The Rival: Conflict and Factionalism in the "School" Community in the Cape Colony, 1890-1915

by

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In the midst of the divisive 1898 election, the Rev Isaac Wauchope lamented the spread of "racial" politics and Xhosa-Mfengu conflict.

When years ago it was feared that there would one day be a general rising of Native tribes against the Government, there were not lacking those among Europeans who preached that it was a sin for Fingoes to have intercourse of any kind with those of Kafir (i.e., Xhosa) extraction. I know a minister who was very reluctant to join a Kafir and Fingoe in marriage, stated that it was politically undesirable that such unions should take place. The enslavement of Fingoes by Kafirs was made too much of... it took a long time before Kafirs could distinguish between the Gospel of Salvation and the Gospel of Cape Politics. It was fortunate that the two races are of the same colour and speak the same language; otherwise we would not be worshipping God under the same roof now. Still the seeds sown in a moment of weakness are still seen in the case of splits in Native Congregations where the line of cleavage is a racial one.

In fact, willingness to worship God under the same roof was declining. This ethnic conflict (mostly Xhosa and Thembu versus Mfengu) after 1890 contrasts sharply with the 1870s and '80s; the easy, amicable relations among the school elite and their enthusiastic participation together in so many associations are very striking. This relative absence of the more or less endemic factionalism in this century means that we have to analyse what happened, and not see the conflict simply as a projection of the past.

The intrusion of factionalism into political behaviour among the "school" elite has been noted and analysed, especially by Andre Odendaal. Wauchope linked this with conflict in the churches. Indeed, some episodes in the churches indicate that the entire school community, not just the elite, was disrupted by factionalism. Moreover, the conflict was not simply an extension of elite relations; it was as much a "bottom-up" phenomenon. The churches most affected by the factionalism were the Congregational Union of South Africa (CUSA) and the Synod of Kaffraria (the Free Church of Scotland mission which became the core for the Bantu Presbyterian Church in the 1920s). Compared with more centralized churches (e.g., the Wesleyan Methodists and the Anglicans) where white control permeated, there was extensive congregational autonomy. Africans gained at least some voice in decision-making, but were also vulnerable to general trends and feelings; increased resentment and conflict in the "school" community emerged symptomatically in disputes over church politics and properties. This paper will examine some of these episodes before returning to more general observations.

A prime example was the disruption of the Synod of Kaffraria in 1898 when P J Mzimba and followers seceded to form the Presbyterian Church of Africa (PCA). It is well known that the secessionists of the PCA were almost entirely Mfengu. The
secession was preceded by three or four years of growing Xhosa-Mfengu conflict in the Lovedale Native Congregation; this church, which was separate from the institution, served Africans living in and around Alice and was pastored by Mzimba. Ostensibly, the dispute was about the site for a new central church building: the members at Lovedale had already purchased the land, but the outstation people objected to the location. Most Lovedale members were Xhosa while those at the outstations were Mfengu. The elders and deacons at Lovedale felt betrayed when Mzimba gave his support to the outstation faction, especially when they claimed that outstation contributions were less than their own.

This fact shd at least help to refute one of several ridiculous statements that are being circulated that the Lovedale Kaffirs are opposing their Minister because he is a Fingo. This too after supporting him for 17 years.

In January 1895, John Knox Bokwe resigned as treasurer of the Lovedale congregation. The secession in 1898 initiated over a decade of intense conflict, not only in the courts but also on the personal level, as protagonists harassed each other. While most secessionists were Mfengu, not all Mfengu seceded. The Rev Elijah Makwane did not secede, and he was harassed as much as the Xhosa clergy. Nevertheless, the Xhosa almost certainly saw the secession and other aspects as Mfengu actions.

