Abstract

This paper charts the broad outlines of the Mozambican system of urban and regional planning since independence in 1975. It begins with a description of the context of social revolution and externally instigated counter-revolution that provide the backdrop for life and policy in Mozambique. The establishment and operation of the spatial planning system are then considered, with a detailed examination of the policies developed in the context of the continuing civil war. The principal foci are urban planning, spatial planning in the strategic Beira corridor and a recent regionally based programme of priority districts. The conclusion considers the extent to which historical patterns of uneven development in Mozambique are being reproduced and intensified by the situation in the country.

The Context

As a broad overview of urban and regional planning in post-independence Mozambique, this article inevitably touches on a number of issues that require much more elaboration than can be attempted here. The civil war is just the first of these; it must be both the starting point and the backdrop to the subsequent analysis, for its complexities are manifold.

Since gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique, under the radical leadership of Frelimo, has undergone social revolution. As a new independent actor in the international arena, Mozambique established a wide range of diplomatic and military alliances, joining the “frontline states” and becoming a founder member of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, besides establishing close relations with the USSR and other “socialist” states in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the Third World. These realignments were accompanied by intensive efforts at ideological reorientation and the creation of a new constitutional and legal system on Marxist-Leninist lines (Egero, 1987). However, the country has also experienced an externally instigated counter-revolution mediated through the rebel movement of Renamo, leading to a destructive civil war (Sidaway 1992; Vines 1991). Whilst the war has a varied texture, reflecting local strategic and political conditions, much of Mozambique is in a chaotic state. By the late 1980s, total economic output was at about one quarter, in real terms, of its level at independence (Hermele, 1988) and recovery since then under the aegis of an IMF administered Programa de Rehabilitacao Economica (Economic Rehabilitation Programme, or PRE) has been both limited and socially divisive (Green, 1989; Marshall, 1990; Wuyts, 1991).

The impact of warfare on socio-spatial organization in many Third World post-revolutionary states was one of the principal themes considered in the only book-length comparative study of urban and regional planning in what was termed “the socialist Third World”: those post revolutionary states in the Third World that had embraced Marxism-Leninism or variants of radical socialism (Forbes and Thrift, 1987). Amongst such states, Mozambique was certainly not alone in having faced externally funded destabilization in the 1980s (Halliday, 1989). Yet, as Saul (1985) has suggested, because the fighting in Mozambique has been part of a war of attrition against civilians and the state itself, rather than of dramatic military engagements, for the outside world the conflict has remained largely forgotten. In Mozambique itself, however, the war is never far away and the human cost has been
enormous. Up to a third of Mozambique's population of 16 million has been directly affected by it. More than one and a half million people have been displaced from their homes within the country and there are also well over one million Mozambican refugees in neighbouring states. More than six million Mozambicans continue to face chronic food shortages (Cammack, 1988; Ratilal, 1990) and a recent survey collating data from a range of databases ranked Mozambique second only to Afghanistan amongst “The most unfortunate nations in the world” (Jongman, 1990).

In response to Frelimo's inability to maintain territorial control and security, Zimbabwe has since 1982 deployed troops to guard the strategic Beira corridor. Without this military deployment, which by 1987 has grown to about 10,000 soldiers, Zimbabwe's shortest route to a port would be closed. From 1984 to the end of 1990, Zimbabwe also deployed a motorised division for the escort of commercial convoys through Tete to Malawi. At the time of writing there are still some 7,000 Zimbabwean troops in the Beira corridor. From 1986 to 1988, Tanzania also deployed troops in northern Mozambique, and since 1987 a battalion of Malawian troops has been guarding the Nacala link. This presence of foreign troops indicates the salience of Mozambique's geopolitical location, as a series of transport corridors vital to Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe - a factor that has also had profound bearing on its internal geography. For example, the aim of the state to minimize urbanization rates by a dual system of residence permits and the extension of social and economic infrastructure to the countryside, documented by Friedmann (1980) and returned to below, has been hopelessly frustrated. Millions of people have fled (or have been forced by the Mozambican army) from the countryside to areas with at least a minimum of security in order to escape from the conflict (Africa Watch, 1992).

Given this context of war and the accompanying social and political dislocation, the scope for state intervention in spatial planning has been limited in the severest of fashions. Indeed, Frelimo has lost control of much of rural Mozambique (see Figure 1). Furthermore, largely as a result of the past decade or so of war, Mozambique has become the prime example of an aid-dependent state. Writing about this theme three years ago, Torp (1989: p 79) then felt Mozambique was becoming an “aid-economy”. The combination of these flows of capital and goods with the failure of Frelimo's economic, political and social objectives and the collapse of “socialist values” meant that the predominant trend had become a struggle within the Party and state apparatuses between those who personally and as a group sought the maximum personal benefit from the foreign assistance programmes. In the 1990s “aid-dependency” has, if anything, become more pronounced [4] and access to the bases of social power for Mozambicans increasingly dependent on their relationship to the flows and sources of foreign aid. Hanlon (1991), in a well documented account, has argued that the external dependence has become so great and the collapse so severe that Mozambique is being, in a de facto sense, “recolonised”: both the autonomy and administrative capacity of the already weakened Mozambican state have been undermined as its dependence on external aid has increased (cf Mittleman, 1991).

