British policy towards South Africa between the wars has been a matter of some historical debate. While those of the revisionist school have chosen to emphasise the capacity of South African power to be exerted northwards in search of new markets and spheres of informal influence, the school of British imperial historiography has focussed upon the comparative failure of formal political annexation and the resilience of the doctrine of trusteeship. Both schools have tended to assume a certain cleavage between political and economic interests. For the revisionists, the failure of the political claims that were periodically made in the years after Union in 1910 for the incorporation of the High Commission territories of Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho was comparatively marginal in comparison to the success of South African industrialists and mining capitalists to exert a hegemonic influence on the southern African sub-region [1]. Likewise, for Ronald Hyam, the most crucial factor was not so much British economic interests in the region dictating policy as a political fear and dislike of Afrikaner nationalist power in South Africa which, in the years after the election of the Pact government of 1924, led to continual resistance to South African claims for the BLS territories on the grounds of the doctrine of indefinite delay and the unripe time. [2]

Certain crucial features within both British and South African policy, however, have been rather neglected in this historiographical discussion. The revisionists, surprisingly, have tended to overlook the political aspects of South African state policy towards the sub-region, though a model of an expansionist, conquest state rooted in a Milnerite and technocratic ideology has been outlined for the period before Union. [3] Hyam's focus upon the resistance by British policy-makers of South African claims for the BLS territories, on the other hand, is based upon a rather ahistorical depiction of the trusteeship doctrine, despite recent research which has tended to cast doubt upon the idea that, even by the late 1930s, it was premised upon the eventual withdrawal of the imperial power in favour of a Whiggish process of decolonisation. [4] As Kenneth Robinson pointed out as long ago as 1965, trusteeship in essence was in general reduced to only a very modest aim in British imperial policy, dictated by the limits of strategic preoccupations, economic pressures and “the reluctance to surrender power from which they were by means exempt, even if temperament and experience combined to give them a flexibility not often displayed by imperial rulers”. [5]

These factors prompt the consideration that historical analysis needs to focus less upon economic pressures divorced from state interest, or on a diplomatic record studied in a relative economic and political vacuum. The focus needs, indeed, to be more on the process of inter-state relations studied at a number of levels and goaded on by considerations of political statecraft. In the case of British-South African relations a Eurocentric model of diplomatic contacts cannot be simplistically applied, despite the pretensions of J C Smuts to play a strong role on the international and Commonwealth stage. It is true that a separate foreign policy arm of government began to be established in Pretoria with the Department of External Affairs in 1927, and throughout the 1930s South Africa maintained an independent presence at the League of Nations at Geneva. [6] However, in many respects, South Africa in the inter-war years was still a white minority post-colonial state seeking to legitimate itself in the international order and grateful, for the most part, for the protective umbrella of the Commonwealth during a period when it was entrenching a policy of territorial segregation domestically. As more recent research on post-colonial “third world” states suggests, internal ethnic cleavages invite the continual threat of external intervention and the first consideration of such states is to seek greater political security through regional diplomatic
blocs. [7] For South Africa during this period the Commonwealth was clearly such a bloc, and Afrikaner nationalist isolationism, as espoused in the 1930s by Afrikaner nationalist politicians such as Eric Louw and D F Malan, was unlike its American counterpart in that it had no “open door” to fall back on and could only rest on an inward parochialism that disturbed a number of industrialists faced with the prospect of mounting tariff barriers to the export of South African goods. [8]

Moreover, a prominent section of the South African political establishment was becoming attuned by the middle to late 1920s with the growing international unpopularity of ideologies of racial segregationism. It was clear that in informed British political circles there was some doubt as to whether the white rule in South Africa could survive. The Dean of St Paul's, W R Inge, for example, did not consider in 1921 that South Africa could ever be a “white man’s country” like Canada and New Zealand, while in 1926 one speaker at the Royal Colonial Institute thought that the white population would eventually be so outnumbered by the country's black inhabitants that it would be forced to retreat to the coastal towns. [9] Such pessimism in conservative British circles indicated that the successive attempts of South African politicians since Union to employ segregationist ideology as a means of legitimating the future of “white South Africa” had by no means been entirely successful even in potentially friendly circles in Britain.

