

## DESTABILIZATION: THE LESOTHO CASE\*

by

John Bardill

### Introduction

Like most countries in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, the independent majority-ruled states of southern Africa face innumerable problems, from the underdeveloped and dependent nature of their economies to the fragile and unstable nature of their political institutions. In southern Africa these problems have been seriously compounded by the vulnerability of these states to economic, military and political pressure from the Republic of South Africa.

Since the replacement of Vorster by Botha as Prime Minister in 1978, the scale of such pressure has risen dramatically. Discarding Vorster's ultimately discredited experiment in detente, the new regime moved quickly to secure its interests in the subcontinent by more forceful means, ranging from economic threats to outright military intervention: a move that was undoubtedly encouraged by Reagan's accession to the US Presidency in 1980. These actions were designed to destabilize the economic and political systems of neighbouring and nearby states, and by so doing to achieve two immediate objectives: (1) the neutralization of the ability of such states to provide a springboard for the increasing activities of the ANC and SWAPO, and (2) the perpetuation of the divisions that exist within and between such states, thereby reinforcing their dependence on Pretoria and frustrating their efforts to reduce this through regional co-operation in the form of the newly established Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). (1) A more distant but nevertheless crucial objective was the creation over time of a more favourable climate within Southern Africa for an alternative regional framework to SADCC, one that would reinforce rather than challenge South Africa's economic hegemony in the subcontinent. Such a framework - the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) - was first proposed by Botha in 1979, but has so far been rejected by all the SADCC states. (2)

This change in tactics - from the detente "carrot" to the destabilization "stick" - has generally been interpreted as a response by the South African ruling class to the serious threats posed to capital accumulation and apartheid by the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in the region and the mounting economic and political crisis experienced by the Republic in the 1970s. (3) As Davies and O'Meara have shown, however, a less commonly understood feature of this response was the fact that it represented a fundamental shift in strategy as well as tactics. (4) As part of the new and wider total strategy introduced by Botha to combat the internal and external challenges facing the regime, this shift involved the replacement of Vorster's attempt to influence individual southern African decision-makers by a much more systematic attempt to shape the environment in which such decisions were made. In this way it was hoped that southern African leaders would eventually have little choice other than to comply with Pretoria's wishes.

This new approach by no means ruled out the possibility of peaceful overtures and incentives, but it did imply that far more aggressive tactics would soon be forthcoming should such initiatives fail to produce the desired results. And it was the failure of the CONSAS proposals to attract support among the SADCC states that precipitated a determined offensive by Pretoria against their territorial integrity, economic viability and political cohesion.

In assessing the ability of such states, either individually or collectively, to withstand this offensive and to provide support for the liberation struggles in Namibia and South Africa, it is important to realize that there are important variations in the will and capacity to resist. Whilst the SADCC states are more or less united in their condemnation of apartheid, there is far less unanimity in their degree of commitment to the tactics of revolutionary struggle espoused by the ANC and SWAPO, or in their willingness to expose themselves to the risks of South African retaliation that overt support for these movements almost invariably entails. Similarly, whilst the military and economic inferiority of such states renders all of them vulnerable to South African pressure, some are clearly more vulnerable than others, the degree of vulnerability varying with such factors as the extent of their economic dependence on the Republic and the incidence of internal political divisions that Pretoria can exploit to its own ends.

Using variables such as these, it is possible to classify Southern African states into a number of different groups, according to the likely extent of their compliance with Pretoria's demands or defiance of them. South African strategists have clearly performed this exercise themselves, and according to Davies and O'Meara have divided the states in the region into three broad categories:

conservative states who are seen as real or potential collaborators; states considered to be the most vulnerable to pressure; and states whose political systems and development strategies are deemed to be the most fundamental challenge to South African capitalism and apartheid. (5)

As with most typologies, however, there are exceptions to the rule. The Nkomati Accord of 1984 has shown that circumstances can force the most radically committed regime to capitulate. (6) At the other extreme, the Lesotho case provides an even more surprising, if regionally less significant, paradox. For although the extreme dependence, serious political divisions and pragmatic, if not conservative, leadership that characterize this small enclave state would seem to qualify it as an ideal candidate for the collaborationist slot in the above classification, the Lesotho regime has assumed and maintained a surprisingly defiant stance against Pretoria. (7)

This paper sets out to explore this apparent paradox and to see what lessons might be drawn from it. First, however, a brief account will be presented of the changing nature of political relations between Lesotho and South Africa and of the continuing nature of Lesotho's economic dependence.

#### Changing Political Relations

In April 1965 elections were held in Lesotho under the new self-government constitution that had been approved a year earlier by the British colonial authorities. These elections determined which of the country's two main nationalist parties would ultimately lead Lesotho to independence in November 1966: Leabua Jonathan's Basotho National Party (BNP) or Ntsu Mokhehle's Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). Most observers predicted a victory for the BCP, a party that was led predominantly by the Protestant-educated urban middle class and which advocated, at

least in principle, radical social change at home and support for the liberation struggle in South Africa. The outcome, however, was a narrow win for the BNP (8), a party led largely by Catholic school teachers and minor chiefs, and strongly opposed to what it saw as the provocative and Communist-inspired militancy of the BCP. The BNP stood for the preservation of traditional values and institutions at home and for the establishment of cordial working relations with the Republic. (9)

In the years immediately following independence, Chief Jonathan's government took steps to put this policy of good neighbourliness into practice. Economic ties were deepened. White South Africans were seconded by Pretoria to fill senior and sometimes sensitive positions in the Lesotho civil service and judiciary. Refugees from apartheid were given a cold reception and occasionally threatened with deportation. And at the OAU and other international forums Lesotho became a leading advocate of dialogue with South Africa.

BNP leaders defended such actions as pragmatic good sense, given Lesotho's geographical and economic position. But the BCP's accusation that they placed Lesotho in an unnecessarily servile position was clearly convincing to the many Basotho who regularly experienced the indignities of apartheid. Opposition to the government's policy and support for the BCP's new line of "realistic co-operation without grovelling" undoubtedly contributed to the BNP's unexpected defeat in the country's first and only post-independence elections, held in January 1970. (10)

Jonathan's cabinet refused to accept this defeat and, assured that the police and paramilitary forces would remain loyal, moved swiftly to nullify the elections, suspend the constitution and assume emergency powers. (11) This unconstitutional seizure of power was widely condemned at home and abroad, and Britain withheld diplomatic recognition and aid. Pretoria endorsed the coup, however, and promised continuing support for the regime. South African assistance - including the loan of helicopters and light aircraft - proved particularly valuable in enabling Jonathan to suppress the widespread resistance that erupted throughout the country in February and March 1970. (12) By the middle of the year British recognition and aid had been restored and the government's security forces had reasserted their control. The scene now seemed set for a continuation of harmonious relations between Lesotho and the Republic. Within a year, however, obvious signs of strain had emerged. These marked the beginning of an important and unexpected shift in Lesotho's policy towards South Africa in the 1970s, the reasons for which will be examined shortly.

