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In March 1924 the government of the Union of South Africa imposed trading restrictions on cattle coming from the British controlled territories to the north. Ostensibly this was an attempt to protect settler farmers in South Africa from northern, mainly African, producers in an over-supplied post-war regional and international beef market. In sketching out the events that led up to these restrictions, I will argue that the collapse of the South African beef industry, although primarily linked to its wartime expansion, reflected upon a set of inherent pre-war structural weaknesses and contradictions, which were largely due to chronic under-capitalization within the settler political economy. In turn these weaknesses were rooted in the effects and influences of certain ideological and economic preoccupations displayed and acted upon by both the imperial power and its settler surrogates in the period under review. They are as much to do with the themes of imperial decline as they are to do with emerging settler nationalism.

A Dysfunctional Heritage, 1902-14

The decade following the Peace of Vereeniging saw a general recovery and expansion of agricultural production in southern Africa. The re-establishment of cattle production was among its most impressive aspects. A significant portion, if not most, of this expansion in cattle farming, occurred in the Transvaal bushveld and in the territories to the north - Southern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The expansion of the cattle herds can be largely attributed to the partial control of the environment afforded by relatively successful government anti-bovine disease campaigns, rather than by any spectacular developments in cattle husbandry or support infrastructure. These improvements encouraged a new confidence amongst the settler farming communities that in turn led to further expansions through investment in land and breeding stock. In time this created the need to dispose of an increasing surplus.

A number of inter-dependent reasons can be attributed to the expansion of cattle populations in the northern cattle economies after the end of the South African War. In the case of the Transvaal, the most important of these were the interventionist policies of the Milner administration, which in many cases carried over into the period of responsible government and Union. These policies, which were driven by the twin imperatives of rural spacial control and urban food security, included European land settlement schemes which were located mainly on Crown Land situated in the bushveld areas of the north and west of the Transvaal. Crucial in the support of such schemes, particularly in the recovery of the cattle population, was the establishment in 1902 of the Transvaal Department of Agriculture under the direction of Rank Smith. Smith's Department went on to provide the model and the policy thrust for the Union's Department of Agriculture, as well as many of the Union's top personnel, right up to the 1920s. The Transvaal Department exemplified the way in which the Milner administration in the Transvaal laid the foundations for much of what was to become the South African state.

Preoccupations with its declining power globally informed imperial policy and may also have encouraged the development the South African beef industry. As Britain was a major importer of food, these considerations often focused upon the problem of metropolitan food security during a time of international crisis. In terms of beef, this concern became more salient after about 1907, when Britain's main supplier, the Argentinian industry, largely passed from British to American ownership. In common with earlier thinking regarding the procurement of grain, it was thought that the dominions should be encouraged to produce more for the British market, in return for trade preference agreements, thus reducing the United Kingdom's dependence upon foreign sources.

By 1910 the highly successful anti-epizootic campaigns of the Department had helped to restore and expand the Transvaal herds, while also partially delivering one of the objectives of the old Milner project, that of re-establishing and extending the rural settler presence in...
the Transvaal. Unfortunately the regional economy was now burdened with a growing surplus in settler-owned cattle, mostly of poor quality. There was only limited slack in domestic demand for these new Transvaal settler herds to take up. African-raised cattle, particularly from the Bechuanaland Protectorate, provided much of the cheap lean meat for the mines, and the small settler butcher trade on the Rand, although high priced, could satisfy white demands for prime cuts traditionally obtained from Orange Free State and Natal sources.\textsuperscript{4}

This practical problem, coupled with the emergence, in 1910, of the Union of South Africa (as a settler polity), generated a debate around the possibility of South Africa’s becoming a beef exporter, to be compared favourably with the Argentine and Australia. Although cattle farmers were not geared up to participate on the world’s beef markets, there was considerable enthusiasm amongst settler officials, politicians and farmers, and from the Colonial Office, for the establishment of an export trade as the chosen strategy for the disposal of surplus production and, ultimately, for the survival of settler cattle farmers in the Transvaal and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{5} As early as 1908, a number of small experimental shipments of Transvaal cattle were conducted to test the British market, but little seems to have come of these initiatives. In 1912 the total value of South African meat exports was estimated at a mere £4,000. Under the direction of the Natal Farmers’ Union further trial shipments were undertaken in June 1914.\textsuperscript{6}

