

CLANDESTINE MIGRATION IN SOUTH CENTRAL AFRICA

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In his pioneering study of African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia, Charles van Onselen showed how the worker's desire to sell his labour in the best market possible led African migrants from the northern territories (Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia) to adopt a variety of ingenious methods to resist the regulations of the state and employers and make their way to higher paying centres of employment in the Union of South Africa. [1] Van Onselen's brief analysis of this clandestine migration terminates in 1933 but there is sufficient evidence to show that the phenomenon he describes continued well into and beyond the 1940s. This paper examines some aspects of this migration and the ways in which the Southern Rhodesian state responded to a movement that denied their employers access to important supplies of labour, in a period of rapid economic expansion.

A very large proportion of the migrant workers who crossed the Zambezi and entered Southern Rhodesia did so with the definite intention of making their way to South Africa. Once in Southern Rhodesia these migrants took out passes to seek work in areas as far south as possible, deserting their employers at a favourable opportunity to continue their journey southwards, until they arrived at the porous borders of the colony where they made use of numerous routes to evade the police patrols and cross into the Union or Bechuanaland. Some of these migrants enjoyed a relatively smooth passage across the borders by obtaining passes to enter the Union from friends and relatives already working there, thus enabling them legally to board a train or lorry service to cross the border. The wartime censorship of African mail helps to confirm "the existence of widespread attempts by natives to obtain any kind of Transvaal native pass to leave the colony". [2]

The time that was spent by northern migrants journeying to the southern border of the colony was much reduced in 1938 when the government introduced a free lorry service for transporting migrants from the Zambezi to Umtali and Mtoko. Before the introduction of this service, which became a source of bitter complaints by some employers, intending clandestine migrants, having walked through the Zambezi valley, arrived in the colony "so tired and debilitated" that they had to "work for two or three months in Southern Rhodesia to get in condition for proceeding ... to the Union, and possibly to find money to travel otherwise than on foot to the border". [3] By making use of the lorry service migrants arrived in Southern Rhodesia in much better health, and once they possessed the necessary funds they could make their way rapidly to the border. The speed with which some of them arrived in the border areas was one of the points noted by a police officer in Kezi when he enlightened his superiors on some of the strategies employed by clandestine migrants:

The majority of natives arrested have been found to have new Registration Certificates issued at some port of entry, such as Umtali or Mtoko, and usually have been in the Colony only a week or so. This points to the fact that when the native entered the Colony he had no intention of seeking employment but was merely en route to the Union of South Africa. Such natives have, for the most part, been transported from their country of origin at the expense of the Southern Rhodesian Government. Letters have been found on these natives from friends in the Union of South Africa giving full particulars of the route to be taken, situation of Police Stations and such like places to be avoided in order to get through. They usually have considerable sums of money on them for the journey. When questioned as to their destination the

answer invariably is the Antelope or Legion Mines; it is significant that natives, only in the Colony a few days, know of these mines, situated on the border; had they required mining work in the Colony they could easily have obtained employment at the numerous mines in the Colony passed on their journey to this, the most southerly, portion of the Colony. [4]

Many of the migrants from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia intending to travel to South Africa made their way to Bulawayo whence they used a variety of routes to travel further south. In July 1939 the Assistant Superintendent of Police at Bulawayo claimed there were two main routes that were used by migrants from Bulawayo: by rail to Gwanda or West Nicholson, thence to Beitbridge by Railway Lorry Service; or by privately owned motor service from Bulawayo via Matobo and Kezi to the Antelope and Legion mines, the latter being some 18 miles from the Bechuanaland border. [5] In one of its numerous attempts to curb the movement of clandestine labour the government, in 1940, issued orders prohibiting Native Commissioners and the Police at Gwanda and West Nicholson from issuing "passes to seek work" to Africans wishing to travel to Beitbridge. It was soon discovered, however, that Africans were switching to other areas, such as Fort Victoria, in order to obtain passes to travel to Beitbridge. [6] Those who could not obtain passes to seek work in the Beitbridge area could still make the journey southwards with one of the African or Indian-owned lorry services that operated on the fringes of the law; others who could not afford this luxury were forced to travel on foot.