Although not accompanied by any fundamental reduction in Lesotho's economic dependence on the Republic, the dramatic nature of the government's break with past policy was revealed in a number of directions: in its increasingly hostile attacks on the system of apartheid; in the suspension of its pro-dialogue initiatives at the OAU and elsewhere; in its refusal to recognize the Transkei and other "independent" homelands; in its reduced reliance of South African personnel; in the shelving of plans to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Republic; in its more forthright support for the South African liberation movements; in the increased hospitality provided to South African and particularly ANC refugees; and in the controversial diversification of its diplomatic ties to include the Communist bloc, much to Pretoria's displeasure. (13)

Despite assurances by Jonathan that this shift implied no threat to South African security or to the close economic relations between the two countries, Pretoria was nevertheless alarmed by these developments. Until the late 1970s, however Vorster's preoccupation with detente and with more pressing problems elsewhere in the subcontinent served to confine hostilities to a war of words. Even so, his warning to Jonathan not to "tempt me too far" (14), issued as early as 1971, served as a constant reminder of the dangers inherent in Lesotho's new foreign

policy. With the emergence of total strategy, and with Jonathan's blunt rejection of CONSAS and other incentives designed to induce a change in policy (15), these dangers were soon to be made vividly clear.

During the past five years a variety of destabilizing tactics have been employed by South Africa in an attempt to compel the Lesotho government to change course, and in particular to reverse its policy towards the ANC, the Communist bloc, the homelands and CONSAS. (16) Especially important has been Pretoria's complicity in the activities of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), an insurgency movement established by Mokhehle and other BCP leaders after their flight into exile in 1974, following an unsuccessful attempt to topple Jonathan from power. Since 1979, despite divisions within its ranks and defections from them, the LLA has mounted a damaging campaign of bombings, guerrilla raids and political assassinations aimed at the violent overthrow of the BNP government. The ability of Lesotho's security forces to contain these activities has been hampered, among other things, by the hold-up of urgently needed arms shipments at South African ports. (17)

Although providing the LLA with arms and with bases from which to launch its attacks, Pretoria has clearly been mindful of the possible costs to South Africa of provoking a full-scale civil war in Lesotho. And it is most probably for this reason that its support has fallen short of total commitment to the LLA's main aim of overthrowing the Lesotho government by force. South Africa's objective has not been the replacement of Jonathan by Mokhehle. Instead, it has almost certainly been to force Jonathan into compliance or, failing that, to create the conditions for a relatively bloodless palace coup against him and his policies from within the ranks of the ruling party or the army, or both.

In addition to its controlled support for the LLA, South Africa has also pursued its own initiatives. These culminated in the raid on Maseru, carried out by the South African Defence Force on 9 December 1982, in which 25 ANC refugees, 3 South African visitors and 12 Lesotho citizens died. Allegedly undertaken to destroy ANC "terrorist" bases - whose existence the Lesotho government correctly denied - the raid's real purpose was to demonstrate to the government and people of Lesotho, and to other states in the region, the costs of defying Pretoria's wishes.

Although the raid provoked widespread international protest, reflected in the rare unanimity of the UN Security Council's condemnation, South African threats against Lesotho continued unabated. Refusing to rule out the possibility of further attacks, Pretoria warned that economic reprisals might also be forthcoming. (18) These followed in May 1983 when the South African authorities began to impose serious delays on the transit of people and goods at their borders with Lesotho. This economic blockade was accompanied by increased LLA activity, as well as by threats to repatriate Basotho migrant workers, and by September 1983 the government had been forced into partial capitulation. Of the 3,000 refugees registered with the UN High Commission in Maseru, about twenty, regarded by Pretoria as particularly objectionable, were forced to agree to "voluntary" evacuation under the auspices of the UN on the grounds that the Lesotho government could no longer guarantee their safety against future South African attacks. (19) Another 200 were expected to follow shortly. Nevertheless, the evacuation was carried out in full consultation with the ANC leadership, and it was not followed up by any major clamp down on the refugees who remained or by attempts to harass them into leaving the country. (20) Furthermore, despite vigorous attempts by South Africa to secure additional concessions at the time of the blockade (21), the partial capitulation by the Lesotho government on the refugee issue was not accompanied at the time, nor has it been since, by any fundamental modification in its publicly expressed hostility to apartheid, in its position on the homelands, CONSAS and relations with the East, or in its unwillingness to enter into a formal security agreement of the Nkomati or Swazi variety.

It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that in the period since September 1983 the war of words between Pretoria and Maseru has continued unabated. Nevertheless, there has been a reduction in overtly hostile acts. LLA activity has decreased, though not ceased, and there have been no more raids or blockades. This has not reflected a weakening in Pretoria's resolve but rather the use of more subtle and less forceful means to secure its objectives. Threats and incentives have played a major part in this. In addition to the possible repatriation of Basotho migrants, the threats have included the withdrawal of South African participation in the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme, a M2.2 billion project designed to supply water to the Republic and electricity to Lesotho. The incentives, it has been alleged, have included the offer of a personal gift of R1 million to Chief Jonathan, as well as an additional R1 million to the ruling party, in return for the signing of a non-aggression pact. (22)

An additional and important strand in Pretoria's policy towards Lesotho in the period since September 1983 has been the transfer of South African support from the violent tactics of the LLA to the more peaceful ones of the Basotho Democratic Alliance (BDA), a new political movement established in February 1984 to mobilize opposition within Lesotho to the alleged Communist inclinations of the government and support for a more accommodating policy towards the Republic. The BDA is led by disaffected members of the BCP and BNP. Its chairman and leader is Phoka Chaolane, a former member of the Ramoreboli faction of the internal BCP. (23) And its first president was the former BNP minister, C D Molapo, whose outspoken criticism of Jonathan's foreign policy led to his resignation from the cabinet in June 1983. However, Molapo was ousted from this position in March 1985.

The formation of the Alliance followed visits by Molapo, Chaolane and others to South Africa for talks with Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister, and it will obviously be able to count on Pretoria's enthusiastic support. The Catholic church in Lesotho, which has become increasingly critical in recent years of what it sees as Jonathan's dangerous alignment with Communism, can also be expected to lend its backing. Given the BDA's limitations, and particularly its lack of a clear programme, splits within its ranks, and the compromising position entailed by its close connections with Pretoria, it is doubtful, however, whether support from such quarters will enable it to ensure a modification in the government's policies, or indeed a defeat for them in the long awaited elections that have now been scheduled for September 1985. (24) If no such modification is forthcoming, then the possibility of a return to the open hostilities of the early 1980s cannot be ruled out entirely.

#### Continuing Economic Dependence

The historical processes through which Southern African societies were subordinated to the interests of capital accumulation in South Africa were compounded in Lesotho's case by intentional colonial neglect and the territory's unique geographical position, inhospitable terrain and limited resource base. During the period of British rule (1884-1966) the outcome was Lesotho's progressive integration into the South African economy as an increasingly impoverished and structurally underdeveloped labour reserve. (25) Given the magnitude of the problems that this situation created for the post-independence regime, it is not altogether surprising that Chief Jonathan's attempt to pursue a more independent foreign policy has not been matched by an equally vigorous or successful attempt to achieve greater economic self-reliance. The continuing nature of Lesotho's economic dependence and the leverage that this gives to Pretoria can be illustrated through a brief account of the country's trade deficit, the customs union, and migrant labour.

### The Trade Deficit

Although official figures provide no detailed geographical breakdown, it has been estimated that about ninety per cent of Lesotho's trade is conducted with South Africa, whose road and rail networks provide the only means by which goods can be moved into or out of the country. (26) The actual movement of goods reflects an increasingly critical reliance on imports from the Republic and a declining capacity to pay for them from its own exports. The result has been a serious and growing deficit that has increased more than five-fold during the past decade and which in 1982-83 was twenty-five per cent higher than the country's GDP (compared to just half of GDP in 1971-72). (27)

Lesotho imports almost all of its fuel and energy requirements, as well as a very high proportion of its manufactured goods and machinery. It also relies very heavily on South Africa for its food supplies. Imports of grain have nearly tripled over the past decade. As a proportion of the country's grain requirements they rose from about one-fifth in 1973-74 to nearly a half in 1980-81. At the same time, the proportion of Lesotho's import bill covered by exports has fallen from twenty per cent at the time of independence to less than ten per cent today. The balance has largely been financed by a combination of foreign aid, customs union revenue and migrant remittances, a fact that has served to reinforce rather than reduce Lesotho's dependence.

