British Documents on the End of Empire Project  
Volumes Published and Forthcoming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Series A</th>
<th>General Volumes</th>
<th>Series B</th>
<th>Country Volumes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vol 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vol 5</td>
<td>Sudan (in two parts, 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol 6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vol 6</td>
<td>The West Indies (in one part, 1999)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Series A Volume 4 and Series B Volume 6 are volumes published in stage two of the project covering the period 1957–1964. Further Series B volumes are in preparation in stage two on Nigeria, Kenya, and Malaysia.

The Volume Editors

RONALD HYAM is Emeritus Reader in British Imperial History, University of Cambridge, and a Fellow and former President of Magdalene College. He is the Editor of the BDEEP general volume, The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–1951 (1992) and the author of Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815–1914 (2nd edn, 1993).

Wm ROGER LOUIS is Kerr Professor of English History and Culture and Distinguished Teaching Professor, University of Texas at Austin, USA, and an Honorary Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford. His books include Imperialism at Bay (1977) and The British Empire in the Middle East (1984). He is the Editor-in-Chief of the Oxford History of the British Empire (1998–1999) and is currently President of the American Historical Association.
The Conservative Government and the End of Empire
1957–1964
The British Documents on the End of Empire Project gratefully acknowledges the generous assistance of the Leverhulme Trust.

The Project has been undertaken under the auspices of the British Academy.
# Contents

*Frontispiece:*  Mr Macmillan addressing Members of both Houses of the South African Parliament, 3 February 1960  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Foreword  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Conservative government and the end of empire 1957–1964:  
Schedule of contents: parts I–II  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>xvii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Principal holders of offices, 1957–1964  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>xxi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Introduction  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>xxv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes to Introduction  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lxxxvii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of documents: part I  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lxxxix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Documents: part I (nos 1–299)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HIGH POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION**  
Chapter 1 Colonial high policy, plans and surveys  
Chapter 2 Strategy and defence policies  
Chapter 3 Administrative structures  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE**  
Chapter 4 West, East, and the Horn of Africa  
Chapter 5 Aden, Mediterranean, Asian, West Indian and other colonies  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Index: parts I–II  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE**  
(1) Likely future status of British dependent territories, September 1963  
(Annex to document no 46)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MAPS**  
(1) Aden Colony and Protectorates  
(2) Greater Malaysia  
(3) The West Indies Federation  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mr Harold Macmillan addressing Members of both Houses of the South African Parliament in the Parliamentary Dining Room at Cape Town, 3 February 1960 (Do 351/670)
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by 1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain’s position in these formal dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed an integral part of Britain’s domestic affairs and international relations. In publishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a degree, the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning the end of British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh and Tinker respectively. The successful completion of *The transfer of power* and *The struggle for independence*,1 both of which were based on British records, emphasised the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of the final stages of Britain’s association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. These documents are crucial research tools for scholars both from sovereign independent states which emerged from colonial rule as well as those from Britain itself. BDEEP is also set in the much wider context of the efforts made by successive British governments to locate Britain’s position in an international order. Here the empire, both in its formal and informal senses, is viewed as an instrument of the domestic, foreign and defence policy of successive British governments. The project is therefore concerned with the ending of colonial rule in individual territories as seen from the British side at one level, and the broader political, economic and strategic considerations involved in that at another.

Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major differences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of the twentieth century while having its roots in the Second World War and before. Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, varying in area, population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individual problems but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring territories and the

---

FOREWORD

growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the
documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be encapsulated within a
relatively straightforward ‘country’ study, in the case of the colonial empire the
documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of territories and their
scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the ending of colonial rule are
not conveniently located within one leading department of state but rather are to be
found in several of them. As the purpose of the project is to publish documents
relating to the end of empire from the extensive range and quantity of official British
records, private collections and other categories of non-official material are not
regarded as principal documentary sources. In BDEEP, selections from non-official
material will be used only in exceptional cases to fill gaps where they exist in the
available official record.

In recognition of these differences and also of the fact that the end of empire
involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than
that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP
is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents
the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents
relating to the empire as a whole are published. Series B represents the country or
territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British government
perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their independence and
countries which were part of an informal empire regained their autonomy. In
addition to the two main documentary series, a third series—series C—has been
published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former colonial empire
which are deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). Series C consists of two
volumes which form an integral part of BDEEP and also serve as PRO guides to the
records. Together they enable scholars and others wishing to follow the record of the
ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their inquiries beyond the published
record provided by the general studies in series A and the country studies in series B.
Volume one of the handbooks, a revised and updated version of The records of the
Colonial and Dominions Offices by R B Pugh which was first published in 1964, is
entitled Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations
Office and Commonwealth Office (1995). It covers over two hundred years of activity
down to 1968 when the Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to
form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volume two, entitled Records of the
Cabinet, Foreign Office, Treasury and other records (1998), focuses more specifically
on twentieth-century departmental records and also includes references to the
records of inter-departmental committees, commissions of inquiry and international
organisations. The two volumes were prepared under the direction and supervision
of Dr Anne Thurston, at the time honorary research fellow at the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies in the University of London, and now executive director of
the International Records Management Trust.

In the two main series the research is organised in stages. Stage one, covering the
years 1925–1957, is now complete and consists of three general volumes and five
country volumes, collectively published in twenty-one individual parts. In series A
there are volumes on Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925–1945 in two parts
(1996), The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–1951 in four parts
(1992), and The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957 in three
parts (1994). In series B there are volumes on Ghana in two parts (1992), Sri Lanka


in two parts (1997), *Malaya* in three parts (1995), *Egypt and the defence of the Middle East* in three parts (1998) and the *Sudan* in two parts (1998). Starting in 1999, the project began publishing volumes in a second stage which covers the period 1957-1964. Here there are five volumes, a general volume on the *Conservative government and the end of empire 1957–1964* in two parts (2000), and country volumes on the *West Indies* in one part (1999), *Nigeria, Kenya and Malaysia*.

The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in individual volumes are explained in the introductions written by the specialist editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in previous series. Each volume also lists the PRO sources which have been searched. However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles which have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is first the end of empire in a broad high policy sense in which the empire is viewed in terms of Britain’s position as a world power and of the inter-relationship between what derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. Here Britain’s relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider defence, economic and foreign policy contexts of Britain’s relations with the United States, with Europe, and with the Commonwealth and United Nations. Secondly, there is investigation into colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those areas which were specifically—but not exclusively—the concern of the leading department. In the period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s, the leading department of the British government for most of the dependencies was the Colonial Office; for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its successor, the Commonwealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy included questions of economic and social development, questions of governmental institutions and constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning the future of the civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of transition from European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the development of political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and the transfer of governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its colonial dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the British government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not to document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major policy decisions made in Britain.

Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters which will be fully documented in the country volumes but some especially significant documents do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of

---

2 The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the Commonwealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive quantity of material devoted to appointments and terms of service—salaries, gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation—within the colonial and related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to address potentially significant issues because the information was not available. Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local information to London began to diminish.

Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the records at the PRO. Unlike the India and Burma series and the current Foreign and Commonwealth Office series of Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO), BDEEP is not an official project. In practice this means that while editors have privileged access (in the form of research facilities and requisitioning procedures) to the records at the PRO, they do not have unrestricted access. For files which at the time a volume is in preparation are either subject to extended closures beyond the statutory thirty years or retained in the originating department under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act of 1958, editors are subject to the same restrictions as all other researchers. Apart from cases where files or series of files are withheld, official weeding processes now tend to remove sentences or paragraphs from public view, rather than the whole document; such omissions are indicated in footnotes. To date access has not impeded the research undertaken by the project to any significant degree, and the project has been successful in securing the release of a number of hitherto withheld documents from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the sequence number, the file reference (in the form of the PRO call-up number and any internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document appear on the first line.3 The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the document, the type of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator (person or persons, committee, department) and the recipient (if any). A subject entry in a heading in single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it appears in the original. An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator composed by the editor. This latter device has been employed in cases where no title is given in the original or where the original title is too unwieldy to reproduce in its entirety. Security classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and receipt, have generally been omitted. In the headings to documents and the contents lists,

3 The PRO call-up number precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents from FO 371, the major foreign office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number of the file.
ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not the title of the office (ie, Mr Macleod, not secretary of state for the colonies). In the same contexts, officials are identified by their initials and surname. In a general volume, ambassadors, governors, high commissioners and other embassy or high commission staff are cited in the form Sir H Foot (Cyprus). Footnotes to documents appearing below the rule are editorial; those above the rule, or where no rule is printed, are part of the original document. Each volume provides an initial summary list of which principal offices were held by whom, and a separate series of biographical notes (at the end) for major figures who appear in the documents. Other figures are identified in editorial footnotes on the occasion of first appearance. Link-notes, written by the volume editor and indented in square brackets between the heading and the beginning of a document, are often used to explain the context of a document. Technical detail or extraneous material has been extracted from a number of documents. In such cases omission dots have been inserted in the text and the document is identified in the heading as an extract. Occasional omission dots have also been used to excise purely mechanical chain-of-command executive instructions and some redundant internal referencing has been removed, though much of it remains in place, for the benefit of researchers. No substantive material relating to policy-making has been excised from the documents. In general the aim has been to reproduce documents in their entirety but where available space is a major constraint on editors, a consideration which applies particularly in the case of general volumes, where the documentation is voluminous, this is not always possible, and some purely factual information may be omitted. It must also be emphasised in this context that the BDEEP volumes do not remove the necessity for researchers to study the original records themselves. The footnote reference ‘not printed’ is used only in cases where a specified enclosure or an annex to a document has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or note of explanation is provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents referred to in the text of the documents included have not been reproduced. Obvious typing errors in the original are in the main silently corrected, but abbreviations and constructions stand. Each volume has a list of abbreviations together with a consolidated index, and country volumes include a chronology of principal events.

One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and Burma series, is that BDEEP reproduces many more minutes by ministers and officials.

Crown copyright material is used by permission of the Public Record Office under licence from the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. All references and dates are given in the form recommended in PRO guidelines.

* * * *

Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a Project Committee chaired by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes professor of imperial history in the University of London. Professor Porter succeeded Professor Anthony

---

4 This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials.
Low, formerly Smuts professor of the history of the Commonwealth in the University of Cambridge, who retired in November 1994. Professor Michael Crowder became the first general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the University of London and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. Following his untimely death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general editor by Professor David Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at the Open University, who played a critical role in establishing a secure financial base for the project and in negotiating contracts with the volume editors and the publisher. His invaluable advice and expertise in dealing with the early typescripts are acknowledged with particular gratitude. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Stephen Ashton who previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of the India and Burma series. Dr Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project director and general editor in 1993.

The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major projects. The Academy made a further award in 1996 which enabled the project to employ a research assistant on a fixed term contract. The Managers of the Smuts Memorial Fund in the University of Cambridge are also to be acknowledged. They made possible the workshop from which the project developed and they have since provided a further grant for work on two of the stage two volumes. The principal funding for the project has been provided by the Leverhulme Trust and the volumes are a tribute to the support provided by the Trustees. A major debt of gratitude is owed to the Trustees. In addition to their generous grants to cover the major costs of both stages, the Trustees agreed to a subsequent request to extend the duration of the first grant, and also provided a supplementary grant which enabled the project to secure Dr Ashton’s appointment. It is thanks largely to the Leverhulme Trust that BDEEP has developed into one of the country’s most significant historical research projects.

Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed encouragement. Professor Low, the first chairman of the Committee, made a singular contribution, initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985 and presiding over subsequent developments in his customary constructive but unobtrusive manner. Professor Porter continues in a similar vein and his leadership and experience are much appreciated by the general editor. The director and the staff of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative support and the congenial surroundings within which the general editor works. The editors of volumes in stages one and two have benefited considerably from the researches undertaken by Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants which resulted in the publication of the two handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official project, the general editor wishes to acknowledge the support and co-operation received from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He wishes also to record his appreciation of the spirit of friendly co-operation received from the editors of DBPO. Dr Ronald Hyam, editor in stage one of the general volume on the post-war Labour government and co-editor of the stage two volume on the Conservative government, played an important role in
the compilation of the house-style adopted by BDEEP and his contribution is acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are due to The Stationery Office for assuming publishing responsibility and for their expert advice on matters of design and production. Last, but by no means least, the contribution of the chief executive and keeper of the records and the staff, both curatorial and administrative, at the PRO must be emphasised. Without the facilities and privileges afforded to BDEEP editors at the PRO, the project would not be viable.

S R Ashton
Institute of Commonwealth Studies
February 2000
The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1957–1964

**Schedule of contents: parts I–II**

---

**PART 1 HIGH POLICY, POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE**

**HIGH POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION**

Chapter 1 *Colonial high policy, plans and surveys*
- (1) Future constitutional development in the colonies, 1957 1–3
- (3) Africa: the next ten years, 1959 19–22
- (6) The remaining British colonies, 1963–1964 43–52

Chapter 2 *Strategy and defence policies*
- (1) 1957–1961 53–65
- (2) 1961–1964 66–81

Chapter 3 *Administrative structures*
- (1) Overseas Civil Service 82–87
- (2) Whitehall organisation 88–99

**POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE**

Chapter 4 *West, East, and the Horn of Africa*
- (1) West Africa 100–115
- (2) East Africa: general, Uganda and Zanzibar 116–139
- (3) Tanganyika 140–156
- (4) Kenya 157–180
- (5) Somaliland 181–187

Chapter 5 *Aden, Mediterranean, Asian, West Indian and other colonies*
- (1) Aden Colony and Protectorate 188–215
- (2) Cyprus 216–241
- (3) Malta 242–255
- (4) East and South-East Asia 256–271
- (5) The West Indies Federation 272–288
- (6) Other territories 289–299
PART II  ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE COMMONWEALTH

ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Chapter 6  Economic and social policies
(1) General colonial economic policy  300–308
(2) Economic development in the colonies  309–326
(3) Overseas aid policy  327–353
(4) Social issues: education, welfare, labour and conservation  354–361

Chapter 7  International relations policies
(1) European Economic Community  362–373
(2) The United States, and the struggle against communism  374–391
(3) The Congo crisis  392–403
(4) Problems at the United Nations  404–430
(5) International disputes: territorial claims  431–436

SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL AFRICA, AND THE COMMONWEALTH

Chapter 8  Southern and Central Africa
(1) Anglo–South African relations and the departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth  437–474
(2) The High Commission Territories: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland  475–491
(3) The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland  492–527

Chapter 9  The Commonwealth
(1) General British policy towards the Commonwealth  528–553
(2) The Pacific Islands: an Australian responsibility?  554–560
(3) The future of the Smaller Colonial Territories  561–567
(4) Commonwealth immigration into Britain  568–583
Abbreviations