The Beef Boom. 1914-19

During the First World War the Union of South Africa enjoyed an optimistic, if brief, period as a beef exporter. As beef-producing areas in the war zones, particularly in France, were disrupted, or destroyed and as large colonial and dominion armies converged on the northern, and later middle-eastern battlefields, the allied demand for more meat and grain products from the agricultural frontiers rose.\textsuperscript{7} Encouraged by generous long-term imperial contracts, colonial producers quickly responded, and frozen meat often followed in the wake of the armies it was eventually to feed.\textsuperscript{8} The war-time demand for South African meat, mainly beef, was not immediate upon the commencement of the war. This can be attributed to a number of factors: the initial un-competitiveness of the quality and price of South African beef available for export, the domestic shortage of cattle due to the prolonged drought of 1913-15, the demands of feeding a mobilized army in South West Africa, and lastly the improved deployment of insulated steamers after 1916 with the establishment of the British Ministry of Shipping.

When South African beef exports did eventually start to flow in significant, if still relatively small, quantities from 1915, the trade took two forms. Small quantities of beef for domestic consumption in Britain and shipped by private wholesalers such as Weddel and Co; and meat for military consumption bought by the Board of Trade on behalf of the Imperial Army Council, and shipped out in insulated steamers under the direct control of the Board of Trade (the Admiralty had responsibility for the deployment of all other Merchant Marine vessels until 1919).\textsuperscript{9} The more substantial and lucrative imperial army consignments for export occurred from around the middle of 1916, mostly to Port Said for use in the Middle East and Salonika.\textsuperscript{10} Further increases followed in 1917. South African beef exports reached their peak in 1917, as a direct result of the redeployment of insulated steamers away from the main operational areas of the German U-boat campaign.\textsuperscript{11}

Farmers and traders in southern Africa responded in a variety of ways to the war-time beef boom. By far the most important war-time export initiative was the establishment in 1915 of the Natal-based Farmers’ Cooperative Meat Industries Company (FMCI). Closely linked to the Natal Farmers’ Union it exemplifies Natal’s clear and early commitment to the export of beef. The proximity of the port of Durban notwithstanding, an underlying reason for Natal’s early drive for export markets can be linked to the loss of its share of the Rand market with the recovery of the Transvaal herds, and the emergence of the new competitive areas of production across the northern borders after 1906 - right at the point when its own herds were being decimated by East Coast fever.\textsuperscript{12}

As the War dragged on, and the demand for beef, both domestically and abroad grew, the FMCI expanded its operations onto a national footing. It found encouraging support from farmers in the cattle-raising areas of the Eastern Cape and the Transvaal, for its plans to set
up, through share options to farmers, a country-wide network of slaughter houses and cold stores. In 1918, the Company opened a large slaughter and storage facility on the Congellia Wharf in Durban, from which it was hoped a substantial and consistent supply of frozen beef could be made available for export. Plans were laid to establish other plants at East London and Cape Town. A similar body, the Smithfields Cold Storage Company was set up in 1917 with close links to Rhodesian cattle farmers and ranchers.

The need to sustain large economies of scale necessary to run these plants meant that the FCMI and Smithfields competed with each other for farmer supporters as potential suppliers and share-holders, particularly in the Transvaal. Many of these Transvaal farmers faced veterinary restrictions on their cattle similar to those placed upon Protectorate and Rhodesian producers. Such government restrictions either banned any sale of their cattle to the Rand market or confined them to the low-priced quarantine market. Depending on where they were situated, many Transvaal farmers, especially in the southern reaches of the bushveld (south of the mountains), were also in direct competition with their northern neighbours. Further north this rivalry was less apparent due to a brisk cross-border trade in young cattle. Although closer in distance to the Rand market, many Transvaal farmers were often further disadvantaged by being more remote from a railhead than many other northern producers. To Transvaal farmers, saddled with high mortgages and rising production costs, as well as local competition from African producers and land companies, the kind of localized capitalization that the cold store companies had in mind, offered the prospect of higher prices and new markets, either domestically or through export.

In the years following the South African War, the land companies were, after the state, the largest provider of land for rent or sale. However during the First World War, in response to good agricultural prices, they emerged as direct producers on a significant scale, with ranching being the most profitable of these new enterprises. Due to its established organizational structure, as well as its close ties with the government, the Imperial Cold Store was also in a strong position to respond to the large imperial army contracts for low-grade frozen beef. By 1917 Imperial Cold Storage was in possession of at least half of the imperial contracts and would no doubt have enjoyed a greater share had it not been for the British Board of Trade procurement policy.