### The Customs Union

Lesotho's unequal integration into the South African economy is institutionalised amongst other things through its membership, together with South Africa, Botswana and Swaziland, of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). (28) Under the revised customs agreement of 1969 Lesotho's revenue from the common customs pool increased rapidly, and as a proportion of total government revenue grew from 45 per cent in 1970-71 to 74 per cent in 1979-80. By 1983-84 it had fallen to 66 per cent. Dissatisfaction with the revenue sharing formula still exists, however, particularly concerning fluctuations in revenue and delays in payment. Although a technical committee agreed to a revised formula in 1981, Pretoria's attempt to use this to extract political and economic concessions from the other member states has led so far to discussions being deadlocked. Despite this dissatisfaction, SACU still provides Lesotho with more revenue than it could most probably raise if it left the union but kept domestic prices at the same level. (29)

Apart from this, the customs agreement confers few additional benefits, but several costs. Established in principle as a free trade area, SACU guarantees South African goods access to the Lesotho market but does little to enhance Lesotho's competitiveness as a production site, or in practical terms to ensure Lesotho reciprocal access to South African markets. For South Africa has at its disposal many non-tariff barriers, including its control over the transport system, through which access to its markets can be limited or disrupted. In addition, South African pressure has been applied on a number of occasions to block the establishment of enterprises - a Japanese motor assembly plant, an Italian shoe factory, and a West German television assembly plant, for example (30) - that might have competed in the South African market.

### Migrant Labour

The most dramatic indicator of Lesotho's continuing dependence is, of course, its reliance on migrant labour. Of an estimated working age population of just over 600,000, close to 150,000 men and 20,000 women migrate regularly to South Africa for work, nearly all of the women illegally. (31) This is four times the number engaged in wage and salary employment inside Lesotho. Following the dramatic increase in real wages for black mine-workers in South Africa in the mid-1970s, migrant earnings grew rapidly, and migrant remittances, which constitute between 60 and 70 per cent of earnings, have become increasingly vital to the country's economic survival.

Ninety per cent of Lesotho's population are based in the rural areas but only about three per cent of rural households are able to sustain themselves adequately from agricultural production alone. The rest rely largely on access to remittances, which today account for over 70 per cent of total rural income compared to 40 per cent fifteen years ago. (32) Remittances have also made a major contribution to customs revenue, through their contribution to imports, and to financing the country's growing trade deficit. (33) And in ways such as these they have clearly helped to disguise the slow rate of real economic change in the economy, as well as the inadequacies of the government's economic policy and development strategy. (34)

Their continuing ability to do so is questionable, however. Even if Pretoria fails to realize its recent threats to repatriate Basotho workers, a gradual reduction in the number of migrants seems inevitable, as South African employers switch from foreign to domestic sources of labour in their efforts to stabilize the work-force and to alleviate the critical rise in unemployment among South Africa's black population. One prediction has estimated that the number of Basotho migrants could be reduced to half the present level by the end of the century. (35) Other forecasts have been more cautious. (36) But what does seem certain is that employment opportunities in the Republic will not expand to meet the growing number of work-seekers from Lesotho. (37) With the population expected to double during the next thirty years, this will create unprecedented problems of unemployment, inequality and poverty, with far-reaching economic and political consequences, unless the government and private sector are able to improve dramatically upon their hitherto disappointing record in the field of domestic employment creation.

### Interpreting the Change

In the light of Lesotho's continuing vulnerability and Pretoria's more forceful attempts to exploit this in recent years, the question that obviously arises is why Jonathan's government has refused to capitulate more fully than it has to South Africa's demands. In answering this question, it is necessary to examine both the original shift in policy in the 1970s and the refusal to modify this in the face of mounting pressure in the 1980s.

### The Original Shift

The change in policy in the early 1970s reflected a growing awareness by Lesotho's leaders of the disadvantages of good neighbourliness and of the corresponding advantages that a more critical stance towards the apartheid regime might confer. (38) The most obvious defect of past policy was its domestic unpopularity, a factor that contributed to the BNP's electoral defeat in 1970 and which was bound to prove a focal point for dissent in the post-coup era. Furthermore, the government's expectations that friendly contact with the Republic would provide compensatory benefits, that would offset such disadvantages, were increasingly dashed. South African aid and investment proved far less than anticipated. The hopes that dialogue with Pretoria might help to promote genuine change in South Africa were also increasingly disappointed. And Lesotho's attempts to discuss the return of the "conquered territories" - lands lost by the Basotho in the wars against the Free State in the 1860s - were met with intransigence by Pretoria.

Jonathan's growing disenchantment with South Africa was enhanced by additional factors. These included Pretoria's failure to consult Lesotho when taking important economic decisions, such as the devaluation of the Rand in 1971 and 1975, that vitally affected its interests; South Africa's refusal to buy water at the price Lesotho wanted, which put paid to the proposed Oxbow-Malibamatso hydro-electric scheme, the most ambitious project in Lesotho's first Five Year Development Plan; the pressure applied by Pretoria to block a number of planned manufacturing

enterprises in the early 1970s; the withdrawal of the South African maize subsidy in 1977; the fatal shooting of five Basotho migrants at the Western Deep Levels mine in Carletonville in 1973; and many more. (39)

At the same time there was a growing appreciation in Lesotho of the benefits that might be realized by assuming a more hostile posture towards South Africa, benefits that could prove particularly vital to a regime that in the aftermath of the 1970 coup needed desperately to establish its control and credibility and to weaken and divide those forces opposed to it.

Two main advantages were in fact realized over time. First, the repeated pronouncements by Jonathan and other BNP leaders on the injustices of apartheid helped to undermine the BCP's claim to a monopoly of anti-South African sentiment, a claim that was finally discredited by Mokhehle's subsequent collusion with Pretoria. In addition, the government was able to use the Republic's threatening response to such criticism as a weapon in its appeal for national unity and reconciliation and as a means for diverting attention from pressing domestic problems. By successfully soliciting the help of King Moshoeshoe II in these appeals, Chief Jonathan was also able to mend, if only partially, the serious and unpopular rift that had existed hitherto between government and monarch. (40)

Second, Lesotho's new stance helped to divert outside attention from the regime's obvious internal shortcomings and thereby to promote a marked increase in international recognition, sympathy and support. Lesotho's enhanced international status was well publicised at home by the government in an effort to offset its lack of domestic legitimacy. The most tangible benefit, however, was the rapid growth in foreign aid that occurred during the 1970s, which was premised far more on Lesotho's efforts to transform its "bantustan" image than on strict criteria of economic need. (41) The magnitude of this growth and the increasing diversification of Lesotho's aid links are shown in Table 1.

The rapid influx of foreign aid was used to finance the major part of the government's expanding development programme. (42) Poor planning, inefficient management, widespread corruption and many other factors have so far prevented this from achieving any fundamental change in Lesotho's labour reserve position, or from overcoming the many serious problems that are associated with it. (43) Nevertheless, some outward forms of social and economic development have obviously been visible and have been exploited by the regime to enhance its credibility.

