The theme of this paper is the array of legislation controlling African tenancy on white-owned farmland. This legislation spread from South Africa (the Cape, 1869; Natal, 1896; Transvaal, 1887; Orange Free State, 1893; Zimbabwe, 1908; Malawi, 1917; Kenya, 1918). In each case, the legislation had a common purpose—to deny to Africans use of white-owned land, except in the capacity of labourers. In each case, the form the legislation took, although derived from South African practice, was determined by the particular constellation of forces in the political economy at the time. The core of this study is an examination of the Southern Rhodesia Private Locations Ordinance (PLO) of 1908, and of its application. There are three levels of discussion. At the regional level, I have drawn on recent published and on some unpublished material which seems to me to be worth bringing together. At the level of white Rhodesian politics, I have looked in more detail at the manipulations which went into the making and implementation of the legislation. And at the local level, I have examined its implementation in one particular district, Melsetter-Chippinga, in the south-east of Zimbabwe.

Labour tenancy was a relation of serfdom which emerged wherever white farmers with limited capital took land from agricultural peoples. It is argued in this paper that in the colonial context it was inherently an unstable relation of production. The development of capitalism in urban, rural and mining areas tended to undermine all forms of tenancy, and tended to create landless proletariats, both urban and rural. But while an effective attack was mounted on other forms of African tenancy on white-owned land, white farmers, by virtue of their disproportionate influence in the legislative process, were able to protect, support and continue artificially the relation of labour tenancy. And, whereas rent and share-cropping tenancy ended through legislative action, labour tenancy, by contrast, ended gradually when the development of capitalist farming made this particular form of labour exploitation uneconomic to the capitalist farmer, and not because of political or ideological reasons. Politically, tenant legislation was enacted as a compromise between mature and incipient forms of white capitalism at the expense of the African peasantry.

The remainder of the paper is in three parts: the economic conditions of labour tenancy; the spread of legislation and the Southern Rhodesian PLO; and the ending of labour tenancy.
I. The Economic Conditions of Labour Tenancy

When white farmers took land, they also gained control of the people on it. This allowed them to extract surplus labour in a variety of ways. They benefited from invested labour in the past, in the form of cleared and cultivated land, and they were enabled to extract a share of the crops grown, or rent in cash, or labour directly. These alternatives obtained from the Cape to Kenya. Both rent tenancy and share-cropping occurred in the context of existing capitalist penetration and a cash economy. Rent tenancy and share-cropping were practised by absentee landowners; rent tenancy was particularly practised by large-scale land speculators in slump periods when the value of their initial investment had fallen (2), whereas share-cropping was practised by landowners at all levels of capital accumulation, from indigent Boer farmers (3) to the substantial British Central Africa Company in Malawi, the only requirement, it seems, being that the European owner had access to a market, whether international, urban or local.

Both rent tenancy and share-cropping occurred in the context of the development of an African peasantry. This class emerged first in the Cape in the late eighteenth century (4) but developed from the late 1860s, and in Natal about the same time, in the Boer territories from the 1880s, in Zimbabwe from the 1890s, in the Shire Highlands of Malawi from the first decade of this century, and in Kenya from the beginning of the century to the 1920s in the White Highlands, continuing later elsewhere. (5) The rise of the peasantry was partly a voluntary response to market opportunities and partly a way of meeting tax and other obligations without having to work directly for the colonizers. There was no necessary opposition between the rise of the peasantry and a section of the mercantile or financier community. (6) There was partial opposition between the interests of the peasantry and those of the capitalist sector who wished to employ wage labour, particularly if large quantities of unskilled labour at very low rates were required. But there was complete opposition between the rise of a peasantry under conditions of rent-tenancy and share-cropping and the interests of white farmers. As commercialization of white farming increased, and as land became an increasingly important factor of production as against labour, this opposition to an independent peasantry increased accordingly.

