This is not the paper I originally set out to write, which was intended to deal with one or two quite specific matters in the story of the Mfengu community living in two adjacent rural locations named Oxaal and Kamastone near the village of Whittlesea in the Queenstown district of the eastern Cape Colony. Instead, I have decided to set down some of that history against the background of present debate and of a persistent orthodoxy which has influenced historical writing.

In most writing about African agriculture in the eastern Cape Colony during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Mfengu are celebrated as examplars of keen and proficient cultivators.[1] I do not intend to challenge this view more than indirectly today, for there is undoubtedly much in favour of it; instead, I want to draw attention to certain factors which support that way of thinking about the Mfengu to the point of over-legitimizing it, allowing a measure of contemporary myth to gain respectability as reality in historians’ texts and in one of the most popularly-read books offering panaceas for modern South Africa’s ills. There, “The Mfengu—natural entrepreneurs”, is the introduction to a few pages which survey the decline of African agriculture. But the book as a whole tends not to acknowledge fully the major structural difficulties which South African capitalist development placed in the way of rural Africans’ freedom of decision and action, or which forced a large proportion of Africans to participate in the market to the detriment of their own adequate subsistence.[2]

Clarity in these matters will have to be found without much help from oral evidence. Attempting to collect oral evidence about the Queenstown Mfengu earlier this year, I was foiled not only by the wish of the Ciskei authorities to let me speak only to members of the “Tribal Authorities” nurtured by the semi-autonomous administration, but also by a factor far more significant in the long term: a genuine and considerable lack of knowledge even on the part of elderly but lucid and quite well-educated people. “Ah yes”, they would say, “Better to ask us about the time after 1920”. The obvious significance here, and challenge, is that what historians write about earlier days may heavily influence the recovery of community self-perception as literacy spreads. This is hardly a novel point, but it is plainly going to matter for the future - and sooner rather than later.

The range of studies now available on Ciskeian and Transkeian African societies and economies between c.1850 and 1900 is now good enough to show that there is no clear-cut and universally applicable connection between the degree of colonially-induced transformation experienced by an indigenous community and its response to survival needs. For example, impoverishment in Pondoland did not necessarily induce an immediate increase in labour migrancy, and the relatively wealthy Engcobo district in Emigrant Thembuland sent out far more migrants than certain adjacent but poorer districts.[3] Thus, within the general process of African rural impoverishment which has afflicted South Africa over a long period, there have been specific and local variations, evident not least during the formative nineteenth century which was for the most part pre-industrial. There is no good reason why these variations should not apply to the Mfengu too - just as, for that matter, there is a good case for refusing to specify a specific decade when the whole of South African white agriculture became capitalist.[4]
And so I want to suggest that the origins of the acclaimed Mfengu agricultural production also show regional variations, and that historians need to wear the spectacles of scepticism when dealing with the eulogies of white officials who "supervised" the Mfengu. What follows is based mainly on my researches into the Queenstown Mfengu, but the paper owes considerable debts to Moyer, Bundy and Lewis as well.

Bundy based much of his argument in *The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry* on the belief that between roughly the 1870s and the last years of the nineteenth century, Africans in the Eastern Cape responded to opportunities created by the advent of a money-based market for their produce, a market whose existence reflected the intrusion of the aggressive capitalist colonial economy and alien patterns of administration into African rural areas. Lewis criticized this interpretation on the ground that nearly all the produce sold by Africans was not a true surplus above subsistence requirements, but rather the unavoidable sale of produce essential for adequate nutrition. The experience of the Queenstown Mfengu supports this dimension of Lewis's argument, and provides the subject of the first detailed study to venture onto this disputed ground since Lewis wrote.[5] Nonetheless, the origins of Mfengu production were not universally quite as Lewis suggests.