The really crucial impact of foreign aid was revealed, however, in the ways it was used to transform the class basis of the ruling party and to strengthen its power and cohesion. The BNP originally reflected the interests of the minor chiefs and the lower elements, largely Catholic and rural-based, of the petty bourgeoisie. During the colonial period attempts by such chiefs to translate their traditional political and economic privileges into a nascent form of capitalist accumulation in the countryside were ultimately blocked by the British "reforms" of the 1940s which eroded much of their former influence and economic power. (44) At the same time, they were placed in an increasingly inferior position to the senior chiefs - many of whom, at least initially, were to become members of the royalist Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) - whose position was in many ways entrenched by these reforms. (45) Similarly, attempts by the lower petty-bourgeois strata to advance their own economic position were thwarted by the fact that the limited but nevertheless crucial opportunities for indigenous accumulation were largely in the hands of the Protestant-educated middle class, represented by the BCP.

During the struggle for independence these two strata came to see that their best chance of overcoming these constraints lay in nationalist party politics and the competition for state power. With the victory of the BNP in the 1965 elections, this objective was realized, but only in part. Their ambition to use the

machinery of the state to advance their economic as well as political power was clearly constrained by the low level of productive forces in society. These would have to be raised if opportunities for state-directed accumulation were to be realized. And the obvious answer was a partnership, however junior, with foreign capital and aid. However, despite the offer of generous tax concessions, cheap labour and many other incentives (46), attempts to attract foreign private investment, particularly from South Africa, proved extremely disappointing. Save for a temporary boost in the mid-1970s, occasioned by De Beers' investment in the diamond mine at Letseng-la-Terai which was subsequently closed in 1982, foreign investment remained low and static, at about M5 million a year, throughout the 1970s. (47)

Attention, therefore, turned increasingly to the possibility of attracting a growing and diversified inflow of overseas aid. Jonathan's vigorous but largely unrewarded efforts to secure this in the period before 1970 undoubtedly helped to convince him that any major growth in aid would have to be premised on a change in policy towards South Africa. Once this change was effected, aid began to pour in.

By facilitating a rapid expansion of state and parastatal institutions, as well as by enhancing their ability to allocate resources and to offer increasingly bureaucratic salaries, this influx of aid helped to transform the class basis of the BNP into an embryonic "bureaucratic bourgeoisie". (48) And the members of this

TABLE 1

Lesotho's Foreign Aid Receipts, 1969-1981

	Gross ODA \$ million	Net ODA \$ million	% of Gross from:	UK	USA	FRG	EC	Other Multilateral
1969	13.3	13.3	67	15	0	0	15	
1970	10.1	10.0	16	40	1	1	38	
1971	16.8	16.8	44	24	1	1	28	
1972	15.4	14.1	47	19	0	7	22	
1973	14.3	14.2	32	14	3	1	41	
1974	22.3	22.3	26	13	7	1	41	
1975	28.6	28.6	30	7	2	0	49	
1976	30.2	30.1	13	13	3	0	40	
1977	38.9	38.8	10	10	3	2	46	
1978	50.4	50.1	20	10	7	7	35	
1979	64.5	64.2	22	14	6	4	28	
1980	90.7	90.3	11	18	20	5	29	
1981	101.4	101.0	10	25	12	7	35	

Notes: ODA is Official Development Assistance, including grants and loans, in current US \$'s. Net ODA is gross less loan service. EC is European Community, FRG is Federal Republic of Germany. Totals of percentages by source do not add to 100 since by 1981 some twelve other bilateral donors were involved. The most important were Austria, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.

Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries (Paris: Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1977; 1980; and 1984).

class have demonstrated an increasing proclivity for using their salaries, their privileged access to state resources and their political influence to engage in commercial, industrial and agricultural accumulation. (49) At the same time the growing volume of state patronage afforded by aid was also used to co-opt elements of what von Freyhold has called "supportive classes": groups, such as trade unions, co-operatives, farmers' associations and traders' organizations, that do not control the state but that can benefit from it. (50) By so doing the regime was able to complement the more obvious and well known authoritarian methods that were used to centralize power more effectively in its hands.

This expansion in the apparatuses of the state was not financed solely by foreign aid, of course. Revenue from the customs union and migrant remittances also played a crucial part. In addition, South Africa's continuing capacity to absorb Basotho migrants was clearly vital if the bureaucratic class was to avoid confrontation with the one class that was in no way "supportive", Lesotho's rural-based migrant proletariat. Chief Jonathan was undoubtedly aware, therefore, that his new policy towards the Republic, whilst conferring obvious benefits, also entailed risks of South African retaliation that might possibly outweigh them. In the 1970s these risks were clearly worth taking. The serious shortfall in foreign labour on South African mines, occasioned by the withdrawal of workers from Malawi and Mozambique, precluded any major reduction in the Basotho migrant work force during this period. And alternative forms of overt retaliation were forestalled by Vorster's reluctance to compromise his detente initiative.

#### Continuing Defiance

With the advent of total strategy, the costs of defiance rose dramatically, however, and Pretoria's efforts, in collaboration with the LLA, to destabilize the regime began to exact an increasingly heavy toll. Economically, they inflicted infrastructural damage, discouraged tourism and investment, and compelled the government to divert scarce resources from urgent development tasks to defence and security, whose share of the budget rose from 8.4 per cent in 1980 to 22 per cent in 1984. (51) Politically, they helped to compound the serious political divisions within the country by fostering the intra-party as well inter-party strife. Important rifts developed within the ruling party and the armed forces, and rumours of alleged coup attempts have become increasingly rife in recent years. (52) Nevertheless, save for its concession on the refugee issue, the Lesotho government has continued to resist the pressure that Pretoria has applied to secure a more fundamental reversal of policy. Two main reasons can be advanced to explain this.

The first, and most obvious, was the government's reluctance to sacrifice the benefits that its political estrangement from South Africa had conferred. Access to aid, for example, has become even more vital in the period since 1979. Increasing quantities of aid have been required to help to provide the material benefits that have been used to maintain, however tenuously at times, the cohesion of the ruling party and bureaucratic class, as well as the loyalty of the army, in the face of the damaging tactics employed by Pretoria to undermine them. In addition, aid has become increasingly important to the regime's efforts in the development field. These have been characterized by a greater sense of urgency in recent years, as government leaders have begun to face up to the fact that their future survival is inextricably linked to their capacity to resolve the problems posed by the declining opportunities for Basotho migrants in the Republic. Any significant reduction in aid would seriously undermine this capacity.

It might have been possible, of course, for the government to make more concessions to South Africa - a security agreement, for example - without necessarily threatening its access to aid. But the regime could not be sure of this, especially as the revelations of the extensive misuse of aid funds, contained in the Auditor-General's Report of 1982, had already aroused concern within the donor community about the continuing value of their development assistance. Donors were also worried by the government's lack of constitutional progress and its deteriorating

human rights record. The promise of elections and the introduction of administrative reforms helped to assuage some of these misgivings. But there is little doubt that the government's resistance to South African pressure and the ways in which this was skilfully exploited to attract international sympathy were of equal, if not greater, importance in maintaining and expanding the influx of aid. The UN's approval of a \$45 million programme of economic assistance in the aftermath of the Maseru Raid is just one illustration of this. (53)

Other crucial advantages that the regime could ill afford to lose were the domestic respect that its defiance had commanded and the international standing that had accompanied and reinforced this. This standing was enhanced in December 1984 when Chief Jonathan received the Dag Hammarskjold Peace Prize in recognition of his peace initiatives for those suffering under apartheid. Since 1983, when the government announced its intention of returning to the ballot box, these factors assumed increasing importance as two of the ruling party's strongest electoral assets.

