WHATEVER DID HAPPEN AT JAGERSFONTEIN?

or

DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER - BUT GOLD IS FOR NOW!

by

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The Turbulent Years – 1913-1914

On Saturday 5 July 1913, the day after the declaration of a general strike and a night of riots, British troops confronted crowds in central Johannesburg. They dispersed groups in the streets, and then, forming a square, fired volley after volley into the gathering crowd. Thereafter, until mid-afternoon, they fired at any civilian who came into view. More than twenty were killed, and several hundred were injured.

The 4th July had been no less violent. Dragoons and Mounted Police, wielding pick-handles and flat swords, dispersed a meeting at which a general strike in support of the mine workers was to be announced. The crowd scattered, and stopped trams and trains running; they burnt down the central railway station and the Star newspaper building, looted gunsmiths, and broke down shop fronts. In neighbouring Benoni, where the strike began, crowds rampaged through the streets, burning down buildings and beating up scabs. In other mining towns there was an uneasy calm. The cycle of violence ended only when Generals Botha and Smuts (the Prime Minister and his Minister of Defence) intervened on Saturday afternoon and conceded the main demands of the striking miners.

Two weeks later, at a protest meeting in Cape Town, the Rev R Balmsworth, in a scathing condemnation of the shootings, stated:

If you ask me who were the worst enemies of the town ...
... I would say, the military, and those upper class hooligans who directed this cruel work. It is a strange thing to say, but nobody seemed afraid of the strikers, everybody was afraid of the soldiers.

Olive Schreiner, novelist and socialist, believed the massacre should have served to show the mass of our people in this country the true conditions under which we are living. The death of those innocent persons will not have been in vain, if we make the light it has shed on our position as citizens of South Africa one which will dominate our future actions, political and social.

In a letter to Edward Carpenter, she wrote:

If they shoot us down in this way the moment WHITE labourers strike, what will it be whenever the native moves? And they are bringing in more and more oppressive laws against the latter. We have just passed a terrible native Land Bill – the worst bit of work we have done for years.
It was too much to hope that in South Africa whites would have learnt "the true conditions under which (they) were living", but Olive Schreiner’s fear of what would happen when the black workers moved was tragically borne out on Friday 9 January 1914. White railway men were out, and a general strike imminent, when several hundred Sotho workers refused to go underground at the diamond mine in Jagersfontein. They were confronted, not by troops but by over a hundred white workers, armed with shotguns, rifles and revolvers. Several volleys were fired, killing at least sixteen and wounding thirty-six (some seriously).

First press reports of this massacre were buried among news of the railway strike — and what appeared was bizarre. Nine thousand blacks had risen and stormed into the town, but were driven back by 500 neighbouring farmers, alongside miners armed by the diamond company; white women and children reputedly fled to Fauresmith or nearby hills, or found refuge in the town hall.11 Later reports were still alarmist, but gave more details. Following the death of one of their compatriots, the Sotho in the mine stopped work and "were in a most turbulent state". They had "created much disturbance and smashed a number of houses in the compound" after moving initially "determinedly towards the town, and it was only a shower of bullets which impeded their mad rush ...".10

Much was ascribed to the example set by white workers, and the Deputy Inspector of Mines, saying that the Sotho were aware of the strike on the Rand, concluded that:

They ... understood that the whites were actually fighting — probably from not being able to distinguish in meaning between striking and fighting. It is notorious how quickly natives get into and how easily they become affected by excitement and unrest. Further comment is unnecessary (sic).11

He also claimed that the main culprits were several hundred Sotho workers, transferred from the Premier diamond mines in Pretoria, after striking seven weeks previously. He “dismissed without comment” complaints of “abuse of natives by miners (which) were of the most vague and illusive character”. It was “purely a matter of rioting and disorder among a proportion of the native employees having had to be met by armed force”.

Yet, Daniel Molipha (or Molifa), a Sotho miner, had died as the result of injuries received underground, and three white miners were accused of murdering him. One man was charged, but went free because of “insufficient evidence”, and the Attorney General refused to prosecute the others. There the matter rested — one further moment in the history of South Africa’s working class that was buried with its victims, until disinterred many decades later.

In this paper we focus on some of the struggles of the pre-war years, and explore the factors that led to the radicalization of leading members of the all-white South African Labour Party (SALP). What seems to need explanation is not only this change but, given the extent of the clashes, why so few were affected; and why it was the strikes of white workers (and miners, in particular) — but not the struggles of other ethnic groups — that pushed them to the left.

Struggles, Convergent and Divergent

There was little peace in the Union of South Africa before the outbreak of the First World War. The institutions of the new state had to be restructured, or developed, and that included unifying the railways, drafting a national budget, establishing a new and unified defence force. The whites split into hostile camps after 1912, and Afrikaner nationalism re-emerged under the wing of General Hertzog’s National Party, with a populist rhetoric against British imperialism and demands for equal language rights. Concurrently, Gandhi emerged as a leader of the Indian petty bourgeoisie in a campaign against discriminatory taxes and marriage laws, precipitating a strike of indentured labourers on the sugar fields and the colleries. Africans, smarting at their inferior position in the new Union constitution14, were devastated by the new
Land Act, and black women in the Free State campaigned against the passes; meanwhile, white workers, particularly on the Rand, were engaged in bitter struggles to improve working conditions, stop redundancies, and secure recognition for their trade unions.

Perhaps the politicians anticipated trouble in 1913. The press painted a sombre picture, lightened only by stories of society scandals. There were warnings of a black revolt, reports on the conflict between Botha and Hertzog, fears of war in the Balkans, and concern over widespread famine in the countryside and economic stagnation in the towns. One commentator, referring to mid-1913, said:

Depression reigned in South Africa; the unemployed wailed; the unemployable agitated; uncertainty stalked everywhere; we were all carrying on a hand-to-mouth existence.

This was the backdrop to demonstrations, passive resistance, and strikes; imprisonments, massacres, and illegal deportations.

In May the miners at the New Kleinfontein mine came out, and all eyes turned to the Witwatersrand. Even the Balkan crisis took second place. In Britain, the Daily Chronicle, noting that the Rand produced 42% of the total world gold, predicted "dire financial disaster" if its flow were interrupted, with "grave difficulties on the (world) money markets ... and a crushing blow to the Union of South Africa whose ... gold industry is the keystone (to its finances)". The Daily News, fearing war in Europe, urged the Botha government to stop the strike spreading, lest there be a temporary curtailment of the gold supply, and the Financial Times spoke of "financial crisis" if shipments were suspended for long. Only the Financier and Bullionist said that "without adequate financial preparations being made" the strike could not last, but added in its next issue that, even if settled soon, there would still be political uncertainty and a "somewhat dubious outlook for money".

Strikes on the Rand reverberated through the country, and there were threats of workers joining them in the larger towns. No other campaign in 1913-14 affected the social and economic fabric of the country as did a strike in the gold-fields, and no other protest brought so many persons into action. All other protests were confined to specific ethnic groups: Africans alone protested over the Land Act, and Africans and Coloureds condemned the arrest of black women in the OFS; Sotho workers were shot in Pretoria and Jagersfontein but evoked no protest meeting, despite condemnation in the Basutoland Council. Only the Indian campaigns had the support of a few destitute white intellectuals - most white workers and "socialists" being antagonistic.

The indifference, or open antagonism, to the struggles of other ethnic groups reflected inter-community conflicts. The African Congress rejected a resolution of solidarity with white strikers in July 1913; Coloured leaders all but ignored the massacre of whites; and Gandhi said he would not campaign when white workers were on strike. White workers ignored the struggles of other communities, or turned their guns on them! The SALP wanted all Indians repatriated, and supported the Land Act because "the government was carrying out one of the planks of the ... Party platform".

These ethnic conflicts permeated the entire society, encompassing white workers and overseers who spurned the labourers, the "ganger" (or contracting white miner) who was "baas" to his black "gang", and all who employed black servants - whether they were White, Coloured or Indian. Barriers due to religion, language and culture were not impermeable, but were none the less there and affected members of all ethnic groups. The overbearing attitude of whites, and particularly of workers, combined the contempt of the artisan class for the unskilled worker with that of colonial overmaster to local "native".

Ultimately, the relationship between man and man, and between the ethnic groups, was influenced by events on the mines, which dominated the economy. Together with the railways, tramways and docks, which serviced the mines and were
controlled by the state or local authorities, they employed most of the country's working class outside of agriculture and domestic service. Thus, most labour legislation reflected the interests of the mines, and this reinforced the divisions of labour along colour lines in the country. It also decided the position of black women in society - but that was largely by exclusion. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the towns on the Witwatersrand were overwhelmingly male dominated and this sex imbalance had a profound effect on family relationships, and a devastating effect on the development of the children.

