NATAL, THE ZULU ROYAL FAMILY AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SEGREGATION

by

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On the 18th October 1913 Dinbulu ka Cetshwayo, son of the last Zulu king, died in exile on a farm in the Middelburg district of the Transvaal. In response to the condolences of the Government conveyed by the local magistrate, Mankulumana, his aged adviser, who had shared Dinbulu's trials and had voluntarily shared his exile, remarked with some justification:

It is you [meaning the Government] who killed the one we have now buried, you killed his father, and killed him. We did not invade your country, but you invaded ours. I fought for the dead man's father, we were beaten, you took our King away, but the Queen sent him back to us, and we were happy. The one whom we now mourn did no wrong. There is no bone which will not decay. What we now ask is, as you have killed the father, to take care of the children. (1)

For the next twenty years Dinbulu's son and heir, Solomon, engaged in a prolonged struggle, first to be recognized as chief of the Usuthu, as his father's most immediate followers were known, and then to be recognized as the Zulu paramount, by the Natal authorities and the Union government. Despite the fact that he gained considerable support both at the level of central government and from a coalition of interests in Zululand itself, the strong opposition of the Natal administration prevented the realization of his demands; after his death and during the minority of his potential heirs, his brother Mshiyeni, who had worked for some time in Natal, and who was believed to be "most anxious to obtain the good opinion of the government and most amenable to the control of the Native Commissioner" (2), was accorded some wider recognition as Social Head of the Zulu Nation and Regent. After a drawn-out succession dispute between Solomon's heirs in the 1940s, his son, Cy-prian, was recognized as chief of the Zulu section in 1946 (3); a couple of years later the Nationalist government installed him "with great acclamation" as paramount, in response to their new imperatives. (4)

Given the importance of members of the Zulu royal family in the contemporary politics of the Republic, and of the role of chiefs in general in the various forms of control in 20th century southern Africa, the earlier years of this struggle for recognition and the political alliances it generated are not without interest. Not only does the story contribute to recent discussion on the origins and dynamic of segregationism in South Africa, and perhaps illuminate through its narrow focus some relatively neglected aspects of this debate; at a wider level it would also appear to provide support for Poulantzas's view that "dominant
ideology does not simply reflect the conditions of the dominant class ... but rather the concrete relations between the dominant and the dominated classes in a social formation". (5)

In a series of important articles, Martin Legassick first put forward the proposition that segregation was a set of policies specifically designed to cope with the strains of a society in the throes of industrialization, an ideology most clearly formulated initially during the reconstruction period in South Africa and devised to resolve the problems aroused in the context of the mining industry by the increased proletarianization of the African work force. (6) More recently, he has shown the role of key thinkers like Howard Pim, C. T. Loram and R. F. Hoernle in refining this ideology in the inter-war years, and with others has suggested that segregation can best be seen as the "superstructural corollary of the articulation of a dominant capitalism mode of production, with the non-capitalist mode of the African 'reserves'". (7) Paul Rich has pointed to yet another strand in segregation policies in this century: in an unpublished seminar paper he has related this to what he terms "the agrarian counter-revolution in the Transvaal, as an intrinsic part of a political response by the white polity in the Transvaal to the challenges from non-whites in the agrarian sector", in the years before the 1913 Lands Act. (8)

Certainly by the end of World War I segregation, in some form or other, had become the accepted convention within which solutions or resolutions of class conflict in South Africa were sought. Valuable as these formulations have been, they do open up certain further questions: questions, as Legassick has pointed out, about the relative autonomy of the political and ideological levels (9), and, related to that, why it was that the particular ideological form of segregation was seen as the most suitable for an industrializing South Africa. Moreover, by focussing on the period after the South African War, as the time when these policies were formulated for a wider South Africa, the earlier origins of the ideology of segregation have to some extent been lost sight of.

It has frequently been remarked that of all the colonies of South Africa Natal's policies in the 19th century were closest to 20th century notions of segregation. Not only were many of the key ideologues of segregation in this period Natal men - M. E. Evans, C. T. Loram, E. H. Brooks in his earlier phase, and G. Heaton Nicholls (10) - most of them also explicitly looked back to Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes and Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal between 1845 and 1875, and the policies he devised; the allocation of reserved lands for African tribal occupation; the recognition of customary law; administration through acceptable traditional authorities; the exemption of Christian Africans from customary law; and the attempt to prevent permanent African urbanization through the institution of a togi labour system. (11) It is these features of Natal's 19th century policies which led David Welsh to entitle his book on the Shepstone era in Natal The Roots of Segregation. (12) At first sight the coincidence of form is puzzling. At a deeper level, however, it is perhaps not so strange. It can, after all, be argued that it was in Natal more than in any other of the territories of South Africa that in the 19th Century colonists were forced in the first instance to come to terms with the strength of the pre-capitalist mode of production and utilize it for their own purposes of surplus extraction and control. Of course, one must be careful in this kind of analysis to note that, though the forms remain the same, the features of Natal policy in the 19th century are used in the 20th for very different purposes, and that, whereas in the mid-19th century surplus was being extracted from the pre-capitalist mode of production in the form of rent, tribute or tax, now the same ideology is being used to legitimate the extraction of surplus directly in the form of labour power. Yet it is no coincidence that there are these analogies, for in both cases we are witnessing an attempt to articulate two different modes of production in which the capitalist mode is dominant and utilizes the surpluses as well as the ideological forms of the pre-capitalist mode. (13)

That Natal should have afforded the most spectacular possibility of doing this raises in turn its particular historical circumstances in the mid-19th century: on the one hand, the forces of colonisation were weak and had to come to terms with
existing structures. On the other, the destruction wrought by the Mfecane and the very fact that Africans in Natal were already producing tribute for a Zulu state meant that in some respects whites were able to utilize the pre-colonial structures for their own ends. Moreover, the fact that in Natal, as Henry Slater has shown so well, it was the absentee landowners who were the dominant white class meant that surplus value was extracted through rent, which could be produced without a major restructuring of African society. (14) The resilience of African society and the weakness of settler forces, together with the unwillingness of the British Government to pay the cost of totally changing African society, meant that even the sugar planters had to rely for labour on indentured Indians. This again reinforced the tendency towards conserving African society, while at the same time providing certain other kinds of models for labour control which were to be utilized in the context of late 19th/early 20th century mining industry.

In the trekker republics of the north, Boer supremacy was based on the outright expropriation of Africans: where this was not possible (as was not infrequently the case, for, as A. J. P. Taylor has remarked of Italy in another context, Boer "eyes were big but their teeth were poor"), there was no "articulation" between two modes of production but simply the uneasy co-existence of separate social formations within a single geographical arena. (15) Boer ideology was undoubtedly based on notions of racial superiority - but not on principles of segregation. This can be seen as late as 1903 in General Botha's evidence (among others) to the Transvaal Labour Commission, when he suggests that the solution to the labour shortage in the Transvaal would be to "break up the locations" of Basutoland, Swaziland and Zululand in order to release directly their land and labour for the white man - a solution which was unacceptable to the Milner administration because of the level of coercion and thus expense it would involve. (16) In the Cape, too, where the forces of colonialism were far stronger and the disintegration of pre-colonial structures were more thorough-going, at least on the colonial "frontiers", there was little material base for an ideology of segregation. There, as Stanley Trapido has pointed out, a liberal, assimilationist ideology emerged out of the dominance of the mercantile class, interested in fostering a stable and prosperous African peasantry: a peasantry which could be "produced" only by a considerable restructuring of pre-colonial society, though the Mfecane and the flight into the Cape of the Mfengu and later the 1856 cattle-killing undoubtedly facilitated the process. (17)