The response from some segregationists in South Africa was to try and link domestic “native policy” with British colonial policy to the north. P A Silburn, for example, suggested a Commission of both British and South African representatives to outline a segregationist programme for the entire southern African region. To fail to initiate such a programme, he warned, would mean that South Africa's “racial future” would be like that of Mexico, Brazil and Haiti. [10]

Such schemes had little chance of influencing British colonial policy for the region, however, once attention began to be concentrated after 1927 on attempting to initiate some development in the High Commission Territories. L S Amery at the Dominion Office sought to link such development with white settlement in order to increase their “British” nature before any possible inclusion in the Union. [11] However, this policy did not appear to rule out the possibility of joint collaboration between the High Commission Territories, Southern Rhodesia and the Union and it was only opposition from within the DO which prevented further action on this front. The four Bills of J B M Hertzog in 1926, tabled in the South African House of Assembly, provided, among other things, for the eventual removal of the African voters in the Cape from the common roll. This undermining of the tradition of Cape liberalism, together with the controversy over the new South African flag, appeared sufficient grounds to some civil servants to avoid too close an entanglement with the Union's politics. Association with South African “native policy” would be at least “premature”, B E H Clifford minuted to Amery in 1928, and “one must face facts and one very obvious fact is that the coloured and native community trust the policy of HMG towards them but are suspicious of the interests of the present government”. [12]

In such a situation, a more aggressive ideological offensive began to be mounted by some sections of the South African governing class in the late 1920s in order to try and transform British imperial thinking towards the Southern African region and foster a more ambitious policy of white settlement. Chief among these was J C Smuts, out of power since 1924, and looking increasingly less likely even to some of his strongest supporters, such as B K Long, editor of The Cape Times, to regain it. [13] But Smuts's connections with the Rhodes Trust and Round Table Lobby proved to be significant in the emerging debate on British imperial policy accompanying the passage of the 1929 Colonial Development Act. They were, indeed, to exert some influence in transforming British views of South Africa as the imperial position came to seem more threatened with the rise of German and Japanese competition.
The Attack on Trusteeship and “Paramountcy”

Smuts’s decision to mount an offensive against the trusteeship doctrine underpinning British colonial policy in Central and East Africa was partly stimulated by clear signals, following Amery’s visit to South Africa in 1927, that British thinking was beginning to move towards a large bloc of Central and East African territories geared to an anti-Union counterpoise. [14] Smuts sought, in part, to try and pre-empt such a course by seeking to link it to an even wider grand design which would stretch from the Union all the way to Nairobi and even beyond.

A receptive audience was to be found in the Rhodes Trust-Round Table circle, some of whose members, such as Lionel Curtis, had regretted in 1923 that Southern Rhodesia had voted to stay out of the Union. [15] In the early 1920s the main link for the Round Table with South Africa had been via Abe Bailey, who had paid the election expenses for Edward Grigg to be elected as MP for Oldham on a platform as a pro-Lloyd George Liberal. This link ended when Bailey had stopped his support with the election of the Pact in South Africa in 1924 and had started trying to act as an intermediary figure with Hertzog. In 1925 Grigg was appointed, too, by Amery as governor of Kenya, and the Round Table began to look for alternative loci of political influence.

In the wake of the 1926 imperial conference with the Balfour formula, it seemed to a number of Round Tablers that the dominion issue had been solved for the moment and the Hertzogites in South Africa silenced. Two important questions appeared to be looming for future Commonwealth policy: that of relations with the United States, where Canada would probably play an intermediary role, and the general issue of race relations, in which South Africa was expected to have a pivotal position. In some respects, the latter seemed the easier to tackle, given the strength of US isolationism, and it was by no means clear that Hertzog’s four bills would ever reach the statute book. [16] The issue seemed especially well disposed to being resolved through education and, with the prospect of Rhodes House being opened in Oxford the following year, the Round Table could possibly perform an important political function on this front. It could underline the ideal of the Commonwealth as a distinct cultural unity which was, Fred Clarke wrote to Reginald Coupland, a “really solid thing” (17).

