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*Lonkos, Curakas  
and Zupais*

*The Collapse and Re-Making  
of Tribal Society  
in Central Chile, 1536–1560*

*Leonardo León*



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To the memory of my son  
Diego León Silva

# Lonkos, Curakas and Zupais

## The Collapse and Re-Making of Tribal Society in Central Chile, 1536-1560

### Introduction

The history of the Promaucae and Picunche Indians of Central Chile remains unwritten. Even though more than 450 years have elapsed since the events that brought about their extinction, the Indian people are still mere shadows on the epic canvas painted by the Europeans and their descendants. The vanquished paid for their defeat with their freedom and then with the memory of their deeds.<sup>1</sup>

In other papers I have tried to redress this unbalanced view of our national past by concentrating on the history of the 'forgotten' Indians. Firstly, I studied the native resistance against Inca expansionism and evaluated its degree of success;<sup>2</sup> then I gathered information about the military resistance against the Spaniards, highlighting the peak period between 1541 and 1545.<sup>3</sup> In a third work I reconstructed the 'discourses' of the *lonkos*, as they were related by European witnesses, in order to show the Indian view of the war against the Spanish crown.<sup>4</sup> In this present paper I will examine both the collapse of tribal society due to the effects of the war fought to acquire control of the Central Valley of Chile and the policies implemented by the *conquistadores* to support and preserve the defeated Picunches and Promaucaes.

Military history is justifiably criticised for confining itself to accounts of battles and heroes; it is possible to extend the history of conflicts, however, beyond these traditional limits to provide a better understanding of the context in which particular wars have taken place and their social consequences. I will attempt to achieve this by studying the economic and social resistance that accompanied the Picunche and Promaucae military effort between 1541-1555 and its impact upon indigenous society. I will also examine the efforts made by the Spaniards to reconstruct tribal society, a contradictory process that took place at the same time as these events and which has been overlooked by the traditional historiography of Chile. Our chronology is based on the understanding that the struggle to halt imperial expansionism in Central Chile was a process that began with the war against the Inca in the early decades of the sixteenth century, and finished in 1558 with the defeat of *cacique* Lautaro on the banks of the Mataquito river.

Over and above historical distortions and literary fiction, there are enough sources and direct testimonies to allow the historian to throw light on the ferocious and violent resistance mounted by the inhabitants of Central Chile against the invaders.<sup>5</sup> It is important to establish this basic fact because there is still a widespread belief that the Inca and Spanish conquests of Santiago and the surrounding districts were carried out without great difficulty and that the Picunches surrendered without much resistance.<sup>6</sup> Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna wrote almost a century ago that the Picunches were of 'an inferior nature, servile and treacherous'.<sup>7</sup> Inspired by his racist prejudices, Francisco Antonio Encina pointed out in his well-known *Historia de Chile*: 'The military energy of the Picunches and Huilliches was far inferior to that of the Araucanians, not only in their strength and tenacity but also in the development of their military imagination.'<sup>8</sup> The Picunche Indian, wrote René León Echaiz, as recently as 1971, 'was not bellicose but peaceful and lived committed to his agricultural work in his small villages . . . He knew and bore with goodwill first the invasion of the Incas and then that of the Spaniards'.<sup>9</sup> Distortions like these and mistaken beliefs that the magnificent garrisoned villages and fortresses recently unearthed in Central Chile could only have been built by the Incas stem from ignorance of the history and archaeology of the Picunches and Promaucaes.<sup>10</sup> The so-called Promaucaes (mountain wolves) were not only deprived of their lands but, like other indigenous people in the continent, their culture was also stolen.

The main fact that I want to establish in this paper is that the early extinction of Picunches and Promaucaes was caused by one of the bloodiest wars ever fought in Chile. Imperial expansionism and Indian resistance were the two sides of the military confrontation brought about by the Spanish invasion, and extermination of the indigenous people was its most visible outcome. The actions of the vanquished left no major traces, simply because there was no-one left to record the actions of *lonkos* and *conas*.<sup>11</sup> Once they were conquered, the Picunches and Promaucaes were forced to generate the economic surplus that made possible the European expansion to Bio-bio and were recruited to join the imperial armies as *auxiliares* in the war against the southern Araucanian tribes. Eventually, the combination of both the ferocity of the war and the over-exploitation of their lands paved the way for the early extinction of one of the most indomitable of the tribal peoples of the continent.

The evidence on which this paper is based has been drawn from contemporary sources such as the *Relaciones de méritos*, *Probanzas* and *Informaciones* presented by the *conquistadores* to the crown,<sup>12</sup> the letters of governor Pedro de Valdivia, the minutes of the Cabildo (Town Council) of Santiago and the chronicles written by Vívar, Mariño de Lobera and Góngora Marmolejo. Several concepts and interpretations are based on modern studies of Inca and Spanish rule in the region.<sup>13</sup>



## The War of the Pukaraes

The war to resist the establishment of imperial control of the Central Valley of Chile was much more than a mere military event. The struggle against the Inca and the Spaniards included economic sabotage, flight to the mountains and, at its most dramatic moment, collective suicide. The war of the Promaucaes and Picunches against the invaders was violent and total.

In other regions of the continent, the Europeans either established alliances with the natives or created a world of co-existence that enabled them to consolidate their territorial gains. This process was facilitated in Peru and Mexico by the presence of sophisticated social and political institutions dominated by a state apparatus; forced labour, tributes and military service were well known to the natives of those regions. When the Spaniards established their system of imperial control, some of their own institutions simply replaced the old. In the periphery of the Andean empires, the presence of powerful chieftains and local warlords made alliances possible between the invaders and some local factions and helped to establish joint dominion over common neighbours. Thus, political pacts and the relatively simple replacement of one system of imperial domination by another made the war of conquest less bloody and sometimes unnecessary. Throughout the Andean lands, annexation and co-option rather than war became the rule.

In Central Chile the situation was different. The Spaniards found an 'incomplete' system of Inca domination, peppered with small, independent Picunche enclaves. South of the Maipo river, they found the Promaucaes, a tribal society which could not be conquered by the men of Cuzco.<sup>14</sup> The first Spanish forays led by Diego de Almagro in 1536 used the system established by the Inca and advanced to the geographical frontiers of the Collasuyu province without much difficulty; helped by his Inca allies and supported by the *caciques* of the northern valleys, the journey towards Central Chile was almost unhindered.<sup>15</sup> Only the weather and the terrain presented an obstacle to *El Adelantado Almagro*. Yet by the Maipo or Maule river the Spanish conqueror encountered the ferocious resistance of the Promaucaes. A few days later, Almagro returned to Cuzco leaving behind a trail of pillage, burnt settlements and death.<sup>16</sup>

Four years after Almagro a new, smaller, expedition left Peru to conquer the southern lands. It was led by Pedro de Valdivia and was composed of 156 men. In the meantime, Inca rule in Chile was collapsing and the whole region was being rocked by internecine warfare, tribal expansionism and the emergence of new military leaders. To establish themselves, Valdivia and his men used the rudimentary material and political infrastructure left by the Incas in Santiago; they also proceeded to exploit the divisions which prevailed between the inhabitants of Mapocho and the powerful Picunche enclaves of the Aconcagua

and Chile valleys. A few days after their arrival in Santiago, the Spaniards held a parley with 11 *caciques* of Santiago valley and the last representatives of Cuzco rule to establish their first military alliance against chiefs Michimalonko and Tanjalonko of Aconcagua valley.<sup>17</sup>

The long-term success of the enterprise led by General Valdivia depended upon the completion of this political and military pact with the people of Santiago and the submission of the northern and southern tribes; but the strong resistance found by the Inca south of the Maipo river and the military power of the Aconcagua and Chile valleys had already shown that the establishment of Spanish imperial rule was not going to be easy.

The presence of strong chieftainships in Aconcagua, Chile and Cachapoal made Indian resistance possible. Historically, Aconcagua and Cachapoal had learnt well from their military struggles with the Incas and had managed to halt Almagro's attempts to conquer their lands; strong leadership and experience gave them confidence to wage an all-out war against the men led by Valdivia. This mixture of history and social development explains in part both the arrogance of the Picunche and Promaucae leaders and the brutal character of the new war for the control of Central Chile which took place between 1541 and 1545.

The final military campaign carried out by Pedro de Valdivia against the Promaucaes in 1545 brought about Spanish control of the lands situated between the Maipo and Maule rivers without major bloodshed. This was the region where anti-Spanish resistance had been most successfully organised since 1541 and where hundreds, if not thousands, of warriors sought shelter. For at least four years the Maipo and Maule provinces had become the symbolic strongholds of local Indian resistance. However, in the end, the Promaucaes and their allies put down their weapons and abandoned their lands.

The sudden collapse of Promaucae and Picunche resistance in 1545 is difficult to understand in the light of the widespread conflict which had prevailed in Central Chile since 1541. The available records are biased. The soldiers of the conquest emphasised how easily they had achieved the occupation of the lands south of Maipo and they manipulated the facts to persuade the crown and other soldiers to support their endeavours. Historians writing later simply repeated these assertions and perpetuated the myth of the 'easy' conquest of Santiago and the surrounding districts. Both conveniently forgot to mention that the last campaign against the Promaucaes took place after four years of intensive warfare and in the context of persistent native anti-expansionist resistance since the beginning of the century.

In the spring of 1544 Valdivia received human reinforcements and material supplies from Peru which renewed the strength of his forces; it is possible that

the sight of these new contingents cowed the natives, but the defeatist attitude taken by the Promaucaes cannot be explained solely in terms of greater Spanish military power. In fact, the increases in European men and supplies probably did not have a dramatic impact as the starting point of recovery for the Spanish forces was indeed very low. Why then did Indian resistance cease so suddenly? The answer to this question is elusive, especially if we leave aside the traditional interpretation based on European racial and technological superiority. However, we may learn about the causes of defeat by analysing the character of the war waged by the Indians to protect their lands and their freedom from Inca encroachment and Spanish expansionism. In other words, the answer may lie in the way the Indians defended their country.

Ever since the early days of the sixteenth century, the Picunches and Promaucaes of Central Chile had fought against repeated attempts by the armies of Cuzco to impose imperial control over their lands. They resisted the armies sent by the Inca by implementing a military strategy designed to exert control over the valleys and lowlands through the establishment of garrisons in specially fortified mountain fortresses. Thus, for several decades, hillforts and mountain settlements flourished on the hills of Santiago and the neighbouring territories to a degree never before witnessed in the area.

The architecture of the Indian forts, *pukaraes* or *al-barradas* was formidable. They were built on the tops of hills or by the sides of lakes. Their construction consisted of dry-stone walls, palisades, earthworks and ramparts surrounded by flooded fields, woods, swamps and flooded ditches. Some of these constructions encircled the hill slopes while in other cases they only strengthened unprotected areas between natural cliffs and precipices. In most cases, two or three dry-stone walls encircled the hills. Within the walls there were dwellings, wells and ritual spaces; although some of the fortifications seemed to have been temporary refuges, in at least one case the Spanish soldiers counted one hundred huts. Well-built paths and reinforced gates also indicated the presence of more permanent settlements. The style of construction was inconsistent, reflecting perhaps the lack of a centralised authority, but in all cases the thrust of the forts was directed towards control of the low valleys and the defence of neighbouring farm fields, routes of exchange and strategic passes. In time of war, the warriors marched to these fortifications to defend the rights of the tribe.<sup>18</sup>

The strategy of fortified warfare was again implemented to resist Almagro and Valdivia. Thus, between 1541 and 1545, at least 18 positions were fortified and defended against the Spaniards, not counting the forts built by the Indians of Santiago who in those years operated in alliance with Valdivia. The Spaniards themselves built '*casas-fuertes*' in Santiago, Apalta, Maule, Limache and Quintero.<sup>19</sup> Eventually, the war to gain or to retain control of the Central Valley consisted primarily of two armies firmly secured behind the walls of their forts making forays against the lands and farms of the enemy. As shown in later

pictographs, the hilltops were dominated by two fortresses, one native and the other Spanish, facing each other while the armies skirmished in the low, flat lands.<sup>20</sup>

The Promaucae and Picunche tribal federations displaced their economic and material resources to the hillforts in order to sustain the war effort against the invaders. The aim of the local strategists was twofold. On the one hand they wanted to protect the Indians who worked the lands in the valleys, while on the other they sought to deprive the conquerors of their most valuable need: fresh food. When Valdivia entered the land in 1541, this type of fortified warfare already had a long history and some of the local hillforts, like Aconcagua, Mauco and Angostura, had gained prestige and fame for their massive buildings, their key locations and the bravery of their garrisons. In Central Chile, the Spaniards found a people who were well experienced in fortified warfare and who were determined to repeat the old tactics that had succeeded in halting Inca expansionism and that had led to the disastrous retreat of Almagro in 1536.

The concentration of men and resources, especially food and animals, in the defended settlements in the mountains was a reasonable tactic, particularly if the invaders lacked their own means of subsistence. Nevertheless, in 1541 the great majority of the Indians were not in a position to take the war of the forts to its ultimate conclusion, exhausted as they were by the long war against the Incas and by the severe battles with Almagro. Worse still, Valdivia and his men were not cut from the same cloth as those who manned the marauding expeditions which left Cuzco in search of gold and silver and who returned quickly to sell their booty. Valdivia's men were genuine settlers, who left Peru with vine-plants, pigs and hens and the aim of finding a land to live in peacefully. They were the veterans of past military enterprises, the ragged scum of the new Spanish towns, who had realised that their military adventures were over. When they reached Mapocho, they found that it was almost identical to the lands they had left in the Spanish peninsula and the area in which they founded their first village they named Nueva Extremadura. In any event, their determination was to stay regardless of the cost and despite the intrigues and plots of those who had joined the enterprise to make quick fortunes and who, in view of the evident poverty of the land, advocated a return to Peru.

For short conflicts, the war of the *pukaraes* offered many advantages to the local tribal fractions; but these advantages diminished with the passing of time. Eventually, the warriors who had secured themselves on the tops of inaccessible mountains were cut off from the lowlands, saw their stocks depleted and witnessed raids against their settlements. This was the case during the war of resistance against Valdivia which went on for more than four years. Thus, the very success of the war of the forts became the weakest link in the overall strategy of resistance against the Europeans.

Every time the Spaniards raided Indian settlements and farms situated in the districts surrounding Santiago, they found no people, food or animals. In a sense, the Promaucaes had won the first phase of the war by depriving the Spaniards of fresh supplies of foodstuffs and other goods made by the tribes. The deprivation suffered by the Spaniards was noted afterwards in a title of *encomienda*: ‘. . . and you were among those who populated the said city of Santiago and helped to support it during the war, battles, pacification and conquest [of] the natives who were settled in the district of the said city of Santiago, a war that was very laborious and dangerous, because the Indians were very bellicose and were prepared for battle and skirmishes and built many forts and *albarradas*’.<sup>21</sup> But as Valdivia’s men starved, they displayed an extraordinary zeal in the search for something to eat: the Picunche settlements were ransacked and men and women were tortured to obtain information about the whereabouts of hidden supplies. Antonio de Herrera wrote in his *Historia general*: ‘[Valdivia] sought refuge in the fort of Santiago, and supplied its needs by raiding the lands, always fighting with the enemies’.<sup>22</sup>

The Picunche and Promaucae forts, the last strongholds of Indian resistance and the storehouses of much-needed supplies, were overrun with renewed eagerness. Ransacking and pillage, initially never intended by Valdivia and his men, became a common practice as discipline and morale declined and death by starvation became a real threat. The *conquistadores* of Castile became a bunch of starved and desperate looters whose appetite was not so much for gold but for mundane grain, milk and clothing. The fact that the Spaniards alone had horses gave them a mobility in their search for food that allowed them to attack the forts and to steal the hidden food stores before the Promaucaes had their defences in place.

The war of raids and pillage began after the destruction of Santiago in September 1541. ‘The General [Valdivia] knew that the Indians did not want to give us a rest; he decided to make them understand and to teach them a lesson. This became the main target for him and his men. He went out of the city with sixty men and marched to destroy the *pucaranes* [sic] or fortresses they had in their provinces because it was from there that they came to raid our lands and where they sought refuge. Thus, at least twenty-five riders were always attacking the Indian lands. And then, after ten or fifteen days, they returned to Santiago and another squad would go out with their respective leaders. The Spaniards gave the Indians no time to rest. And the Indians, seeing that they could have not even an hour of peace or quiet, began to go away.’<sup>23</sup>

It was during these days of intensive war that the legend originated of the *zupais*, the tireless evil white men who traversed the land raiding stores and burning Indian villages. If elsewhere in the continent the Spaniards rode in search of fortune, in Central Chile they galloped ceaselessly looking for food. The poet-soldier Ercilla wrote in this respect: ‘Not without great risks /and loss

of their lives/ they survived besieged for six years./ Eating tasteless wild roots,/ they maintained their tired bodies'. Vivar described the return of one of the columns sent out to loot Indian villages: 'They brought some *yanacona* Indians loaded with maize. They were welcomed for their capability and great achievement because it is praiseworthy that the Spaniards, being so few and so isolated from any source of support, had been able to fight such a brave and barbarian people and to come out victors.'<sup>24</sup> Ironically, the scarce economic surpluses accumulated by the tribes in past years and stored in the *pukaraes* went to feed the starved forces of Valdivia.

