Social history, together with offshoots such as "history from below" and "alltagsgeschichte", has, as a result of the work of a variety of practitioners in Britain, Europe and America during the past two decades or more, made an indelible imprint on the general conceptualization of the past. Even if the swing of the pendulum should again turn towards an emphasis on political history, as is being contended, it will most likely be in a form shaped to some extent by the concerns of social history. [1]

British influences in particular are noticeable in the South African variant of social history. This approach is, inter alia, characterized by a historical-materialistic premise which is, however, strongly qualified by the rejection of economistic theory; experience and culture are emphasised instead of merely functional analyses of social phenomena, and an empathic humanism for the oppressed and "forgotten" people of the past is manifested. [2]

Heated debates which were waged in Britain over the nature and implications of this method [3] have also been echoed in South Africa in a less intense and adapted form. Objections in South Africa are, inter alia, that social history does not address the big issues such as, for example, the periodization of capitalism, and often degenerates into a-theoretical microstudies. [4] Afrikaans-speaking historians still find themselves outside of this debate, just as they have not effectively entered the field of social history for the past number of years.

Afrikaans historians have indeed tackled subjects with a social content, but this does not necessarily qualify as fully fledged social history. A description, for example, of the way in which Afrikaners entertained themselves in Johannesburg is not yet modern social history if the nature and function of the activity are not placed within an explanatory economic, political and ideological context. [5] Thus a description of cultural manifestations such as dog races on the Rand during the 1930s and 1940s may well contain interesting information; dog races were extremely popular among lower-class Afrikaners until they were prohibited in 1947, mainly at the urging of the church. Yet an analysis of this would suffer a loss if the cultural transmission of an original British working-class practice were not seen against the objective economic circumstances of the Afrikaner on the Rand and the political agenda of the Afrikaner middle class to prescribe and to confirm "purer" forms of culture on behalf of Afrikaner nationalism.

In order to understand the situation pertaining to social history and Afrikaner historiography, it is necessary to highlight certain characteristics of this historiography. A striking feature is the large amount of information which is usually collected and systematized, but at times presented unproblematically from an Afrikaner vantage point. Since it is grounded in a belief in "objective-scientific" historiography, in which the "facts" are supposed to speak for themselves, the relativity of "facts" is sometimes not sufficiently taken into account and the topics are also not problematized accordingly. There is likewise an insufficient awareness that the concept "objective-scientific" historiography has a history of its own, and that it arose from a conservative tradition which can in no way lay claim to political impartiality. [6]

In addition, Afrikaner historians cannot be seen in isolation from their community. Between the 1930s and the late 1960s Afrikaner society in general experienced rapid upward social mobility. In the cities, in businesses, and especially in the civil service, Afrikaners
increasingly exerted an important influence. [7] In rural areas as well the farmers in certain regions prospered, with the assistance of state subsidies. It was only with a slight degree of exaggeration that a commentator, after the particularly good profits from wool farming in the 1950s, could write the following about the newly affluent farmers:

The farmer plays billiards, ‘does’ Europe on a Cook’s tour, buys a new car when the ashtray of the old one is full, goes deep-sea fishing and puts stink wood parquet flooring in his shearing pen. [8]

Afrikaner historians did not live in such luxury, but, as an integral part of the intelligentsia who formed the “thinking wing” of the new Afrikaner materialism, they were not themselves outside of the process of capital accumulation. Consequently they were also not predisposed to question the underlying principles of the value system of the emergent middle classes, but rather inclined to regard the Afrikaner’s conquest of certain capitalist bastions as a “natural” continuation of the Afrikaner’s triumphant historical progress which stretched at least from the Great Trek. [9]

Furthermore, the topics investigated by Afrikaner historiography confirm the close bond which existed between academics and the National Party until approximately the early seventies. It was not so much that the National Party prescribed to the historians which themes were acceptable and which not, but rather that historians through organizations such as the Broederbond realised “intuitively” which fields of investigation ought to fall within the ambit of Afrikaner historiography. [10] The history of political parties, government institutions and related subjects, as well as particular biographical studies were and still are the staple diet of most Afrikaner historians. Although such themes are to be found in virtually any historiographical tradition, in the case of Afrikaans-speaking historians they supplanted almost any other form of historiography. In addition, the topics were usually exceedingly narrowly conceived; politics was politics and socio-economic influences had no, or little, relation to politics. A kind of categorical demarcation mentality, which was probably not too far removed from apartheid thinking, maintained a firm grip on Afrikaner historiography. This promoted a certain degree of rigidity and isolation; technically speaking many of the works were impeccable, but in terms of conceptual understanding and analytical investigation of the motivations of the complex South African past, they had little to offer. In fact, an eminent Afrikaans historian was probably correct when he recently asserted: “The Afrikaner form of historiography was elitist, personality-bound, idealistic, qualitative and narrative - as if history was solely and merely aimed at the exercising of political power by the nation or state.” [11]