In terms of the limitations to sovereignty, however, the reduction of the Frelimo-led state to towns and a set of barely secure (or in some cases wholly insecure) corridors patrolled by foreign (i.e. Zimbabwean and Malawian) troops is an equally profound limitation. With these themes in mind a section of the paper will examine the Beira corridor in context, as a concrete and geographically specific example of the limits to Mozambican sovereignty. To start with, however, the structure and operation of state-directed spatial planning activities will be considered. For, despite the war, explicit spatial policy has continued to be designed and implemented, albeit with dramatically adapted goals and constrained scope.

The Framework for Territorial Planning

Mozambique is a fairly centralized, unitary state, divided into ten provinces (see Figure 1). In turn, the provinces are divided into districts, administrative posts and localities. The capital
and other cities are administered by appointed Conselhos Executivos (Executive Councils). Within their boundaries, the Conselhos Executivos are nominally responsible for planning activity. In practice, however, the provincial offices of the National Institute for Physical Planning produce land-use plans for urban areas.

The Instituto Nacional de Planeamento Físico (National Institute of Physical Planning, or INPF) is the co-ordinating body for territorially based planning. It was not actually established until 1983, some eight years after Mozambican independence. Since then the impact of the war, specifically the loss of state control over large swathes of territory, as referred to above, has limited the scope for planning in rural areas and for regional planning in general. Hence the primary role of the INPF and its local offices has been urban planning, which is the first and principal theme that will be considered below. The INPF has also recently been involved in producing plans for a number of priority districts identified as part of a new, and potentially significant, programme. The Programma dos Distritos Prioritarios (Priority District Programme, or PDP) is the closest to an explicit, regionally based programme that Mozambique has seen since the 1970s. As such, it is considered in some detail in a later section. Together with the Ministry of Agriculture, the INPF has also been involved in the demarcation of Zonas Verdes (Green Zones) for agricultural production around Mozambican cities. These activities will also be given brief consideration. However, since it has been documented elsewhere (Araujo, 1986, 1988) and has been eclipsed by the consequence of the war (Sidaway, 1991a), rural settlement policy and the role of the INPF therein will not be addressed here.

Until the establishment of the INPF, urban planning was one of the responsibilities of the Direcção Nacional de Habitação (National Housing Directorate or DNH) that had been founded in 1978 (Jenkins, 1990; Pinsky, 1982, 1985). In turn, the DNH had absorbed the few urban planning offices that had been established during colonialism. Beyond these municipal offices the colonial state had made no formal provision for the national co-ordination of territorially based planning. The establishment of the INPF changed this, at least on paper.

The mandate of the INPF defined its roles as:

(a) To study and propose a better distribution of economic activity and of "human agglomerations" in territory.

(b) To participate in the definition and the implementation of programmes and projects of development, so as to ensure that the physical aspects - ecological and infrastructural - will be considered, as well to offer a guarantee of correct physical relations between envisaged or current projects.

(c) To acquire, systemize and transmit information of a geographical order so as to have better knowledge on the territory and its use.

(d) To train technical staff in the areas of physical planning (INPF, 1986, my translation).

The document also referred to the problems likely to result from the shortage of staff and from the "anarchical" situation in implementation of land law (a theme that cannot be considered in detail here). [5].

In formal terms, the INPF was given an equal status to sectoral economic planning. However, in practice, its role has principally remained that of an advisory body to other institutions and its impact has depended very much on individual contacts and collaboration. Moreover, many of the provincial offices have become increasingly ineffective through the lack of financial and technical support. Co-ordination and contact between Maputo and the
provincial offices is frequently weak, a phenomenon reinforced by the war-related dislocation. Furthermore, the role of physical planning is often not understood within other, longer established, state structures.

For example, the same document that defines the principles and rationale of physical planning in Mozambique admits that

> In our professional practice, we occasionally meet situations in which we have to explain what is our competence, what is our area of intervention. It has not been rare to meet people who think that physical planning is only about the demarcation of building plots. (INPF, 1986, my translation)

Similarly, a 1991 report describing the activities of the INPF since its creation notes that

> The large battle limiting the INPF since its creation has been its recognition, in the [wider] political-institutional ambit, as an institution that has to effectively control the process of occupation of physical space. Notwithstanding the numerous official declarations on the role of physical planning in the context of the development of the country little attention has been given to this question on the part of the government, including the National Planning Commission .... As a result a vicious circle has been generated in which the INPF does not have the capacity to offer services to the government because it does not have the necessary political, financial and institutional support; and by not offering services, it does not succeed in catching the attention of the government for [the resolution of] its operational problems. (Dias, 1991: 19, my translation)

Accounting for this requires consideration of both the colonial legacy and of the post-independence institutional and political contexts of spatial planning, as well as reference to the shifting backdrop of the Mozambican situation.

### The Colonial Legacy

> "Lourenço Marques, cidade de cimento. Erguida para demarcar bem a diferença entre nós e os colonos ..."  
> ("Lourenço Marques, city of cement [6], built high to mark well the difference between us and the colonists ...")
> (Machel, 1980: 17-18)