Labour tenancy, however, was a relation which was strongly favoured by the conditions of white settler-farmers, particularly in the early stages when land (for whites) was plentiful and capital was scarce. In the first few decades of farming, white farmers were far from using all the land they owned. This was particularly the case with Boers in South Africa, and when they expanded into Zimbabwe or Kenya. The treks of the 1890s into Zimbabwe comprised men who had little more than possessions in an ox-wagon, and debts at home. (7) Although from the early years of this century the Southern Rhodesian and Kenyan authorities made efforts to exclude the indigent (bywoner) element, such men often secured large farms in the early period. The result was labour intensive farming practices.

Such white farmers were unwilling to pay for wage labour where they could avoid it. They might pay their transport riders and skilled workers, but for seasonal and unskilled labour — road-making, planting, weeding, reaping, herding, making irrigation channels, putting up grain stores and the like — they found it convenient and profitable to use labour tenants. Such pioneer farmers were technically and managerially unskilled and their farms were often very poorly managed. They were often incapable of making efficient, planned use of the services of their workers. Hence the convenient solution of labour tenancy, which in its primitive "Boer" stage bound tenants to work "when called on". The resistance of farmers in the Cape, in Natal, and particularly in Rhodesia, to pressure to regularize their labour contracts by specifying the periods for which their labourers would be required (pressure which came both from tenants and from the urban/mining sector through the Native Department) illustrates this. Farmers resisted specifying labour terms not only from some primitive feudal urge to "own" their tenants but because of their managerial inefficiency. Much of their work was done on an ad hoc, piece-work basis. But labour which was unpaid or paid at extremely low wages was the principal reason for the adoption of the system.
The preference of farmers to make their own agreements directly with tenants can be illustrated from the patterns which developed in Zimbabwe following the defeat of the 1896-7 Risings. When peace negotiations were concluded in October 1896, the Ndebele "were starving, their lands unplanted". (8) Whites had swarmed into their country, pegging it off into farms. (9) The reserves which were declared not with the intention of shooting them. (15) The objects of the proclamation were presumably to distribute the Ndebele evenly so that their political power would be broken and so that every white farmer would be assured of a supply of resident labour after a grace period (originally two years, but the settlers and the company reduced it to one). Thus, large concentrations of people would be broken up. The Proclamation allowed for Native Department vetting of annually renewable labour agreements and ensuring that residents had the opportunity and the land to cultivate their own crops. (10) Groups of less than seven families did not constitute a location and therefore did not come under the terms of the Proclamation. (11)

The Southern Rhodesian administration was thus attempting to interpose, between the settlers and the people, administrative control to ensure a docile labour force and a required minimum of employer responsibility. But farmers had no wish to see the Native Department come between them and their tenants, and they therefore "concluded agreements" with their tenants on a local basis, and not in terms of the Proclamation. In Matabeleland in 1907 there were only 154 official agreements, covering nearly 40,000 tenants, and in Mashonaland 11 agreements covering just over 700 tenants. Even the Matabeleland agreements were admitted not to be strictly in terms of the Proclamation. (12)

What kind of private "agreements" did tenants have imposed on them? For example, in the very earliest years of farming settlement, there is a full account of Melsetter District, when a meeting was held to clarify the triad of relationships between farmers (who had trekked into the area in the preceding two years), tenants, and the newly arrived Native Commissioner (NC). One farmer paid his herdsmen a two-year-old heifer at the end of a year, semi-skilled workers such as brick-makers five shillings per month, while casual labourers had to provide free labour for the "right" of living on the farm. G. B. B. Moodie, the leader of the settlers, paid those "who work by the month"; but "those who do gang work have to do it for the right of squatting on my farm". Another farmer testified that a certain amount of work, such as "hoeing mealies", was performed for "nothing but the right of staying on my farm". Another divided his tenants into eight or nine gangs, coming in rotation for a week at a time "for the right of staying on my ground". (13)

What compelled the tenants to remain under such circumstances? First, the fact that farmers had chosen already populated land (14); then, also, because almost all the attractive farming land was quickly earmarked for European occupation, and what was left over, subsequently to become reserves, was dry, with poor soil. But, even so, many farmers found that their tenants resisted, either by refusing to work or by running away. The refusal was dealt with by a celebrated case of public beating which was a symbolic assertion of settler power and Native Department powerlessness. Sometimes it was dealt with by crude fire-power. "I have tried every way to get boys", wrote one farmer. "I have been obliged to fire on 2 of them, but not with the intention of shooting them." (15)