There is one further dimension of ethnic division that has not previously attracted attention - and needs further investigation. Struggles by different ethnic groups did not reinforce each other, but set communities even further apart. The whites on strike demanded that blacks be kept out of some occupations; black women opposed passes that whites insisted they carry; black miners wanted bullying overseers removed, and so on. There were also slogans (or beliefs), and methods of struggle, that set the groups apart. Satyagraha and courting arrest was not a tactic that many whites would adopt, and the millenarian beliefs expressed by Indian labourers during their strike (and particularly their hope that rajahs would rescue them - or punish them!) could find little resonance within other communities.

Black Friday ... and Bloody Saturday

There were 38,500 white workers employed on the Witwatersrand in 1913: some 22,000 on the mines and 4,500 on the railways, the rest distributed in the building trade, tramways, print shops, electric power works, and small workshops. The mines employed some 200,000 Africans, mostly as underground labourers; other Africans were employed in domestic service (or as washermen), or in the many workshops. All were unskilled, and most were employed as heavy manual workers, or as carriers and cleaners.

Trade unions consisted of only a tiny minority of the work force and were almost all craft dominated, restricted to whites, and concerned with wages and work conditions. If they had any political aims, it was for the reservation of certain jobs for whites or, more ominously, that all Africans be removed from the towns. The Transvaal Miners Association (TMA) argued differently: they opposed the use of whites as unskilled workers, and, fearing competition, they wanted black labourers restricted to unskilled jobs. Furthermore, the TMA's main aim was not higher wages but recognition of the union, an eight-hour day bank-to-bank - to shorten the time at the working face - and to combat the dreaded "white death" (or miners' phthisis).

Phthisis, caused by the inhalation of white rock particles, produced by drilling and dynamiting, was the greatest killer on the Rand, accounting for thousands of deaths every year, cutting down the average life expectancy to five, or only four, years in many cases - and even where the miners did not die "their active working life ... (was) only four years". Until this was controlled, the one ameliorating factor would be a shorter working day. Lord Gladstone, in a dispatch to the Colonial Office, after the 1913 strike, said that:

The principal factor (for the unrest) has undoubtedly been the growing realization ... of the frightful risks from the ravages of miner's phthisis to which their work exposes them ... They gamble with their lives for high wages, but there remains the haunting dread of the future, and to earn £100 a month (sic) is for them no soporific ... phthisis has made their life abormal, and the capitalists who are the only visible beneficiaries under the system ... have become ... the focus of bitter class hatred on the part of many of the men.

R L Outhwaite, the British MP who was on the Rand during the miners' strike in 1907, said that the action aimed at "an intolerable death-dealing tyranny" and "endeavour(ed) to break ... the terrible relations" leading to the high mortality in the mines. Reynolds's Newspaper, in several articles on the gold
mines which caused a stir on the Rand, gave statistics of fatalities under the headline “City of Dreadful Death” 

Ivon Jones wrote to say that, of the 15 men on the 1907 strike committee whose names were known, ten had since died of phthisis, three had the disease but were still alive, and only one other was known to be living. 

The issue was summed up by a pro-labour paper that said:

“Phthisis must be destroyed or it will destroy the mines, and with them the Rand. This is where the length of the day comes into the discussion.”

However, that was not the whole story. There was deep resentment amongst Labour supporters against the government, the mine magnates and the press (which was regarded as being in their hands). Since 1911 the TMA had fought the Randlords over the reduction of overtime pay and retrenchment, victimization of union officials, and the refusal of management to recognize the union or even communicate with union officials on conciliation boards. In addition, it was claimed that there was fear in some towns lest marginal mines be closed without notice, and the men left without employment.

Yet, in all the conflicts with management, the white workers and their supporters showed only contempt for the Africans. In what must stand as the most cynical of the many statements of the time, that of the Evening Chronicle, sturdy champion of the miners, surpasses all others. In an editorial column, the paper provided a rough calculation of the cost to management of shortening the working day to provide an 8-hour bank-to-bank day. They estimated that, if applied to all workers, the annual cost would be £600,000, but if only white workers were considered the cost would be £300,000. The editor concluded:

“...Our own view is that there is very little objection to such differential treatment if the true losses can be adjusted.”

When the clash came, it was at the New Kleinfontein mine in Benoni — and the issue was union activity:

“The management at last arrived at the fact that they were losing a good deal of profit and appointed a new manager to ‘cleanse the stable’.”

The new manager, E H Bulman, was reputedly a hard task master, and together with a new underground manager secured the dismissal or resignation of “redundant” miners. He also cancelled the Saturday half-day holiday that mechanics had long enjoyed, and when they protested replaced them by non-union labour.

The Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) and the TMA demanded that the Saturday half-day be restored, but management was adamant. The Transvaal Federation of Trades (the trade union federal body) got a strike committee elected, and demanded the reinstatement of the sacked and recognition of the TMA. By 27 May, engine drivers and reduction workers were out and the strike was complete. The management retreated when told by an inspector of labour that the dismissals contravened the Industrial Disputes Prevention Act, but would not communicate directly with the union. On 12 June, with the strike still total, the management brought in scabs.

On 18 June miners at Van Ryn came out in sympathy with New Kleinfontein. Two days later five strike leaders were arrested, and infuriated workers all but stormed the Benoni police station. Thereafter, workers led by pipers in highland attire and women carrying red banners marched to mines and Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company (VFP) stations (which supplied electricity to the mines), appealing to the workers to come out; they were seldom turned away. By the end of June nine mines were idle — except for pump-men, permitted by the strike committee to stay, to prevent flooding.

Scabs were attacked, houses burnt down, and G W Mason, a union official, quoting Jack London, declared at a meeting:
No scab had any right to live as long as there was a pool of water deep enough to drown him in, or a rope long enough to hang him with.

The government brought in 540 Royal Scots in a show of force, but by 2 July the strike had spread to many of the VFP stations. A broader committee took control and declared a general strike which was to be announced at the Johannesburg market square on Friday 4 July. The meeting was banned under the old Transvaal Republic Law 6 of 1894 (forbidding meetings, and allowing troops to disperse more than six persons on a public square). But a similar ban had been defied in Benoni on 29 June, and it was not believed that this would be any different.

The meeting began, but when the third speaker rose troops and mounted police wielding pick-handles charged and knocked people down indiscriminately. When the crowd retaliated with stones and bottles, swords were drawn, and again and again (using flat blades) the crowd was driven back, reformed, and met a new onslaught. People scattered, halted the trains, stopped the trams, and set the centre of Johannesburg ablaze (see p 68). And there were running battles between police and those who had seized guns.

On the 5th the General Strike on the Rand was complete, and in the early afternoon, as crowds collected near the Rand Club, the Dragoons formed a square and fired. Press reports, and Gladstone's dispatches, exonerated the troops but eyewitnesses told a different story. One man at the scene wrote:

Opposite the (Rand) Club the cavalry came to the halt and dismounted, the crowd flying for safety to the pavements. The crowd finding the military did not pursue, halted and watched the scene, and whilst some were thus standing and others trying to get away, a volley was fired (blank, so I am informed). Seeing that no harm was done the crowd still watched. Practically without an interval another volley was fired - ball this time - and they dropped. Altogether eight or nine volleys were fired and I believe everyone in the vicinity will agree that there was no appreciable pause between any of the volleys. It was load and fire. The crowds were running, and as they ran the shots were pouring into them. I saw the firing, saw the people drop. I was through the war with the first Cavalry Brigade, but I have never seen such a sight as the indiscriminate shooting of men, women, and children.

Over 20 lay dead, and over 200 were wounded. Correspondents likened the events to the Paris Commune, but that was fanciful. The workers were furious, but did not try to remove the government. Lumpen elements used the occasion to loot the stores of Indians in Vrededorp, Fordsburg and Newlands. Even in Benoni, the centre of greatest violence, there were no signs of an assault on the state. The goods station was burnt to the ground, scabs assaulted and some of their houses or possessions destroyed, wagons held up or destroyed, and, according to one report, "The Red Flag has been supreme ... It waves from hundreds of houses and stores. The police and military have been impotent ..." The government summoned 800-1,000 cavalrymen to the Rand the following morning and the red flags disappeared.

On the afternoon of the 5th, Botha and Smuts travelled from Pretoria and agreed a truce with the Federation: appearing to supercede but acting in concert with the mining magnates. The strike was called off and all disturbances were to end; there was to be no victimization, and workers' grievances would be investigated. The government undertook to compensate the scabs, but that was disavowed by the trade unions. Part of the waiting crowd rejected the truce, with cries of "What about the shooting?" "What about the dead?" and "You've been bought." Others, who accepted the truce, agreed that it should have been voted on by strikers. Mary Fitzgerald, Dave Kendall, (?) Horak (representing Afrikaner
workers), and others claimed the settlement offered nothing to the vast majority who came out, and resolved to continue the strike. But there was no organization or means to continue, and men returned belatedly to work.