CUSA incorporated the London Missionary Society (LMS) missions. Beginning about 1850, the LMS began reducing financial support to its missions in the Cape Colony. Local members were expected to pay expenses, even the minister's salary. However, by the end of the century, in common with the experience of other "peasants" at the Cape, inhabitants of mission stations experienced serious declines in incomes and welfare. Church membership declined as mission residents were drawn/driven to the growing urban centres at the mines or ports. War, and later "Ethiopianism", caused further haemorrhaging of church membership. Church finances became a critical problem; when drought or depression struck, inadequate revenue left unpaid salaries and other deficiencies. As a result, clergymen came into competition for the stations with the biggest and most reliable incomes. Nevertheless, self-sufficiency did mean a good deal of local autonomy and a large say in control of property (usually title was vested in six trustees - three chosen by the local congregation and three by CUSA).

CUSA was prey to the problems of congregational-type churches everywhere: generation feuds (e.g., older deacons against younger ministers), class feuds, and family or other cliques. In addition, whenever there was any sort of cultural or distinct group difference, there were more possibilities (Coloureds against Africans, Xhosa against Mfengu, Thembu against Mfengu, etc). Most LMS stations and congregations had a rather heterogeneous composition. Under the more or less kindly autocracy of the white missionary, Khoi-Khoi, ex-slave, Xhosa, Mfengu, etc, had co-existed. With the introduction of a congregational form of government, most stations were soon racked by bitter politics, as noted by T Durant Philip in 1890:

The Union has not the limited Presbyterian power of moderating a call to any church, much less the Wesleyan power of appointing a man as minister to the charge. And this brings into play that conflict of races which threatens to make havoc of our native churches.

Eventually, separate congregations had to be created for Africans and Coloureds, but conflict emerged among Africans as well.

Peelton Mission (near King William's Town) was almost constantly in turmoil, although factionalism was intermixed with other issues. The Girls Institution, run by Miss Sturrock and the "Society for the Promotion of Female Education in the East", was a major issue. It prompted an attempt by the Deacon's Court to assert control in 1889, and interventions by the CUSA executive to engineer a "call" to a white missionary each time Peelton became vacant - 1892,
1903, 1906, and 1916. On Richard Birt's death in 1892 and recurring thereafter, many members wanted an African minister, especially Birt's protege and assistant, Walter Rubusana. Nevertheless, Mark Wilson was called and Rubusana was given East London. A three-man committee failed to resolve divisions in 1895; the Rev Loose's appointment in 1903 (he soon left Peelton as a "lost cause") and Wilson's return in 1906 repeated the 1892 experience with rising tension, as the Rev Evans reported in 1906: "Our mission was a delicate one... there was an amount of pent up feeling that made one fear it might break loose at any moment." By the end of 1815 all the CUSA African congregations in the area (i.e. East London, Peelton, and Brownlee Mission in King William's Town, each with its outstations) were in a turmoil. In 1913, while still a member of the Cape Provincial Council, Rubusana had engaged Joel Mbengo-Nyangi as his assistant at East London. By the end of 1915, Rubusana had been forced to appeal to the CUSA executive: "He has been doing everything to undermine me in my Church.... The consequence is that he has now created a split in my church." The CUSA executive sided with Rubusana; they pressured and threatened Nyangi to leave the area. In contrast, the two local white ministers, Harper (Brownlee Mission) and Wilson (Peelton), supported Nyangi and the dissidents. At exactly the same time, Harper was retiring from Brownlee Mission. Although Harper succeeded in getting a vote to "call" Wilson, a faction - which included William Siyo - objected. Claiming that the proceedings had been unconstitutional, Rubusana intervened and declared himself consultant to the Brownlee dissidents. Peelton was again vacant and Wilson reported on his attempts to have the Rev Jones called:

The Committee there does not seem able to make a suitable choice. I regret to tell you that the only two names mentioned in the Selection com. have been natives viz Rubusana! & H Mama at Lovedale.

While personal antagonisms were present (the Wilson-Rubusana rivalry was 24 years old), the Rev Newell of Port Elizabeth declared that the trouble was largely "racial".