Over time, crude force became supplanted by legal and economic pressure. It would appear that the Masters and Servants Ordinance (5/1901, 1/1902) was not effective, nor was the Pass and Registration legislation (16/1901, 10/1902, 11/1902, 12/1904) where vague agreements such as those above were in force. But large areas of land were under white control. Moreover, farmers in a certain district all tended to exact the same kinds of demands on their tenants, so that there was little benefit for a tenant in moving from one farm to another. This tended to stabilize the labour tenant situation. Thus, in Enkeldoorn, a heavily settled Afrikaner farming area in the Midlands, the commonest rate was 10/- per month, or one month's labour; in Salisbury, £1 rent or four months's work at 10/- per month; in Umtali, £1 rent, 10/- rebated to 10/- if the tenant worked "when called upon"; in South Masoe, another
heavily farmed area north of Salisbury, 3 months at 10/- per month. (16) By this stage, in Melsetter the unpaid "agreements" had been replaced with a wage of 5/- per month for three months or payment of the £1 tax in lieu. (17)

The first stage of labour tenancy can therefore be characterized as that of farmers' resistance to state interference through legislation. Informal agreements were possible because the competition from urban and mining sectors was not so great as to deprive farmers of their labour tenants. Conflicting interests could be resolved by compromise. For example, in 1906 the Matobo (Matabeleland) branch of the Rhodesian Land Owners' and Farmers' Association (RLOFA) failed in its attempt to transfer the issue of urban passes from the NC to the farmer himself. Instead, farmers were allowed to endorse passes so that before an NC allowed an African to go to town to seek work he could be sure that the labour tenancy obligations had been fulfilled.

II. The Pressure for Legislation

Legislation does not mirror a working system. It is created when a system begins to break down. It reflects the interests of the powerful, and where these interests are divided, legislation may well emerge as confused, inconsistent and ineffective. The horse was created by God, but the camel was designed by a committee. The 1908 PLO was a camel.

But, before we look at the legislation itself, we must examine the conditions which led to its being considered necessary. It appears that these conditions developed first in the Cape, and as they spread north through South Africa to Zimbabwe, Malawi and Kenya, Cape legislation became a model to be adapted to local conditions. Four conditions were necessary and sufficient. The first was the penetration of finance capital into land, leading to the accumulation of large estates for the purpose of speculation, and hence also to the rise of rent tenancy and share-cropping. The second was severe labour competition from mines and urban areas. The third was a differentiation of capitalization within white farming, with the more highly capitalized farmers becoming particularly hostile both to the casual labour tenancy agreements and to the rentier landlords. The less capitalised farmers, still depending on labour tenancy, were forced to accept State regulation of their feudal relations of production. It was from this highly capitalised group that the vociferous ideological attack on "squatting" and "Kaffir farming" came. These were pejorative and emotional terms, used to attack rentier landlord and share-cropping interests, and from the Cape to Nairobi the rhetoric was remarkable for its similarity. "Squatters" were people resident on the land of other white landowners (one's own residents were "boys"). They were a danger and a nuisance, and a damage to the economy. "Kaffir farmers" were those rentier interests who profited from them. They were parasitic on the community. The rhetoric was an attack directed at African access to land as a means of production, at the African peasantry. The final condition necessary for legislation was that this voice should have effective political power to translate its ideology into legislation.