None of these, then, could provide ideologies which "could serve to rationalize or reproduce bourgeois social relations" in the new industrializing context of early twentieth century South Africa, with its massive black proletariat. (18) That Natal could provide the model was, however, quickly realized by Sir Alfred Milner, High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony. As early as November 1897, in a letter to Asquith - at that time front-bench member of the Liberal Party - he categorized the various colonies and territories of southern Africa in relation to their treatment of the black man:

The best is Natal, for here the black population is so enormous, compared with the white, that though they are kept in subjection, prudence, apart from all other considerations, would necessitate their not being treated too harshly. Besides, the white men are mainly of British race. (19)

Despite the racial interpretation and Milner's emphasis on "treatment", it would appear that the High Commissioner was quick to realize the utility of Natal forms for his own "modernising" policies; the constraints on using force to expropriate Africans in order to provide the necessary labour supply for gold mines or the land for white farmers were to be features of his reconstruction administration, in common with the early days in Natal, and, given the earlier expedients, it was clearly simpler to adapt these than to start from scratch.

I am not, of course, suggesting that segregation can in any way solely be seen as a result of Natal's prior experience: this would be absurd reductionism. Apart from all else, the ideology comes to be more and more clearly formulated in the
newly industrializing context of South Africa. Moreover, it is a many faceted policy made up of varying components which can be, and are, subtly shifted in response to circumstance and to the needs of different interests of the dominant white group in South Africa. Indeed, its greatest strength as an ideology was its very elasticity, its ability to serve the needs of very many different interests and to absorb "elements stemming from the way of life of classes and fractions other than the dominant class or fraction". (20)

It is indeed these latter aspects that I now wish to turn through a closer examination of the relationship of the Natal government to the Zulu royal family. In Natal, as we have seen, the control of the African population had been premised since the mid-19th century on the rule of chiefs. The conquest of Zululand in 1879, its annexation by Britain in 1887, and its final take-over by Natal in 1897 posed problems, however, in the control of the African population. The war of 1879 was undertaken, in the first instance, largely to destroy the power of the Zulu king and thus release the resources and manpower of the tributary state for white exploitation. It was, however, far more difficult to fill the power vacuum left by the removal of the king in Zululand than it had been in Natal earlier in the century. Despite the British victory at Ulundi, in fact the imperial army never totally destroyed the Zulu kingdom (21), nor were the Imperial authorities willing to take on the costs of direct administration of the territory. The Zulu king posed far too great a threat to be recognized as a ruler, and the settlement after the war therefore meant finding the most compliant alternatives. The broad details of this need only be rehearsed here: the "Kilkenny cats" settlement after the Zulu war; the return of the king as simply one of the many chiefs of Zululand in 1885, in an attempt to end the civil wars which had erupted in his absence; the trial of Dinuulu, his son and heir, for rebellion in 1887 and his exile to St Helena; the non-recognition of Dinuulu's position as Zulu king on his return from exile and the perennial fears which his presence aroused amongst white officials in Natal and Zululand until his second trial and exile in 1906, for alleged complicity in the Bambatha rebellion. (22)

Thereafter, for the next six years of his life, Dinuulu remained in exile. The Natal government continued its paranoia about the influence of the Zulu kings and strenuously opposed any suggestion that he be allowed to return to Zululand; they looked with suspicion on the activities of messengers to and fro from his family, and it was only the more relaxed attitude of the Union government which left him to live out his last days on a farm in the Middelburg district of the Transvaal. (23) After his death, a decision had to be taken about the position of his son and heir, Solomon. Again, the attitude of the Natal government was passionately against any form of recognition of the special position of the Zulu kings. Indeed, it was only in 1917 that Solomon was recognized as chief of the Usuthu section of the Zulu, but, again, any further hopes he might have had of wider recognition of paramountcy were sternly frowned upon by the Natal administration. (24)

In 1916 there was one of those flurries of hysteria to which Natal was prone when the support which the Zulu kings enjoyed became manifest. As a result of a misunderstanding, Solomon had called a ritual hunt to "cleanse the nation" after the period of mourning for Dinuulu had ended. The Chief Native Commissioner in Zululand was convinced that this was yet another ploy by the Zulu kings to gain recognition from their people. (25) It was only the intervention of the central government which prevented the removal of Solomon from Zululand and a heavy fine in cattle being imposed. (26) As late as 1920 the Chief Native Commissioner in Zululand was very concerned by the visit of Solomon's brother David to Cetshwayo's grave - news of which "thundered through the country". (27) The Commissioner warned the keepers of the grave against the consequences of "continuing to be a hindrance to the Government and getting mixed up in political matters. They had had a lesson during the rebellion and now they were deliberately courting trouble again by becoming mixed up with royal youngsters". (28)

Nevertheless, by the mid-20s there was a perceptible change in attitude. Although this was not to be given full administrative expression until later, it is none the less of considerable significance, particularly as it was associated with a class-alliance between the Zulu royal family, the Natal African
petty bourgeoisie and the Zululand planters.

On the white side, the key figure was George Heaton Nicholls, at that time Member of Parliament for Zululand and President of the South African Planters Union and its affiliate, the Zululand Planters Union. (29) By far one of the most articulate proponents of segregation, and at this time one of the most influential in terms of the political power he achieved, George Heaton Nicholls's role in the formulation of the policies of segregation has been curiously underestimated, notwithstanding — or perhaps because of — the significance he himself attached to it. (30) An important member of the Joint Select Committee appointed to take evidence and formulate revised policy on Hertzog's 1926 native legislation, Heaton Nicholls, as a member of the Native Affairs Commission, was also responsible in 1937 for publishing as an appendix to the Native Affairs Commission Official Report a major interpretation of segregationist principles. (31)

In the late 20s and early 30s he set out his ideas in a series of revealing private letters and memoranda. He had little doubt what the alternatives to segregation would be. As he wrote to J. H. van Zutphen in May 1929, just as tension was mounting in Durban over Champion's beer hall boycott, which was to lead in the following month to the deaths of six Africans and two whites and the injury of another 108 Africans:

We must come back to the real essence of native life — communalism — a very different thing to communism. If we do not get back to communalism, we will certainly arrive very soon at communism ... We cannot long continue as a white aristocracy or black proletariat ... We end ultimately I think in the not too distant future in the class war. (32)

He elaborated this further in an undated fragment, probably written about 1931:

An adaptionist policy demands as its primary concept the maintenance of chieftaindom, without which the tribal society cannot exist. The institution is the necessary pivot around which all tribal evolution must take place ... The adaptionist policy assumes a difference between the Abantu and the Europeans. It assumes what is in effect the growth of a national consciousness amongst the Abantu themselves ... The opposite policy of assimilation substitutes class for race, and if continued on its present basis must lead to the evolution of a native proletariat, inspired by the usual antagonisms of class war. The process of assimilation has already gone very far and unless some effort is made to stem the tide of tribal disintegration, it will soon be too late. (33)

He was very concerned with what he saw as the discrepancy between the treatment the Government handed out to the ICU organizers, at that time active in Natal, and the lack of respect accorded to traditional authority. In the same fragment he continued: "... the Governor-General on a visit to Durban a few years ago shook hands with Champion in the sight of thousands of Zulus assembled ... by the municipal authorities, while Solomon ka Dinuzulu was a few days later talked down to and reprimanded before his people in Zululand by the Governor-General, and his Chief's stipend stopped for a year because of some assumed disrespect." (34) In yet another letter at around the same time, he set out his views, if anything, even more explicitly:

The policy of a Bantu nation, as distinct from that of a black proletariat — and that stripped of all verbiage, that is the real issue in Africa — obviously brings in its train a pride of race. The most race-proud man I know is Solomon. He glories in his race and its past prowess; and there is no native in the Union who is so
earnestly desirous of maintaining a Bantu race purity... The fact is that while Macmillan is all economics Hoernle omits economics altogether.