On Sunday the strike committee constituted itself as a Committee of Public Safety, posting pickets at hotels, bottle stores and other threatened premises, while police and military guarded public buildings, bankés and residences of magnates, the Chief of Police and the Public Prosecutor. Of the 120 persons arrested on Saturday, 25 were charged with looting, the rest with "public violence".

Some Africans stopped work in June, at times encouraged by trade unionists who grasped the need for joint working-class action. R B Waterston, a strike leader, using a crude version of the artificial mine language, called on black workers to "Tchella lo Basa wena tune meninengi mali and picinniny sebenza" (Tell the bosses you want more money and less work), but many white workers disapproved; and Dan Simons caused a stir in his address at a Benoni open-air meeting, with the words "Ladies, Gentlemen, and Kaffir Brethren".

After the 5th, many black workers came out, demanding higher wages, or wages deducted for days in which the mine had been idle. At several mines Africans, wearing red rosettes, refused to go underground, and demanded 5s a day (compared the existing wage of 2s). However, most were driven back to work by troops, mounted police, or white workers, and threats of instant dismissal. "Ring leaders" and those who would not resume work were arrested. Once again, British troops confronted the workers, with bayonets drawn, firing overhead or "into the ground near their feet", or charging with iron-shod pick-handles; one eye-witness claiming that two workers were killed at the Meyer and Charlton by men of the Staffordshire Regiment. Some workers demanded the release of imprisoned colleagues, or at City and Suburban shouted "Kill the Police", but the strike was over.

The General Strike of 1914

If the miners struck alone, Johannesburg could still contrive to get along for a time - probably for longer than the mines could hold out; if the railwaymen struck too, the case of Johannesburg was desperate.

Round Table

Throughout July there was talk, first of resuming the strike, then of a "suspended strike" (allowing for a walk out at any time), and finally at the end of the month the Federation of Trades decided to abandon the strike and "rely upon our industrial and political organizations to remedy our grievances". During this period the government was condemned by the Federation and the Amalgamated Society of Railway and Harbour Servants (ASRHS) for refusing to recognize the railwaymen's union, and not investigating workers' complaints - chief of which were the long hours worked by train crews, and the pay of unskilled white workers who received 3s 4d, 4s, or at most 5s per day, when bare subsistence was said by the union to be 8s per day.

General Smuts said that accepting the terms of the strike leaders on the 5th was "one of the hardest things (he had) ever had to do", and he resolved to be ready next time. Contingency plans were drafted, requesting that in the event of a fresh strike available imperial troops be placed at the disposal of the government; advising mayors on procedures to be followed; and allocating control officers and headquarters in twelve central areas. Proclamations were drafted, to be signed by the Governor-General and Smuts when required, specifying measures to suppress disturbances and maintain order and public safety.

Reports of dynamite being found on railway platforms, in culverts, and so on, added to the state of uncertainty. In September 1913, when the government was still investigating workers' conditions, in fulfilment of the July agreement, the
Minister for railways announced that retrenchments would be necessary, and on Christmas eve the first dismissal notices were handed out, possibly as a provocation, because the railways were busy and men were working overtime. J H Poutsma, the union secretary, had threatened to stop the railways at the first sign of dismissals, and a strike was called for Friday 8 January.

Meanwhile, on 2 January, white miners in the Natal collieries came out, demanding 20s per day, a 57 hour week, and overtime at time-and-a-half. They also demanded the reinstatement of four men, laid off because there was a shortage of black labour. Over a thousand black workers also took action, demanding £5 per month, but they went back when warned that the strike was illegal. The whites called for a general strike, and that posed the threat of a national coal shortage. Although their executive demurred, the threat remained.

There were fears of a coal shortage when the railway strike started on the 8th, and this was to influence events at Jagersfontein. Most railway workshop employees came out, as did the train crews in some districts — but too few to cause much dislocation. There were doubts about the role played by Poutsma in what happened: he did not consult the branches, nor other unions with members on the railways, and there were few signs of preparation, locally or nationally. Members of the Federation advised against the strike, and they were furious when the strike was announced. However, there were sympathy walk-outs by typographers, building and Municipal workers, and colliery workers, indicative of the depression and discontent of the time. A week later, just over 9,000 gold miners were out. The Federation closed ranks, and after a ballot a general strike was called for the 14th. This was countered by a declaration of Martial Law, and the total number of workers who responded is unknown, but in the confusion numbers had little meaning.

Strikers first tried, unsuccessfully, to pull the train crews out, and then the signalmen, and there was also some attempts at sabotage. Official sources listed thirty-eight instances in which portions of lines were blown away, explosions occurred on trains, or on railway property, points were interfered with, and so on. But the strike could not have succeeded — and some suspected at the time "that the crisis was deliberately sought and prepared for by the government" to destroy the trade unions and the Labour Party", with Poutsma as the witting or unwitting tool. On the 7th troops occupied railway stations and workshops in Johannesburg, Germiston and Pretoria. Poutsma, Justin Nield (his deputy) and Colin Wade of the SALP were arrested on the 10th, and held incommunicado. Then came Martial Law on the 13th, the proclamation and special passes for movement in proclaimed areas having been printed in anticipation in December.

The nature of Smuts' measures was described in the latter of 21 January by SALP leaders:

The situation prevailing here is intolerable, and quite unprecedented under the British flag and constitution. The story which has been put about by the South African press and no doubt cabled home, of a Syndicalist Revolution, is entire rubbish, and without the slightest foundation, being designed partly for British consumption, and partly to enlist middle class sympathy out here. ... It is a deliberate effort to suppress their political opponents by removing the leaders and terrorising the rank and file, and at the same time to swamp Hertzogism by exciting Dutch racialism against the 'common enemy'.

The whole affair has been on our side a peaceful and industrial dispute: the Mass Meeting on Sunday, January 11th on Market Square was not only perfectly orderly, good humoured and self controlled, but it afforded a dramatic proof that the disturbances of the previous July were directly due to the action of the Police and soldiery in charging the crowd.
On this occasion not a Policeman or soldier was to be seen, and although the Authorities had suspended the local tram service, the crowd was greatly larger than the one that had collected on July 4th.

The authors listed the stringent measures imposed under martial law. The offices of trade unions and the SALP had been raided, as had printing shops that produced leaflets for the labour movement - and their machines destroyed. There were arrests, without legal help being allowed, of MPs (Creswell and T Boydell), of Provincial and town councillors, and of candidates in forthcoming elections - and of the entire executive of the ASE and the ASRHS, although all opposed violence.

The severest sentences are anticipated and the deportation of the Leaders is believed to be imminent. Railway and mine workers are being evicted everywhere. It is an offence ... to advise any person to strike or to continue to strike or to assist a striker or his family in any way. The police also looted the Strike Distress Committee's food supply in Pretoria.

There were bans on wearing SALP colours, on the red flag, or using the words "scab" and "blackleg", said the writers. "A man got £2 or fourteen days for looking 'sneeringly' at a Policeman ..." Permits were needed to cross magisterial boundaries, or to use wheeled vehicles (and these were usually refused), meetings of more than six persons were banned, news censored, and prominent persons restricted to their houses or shadowed by police spies. An elaborate system of passports was used to stop strikers intercommunicating; persons approaching public buildings could be shot on sight; and all persons found "guilty" of supplying food to strikers were "penalised".

The letter to the Colonial Office took the account further:

All centres are swarming with Burghers, who are to be allowed to retain their arms and accoutrements permanently. Racialism has been directly revived by the Government through this means and has received great impetus ... The public is menaced everywhere by Police, Burghers and Civilian Force with fixed bayonets. Unoffending people walking the streets are ruthlessly handled, herded into arcades, and driven like cattle to the Charge Office under Police guard.

Apart from all questions of detail, the serious features are that, as in the case of the Indians, the armed forces of the country are being used, not to suppress violence, but to terrorise men into working. Secondly, that the public services of the country, such as post, telegraph, telephone and the public press are being controlled under the pretext of Martial Law not merely so as to prevent incitement to violence but to prevent any criticism of the Government and to avoid any information being made public either here or in England which the Government finds inconvenient. Thirdly, that these things are being done for Party Political purposes, relating partly to the domestic issues between Botha and Hertzog, but still more to the tacit combination of Botha and the capitalists to stay the rising forces of the Labour Party, in particular of Botha's public and repeated assertions that 'socialism cannot be allowed in South Africa'.

After commenting on General de la Rey’s statement that his men had responded “to the
call of their party, which was represented by the Government in power”, they
concluded that the government’s actions would “undoubtedly be endorsed by the Union
Parliament”, and they hoped the Indemnity Bill would be vetoed by the king.

Some 70-100,000 men from the army, defence force, police, and burgher
"commandos" were called up by the government – including many who were strikers –
and special constables were enrolled to replace police called up for strike duty.
All railways, communication networks, power stations, and mines were placed under
guard. On 15 January the main round up of trade unionists began. First, the
Pretoria and Johannesburg strike committees, and hundreds of "strikers" in Benoni.
Activists in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Volksrust, Bloemfontein, Cape Town, and
so on, were arrested. The armed forces were instructed to root out the forces of
"anarchy", and the nadir of this action consisted of investing the Trades Hall with
4,000 troops, training a field gun on the building, and demanding the surrender of
the incumbents – eleven members of the Federation executive, and thirty-two
pickets.