There is not space here to discuss the spread, differentiation and frequent amendment of legislation from the Cape to Natal, the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Kenya. (It was considered in Zambia, but there the settler voice was too weak to stand up to labour demands from the south.) But the patterns show a remarkable similarity. The 1903-1905 South African Native Affairs Commission saw only two solutions to the "problem" of Africans on land which had been taken by whites: to regulate their occupation, or to remove them. (19) Throughout each of the territories discussed, first one and then the other was done. Except for a brief period in Malawi, and to a limited extent, there was no third option of tenant protection.
We may now place the PLO of 1908 in this wide perspective. In the standard History of Southern Rhodesia, Gann discusses the Native Department's concern over rackrenting and suggests, by continuing immediately with the statement that "the Government passed an ordinance which did away with the worst abuses" (20), that the PLO was a piece of reforming legislation initiated by the concern of the Native Department for the welfare of the tenants. An examination of the detailed evidence indicates that this view is false. It was a political victory - and a major one - for settler farmers against speculative finance capital, on the one hand, and the African peasantry, on the other.

The Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) did indeed draw the attention of the Administrator to the connection between rackrenting and the Natal disturbances of 1906, and the CNC Mashonaland agreed on the need for compulsory legislation. But a survey of opinion among Matabeleland NCs revealed wide differences of opinion. One extreme stressed the "landlord's liberty to exact anything he likes". The other stressed the dominant contribution tenants were making to the colonial revenue and economy and argued for the maximum protection of their interests. In the face of such diversity of opinion, the Administration thought that there was no good reason to proceed with the proposed legislation. (21)

Later in 1907, however, the High Commissioner inquired about reports of tenant discontent over high rents in Inyanga, and the Administrator was able to reply that legislation controlling tenancy was under consideration. (22) What had caused the Administration to change its earlier view that legislation was not necessary? The answer is that the voice of the settlers at a time when white farming was becoming a major concern was much less easy to ignore than the voice of the NCs. When the British South Africa Company directors visited Rhodesia in 1907, they received a deputation from RLOFA which called for legislation to restrict African occupation of white farms. Thus, far more than the protection of tenant interests by definite contracts, was what the Administration was prepared to consider. (23) The Administration therefore undertook to give favourable consideration to a Private Locations Ordinance. The Ordinance which was finally passed in 1908 was significantly different from the proposed Bill. An examination of the process of the actual framing of the final ordinance reveals the extent to which the white settlers got their own way. The Native Department did indeed include men, particularly the two NCs, of a certain stern humanitarian sympathy with the "condition of the Natives", and they hoped to be able to intervene in and regulate landlord-tenant regulations. As a relatively autonomous department, coming directly under the Administrator, they were entitled to be consulted about legislation affecting the African population. The Colonial Office, too, had its watch-dog. But events showed that it was the settler view which prevailed on almost every count.

The Bill repealed the High Commissioner's Proclamation of 1896. Its original drafting provided for three things. First, under Section 2, the Administrator had complete control of the conditions under which Africans resided on white farms, except where they were in continuous employment. The PLO applied to all tenants, whether the landowners were occupier-farmers or "Kaffir-farmers". Second, there were fairly wide powers for the Native Department in ensuring clear and secure terms of tenancy, under agreements which were compulsory, witnessed by the local NC, and enforceable with penalties against both parties. The NC had to satisfy himself that the tenants had sufficient land and that they understood the terms. He had right of entry to the location. There were safeguards against sudden or arbitrary eviction. Third, there was a deterrent to leasing land for rent, by a differential fee: 1/- per tenant for an "occupied" farm and 5/- per tenant for absentee landlords. There were penalties for exceeding the maximum size of location, which was 40 male adults per 1500 morgen (about 3000 acres). (24)

The Bill embodied the views of the NCs, and was an administrative compromise between their views and those of the settler farmers who wished simply to attack rentier landlords and the peasantry. When the Administrator forwarded the Bill to the High Commissioner for comments, he remarked rather misleadingly that the views of the Bulawayo farmers were "endorsed by the Chief Native Commissioner". (25) But subsequent events showed that the settlers had quite different ideas in mind.
The rentier landlords objected to the Bill, too, and protested vehemently that there was no need for legislation at all. By threatening evictions, they held up the implementation of the PLO until 1910. But they were unable, lacking an effective political voice, to alter the PLO or to prevent its passage. (26)