The Government’s response to the beef boom was inadequate, often being confused, slow and underfinanced. The war, particularly in Africa, and the more immediate problems of mining production and the high cost of living in the urban areas, left little time or resources for the formulation and implementation of a coherent capitalization programme that would have placed the beef industry on a permanent export footing in preparation for the post-war period. Despite the foregoing, there was an expressed commitment to large-scale settler ranching as well as irrigated pastures from 1918 onwards. Some effort was made in this direction in the Bushveld Areas through the further extension of the land settlement schemes and the inauguration of new irrigation projects. However the Department of Agriculture, and in particular the Veterinary Division, was starved of funds. In addition, infrastructural weaknesses in general deepened. Rural railway expansion was frozen after 1916 and freight costs were allowed to rise. Legislation that sought to promote settler cattle production, often at the expense of African producers, such as the Agricultural Produce Export Bill (1917) or that imbedded in the Native Administration Bill (1918), were either too modest in their aims or came too late to encourage further development of settler cattle production before the end of the war.

The Union Government did make strong overtures to the imperial government and this probably contributed to the Board of Trade’s decision to deploy more insulated streamers to South Africa in 1916. Further efforts were made in 1917. South Africa had little or no influence over the deployment of these ships, as this was controlled from London. The result was that a serious shortage of tonnage in 1918 held up huge quantities of South African beef right at the very time that the new cold stores were beginning to come on line. Consequently the South African beef industry lost a vital year in its race to capitalize before the war’s end.

Although part of the explanation for this settler rush to invest in the beef boom can be attributed to economic incentives, including what might be termed a well-established culture of speculation, it is difficult not to include non-economic factors in our understanding of settler motivation. Why was it that so much effort and national capital came to be
mobilized, in so short a space of time, in an agricultural sector traditionally associated with
drought, disease, and a plethora of other problems? A mobilization, generated, not by the
emergence of peace-time export markets, providing for the discernable and fickle tastes for
cheap high grade chilled beef among the consumers of northern Europe; but one based upon
the war-time imperial expedients noted above.

I would suggest that further explanations should be sought in certain features of settler
ideology and politics. Like the economic structure of the cattle industry, these notions were
rooted in the history of the region in the years following the South African War, as well as
the more recent establishment of the South African unitary state after 1910. In the case of
the Transvaal, the objectives of the old Milner legacy, that linked the bushveld land
settlement schemes to its status as the main area of expansion for settler cattle production,
could finally be justified in economic terms.27 The First World War held out the prospect of
a permanent settler presence in the cattle raising areas through export-generated
capitalization. The political implications of this prospect of success for these cattle-based
settlement areas was that no significant turnabout would now have been needed in the
direction of a racially-defined rural development of production.

Transposed to the national level, such economic success could have contributed to a wider
affirmation, one that would have enhanced the status of South Africa in the eyes of the
world. Recognition of its status as an emerging beef exporter would have signified its
progress economically (to the contemporary view that such exports signalled progress on
the trajectory of economic development), while also enhancing its image as a “whiteman’s
country” assertively fulfilling its “manifest destiny”, not only in its own rural areas, but as a
member of the world-wide community of “white” dominions.28

Collapse: 1920-1923

In 1920 the world market in war-time beef collapsed as the United Kingdom government
removed price and supply controls and the market attempted to adjust to peace-time
conditions.29 The effect on South Africa’s infant beef export industry was immediate. In
1919 the Union exported the equivalent of 78,249 head of cattle, by 1920 this had declined
to 25,720, and by 1921 it had further declined to almost pre-war levels.30 In the meantime
calls for protectionist measures against northern imported cattle steadily grew as South
African imports from these sources rose from 57,873 head of cattle in 1919 to 89,901 in
1920. The overall deficit of imports over exports in 1920 thus stood at 64,181 head of
cattle.31 The decline in beef exports reflected the fact that the bulk of this trade had been in
the form of army contracts for frozen meat.32