For those migrants who travelled to the Legion mine, the journey south was continued on foot. [7] They entered Bechuanaland along its north-eastern border, travelling through the sparsely populated area between the Shashi and Limpopo rivers, then across the Limpopo into the Transvaal. [8] The routes through Bechuanaland were also popular with indigenous Africans. In the middle of 1942, it was estimated that between 50 and 100 such migrants were entering Bechuanaland each day, an exodus that was "much in excess of the normally observed flow". [9] The exodus was undoubtedly encouraged by the need to escape wartime compulsory labour. This was first introduced in 1940 for construction work on the Empire Air Training Scheme and was extended in August 1942 to incorporate agrarian labour. [10] Some of these migrants crossed the border with the hope of being recruited by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) which had offices at Bobonong's Kraal, some 60 miles from the Southern Rhodesia border. The WNLA was not allowed to recruit Africans from Southern Rhodesia, but the migrants circumvented this regulation by giving a false name and other information in order to pay for a one-year tax in the Protectorate to obtain a tax receipt purporting to be that of an African from Bechuanaland. [11]

The routes from Bulawayo were by no means the only ones that were used by clandestine migrants, nor were Africans from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia the only ones to take advantage of Southern Rhodesia as a stepping-stone to the Union. A systematic survey of clandestine migration conducted by the BSA Police in 1944 provided a detailed account of several routes along which migrants travelled to the Union and the territories/areas from which they originated. Between 25 August 1944 and 20 December 1944, a police contingent travelled a total of 4,041 miles through the whole of the southern portion of the colony; and to border areas in the Transvaal, Mozambique and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. They patrolled all the main routes used by migrants; checked the rail and lorry services; visited a number of mines, farms, stores, and twenty police stations at which they made notes from records; and interviewed ANCs and NCs at twelve Native Departments and officials in the Transvaal. At the end of this exercise, it was estimated that a total of 33,500 clandestine migrants had travelled through Southern Rhodesia to the Union in 1944; 40 per cent of this figure came from Mozambique, 30 per cent from Nyasaland, 10 per cent from Northern Rhodesia and 20 per cent from Southern Rhodesia. [12]

The majority of the migrants from Mozambique travelled to the Union via routes 2(c), 3 and 4 as shown on the map. The tight security around the Kruger National Park prevented

migrants from entering the Union direct from Mozambique; they therefore had to chart routes through Southern Rhodesia in order to enter South Africa. In most cases these migrants entered the colony at Beacon 106 in South Chipinga, avoiding registration in Southern Rhodesia on entry. They then cut across the south-eastern portion of Chipinga, Zaka, Nuanetsi and Beitbridge areas, from where they entered the Union and were taken by Transvaal recruiters to Messina or Louis Trichardt for employment. Migrants from the northern parts of Mozambique often registered on entry into Southern Rhodesia and then travelled along routes similar to those used by Nyasas (esp 3b). Clandestine migrants from Nyasaland usually registered at Umtali or Mtoko; some then travelled via route 3(b) but the majority went via routes Nos. 1 and 2 and generally did not enter employment; sometimes they worked in the colony for short periods and "in some instances they pretend[ed] to offer themselves for employment for convenience and abscond[ed] without actually commencing work".

Northern Rhodesian migrants were generally found on routes 1 and 2 (a) and (b). Clandestine migrants from Southern Rhodesia, 20,697 of whom were in regular employment in the Union in 1943, were found to be the ones most difficult to detect; they were "very rarely seen by patrols except perhaps in the Plumtree area where Mashonas can be identified as migrants". [13] Indigenous Africans did not require a pass for movements within the colony, except in the case of those wishing to enter the towns; this meant, as the Police frequently stated, that they could easily wander about the border area without being arrested since no offence was committed until they were actually caught trying to cross the border. [14]