Thus Smuts found a receptive audience when he urged the creation of a wider bloc of white settlement, for there was the “danger in want of vision and too keen a preoccupation with the immediate difficulties, instead of looking ahead and trying to catch the greater vision of future development”. The scheme, however, implied a counter attack against the critics of British colonial policy like Sydney Olivier, Norman Leys and McGregor Ross, for, Smuts claimed, there would be land enough for both black and white and “I am afraid that with the somewhat negrophilist temper which is about today, due regard will not be given to the larger points of view and to the necessity of keeping the widest door possible open to the future white settlement over all the highlands of South Africa”. [18]

Such sentiments underlined Smuts’s lectures at Oxford in 1929, which were published in 1930 as Africa and Some World Problems . [19] The proposals for a massive scheme of effective biological and social engineering in Central and East Africa to create a new white African race were, however, considerably out of tune with establishment opinion in Britain in the wake of the 1929 Wall Street Crash and defeat of the Conservative government of which Amery had been a member. [20] Even before the election it had been doubtful whether Stanley Baldwin, the Tory leader, would have reappointed Amery to the Colonial Office, as the latter’s attempts to undermine the Devonshire doctrine of African paramountcy in East Africa had led to a considerable degree of political embarrassment. [21] The party’s powerful pro-India lobby, in particular, was critical of Amery’s continual pro-settler stand, and there was an emerging climate of opinion favourable to the idea of seeing tropical Africa as a source of raw materials and a growing market for British goods rather than for controversial and potentially troublesome schemes of white settlement. [22]
These arguments were skillfully employed in criticism of Smuts’s lectures by J H Oldham in *White and Black in Africa: A Critical Examination of the Rhodes Lectures of General Smuts* (1930) in which a more technocratic ideal was espoused, based upon capitalist industrialisation rather than the long-term project of creating a new white dominion. “The creative forces in the light of Africa at the present time”, Oldham wrote, “are not limited to white settlement. They proceed from the insistent demand of the rest of the world for the products of the tropics. The economic forces set in motion by this demand are operative, and are clearly revolutionary changes, in vast areas where European settlement is impossible. What is needed is a comprehensive policy which will envisage the process as a whole.” [23] Such arguments were geared to impressing mainstream “middle opinion” in British politics after a considerable period when the essentially moral critique of white settlement by the Leys, Olivier and McGregor Ross lobby had failed to make much headway even within the Labour Party (where they controlled the Advisory committee on Imperial Affairs), let alone with wider commercial and business opinion. [24]

Thus, it is by no means clear that the shift in informed British opinion against South African segregationist policy was as a result of the writings of Leonard Barnes, Sydney Olivier and Norman Leys, as Martin Chanock has suggested. [25] These writings fed into an emerging debate on the left in British politics, which would start to have a more significant political impact after World War Two, as well as into the more general debate on a “forward” policy in British colonial policy. [26] During the 1930s, however, British colonial policy still remained the preserve of a small coterie who were to a considerable degree insulated from domestic political pressure: it was quite possible for Colonial Secretaries to display a remarkable ignorance of their subject - such as Philip Cunliffe-Lister who was unaware in 1932 that Bechuanaland was not part of the Union. [27] There was no very strong public awareness of the issues nor a large fund of humanitarian conscience to be tapped on lines similar to the nineteenth-century anti-slavery impulse. Thus, while D D T Jabavu wrote hopefully in 1932 that “an urgent task before Christian men and women in Great Britain is the creation and enforcement of a Christian public opinion on all matters connected with White and Black in South Africa” [28], in practice enormous organisational and political difficulties confronted the anti-settler lobby in the bleak years of the National Government.

On the issue of forced labour in British colonial territories it was possible for the anti-imperial lobby, via organs like *The New Leader*, to make some headway, given the dislike of the Colonial Office for parliamentary difficulties from obstreperous Labour backbenchers. [29] But, on the more general question of opposing the drift in segregation policy in southern Africa, the lobby faced considerable difficulties throughout the 1930s, not least the fact that their allies in the region remained scattered and unable to unite in any common collective pressure group. [30] It also became clear as the decade progressed that potentially helpful opinion on the left was diverted into other issues concerning Japanese aggression in the Far East or the rise of fascism in Europe. The International African Service Bureau complained, when it came to the issue of South Africa’s renewed claims for the Protectorates, that these other issues “engage the attention of the British people to the exclusion of equally sinister tendencies within their Empire”. [31]