The elected settler representatives in the Legislative Council, however, soon got their teeth into the Bill, and worried at it until it emerged a very mangled Ordinance. Almost every clause which gave the Native Department an interest in the Bill was removed. Their power to ensure that tenants had sufficient arable land was removed on the grounds that they were "going too far in the so called protection of the native". Tenants' protection from sudden or arbitrary eviction was deleted. Instead, the Administrator was empowered to evict people considered "undesirable" by neighbouring farmers. Labour tenancy, originally to come under the Ordinance, was excluded, by altering a provision which had originally excluded only tenants in "continuous" employment. Under the Ordinance as passed, Section 2 excluded from the definition any tenants who were in employment, continuous or not. (27) Finally, the settler representatives, anxious to secure as large a potential supply of labour as possible, altered the original intention of the Bill, which had been to prohibit locations of more than 40 people. Under a new Section 13, which they inserted, the Administrator could permit locations of any size "provided no burden is imposed on such natives in respect of such residence, either by way of payment of rent, supply of labour below the ordinary rate of wage, or otherwise". (28) This last provision let the Administration off an uncomfortable hook, because they were spared the necessity of facing large-scale evictions and finding land on which to settle people so evicted, and so they concurred.

The wording of the Ordinance was now unclear, because many farmers who had labour tenants did indeed impose a burden on them by requiring unpaid labour as a condition of tenancy. Were they exempt from the Ordinance, as was stated in Section 2? Or were they subject to the Ordinance, thereby having to register their tenants in agreements under the supervision of the Native Department, as implied in Section 13? The Attorney General and the Resident Commissioner, watch-dog of Imperial interests, both noted the inconsistency, but the Ordinance was allowed to stand in its confused state. It was finally promulgated in 1910, after the Colonial Office was convinced that widespread evictions and hardship to tenants would not result. (29)

Over the next twenty years the Native Department engaged in a battle with settler farmers and with the Administration in its attempt to ensure that tenants resident on white-owned land who paid rent, or who were labour tenants, were on terms which were written, and understood. They were aided by an opinion of the Attorney General, who ruled that in order to be exempt from the PLO a farmer should have his tenants "at a fixed rate of wages and for a fixed ... period [and] the labourer should have the right of having his services accepted and paid for during that period". (30) They had little trouble in Matabeleland, where commercial capitalized farming was more developed and farmers were willing to accept such terms. But the Melsetter farmers, in a remoter area of the country and in a much more primitive stage of capital accumulation, held staunchly to their local practices and signed agreements with their tenants under increasing protest. Their protests were upheld by a reversal of the Attorney General's earlier opinion, and the Administrator ruled that local (settler) custom should be observed. If the tenants did not like it, they could move elsewhere. Since moving elsewhere involved moving on to unattractive, overcrowded and arid land, the tenants by and large were forced to like it. Thus, Melsetter was exempt from the PLO. (32)

The Native Department did not give up its attempts. In 1915 a new Assistant NC came to Melsetter, a man with some humanitarian sympathy for the position of tenants in the District, and he managed to gain the support of the CNC in an attempt to bring the District under the PLO. He wanted to force the local farmers to engage their tenants for three months' continuous service at paid rates. This would certainly have been popular with the tenants, as they would have been able to earn wages elsewhere without losing their homes and gardens. (33) But the Attorney General was adamant that the Ordinance was not to be used for the protection of tenants in this way, and the Administrator, Chaplin, concurred. (34)
The Native Department did not give up its fight to use the PLO as an instrument to improve the lot of the labour tenant. In 1921 the Melsetter Native Department tried to prosecute a farmer in a test case of their power to enforce the PLO, but the Attorney General declined to prosecute. (35) From 1927 the Umtali Native Department, just to the north, developed a similar concern, and succeeded in bringing a farmer to court under the PLO for failure to pay adequate wages. In 1931 the conviction was sustained, and the Native Department had finally gained the power to use the PLO as an instrument of reform. (36) It was one year too late. In 1930 the Land Apportionment Act had abolished the PLO agreements.