Despite the risks they ran from the constant attack of guerrilla groups and regardless of the sacrifices involved in the expeditions to the Indian lands, the Spaniards renewed their efforts to capture the forts in order to transport the stored food back to the capital. Meanwhile, they were also breaking the material foundations upon which the Indian military effort rested.

The destruction of the undefended settlements in the lowlands was an inherent part of the costs of fortified war as practised by the Picunches and Promaucaes. The Indians were able to minimise the loss of food after the capture of the forts by reducing the quantity of provisions stored and constructing secret silos. Even the greater mobility of the Spanish forces was neutralised by the building of ditches, the flooding of lands and the placing of forts on the tops of inaccessible mountain peaks. Yet the Indian leadership had no way of counteracting the devastating effects of a long war.

The building and victualling of the *pukaraes* and their garrisons for almost five years of permanent conflict simply exhausted the capacity of tribal society to generate additional resources to feed their warriors. As was pointed out by witnesses, the warriors and their women and children had to be fed with goods that were becoming scarce. One solution was to migrate to the lands of the south. 'All the chiefs and natives of these lands', wrote Vivar, 'went to the Province of the Pormocaes [sic], to a fort that they had built with the purpose of refusing to serve us and with the intention that, having their women and children there well protected, they could come out and fight us in this city and kill the people who served us'.

While the number of Indians who sought refuge behind the walls of the forts in the south grew bigger as the Spaniards successfully entered the lands of Cachapoal, the numbers who could carry on working the land, collecting roots and fruits, maintaining channels and terraces and hunting and fishing became even smaller. On the other hand, the building of more complex forts with ditches, solid walls, wells and secret silos required the massive participation of all those able to work. Thus, the development of the conflict for a longer period and the new military requirements forced the displacement of the increasingly small economic force. Finally, the defence of the fortresses, the accumulation

of missiles, the manufacturing of arrows, the deployment of scouts and watchmen and the ceremonial tasks associated with the tactics of the fortified war stretched the capacity of tribal society to the point of collapse. The war of the *pukaraes* required a high investment of energies and imposed severe economic penalties which the Picunches and Promaucaes could not sustain for an indefinite period of time.

Militarily, the inhabitants of Central Chile did not develop a pan-tribal political system that could enable them to coordinate the movement of human and material resources throughout the land. The local political system, based around the basic social unit composed of extended families, was adequate to sustain guerrilla warfare but could not cope with the development of fixed military fronts. There was a real need to articulate the strategy and the tactics of the fortified war but there was nobody to do it. In a sense, the emergence of the *lonkos* who commanded the loyalty of larger tribal segments came too late to deal with the needs and problems of overall leadership created by the new war. Moreover, with the exception of the massive attack against Santiago in September 1541, the Picunches and Promaucaes were reluctant to move the focus of conflict to the city and its surrounding districts. It is true that they were successful in besieging the Spaniards for almost four years; it is also true that they could not stop Valdivia and his men from slipping through their undisciplined lines to attack positions in the rearguard. In consequence, lack of coordination and mobility exposed the warriors to the constant and systematic attacks of the Spanish cavalry. With the help of *yanaconas* and *auxiliares*, the Spaniards managed to move the military front to the heart of the free Promaucae lands and introduced the war of the *maloca* (raids), taking full advantage of their greater mobility.

Traditionally, the *pukaraes* had been a valuable defensive device used by the Indians to repel invaders. The last time that they proved their worth was in 1536, when Almagro was forced to return empty-handed to Peru. Nevertheless, Almagro and his men were typical adventurers who marched out to the periphery in search of gold and booty, while the band of *desesperados* led by Valdivia were men determined not only to rob but to conquer as well. They were the archetype of the new colonisers who were founding towns and villages throughout the known lands of the sub-continent. Faced with the frightening *zupais*, the Picunches and Promaucaes made the mistake of returning to the hillforts with their women, belongings and food. Thus the *pukaraes* became death traps in which the Indians suffered the full impact of the Spanish fury and European military superiority.

The horse, firearms and their long experience in fortified warfare favoured the Europeans and decided the military fate of the local tribes. While the Spaniards raided the Picunche and Promaucae villages and several columns made incursions into the tribal heartlands, the Indians continued building their

magnificent fortresses, which most of the time they could not even finish before the Spaniards attacked them. Unexpectedly, technological superiority had made the war of the *pukaraes* obsolete. The Indians, stubbornly persisting in their old tactics, overstretched the material resources of their tribal society and thus paved the way for their own defeat.

### The Economic War

The demand for extraordinary resources to sustain the material demands of the war of the *pukaraes* came about precisely when the Indian leadership had decided to destroy all the food supplies that could have helped the survival of the Spaniards in Santiago. In 1545, Valdivia wrote to Emperor Carlos V that after the burning and destruction of Santiago the Indians had intensified their hostility, 'refusing to plant, staying alive by eating a kind of onion and a nutritious grain that looks like oats'. In another communication the governor repeated: 'they were so arrogant that they refused to till their lands in order to make war against us'. In his letter to his attorneys at the Spanish court, written in 1550, the Castilian general added further details about the extraordinary resistance of the natives of Central Chile: 'when they realised that we were cultivating the land and had no intention of leaving, in order to force us to go back they kept fighting all the time and everywhere; they did not plant but kept themselves alive by eating some onions and other legumes that grow wild in the land'.<sup>25</sup> Vivar described the attitude of the Indians after September 1541 in similar terms: 'They came together and then all went to war, and they hid their supplies and everything they owned . . . They had sown little maize and not like they used to do in older times; their intention was that, once the Spaniards had seen that there were few plots planted, they would not wait to harvest them, so that with so few provisions they would either die or would abandon the country. If they were to stay, then they would be killed on the one side by hunger and on the other by war'.<sup>26</sup> Chronicler Pedro Mariño de Lobera described similar scenes: 'they resolved that it would be better to seek refuge in the most hidden parts of the land, where it would be difficult for the Spaniards to find them, withdrawing their services and supplies; they also decided to halt the cultivation of the land or to harvest their *chácaras*, in order that the Spaniards would lack all means of subsistence. Then they would be forced either to starve to death or to go back to their countries in search of food'.<sup>27</sup>

The drastic stoppage of all economic activities was a dramatic gesture of defiance designed to put additional pressure on the Spaniards besieged in Santiago. Cut off from Peru by the formidable resistance of the Aconcagua warriors led by Michimalonko and Tanjalonko, Valdivia and his men had no sources of food other than what they could obtain from the neighbouring districts. The decision to stop producing food was apparently honoured by the



majority of lineages settled in the Central Valley. Mariño de Lobera indicated: 'This was the best trick they could devise to accomplish their aims; by agreement it was decreed that they should cease immediately any sort of cultivation, a decree that was unanimously obeyed to such a point that the whole country became extremely poor and sterile.'<sup>28</sup>

The destruction of the food supplies and the dismantling of the tribal economic network was not a mere tactical device but was part of the strategy of resistance put in motion from the very first days of Valdivia's arrival in Santiago. 'The Indians of this country', wrote a soldier, 'ceased to sow the land from the days the Christians came.'<sup>29</sup> Valdivia himself described in a letter to Hernando de Pizarro the difficulties he encountered when he entered Chile: 'It took me eleven months [to reach Santiago] and this delay was caused by the hard labour we had in finding food that the Indians hid so well that not even the Devil could find it.'<sup>30</sup> 'The Indians fought for four years', pointed out Captain Rodrigo de Quiroga in 1564, 'and did not want to sow the land on the understanding that hunger would force us to leave the town.'<sup>31</sup> Pedro de Artaño declared in 1558 that 'he knew and saw that for more than two years the natives of these provinces did not want to work the land and fled to the mountains and survived eating grapes, wild onions and other herbs'.<sup>32</sup>

The Indians used hunger and the threat of starvation as an additional weapon in their war of resistance. They expected that, however painful it was, the destruction of food and supplies would eventually lead to victory as in the days of Diego de Almagro. In this respect, Gabriel de la Cruz affirmed that 'owing to the war with the said Indians they refused to plant or to work their *sementeras*, thinking that this would force the Spaniards to go away from their lands, as in the times of Diego de Almagro'.<sup>33</sup> Juan Godínez, a veteran soldier who took part in Almagro's expedition and then joined Valdivia's to become one of the most powerful men in the new colony, wrote that the Indians 'made war by not planting, having it for certain that they would force us out of the land, and thus they did not work their fields for many years'.<sup>34</sup> Francisco de Riberos wrote that the Picunches and Promaucaes 'rebelled for more than five years, not sowing the land and believing that as Don Diego de Almagro had returned to Peru in the past so would the said Governor don Pedro de Valdivia be forced to do so on this occasion'.<sup>35</sup> The inhabitants of Central Chile geared the tribal economy totally towards the war effort.

Cut off from the imperial forces in Peru and condemned to survive in a situation of almost total siege, the Spaniards fully realised that the hunger-war was complementary to the war of the *pukaraes*. Francisco de Riberos pointed out that the Indians 'cease to work in order to raise the stakes in their war'.<sup>36</sup> The natives, another soldier pointed out, 'stop sowing the land thinking that it would force the Christians to leave'.<sup>37</sup> Santiago de Azócar added that Picunches and Promaucaes 'always tried to resist the Christians and fought to throw them

out of their kingdom, and for this reason they agreed to stop sowing'.<sup>38</sup> Apparently, all the northern tribal segments joined in this dual strategy. According to Diego de Rosales, who wrote his chronicle about eighty years later, this dramatic decision was taken by the Indians of Aconcagua, Limarí, Coquimbo, Illapel and Chuapa, Copiapó and Santiago. During a pan-tribal gathering, the Jesuit observed, 'they agreed to withdraw all food, supplies and livestock, and took everything of value with them to the mountains and then built their fortresses on the tops of high peaks'.<sup>39</sup>

The scarcity of food and supplies did not achieve its target but it had a serious impact on the morale of the *conquistadores*. In fact, a review of all contemporary *Informaciones, Relaciones* and *Probanzas* available shows that the severe lack of food and provisions became traumatic for the Europeans; they repeatedly asserted that those had been very hard and laborious days, especially during the siege of 1541-1544. 'We suffered great hardships, were very needy and experienced great risks to our lives' – observed Hernán Páez – 'because we had to fight so often with the Indians and lacked food; there was such a large shortage that the Europeans dressed in the skins of the wild animals they had killed for food, and survived feeding on wild herbs and bad food, of little value and bad taste, all because the Indians did not want to sow the land for several years.'<sup>40</sup> Pedro de León wrote: 'in all the Yndias there has never been anything like what took place in this country because besides the great war and battles they gave us . . . the said natives decided not to work the land for six years and it caused us great hardships'.<sup>41</sup> Pedro de Herrera, another companion of Valdivia, pointed out in 1558 that during the conquest and pacification of the Central Valley 'we went through great and excessive hardships . . . because no ship came to this land and the Indians, in order to force us to abandon their country, did not want to serve'.<sup>42</sup> The inhabitants of Santiago, declared Juan Carmona in 1564, lived in a state of such misery during the war with the Promaucaes that they 'were dressed in the furs of foxes, dogs, seals and cats'.<sup>43</sup>

If the Indians' strategy based on the threat of starvation was decisive in the successful outcome of the conflict with Almagro, it had less impact in the war against the men led by Valdivia. While Almagro's men were soldiers of fortune, the men who accompanied Valdivia were genuine colonists determined to prosper in the harsh conditions they met in Santiago. Furthermore, the military siege imposed by the Indians from September 1541 left the new conquerors with no options; isolated and starved, the Castilians had to fight not just for conquest but also for their own survival. As Vivar noted, Valdivia's main objective during these trying days was food and the accumulation of grain, 'because he feared hunger more than work and war'.<sup>44</sup>

The situation of misery created by the Indians backfired. While the Spaniards used all their past experience to create a rudimentary economic system that permitted their physical survival, the Indians witnessed the rapid deterioration

of their own strength and the sudden collapse of their military capability. By implementing economic war at the precise time that additional resources were needed to maintain large contingents of warriors to defend the *pukaraes*, forts and palisades, the Indians made a grave error. 'During the period of intensive war', wrote Mariño de Lobera, 'the Indians were not free from these sacrifices, because besides the hunger that they suffered, they also saw how they diminished owing to the war and hardships.'<sup>45</sup> The sudden military defeat of the Picunches and Promaucaes in the summer of 1545, precipitated though it was by the Spaniards, was the culmination of a long process of resistance that was weakened by their own decision to destroy most of their material resources.

### **The Flight of the Warriors**

'When they realised that the confrontation was total, and seeing that they had started something that they could not abandon without losing their lives, many of them left their lands.'

Gerónimo de Vivar, *Crónica y relación copiosa y verdadera de los reinos de Chile* (1588), p. 64

The impact of the war of raids and pillage and the increasing scarcity of resources forced the Picunches and Promaucaes to abandon their lands. This eventually paved the way for the collapse of tribal society in Central Chile. It is true that the migration secured the survival of several thousand men who sought refuge and settled on the southern banks of the Maule river, but it also demolished any hope of military victory over the Europeans. Lacking a social structure that could materially sustain the military effort and without the warriors to defend their settlements, the defeat and submission of the last Picunches and Promaucaes became inevitable.

Several authors have described the flight of the warriors, identifying two successive migrating waves. Sergio Villalobos has dated it at about 1543-1544, observing that the Indians 'fled to isolated lands, cut off by mountains and snow, away from the plains dominated by the cavalry. But put to the test of hunger and the sword, they had to bow and come down to serve the invaders'.<sup>46</sup> This interpretation of events is based on contemporary testimonies such as that left by the veteran soldier Santiago de Azócar. Describing the military expeditions sent out to the Indian lands after September 1541, Azócar pointed out that the soldiers 'found the food in the fields, and the Indians fled from their villages and were absent for some days; after some two or three months, Valdivia sent his soldiers and people to raid their lands and to call them to make peace; then the Indians came to promise their obedience, and most of the people of the land

were at peace with us, with the exception of two from the valley of Aconcagua and Chile, who remained stubbornly rebellious'.<sup>47</sup>

According to several other testimonies, it seems that the first sudden flight to the mountains was followed by a more systematic migration to the south and perhaps across the Andes. Vivar wrote that not only did the Promaucaes abandon their lands, but once they had settled in the new country they called the Indians of Mapocho who had stayed behind to come and join them. 'The Promaucaes sent their messengers to the Indians of the country [Santiago] who were serving us. These Indians had no alternative but to serve us because they lived too close to our city and had their settlement in flat lands. The Promaucaes invited them to abandon Mapocho and to settle among them; they told these Indians that there were enough lands to harvest and to settle; that they should no longer serve us and that the Promaucaes would give them their lands willingly. The Promaucaes had reasoned that if nobody worked for us, we would be forced to leave the country. In their opinion, the Spaniards had stayed only because the Indians of Mapocho had served and helped to build our houses and fields.'<sup>48</sup>

Apparently, the long term military objective pursued by the Promaucaes was to establish a military alliance with the northern Picunche groups and to build a fortified frontier on the southern bank of the Maipo river. To this end, on several occasions messengers were sent to the north to parley with the rebels led by Michimalonko and his allies. In September 1541, Valdivia marched to Cachapoal led by two captured Promaucae *caciques* who were promoting support for this enterprise. The Promaucaes failed to achieve their military alliance with the Picunches, but once the Spaniards crossed the river Maipo they found that the migration had been very significant. Thus, the lands and fields of Santiago were almost empty and the *encomiendas* were depopulated. Above all, the flight of the Promaucaes and the northern Picunches benefited the Indians of Maule who saw their warring armies swollen by veterans of the war of Santiago. Eighty years later, Rosales pointed out that the Araucanians had become more arrogant and powerful, 'because they were joined by the Promocaes, with their women and children, who fled their old country, to avoid the rigour of Spanish arms'.<sup>49</sup>

The massive migration of the original inhabitants of Santiago and the neighbouring districts had few parallels in the continent and caused alarm among the *conquistadores*. Spanish expansionism did not consist in the annexation of lands but in the submission of people and their exploitation as cheap labour. Immediately after the destruction of Santiago, when the Indians abandoned their settlements, Valdivia sent several parties to the country 'to call the rebel natives to peace and to encourage them to remain settled in their houses'.<sup>50</sup> Captain Rodrigo de Quiroga pointed out that, as leader of some of these parties, his soldiers 'found the food burnt in the fields and the villages depopulated'.<sup>51</sup>

Pedro Gómez don Benito wrote that in the course of these expeditions, the Spaniards found 'the Indian villages without people because they had abandoned them'.<sup>52</sup> Despite their strenuous efforts to halt the Picunche wave the Spaniards ended up with lands that were barren and desolate.