Despite the war-time efforts of farmer-based organizations such as the Farmers’ Meat
Cooperative Industries or those of the Government to secure further imperial or civilian
contracts for South African beef, little was achieved in the way of transforming the
underlying structural and infrastructural problems that had beset the cattle and beef-
processing industry before the war.33 In fact these problems were exacerbated by increased
production, through the war-time expansion of cattle land and herds, as well as the
comparatively high commitment to investment domestically, both in expensive plant and
breeding stock.34 The fact remained that by 1919 South Africa still produced mostly low-
grade cattle, much as it had done before the war, only now in larger numbers, and at a price
and a quality unsuitable for export on the world market.35

A glutted domestic market in low-grade cattle followed the collapse of beef exports. Prices
were further depressed in 1920 as a result of increased imports of northern cattle, as
drought-stricken producers in the Protectorate sought to sell cattle before they died. The
first protectionist measure of this period was the re-imposition of the old restrictions that
confined northern cattle to the so-called Rand quarantine market before 1917, but this did
not come into effect until March 1923. The reluctance on the part of the Union government
to impose restrictions on northern cattle sooner can be attributed to a number of reasons:
including the need to maintain a cheap uninterrupted supply of beef to the mines, the
future status of Rhodesia, and the hope that the British desire for beef self-sufficiency in the
empire would lead to new beef exports to the United Kingdom.36

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Before the 800lb restrictions against northern cattle came into effect in March 1924, a number of long- and short-term strategies were attempted in order to restore the cattle sector’s prosperity. Ranchers in Rhodesia and the Transvaal formed their own cattle breeder associations with the aim of improving the quality of their livestock and thus their export prospects. Smaller farmers saddle with high overheads and large land bonds, often sought better prices for their cattle through closer alliance with one of the rival cold store companies. The Imperial Cold Storage expanded its interests in the exploitation of African-produced cattle in South West Africa and the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

In May 1921 the Meat Producers Exchange (MPE) was established in Johannesburg. It represented a unique alliance of some of those bodies mentioned above. The aim of the Exchange was to reduce the regional surplus by boosting the domestic consumption of beef. This in turn, it was hoped, would provide the necessary capital to promote the resurrection of the export trade. The Exchange intended to do this by entering the market as a wholesaler offering higher prices to farmers and lower prices to butchers and thus undercutting the perceived villains, the Newtown meat wholesalers, who controlled the Rand market and much of its credit. The Exchange was truly southern African in its settler membership, with many of its founder members and leaders coming from Rhodesia, the Protectorate and Swaziland. In fact by fostering cross-border marketing cooperation in this way, many non-Union cattle farmers, perhaps fearing the worst, may have felt that such a strategy would help reduce already discernible calls from Union farmers for protectionist measures. Certainly such inter-regional and cross-class cooperation would never be seen again. After the collapse of the Exchange in 1923, regional and sectional interests appear to have prevailed.

Rob Morrel has highlighted the role of the Imperial Cold Storage in the decline of the Exchange. The cash flow problems of the Exchange were a further factor in its demise. However, it should also be pointed out that central to its decline was the MPE’s failure to secure any substantial export shipments at this time. Much of the Exchange’s expensive cold store plant lay unused. Despite its best efforts to break into the continental markets of France and Belgium, where South African beef might have been more acceptable to local tastes, such endeavours were thwarted by the consistently poor quality of the beef shipped and the dumping of large quantities of cheap frozen beef from America and the Argentine on to that market. It also appears that an unfavourable exchange rate after 1919 affected South African exports due to the high price of gold.

The absence of a coherent overall strategy for the cattle industry on the part of the Union government carried over into the postwar period. The most important underlying feature of government policy in the period leading up to the March 1924 restrictions was the continued emphasis on land settlement schemes, based on large-scale ranching in the northern and western Transvaal. However, high retail prices at home and declining markets abroad put the Union government under increasing pressure from South African cattle farmers and those representing consumers to intervene in the looming crisis. From late 1919 it attempted a number of unsuccessful short-term strategies in an attempt to address some of the more deep-seated problems afflicting the cattle industry, and to provide some solution to the immediate problem of the fall in demand for beef. A Commission of Inquiry into the Meat Trade was set up in late 1919 to investigate ways to control and set prices on both wholesale and retail meat. Supported by the Cost of Living Commission, the Meat Trade Commission managed to have exports of meat temporarily suspended in December 1919 because of an acute meat shortage on the domestic market due to widespread drought. Similarly the Meat Control Board was constituted under the auspices of the Profiteering Act in early 1921, and for a time attempted to fix the margin of profit on wholesale and retail prices to 15 per cent and 25 per cent respectively.