ACEC  Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies (CO)
ADM  Admiralty
ANC  African National Congress
ANZAM  Australia, New Zealand and Malaya
ANZUS  Australia, New Zealand and United States (Pact)
APL  Aden Protectorate Levies
ASP  Afro-Shirazi Party (Zanzibar)
BAOR  British Army of the Rhine
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation
BBS  Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland
BDEEP  British Documents on the End of Empire Project
BOAC  British Overseas Airways Corporation
BoT  Board of Trade
C  Cabinet memorandum/memos, Conservative (Macmillan)
government, 1957–1963
CAB  Cabinet
CAF  Central African Federation (Rhodesia and Nyasaland)
CC  Cabinet conclusions (minutes), Conservative (Macmillan)
government, 1957–1963
CCTA  Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa
CDC  Colonial Development Corporation
CD(&)W  Colonial Development and Welfare (Act)
CENTO  Central Treaty Organisation (Turkey, UK, Pakistan, Iran)
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
C-in-C  commander-in-chief
CIGS  chief of the imperial general staff
CM  Cabinet conclusions (minutes), Conservative (Douglas-Home)
government, 1963–1964
Cmtee  committee
CO  Colonial Office
col  colonial
Con  Conservative Party (MP)
COS  Chiefs of Staff
CP  Cabinet memorandum/memos, Conservative (Douglas-Home)
government, 1963–1964
CPA  Conservative Party Association
CPC  Colonial Policy Committee (Cabinet)
CPP  Convention People’s Party (Ghana)
CRO  Commonwealth Relations Office
Dept  Department
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>Defence Committee (Cabinet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOPC</td>
<td>Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (Cabinet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTC</td>
<td>Department of Technical Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EACSO</td>
<td>East Africa Common Services Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAD</td>
<td>East Africa Department (CO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAHC</td>
<td>East Africa High Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EALF</td>
<td>East African Land Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Co-operation Administration (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECGD</td>
<td>Export Credit Guarantee Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td>Greek initials of National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>Economic Policy Committee (Cabinet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMA</td>
<td>Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa (South of Sahara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>French Overseas and Associated Territories/Food and Agriculture Organisation (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federation of British Industries (later 'Confederation')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GKN</td>
<td>Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOC</td>
<td>general officer commanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gov</td>
<td>governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gov-gen</td>
<td>governor-general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>govt</td>
<td>government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H of C Debs</td>
<td>House of Commons Debates (Hansard)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCTs</td>
<td>High Commission Territories (Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Government (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMOCS</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Oversea Civil Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA</td>
<td>International Co-operation Administration (USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trades Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRD</td>
<td>International Relations Department (CO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPS</td>
<td>Joint Planning Staff (COS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAR</td>
<td>King's African Rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNFU</td>
<td>Kenya National Farmers’ Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>Labour Party (MP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leg Co</td>
<td>Legislative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSA</td>
<td>land, sea and air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTS</td>
<td>Long-Term Study Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>memo</td>
<td>memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEOC</td>
<td>Middle East Official Committee (Cabinet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>member of parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAAFI</td>
<td>Navy, Army and Air Force Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNC</td>
<td>National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKG/P</td>
<td>New Kenya Group/Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organisation for European Economic Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEX</td>
<td>United Nations Technical Assistance Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Oversea Service Department (CO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Public Accounts Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAFMECA</td>
<td>Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>People's Action Party (Malaya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>prime minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POMEF</td>
<td>Post Office, Middle East Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Parliamentary Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>People's Progressive Party (British Guiana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record Office (Kew)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUS</td>
<td>permanent under-secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>supreme allied commander, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAAP</td>
<td>Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South-East Asia Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S of S</td>
<td>secretary of state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/Tsy</td>
<td>Treasury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEMA</td>
<td>Tanganyika Elected Members’ Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAM</td>
<td>Union of African and Malagasy States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>unilateral declaration of independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UF</td>
<td>United Front Party (Southern Rhodesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFP</td>
<td>United Federal Party (Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Commission for Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN(O)</td>
<td>United Nations (Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US(A)</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCIGS</td>
<td>vice-chief of the imperial general staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>Zanzibar National Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Principal holders of offices 1957–1964

### 1 Ministers

(a) **Cabinet ministers**

Prime minister

- Mr H Macmillan (10 Jan 1957–13 Oct 1963)

Lord chancellor

- Viscount Kilmuir (14 Oct 1957)
- Lord Dilhorne (13 July 1962)

Chancellor of Exchequer

- Mr P Thorneycroft (13 Jan 1957)
- Mr D Heathcoat Amory (6 Jan 1958)
- Mr J S B (Selwyn) Lloyd (27 July 1960)
- Mr R Maudling (13 July 1962)

S of S foreign affairs

- Mr J S B (Selwyn) Lloyd (20 Dec 1955/14 Jan 1957)
- Earl of Home (27 July 1960)
- Mr R A Butler (23 Oct 1963)

S of S colonies

- Mr A T Lennox-Boyd (30 July 1954/14 Jan 1957)
- Mr I Macleod (14 Oct 1959)
- Mr R Maudling (9 Oct 1961)
- Mr D E Sandys (13 July 1962)
  (office held jointly with S of S Commonwealth relations)

S of S Commonwealth relations

- Earl of Home (12 Apr 1955/14 Jan 1957)
- Mr D E Sandys (28 July 1960)
  (office held jointly with S of S colonies from 13 July 1962)

Minister i/c Central Africa Office

- Mr R A Butler (Mar 1962–Oct 1963)
  (First S of S & deputy prime minister, July 1962–Oct 1963)

S of S defence

- Mr D E Sandys (13 Jan 1957)
- Mr H A Watkinson (14 Oct 1959)
- Mr P Thorneycroft (13 July 1962)
(b) **Junior ministers**

(i) **Colonial Office**

Minister of state

- Earl of Perth (17 Jan 1957)
- Marquis of Lansdowne (20 Apr 1962) *

Parliamentary under-secretary of state

- Mr J D Profumo (18 Jan 1957)
- Mr J Amery (28 Nov 1958)
- Mr H Fraser (28 Oct 1960)
- Mr N Fisher (16 July 1962) *
- Mr R Hornby (24 Oct 1963) *

(ii) **Commonwealth Relations Office**

Minister of state

- Mr C J M Alport (22 Oct 1959–1 Mar 1961)
- 11th Duke of Devonshire (6 Sept 1962) *

Parliamentary under-secretary of state

- Mr C J M Alport (18 Jan 1957)
- Mr R H M Thompson (22 Oct 1959)
- Mr B Braine (9 Feb 1961–16 July 1962)
- Mr J D Tilney (16 July 1962) *

2 Civil servants

(a) **Secretary to the Cabinet**

- Sir Norman Brook (1947–1962)
- Sir Burke Trend (1963–1972)
  (Deputy secretary, 1956–1959)

(b) **Colonial Office**

(i) Permanent under-secretary of state

- Sir John Macpherson (1956–1959)
- Sir Hilton Poynton (1959–1966)

(ii) Deputy under-secretary of state

- Sir Hilton Poynton (1948–1959)
- Sir John Martin (1956–1965)
- Sir William Gorell Barnes (1959–1963)

(iii) Assistant under-secretary of state

- W L Gorell Barnes (1948–1959)
- W B L Monson (1951–1964)
- E Melville (1952–1961)
- A R Thomas (1952–1964)
- C Y Carstairs (1953–1962)
- P Rogers (1953–1961)

* These offices jointly held between CO and CRO from 21 Oct 1963
A N Galsworthy (1957–1965)
Trafford Smith (1959–1967)
W I J Wallace (1963–1966)

(c) Commonwealth Relations Office

(i) Permanent under-secretary of state
Sir Gilbert Laithwaite (Feb 1955–Aug 1959)
Sir Alexander Clutterbuck (Sept 1959–Dec 1961)
Sir Saville Garner (Jan 1962–1968)

(ii) Deputy under-secretary of state
Sir Henry Lintott (Oct 1956–1963)
Sir Algernon Rumbold (Dec 1958–1966)

(iii) Assistant under-secretaries of state include:
H A F Rumbold (1954–1958)
A W Snelling (1955–1959)
W A W Cark (1958–1960)
D W S Hunt (1959–1960)
G W StJ Chadwick (1960–1966)

(d) Foreign Office

(i) Permanent under-secretary of state
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar (1957–1962)
Sir Harold Caccia (1962–1965)

3 Select list of ambassadors, high commissioners and governors

Ambassador in Washington
Sir Harold Caccia (1956–1961)
Sir David Ormsby-Gore (1961–1965)

Permanent representative to the UN
Sir Patrick Dean (1960–1964)

Permanent representative to the UN Trusteeship Council
Sir Andrew Cohen (1957–1961)
Sir Hugh Foot (1961–1962)

Commissioner-general, South-East Asia
Earl of Selkirk (1959–1963)

High commissioner, India
Mr M J MacDonald (1955–1960)

High commissioner, South Africa and High Commission Territories
Sir Percivale Liesching (Mar 1955–Dec 1958)
Sir John Maud (Jan 1959–Dec 1962) (ambassador to South Africa from May 1961)
Ambassador to South Africa  
Sir Hugh Stephenson (1963–1966)  
(high commissioner, BBS, until 1964, when post abolished)

High commissioner, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland  
Lord Alport (May 1961–July 1963)

Governor-general of The West Indies Federation  
Lord Hailes (1958–1962)

Governor of Kenya  
Sir Evelyn Baring (1952–1959)  
Sir Patrick Renison (1959–1962)  
Mr M J MacDonald (1963–1965: gov-gen/high commissioner)

Governor of Tanganyika  

Governor of Nyasaland  
Sir Robert Armitage (1956–1961)  
Sir Glyn Jones (1961–1964)

Governor of Northern Rhodesia  
Sir Evelyn Hone (1959–1964)

Governor of Cyprus  
Sir Hugh Foot (1957–1960)

Governor of Aden  
Sir William Luce (1956–1960)  
Sir Charles Johnston (1960–1963)  
Sir Kennedy Trevaskis (1963–1965: high commissioner)
Introduction

The documents and their selection
The arrival in office of the Macmillan government brought with it a huge increase in documentation. Nowhere was this more true than in the field of overseas and colonial policy. For example, the number of PRO Foreign Office files (FO 371) on one subject for a single year, relations with the UN in 1962, totals 500; the general correspondence of the CRO (DO 35) generated 6,682 files between 1957 and 1960; and the CO records on the West Indies alone (CO 1031) run to 2,335 files, 1957–1964. Faced with documentation on such a massive scale, the best any editor can do is to work from the PRO listings and call up for study those files which seem most likely to yield promising material for selection. Searches in this manner were conducted by the editors across the records of several government departments, the most useful being those of the Cabinet, the prime minister’s office, the CO, CRO and FO. The editors have noted shifts in the salience of different parts of the policy-making machine over time. In the post-war years, the Defence Committee, the Economic Policy Committee, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee all played major parts in the formulation of colonial policy. This had ceased to be true by the late 1950s, when the Colonial Policy Committee and its successors (the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee by 1963) came to occupy a more central position. The Treasury remained in a purely secondary role, at least as far as decolonisation policy was concerned.

Before BDEEP was launched, one particularly influential supposition, especially among economic historians, was that the Treasury files would hold the key to understanding the dynamics of decolonisation.¹ With ten BDEEP volumes now published (in twenty-four books), it is possible to report, though with all due caution, that this has not proved to be the case. The Treasury generated apparently promising-looking files labelled ‘general policy’, but this mostly turns out to be in Treasury parlance merely a misnomer for ‘miscellaneous’. The Treasury had no positive input into colonial policy initiatives and simply reacted to proposals laid before it. As often as not, its consideration of colonial issues was easily dismissed with the summary conclusion ‘no Treasury interest’. Of course, where expenditure was involved, scrutiny could be rigorous (below, p lxiv). One should not imagine that the CO was constantly bombarding it with unrealistic requests, or that the two departments were constantly at loggerheads, although there was some tough bargaining over the size of financial settlements at independence. At the conclusion of his five-volume Official History of Colonial Development, D J Morgan (who had unrestricted access to the files), endorsed the picture painted by a former deputy under-secretary of state for the colonies, Sir Charles Jeffries: that the work of the CO touched the Treasury less continuously and less intimately than the work of other departments, and so for ‘most of the time the Colonial Office went its own way’.² Even in the titanic debate over the funding of pensions for the new Overseas Civil Service (HMOCS) between 1955 and 1961, the Treasury officials were, Jeffries found,
'anxious to be as helpful as possible within the limits of what they regarded as the correct approach'. And in the end, 'the Colonial Office substantially achieved all that it fought for over the years' in the scheme established under the Overseas Service Aid Act, 1961. The Treasury can also be shown to have exercised flexibility in other matters too, such as the new Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1959 (document nos 83, 306, 319, 320).

One other observation needs to be made about the nature of the archival records. This concerns the official weeding and withholding of documents. BDEEP editors can only see at the PRO what the general public are allowed to see. It is frustrating to know that runs of files on the Falkland Islands are not available and the minutes of some Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings are withheld—or to infer that references to Hong Kong or CIA activities are blanked out in otherwise intact documents—but none of this has in practice proved to be an insuperable problem.

When it comes to explaining why our selection is what it is, the first thing to say is that the most serious challenge has been to stick within the predetermined strict page-limits imposed. Defining the general shape and scope of the selection has not in itself been difficult. It follows the now well-established BDEEP pattern for the general volumes, of giving more or less equal space to the three categories of political, administrative and constitutional change, economic and social policies (including race and human rights), and defence, Commonwealth and international relations. An opening chapter in Part I attempts to bring together the more important surveys and planning papers on general policy formation, of which there are a considerable number. Documents referring to more than one country find their place here. Similarly, the final chapter in Part II is also organised around a general theme, this time Commonwealth issues. The test of what kinds of document are most relevant and suitable for selection draws on accumulated BDEEP experience.

Although a high proportion of Cabinet-level conclusions on any given problem—assuming there were any—has been selected, the editors have constantly borne in mind the desirability of representing, where possible, opinions expressed along the various chains of decision-making, from junior officials upwards.

As far as technical editorial practices are concerned, printed selections such as this inevitably impose on the documents a deceptive coherence and tidiness, and even an elegance, alien to the actual archival record. A document may consist of a barely legible typed carbon copy on flimsy paper, or perhaps a hand-written note, and may lack any convenient indication as to what it is about. An editor has to start by doing what any reader of the original files on colonial policy would have to do: mentally assemble the sequence, cross-referencing and co-ordinating the records, not only between different government offices, but also sometimes between departments within those offices. A document may go through several drafts or reincarnations. These have to be evaluated and the final version identified. Memoranda and decisions, minutes and papers, letters and replies, which have become separated archivally have to be correctly aligned again. But in addition, editors on occasion do what readers would not, namely, undertake a certain amount of ‘document creation’. What sometimes appears here as an apparently neat ‘document’ may in fact be artificially constructed out of some of the minutes which appear in a bigger batch on the minute-sheet attached to the inside front-cover of a file, and editorially integrated with other minutes buried in the main body of the file.

The two editors of the present volume have probably each contributed about half
INTRODUCTION

of the selected total of 583 documents, though WRL searched the larger number of original files. There was no systematic division of labour between us at the PRO, and we avoided undue duplication of effort by the simple device of keeping each other up-to-date on which files we had read. The final selection, link-notes, footnotes and copy editing have mainly been the responsibility of RH. Our task has been eased to some extent by Morgan’s pioneering research, published as volumes III, IV and V of The official history of colonial development, the coverage of which is somewhat wider than the title suggests. The erratic organisation of Morgan’s work, the scissors-and-paste method, the random mixture of quotation and paraphrase, and the absence of PRO referencing, all make these volumes difficult to use. But they provided some welcome signposts and alerted us to a number of points which we might otherwise have missed.

Dr Peter Henshaw provided an important set of xeroxes from the Government Archives in Pretoria to complete our South African documentation. Others who have helped us with insights, advice, or answers to enquiries, include Dr Mandy Banton (PRO), Sir Derek Oulton, GCB, QC, the late Professor R E Robinson, CBE, Professor A D Roberts, Dr John Lonsdale, Professor Tony Stockwell, Dr John Kent, Dr T N Harper, Dr Philip Murphy, Dr S J Ball, Philip Alexander, and Richard McMillan; and above all, our general editor, Dr Stephen Ashton.

We also acknowledge gratefully the generous contributions to the costs of researching and preparing this volume made by the University of Texas at Austin, Magdalene College, Cambridge, and the Managers of the Smuts Memorial Fund in the University of Cambridge.