In the first place, the lack of recognition referred to in the proceeding section reflects the legacy of the low status given to the formal machinery of spatial planning in the colonial state apparatus. It must be said that, as well as implanting a characteristic architectural style, Portugal did transmit some formal urban planning ideas and practices to its overseas territories (Kubler and Soria, 1959; Cahen 1989). It is also important to recognise that, in addition to formal planning, a network of norms, regulations and modes of operation structure the colonial-built environment (King, 1990). In the case of the Portuguese colonial cities in Africa, it has been argued that these norms and the influx of settlers generated a distinctive "Lusitanian" form of the African colonial city (Cahen, 1989; Sidaway, 1991). However, the tradition of formal urban planning in modern Portugal was weak and its form derived from countries where urban planning was more developed (Williams, 1984). Despite earlier grand schemes, such as Pombal’s eighteenth-century reconstruction of central Lisbon on a neo-Classical grid following the devastating earthquake of 1755 (Franca, 1977) and
isolated redevelopments in cities such as Oporto (de Oliveira, 1973), town planning was in no way institutionalized in Portugal until after the establishment of the Estado Novo in the 1930s. Even then, the urban planning acts passed in 1934 and 1944 requiring municipalities to draw up plans had limited impact, given the shortage of qualified personnel and frequent lack of local resources (Goncalves, 1977). In Portuguese colonies, where these deficiencies were even more pronounced, formal urban planning remained relatively poorly developed up to independence. In Mozambique, the plans that were made, notably for Beira and Lourenço Marques in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, focused on the expansion of the physical infrastructure, with particular emphasis on road schemes as the basis for state facilitated private development (Mendes, 1986).

Hence the legacy inherited by the newly independent state was of a weakly developed urban planning, mainly devoted to infrastructural projects. In the first instance, these benefited capital and the security of the state itself, whilst the indigenous population barely derived any benefits at all. Limited ventures in the late 1950s (Rita-Ferreira 1967-1968) and an attempt in the late 1960s and early 1970s to win indigenous political support on the part of the colonial administration provided some canico [7] (cane construction) areas around Lourenço Marques with public taps and refuse collection services. In addition, a number of roads in these areas of the city were straightened and sometimes surfaced to facilitate access, but the primary motivation for this “development” was to enhance security (Guedes 1971; Saevfors 1986). In short, Mozambique was no exception to the situation described by King (1976; 1990), O’Conner (1976) and Simon (1988; 1992), whereby urban planning in colonial sub-Saharan African had, in the main, reinforced elite interests.

Independence, under a radical government committed to socialist transformation created a new prospect - or so it seemed.

Planning in Urban and Peri-Urban Areas Since Independence

Whilst there are a number of accounts of urban planning under the colonial system (Mendes 1986; Rita-Ferreira 1967-1968) and a bibliographical guide to the history of urbanism in Maputo during colonialism (Pedro Roque 1987), there are only very limited published sources on which to draw for an account of urban planning in Mozambique since independence. A recent general survey of housing policies in post-independence Mozambique (Jenkins 1990) contains little information on urban planning per se. Mendes (1988; 1989) makes some consideration of urban planning, in papers on the structure of slum and squatter settlements in Maputo and on the broad repercussions of independence on the city. However, Pinsky’s (1982; 1985) short papers still remain the most substantial published account of urban planning in post-independence Mozambique. He argued that, in line with the wider formal commitment of the state to socialism and popular participation, an expanded system or urban planning could begin to serve mass interests much more widely.

Pinsky focused on the improvements, and popular participation achieved a pilot upgrading scheme in the Maputo canico suburb of Maxaquene. As his and Saevfor’s (1986) more focused account show, the Maxaquene project involved approximately 45,000 residents and provided improved drainage and sanitation, social infrastructure and physical reorganization of the bairro (neighbourhood) on a grid basis. The upgrading was implemented by the DNH. In turn, the experiences from this project formed the basis for a set of resolutions on urbanism in the report of the “First National Meeting of Cities and Communal Bairros” in February 1979 (Moçambique, 1979) and for a subsequent national meeting on urban planning bringing together staff from provincial planning offices (Moçambique, 1982). However, the project was not replicated, owing to a combination of logistical and political constraints that are considered below. Furthermore, even at the time of the project and before the subsequent, war-generated, influx of destocados (displaced people), it incorporated only a small percentage of the total number of canico dwellers in Maputo alone.
More important than the Maxaquene project per se was the fact that the nationalization of land meant that dwellers in the canico areas were no longer subject to arbitrary removal. Forced "removals" had sometimes been applied under the colonial state, when the owners of land on which there were canico dwellings decided to "develop" such areas. Though uncodified (but with a formal basis in the new post-independence Land Law), compensation has been awarded by the authorities whenever compulsory demolitions have had to take place. This amounts to "material in kind", including cement where cement houses in the broader canico areas have had to be demolished.

Aside from this, the Conselhos Executivos (Executive Councils) of each town and city, which have been nominally responsible for planning in urban areas (in co-operation with the national or relevant provincial office of the INPF), have generally lacked the personnel and resources to develop comprehensive planning programmes and interventions. In fact, outside Maputo, it is only in Beira, Nampula, Quelimane and Nacala, that the Conselhos Executivos have developed planning programmes. Even in Maputo, the limit of Conselho Executivo "planning" activity has been development control, site survey and land allocation (Jenkins 1990).

Additionally, since 1987 the Maputo Conselho Executivo has contained a semi-autonomous unit working with World Bank financing. This is a part of a scheme to provide sites and low interest loans for the construction of new "middle income" housing in selected bairros. Provided that the new construction is according to one of a number of standard plans, the usually cumbersome planning permission process is by-passed (UNHCS - Habitat/Ministerio de Construcao e Aguas 1990; Jenkins 1990). However, this project is not a Maxaquene-style upgrading, and the beneficiaries are mostly comparatively well-off residents in the cidade de cimento who are in a position to take up the loans offered by the project and hence to move out of state-owned property in, or near to, the centre of Maputo.