In February 1920 the Government coopted the entire national executive of the South African Agricultural Union onto the Agricultural Advisory Board of the Department of Agriculture. In early 1922, at the behest of the Minister of Agriculture, the Railway Administration agreed to reduce its freight rate on beef by a half to 3/4d per lb in an effort to revive exports. A number of largely ineffectual measures were passed in 1923, including, in April, an amendment to the Agricultural Produce Export Act of 1917 that finally included regulations governing the export of beef. Followed in June by the Meat Export Bounties Act for the subsidizing of meat exports. As already noted in March 1923 the Government took measures to reimpose certain traditional restrictions on northern cattle, once again
confining such livestock to the low-priced (not just those from infected or proclaimed areas) quarantine market, which while not really reducing the flow of northern, particularly Protectorate, cattle onto the Rand, at least had the effect of providing cheaper compound cattle for the mines and industry, while to some extent dampening the demands of South African settler farmers. This was followed by the imposition in November 1923 of 800 lb weight restrictions on northern cattle following further pressure from the Transvaal Agricultural Union in August 1923. These new restrictions became effective from March 1924.

In endeavouring to assess the impact of the First World War on South/southern African beef production, it is particularly useful to focus on the size and nature of the “cattle surplus” after the First World War. The actual narrowness of this regional surplus was illustrated in 1918-19, when high export prices combined with significant drought-related losses resulted in a domestic shortage of meat. As we have noted the shortage was so acute that the Union government imposed a temporary ban on beef exports in late 1919. Such an instance highlights the problems of assessing the true state of the industry and its relationship to the domestic market in this period; not least the problem of uncoupling nutritional need from market demand as a way of understanding the cattle surplus/exports relationship. Certainly projected estimates of the “surplus” based on cattle per capita, that were used at the time in the arguments for a post-war export drive, tended to underplay or exclude the actual or potential significance of black people as consumers in South Africa.

Inclusion of this population would have reduced the calculated per capita rate of cattle to humans, placing South Africa not amongst the medium-sized producers (e.g., Australia) as was often stated, but with a smaller producer such as New Zealand, but without any of the favourable climatic and environmental conditions of that dominion.

Later on such contemporary contemplations on the size of the surplus became increasingly academic, telling us more about the settler world-view than about what quantities of beef were actually available for export. The fact was that most of this cattle surplus was not suitable for export either as frozen or as chilled beef. South Africa lost what post-war chance it had as an exporting nation by allowing farmers to sell their limited quantities of prime beef locally, when domestic prices became more attractive than those offered on the depressed world market. The likelihood of exporting prime beef was further reduced after the implementation of the export bounty scheme, the effect of which was to encourage farmers to use subsidized exports as an outlet for their low-grade meat.

Conclusion

The twin imperatives of rural spacial control and urban food security embedded in the rural policies of the Milner administration contributed directly to the establishment of the modern South Africa beef industry. These considerations found particular expression in numerous European land settlement schemes. However, ultimate commercial viability was seen as crucial for the long-term survival of this particular state rural development project. What was required was massive capital investment. Unfortunately the climate and ecology of the remote semi-arid bushveld of the northern and western Transvaal - the nub of the cattle sector's expansion - was not an attractive investment prospect for would-be capitalist ranchers. Nor was large-scale public investment forthcoming for the establishment of viable family farms. The limits to which the various South African states could affect the modernization of the industry is illustrated by the success of government anti-bovine disease campaigns and the ongoing white land settlement. But all this did was contribute directly to the growing surplus of low-grade cattle after 1910. Capital that would have gone some way to transforming actual conditions was largely absent. The primary weakness in the re-establishment and expansion of the Transvaal cattle industry was that it owed more to these essentially political considerations than to any regard for commercial feasibility.