Lewis sees the cataclysmic Xhosa cattle-killing and crop destruction of 1856-57 as vital to the incorporation of the Xhosa into the money-based colonial economy: deprived of a subsistence base, they had no choice but to labour in the colony and to accept the imposition of colonial administrators and of taxes which could only be paid in cash. The Mfengu, Lewis argues, were moving in this direction even before the cattle-killing. As colonial collaborators, they were rewarded after the 1850-53 frontier war with tracts of land (Oxkraal and Kamastone, Keiskammahoek, Fort Beaufort etc.) on which crop production was feasible, especially when lungsickness (bovine pleuro-pneumonia) decimated their cattle herds between 1853 and 1855. Governor Sir George Grey was just as much a threat as lungsickness, for he proposed to subdivide the several Mfengu locations into small household plots under individual tenure and thereby to interfere with the homestead economy. Responding to these dual threats, some Mfengu acquired wagons, ploughs and (where possible) oxen to draw both, in an effort at diversification to preserve control over their local political economy. When the Xhosa experienced their great need, the Mfengu were in a position to supply them with substantial quantities of grain, and did so via purchasing depots set up by the colonial authorities. Large amounts of cash entered the Mfengu locations thereby, stimulating continued crop sales in future years as a way of raising money for tax payments and the acquisition of consumer articles - a process going on throughout the Eastern Cape.[6]

Lewis's picture of the origins of Mfengu agricultural production rests on information about the Keiskammahoek and Peddie Mfengu. While it may be valid in those cases, it does not readily fit the experience of the Queenstown Mfengu. Even on some of their new land, Mfengu were regarded as short-term tenants only and were overcrowded from the outset - so much so, that at Fort Beaufort they broke up grazing land for crops in an effort to meet their subsistence requirements.[7] Substantial numbers of Peddie and Tyhume Mfengu entered service with farmers during 1854 and 1855,[8] and it seems plain enough that there was a subsistence crisis in these locations. But the Queenstown Mfengu were not so crowded, despite a major influx of population, and did not engage in similar labours. Queenstown farmers were starved of labour at this time, and Mfengu did not work for them save in isolated cases. Let us review some of the issues involved.
In the first place, we do not know with certainty who the people known as “Mfengu” were. What was generally-accepted orthodoxy until recently - that the Mfengu were people forced southward from Natal by the Mfecane - is being questioned in a fascinating but yet unproven hypothesis which postulates that far from having been brought out by the British in 1835 from a sort of undefined oppressive subordination amongst the Xhosa, they were nearly all Xhosa who were captured by British and colonial forces in the 1835 frontier war, and carted off to the colony as a labour force. A minority amongst them was treated more decently and allowed to settle in dispersed mission settlements. [9] It has been recognized for some time that the term “Mfengu” has a catch-all nature, and that a Mfengu could be a Gcaleka or Thembu (for example) who sought accommodation amongst what was accepted as a Mfengu community. But now Cobbing and Webster are suggesting that the Mfengu were not a roughly homogenous ethnic entity by origin. This theory of Mfengu origins appeals to me with regard to the Queenstown community, whose post-1853 nucleus was assembled in the late 1840s from a thoroughly disparate trickle of “Mfengu” (?) who converged on the Kamastone mission station from as far afield as the Tzitzikamma. The community which survived the next war (1850-53) entered peacetime as one whose political and economic institutions were in flux, and its members certainly did not all owe allegiance to any one leader, whether styled a chief or headman by the colonial authorities or not.

In 1853, land near to Kamastone mission was annexed to the Cape Colony to form the Queenstown district, and white farmers settled on extensive tracts adjoining the Mfengu lands. The authorities shuttled the Mfengu around so drastically during 1854, before leaving them more or less in peace under a white Superintendent on what became the Oxkraal and Kamastone rural locations, that a couple of years were needed for social and economic “shakedown”. Obviously a key priority after such serious unsettlement was the production of food, and the volume of food production would have risen rapidly between 1853 and the onset of the cattle-killing because of an enormous influx of outsiders, by no means all what passed by then as ethnic Mfengu, into the locations during that time. The statistics are wretchedly unreliable; nevertheless, the population probably rose by over 2,000 in two years. And long after the cattle-killing, outsiders who were primarily Thembu persisted in trying to gain access to the locations, often encouraged by local headmen who wanted to build up followings, but sometimes prevented by the location Superintendents. These were not conditions under which the Mfengu of Queenstown would supply grain to destitutes in Xhosaland: they were too busy trying to feed themselves, and the newcomers were establishing their own homesteads. The distance from their locations to the purchasing depots was also greater than Mfengu from more easterly locations would have needed to go. And one cannot invoke the £1 quitrent charge as effective proof that there were a lot of sales of produce to raise cash, for the Mfengu were frequently offered exchange in kind at the trading stores. This tendency only changed gradually: monetization was more common at the end of the 1860s than at the beginning of the decade. The Superintendent of the Queenstown Mfengu defended the people against charges of defaulting on hut tax on the grounds that the exchange system made it difficult for them to pay.[10] This contrasts vividly with the cash-flush Mfengu Lewis claims lived in Keiskammahoek; moreover, it was not until 1863 that the Queenstown Mfengu started to sell produce in noteworthy quantities to traders in their vicinity.

