Philip Qipu Vundla was prominent as a political leader on the Rand from the early 1940s until his death in 1972. He was based in the Western Areas of Johannesburg until the area was declared a “black spot” and the inhabitants removed, and thereafter in Soweto. To a remarkable degree he married concern for local issues to national politics. Thus he remained as an Advisory Board member at Western Native Township (WNT) from 1942 to 1962 whilst being involved in campaigns of the Communist Party, various trade unions and the ANC, becoming a member of the national executive of the latter from 1952 to 1955. During campaigning against Bantu Education he was felt to have opposed the ANC’s policy and was expelled from the organisation. Thereafter Vundla was only active in local politics.

This paper will attempt firstly to discuss the link between class and the radical leaders of the district, of whom Vundla was one of the most significant. Secondly it will attempt to shed light on a key political leader of the 1940s and 1950s and relate him to the politics of the Western Areas during these turbulent years.

Several influential studies of political leadership in black South African politics have pointed to the way in which class guides the actions of such leaders to a considerable extent. Leaders are shown to have come mostly from the small group who were traders, artisans, teachers and clerks. Whether characterised as petty bourgeois or lower middle class, they endorsed common cultural values: notably education, Christianity and “law and order”. Their position between labour and capital was reflected in political attitudes which “identified upwards” or “identified downwards”. [3] This approach illuminates much but leaves further questions unanswered. Why did leaders so often come from such a narrow stratum? What common cultural ties were there between leaders and led? When leaders identified downwards, were they drawn down by the whole community or by fragments of it, and if so which and why?

An examination of the backgrounds of a number of consistently radical leaders in the Western Areas may shed light on these questions. [4]

Helen Bradford points out that leaders necessarily tended to come from a more educated stratum than the bulk of the black population since their role required possession of literacy and administrative skills. [5] But there were other forces shaping the backgrounds of political figures. S P Bunting wrote in the early 1920s of how

Any native found effectively organising his fellow workers and refusing to be bought or flattered out of his duty to them can be and is readily deprived of all chance of making a livelihood apart from what other trouble lies in store for him, and requires to be provided with independent means of subsistence, however

inconsiderable, to carry on his work. [6]

Similar pressures continued to be felt by more radical leaders into the 1950s. [7] Of leading figures in the Western Areas, Vundla, Marks, Radebe and Resha could testify to the close correlation between radical politics and the sack. [8] Apart from dismissal, assault and even attempted assassination might be the lot of such leaders - as Vundla’s experience indicates. Such instability - coupled with the time which political activities took up - constituted a major barrier between continued radicalism and the paid employment usually taken by residents of the Western Areas.

Trade was one alternative [9], and another avenue was estate agency - favoured by Marks, Radebe, Bopape and Sisulu. [10] A number, such as Vundla, Resha or Marks, lived for
much of the time as full-time leaders, sometimes coupled with journalism, though this could place great financial strains on their families. [11] Advisory Board members received a small allowance and could expect to be rewarded for efforts made for individual residents. Some board members seem to have been able to live by such means alone. [12]

Many political meetings of these years ended with some form of collection and there were occasional mutterings that not all the proceeds went on the cause for which they were raised. [13] The question of to what extent some leaders were championing causes to raise funds - rather than vice versa as political “entrepreneurs” - is an important one, though beyond the scope of this paper. What is clear is that political inclination affected occupation just as occupation affected political inclination.

I would argue that strands of culture such as belief in education, religion and “law and order” were not only the preserve of a middle class but formed key constituents of popular culture, though they tended to be embraced by the more settled, older sections of the population. [14] Endorsement of such values was as common amongst the most radical leaders as the more conservative. The Civic Guard movement, intended to combat appalling levels of crime committed mostly by unemployed young people, was supported by politicians of all shades of opinion. [15] Robert Resha, whom the state in the Treason Trial singled out as particularly extreme because of his equivocation over the question of violence, was a member of the Johannesburg Joint Council (an extremely moderate body) a few years earlier. Vundla could stand for temperance. Josie Mpama (Palmer), a leading woman activist in the Communist Party, called for beer-halls for single migrants but home brewing for the “respectable native” who otherwise “has to drink with a type of person with whom he does not associate.” [16] Emphasises on law and order, temperance and on the distinction between the mores of migrants and township residents were compatible with the most radical politics of the day. Likewise, in the mid-1950s no contradiction was felt to exist in such leaders wholeheartedly endorsing campaigns to preserve freehold rights and access to an even remotely decent education. Adherence to the ethos of settled, older residents was compatible with, and could even be conducive to, a radical stance. This was the background to Vundla’s political career.