* * * *

The policy-making process: ministers, officials, and administrative structures

Macmillan is of course famous for his proclaimed awareness of the need to come to terms with the nationalist ‘wind of change’ in Africa. His speech in Cape Town on 3 February 1960 (document no 32) was not just an official declaration (though it was that), nor did it represent a sudden personal conversion. In June 1955 we find him writing to the ambassador in Paris: ‘The tide of the world is set in the direction of national…autonomy and identity. . . . Time is not on the side of France, and she will not be able to swim against the tide of nationalism in North Africa any more than we have been able to do elsewhere in the world’.4 Again, as early as July 1957 Macmillan made a speech describing nationalism ‘as a tidal wave surging from Asia across the ocean to the shores of Africa’, powerful, swift and elemental: ‘it can be led, but it cannot be driven back’.5 Macmillan regarded this tide of colonial nationalism as one of the two biggest developments in the world since 1945. The other was the ideological struggle against communism ‘which really dominates everything . . . really holds the front of the stage’ (541). It was within these parameters that he approached the higher level of colonial problems. It was very much the essence of his policy to find ways of harnessing colonial nationalism so as to prevent the spread of communism. This indeed was the theme at the heart of the Cape Town speech.

It is perhaps hard to see that Macmillan had any deep conviction which would predispose him to favour the continuation of colonial rule. He came to the highest office with a particular set of previous conditioning experiences. He probably knew as much about the French empire as the British, after his three-year involvement with
North Africa during the war, which had shown him how much damage imperial pretensions could do to a great power and how tiresome settler communities could be. Even before this, briefly at the CO in 1942 as parliamentary under-secretary, he had proposed an extraordinarily bold scheme for ‘buying out’ the European farmers of the Kenya ‘white highlands’ and repatriating most of them. Then, as chancellor of the Exchequer in the last months of the Eden government, he had taken the initiative for a reappraisal of overseas defence commitments (‘The future of the UK in world affairs’). Reviewing government expenditure as a whole, he took the line that if available resources were too small to go round, colonial development might have to be slowed down. As secretary of state for the colonies, Lennox-Boyd countered that it would be ‘a very serious step indeed’, causing acute embarrassment politically and economically in relations with colonies. Macmillan in reply (May 1956) agreed it would be serious, but ‘in our present economic situation, serious and unpalatable steps may have to be taken. I could not accept the view that Colonial development should in all circumstances be exempt from review’. Nor was he entirely happy about the level of the financial settlement made as Ghana approached independence.

When Macmillan became prime minister in January 1957, he wanted the entire colonial position reassessed as one of the first acts of his administration (1). As Morgan comments dryly, ‘whether he would have felt so had he moved directly from the Foreign Office rather than the Treasury is an interesting matter for speculation’. What is beyond doubt, however, is the rebuff given to his initiative by officials (2–3). As a result, any hopes Macmillan might have had of speeding up transfers of power in the colonies—other than Cyprus—were put on the back-burner for the next two years. His position was then enormously strengthened by an unexpectedly solid election victory in October 1959, after which the colonial empire unravelled instantly and without remission. In part that process was facilitated by the way he had actively encouraged further preparatory policy studies. In this sense, the two intervening years were not wasted years.

Macmillan’s chosen instrument for speeding up decolonisation from October 1959 was Iain Macleod, who, although aged only forty-six and without directly relevant experience, seemed to have the right kind of qualities for a task likely to be both difficult and controversial: ‘it would need a Minister of great imagination, even genius’. So did Lord Hailsham, the other possible candidate for the CO, but Macmillan disapproved of his unfortunate marital circumstances, even though Hailsham was not the guilty partner. It may also be noted in passing that he did not promote his son-in-law, Julian Amery, already in post as parliamentary under-secretary at the CO since November 1958, and this despite the fact that nepotism held no terrors for Macmillan. He thought Amery a skilful negotiator, having an ‘exceptional combination of patience and determination’. Amery was, however, a right-wing die-hard upholder of his father L S Amery’s vision of the geopolitical verities of empire and its need for fortress colonies (193, 194). Clearly this was not the kind of outlook Macmillan wished to see directing the CO. Instead, it is possible that he had earmarked Macleod for the post as early as May 1959. At least one MP noticed that from about this time Macleod began attending parliamentary debates on colonial and Commonwealth matters.

There were in all four secretaries of state for the colonies during the Macmillan years: Alan Lennox-Boyd (July 1954 to October 1959), Iain Macleod (October 1959 to
October 1961), Reginald Maudling (October 1961 to July 1962) and Duncan Sandys (July 1962 to October 1964). There were two secretaries of state for Commonwealth relations: Lord Home (April 1955 to July 1960) and Sandys (July 1960 to October 1964). Any ranking of these five key ministers would probably put Maudling at the bottom, despite his important contribution to independence for Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, simply because he occupied his office for a mere nine months. By contrast, Home spent five years at the CRO before taking over the FO in 1960 for three years, followed by one year as prime minister: a total of more than nine years—the nine crucial years, it may be argued—at the centre of policy-making during the ‘end of empire’. He was also a close and continuous confidant of Macmillan’s in a way none of the others ever was. The only other leading ‘overseas’ minister, in the later years at least, was R A Butler (home secretary, 1957–1962), put in charge of a Central Africa Office for eighteen months (March 1962 to October 1963), and then foreign secretary. Among the junior ministers, an especially active role was played by Lord Perth as minister of state at the CO for over five years, under three successive secretaries of state. Although he emerged from and returned to political obscurity, Perth made himself in these years useful by providing an element of informed continuity. Julian Amery during his two years at the CO made a distinctive if sometimes unsettling contribution, specialising on colonies where defence issues were involved.

All the five principal ministers of the inner group were strong characters. Lennox-Boyd was perceived as a dominant, exuberant, and quixotic personality, a right-winger, who got on well with colonial governors. Macleod also had plenty of confidence, was a fine orator and debater, quick, well-organised and often ingenious in decision-making, but many found him abrasive and even rude. (He was often in pain, caused by arthritis and ankylosing spondylitis.) Lord Salisbury’s jibe in March 1961 that he was ‘too clever by half’ proved to be damaging to Macleod’s reputation. By contrast, Maudling was more genial but much less good at public speaking. He was reckoned to be a centre-right Conservative. Despite a keen intellect, he was unfocused and perhaps too relaxed. Sandys was less clever, more ponderous, and more to the right politically than these two, but methodical, a tough and patient negotiator, forceful, and (as his permanent under-secretary admitted), ‘if necessary, brutal’. Some senior advisers, including the Chiefs of Staff, found him unnecessarily inconsiderate. Nehru remarked that Sandys reminded him of the sort of Englishman who used to put him in jail. Home was a shrewd, pleasant and competent administrator, who could be tough when necessary, and generally came to sound official conclusions whatever his private prejudices. As prime minister, he was less ‘presidential’—and less agitated or emotional—than Macmillan. There was undoubtedly serious incompatibility between him and Macleod. Home regarded Macleod as lacking in judgment to an alarming degree (‘he clearly believed Lumumba was the greatest man in Africa’), and thought he should have stuck to domestic politics. For his part, Macleod regarded Home an unregenerate traditionalist.

Each of these ministers in the last or penultimate phase of dismantling the empire had to work extremely hard. It was not uncommon for more than one constitutional conference to be taking place simultaneously. Sir Kennedy Trevaskis of Aden provides striking vignettes of Macleod and Sandys at work. Macleod he found preoccupied with the West Indies, Northern Rhodesia, East Africa, Mauritius and...
INTRODUCTION

Gambia. Trevaskis eventually got ten minutes with him to talk about Aden’s serious problems. Macleod was eating a sandwich, glancing at newspapers, and issuing instructions to his secretary on points in them: ‘he was like one of those international chess champions who think nothing of taking on a couple of dozen opponents at once. It was admirable, but seemed an odd way to wind up an empire’. Of Sandys, Trevaskis recalled that his appointments book ‘read like an imperial gazetteer’ and he ‘looked wan with fatigue . . . but not as wan as his red-eyed officials. He was beset by a host of crises—a revolt in Zanzibar, mutinies in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, near war in Cyprus . . . Rhodesia’.16

Macmillan became disillusioned with both his chosen CO lieutenants. Macleod revealed ‘many faults’, threatened resignation too often, was too proud, too emotional, too ambitious. And then to Macmillan’s astonishment, Maudling, replacing him, did not produce a ‘steadier’ atmosphere but proved to be ‘plus noir que les nègres, more difficult and intransigent than his predecessor’.17 Why did Macmillan come to think they were both moving too fast?

On the eve of his departure for his African tour, Macmillan told Sir Norman Brook: ‘Africans are not the problem in Africa, it is the Europeans who are the problem’ (497). Meeting settlers at first hand impressed upon Macmillan the strength of their views. The Africans could not be dominated permanently, but: ‘nor can the Europeans be abandoned’ (below, p liv). As decolonisation gathered momentum, Macmillan began to feel the Europeans were being lost sight of: ‘no-one seems to worry very much about the Europeans’ (124).18 More than once he reminded his ministers of Britain’s ‘moral obligation’ to the settlers. Macleod had to ease him along and persuade him that there was no such thing as a safe colonial policy. In retrospect, Macleod showed considerable understanding of the prime minister’s mind:

I think the difficulty with Harold Macmillan in relation to Africa was that he had all the right instincts, as his ‘Winds [sic] of Change’ speech showed quite clearly. He was more than prepared for a rapid move to independence—as his appointment of myself showed. But from time to time he wanted, as I daresay we all do, the best of both worlds, he didn’t want to fall out with his good friends either at home or in Central or East Africa as the case may be. Whereas, I took the brutal, but I think practical view that this was an omelette that you couldn’t make without breaking eggs and one couldn’t be friends with everybody however much one wanted to do it, while one was pursuing such a policy.19

This astute interpretation receives support from an American insight into Macmillan’s government (April 1963): ‘From a narrow national interest point of view they would probably prefer to get out [of Southern Rhodesia] as quickly as possible. However, as in the case of other dependent territories, they are showing a marked sense of responsibility and making persistent endeavours to work out pragmatically arrangements acceptable to the various elements concerned’.20

Of the civil servants, Norman Brook as secretary of the Cabinet, and, by 1957, with ten years’ experience behind him, was already an olympian figure, able to offer the prime minister magisterial advice until the very end of 1962, when he was succeeded by his deputy, Burke Trend, from January 1963. Brook was closely involved in the production of many of the major reports and surveys; Trend ran the Africa Committee. In the CO, the permanent under-secretaryship in this period was divided
(at August 1959) between Sir John Macpherson and Sir Hilton Poynton, while Sir John Martin was deputy under-secretary of state throughout, jointly with Sir William Gorell Barnes between 1959 and 1963. Macpherson had returned to the CO after being governor (and governor-general) of Nigeria, 1948 to 1955, an experience which gave a hard-edged practicality to his recommendations. Poynton was clever, but did not get on with Macleod and was perceived as a patrician civil servant of the old school; so was Martin in many ways, but more balanced and open-minded. Gorell Barnes had a good brain but was thought to be tactless. Among the assistant under-secretaries, Leslie Monson became especially prominent, in charge of East and Central Africa from 1959. By contrast, one of the radical high-flyers of the period before 1951, John Bennett, was in effect side-lined, being shuffled around a rapid succession of the less active CO departments and then denied all further promotion for the last twenty-five years of his career.

The three permanent under-secretaries of the CRO—Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Sir Percivale Liesching and Sir Saville (Joe) Garner—were all formidable and highly experienced. Laithwaite transferred from the India Office and had been high commissioner in Pakistan. Liesching had served in Canada, South Africa and Australia, as well as in the Board of Trade and Ministry of Food: an unflinching, lucid realist. Garner had served in India and Canada, married an American wife, and loved skiing; in retirement he wrote an important semi-autobiographical history of the Commonwealth Office.

The governors who loomed largest in the Whitehall limelight were those who took a radical stance: Hugh Foot and Richard Turnbull. Foot was a left-winger of Quaker education, who as governor of Cyprus (1957–1960) helped to achieve a settlement there, though he felt he disagreed with Lennox-Boyd about almost everything. As the British permanent representative to the UN, he had an even more fundamental disagreement with Poynton, and increasingly found government policy on Rhodesia unacceptable. He resigned in October 1962 (below p lxii). He came into his own again under the Labour government of 1964. Turnbull in Tanganyika was widely recognised as a powerful and robust figure, performing for East African decolonisation a role comparable with that of Sir Charles Arden-Clarke ten years earlier for West Africa. Tanganyika seemed a model of how to transfer power: swift, smooth, peaceful and apparently amicable. Like Foot, Turnbull was a rowing fanatic; unlike him, he had an earthy streak, which showed itself, for example, in teaching his parrot to swear roundly before reciting the Lord’s Prayer. Turnbull provides a notable case of a governor who seized the initiative and who was able decisively to speed up the timetable. Reassessments by new governors were in any case always eagerly awaited, not least Sir Charles Johnston’s for Aden in 1961 (199). The post of high commissioner in South Africa was the most demanding of the ‘ambassadorial’ appointments, and it was filled with great panache by a former academic town-planning expert, Sir John Maud, for four years (January 1959 to December 1962). His despatches were among the best received from the periphery during this period, full of caustic insight into the evils of the apartheid regime (462, 479).

Although the Cabinet was the final arbiter in all matters, many of the most important decisions for the colonies were hammered out in its specialist sub-committees. The Colonial Policy Committee was for Macmillan’s first few months chaired by the lord president of the Council, Lord Salisbury. Its members were the lord chancellor, the foreign secretary, the secretaries of state for Commonwealth
relations and for the colonies, and the minister of defence. The prime minister attended for Cyprus business. After Salisbury’s resignation over the release of Archbishop Makarios, from April 1957 the chair was taken by the lord chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, the lord president no longer attending. Macmillan was not an admirer of Kilmuir, and the Committee tended to get bogged down on Cyprus and Malta. Towards the end of 1958, Macmillan took over the chairmanship himself (554) and ensured that it reviewed constitutional developments more widely. Behind it was an official committee (ie, a committee made up entirely of officials), which declined rapidly in importance after its heroic work in 1957 on Macmillan’s ‘profit and loss account’, and with the setting up from mid-May 1957 of an official Africa Committee under Burke Trend. (This was after the FO had protested about the ‘insufficiently interdepartmental’ way Africa was being dealt with.) The Africa Committee rapidly gained in significance. In July 1962, with decolonisation well advanced, the Colonial Policy Committee was converted into the Oversea Policy Committee, to provide a more international overview; its parallel official committee took on the functions of the Africa Committee (97). The OPC was chaired by the prime minister; its members were the first secretary of state (Butler), the foreign secretary, the Commonwealth secretary (Sandys, also representing the CO), the minister of defence and the chancellor of the Exchequer. The higher-level nature of the new committee is evident in the presence of the chancellor, who had not sat on the CPC. Then in October 1963 the Defence Committee was wound up and its functions, together with those of the OPC, were amalgamated into a single Defence and Oversea Policy Committee.