The virtual depopulation of Santiago became clearer when Valdivia decided to create the first *encomiendas*. It was at this hour of the distribution of the spoils of war that the Europeans could fully appreciate its devastating effect and the scale of the flight of the natives. During the *Cabildo Abierto* which took place in Santiago in 1542 to distribute the Indians in sixty *encomiendas*, Valdivia stated publicly to his soldiers that he had 'no clear idea of all the *caciques* settled in the land, [but] that he wanted to reward them on behalf of His Majesty, and that if he was not able to give them as he wished and wanted and they deserved, it was because the whole country was at war and very few wanted to serve publicly'.<sup>53</sup>

The exodus of the Picunches was not limited to Santiago and Maipo. Once the Spaniards extended their control to the province of Maule and then began to penetrate the southern lands, a second migration of Picunches and Promaucaes took place. In a title of *encomienda* granted by Valdivia to Hernando de Huelva in July 1552, the governor highlighted the recent movements of people in the southern regions and the uncertainties that surrounded the creation of new *encomiendas*. The document stated that the *encomienda* granted to Huelva included 'the *lebos* of Otogüe, Coigueco, Pelel, Viegana and Chilean, with their appointed *caciques* Reynoguellan, Tipaxququen, Millamiral, Painelen, Catarongo, Gunachaco, Paivelerma, Guanamangua, Guelen, Basracheuque, Languaguano, Molovaveen, Tarnelo, Tarnande, Aneprelan, Caromande, Calmacheuque and all the other *caciques* and those who are not *principales*, plus all the Indians and subjects of the *caciques hereby named, and those who are absent* [our emphasis], insofar as they are subjects and belong to the jurisdiction of the said *lebos*, who have their seat near Itata river and this city of Concepción, in order that you should be served by all of them'.<sup>54</sup> As had happened in Mapocho, by the time the first *encomiendas* in Maule were created, only the skeleton of a dismantled social system existed there. Institutionally, some *cacicazgos* still persisted but the majority of the Indians were absent or lived in such disorder (*behetrias*) that their affiliation to a particular group was in doubt.

The massive migration of warriors varied regionally, but it affected all the tribal segments settled in Central Chile. The valleys, formerly occupied by the colourful and picturesque settlements of the Promaucaes and Picunches, became a waste land. Yet the fields they abandoned were some of the best in the country, irrigated and terraced, close to woods and rivers and well protected by the hillforts in the neighbouring mountains; they enjoyed relatively mild weather and had easy access to the Andean foothills. This had facilitated the development of a pastoral economy with an endless supply of rich grazing and

seasonal pasturage. The Spaniards, who up to 1544 had been restricted within the walls of the city, recognised the good quality of the land and proceeded to reallocate the empty fields to Indian allies who, for unstated reasons, found themselves landless. In fact, entire communities were re-settled in the lands left behind by the fleeing Promaucaes and Picunches. This is what happened to the lands of Vuilquisa, on the northern banks of the river Maipo, which had belonged to *cacique* Ellocaudi; they were given by Valdivia to *cacique* Alongomanico on the pretext that they were 'at present not populated'.<sup>55</sup> In 1553 the Cabildo of Santiago agreed to give to Juan Jufre the lands positioned 'in the valley that runs through the middle to the Tagua-Taguas . . . that valley and land is not settled'.<sup>56</sup> It is worth mentioning that the *pukaraes* of Tagua Tagua were the last military strongholds of Promaucae and Picunche resistance, and that between 1541 and 1544 the area had witnessed a large concentration of migrants from the north. The final thrust of Valdivia and his men did accomplish the annexation of the lands between the Maipo and Maule rivers, but most of the area was deserted.

The flight to the south had enormous social consequences for the survival of tribal society in Central Chile but it was not the most dramatic reaction to European invasion. While the great majority of the original inhabitants fled, others simply accepted their fate and committed suicide. While this behaviour was common in other regions of the continent, it generally took place among the Indians when they experienced the abuse and exploitation of the *encomenderos*. In Central Chile the natives took the path of death before the war of conquest finished. The soldier Lope de Ayala wrote in this respect: 'the Indians spent a long time without working the fields and let themselves starve'.<sup>57</sup> Garcí Díaz de Castro pointed out: 'we suffered great hardships and starvation, because the Indians rebelled and were at war against the service of His Majesty. They thought they could throw us out of their lands by halting their work and allowing themselves to suffer'.<sup>58</sup> The same picture was painted by Juan de Almonacid who wrote that 'the Indians of the country allowed themselves to die and stopped their sowing for more than three years'.<sup>59</sup> Vivar, whose account of these early days is rather moderate in tone, pointed out that from 1541 the Indians 'preferred to lose their lives rather than serve the Christians'.<sup>60</sup>

In 1559 the *Licenciado* Hernando de Santillán corroborated the observations made by the soldiers during his visit to the districts of Santiago and La Serena, noting that during the course of his *visita* he had endeavoured to communicate to the Indians 'that the will of His Majesty was that they should be preserved, a fact that had never been communicated to them, rather they have been treated like enemies. For this reason they were desperate. I found through communications with religious people that the Indian mothers had refused to breastfeed their infants but preferred to kill them, saying that that was better than to wait until they were seven or eight and were taken away by the *encomenderos* to work in the mines, never to be seen again.'<sup>61</sup>

Death, hunger and massive displacement eroded the body of society and weakened Picunche and Promaucae resistance. Bearing in mind that their numerical superiority could still incline the military balance in favour of the natives, the loss of the warriors and their families accelerated the end of the war for the control of Santiago and the neighbouring districts. Yet there still remained the hope that the fleeing tribal clans could recover their strength in the free lands of Araucanía or Itata and return to the north in order to liberate the lands of their ancestors. For those Indians who stayed behind, the end of the war marked the beginning of servitude and extinction.

### The Demographic Collapse

The end of Promaucae and Picunche resistance was also accelerated by the rapid demographic collapse experienced by tribal society. The factors behind this collapse included the exodus to the south, forced recruitment as auxiliaries by the Spaniards, and the deaths caused by the battles of Santiago.

Contemporary sources do not describe plagues or epidemics which may have decimated the Indian population. Only in 1549 is there a reference in the minutes of the Cabildo of Santiago indicating the presence of *carache*: 'it is acquired by cattle, horses and mares . . . and some Indians'.<sup>62</sup> Vivar described an epidemic of typhus and a severe drought which affected the Araucanian lands between 1554 and 1557, exterminating at least two thirds of its population, but there is no reference to a similar impact in Central Chile.<sup>63</sup> One can only speculate that if there was such a disaster in the region, it took place through contact with the northern tribes before the arrival of the Spaniards.

It is difficult to evaluate in demographic terms the impact of the war and the flight to the south. According to modern calculations, the original population of the Central Valley in 1540 was 130,000.<sup>64</sup> In 1594, almost half a century later, the Indian population has been calculated at 20,000.<sup>65</sup> According to Jorge Hidalgo, the warriors who crossed the Maule river fleeing from the Europeans numbered up to 25,000 fighting men and their families.

The forced resettlement of Indians or their incorporation into the imperial army left some evidence of the numbers involved. Vivar observed that in September 1541 the *curaka* Quilicanta offered 400 men to Valdivia in his campaign against the *pukara* of Michimalonko: '*Apo*, use these Yndians who are well prepared for fighting, because they are very bellicose and good warriors, they come from the valley of Mapocho.'<sup>66</sup> Whether these men of Mapocho were specialised soldiers or not, their number was rather small. References to massive movements of Picunches and Promaucaes in the expeditions to Araucanía are scarce and the numbers of *auxiliares* involved are also

insignificant. Góngora Marmolejo observed that one of the survivors of the disaster of Tucapel in 1554 was 'a *principal* and lord of the valley of Chile in Santiago, whose name was Don Alonso and who served Valdivia, one who could speak Spanish and who showed plenty of common sense'.<sup>67</sup> During the same battle, observed Mariño de Lobera, the Europeans counted on the support of a 'good number of Indians brought by Valdivia from the subjected villages; their captain was the famed Michimalongo, who had been the leader of the rebels before this land was conquered'.<sup>68</sup>

In 1546 the townspeople of Santiago presented a petition to Valdivia in which they described the magnitude of the demographic collapse caused by the war. 'We know that there are few Indians, either because when we entered this land there were not so many as it was said, or because the few who were there have died in great quantities from the great wars that have taken place in the conquest and subjection of this land.'<sup>69</sup> Then they added: 'the *encomiendas* have very few Indians, at most one hundred or fifty and some only thirty'. At a ratio of a maximum of 150 male Indians per *encomienda* (a very optimistic estimate considering the numbers quoted), the total population of Central Chile in 1546 was no more than 25,000, including women and children.

The picture of demographic desolation painted by the *vecinos* for the early days of the conquest was contradicted by other witnesses. Vivar affirmed that the collapse of the Indian population was caused first by the war of conquest and then by the hard labour imposed upon the Indians in the mines and agricultural fields. 'There are not as many people in this land now as there were when the Spaniards entered this country, because of the wars and rebellions the Indians raised against us. This was a reason for their decrease, that from three parts there is now only one left. The mines have also been a cause; one combined with the other contributed to their destruction.'<sup>70</sup> Whatever the causes of their diminution, the reduced number of Indians observed a few years later was a grim balance of the conquest.

The sharp fall in the number of Indians available for service in the *encomiendas* and *mitas* forced Valdivia to reduce the original total of 60 *encomiendas* granted in 1542 to just 32 in 1544. Vivar described this change as follows: 'The General realised that there were too many *vecinos* in the city and that the Indians were few, and that it was too much for the latter to be distributed among 60 *vecinos*; he decided for the well-being of the natives to reduce the number and ordered the formation of only thirty *encomiendas*'.<sup>71</sup> Góngora Marmolejo wrote that a few weeks later Valdivia marched to Itata 'when he realised that within the limits of Santiago there were not enough Indians to reward his soldiers'.<sup>72</sup> Valdivia himself, in a letter to Carlos V written in 1550, pointed out that only in 1544 had he fully realised that Indians were scarce: 'conquering the land and consolidating peace, I had a truthful account and saw that the number of people was small'.<sup>73</sup>



According to a decree published in 1546, the governor was even forced to include absent Indians in the new *encomiendas*. The decree specified that 'of sixty *vecinos* who had Indians within a territory of 35 leagues long by 12 or 13 across, which are the limits of this city, they have been reduced to thirty-two; besides the Indians of the said jurisdiction, they have been granted twelve or thirteen *caciques* who are settled on that side of Itata river'.<sup>74</sup> In another instance of redistribution of *encomiendas*, Valdivia made it clear that the reason that moved him to grant additional Indians to his soldiers was the fact that the soldiers could not sustain themselves with the few Indians left in their service. In the title conceded to Marcos Veas granting *cacique* Vichato and half of the natives of Lampa, Valdivia wrote: [I do it] 'because you have very few Indians in your service'.<sup>75</sup> The *encomienda* of Juan Godínez on the banks of the river Maipo decreased from forty Indians granted in 1542 to just twenty, two decades later.<sup>76</sup>

The Spanish soldiers depended on the possession of Indians to recover the expenses incurred during the wars of conquest. Therefore, the restructuring of the *encomiendas* and the reallocation of the natives carried out by the governor greatly benefited a few soldiers but it also caused resentment and was the cause of legal disputes. In 1548, during the trial organised against him by his 'enemies' in Lima, Valdivia justified his actions by arguing that 'the land was so deprived of Indians that after a visit we found no more than twelve thousand Indians and there were *caciques* who had no more than three hundred'.<sup>77</sup> Valdivia put forward a similar argument in a letter to the Emperor stating that the first *encomiendas* had been allocated 'without proper information, because it was necessary to placate the temper of the soldiers'.<sup>78</sup>

In 1549 the rapid extinction of Picunches and Promaucaes caused conflicts between the *encomenderos* of Santiago and the leaders of the expedition organised to conquer Bio-bio. The attorney of the Cabildo, Pedro de Miranda demanded that Valdivia should take notice of the representations made by the *encomenderos* to stop Indian males draining away to the south: 'because Indians are so scarce in this country, he should neither consent nor allow soldiers or others to take away any *pieza* . . . nor should the Indians used to carry burdens be taken beyond the Itata river, but should be able to return to their fields to take care of their subsistence; if His Lordship should decide otherwise, this land would be lost and depopulated'.<sup>79</sup>

The visible signs of the profound changes that tribal society in Central Chile was undergoing under the European invasion ranged from economic crisis and the flight to the south, to the demographic collapse of Promaucaes and Picunches. Each of these events reflected the rapid destruction of the social system which, in the past, had made possible successful war against the Incas and against the soldiers led by Almagro. 'Whatever were the factors that caused the disintegration of native society', Sergio Villalobos wrote recently, 'the

outcome was the same. The life of the villages was disorganised, families lost their cohesion, men and women left each other for different destinations, children were left semi-abandoned. Many men became members of a transient population in which laziness and crime occupied most of their time. The disintegration was not only social but also moral.<sup>80</sup>

The testimony left by the Spanish soldiers does not provide enough evidence to assess the psychological reaction of the Indians to the disaster inflicted by imperial expansionism. A few references do show that suicide, alcoholism and social alienation were considered by many as the best escape from the world of desolation in which they had to live. Unlike the stubborn soldiers led by Valdivia the inhabitants of Central Chile had not chosen their fate. It was imposed upon them.

### **The Policy of Abuse and Theft**

‘There were cattle when we entered this land, but not very many. As a result of the wars numbers have been depleted. Now there are none left. This is because wherever the Spaniards go, especially in their conquests, they are like locusts on bread.’

Gerónimo de Vivar, *Crónica y relación copiosa y verdadera de los reinos de Chile* (1588), p. 186

‘They set dogs on them, and others were burnt and tortured, and their women and daughters were taken away. They were chained and burdened. Their houses and villages were devastated by fire, their fields destroyed. Because of this the Indians became sick and large numbers died of cold and hunger and as a result of feeding on wild plants and roots.’

‘Relación de lo que el licenciado Fernando de Santillán, oidor de la Audiencia de Lima, proveyó para el buen gobierno, pacificación y defensa del reino de Chile, 4 de Junio de 1559’, *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de Chile desde el viaje de Magallanes hasta la batalla de Maipo* (Santiago, 1888), vol. 28, p. 284.

The end of the war did not mark the end of sufferings and sacrifices. The war of conquest in Central Chile was followed by the introduction of imperial control over the conquered people. This process, especially the appropriation of the land, meant the forced displacement of the original inhabitants, destruction and death.

The formation of landed properties in rural Chile took place after the introduction of the *encomiendas* and only after the Indians had been militarily defeated. In this context, the Spaniards saw that it was in their interest to clarify the links of affiliation that existed between the Indians and their respective groups and settlements. The future appropriation of their lands by the *encomenderos* depended on this.

However, in the circumstances of social disorder and chaos that prevailed after 1541, it was not easy to re-constitute the old lineages and tribal segments. A method that facilitated the early transfer of lands was the displacement of the original owners either to the mines or the town, or simply to lands vacated by other Indians; in this way, large tracts of farmlands, grazing lands and woods were made available to the *encomenderos*. A title of lands granted by the Town Council of Santiago to Joan de Cabrera in 1547 indicated that the lands given were situated 'in a valley called Bombancagua, where there used to be a village of *guanaqueros*'.<sup>81</sup> The same day the Council gave lands to Diego Oro 'in the fields that used to belong to *cacique* Apochame, where there was a village of the said *cacique*'. A year before, the Town Council took possession of the pastures that belonged to chief Guaraguara, pointing out that the act of possession included 'all the lands as they are and [that] used to belong to the said *cacique*'.<sup>82</sup> In similar terms, Governor Valdivia offered in 1552 'the waters and fields where there used to be an Indian town and which is now abandoned'.<sup>83</sup> It is important to note that in at least two of the cases quoted, the Spanish authorities had some knowledge of the previous owners; if they had fled during the war, and before the arrival of the soldiers, then it is unlikely that the names of *caciques* would have been mentioned in the grants; therefore, it is more probable that the transfer of lands took place after the war and was parallel with the expulsion of the natives.