P Q Vundla was born in Healdtown in the Ciskei where he received some education but failed in his efforts to obtain secondary schooling. Then followed a succession of jobs, first in East London and then in Johannesburg before he landed “a good post” as a mine clerk. Such security was not to last. Although having no previous political background Vundla gave evidence to the Lansdowne Commission regarding poor conditions on the mines, was demoted and chose to resign rather than accept the humiliation. Instead, he became an organiser for the newly formed African Mineworkers’ Union (AMWU), having recently been elected on to the Advisory Board of WNT. [17]

By the early 1940s, when Vundla rose to political prominence, the various townships comprising the Western Areas were well established and had distinctive characteristics. Sophiatown and Newclare were freehold townships but were otherwise very different. Sophiatown, the larger of the two, had many more African owners than Newclare and contained a much larger number of schools and churches. Newclare contained within it several distinct communities: a coloured community which hermetically sealed itself off from the rest of the township; a substantial Indian community, with property and trading interests; a large section of the southern end of the township occupied mainly by Sotho women brewing beer for migrant workers in the surrounding mines.

Unconstrained by council control, the population in the freehold townships rose well above that of WNT, a location. By 1951 they held some 60,000 people whilst WNT had a further 20,000. [18] Demography combined with the constraints of municipal administration to give WNT a distinctive character. With a small, more settled population, WNT had a higher proportion of domestic servants, washerwomen, professional and clerical workers and a lower proportion of labourers and single migrants than the other townships. [19] Since
Township rents were not increased in line with inflation, it became markedly cheaper to live in WNT, and tenants tended to stay put, whereas in Sophiatown and Newclare high rents encouraged frequent moves and even flight. WNT was also much better provided for with school places than Sophiatown or, especially, Newclare. [20] The township’s more stable nature was reflected in marriage patterns. Half the marriages in the freehold townships were by traditional custom and a sixth by Christian rites, but in WNT this proportion was reversed. [21]

The political climate in the townships prior to 1939 had been rather subdued. The ANC, ICU and the Communist Party were present in the area, but only the latter engaged in intensive and persistent campaigning, drawing forth little response. This is not to suggest residents were happy with their conditions. In WNT constant protests were made about rent (which was eventually reduced) and in the freehold townships African owners successfully prevented the Council from restricting their right to take in tenants. But in neither case were such causes taken up by the national bodies.

Activism finally bore fruit in 1939 with a successful beer-hall boycott, but the 1940s saw a return to the comparative quiescence of the previous years. The Communist Party remained the most prominent national body present in the district but it was in decline by the end of the decade. [22] Vundla, though active as an Advisory Board member and with strong links with the Communists, directed his energies mostly towards national campaigning. He was engaged in campaigns such as those against passes, for teachers’ salaries and the People’s Assembly for Votes for All in 1948. [23] But he was most heavily involved in trade union activity, being an organiser for the AMWU and the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU). [24]

The political tempo only quickened in 1949, with a remarkably well supported tram boycott. This was followed by two well supported stay-aways in 1950, the organisation of Civic Guard across the area in 1951-52, and the Defiance Campaign of 1952. In these years South Africa as a whole was markedly radicalized, and nowhere more so than the Western Areas. However, the campaigns also exposed major fissures within the district over the question of violent or non-violent tactics and the tension between more settled residents and youths and the Sotho “Russians” gang over crime.

Although those who boycotted the trams or stayed away from work were mostly older residents, the tram boycott and stay-aways of 1949-50 were punctuated by virtual pitched battles between young people and police. Such conflict also led to attacks on Indian and Chinese owned shops in the area. [25] Leaders, whilst recognizing the conditions encouraging conflict, persistently distanced themselves from the violence and emphasised the need for an inter-racial approach. [26] The tram boycott and stay-aways had been remarkable expressions of solidarity but with solidarity had come massive repression and inter-racial conflict within the Western Areas. Furthermore, the area’s volatile nature provided the government with a substantial rod with which to beat political leaders, most notably in the commission appointed to enquire into the tram boycott riots and the troubles in Newclare (as well as other areas). Vundla himself had been detained and assaulted during the tram boycott and was the object of an anti-communist witch-hunt early in 1950. [27]

Because of such pressure, Vundla played little part in the protests of 1950. [28] After 1950, open-ended appeals for boycotts or stay-aways ceased to be the norm, whilst the Defiance Campaign, the Civil Guard movement and the Removal Campaign were characterized by much greater regimentation. The momentum of the tram boycott was to be sustained but not by violent protest.