So the “fresh lands plus opportunity to make money from starving Xhosa plus hut tax/quitrent demands” thesis about the origins of Mfengu agricultural production will not really fit the Queenstown case. The Queenstown Mfengu certainly did develop a great need for cash income to pay taxation and to purchase manufactures, but this occurred once their administration was tightened-up from the 1860s and under the impact of the appalling drought of the first half of the 1860s, plus worsening stratification amongst homesteads, with polygamous homesteads generally the better off - not under the stimulus of a cash bonanza from sales to the Xhosa. What, then, of Lewis's other major thesis, that most market production by Africans was not a true surplus over and above subsistence requirements?
Here we are on firmer ground, but must beware of exaggerating the extent of damage to the homestead economy before the imposition of individual tenure in 1877, in the Queenstown case at least. Lewis made the mistake of analysing mid-1860s Oxkraal and Kamastone as surveyed locations.[11] In fact, petitions against survey submitted in 1873 by four territorial groups within the locations indicate that elements of a pre-colonial productive mode still obtained. Here is an example:

... grant to us the piece of land as originally given by our first Magistrate ... to Mayekiso and Vumazo and their people.
We have long ploughed and sowed. We have built houses and kraals [homesteads], and have lived in peace, but we should like some letter from the Government that the ground is our own, and that our present arrangements will not be interfered with.[12]

Yet this communal-sounding mode of production and social organization, whose specific characteristics are impossible to reconstruct, had failed to enable the people to resist major colonially-driven damage to their economic wellbeing. Economic stratification of an intense type had emerged, due to a range of factors. Many homesteads were unable to rise above the poverty with which they entered the 1850s, and were weighed down with quitrent/hut tax demands, while the minority of polygamous homesteads benefited from commanding a numerous labour force to work in the fields and to mind stock. In these larger homesteads one finds most of the market-focused dynamic of surplus production which Bundy emphasizes, for it was these which had most chance of generating a true surplus over their own requirements, or of running enough sheep to make money from wool sales. In 1869, when a land surveyor carried out preliminary work on the external boundaries of the location, a wealthy headman named Goda put a plan to him by which the locations would be divided into a few farms of 2-4,000 morgen (4.5-9 thousand acres), granted in undivided shares to groups of twelve to twenty people (the size of an average homestead), “mostly of one kin or affinity”. Goda wanted this because “it would enable the most industrious in time to become sole owners of a part or the whole by buying out their partners ... and to 'become Englishmen'”. [13]

Plainly this reveals incipient self-conscious class formation and a blatantly elitist concept of the future. Exploiting the labour of clan segments, Goda intended to use the binding force of nearer kindred to serve his interests. The community emphasis in the 1873 petitions had no place here. David Parkin has shown how Giriama accumulators in Kenya have manipulated bridewealth and other traditional mechanisms of wealth distribution to their own advantage[14]; likewise, Goda and his like wanted to use survey as a weapon to end all traditional means of redistribution in their society which had suffered severe colonially-inflicted damage.