The Fingoes some few years ago instituted a 'Fingo Day' to celebrate their emancipation from the thralldom of the Kaffirs or more correctly the Amakosa, the latter were not pleased at this as they declared that the Fingos had never been held in thrall; so they decided to hold a tribal festival once a year in honour of Ntsikana; this has been very thoroughly organised and a very strong branch exists in Port Elizabeth. It has divided families & Churches. I lost fifty members in a day, so I have had some experience of its working & baneful effects.

The point d'apui is that on this day the Kaffir youths are to be warned against the evil habits of the Fingos. You may judge of the result if you imagine Englishmen at St George's banquet denouncing the Scots for their immorality!

I entered into correspondence with the leaders, the Revs M B Rubusana & J Knox Bokwe entreating them to give up this offensive part of the programme, but all in vain.

Factionalism affected the huge congregation established in the Transkei by S P Sihlali in 1886. It was an attempt to achieve two aims: to serve Mfengu migrants from CUSA stations in the Cape and to satisfy a request for a white missionary from the Thembu chief, Mqudwa. In spite of serious disabilities (James Read wrote in 1886 that Sihlali had "Kafir & Temboo element & white prejudice against him"), Sihlali was successful; by 1923 the congregation (Sihlali died 1919) was spread over 100 square miles in six magisterial districts, and had at least 14 churches and outstations with 13 schools employing 23 teachers. Sihlali's tact
with the Thembu and his relationship with Mgudlwa held the Thembu-Mfengu tensions in check for twenty years. However, in 1907, a group of Thembu elders and deacons began a revolt against Sihlali and the Mfengu-dominated Deacons' Court; this feud was to continue beyond 1945. Sihlali avoided a clash in the Deacons' Court and took the matter to Mgudlwa. For a while he was able to report:

The Chief Mgudlwa who is a Tembu is doing all in his power to assist me loyally, if it were not so all the Tembus would have followed the malcontents ... Mgudlwa however in consequence of his health and age (88) continually postponed the matter and ultimately advised that the matter should be settled by the Church.24

The issue was the central church at Solomon's Vale (i.e. Mgudlwa's great place, Elucwecwe); this stone building was the most valuable property in the congregation. In March 1907 Sihlali persuaded the deacons that the outstations (mostly Mfengu) should assist in paying off the debt of the central church. Sihlali discovered from Chief Mgudlwa why the Thembu dissidents objected:

(a) It was he who first asked me ... whether my collecting would not make the Solomon's Vale Church the property of the other stations. I at once told him that the Solomon's Vale Church as the central Church belonged to all my stations and that it was the duty of the outstations to contribute to liquidate its building debt ... After my explanation he seemed satisfied.25

Nevertheless, in 1908, Mgudla yielded to the Thembu dissidents. The Church split bitterly along Thembu-Mfengu lines.

In May the Thembu dissidents appealed to the CUSA executive.26 Sihlali's analysis (the fears about "Ethio'anism" were perhaps exaggerated) was confirmed by two investigations in the 1920s.

The causes alleged by (the) malcontents for the steps they have taken are not the real causes for their dissatisfaction. About one tenth of the members of my church are Tembus and the remainder Fingoes. There has been a growing feeling that the prominent men in Church and social matters have been Fingoes and that the time had come that the Tembus and other Kafir races should now have their turn.

Claiming that three of the seven "malcontents" who signed the appeal had come over "from the Tile movement", Sihlali asserted that "their main object is to detach Solomon's Vale and Beyele from the other stations and have a minister of their own nationality, and failing that to join Ethiopianism".27