Economics can’t be left out – even on the issue of miscegenation. Do these people understand the real gunpowder mine we are sitting on in South Africa? Do they realize that if the white mob once got out of hand there would be the red ruin. When the police were told [sic] in Durban to put down the native disturbances on Cartwright flats [December 1930] the chief constable gave instructions that it was not the natives they were to look out for so much, but the European mob... We must take note of the dangers of creating a native proletariat... (35)

Heaton Nicholls, as an outsider, was well aware of the possibilities which were being shut down by the Government’s refusal to acknowledge the position of Solomon: he had, in his Northern Rhodesian days, had the task of training the Barotseland Native Constabulary and was doubtless aware of the role, as paramount, played there for the BSA Company by Lewanika, king of the Loxi. (36) According to Nicholls, in Zululand many of the magistrates had the Zulu war plus the Bambatha rebellion mentality and resented the influence of Solomon, the Zulu king, in their district, although they all knew that he was the undoubted paramount chief of the Zulus. The Government made no use of Solomon on some idea as out of date as an assagai that it was dangerous to create officially a paramount chief. Solomon himself was disgruntled. He asked merely to be used. When deadlock was reached between the Administration and the natives at Mtunzini in connection with their cattle, the administration called Solomon in to help them. 'Is that all,' said Solomon... He went himself and settled the dispute in five minutes which had been going on for over a year. (37)

If one prong of Heaton Nicholls’s policy was to restore “Bantu-race pride” and make use of the unemployed talents of the Zulu royal family, the other was the co-option of the Natal African petty bourgeoisie, under the leadership of John Dube. This was very clear, both in the schemes he laid before the Joint Select Committee and in his correspondence with Dube on the Hertzog legislation. Again, unlike his predecessors earlier in the century, who saw John Dube as a “pronounced Ethiopian” who ought to be watched (38), an attitude which persisted until well after World War I, when the Durban municipal authorities were convinced that Dube was behind the unrest amongst workers in that city in 1918–9 and should be reprimanded (39), Heaton Nicholls perceived the conciliatory and conservative role which Dube could play. In this, indeed, he may have been preceded by the CNC for Natal and Zululand, C. A. Wheelwright, who was described in 1923 as Dube’s “strongest supporter”. (40)

Again, too, the perceptible shift in attitude comes in the early ’twenties as new and more dangerous class forces begin to emerge.

What Heaton Nicholls recognised was the need to co-opt the Natal kholwa if his schemes for the Hertzog legislation were to have any chance of success. His connection with John Dube may well have come through their common contact with the Zulu king and their common antagonism to the ICU – though I have no direct evidence of this as yet. In 1931, through John Dube, he sought and obtained the agreement of a number of prominent African leaders to a scheme entitled “The Land Settlement”, which set out "the principle of creating reserves" in which Natives will be "enabled to attain a high standard of economic production under a system of local self-government". The reserves were to be compact and large enough for Africans "to develop a real national life... a becoming race-consciousness". Each reserve was to have, in addition, a local council with powers greater than those of the Transkeian Bhunga, the civil service was to be
open to "competent natives" and the "fullest facilities for trading by Natives in the reserves should be allowed". There was to be a Union Native Council elected from members of the provincial councils to "deal with all matters affecting the native people as a whole". In return for the disappearance of the Cape franchise with the present voters, there were to be eight Africans elected on equal terms with the Europeans to the Senate. (41)

In his autobiography, Nicholls was thus able to assert with some confidence that Natal's effort to find a solution to Hertzog's legislation "met with the full approval of a number of the leading natives". (42) It was indeed the success of Nicholls's manoeuvres which led to Albert Luthuli's first lesson in politics, which he entered when invited to attend a Conference of chiefs and leaders to discuss the Hertzog bills in 1935. The Regent was the Chairman, with Dube acting for him. According to Luthuli, the Rev. Mtimkulu, one of the "old guard", was appointed to head a committee to report on the findings of the conference, but Luthuli acted in his place. When it came to report, however, Mtimkulu rejected the committee's findings - and presented instead one which Luthuli describes as "inspired unofficially by a clerk in the NAD". It was more than likely that it was inspired by Heaton Nicholls.

The upshot was that Natal Africans appeared completely indifferent to the fate of their disenfranchised brothers in the Cape and the conference appeared to accept without criticism the proposals relating to land ... We younger men were shocked and taken aback, but we did not see how to make an issue of it with a politically entrenched older man. (43)

I do not wish here to dwell on this rather later aspect of the story. I have set out some elements of this in my article, "The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal". (44) Here, what is important to show are the inter-connections, both at the level of Heaton Nicholls's policy formulations and in terms of the alliance between the Natal petty bourgeoisie and the Zulu royal family.

It is no coincidence that it was in the late 20s that Heaton Nicholls began to elaborate his ideas on segregation. It is not simply the accident that he was the Natal representative on the Select Committee, or that he later became a member of the Native Affairs Commission. In the twenties there were more fundamental reasons why the representative of farming interests in Zululand should take such a particular interest in schemes for bolstering the powers of chiefs and resuscitating the reserves. For it is clear that it was at this point that Zululand began to show really major strains as a result of the expansion of white capitalist farming, class formation within the African population, and overstocking and overgrazing - the latter ecological concommitants of the first two factors taken together with the consequences of the eradication of East Coast Fever - by about 1920.

Although, as Jeff Guy has pointed out, proletarianization in Zululand probably began with the destruction of the Zulu kingdom in the 1880s (45), this was still a very uneven and jagged process. Some of the southern districts were feeling stress at the beginning of the century, yet as late as 1925 magistrates in Zululand commented the good year Africans had had, and the abundance of cattle and grain after the rains. In some areas to the north, indeed, settlers and magistrates maintain that the Africans have never been more prosperous. (46) One must be wary of taking these reports at their face value. Though there clearly were individuals with herds of two to four hundred in Zululand at this time, they were undoubtedly the privileged few. (47) For the majority, the effects of poverty are only too evident.

Above all, these were the years in which white farming activities expanded rapidly in response to world demand for tropical commodities: cotton and sugar expanded along the coast, wattle and sheep in the thornveld of the Zululand interior and the northern districts of Natal. And both forms of expansion had major repercussions for the African peasant. In the old Republican districts - annexed to Natal after the South African war, with their relations of production (if such they can be termed) virtually intact - of Vryheid, Utrecht and Paulpietersberg, rural relationships were now
radically restructured for the first time. (48) The result was massive evictions (49). Chief Mgizo, grandson of the Zulu king Npande, put it vividly when he talked of "the yawning crack which empties forth human beings". (50) Many of these "homeless wanderers" (51) found their way to Zululand where chiefs tried to squeeze them onto already overcrowded lands - lands which had seen a steady influx of Africans from Natal not only since the passage of the 1913 Lands Act, but even earlier, since the 1880s, as part of the British "settlement" of southern Zululand.