Thus British policy towards South Africa during the 1930s was dictated less by a response to the moral and ideological pressures from the small anti-imperial lobby than to the dictates of wider imperial strategy. While Smuts’s more general ideological offensive against trusteeship in its Devonshire form had generally been seen to fail, given its rather antiquated relapse back to an older, Victorian style of imperialism, his plea for a reconsideration of imperial policy in Africa did not fall on deaf ears. Over the following years a reassessment did take place on two notable levels. Firstly, it led to a discussion, accompanying Hailey’s *Survey of African Affairs*, on research into a more “scientific” African colonial policy in which the consideration of the ideological aspects of segregationism could, to a considerable degree, be downgraded. Secondly, it led to a reassessment of British defence arrangements with South Africa as British imperial security seemed increasingly threatened by Japanese naval power. In an atmosphere of mounting imperial crisis, the more hard-headed organs of
government policy in both the Foreign Office and the Dominions Office began to usurp the position of the Colonial Office, which had had a somewhat marginal presence in the region once the BLS territories passed to the DO in 1925. It was in this context that the more general Foreign Office tradition of appeasement came into play: a policy that was essentially positive in that it sought the rational resolution of disputes through admitting and attempting to satisfy grievances rather than resorting to armed conflict. This had been, as Paul Kennedy has shown, a basic principle behind British policy since the era of Palmerston and was not to be thrown into disrepute until Munich in 1938. [32]

The Hailey Survey and the Issue of the Protectorates

Despite growing attacks on South African policy by the left in Britain in the early 1930s as an example of a counter-revolutionary offensive of mining and agricultural capital, some liberals still considered it a terrain for a successful resolution of what was seen essentially as a racial conflict between black and white. [33] This became evident in the debate that ensued in the wake of Smuts's 1929 Oxford lectures on the idea of more co-ordinated research on African issues. An initial meeting on “The African Problem” took place at Church House on 21 September 1930, consisting of Philip Kerr, J H Oldham, D Ormsby-Gore and Sir Basil Blackett, with Baldwin in the chair. This led to a conference on Africa at Rhodes House on November 9th, where Smuts urged the creation of a school which would fulfil many of the ideas of Rhodes himself. [34] Curtis urged the continuation of a ruling race in Africa, for “it might indeed take three or four centuries under the white man before the black man has real civilisation”. [35] Oldham, despite his public criticism of Smuts's lectures, agreed with his “fundamental thesis” that the basic issues of African administration remained open and that there was a need for the analysing of race relations comparatively. In general, he took only a “modest view on the possibilities of negro development”, but on the issue of general political agitation it was the white settlers in Kenya who were making all the claims”. [36]

The line of discussion indicated that there were not such fundamental cleavages as might be imagined, and, when it came to the question of appointing someone to co-ordinate the proposal for a general survey of Africa, once again Smuts's indirect influence was apparent. Though the South African scholar W M Macmillan was undoubtedly well qualified, Curtis admitted to A M Carr Saunders, “had we given him the job we should have had at once hard against us the Union of South Africa and the settler element in East Africa”. [37] The decision to appoint the Indian administrator Malcolm Hailey had the advantage of securing someone ostensibly neutral in the ideological debate on African political and economic development. However, it enabled Smuts to secure a tactical retreat from his position of 1929 by calling, in Nairobi in August 1933, for the study of different African “native policies”, to determine “on a purely objective scientific basis, apart from party prejudices, what policy would be best in the interests of both white and black”. [38]

The Hailey Survey contained an intellectual momentum which carried it some way beyond its original formulation towards a preoccupation with the scientific side of African colonial development. [39] The response from the Colonial Office was initially sceptical, since the focus of the research challenged the Office's departmental pattern of organisation. Some officials considered the scheme ill thought out, and there was a fear in some quarters of the Office that it would lead to “interference” with the CO's work in Africa. [40] However, there was sufficient prestige behind the research effort to lead to a generally cautious approach based on the trust that Hailey would exercise “discretion and discrimination in using the material prepared for him”. [41]

Some in the Round Table, such as Lionel Curtis, probably saw Hailey’s Survey as contributing to the lobby's authority to pronounce on African issues, especially in the light of the renewal of the issue in 1933-34 of the transfer of the BLS territories. Curtis had been surprised, on returning from a visit to South Africa in 1933, at the strength of opposition to the transfer, though he considered it confined mostly to “religious circles and a very small
minority of intellectuals”. [42] In practice, many of those who were formally opposed to
the transfer were resigned to the idea at this time that the handover of the BLS territories to
the Union was more or less inevitable. [43] But, for Curtis, the issue confirmed his
longstanding view that the solution lay in South African political jurisdiction from the Cape
to the Zambesi. Another line of thinking within the work on the Survey, however, indicated
that less formal political linkages would suffice. At a meeting addressed by Sir Alan Pim in
June 1934 at Chatham House on the Protectorates issue, widespread support was given to the
idea of British imperial trusteeship in the region. Margery Perham, especially, pointed out
that there was a contradictory tension between humanitarianism and liberalism in British
policy which had waivered “all the more for lack of power or of will to control the restless
and complex situation”. [44] W M Macmillan added that Britain was guilty of the “sin of
omission” in that it had “deferred taking a firm line against illiberal tendencies against South
Africa”. [45]