Support for the regime's foreign policy has not been unqualified, of course. It is not just the Catholic church that feels that aspects of it have been unnecessarily reckless and provocative, particularly the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, China and other Socialist countries. (54) But attempts by the BDA and the equally pro-South African United Democratic Party (UDP) to harness such feelings into an effective opposition to government policy have so far been heavily compromised by their close connections with Pretoria. (55)

Following the government's announcement in 1983, the scheduled date for elections has been repeatedly postponed, leading to speculation in some quarters that they might not take place at all and that the original promise to hold them was little more than a sham designed to confuse the opposition and assuage Western aid donors. In January 1985, however, the interim National Assembly was dissolved and a delimitation commission was set up to establish the boundaries of the sixty single-member constituencies for the new parliament. By May the registration of voters was well under way, and the government now announced that elections would take place on 17 and 18 September 1985. Hopes that the Basotho people would be able to express their choice at the ballot box for the first time in fifteen years were dashed in August, however, when the five opposition parties expected to contest the elections refused to nominate candidates (56), protesting that they could not do so without the voters roll, which they claimed had not been made available to them. All sixty candidates of the ruling BNP were therefore deemed to have been returned unopposed. Whatever the merits of opposition allegations of substantial irregularities in the electoral machinery, and government denials of them, the BNP's victory by default is unlikely to do much to enhance the regime's domestic legitimacy and international respectability, or to resolve the bitter divisions that have long afflicted the nation. Given this, the credibility conferred by the government's policy towards South Africa will undoubtedly continue to be just as vital in the future as it has been in the past.

The second reason for the regime's continuing defiance concerns the limits of destabilization. South Africa clearly possesses more than sufficient military and economic might to force Jonathan into compliance or to topple him from power if Pretoria so wished. But, despite frequent threats to use such power, particularly through the forced repatriation of Basotho migrants, it is doubtful (though by no means impossible, of course) if they will ever be put into practice. Any attempt to invade Lesotho or to impose massive economic sanctions would invite international retaliation and could in any case prove detrimental to South African interests by promoting chaos on its frontiers rather than compliance with its policies. In addition, any attempt by the South African state to use its major economic weapon against Lesotho - reductions in the numbers of migrant mine workers - could well be resisted by the mining industry, which has a substantial investment in the skills of Basotho miners. Reportedly, several mining executives expressed public alarm about a South African radio commentary in April 1984 suggesting that tight restrictions on

border crossings might be reintroduced if Lesotho continued to remain recalcitrant. When later in 1984 a threat was made by Pretoria to reduce the number of Basotho migrants to 65,000 unless Jonathan signed a non-aggression pact similar to the Nkomati Accord, mining houses reacted by immediately requesting more Basotho workers from their recruiting agency, TEBA. (57)

Although far from complacent about Pretoria's threats, Chief Jonathan has undoubtedly been aware of these constraints and the limits they place on destabilization. And this awareness has clearly afforded greater scope for manoeuvre than suggested at first sight by Lesotho's economic and military vulnerability. Attempts have been made to enlarge this scope through an energetic campaign to enlist support from the international community. The establishment of diplomatic ties with Moscow and Beijing can be interpreted largely in this light. For, in addition to the economic and military aid that is anticipated, the government clearly hopes that the presence in Maseru of two additional and permanent members of the UN Security Council will help to deter further efforts by South Africa seriously to meddle or intervene in Lesotho's affairs. The effectiveness of such efforts to solicit international support should not be exaggerated, of course. The government was disappointed, for example, by the lack of American sympathy at the time of the Maseru Raid. Even so, Reagan's commitment to "constructive engagement" has not prevented his Administration at other times, and less publicly, from cautioning Pretoria "against actions which would undermine or topple the Jonathan Government". (58)

In addition to these two main reasons, another possible motive for Jonathan's estrangement from the Republic, as well as for his enthusiastic but so far largely unrewarded commitment to SADCC, may well have been to claim a more prominent voice for Lesotho in future developments in southern Africa. It is far from certain what direction these developments will take. Nor is it certain that a radical transformation in South Africa, for example, would necessarily ease the present regime's difficulties. Leistner has argued that an ANC regime in Pretoria might easily be tempted to give preference to South African work-seekers over those from Lesotho. It might also be tempted to encourage radical opposition to the present leadership in Lesotho, or even to claim sovereignty over the country. (59) Jonathan is undoubtedly aware of such dangers, and his present policy might be construed as an attempt to insure against them. For, as Weisfelder has argued, he would clearly prefer to see Lesotho as "part of the solution rather than the problem" in whatever regional change does take place. (60)

### Lessons and Conclusions

Relations between Lesotho and South Africa have inevitably been overshadowed, and will continue to be, by developments elsewhere in the subcontinent, and especially within the Republic itself. It would obviously be unwise, therefore, to overstate the regional significance of the Lesotho case. In economic or military terms, Lesotho poses no threat whatsoever to Pretoria; nor has she ever done so, despite South African concern at the alleged existence of ANC "terrorist" bases in the period before 1983. In addition, it is doubtful in real terms - rather than in terms of propaganda value - whether the presence in Maseru of half a dozen Eastern bloc embassies has done much to enhance Pretoria's fears of a Soviet-inspired Communist onslaught in southern Africa. Moreover, it is equally doubtful if the polemical anti-apartheid pronouncements that have flowed regularly from Maseru have made much of an impression on Botha or his supporters, particularly as the South African media have not been slow to point out the irony involved in Jonathan's support for human rights in South Africa and his denial of them in Lesotho.

Nevertheless, it would also be unwise to treat the confrontation between Lesotho and South Africa, as some observers have done (61), as a minor though perhaps interesting distraction from the major issues and struggles that dominate

the region. In a number of important respects Jonathan's repeated insistence that apartheid is incompatible with regional stability and his stubborn refusal to comply more fully with Pretoria's demands have proved more than a mild irritant to the South African regime. They have helped to frustrate its hopes for a crack in the resistance to CONSAS and the homelands policy. They have helped to undermine Pretoria's efforts to convince its allies in the West that apartheid presents no threat to international peace. And they have helped to dent the image of South African invincibility and to provide support, if only moral, to those presently engaged in the attempt to shatter it entirely. Whilst not exaggerating the importance of such challenges, the fact that they have been of some significance can be judged from the scale of Pretoria's response to them over the past five years.

At the more specific level, two principal lessons might be drawn from the Lesotho case. Whilst the serious economic problems and social cleavages that characterize most SADCC states will continue to provide a fertile breeding ground for South Africa's efforts to realize its regional objectives, the first lesson is that it is surely over-simplistic to view the likely success or failure of such efforts solely in terms of the degree of economic dependence or the degree of conservatism or radicalism (political dependence) of the regime in question. As Daniel has shown in his study of Swaziland, for example, it was not so much the country's economic dependence, or the innate conservatism or traditionalism of the Swazi ruling class, that has turned Swaziland into "South Africa's most reliable partner in the whole regional network of states" but the specific ways in which this class established and consolidated its economic and political power through a compradorial alliance with foreign capital in general and South African capital in particular. (62)

The Lesotho case reveals a different story. Lacking the resources to attract anything like the level of foreign private investment experienced by Swaziland, the petty-bourgeois strata that assumed control of the Lesotho state at independence have attempted to transform their class basis and to enhance their economic and political power through a different kind of alliance, with the international aid community, an essential pre-condition for which was a fundamental change in Lesotho's political relations with the Republic. Economic relations have changed far less, of course. Dependence on South Africa, and particularly on the mining industry for the continuing absorption of Basotho migrants, has proved in many ways as vital as foreign aid in enabling Lesotho's ruling class to contain, if not resolve, the contradictions inherent in the Lesotho social formation.

