THE TURN TO THE MASSES:
THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS' STRATEGIC REVIEW OF 1978-79[1]

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I

This paper examines a formal review of strategy undertaken by the African National Congress (ANC) and its influential incorporated ally, the South African Communist Party (SACP), in 1978-79. This review led to changes in their understanding of the immediate strategic tasks before them. These changes turned on the relationship between political and military forms of revolutionary struggle and the tactics of their combination.

ANC and SACP strategy between the early 1960s and 1978 centred on the development of a popular armed struggle, situated mainly in the rural areas, for the seizure of state power in South Africa. [2] The strategic review of 1978-79 did not alter the essence of this perspective. What the review did change was the ANC's understanding of the means it should employ to build an organised revolutionary political base for itself inside South Africa. Whereas, since the early 1960s, the ANC had behaved as if armed activity was the major means to develop an organised political base [3], in 1979 the review concluded the main means should rather be political organisation by political means - legal, semi-legal and underground.

The ANC's and SACP's interest in such a popular political base was common to revolutionary struggles from the 1930s. Revolutionaries invariably fought wars that were, as Rapoport has termed it, "not symmetrical" [4] - in which revolutionaries did not possess the resources of the state they were seeking to overthrow. The usual means revolutionaries used to redress this asymmetry was to secure the support or compliance of the civilian population. Without redressing the asymmetry, revolutionaries generally stood little chance of success.

In practice, the review did not benefit the ANC's and SACP's armed struggle as intended - for reasons outlined towards the end of this paper. Instead, it equipped the ANC and SACP with a formally sanctioned framework to become involved in, and in later years to benefit considerably from, popular political struggles conducted in the legal and semi-legal spheres inside South Africa. It also facilitated the ANC's later role in the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Moreover, when it became clear in the late 1980s that their armed struggle was a failure (assessed in the terms in which they had conceived of it), the political initiatives sanctioned by the 1978-79 review meant the ANC and SACP were well placed, in comparison to their rivals, to place their major emphasis on the politics of popular action.

The ANC's 1978-79 strategic review, a formal exercise instituted by the ANC's national executive committee (NEC), had two stages. In the first stage, from about June to December 1978, sections of the ANC leadership made concerted attempts, including a visit to Vietnam, to find remedies for their organisation's weakness and difficulties. These attempts led to a second stage: the appointment in January 1979 of a commission to review ANC strategy, tactics and operational structures. This commission reported in March of that year and most of its central recommendations were formally adopted by the ANC in August.

This paper relies substantially on original research, mainly on interviews conducted between 1989 and 1991. [5] If made available for public scrutiny, confidential ANC documents of the late 1970s should bear out the weight of the interviews.
II

The origins of the ANC’s emphasis on armed activity between 1961 and 1978 lay in the interplay of three sets of factors. They were the theoretical revolutionary discourse of the ANC and SACP after 1961 [6], the strategic examples set by other contemporary anti-colonial and revolutionary struggles imbibed by the ANC and SACP [7], and a fairly general desire within ANC and SACP ranks to retaliate against what was seen as a brutal, violent state. [8] Together these factors locked the ANC and SACP into an assumption that revolutionary armed struggle was not merely the means by which ultimately to contend for state power but also the principal means by which to progress in each phase of escalation towards that eventual goal.

When the ANC finally succeeded in actually resuming armed action inside South Africa in 1976, after a 13-year silence, its senior operational organ, the Revolutionary Council (RC), saw matters very much in these terms. The ANC saw itself then as being in “the early stages of people’s war” in which the “primary activity” must be “engaging, harassing and dispersing the enemy’s armed and police forces, and hitting enemy installations (administrative, economic, military, communications, etc) in order to reduce its will and capacity to pursue the struggle”. [9] Political mobilisation was, a “precondition for the long-term success of armed struggle”. [10] That is, political organisation was subject to military imperatives.