In practice, Britain’s potential to influence the situation decisively at the local level started to
decline significantly in the years after South Africa abandoned the gold standard in
December 1932 and started to engineer a new mining boom. Some officials within the
British colonial administration in the BLS territories, such as Sir Charles Rey, the Resident
Commissioner in Bechuanaland, remained fervent advocates of a British-led counterpoise as
a means of at least neutralising if not smashing South African power. [46] But such figures
were isolated exceptions in an otherwise generally indolent administrative apparatus that for
the most part hid behind the doctrines of trusteeship and indirect rule as a means for not
having to initiate decisive new lines of policy. Even the Treasury could sympathise with
such general policy guidelines, for, as one official minuted, “even if no such obligation [not
to hand them over] existed, these places are inhabited by ‘fighting’ peoples of character who
are capable of making trouble which might have considerable reverberations in Africa if they
believed themselves ill treated”. [47]

Such sentiments reflected, if only dimly, the fact that an articulate black opposition had been
mounted to the possible transfer alongside the rather genteel debate between Lionel Curtis
and Margery Perham in The Times. [48] Tshekedi Khama, who had been a significant
opponent of Rey’s efforts to open up parts of Bechuanaland to South African mining
operations in the early 1930s, mounted a strong attack on the whole idea, based upon the fact
that South African “native policy” had clearly departed from the basic tenets of “indirect
rule” with the strongly autocratic 1927 Native Administration Act. “Direct rule, the division
of function between the two Departments of Native Affairs and of Justice; the extensive
reliance upon police as agents of administration”, he wrote, “have all militated against the
training of personnel ready for the difficult and delicate task which is now set for them.” [49]

Such considerations underlined the ideal that the BLS territories might yet be what Lord
Snell termed “laboratories in which to work out perfect institutions of a progressive native
government”. [50] They were probably of some importance when it came to the question of
responding to Hertzog’s renewed demand in 1935 for the transfer of the Territories. An aide
memoire handed to Hertzog by the Dominions Secretary, J H Thomas, came near to
accepting the idea that there was reasonableness in the South African claim and supported
measures to encourage the “closest possible cooperation” between the BLS and Union
administrations. Though there was some ambiguity in the British position, it was clear that
transfer would still depend upon the consent of the inhabitants of the Territories. It also
emerged over the following months that local administration would become very difficult if
the British government were to agree to the transfer. E L Richards, the Resident
Commissioner in Basutoland, for example, warned that any attempts to introduce soil erosion
schemes in the territory would be jeopardized “if it were thought that it was being undertaken
or assisted by the Union Government as a prelude to incorporation. The result would be...
that not only would the Basuto as a nation refuse to accept local assistance or to cooperate in
the work so financed but they would actively or passively oppose or obstruct them”. Several
officials also resented their work possibly being subject to the “scrutiny” of officials of the
South African Native Affairs Department with whom they felt little administrative
compatibility. [51].

By the end of 1937, therefore, the South African efforts to incorporate the Territories had been effectively rebuffed yet again, so underlining an ideological gap between British and Union "native policies" which was to become even clearer by the end of World War Two. To Curtis, the issue appeared to confirm the pressure of the "permanent officials" in the CO and the DO to retain their control and to reflect the fact that "people on this side of the world can do no more to improve the status of the South African natives than they can to improve the status of the American negro". [52] Likewise, for some South African liberals the issue appeared to indicate their progressive isolation from wider Commonwealth, and Alfred Hoernlé wrote to W M Macmillan that he found British claims to the Territories based on Tshekedi’s opposition a "most unedifiable verdict". [53]