The extent of that damage has been examined by Lewis, and more recently by me, on the basis of computer analysis of contemporary reports, letters and unpublished census data.[15] I had access to more census data than Lewis did. It is too long and technical an exercise to put down here. The findings agree that severe economic stratification existed as early as c.1860, and almost certainly before that. However, there is disagreement over the timing of the period of the most extensive production, and in fact there is a three-way disagreement here, for Lewis and I disagree with Bundy over the periodization too.

In the new Preface to the second edition of his book, whose main text is unaltered, Bundy does not concede Lewis’s argument that the high point of production had been passed by the mid 1870s, insisting that it had not been attained by then. I think there are two reasons for the difference in views, particularly as far as the Mfengu are concerned: first, the need to reach agreement over the degree of reliability of the unpublished census data for individual locations, and second, the historian’s vulnerability to exaggerated contemporary reports, some of which have fostered the myth of the efficient and wealthy Mfengu.
An exaggerated impression of Mfengu wealth prevailed from the early 1850s amongst colonial officials and public, nearly all of whom were impervious to pleas to the contrary. In 1865 the Queenstown newspaper claimed that “many” Mfengu held bank accounts, but in the comparative context of a small community like white Queenstown this could have been as few as twenty or thirty.[16] In 1869, changing its tune and noting that very few Mfengu had bank accounts (this itself discloses flawed colonial perceptions and information), the newspaper commented,

They do earn a great deal more money than they spend in food and clothing. We suspect however that most of them prefer investing in live stock.[17]

Mythologies clouded the editor’s thinking as he wrote of Mfengu super-industriousness and of a cult status applied to livestock. There was no perception that wealth in the locations was massively unevenly distributed. Similarly, when John Hemming returned to Queenstown as Civil Commissioner in 1875 after an absence of several years, he reported a “very great advancement” amongst the Mfengu. There were more brick or stone dwellings, more irrigation furrows, and “the slopes of the hills and extent of land turned over surprised me ...”. [18] He did not know that there were only ninety brick houses amongst more than two thousand dwellings,[19] and in 1878 asserted that,

In 1865 the ... Locations were thinned by the emigration of about 1200 people, those remaining behind occupying the ground thus vacated in addition to what they were then in possession of.

They have increased in wealth since that time ... [20]

On the contrary, after some of the community emigrated to what is now the southern Transkei in 1865, much of the evacuated land probably passed into the hands of a small group of headmen and a small group which had been accumulating stock and land before 1865. Stratification became more, not less, intense after 1865, and if there was a rise in production, it was not exclusively, and probably not even largely, the effort of the smaller homesteads. The Queenstown evidence does not conform to Lewis’s assertion that agricultural production by poorer homesteads increased across the board in the Mfengu locations between 1865 and 1875.[21] I have also been unable to accept the way Bundy interpreted Hemming’s remarks, which was as evidence of a still-rising surplus production;[22] actually, statistical and detailed documentary analysis suggest that agricultural enterprise was already in serious trouble. The 1891 census, a poor source but still better than the 1875 census, suggests that even if they had been able to retain all their production for their own consumption, the Mfengu would have had a grain supply of 571 lbs. per person per year, over 100 lbs. below the minimum adequate nutritional level of 689 lbs. which was specified by a study in 1952.[23] Since they actually sold some of their produce, the intensive cultivation which delighted Hemming was woefully less than what was necessary.

Yet the myth of the rich Mfengu remained powerful. In 1868, the Queenstown Mfengu asked for unrestricted access to a pocket of Crown land next to their locations in order to graze cattle. The response by an official whose knowledge of the area was unquestionably better than that of most of his fellows was also conditioned by a largely unsubstantiated impression of Mfengu wealth:

Why should they have a free run? ... they can club together and purchase the lease ... as a body they can afford to give a higher price for the land than the European farmer.[24]

The fixed belief of local officials and the Native Affairs Secretariat in Cape Town that the Mfengu were wealthy helps to account for the exclusion of adjacent Crown land from the area divided into individual plots in 1877. Greatly mistaken though the authorities were, they were probably encouraged by the example of a mere handful of Mfengu who did lease
additional ground.