III

The 1978-79 strategic review was stimulated primarily by the ANC’s difficulty in situating a sustained armed presence inside South Africa. The ANC came to identify the absence of an organised political base able to receive, securely locate and protect an armed presence as the major reason for this difficulty. The review offered a new answer on how to create this political base - in order eventually to enhance the prospects for what it saw as the main means to achieve state power, namely revolutionary armed struggle.

The uprisings in Soweto and elsewhere in 1976 had indicated an immediate potential for popular insurrectionary activity in urban areas. The ANC had largely disregarded such potential in strategic formulations after “Operation Mayibuye” had been still-born in 1963; the SACP only slightly less so. [11] The urban-centred uprisings of 1976, which had depended neither on ANC armed activity (there had been none inside South Africa for 13 years) nor on ANC political activity, prompted some in the ANC to begin to “rethink the possibilities for domestic popular involvement in revolutionary struggle. [12]

Despite state repression, oppositional political ferment inside South Africa had indicated possibilities for legal and semi-legal popular political mobilization against apartheid. These possibilities had been apparent since the early 1970s, with the rise of the black consciousness movement and independent trade unions, but the ANC had given scant attention to them.

By late 1978, the state was adapting a range of political and economic relations to dissipate the threats to white rule and capitalism it had identified in the anti-apartheid ferment in the mid-1970s. [13] These adaptations formed part of a comprehensive new security doctrine, “Total Strategy”. The strategy’s main political device was the demobilization of militancy in some black sectors and their co-option into alignment with the state.

Within the region, the South African state combined military, economic and diplomatic pressures to ensure the obeisance of neighbouring independent African states as well as their eschewal of support for the ANC. This was a response to a shift in the regional balance after Angolan and Mozambican independence, renewed ANC armed activity and guerrilla war in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. [14]
The exodus of several thousand young militants from South Africa after the 1976 uprisings had given the ANC, for the first time since the mid-1960s, a small army of young and fit guerrillas. [15] Most recruits to the ANC in exile after 1976 had wanted to go into MK. [16] This, too, was precisely where the ANC leadership wanted the bulk of them to go. [17]

IV

By October 1978, there were reasons to question not merely the adequacy of the ANC’s initiatives in this developing situation; there was also a compelling argument against their character. In exile, the ANC’s operational organs had several weaknesses. There was a dislocation between political and military organs on the RC. Political organs were relatively weak and amorphous, whereas military organs predominated. [18] The military was resorting to short-term infiltrations commanded, controlled and supplied from abroad. The few attempts at building internal military structures had met with little success; and attempts to indigenize an armed capacity had come to be deferred. Inside South Africa, formal ANC underground structures remained extremely small and weak - despite growing popular amenability to ANC perspectives.

On the military side in exile, control of armed activity came under an RC department known as Central Operations Headquarters (COH). [19] COH had been set up after the 1976 uprisings [20] and was a revamp of an earlier MK operations section. [21] COH was headed by Joe Modise with Joe Slovo as his deputy [22], and was a purely operational command. By 1978, COH was relating to regional COH machineries in the forward areas (independent African states immediately adjacent to South Africa - Botswana, Lesotho, and Mozambique-Swaziland which had joint machineries). Each COH regional machinery oversaw armed activity in a particular area of South Africa. [23]

By mid-1978, a “good proportion” of new recruits from the 1976 exodus of militant black youths who had already completed their guerrilla training had been deployed, according to COH. [24] The number this represented is unclear. In June 1978, South African police estimated that at least 4,000 young black South Africans were in guerrilla training camps following the 1976 uprisings, the majority of them with the ANC - perhaps as many as 3,000. [25] Given difficulties of the time, the “good proportion” probably refers to fewer than 200 military cadres.

COH believed that news of some MK activities was being suppressed. The Minister of Police appeared to concede this in February 1978 when he said that a number of clashes between ANC guerrillas and security forces had remained unpublicized. [26] The number of MK strikes between 1976 and the end of 1978 was between 37 and 57, many of them modest in character. [27] Over that period, according to police statistics, the number of ANC guerrillas killed or captured was 35. [28] This indicates that the casualty/strike ratio probably fell somewhere between one guerrilla casualty for each attack and two guerrilla casualties for every three attacks.