Continuing appalling levels of crime, mostly carried out by unemployed youth, led to the revival of the earlier Civic Guard movement in 1951-52. This drew support from right across the political spectrum and had considerable success in making the area safer. But it was particularly endorsed by older, more settled residents and, apart from inevitable antagonism between it and the youth, it also came into conflict with the Sotho “Russians” gang and the
Sotho enclave in Newclare South. The results were bloody in the extreme and coincided with the advent of the Defiance Campaign. By dividing the district and diverting the energies of leaders, it did little to aid the campaign's progress in the area. [29]

The local leadership of such events included several people who had been heavily involved in or connected with the Communist Party until its banning, such as Marks, Vundla and Kenosi. Until 1950 the ANC had been largely inactive in the area [30], and a number of such figures became leading lights in the organization thereafter. However, it would be a mistake to see the Communist Party, banned in 1950, as simply feeding into the ANC. The party was itself at a low ebb in the area in the late 1940s. There was already a considerable overlap between the two bodies, whilst Vundla seems to have worked closely with the Communist Party without being a member and his statements do not suggest that he was deeply influenced by the party's thinking. [31] It is important to emphasize the centrality of WNT and its Advisory Board in the boycott and the Civic Guard. Though the most stable and respectable of the three townships, it had a direct channel for communicating with residents and with the Council. Only registered tenants (some 20 per cent of adults) could vote and only a minority of them did. Yet the Advisory Board was the body with the greatest legitimacy amongst the population. [32]

In the early 1950s the ANC emerged as the main force in black politics in the Western Areas and across the country, and Vundla's prominence increased at the same time. Through the tram boycott and the Civic Guard he had become the most significant figure in the district and, after ten years of activism, he emerged on to the national stage as a member of the ANC's national executive and vice-president of CNETU. [33] During the Defiance Campaign Vundla took charge of publicity and provision for the families of those arrested whilst "defying". [34]

The removal, as part of the implementation of apartheid, of the Western Areas (and of Sophiatown in particular) did much to ensure the area's fame and, as the episodes concerning the enforcing of the removals have been well covered elsewhere, only material relevant to Vundla will be discussed. [35] Meetings were held in 1953 but it was only in the following year that the campaign against removal got into gear. By now Vundla was chair of the Western Areas branch of the ANC and one of the most important figures in the campaign, despite his not being affected by removal of freehold rights, which formed the centre of the protest.

Vundla and other leaders sought to harness the youth to the campaign against removal but without the violent consequences of the 1949-50 campaigns. Passive resistance was the watchword, direct confrontation was to be avoided. [36] But this entailed disillusioning many younger residents, all the more so when the tactics against removal proved woefully ineffective in the face of the massive force deployed. [37] The removal campaign, despite the constant pressure of the police, constituted the pinnacle of Vundla's political career and his popularity was reflected in his hold on WNT. The opposition of previous years evaporated and in the election of December 1954 Vundla's grouping on the Advisory Board won easily. This was undoubtedly helped by a successful campaign to block rent increases. [38] Residents' meetings were now effectively ANC meetings.

Immediately following the campaign against removal came the campaign against Bantu Education, in which Vundla was also heavily involved. The nature and timing of the national campaign were highly confused [39] and this was reflected in the Western Areas. Sophiatown showed eagerness to call an indefinite boycott but a residents' meeting in WNT, where parents were more heavily represented, was less keen. [40] Amid general uncertainty, the boycott broke out in a piecemeal fashion, starting on the East Rand. As other districts, including the Western Areas, followed suit, Vundla sought to compromise and called for a boycott but not an indefinite one. [41]
The government’s response was rapid and harsh: all children who did not return to school by April 25 were to be permanently excluded. Vundla, who in the Civic Guard had fought hard against tsotsidom, now foresaw an entire generation of delinquents and called on residents to send their children back to school. At a subsequent meeting in WNT he was attacked by a group of youths, stabbed twice in the head and nearly killed. There is strong evidence to suggest that Sophiatown Youth League members were responsible, though they seem to have used local gang members for the attack. At the same time the government further embittered the boycotters by carrying out its threat: dismissing 60 teachers and 3000 pupils from the area as well as many more outside it.