Yet the Conselho Executivo in Maputo and in other cities, enjoys a relative political clout (in particular vis-à-vis the INPF), derived from the direct linkages it has to the higher party-state apparatus and its control over funds that originate from the central government (Sidaway 1991a; 1991b). Although they are all dependent on such central funding and have no powers to raise funds locally, the Conselhos Executivos do have the power to facilitate, or block, the schemes produced by other state agencies such as the INPF. For example, an overall structure plan for Maputo produced by the INPF and presented for approval to the Conselho Executivo in May 1986 elicited no response and was not approved. [8] This reflected and resulted from the general lack of recognition of the role and potential benefits of urban planning and of the INPF, and disputes between the policy outlined in the plan and the Conselho Executivo policy concerning the question of appropriate plot sizes within the cidade de canico. The INPF proposed variable plot sizes, with more land available to those in the most peripheral areas, but this was resisted by the Conselho Executivo (Henrique, 1989), which sought a uniform plot size. Although the plan was resubmitted in 1988, it had been overtaken by wider events and the continued influx of deslocados had rendered it outdated.

As was noted in the introductory section, the aim of minimizing urbanization rates through a combination of controls on movement (Sidaway, 1991a), an extension of social infrastructure to the countryside (Friedmann, 1980) and rural collectivization (Araujo, 1988) have been overtaken and hopelessly frustrated by the wider situation in Mozambique. The war and economic crisis have compounded the problems and limited the scope for the establishment and operation of a progressive urban planning system that from the outset was chronically under-equipped in human and technical terms and given low priority by other sections of the state apparatus. The massive influx into peri-urban areas of deslocados and the increasingly severe fiscal and logistical constraints have, in themselves, meant that there could not be much possibility of expanding or replicating the type of relatively successful canico-upgrading project carried out in Maxaquene.
However, there is more to the failure to extend or reproduce the upgrading than such constraints. In effect, a conflict between the “bottom up” style associated with the Maxaquene project and a more technocratic and elitist style of planning concerned with “modern”, “advanced” projects, such as roads and cement buildings, has never disappeared. Several enduring features of the colonial system must again be referred to here. In the first place, elements of the “modernizing” and, in original terms, “civilizing” mission of the colonial state were reproduced in the Frelimo “party-state” (Cahen, 1985; 1987; 1990). The focus on grandiose schemes and the voluntarist “radical modernization” present in Frelimo strategy, also impacted on the urban planning process. As in the wider experience of Mozambique, the focus on grand projects within the “state socialist” model combined with and tended to reinforce these tendencies (Hanlon, 1984; Young 1988). The relative weakness of the INPF has also been accentuated by the shortage of skilled personnel (from its creation, it has relied on technical support from foreign cooperantes); a legacy of the low profile of planning under colonialism and, in more general terms, of the limited educational opportunities available to Mozambicans under the colonial system.

Another (related) factor has been the clash between those, such as the planners, who have been defined and perceive themselves fundamentally as “technicos” (technician) and those who are “politicos” (politicians) or “administradores” (administrators). This type of dichotomy is hardly confined to Mozambique (Thompson, 1961), although it was particularly profound there under colonialism, as both Moreira’s (1963) and Bailey’s (1969) accounts acknowledged.

As has frequently been noted, urban and regional planning often tends to be regarded by its practitioners as a purely technical and “professional” practice abstracted from political and social considerations. In the main, Mozambique was no exception to this. The colonial Estado Novo encouraged the idea of all forms of state intervention as rational, technical and serving the higher interests of the “nation” and/or empire. Although they were reformulated, such conceptions did not disappear in 1975. After independence not only did the legacy of an artificial, but significant, division between the “technical” and the “political” persist, it was maintained by the “new” system. The terminology applied is revealing; the “National Institute for Physical Planning” (INPF) is usually seen (including by many who work within it) as a “technical” body. In a similar vein to the focus on “grand projects”, post-independence politics reproduced attitudes and values imbibed during colonialism. In this case, the way in which popular participation was constrained by Marxist-Leninist politics must also be acknowledged as having considerable impact. After independence Frelimo adopted a Marxist-Leninist model associated with a vision of state-led transition to socialism as referred to in the introduction. Although it did contain participatory elements, these tended to be swamped by bureaucracy and centralism. Policy was usually made in Maputo and transmitted to the provinces without taking into account local conditions. Indeed, within an expanding literature on the social and political roots of the war, it is argued that such centralization and lack of sensitivity to specific local milieu generated discontents that have contributed to external destabilization (Hall, 1990; Sidaway, 1992; Vines, 1991). Again these are themes that cannot be considered in detail here. They are mentioned because the response to the war and government attempts to restabilise the situation in Mozambique are central to the scheme of “regional” scale planning described below. However, before this is considered, the scheme for Zonas Verdes (Green Zones) must be mentioned.

Although the origins of a state-orchestrated project to boost food production in the peri-urban areas of Maputo go back to just after independence, it was not until 1980 that an official structure was established for the purpose. The Gabinete das Zonas Verdes (Green Zones Office or GZV), which falls within the Conselho Executivo of the city of Maputo, was created to accompany the so-called “Political and Organisational Offensive” launched by Samora Machel at the start of the decade. In line with the strategy that later resurfaced in other forced population movements [9] (Urdang, 1989), one of the principal objectives of the Green Zone project was to provide work for those whom the state defined as “criminals” or “marginals”.