The specific form which Afrikaans historiography adopted is not unique. In so far as its anti-colonial and pro-nationalist nature is concerned, it resembles the kind of historiography which reigned supreme in Africa in the aftermath of the colonial era. Nationalist historiography in newly independent states often served the interests of the post-colonial state elite, and the rediscovery of African history as against its earlier denial in the colonial period was often accompanied by the political processes of nation-building. As in the case of African historiography, this approach had an attenuating effect on the study and understanding of the past. With reference to African historiography, C Neale recently remarked:

To some [historians] it now seems regrettable, both from a political point of view in that it [nationalist history] served the interest of new regimes which in hindsight were not what historians hoped they would be, and from an intellectual point of view, in that historians concentrated on narrowly political themes at the expense of social and economic ones. [12]
It can, furthermore, be argued that the issues involve more than just the selection of nationalist-related topics at the expense of topics from the field of social history. In essence it means that a nationalistic paradigm is diametrically opposed to the basic conceptualization, nature and aims of modern social history. Whereas nationalist historiography emphasizes ethnic or national unity, class conflict and division are of importance to the social historian; where party politics, official state policy and constitutional issues are regarded in nationalistic historiography as a natural given, the social historian questions the nature and function of these institutions and structures in particular developmental stages of capitalism; and where the focus of nationalistic historiography is on great leaders and the utterances of politicians, the social historian concentrates to a large extent on the way in which “ordinary people” experienced certain historical events and processes. In addition to this, social history usually has an oppositional character, while nationalistic historiography tends to confirm the status quo.

The other factors that have been touched on - the class position of Afrikaner intellectuals and the ideal of “objective-scientific” historiography - also affect the situation. Afrikaner historians were, and are, to a great extent prisoners of the value system of their class position; the history of the lower classes is not really a subject which appeals to a relatively recent middle class. The aim is to deal with “elevated” and “important” subjects, and subjects from the field of social history are often easily, and without proper consideration of their broader ramifications, dismissed as trivial and insignificant. Afrikaner historians’ obsession with the delusional notion of “objective-scientific” historiography also presents an obstacle in the way of a full meeting with integrated social historiography. Controversial and unorthodox topics, which would possibly implicate the “objective-scientific” ideal, were preferably avoided.

Given the problems relating to social history and Afrikaans historiography, it could be asked whether any potential for revival exists. A comparative perspective is useful when one evaluates the circumstances and factors which could possibly play a role in the shifting of historiographical centres of gravity. In Canada, for example, nationalist historiography reigned supreme until about 1967, when Canada celebrated its centenary as a nation state. In the midst of the “orgy of national festivities and self-congratulation”, however, critical voices were raised with regard to the nature and meaning of Canadian nationalism, and in the course of time a greater emphasis was placed on regional and class differences. This development coincided with the broadening of the Canadian university system and an increase in the number of students from the lower classes - mostly recent immigrants - and an accompanying increase in the number of lecturers. The new generation played a particularly important role in the emergence of social history; as immigrants, they did not share the nationalist sentiments of their academic predecessors, and their experiences as new Canadian citizens predisposed them to view Canadian society in terms of class rather than in terms of nationalism. This view also had an impact on historiography. The growth of social history in Canada was therefore closely interwoven with broader trends and it developed organically from processes in society. Afrikaans-speakers will perhaps also have to wait for a new generation.

Related to this is the phenomenon that in communities which experience rapid political and socio-economic changes, with accompanying cultural shifts, the past is often examined afresh. In this regard J Rüsen, a German historian, pointed out that “the needs for structural change in historical studies grow in their cultural context, where experiences of actual change in the conditions and forms of life must be interpreted in a way that people know how to meet them”. [16]