Two of the Advisory Board members opposed Vundla’s stance but residents’ meetings were solidly behind him. Vundla clashed with an alliance between radical Congressites (Moretsele and Matseke) and a conservative nominated member (Phohlele) over his desire to use the communal hall to house a temporary school for those who had been expelled. The ANC national executive seemed to point in both directions, censuring the radicalism of the Transvaal ANC for starting the boycott early but condemning Vundla’s caution and removing him from his post as the head of the Western Areas ANC branch.

The damage done to unity in the district was evident in preparations in May for the Congress of the People. Whilst there was much activity in Sophiatown, a residents’ meeting in WNT showed little interest. This split was made formal in mid-July when Vundla was expelled from the ANC. Perhaps the strongest ANC area in the country was now deeply divided and Vundla, who had earlier to defend his stance from the charge of extremism, was now reviled by many as a sell-out.

Yet he retained the continuing support of many residents of WNT for his stance on the boycott. Moreover, Lovedale Mfeka, Vundla’s “lieutenant” on the Advisory Board, and Ida Mntwana, leader of the Transvaal ANC Women’s Section and prominent congressite in the township, denounced the expulsion. Vundla and Mntwana attempted to heal the breach; using a mixture of calls for reconciliation, threats and demonstrations. No settlement occurred, and the Advisory Board elections of that year saw Vundla and Mfeka trounce their former partners, Moretsele and Matseke. Vundla was back to where he had started in 1942, an Advisory Board member, albeit a well-supported one.

Without substantially greater holdings of private political papers, it is difficult to do more than speculate as to why Vundla’s fall was so abrupt. Until his call for a return to school he had been at the apex of ANC leadership and head of its most active branch. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that his expulsion was not solely because of disagreements over the boycott. The speed of his decline suggests that his ebullient, idiosyncratic style had won him few friends amongst his fellow leaders. More generally, the campaigns against removals and Bantu Education had been badly planned and executed. Because he had rescinded the call for the boycott Vundla was an obvious target for blame.

At the same time a new element entered Vundla’s make-up, which greatly shaped his political attitudes. Shortly after being assaulted he was approached by and joined the Moral Re-armament Movement (MRA). This was a non-denominational Christian body which grew up in the post-war period, calling for reconciliation between the Allied and Axis powers and between the protagonists of the Cold War. In South Africa it espoused a mixture of anti-communism and faith in interracial reconciliation. It drew support from leaders who were or had become notable conservatives, such as Selope Thema or Drs Nhlapo and Nkomo, and had strong links with the Bantu World, which took a line highly critical of radical politics. To suggest that the organisation was “an international conspiracy” may have been exaggerated, but MRA’s apolitical stance was certainly dubious.

In that it offered Vundla an alternative organisational base and later led to tangible benefits, including trips abroad and eventually a house built for him in Dube after WNT’s removal, he had prosaic reasons for joining this group. Some of those who knew him felt that conversion
was in essence a ploy [53], but the tangible benefits came only after some while, suggesting that they were not his main motivation for getting involved. Given the extreme hostility shown to him it is not altogether surprising that he should react in a similarly dramatic manner. Aspects of his change of heart suggest genuine conviction. At a time of gross government insensitivity Vundla seems to have been genuinely impressed that there were still those who could treat him “like a fellow countryman and colleague”. [54] Converts often emphasize the sins of their earlier years, but Vundla’s repudiation of his autocratic style of leadership rings true. [55] His behaviour towards his family was similar and his wife saw his conversion as a definite break with the past and a decided improvement. [56]

This did not mean a break from involvement in local issues, and early in 1956 he was caught up in attempts to end gang wars in Sophiatown and WNT. He could still be spoken of approvingly by the radical press and supported a campaign against rent increases. [58] However, exasperated by his failure to be reconciled with national politics, Mntwana and Mfeka, his staunchest supporters, turned against him and came close to unseating him from the Advisory Board. [59]

More important in confirming his complete break with radical politics was his stance on the bus boycott early in 1957. Vundla was away doing work for MRA when it started, and took a stance of careful ambiguity, unable to join a boycott led by his opponents in the Advisory Board elections but unwilling to toe the City Council’s line. Vundla supported a compromise group and the situation polarized, with Sophiatown Youth Leaguers again the most militant storming a meeting chaired by Vundla and attempting to set his house on fire. [61] Vundla’s stance on the bus boycott left him far more isolated than over the question of Bantu Education. He had been seen to equivocate over one of the most significant popular protests of the decade.