Most of the clandestine migrants who evaded employers and border patrols to enter the Union of South Africa intended to make their way to Johannesburg or some other major industrial centre. Partly because of pass law regulations, the majority of these migrants found themselves having to work for short periods with Transvaal farmers before obtaining passes to seek work in the industrial centres. There was no difficulty in finding employment with farmers in the Transvaal, where wages were on average three times higher than in Southern Rhodesia. On the contrary, migrants experienced more difficulties trying to avoid farm labour in the Transvaal. Expansion in the gold mining and secondary industry in South Africa in the later 1930s created in its wake an expanded demand for African labour. This was partly satisfied by a flow of workers from the rural areas to the cities, which in turn resulted in a "serious shortage of farm labour in Transvaal, Free State and Natal". [15] To counter the drain on their labour supply, farmers in the Transvaal began to look more to the north, to the thousands of migrants who wished to gain access to the relatively higher wage economy of South Africa. On crossing the border into the Union clandestine migrants found themselves in a territory swarming with recruiting agents and their African runners, who spoke "every language and dialect in Rhodesia and Nyasaland". Since most of these workers entered the country without passports and permits to seek work - avoiding the South African immigration authorities at Beitbridge - they were placed at the mercy of the recruiters, who, for most of the period, were operating in an area where recruiting was meant to be banned. [16] The majority of the recruiters congregated around the Messina area. An example of the methods they employed was given by the Governor of Nyasaland:

...the Northern native is allowed to look for employment in certain areas of the Union upon taking out a 5/- permit. The Permit Office is at Messina, 9 miles from the Beit Bridge over the Limpopo. The gap is filled with labour touts and farmers' agents, who collar the wretched Northern native under the threat of handing him over to the Immigration authorities for punishment for being without a permit. Yet the Union Government will not move the Permit Office to the Beit Bridge for the reason, I suspect, that this would antagonise the farmers of the Northern Transvaal. [17]

Those migrants who were rounded up by the recruiters were forced to put their marks to contracts with Transvaal farmers, the contents of which many did not understand. On the farms the migrants worked under "near-slavery" conditions, some of which were made public in the post-war years. The Bethel area of the Transvaal, where 90 per cent of the work-force were clandestine migrants, gained notoriety for its oppressive conditions of employment. In 1947 the Johannesburg *Sunday Times* wrote of "the well-substantiated reports of natives labouring under the crack of the sjambok" in the area, and of one African who was sjamboked to death on a farm. [18] Knowledgeable Africans did their utmost to avoid the recruiters. This was quite hazardous, even fatal at times, as was noted by one Labour Officer when commenting on a recruiting expedition that took place in April 1945:

An European in charge of a lorry load of recruiters observed a native who obviously was trying to hide in the bush. The European instructed his Induna to chase the native and 'bring him in'. The latter was out-paced and felled with a knobkerrie. The two-inch scalp wound resulting from this attack was treated by a Messina doctor daily for a week before the native, then very ill, was admitted to the hospital as an in-patient. Two days later he died of tetanus. Subsequently the Induna, one Petrus Maraba, was arrested and brought to trial. Pleading guilty to, I believe, a charge of assault he was given a suspended sentence of two years. The accused thereafter left the Court a free man. [19]

How best to put a stop to, or limit, the flow of clandestine migrants to the Union of South Africa, was a question that severely taxed the imagination of settlers and the resources of the settler state for several decades. The intensity with which this problem was tackled was closely related to the varying perceptions of the "labour shortage". Thus one finds that during the Depression the police were prepared to turn a blind eye to clandestine migration and refused to press earlier demands for South Africa to repatriate illegal migrants from Southern Rhodesia whom they arrested. [20] With the recovery from the Depression, however, and the expansion of economic activity during the war, employer organizations - especially those representing farmers and miners - waged a ceaseless campaign for the state to intervene and stem this movement. In most instances, it was the BSA Police who were asked to solve the problem by enforcing more patrols of the border areas. But such measures, when implemented, had a minimal impact. The explanation for this given by the Head of the CID in Mashonaland was typical of the response of Police Officers who were urged to be more vigilant in their border patrols: "Our Southern and South Western borders are more than 400 miles in extent and for the greater part of the year can be crossed with ease at any place. It is an impossible task for the BSAP to cover this distance by day and by night ..." [21] The government entertained the idea of declaring the entire area within twenty miles of the southern borders of the colony a "native free zone", a most impracticable solution that was never put into effect. [22] In 1939 they decided to prohibit migrants from being issued with passes to enter, visit, or seek work in border districts. But there was no noticeable change; Africans simply developed more devious routes for entering the Union.