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Because of this focus, work in the Zonas Verdes was initially seen as a punishment. However, after a few years greater stress was put on the contribution to food production. Particularly during the severe food shortages experienced in urban areas during the early and mid-1980s, acquiring access to a machamba (a small plot of land) in the Zonas Verdes became attractive to city dwellers. Between 1982 and 1984 the "Production Units" managed by the Gabinete das Zonas Verdes were dismantled and the land passed to co-operatives and family-scale private farms, with the provision of fertilisers, seeds, basic tools and other inputs at low cost. During this time, a number of foreign NGOs became involved in supporting the project and a particular individual, an Italian priest (Sr Prosperino), played a major role in mobilizing support.

As of 1989, the structure of land utilization was as follows: 390 private farms totalling 2,200 hectares; 293 co-operative farms covering 750 hectares with a total of 11,000 members, 95 per cent of whom were women; and over 58,000 family farms covering 12,301 hectares. The 58,000 families represent one-third of the population of the Maputo area. As for the INPF role, since the mid-1980s, it has been involved in survey work within the Zonas Verdes. This involved mapping the most fertile land in order to preserve it for agricultural production, since parts of the zone lie on land that was earlier scheduled to be used for settlement, or may be spontaneously occupied by deslocados. Given that only about 16 per cent of the Green Zone is of high fertility, this task has particular importance. Yet, whilst there has been relatively good co-operation between the INPF and the GZV, neither has a sufficiently well developed linkage to the Ministry of Agriculture. In part, this is a reflection of the low status of both institutions in the eyes of a well established prestige ministry. In turn this must be related back to the themes considered in the foregoing section, in so far as it arises from the plethora of state agencies and the pervasive tendency towards the prioritization of "grand" projects.

Yet, despite this, and although little detailed information is available concerning the above issues, the Green Zones, since replicated around other Mozambican cities, have been widely acknowledged as a success, providing food, employment and opportunities for women (who are the main farmers in these areas) in a sustainable context (Gentili, 1989; Mulder, 1989; Urdang, 1989; White, 1985). The location in peri-urban areas means that there has generally been sufficient security to permit continuous cultivation. In war-torn Mozambique, physical security has become the prerequisite to development. As the next section shows, this has been particularly evident in the strategic Beira corridor.

The Beira Corridor in Context

The presence of the Zimbabwean National Army in Mozambique has both signified and cemented the Maputo-Harare axis, geopolitically one of the most important relationships in the region. The protection accorded to the strategically vital transport links between the Zimbabwean frontier and the port of Beira has greatly enhanced the security of many areas along the Beira corridor. Indeed, the relative security of areas adjoining the corridor has resulted in a massive influx of deslocados. Travelling along the corridor in 1989, one observer described the result as "forming a strange linear city, nearly two hundred miles long, of reed-and-mud huts" (Finnegan, 1989:76).

The relative security offered to parts of Manica and Sofala provinces by the foreign troops, the comparatively fertile land and moist climate and, not least, the historic precedent of foreign (British and Rhodesian) investment in the region of the corridor, have also resulted in it and adjoining areas being leading domains of foreign direct investment and joint ventures in contemporary Mozambique beyond Maputo (as Figure 2 indicates). In general, the Beira Corridor has been held up as something of a model for Mozambican-Zimbabwean cooperation, private-sector involvement, and for the SADCC project of reducing mutual dependence on South Africa.
It is certainly true that Beira and the corridor have had immense strategic significance to the frontline states, in particular to Zimbabwe. In the early 1980s, at the same time that South African-orchestrated destabilization was having significant consequences for Mozambique, South Africa closed its border with Zimbabwe on several occasions, disrupting traffic and causing successive fuel crises. By 1986, virtually all of Zimbabwe’s petrochemical imports were passing through the pipeline or road and rail links to Beira (Morna, 1988). The lessening of tensions in southern Africa since the 1989 advent of the De Klerk administration in South Africa means that the strategic significance of the Beira corridor has diminished latterly, although it has not altogether disappeared. Indeed, geo-strategic factors aside, Beira remains the “natural” outlet for Zimbabwean imports and exports: 1,379 kilometres nearer to Harare than the nearest South African port at Durban.

As for the city itself, Beira has not been the centre for state structures in the way Maputo has. However, located at the end of the road, rail and also, since 1965, the pipeline links to Zimbabwe and beyond, it has been a crucial node. Formerly it was a point of articulation between the Southern Rhodesian colonial settler-state, colonial Mozambique and the wider world system. Latterly it has been part of a geo-strategic axis between independent Mozambique and independent Zimbabwe, referred to above. Such shifts in the international relationships and power structures in which Beira is embedded have profoundly influenced the city since its creation just over one hundred years ago.

Indeed, the very foundation of Beira was the result of such wider strategic and geopolitical changes. The Portuguese attempt at “effective occupation” in order to meet the demands of the Berlin Congress, led to the creation of a new military post in 1887 at a strategic location in relationship to the declining indigenous Gaza empire. This was where the city of Beira would later grow (dos Muchangos, 1989; Liesegang, 1989; Lobato, 1981). It was actually the granting of a concession to the Mozambique Company in 1891 that triggered growth. Such concessions were part of a somewhat desperate scheme on the Portuguese part to promote “effective occupation” (Newitt, 1981; Smith, 1991; Vail, 1976). Unable to “pacify” vast areas of the territory that had been conceded to it and unwilling to invest there, the company focused on developing Beira and a railway to Rhodesia (Nunes, 1929; Vai, 1976). The railway was finished in 1900 and the city remained under the jurisdiction of the Mozambique Company which itself had come under British financial control early in the twentieth century.