What this suggests, therefore, is that any effective analysis of the degree of complicity or defiance demonstrated by individual SADCC states in their relations with the Republic must start from a detailed examination of the specific contradictions involved rather than from predetermined assumptions concerning economic or political dependence.

The second lesson concerns the limits of destabilization and the possibilities that these create for resistance to South Africa's regional objectives. The Lesotho case suggests the existence and possible future expansion of such limits and possibilities. With total strategy clearly failing to quell the rising tide of resistance in South Africa, and with Western governments moving towards limited sanctions, there are certainly grounds for thinking that Pretoria would be ill-advised to invite additional international retaliation or to compound its serious domestic problems by persisting with a strategy of destabilization that might easily plunge the whole region into chaos. Surely South Africa's leaders should be more inclined to heed the advice of foreign policy experts, such as Deon Geldenhuys (many of whom, Geldenhuys included, were former apologists for destabilization), to move towards more subtle and less risky forms of regional pressure. (63) Over the past eighteen months South Africa's policy towards Lesotho, as well as its accords and agreements with Mozambique and Angola, suggest that Pretoria was beginning to do just this.

It would be unwise, however, to generalize too much from the Lesotho case. It would also be unwise to assume that Pretoria's understandable preoccupation with its pressing domestic problems will inevitably act as a brake on its campaign of regional destabilization. A number of the most recent developments in Southern Africa suggest just the opposite in fact. Botha's threats to repatriate all foreign workers if full economic sanctions are applied by the West, South Africa's raid on Botswana and its continuing incursions into Angola, Pretoria's declaration of open support for UNITA and its arrogant admission that it has consistently violated the Nkomati Accord by providing support for the MNR, are all indicative of a readiness to escalate rather than reduce the level of regional tension.

Whether such an escalation does take place, or whether Pretoria ultimately opts for more subtle and less violent forms of pressure, what can be safely concluded is that South Africa's regional strategy of destabilization, whilst achieving temporary tactical victories, is unlikely in the long run to prove any more successful than detente in providing the apartheid regime with a lasting regional settlement or in helping to contain the rapidly mounting crisis within the Republic itself.

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#### Notes

\*This paper was presented on 7th June 1985, i.e. before the coup which overthrew Jonathan's BNP at the beginning of 1987.

- (1) The nine member states of SADCC are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. SADCC was established at a meeting of Heads of States in Lusaka on 1 April 1980. For an analysis of its origins, aims, achievements and prospects, see Roger Leys and Arne Tostensen, "Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa: the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference", Review of African Political Economy, No 23 (1982), pp 52-71; and Michael Sefali, "SADCC and the Development of Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa" (Paper presented at the Inaugural Congress and Workshop of the Southern African Development Research Association on Development and Destabilization in Southern Africa, Roma, National University of Lesotho, 1983), henceforth known as the SADRA Workshop. The selected proceedings of this workshop, edited by John Bardill and Michael Sefali, have been published by the Institute of Southern African Studies, NUL, Roma.
- (2) For a brief analysis of CONSAS, see Centre of African Studies, "CONSAS: a new strategic offensive by South Africa", Review of African Political Economy, No 18 (1980), pp 102-105.
- (3) A detailed discussion of the origins of this crisis and South Africa's response through total strategy is provided in John Saul and Stephen Gelb, The Crisis in South Africa: class defense, class revolution (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1981).
- (4) Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, "South Africa's Strategy in the Southern African Region: a preliminary analysis" (Paper presented at SADRA Workshop, Roma, 1983), p 7. This paper provides a useful analysis of the origins of total strategy and its changing implications at the regional level. Also see Davies and O'Meara, "The State of Analysis of the Southern African Region: issues raised by South African strategy", Review of African Political Economy, No 29 (1984), pp 64-76.

- (5) Davies and O'Meara (1983), p 16. Leys and Tostensen also attempt a brief classification of Southern African states according to the degree of economic and political dependence, the latter reflecting the degree of conservatism or radicalism of the regime in question. They do recognize that Lesotho does not fit easily into their typology but do not attempt an explanation. Leys and Tostensen, pp 66-67.
- (6) See, for example, Paul Goodison and Richard Levin, The Nkomati Accord: the illusion of peace in southern Africa (University of Liverpool, Department of Political Theory and Institutions, Working Paper No 11, 1984), pp 1-17.
- (7) In 1982 this stance earned Lesotho the distinction of being included by General Magnus Malan, Botha's Defence Minister and one of the principal architects of total strategy, among those southern African countries, including Mozambique and Angola, that were "politically immature" (i.e. non-compliant), rather than among those, such as Swaziland, that were regarded by Pretoria as having attained "political maturity" through their willingness to collaborate with South Africa. Rand Daily Mail, 12/10/82.
- (8) Of the 60 seats in the National Assembly the BNP won 31, the BCP 25, and the royalist Marematlou Freedom Party 4. Chief Jonathan was defeated in his own constituency and had to wait until a safe seat could be provided via a by-election in July 1965 before taking over as Prime Minister. A brief survey of the 1965 election is contained in Macartney's article on the 1970 General Election. W J A Macartney, "Case Study: the Lesotho general election of 1970", Government and Opposition, 8, No 4 (1973), pp 474-75.
- (9) These stereotypes of the two main nationalist parties should not be exaggerated, however, and have undergone a major modification in the period since independence. For a discussion of the changing patterns of political cleavage in the period since 1966, see Richard F Weisfelder, "The Basotho Nation-State: What legacy for the future?" The Journal of Modern African Studies, 19, No 2 (1981), pp 221-56.
- (10) Macartney, p 479. Although the election results were never published officially, Macartney's calculations give the BCP 36 seats, the BNP 23, and the MFP 1. His article provides a useful survey of the background to the election and the coup which followed it.
- (11) The emergency powers were lifted in 1973, since when the government has ruled through an interim National Assembly established in that year. This was a purely nominated body, dominated by BNP supporters. The most detailed analysis of the events leading to the coup, admittedly from a partisan royalist perspective, is B M Khaketla's Lesotho 1970: an African coup under the microscope (London: Hurst, 1971).
- (12) Colin Legum (ed), Africa Contemporary Record: annual survey and documents (London: Rex Collings, 1971), p B482. Henceforth known as ACR.
- (13) For a detailed and useful account of all these changes, see David Hirschmann, "Changes in Lesotho's Policy Towards South Africa", African Affairs, 78, No 311 (1979), pp 9-17.
- (14) ACR 1971-72, p B315.
- (15) Other incentives used by Pretoria included the offer of a renegotiated customs agreement and the possibility of a deal on the "conquered territories" in exchange for Lesotho's recognition of the Transkei.
- (16) For a discussion of Lesotho's foreign policy in the era of destabilization, see R O K Ajulu, "South Africa's Strategy of Destabilization: the case of Lesotho" (Paper presented at SADRA Workshop, Roma, 1983), pp 1-10; and G M E Leistner, "Lesotho and South Africa: uneasy relationship", Bulletin of the Africa Institute of South Africa, 23, No 16 (1983), pp 141-44. By far the most useful source material on LLA activity, destabilization in Lesotho, and

other aspects of the contemporary situation in Lesotho can be found in Lesotho Clippings, published quarterly since January 1982 by the Documentation and Publications Division of the Institute of Southern African Studies, Roma, Lesotho.