The effects in the coastal areas were different but no less traumatic. These areas had always been thinly populated - with good reason. As the cotton and sugar plantations extended, and the railway was built to service them, a malaria epidemic of major proportions raged. (52) It was not to be brought under control until the 1930s. No wonder, then, that in the 1930s Max Gluckman found that the whites "were accused of having introduced malaria into a Zulu arcady". (53) According to the Medical Officer of Health in Natal, who was greatly concerned at the casual attitude of the Department of Railways to the loss of life in building the new line, and the spread of the disease into Natal and even the eastern Cape by non-immune labour, there is no other part of the union with such a large labour force engaged in the conduct of extensive agricultural operations in such an unhealthy area. (54)

It is against this background that the response of the Zulu to the spread of the ICU in rural areas has to be understood. As Peter Wickins has shown, the move of ICU headquarters to Johannesburg and Durban in 1926 led to "a proliferation of branches in the countryside". Kadalie was able to rely very heavily on Durban financially, and this became the bastion of the ICU in 1926. (55) Wickins attempts to explain this by saying that it was through the "efforts of A. W. G. Champion, who had a genius for making himself unpleasant to those in authority and for fastening upon and exploiting grievances". (56) While the role of Champion was undoubtedly important, particularly in Durban itself, far more significant was what was happening in the countryside. As the Times noted in October 1927, "thousands of Zulu are joining up. The red ticket of promise is everywhere". (51) And it was among the wage-labourers and labour-tenants that ICU propaganda gained most response. The reaction of Natal farmers was immediate. At a special Congress in 1927 policy was discussed of evicting ICU members from the farms, and it seems as though many farmers were doing precisely this. In August, it was resolved to take special measures, if possible in the form of a Farmers' Vigilance Association for the protection of farmers "against unreasonable actions of trade union organizations and communist bodies". White resentment erupted in violence in Bergville, Greytown, Weenen, Kranaskop and Pietermaritzburg. (58) In 1929 and 1930 the rural unrest found its counterpart in urban disturbances in Durban. Again it is no coincidence that the Communist Party's anti-pass demonstration gained its greatest support in Durban itself that year. (59) The urban and rural disturbances are reflections of a single reality: the increasing impoverishment of the African population in the rural areas and their proletarianization.

If, however, one of the responses of the African population was to join the ICU in an attempt to find a solution of their problems in these years, it would seem equally clear that for many Africans the Zulu king constituted an alternative answer. After all, in the Zulu state the king had represented the unity of the community, its father and redistributor. He personified the community and had the role of "representing and defining the common interests of all members of the community". (60) At the ideological level, he and his ancestors had ensured the integrity and well-being of the people on both their natural and supernatural planes. (61) Therefore, in a situation of crisis it was perhaps natural, especially at a time when the majority of Africans had not accepted the new ideology of the whites and certainly did not see the white state as in any way representing their interests, that they should turn again to the Zulu royal family. (62)
officials, on the one hand, and through the literate African elite and the far from disinterested royal family itself, on the other. Moreover, it can be argued that the very processes which the administration used to manipulate the subordinate chiefs in Natal to undermine the Zulu Royal family in fact strengthened the latter's position. Whereas the subordinate chiefs came to be seen as "the government's 'boys'", the royal family could, in some sense, be seen - like the people - to be the victims of the colonial administration. (63) The cleavages, which Shepstone had picked up in the nineteenth century in Zululand (64), were in the process of being papered over by the Natal government's very obstruction in regard to the royal family. At a time when the subordinate chiefs were becoming increasingly unpopular and their power crumbling, as a result of the abuse of power, the Zulu royal family, as Max Gluckman has remarked, "had no power to abuse". (65) And while this probably overstates the case - for power was not simply to be measured in the authority granted by the colonial government - ironically the very attempt to strip the royal family of its "pretensions" increased its popularity. In the twenties, when so many of the lesser chiefs were becoming impoverished and losing their land base through evictions - from which chiefs on private lands were no more immune than their followers - the appeal of "the good old days" when the Zulu kings had an abundance of land and cattle with which to reward their followers must have been considerable.

Nor were Solomon and his advisers unaware of the importance of sustaining their popular appeal through positive action, though it is almost impossible to distinguish cause and effect through the inadequacy of the sources. Thus, soon after his return to Zululand, at the time of the notorious "hunt" (66), Solomon was called up before the Chief Native Commissioner in Zululand, who told him "to leave the Zulu alone" until the government had decided how to define his status:

His replies were most characteristic, and his demeanour ... although ... extremely courteous left not the slightest doubt in my mind that his aspirations are to become head of the Zulus. He kept repeating 'I do not ask these people to follow me and show me any sort of respect; wherever I go, they recognise me as the representative of the Zulu House and accord me the respect due thereto'[Solomon then asked for the restoration of his ancestral lands] ... I told him to disabuse his mind of any hopes of the resurrection of the situation which formerly existed ...

At present, Solomon is attempting to build up his status as a leader of the Zulu people with the connivance of Mnyaiza [his cousin, and chief adviser]. (67)

In the twenties, as we shall see, the evidence that the royal family were manipulating traditional forms and popular feeling to secure recognition of the "paramount" position of Solomon is clearer; there is, nevertheless, considerable evidence of the hold the monarchy had in popular consciousness. To some extent this can be gauged through the recurrent rumours long after his death that Dinuzulu was still alive and about to bring a fresh army into Zululand, or that he was - very threatening for the Natal administration - in alliance with the Germans during World War I. (68) The rumours continued until at least 1920. (69) In 1923 the missionary Oscroft remarked, after observing a meeting of the newly formed Zulu National Council, Inkatha (70), that

the real object is to unite all black races ... they consider that the native is victimised in many ways and receives unfair and unjust treatment from the white man; that this will continue as long as the natives are divided; that the native peoples will never be strong until there is unity among them. They are casting around for a rallying point - a central figure - and that figure would seem to be Solomon. (71)
In the twenties, at a meeting of magistrates, all admitted that the power of Solomon in their district was "extraordinary, and that no chief could act contrary to his wishes". (72) Most strikingly, in 1930 before the Native Economic Commission, Archdeacon Lee of Vryheid maintained:

I may say that the present very serious political condition of Zululand - one which cannot be exaggerated - I do not want to be alarmist - may lead to trouble before many years are over. The political conditions are due to one thing... and it is... that while Solomon is recognised by the people as their King, he is not recognised by the State. He has all the responsibilities of kingship and none of the authority. There is no political question which is ever debated amongst the Zulu people which is not brought to Solomon, and he has instituted... more with the connivance of the Government than its recognition a large committee of Zulu people which he calls Inkata ka Zulu. (73)

The origins and development of Inkatha owed as much to the deliberate resurrection of the Zulu royal family of traditional forms as to the spontaneous reaction of the Zulu people. Founded in 1922-3, by a group of Solomon's advisers, including the redoubtable Mankulumana and Nuyenzi, but also a group of Kholwa, including John Dube of Natal (74), Inkatha ya ka Zulu was a deliberate attempt to make use of traditional forms in the establishment of a council of chiefs and "important men" in Zululand. It was closely associated with the raising of a Zulu National Fund - alleged to have £3,000 banked at Vryheid in 1923, and used to pay off the debts of the Zulu royal family (which were considerable, and which led to snide magisterial comment) as well as "to be used for the benefit of the Zulu nation from time to time". (75) At a five hundred-strong meeting of Inkatha in 1924 the matters discussed included the building of a national church to be called the "Chaka Zulus Church", "to commemorate Chaka, who is looked upon as the founder of the Zulu nation and power", the Zulu National Fund, the division between the Mandhlakazi and Usuthu sections - a division which went back to Cetshwayo's day - and, most significantly, the opposition to the introduction of the council system on the Transkei model into Zululand; the meeting maintained that "the present means of government through Solomon and the chiefs should not be interfered with". (76) Not surprisingly, Heaton Nicholls was an enthusiastic supporter of Inkatha in the late twenties, urging that

The Inkata is their very own. All the Natives belong to it... It is based upon the old Zulul, [sic] national system which existed under their old kings and I think it would go far to win the confidence of the Zulu if the government would adopt the Inkata instead of creating the stereotyped council of the Cape... (77)

As the missionary L. E. Oscroft appreciated, the role of "educated natives from outside" in the creation of Inkatha was considerable. (78) In some respects, indeed, Inkatha can be seen - as can this alliance between the Zulu royal family and the Natal Kholwa involved in its inception - as a deliberate attempt to reduce the tensions which had arisen within Zulu society as a result of the growth of internal social stratification.