RC officials felt in mid-1978 that “the flow of combat actions had significantly raised the prestige and following of the ANC both inside and outside the country”. [29] ANC armed activity was undoubtedly a factor in the increase in the popularity of the ANC among black South Africans evident over this and the subsequent period, according to accounts of anti-apartheid activists. [30]

But it was apparent to some on the RC that the ANC had some way to go towards developing sustained armed activity. They saw their major obstacle as the “lack of sufficient facilities in adjacent territories”. [31] Gradually, some on the RC argued that this disadvantage could be mitigated only by building an internal revolutionary base capable of indigenizing an armed presence. Within COH, there was dissatisfaction with the quality of political reconstruction work inside South Africa. [32] COH wanted internal reception networks for returning
guerrillas [33], but very few existed in 1978.

Between 1969 and 1976, there had been no ANC organ charged clearly with internal political work: theoretically, this was the task of the entire RC but, in practice, the RC had been dominated by military considerations. [34] Then, in 1977, the ANC had established an Internal Reconstruction and Development Department (IRD) to oversee political reconstruction inside South Africa. But IRD, which initially came under weak leadership, was the only RC department concerned with political work [35]; the remaining eight or nine emergent RC sections were engaged in military tasks. [36] From early 1978, this imbalance was gradually moderated with the appointment of Mac Maharaj as IRD secretary. A combative and innovative personality, Maharaj was a major protagonist in battles over strategy on the RC. He demanded that more emphasis be given to political reconstruction inside South Africa by political means. [37]

Below the RC, COH regional commands in the forward areas usually operated separately from initially indistinct regional IRD political structures. [38] To the extent that there was any liaison or co-ordination between them at regional level it was discretionary, informal and, often, non-existent. The RC’s ability to co-ordinate specializations and to develop coherent politico-military perspectives was hampered by frequent absenteeism from its meetings. [39] This was often because RC members had to attend to other ANC or SACP diplomatic and administrative tasks.

Inside South Africa by mid-1978, IRD had begun trying to rebuild the embryonic political underground structure established in the mid-1970s in Natal, the Transvaal and eastern Cape - although their cores had been smashed by 1977 in Natal and the Transvaal. The size of the formal domestic political underground after 1976 numbered about 50 units, according to one ANC leader’s unofficial estimate. [40] This probably involved no more than about 200 people, most in urban centres. Underground units fostered by IRD from 1978 were concerned mainly with propaganda work, creating reception networks and developing linkages into popular organisations. [41]

V

In the first stage of the review, comprising mainly discussions and arguments at leadership level in late 1978, the ANC and SACP found themselves grappling with the reality that armed activity was not, of itself, succeeding in building the revolutionary political base necessary to wage popular armed struggle. Disputes over the solution took a number of forms.

Some on the RC argued that targets chosen for COH’s armed activities were often inappropriate to political needs. [42] They also said that it made little sense to rely on combat groups sent into the country from abroad. [43] This pattern meant time and energy were wasted on a host of specialities - for surveillance teams, logistics and ordnance departments, and for the combatants themselves. [44] It made more sense to organise people living inside the country to mount attacks. [45] Some RC political personnel also argued that using externally controlled combat units was encouraging the ANC’s potential constituency inside South Africa to wait passively for exile-based ANC military activity instead of themselves becoming involved in it. [46]

To this, COH responded that involving people in the ANC’s potential constituency was impossible because of the lack of progress in building an organised popular revolutionary political base inside South Africa. [47] COH, which had sometimes behaved in the past as if its military activities would create such a base, now began to argue with increasing vehemence that it was, instead, the task of political workers to do so. [48] COH added that it could not wait for the political section to produce the political goods: it had to meet another immediate demand: that the ANC be seen to be striking at the South African state. [49] It
had to keep the pot boiling. COH argued that the solution to most of its military problems lay in increased political organisation inside South Africa. [50]