Jacob Mkande, an intriguing figure about whom all too little is known, accumulated stock while living on a mission, and bought two small but good farms near Oxkraal, originally owned by whites, during the 1870s. In the early 1880s, three other Mfengu leased farms in the same area, paying annual cash rentals of up to £230. These were highly exceptional. All such enterprising people were also hampered by all Africans' lack of access to financial credit. Had Africans in the rural locations been able to borrow money, they would have been able to buy and develop land. Development was no less vital, over time, than purchase and initial access: without developing the productive resources of the land, one could easily lose it, as many poor whites found out. Throughout the Eastern Cape, institutional lenders were reluctant to provide money even to rural whites. It was asking a great deal to expect a lender to believe that an African with few means beyond his livestock could establish himself on some quitrent land, pay his quitrent each year, and repay his loan. Furthermore, Queenstown Mfengu had to compete with a rapidly capitalizing class of white farmers who wanted to augment their landholdings.

A land survey, designed to divide Oxkraal and Kamastone into small plots, was finally launched in 1875 despite extensive opposition. Plots of six acres were measured for each household, threatening the homestead structure of production and resource sharing which the petitioners of 1873 sought to preserve. Dispersed homesteads were to be concentrated into villages some distance from the lands. Work was in progress when an extraordinary letter from the Queenstown Civil Commissioner arrived on the Surveyor-General's desk in Cape Town, admitting that the Commission which had investigated the feasibility of survey had "failed to take evidence...that the natives were ding and anxious to obtain title to the 6 acre allotments, this they most certainly are". With reason, the Surveyor-General treated this sceptically; but he allowed the survey to proceed in the hope that it would reveal what the Mfengu actually thought.

By so doing, the Surveyor-General committed the Mfengu to the burden of individual tenure. Although they protested, and the work of survey was continually interrupted by their representations, a survey was virtually unstoppable once underway. At that juncture in Cape history, in any case, encouraging individual tenure was a key element in an official obsession with undermining all foundations of chiefly authority.

The survey favoured no-one save chief Zulu and several headmen, whose goodwill had to be bought with extra grants of land as compensation for lost powers. Goda and his cronies were completely outflanked and gained nothing, which suggests both that they lacked the effective patronage received by Zulu and his senior headmen, and that the government was unsympathetic to moving very large numbers of people out of the locations. For the mass of common people, the survey forced them to make the most of difficult circumstances. By the end of 1879, with the survey only in operation for some eighteen months, water had almost run out and a substantial number of people had emigrated permanently. By 1883 the prospects were worse than the Locations Superintendent could recollect seeing over a period of twenty-five years.

Adding to the crisis was a lack of overflow grazing ground, exacerbated by loss of access to adjacent Crown land. Under all these circumstances, titles were taken up slowly or not at all. By the end of 1881, only 153 of 1,779 grantees had collected and paid for their titles. Emigration continued throughout the 1880s. By 1887, well over 100 title-holding grantees were in arrear with their quitrent payments.

In 1922, the Oxkraal and Kamastone survey was cited in an official report as an example of the inadequacy and unviability of many small-plot surveys of Cape rural locations carried out during the nineteenth century. Inheritance disputes wrought havoc with the title system, and the people evaded the village system in order to settle closer to their arable lands.
details of the breakdown, and a close examination of to what extent the homestead economy
did survive the shock of survey, await research; but historians will be quick to point out that
the “Israelite” millenialists shot down at Bulhoek in 1921 lived in the Kamastone location.

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Finally, as an issue without direct thematic links to the previous part of this paper, I would
like to consider the matter of ethnicity amongst the Mfengu before c1890. Although the
period was highly significant in setting the foundations for the economic tragedy of the rural
Cape African reserves, it seems not to have witnessed any significant development of an
ethnic consciousness amongst the Mfengu beyond the well-known point that they had a
history of collaboration with the colonial power during frontier conflicts, and that they
constituted a group of people who gained access to increasingly scarce land as the fruit of
their collaboration. Amongst the Queenstown Mfengu, however, there was no “consciously
crafted ideological creation”; no “culture brokers” or educated intellectual core existed to
speak to the people.[29] If any powerful and formative ideology was at work, it lay in the
colonial authorities’ muddled perception of distinct Mfengu “tribes”, which is perpetuated in
history books and popular white belief in the “tribal”, “warring” or “fractious” character of
African society.[30] Moyer does point out that settlement in the colony under a sort of
British patronage encouraged the Mfengu to develop into a “cohesive political
community”.[31] Beyond this point, however, there was no sign of the kind of protest which
animated Nehemiah Tile and the “Thembu Church” in the early 1880s. The Thembu were
reacting to encroachment by white authority, obviously an inappropriate stance by the
colonial Mfengu. But once the Thembu church ceased to be ethnic, and appealed instead to
common blackness, Transkeian Mfengu joined it in the 1890s. [32]