Reasonably good working relations appear to have been established between the CO and CRO over transitions to independence (88, 89), though there was always a certain amount of rivalry, and the CRO sometimes would have liked more information, particularly about the economic circumstances of territories coming its way. The High Commission Territories (Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland) were transferred from the CRO to the CO as a consequence of South Africa’s departure from the Commonwealth in 1961. Macmillan was not entirely happy about this but saw no alternative.21 It occurred to him that a possible reverse transfer of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from the CO to the CRO might be made, partly as a quid pro quo, and partly as a means of resolving the tensions between the two departments in their joint handling of the Central African Federation. Brook, however, convincingly disabused him of this idea, stressing that it would be read as shifting the balance of sympathies too much in favour of the Europeans (94). Instead, Brook proposed an entirely new Central Africa Office. This was duly established, to great surprise within the Federation and opposition from Sir Evelyn Hone, the governor of Northern Rhodesia (96). Butler took charge and, as intended, reduced the pressure on the prime minister, who had found himself at the centre of repeated disagreements. It is a good illustration of how a neat and simple solution can sometimes be found to a bureaucratic nightmare, even if a little late in the day.

An amalgamation of the CO and CRO seemed in principle to make sense, with Brook being among the first to point out the desirability of getting rid of the term ‘colonial’. Neither office was keen to lose its identity before it had to.22 Sounding out Commonwealth governments through the high commissioners in 1959 only further discouraged the idea for the moment: they felt the existence of a separate CRO was proof of the importance attached to the Commonwealth, and if this ‘retrograde’ step were taken, their governments might bypass the new combined office and deal direct
with the FO instead (90). The prime minister concluded in 1960 that merger was as yet premature. However, the overall situation had altered so much by the end of 1962 that Macmillan was then willing to accept the principle of amalgamation. What he absolutely rejected was a merger between the CRO and FO as the supposedly two ‘diplomatic’ departments; it would be ‘political dynamite’ (98). Sandys took over responsibility for the CO as well as the CRO in July 1962. As the territories for which the CO was responsible shrank dramatically in number, the attractions of amalgamation grew. Poynton was determined that the CO should not be side-lined as a mere ‘rocks and islands’ department (99). The two offices were eventually amalgamated in 1966.

By this time in any case, a lot of the functions the CO performed for the smaller territories had already been transferred, at first to the new Department of Technical Co-operation, set up in 1961 in order to co-ordinate and expand all the government’s activities in this growing field (92, 93, 346). Ministers soon thought it needed glamorising (43); it was transmuted by the new Labour government of October 1964 into a new Ministry of Overseas Development, under Sir Andrew Cohen as the first permanent under-secretary.

Other proposed administrative innovations were abortive. The CO turned down as unnecessary a suggestion to appoint its own minister for aid; the Development Policy Committee provided enough co-ordination.23 Brook urged the CO to start a planning section like the one run by Peter Ramsbotham in the FO. Poynton would not agree, reflecting a general scepticism in the CO about ‘thinking departments’ divorced from practical responsibilities; in any case everything in Africa was changing so fast that any policy projections would soon be invalidated. A suggestion for a ‘commissioner-general for Africa’ (parallel to the commissioner-general for South-East Asia) was also ruled out, as too difficult and unnecessary.24 A proposal from Malcom MacDonald (high commissioner in India) for an aid co-ordinator in South-East Asia was rejected (341, 345).

For the Colonial Service, the main event of these years was the finalisation of the arrangements for the new Overseas Civil Service after protracted planning since 1956.25 The idea was to reassure officers who might feel they were working themselves out of a job and to ensure administrative continuity through transfers of power. The substantive issue surfacing in 1957 was anticipating administrative breakdown in Nigeria. The Treasury submitted to CO and CRO pressure to try to ensure that a reasonable number of officers stayed on after independence (82). The alternative might be a disastrous collapse. Moreover, as Home argued the case, ‘today trade follows the technical adviser and administrator, just as in the past it followed the flag’ (83). However, at this juncture the emphasis was on getting a fair deal for civil servants. In the event, decent compensation proved to act as a disincentive to staying on. Macmillan decisively intervened, helping Macleod to expedite a solution. A ‘new approach’ was adopted in July 1960, enabling as many expatriates as possible to continue in post, the cost of the excess of their emoluments over those of locally recruited officers being borne by the British government. This cost was estimated at about £24 million a year. The chancellor of the Exchequer was anxious about such a substantial new expense, but accepted that offsetting pension savings could reduce the apparent cost significantly, while he could not deny the need to give high priority to good administration in newly independent countries (85, 86). A survey was made in August 1960 asking governors for their opinion of the new scheme. The response
was generally favourable, the only sour reply coming from Sir William Goode of North Borneo (87). As enacted, the Overseas Service Aid Act (1961) was essentially a scheme of technical assistance, in that it helped developing countries to secure and retain experienced staff from overseas by giving them direct financial help.

High policy planning and surveys
The Macmillan government is notable for the large number of policy studies it produced, most of them initiated by the prime minister himself, starting with ‘Future constitutional development in the colonies’, 1957. Barely two weeks after taking office, Macmillan called for an analysis of progress towards independence, and ‘something like a profit and loss account’ for each colony; he wanted to know whether Britain stood to lose or gain by its departure (1). It is probable that he saw the exercise as moving in tandem with the defence review entrusted to Sandys. (The prime minister asked for a ‘Chequers weekend’ discussion in late February to take account at least of the strategic aspects of colonial constitutional development; the CO refused to co-operate, since the information by then available would be incomplete.) In the event the assembling of the analysis was so complex that the process could not be finalised within the time-scale Macmillan had envisaged, with Cabinet consideration perhaps in June 1957. The main CO paper (2), co-ordinated by Ian Watt (an assistant secretary) was ready in May. CO ministers praised it highly: ‘this is a stupendous job—splendidly done’ (Lord Perth), ‘a magnificent achievement on which all who have worked so hard in the Department deserve the highest possible praise’ (Lennox-Boyd). The secretary of state thought it both comprehensive and realistic, and said later that he constantly referred to it. Governors were not consulted, the permanent under-secretary taking the view that it was ‘best not to alarm them by the knowledge that this exercise is being conducted.’

Moreover, Brook, in a remarkable piece of bureaucratic obfuscation, began to argue that the whole purpose of the reappraisal was simply information-gathering; the prime minister was not concerned to evaluate or write off colonies in order to save money. Officials like Watt himself and Sir Frank Lee of the Treasury dismissed this tendentious briefing with a pinch of salt. Brook further played down the exercise by advising the prime minister that Cabinet discussion was not required after all, since any policy decision would require special consideration in the light of each local situation. Macmillan—perhaps disappointed that the result was not more supportive of his presuppositions—agreed that circulating the reports would suffice.

The thrust of the officials’ argument (2, 3) was that withdrawing from colonies might produce some modest financial saving but would be discreditable where it was not dangerous, and not only for strategic reasons. They advanced four reservations. The first was a worry about withdrawal of British authority from multi-racial communities, especially Kenya, Fiji, and Mauritius, where the presence of Indian immigrants was, after all, entirely Britain’s responsibility. The second was a warning that withdrawal might lead to a vacuum into which other powers would move: France into Gambia and Sierra Leone, Yemen into Aden, Greece, Turkey or even Egypt into Cyprus, Indonesia into Borneo, the United States into Guiana, Guatemala into Honduras, and Argentina into the Falklands. British prestige would be damaged, and the risk of communism would then be increased. The third reservation was concern that trusteeship obligations would be repudiated. Where international reputation, strategic requirements or global prestige could not be said to be at stake,
the officials raised the objection of ‘moral abdication’. This was held to operate for Seychelles, Mauritius, the Solomons, and Gilbert & Ellice Islands; the last two indeed could be expected to ‘revert to a primitive mode’ of chaos and barbarism. Finally there was a risk that an expanding South Africa might use the opportunity of British withdrawals to take over the High Commission Territories, the two Rhodesias, and even Tristan da Cuhna, all of which would be equally bad for the inhabitants and for British prestige and moral standing. (Fear of the spread of apartheid seems to have been as great as fear of communism.) In short, massive, not to say fanciful, objections were raised to reducing British colonial commitments. Indeed, the response was even more negative than a similar exercise (though on a much smaller scale) undertaken by the FO in 1952, when at least the Falkland Island Dependencies were identified as a possible sacrifice. Now the Falklands were clearly marked out for retention (because abandonment of the British population to the fate of Argentinian rule ‘would be discreditable and severely damaging to prestige’); while the Falkland Island Dependencies were said to be an important base for Antarctic research, the loss of which would contribute to damaging British prestige and influence, ‘especially in scientific circles’.

However, what is significant here is that no economic or strategic objections were advanced as a general bar to constitutional progress. Even in territories where the strategic requirements were reckoned to be large, it was forecast that the government might for political reasons be forced to reduce their military expectations. Officials recognised that much would depend on policies pursued after independence, because the economic and financial implications of the grant of independence did not flow from the grant itself; the maintenance of goodwill and friendship was therefore the vital thing. The conclusion of the whole matter was, then, as far as economic factors were concerned, that the officials pronounced a nihil obstat. And accordingly they highlighted the salience of political considerations and prestige calculations.

As to the other main issue, progress towards independence, two themes emerged strongly. One was scepticism about the speed of advance in Nigeria. The Gold Coast had ‘set a pace too fast’ for Nigeria, and the prospects for the latter’s future under self-government seemed doubtful. But there could be no turning back. The other theme was the identification of East Africa as the pivotal area for future constitutional planning, caught as it was—or so the officials argued—between Islamic instability and Soviet expansion moving potentially southwards, with South African expansion and apartheid moving potentially northwards, and possibly even Indian expansion moving potentially westwards. Local internal nationalism would be growing all the time.

In the summer of 1958 another major officials’ report emerged, ‘The position of the United Kingdom in world affairs’ (5), in which Brook completed an initiative for which Macmillan had been mainly responsible before he became prime minister. Although there were several departmental submissions, the FO draft by Ramsbotham formed the core of it. The CO insisted (once again) that its obligations should not be abandoned (‘to do this anywhere would undermine confidence and imperil our policy everywhere’), and Brook was (once again) sympathetic; he also played up the Commonwealth. The CO were pleased with the final report: ‘an excellent and well thought out paper’, which suited them nicely. Lennox-Boyd found it a ‘worthwhile document, especially paras 16, 21 and 22’. On the other hand, the Treasury did not
like the prospect of ‘some immediate but limited expenditure in support of colonial and Commonwealth commitments’. The report concluded that there was no scope for reducing overseas commitments on the scale required, nor could further major defence cuts be contemplated.

In receiving this report, Macmillan decided he wanted officials to look further ahead, over the next ten years, and to make a comprehensive study of total resources in relation to total overseas commitments. Thus the ‘Future policy study, 1960-1970’ was designed as a large-scale planning exercise which might become a blueprint for whichever government took office after the general election in October 1959. Sir Patrick Dean (deputy under-secretary of state at the FO) was put in charge. Lennox-Boyce supported it: ‘I am strongly in favour of this and think that such a wide-ranging study will be of great value to the members of a new administration’. Into it were fed not only the ‘position of the UK’ report, but despatches from Malcolm MacDonald on India (eg, 7), and correspondence about the South-West Pacific (9, 10). The CRO submitted a major new survey of the Commonwealth (11), the Treasury an analysis of ‘economic strength’, and the FO a paper on Anglo-American relations (13). Of these the most contentious was the Commonwealth paper, even in its revised form. The CO (14) and the FO considered that claims for the value of the Commonwealth had been over-pitched by the CRO. Surely the Americans did not listen to Britain because of the Commonwealth? (para 31). Surely Britain was not a spokesman for the Commonwealth? And if it was economically ‘good business’ (para 32), surely this did not depend on its cohesion as a political entity?

The basic premise of the report was gloomy: that during the 1960s Britain’s relative power would certainly decline. Its fundamental conclusion was therefore that the preservation of the Atlantic alliance was ‘the core of our foreign policy’ and ‘in the last resort, the most basic of our interests’. The study was emphatic that the first, the ultimate, aim of British policy in the 1960s would be to check the growing power of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The implications of this conclusion were perceived with succinct clarity by Ramsbotham: ‘United Kingdom power will thus be founded on United States partnership, buttressed by Western European solidarity (we hope), and usable through the instrument of the Commonwealth’.

Integration with Europe was certainly seen as a possible alternative to the Atlantic alliance; but no more than that. As Dean put it: ‘I am concerned that we should not lightly consider throwing away the bird-in-the-hand of the Anglo-United States interdependence and special relationship for the as yet bird-in-the-bush plan for much closer association, leading perhaps to integration, with Western Europe’. The British ambassador to France, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, could not persuade him that it was ‘later than you think’ and not too soon for the European option to be more fully thought out.

The CO felt this important and inevitably complicated exercise had been handled very efficiently by Dean and the permanent under-secretaries. They thought ‘a fascinating set of papers’ had been assembled; they were especially impressed by the Treasury paper, which was unexpectedly sympathetic to increasing the amount of aid. Carstairs (one of the assistant under-secretaries of state, who had a philosophical turn of mind) contributed two criticisms of the draft report: successfully urging that a clearer statement of fundamental objectives was needed, but less successfully trying to inject some traditional trusteeship doctrines.
countries’, which Macmillan wanted kept separate (117). This examination of the validity of the Westminster model of government was organised by Brook, relying chiefly on FO advice. Unfortunately the FO took two years to produce its paper, and when it did so, neither the CRO nor the CO liked it (25–27). Meanwhile, the CO was conducting its own investigation into the reasons for the apparent failure of democratic parliamentary institutions (28). This whole debate resonated within the cold war context, validating the idea that post-independence deviations from the Westminster model should be viewed tolerantly. Stable and popular government was what mattered, and it was probably at least as important to make ‘these countries less backward as to make them democratic’. In any case, whatever doubts there were about the Westminster model, theorising seemed to CO officials to be largely irrelevant. It would be quite impracticable to offer an alternative, since this would be resented by emerging nations themselves (25). Only Swaziland rejected the model from the outset.

‘Africa in the next ten years’ was a report prepared early in 1959 by officials of the Africa Committee working under its chairman Burke Trend of the Cabinet Office (20). It provided an interdepartmental view as well as a basis for ministerial talks with, and persuasion of, the Americans and Canadians (November 1959) (22), and the French (December 1959). Its central thesis was as follows:

If Western governments appear to be reluctant to concede independence to their dependent territories, they may alienate African opinion and turn it towards the Soviet Union; if on the other hand they move too fast they run the risk of leaving large areas of Africa ripe for Communist exploitation.

By thus starkly demonstrating how policy was impaled on the horns of a dilemma, the paper undoubtedly sent a very clear cautionary message to ministers. When officials discussed their draft report, they felt the emphasis on defence might seem rather heavy, but in the last resort it was difficult to define British interests in Africa in other than strategic terms, which seemed likely to remain strong for the next decade. They had in mind particularly the need for over-flying rights to ensure communications to the Persian Gulf and South-East Asia. They also addressed the South African problem. Although they felt that on balance South Africa would probably still be in the Commonwealth through the 1960s, it was fundamentally important not to be thought identifying with its policies.42

The US State Department received the paper as ‘a very fine intelligence document’, ‘remarkably perceptive’. The Americans did not wish to dissent from it, although they could have wished for something more specific on future policy.43 The French also found it ‘excellent and comprehensive’, if rather too optimistic in tone; perhaps a more catastrophic view should be taken in the light of the Congo?44 The prime minister’s personal advisers were much less indulgent. Tim Bligh (principal private secretary) thought it only quite good, but not very original and not very profound about many of the fundamental questions. De Zulueta (the foreign affairs private secretary) was unimpressed. Unfortunately, perhaps, he secured Macmillan’s signature to his critique, which was neither well-informed (his views on Indirect Rule and on the kabaka of Buganda were obviously out of date) nor realistic (Africa was ‘one of the few parts of the world in which European powers still have direct influence’). In reply, Lennox-Boyd attempted politely to put the prime minister
straight (21). But the prime minister’s request for further investigation was readily conceded. Moreover, Macmillan in March 1960 authorised a South-East Asian counterpart, modelled upon it, as an off-shoot of the ‘Future policy study’. A committee chaired by Sir R Scott (formerly commissioner-general for South-East Asia) reported in October 1960: ‘Future development and policy in South-East Asia’.45

The ‘wind of change’ speech takes its place in the sequence of key state-papers and policy declarations (32). The idea of an African tour was entirely Macmillan’s own, one which came to him after the 1959 election victory. Africa, he explained to Brook, seemed to be the biggest problem ‘looming up for us here at home’:

We just succeeded at the General Election in ‘getting by’ on this. But young people of all Parties are uneasy and uncertain of our moral basis. Something must be done to lift Africa on to a more national plane as a problem to the solution of which we must all contribute, not out of spite—like the Observer and New Statesman—and not out of complacency—but by some really imaginative effort.