This general statement is at present particularly applicable to the historical profession in Russia, where glasnost and perestroika have led to a lively and far-reaching debate about the
nature and shortcomings of Russian historiography. A profound reassessment is in progress and it is openly acknowledged that Soviet historiography has stagnated: political servility, hidebound methodological and theoretical premises, and insufficient access to historical sources have all contributed to a rigid view of history with many deficiencies. Under the influence of a severe structural Marxism, Soviet history was presented mechanistically, and, with the exception of the “great leaders”, virtually stripped of human actors who had asserted themselves in history as ordinary people. An eminent Russian historian, P P Volubuev, expresses this as follows: “Everything you might want in a historical narrative is there – laws, logical development, anything you like – except human beings.” [17] A dogmatic Marxist approach (without the flexibility which is, for example, characteristic of the work of certain British social historians who proceed from a historical-materialistic perspective, but are sensitive to individual agency and cultural considerations in the context of political developments) led to an elitist form of historiography. “What we used to have in Soviet history was a history of bosses written for bosses”, according to a recent statement by the Russian historian W Kazlov. “Now we have a history of bosses that is being written for the people - but what we still don’t have is a history of the people and society.” [18] It is rather ironic that, with certain slight changes, this statement can also be applied to Afrikaner historiography. Although the state has little use for history at present, as will be discussed below, for a substantial period a vision of history was maintained which mainly reflected the interests of the rulers and which, by implication, paraded as a history of South Africa and all its people, without an integrated history of society coming into being.

In contrast to the factors which elsewhere have led to a shift and soul-searching in the historiographical industry, no such intense debate is currently taking place in Afrikaner circles. The absence of a fundamental re-examination is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that South Africa, like the former Soviet Union, is at present in a process of rapid transition. This silence can perhaps be attributed to the relatively fewer historians in South Africa as well as to the fact that, in spite of certain censorship restrictions in the past, the profession as a whole does not exhibit the same degree of uniformity of approach. More than one approach - for example that of liberals and that of the revisionists - have gained academic acceptance. However, with the exception of a few commentaries, Afrikaner historians have remained outside of the broader trends and debates in South African historiography over the past fifteen or more years. It is true that there have been some highly publicized mea culpas from an eminent Afrikaner historian like F A van Jaarveld, but even in his case the admissions fall far short of a paradigm conversion. [19]

Irrespective of what is happening in academic circles, issues such as the historical nature and construction of the past and its implications are not of much interest to National Party politicians at the present time. It is only the right wing who still make use of historical works which were produced during the heyday of apartheid rule; the modern, pragmatic Afrikaner state of today cares much less for history and finds less use for it than the state of 25 and 40 years ago. At an institutional level, for example, the virtual disappearance of the historical research department at the Human Sciences Council to make way for policy-centred research is surely not a mere coincidence, but can be regarded as being illustrative of the generally diminishing status and value of history.

History, and recent apartheid history in particular, has in fact become an embarrassment to certain Afrikaners, especially since February 1990. This past, argued one cabinet minister recently, should best be disregarded: “Many of us ... have for a long time already been experiencing a considerable degree of intellectual and emotional discomfort in respect of what we were busy with ... It is history. But at least it is behind us.” [20] A returned exile was struck by this type of social amnesia. According to him,

It is all about memory, and its opposite, the forgetting of the past. ‘Europeans only’ has been taken down at least in the public space, and the old white way of talking is muffled ...

The Government has a vested interest in forgetting. Their
apologists speak of the crime of apartheid ... The monuments still stand, the homeland government buildings in rural wastelands, the fascist sculpture of the boer-trekkers, but they seem to be ancient relics of a former barbaric civilization. Although the objects still remain, somehow people have forgotten their purpose, they don't understand their meaning in the context of a whole new system. [21]

It must, of course, be taken into account that the events and practices of the past can be stumbling-blocks in the present era of negotiation politics and therefore that the state would rather prefer to leave them aside, but it is at the same time an optimistic misconception to think that negotiations per se will create a new South Africa, and that overnight. Even if a political settlement is reached, the historically determined discrepancies in the socio-economic field will survive much longer. This in itself offers enough reason not to suppress history, and especially social history.

In addition to this, it is easy to underestimate the historical hegemony and the political achievement of Afrikaner historiography. Afrikaner historians have succeeded effectively in undermining and ousting the competing imperial view of the 1920s and 1930s of the South African past, in which South Africa was merely considered as a part of the British Empire.[22] In this process a conception of history was created in which the Afrikaner emerged as the central figure. The history of South Africa was virtually equated with the history of the Afrikaner, and this view was embedded and facilitated after 1948 through greater control over education and curricula. By about the 1960s such a view was firmly entrenched, and for a considerable number of years the Afrikaner interpretation of history was to occupy a dominant position in educational establishments and elsewhere. Bill Freund rightly commented recently that “Afrikaans historiography is the historical tradition that feeds into the school books that the great majority of literate South Africans experience, and ... with all its warts, the Afrikaans school makes the only major attempt at a national historiography”. [23] It is an interpretation which leaves little room for those who fall outside the nationalist framework.