The way historians understand Mfengu ethnicity is likely to be strongly influenced by
whatever emerges from the current work on Mfengu origins. If the Mfengu actually were not
Natal refugees, but (for the most part) a miscellany of captives from the Transkei and Ciskei,
then people like John Ayliff in 1835, Whiteside the amateur historian, and all officials
connected with Mfengu administration subsequently, will appear as “culture brokers” who
couraged the emergence and consolidation of a Mfengu ethnicity. It is also worth noting
that the untidy way in which the Mfengu core group assembled at Oxkraal and Kamastone
between c.1845 and 1852 meant that the followers of different headmen could interpret or
express their assorted historical experiences in a way which their white Superintendents
readily construed as “tribal”. Denied opportunity of interaction with fresh sources of ideas,
an ethnic history of the Mfengu took shape amongst the people themselves as well as
amongst observers. And it all grew out of the colonially-generated justificatory dogma of
“Mfengu liberation from Xhosa domination” by the British in 1835, which is now being
challenged through effective research.

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Notes


2 L Louw and F Kendall, South Africa: the Solution (Johannesburg, 1986), pp 7-17; revised as After Apartheid: the Solution for South Africa (San Francisco, 1987).


7 LG 676, Superintendent of Fingoes, Fort Beaufort, to Civil Commissioner of Fort Beaufort, 9 November 1853; Graham's Town Journal, 7 January 1854.

8 Cape Printed Papers, Further Papers Relative to the State of the Kaffir Tribes ... 1855, 43, 44, 48.


10 LG 419, G M Shepstone to Secretary to Lieutenant-Governor, 26 December 1861. See also R Southey to Co, 30 May 1855, with enclosures.

11 Lewis, “Economic History”, 442.

12 NA 171, petition of Mayekiso et al. dated 17 March 1873, under cover of Civil Commissioner of Queenstown to Secretary of Native Affairs, 10 May 1873.

13 CO 913, “Memorandum: the Ox Kraal and Kamastone Fingo Locations”, under cover of F Orpen to Surveyor-General, 22 March 1869.

14 D Parkin, Palms, Wine and Witnesses (San Francisco, 1972), 49-86.

15 Lewis, “Economic History”, 458-74; Bouch, “Colonization of Queenstown”.

16 Queenstown Free Press, 21 February 1865.

17 Queenstown Free Press, 27 April 1869.

18 Cape Printed Papers, G 16-'76, Blue Book for Native Affairs, 1876, 85.

19 Ibid., 88.
20 NA 178, Civil Commissioner of Queenstown to Secretary for Native Affairs, 12 October 1878.


22 Bundy, op. cit., 72.


24 CO 3163, marginal comment by C D Griffith on R Dugmore to Colonial Secretary, 29 January 1869.


26 Cape Printed Papers, G 3-'84, Blue Book for Native Affairs, 1884, 60.

27 SG 1/1/1/48, E C Jeffrey to Civil Commissioner of Queenstown, 22 October 1881 and 8 February 1882; LAND 1/228, E C Jeffrey to Civil Commissioner of Queenstown, 5 August 1887.


30 Notably, J Ayliff and J Whiteside, History of the Abambo, generally known as “Fingos” (Butterworth, 1912; repr. Cape Town, 1962), which was essentially Whiteside’s work, endorsed the notion that the Mfengu comprised a series of “clans” - but he defined them in a manner that anthropologists do not recognize.

31 Moyer, op. cit., 16.