To this, some in IRD responded that they were desperately short of suitable resources and personnel to do political work, and their work was often frustrated by COH itself. [51] Moreover, they said that to conceive of internal political work from the outset as something that should be conducted merely to service the imperatives of military struggle, as COH apparently did, would be counter-productive. Rather, political work should be conducted according to its own imperatives, and COH could expect only spin-off benefits. [52]

A view gradually developed among some RC members that underlying their difficulties lurked basic questions of revolutionary theory, strategy and practice. Rhetorically, the ANC had long maintained that the political leadership directed and guided the military. But, in late 1978, some within COH began to come around to what was originally the view of some in IRD, that the ANC was “showing grave weaknesses which, if uncorrected, could result in a militarist deviation”. [53]

In the course of its attempts to resolve its problems, a small RC delegation visited Vietnam in October 1978. [54] A report on the visit, written by Slovo, identified a number of general propositions which it said had guided Vietnamese revolutionaries. These should be creatively applied by the ANC. These propositions centred on the need for armed struggle to be continually related to political needs and to be conceived of as dependent upon the strength of political organisation; moreover, the report suggested that a revolutionary vanguard could best relate to its potential constituency by means of a front of legal and semi-legal organizations which could play a considerable role in building a revolutionary political base. [55]

The report also argued that much ANC practice hitherto had been militaristic. The ANC had started from the premise that armed activity would help regenerate conditions for political work but had then behaved as if armed activity was the movement’s primary task. [56] Post-1976 military activity had been taking place in something of a void; most of it could not be related to an organised political base or to regional or local political issues and ANC tasks. [57] Moreover, without effective political organisation, without a mass political base, the military struggle could not mount a challenge for state power. But, alleged the report, the ANC lacked not merely an organised internal base but also a clear and detailed strategy for developing one. [58]

Slovo and others now felt the ANC had to reopen the debate on how to achieve an organized domestic political revolutionary base. In the past, the ANC had

not paid sufficient attention to the militant political struggle inside the country, to the possibilities of combining legal and illegal actions and relating them to our political-military strategy. We had not given proper weight to the significance of the many mass organisations which had recently arisen; and we had sometimes taken sectarian positions towards them ... [59]

Important voices in COH now began to argue that the ANC’s war had not really begun at all, whatever the contrary claims of ANC propaganda [60] and the views expressed by COH and the RC after the 1976 uprisings. [61] Slovo’s report argued that the ANC was at a stage when the “main task was to concentrate on mass political organisation and legal and illegal mobilisation”. [62]

It was something that Maharaj and others had been arguing for some time - though they rejected a view of political struggle, apparently held by some in COH, which conceived of it from the outset as merely a servant of military struggle. Now, Slovo and others were
suggesting, armed activity should play merely a supportive, secondary and auxiliary role in the construction of a popular revolutionary base [63] - the better eventually to service an all-round armed revolutionary assault. The main means for developing this base should be “the building of a broad front” on issues of immediate material relevance to the ANC’s potential constituency inside South Africa. [64] A broad front could, they now argued, prompt a “mass upsurge [which], together with armed confrontation, would lead to the winning of people’s power”. [65]

A copy of the report on the Vietnam visit was presented to an NEC meeting in late 1978. A special meeting of the NEC and RC was held in Luanda, Angola, from December 27 1978 to January 1 1979. [66] The context of the meeting was a view that IRD was “not delivering the goods”. [67] The Luanda meeting elected a commission, which it named the Politico-Military Strategy Commission (PMSC), to consider the report’s arguments as well as other opinions and options. [68] This heralded the second stage of the review. In August 1979, the NEC accepted most PMSC recommendations - with one crippling exception, dealt with below. [69]

The members of the PMSC were: ANC president Oliver Tambo as chairman, Joe Gqabi, Moses Mabhida, Thabo Mbeki, Joe Modise and Joe Slovo. [70] Its terms of reference covered ANC political and military perspectives and operational structures. [71] Their recommendations echoed many perspectives for underground and popular mobilization already being development by IRD under Maharaj and contained in Slovo’s report on the Vietnam visit.