III. The Ending of Labour Tenancy

The attack on rent tenancy and share-cropping had been an ideological one, using legislation as an instrument of control. In contrast, the ending of labour tenancy was piecemeal, and came about through economic pressures. The pressures were due to increased capitalization of farming and diversification at a time when labour was becoming dearer, land more valuable, and capital easier to obtain through subsidies and loans and the involvement of the state in marketing operations. Under these circumstances, there was pressure to increase the burdens on the labour tenants, to move towards a system of full-time wage labour, and to develop a rural proletariat. Thus in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya, particularly from the 1930s, there were increased pressures towards the eviction of tenants. It seems to me to be inappropriate to characterize this process, where it was legislated, as one of reform, which is how Pachai sees the Malawi legislation of 1952 and 1954. (37) As A. J. P. Taylor has remarked appositely in another context, it was not so much a matter of freeing the serfs from the land as of freeing the land of the serfs.

The Land Apportionment Act (LAA) of 1930 in Zimbabwe shows the extent to which the balance of power had moved to the side of the farmer and against the tenant. Under the LAA, labour agreements could still be made between landholder and tenant, but since the main aim of the Act was to end African occupation of what was declared European land, the element of tenant protection was withdrawn. While the Native Department was trying, with little success, to use the PLO for its aims, the settler-farmers were trying to use it for their ends. The success with which they did so is vividly illustrated in Melsetter. After the First World War, farmers had overcome their initial doubts about the PLO and had begun to see in it a way of preventing the migration of their tenants to the mines. They therefore came under it, one by one and voluntarily, while resisting any attempt to enforce it on them against their will. (39) In 1924 the Eastern Districts representative in the Legislative Assembly successfully proposed an amendment to the PLO which would make the tenant's non-fulfilment of his labour agreement a punishable offence. (39) The Native Department forced an administrative compromise whereby labour agreements were endorsed on the Registration Certificate, making the holder liable to penalties under the Masters and Servants Ordinance. (40)

The coming of the LAA of 1930 brought little change to the Melsetter situation. Under it, Melsetter farmers were given the special concession of being allowed to retain their tenants under labour agreements which were subject to the approval of the new Land Board, under the chairmanship of the CNC, then Col. Carbutt. Carbutt's instinctive reaction, despite his crusty conservatism, was to object to all vague agreements where the tenants had to work for the landholder without pay, on the grounds that it would "impoarish" the tenants. But when he discovered how widespread the agreements were, and that forcing farmers to pay wages would result in the eviction of tenants to the "torrid lands of the Native Purchase area and the Native Reserves", he quickly gave way, approved all the Melsetter agreements, and confirmed the tenants in their unenviable position. (41)

Melsetter's ten-year period of grace elapsed in 1941, and the revised LAA brought all labour agreements under Government approval and annual review. The Eastern Districts Legislative Assembly representative obtained an amendment deleting a minimum wage proposal for the post-1941 Agreements. (42) Thus, when the Native
Department found itself with formal, legal control over the agreements in 1941, it was control without teeth, because there were no standards specified of what kinds of agreement were acceptable. In any case, within a few years, the post-war boom brought considerable prosperity to white farming, and with it the increasing employment of labourers from Mozambique and Malawi. Thus, for thirty years, the chief effect of the PLO in the District was as a legislative aid to poor white farmers, to secure them a docile labour supply at their own convenience.

The PLO was not, and never was intended to be, an instrument of reform. The fate of the attempts of the Native Department to use it as such bear ample witness to that conclusion. As elsewhere, it was the product of the rise of commercial farming. It was a victory for local capitalist interests over finance capital and speculative landholding. It was a move to provide an increased labour supply by attacking the basis of African peasantry, and it became transformed into an act to enforce labour tenancy at a time when it would otherwise have begun to dissolve away. It was an essential element in the primitive accumulation of capital by settler farmers.

Notes

(1) I should like to thank particularly Neil Parsons, Robin Palmer, Richard Hodder-Williams and Richard Moorson for helping to clarify the ideas which went into this paper. None of them is responsible for the conclusions. A lengthier version was presented to the EASSC conference at Dar es Salaam in December 1976.


(4) Monica Wilson, "The Growth of Peasant Communities" in ibid., p. 48.