The patrols also discovered that arresting migrants who were found attempting to make an illegal exit from Southern Rhodesia was not a simple task. Such was the determination of African workers to sell their labour in the best market possible that they violently resisted being arrested by the police, especially if they were travelling in large groups. The attacks on African police and messengers who stopped northern migrants on their way to the border and asked them to produce passes became so frequent that local officials and the police had to order African staff to "refrain from questioning aliens re passes, etc unless they are in a position to obtain aid from the indigenous population". The Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) recommended in February 1940 that additional police staff be drafted to the Gwanda District, including Beitbridge, to help enforce the law [23]; but this measure, if adopted, was not an adequate deterrent to the clandestine migrants as three years later the BSA Police were still filing reports on Africans who successfully crossed the Beit bridge after assaulting

members of the force. [24]

The Police, who grew weary of insinuations of incompetence, repeatedly warned that "the solution lies - not in repressive legislation which anyway cannot be enforced - but in raising the standard of pay and conditions of service to those obtaining in the Union". [25] Yet employers and state officials continued to look to the power of the state to effect greater control over clandestine migration. Another area in which it was felt that the state could be more vigilant in controlling the exodus of migrants was in the sphere of labour recruiting. Several employers were convinced that the flow of labour to the south was being assisted by illegal recruiting agents who were operating in the colony on behalf of South African employers. Once again the BSA Police were forced to respond to this complaint: this time by using African undercover agents, known as "traps", to detect any illicit recruiting of Africans for employment in the Union by pretending to be intending migrants to the Union. "Trapping", as the method of investigation was called, was authorized in the early months of 1939 [26], but its implementation revealed no significant illegal recruiting for the Union. According to the CNC, African touts were probably at work on mines and in towns, "but dealing with the problem in the aggregate, recruitment [was] a minor factor". [27]

There is much evidence, then, to support the view that the Rhodesian state was powerless to introduce measures effectively to control the flow of clandestine labour from its territory to the Union of South Africa. The plain truth about clandestine migration, which was duly acknowledged by the Secretary for Native Affairs, was that "without the co-operation of the Union authorities, nothing short of the counter-part of a land 'Atlantic Wall' [was] likely to help the situation". [28] Not having the resources for constructing such a "Wall", the government devoted a good deal of effort to securing an agreement with the Union Government over measures to stop or limit the flow of clandestine migrants. They were supported in these efforts by the northern governments who, at the behest of the Colonial Office, were showing greater interest in the adverse effects of migration on their rural communities. Officials in the north also realized that a more organized system of recruitment could yield more revenue for the state.

Southern Rhodesian officials took every opportunity at international meetings on migrant labour to register their demand for the Union government to exercise greater control over the inflow of clandestine labour. The existence of clandestine migration was one of the reasons advanced by the Rhodesians for opposing increases in the number of labourers that the WNLA was allowed to recruit in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. They insisted that such quotas should not be increased while the Union authorities turned a blind eye to clandestine migration. Furthermore, they believed that allowing the WNLA to extend its activities in the northern territories only created more scope for the organization's recruiting propaganda encouraging more Africans to migrate illegally to South Africa. These arguments were put before Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary, in London in July 1939 when the Prime Minister, Godfrey Huggins, spoke of a recruitment "racket" through which Africans were enticed across the Limpopo. The only possible means of controlling clandestine migration, he said, was by the Union adopting a passport control system, but the government were failing to act for political reasons: they were fearful of losing the support of the back veld farmers who could face acute labour shortage if the system was introduced. [29] The Colonial Office's labour adviser, Major Orde Browne, who was present at the meeting between Huggins and MacDonald, later added his support for the Prime Minister's perception of the political constraints faced by the Union government:

Mr Huggins pressed for the maintenance of some sort of pass system in the Union, and said with truth that this could easily be introduced. There is however little hope of any such measure being adopted, since the farmers rely largely on the influx of ignorant and helpless Northern natives, to keep their labour supply, the kaffir being increasingly difficult to coerce. The farmer's vote is probably quite strong enough to dictate the

Government's policy, since the Chamber of Mines is politically poorly represented, though financially strong. [30]

Despite the known political strength of agrarian capital in the Union, the Rhodesians and their northern neighbours pressed ahead with negotiations over the control of clandestine migration. In August 1939, a recommendation was made by the three central African territories for a joint approach to be made to the Union government on the introduction of a passport system for northern labour. [31] When preparing their case for presentation to the Union, the Southern Rhodesian government was advised by Charles Bullock, the CNC, to highlight the problem of disrespect for law and order displayed by clandestine migrants. [32] The thought of insubordinate Africans must have struck a chord with Smuts, who agreed to a meeting in Johannesburg with his northern neighbours. [33] The meeting never materialized [34], becoming one of a series of missed appointments on the subject of clandestine migration. Orde Browne was not surprised as "General Smuts always tactfully ignored negotiations" on the subject. [35]