The mechanics of the transfer of lands were rather simple. Firstly, the Indians were identified with or ascribed to a particular group and settlement; then they were given in *encomienda* to a Spaniard. Once distributed, they were forced to work in the mines in the north or in the fields neighbouring the city. At this point, their lands fell into disuse and began to look abandoned, forcing their transfer. It is likely that the Indians were returned to their settlements to work the fields now owned by their *encomendero*.

A similar process of appropriation of lands took place south of Santiago. In 1549, the Cabildo granted itself the monopoly exploitation of woods situated 'in all the lands that belonged to *cacique* Millacaza, in Maipo and the banks from the mountains to the sea'.<sup>84</sup> In another title granted to Juan Gómez in Cailloa it was noted that the lands 'used to belong to Quinellanga'.<sup>85</sup>

Once the Spaniards had consolidated their hold of the Central Valley, the soldiers openly demanded ownership of the lands occupied by the Indians of

their *encomiendas*. In 1553 Juan Cuevas asked the Cabildo to grant him 'the town called Ranguelpaico, that belongs to *cacique* Leumoulen'.<sup>86</sup> Pedro de Miranda, Pedro de Gómez and Alonso de Córdoba, all of them veterans of the war against Picunches and Promaucaes, demanded the lands of *caciques* Huechuraba, Cachapual and Talagante respectively.

This process of appropriation was obstructed by the confusion regarding the true affiliation of the Indians. The land-measurer Ginés de Lillo presented interesting testimonies concerning a lawsuit between the *encomenderos* of Colina and Lampa, during which they called upon the Indian elders to testify to the legitimate right of each group to occupy the fields in the valley of Liray. These fields, pointed out an Indian called Quiñalpangue, 'have always been known to belong to the Indians and *caciques* of the said village of Colina where they have lived and had their cattle. The Indians of Lampa have never trespassed on the borders I have described, neither have they ever had any quarrel about it with those of Colina.'<sup>87</sup> Another Indian witness asserted that the lands of Liray 'belong to the Indians and town of Colina, who have always sowed the land and lived there with their cattle. For this reason the Indians of Lampa have never occupied these fields because they do not belong to them'. Paradoxically, although the testimonies of the old Indian men confirmed the exclusive use of the lands by the people of Colina, they were recorded to legitimise the exclusive right of the *encomendero* to exploit the fields of Liray.

The pressure to obtain lands that the Spanish soldiers exerted on the authorities had to be balanced against the right of the Indians to natural justice. The combination of both created conflicts. In 1547 the Cabildo discussed the allocation to Pedro de Villagrán of 'an *estancia* for pasture and labour by the banks of the river Maipo, in the lands of Guachinpilla, *cacique* of Marcos Veas'.<sup>88</sup> After a long discussion, the lands were granted to Veas. To justify their decision, the members of the Cabildo said that if they had done otherwise it would have been 'in prejudice of the natives'.

The paternalist mentality inspired both by practical reasons and by the need to restore the Indian labour force was not constant. Only twenty years later, in 1577, Chile witnessed fierce and bitter polemics between *encomenderos* and clerics, sparked off by the abuse and over-exploitation of the natives. Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa observed in his *Visita*: 'it is our experience that by having the *encomenderos* in their power and administration the said Indians are abused and have diminished and have died in large numbers from the excessive work they have been put under; for this reason I order that all the *vecinos encomenderos* should not publicly nor secretly nor by third persons enter the villages of their Indians, neither should they use them in their service unless they have direct authorisation from me'.<sup>89</sup>

The demographic decline caused by migration and war worsened once the Indians were distributed in *encomiendas*. The worst instruments of destruction were the forced displacement of the natives, work as servants in the towns and the over-exploitation that took place in the mines and farms. This was so in the case of the Indians granted in 1542 to Antonio de Tarabajano. Tarabajano accused Governor Valdivia of nepotism and denounced the misery caused to the natives led by *caciques* Aloande, Tunapande y Maquindoande, original inhabitants of Mapocho, after his *encomienda* was granted to Francisco de Aguirre. 'At the time I was dispossessed of them, the said Indians were rich, well settled and could be counted in great numbers; I ask you if you know that now, owing to ill treatment and because the said captain Francisco de Aguirre has taken them away to use them as servants, and has moved them to live with him to extract gold in the city of La Serena, the said *caciques* and Indians are lost, dispersed and dead.'<sup>90</sup> Francisco de Villagra confirmed the accusations made by Tarabajano, pointing out that 'at present the said *cacique* Aloande and his Indians are dissipated and are fewer than they used to be, reduced by more than half'. A similar situation took place in Rapel and Topocalma, where the *encomienda* granted to Juan Gómez was withdrawn by García Hurtado de Mendoza 'because the said Juan Gómez has decimated and destroyed the said Indians'.<sup>91</sup>

The forced re-settlement of the Indians began after the defeat of the *pukara* of Michimalonko in Aconcagua. On that occasion, at least 600 Indians were sent to work in the mines of Marga Marga. This was the first *mita* ever established by the Spaniards in Central Chile and became afterwards a regular event, with a constant flow of men and women duty-bound to the mines. Mariño de Lobera observed that one of the *encomenderos* who contributed regularly to the *mita* was Rodrigo de Quiroga, who sent a quota of 600 natives to work in Marga Marga: 'This was imitated by the other *encomenderos* with great loss to the bodies and souls of the wretched Indians.'<sup>92</sup> The experience and skills gained by these Indians in the mines transformed them into valuable assets for the future development of mining in other conquered regions. According to Góngora Marmolejo, the initial stages in the exploitation of the gold mines of Angol, in Araucanía, were carried out by '*yanaconas* withdrawn from the mines of Santiago'.<sup>93</sup>

Another cause of Indian destruction was their removal to satisfy the economic needs of the *encomenderos*. Valdivia recognised this irregularity and the severe effects that previous decisions had had on the natives of Lampa in the title of *encomienda* granted to Hernando de Gallego. The title established that the *encomienda* consisted of 'half of the said valley of Lampa and half of the *caciques* and *principales*, Indians and subjects of the said valley, wherever the said Indians may be now, bearing in mind that I have decreed their removal from the valley of Chile'.<sup>94</sup> Not least destructive was the allocation of several physically scattered Indian lineages to a single *encomendero*. Juan de Cuevas,

for instance, had in *encomienda* the followers of *caciques* Andegauleu, Guamizalvi and Ibimalongo of Santiago, Huechuraba of Mapocho valley, Curiomilla and Longomilla of Maule, Guarongo, Macohuano, Arongomanique and Gatuyavi of southern Maule and the Promaucaes Curanaval and Paniarongo. In these cases the dispersion of the Indians and the need to extract maximum profit from their labour encouraged their removal to the most productive farms or to the cities to work as servants. Nothing is said in the documents about the conflicts of Indians from different clans and tribes, in most cases sworn enemies, being forcibly mixed by their masters, but it is likely that murder by poisoning was a common feature in the new 'settlements' created by the Europeans.

These mechanisms of destruction of tribal society operated within the violent environment created by the conquest. The Spaniards occupied the richest farm lands, destroyed the woods and exhausted the traditional sources of hunting and gathering; the war they waged against the natives interrupted their migration to the mountain slopes and dramatically halted inter-ethnic trade. Amid these extraordinary and sudden changes, the chances of survival for the local population became more remote. The Picunches and Promaucaes who survived the horrors of the war and forced displacement had to learn new skills and forego their ancestral techniques and ways of relating to the environment; equally traumatic were the new burdens of acculturation and ideological conversion and their absorption into a highly repressive social and religious system. Finally, the Indian women had to suffer the sexual demands of the Europeans and bear their mixed-blood offspring. Although these were the more subtle ways of exploiting the vanquished they were as dramatic and perhaps even more destructive than work in the mines and labour as servants.

Meanwhile, the new duties to the imperial state and to their *encomenderos* restricted the Indians to the exploitation of their nearest plots of lands, woods and fields; the days when they could combine several ecological niches in the course of their enterprise were gone. They had neither access to their ancestral fields in far-away districts nor men to carry out these tasks. The tribal economic system was contracting, more lands were being vacated and greater opportunities were thus created for Spanish and *mestizo* encroachment.

Survival for the Picunches and Promaucaes was synonymous with poverty and hunger, deprivation and pain. Condemned to live in the impoverished lands allocated by the new authorities, the Indians of Santiago saw the Castilian horseman galloping through the beautiful valleys and ravines of the old land; his flag was a symbol of extermination and death.

It was difficult for the Spaniards to accept that they were the real cause of so much terror and so many premature deaths. In their minds, the Indians themselves were responsible for their fate either because they had resisted the imposition of imperial rule or simply because they were inherently wicked.

Valdivia stated this view in no ambiguous terms when he appointed Juan López as *Alcalde* of the mines of Marga Marga. Valdivia instructed López to exert his authority with zeal: 'You know that the Indians are liars and only wish to escape, not because they are ill treated or because they are subjected to hard labour in the gold mines, nor because they lack food or supplies, but because they are *bellacos* [wicked] and badly disposed in everything.'<sup>95</sup>

The Picunches and Promaucaes protested against their masters by either escaping or refusing to work. In those instances of rebellion Valdivia himself headed military squads to smother the last sparks of resistance. During the early years of the city, Vivar wrote, the governor spent his time 'pacifying the country, because there were some *caciques* who refused to serve their masters and as soon as he knew of any rebel, the general visited his settlement at dawn with thirty riders and gave the necessary punishment, and forced him to serve. He did this with diligence and promptness where appropriate and most convenient.'<sup>96</sup>

The repression of the rebels was at times combined with indiscriminate punishment in order to maintain order and discipline throughout the conquered lands. The main reason for this arbitrary and intimidating policy was the development of the Araucanian war in the south, which threatened several times to spill over into Central Chile, and the renewed upheavals of the northern tribes. Although the battles for the control of Santiago had concluded by 1545, the war for the conquest of the country had only begun. In 1549, with the emergence of a rebel front in Copiapó and Coquimbo, the Spaniards imprisoned the main *caciques* of Chili and Mapocho. At the same time, Juan Gómez was authorised to 'arrest any Indians from any *repartimiento*, whether at peace or war, and to torture and to burn them to obtain information about their intentions. He [Gómez] would neither be held responsible now nor in the future would he have to account for his actions because this is required in the service of God Our Lord and the wellbeing of this land.'<sup>97</sup>

### **The Re-Making of Tribal Society**

Spanish expansionism in the New World rested upon the desire of the conquerors to extend the frontiers of the empire at their own financial cost, and depended upon the rapid capture of new land, wealth and human resources which would allow the crown to reward these private efforts.

In Chile, Valdivia and his comrades showed from the early days of their enterprise that they were determined not only to incorporate America's southern territories into the Spanish crown but that they also intended to settle permanently in the new kingdom. However, the destruction and collapse of tribal

society threatened the plans of the Europeans. On the one hand, their expectations of feudal service could not be satisfied because of the shortage of Indians. On the other, the scarcity of economic resources obstructed the accumulation of private fortunes that could be invested to finance imperial expansionism into Araucanía.

During the early days of the Spanish conquest, the presence of a vast army of Indian labourers that could cultivate the land and work the mines was crucial for the development and consolidation of the new colonies and towns. Their availability determined the creation of any surplus and was essential for the development of any future expansionist enterprise. In Chile, the threat of extinction of the Picunches and Promaucaes boded the end of the enterprise, unless Valdivia and his men were able to raise funds and men in Peru or Spain.

The Indians of Central Chile, after so many years of war, hunger and misery, could hardly satisfy the expectations of feudal service built up by the conquerors between 1540 and 1545. The gold and copper mines, agricultural works and cattle-raising farms had to wait until the Indians had recovered from their miserable state. If in the rest of the continent the *mitas* and *encomiendas* became operational as soon as the Indians were distributed among the Spanish soldiers, in Chile the integration of the tribal segments to the new social and economic structures was a much slower process. The weakness and poverty in which the Indians found themselves at the end of the war left the Spaniards with no other option. Alternatively, intensified exploitation of the few Indians left would have simply quickened the pace of their extinction, thus compromising the future of the colony itself.

Despite past hatred and rivalries, the Spaniards needed their old enemies. A dead Indian had no value for *encomenderos*, governor or crown. To establish a profitable system of exploitation, the Spaniards in Central Chile had first to help their future servants to survive. This was well understood by Valdivia and his followers. As Mariño de Lobera pointed out, once the war against the *cacicazgo* of Michimalonko had concluded and the war against the Promaucaes began, the governor 'began to put in order the work of the land and communicated to the Indians their duties through *servicio personal*, instructing them to cultivate the land immediately, so that they could supply the Spaniards abundantly'.<sup>98</sup> The old spirit of confrontation was replaced by pragmatism.

Once the natives of Mapocho and Aconcagua had been defeated and the expansion to Maule had begun, the Spaniards proceeded to create an environment of peaceful coexistence with the Picunche and Promaucae tribal segments who had stayed in Central Chile. Aware that their own physical survival depended on the continuing presence of Indians in the conquered valleys, the European soldiers rapidly occupied the lands between Mapocho and Maule, recognised the authority of the *lonkos* and promoted the material and



social recovery of native society. If the policy of war had brought destruction, the new policy of domination and control was designed to bring peace and stability to the Indians.

While they were still fighting against the Promaucaes, the Spaniards moved swiftly to Maule to halt the flight of the warriors and thus stop the drain of people to the south. In July or August 1541, only six months after the foundation of Santiago, Valdivia sent Captain Pedro Gómez to explore the lands situated south of the Maipo river. This first expedition was exploratory, but soon after its return the Spaniards set forth towards Maule and established a garrison in the unconquered lands. Pedro de Villagrán, commander of the new fort in the neighbourhood of the river Maule, wrote in his *Información de Servicios* in 1562: 'To put order in the conquest, pacification and consolidation of the city of Santiago and its districts, the said Governor Pedro de Valdivia gave instructions to build and we built a fort on the river Maule, which is situated thirty-five leagues from Santiago, so that a frontier garrison with a captain and soldiers could be established. They were [instructed] to carry on the conquest from there with greater comfort because that was the most convenient place to do so; it was the stronghold of the whole country.'<sup>99</sup> Francisco Ponce de León described in his statement the military operations carried out under the leadership of Villagrán: '[He] suffered and had great and excessive burdens because he and his companions had to fight continuously, destroying forts and *puclaráes* [sic] that the Indians built and erected against them, etc.'<sup>100</sup>

The strategic importance of the Maule fort was considerable. It was from there that an expedition led by Villagrán reached the banks of the Bio-bio river and explored the rich lands controlled by the Indian lords of Andalién and Reinoguelén. On his return to Maule and after informing the governor, Villagrán and his men were moved 'to the Province of Apalta, which is sixteen leagues from Santiago . . . he held that garrison for a long time, carrying out from there, as elsewhere, many sorties against the Indians, having many battles and skirmishes with them'.<sup>101</sup>

The military campaigns fought by Villagrán against the Promaucaes were followed by the final march undertaken by Valdivia in 1544 against the strongholds of Tagua Tagua. According to Vivar, when the Europeans entered the *provincia* of the Promaucaes 'all the people of war went to the other side of the river Maule. Having seen this, the General [Valdivia] rode through the land and province of the Pormocoes [sic]. He reached the river Maule, working with those Indians who stayed behind and those he found in their towns, telling them not to go and not to be afraid, but that they should serve, and that no evil or damage against them was intended; he told them to pass on the message to other Indians, that they should come back to their lands and re-build their houses and sow the land.'<sup>102</sup>

Despite the efforts made by Valdivia to halt the drain of people to the south, the migrational flow of the Promaucaes did not cease. Facing disaster, the governor sent Francisco de Villagra to 'the province of Arauco, by land . . . to gather information and to push the Indians who belonged to these lands back to us'.<sup>103</sup> By the beginning of April, Francisco de Aguirre was left among the Promaucaes 'with stores and provisions in an Indian town because, being there, the Indians could not return to their villages to live in peace unless they were prepared to serve'.<sup>104</sup> This statement, included in a letter from Valdivia to the Emperor, reflected the serious burden faced by the governor who, under pressure from his men, had to provide Indians for *servicio personal* out of an ever smaller native population.