The question of ownership was tied in an ecclesiastical and legal Gordian knot. The three local trustees were elected by the Mfengu majority while the building itself was located in Thembu territory at a distance from the Mfengu majority. The CUSA executive had only limited powers of intervention; it could mediate, but it could not impose a settlement. Neither faction was willing to relinquish the church to the other. From 1908 through 1910, the Thembu asked that the congregation be divided. The central church and two outstations in Thembu areas would separate and receive a Thembu or Xhosa minister. Sihlali would continue as minister of the Mfengu section but would move from the house and church at Elucwecwe. This solution (favoured by CUSA executive) was rejected by the Mfengu. Early in 1911, Mgudlwa sued for Sihlali's ejection from Elucwecwe. Because the suit would destroy the CUSA title and leave nothing to prevent the Thembu from seceding to form an independent church, the executive opposed the suit successfully in 1913. A Thembu proposal for arbitration by the CUSA executive was rejected by Sihlali. In June 1913, as a compromise, William Siyo was appointed to act as minister for the
Thembu dissidents. Siyo and the Thembu were allowed complete use of the central church two Sundays a month. Shortly after Siyo was disavowed by the executive in May 1915, Dr Rubusana was appointed consulent to the Thembu dissidents, a position he retained until 1925.

In politics, the split among African voters and activists was precipitated by the polarization and realignment among whites. Although there were many exceptions, there was a tendency for Mfengu to follow Jabavu in supporting the South Africa Party (the Bond and its anti-Rhodes allies) and for Xhosa and Thembu to follow the East London group at Izwe Labantu in supporting the Progressives. The rivalry intruded even on the issue of higher education. As late as July 1906, Rubusana, on behalf of the South African Native Congress (the East London group), was still promoting the rival Victoria Memorial College against the Inter-State College scheme for which Jabavu was so active. Rubusana's objections to the latter scheme (opposition to denominationalism; six Europeans but only two Africans on the board of control; concern that, as in the past at mission institutions, Africans would be prepared only for poorly paid professions - teacher and clergy - rather than more lucrative ones) were shared by Jabavu, but it was the project most likely to succeed. Rivalry with Jabavu loomed large.

Was the factionalism primarily a legacy of feelings from the wars of conquest? Certainly, by allying with the whites, the Mfengu had received part of the land and cattle confiscated from the Xhosa resisters, but there are problems accepting this an an adequate explanation. "School" Xhosa usually remained neutral in the wars and retained much of their land. The Mfengu were not alone in allying themselves with the whites. Ngqika allied himself with whites in 1818 and his example was followed by other Xhosa chiefs and clan heads; the Thembu made almost as many treaties with whites as did the Mfengu, yet Xhosa and Thembu began to identify with each other against the Mfengu. Also, the last war was fought only in 1877-78, when there was little expression of factionalism among the elite.

Were whites responsible for fomenting the conflict, as suggested by Wauchope above and by the Rev J. G. Nyovane, who accused white politicians of saying "bad things" about the Mfengu? Whites certainly tried this, but it is not a convincing argument; in the 1880s they had little success. In 1887, following annexation, the highly touted magistrate Matthew Blyth tried, without much success, to disrupt efforts to organize a political association among African voters in the Transkei. "Its promoter is a law agent, Mr Gontshi, a Kafir, and a Gaika. He put it to the Fingoes - What good has a Kafir ever done for the Fingoes?" However, he also accused Invo and Jabavu (Mfengu) of spreading sedition. Jabavu was outraged during an 1888 election in King William's Town:

Then, a foul and infamous falsehood was invented, that Mr Tengo-Jabavu boasted that the Fingoes would not vote for Mr Schermbrucker, while the Amakhosa would. Mr Tengo-Jabavu has never cherished within his breast any distinction of race among the Natives.

However, the Rev Charles Paala, an Mfengu, supported Schermbrucker, and Richard Birt's support of Schermbrucker was probably the biggest factor in splitting the Peelton vote.