The introduction of compulsory labour during the war and the difficulties of effecting wartime discussions on the subject would have been contributory factors to a waning of interest in negotiations with the Union during the war years. Once the war was over, compulsory labour withdrawn and the pre-war "labour shortage" re-emerged, the need to establish an agreement with the Union returned to the top of the agenda of labour issues. In making recommendations aimed at resolving the post-war shortage of labour, A J Huxtable, the Commissioner of Native Labour, warned that far too much attention had been paid to acquiring labour from the north as opposed to controlling and regulating the flow to the South. "It is almost useless to tap new sources of supplies when the migration to the South continues", he advised; and, unless some labour agreement was negotiated with the Union, "the very future of the Colony will receive a severe check". If only they could save around 10,000 from those migrating to the south, the colony's labour problems would be solved, wrote Huxtable. [36] His concern over the exodus of clandestine migrants was echoed at the meetings of the Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission, where he acted as chairman. Claiming that clandestine migration was "seriously jeopardizing the development of [the] Colony", the Commission asked the government to approach the Central African Council (CAC) with the request for a joint approach to the Union by the Central African territories for the implementation of some means of controlling migration, possibly by means of a quota, which could be organized through a control organization in co-operation with the three territories. [37]

The three Central African territories continued to find common cause in pursuing a Migrant Labour Agreement with the Union government. Following a suggestion by the CAC, a joint delegation led by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, the Acting Governor of Nyasaland and the Governor of Northern Rhodesia met with Field-Marshal Smuts and other Union representatives in Pretoria, in August 1947, for discussions on the possibility of the Union becoming a party to the Central African Migrant Labour Agreement. In his opening speech to the conference Smuts "fully endorsed" the proposals by the northern governments on the control and care of migrant labour. He said that although they welcomed the labour, especially the Transvaal farmers, they would like to have arrangements with the Central African territories in order to avoid having an "uncontrolled mob" in the Union, an occurrence that caused great difficulties during the Depression. [38] The Secretary for the CAC "felt that, if one could have presented the Central African Agreement and suggested that another set of initials would look very pretty on it, [Smuts] might have signed, there and then"; but they "soon found that his advisers were rather tougher in negotiations". [39] They were "more obsessed by the difficulties than the attractiveness of comprehensive arrangements for regulation of the flow to and from the Union". [40] A follow-up meeting was held with the Union representatives in Salisbury in December, but this only helped to confirm that the Union government was still constrained by the political power of agrarian capital. As at the Pretoria meeting, the Union representatives were not willing to give any undertaking to reject clandestine migrants. The most they were prepared to recommend to

their government was a reduction of such immigrants' authorized period of stay in the Union to nine months. The request for legislative action to enforce arrangements such as deferred pay and repatriation was ruled out of the question by the representatives, especially with a general election around the corner. [41]

The Nationalist government which emerged in South Africa in 1948 was in no haste to enter negotiations on the control of clandestine migration. The CAC reported in February 1950 that after the elections "repeated pressure" was brought to bear on the Malan government for discussions, but "with no concrete result up till now". [42] At a conference in Salisbury in October 1950 representatives of the Central African territories and the Union of South Africa agreed to recommend to their government proposals for a migrant labour agreement. These included the acceptance by the Central African governments of an undertaking to issue identity certificates valid for two years to adult male Africans applying to go to South Africa, with the caveat that each government could take steps to ensure that "sufficient adult able bodied male Africans" were kept within its borders "to meet its own economic requirements and to maintain its social structure". There was to be no recruiting in the Central African territories on behalf of the Union except by approved organizations; the Union government was to discontinue the issuing of permits to clandestine migrants from an agreed date; and they were to establish transit depots at or near these borders for transporting legal migrants who, they were to ensure, were engaged on satisfactory conditions. [43]