The mere presence of a Spanish fort among the Promaucaes and the permanent deployment of cavalry columns were not enough to stop the wave of migrating exiles to Araucanía. In September 1545, Valdivia instructed Francisco de Aguirre to march with twenty men 'to the southern banks of the river Maule, which is situated thirty miles away from this city of Santiago, to build there a fort and to ride the lands bearing in mind three reasons: the first, that if the Promaucaes intended to escape in order not to serve there would be someone to punish them; that if they found any Indians, they should force them to return to their lands to work for their *caciques*; thus, everybody will benefit. Finally, because the Maule Indians, seeing all this and having their lands raided by the Spaniards, would not allow the Promaucaes to settle in their province, and thus they will decide to submit themselves and give obedience to us.'<sup>105</sup>

Spanish expansionism into Araucanía was brought to a halt by the need to stabilise the fragile structure of Indian society and the strategic plan to consolidate their control over the territories of Central Chile. After 1545, the main priority was to help the recovery of the Picunches and Promaucaes and to stop the flight of the defeated warriors. In his letter to Madrid, Valdivia wrote, after his campaign against the Promaucaes, 'I have a captain with men in the province of Itata in order to stop them from going back there'.<sup>106</sup> In another communication, Valdivia pointed out that he had put Francisco de Aguirre in charge of the garrison at Itata: 'He doesn't allow the Indians from here to cross to the other side, and if the Maules welcome them [the fugitives], he punishes them.'<sup>107</sup>

The deployment of troops to the Maule region and the attempts made by the Europeans to stop the migration of Picunches and Promaucaes to the south were part of a wider strategy implemented by Valdivia and his captains to restore some degree of normality to the territories conquered south of Santiago. The Spaniards did not ignore the magnitude of the crisis affecting the natives and fully realised that mere repression would not achieve the desired results.

Despite the shocking picture of desolation and misery in Central Chile left by chroniclers and witnesses, it is evident that the flight of the Indians was not total. Modern historians are right when they state that the road to the south was taken mainly by young warriors and their women, and that children, mature men and the old and infirm stayed behind in the lands of their ancestors. These social groups bore the brunt of the war, became the first serfs of the Europeans and witnessed the transformation of the Spanish soldiers into masters of men. They also witnessed the metamorphosis suffered by the new rulers who began to dispense support and care towards those who were previously their enemies. The task of the King's representatives as they tried to reconstruct tribal society under the umbrella of the new Hispanic institutions was certainly formidable.

The survival of the Europeans in Central Chile, as in the rest of the continent, depended largely on the early establishment of cooperative ties with the local Indian leadership. Thus, Valdivia tried to maintain a relationship based on collaboration with the tribal segments of Mapocho and Aconcagua even during the worst moments of war. His efforts to create a friendly network of allied *lonkos* and friendly *caciques* were facilitated by the persistent internal disputes and internecine warfare among the aborigines. In fact, the first parley celebrated in Santiago in the summer of 1541, attended by the Inca Quilicanta, the *lonko* Atepufo and eleven other chiefs, was used by the Indians of Mapocho to forge an alliance with the newcomers to fight against their enemies of Aconcagua. When Michimalonko was defeated in 1541, the governor avoided the total humiliation of the *lonko* by accepting his promises to give obedience and remain at peace. According to the testimonies, the *pukara* of Aconcagua was left intact, no hostages were taken and the power and prestige of Michimalonko, perhaps one of the most powerful chieftains of Central Chile, remained relatively untouched.

The outbreak of a second military campaign in Aconcagua, initiated by the burning of a Spanish vessel in Quintero, led to the capture and imprisonment of the main *caciques* of the area. Their removal to the Spanish fort of Santiago was followed by the formation of a widespread Indian alliance which incorporated Incas, Diaguitas, Picunches and Promaucaes; their target was the destruction of the Spanish garrison. During the decisive battle of Santiago, on 11 September 1541, the Indian warriors sought to liberate their leaders from prison. This action reinforced the status and authority of the old *lonkos* and *caciques* in the eyes of their followers.

Nevertheless, the murder of the captured prisoners by the besieged soldiers put in jeopardy Valdivia's plans to keep the tribal leadership in place. As soon as the battle was over, Valdivia sent several columns to the neighbouring lands, urging the Indians to remain settled and at peace. After the second campaign against the Promaucaes, Valdivia and his men marched for the third time against Aconcagua, and captured *lonko* Tanjalonko, lord of the lower half of the

Aconcagua valley. 'When the captured *cacique* Tanjalongo [sic] was presented to the General, he [Valdivia] ordered his feet to be cut off. They did not kill him, as his crimes demanded, because he was a powerful *cacique*. His word was respected and he would attract support for peace with the same strength as he was able to incite to war many other *caciques* and Indians.'<sup>108</sup>

The defeat of Tanjalonko eliminated the leadership of the coastal tribal segments, but Valdivia persisted in his efforts to transform *lonkos* into effective agents of the new system of domination and control. According to Vivar, General Rodrigo de Quiroga returned to Santiago 'and brought with him some Indians and *principales*, who were sent by the governors as messengers . . . to those who had run away in order to persuade them to return to their homes'.<sup>109</sup> A similar tactic was used during the war against *cacique* Cachapoal, when the Spanish column headed by Valdivia included two Promaucae chiefs 'to negotiate peace with them'.<sup>110</sup>

The prolonged Indian resistance to the invaders caused the disintegration of the main *cacicazgos* of Central Chile. Furthermore, from 1542 Valdivia changed his policy and decided to remove the last remnants of the old tribal leadership. Thus, after the fierce battle of the *pukara* of Angostura, the governor 'hanged some *principales* and Indians and did the same outside the fortress, so that the others would see and would come to serve by their own will and would stay in peace; they would realise that [this] would be healthier and of greater profit to them'.<sup>111</sup>

The political vacuum caused by the absence of a formal tribal leadership was worsened by the growth of leaderless social segments and the rise, on other occasions, of two or more chiefs. Traditionally, some of the tribes of Central Chile had developed a dual system of leadership similar to the political structures of the northern Andes, but since 1541 the political system disintegrated as the *caciques* fled their lands and other men took over the role of the traditional chiefs. Throughout the Central Valley the Indian villages witnessed the rise of new leaders appointed by the Spaniards.

Thus, in less than a decade, the ancient system of distribution and recognition of political and military power within tribal society suffered a substantial transformation. On the one hand, the traditional mechanisms to generate political power were destroyed by the fragmentation of the tribes and the scattering of the lineages; on the other hand, the Spaniards emerged as an outside power, always ready to recognise and legitimise the new *caciques*. In truth, the Spaniards had no practical alternative but to recognise the new chiefs because the distribution of Indians for the *encomiendas* depended to a large extent on the ability of native leaders to name their followers. Obviously, the difficult task of gathering together the widely scattered social segments was greatly facilitated by the intervention of these new leaders. Not least important was the revival of the

Indian chiefs as natural mediators between the crown, its representatives and the Indian population.

Bearing in mind their need to stabilise Indian society, to ascertain the size of each *parcialidad* and to establish with greater clarity the links of dependence and loyalty between families, lineages and clans, the Spaniards readily recognised the authority claimed by the new *lonkos*. This was shown when Valdivia integrated into one single *depósito* the followers of *caciques* Palloquiebico, Topocalma and Gualauquen 'with all their subjects, *prencipales* [sic] and Indians, who are in the *provincia de los poromaucaes* [sic], by the coast. Along with *prencipales* Arcanaval, Rutaucony, Arongo Milla, Quienchogare, and all their Indians, who were formerly subject to *cacique* Lilongomoro in this valley of Mapocho.'<sup>112</sup> Two years later, Valdivia renewed the grant of the *caciques* mentioned adding 'the *prencipales* Huminelgas and Calmalongo and Guanunabal, who fled many days ago from the lands of Palloquilica, and are now settled in that region of Maule'.<sup>113</sup>

Explaining his policy of reorganisation of the old *cacicazgos*, the governor wrote in his letter to the Emperor in 1545: '[I] took from the *caciques* to give each [Spaniard] some people for his service; and the accounts I had were of (great) quantities of Indians from Mapocho valley to Maule; I had many names of *caciques*. They have never served, because the Inca did not conquer beyond these lands, and they are barbarians; everybody was named as *principelejo*; each of them had 20 or 30 Indians and so I gave them in *encomiendas* after the war finished and I went to visit them.'<sup>114</sup>

To avoid disputes between the *encomenderos* over the right to recruit Indians belonging to two or more chiefs, Valdivia made it clear to Captain Gómez that the Indians granted for his service were 'all the Indians of the said *prencipales*, whether they are subject to them or to other [chiefs]'. In the same document, the governor established that if any *lonko* wanted to bring more people to the *encomienda* granted to Gómez, 'it is my will, on behalf of His Majesty, that you should have no right to the chief or his Indians, because I have ordered that they be taken away from him [the *cacique*]'.<sup>115</sup> Valdivia, moved by the desire to generate new *cacicazgos*, broke up larger social units by recognising new *lonkos*, and thus he divided the Promaucae tribe led by Marucalagua and Guandopuche. In his grant of Indians to Captain Diego García Villalón the governor separated '*cacique* Guandolcalqui with all his *prencipales* Indians and their followers'.<sup>116</sup>

In some cases, the intervention of the conquerors led to the formation of new tribal segments. This was the case in the distribution of the Promaucae led by *cacique* Guandolcalqui, who saw his following enlarged with the Indians of *caciques* Quinvaulibi and Colicoli 'with all their *prencipales* and Indians, who are settled among them [Guandolcalqui's people], and *cacique* Quelangari with his town Cauquin, with all his Indians, who are in this *provincia de Mapocho*,

on the other side of Maipo'.<sup>117</sup> In 1548 the governor confirmed the successful integration of the Promaucae in a new title of *encomienda*; there he stated that the *encomienda* consisted of *caciques* 'Guandopuche, and Guandocolque and Colicoli with their *principales*, towns and Indians . . . one thousand two hundred Indians'.<sup>118</sup> A year before, Valdivia created an *encomienda* with the followers of *cacique* Tipitureo, incorporating '*cacique* Vitapandi . . . if the said Vitapandi happens to be subject to *cacique* Tipitureo'. In 1549 the Spanish authorities applied a similar method in the creation of the *encomienda* granted to Juan Jufre. On that occasion it was stated that the *encomienda* would incorporate the followers of *caciques* Malti and Tocalevi 'with all the Indians and *principales* who are settled on the hills of this valley of Mapocho, and who used to be subject to *cacique* Longomarico'.<sup>119</sup> A few years later, Valdivia enlarged this *encomienda* by integrating the Indians of *caciques* Inviralongo, Pelquitarongo, Antiguano and Vandeguano 'who are settled in the valley of Mapocho and belonged to *cacique* Longomoro'.<sup>120</sup> The governor also added *caciques* Aloande, Quipandi, Niticura, Quilicura and Andequina, 'with all their Indians and *principales* and subjects, as they were under the orders of *cacique* Chiguarua, who are settled in the said *provincia de los Promocoes*'.<sup>121</sup>

In another *encomienda*, granted to Captain Francisco de Aguirre in 1549, Valdivia included among the original inhabitants the followers of *caciques* Aloande, Tipande, Niticara, Quintecara and Andequina 'with all their Indians and *principales* and subjects, as they were under the rule of *cacique* Agamba, who are all settled in the *provincias de los Promocoes*'.<sup>122</sup> Diego de Velasco received in similar circumstances the *encomienda* integrated by *caciques* 'Perimalongo, Tongui, Catalandi, with all their Indians, *principales* and subjects, who are settled in the valley of Mapocho and who belonged to *cacique* Villacura'.

The main objective of the policy implemented by Valdivia of integrating different *cacicazgos* was to make the *encomiendas* economically viable and operational; he also sought to define the ties of loyalty between Indians and their disorganised lineages and clans and, not least important, to obtain a clear picture of the number of followers claimed by each *cacique*. Indirectly, however, the Spanish governor, by legitimising the claims of the new *lonkos* and by establishing new tribal segments, was interfering in the internal political affairs of the Indians. The impact of this policy could not be ignored. Potentially, it sowed the seeds for tribal warfare as there was always a possibility of a clash between the new leaders, legitimised by the Spaniards, and the *lonkos* and warriors who migrated to the south. It has to be borne in mind that Valdivia and his men were operating during the 1540s in lands and against men who had not been definitively defeated, and that large sections of the Picunche and Promaucae tribes were preparing to reconquer their lost lands and to recover their right to rule. Internal disputes and internecine wars, which had been common in the region before the arrival of the invaders, were rife during the

years of Inca rule. These also occurred during the war of resistance against the Spaniards and there was no reason to believe that they had disappeared forever. However, regardless of the dangers inherent in the creation of the *cacicazgos* and the rise of new *lonkos*, Valdivia in 1546 issued a decree aimed at consolidating his 'restructuring' policy. In his decree, the governor formally recognised all the new *cacicazgos* and declared that the Indians were 'free of any obligation to other *caciques*, in order that they should serve with the Indians of their [new] masters'.<sup>123</sup>

The new *lonkos* did not always replace the *caciques* who had fled. In 1553 Juan Fernández attended a meeting of the Cabildo of Santiago with some Promaucae chiefs; among the Indians was *cacique* Querepanto who described himself as subject to *cacique* Guarquincheo. The latter, it was noted in the minutes, 'was now in charge of the Indians of [*cacique*] Gurgey, deceased'.<sup>124</sup> Furthermore, the replacement of *lonkos* was not universal. The *cacicazgo* in Aconcagua led by Michimalonko and Tanjalonko remained untouched for at least two decades. So it appears in a *memorial* presented to the authorities in 1560 asking for an *encomienda* of 'the *caciques principales* of the said *repartimiento*, one called Michimalongo, with all his *principales* and Indians, and the other *parcialidad* led by *cacique principal* Guatelmilla, heir of Guandocongo, with all his *principales*'.<sup>125</sup> It is probable that Valdivia reached a military alliance with Michimalonko and Tanjalonko that helped to maintain them in their position of power and preserved their following. They had already reached a similar agreement with the Incas in the past and, more than probably, did so with the *conquistador*. Similarly, the *cacicazgo* may have been preserved by the fact that both tribal segments were granted in *encomienda* to a single individual, the cleric Rodrigo González. Nevertheless, regardless of the reason, the continued existence of the *cacicazgo* of Aconcagua as one single entity was rather the exception than the rule.

The effort made by Valdivia to recognise the new *caciques* was a consequence of both political and military considerations. Politically, the rise of new *caciques* fragmented the tribes and made possible the grant of smaller *encomiendas* to his soldiers. Thus, although the grants contained fewer Indians, they relieved the pressure from disgruntled soldiers. Militarily, the legitimisation of new *lonkos* created further divisions among the natives, weakened their power and consolidated the role of the Europeans as 'king-makers' and masters of men. Socially, the reconstituted *cacicazgos*, smaller in size and restricted to smaller territories, made the recovery of tribal society more feasible.

The new *caciques* were exempted from personal service and the *mitas*. Besides their traditional role as headmen and advisers, the *caciques* began to play an active part as mediators between the mass of the Indians and their new masters, reproducing to some extent the system of social and political control imposed by the Incas in the region. The new chiefs received resources and

provisions from the Europeans that they could distribute among the starving Indians, forging ties of dependency and loyalty. The survival of the new system of coexistence with the Europeans was largely beneficial to the new leaders who sought to bring political and social stability to the region. The balance for the Spaniards was positive, as the new *lonkos* facilitated the incorporation of the remaining tribal segments into the new society and contributed to their survival. Nevertheless, the artificial reconstruction of tribal political leadership was a perilous path to follow; it was done at the cost of dividing some *cacicazgos* into smaller, perhaps non-viable social units, and in the face of the danger of the violent return of the old *caciques* from the south. The seeds were sown for the development of new internecine disputes, this time between the leaders acknowledged by the Spaniards and the traditional chiefs.