For if the general picture in these years is one of impoverishment, as I have already suggested (79), it is also evident that the same processes had brought into being a class of prosperous black farmers employing outside labour; a process which had begun in Natal in the mid-nineteenth century but which found its parallel in Zululand in the 1920s. Thus at a time when there is increasing evidence that in certain areas of Zululand congestion, overstocking and erosion, with the consequent impoverishment of the people, is the norm, there is also evidence of a stratum of increasingly wealthy farmers: according to Archdeacon Lee before the 1930-2 Native Economic Commission, "there are people now in Zululand who have herds of three hundred and four hundred". (80) More revealingly, he added: "One of the obstacles in the way of the more economic use of land is through the land-grabbing by men of importance in
the community". (81) Many of these were dependent on the use of outside labour, and offered the same terms as white farmers. (82) By the second half of the twenties, they were also threatened by the rise of the ICU. This indeed was recognized by Solomon in a bitter attack on the union in August 1927. Reported in Ilango lase Natal in Zulu, the editor took the opportunity of the English translation to make the message even more explicit:

... the organisation would be a good thing in industrial centres if the ideal aimed at was the amelioration of conditions under which the natives labour, and to secure those means by cooperation of both Natives and Europeans. But he [Solomon] regards the activities of the leaders ... as very dangerous ... The I.C.U. are exploiting poor Native workers ... The leaders are irresponsible, they do not understand the relations of capital to labour, the need for investment ... what workers are they looking for in the native areas and reserves? Are any of their leaders engaged in business employing a number of people for farming and paying 8 shillings a day to their workers? How about that for the men of Groutville, Amahlabisi and Ifafa! Are they prepared to pay their employes that wage? How long can they raise oans at a profit if they pay such wages? (83)

It is indeed to this alliance between the Zulu royal family and the Natal petty bourgeoisie that we must now turn. At first sight, it would indeed appear to need some explanation. After all, in the 19th century it was the Natal Kholwa who were recruited to fight against the Zulu during the 1879 war. During the Bambatha rebellion the Kholwa were regarded as Anamibuka - traitors to the white man. (84) It was frequently held that they had a very different set of values, and were antagonistic to traditional authorities. In some cases, in the 19th century, they deliberately cut themselves off from their fellow-Africans in their adoption of a new ideology and a new way of life - and, indeed, the whole policy of mission reserves in Natal was designed to do precisely this. (85) Nevertheless, nothing is more incorrect than to imagine that there was an inevitable and invariable rift between the new elite of teachers, preachers, clerks, lawyers and prosperous farmers and the old elite of chiefs. As has now frequently been pointed out, on many occasions the new elite were indeed the old in new guise, the sons of chiefs and the aristocracy having had preferential access to the resources necessary for the acquisition of education and modern skills. John Dube was the descendant of a chiefly family, as was the equally distinguished S. M. Molema; Pixley ka Isaka Seme was married to the daughter of Dinuzulu, and both Stephen Mini and Martin Luthuli, leaders of the Natal Congress at the beginning of the 20th century, were Christian chiefs. Both, too, had served as clerks and interpreters to the royal families of South Africa; Mini to the Swazi royal family, Luthuli to Dinuzulu, both in the 1880s and during his exile on St Helena. (89)

The royal families, moreover, offered not only opportunities of employment but also financial resources to the new petty bourgeoisie. The South African Native National Congress was heavily dependent on financial support from the major royal families - the Swazi royal family funded its newspaper, Abantu-Batho, for example (88), while S. T. Plaatje hoped that his book, Native Life in South Africa, would be financed by a grant from the Rolong chief, Lekoko. (89) With the foundation of the South African Native National Congress, the alliance took on an even more concrete form: the special role of chiefs was recognized in the creation of a separate upper house, while many of the royals were recognized as honorary vice-presidents. Dinuzulu himself was clearly in close touch with the founders of the SANNC. (90)

It was indeed during Dinuzulu's second trial that the support of the Kholwa community, expressed through its most outstanding member in Natal at that time, John Dube, became most explicit, and it is in their connection during the trial that the
origins of the later alliance between Dube and the Zulu royal family should probably be sought. Both Dube and Seme were heavily involved in the affairs of the Zulu royalties in Middelburg in the Transvaal, and after Dinuzulu's death Dube continued as adviser to the young princes and especially to Solomon, his heir — a fact which caused some alarm to the Chief Native Commissioner in Natal, who remarked on Solomon's accession: "that he was one who may confidently be expected to lead a quiet life unless led away by the headmen and agitators such as John Dube, Seme and others". (91)

To some extent the royal family could play a function for the new petty bourgeoisie which the subordinate chiefs could not: a nationalist role - in the sense of a pan-Zulu nationalism; a modernizing role - the position could be conceived of, and was, as similar in some way to that of the British constitutional monarchs; while their central position as the "pivot of Zulu cultural life" (92) could tie in later on very fruitfully with a revival of Zulu national consciousness. This was most explicit in the foundation of the 1930s of the Zulu Society, ostensibly a cultural union for the promotion of Zulu cultural identity. (93) It is no coincidence that John Dube was its founder and first president, and Mshiyeni its honorary patron.

Above all, it can be argued that with the sharpening of class conflict in Natal and Zululand in the twenties, the Zulu royal family and the traditionalism it represented constituted a bulwark against radical change, a bulwark for the African petty bourgeoisie as for the ideologues of segregation. There are several ironies in the situation. Whereas in the 1880s it can be argued that it was the "new men", "entrepreneurs" like Sibhebhu of the Mandhlakazi or the king's cousin, Uhamu, or the intrusive Hlubi in Nqutu district, who were at the same time most closely involved in the colonial economy and the king's bitterest enemies, by the twenties and thirties the unrecognized king was coming to act as their spokesman. Even the deep-seated rivalry with the Mandhlakazi was resolved on Mankulumana's death, when the Zulu royal family petitioned the government for Bhokwe, the son of Sibhebhu, to join Matole Buthelezi, son of Tshanibezwe, son of Mnyamana, Cetshwayo's last hereditary prime minister, as joint adviser to Solomon. (94)

The Natal kholwa attitude, too, had undergone equally profound changes. As late as 1912 John Dube could write in his "Address to the Chiefs and Gentlemen of the South African Native National Congress":

> Upward into the higher places of civilization and Christianity - not backward into the slump of darkness, nor downward into the abyss of antiquated tribal systems. (95)