Undertaking a journey immediately after Christmas would bring this African problem ‘into the centre of affairs’. Brook was to be sure to tell him if this was a bad idea, ‘but I have the feeling that it might be a good idea and just get something moving in what seems [to be a] log-jam of ideas’. Macmillan’s original plan was to start the tour in the Union, and of course if the South African government would not receive him then the whole thing would probably be called off.46 In fact Verwoerd was not averse to the visit, but the sequence had to be reversed, with the Union coming last. This was mainly because South African MPs would not reconvene until mid-January. Macmillan himself had not intended to visit the High Commission Territories, but Maud persuaded him that this would be a mistake, since it would be interpreted as lack of interest in them.

The general preparation of the speeches for the tour was begun by Bligh, who set out some suggested themes which were then considered by various CO departments, who submitted drafts to the prime minister’s office for co-ordination and refinement. The Ghana draft, forwarded by Poynton, was largely the work of High Commissioner Arthur Snelling and, in the CO, of O H Morris and J H Robertson. C G Eastwood (an assistant under-secretary of state) revised the collective CO advice that the prime minister should be ‘a man in a hurry’ in Africa into an exhortation to ‘remember the pace of change in Africa’. (The CRO brief made a similar plea: ‘in the face of the rising flood of African nationalism the pace at which we have to move becomes very delicate’.) Gorell Barnes (deputy under-secretary of state) counselled the prime minister against referring to a time-table: ‘we are not on the run, with our dependencies pace-making; we are discharging our obligations in a conscientious and orderly manner’. The Nyasaland speech was drafted in the high commissioner’s office at Salisbury and, unsurprisingly, was badly received in the CO. It seemed too supportive of Sir Roy Welensky (federal prime minister) and the Federation, too committed to a limited franchise and slower African progress. As Perth complained, such an emphasis could only spread ‘alarm and despondency’ in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Radical redrafting was therefore undertaken, by Perth himself.47

The preparation of the crucial keynote speech to the South African parliament in Cape Town was entrusted to Maud, since he seemed to have mastered the knack of speaking forcefully to Afrikaners without mortally offending them. Macmillan’s
directive to Maud was that he ‘must philosophise but not attack’. In two discussions with Maud on 14 December 1959, when they planned the outlines of the speech, Macmillan said he believed ‘there was a very strong demand’ in Britain that he should ‘indicate that the vast majority of people in this country did not agree with the Union government’s policy on apartheid…he must really try to find some phrase which indicated a critical approach’. It would be fruitless to tell them that we did not approve of apartheid, but criticism could be expressed in terms of how Britain dealt with not dissimilar problems; South Africa was not the only state grappling with racial diversity. Maud agreed this would be an excellent approach; necessary courtesies must be observed, but they were after all dealing, in Maud’s view, with a police-state run by Transvaal thugs; the main objective would be to get them to be less ostrich-like, and look at themselves against the background of the world as a whole. Maud emphasised the theme that ‘the stage was still being set in Africa as to whether the forces of nationalism would be harnessed for or against Communism’. This theme was built into the speech, and the records also show clearly that the sentence which came at its climax was a revision worded by Maud. This was the unequivocal statement that there were some aspects of South African policies which made it impossible to support them ‘without being false to our own deep convictions about the political destinies of free men, to which in our own territories we are trying to give effect’.

Meanwhile, Home had asked the former high commissioner in South Africa, Sir Evelyn Baring, to think of themes which would help to create a more emollient atmosphere. Baring helpfully suggested references to Scotland, the Afrikaans language, pioneers, and accomplishments in farming and industry. Maud consulted his deputy, Jack Johnston, despite having to produce a first draft at speed. This went to the CRO, then back to the prime minister’s secretaries and to Brook. The CO was simply shown the resultant draft at the end of December. The reaction there was decidedly favourable: ‘this is a clever speech’ (O H Morris); ‘very good and courageous, if possibly a little long’ (Eastwood); ‘goes further than might have been expected in the direction that we in the CO would wish it to take’ (J H Robertson). Robertson reported to Bligh how relieved the CO was that a good deal would be said about the Afro-Asian Commonwealth and the way in which South Africa was an embarrassment to Britain: ‘I have been asked to say to you that if the prime minister had not felt able to take this sort of line when he was in South Africa, we think the repercussions in many colonial territories might have been serious’. Indeed, the underlying sub-text of the speech as a whole was that South Africa was a liability to the West in the geopolitical context of the all-important battle against communism. This battle required coming to terms with the rising tide of African national consciousness: ‘the wind of change is blowing through this continent’.

The famous phrase occurred only about a third of the way into the speech. It was first used on 9 January in the Ghana speech, following a reference to states which had recently achieved independence, and those who were about to do so, Togoland, Somaliland and Mali: ‘the wind of change is blowing through British East and Central Africa and through the Belgian Congo’. It attracted little attention, but someone in Macmillan’s entourage thought it worth repeating, and inserted it at the last moment into the Cape Town speech. Who this was is not entirely certain. Two members of the party, John Wyndham (one of the private secretaries) and Tim Bligh,
both later disclaimed any knowledge of the phrase’s genesis (which might be thought almost to prove neither of them was responsible). On the other hand, the CRO’s D W S Hunt (later Sir David) did claim to be the ‘author’. It may well be that Hunt made the insertion into the Cape Town speech, but the phrase itself belongs to a section of the Ghana speech apparently written by J H Robertson before 15 December. Robertson was allowed to accompany the prime minister in order specifically to help with the finalisation of his speeches.

The address was received by the South African parliament in silence, with only a mild titter where laughter was expected. The Opposition and the Africans were, however, jubilant, and no-one could deny its impact. From the British point of view it was a triumph (444). Maud commented privately and at once that ‘the whole thing will have done untold good out here’. His considered judgment was that it made the visit ‘probably the most important event in South Africa since 1948’, for, as Hunt declared, the speech was the visit (444). Back in Whitehall, a planned declaration on British colonial policy was finally abandoned, Sir Alexander Clutterbuck explaining to the CRO: ‘we now have the Cape Town speech as our *locus classicus*, and no-one can say that our broad policy is not known to the world’ (34). In the CO, it was seized upon by John Bennett (who had long urged the need for a faster and more radical approach to decolonisation) as ‘an important speech . . . one of the most noteworthy statements of United Kingdom policy about Africa and the developing Commonwealth which has been made in recent years’. At his insistence copies were transmitted to all governors, thus underlining the status of the speech as a definitive guide to government thinking. Brook reported to the Cabinet that the prime minister was generally thought to have been both courteous and courageous.

Within weeks the phrase ‘wind of change’ entered the discourse of decolonisation, quoted and appealed to by ministers, proconsuls and officials alike. Macleod invoked it (147). Home referred to it (40: and p liv below). Macmillan mournfully quoted it against himself when South Africa left the Commonwealth (‘the wind of change has blown us away’).

In order to establish the exact significance of the speech in the evolution of British policy towards its own colonies, we may observe that nowhere did it employ the old well-worn slogans about multi-racialism and partnership (in the idiomatic Central African sense). Instead, it endorsed the term ‘non-racial’ which had been used by the foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, at the UN General Assembly on 17 September 1959, ‘our policy is non-racial’. The term seems rather suddenly to have come into use during 1959, Maud using it in connection with Swaziland in February; it was also applied to Basutoland (December 1958: 478), Kenya (20 & 116 n 3), Tanganyika (141) and Zanzibar (116). Macmillan’s speech gave it greater prominence.

Importantly too, the speech meshed in with the new clarity of thought which Macleod brought to colonial policy from October 1959. For Macleod, the ‘real problem’ at the heart of all his challenges, was East-Central Africa, especially Kenya (31, 35). ‘The final test of our policies’ would come in Kenya, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia (35). The basic difficulty was ‘to achieve an orderly transfer of power to the Africans without losing the confidence of the Europeans’ (37). The overriding consideration was to make sure East Africa did not become sympathetic to the Sino-Soviet cause. The speed of advance was driven by events, ‘above all in the Congo’ (160). Macleod’s Cabinet memorandum of 3 January 1961 (36) contains his well-known statement that he had tried to ‘define the pace of British colonial policy
in Africa as “not as fast as the Congo and not as slow as Algeria”’. He invited his colleagues to recognise that ‘pressure from the United Nations, now that Belgium and France are dropping out as colonial powers, will increasingly concentrate on us’.

An officials’ interdepartmental paper in August 1961 firmly returned the focus to the cold war context. Africa was a ‘target in the east–west struggle’ and policy-makers must always remember the need to keep it out of the communist camp. Over-flying rights still seemed essential for the maintenance of the British position in the world. But much the most effective policy was ‘to disengage, to leave the Africans alone, to advise and help only when our advice and help is asked for’ (39).

The main policy surveys of the early 1960s were concerned with the expansion of the Commonwealth and the future of the smaller colonial territories, those too small to aspire to realistic independence. The notable report prepared by officials under John Chadwick (an assistant under-secretary, CRO) in April 1962 reflected the progress made with decolonisation (544). And then a most important CO survey produced in September 1963 showed that although there were still forty British dependent territories, independence was the proclaimed goal for twenty-four of them. These were expected to get it by 1965, though no date could as yet be given for the High Commission Territories. This left sixteen small territories, most of which could probably find their future within a UN category of ‘free association’ with Britain, allowing them internal autonomy. The CO pondered whether a ‘general act of decolonisation’ could be made by 1965. Everyone seemed to agree this was neither possible nor wise, and that no general solution could be proposed for colonies whose status was so diverse. The CO believed, however, that these sixteen colonies could all make significant political advances (46). The survey was tested on other departments and no substantial modifications resulted, so the paper held the field for the remainder of the life of the Conservative government (47–49).

As prime minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home* in Canada in February 1964 proclaimed ‘the virtual end of the process of decolonisation’, making a ritual reference to its beginnings in the Durham Report of 1839. ‘Colonialism is nearly at an end’ and it was time to take up the challenge of other problems (389). And Duncan Sandys announced to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting on 8 July 1964, ‘we have no desire to prolong our colonial obligations for a day longer than is necessary’ (52). These pronouncements were as near as the Conservative government came to a formal declaration of the ‘end of empire’.

Defence policy and strategy
Macmillan’s desire for a defence policy combining maximum effectiveness with minimum cost was speedily delivered by Sandys as minister of defence. The 1957 Defence White Paper60 was a rigorous reappraisal which arose directly out of Macmillan’s cognitions as chancellor of the Exchequer and before that as minister of defence himself. He commissioned Sandys to secure substantial savings in costs and manpower. In the last five years defence had been absorbing ten per cent per annum of GNP, and the aim was to get it down to seven per cent by 1962. The priority given to the nuclear deterrent was upgraded (perhaps reflecting disillusionment over the

* Lord Home had renounced his peerage in order to become prime minister from 18 October 1963.
reliability of the United States in the Suez Crisis). Consequent upon this, the end of National Service (conscription) was decreed for 1962, together with reductions in the size of the Navy and RAF Fighter Command. For the remaining all-volunteer (regular) conventional forces, mobility was to be the key doctrine. Presented to the Cabinet as a five-year plan amounting to ‘a fundamental revolution in our defence policy’ (53), the new policy stopped short of questioning the need for a global role. The government believed it was important to remain a nuclear power, in order to have the maximum influence on world affairs. The cuts, however, were deep, and the huge reduction in manpower (to 375,000) was bound to make sustained counter-insurgency operations problematic. British army strength in the colonies was slashed by almost two-thirds. A settlement in Cyprus was now urgently required. To the extent that calculations about the feasibility of continuing to hold on to colonies by force were integral to decisions to transfer power, the new defence policy can be said to have contributed to decolonisation. Lennox-Boyd was especially anxious about the naval cuts (54).

The 1957 principles were superseded by the White Paper of 1962. Once again the review was initiated by the prime minister, in a directive of October 1961 calling for the preparation of a new strategy for the 1960s, setting forth the objectives and likely limitations (66). The aim was to keep defence costs within seven per cent of GNP (one-third of government expenditure), which meant reducing overseas costs by £35 million a year. Although the government’s commitment to the nuclear deterrent remained firm (42), the balance was deliberately shifted towards conventional forces, and towards reliance on sea-borne and air-borne forces (67). Defence Minister Harold Watkinson told the Chiefs of Staff he was looking for a change of image: ‘I wish this image to be one of highly mobile, well-equipped forces, with a touch of the swashbuckling of the first Elizabeth’s forces about them’. Perhaps, he added, ‘in modern times, it must be more like Dan Dare’ and less like the public’s conception of Whitehall-bred warriors.*

The perennial problem of rising defence costs was examined again in February 1963 (69). Ministers seemed inclined to prefer to reduce commitments in Europe rather than East of Suez. But they wondered whether oil might not flow without bases, and whether Kuwait might not be encouraged to look more to self-defence. Burdens in the Far East could only be reduced by curtailing political commitments to Malaysia. In the context of a decision about aircraft carriers in July 1963, the chancellor, Maudling, insisted ‘a healthy economy was as important in the worldwide struggle against Communism as military forces’ (72), thus echoing the kind of warnings made by chancellors right back to the 1930s.

By the summer of 1963 the minister of defence, Peter Thorneycroft, summarised the three pillars of the existing strategy on which defence planning was based: ‘a contribution to the forces of NATO, the preservation of an independent nuclear deterrent, and the provision of a continuing military presence East of Suez’. It was clear to him at any rate that the government could not abandon any of these, though in due course the European burden might be scaled down. Chancellor Maudling accepted this, but questioned how vital the ‘third pillar’ was (72). Macmillan

---

*A space-age clean-limbed comic-strip figure in The Eagle, a famous boys’ comic, edited by a clergyman.
certainly felt there was room for argument about the levels of military capacity in the Middle East and Far East: the commitment to the external defence of Malaysia by maintaining forces at Singapore need not be a long-term one, particularly if a political understanding could be arrived at with Indonesia; and they would need to consider whether the threat of force in Aden to protect oil supplies would become increasingly less effective.\textsuperscript{63} Politically, though, the Cabinet agreed that there was no scope for an early reduction of anything: better to reduce in the future than to take over-large risks now.

How then were strategic interests in the Middle and Far East conceived? For the Middle East (including the Persian Gulf), it was commonly understood that the principal British concern was economic: to secure the flow of oil, and on ‘remunerative commercial terms’ (71). It followed that the other aims were: (a) minimising or containing Soviet penetration (since several countries had borders with Russia) (55), (b) maintaining the stability of the region, or ensuring that if there was change it should be peaceful change, (c) keeping open the direct sea-route to the Far East, via the Suez Canal, and (d) preventing unified Arab control of oil.\textsuperscript{64} The region was perceived as one in which Egypt’s unfriendly Col Gamal Abdel Nasser loomed all too large, an area which, if left to its own devices, would become ‘a jungle of smash-and-grab’ (77).