For the post-1896 settlement, see R. H. Palmer, "War and Land in Rhodesia", Transafrican Journal of History 1, 2 (July 1971), 43-62; and the comprehensive account in his Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia (Heinemann, 1977).

National Archives of Rhodesia (NAR), LO 5/6/1, Administrator (Grey) to Resident Commissioner (Martin), 20.6.1896; LO 5/6/2, Administrator to Resident Commissioner, 11.7.1896; High Commissioner to Resident Commissioner, 16.7.1896. All file references, unless otherwise specified, are to this archive.

In contrast to P. Mason (The Birth of a Dilemma: the conquest and settlement of Rhodesia [London: OUP, 1958]), who states erroneously that not more than seven families constituted a location. The opposite was the case. Mason's account of labour tenancy is inaccurate in a number of respects.


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A 2/5/4, Administrator to Resident Commissioner, 17.12.07; by 1903 there were an estimated 63,000 under such agreements: Cape of Good Hope, South African Native Affairs Commission: Report, 1900-1905, 6 Vols: I, 23-24 (SANAC).

The meeting was attended by 18 farmers, two officials and three missionaries.

NUE 2/1/1, Native Commissioner (NC) to Chief Native Commissioner (CNC), 13.10.1895; NUE 2/1/2, NC to CNC 20.10.1897.

DM 2/7/1, Fetherstone to Henry 5.1.1897.

A 3/21/71, Private Secretary (Administrator) to RC, 29.10.1908, summarizing the responses of NCs to a questionnaire.


SANAC, I, 31.

Gann, History of Southern Rhodesia, p. 191.

A 3/21/65, CNC to Chief Secretary, 31.8.1906 and subsequent correspondence; CNC Matabeleland to Chief Secretary, 7.12.1906 and subsequent correspondence.

RC 2/2/4, NO to Administrator, 1.10.1907; A 2/5/5, Administrator to RC, 17.12.1907.

A 3/21/71, Atg. Administrator to RC, 4.5.1909, in contrast to the expressed opinion of the CNC Mashonaland.

A 3/21/71, 0.0.2 of 1908.

A 2/5/4, Administrator to NO, 13.7.1907.

A 3/21/71, Secretary, Chamber of Mines, to Sec. Admin., 15.6.1908. A body called the Rhodesian Landowners corporation was formed to present the views of the rentier landlords in opposition to the RLOFA. Correspondence relating to their campaign may be found in RC 2/4/10; RC 2/5/5; RC 2/4/11; A 3/21/71; A 3/21/73 and RC 3/3/18.


Mason, Birth of a dilemma, pp. 266-267, is wrong on this point when he interprets it as a clause put in by the Administration over the objections of the farmers. The Legislative Debates show clearly that it was the wishes of the farmers which prevailed at this point.

In the Public Record Office, London, the considerations which led the Secretary of State to hold up the Ordinance may be followed in CO 417/452-454.

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A 3/21/73, Admin. to CNC, 7.10.1910; CNC to Admin., 10.10.1910.

N 3/16/8/2, NO Melsetter to SN Umtali, 14.5.1912 and subsequent correspondence; N 9/1/13, NC Melsetter, Annual Report 1910.


(34)  N 3/16/8/2, Attorney General to Admin., 15.1.1916 and subsequent correspondence.

(35)  S 138/81, R. v. Steyn (committed for trial 18.6.1921); opinion of Attorney General, 25.8.1921.

(36)  S 138/11; NC Umtali to CNC, 24.9.1927; R. H. B. Dickson to NC Umtali, 1.2.1930; to Governor, 15.3.1921; to CNC, 2.2.1933.


(38)  NC Annual Reports, 1916, 1921; CNC Annual Reports, 1911-1916.

(39)  Legislative Assembly Debates, 4.7.1924, cols. 670-673.

(40)  S 138/11, CNC to Secretary to Premier, 15.11.1924 and subsequent correspondence.

(41)  S 138/11, CNC to Secretary to Premier, 17.3.1931 and subsequent correspondence; Land Board Minute 18, 6.5.1931.

(42)  Legislative Assembly Debates, 24.6.1941, cols. 1651-1654.