The Rhodesian officials would have been naive to think that there was any possibility of the Malan government agreeing to such terms. In May 1951 the CAC was informed that "the recommendations ... cast considerable obligation on the Union Government without the granting of commensurate concessions by the Central African Territories". [44] One year later the Union government's rejection of the Central African proposals on migrant labour was made in much stronger terms. The government regretted that it could not give an undertaking "effectively to prevent the employment of clandestine migrants, because such an undertaking cannot be carried out". "If however", the message continued, "would-be clandestine immigrants were prevented by the governments of their territories of origin from coming to the Union, there would be no need for such an undertaking." As the Union government saw it, the control of clandestine migration was the responsibility of the Central African governments. Implicit in the latter's request for the prohibition of the employment of clandestine migrants, argued the Union, was the suggestion that they be repatriated or be permitted to starve, but repatriation was "exceedingly expensive" and starvation could not be "seriously contemplated". For the Union government, "the only feasible method of reducing clandestine immigration" was by increasing the opportunities for Africans to migrate legally to places of employment in the Union. Such a system existed with regard to the gold-mining industry but the imposition of restrictions prevented many Africans from making use of it, argued the South Africans, who saw increased quotas for the Rand as one way of stemming the flow of clandestine migrants. [45]


The Rhodesian opinion on increased quotas for the Rand as a means of decreasing clandestine migration was already on record. Increasing quotas without an appreciable contribution towards alleviating the problem of clandestine migration were only going to increase the total number of Africans migrating to the Union. Faced with the cynical proposals of the Union government, the Central African territories could do no more than plead with them to be less intransigent. In the meantime, undercapitalized Rhodesian employers without the resources to compete with their counterparts further South had to continue to contend with the ingenuity and resourcefulness of those African workers who sought to sell their labour in the best market possible.

Notes

- 1 C Van Onselen, *Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1930-1933* (London, 1976), pp 227-37.
- 2 S1226, Minute by Asst Comm, CID, Bulawayo, 20 June 1942. (Except where otherwise indicated, all references are to material kept in the National Archives of Zimbabwe.)
- 3 S482/224/39/Dec 1938 - March 1940, Secretary for Native Affairs to Minister of Native Affairs, 3/7/39.
- 4 S1226, NCO i/c, BSA Police, Kezi to Asst Commissioner, BSA Police, Bulawayo, 10 July 1942.
- 5 S1226, Lieut W H D Walker, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Bulawayo - South, to the Chief Superintendent, BSA Police, Bulawayo, 24 July 1939.
- 6 S482/224/39/April 1940 - 3/10/41, Skillcorn to Guest, 28 March 1940.
- 7 That a large number of these migrants arrived at the Legion mine with no intention of finding employment there was made clear by the manager. In the middle of 1939 his mine was operating at 50% under strength but only a few of the estimated 100 workers who arrived each week - conveyed from Bulawayo by two Indian and one African transport contractors with seven lorries - were prepared to accept employment, and they worked "only for short periods before taking their discharge". S1226, Chief Superintendent, CID, to Staff Officer, BSA Police, Salisbury, 15 June 1939.
- 8 S1226, Deputy Commandant, BP Police, Mafeking, to Asst Comm, CID, BSA Police Bulawayo, 1 July 1942.
- 9 S1226, Asst Comm, CID Bulawayo, Minute, 20 June 1942.
- 10 See D Johnson, "The Impact of the Second World War on Southern Rhodesia with Special Reference to African Labour", PhD thesis, SOAS, 1989, ch 5.
- 11 S1226, "Report by Native Detective, Musimane", 27 October 1939; "Report of 9299 Native Detective Musimane", CID Bulawayo, 17 June 1942.
- 12 S482/509/39, "Clandestine Migration of Natives to the Union": General Summary, Sub Insp Robotham, 5/1/45; Eastern Border: Summary, Sub Insp Robotham, 3 January 1945. The number of Northern labourers clandestinely migrating to the Union showed no sign of diminishing in the later 1940s. In 1946 there were an estimated 3,000 clandestine migrants per month entering the Union, and at the beginning of 1950 the Northern clandestine population in South Africa was reckoned to consist of 35,000 from Nyasaland, 25,000 from Southern Rhodesia and 5,500 from Northern Rhodesia. F137/186 C/first file, "Extract from the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia Labour Officer's report for Johannesburg for July, 1946"; F137/Vol VI, Secretary for Native Affairs, South Africa, to Secretary for Native Affairs, Southern Rhodesia, 13 January 1950.

