
(249) Ibid., p. 126.
(250) Ibid., p. 133. This theme died hard in the Transvaal and was resuscitated when Chinese labour supplies were threatened. See Tvl., Report of the Liquor Commission 1908, para. 103. See also the "reservations" of T. N. De Villiers and G. G. Munnik.
(252) Ibid., LII, No. 667, 5 October 1901.
(256) South Africa, LIII, No. 681, 11 January 1902.
(258) South Africa, L, No. 651, 15 June 1901, p. 583.
(261) South Africa, LVII, No. 739, 21 February 1903, p. 610.
(263) Ibid.
(264) Ibid.
(265) See, for example, George Rude's Paris and London in the 18th Century (London, 1969).

(267) Speech read on "The Transvaal Labour Problem" by F. Perry to the Fortnightly Club, 1 November 1906.

(268) See the Report of the Chamber of Mines for 1904, p. 54 - "Kaffir Beer". When it was proposed that ordinary beer be sold to African miners, however, the Chamber of Mines objected to a trade over which it would not have personal control: see Report of the Chamber of Mines for 1907, pp. 12-13. See also footnote 250 above.

(269) W. S. Cohn to the editor, Transvaal Leader, 5 May 1899.