WNT’s removal began in 1961 and these years were for both the township and for Vundla a curious twilight phase. He continued to represent residents’ grievances and continued to be re-elected at the top of the poll - registered tenants (the only voters) being drawn from the older section of the township, who stayed solidly behind Vundla. Yet he was frequently absent on MRA business and from 1960 moved to a house in Dube. The Council bent its own rules to allow him to sit on WNT’s Advisory Board without actually living in the township in return for Vundla’s cooperation in WNT’s removal - a cosy relationship, made all the more striking by earlier struggles. [62]

Thus ended an extraordinary political career in the Western Areas of Johannesburg, though Vundla was to remain active in Sowetan affairs until his death in 1972. In the 1940s he worked on a diverse group of issues with various organisations. Between 1949 and 1955 he became a key local and national leader in a series of very popular campaigns under the ANC. Had he not been expelled from congress, he would almost certainly have been one of the Treason Trialists. After his controversial expulsion, his decision to remain active in local politics meant adopting positions at variance with his past. Having lost a political empire he was unable to find a role.

Vundla is also suggestive of some of the problems of using terms such as petty bourgeois or lower middle class with regard to political leaders. It obscures the way in which radical political leadership sharply restricted options in terms of occupation. With regard to culture, this may conceal the extent to which “petty bourgeois” values (e.g. interest in education, Christianity, “law and order”) resonated widely amongst a township population. Emphasising a class cleavage between leaders and led may also obscure deep divisions within the latter. Leaders such as Vundla faced major contradictions: between young and old; Civic Guards and “Russians”; WNT and Sophiatown; a non-racial or an Africanist approach; local and national politics; violence or non-violence. On the question of the Bantu Education Boycott Vundla was torn not only in his own mind but between two constituencies. That delicate equation of half a loaf or no bread was never an easy one to answer.
Notes

1 This paper is very much a case of work in progress but what coherence it has acquired is largely due to help given by Stanley Trapido, to whom I am extremely grateful. Because the paper is a condensed version of several chapters, some footnoting has had to be omitted.

2 Apart from Kathleen Vundla's biography of her husband, PQ: the Story of P Q Vundla (Johannesburg, 1973), there are no substantial studies of Vundla. Tom Lodge offers the most detailed information in Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (Loon, 1983), pp 17, 97, 105-06, 122-24. Otherwise Vundla has largely disappeared from view. A collection of profiles of major figures from the 1950s ignores Vundla completely: J Schadeberg (ed) The Fifties People of South Africa (Johannesburg, 1987).


4 The terms "radical" and "conservative" are used in this paper solely in the context of South African politics in the 1940s and 1950s.


8 African Communist, 51, 1972, pp 9-10; Non-European Affairs Department, Johannesburg (hereafter NEAD) Reports 21, 1944 Manager's Report, 1/1944, with Agenda for meeting on 6 January 1944; T Karis and G Carter From Protest to Challenge (Stanford, 1972-77), vol 4, p 132.

9 Bantu World, 5 October 1935; IA WRDB 302/3/1/6 WNT Shop 7, minutes of meeting to select tenants for two new shops in WNT, 28 February 1939.


11 Interviews 3 and 5.

12 Interviews 1 and 2.

13 D Goodhew "'No Easy Walk to Freedom': political organisation in the Western Areas of Johannesburg, 1918-39" (African Studies Institute, Witwatersrand, seminar paper,
31 May 1989).


15 D Goodhew, “Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea”.

16 CPSA AB1433/Cj 2.1.25, Johannesburg Joint Council Correspondence, Hon Secretary Johannesburg Joint Council to Robert Resha, 18 May 1948; Bantu World, 6 October 1951; CAD NTS 7032:31/322(6) Pt 2, Native Affairs Committee of Inquiry into Kaffir Beer, evidence of Mrs Josie Palmer, Secretary of the Non-European United Front, 9 September 1941.

17 Vundla, PQ: the Story of P Q Vundla, pp 11-23.

18 Johannesburg NEAD, Annual Reports 1951-52.

19 Johannesburg NEAD, Survey of the Western Areas 1950, p 50; Johannesburg NEAD, Sample Survey of the Western Areas, 1951, p 111.

20 IA CHD (first series) 191: 8/26/10, Housing Schemes, Western Areas, vol V, Report No 1/1954, Manager NEAD to Advisory Committee for Western Areas Clearance and Development Scheme.