As a declining imperial power relinquished direct control to an emergent settler nationalism, so the prescriptive logic and bureaucratic thrust of these early policies became a part of settler preoccupations that carried over into the period of Union. Such policies encouraged an underlying increase in cattle production which in turn generated an impression of a burgeoning domestic surplus. However, given the adverse climatic and ecological conditions, and the chronic lack of capital under which beef production was conducted, South Africa had the potential for exporting beef on only the narrowest of surpluses.
Indeed this "surplus", may have had more to do with an increasingly racially controlled and differentiated domestic market, rather than one based on the fulfilment of the nutritional and consumption needs of the Union or indeed of the region as a whole. However the perennial difficulty of disposing of this "surplus", either domestically or on the world market, reflects upon the underdeveloped nature of the South African beef industry during this period.

The promotion of the idea that the Dominions would increasingly provide beef supplies to the United Kingdom to reduce British dependence on "foreign"-controlled beef, prevailed. During the First World War such ideas never disappeared, but were overlaid and enhanced by the more immediate needs of war supply. However a combination of high prices and Empire Loyalism encouraged war-time Dominion production. This was particularly the case with regard to South Africa. In spite of being hampered by a continual shortage of insulated shipping, British wartime demand for South African beef nonetheless falsely confirmed and strengthened the logic of those earlier policies and ideas on rural development.

The beef boom encouraged unprecedented, if belated, disorganized, and ultimately non-transforming, domestic investment in land, cattle, and plant. By 1922 many over-extended farmers, particularly in the Transvaal, faced ruin and the loss of their farms. Political pressure from these farmers, and the prospect of a settler withdrawal from marginal areas such as the bushveld, further ensured that there would be no reversal of the Union government's rural policy in the new settlement lands. In fact the imposition of the 1923 weight restrictions heralded a period of greater intervention on the part of the South African state in support of the crisis-ridden settler cattle industry. Tangible results were modest. A small export trade was later resumed, supplying the fascist army in Abyssinia, but it was only with the coming of the Second World War that the industry was restored to profitability. During the inter-war years restrictions against northern cattle grew tighter and led to the reemergence of "smuggling" as the cross-border trade in cattle was effectively criminalized.

NOTES
1 "Taking the Union as a whole, and comparing the returns of 1911 with 1904, cattle are seen to have increased by 2,296,496, or 66%... [total for 1911] 5,796,949". PRO CO 551/49 26690 Trade of South Africa Report to the Board of Trade on the Trade of the Union of South Africa for the year 1912. By H.M. Trade Commissioner for South Africa (Sir R. Sothern Holland), p 6.
2 This influence was recognized on Frank Smith's retirement in 1920, see Farmers' Weekly, 22 Sept. 1920, p 543.
4 Transvaal Administration, Reports for the year ending December 1902, vol. 1 Annexure B, p.C.7; Transvaal Administration, Report of the Department of Agriculture, 1904-5, p 41, pp 43-44.
6 During June 1908 a small experimental shipment consisting of 120 quarters of frozen beef was made by Messers. Abbot Bros., of Mooi River, Natal. See Department of Agriculture, Farmers Bulletin no. 69, 1914, p 15; PRO CO 551/49 26690, "Trade of South Africa. Report to the Board of Trade on the Trade of the Union of South Africa for the Year 1912", p 33; "An Export Trade in Meat?", p 792; "The Export Trade in meat will have the effect of steadying the prices in the local markets and with better management and breeding supplies will be more constant and of uniform quality...", Department of Agriculture (Agricultural Education), Local Series Bulletin
It is interesting to note that only Australia and New Zealand enjoyed these long-
term contracts. South Africa, Canada and other beef producing areas of the Empire,
relied upon a series of one-off contracts. MAF 60/93 Cabinet Papers. Control of

With the establishment of the Ministry of Food in 1917, most civilian supplies were
procured by the Food Controller, mainly from North and South American sources.
PRO, MAF 60/177, “Tonnage Restrictions of Imports Estimated for 1918. Memo on


MAP 60/437, ibid., p 52.

12 Department of Agriculture, Local Series Bulletin no. 11, 1917; Imann G. J. van den

13 Debates of the House of Assembly, 9 June 1917; “Meat Export and the Future - Spirit

14 “Smithfield Cold Storage and Export Co - Directors' Review of the Past Year”,
Farmers' Weekly, 4 Aug. 1920, p 2769.

Cattle - the Quarantined Area”, Farmers' Weekly, 5 Feb. 1919, p 2433.

16 A. J. Christopher, The Crown Lands of British South Africa (Kingston, 1984), pp 177-
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June 1920, p 2003; UG32-18, Evidence to the Native Land Commission (E. Tvl)
(Pretoria, 1918), 23 Jan. 1918, pp 149-52.