The Question of Imperial Defence

Despite this failure, by the middle 1930s, South African political influence on British policy found its strongest card to play with the issue of defence. Even before the 1935-37 claim to the BLS territories, the DO was anxious to underline its commitment to the Commonwealth rather than Europe. [54] In the wake of the 1932 Disarmament Conference the British Chiefs of Staff had begun pressing for a shift in defence policy away from the so-called Ten Years Rule, based upon the assumption that war would not occur within ten years of any particular date. Attention turned towards a more defensive imperial policy which would include bases such as that at Singapore. Such a commitment generally ran counter to any involvement in continental affairs, which had generally been opposed by the Dominions since the Locarno Treaties of 1925. There were considerable divisions within the Chiefs of Staff, but the Committee of Imperial Defence remained dominated by the figure of Hankey and the "blue water school" who favoured a reliance upon naval power, despite some evidence to the contrary suggesting the exposure of ships to aerial attack. [55]

These considerations came into play by the time of Hankey's empire tour of 1934, which has on the whole been seen as confirming the general indifference of the Dominions in the broad theme of imperial defence, especially in regard to British power in the Far East. [56] If the idea of "dominion defence" was really a mythical concept that could be used by ministers to buttress their arguments in cabinet, nevertheless it could be skilfully employed by Dominion ministers to manipulate British policy towards their own line of interest: employing the Commonwealth ideal to the point that it suited them without any firm commitments regarding future European entanglements. As Michael Howard has cogently pointed out, dominions such as South Africa and Canada "used their new and dearly bought membership of the international system to contract out of it". [57]

The price that Britain paid, therefore, for securing at least nominal dominion support for the idea of a common imperial defence was some form of appeasement, and it was this which did so much to weaken its claims to act as a decisive imperial power in the sub-region. It was possible for small posturings to take place, such as the naval task force sent from the Cape to Bechuanaland in 1933 under Admiral Evans to depose Tshekedi Khama for allegedly exceeding his powers. But, in reality, Britain was far less able to exert her influence in resisting Afrikaner power than Hyam has suggested. [59] Maurice Hankey's visit in September 1934 occurred at a time of some anxiety regarding the growth of Afrikaner nationalist isolationism, though the CID had been impressed in July by the apparent willingness of the Union Minister of Defence, Oswald Pirow, to engage in defence cooperation. "If something, however elementary, could be arranged", Hankey wrote to Sir Herbert Stanley, the British High Commissioner in Pretoria, "it would be an admirable example to other Dominions whose help would be really valuable." South Africa could, he felt, make a "real contribution" in both coastal defences around Cape Town and in aerial power, though "we cannot have anything said which would make either the settlers or Natives think that we were anxious in any way". [59]
Hankey's visit confirmed his view on the symbolic value of the navy as the cement binding imperial feeling, while at the same time he was anxious to promote Smuts's views on the value of Commonwealth defence arrangements. [60] The visit attracted considerable press attention in South Africa and Die Burger considered it "undoubtedly one of the most important and far reaching Empire missions since the Great War". [61] In practice, it was far more of a publicity exercise, though it underlined the view in the Chiefs of Staff that Simonstown was a critical naval base which might have great strategic value in the light of possible Italian or Japanese military aggression. [62] It gave a boost to Smuts's calls for closer cooperation between the British Commonwealth and the United States, which echoed similar sentiments in Round Table circles in Britain. [63] More particularly, it reinforced the standpoint of South Africa in the 1930s as one of the most prominent of dominions to support appeasement of Germany.

The sources of this South African support for appeasement were complex, ranging from outright admiration for Nazi Germany amongst a small clique, led by Pirow and some of the more die-hard Afrikaner nationalists, to emulation by Smuts and Patrick Duncan of the Round Table style in Britain. [64] In a more general sense, however, the South African political class was divided on the issue, despite the fact that even the English-speaking members in the United Party government favoured neutrality until 1938. [65] In the event, the UP cabinet split by 7-6 favouring Smuts's support for war in September 1939, so indicating that at least part of the publicity and propaganda for the idea of imperial defence ultimately had some pay-off. But, in a more long run sense, there was a strategic calculus behind Smuts's position which was to become more evident during the course of the war itself as a firm political alliance was secured with the Churchill government based especially upon the centrality of the war in the Middle East. Smuts probably hoped such military successes as the Union forces secured in Madagascar and East Africa would reinforce renewed claims for the BLS territories, once hostilities were over. In this, however, he was misled as he failed to understand the tide of international opinion against both colonialism and racial segregation. The decade up to 1939 had given some credence for such a belief, as the policy of appeasement in Europe had in some degree spilled over into policy towards the dominions as well. With the collapse of this appeasement policy in 1938-39, a false dawn appeared to emerge for the Smuts political leadership, which was to be rudely shattered by the post-war international order after 1945.
Notes