The efforts made by the Europeans to reconstruct Indian political leadership were accompanied by a parallel policy designed to give lands to the new *cacicazgos* which had been displaced from their traditional territories. The displacement of the Indians to work in the mines and *obrajes*, the suspension of their traditional economic activities and the flight to the south, reduced tribal society in Central Chile to a calamitous state. This social disaster was aggravated by the forceful take-over of their lands during the war and the new demands for lands brought about by the rise of the new tribal segments. This led to several applications for lands by Indians who found themselves destitute at the end of the war. In 1552 the Indians granted in *encomienda* to Captain Pedro Gómez presented one such application to the Cabildo demanding the return 'of certain lands that belonged to them, or [to be given] other lands for their subsistence; they stated that their lands were taken away to settle Spaniards'.<sup>126</sup>

To relieve the misery brought about by their actions and to accelerate the social and economic recovery of the natives, the new authorities proceeded to give lands to the displaced Indians. In 1550, the Cabildo instructed Captains Juan Gómez and Pedro de Miranda to visit the lands of 'Quintililica, within the jurisdiction of this city, so that in the name of God and their conscience they should give and distribute lands among the Indians of the said Captain Field Marshall Pedro de Villagrán, without damage to the Indians of Alonso de Escobar, a citizen of this city, or any other Indians'.<sup>127</sup> The same year, the Cabildo designated two magistrates to 'give lands to the Indians of the said Pedro Gómez, without prejudice to the *caciques* and Indians granted to Bartolomé Flores'.<sup>128</sup> In their instructions to the magistrates, the members of the Cabildo pointed out that they should make 'physical deposit' of the new lands, establishing their limits very clearly, 'so that they can have and own them'. In 1552, the Cabildo was forced to consider the allocation of lands to the people led by *cacique* Martín, of Mapocho, who had been granted in *encomienda* to Juan Jufre and whose lands had been distributed among the conquerors in 1541. In the first instance, the Cabildo agreed to grant the lands occupied at that moment by Martín and his followers 'without damage to the



Indians'. However, in the event that the land proved to be insufficient, they were to be given the lands of 'Poangui, and lands of *cacique* Talagante, and other vacant lands that were and could be idle'.<sup>129</sup> Nevertheless, it was not necessary to take over the lands of Puangue or Talagante. Eventually, Martín and his followers were settled 'in a town near the river Maipo, which is called the seat of Maipo, that used to be a *mitimaes* of the Inga [sic] and is now empty'.<sup>130</sup>

This was not the only time that the availability of lands vacated by the *mitimaes* helped to satisfy the need for lands among the aboriginals. In 1553, the Cabildo granted lands to the followers of *cacique* Guelenguala 'by the said channel that used to belong to the Inga *mitimaes*'. Like Martín, Guelenguala and his followers had their lands distributed among the Europeans. Reflecting the scarcity of good lands in the region, the title of property granted by the Cabildo specified that the distribution and allocation of the new fields to Guelenguala had to be carried out taking care that 'the neighbouring Indians do not suffer'.<sup>131</sup> The officers in charge of giving the lands were instructed to perform their duty in such a manner that 'the Indians should have those lands as their own, for now and forever; because the said Indians were deprived of their lands to found this city'.<sup>132</sup>

The demand for space to settle the landless Indians was greater than the lands available for distribution. This forced the authorities to break down territories that belonged to one single *cacicazgo* or to compel some lineages to share their resources with newcomers. The latter was the case in the grant of lands given to the Indians of the *encomienda* of Juan Cuevas, who were to be settled in the lands of *cacique* Leumaulen, 'without great damage to the said Leumaulen, although the lands belong to him, because the said Leumaulen confirmed in this Cabildo that he does not need the said lands'.<sup>133</sup> Perhaps a similar mechanism allowed the resettlement of the *encomienda* of Pedro Gómez in Quimamba, whose people were installed in the territories situated between the Indians of the *encomiendas* of Bartolomé Flores and Pedro Gómez in the neighbourhood of Río Claro.

The re-making of tribal society included not only the distribution of lands but also the delivery of seeds and grains to the Indians, whose stocks had been depleted or destroyed by the *conquistadores*. Valdivia pointed out in a letter to Hernando de Pizarro in 1545 that 'the Indians are now so exhausted [by the war], that they want to stop; they want to come and serve us; so they have cultivated the lands again and they have been given wheat and maize to plant and to harvest for their own subsistence'.<sup>134</sup> Vivar corroborated this, stating that the governor 'visited the land personally, encouraging the Indians who were subjected to settle in their lands and to make large fields of maize and wheat'.<sup>135</sup> Juan Gómez observed some years later that the Indians had directly benefited from the farms kept by the Spaniards in Santiago during the worst years of the war. According to Gómez, during those years the Indians fed

themselves 'with wild herbs and other things from the countryside, but it did not stop them gathering in fortresses in the *provincias de los Promocoes*, leaving behind their lands and environment. If the Spaniards had not cultivated their fields, it would have caused great damage and they would not have survived; and this also helped the Indians who later came in peace, because it was a great help and prevented them from starving. They fed from the fields of the Spaniards.'<sup>136</sup> Pedro Miranda, one of the witnesses presented by Gómez, pointed out that because the Indians had resisted for a long period of time without working the lands, 'after they had agreed peace the farms [of the Spaniards] were crucial, for them not to starve, because they were supplied and provided'. Once the Indians had surrendered, wrote the cleric Rodrigo González, the Europeans supported them with food, preventing 'their starvation and making possible their reproduction'.<sup>137</sup>

The support given to the Indians took place while the policy of abuse, theft and ill treatment still afflicted the inhabitants of Central Chile. The Spaniard was still a greedy soldier, embarked on the hazardous enterprise of getting rich quickly, but he also was the master of men, responsible for the well-being of those left in his charge. The contradictory co-existence of these two processes made life for the Indians even more confusing and unbearable. It is true that the latest actions of the Europeans reflected a greater understanding of the conditions of misery and hopelessness in which the natives found themselves after the war – an understanding that was probably inspired by a genuine charitable attitude or perhaps by the increasing social exchanges they developed with the natives – but it cannot be ignored that owing to the private and capitalistic character of the enterprise of conquest, it was in their interest to avoid the extinction of the aborigines. The authorities could not ignore that the Indians were actually the prize, together with lands and patents of nobility, which the crown could dispense to reward the efforts of the private soldiers. Imperial expansionism was meaningless if it took place in empty lands. In the new feudal environment that emerged on the periphery of the empire, the absence of servants deprived the soldiers of the crown of one of the main incentives to migrate to the New World. As was well known, for the European nobles and peasants who crossed the Atlantic social power and status could only be acquired from the control they could exert over other men. America could not be the golden land if it was barren and empty.

The efforts made by the Spaniards to reconstruct tribal society in Central Chile during the 1540s had not achieved the desired results by the end of the decade. In the early 1550s the Promaucaes and their allies still lived in disorder and anarchy. Social disintegration, *vagabundaje*, indiscipline and generalised anomy disrupted the productivity of the *encomiendas* and prevented the better use of the scarce material and human resources available in the region. Moreover, tribal disorder was still the cause of dangerous 'arguments and passions' among the Spaniards of the small colony. The focus of these

differences was the confusion created by the ambiguous affiliation of the Indians to the *encomiendas*, 'because too many *caciques* and *principales* and men and women go wandering away from the control of their *caciques*'.<sup>138</sup>

To re-establish a certain degree of normality in the *cacicazgos*, the Cabildo instructed Captain Jufre to visit the Indian settlements and villages of Santiago and the surrounding areas and to carry out an enquiry 'to gather information, rationally and without much alteration, and to return the Indians to whom they belong'. Jufre carried out his *visita* during 1551 and presented his report to the Cabildo in the following year. In his presentation, the veteran captain pointed out that he had managed to return the Indians 'to whom they in each case belong', but that there were still some *encomenderos* who complained 'about aggravation they suffer because their Indians had run away from their villages and *caciques*'.<sup>139</sup>

The relative success achieved by Jufre was followed at the end of 1552 by a new commission, this time ordered by governor Valdivia, to carry out a similar *visita* among the Promaucaes. In his decree, the governor described the situation of social disorder prevalent among the Indians and the serious threat it represented against continued imperial control in the region. Because of its quality it is here quoted in full: 'Because the *caciques*, *principales* and Indians who are granted in *encomiendas* among the townspeople of this city of Santiago still persist in living like animals, fleeing their towns and seeking refuge among others, in alien lands, causing great inconveniences to the said townspeople because they cannot use what belongs to them; for this reason there is need to appoint a mature and experienced captain who can take care of this work and who should be able to order each Indian to go to serve his master in his town and leave those foreign villages where they are in hiding and living like escapees. In case they refuse these just and reasonable orders, he [the captain] is authorised to harass and to punish them for disobeying the orders that they have been given, ordering them to be clubbed or to have their limbs cut off, to be burnt or hanged, and any other punishment that he should consider convenient and just . . . [You are given these instructions] so that you will be able to put order and reason in respect of the *caciques principales* and Indians who are *encomendados* to the townspeople of this city and its districts and jurisdiction, and so that you will be able to order them to go back to their villages to serve their masters. You will be able to punish them without making a written statement in front of a notary, but on your word only, because it is convenient that way, as they live in their villages in utter barbarism; you will not incur any responsibility for these punishments or for the shedding of blood that you may order of one or more Indians; and in order that you may carry out your commission with prudence and moderation I call upon your conscience, so that like a knight you should use the least rigour possible . . . because you are aware of the love I feel for these Indians.'<sup>140</sup>

The extraordinary instructions given by Valdivia to his captain which sought to re-establish 'normal' social relations among the Indians of Central Chile reflected a desperate state of mind. However, in the context of the events that had shocked the region since 1541, the drastic measures adopted by the governor seemed to have been the only realistic method of bringing back tribal society from the very brink of total collapse. In other words, the magnitude of the catastrophe that affected the natives demanded severe action, otherwise the last echelons of aboriginal society would soon disappear. Only a week later, Valdivia reiterated his instructions to Jufré, widening his powers so that he would be able to put down the rising number of internal disputes and alleged sorcery among the Indians. 'As you are aware,' wrote Valdivia to Jufré, 'among the Indians who are distributed among the townspeople of this city there is too much barbarism, they kill each other with *hambi*, bad herbs and sorcery, and although they have for this been harassed and punished, they persevere in their mistakes. The authorities of this city will appoint somebody to deal with this, and because you are going to visit the villages of the *caciques*, to make sure that the Indians who belong to one [village] should not flee to other villages, I give you my commission so that you can also put a stop to this.'<sup>141</sup>

The selection of Jufré to carry out such a sensitive task was not arbitrary. Jufré was one of the most distinguished soldiers of the conquest and had become a powerful *encomendero* among the Promaucaes. Under his charge were the *cacicazgos* of Tipitureo, Guaquilla, Tipandi, Arongoante, Millanabal, Quidetuy, Calquimarongo, Catearongo, Curipillán and Nancoande. Describing his tasks, Jufré left in his *Probanza* a detailed, although short, account of the work he carried out on behalf of Valdivia to restore social order among the Promaucaes: 'I gathered them in towns and made them sow the lands and store provisions for one year and brought them to live in peace, teaching them to become men again. In all this I spent a long time and underwent great sacrifices, because the said Indians were barbarian people and they used to go about naked and lacked order, justice and public life, but now they enjoy tranquility and are rich.'<sup>142</sup> Diego Díaz declared in the same document that the deeds carried out by Jufré were of some magnitude 'because by that time the Indians of the *provincias de los Promocoes* were wild people who lived without any order'.

Whether Jufré was as successful as he claimed is difficult to ascertain for lack of additional evidence. A year later, Valdivia was still dealing with the problem caused by the unclear affiliation of the Indians to the *cacicazgos* and their constant movement among the villages. This, added to the rapid demographic deterioration of the Indian population, was once again creating disputes among the *encomenderos*. Valdivia's new decree, issued in 1553, introduced new methods to pursue claims about missing Indians. He justified his new rules stating: 'Because the said townspeople have begun to move too many lawsuits and arguments about the Indians that have been granted to them, which is a great disservice to God and His Majesty; because this may bring about greater

scandals and disturbances to his vassals; because the said Indians could be ill-treated, distracted, removed and displaced from their homes and natural environments; because in the name of the King I need, to keep my conscience clear and to benefit the realm, to provide a cure before this disease grows; because this is a wild country, and the Indians do not recognise their own *caciques*, and there are too many *principales* with Indians, who allege that they belong to one *cacique* at the beginning and then we find that they do not, [this instruction to be kept] until we have greater knowledge of their uses and customs, their way of life and submission.<sup>143</sup>

Perhaps the greatest significance of this decree is that it was issued so many years after the conquest of Central Chile, in an epoch when the initial disorder and anarchy caused by the war could well have been a thing of the past. More than anything else, it shows that the magnitude of the destruction of tribal society was greater than has been accepted up to now, and that the recovery of the Indians was a far more complex process.

By the time *lonko* Lautaro and his warriors crossed the Bio-bio to liberate the lands of the legendary Picunches and Promaucaes, the re-making of tribal society was well underway, a fact that Lautaro and his Araucanian allies ignored in their strategy. It is true that they were well received by some of the surviving tribal segments, but even those natives who welcomed them as liberators had already lived under European subjection and adopted some of their way of life. Thus, many Indians were more ready to betray the warring *lonkos* and their warriors than to fight for their own freedom. A pure tribal society, as may have been dreamt of by those in exile, no longer existed. This determined from its very beginning the outcome of the last war for Central Chile and decided the ultimate defeat of its inhabitants.

## **The End of an Era**

By the beginning of the 1550s tribal society in Central Chile was militarily defeated, economically ruined and socially broken. The Picunches and Promaucaes had by then become the barbarians described by the Inca and Spanish chroniclers. The flight to the south and east, the forced re-settlement of large ethnic groups and the need to adjust their lifestyle to the new norms introduced by the invaders broke down the old social system and destroyed the mechanisms of cohesion which had previously bound the tribal lineages. Each man and his extended family had to develop his own strategy for survival while the traditional ties of solidarity and support weakened; fractionalism replaced the military co-operation and combined political action that had flourished in the previous decades. The calls for a renewed war issued by the Promaucaes did not find echo in Santiago, wrote Vivar, 'because these Indians preferred to serve the

Spaniards in order to enjoy their lands and their country rather than be hunted down and killed with their women and children'.<sup>144</sup> The war of the *zupais* and the long days of repression that followed had left a heavy mark on the vanquished. Meanwhile, the new *caciques* lacked legitimacy and vision. The final hour for the Picunches and Promaucaes had arrived.

As elsewhere in the continent, several legal sanctions were introduced in Chile to soften the impact of imperial rule and individual abuse. More than anything else they helped to create an environment of concern in which the fate of the natives was not completely ignored, but the effect of the restrictive legislation was mainly formal and co-existed with abuse and terror. In other words, the influence of Catholicism and the impact of the argument in defence of the natural rights of the Indians were not enough to transform the system of oppression and servitude introduced in the New World. The system itself had been established to answer material needs and to reward generously the financial investments and personal sacrifices made by the soldiers in the expansion of the frontier of the empire. Respect for the oppressed and overworked Indians had no place in a society based on the submission of men; tribal society, on the other hand, could not operate alongside a system based on the imperative of rapid accumulation of capital to finance new expansionist enterprises.

Nevertheless, in Central Chile the Spaniards had enough reasons to halt the extinction of the natives. Firstly, it was obvious to the Europeans that their own survival depended greatly on the presence and availability of a large army of labourers and military allies who could maintain and defend the new towns; Santiago de la Nueva Extremadura was physically cut off from Peru and Spain and the contingent of European soldiers was too small to be able to carry on the war and also work the fields. Secondly, the first clashes with the fierce and resourceful Araucanian warriors in the south had shown that imperial rule had to be consolidated north of the river Bio-bio. It certainly implied a tighter system of control over the surviving Picunches and Promaucaes, but the new social system had to be imbued with pragmatism and inspired by greater charity in order to be firmly rooted in the new lands.

The *conquistadores* had won the war but they had to survive among and with the vanquished. Therefore, as soon as the war of the *pukaraes* was over and Central Chile was under their control, the Spaniards faced a more challenging and almost impossible task: the reconstruction of tribal society and the practical subjection of the Indian to the crown.

In the early stages, as reviewed in the previous pages, the re-making of Indian society was carried out by giving lands, food and seeds to the starved Indians and then by recognising their leaders. Whether that was enough to achieve strategic targets is a question that goes beyond the remit of this paper, but suffice it to say that by the end of the 1550s a new wave of rebellions indicated

that some recovery had taken place and that the Indians could once again resist their oppressors and fight for their freedom.

Promaucae and Picunche society in Central Chile collapsed under the military thrust of the European invaders but the speed and magnitude of this disaster was largely determined by the Indians themselves, who chose the wrong tactics and fought the war with a mistaken perception of the new enemy led by Valdivia. The arrogant *lonkos* and their warriors, who had stopped the Incas and defeated Almagro, realised their miscalculation and marched to exile in Araucanía, while the rest of the natives had to work in the mines and the *encomiendas*. The territories controlled by *señoríos* led by Michimalonko, Tanjalonko, Vitacura, Lonkomilla and so many other *caciques* became the new province of Nueva Extremadura.

In servitude, few Indians survived the hardship, humiliation and ill-treatment inflicted by the Europeans, but those who did became the labour force and cannon fodder that sustained the Spaniards and made possible their expansion to Araucanía. The *pukaraes*, symbols of past power and independence, were left empty on the mountain-tops as mute witnesses of an era of epic wars that would have no equal in the history of Central Chile.