The four strategic lines recommended by the PMSC and accepted by the NEC were that the ANC should: one, elaborate an overall strategy based on mass mobilization of people inside South Africa; two, create inside the country the broadest possible national front of organizations and people for national liberation, and win this front into alignment with the ANC; three, draw into ANC underground structures those promising activists thrown up in popular organizations and in popular anti-apartheid struggles; and four, grasp that military-type operations developed out of political activity and should be guided by the needs and level of political organisation. [72]

Of these, the PMSC identified the second - the creation of the broad front - as the most important immediate task before the ANC. [73] The PMSC reasoned that if the ANC were to build a domestic political base it had to relate to people at large; this meant becoming deeply involved in popular organisations operating in the legal and semi-legal sphere.

The major theme of PMSC thinking was that the ANC:

had to make a deliberate turn to the masses for the purpose of teaching them and learning from them. We had for too long acted as if the repressive conditions made mass legal and semi-legal work impossible. If the people had taught us anything through the initiatives they had taken in the preceding five years, it was that the potential for political struggle [had] never [been] exhausted. And, if our own independent efforts had taught us anything, it was that our efforts would reach a dead-end unless they had a broader political base. [74]

The militarist vanguardism of the past had manifestly failed. If the ANC neglected to “turn to the masses” it would become one of “the spectators in years to come”. [75] A broad popular front was the channel for the necessary dialogue. Membership of the front should be based on an organisation’s commitment to political freedoms and opposition to racist rule. [76] The PMSC said ANC activists had to be present whenever people acted against apartheid - no matter how inchoate that popular resistance might be - in order to steer organization in a
revolutionary direction. It meant the ANC "could not shun any organisation engaged in such activities merely on the ground that it did not embrace [the ANC's] long-term revolutionary aims or criticised part of [the ANC's] strategy". [77]

Building a front should be, the PMSC recommended, the primary task of the ANC underground for the foreseeable future. [78] The underground had to develop ways to insert the ANC's political purposes into popular organizations and resistance. The PMSC argued that the ANC's illegality meant it had to develop a subtle relationship with the front:

The guiding hand of our liberation movement did not always have to be seen publicly or acknowledged. Our work had to proceed in a way which could not unnecessarily expose the legal and semi-legal organisations to more intense enemy harassment and provide the excuse to destroy these public bodies. [79]

The PMSC added that sectarian behaviour by some ANC members would have to stop. The state's restructuring, one of whose intentions was to win over a portion of the ANC's potential constituency, did not allow for such behaviour. The Commission saw a distinct role for the ANC in stimulating more popular organizations - trade unions, civic organizations and internal committees of SACTU, among others. [81] And it criticized the ANC for its past inability to develop any strategic approach on the bantustans. [82]

The PMSC suggested a number of future campaigns. One should be launched to repopularize the Freedom Charter. COH/MK should choose targets which highlighted particular demands in the Freedom Charter. [83] The ANC should help escalate campaigns against local government structures created for sectors of the black population. These campaigns should culminate in their "permanent destruction" in order to reduce "the capacity of the enemy to govern our people". [84] It also saw boycott as one tactic which could damage the state's capacity to govern whilst activating the ANC's potential constituency. Boycott tactics should suit circumstances. [85] Forthcoming elections for the government-created South African Indian Council were specifically earmarked for action. [86]

Moreover, the ANC and its allies had to lend all possible support to the struggle to "build a progressive trade union movement inside the country which rejected all attempts to isolate the workers from the struggle for national liberation". [87] This reflected ANC suspicions over the position taken by a number of the better organized emerging industrial trade unions that they should, at least temporarily, hold back from a national political involvement. At the same time, the PMSC identified an immediate insurrectionary potential in urban black townships. [88] It suggested that this potential should be developed within a perspective of protracted struggle. Popular uprisings, the PMSC suggested, would probably punctuate this protracted struggle and raise it to a higher plane - without necessarily being decisive.