Meanwhile, British and Rhodesian influence became paramount in Beira. British currency was in use in the city and an English-language newspaper even appeared. The British constructed another railway linking the city to Nyasaland (Vail, 1975). Hence, not only did Beira’s hinterland have separate administration and tariff systems until 1941 (when the lease of the Mozambique Company finally expired), but even after that time, the city had closer links with neighbouring British colonies (subsequently independent Malawi and UDI Rhodesia) than with the rest of Mozambique.

Apart from the nationalization of the port in 1948 and of the railway to Rhodesia in 1949, none of this had really changed when the events of 1974 precipitated the collapse of the colonial system. By the time of Mozambican independence, Beira had grown to be the second city of Mozambique, with a population in excess of 110,000 (dos Muchangos, 1989). It was also a major conduit for Rhodesian “sanctions busting”.

After Mozambican independence, Frelimo abided by UN sanctions against Rhodesia, closing the border at Machipanda from 4 March 1976. One of the results was that traffic through Beira port collapsed. Frelimo’s solidarity may have cemented its relations with ZANU and have been a further nail in the coffin for the Smith regime, but it also removed much of Beira’s raison d’être. Without its hinterland and buffeted by the economic crisis that accompanied the departure of the settler population, the economic base and physical fabric of the city declined. There was a brief respite after Zimbabwean independence when, in line with the wider optimistic climate in Mozambique, it was hoped that recovery (and even
socialist transition) were firmly on the agenda. Trade through the port recovered somewhat, but it was not long before the war and economic crisis of the 1980s closed in on the city.

In the last few years, the growing trade through the Beira corridor and the reintegration of Beira into the broader regional and global system have generated a revival, although with only limited impact on the conditions for the majority of the population in the city. Between 1977 and 1979, a plan for the rehabilitation of the port was developed with funding from the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation. However, implementation of the plans had to wait until after the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.

Since Zimbabwe was the hub of the southern Africa transportation network north of the Limpopo River, the sanctions and border closures following Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 prevented the majority-ruled states of the region from establishing substantive transport co-operation. The foundation in 1980 of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference with the official aim of reducing the mutual dependence of its members on South Africa, laid the basis for the co-ordinated rehabilitation of the port. Yet, whilst a number of rehabilitation schemes got underway during the first half of the 1980s, it was not until 1985 that a comprehensive programme was developed - based on the plan referred to above. Then, with Zimbabwean troops offering the minimum requisite security to the corridor, a ten-year development programme for the Beira corridor was formulated with assistance from the European Community and the SADCC.

When the plan was completed the Mozambican government created (by Joint Ministerial Decree, 19 December 1985) the Gabinete do Corredor da Beira (Beira Corridor Authority) within the Ministry of Ports, Railways and Merchant Shipping. The Gabinete became responsible for mobilizing the capital and co-ordinating the rehabilitation of the port, including the roads, housing and training of the workforce. The projects, however, have been entirely funded by foreign aid, which is anticipated to total US$670 million over the ten years to 1995. [13] Furthermore, although the rehabilitation of the port offered long-term prospects for the rehabilitation of the city, so far the development has been of dependent and enclave nature. Within the port the rehabilitation makes for a dynamic atmosphere, but for the city in general the indications of recovery are much more limited and contradictory in effect. As a spin-off from the Beira port and corridor development, there is now a programme to rehabilitate the physical infrastructures of the town. By the end of 1990, seven such rehabilitation projects were underway (Beira Corridor Authority 1991). In general, however, the dynamism of the quasi-internationalized zone within the firmly bounded confines of the port and the opportunities for Mozambicans who are able to find employment on the projects therein contrast starkly with the prospects for those outside the small merchant and trading group in the city who also benefit directly or indirectly from the infrastructural projects. As in colonial times (Coimbra, 1970), the majority of the people who reside in the cidade de canico are marginalized. Furthermore, although no published figures on the theme are available, it is clear that the vast majority of the required materials, equipment and skilled personnel are “imported”.

In addition to the massive project co-ordinated through the Gabinete, the Beira Corridor Group (BCG), a private organization funded by Zimbabwean capital with its head office in Harare, was founded in 1986. The BCG seeks to profit from participation in the rehabilitation projects as well as making related investments. The existence of an “internationalized” port largely financed and operated by foreign capital, with investments coming from Zimbabwe, echoes the historical pattern of Beira as an entrepôt for Rhodesia. In a very broad sense the parallel is striking. However, the sources and nature of the capital flows of today are quite different to those of colonial Beira. At US$1.35 million, the private capital invested by the BCG is only a tiny fraction of the much wider aid flows to the port and associated infrastructure. In the words of one report, BCG investment is “riding on the back of the donors putting aid money in to the corridor” (Hanlon, 1989: p 72). For Beira, as elsewhere in Mozambique, if large scale private capital is to follow, it will be along conduits put in place by international aid.
The consequences of this, in terms of reinforcing Mozambican dependency and replicating, albeit in new contexts, the regional patterns of uneven development, also seem assured, if not widely acknowledged. As the following section indicates, the Priority District Programme will not reduce such disparities, even though it has been forced to consider the issue.