- (17) For examples of complaints about the hold-up of defence equipment by the South African authorities, see Leabua Jonathan, Destabilization: a brief to the Lesotho parliament by the prime minister, the Right Honourable Dr Leabua Jonathan, on South Africa's activities against Lesotho (Maseru: Prime Minister's Press Office, 1983), p 7.
- (18) In his speech to the UN Security Council after the raid, the SA Ambassador, David Stuart, was not only unrepentant but warned Lesotho that South Africa would consider using border controls if the government continued to harbour "terrorists". Rand Daily Mail, 17/12/82. Threats to send home Basotho migrants were also made at this time.
- (19) Reportedly, Pretoria supplied the Lesotho government with a list of 68 refugees it wanted expelled immediately, although adding that all politically affiliated refugees, a total of 502, should ultimately be expelled. Of the 68, the Lesotho government claimed that it had no knowledge of 26 and that another 22 had already left Lesotho. The remaining 20 "volunteered" to be evacuated and were air-lifted out of Lesotho by the UN via the twice-weekly air link to Swaziland and Maputo. Most of these were ANC, but some PAC refugees were also forced to agree to "voluntary" evacuation. For details, see Africa Research Bulletin, 20, No 9 (1983), p 6968.
- (20) This refers largely to the ANC. Relations between the government and the PAC have been less cordial. The PAC has been accused of training members of the LLA in Libya, and in March 1985 six PAC members were killed in a clash with units of the Lesotho Paramilitary Force. Following this incident the PAC was threatened with expulsion from Lesotho unless it changed its hostile attitude towards the government. Africa Research Bulletin, 22, No 3 (1985), p 7573.
- (21) Press reports at the time claimed that the Lesotho officials believed the real objective of the blockade and other forms of pressure exerted by Pretoria were "to get us to join the constellation of states, to recognize the bantustans, and to force us to sell them water at a cheaper rate", with the ANC issue merely a "smokescreen". Financial Mail, 15/7/83.
- (22) A M15 million Feasibility Study for the Highlands Water Scheme has been in progress since 1983. The study is being financed jointly by South Africa and Lesotho (Lesotho's share by the EEC). South African vacillation caused delays in this study during 1984, and in August 1984 Pik Botha threatened that South Africa might pull out altogether unless Lesotho proved more accommodating in her relations with the Republic: Africa Research Bulletin, 21, No 8 (1984), p 7332. By November 1984, however, the study was under way again: Lesotho Weekly, 23/11/84. For Jonathan's allegations about South African efforts to bribe himself and the ruling party into signing a non-aggression pact, see Africa Research Bulletin, 21, No 8 (1984), p 7332.
- (23) This faction, led by Gerard Ramoreboli, broke away from Mokhehle in 1973 on the issue of whether to participate in the interim National Assembly. Mokhehle's faction refused to participate, but Ramoreboli, Chaolane and others did accept nomination to the Assembly, and Ramoreboli became at one point the Minister for Justice.
- (24) This section was written and typed before the opposition parties decided to refuse to nominate candidates for the forthcoming elections. For a brief discussion of the BNP's victory by default, see page 11.

- (25) An incisive account of Lesotho's transformation from a prosperous granary at the end of the nineteenth century to an impoverished and underdeveloped labour reserve by the time of independence is provided by Colin Murray, "From Granary to Labour Reserve: an economic history of Lesotho", South African Labour Bulletin, 6, No 4 (1980), pp 3-20.
- (26) Calvin Woodward, "Not a Complete Solution: assessing the long years of foreign aid to Lesotho", Africa Insight, 12, No 3 (1982), p 175. Lesotho's dependence on South African road and rail networks might be reduced when the new International Airport is opened.
- (27) These and all other figures used in this section, except where otherwise stated, are derived from the following sources: Central Bank of Lesotho, Annual Report for 1983; John Gray et al., "Lesotho: a strategy for survival after the golden seventies", South African Labour Bulletin, 6, No 4 (1980), pp 63-78; Kingdom of Lesotho, Annual Statistical Bulletin 1981 (Maseru: Bureau of Statistics, 1982); Kingdom of Lesotho, First, Second and Third Five Year Development Plans (Maseru: Central Planning and Development Office, 1970; 1976; and 1971); Kingdom of Lesotho, Donor Round Table Papers, Vol 1 (Maseru: CPDO, 1983); and K T J Rakhethla, Budget Speech Presenting the 1983-84 Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure (Maseru: Government Printer, 1983).
- (28) Other agreements through which Lesotho's dependence on South Africa is institutionalised are the Labour Agreement of 1973 and the Rand Monetary Area Agreement of 1974.
- (29) For differing views concerning the costs and benefits of Lesotho's membership of SACU, and of the possible gains and losses of withdrawal from it, see Paul Mosley, "The Southern African Customs Union: a re-appraisal", World Development, 6, No 1 (1978); Peter Robson, "Reappraising the Southern African Customs Union: a comment", World Development, 6, No 4 (1978); and James Cobbe, "Integration Among Unequals: the Southern African Customs Union and development", World Development, 8, No 4 (1980).
- (30) For details, see Gabriele Winai Strom, Development and Dependence in Lesotho, the Enclave of South Africa (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978), p 115.
- (31) This is oscillating and not permanent migration, of course. South African legislation in the early 1960s (Aliens Control Act 1963; Black Laws Amendment Act 1963) excluded permanent migration and in addition made it all but impossible for Basotho women to work legally in South Africa.
- (32) Arie van der Wiel, Migratory Wage Labour: its role in the economy of Lesotho (Mazenod Book Centre, 1977), pp 87-88.
- (33) According to the Lesotho government's third Five Year Development Plan, remittances generated 40 per cent of customs revenue and covered 62 per cent of Lesotho's trade deficit. Third Plan, pp 13 and 17.
- (34) It has been estimated that migrant remittances have accounted for 80 per cent of the growth in the Lesotho economy in the past decade. Woodward, p 175.
- (35) Jerry Eckert and Ron Wykstra, The Future of Basotho Migration to the Republic of South Africa, Lesotho Sector Analysis Project Report No 4 (Maseru: Ministry of Agriculture, 1979), p 18. For an additional discussion of the changing recruitment patterns on the South African mines and their effects on Lesotho, see Colin Murray, "'Stabilization' and Structural Unemployment", South African Labour Bulletin, 6, No 4 (1980), pp 58-61.
- (36) A range of different possible scenarios are outlined in H Kizilyalli, Options for the Lesotho Economy in the Year 2000: Perspective Plan Alternatives (Maseru: CPDO, 1982). Even the most optimistic scenario predicts a 53 per cent unemployment rate by 2000. Others predict a rate as high as 67 per cent.