## APPENDIX I

### Encomiendas of Central Chile

|                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| Pedro de Valdivia        | Quillota, Lampa   |
| Gonzalo de los Ríos      | Putando, Lá Ligua, Papudo   |
| Inés de Suárez           | Colchagua, Peumo, Teno, Melipilla,<br>Apoquindo                                   |
| Juan de Cuevas           | Huechuraba, Curaumilla, Vichuquen, Lonkomilla,<br>Huenchullani                    |
| Juan Jufre               | Nuñoa, Macul, Peteroa, Copequen, Mataquito,<br>Colquillay, Pocoa, Purapel, Pequen |
| Antonio de Azócar        | Rauco, Pelvin.  |
| Juan Godínez             | Maipo, Choapa   |
| Antonio González         | Pico, Aconcagua   |
| Bartolomé Flores         | Talagante, Cauquenes, Putagán   |
| García Hernández         | Cuyo  |
| Rodrigo de Araya         | El Salto, Cachapoal   |
| Gabriel de la Cruz       | Lampa   |
| Pedro Gómez don Benito   | Lora y Quilicura  |
| Diego García Cáceres     | Huechuraba, Guechún, Llopeo, Apalta, Aculeo                                       |
| Rodrigo de Quiroga       | Peumo, Teno, Colchagua, Melipilla, Apoquindo                                      |
| Alonso de Silva          | Gonza   |
| Francisco de Riberos     | Aconcagua, Panquehue, Llai-Llai, Malloa,<br>Peteroa                               |
| Clérigo Rodrigo González | <i>Cacicazgo</i> of Michimalonko  |
| Antonio de Taravajano    | Promaucaes  |
| Alonso de Córdoba        | Vitacura, Pirque, Rancagua  |
| Alonso de Escobar        | Nancagua, Chimbarongo   |
| Marcos Veas              | Lampa, Maipo  |
| Esperanza de Rueda       | Lampa, Tobalaba, Tango, Ligueimo  |
| Francisco de Irrázabal   | Quillota  |
| Francisco Martínez       | Colina, Chicureo, Painalbique, Chacabuco  |
| Juan de Barros           | Lampa, Tobalaba, Tango, Ligueimo  |
| Juan Gómez de Almagro    | Topocalma, Rapel  |
| Pedro de Miranda         | Copequen  |
| Juan Bautista Pastene    | Puangue, Taguataguas  |
| Pedro Ordóñez            | Chanco  |

## APPENDIX II

### Caciques and Indian villages in Central Chile

| Cacique  | Tribe/Village                         | Year mentioned |
|--|---------------------------------------|----------------|
| Michimalongo, Tanjalongo   | Valley of Chile                       | 1541           |
| Chingaimangue  | Valley of Chile                       | 1541           |
| Aloande, Turiopande, Maquindoande  | Santiago                              | 1541           |
| Painelonko   | Lampa                                 | 1541           |
| Quilacanta   | Indio del Perú                        | 1541           |
| Longomilla   | Maipo                                 | 1541           |
| Caloande (or Moyande, Aloyande<br>or Aloande)  | Promaucaes                            | 1542           |
| Topocalma, Gualauquen  | Promaucaes (coast)                    | 1544           |
| Arcanaval, Rutaucory (Rutancomi),<br>Arongomilla, Quiechongare (previously<br>subject to <i>cacique</i> Cilogomoro<br>or Atongomoro) | Mapocho Valley                        | 1544           |
| Marucalagua, Guandopuche,<br>Guandolcalqui   | Promaucaes                            | 1544           |
| Painavillu   | Promaucaes                            | 1544           |
| Perimalongo, Tongui, Catalandi<br>(previously subject to Villacura)  | Mapocho Valley                        | 1544           |
| Tipitureo  | Río Guelenguelevano,<br>Promaucaes    | 1544           |
| Andegauleu, Guamizalvi, Ibimalongo   | (?)                                   | 1544           |
| Cachapoal, Elisoca   | Promaucaes, Maipo                     | 1545           |
| Quinvaulibi, Colicoli  | Promaucaes                            | 1545           |
| Quelangari   | Cauquin, south bank of<br>Maipo river | 1545           |
| Llangallave  | Promaucaes (?)                        | 1545           |
| Guaraguara   | east of Santiago                      | 1546           |
| Guanunabal (subject to Palloquilica)   | fled to Maule                         | 1546           |
| Inlagorongo  | Cerrillos de Apocheme,<br>Santiago    | 1547           |
| Guachinpilla   | banks of the Maipo                    | 1547           |
| Tariopande, Neaquidoande, Naamachese   | Promaucaes                            | 1548           |
| Condatongo, Anguaguay, Parapuchi   | Mapocho Valley                        | 1549           |
| Querogalguen, Paynavillo, Llavelenco,<br>Guaguinpangue, Guaquey, Mareande<br>(previously subject to Aloande)                         | Promaucaes                            | 1549           |
| Hernando   | banks of the Maipo                    | 1549           |
| Malti, Tocalevi<br>(previously subject to Longomarico)   | Mapocho Valley                        | 1549           |
| Guaquilla, Tipandi   | Promaucaes                            | 1549           |

| <b>Cacique</b>  | <b>Tribe/Village</b>                                | <b>Year</b> |
|---|---|-------------|
| Arongoante, Millanabal, Calquimarongo, Catearongo, Quidetuy                 | Promaucaes  | 1549        |
| Inviralongo, Perlquitalongo, Antegueno, Landaguano                          | Santiago  | 1549        |
| Tipande, Niticara, Quintecara, Andequina (previously subject to Agamba)     | Promaucaes  | 1549        |
| Millacaza   | Maipo   | 1549        |
| Quinellanga, Itinguillanga  | Cailloa (between rivers Cachapoal and Tinguiririca) | 1549        |
| Maluenpangue  | Taguataguas   | 1549        |
| Joan Darongo (Guandarongo)  | between rivers Mapocho and Maipo                    | 1549        |
| Antequilica, Chumayo, Catanlagua  | Picones of Poangui                                  | 1550        |
| Palloquiebico (Palloquilica), Huminelgas, Calmalongo, Millanabal, Purinabal | Promaucaes  | 1550        |
| Tabon, Culimailen   | Rapel   | -           |
| Catiputo  | (?)   | -           |
| Vicelongo, successor to Longomoro   | Mapocho   | 1551        |
| Umbarango   | Mapocho   | 1551        |
| Atumapante, Andequina   | Promaucaes  | 1551        |
| Vandeguano (previously subject to Longomoro)                                | Mapocho   | 1551        |
| Aloande, Quipande, Niticura, Quilicura, Andequina                           | Promaucaes  | 1551        |
| Victiolo, Longopilla, Guahunpilla   | Lampa (?)   | 1552        |
| Catarongo, Parapolin  | Tobalaba  | 1552        |
| Quiroalgauen, Nimaogalgauen   | Vitacura  | 1552        |
| Painabillo, Lonquie   | Ruydabal (Santiago)                                 | 1552        |
| Conelquenau, Malopangue   | Llangan (Santiago)                                  | 1552        |
| Isache, Guarquincheo, Arrequey Curguey                                      | Quelerima (Santiago)                                | 1552        |
| Arcapeo, Guayqueande  | Peteroa (Santiago)                                  | 1552        |
| Morangallo, Morongarita, Canavas, Millalonique, Imporongo                   | Mapocho   | 1552        |
| Capelande   | between rivers Maule and Itata                      |             |
| Inviralongo, Pelquitarongo, Antiguanos, Guachuraba                          | Mapocho   | 1552        |
| Curiomilla, Longomilla  | banks of the Maule                                  | 1552        |
| Guarongo, Macohuano, Arongomanique, Gatuyavi                                | Maule   | 1552        |
| Curanaval, Paniarongo   | Promaucaes  | 1552        |
| Annmaulen   | Ranguelpaico  | 1553        |

*Source: CDIHCh (see fn. 12) and Colección de historiadores de Chile y documentos relativos a la historia nacional (Santiago, 1861), vol. 1.*

## GLOSSARY

|                        |   |
|------------------------|---|
| <i>Al-barrada</i>      | Arabic word meaning 'wall of stones'; 'wall of dry-stone'.  |
| <i>Apo</i>             | Quechua word meaning Lord, Father, Master.  |
| <i>Auxiliares</i>      | Indian warriors in the service of the Spanish army.   |
| <i>Cabildo</i>         | Town Council.   |
| <i>Cabildo Abierto</i> | An emergency Town Council meeting augmented with selected citizens.   |
| <i>Cacicazgos</i>      | Social segment composed of several lineages under the leadership of a powerful <i>cacique</i> .   |
| <i>Cacique</i>         | Indo-american word meaning headman, leader, head of extended family.  |
| <i>Carache</i>         | Mapuche word meaning skin rash.   |
| <i>Chácaras</i>        | Small farms located near the Spanish cities.  |
| <i>Cona</i>            | Mapuche word meaning warrior, soldier.  |
| <i>Conquistadores</i>  | Spanish soldiers.   |
| <i>Curaka</i>          | Quechua word meaning crown representative of the Inca.  |
| <i>Depósito</i>        | Spanish word referring to Indians who had been retained by the crown and were then given temporarily to a Spaniard.   |
| <i>Encomienda</i>      | Grant of Indians, especially as tribute payers.   |
| <i>Encomendero</i>     | Holder of an encomienda.  |
| <i>Estancia</i>        | Large estate or ranch.  |
| <i>Guanacueros</i>     | Guanaco (Andean camelids) shepherds.  |
| <i>Información</i>     | Evidence presented by individuals to the crown to support demands for promotion or titles.  |
| <i>Lebo</i>            | Informal Mapuche administrative division containing nine smaller <i>cavies</i> or <i>rehues</i> (settlements).  |
| <i>Licenciado</i>      | Used in the sixteenth century to describe someone with a university degree or at least some knowledge of law.   |
| <i>Lonko</i>           | Mapuche word meaning headman, leader.   |
| <i>Mestizo</i>         | Person of mixed white and Indian blood.   |
| <i>Mita</i>            | Quechua word meaning 'turn'; conscription of Indian labour for public or private work, especially in the mines.   |
| <i>Mitimaes</i>        | Quechua word to describe groups of people forcibly removed by the Incas within the empire to colonise areas recently conquered. Their task was sometimes purely military, but they were also engaged in the teaching of special skills and customs. The Spaniards found several of these colonies in Central Chile. |
| <i>Parcialidad</i>     | Spanish word to denote either Indian settlements or relatively small Indian groups.   |
| <i>Pieza</i>           | Indian slave captured in war.   |

|                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| <i>Probanza</i>            | Official form filled in to support claims made by individuals/litigants.  |
| <i>Pukaraes</i>            | Quechua word meaning hillforts, fortified villages built on hills; walled corrals.  |
| <i>Relación de Méritos</i> | Description of deeds presented by individuals to the crown to petition awards.  |
| <i>Sementeras</i>          | Farm fields.  |
| <i>Visita</i>              | Inquiry carried out by a crown official.  |
| <i>Vecinos</i>             | People living in a neighbourhood, settled members in towns, with the right to be members of the Town Council.   |
| <i>Yanacona(s)</i>         | Quechua word to denote a particular group of slaves in pre-hispanic times, throughout the Inca empire. It was adopted by the Spaniards in Chile to designate their own Indian slaves, and also, generally, all those who looked like Peruvians. |
| <i>Zupais</i>              | Quechua word for evil men.  |

## Notes

1. Crescente Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile. Pedro de Valdivia* (2 vols., Santiago, 1911); Ida Stevenson W. Vernon, *Pedro de Valdivia, Conquistador de Chile* (Austin, Texas, 1946); R.B. Cunninghame Graham, *Pedro de Valdivia* (London, 1926); Tomás Thayer Ojeda, *Los Conquistadores de Chile* (Santiago, 1908).
2. Leonardo León, 'Expansión inca y resistencia indígena en Chile central, 1470-1536', *Chungará*, vol. 10 (Arica, 1983).
3. Leonardo León, 'La guerra de los lonkos en Chile central, 1536-1544', *Chungará*, vol. 14 (1986).
4. Leonardo León, 'La resistencia anti-peninsular en Chile central y el rol de los fuertes indígenas, 1536-1545', *Revista CUHSO* (Temuco, 1987).
5. See René León Echaiz, *El toqui Lautaro* (Santiago, 1971); Carlos Barella Iriarte, *Lautaro Guerrillero* (Santiago, 1971); Benjamín Subercaseaux, *Pasión y epopeya de Halcón Ligero (Lautaro)* (Santiago, 1957); Elías Lizana, 'Apuntes para la historia de Lautaro', *Revista Católica*, nos. 32 and 33 (Santiago, 1917).
6. More recently, Indian resistance to Inca expansionism has been studied by Osvaldo Silva Galdames, '¿Detuvo la batalla del Maule la expansión inca hacia el sur de Chile?', *Cuadernos de Historia*, no. 3 (1983), pp. 27 *et seq*; Horacio Zapater, 'Los incas y la conquista de Chile', *Historia* (Santiago, 1981), *passim*.
7. Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *Lautaro y sus tres campañas sobre Santiago, 1553-1557* (Santiago, 1876).
8. Francisco A. Encina, *Historia de Chile* (Santiago, 1955), vol.1, p. 75.
9. León Echaiz, *El toqui Lautaro*, p. 58.
10. Leonardo León, *Pukaraes incas y fortalezas indígenas en Chile Central, 1470-1560* (London, 1989); Rubén Stehberg, 'La fortaleza de Chena y su relación con la ocupación incaica en Chile central', *Publicación del Museo de Historia Natural* (Santiago, 1976), pp. 8 *et seq*; Mario A. Rivera et al, 'Algunas estrategias para el estudio del camino del inca en la región de Santiago de Chile', *Cuadernos de Historia*, no. 4 (Santiago, 1984), p. 109.

11. The Spaniards left hundred of records of their actions in Central Chile. The most important chronicles of the war are Pedro Mariño de Lobera, 'Crónica del Reyno de Chile escrita por el capitán P. M. de Lobera. Reducida a nuevo método y estilo por el padre Bartolomé de Escobar (1595)', *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles* (Madrid, 1967), vol. 131, p. 356; Alonso de Góngora Marmolejo, 'Historia de Chile desde su descubrimiento hasta el año de 1575', *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*; Gerónimo de Vivar, *Crónica y relación copiosa y verdadera de los reinos de Chile* (1558) (Berlín, 1979), p. 206. The poet-soldier Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga wrote his epic poem *La araucana* (1569) (Santiago, 1968) inspired by these events.

12. *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de Chile desde el viaje de Magallanes hasta la batalla de Maipo*, collected and published by José Toribio Medina, 1st series (30 vols., Santiago, 1888). Henceforth quoted as *CDIHCh*.

13. It is always difficult to name all the authors and individuals who have helped to develop the concepts and ideas underlying a piece of historical work. In the making of this research paper I should mention Néstor Meza Villalobos, *La política indígena en los orígenes de la sociedad chilena* (Santiago, 1959) and *Estudios sobre la conquista* (Santiago, 1971); Alvaro Jara, *Guerra y sociedad en Chile* (Santiago, 1971); Sergio Villalobos, *Una reflexión de la conquista* (Santiago, 1977) and *Historia del pueblo chileno* (Santiago, 1981); Jaime Eyzaguirre, *Ventura de Pedro de Valdivia* (Santiago, 1942); and Andrés Huneeus Pérez, *La polémica de Indias en Chile* (Santiago, 1965). For ideas on Indian society, Louis C. Faron, 'The effects of conquest on the Araucanian Picunche during the Spanish colonization of Chile, 1536-1635', *Ethnohistory*, vol. VII, no. 3 (1960), pp. 239-307; Jorge Hidalgo, *Algunas notas sobre los mapuches protohistóricos* (Temuco, 1973); Osvaldo Silva Galdames, 'Consideraciones acerca del período inca en la cuenca de Santiago', *Boletín del Museo Arqueológico de La Serena*, no. 16 (La Serena, 1977-78) and 'Los promaucaes y la frontera meridional incaica en Chile', *Cuadernos de Historia*, no. 6 (Santiago, 1986).

14. Studies of the specific social structures prevalent in Central Chile at the time of the conquest are scarce as the Picunches and Promaucaes are integrated into the larger Araucanian ethnia, despite the gap that existed between them in time, social structure and geography. See Ricardo Latcham, *Prehistoria chilena* (Santiago, 1936); Greta Mostny, *Las culturas precolombinas de Chile* (Santiago, 1954); Osvaldo Silva Galdames et al, *Historia de Chile* (4 vols., Santiago, 1974) and 'Los araucanos pre-hispánicos: ¿Un caso de doble filiación?', *Boletín Museo Regional de la Araucanía*, no. 1 (1984); René León Echaiz, *Prehistoria de Chile*

*Central* (Santiago, 1976); and Holdenis Casanova, 'El rol del jefe en la sociedad mapuche prehispánica', in Sergio Villalobos et al, *Araucanía, temas de historia fronteriza* (Temuco, 1989).

15. See Sergio Villalobos, 'Almagro y los incas', *Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía*, vol. 130 (1962), passim; Zapater, 'Los incas y la conquista de Chile'.