The PMSC's central strategic formulation was that

people's power in South Africa would be won by revolutionary violence in a protracted armed struggle which must involve the whole people and in which partial and general mass uprisings would play a vital role. [89]

Within this perspective, the role of the envisaged front was to

engage the mass of our people in ever-growing political struggle to weaken the enemy, to create effective revolutionary bases as the foundation of a developing armed struggle, and to win the aims of our national democratic revolution. [90]
VI

This perspective still turned on popular armed struggle for the seizure of state power. It laid more emphasis on political work by political means than any ANC strategic formulation since 1961. It saw only a secondary role for armed activity in the construction of a popular revolutionary base. But, still, the strategic vision was one in which political organization was ultimately seen as subject to military imperatives - notwithstanding ambiguity in some formulations developed in the course of the review. Where there was ambiguity, it was settled in practice in future years in favour of the military by the huge imbalance in favour of the military in ANC operational organs which persisted after 1979. This bias continued largely because the NEC refused to accept one of the PMSC's key recommendations.

Before dealing with this rejection, however, it is convenient briefly to point out that, accompanying the PMSC's recognition of insurrectionary potential, were two shifts in strategic thinking. One was towards the view that urban rather than rural areas were the major terrain for a revolutionary challenge against the South African state. A second was the ANC's and SACP's (re)discovery of the importance of sectoral political struggles. These incipient changes imposed new demands on ANC organisation. the critical one being an improved ability to relate different forms of struggle to each other.

The NEC rejected a PMSC recommendation that the ANC develop a smaller, more cerebral and more muscular RC. As noted, the RC was afflicted by predominence of the military, absenteeism and inter-departmental tensions. These problems seriously weakened the RC's ability to analyse successes and failures, to overcome political-military parallelism, and to develop co-ordinated or integrated political-military perspectives. The PMSC suggested reducing the RC from some 20 to about 10 members, comprising the ANC's most talented strategists. RC members should be freed from all non-operational ANC tasks. The new organ should reflect a much stronger political presence. Crucially, it should have increased quasi-executive powers of decision-making on internal work. [91] The major reason for the rejection of this recommendation was, according to some, a fear among some NEC members that a new central operational organ of this kind could develop into a locus of power to rival the NEC. [92]

This rejection had far-reaching and damaging results. The RC continued essentially as before, with much the same membership, personal and interdepartmental rivalries, and individual strategic mindsets. There was only marginal improvement in political-military co-ordination as a result of the review. What improvement there was occurred mainly in RC subsidiary structures, known as the "senior organs". These were mini-RCs set up in the forward areas; they existed until 1983. Some minor improvements in IRD representation on the RC did little to alter military predominence.

The result of the continued shortcomings in the RC was that what political advances were made in later years to 1983 were not of a kind which could absorb, sustain and integrate a military combat presence in the way the PMSC report envisaged: military asymmetry could not be redressed. Military and political work continued essentially in parallel to each other. Military combat continued to take mainly the form of short-term penetrations commanded and supplied from abroad. Whatever the ANC's theoretical or rhetorical advances in the course of the strategic review, ambitions and jealousies at the top level of leadership had crippled the ANC's ability to translate them fully into practice.

The review did, however, sanction a number of ANC political interventions in the legal and semi-legal spheres. These ANC initiatives coalesced with other, often significantly autonomous, forces and developments inside South Africa to stimulate popular anti-apartheid campaigns in South Africa in the 1980s. These initiatives equipped the ANC to benefit from the popular political ferment after 1981. Among these benefits were the UDF in 1983 and COSATU in 1985.
The prescience of the ANC's 1978-79 strategic review may lead some in hindsight either to conclude that the ANC was singularly responsible for the formation of the UDF, or to want to convey that impression. Earlier versions of this paper have verged on giving the former impression. New information has come to light which does not support this veiled suggestion. Rather, the ANC was one among several progenitors of the UDF and COSATU—although the ANC was undoubtedly the major beneficiary of their formation. There is a paradox in this: had the ANC alone been progenitor of the UDF and COSATU, it could probably never have derived as much benefit from them as it did.