- 13 S482/509/39, "Clandestine Migration of Natives to the Union": General Summary, Sub Insp Robotham, 5 January 1945; Eastern Border: Summary, Sub Insp Robotham, 3 January 1945.
- 14 S482/52/44, Memorandum by Secretary for Native Affairs, 13 April 1944.
- 15 S1226, Chief Supt, BSA Police, Bulawayo District, to Staff Officer, BSA Police, 11 October 1937.
- 16 *Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, 13 July 1947, in F137, 186c/Second file.
- 17 PRO, D035/831/R17/179, Mackenzie-Kennedy to Beckett, 18 February 1942.
- 18 PRO, D035/3717/R250/1, Extracts from *Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, 29 July 1947.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 S1226, CNC to The Commissioner, BSA Police, 17 March 1934.
- 21 S1226, "Notes on Migrant Labour" by Provincial Criminal Investigation Officer, Mashonaland, 5 October 1950.
- 22 PRO, DO 35/830/R17/161, Minutes of International Conference, 6 & 7 March 1940.
- 23 S482/509/39, Secretary for Native Affairs to Secretary to the Prime Minister (Native Affairs), 21 February 1940.
- 24 S1 226, Extract from "Monthly Intelligence Summary: Bulawayo District", March 1943. Arrests and prosecutions, when successful, were also insufficient deterrents to clandestine migrants. The usual practice was for the migrant to pay the fine and/or serve the term of imprisonment then proceed with the journey South at the earliest possible opportunity.
- 25 S1226, "Notes on Migrant Labour" by Provincial Criminal Investigation Officer, Mashonaland, 5 October 1950.
- 26 S1226, "Native Labour", circular letter to all CID Stations, 28 February 1939.
- 27 S482/224/39/Dec 1938 - March 1940, Secretary for Native Affairs to the Minister of Native Affairs, 3/7/39. Trapping helped to uncover a "racket" operated by white guards on South Africa Railways. For fees ranging from 30s to £3 they smuggled migrants across the Bechuanaland border in their cabooses. S1226, Investigation Diary of Det Sgt Leaver, Entry 24 March 1944.
- 28 *Ibid.*, Memorandum by Secretary for Native Affairs, 13 April 1944.
- 29 PRO, D035/830/R17/140, Minutes of meeting between MacDonald and Huggins on Migrant Labour in South Central Africa, London, 25 July 1939. See also comments to minutes submitted by S M Lanigan, O'Keefe, on 17 August 1939.
- 30 PRO, D035/830/R17/140, Memo on the position of migrant labour in the Rhodesias and the Union of South Africa by G St J. Orde Browne, n.d.
- 31 PRO, D035/830/R17/156, Minutes, 22 August 1939.
- 32 PRO, D035/830/R17/161, S1215/1087/6, Proceedings of International Conference, 6 & 7 March 1940.

- 33 PRO, D035/830/R17/161, Smuts to Stanley, 28 March 1940.
- 34 PRO, D035/830/R17/172/, Cranborne to Harlech, 21 November 1941.
- 35 PRO, D035/830/R17/172, Minutes, Orde-Browne, 11 November 19/41.
- 36 S4821224/39 (Oct 41 -), Commissioner of Native Labour to CNC, 26 August 1946.
- 37 S482/20B/46, RNLSC: Minutes of Second Meeting, 18 November 1946.
- 38 F137/186c (Second File), "Notes of Conference ...", Pretoria, 12 August 1947.
- 39 F141/Vol III/Part 1, Verbatim Record of Sixth meeting of CAC, 19 and 20 December, 1947.
- 40 F137/186c (Second file), CAC Memorandum No. 38/47, 15 August 1947.
- 41 F141/Vol III/Part 3, CAC Memorandum No.57/47, 8 December 1947.
- 42 F141/Vol. VI, CAC Memorandum No 6/50, 21 January 1950.
- 43 *Ibid.*, CAC Memorandum No. 10/50 and enclosures.
- 44 F137/86E, High Commissioner for South Africa to Chief Secretary, CAC Salisbury; 12 May 1951.
- 45 F137/86E, High Commissioner to Chief Secretary, CAC, 16 May 1952.



LEGEND
 RAILWAYS - - - - -
 BORDERS ————

**CLANDESTINE LABOUR
 ROUTES TO SOUTH AFRICA**

NOT TO SCALE

SOURCE: Reproduced from S482/509/30,
 "Migration of Natives to Union:
 Map", BSA Police Border
 Patrols, 1944.