While the ethnic factionalism which emerged so prominently after 1890 looked like and had links to older phenomena, it was really a new development. The school community, by definition, were those who were assimilated (to a greater or lesser degree) to the new economy and society introduced and imposed by whites. The old ethnic distinctions created fault lines, and under pressure the school community tended to fracture along those ethnic fault lines; but explanations must focus on the new pressures and tensions. Trepido's argument that it was a generation conflict which happened to coincide with ethnic lines is a useful, but partial, explanation. Because they had been faster to plunge into Christianity/education, the Mfengu did occupy many of the limited, diminishing number of jobs available to newly educated, younger Xhosa in the 1890s. However, Rubusana and Bokwe were the
same generation as Jabavu, Makiwane and Mzimba. Also, the evidence from the churches suggests that the conflict in the school community was not restricted to the elite and requires additional explanation.

The 1890s began a long and painful "period of stress" for the school community and its elite. Educated into the cult of "progress" at its apogee, their letters and writing in the 1870s and 1880s were filled with utopian expectations: the end of prejudice, the end of oppression, the opening of opportunity, the achievement of equality. While requiring time and education, they were none the less inevitable. However, in common with other Africans, the school community and its elite suffered a catastrophic deterioration in their economic, social and political position after 1890. "Liberalism" in the Cape Colony was undermined by racism and social Darwinism as well as by economic transformations, as Trapido has shown. In the newspapers, white politicians, editors and readers extolled the virtues of the northern racial policies and rejected the "negrophilist" policies of the Cape.

The signs were unmistakeable: the franchise qualifications were raised in 1892 and the Glen Grey Act was the opening salvo in the use of legislation to coerce Africans into the labour market. Opportunity also withered. The relative economic position of Africans declined markedly as the wealth from minerals flowed only to whites (of course, not all whites shared either). Moreover, whether the earlier period (1860s to '80s) was a period of prosperity or simply a pause in the long-term deterioration, there was a stunning collapse in the real economic well-being of Africans after 1890. The "school" community and elite were a major part of the "peasantry", which declined and/or was destroyed. Natural disasters (cattle diseases and drought), war-time disruptions, post-war depression, as well as legislation of white governments, all contributed to the economic miseries.

For the elite, new jobs in the economy outside farming not only failed to open but discrimination reduced some of the existing ones, as Imvo documented. In Kimberley (22 May 1890), efforts were made to replace the African interpreter with a white man and (9 June 1892) to replace the letter and telegram carriers with "indigent" whites. Some magistrates (even in the Transkei) were excluding Africans from temporary employment as census-takers (16 and 30 April 1891). The employment of Africans by the government was attacked in Parliament (13 August 1891).

Alan K Soga's career provided a graphic example of rising discrimination. A younger son of the Rev Tiyo Soga, Alan Soga had a Scottish education and had passed the law examinations. After appointments as clerk and assistant Resident Magistrate at St Mark's in the Transkei, he was on track to become the first African magistrate (10 January 1894). However, in 1895 Soga was transferred to the Labur Office and thus transparently diverted from establishing this career precedent. After a number of anonymous, derogatory letters from other Africans appeared in the local press, Benjamin Sakuba was replaced in the highly paid, prestigious position of court interpreter at King William's Town by a white man (6 May 1897).

The effects of economic privation in increasing the level of tension in the churches is clear. CUSA and the Synod of Kaffraria were the denominations most heavily dependent on African contributions. The position in the Congregational Union was particularly difficult and promoted strong competition. In the Synod of Kaffraria, the salaries of the white missionaries and some other expenses were paid from Scotland, but the salaries of African clergy were raised locally. In 1907 and 1908, because of declining receipts from Africans, all grants to evangelists were cut off (thus throwing a number of men into unemployment), and African-ordained clergy salaries were reduced from 80 to 75. The Rev C J Dambuzals response to the declining revenues of the Synod Fund reveals how irritation was raised by the problems:

As long as some men are paid from Scotland & worse still they occupy the congregations that ought to be supporting Native pastors ... The Synod Fund will continue to fall because we are starving & they are alright & so they do not trouble themselves to lay the matter seriously before the Congregations.