The use of the army was not without its own internal contradictions.
There were 30,000 burghers under arms, and there was open talk of the commanders
arresting Botha and Sauts, and proclaiming a Republic. Denys Reitz, a Botha man,
recalled that the troops he led from Heilbron, in the OFS, had to be harangued for
two days before they would cross into the Transvaal. They also meant to discredit
the government – thus General Beyers, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief, gave
orders in Germiston to arrest "every man if he looked like a striker ...", and,
marshing at the head of his troops, deliberately created a great deal of resentment
among orderly citizens. Whether other brutalities were similarly motivated is not
recorded. Troops wielded sjamboks and rifle butts indiscriminately, and men and
women were herded into cattle pens, or marched several miles to gaols. By way of
contrast, members of Commandos fraternized with strikers in some districts, after
hearing their complaints.

The men went back defeated. Nearly 700 railwaymen were retrenched, and
many accepted lower rates of pay. The position of the ASRHS was precarious, with
the men "crushed and dispirited" and working under conditions that left them in
despair. They could "not cease work, nor absent themselves from duty, nor write to
the press, nor in any way communicate their grievances to the public – under the
threatened penalty of six months' hard labour, or a fine of £50, or both". There
was also widespread victimization. Hundreds of strikers were blacklisted; former
executive members of the ASRHS were dismissed, and in some regions membership of the
union was proscribed.

The ultimate move by Sauts was covertly to move nine men on the night of
27/28 January from prison in Johannesburg, and place them on the "UNGRAT" in Durban.
Despite attempts by members of the SALP to have this illegal deportation stopped,
the boat could not be stopped at sea and the men, not all of them leaders of the
strike, were shipped to Britain. Sauts was indemnified by parliament, but he had
agonized many people and this was made obvious by the election results for the
Transvaal Provincial Council elections, in which the SALP made significant advances
and won 23 seats.

The Natal Indian Workers' Strike

For ninety years after emancipation, sugar planters
and sugar workers ... worked out the inheritance of
slavery ... As part of the world demand for raw
materials, the Indians voyaged across the seas ... to
labour upon the plantations ...

Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery

From 1860 to 1911 Indian indentured labourers arrived in South Africa
primarily to work on the sugar plantations, and then in the collieries, the railways
and elsewhere. In 1903, the Indian government set a quota after the rejection of
its demand that legal disabilities be mitigated", but the system continued until
stopped by the Union government in 1911. The whites of South Africa divided on the issue. Employers saw advantages: indentured labour was not easily organizeable, and wages on the plantations were sub-minimal. The housing was squalid, the rations poor, and hours of work during the busy season inhuman. But traders opposed their Indian counterparts (most of whom arrived to cater for the labourers); and white workers, trade union leaders and members of the SALP were vehemently anti-Indian and urged repatriation, fearing that white wages would be undercut.

Men were promised a free return passage after five years' indentured and five years' "free" service, or a plot of land. To discourage those who opted to stay, a £3 yearly tax was imposed in 1902 on every non-indentured adult who had arrived after 1895, and their children (including girls over 12 years and boys over 16). There were other discriminatory measures, including the proposed invalidation of customary marriages (partly to prevent spouses of multiple marriages entering the country), a bar on crossing provincial borders without permits, and a register for Indians in the Transvaal (to determine the right of residence).

The provincial and national Indian associations petitioned and agitated against these discriminatory and offensive regulations, and Gandhi conducted a personal crusade to get them repealed, co-operating at times with some of the Indian organizations. His Satyagraha (akin to "soul-force", which disavowed active retaliation against an opponent) had little appeal for the indentured worker, with whom Gandhi had no empathy, and little, if any, contact. During 1910-11 Gandhi campaigned against registration in the Transvaal, but this collapsed when traders found that renewing their licences depended on compliance. Thereafter Gandhi called for the repeal of the £3 tax, and the Indian working class responded, far beyond expectations.

The Indian working class in 1913-14 consisted of some 3,800 colliery workers, 18,000 on sugar plantations, 2,700 on public bodies (including railwaymen), and 2,600 in other occupations. The colliery workers were the first to respond to a strike call by Gandhi and his co-workers, and starting on 14 October some 2,500 had stopped work by the 27th. The sugar workers started coming out on 5 November, and a general strike, called from Monday 10 November, involved some 17-19,000 men (and an unstated number of women) for periods ranging from a few days to three or four weeks. Newspaper reports indicated that all branches of industry in Durban were affected, and that railway workers, municipal services, messengers, drivers, cooks, and even house servants across Natal were out.

The extent of the strike was indicative of the two factors that weighed on every worker: the squeeze they felt in a period of economic depression, and their frustration in trying to escape from servitude. The £3 tax, which acted as a barrier to their entering the free labour market, or even escaping from proletarianization, was the triggering factor in their entering the strike, but their objectives and hopes ranged from that of the more permanent workers, who hoped to improve their work condition, to plantation workers living under the most degrading conditions and subjected to supervision that was brutal, who believed in the intervention of a rajah who (in one version) would rescue them from their desperate position.

On 14 October 78 workers from the Farleigh colliery came out on strike. When ordered to return to work by the 17th or face prosecution, they were joined by some 2,000 workers from nine mines. One week later, 4-5,000 (including railwaymen) were out in northern Natal. Initially, the mines kept working but, although no attempt was made to call out the African workers, the strike seriously affected the output of coal. On the 29th, the workers were ordered to return, or have their rations (which many mines still supplied) withdrawn, lose pay and be in breach of contract.

At this juncture the workers joined the satyagrahists in illegally crossing the Transvaal border. Gandhi hoped that their arrest would enhance his campaign, and the workers would get food and shelter in the goals. From 29 to 31 October 750 coal miners, some with families, moved towards the border, and within days 4,000 were on the march. The first batch of volunteers were arrested and sentenced to return to the mines, which were proclaimed outstations of the prisons.
in Newcastle and Dundee, and forced to work under the staff who were appointed temporary warders. However, the government was in no hurry to arrest most of the marchers, and the organizers had to supply, and pay for, the marchers' food.

The arrest of Gandhi seemed to bring the campaign to an end, and it might have collapsed but for its spread to the plantations. Yet no one claimed responsibility for calling the plantation workers out, and Gandhi said that he had told them emphatically not to strike. Writing to Senator Campbell, he said that after his arrest it was "impossible to control the men, and the movement became not only spontaneous, but it assumed gigantic proportions". Gandhi explained that he had tried to confine the strike to the collieries, hoping "that this would achieve the purpose aimed at". He said nothing about conditions on the plantations, nor on the shooting of strikers (see below), and he assured the Senator that he was so indebted to him for trying to get the tax repealed that, if he had called the plantations out, Campbell's men would have been last on the list.

The strike of field workers and mill operatives was a mix of peasant revolt and industrial action. Cane fields were burnt and groups of workers patrolled the fields to prevent any work, while others stayed in their barracks and refused to venture out. Local leaders emerged and were defiant. One group confronted by police at Lamarcy, near Verulam, said that Gandhi had told them not to work, and "The police could shoot if they chose, but they would not work". There was at least one clash in which there was shooting. Colin Campbell, son of the Senator, led troopers across the Mount Edgecombe estate to persuade workers to go back to the fields (by promising to restart rations). Workers who would not comply came under gunfire, and at least six were killed and forty wounded.

The strike hit deep in Natal. Ships ran short of supplies of bunkering coal, and the mines lost export orders they could not be sure of executing. Hotels, shops and railways were short of labour, and alternative staff had to be trained. But it was Indian businessmen who suffered most, and many were reported to be doing scarcely any trade. Their support for the campaign, already strained after disputes with Gandhi, was tempered by the need for a return to the status quo, and they tried to cool the situation. On 20 November, while reaffirming support for passive resistance, they condemned violence, advised strikers to be patient and give no trouble to the police, and urged a return to work for some. Members of the Natal Indian Association, with police permission, visited the sugar estates and warned workers against leaving the estates to which they were attached, or resisting the police.

No demands on behalf of the workers were ever presented, and no national leader(s) intervened to state the workers' grievances. That alone ensured failure. Furthermore, Africans and white women were being employed in the town and the railways to replace them, and there were reports of "Indians rushing to get back their places". In fact, the Indian workers got little, and many lost their livelihood or suffered great privations. One estimate placed their losses in wages and savings at well over £30,000, and many women were forced to sell their jewellery. Living conditions did not improve, and the workers had little to show for their militancy and solidarity with the petty bourgeoisie.