This was a far cry indeed from the views of the kholwa who gave evidence to the 1930 Native Economic Commission on behalf of the chiefs and headmen in the northern districts of Natal that "everything in tribal custom was good, except the practice of witchcraft" (96), and the appeals of Charles Mpanza, secretary of the Zulu Society, in 1938 that the paramountcy of the Zulu chief be recognized:

> It was unanimously felt at that meeting [of the Zulu Society in Durban] that according to the customs and traditions, the preservation of our wholesome Traditions and Customs and Rule of Etiquette should centre around and receive the support of the Head of the Principal family of the Zulu whose status today was that of an ordinary chief officially. (97)

From the white point of view, the turn about was even more complete. Whereas in the 1870s and 1880s, the Zulu royal family had to be destroyed if Zululand was to be "opened up" for white exploitation, now that the real powers of the Zulu kings had been removed, their regiments dismantled and their economic position undermined, the residual hold they had at an ideological level was to be used to make Zululand safe for the sugar planters! To quote Heaton Nicholls once more in his advocacy of the recognition of Solomon as paramount:
The recreation and the maintenance of the old native aristocracy is essential to the growth of the adaptionist ideal ... if native policy could be directed to capturing the latent loyalties of the Zulu race by recognising the Royal House as paramount, it would go far to satisfy native opinion and to reorient that opinion in the direction of building up a native society in the reserves ...

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Notes

(1) Pretoria Archives, Native Affairs Department (henceforth NA) 290/2151/F.727, Report G. W. Kinsman, Assistant Magistrate, Babanango, to Chief Native Commissioner (CNG), 28.10.13. There was debate over the "inflammatory nature" of this speech, and in particular over the somewhat obscure phrase "There is no bone which will not decay". It was accepted in the end that the term "kill" had a more general sense of "mutilation of the body" and the phrase meant "let revenge cease". For Natal's antagonism to the Zulu Royal family, see My Reluctant Rebellion (Oxford, 1970), parts II & IV. The attempts to destroy the royal family after the Bambatha rebellion are described on pp. 353 ff.

(2) Heaton Nicholls Papers, Killie Campbell Library, Durban (henceforth MSS No. 00.08.1) KCM 3305 d, carbon fragment, folder 2, n.d.

(3) Native Affairs Department, Annual Report, 1948-9, p. 36.


(6) These were first presented as three papers under the general title "Ideology and Social Structure in 20th Century South Africa" to a postgraduate seminar at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, in 1973. The final paper was published in revised form in the Journal of Southern African Studies, 1, October 1974, pp. 5-35, under the title "Legislation, Ideology and Economy in Post-1948 South Africa".

(7) The papers on Pim and Loram are as yet unpublished; that on Hoernle, "Race, Industrialization and Social Change: the Case of R. F. Hoernle", was published in African Affairs, 75, April 1976. The quotation comes from the latter article, p. 229.


(9) "Race, Industrialization and Social Change", p. 229.


(11) of M. Legassick, "South Africa: Forced Labour, Industrialization, and Racial Differentiation" in R. Harris, ed., The Political Economy of Africa (New York, 1975), where he defines segregation as "restrictions on permanent urbanization, territorial separation of land ownership, the use of traditional institutions as providers of 'social services' and means of social control", p. 250.
This is subtitled Native Policy in Natal (1845-1910) (Cape Town, 1971). of p. 322: "It is a myth that apartheid is the exclusive product of Afrikaner nationalism: its antecedents are to be found in Natal rather than in any of the other provinces. A long line of segregationist writers and politicians from Natal did much to create the climate of opinion in which segregation became acceptable to white electorates ..." Walsh does not, however, really explain why this should have been so.

For a fascinating illumination of how this could operate in a different context, see Maurice Godelier's "The non-correspondence between form and content in social relations. New Thoughts about the Incas", in his recently translated Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 186-196. The essay offers a useful model not only of how the colonial state utilized the pre-capitalist forms of the Zulu state but also of how the Zulu despotism was able to establish its hold through actively maintaining part of the former mode of production.


Legassick, "Race, Industrialization and Social Change", p. 228.

For a full transcription of this document and a commentary upon it, see J. Butler, "Sir Alfred Milner on British Policy in South Africa in 1897" in J. Butler, ed., Boston University Papers in African History, I (Boston, 1964), pp. 245-270. The quotation is on p. 246.

Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, p. 203.

For a full account of the Zulu war and its aftermath, the civil wars in Zululand, see J. J. Guy, "The destruction of the Zulu kingdom: the civil wars in Zululand, 1879-1884" (unpubl. PhD, London, 1975). Guy shows convincingly that the British victory at Ulundi was illusory - it was more of a tactical withdrawal by the Zulu - and that the real destruction came five years later at the second battle of Ulundi between the Usuthu supporters of Cetshwayo and the Mandhlakani supporters of Zibhebhu. As we shall see, this breach was only partially healed in the late 1920s.

See Reluctant Rebellion, Sections II and IV, for these events.

Reluctant Rebellion, p. 303.

See below.

NA 289 2151/F727, especially SNA to MMA 24.2.16 and CNG, R. H. Addison, Natal, to W. Dower, Pretoria, 27.1.1916. See also Notes of a Meeting at Magistrate's Office, Nongoma, 28.2.1916, in connection with the attempt by Solomon to hold an unauthorized hunt.

Ibid. CNG to SNA, 27.1.1916; E. Barrett to SNA, Cape Town, 15.2.1916.

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Ibid. CNG to SNA, 27.1.1916; E. Barrett to SNA, Cape Town, 15.2.1916.

See Reluctant Rebellion, Sections II and IV, for these events.

Ibid.
(29) Heaton Nicholl's early career is fascinating. Born in 1876, the son of an army officer, he ran away from home at the age of fifteen to join the British army himself. After serving in Burma, north India and Ceylon, whence he escorted the last of the Africaner POWs back to Cape Town, he took service with the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia, initially in the police force to train the Native Constabulary in Barotseland, later as a District Officer. After being made redundant in 1907, he emigrated to Australia, where, after a short spell sugar-farming in Queensland, he was employed by the colonial service in Papua. His marriage to Ruby Hitchens, daughter of the Natal Minister of Railways (1906-10), brought him back to South Africa just after Union. With his father-in-law's assistance, he started up as a sugar planter in the Umfolosi district of Zululand in 1912-13, and rapidly rose to political prominence. He became MP for Zululand in 1920, and played a crucial role in representing planter interests against the large mill-owners in parliament. (See his autobiography, South Africa in My Time, passim.) For his role in the founding of the South African Planters Union, see South Africa in My Time, pp. 99-101.

(30) See the somewhat snide way in which Alan Paton refers to Heaton Nicholl's in his biography of Hofmeyr, Hofmeyr (OUP, 1964), p. 230: "Nicholls, though he had not come to South Africa until the age of 36, was also regarded as an expert on the 'native question' because he was not only a farmer, he was a farmer in Zululand ... One did not twit Nicholls lightly; he took himself seriously, imagining that South Africa would at various points in her history have taken quite different and desirable turnings if his advice had been heeded."

(31) Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1936 (UC 48, 1937). Legassick, ("Hoernle", p. 236), cites this to show the continuity with Hoernle's thought in 1909. As the next quotation but one reveals, it is extremely close to Heaton Nicholl's writings in 1929-31 - which is not surprising, as Nicholls probably composed the Report. Although Legassick is correct in showing this essential continuity (see n. 35), there were important differences in the outlook of Nicholls, who saw the way to controlling the African population through inculcating "race pride" and defusing class-consciousness, and Hoernle, who looked to class divisions as the mode of control.