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While there may have been mutual reinforcement occurring in that factionalism in the churches intensified conflict in politics, and vice versa, both seem to arise from the same underlying stresses. The factionalism should not be exaggerated, as Africans continued to find it necessary and possible to co-operate: most Africans supported the Inter-State College scheme; Jabavu joined Rubusana and the other delegates to London to protest the South Africa Act. However, it should not be ignored either. There were many factors in the debacle of the 1914 Tembuland election, when Jabavu stood against Rubusana for the Provincial Council and ensured his defeat, but for a decade and half the dragon's teeth of factionalism had been growing. What role did Sihlali, active in elections and political issues since the 1880s, have in the 1914 election? Sihlali was moderate and patient, but in 1914 he had to turn his church over to Rubusana's associate, William Siyo, two Sundays each month.

Little has appeared in the literature on Ntsikana Day or Fingo Day. Regarding Ntsikana Day, a modern informant, perhaps ingenuously, insisted that its purpose had been "the Unification of All Black Races into Christendom", with membership open to "All Black Races of Southern Africa Irrespective of Tribal Affiliations". However, he added: "To the Xhosa Nation, Ntsikana's Memorial Celebration is founded on the same National Ideology as St George's Day to the English Nation, Saint Patrick's Day to the Irish Nation, St Andrew's Day to the Scottish Nation, etc, etc." After recognition as a school holiday in 1907, Fingo Day was celebrated formally. In an effort to mollify the Xhosa, the Peddie committee passed the following resolution in 1908 (probably with minimal effect):

The observing of this day as a holiday by the Fingoes is in no way antagonistic to the other nationalities, whose friendly relations this meeting wishes very much to retain, and to whom they are indebted for their kindesses and rescue from starvation prior to becoming British subjects.

The enthusiastic response to a 1910 proposal to publish a history of the Mfengu revealed a strong sense of identity and cohesion. The twenty-six district organisers were a "Who's Who" of Mfengu elite.

The rival celebrations lasted from the 1900s into the 1970s at least. The effect was that factionalism was institutionalized and the conflict perpetuated. The legacy continues and the Ianjantstan policies of the National Party regime exploit and foster the factionalism.
Today all are considered Xhosa as the Xhosa language has become dominant; regional variations and dialects, which had never been great, are all being affected by western and urban influences; mingling and mass communications are rapidly diminishing differences. In this paper, however, Xhosa refers only to those chieftaincies and clans which trace their descent from the chief Xhosa and have been defined in the literature. See J B Peires, The House of Phalo (University of California Press, 1981); also J H Soga, The South-Eastern Bantu (Kraus Reprint, 1969), and Oxford History of South Africa, I (Oxford, 1969), pp 75-130.


Terminology presents difficulties. Conflict involving the Xhosa or the Thembu against the Mfengu was not "traditional" in predating European intrusion; it began only after the "emancipation of the Fingo" in 1835 and was mainly a consequence of the wars of conquest. The Xhosa and the Thembu had a longer history of fighting and jostling each other, including being an element precipitating the last war in 1877-78. Yet, these "traditional" enemies began to identify with each other against the Mfengu. "Tribal" is even less applicable. The Mfengu were not, and never had been, a "tribe", although they did acquire a distinct identity during the nineteenth century. "Factionalism" implies new phenomena as well as being internecine, especially in the "school" community.


John Knox Bokwe, Letterbooks, II (1894-97), in the South African Public Library, Cape Town; Bokwe to Rev Don, 17 January 1895. Most of the background of this dispute is from this memo and other correspondence in the Letterbook.

It seems unlikely that Mzimba himself was concerned with what might be termed "Mfenguism". In the earlier conflict, he appears to have been forced to choose sides. After secession, he set out to broaden his church and the PCS soon expanded beyond the narrow Mfengu base it had in the beginning.