21 Survey, 1950 p 53; Survey, 1951, p 75.

22 D Goodhew, “Political Organisation in the Western Areas in the 1940s” (draft chapter).


26 Bantu World, 10 September and 15 October 1949; Guardian, 2 and 16 February 1950; Bantu World, 29 April 1950.


28 It is unclear whether this was simply because of the intense government pressure on him or also because he had doubts about the wisdom of the May 1 and June 26 stay-
aways (as a number of senior Transvaal ANC figures did), thought the latter is more probable as he had close links with the organizers previously. See: Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa*, pp 33-34.

29 Goodhew, "Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea".


31 Unlike Marks and Radebe, he does not seem to have written for *Inkululeko*.

32 Although in theory the board only represented WNT, board members had previously helped residents of the freehold townships with matters such as passes and worked with other bodies in the area on questions such as policing.


34 *Umteteli Wa Bantu*, 5 April 1952; *Bantu World*, 28 June and 8 November 1952; Vundla, *PQ: the Story of P Q Vundla*, p 34.


36 *Drum*, February 1955; *Bantu World*, 5 and 19 February 1955; CPSA AD1812, Treason Trial Ea 1.8.2, ANC Meetings (transcripts) meetings at Sophiatown, 9 and 30 January 1955.


39 *Bantu World*, 2 April 1955; CPSA AD1812, Treason Trial Ea 1.11.2, ANC Conferences, minutes of meeting of branch officials of the ANC, Transvaal, 27 March 1955.

40 *Bantu World*, 12 February 1955; *Umteteli Wa Bantu*, 26 March and 16 April 1955.

41 *Bantu World*, 23 April 1955.

42 *Umteteli Wa Bantu*, 30 April 1955; Vundla, *PQ: the Story of P Q Vundla*, p 41; Interviews 3 and 4 (interviews with a member of Vundla’s family and an ex-gang leader).

43 *Umteteli Wa Bantu*, 7 and 21 May, 11 June 1955; *Bantu World*, 11 June 1955.

44 *Bantu World*, 28 May, 4 and 11 June 1955.

45 CPSA AD1812, Treason Trial Eg 7.2 SACOP: Transvaal Consultative Committee “Forward To Freedom” (Bulletin of the Transvaal Committee of the COP), 17 May 1955; e.g. 7.3 SACOP Meetings (Johannesburg) transcripts, meeting on 21 March 1955; *Umteteli Wa Bantu*, 25 June 1955; *Bantu World*, 233 July and 6 August 1955.

46 *Bantu World*, 23 April 1955.


48 *Bantu World*, 1 and 8 October 1955.

154
49 IA WRDB 401/1/16 ENT, WNT, Pimville and Orlando Superintendent, WNT to Manager, NEAD, 19 December 1955; *Umteteli Wa Bantu*, 17 and 24 December 1955.


52 CPSA AD1812, Treason Trial Ea 3.4.1 Publications/The Africanist, 11, 1, January-February 1956; *Bantu World*, 24 October 1953.

53 Interviews 1 and 4.


55 Interview P Q Vundla, 1958. (ICS. London, p.10.)


57 Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Committee (NEAC) Reports 51, January-April 1956, WNT Advisory Board minutes, 7 February 1956, with agenda of meeting on 9 March 1956; NEAC Reports 52, April-June 1956, WNT Advisory Board minutes, 6 March 1956 with agenda of meeting on 5 April 1956; IA WRDB 210/6(1), Monthly Meeting of Joint Advisory Board with Non-European Affairs and Housing Committee minutes of “informal discussion”, 28 March 1956.

58 *New Age*, 6 September 1956; NEAC Reports 53, July-September 1956, WNT Advisory Board minutes, 2 October 1956, with agenda of meeting on 6 November 1956.


60 *The World*, 12 and 19 January 1957; IA WRDB 81/7(1), Bus Boycott Johannesburg Joint Advisory Board minutes, 23 and 28 January 1957; IA WRDB 81/7(1) Bus Boycott undated broadsheets issued by the ANC (Transvaal) and the Society of Young Africa (Transvaal).

61 *Star*, 7, 8 and 9 March 1957.

62 IA WRDB 401/1/12(1) Advisory Boards: WNT Advisory Board Superintendent, WNT to Manager, NEAD, 11 March 1959; Manager to Secretary, WNT Advisory Board, 12 May 1960; note by Manager, NEAD, 4 October 1960; WNT Advisory Board minutes, 18 July 1961.