(32) Ms. Nic. 2.08.1, KCM 3348, 28.5.29.

(33) Ms. Nic. 2.08.1/Folder 3, pencil draft, n.d./KCM 3323. of "The Native Economic Commission warned the country that 'the growth of a Native nationalism or race consciousness is a factor which is not yet generally recognised by Europeans of the Union, but it is one which must be kept clearly in view when questions affecting the Natives' social and economic position is being considered. ...' It is this factor which the Commission [Native Affairs Commission] wishes to emphasise. *The alternative of turning the Natives into a lower class of the population must result, not only in the engulfing of the ethos of the Bantu race in a black proletariat, with the loss of every vestige of independence and communal brotherhood ... but also, and inevitably, it will result in the class war - a war waged between sections of the community of unequal strength and power in which the proletariat and the bourgeoisie can be easily distinguished from each other by the colour of their skin ..."* (Legassick, p. 236, cites the section between asterisks) Report of Native Affairs Commission, 1936 (UG 48, 1937).

(34) Ibid. See also Ms. Nic. 2.08.1, KCM 3350d. Carbon fragment, p. 10.

(35) Ms. Nic. 2.08.1, KCM 3362d. Carbon copy of a letter, n.d., no addressee. It is interesting that, although in the early thirties Heaton Nicholls and Hoernle regarded one another with the greatest antagonism, and entered into public polemic against one another, in 1937 Hoernle was to write to Nicholls: A few weeks ago I read an article of yours contributed to the South African supplement of the Daily Telegraph. I was very much interested in your presentation there of the case for trusteeship and especially in two of your phrases viz., 'Bantu Nation vrs Bantu Proletariat' and 'Paramountcy of Native interests in Native areas'. Speaking for myself I am willing to back any policy which aims at the realisation of these objectives. If that is the direction in which you and your colleagues in the Commission [Native Affairs Commission] are working, more power to your elbow.

Ms. Nic. 2.08.1, KCM 3362, 26.7.37.

(37) Ibid., p. 155.

(38) CO 179/235/22645, Gov. to Sec. St., 30.5.06. For Dube's earlier career, and the Natal government's attitude towards him, see *Reluctant Rebellion*, pp. 72-76; for this period, my "The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal", in *JSAS*, I, 2 April 1975, pp. 162-180. My current interpretation is, however, rather different.

(39) See especially NA 214 723/19/F 473. J. H. Nicholson, Mayor of Durban, to FM and MNA, General Botha, 9.8.18, and enclosures; Natal Mercury, 12.8.18.

(40) See Pim Papers, C. A. Wheelwright to Howard Pim, 14.12.23.

(41) Ms. Nic., 2.08.1, KGM 3350, Document entitled "The Native Land Settlement" (copy, with signatures in Dube's hand).

(42) *South Africa in My Time*, p. 290.


(45) "The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom", *op. cit.*, and his unpublished paper to the Witwatersrand Labour Conference, April 1976.

(46) See, e.g., evidence C. H. Wheelwright before the 1930 Native Economic Commission. Wheelwright had just retired as CNC, having served in Natal-Zululand since the 1890s. Evidence before the Native Economic Commission, or Holloway Commission (UG 22 - '32), was never published. Its 9,000 pages constitute an incomparable source for these years. There is no single complete set at present available (presumably it exists in the Pretoria archives, but this is still in the "closed" period under the 50-year rule). By using sections in different archives and libraries in South Africa, however, one can piece together most of it; this does mean that the pagination may be somewhat erratic. I have used here a microfilm kindly provided by the University of Cape Town, Jagger library, of some 1500 pages of evidence from the Transvaal, northern districts of Natal, and Zululand. Their accession number at UCT is BC 79. 2.1. The pages bear two sets of numbers. Here and elsewhere I have followed the number added by the UCT librarian.

(47) See below, p. 10.

(48) See the evidence, for example, before the 1930-32 Native Economic Commission of the Kambule Farmers' Association, p. 1632.


(50) Native Economic Commission, p. 1778.

(51) Champion papers, (UCT), A. B. Ncobo, Ehohwe, to Champion, Durban, 30.8.27.


(53) Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand (The Rhodes Livingstone Papers, No. 28, reprinted by Manchester University Press, 1968; first published 1940-42), p. 50. He goes on to add "thus bringing the objections to the innovation into line with the dominant rationale of the society", though he admits that "the incidence of malaria" may have increased "with an increasing density of population, occupation of areas previously deemed unsuitable, and work on malarial sugar-farms". The callousness protested against by Park Ross in his reports lends greater validity to the African perception.

(54) Ann. 452-126.


(56) Wickins, *op. cit.*


(60) Goddier, "The Non-Correspondence between Form and Content in Social Relations", *op. cit.*, p. 189, talking of chiefs amongst the Andean peoples. cf. n. 61.

(61) It is illuminating to compare the following two passages in this connection:

> The social cohesion of the Zulu state therefore centred, in all particulars, on the king. His rule was sanctioned by the force behind him, but he was supposed to use it to defend the national interests. The unity of the system was derived from more than force. As the symbol of national unity and health, the king was magically treated in the first fruits ceremonies, that the nation might prosper and conquer its enemies, home and foreign. He stood as final judge, who was bound to defend the legal rules which helped control Zulu social and ecological relations. For Zulu moral values stood the king, not only the symbol of social cohesion but also its artificer.

> and

> and

> in those ancient societies characterised by the Asiatic mode of production and by the exploitation of village communities and local tribes dominated by a State personified in the person of a 'despot', ultimately [this higher community exists and] appears as a person. This surplus labour is rendered both as tribute and as common labour for the glory of the unity, in part that of the despot, in part that of the imagined tribal entity of the god. The main thing which Marx is pointing out here is the fact that everything occurs 'as if' the conditions of reproduction and in society - the thing which assures the unity and survival of the community as a whole, its groups and members - really depended on the existence and actions of an imaginary tribal Being, or God, or on the person of an absolute despot, placed above the common run of mortals. Here, therefore we find that man's relationship with his natural and social conditions of existence is both a real and a phantasmic one...

> Gluckman, *Analysis of a Social Situation*, p.34.

(62) Gluckman notes this in his *Analysis of a Social Situation*, pp. 43-44, but again in very general terms of the heightened tension between black and white in South Africa as a result of "Fundamental drives in the South African economy". cf. also "...the Zulu political authorities receive loyalty from their subjects not only as Government bureaucrats or from sentiment and conservatism, but also because some of the political tension against the Government is expressed in that loyalty". (p. 22)

(63) Harriette Colenso noted this in a letter to a Mr Pollock in Johannesburg in 1908: "At the same time Natal's policy towards the Natives of destroying their political organisation, a policy carried on secretly all along and now culminating in this open outrage and persecution of Dinuzulu - whose treatment the bulk of Natives recognise and resent as personifying their own ..." Colenso Collection (Natal Archives), 140 Vol. III, corr. 27.9.08.

(64) Shepstone maintained that there was no such thing as a Zulu nation - only "autonomous tribes" yearning for "their ancient separate existence" and eager to shake off the "terrible incubus of the Zulu Royal family". This was undoubtedly a gross exaggeration, though it formed the basis of the British "settlement" in Zululand after the war. Whatever reality it may have had in terms of factions and incipient class interests within Zulu society was blurred however by the nature of conquest and white domination. See *Reluctant Rebellion*, pp. 96-98, which also sets out the Royal family view as argued by the Colensos - perhaps too uncritically.