Women in Protest

Our search for the connections between the many strands of struggle in 1913-14 started in Jagersfontein, where African and Coloured women (and those of Bloemfontein and Winburg) refused to carry passes, or pay fines, and were imprisoned. The question seemed to be whether there were unique conditions in this mining village, leading to two significant events over six months, or whether this was only coincidence.

This required a new look at this province, which had some unique features. Firstly, it had only one tiny Reserve, and blacks were dispersed across the Province, on farms and in towns. Together with the arrival of many women from
Basutoland, this accounted for the almost "normal" sex ratio, in contrast to towns in other Provinces; and women, Coloured and African, were required to carry passes under regulations that pre-dated Union.

Political life in the Free State underwent significant changes in 1913, when its branch of the governing party followed General Hertzog into opposition in Parliament. The local army commanders sided with Hertzog and, presumably, the police followed suit. Which of these events effected increased police action in May is uncertain, but the number of arrests on pass offences increased considerably, that of women going up fourfold in Bloemfontein.

At first, the women paid their fines, but from the end of May through September women in Bloemfontein, Winburg and Jagersfontein defied the law and chose to go to prison. They were led by local women, many of them active church members, and/or school teachers, or the wives of ministers, teachers and business men. Half the women charged were domestic servants, the others were housewives. Although they won (belated) support from the Natives Congress, and from the African Political Organisation (AP), the initiative was theirs, and they faced ridicule from some of the men. Ultimately, they formed their own independent OFS Native and Coloured Women's Association, led by Catherina Simmons and Katie Louw, the president of the Methodist women's prayer group. It collected funds for the families of women in prison, organized deputations, and mobilized support.

The first protest came at the end of May in Waaihoek location (Bloemfontein), when a mass meeting of women resolved not to carry passes if police harassment was not stopped. A deputation to the mayor was told that he could not change the laws, and a crowd collected at the police station where some eighty women tore up their passes - for which they were charged. On Friday 30th, some 600 women marched to the court waving walking sticks, knobkerries, broom sticks, and Union Jacks. There was a fracas when the police tried to clear the court and the women lashed out at their tormentors. "We have done with pleading, we now demand", they were quoted as saying.

The eighty pleaded not guilty but refused to pay fines and in this instance were dismissed by the court. The idea caught on, and other groups were to emulate them in the coming months, but it was not always peaceful. On 16 June, a near riot followed the arrest of a woman in the location for being without a pass. Two of her friends released her, and when a posse of police arrested all three, a large crowd collected and followed them to the police station. There, it is claimed, the police struck a spokeswoman with a sjambok when she asked what the charges were, and in the fight that followed the women wielded sjamboks, threw stones, and bit the police. The next day Bloemfontein experienced its first stay-at-homes in a long history of such actions. No woman was allowed to go to work, and "those that tried to escape were beaten". Furthermore, said one report, "The most troublesome were the Cape girls".

Thirty-four women were arrested as a result of the scuffle with the police, and found guilty of public violence; but, rather than pay a fine, they went to gaol for two months. This inspired Sol Plaatje, Secretary of the South African Natives National Congress, to write in Tsala ea Batho of 21 June:

> Let no woman pay a fine. They should all go and fill the gaol ... Let them build new gaols. It is no disgrace to fill them for Liberty.

The APO praised the women on 14 June, and advised them not to do any work while in prison. A fortnight later, they criticized men for not standing up, as had the women:

> Our manhood has been almost extinguished. We docilely accept almost every abject position, and submit to every brutality of the white man, with little more than a murmur. Not so our women. They have accepted the white man's challenge, and have openly defied him to do his worst.
There were arrests in Winburg in May, and on 2 June 600 women of the location, singing hymns, marched to the Town Hall and declared they would no longer carry passes. The Town Council was nonplussed, and then, following the lead from Bloemfontein, decided to prosecute. On 20 June women were given six days within which to carry passes, and from 1 July the police arrested batches of women, six at a time – the maximum number the local gaol could take! The penalty was four days in prison, although this stiffened over time and by October was one month or a £2 fine.

The problem of young women over 16, who were at school or unmarried and not employed by a white person, was highlighted on 15 August with the arrest of Ruth Pululu, an assistant schoolmistress. Ineligible for a residential pass on all counts, she was required to take employment in domestic service or go to gaol. Either course meant that the school would have to close down.

Pass fees were also meant to provide part of the revenue with which to finance location amenities, and when Winburg's white rate-payers, meeting on 25 September, were told that there was a deficit of £700 in location accounts, they demanded the immediate arrest of the guilty women and that additional gaol space be made available.

Registers were compared by whites (in all centres of opposition) with British suffragettes, and their sporting of blue rosettes was taken to be a mark of opposition to carrying the pass, although it is not clear whether the issue of the vote was raised. One white woman seemed impressed. Writing anonymously to the Friend of 11 October, she commended the protesters' courage and called for a demonstration of support by whites. Plaatje, amongst others, responded enthusiastically, but this proved to be quite misplaced. The Friend received replies that were largely abusive, and the demonstration never took place.

The third centre of active protest was Jagersfontein, and the situation differed in that there was an active local branch of the APO and active women in Congress. From May arrests commenced, and older women responded by refusing to buy their monthly pass. Negotiations with the town council elicited no response, and at the end of September 60 women were arrested and charged for not having passes. Aploon Vorster, described as a Mozambiquan Lady, was their spokeswoman, and was sentenced to 30 days; the others got seven days. Thereafter, said the Friend of 29 September:

... a large number of native girls paraded the streets ... singing, shouting and flaunting the blue ribbon – the sign of their suffragettism. They made a rush to the spot where the fifty (sic) convicted women were under police guard waiting to transport them to Fauresmith ... (and) police had to requisition the fire hose to disperse them. Later on some mounted constables with sjamboks were required to clear the streets.

After October, the arrest of women on pass offences seems to have abated – although the campaign continued for many months. The issue raised in the address by Dr Abdurrahman at the annual APO conference in October was widely publicized because of its "spleenetic" tone and "rabid fulminations":

... this policy of repression cannot last much longer. If a handful of Indians, in a matter of conscience, can so firmly resist what they consider injustice, what could the coloured races not do if they were to adopt this practice of passive resistance? We must all admire what these British Indians have shown in their determination to maintain what they deem to be their rights. The inhumanity of the Free State has driven our women to resist the law. Thirty four of them went to gaol rather than carry passes ... I am convinced that if our people as a whole were prepared
to suffer likewise, we would gain redress of our most serious grievances while General Botha is still alive. Are we to be driven to that course?

Abdurahman then said that if 200,000 mine workers downed tools, and farm labourers refused at harvest time to work for 1s 6d per day, the economic foundations of South Africa would suddenly shake and tremble with such violence that the beautiful white South African superstructure which had been built on it would come down with a crash entailing financial ruin such as the world had never seen before.

But the President then switched. He stopped threatening, and pleaded with the whites to prevent such a calamity by encouraging the Coloured peoples to "improve their position and become more useful citizens". He prescribed the upliftment of the "lower classes of coloureds", calling for sobriety and prohibition. He wanted an insurance society for Coloureds; and called on all Coloured people not subject to the Native Lands Act to aim to buy land. The "spleenetic" speech turned out to be rather a fuzzy speech - but did indicate that the women's struggle had resonated somewhere in the thinking of the Coloured leadership.

Strikes at the Diamond Mines

There were several strikes at the smaller diamond mines in 1913-14, at Koffiefontein, Klipfontein, Randfontein, Kimberley, Premier Mines, and Jaggersfontein, many of which have still to be investigated. These events were invariably described as riots, but as far as can be ascertained from cursory press reports they involved strike action, leading to conflict between sections of the black work force, or between them and white police or workers. Only the shootings at Premier mines and Jaggersfontein led to significant publicity, but once again strikes were ascribed to "tribal" friction, illegal beer drinking, and so on, trivializing the event and exonerating the authorities.

Our information on events at Premier mines comes mainly from evidence at an official inquiry. Mine officials said that on 23 November 1913 a Shangaan policeman struck a Sotho worker while stopping gambling and drinking at No 6 compound. There was looting by the offended workers, and then a lull. At 8.00 p.m. the Sotho were said to have attacked Shangaan in the compound. Whites intervened to stop the "looting and rioting", and the Sotho turned on them. Fortuitously, the whites were armed and they fired two volleys, killing four and wounding twenty-four. Twenty-two Sotho were arrested.

The account is too glib, and begs too many questions. What was the cause of this "tribal" friction? Why did the whites intervene, and why were they present with guns? Who were the "armed local whites" who somehow appeared on the scene? Why were 300 "trouble makers" transferred to Jaggersfontein - a fact that might never have been mentioned, had they not been such convenient scapegoats for the Deputy Inspector of Mines in the events of January 1914.