16. Armando de Ramón, *Descubrimiento de Chile y compañeros de Almagro* (Santiago, 1953); Sergio Villalobos and Rolando Mellafe, *Diego de Almagro* (Santiago, 1954), passim.

17. Detailed descriptions of this war are given in León, 'La guerra de los lonkos', and 'La resistencia anti-peninsular en Chile central'.

18. León, 'Pukaraes incas y fortalezas indígenas'.

19. Jaime Vera, 'La casa-fuerte de Quillota de Pedro de Valdivia. Mito y Realidad', *Nueva Historia*, no. 17 (London, 1989), pp. 1-12.

20. Felipe Huamán Poma de Ayala, *Primer Nueva Crónica y Buen Gobierno (1614)* (La Paz, 1944).

21. 'Título de encomienda otorgado por el gobernador Francisco de Villagra a Gaspar de Villarroel, Concepción, 20 de Abril de 1563', *CDIHCh*, vol. 16, p. 451.

22. Antonio Herrera, *Historia general de los hechos de los castellanos en las Islas y Tierra Firme del Mar Océano (1730)* (17 vols., Madrid, 1955), vol. 14, p. 31.

23. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

24. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

25. 'Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia', *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, vol. 131, pp. 6, 18 and 30 respectively.

26. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

27. Mariño de Lobera, *op. cit.*, p 271.



28. *Ibid.*

29. 'Información de servicios hechos a S.M. en las provincias del Perú y Chile por Rodrigo de Quiroga, gobernador de las Provincias de Chile, 31 de Octubre de 1560', *CDIHCh*, vol. 16, pp 119; see also 'Probanza de los méritos y servicios del general Juan Jufre en el descubrimiento y población de las provincias de Chile, 1576', *CDIHCh*, vol. 15, p. 24.

30. Pedro de Valdivia to Hernando de Pizarro, 4 September 1545, 'Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia', p. 16.

31. Statement made by Rodrigo de Quiroga in 'Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Francisco de Riberos, 1563-1564', *CDIHCh*, vol. 17, p. 194; in the *Probanza* of Pedro de León, Quiroga pointed out contradictorily that the Indians had stopped sowing the lands 'for two or three years', 'Información de servicios del capitán Pedro de León, con parecer del cabildo y del gobernador Pedro de Villagra, 16 de Agosto de 1564', statement made by Rodrigo de Quiroga, *CDIHCh*, vol. 18, p. 336.

32. Statement made by Pedro de Artaño in 'Proceso de Francisco de Villagra, 1558', *CDIHCh*, vol. 22, p. 87; in the same trial Pedro Gómez declared 'after about three years the Indians did not want to work', *ibid*, p. 232.

33. 'Probanzas de Juan Gómez Almagro y Antonio Tarabajano en el pleito seguido entre ambos sobre la encomienda de indios de Topocalma, 1556-1561', *CDIHCh*, vol. 11, p. 195.

34. Statement made by Juan Godínez in 'Probanza de los méritos y servicios de Santiago de Azócar, 17 de Octubre de 1562', *CDIHCh*, vol. 12, p. 11; additional information in Tomás Thayer Ojeda and Carlos J. Larraín, *Valdivia y sus compañeros* (Santiago, 1950), p. 91.

35. 'Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Francisco de Riberos, 1563-1564', *CDIHCh*, vol. 17, p 109.

36. Statement made by Francisco de Riberos in 'Diego de Velasco, vecino de la ciudad de Santiago, con Alonso de Córdoba, de la misma vecindad, sobre ciertos indios, 1577', *CDIHCh*, vol. 14, p. 458.

37. Statement made by Juan de Cuevas, *ibid*, p. 463.

38. Statement made by Santiago de Azócar, *ibid*, p. 477.

39. Diego de Rosales, *Historia General del Reyno de Chile, Flandes Indiano* (3 vols., Valparaíso, 1877), vol. 2, p. 381.
40. Statement made by Hernán Páez in 'Probanza de los méritos y servicios del general Juan Jufre en el descubrimiento y población de las provincias de Chile, 1576', *CDIHCh*, vol. 15, p. 82.
41. 'Fragmento de la información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Pedro de León, 16 de Agosto de 1564', *CDIHCh*, vol. 16, p. 420. In a different document León pointed out: 'The Indians, being rebellious, did not sow the land and there was great need of supplies to eat and survive', 'Probanza de Juan Gómez de Almagro', *CDIHCh*, vol. 11, p. 222.
42. 'Proceso de Francisco de Villagra', *CDIHCh*, vol. 22 p. 139.
43. Statement made by Juan de Carmona in 'Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Francisco de Riberos, 1563-1564', *CDIHCh*, vol. 17, p. 135.
44. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
45. Mariño de Lobera, *op. cit.*, p. 272.
46. Sergio Villalobos, *Historia*, vol. 2, p. 75.
47. 'Ynformación de servicios hechos a Su majestad en las provincias del Perú y Chile, por Rodrigo de Quiroga', statement made by Santiago de Azócar, *CDIHCh*, vol. 16, p. 204.
48. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
49. Rosales, *Historia general*, vol. 1, p. 434.
50. 'Probanza de los méritos y servicios de Santiago de Azócar', *CDIHCh*, vol. 12, p. 98. Rafael Varón and Auke Pieter Jacobs, 'Los dueños del Perú: negocios e inversiones de los Pizarro en el siglo XVI', *Histórica*, vol. XIII, no. 2 (1989), provides new evidence on the economic motivation of the early *conquistadores*.
51. 'Ynformación de servicios hechos a Su majestad en las provincias del Perú y Chile, por Rodrigo de Quiroga', *CDIHCh*, vol. 16, p. 117.

52. *Ibid*, p. 184.
53. 'Título de encomienda otorgada a Diego García de Cáceres por el gobernador Pedro de Valdivia, 1ro. de Agosto, 1546', *CDIHCh*, vol 13, p. 258.
54. 'Cédula de encomienda expedida por Pedro de Valdivia a favor de Hernando de Huelva, Concepción, 8 de Julio, 1552', *CDIHCh*, vol. 28, p. 166.
55. 'Título de encomienda otorgado por Pedro de Valdivia a Juan Fernández de Alderete', *CDIHCh*, vol. 18, p. 103.
56. 'Minutes, meeting 14 April 1553', *Colección de historiadores de Chile y documentos relativos a la historia nacional* (Santiago, 1861), vol. 1, p. 346. Quoted henceforth as 'Minutes' followed by date and page.
57. Statement made by Lope de Ayala, 'Fragmento de la información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Pedro de León', *CDIHCh*, vol. 16, p. 441.
58. Statement made by Garcé Díaz, 'Información de servicios del capitán Pedro de León, con parecer del cabildo y del gobernador Pedro de Villagra, 16 de Agosto de 1564', *CDIHCh*, vol 18, p. 277.
59. Statement made by Juan de Almonacid, 'Proceso', *CDIHCh*, vol. 22, p. 323.
60. Vivar, *op cit.*, p. 74.
61. 'Relación de lo que el licenciado Fernando de Santillán, Oidor de la Audiencia de Lima, proveyó para el buen gobierno, pacificación y defensa de Chile', 4 de Junio de 1559, *CDIHCh*, vol. 28, p. 284.
62. 'Minutes of 25 September 1549', p. 207.
63. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 226.
64. Jorge Hidalgo, *Algunas notas*, pp. 26 *et seq*, and *Culturas protohistóricas del norte de Chile: el testimonio de los cronistas* (Santiago, 1972), pp. 57 *et seq*.
65. Villalobos, *Historia*, vol. 2, p. 107; Mariño de Lobera calculated that while 50,000 Indians inhabited the province in 1541, only 7,000 remained in 1595, *op. cit.*, p. 257.
66. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

67. Góngora Marmolejo, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
68. Mariño de Lobera, *op. cit.*, p. 302.
69. ‘Traslado de un requerimiento hecho a Pedro de Valdivia para que verificase la reformatión del repartimiento de la ciudad de Santiago, y pregones que sobre ello mandó dar, 6 de Julio de 1546’, *CDIHCh*, vol. 8, p. 121.
70. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
71. *Ibid*, p. 119.
72. Góngora Marmolejo, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
73. Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Carlos V, Concepción, 15 October 1550, ‘Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia’, p. 45.
74. ‘Bando de Pedro de Valdivia, 25 de Julio de 1546’, quoted by Guillermo Feliú Cruz and Carlos Monge Alfaro, *Las encomiendas según tasas y ordenanzas* (Buenos Aires, 1941), p. 97.
75. ‘Encomienda de indios dada por Pedro de Valdivia a Marcos Veas, 14 de Noviembre de 1552’, *CDIHCh*, vol. 9, p. 456.
76. ‘Juan Godínez, vecino de Chile, con Doña Esperanza de Rueda y Pedro de Miranda, de la misma vecindad, sobre ciertos indios, 30 de Diciembre de 1564’, *CDIHCh*, vol. 14, p. 251.
77. ‘Testimonio original de información para el cargo y descargo de Pedro de Valdivia, 28 de Octubre de 1548’, *CDIHCh*, vol. 8, p. 334. The distribution of the *encomiendas* under Valdivia was far from equitable. Francisco de Aguirre acknowledged in 1545 that the governor had given ‘one thousand Indians led by *cacique* Cachapoal and his heir Elisaca, within the limits of this city, from among the Poramaucaes, and here in this valley of Mapo [ms. interrupted] and another *cacique*, named Vicelongo, heir of Longomoro, with one hundred Indians, for service in my house’, ‘Informaciones de los servicios hechos en las provincias del Perú y Chile por Francisco de Aguirre, 26 de Septiembre de 1552’, *CDIHCh*, vol. 10, p. 17. In another *Probanza* recorded in 1551, Aguirre augmented the number to ‘two thousand followers of the *caciques* Umbarango, of Mapocho, and Atumapante and Andequina’, of the Promaucaes. Gaspar de Orense, in another section, is described as in possession of ‘four thousand or five thousand Indians’ while Juan Gómez appeared only with ‘three hundred or

four hundred', 'Probanza de Juan Gómez de Almagro', *CDIHCh*, vol. 11, p. 141. Diego García de Villalón, who was granted the *encomienda* of *caciques* Guandopuche, Guandocolque and Colicoli, was described in 1548 to be in possession of 'one thousand two hundred Indians', 'Diego García de Villalón, Alguacil mayor de la Paz, con el Fiscal de S.M., sobre restitución de los indios de que fue despojado, 1563', 'Título de encomienda entregado por Pedro de Valdivia a Diego García Villalón, 4 de Enero de 1544', *CDIHCh*, vol. 12, p. 185.

78. Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Carlos V, 15 October 1550, 'Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia', p. 45.

79. 'Minutes of 13 October 1549', p. 244.

80. Villalobos, *Historia*, p. 161.

81. 'Minutes of 27 June 1547', p. 126.

82. 'Minutes of 10 March 1546', p. 119.

83. 'Minutes of 13 November 1552', p. 311.

84. 'Minutes of 2 August 1549', p. 200.

85. 'Minutes of 23 December, 1549', p. 221.

86. 'Minutes of 7 April 1553', p. 345.

87. Quoted by Silva, 'Consideraciones', p. 220.

88. 'Minutes of 2 June 1547', p. 125.

89. Tasa de Gamboa, Item 3, in Mario Góngora, 'Documentos inéditos sobre la encomienda de Chile', *Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía*, no. 123 (1954-1955), p. 211.

90. 'Información de Antonio de Tarabajano, 23 de Julio de 1555', *CDIHCh*, vol. 15, p. 289.

91. 'Probanza de don Francisco de Irrázabal en la causa seguida a su instancia contra Juan Gómez y el fiscal de S.M. sobre la tenencia de ciertos indios del valle de Quillota de las provincias de Chile, 1o. de Diciembre, 1565', *CDIHCh*, vol. 23, p. 56.

92. Mariño de Lobera, *op. cit.*, p. 276.
93. Góngora Marmolejo, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
94. 'Merced hecha por Pedro de Valdivia a Hernández Gallego de la mitad del valle de Lampa y compañía celebrada entre ambos, 17 de Octubre de 1552', *CDIHCh*, vol. 9, p. 441.
95. 'Minutes of 7 January 1550', p. 227.
96. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
97. 'Minutes of 13 March 1549', p. 169.
98. Mariño de Lobera, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
99. 'Información de servicios de Pedro de Villagrán, 11 de Septiembre de 1562', *CDIHCh*, vol. 13, p. 10.
100. *Ibid*, p. 93.
101. *Ibid*, p. 11.
102. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
103. Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Carlos V, 4 September 1545, 'Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia', p. 10.
104. *Ibid*.
105. *Ibid*.
106. Pedro de Valdivia to Hernándo de Pizarro, 4 September 1545, *ibid*, p. 21.
107. Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Carlos V, 4 September 1545, *ibid*, p. 10.
108. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
109. *Ibid*, p. 91.
110. *Ibid*.

111. *Ibid*, p. 99.
112. ‘Probanza de Juan Gómez Almagro’, ‘Título de encomienda otorgado por Pedro de Valdivia a Juan Gómez, 4 de Enero de 1544’, *CDIHCh*, vol. 11, p. 8.
113. ‘Título de encomienda otorgado por Pedro de Valdivia a Juan Gómez, 11 de Julio, 1546’, *ibid*, p. 9.
114. Pedro de Valdivia to Emperor Carlos V, 4 September 1545, ‘Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia’, p. 13.
115. ‘Probanza de Juan Gómez de Almagro’, *CDIHCh*, vol. 11, p. 9.
116. ‘Diego García de Villalón, Alguacil mayor de la Paz, con el Fiscal de S.M., sobre restitución de los indios de que fue despojado, 1563’, ‘Título de encomienda entregado por Pedro de Valdivia a Diego García Villalón, 4 de Enero de 1544’, *CDIHCh*, vol. 12, p. 182.
117. ‘Confirmación de la encomienda otorgada por Pedro de Valdivia a Diego García de Villalón, 6 de Julio de 1545’, *ibid*, p. 189.
118. *Ibid*, p. 185.
119. ‘Probanza de los méritos y servicios del general Juan Jufre’, *CDIHCh*, vol. 15, p. 6.
120. *Ibid*, p. 13.
121. *Ibid*.
122. ‘El Fiscal de S.M. con Agustín Briseño, vecino de la ciudad de Santiago de las provincias de Chile sobre los indios de Gualemo; tercero al general Juan Jufre, 2 de Marzo de 1568 y 5 de Marzo de 1574’, ‘Título de encomienda concedido a Francisco de Aguirre’, *CDIHCh*, vol 15, p. 221.
123. ‘Decreto del gobernador Pedro de Valdivia’, *CDIHCh*, vol. 8, p. 120.
124. ‘Juan Godínez, vecino de Chile, con Doña Esperanza de Rueda’, *CDIHCh*, vol. 14, p. 220.
125. ‘Memorial del capitán Juan de Mier de Cosío en el que refiere sus servicios y pide que se le haga merced de quince mil castellanos de renta en el

Perú o se le dé el repartimiento que tenía en Chile, año de 1560', *CDIHCh*, vol. 19, p. 66.

126. 'Minutes of 28 November 1552', p. 317.

127. 'Minutes of 5 November 1550', p. 260.

128. 'Minutes of 16 December 1550', p. 262.

129. 'Minutes of 22 February 1552', p. 289.

130. 'Minutes of 27 February 1552', p. 294.

131. 'Minutes of 14 April 1553', p. 347.

132. *Ibid.*

133. 'Minutes of 4 August 1553', p. 357.

134. Pedro de Valdivia to Hernando de Pizarro, 4 September 1545, 'Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia', p. 21.

135. Vivar, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

136. Statement made by Juan Gómez in 'Información de los méritos y servicios de Francisco de Riberos, 1563-1564', *CDIHCh*, vol. 17, p. 157.

137. *Ibid*, p. 207.

138. 'Minutes of 26 January 1551', p. 267.

139. 'Minutes of 2 January 1552', p. 286.

140. 'Probanza de los méritos y servicios del general Juan Jufré', 'Cédula otorgada por Pedro de Valdivia a Juan Jufré, 8 de Noviembre de 1552', *CDIHCh*, vol. 15, p. 97.

141. 'Cédula otorgada por Pedro de Valdivia a Juan Jufré, 14 de Noviembre, 1552', *ibid*, p. 98.

142. Juan Jufré, 'Probanza', *CDIHCh*, vol. 15, p. 26.



143. 'Mandamiento de su señoría el Señor Gobernador sobre la orden que se ha de tener en los pleitos sobre indios, Concepción, 7 de Abril de 1553', in 'Actas del cabildo de Santiago', *Colección de historiadores de Chile*, vol. 1, p. 346.

144. Vivar, *op cit.*, p. 77.

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