These hostilities were long remembered. In 1971 an informant (whose father and uncle had been Xhosa clergymen "persecuted" by PCA members) denounced the Mfengu roundly. Most of the events he was denouncing had taken place before he was born. The Inspector of Natives for Victoria East, Liefeldt, described the type of harassments to which PCA seceders were subjecting the Free Church members: "The latter (PCA members) impound the cattle of the former (Free Church members) on every opportunity, members of their denomination are exempt. they (FC members) are not allowed to water their stock at certain private holdings, nor are they invited to any festivities. Many other trifling matters have occurred that can not be altogether proved, such as driving stock by night into the lands of the members of the Free Church." Cape Archives, Native Affairs Department, NA 498, confidential report, 5 September 1902.

The non-seceders, and even more the white missionaries, pressured the government not to recognize the PCA, and in this way prevented its clergy being recognized as marriage officers and precluded it being granted church/school sites.

Christian Express, 1 August 1890, p 115. Philip was the CUSA tutor attached to Lovedale Theological School.

Imvo, 12 September 1889. "The claim is simply monstrous. As well might Rev P J
Mzimbā's congregation, at Lovedale, demand to have the management of Lovedale Institution entrusted to it. We must warn our Pealton friends not to agitate for powers of control over an Institution that they have not the wherewithal to support it."

12 *Iovo*, 19 December 1895.

13 CUSA Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS 14,545, Report of Deputation (James Ramage and B Evans) of meeting held 25 October 1906 under cover of letter from Ramage to Rev Friend (7 November 1906). Also, John Harper to Rev Ritchie, 9 April 1903; B Evans to James Ramage, 27 October 1907.

14 Ibid., MS 14,535 (c), Rubusana to Rev Walker, 30 December 1915.


16 Details of Siyo's career are sketchy. In 1903 he was a political agent for the South Africa Party in the election: see Stanley Trapido, "African Divisional Politics in the Cape Colony, 1884 to 1910", *Journal of African History*, XI, 1 (1968), pp 91-92. However, by 1909, Odendaal refers to him as a stalwart of the East London group (p 162), and he had become an associate of Rubusana. After 1910, his name begins to appear in CUSA Papers, MS 14,537, acting for the Thembu (see below). In 1913 he had a church appointment. In one document — "Opinion on Solomons Vale Difficulties", 5 June 1913, signature not decipherable — Siyo was referred to as "Reverend". I never confirmed that he was ordained. Siyo resided in Tafeni, King William's Town, and hence his involvement here. In 1915 he was deprived of all affiliation with CUSA work — MS 14,537, Sihlali to Walker, 26 May 1915.

17 This office, adapted from the Dutch Reformed Church, was intended as a temporary appointment and was used primarily in two situations: (a) to fill an interim between two ministers, and (b) to serve dissidents who had quarrelled with and separated from their congregations.

18 CUSA Papers, MS 14,535 (c), Rubusana to Rev Walker, 22 January 1916. Wilson complained that Rubusana, with Siyo and others, had broken into an outstation and performed ministerial functions — MS 14,535 (c), Wilson to Rev Ferguson, 4 February 1916. After complaining about Rubusana's interference in his church, he proceeded in the same letter to support Nyangi and the dissidents in Rubusana's church.

19 Ibid., MS 14,535 (c), Wilson to Rev Ferguson, 4 February 1916. Eventually Jones was issued a call.

20 Ibid., MS 14,531, Newell to Walker, 7 April 1916, "PS Confidential". Bokwe's participation in the Ntsikana Day movement perhaps grew out of resentment from the earlier conflict involving Mzimba; however, on leaving Lovedale in 1897, he entered a short-lived partnership with Jabavu in publishing *Iovo*.

21 The first African to pass the Cape University Matriculation examination, Sihlali was an active participant in politics and various voluntary associations of the school elite from the 1880s.

22 CUSA Papers, MS 14,556, "Private for Secty & Executive".

23 Ibid., MS 14,537, Martin Dower to CUSA Executive, 7 March 1923, with map.

24 Ibid., MS 14,537, Sihlali to Ferguson, 10 August 1908.

25 Ibid., MS 14,537, Sihlali to Ferguson, 10 August 1908.

26 Ibid., MS 14,537, P B Mtni et al to Rev Ferguson, 11 May 1908. The English is
poor and it is difficult to understand some of the allegations. Most are clarified in Sihlali's letter to Ferguson, 10 August 1908.