The Priority District Programme

The Programma dos Distritos Prioritários (PDP) is also a response to the conditions generated by the war; a recognition that the government can focus only on limited areas of the national territory as well as a programme of selective economic and political regeneration. The impact of the programme has so far been very limited, given the continuing constraints of the war and a degree of reluctance by foreign NGOs to participate in the project on the terms offered by Mozambican ministries (Hanlon, 1991). However the PDP is potentially significant, in the first place as a Mozambican-designed programme that, in the words of a foreign consultant to the Mozambican government,

... is better conceptualised, more contextualised, better linked to political level goals and decisions, more integrally Mozambique's own work and more likely to be broadly successful in attaining its targets than any previous Mozambican rural development initiative. (Green, 1990a: p 12)

As Green (1990b) has pointed out elsewhere, the programme is also, in terms of rural development, the “first broad front strategic initiative” in ten years. Restricted in the first year by fiscal constraints to only six districts, with incorporation of all forty not envisaged until 1995, it is admitted that the programme cannot reduce regional disparity. This, however, is not the aim of the PDP, although it has been forced to consider inter-provincial disparity, as is described below.

The brief but valuable accounts in Hanlon (1991) and Green (1990a; 1990b) show how the PDP is being designed as a co-ordinated, multi-ministerial effort, and also the financial and logistic constraints under which it will operate. In the former sense, it is a partial break with the firmly top-down strategy that was pursued during the years of attempted state-led socialist transition. The proposed strategy includes investment in basic physical and social infrastructure combined with institutional development, a unified monitoring scheme and the preparation of district plans.

The scheme began with the selection of the districts in 1987, based on an earlier INPF study of the economic potential of Mozambican districts (Mullin, Meeuws and Sumalgy, 1985). Since then Mozambican documentation (Frelimo, 1989; Carrilho et al, 1990) has stressed the economic and social goals. However, as already noted, it is clear that these are also conceptualized as part of a wider strategic policy of recuperation of the state and society in the countryside: part of a challenge to Renamo and to other “freelance” armed bandits operating in the situation of confusão (confusion/disorientation) that prevails in many rural areas. The actual selection took into account security conditions, the grading of the districts, and the prospects for funding. A map indicating the location of the priority districts (see Figure 3) reveals a concentration along the strategic Beira, Nacala and Tete corridors and along the coast.

The 40 priority districts constitute 30 per cent of the total number of Mozambican districts. However, in the districts selected, 60-70 per cent of the marketed agricultural production is produced and 50 per cent of the rural population is located. Whatever similarities it may have to the tried and tested regional development formulas of “growth poles” or “agropolitan development” (Gore, 1984; Simon, 1990; Stohr and Taylor, 1981), the programme is not a “conventional” regional development scheme, but a project developed in response to the
specific conditions prevailing in Mozambique. In so far as it constitutes a regional
development strategy, it is one where strategic considerations are paramount. Hence it makes
no attempt to focus on the least developed districts. In the context of the wider situation in
Mozambique, that would be impossible. Furthermore, the districts selected contain only 30
per cent of the deslocados. Indeed, as already noted most of the districts are located along the
coast or the transport corridors: in short, the more developed parts of Mozambique.

However, the Priority Districts were selected so as to produce a more or less even share
between provinces. For, in addition to the selection on the criteria noted above, there was:

... another [criterion], of an essentially political character: the
activity has to be carried out in all of the country's provinces,
in an attempt to avoid maximizing regional disequilibriums
(Carrilho, 1990: p 3) (my translation)

Mozambican documentation admits that without this political criterion, it would be possible
to select districts in such a way that over 85 per cent of marketed output would be produced
in the ones that were chosen. In this case, 75 per cent of the Priority Districts would be in
Zambezia and Nampula, but a generally less fertile province such as Inhambane would be
excluded entirely (Carrilho, 1990: p 4). It is clear that “regional disequilibrium” refers to
inter-provincial disparity. This is related to Frelimo’s concern for “national unity”. It is
recognized that a focus on one or two provinces could become a political issue if the
programme began to have a substantive impact.

So far, though, the PDP remains embryonic. Both the extent to which it will be able to realize
its objectives and the ultimate form of the programme are uncertain. The respective
provincial offices of the INPF have been involved in the preparation of the district plans
required for the project. To date, however, the programme remains largely at the planning
stage, despite the creation in December 1990 of the Instituto de Desenvolvimento Rural
(Institute of Rural Development, or INDER), a new state agency which has taken overall
responsibility for the administration of the project. [14] Meanwhile, the potential co-
ordinating role of physical planning within the programme has not received sufficient support
either from the respective provincial governments or particular ministries, which still tend to
put forward their own projects without seeking co-ordination. [15] The general lack of status
which spatial/physical planning suffers from, referred to earlier in the section on urban
planning, is not something that has yet been transcended in the nascent PDP. Furthermore,
and critically, it seems that the international donor community, who in Hanlon’s (1991) terms
now “call the shots” in Mozambique, has done little to support the programme. In fact, many
international agencies have tended to reinforce the fragmentation of policy and the tendency
to by-pass the planning system.

Conclusions

It is notable that the PDP is directed at regeneration, with the state playing a facilitating and
not a directing/leading role. As such, it is a long way from the policies of the first ten years
after independence during which Frelimo sought, in increasingly difficult circumstances, to
direct Mozambican economy and society. The very failure of Frelimo’s project of socialist
development and transformation and the ensuing enfeeblement of the state and conditions of
civil war have limited the capacity for urban and regional planning in general. In the last few
years the collapse of socialist ideology has seen Frelimo embrace a pro-capitalist stance.
Whilst this has been accompanied by a limited economic recovery, it has also seen increasing
social inequality and a greater subordination of Mozambique to the regional nodes and global
cores of the world capitalist system than at any time since independence. [16] (Hanlon,
Furthermore, there has been a profound structural continuity in the general pattern of uneven development in Mozambique. It is still largely a country of corridors that provide transit routes for its neighbours, epitomized by the Beira corridor. In fact, the war has accentuated the differences between urban areas and the territory as a whole. Despite the recent rise in urban crime and violence (Independent, 26 September 1991), the former are relatively secure islands in a sea of conflict. The war may ebb and flow according to changing strategic and tactical conditions, but the very unpredictability that characterizes the security situation in large areas of the Mozambican countryside contrasts starkly with the main towns. Yet, even in a post-war scenario, the scope for transcending the inherited patterns of uneven development remains minimal. Although an essay produced for Frelimo's Fifth Congress in 1989 on the theme of “uneven development in Mozambique” argued that the patterns of uneven development in the country threatened national unity and were neither economically nor environmentally “rational” (Pereira, 1989), the capacity for the state to alter this in the short or medium term is severely limited.