Kuwait was the largest oil-producing state. Its oil was also the cheapest in the world to produce, so its importance to Britain was paramount. It was, however, under mounting threat from its neighbour Iraq after the Iraqi revolution of 14 July 1958, when a coup by General Qasim overthrew the anglophile Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad, murdering the king and the prime minister. The British government hoped this new regime might be usefully anti-Nasser, but its growing reliance on the Communist Party and its sabre-rattling towards Kuwait created a dilemma. A batch of papers (57–59) in the early summer of 1959 analysed the position in the Gulf and Kuwait. The defence of Kuwait was the central issue. Home warned that action against Iraq ‘could mean the break-up of the Commonwealth as we at present know it’ (58). Suspicions of an intervention by Qasim were seized upon by the Defence Committee as real evidence that the threat to Kuwait had become imminent by July 1961. An expedition was launched. Qasim backed down. Brook was critical of the government’s action: ‘we are still pursuing our traditional policy of extracting oil concessions from an autocratic Ruler in return for military protection. I doubt whether this policy is realistic in the circumstances of today’.\textsuperscript{65} Realistic or not, while Iraq kept up its claim, the vulnerability of Kuwait continued to be a stumbling-block for Britain (68). In March 1963 the diplomat Lord Hood declared that Kuwait remained ‘the lynchpin of British interests in the Middle East’.\textsuperscript{66}

Turning now to British strategy in the Far East (79), the British interests were: (a) maintaining the links with, and defending, Australia and New Zealand, (b) containing the expansion of Sino-Soviet communism, and (c) making an effective contribution to the Anglo-American partnership in upholding world peace.\textsuperscript{67} The main reason why the Singapore base remained at such strength (32,000 troops) was primarily for defence of the Australian connection. In the long run, Australia was the only possible secure British base in the area. (North Borneo might once have been a possibility, but not after the Indonesian Confrontation with Malaysia.) (63) Whenever strategic planning was discussed, the development of Australia as a main base figured prominently. As Sir Patrick Dean observed, it had not been put in the ‘Future policy
study’ report, but the increase of the Australian European population was an important objective: 30 million whites there would greatly strengthen the political and strategic position for British interests.68 Hong Kong was regarded as in the last resort untenable, but its inevitable transfer to China in 1997 had got to be peaceful. Britain could not afford to be forced out of Hong Kong before then. A premature withdrawal would be a blow to prestige, bad for Anglo-American relations, and involve the loss not only of valuable trade and finance but of an irreplaceable source of intelligence about China.

The last major reconsideration of defence requirements in these years took place in 1964, leading to significant conclusions about ‘future politico-strategy’ in the last days of the Conservative government (80, 81). Although the implications of an enforced withdrawal from Far East bases had been contemplated as early as 1960 (83), and the value of fixed bases in general was being seriously questioned from 1961 (65: ‘nowhere did we seem to have absolute security of tenure and absolute freedom from strings’), a much more systematic analysis was under way in the late summer of 1964. Reports were commissioned from officials, covering the Middle East, the Far East, Europe, and the overall future situation (79–81). Their instructions were to assume that within the next decade Singapore and Aden would be lost. These terms of reference ‘represented a distinctly more radical approach than that underlying previous studies of this nature in recent years’. A sharper and more critical view could thus be taken of ‘the relevance of our existing commitments to our real interests’ (80). The long-term military value of Singapore was found to be declining, while politically the presence of so many troops was a public relations liability. It would be important to withdraw before being asked to go, and a balance had to be struck between the ‘dangers of staying too long and the opposite dangers of withdrawing too fast’ (79)—the classic dilemma of decolonisation. Military presence in the Far East was found to be significantly more expensive than in the Persian Gulf, and partly for this reason the latter should have priority for continuation if it came to a choice between them. Simultaneously, a junior FO official submitted a paper (78) recommending the dismantling of the Gulf political treaty structure, which he held was actually ‘delaying progress by obscuring the need for it’. All these papers are striking evidence of at least a willingness to get rid of all forms of colonial control, whether formal or informal, even if bureaucratic inertia prevented their rapid implementation. One sentence used at this time surfaced again prominently in the reasoning behind the disengagements of 1967–1968: that global influence ‘depends not only on military strength but also on our economic power and the respect (or lack of it) which the nations have for our economic performance’ (80).

Meanwhile, in developing the ‘flexible mobile strategy’ of the future ‘island bases scheme’, considerable hopes were pinned on the prospects for American help East of Suez (73). The joint development of a new defence strategy in the Indian Ocean—American support-facilities on British-owned islands for shared use—would of course solve many problems. The Aden–Gan–Singapore line of communication had recently been completed after three years spent constructing an air staging-post at Gan in the Maldives, which the inhabitants had to be coaxed to accept (60). This would now be reinforced by a new more southerly route to the Far East, Australia and New Zealand: Aldabra (Seychelles)–Diego Garcia (Mauritius)–Cocos/Keeling (Australia) (74–76).
Political and constitutional change

On the morning of 3 March 1959, the president of the Nyasaland Congress Party, Dr Hastings Banda, was arrested at his house in Limbe, and bundled off into a truck, still wearing only his pyjamas, to be flown to Southern Rhodesia together with seventy-two other detainees. At Nkata Bay twenty Africans, demonstrating against the arrests, were shot dead (and others followed in the days to come). On the same day, 1,200 miles to the north, eleven Africans were killed at a remote ‘rehabilitation’ camp for hard-core Mau Mau detainees (not convicted criminals), as a result of beatings administered to force them to work on an irrigation scheme. About twenty others were seriously injured at Hola Camp in the same incident. If one had to choose a single fateful date which signalled the moral end of the British empire in Africa it would thus be 3 March 1959. Macmillan told his Cabinet colleagues that the system which led to the Hola deaths had ‘undoubtedly been wrong’ (159). Macleod later recalled his sense of outrage: ‘this was the decisive moment when it became clear to me that we could no longer continue with the old methods of government in Africa, and that meant inexorably a move towards African independence’. Macleod believed that the same was true for Macmillan.69

In July 1959 the report of Sir Patrick Devlin (a high court judge) into the Nyasaland disturbances was published, stating on the first page that ‘Nyasaland has become, doubtless only temporarily, a police state’. The report as a whole was a brutal condemnation of the government, and the fact that a senior British judge could speak of a ‘police state’, and couple it with such an acid parenthesis, had a profound effect on British opinion.70 This was a phrase more electric to contemporaries than the rather tame ‘wind of change’ which followed it half a year later. Whatever flaws there were in the Devlin Report, the Cabinet was patently being misled in an invitation to make a comparison between the Nyasaland disturbances and Mau Mau ‘and possibly with the Indian Mutiny’ (494).

Southern Rhodesia had also declared a state of emergency early in 1959, in the course of which some five hundred people were detained without trial, among them Guy Clutton-Brock. He was an ANC member, a missionary farmer, reported by the native commissioner of Rusape, H B Masterson, as an ‘odious and harmful influence’, a ‘subversive’—because he let natives eat with him at his own table, even sleep at his house, and did not teach them to rise to their feet if a European entered the room. The Cabinet was compelled to consider the case of Clutton-Brock after Barbara Castle in the House of Commons had described the Rhodesian government’s action against him as ‘absolutely fantastic’. The Cabinet decided that it was ‘ill-advised’ of the Rhodesian authorities to victimise so prominent and distinguished a European, and even though it was contrary to established practice to interfere on behalf of British nationals with dual citizenship, pressed the Federal government to release him. When he died in 1995 he was proclaimed ‘a hero of Zimbabwe’.71

Even before it knew of the Hola massacres, though aware that two newspapers in Kenya had been banned (which seemed bad enough), the CO was alarmed that the government would be seen as declaring war on African nationalist aspirations. Accordingly, the CO permanent under-secretary drafted for Lennox-Boyd a public statement reaffirming his commitment to preparing for self-government in Africa as quickly as possible.72 In the course of the early summer of 1959, during the crisis over Hola Camp and the Devlin Report, Lennox-Boyd offered his resignation twice over.
All these unfortunate episodes, and the bad attendant publicity, in the long run played into the hands of Macmillan and Macleod by reducing opposition to their plans for constitutional advancement. If these events, and especially Hola, made them more determined, and improved the chances of Conservative Party acquiescence, the electoral victory of October 1959 delivered them the necessary power to act.

At around the same time, there were vital facilitating influences coming from outside as well. Independence was to be granted by the UN to Somalia in 1960 consequent upon the surrender of the Italian trusteeship. Accelerated political progress there would inevitably lead to a demand for equivalent advancement in British Somaliland and in neighbouring territories, especially Aden (198) and Kenya, whose peoples were more advanced than the Somalis. As Gorell Barnes put it: Britain ‘was compelled to move with the tide’ (183). The governors of East Africa realised that an independent and united Somalia would ‘increase the difficulty of controlling the pace of constitutional development’ in their own territories, but this was preferable to the emergence of a hostile Somalia (184).

In the middle of 1958, de Gaulle had challenged francophone Africans to choose between a continuing relationship with a revamped French Community or independence out in the cold. Sékou Touré’s supporters in Guinea voted ninety-five per cent (in the referendum held in September 1958) against the new Community constitution. Suddenly de Gaulle was urging Macmillan to see that France and Britain must decide jointly whether to stay in Africa or go. The writing on the wall could not have been plainer. As Macmillan’s official biographer understood, de Gaulle’s African policy had a profound influence on Macmillan. Lennox-Boyd also pondered the implications of French policy:

I have been considering the effect on British territories of the recent referendum in French Africa and the possibility of the French action having some lessons for us. We have yet to see how things will settle down; but we should take stock of our own position in the light of these dramatic developments on the French side. … My provisional conclusions are that some results of French policy are bound to have repercussions, possibly unfavourable, in British territories, especially in Sierra Leone; that it would be wrong for us to try to follow the French example in any general way; but that the French action, taken as a whole, is likely on balance to be a good thing for us and the West.

De Gaulle was gradually driven into an unequivocal offer of ‘self determination’ in September 1959. The Belgians in January 1959 announced far-reaching plans for constitutional advancement in the Congo, which by the end of the year had telescoped into independence by June 1960. These developments, British officials recognised, were ‘bound to have major repercussions in British East Africa’. Together the French and Belgians were putting Britain into the position where the period of British leadership in the transfer of power in Africa would appear to be coming to an end. The possibility was unfolding that Britain might be ‘classed with the Portuguese as the obstacle to further advance’ (20). This was not an appealing prospect to either Macmillan or Macleod.

Almost all officials and politicians felt that a pace of political advancement faster than they would have preferred had been unexpectedly forced upon them. Sir James Robertson, governor-general of Nigeria, may be quoted here:
The trouble is that we have not been allowed enough time: partly this is because we are not strong enough now as a result of two world wars to insist on having longer to build up democratic forms of government; partly because of American opposition to our idea of colonialism by the gradual training of people in the course of generations to run their own show; partly because of dangers from our enemies, the Communists, we have had to move faster than we should have wished.75

And Joe Garner, permanent under-secretary of the CRO:

with the wind of change in Africa and throughout the world, the impact of nationalism and pressures in the United Nations, the pace of constitutional development has been forced in recent years. The result is that a number of countries have now been included as Commonwealth members before they can be regarded as fully mature and responsible, and fully capable of standing on their own feet.76

From a Colonial Service perspective, Robertson advised Macmillan that although Africans would not be ready for independence for fifteen to twenty years, they should have it at once, otherwise all the most capable would be in prison and learn nothing about administration.77

The underlying dynamics of the accelerated pace appear to be centred around calculations about the feasibility of holding on to colonial territories demanding change, and the pressures of external and especially neighbouring example. The CO understood well that the emergence of strong personalities such as Kwame Nkrumah (in the Gold Coast) and Julius Nyerere (in Tanganyika) was a vital factor in progress to independence, and—with the exception of South Arabia—they had no desire to exclude such leaders by backing, or artificially creating, authoritarian puppet regimes (based on traditional chiefs or feudal rulers), which could only lead ‘to the creation of a revolutionary force against the set-up that we had created’.78 As to feasibility, the dilemma was well expressed in Lennox-Boyd’s memorandum on Nigeria in May 1957: ‘either to give independence too soon and risk disintegration and breakdown of administration; or to hang on too long, risk ill-feeling and disturbances, and eventually to leave bitterness behind’ (100). The British meanwhile faced almost insoluble administrative problems in coping with a discontented and possibly rebellious Nigerian population (105). Also, conventional wisdom was already well established generally that the ‘risks of going too slow were probably greater than the risks of going too fast’ (2, para 52). As to neighbouring example: Ghana had set a dangerous but unavoidable precedent, so Nigeria had to be given what Ghana had (2). Chain reactions were operating. Sierra Leone moved forward under the impact of events in Ghana and Nigeria and the French territories, especially Guinea, so that ‘anything less than a real measure of advance would cause trouble’.79 What happened in West Africa must eventually be repeated in East Africa. Kenya’s political advancement was speeded up as a result of Somaliland’s impending independence; Tanganyika profited especially from the example of the Congo. Nyasaland was the beneficiary of the acceleration of the timetable in Kenya; Northern Rhodesia in its turn followed Nyasaland. So did Zanzibar, where the feasibility of getting troops into it was in doubt after the independence of Kenya (130-132). Further afield, even the Solomon Islands began to move forward after Australia announced plans to introduce universal suffrage in Papua New Guinea from 1964.80

The question must thus arise as to whether the influence of ministers in London made much difference. Clearly there were elements of continuity between each of the
secretaries of state for the colonies and an underlying support by at least some of their advisers for policies of constitutional progress. As Macleod recognised in respect of Kenya: solid disagreement from his officials ‘might have halted me in my tracks’. As to continuity, it was his predecessor Lennox-Boyd who had said: ‘there is of course no stopping the process of devolution on which we are now well set’ (54). However, judgments about timing were crucial. Macleod’s own assessment of his role seems a fair one:

The change of policy that I introduced in October 1959 was, on the surface, merely a change of timing. In reality, of course it was a true change of policy, but I telescoped events rather than created new ones.\(^8\)

He published his definitive apologia in the *Spectator* in 1964, defending the deliberate decision to speed up the movement towards independence:

And in my view any other policy would have led to terrible bloodshed in Africa. This is the heart of the argument. … Were the countries fully ready for Independence? Of course not. Nor was India, and the bloodshed that followed the grant of Independence there was incomparably worse than anything that has happened since to any country. Yet the decision of the Attlee Government was the only realistic one. Equally we could not possibly have held by force to our territories in Africa. We could not, with an enormous force engaged, even continue to hold the small island of Cyprus. General de Gaulle could not contain Algeria. The march of men towards their freedom can be guided, but not halted. Of course there were risks in moving quickly. But the risks of moving slowly were far greater.\(^8\)

It would be a work of supererogation to summarise here all the political developments and constitutional advances in each of the British colonies. What follows is therefore a selection of some of the more significant cases: Cyprus, Tanganyika, Kenya, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, Aden, Malaysia, and the West Indies Federation. But a preliminary observation should be made. Even apart from the obvious question-marks hanging over territories claimed by other powers—Hong Kong (9, 10, 258, 259), Gibraltar (290), the Falkland Islands (432, 436) and Honduras (431, 433–435)—almost every colony had puzzling and unique problems of its own. In Uganda progress was bedevilled by the relationship of its four kingdoms, especially Buganda, to the centre (120-121): a complex, confused, and according to Macleod even ‘somewhat Gilbertian’ situation (36). The governor, Sir Frederick Crawford, despaired of ‘our problem children’, roundly denouncing ‘these bumptious, beer-swilling, bible-punching, bullying, braggart Baganda’.\(^3\) Secession was ruled out (36). In geographically anomalous Gambia (111, 112), and tiny St Helena (291, 341), the problem was one of viability. In Malta too—‘a small but terribly difficult problem’ (Home: 254)—the worry was how 320,000 ‘not very industrious people living on a relatively barren island group’\(^4\) would manage without high employment in the naval dockyard (242–255). In Fiji, the peculiarity was the unwillingness of the Fijians to contemplate any form of independence, locked as they were in ethnic rivalry with a powerful immigrant Indian community (292, 296). In Guiana the communist leanings of Dr Jagan bred hesitancy, assiduously played upon by the Americans, fearing that independence would result in another Cuba or Congo (293–295, 297–299). In Southern Rhodesia the problem was the intransigence of the 250,000 Europeans, most of them bent on blocking African
majority rule (the approach to UDI in 1965 is documented in 514, 518–520, 524–527).