- (37) Close to 30,000 young people enter the Lesotho labour market annually. Given present trends in employment creation within Lesotho and in recruiting practices by the Chamber of Mines in South Africa, only 2,000 to 3,000 at the most can hope to become legal migrants and perhaps a comparable number to get formal sector jobs in Lesotho. It is difficult to see how the remaining 20,000 plus can be effectively absorbed in agriculture and the informal sector in Lesotho.
- (38) David Hirschmann, especially pp 3-9, presents a clear and convincing account of the various factors involved here and the ways in which they have been used to the advantage of Chief Jonathan, the ruling party, and what he calls the "ruling political-administrative-business class". By assigning more or less equal weight to each of the factors involved, however, he tends to underestimate the critical impact that the limited access to South African capital and the far greater access to foreign aid have had in shaping the nature and ideology of this class.
- (39) For additional details, see Hirschmann, especially pp 4-5.
- (40) The rift between the King (formerly the Paramount Chief) and Jonathan has a very long history, but became particularly bitter in the period immediately before and after independence. The main source of controversy at this time was the limited role given to the King in the independence constitution. Tension mounted after 1966 and resulted in a violent confrontation between royalist supporters and the police in December 1966. The King was placed under house arrest and his limited powers further circumscribed. Public opposition to the government's treatment of the King was also a factor in helping to explain the BNP's electoral defeat in 1970. See Macartney, p 490. After the coup the King was exiled for a short time, but on his return to Lesotho relations with the government improved.
- (41) For a detailed analysis of the extra-economic criteria upon which aid to Lesotho has been based, see Woodward, pp 170-76.
- (42) Foreign aid has provided between 59 and 80 per cent of development funding in recent years. Woodward, p 175.
- (43) This was particularly true of the ambitious area-based agricultural projects in the mid-1970s which yielded minimal long-term benefits from the large amounts of foreign aid invested in them. The \$15 million Thaba-Bosiu project, for example, saw production per acre actually decline during the period of the project (1973-77). Meanwhile, production costs rose and incomes stagnated, despite rising prices for the crops produced. Henk Huisman and Jan Sterkenburg, "The Spatial Organization for Development in Lesotho" (Department of Geography, National University of Lesotho, Roma, 1981), pp 24-26. For a useful summary of the limited achievements of foreign aid in Lesotho, see Woodward, pp 167-79. For an account of the government's administrative shortcomings in the development field, see Roeland van de Geer and Malcolm Wallis, Government and Development in rural Lesotho (Moriya: Morija Printing Works, 1982). And for startling revelations about the widespread existence of financial mismanagement and corruption and their implications for the administration of aid-related projects, see Kingdom of Lesotho, Report of the Auditor-General on the Public Accounts of Lesotho for the Tax year Ended 31 March 1978 (Maseru: Government Printer, 1982); and Paul Wellings, "Making a Fast Buck: capital leakage and the public accounts of Lesotho", African Affairs, 82, No 329 (1983), pp 495-508.
- (44) Based on the recommendations of the Pim Report of 1935, these "reforms" represented a belated attempt by the British to curb the seemingly uncontrollable expansion of the chieftainship and to limit the abuses of chiefly power through the introduction of a system of indirect rule into Basutoland. The "reforms" involved the statutory recognition and gazetting of chiefs, and a reduction in their numbers and powers. By 1950 only 122 chiefs were entitled to hold courts, compared to 1,340 earlier, and chiefs had lost their rights to tribute labour, court fines, and the proceeds of the sales of

- stray stock. Chiefs were now to be paid salaries from the Native Treasury, established in 1946. Many of the junior chiefs and headmen received very little by way of remuneration, however, and some received nothing at all. With their traditional sources of income now terminated, this provoked considerable frustration and resentment amongst the lower ranks of the chieftainship which the BNP was later to tap. For a summary of the "reforms" and their limitations, see Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part V: the High Commission Territories - Basutoland, The Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland (London: HMSO, 1953), pp 79-112.
- (45) In contrast to the lower ranks of the chieftainship, the senior chiefs, and particularly the principal and ward chiefs, received quite generous salaries from the Native Treasury, therefore widening the gulf between themselves and the junior chiefs.
- (46) Other incentives included duty-free access to the EEC market; free movement of capital, profits and interest; loan guarantees and training grants; and the provision by the government of industrial sites and purpose-built factories. For additional details, see Sam Rugege, "The State of Research on State and Class in Lesotho" (Paper presented at the Workshop on Research Priorities in Southern Africa, Institute of Southern African Studies, National University of Lesotho, Roma, 1981), p 24.
- (47) Third Plan, p 16. For a discussion of the constraints on industrial development in Lesotho and the difficulties in attracting foreign private investment, see JASPA, Options for a Dependent Economy: development, employment and equity problems in Lesotho (Addis Ababa: International Labour Office Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa, 1979), pp 143-45.
- (48) This term is used reservedly here and in no way implies that this bureaucratic class has as yet turned itself into a national bourgeoisie which fully controls the process of economic reproduction within Lesotho. For a very detailed analysis, though from a statist and specifically anti-Marxist perspective, of the ways in which aid-financed projects have been used to facilitate the expansion of state institutions and state power in Lesotho, see John Holm, "The State and Rural Development in Botswana and Lesotho" (Unpublished Paper, Department of Political Science, Cleveland State University, 1979).
- (49) For details, see Rugege, pp 16-18.
- (50) For von Freyhold's conception of supportive classes, see Michaela von Feyhold, "The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version", Review of African Political Economy, No 8 (1977), p 77.
- (51) ACR 1980-81, p B679; and Rakhetla, 1983-84 Budget Speech, p 9.
- (52) For details of alleged coup attempts, see The Friend, 27/12/83; Rand Daily Mail, 21/12/83; Cape Times, 31/3/84; and The Friend, 10/2/84. Although the government has so far survived such alleged attempts to overthrow it, disaffection within the ranks of the armed forces manifested itself in 1984 through various incidents of banditry by LPF units, culminating in a near mutiny by units in the South of the country in mid-1984. Divisions within the country have not only been fostered by South African and LLA activity, of course; they have also been exacerbated by the regime's somewhat heavy-handed repression of suspected LLA sympathisers within the country, as well as by the government's policy towards the Communist bloc, which has alienated some of its former supporters, particularly within the Catholic church.
- (53) This aid was used to finance nine projects, including the government's plans for a new International Airport, which would promote greater independence from the Republic and help to insure against the consequences of possible future South African raids. Africa Economic Digest, 18/3/83.

- (54) Lesotho has relations at ambassadorial level with the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Romania and Yugoslavia, and at the non-ambassadorial level with a number of other Socialist countries, including Cuba and Czechoslovakia.
- (55) The UDP was formed by Charles Mofeli in 1967 following his defection from the parliamentary ranks of the BCP. Mofeli and his party joined the interim National Assembly when it was established in 1973, and for a while he became an outspoken critic of government policy, particularly the regime's changing policy towards South Africa. Mofeli's appointment to the Cabinet in the late 1970s silenced him for a while, but, following his dismissal in 1981, he returned to the attack with renewed vigour. In 1984 his open declaration of support for South African policy towards the ANC in Lesotho led to his expulsion from the National Assembly.
- (56) The five parties were the BDA, MFP, UDP and two new parties formed in 1985: the conservative National Independence Party, led by Anthony Manyeli, a staunch Catholic and former BNP minister who resigned from the government in 1972; and the more radical United Fatherland Front, led by Joel Moitse, also a former BNP minister who was dismissed from the Cabinet in 1975. Neither the external wing nor the various internal factions of the BCP were prepared to contest the elections.
- (57) Apparently TEBA managed to process 4,000 novices from Lesotho within three weeks. For further details on these incidents, see Fion de Vletter, "Recent Trends and Prospects of Black Migration to South Africa", International Migration for Employment Working Paper, No 20 (Geneva: ILO, 1985), pp 17, 30, 33 & 39.
- (58) Malcolm Wallis and Robert D'A Henderson, "Lesotho 1983: Year of the Election?" The World Today, 39, No 5 (1983), p 191.
- (59) Leistner, p 15.
- (60) Weisfelder, p 256.
- (61) "South Africa's reputed destabilizing jabs are really only pinpricks", Woodward, p 176.
- (62) John Daniel, "The South African-Swazi State Relationship: ideological harmony and structural domination" (Paper presented at SADRA Workshop, Roma, 1983), pp 3-8.
- (63) See, for example, Deon Geldenhuys, "Militancy Gives Way to Moderation", Cape Times, 8/3/84.