27 Ibid., MS 14,537, George Ferguson, "Union Representative's Report. Solomons Vale", March 1921, and J Martin Dower to CUSA Executive, 7 March 1923.

28 Ibid., MS 14,537, Sihlali to Ferguson, 10 August 1908.

29 This summary is based on the correspondence in CUSA Papers, MS 14,537 (1908-1915).

30 Odendaal, passim; Trapido, "African Divisional Politics", pp 80-82; Stormont Papers, Rhodes University, MS 14,303, G W Tyamzashe to Stormont, 6 July 1898, #119: "We have decided to cast in our lot with the Progressives, but in doing so, have not pledged ourselves either to Mr Rhodes or Mr Innes, or Sir Gordon (Sprigg). To us it is immaterial who among the Progressives is in power, be it the League or any other organization - as long as we are assured that the party in power belongs to the Progressive ranks, we are prepared to support it in preference to the Bond."

31 Cape of Good Hope Parl. Papers, Report of the Select Committee on Native Education (A.1 - 1908), Minutes of Evidence, pp 246-57.


33 Odendaal reached the same conclusions, pp 66-67.

34 Imvo, 28 March 1905.

35 Imvo, 26 June 1887.

36 Imvo, 11 October 1888. Jabavu was firmly allied with Schermbrucker's enemies, Richard Rose-Innes and the other proprietors of the Cape Mercury.

37 C C Saunders, "The New African Elite in the Eastern Cape and Some Late Nineteenth Century Origins of African Nationalism" in The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries I (ICS, CSP 1969-70), p 47. Pamla was in hot water throughout 1888. As a result of a widely publicized interview with Sprigg in which he had supported Sprigg and his Government, he was denounced by Imvo and its readers throughout January and February. Imvo (15 November 1888) claimed that only 60 Africans voted for Schermbrucker as opposed to 730 who voted for Richard Solomon, but Schermbrucker beat out Solomon for the second and last seat. Jabavu was furious with those 60 "weak-brained individuals" and with Pamla. Jabavu was circuit steward in the church where Pamla was minister. Their relations were so bad that church authorities hastily moved Pamla to the Transkei in 1889.


40 As Monica Wilson noted, the number of cattle per capita (the major form of wealth for Africans) was much higher in the early nineteenth century than at the end: Oxford History of S Africa, II, pp 57-58. Colin Bundy - in a number of articles and The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (London, 1979) - together with William Beinart - in Bundy and Beinart, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa (London, Berkeley, and Johannesburg, 1987) - argued that the decline was partly reversed by a period of prosperity (c1860-90) as Africans responded to the market to increase agricultural production. Their account of the decline after 1890 showed that capital intensive agriculture and repressive land and labour legislation played a greater role than previously recognized.
In a critique of Bundy’s work, Jack Lewis — "The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry: a critique and reassessment", *Journal of Southern African Studies* XI, 1 (1984), pp 1-24 — has rejected the idea of a period of prosperity and concluded that it was a short-term pause in the long-term decline.

41 *Imvo*, 25 July 1895, attributed the action to Bond agitations. This explains why Soga reacted so strongly to Jabavu’s alliance with the Bond in the 1898 election — see *Imvo*, 3 August 1898 — and why he preferred the Progressives.

42 John Lennox Papers. These papers were unorganized and uncatalogued in 1972 when I examined them at Federal Theological Seminary at Alice. See financial statement headed "Synod of Kaffraria" showing the decline in income from the high in 1904 of 1,258.8.3 to the low 570.12.10 in 1908.

43 Lennox Papers, letter from Dambuza to Lennos, 27 June 1908.


45 *Imvo*, 22 October 1907.

46 *Imvo*, 30 June 1908.

47 *Imvo*, 5 April 1910.