1 William Minter, *King Solomon’s Mines Revisited* (New York, 1986), pp 45-46, for a recent statement of this view.


7 See, for example, Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations* (Boulder, Colorado, 1987).


12 DO 119/1001, B E H Clifford to L S Amery, 30 May 1928.


15 A S Cripps Papers, Zimbabwe National Archives, Harare, ASC CR 5/1/1, L Curtis to A S Cripps, 20 November 1923.

16 GD 40/17/227, F Clarke to P Kerr, January 30 1928.

17 GD 40/17/234, F Clarke to R Coupland, September 14 1929.

18 GD 40/17/231, J C Smuts to P Kerr, 23 May 1928.

20 Smuts, *op. cit.*, p 63: "The system of native administration is today so ramified and pervasive", he continued, "the policeman is so ubiquitous, that segregation can be tried under far more favourable conditions than existed in South Africa in the past." (p 102)


25 Chanock, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-03.


29 CO 533/408/10, J DS... minute 21 February 1931.

30 MSS Brit Emp. S22 G433, J Lewin to J Harris, July 15 1936; J Harris to C Roberts, 15 July 1936; J Harris, circular 12 September 1936.


Oldham was keen to emphasize that scientific expertise in the Survey might invite funding from the Colonial Development Fund, an argument which has a certain contemporary ring to it.

GD 40/17/120, L Curtis to A M Carr Saunders, 29 June 1933.

The Times, 31 August 1933.

GD 40/17/120 Lord Lothian to Sir John Orr, 18 March 1935.

CO 847/2/1, minutes by A Fiddian 16 January 1933, C Jeffries 1 February 1933, and J E W Flood 1 September 1933 who found Lionel Curtis's requests for CO assistance tiresome: "one would have thought that Mr L Curtis with S Africa, India, Ireland and the Basel Treasury Society as leaves in his laurel crown would have the grace to keep quiet - but then [one] would not know Mr L Curtis."

CO 847/3/3 Sir G Tomlinson, minute, n.d. (May 1934?).

J C Smuts Coll., South African Institute of International Affairs, University of the Witwatersrand, L Curtis to J C Smuts, 5 June 1933. Curtis also confessed to being surprised by the strength of opinion in South Africa against the transfer, L Curtis Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, L Curtis to R Feetham 26 March 1933.


Ibid., p 685.

Monarch of All I Survey, diary entry 13 August 1930, p 40.

T161/111/S39540/1, R V Vernon to E E Bridges, 28 February 1935.


House of Lord Debates, 90, 13 December 1933, col 468.

DO 119/1072, R Philby (Mafeking) to H E Priestman, 12 June 1936. Sir Charles Rey also warned of the possibility of black politicians taking up the issue in South Africa in the light of the All African Convention meeting in Bloemfontein. Any present attempt to transfer the Territories would, he considered, be “likely to meet with a very definite and emphatic negative resolution as to going into the Union, and against the acceptance of financial aid from the Union designed to facilitate incorporation”. (DO119/1063, C Rey to C Fforde, 25 December 1935)

Lionel Curtis Papers, L Curtis to G Dawson, 9 July 1937. Dawson blamed the government for refusing to confront “the John Harrises and Macmillans who undoubtedly could and would make a great noise” (Dawson to Curtis 4 March 1937).

DO 119/1041, R Wiseman to P Liesching, 3 August 1933.


Ann Trotter, "The Dominions and Imperial Defence: Hankey's Tour in 1934", Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 11, 3

Howard, op. cit., p. 76.

Hyam, The Failure, p 139.

CAB 63/69, M Hankey to Sir H Stanley, July 5 1934.

Ibid., Hankey to Chatfield, 11 September 1934.

Die Burger, 9 January 1935.

CAB 53/28, Committee on Imperial Defence, Chiefs of Staff Sub Ctee, South Africa-Co-operation in Imperial Defence, Visit of Mr Pirow to England, 1934.

J C Smuts, "The Present International Situation", International Affairs, XIV (Jan-Feb 1935).