Notes

1 This paper is a summary of another, similar paper with the same title by me, in the *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol 18, No 1, April 1992.


3 See Howard Barrell, *MK: The ANC’s Armed Struggle* (Johannesburg, 1990), pp. 6-30.


5 I have decided not to identify my interviewees at this stage. Most are members of the ANC or South African Communist Party, while some were formerly leading activists in the mass democratic movement. I conducted the interviews between July 1989 and April 1991 in Cape Town, Harare, London, Lusaka and Johannesburg. I selected the interviewees mainly on account of their roles in formulating the strategic perspectives dealt with or their service in ANC operational structures. At the conclusion of my research, these interviews will be made available to others.


8 Interview G1, p 1; Interview K1, p 13; Interview 0, p 10; Interview R, pp 27-29; Interview X1, p 2.

9 Interview F1, p 10.

10 Interview F1, p 10.

11 See ANC, "Strategy and Tactics of the ANC"; SACP, "Road to South African Freedom", p. 315; Interview F1, p 1.

12 Interview D, p 2.


15 Interview F1, p 14.

16 Interview G1, p 1.

17 Interview H1, p 7.

18 Interview R2, pp 13-25, 40.

19 It was known by various names within the ANC, among them the "Operations Unit" of MK and "Operations and Planning Department".

20 Interview F1 p 13.

21 Interview F2, p 5.

22 Interview A, p 1.

23 Interview F1, pp 15-16.

24 Interview F1, p 16.


26 Reported in Moss, The Wheels Turn, p 3.


28 Harms Commission of Inquiry into politically motivated violence (1991), General Stadler's evidence, p 1,024.
See, for example, Interview T, pp. 7-8; also Interview L, pp 2-3. See also Mark Orkin, *Disinvestment, the Struggle and the Future. What Black South Africans Really Think* (Johannesburg, 1986), p 37.

Interview F1, p 17.

Interview K2, p 34.

Interview K2, p 20.

Interview K2, pp 13-25, 40.

Interview K2, pp 13-25, 40.

Interview K2, pp 13-25, 40.

Interview K2, pp 20, 24, 27-30.

Interview F2, p 6; Interview I1, p 25.

Interview F1, p 14; Interview F2, p 5.

Interview D, p 4.

Interview K2, pp 25-30.

To the end of the paragraph, Notes on Interview with A, pp 1-2.

Notes on Interview with A, pp. 1-2.

Interview F1, p 17.

Interview R2, pp 11-13, 19-21, 24-25, 27, 30-32, 34-35.

Interview R2, pp 20, 24.

Interview F1, p 18.

Interview F1, p 24.

Interview F1, pp 24-25.

Interview F1, p 19.

Interview F1, p 19.

Interview F1, p 20.

Interview F1, p 18.

Interview F1, pp 18-19.

See Interview F1, p 10.

Interview F1, p 20.
Interview F1, pp 22-23; Interview K2, pp 42-45, 49-51.

Interview K2, pp 44-45.

The first was presented to the Southern African History and Politics Seminar, University of Oxford, November 27 1989; the second was published in *Southern African Seminar Work in Progress* (Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, October 1990).

Interview B, p 8.

Interview F1, p 37.

Interview F1, p 21.

Interview F1, pp 22-23; Interview K2, pp 42-45, 49-51.

Interview K2, pp 44-45.

Earlier versions were presented to the South African History and Politics Seminar at Oxford University, on 27 November 1989, and published in *Southern African Seminar Work in Progress* (Oxford, October 1990).