On Wednesday 7 January, an overseer, F M de Wet Stokenstroom, and two white miners assaulted Daniel Molipha, variously described as a "boss-boy", the popular compound barber, and also as a "petty chief". He was kicked and hit while down, and had been left unable to move. Workers carried him to the compound, bloodied and covered in sweat and mud, then transferred him to hospital where he died the next day. On Friday morning, one Lenepo led a group to ask about Daniel. They saw Nesbitt, the Compound Manager, who said that the doctor ascribed the death to a ruptured ulcer, brought on by eating too much porridge, drinking too much Mablieu (beer) and coffee(!), smoking dagga (cannabis), and to gonorrhoea (sic). When they asked to see the General Manager, Nesbitt "kicked them away".

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This was too much. In utter disbelief, the men called on everyone to stop work until an enquiry into Molipha's death was held. Most Sotho workers refused to go underground, stoning men of other ethnic groups going to work, and driving whites out of the compound. Attempts were made by officials, and by the General Manager, to get the men back to work, but to no effect. Police officers, together with armed men (many of them miners), arrived and blocked the three compound gates, and two volleys were fired, leaving dead or wounded in the compounds. It is not known who gave the order to fire, or in fact why the order was given. At the very worst, one or more stones were thrown; but even this was denied. The police sergeant was accused of having given the order to shoot, and many of the dead had been far from the gates. Most damning of all, Machopane Mahapela, a policeman, who appealed to his fellow Sotho to surrender, was shot twice by the whites—and lay dead.

The damage done by the mineworkers was, in fact, remarkably slight. They chased the Compound manager and his staff from the Compound, smashed windows and furniture, and seem to have taken some £50 and about £300 worth of clothing—even these are not certain. The point-blank shooting at unarmed men and the casualties inflicted on them by the white vigilantes were out of all proportion to what the men did. Many men panicked and tried to escape, but when they clambered across the compound fence they were driven back at gun-point. A press correspondent, writing from the mine, said that "those who made for the fence did not desire to enter the town but wanted to get away from the mine, the shooting, and the general bloodshed, and to make for Basutoland." When told to return to work, the men declared that they wanted to go home. They would not give evidence at the official inquiry into the shooting, having little confidence in speaking to white officials after the recent, widely publicised, case of P J Pienaar, a farmer in the Ladybrand region. Accused of killing two blacks (a man and his sister), and selling their cattle to discharge some pressing debts, he was acquitted by a jury, despite damaging (but circumstantial) evidence. Starting on Saturday, some 600 were taken under armed guard to the border in batches of up to 200.

Jagersfontein—whatever did happen?

At one level there is a simple answer to the question "Whatever did happen at Jagersfontein?" The women in the location, Coloured and African, and the men in the compounds responded to regulations or to acts of brutality, confronted their immediate oppressors, and took what action they could. Racism in the Free State was harsher, or at least less easily countered, and flash-point was soon reached. It was the one Province in which there was no Indian struggle, but by default Indians were prohibited in the "Free" State.

We can only guess at the contact between the women and the men, but with the sex-ratio of Jagersfontein at around sixteen to one, and abnormal for a Free State town, intercourse between mine and town must have been considerable. The men would have known of the women's campaign (as, indeed, the women knew trouble was to be expected on the mines), and that must have had some impact on their own actions, but this would not account for the large number involved in the strike, nor the violence. Nor could the contact with the Free State women account for the strike at Premier mines. Nevertheless, the authorities in Jagersfontein took drastic action against the women. In March police sealed off the location and, moving from house to house, demanded passes at gun-point. Sixty-one women (over half Coloured) were arrested.

It is perhaps more fruitful to look at Basutoland, with which the men kept close links, and to which the men sought to return after the shooting in Jagersfontein. Three issues would have affected the Sotho in 1913: the economic depression (noted above), accompanied by the drought over South Africa, which was particularly severe in Basutoland, and the first request that the British territories be handed to the Union. The drought was probably the most important issue—and in its wake migrant workers, already under economic pressure, would have received urgent pleas to send money home.
In March 1913 Botha sought the transfer of Bechuanaland and Swaziland to South Africa, as part of a plan to absorb South West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Mozambique. The Sotho had always opposed incorporation in South Africa, and they would have been alerted to continued South African ambitions. It is in this light that two official reports can be read:

Recent events would seem to indicate ... that the British Basuto is ever ready to come into open revolt at the slightest provocation, whether imaginary or otherwise, and on such occasions all attempts made by the Europeans in authority to reason with them are met with jeers and insults.

And also:

At Kimberley ... the Basuto are always regarded as the most troublesome element in the Compounds, and ... in Basutoland I have noticed derisive shouting and gestures from the herdboys and a disinclination among older folk to discourage ... dogs from making themselves objectionable to European travellers.

Young men on horseback pass one ... with a sneer or a scowl instead of the friendly greeting of the Cape Colony, the salute of Natal or the silent deference of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Mud slogging and stone throwing on the part of the small boys, and the wilful startling of cart horses are said not to be uncommon.

These things may be mischief, but mischief of a disrespectful almost aggressive sort, and it is certainly not pleasant to conjecture up pictures of a conflict precipitated by the spurious class antagonisms which are being fostered by the agitators of labour (sic), when aggravated by deep-rooted antipathies of race and colour.

The solution proposed was that the police force in Fauresmith and Jagersfontein be increased "to say thirty men".

The period we have discussed was one of instability in South Africa, consequent on economic depression, the dislocations involved in unifying local institutions and in reconstituting the army. The ruling class was split, and the army command was close to mutiny. With war in Europe imminent, the government, in its moment of triumph in January 1914, was probably at its weakest. If the armed rebellion had not been suppressed so speedily after war was declared, the government would have been saved only through an occupation by Imperial troops. But, despite their belief that the railway strike had been provoked to destroy the labour movement, and their anger at the deportation of the strike leaders, Labour was still prepared to come to the government's aid when war was declared.

During the events of 1913-14, the perpetrators of the worst outrages were the government, the mine owners, and the British army. However, over and above the actions of the army and police force, the white workers, when not involved in struggle with the Randlords or the government, were themselves agents of repression. They shot down workers at the diamond mines, acted as temporary warders in the Natal collieries, and formed vigilante groups to stop Indians crossing into the Transvaal. Consequently, in January 1914, when white miners at Premier mines joined the general strike, Africans just carried on working. If some white trade unionists were aware of the contradictions in their organisations, and Labour leaders were beginning to perceive the nature of the problems they faced, they were still blinkered by the belief that white labour alone could effect change in the country, and the SALP still declared in December 1914 that:
The Merriman motion, calculated to put the Labour Party in a cleft stick, and to further Corner House schemes, namely, to abolish the Colour Bar on the Transvaal Mines, set with such puissant counter attacks from our members that the sponsors of the scheme hurrledly dropped it.

Some white socialists did cross the colour line, but this was exceptional. Amongst the first public declarations of support was that of J T Bain, secretary of the Federation of Trades, who supported the Indian workers and hoped that

at a later date the party of which he was secretary would endorse (his statement) that an injury done to the most humble of their race was an injury done to humanity. They must fight for human rights, whether for the coloured or white people. Race must not tell.

He characterized "the indentured system as (one) of slavery glossed over and disguised by law". Then came a meeting in Johannesburg attended by several prominent white trade unionists. T W Ward (one of those arrested in July 1913), speaking on behalf of Bain, described the movement of the Indians as

an expression of their revolt against oppression. But the real cause was economic ... He was not going to advise them against passive resistance, but he warned them to be careful, and to be ready to be shot down.

He was not there to stir up race prejudice, but came as representing a small minority of white workers on the Reef, who realized that the Indians' fight was the white workers' fight. Your brothers in Natal are fighting your fight. Their fight today will be your fight tomorrow. Do not forget there were a few white men willing to forego all questions of colour to help you.

But Bain was vilified in letters to the Evening Chronicle, which had provided the fullest report of what he had said, and the Natal Federation of Trade and Labour Unions, at a meeting of delegates, reaffirmed the Labour standpoint and called on the government to speed repatriation. Herein lay the tragedy: the white workers, embattled in 1913-14 against mine magnates and government, while strengthening their unions and building (white) class solidarity, never extended a hand to the blacks. Their demand for security was won only at the expense of their own, unrealised working-class interests - and this was the basis for the compromise they eventually secured from the ruling class.

The position of blacks cannot be placed on a par with whites - just as the interests of slaves could never be compared with those of their enslavers, but it must be noted that the actions of the black leadership did little to commend them. Sol Plaatje, champion of the black women, blocked an ANC vote of solidarity with white strikers; Gandhi called off his campaign in January 1914, to avoid embarrassing the authorities; and Abdurahman used his gibes against white repression to plead for the economic advancement of Coloured businessmen. They reflected, in a very distorted mirror, the pusillanimous approach of the white working class.