(a) Cyprus. As a way of introducing the Cyprus problem, the following magisterial passage by Professor Nicholas Mansergh can hardly be bettered:

A Byzantine emperor, in grateful acknowledgement of a copy of the Gospel according to St Matthew found in the tomb of St Barnabas near Salamis and sent to him in Constantinople, decreed that henceforward the Orthodox Church in Cyprus should be autocephalous and that its Archbishop should enjoy the imperial privilege of signing his name in red ink. British governors accorded to themselves a like privilege, signing their Minutes in red—an essay in imperial emulation no doubt gratifying to gubernatorial vanity.* But when confronted with a demand for self-determination which had the backing of the Orthodox Church and the leadership of the Archbishop, the British imperial authorities found that they could not arrogate to themselves what mattered most—the quasi-spiritual sanctions of Byzantium. So they resorted to the cruder device of episcopal and archiepiscopal deportation in a vain endeavour to bring to an end a prolonged and painful struggle for which psychologically they were ill equipped and the character of which, in conjunction with earlier experience in Ireland, and contrary to the fashionable assumptions of the time, suggested that similarities in race and colour, not differences, served most to intensify the bitterness of national revolt against the imperial power.85

A conflict of this character had long been regarded both by the CO and FO as anomalous, dangerous and embarrassing.

One of the earliest acts of the Macmillan government was to release Makarios from his ‘archiepiscopal deportation’ to the Seychelles, of which Macmillan had never approved.86 It was hoped that this would clear a path towards a settlement. Macmillan was prepared to give priority to Cyprus in part because the problem was familiar to him from his time as foreign secretary in 1955. The baffling deadlock encountered then persisted into 1957.87 The problem was essentially a strategic one, with two elements. The first was that the Chiefs of Staff declared that Britain needed a secure grip on Cyprus as a whole. The second was that the British government feared an independent Cyprus would implement Enosis, that is, union with Greece, and Greece might become communist. In any case, good relations with a strong Turkey as a NATO ally on its eastern flank were essential. And Turkey was vehemently opposed to Enosis: to Turkey, Cyprus was an off-shore island only forty miles away, and one-fifth of the Cypriot population was Turkish. Thus for Britain the wishes of Turkey increasingly became more important than those of Greece: ‘to keep in with the Turks—both in Turkey and in the island’, as Julian Amery rather bluntly expressed it (237).

The Colonial Policy Committee agreed in June 1957 that they needed ‘release from the odium and expense which we carried at present’ (218). Governor Sir John Harding told them that without a political settlement 10,000 troops would be required indefinitely, plus 6,000 reinforcements—which was impossible. Ministers dreaded ‘a second Palestine’. In December hard-line Harding was replaced by the more flexible Hugh Foot, who produced a plan for qualified internal self-

---

* This practice was not confined to governors of Cyprus, and was also adopted by secretaries of state.
government, leading to self-determination after a period of up to seven years—apparently basing his hopes on a sort of compulsory co-operation across the ethnic divide. Ministers felt this would commit Britain to continuing close involvement, which ‘could not be reconciled with the policy of progressive reduction in the strength of the Army’ (229, 230). They could not go on indefinitely ‘bearing the burdens and costs’ of sole responsibility for administration, with the risk of renewed large-scale violence. Instead of Foot’s plan, Macmillan preferred a ‘tri-dominium’ solution, which would bring in representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments as resident advisers. At Zürich in February 1959 the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey announced (to general surprise) that they had after months of negotiation agreed that Cyprus should be independent, more or less under the Macmillan Plan. Macmillan regarded the settlement, confirmed at the London conference of February 1959, as one based on a parity of sacrifice. The British abandoned sovereignty, except over ninety-nine square miles of base-enclaves. The Greeks agreed not to press for Enosis. The Turks agreed not to pursue their preferred outcome of partition. The new state would have a Greek Cypriot president (Makarios was the first), a Turkish Cypriot vice-president (both with a veto in certain matters), and a cabinet of seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots. This 7:3 proportion was repeated right down the administrative ladder; in other words, Turkish Cypriots were entitled to thirty per cent of posts even though they had less than twenty per cent of the population. It was not exactly a popular solution, nor did it last for long. In December 1963 fighting broke out again, barely three-and-a-half years into independence. Britain invoked the help of the United Nations, who policed a ‘green line’ demarcation between the two sides. In 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus and consolidated de facto partition.

Partition was of course the one thing the British had steadfastly refused to be responsible for. In Macmillan’s words, it would be a ‘confession of failure’ (219). It would be immensely difficult to carry out, internal ‘bitterness and bloodshed’ being matched by the damage it would do to British prestige and international reputation (220, 226). No-one in the CO believed partition had any attractions except as a last resort. Lennox-Boyd minuted: ‘A “Palestinian solution” is distasteful to me’. Harding, the Chiefs of Staff, and constitutional adviser Lord Radcliffe, were all against it. The FO, however, with their special pro-Turkish concerns, always seemed to hanker after it, and as prime minister, Douglas-Home (a former foreign secretary) did not flinch from it as the probable ‘final solution’ (241).

Cyprus gained independence because of British strategic revaluation and a need to cut costs. In 1954 a government spokesman had implied that Cyprus would ‘never’ be independent. Although that should probably have read ‘not yet’, the strategic objections then were formidable. Cyprus, however, was a principal beneficiary of the post-Suez shake-up. It had proved to be of limited use in that operation, and once it was clear the military planners did not need to hold the entire island as a base for major military purposes, the strategic requirements could be reduced to the retention of airfields. The prospect—which Foot warned about repeatedly (231)—of ‘civil war in Cyprus, possibly leading to war between Greece and Turkey’, also increased the pressure for a peaceful disengagement.

(b) Tanganyika. In 1957 the official members of the Executive Council were redesignated ministers, and assistant ministers (four Africans, one European and one
Asian) were appointed to the Legislative Council. The old idea of an equal three-way split between Europeans, Africans and Asians, regardless of the actual population proportions, was abandoned. A general election was held in 1958, preparatory to the establishment of a council of ministers. Lennox-Boyd defined a policy of gradualness, a controlled, step-by-step, middle-of-the-road constitutional advance in order to prevent ‘frustration and bitterness’ (116, 117), and by January 1959 he expected independence in perhaps 1970.

In May 1959 Governor Sir Richard Turnbull presented radical proposals for stepping up the speed of political advancement in Tanganyika (141). His thesis was that there had been ‘a great upsurge of nationalism in the Belgian Congo which had not been foreseen’. A similar turmoil in Nyasaland and Ruanda-Urundi had erupted. And it ‘could not be expected that Tanganyika would remain immune from the trend of events elsewhere in Africa’ (142, 143, 145). Accordingly his plan was to ‘tame Nyerere’, using him to rob those he called ‘the wild men’ on the lunatic fringe of their glamour. To do this, reasonableness and co-operation with Britain on Nyerere’s part must be shown to be a paying proposition. Therefore, Britain should introduce immediately an unofficial majority, smack ‘the wild men’ down, and encourage the moderates. Although Turnbull did not think Tanganyika was really ready for independence for twenty years yet, without this kind of political progress, he forecast a chillingly apocalyptic scenario, predicting two major insurrections in Tanganyika. The first would come in 1960 or 1961. The second would arrive, apparently, in 1970, and it would be a ‘combination of Mau Mau and the Maji-Maji rebellion, with the support of modern techniques of guerrilla warfare and fifth-column activities’. The forces available to put such uprisings down would be wholly inadequate. Turnbull’s advice was that holding to ‘ordered progress to self-government’ would depend primarily on Nyerere’s not being supplanted by an ‘extremist’, but also on Britain’s finding enough money to spend between 1960 and 1970 on education and training in order to sugar the pill of political gradualism. Basically what he envisaged was chopping about four years off the timetable, that is to say, reaching an unofficial majority in the Council of Ministers by late 1960 instead of early 1965.

Lennox-Boyd and his officials were flummoxed by this extraordinary initiative, which contradicted a policy agreed at Chequers only five months previously (141). For the remainder of his time in office, Lennox-Boyd prevaricated, some plausibility being lent to this by the impending general election in Britain. However, Turnbull met Macleod on 16 November 1959, only weeks after Macleod had taken over, and Macleod was persuaded (145). Lest we attach too much importance to Macleod’s enabling role, it is worth noting that his predecessor was probably beginning to accept Turnbull’s line. But we are entitled to take the view that Macleod was more genuinely sympathetic, and considerably better at getting Turnbull’s policy through the Colonial Policy Committee than Lennox-Boyd would have been. Macleod sold the policy to his colleagues by telling them that he believed the governor’s argument was sound: if the government did not concede the unofficial majority, ‘we may be faced with serious disturbances and may lose the opportunity of some years of constructive effort’ in the vital matter of economic and social development. Macleod also emphasised the inability of the police to cope with any serious trouble, especially in circumstances where Britain could expect little support either inside or outside Tanganyika. Indeed, they would face active UN criticism for failure to ensure peace by a positive response to a claim for self-government requested in a reasonable and
constitutional manner. Rejection could only lead to non-co-operation and administrative breakdown (146). Finally, the Cabinet in November accepted that it was necessary to advance the timetable in order to maintain peaceful development, and confidence in Britain. And so in December 1959 a second general election was announced, with constitutional changes which would bring in an elected majority on both the Executive and Legislative Councils in August 1960. Of the seventy-one seats, fifty were open to contest by all races. In the event Nyerere’s TANU party won seventy seats. Just before the election Macleod argued that ‘the wind of change has been gathering force since last November, so the thinking of all of us has been speeded up’; the government could now contemplate Tanganyikan independence by July 1962 instead of 1968 (147). In fact independence was reached in December 1961.

What were the dynamics behind the dramatic speeding up of the transfer of power in Tanganyika? First, there had been the collapse of faith in its European settlers, well under way even by 1957. Then there was the near inevitability of promoting a personable, moderate, collaborative nationalist leader, of co-opting Nyerere as the best available African, for whom there seemed to be no acceptable alternative: the policy which Arden-Clarke had called (with respect to Nkrumah) backing ‘the one dog in our kennel’. Calculations about governability also came to the fore: here, Turnbull’s scare tactics performed an historic function. The ‘wind of change’ was evoked to telling effect, in combination with the influence of what was happening in neighbouring states, particularly in the Congo. Finally, there was a recognition of the importance of keeping on the right side of world opinion and heading off the pretensions of the UN to assert itself.

(c) Kenya. Where Tanganyika led, Kenya was bound to follow, profiting from Turnbull’s ‘no immunity from neighbouring trends’ argument. The first African elections were held in Kenya in March 1957, but deadlock ensued. A new constitution equalised the communal representation of Africans and Europeans and a common roll was introduced (the Lennox-Boyd constitution). Fresh elections were held in March 1958. By June 1959 Macmillan was looking for ‘perceptible movement’: heading off African disturbances without driving the settlers into trying to join the Union of South Africa (29). At the Lancaster House Conference in January 1960 Macleod devised a complex new constitution, under which the Africans (on a greatly extended common roll) could expect to secure thirty-three out of sixty-five elected seats in the Leg Co. Macleod had in effect been able to concede the principle of majority rule and was well pleased with the way things had moved forward (160). The question from then on was the timing of independence, which as Macleod saw it was ‘to go as slowly as possible, but not as slow as Alec Home [now foreign secretary] would like’, because that would lead to ‘a Cyprus on our hands again’ (125). But Macleod absolutely rejected the idea being floated that it would be possible in practice ‘to maintain our position in Kenya by consent for anything like eight years’, as some ministers were suggesting. He pointed to ‘the growing pressure in the United Nations to bring Colonial territories to independence’. He reminded them of the success of their policy in Tanganyika, which was ‘largely due to our willingness to consider a progressive and early transfer of power to the Africans’. The Colonial Policy Committee accepted that if, as seemed possible, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar were likely to move fairly quickly towards independence, ‘it would be impossible to justify to the Kenya Africans the maintenance of United Kingdom rule
in Kenya merely on account of the presence of significant numbers of Europeans'.

Macleod’s successor, Maudling, reinforced the same message in November 1961: ‘arithmetic and African nationalism’ had destroyed European political power, and it was impossible to continue to rule Kenya for some years to come, because this would require the use of force, which could only lead to ‘another outbreak of Mau Mau’ and great disorder, ‘possibly reaching even Congo proportions’.

However distasteful it was, they had to face the fact that Jomo Kenyatta would end up as prime minister, since he was the leader the Africans acknowledged.

Full internal self-government was introduced, following an unhelpful London conference early in 1962, but Kenya remained ‘an extremely intractable problem’ (Macmillan: 169). The issues anxiously discussed by the Cabinet over the next two years included: safeguards and compensation for over 3,000 European farmers (175, 176, 180), the threat of economic and financial collapse (which a European exodus would exacerbate) (174), the maintenance of law and order between the Kikuyu and their rivals (173, 175), whether or not to retain a military base (65, 178), whether or not to allow the Somali-majority Northern Frontier District to join the Somali Republic (178). (The integration of the NFD into a ‘Greater Somalia’ might forestall a frontier civil war, another Congo or Kashmir, but it would upset Ethiopia—the emperor would get very excited’, said Macmillan.)

In the face of such problems, it is perhaps hardly surprising that ministers turned once again to ‘the federal panacea’. Macleod thought an East African federation would be ‘a wonderful prize’ (150, 154). Malcolm MacDonald (now governor of Kenya) regarded it as ‘a dream answer’ (177). The prospects were repeatedly reviewed (123, 124, 126, 128, 129, 138, 153), it being always understood that the initiative would have to be left to local politicians. Despite an initial interest in the idea, especially by Nyerere, they eventually got cold feet (126).

Thus in speeding up the timetable for decolonisation in Kenya, the same fundamental imperatives were at work as they had been for Tanganyika: fears of the country dissolving into chaos, worries about the whole situation going sour on them, the ineluctable impact of what was happening in neighbouring territories (especially the negative example of the Congo), the desirability of pre-empting the growth of Russian and Chinese influences and the necessity of submitting to the overriding dictates of cold war considerations (172, 174). Kenyatta duly became president of Kenya in 1964, after a year as prime minister, and proved to be much less extreme than the white settlers had feared.