However, such a view of history does not necessarily any longer exercise the same hold on the public. In so far as white Afrikaans-speakers who do not identify with the right wing show an interest in the past, there does appear to be a need for new interpretations. A reader of a popular Afrikaans Sunday newspaper recently pointed out that

An extremely narrow and one-sided presentation of the past was long accepted. In its time and place it served to unite a nation. It is, however, strongly to be doubted that an open society would accept insulting and irresponsible statements from days gone by. Study groups with empathy for and knowledge of the culture and history of all our population groups would need to have a share in the rewriting of our history. All will have to have a say! [24]

However laudable such sentiments might be, it is doubtful whether attempts to create a type of consensus history would really offer satisfaction in the “new” South Africa. For the sake of unanimity debatable historical motivations and controversial issues may possibly be watered down in order not to offend any group, but this would equally provide a distorted image of the stormy South African past.

Interpretations of the past are to a greater or lesser degree forged in the heat of the political struggles of the day. They can openly support certain narrow aims of the present, or they can relate more implicitly and in a nuanced way to particular contemporary political trends. No historian is totally removed from his own time and place, and in South Africa this is least of all the case. While “establishment” whites would perhaps like to negate history to a certain
extent, the opposite is true in various black circles. As Luli Callinicos puts it, “One of the existing (and problematic) things about being an historian in South Africa today is that history is so hotly contested. Passionate interpretations of the past emanate from a range of activists on the South African scene.” [25]

What dominant image of history will emerge from the crucible of the “new” South Africa is still unclear at this stage. It is, however, not too far-fetched to think that a black nationalist vision will be a strong contender. Elements of such a viewpoint can already be detected in the interpretation of ANC history as a triumphant march with perspicacious and virtually irreproachable leaders. [26] In such a history there is no scope for mistakes of judgement, no contradictions or tensions exist in the movement, and class differences and gender issues receive slight and superficial attention. [27] A new view of history will not necessarily incorporate the interests of social history, in which emphases on, *inter alia*, social conflict and tension are important elements. It may perhaps be necessary that the claims of social history be put forward once again, in order to avoid “ordinary” people, whether black or white, once again becoming the “forgotten” people of the past.

Although Afrikaans-speakers mainly stood on the side-lines during the “first round” of social history, it is not inevitable that they need to find themselves off the playing-field during a possible “second round”. A new generation of Afrikaans-speaking historians who are not burdened with the nationalist baggage and ethnic garb which immobilized their predecessors on the road of social historiography can play an important role in strengthening social history in a new dispensation, and developing it both academically and politically.

In a “new” South Africa there will perhaps be more opportunities for brown and white Afrikaans-speaking historians to work together. It must be kept in mind, however, that apartheid will still cast a shadow for a long time and that brown and white Afrikaans-speaking historians have had essentially different life experiences. Nevertheless, both groups use a language which, linguistically at least, gives them easy access to the oral traditions, customs and cultural nuances of not only an urban working class, but also a subordinate class in rural areas for whom Afrikaans is the home language.

Although informative work has already been done in respect of the city and the countryside [28], it could be argued that especially the social history of the Cape countryside (which is predominantly Afrikaans-speaking) is underexploited in comparison to the studies which have been undertaken in other parts of the country. What Charles van Onselen has done for the western Transvaal countryside, still remains to be done for the Cape countryside. [29]

A distinctive political culture and traditions have developed among “coloured” communities in the countryside. It is a culture in which Afrikaans played a more central role in the resistance to apartheid during the 1980s (as indicated, for example, by the Afrikaans newspaper *Saamstaan*, which was launched in Oudtshoorn) than was the case elsewhere. Owing to the nature of the communities - according to Allan Boesak, “Afrikaans-oriented, conservative, christian communities” - the discourse of political mobilization was also different. Boesak further points out that

> the dynamics of the Africans in Transvaal differ totally from the dynamics of coloured people in Namaqualand, the Karoo and the Southern Cape ... you cannot send a lot of activists into rural areas with a language which is a mixture of MK rhetoric and SACP rhetoric. This kind of thing will even more quickly drive the people into the arms of the NP. [30]