War was declared in Europe in August and extended to Africa, raising new issues. The leaders of the ANC, the APO, and the Indian movement all supported the government's war effort, and the white working class - or at least the English-speaking section - trooped to the colours. The Afrikaner workers were in dissent, but they were tied too solidly to the Nationalist camp to provide any answers. A tiny group of SALP leaders maintained an internationalist position and they formed a War on War League. Its leaders were among those who were radicalized by the events of July 1913 - January 1914, but they had not had enough time to
capitalize on the experiences of the strikes. The "War-on-Warites" were in a minority in the SALF, and many of their adherents retreated before the wave of patriotism that swept the country.

A short boom in the diamond industry from 1911 to 1913 ended, and the mines were closed from September 1914 till January 1916. leading to the repatriation of all migrant workers. "Diamonds were forever" (perhaps) but were not wanted then: but, to finance the war, gold production expanded and Africans were used as semi-skilled replacements for miners who joined the army. And during the war industries expanded, absorbing new layers of black workers and tilting the class balance towards an urban black proletariat. The radical socialists, confronted by new social forces, rejected the colour bar but were still convinced that the white working class, who had fought so valiantly, were a revolutionary force. This heritage, understandable in terms of the events of 1913-14, was not easily brushed aside - but it was to cost the socialist movement dearly.
Julia Wells did the research work on the women's anti-pass campaign for her PhD; Judie Jancovich sought out the information on Jagersfontein; and Baruch Hirson found new material on the strikes, for a biography (together with Gwyn Williams) on D Ivon Jones.

The country's defence force had just been reorganized, and was not ready for action; therefore, British troops were requested by General Smuts. They were also undoubtedly more "reliable".

*Labour Leader*, 7 August 1913, quoting the *Worker*.

Reported in *Cape Times*, 21 July 1913.

Ibid.

Letter to E Carpenter, quoted in *Labour Leader*, 28 August 1913. There is no copy in the Carpenter collection at Sheffield.

Jagersfontein, in the Orange Free State, was six miles from Fauresmith. It boasted five hotels, a public library, two banks, and a town hall. The population of some 8-9,000 (mostly black mineworkers) was largely concentrated in the mine, which produced the best quality diamonds in South Africa and accounted for 10% of the country's output. They were sold almost exclusively in the USA. It had an authorized capital of one million pounds, half in preference shares paying cumulative dividends of 25% per annum. All other profits went to the other shares.

There were garbled accounts in the South African press at the time, but no reports on the independent inquiry in Basutoland. R K Cope, *Comrade Bill: the life and times of W H Andrews, workers' leader* (Stewart Printing: Cape Town, ci1942), pp 160-61, gives a brief account.

These reports, with few variations, appeared in the local press, and were repeated in the British press: see, e.g., *Star*, 10 January 1914; *Manchester Guardian*, 12 January 1914.

*Transvaal Leader*, 12 January 1914. Other local and foreign reports were similar.


Police brought in to subdue the workers had fired into the crowd and killed three and wounded nineteen.

Ibid. This strike was reported in the press, and a report of the inquiry on the "riot" of 23 November 1913 appeared in the *Transvaal Leader*, 3 January 1914.

Blacks were excluded from parliament, and only a minority of men in the Cape had the vote.


*Daily Chronicle*, 4, 7 July 1913. South African gold production was £36m ex £92m world-wide.

*Daily News and Leader*, 3 July 1913.

*Financial Times*, 4 July 1913. On the 7th the paper spoke of an "immense sigh of relief" because the strike was over.

*Financier and Bullionist*, 4, 5 July 1913.
The support of "Tolstoyans" for the Indian campaign was exceptional, but these were isolated whites and only later, when colliery and sugar field workers were on strike, did a few white trade unionists and socialists offer messages of solidarity.

Gandhi was reluctant to embarrass the government, but see Transvaal Leader, 10 January 1914, "Indians Want to Help Strikers".

F H P Creswell, speaking in the Legislative Assembly, quoted in Rand Daily Mail, 13 May 1913.

W H Andrews, speaking in the Legislative Assembly, as quoted by Rand Daily Mail, 16 May 1913.

This included the rights to vote, sit in parliament, man the bureaucracy, join the armed forces and become officers.

A study of the impact of segregation on black children, so urgently needed, is outside the scope of this paper.

The Evening Chronicle, July 1913, passim, carried a series of articles on the July days, using this heading.

Gladstone to Colonial Office, 22 January 1914, CO 4990. On 31 January he gave the total number of white workers as 92,000.

Evening Chronicle, 5 June 1913.


Outhwaite, Daily Chronicle, 7 July 1913, quoted the South African parliament, and also an authority's claim that "at least 150,000, probably 250,000, and possibly 350,000" were killed, maimed and scrapped in the mines since the end of the (Boer) war.

Reynold's Newspaper, 3 August 1913. The article gave figures of African fatalities, and quoted doctors' reports on men who never reached their kraals but were found dead on the roads.

Reynold's Newspaper, 14 September 1913. Jones's letter was quoted in an editorial. The strike of 1907, over the introduction of more rock-drills per supervisor, was occasioned by the fear of phthisis.

Evening Chronicle, 4 June 1913.

Manchester Guardian, 9 July 1913. The causes of the strike as given by Labour leaders to the Daily Chronicle correspondent in Johannesburg. The principal cause was stated to be the "terrible mortality in the mines".


Evening Chronicle, 1 September 1913. Letter from Buss Melman, who supported the demands of the "world working class", and the SALP, and wanted security of tenure ... if South Africa was to be kept a "white man's country".

Evening Chronicle, 3 June 1913.


Katz, op. cit., p 381.
This account is compiled from newspaper accounts; Cope, op. cit.; and Katz, op. cit., Ch 9.

Rand Daily Mail, 21 June 1913.

Cape Times, 2 July 1913, described the procession as the "Great Red Army".

Transvaal Leader, 1 July 1913. If the men at the WFP stations came out, the pumps would be inoperable. By 4 July at least one station (Bosherville) was out, and workers at Brakpan and Vereeniging were considering their position.

Transvaal Leader, 1 July 1913, reporting a charge of incitement to violence against Mason, at the Benoni court.

Outhwaite, Reynold's Newspaper, 6 July 1913. He also wrote of trade unions being "a matter of life and death for the workers if they are to prevent the spread of phthisis".

Cape Times, 21 July 1913, from a letter sent by a clergyman to the Rev Balsworth, and read out at the protest meeting. (See above.)

Cape Times, 8 July 1913. This report noted the "great part" played by women, who incited the crowd to resist police and troops on the 4th, led the holding up of the trams, brought the railways to a standstill, and "showed the way to ... miners who closed down the stores in town".

Letter written by "For Valour", Evening Chronicle, 9 July 1913. Similar letters, written by "A Scotchman" and by A S Purchase, appeared on 10, 11 July. Extracts of the first letter were reprinted in Labour Leader (London), 7 August 1913.

Evening Chronicle, 26 September 1913, reported that the number of wounded treated at the Johannesburg Hospital for wounds received on 4 and 5 July was about 170; 89 had been detained for treatment, 12 had died, and 12 were still in hospital. On 7 July the paper said that the real total would never be known, as many sought their own medical attention.

Daily Chronicle, 7 July 1913.

Yet, see Evening Chronicle, 8 July 1913, for a rumour, believed by many, that General Hertzog was marching on Johannesburg with 3-25,000 oprechts (upright) burghers to help the strikers.

Evening Chronicle, 9 July 1913.

Transvaal Leader, 8 July 1913.

Daily Chronicle, 4 July 1913.

Transvaal Leader, 8 July 1913. (No papers appeared on Monday the 7th.)

Daily Chronicle, 7 July 1913.

This was the view of Waterston, a leading member of the SALP. Transvaal Leader, 8 July 1913.

Ibid.

Cape Times, 8 July 1913.

Transvaal Leader, 8 July 1913.

Report of meeting of 13 June, Cape Times, 9 July 1913.
The numbers involved are not known. Press reports gave 9,000 in the central mining area nearest Johannesburg – 5,000 at Village Main Reef, 1,000 at City and Suburban, 1,000 at Mayer and Charlton (Daily Chronicle, 9 July); 1,500 in Randfontein (Manchester Guardian, 7 July), 500 at New Modderfontein (Transvaal Leader, 10 July).

Evening Chronicle, 11 July 1913.

Evening Chronicle, 11 July 1913.


Evening Chronicle, 21 October 1913, gives details on wage Union rates from the secretary of the Braamfontein branch of the ASRAS. Union recognition was held up by ASRHS refusal to concede the administration's right to alter the union's rules "if deemed necessary".

There were several reports that at one stage J Bain held a pistol to Smuts' head, to stop an armed unit storming into the negotiating room.

Gladstone Dispatch, enclosing letters from the Prime Minister's office, dated 25 July 1913, CO 29414. There were also other drafts on the enrolment of special constables, and so on.

See, for example, Rand Daily Mail, 11 July 1913. It seems that this was largely the work of provocateurs.

Ibid., pp 150-51; Transvaal Leader, 2 January 1914.

A coal shortage would have affected production at all mines, and this seems to have heightened the tensions at Jagersfontein, where there were plans to send black workers home.