Meanwhile direct negotiations to end the war have been slow in producing results since their commencement in 1990, as the combatants continue to jockey for the best negotiating position (Africa Confidential, 1991a; 1991b; 1991c; 1991d; 1992). The future for the Mozambican regime is uncertain, given that following a peace accord multi-party elections will be held. However, like the Mozambican people and the Mozambican state, the formal territorial planning machinery in Mozambique continues to struggle against overwhelming odds and will face new challenges once the war is finally ended.

Notes

* The paper focuses on the experience between 1975 and up to the end of 1990. Since then, a number of significant changes have taken place. The INPF has become increasingly marginalized and now exists more “on paper” than as a functioning entity. The newly founded Instituto de Desenvolvimento Rural (Institute of Rural Development, or INDER) has taken over responsibility for the priority district programme. Most significantly of all, negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo have reached an advanced stage and on the 7th August 1992 Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama and President Joaquim Chissano agreed to sign a cease-fire on the 1st October 1992 in Gaborone. The significance of these developments will be detailed in an expanded and updated version of this paper which is due to be published in the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research in 1993-94.

1 In Mozambique, the war and ensuing crisis are often referred to as “a situação” (the situation).

2 Prior to 1975 Mozambique was ruled from Lisbon, as part of the wider Portuguese empire. The radical nationalist movement of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), formed in exile in Tanzania in 1962 from an amalgam of resistance groups, had launched a guerrilla war for independence on the 25th September 1964. Ultimately,
the loss by the Portuguese armed forces of the military initiative in parts of Mozambique, as well as in Portugal’s other continental African colonies of Angola and Guinea-Bissau, played a role in prompting the leftist Movimento das Forcas Armadas (MFA) to overthrow the authoritarian government of Marcelo Caetano in April 1974. Following this, Portugal quickly withdrew its remaining colonial possessions, and by the end of 1975 what had been both the first, and the most enduring, European overseas empire was gone. In the Mozambican case, Portugal signed an independence agreement with Frelimo on the 7th September 1974 and a transitional government was set up, leading to independence on the 25th June 1975. Frelimo formally declared itself a “Marxist-Leninist vanguard party” at its Third Congress in February 1977. At its Fifth Congress, in 1989, the party was redefined as the vanguard of all the Mozambican people and references to Marxism-Leninism dropped.

3 The Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) was originally set up by the Rhodesian security forces in 1976-1977, and for some years after Zimbabwean independence they were supplied and trained by the South African military (Fauvet, 1984; Vines, 1991). In English, Renamo has often been termed the MNR (Mozambican National Resistance). Until recently, the Mozambican government refused to use these names and often still refers to the group as bandidos armados (armed bandits).

4 For 1992, over 60 per cent of the state budget is projected to come from foreign aid. In recent years the “aid sector” has constituted around 50 per cent of the GNP (Hanlon, 1991; Waterhouse, 1992; Wuyts, 1991).

5 The theme of Mozambican land law, its application and relationship to the land-use planning system are considered in Sidaway (1991a) and Simon (1991a; 1991b).

6 In Mozambican cities a broad physical distinction is customarily made between the central cidade de cimento (cement city) and the surrounding cidade de canico (cane city). In turn, this relates to the distinction between a “formal” sector of private or state-owned buildings and an “informal” sector of unregistered private housing of cane or other light material. In a 1985 report it was estimated that only about 8 per cent of the Mozambican population lived in permanent houses of brick or cement (Forjaz, 1985).

7 See note 6.

8 Interview conducted with INPF official in Maputo, August 1989.

9 Some observers have traced this to Machel’s moralistic anti-urbanism (Henrikson, 1978; Libby, 1987). For a discussion of this issue and of Frelimo’s attitude to urbanism in general, see Sidaway (1991a).

10 Data supplied by the GZV, Maputo.

11 However in more general terms, Mozambican “physical” planning has not taken a great deal of account of the gendered nature of social space.

12 The fact that Maputo, in the far south, is the capital of Mozambique, rather than the centrally located Beira, as well as the fact that Maputo’s Conselho Executivo receives the lion’s share of the funding that must be shared between all such bodies nationally is perceived by many in Beira as part of a wider southern bias in the country.

13 For a listing of the donors and projects, see Muhate (1989).

14 What the impact of the creation of INDER will be remains unclear. It is located in offices formerly occupied by the INPF in Maputo.
Interviews conducted with INPF officials in Chimoio and Maputo, April 1990.

The neo-liberal orthodoxy of the World Bank and the IMF, who direct the Mozambican “structural adjustment” programme, has relatively little to say about the role of spatial planning. To what extent the broad, anti-statist and anti-planning ideology and the stress on “effective administration” which these powerful international agencies espouse are likely to affect the nature of the Mozambican spatial planning system remains to be seen.

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