For the social historian it would, *inter alia*, be important to anchor the political processes in rural areas in the varying and often contradictory contextual influences which, over time, have had a formative effect on such communities.
Such influences, which involve a complex network of material circumstances accompanied by ideological and religious considerations, also emerge when the controversial issue of a so-called "coloured identity" is raised. The construction of such an identity from above has already been discussed by writers such as I. Goldin [31], but it has not yet been fully complemented by an analysis of its signification at ground level. Material circumstances sometimes dissolved the distinction between white and "coloured" for class to take precedence over race. In Carnavon in the Karoo, for example, persons who were classified as "coloureds" accommodated poor whites in their backyards as tenants, and in the George-Knysna forests of the southern Cape marriage to so-called "coloureds" often meant upward social mobility for daughters of poor-white woodcutters. [32]

Broadly speaking, the social historian's vision of the actions of "ordinary" people and the patterned nature of processes taking place at ground level serves as a corrective for the version of history in which official policy has priority over social processes, the city is given preference over rural areas, the past is regarded solely from a male perspective, and the successful and the affluent are emphasized at the expense of the less successful and the poor. This might just as easily happen in the "new" South Africa, as it did in the "old" South Africa. Social history has a function to prevent the historical story from remaining exclusively the story of the winners. Social history is, however, also more than this; it is the story of the interaction between different classes, and between people, structures and processes. It has the potential to deepen the understanding of the past and the present.

Afrikaans, when freed from its apartheid stigma, can be of great use in a process of renewal. While there have been concerted attempts in literature to allow Afrikaans to move beyond the domain of the white elite [33], Afrikaans-speaking historians are yet to do likewise. The sociologist, Pierre van den Berghe, recently emphasised the range of Afrikaans as follows:

Afrikaans is the only truly popular new language which the contact of Europe, Africa and Asia created on Southern African soil. Advocates of alternative Afrikaans are merely rediscovering that profound truth of South African history. Just because the National Party hi-jacked Afrikaans, is no reason to stigmatize it as the "language of the oppressor", it has equally been the language of the oppressed. It is the only South African language that truly cuts across all social classes. English, on the other hand, has largely failed to creolize, and remains, as it has always been, an elite language. This is equally true of the blacks who speak it as of the whites. [34]

Van den Berghe's view possibly contains certain debatable statements, but it is none the less valuable in so far as it accentuates the democratizing potential of Afrikaans among different classes. This potential is also important for the social historian tapping into the body of "informal knowledge" [35], hitherto largely unexplored, and in turn in giving the relevant communities access to his or her work in an easily digestible form and in their own language.

However important such a development might be, it would be erroneous to accept that a simplistic one-to-one relationship exists between a changing society and historical consciousness. The correlation is more complex and historians can easily over-simplify and over-estimate their own role in the transmission process. As I N Afanas'ev recently pointed out in relation to glasnost Russia:

The historical knowledge and historical consciousness of a society doesn't always correspond to the ordinary consciousness of that society ... Overcoming this - that is, transforming scholarly consciousness into a mass consciousness - is a step involving colossal difficulties, and it
will be opposed not only by retrogrades, not only by those who are living comfortably and by bureaucrats, but also by those who possess this ordinary consciousness, for it is easier for them to live with false but familiar myths than to cast them off and adopt completely new ones. This is the agonizing process of society’s search for its own identity, a process that has begun only recently and is far from finished. [36]

In South Africa, where the quest for another identity is also in progress, similar factors may influence the formation of a new historical consciousness, irrespective of a political change of government, and by implication they would also have an effect on the role and place of social history and Afrikaans historiography in a post-apartheid South Africa.

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Notes


6 The issue of “objective scientific” history is discussed in A Grundlingh, “Politics, Principles and Problems of a Profession : Afrikaner historians and their discipline” in Perspectives in Education, 12, 1, 1990/91, pp 6-11.


10 Leading historians, for example A N Pelzer of the University of Pretoria and H B Thom of the University of Stellenbosch, to name only two, were prominent members of the Broederbond. Grundlingh, “Afrikaner Historians”, p 2.


17 “Perestroika, History and Historians: Round Table, Moscow, January 1989”, in *Journal of Modern History*, December 1990, p 788.


20 *Beeld*, 20 June 1991, “Apartheid staan in die geskiedenis as ’n fout, sê Marais”.


26 For example, F Meli, *South Africa Belongs to Us: a history of the ANC* (Harare, 1988).


30 *Vrye Weekblad*, 24-30 May 1991: “In my hart is daar groot twyfel oor FW.”


33 For example, J F Smith, A van Gensen and H Willemse (eds), *Swart Afrikaanse Skrywers* (Bellville, 1985).


36 “Perestroika, History and Historians”, p 805.