18 MAP 60/437, “Confidential. The Board of Trade and the Great War”, p 94; Debates of
the House of Assembly, 23 May 1917, 19 June 1917.

19 Information for Settlers”, Farmers' Weekly, 9 Oct. 1918, p 628; “Land Settlement
Departmental Activities: Peopling the Back Districts”, Farmers' Weekly, 27 Oct. 1920;
Evidence to the Native Land Commission - (E. Tvl) Pretoria, 12 Jan. 1918, pp 119-
121.

20 15 veterinary officers and 12 stock inspectors were away, about 25 per cent of the
Division's staff. UG5-18 Department of Agriculture, Annual Report for Year Ended
31st March 1917, Appendix I, Veterinary Division Report, vol. 4, p 34; “An Urgent
Warning”, Farmers' Weekly, 2 July 1919, p 2211.

21 Department of Agriculture, Local Series Bulletin No: 11, 1917, van den Bosch, p 18;
May 1919, p 1231; PRO Ministry of Transport (Marine Division), MT25 (Ministry of
Shipping) Vol. 13 40304/18, “Report to Transport Department on Shipping Situation in
South Africa”. From Naval Transport Officer Durban to MoS, November 1917; see
also “Sidelights”, Farmers' Weekly, 13 Nov. 1918, p 1135; South African Journal of
Industries, vol. 1, no. 13, Sept. 1918, ‘Report on the Transvaal Agricultural Union,
Sixteenth Annual Congress’, p 1242; Debates of the House of Assembly, 21 June 1917.

22 UG31-18, Majority Report of the Eastern Transvaal Natives Land Committee (1918),
p 6, pp 14-15; Evidence to the Native Land Commission - E Tvl., 11 Jan. 1918, pp
115-17; UG31-18, Report of and Evidence to the Native Land Committee - Western
Transvaal, Zeerust, 9 Oct. 1917; Report of the Native Land Commission. [1918], p
89
for the Agricultural Produce Export Bill that failed to include beef exports in its scope see *Debates of the House of Assembly*, 21 June 1917.

CO 551/85 37118, “Export of Frozen Meat to UK”, Prime Minister’s Office (Union) to Governor General, 11 July 1916; CO 551 87/44392, Buxton to Secretary of State, 15 Sept. 1916.

CO 551 95/23492, Buxton to Secretary of State, 4 May 1917; *Debates of the House of Assembly*, 23 May 1917.


It was estimated that between 1920-21, the price of imported frozen beef on the London market prices declined from 140 per cent to 23 per cent above 1913 prices, see UG14-23 Department of Agriculture, *Report for the Year Ended 30th June 1922*, p 236; for the flooding of English market, see MAF 60/93, “Cabinet Papers. Extracts from the Minutes of a Conference held at 10 Downing Street on 28 Nov. 1919; South Africa’s Export Trade in Meat. Messrs. W. Weddel & Co’s Review”, *South African Journal of Industries*, vol. 4, no. 7, July 1921, p 530.


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The *South African Journal of Industries*, vol. 4, no. 7, July 1921, p 530.


See, “The Cattle Industry”, *Journal of the Department of Agriculture*, vol. VII, no. 4, Oct. 1923; CO 417/698 61284, “Cattle: Importation into Union from HCT; with copy of the memo of the recommendations of the Inter-state Conference at Pretoria on 12th October 1923”, High Commissioner to Secretary of State, 30 Nov. 1923. For British plans to promote Empire beef supplies in the post-war period see CO 532/92.
29189, "Meat Supplies Conference", from Union High Commissioners' Office to Colonial Office, 8 June 1917; MT25 61609/18, "Imperial Meat Supplies, Report on Imperial Meat Resources", 26 March 1918; MAF 60/93, "Report of the Committee Appointed by the Board of Trade to Consider the means of securing Meat Supplies for the United Kingdom". For South African hopes of new UK markets see Debates of the House of Assembly, 23 June 1923, as reported in the Cape Times 24 June 1923, ‘Concluding Day of the Session - General Smuts and the Imperial Conference’.


UG14-23, Department of Lands, Report for the Year Ended 31 March 1922.


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UG1-24, Department of Railways and Harbours, Report into...the development of Export Meat Traffic, 1923, pp 10-19.