(65) *Analysis of a Social Situation*, p. 44.

(66) See above.
This should, of course, not be confused with the National Cultural Liberation Movement founded recently by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, also called Inkatha yakwa Zulu, or simply Inkatha. The connection between the two organisations is, however, alluded to in the Constitution of the new movement which has, at the head of its constitution, "Founded in 1928 - by: King Solomon ka Dinwulu". The decision to use the same name is surely not accidental, and in both cases the deliberate manipulation of tradition is manifest. An inkata or inkatha is literally "a grass coil placed on the head for carrying a load". The inkatha yezwe, or "grass coil of the nation", according to James Stuart's informant, Baleni ka Silwana, in 1914, was an actual ritual object, 15 or 18 inches in diameter, which was inherited by Shaka's successors, and kept at the royal headquarters. According to Baleni, "The inkatha's purpose is to keep our nation standing firm. The binding round and round symbolises the binding together of the people so that they should not be scattered". C. de B. Webb and John Wright, The James Stuart Archive, pp. 40-41. The italicised phrases have been translated by the editors from Stuart's original Zulu; the definition of inkatha I owe to the editors' footnote 49, p. 51 (Natal, 1976), 1.

The documents on the early formation of Inkatha - 1922-23 rather than the 1928 suggested by the recent constitution - are to be found in DJ 6/953/23/1 - a series of reports and memoranda; on the other hand, it would appear as if Inkatha became a rather more formal organization in the later twenties, in response to the challenges posed by the ICU and rural discontent, as suggested below. For this quotation, see DJ/953/23/1, Report of a meeting of Inkatha, 9.10.24, by the Rev. L. E. Oscroft.

NA 289 2151/F/ 727, CNC to Dower, 4.5.16.  
Pretoria Archives, Department of Justice (henceforth DJ) 221 4/65/15, P. Binns, Chief Magistrate, Durban, to J. de V. Hoos, Secretary of Justice, 11.2.15.  
Natal Archives, SNA 1/9/5, Carbon copy CNC 2261/920, Interview with Manzolwandle ka Cetshwayo (Dinuwu's half brother), 24.6.20.  
Natal Archives, SNA 1/9/5, Carbon copy CNC 221 4/65/15, P. Binns, Chief Magistrate, Durban, to J. de V. Hoos, Secretary of Justice, 11.2.15.  
Ibid. See also Deputy Commissioner, Natal Police, to Deputy Commissioner, CID, Pretoria, 25.11.24, who maintains that "shortly after the meeting [of Inkatha, which is sometimes called the Zulu National Congress at this time] Solomon purchased a new motor car at Vryheid for the sum of £500, and has engaged a young European as chauffeur". Sim. Inspect. T. H. Hedges, SAP, Eshowe, to Deputy Commissioner of Police, Natal, 6.9.23: "There have been begging campaigns in the last two years in order to relieve his embarrassments arising out of his heavy indebtedness to the proprietor of the Denny Dalton Bottle store and his investment in landed property in Johannesburg on behalf of the same." It should be added that Inspector Hedges was very hostile to the royal family and had been one of those responsible for building up the case against Dinwulu in 1907-8.

Ibid. See also the evidence of the Kambule Farmers' Association (Vryheid), p. 1642, and of Mkwintje and Kumalo, themselves "progressive" farmers and traders, Nongoma, p. 1807.

See, e.g., evidence of Mkwintye, Nongoma, Native Economic Commission, p. 1821, who sometimes has 40 to 60 "assistants" working for him on a seasonal basis, and whom he paid 1/- a day.

Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 326-337, for the very divided response of the Kholwa to the "rebellion". cf. also Welsh, Roots of Segregation, pp. 282-284, for the
cleavage between the chiefs and the Kholwa.

(85) For the origins and repercussions of the policy of creating mission reserves, see N. A. Etherington, "The Rise of the Kholwa of South East Africa, African Christian Communities in Natal, Pondoland and Zululand, 1835–1880" (unpubl. PhD, Yale University, 1971); see also Welsh, op. cit., pp. 45–50. Welsh emphasizes the cleavage in the 19th century – which reinforces one’s impression of change in the period under discussion.


(87) E. Roux, Time Longer than Hope, Ill.


(89) Not only was he made an Honorary Vice-President of Congress; at the first meetings of the SANNC called in Zululand and addressed by leaders like Dube and Saul Msane, "Natives well-known supporters of the Usutu who are not in the habit of attending at the promulgation of Government laws or notices or at the visit of any Ministers or high officials were noticed amongst the assembled", MA 268/3098/12/7639, DNC Zululand/A. H. Addison to CNC, Natal, 10.12.12.

At Saul Msane’s meeting to announce the SANNC in Ehohwe district there was "a noticeable absence of chiefs" – but a son of Mpane, and therefore brother of Oetshwayo, Mgidihsana, is reported to have called out, in spite of the remonstrance of his chief:

We return thanks for what John Dube is doing for us. We will not wait for others, but will speak for ourselves. Although we are the descendants of Senzengakhona ... we are now accounted as nothing in this land, although of the Chiefs here present were the headmen of our fathers, I say we of the house of Senzengakhone return thanks for what these men are doing on our behalf. Let them make representations for us: for we have long been in trouble.

Ibid. Encl. Account of Saul Msane’s meeting with natives at the Mission Station, Ehohwe.

(90) CNC, Natal (R. H. Addison, for a short period), to SNA, Pretoria, 3.11.13.

(91) The phrase occurs in a letter from Charles Mpanza, Sec. of Zulu Society, ZS Papers, to its President, A. W. Dinlamini, as the conservative answer to the changes resulting from urbanization and proletarianisation.

(92) See the Charter of the Zulu Society, issued by the Zulu Society, Natal, 1st edition, 1937; 2nd edition, 1939. The papers of the Zulu Society are in the Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg. I had hoped, in this paper, to show the connections between the alliances sketched for the twenties and the Zulu Society in the later thirties, one of whose main objects was to fight for the recognition of the Paramount; and at the end of the ‘30s Mschiyeni was in fact to be recognized by the Government as "Social Head of the Zulu Nation" – a phrase which also occurs in the letters of Charles Mpanza, Secretary of the Zulu Society. Again, the Society has to be seen in the context of the deliberate utilization, if not fabrication, of "tradition". This will have to be discussed in a subsequent paper.

(93) Ms. No. 2.08.1, KCM 5305, Carbon, n.d. Address to the Rt. Hon. General Hertzog, PM and SNA. Signed "By authority of the Nation, Mvambsa ka Mfikisabo and Frans Zulu". (The bulk of the document is an appeal for the recognition of the paramountcy.)


(96) ZS III/1/2, Charles Mpanza to E. H. Braatvedt, magistrate, Nongoma, 22.8.38. cf. Gluckman, Analysis of a Social Situation, p. 44:

Some better educated Zulu tend to return to old customs and this seems a turning back; it is encouraged by Government as part of the policy of segregation and parallel development and this has produced a social anthropology which records the vitality of Bantu culture without reference to its causes. This vitality may be
ascribed to an attempt to bridge the gap between Christians and pagans, to the revulsion of educated Zulu from the White civilization they are denied, and to the politically safe means it offers of expressing Zulu pride and hatred of the culture to which they dare not aspire.

(97) Ms. Nic. 2.08.1, KCM 3323, Draft, fragment, n.d.