Cope, Comrade Bill, p 148, says "he played a leading and exceedingly suspicious role ...". See also pp 150-52 on the position of the union.

A printed list of "secret outrages committed or attempted" during the strike of January 1914, CO 7843. See also Manchester Guardian, 10 January 1914.

Letter sent indirectly to the Colonial Office, of 21 January 1914, signed by leading Labourites, W H Andres MHA (President of the SALP), H W Sampson MLA, W Wybergh, S F Bunting, F A W Lucas, and D Dingwall, CO 52158.

O'Quigley, loc. cit.

Cope, op. cit., p 150. The proclamation terms were printed in the press: see Transvaal Leader, 14 January 1914.

See note 75.

Ibid.

Ibid.


See not 75.

Gladstone Dispatch, 22 January, CO 4990, p 16.
O'Quigley, loc. cit.; Cope, op. cit., pp 154-55, describes the measures (and the brutalities) of the armed forces. The Transvaal Leader, 13 January 1914, under the heading "Free State an Armed Camp", said that streets in Bloemfontein recalled war days but that strikers were "orderly and peaceful".

Cope, op. cit., p 153.

Denys Reitz, Trekking On (Faber, 1933), pp 63-65.

Ibid.

Cope, op. cit., p 154.

O'Quigley, loc. cit.

Letters from J Nield to his sister, Ada Nield Chew, reprinted in Labour Leader, 18 June 1914, and in Socialist (Glasgow), July 1914.

The deportation was forecast in the letter to the Colonial Office of 21 January (above). Cope, op. cit., p 156, cites a similar prediction in the conservative South Africa ten days before the event.


See M Tayal, "Natal Indentured Labour in Natal, 1890-1911", Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol 14, No 4. 152,184 labourers entered Natal from Madras and Calcutta between 1860-66 and 1874-1911; 26,000 were on plantations in 1908 and 18,000 in 1911.

Tinker, op. cit., pp 297-98, stated that Sir Alfred Milner's request in 1903 for 100,000 men to work on the railways of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony was blocked for this reason.

Henry S L Polak, The Indians of South Africa: helots in the Empire and how they are treated (Nateson: Madras, 1909), p 48. Men got 10s x 1s = 14s per month, and adult women and youths 5s x 6d = 7s for the first five years; and 16-20s and 8-10s, respectively, for a second term.


Indians were forbidden entry into the Orange Free State, and faced restrictions in the other Provinces.

See Swan, op. cit., for the factions inside the petty bourgeoisie, and their attitudes to the workers; also a review (p 247) of the Transvaal campaign and its collapse by 1911. See also M K Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa (Navajivan: Ahmedabad, 1972).


J A Polkinghorne, "Report of Deputy Director of Indian Immigrants, Natal, for the Year Ending 31st December 1913", CO 12682.

Transvaal Leader, 18 November 1913.

Swan, op. cit. The "raja" appeared either as a beneficient saviour or as a punisher of non-strikers. There were also claims that Gokhale of the Indian Congress was coming to abolish the tax, but some said they had come out in support of Gandhi.
Gandhi, quoted in Transvaal Leader, 27 October 1913, said that Africans were not being asked to strike because there were no complaints against the employers (sic).

The minimum ration per adult, of one and a half loaves of bread daily, and some sugar, cost thousands of pounds per month.

The trial was reported in Transvaal Leader, 25 October 1913. The number sentenced is uncertain, because of varying reports in different papers, but was probably less than twenty.

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Press reports, mainly quoting from white sources, altered in successive accounts and were radically different from those told by plantation workers. It is thus not possible to provide a systematic story covering the events.

Gladstone dispatch, 29 November, CO 43234, gave four killed and 24 wounded, and eight whites "more or less seriously hurt". The Transvaal Leader, 26 November, gave 6 Indians killed and forty wounded (of whom at least two died later); there was no mention of any white injured.

Evening Chronicle, 17 November 1913, reported that 150 acres of cane were destroyed, after strips of cane were set alight.

Evening Chronicle, 17 November 1913.

Evening Chronicle, 17 November 1913.

Evening Chronicle, 7 November 1913.

Evening Chronicle, 20 June 1913.

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Evening Chronicle, 17 November 1913.

Evening Chronicle, 7 November 1913.

Evening Chronicle, 20 June 1913.

Letter to Diamond Field Advertiser, 16 October 1913, sub-headed "Help From an Unexpected Quarter".
As reported in Transvaal Leader, 30 September 1913. A copy was sent by Gladstone to the Colonial Office (CO 37199), but there are no further details in any of his dispatches.

Ibid.

See, for example, Transvaal Leader, 7 November 1913, on 600 Africans sentenced to one month’s hard labour, following "theft from the compound" during a "riot" at Smith Mine at Klipdam.

Wages for blacks in diamond mines (78-89s for a 26-day month) were higher than in gold mines (52s), or coal mines (41-43s), but were pitifully low. We know little about conditions in the compounds in the smaller mines, but working conditions were unpleasant. Underground tunnels were 1-1.5 yards wide, with lighting only from lamps on helmets. Wagons were hand-pushed and ran on rails. It was hot and sweaty, with mud underfoot. The Transvaal Leader, 26 November 1913, reported a roof-fall and the death of two blacks and one white at Jaggersfontein. Body searches were frequent.

The report in the National Archives, Maseru, quoted by Ranger, "Faction Fighting", is similar to the above, taken from the Transvaal Leader, 25 November 1913. Ranger has his doubts about the explanations offered at the Inquiry, and we concur.

A letter of the Basuto Council to Gladstone, 16 April 1914, gives these numbers. The press reported three killed, and 22 wounded, eight seriously.

See Transvaal Leader, 25 November 1913.

The Deputy Inspector claimed that the 300 men from Premier mines were troublesome from the start, affected the labourers, and were the "ring leaders and initiators" in the January event.

From the deposition of Ben Khotso, 15 January 1914, and Joe Letsie, 17 January, Basutoland Despatches (BD), No 168, 1914.

Ibid. Deposition of Sepinare Phahlahla, 15 January 1914.

Ibid.

Ben Khotso's statement.

Ranger, "Faction Fighting", states that the mine authorities sold these arms to white workers, at reduced prices, after unrest at the Koffiefontein mine.

Deposition of Sepinare Phahlahla. Mahlabani stated that he was struck on the back and the leg by a pick-handle "because I was speaking to the others".

BD 168.

Deposition by Sepinare Phahlahla, BD 168. Phahlahla also stated that the men were satisfied with their treatment prior to this affair. Mahapela was a policeman, according to a letter by Chief Griffiths and others to the Governor-General, Lord Gladstone, 16 April 1914, BD 383 (dated 9 May 1914). See also Rand Daily Mail, 12 January 1914.

Report, Deputy Inspector of Mines.

Friend, 12 January 1914; see statement by Mahlabani, BD 168.

Evening Chronicle, 13 September 1913.

Ibid., Ben Khotso. There were varying reports about the number sent home, but no reliable figure is available.

Some women informed their employers, on the morning of the strike, that trouble could be expected, but there is no further information about their contact.
APO, 21 March 1914; Jagersfontein Criminal Record Book, 1912-14. We have not been able to trace any further details about this raid, or about the trial of the 61.

Smuts spoke about Mozambique becoming part of South Africa, at a public meeting in Johannesburg, and had been rebuffed by the Portuguese consul. He raised this issue, together with that of Namibia, inside the British war cabinet in 1918.

T E Liefeldt, Inspector Native Affairs Dept, Report on Riot at the Premier Mines, 16 March 1914, CO 417/545, 103706 - BD.

A L Barrett, Inspector, OFS Labour District, Dept of Native Affairs, "Basuto Attitudes - Jagersfontein", 21 March 1914, COK 417/545 103706 - BD.

In a quixotic move, the SALP offered its services to the government to approach the rebels and secure internal peace.

See Transvaal Leader, 10, 12 November 1913, for the meeting of the local magistrate, and the Volksrust Vigilance Committee, on their opposition to the Satyagrahists. Also the copy of 18 January 1914, in which the Minister of Justice, N J de Wet, "acknowledged the valuable support given to the Government ... in resisting the Indian invasion".

"Executive Report, SALP", December 1914.

Reported in Evening Chronicle, 13 November 1913. Several other white socialists appeared on platforms to express solidarity, but they represented only themselves. These were leaders without any troops.

Quoted in Transvaal Leader, 1 December 1913. As Ward predicted, they "had to be ready to be shot down".

Gladstone makes this point in his dispatch.

Brian Willan, Sol Plaatje: South African nationalist 1876-1932 (Heinemann, 1984), p 163, states: Plaatje "personally drafted a resolution 'dissociating the Natives from the (white miners') strike movement' after the idea had been put forward ...".

M H de Kock, Selected Subjects in the Economic History of South Africa (Juta: Cape Town, 1924), p 261.