(d) Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The documentary record in Part II hardly conveys the underlying tensions and contortions in the ministerial handling of the future of the Central African Federation (established in 1953). Macleod twice threatened resignation, Maudling once. For Macmillan it ‘haunted, not to say poisoned’ the last years of his premiership. He personally did not believe they had the right to break up something which had a chance of working, though his condescending attitude to critics (493) reflects his distinctly Augustinian attitude—
Ministers struggled to keep the doomed Federation afloat, because it represented their commitment to stability and multi-racialism in Central Africa. Nor did they want to fall out with the white Rhodesians who were its principal beneficiaries, lest they be driven into the arms of South Africa (regional military alliance was more likely than integration) (499, 506, 510, 521), or refuse Britain the over-flying rights which were essential for the protection of the High Commission Territories (523). In June 1959 Home advised buying time by appointing a commission of inquiry into discontent: ‘properly managed it would carry us on for nine months’.99 In asking Walter Monckton (the retired former Conservative Cabinet minister) to chair this commission, indeed to avert ‘a maelstrom of trouble’, Macmillan set out his own views crisply:

The cruder concepts, whether of the left or the right, are clearly wrong. Africans cannot be dominated permanently (as they are trying to do in South Africa) without any proper opportunity for their development and ultimate self-government. Nor can the Europeans be abandoned. It would be wrong for us to do so, and fatal for the African interests.100

When a few months later Macleod took office, the new secretary of state quickly concluded that the resentments building up in the Federation ‘will be our most difficult single problem to solve’ (31). He agreed with Macmillan (towards the end of 1960) that ‘the crux of the matter’ was that they ‘did not want an Algeria’ in Central Africa, even if on a smaller scale.101

Macleod’s first task was to calm things down in Nyasaland. He believed that continuing detentions under the emergency would be indefensible before the Human Rights Commission. Early in December he raised the question of Banda’s release, preferably before the arrival of the Monckton Commission. ‘There are no more moderate leaders likely to emerge than Banda himself’, he wrote to the prime minister, and ‘an imaginative offer on constitutional advance at a fairly early date’ was the best and perhaps only hope of holding the position (31, 495). However, the CO officials were dubious about releasing Banda, since the governor had assessed the risks of doing so as dangerous;102 but neither Macmillan nor Macleod fully trusted Governor Sir Robert Armitage: he was ‘not giving a real lead’, when a ‘positive policy’ was needed, and he had been rude to Macmillan when they met in January 1960.103 Home by then was also convinced that ‘the wind of change’ was blowing strongly, that the political log-jam must be broken, and that it would be dangerous to stand still in Nyasaland politically (492, 499); he accepted that Banda could be used ‘to further our constitutional plans’. Macleod’s timing for the release was, however, deeply controversial. He threatened to resign, but a compromise solution was found, since Macmillan could not afford to lose him after only four months in office. So Banda was released on 1 April 1960, shortly before the Monckton Commission completed its work in Nyasaland, and he was thus able to give evidence as a free man (498). This was the decisive step. Macleod was proved right when it did not lead to an escalation of violence. A new constitution was agreed in July 1960. Elections in August 1961 resulted in a majority for Banda’s Malawi Congress Party. Internal self-government was achieved in the spring of 1963.

But it was Northern Rhodesia, not Nyasaland, which was ‘the true problem’ of the region, Macleod believed (35). His decision to speed up change there arose out of two
favourable developments by the autumn of 1960: agreement on the Nyasaland constitution, and the Monckton Report's recommendation of an African majority on the Northern Rhodesia Leg Co, in the context of its general conclusion that the Federation could not be maintained in its present form. The nationalist leader Kenneth Kaunda had restrained his followers. Macleod realised that Kaunda ought to be able to show that his moderate policy was producing results; violence could break out if there was no move soon. Welensky (the settlers' leader) was firmly told 'we cannot hold the position by a Canute-like process of ordering the tides to return ... move we must.' Macleod tried to find a solution 'somewhere around parity' in the Leg Co, a token African majority amongst the elected members, which would swiftly resolve into an actual majority. At the February 1961 conference, Kaunda demanded an immediate African majority. Macleod persuaded him that although what was on offer fell short of what Tanganyika, Kenya and Nyasaland had got, it was safely and definitely on the right lines for the future (502). The settlement was, however, saddled with a new voting system of almost incomprehensibly labyrinthine psephological complexity, and there followed months of ministerial wrangling, back-bench dissent, pressure from Welensky, devious discussions and back-trackings, as various formulae—'transient phantoms in an unreal dream', Macmillan described them—were produced and examined and discarded. Successive Cabinets wrestled with technicalities they ought never to have got involved in (504, 506). By June 1961 there seemed to be an agreed solution, but after widespread African protest and disorder, in September 1961 Macleod sought to reopen the policy-decision to make it more favourable to the Africans.

Not long afterwards Macmillan removed him from the CO. His successor Maudling decided that Macleod was indeed right: there must be a constitution acceptable to Africans, giving them a chance of winning at least a small majority, otherwise there would be civil disobedience and rioting, and 'the situation would get out of hand' (506). He too threatened resignation, and in all probability Macleod and Perth would have resigned in sympathy. The new constitution came into force in September 1962. As Macmillan later admitted, 'the delay between December 1960 and February 1962 achieved nothing'. It is hard not to agree with Richard Lamb: 'The only verdict can be that it antagonised the Africans without pacifying the Europeans'.

In March 1962, Butler took over ministerial responsibility for Central Africa. With considerable cunning and finesse he managed to gain the confidence of all sides. In Zomba the Africans honoured him with the name 'Large Elephant'. He got on well with Banda and retained Welensky as a friend. Macmillan was naturally thankful to transfer matters to his 'wise and experienced hands' (513). Butler achieved the orderly dissolution of the Federation on terms which the settler lobby of the Conservative Party had to accept. The crucial issue was Banda's demand for secession (505). Banda was acting co-operatively, taking 'a moderate and constructive line', according to Macmillan (512), so concessions to him could be contemplated, just as they had been to Nyerere and Kaunda. Butler decided that the importance of retaining Banda's goodwill outweighed the danger of worsening relations with Welensky (507), and did so in the main because they could not cope with a serious security situation in Nyasaland (511). In any case, 'against the pace elsewhere in Africa, the extent to which we can hope to apply the brake ... is extremely limited' (509). Sandys was in full agreement: to fight Nyasaland on secession would lead to 'another Cyprus' (511). It was also pointed out that recent precedents from the West Indies would make it
INTRODUCTION

difficult to refuse to agree to secession (508). Ministers, however, did not wish to give any encouragement to Banda to secede, partly because of the economic implications (almost certainly making increased aid from Britain necessary), and partly because Northern Rhodesia would almost automatically follow suit (510). For seven months Butler spun out the time on secession, but by October 1962 he could no longer continue to do so without a show of force: ‘this would not only be inherently mistaken but was also impracticable’. In the long run, he argued, it would be more expensive financially than the consequences of secession, and extremely costly in terms of international reputation. Though secession would inevitably mean in time the dissolution of the Federation, ‘there was really no alternative’ (510).

Home in particular clung to the notion that some sort of Northern and Southern Rhodesian association could be maintained (511). This continued to be explored (512, 515, 517, 522). The Cabinet reluctantly accepted Northern Rhodesian secession on 28 March 1963 (517). A decision on the long-term future of an unregenerate Southern Rhodesia was, on Macmillan’s advice, deferred as long as possible, since it could only be ‘profoundly damaging’ and probably ‘a fatal blow to the Commonwealth’ to accept the whites’ demand for immediate independence (518, 520-522, 526). The Federation was dissolved on 31 December 1963. Nyasaland became independent as Malawi on 6 July 1964. Northern Rhodesia became independent as Zambia on 24 October 1964. Southern Rhodesia became independent as Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980.

(e) Aden. The first acquisition of Victoria’s empire (1838), Aden 120 years later was fast becoming the last imperial frontier. It had an excellent natural harbour, and had developed as an important coaling station on the route to India and the east. This had unlovely results: Kipling’s ‘unlit barrick-stove’; ‘the cinder-heap of the world’. From the later 1950s its value was increasing as other bases and footholds came under threat: not only was it a staging-post ‘East of Suez’, but the citadel of oil-bunkering, the protector of Middle East oil interests, especially in Kuwait, and the base from which military commitments in the Persian Gulf and East Africa could be discharged. Thus it was not totally surprising when a government minister declared in 1956 that Aden could not expect to aspire to more than internal self-government ‘for the foreseeable future’ (2). In 1960 it became the headquarters of Middle East Command, and by 1964 there were 8,000 troops stationed there.

Aden was a particularly intractable case for decolonisation (198). At its heart was the port of Aden Colony. But it was surrounded by successive ‘layers’ of unfavourable circumstance which made it hard to manage. The tiny Colony itself was, according to Macleod, ‘a very politically conscious place’ (127), penetrated by militant trades unions, the ATUC being led by the pro-Nasserite al-Asnaj, and composed largely of Yemeni migrant workers staffing the expanding BP oil refinery opened in 1954 in the aftermath of the Iranian oil crisis of 1951. There were eighty-four strikes in 1959 alone. By then the colony had a population of 37,000 Adenis, but 48,000 Yemenis, in effect a fifth column whose task was to spearhead the incorporation of Aden into Yemen. The immediate surrounding ‘layer’ was the turbulent and murderously unstable hinterland of South Arabia, a protectorate which the British had almost entirely ignored, leaving it to its traditional princes, tribal rulers and warring factions. Because it was claimed by Yemen, the protectorate could not stand by itself and the rulers sought to ‘put their paws’ on Aden and bring its international port
within their ambit. If Aden developed constitutionally on its own, this would seem disastrous to the Yemenophobic princes of the hinterland, who were friendly to Britain. In February 1959 a somewhat chaotic Federation of the states of the Western Protectorate was formed. Then, in the outer layer came the hostile neighbour itself, Yemen, ruled by 'a gloomy medieval imam' until 1962, when he was overthrown by a republican coup dominated by Nasserites. In British eyes, Yemen became a virtual Egyptian puppet-state, with 70,000 Egyptian troops stationed there. British government departments were divided on according recognition, the FO in favour, the CO and MoD against. Macmillan could see attractions in recognition: it was 'repugnant to political equity and prudence alike that we should so often appear to be supporting out-of-date despotic regimes and to be opposing the growth of modern and more democratic forms of government'. Moreover, recognition might embarrass Nasser, whom Macmillan persisted in regarding as 'another Hitler'. And in the background beyond Egypt there was the UN, where the international witch-hunt against 'colonialism' was in full cry, and British policy in South-West Arabia was routinely denounced as 'the engine of oppression'.

The new governor towards the end of 1956 was Sir William Luce, fresh from acting as constitutional adviser to the governor-general of the Sudan during its run-up to independence. With this background, Luce had no difficulty in recognising that to deny self-government to Aden beyond about 1967 would involve 'a head-on collision with Aden Arabs'. The decline of British power, the policy of moving from dependence to independence, Arab nationalism, and Russian expansion—all these impinged on Aden, and, he concluded, pointed to a gradual disengagement leading to the 'termination of British control' within the decade (188). Macmillan seems to have been sceptical. There was general agreement in the CO that Luce's idea of a federation in the hinterland need not be discouraged, but they were less sure about letting go of sovereignty in Aden (189,190). Amery fought for a rejection of Luce's radical policy, and for sticking with the hard line of 1956. Aden, he argued, was a vital fortress colony, controlling a key position globally, which it was geopolitically advantageous to retain (193,194). In May 1959—a year after Luce's proposals were received—Lennox-Boyd was still stalling: 'the wisest course will be to play for time and to avoid defining our policy too clearly' (195, 196). Before leaving his post, Luce developed his idea of bringing together the friendly princes of the hinterland and the friendly moderates of the Colony (197). His procedural suggestions for engineering this constitutional merger did not convince the CO, and gave them 'much to think about'. The Defence Committee confirmed that the retention of the base was still essential (198). Macleod wanted the views of the new governor, Sir Charles Johnston, before deciding anything (198). In March 1961 Johnston confirmed that merger would be the right solution, preceded by self-government in Aden Colony (199), the aim being the creation of an 'independent and prosperous Arab state in relations of friendly partnership with ourselves'. After going to Aden to see for himself, Macleod decided to support this plan. He admitted that the princes would not like an election in Aden under a self-governing constitution, and neither would the British government if the moderates did not win (in which case direct rule would have to be resumed), but, applying his trusty doctrine of 'lesser risk', Macleod believed it would be 'less dangerous to our interests than would be the certain dangers involved in our refusing the moderates their wish for constitutional advance'. Accordingly he would tell the hinterland rulers that although they could have their merger, 'we could not
exclude Aden Colony from the general aims of our overall colonial policy’, and must give due weight to the principles of consent (200).

After some grumbling by the minister of defence, Harold Watkinson, and by Amery, the Cabinet accepted that merger should be encouraged if the parties could agree upon it. The policy was seen as a means of securing defence facilities for as long as possible (202, 206). Sovereignty over Aden would continue for the moment. The CO was still aiming to ‘pay out the rope as slowly as we decently can’, regarding the merger as a way of buying time (203), although recognising that even the moderates were ‘susceptible to the wind of change’ and sensitive to charges from Cairo that they were ‘British stooges’.

In September 1962 the Aden Leg Co voted for merger, and the Federation of South Arabia came into being on 18 January 1963. The status of Aden was again considered towards the end of the year, with Trevaskis as high commissioner proposing its advance to full internal self-government. A decision in favour was temporarily thrown off course by an assassination attempt against him (December 1963), but by the end of February 1964 ministerial opinion was beginning to crystallise around the doctrine of timely concession: ‘if we ignored the pressure for constitutional advance there would be serious political trouble, in the face of which we should eventually have to give way’ (211). At a constitutional conference in London in June 1964 it was agreed that the federal constitution should be reformed on a democratic basis with a view to independence no later than 1968; also that Britain would renounce sovereignty over Aden as soon as practicable, at a date to be agreed after a general election in October, and with a defence agreement covering the retention of the British base. It had taken more than six tortuous years to reach these not very remarkable conclusions, which were then put back into the melting-pot by the Labour government. Towards the end of 1967 Aden and the Protectorates were finally abandoned to the Yemen-based National Liberation Front, who established a Soviet-Marxist successor government.

(f) Malaysia. On 31 August 1957 the British formally transferred power to a Malayan elite headed by the anglophile Tunku Abdul Rahman (257); any possible alternative government, they believed, would certainly be less well-disposed to them. The subsequent transformation of the Federation of Malaya into the Federation of Malaysia in September 1963 represented a major reconstruction of the map of South-East Asia, accompanied by accusations that it was a ‘neo-colonialist plot’. Paradoxically, however, if Britain had given a blank refusal to this project, the accusation would have been one of ‘preventing the natural development’ of the Malay world. In Singapore, the first prime minister under internal self-government (256, 260), Lee Kuan Yew, needed the merger with Malaya in order to ‘finish off colonialism’ as a political issue there. Tunku Abdul Rahman had an expansionist desire to double Malaya’s territory and get access to the oil revenues of Brunei; negatively, the incorporation of Singapore was designed to head-off the possibility of an independent communist state’s establishing itself on Malaya’s doorstep. For he had come to realise that he would not for much longer be able to rely on a positive and effective British presence in Singapore. Its incorporation alone would upset the racial balance of Malaya by adding 1.5 million Chinese, so the Borneo territories were a necessary way of redressing the balance and sweetening the pill (261).

From the British government point of view, ‘Greater Malaysia’ seemed to offer the
resolution of several problems. First, it would be ‘an ultimate solution’ for Singapore, ‘the best and possibly the only hope for longer-term stability’, neutralising communist tendencies and, after re-negotiation of defence facilities, reducing the prospect of increasing hostility to the base (79). Secondly, it might provide a viable future for the three Borneo territories, which would otherwise be vulnerable to Indonesian encroachment. Thirdly, it might forward the purposes of decolonisation, including retrenchment, in an area where Britain was from 1954 the last colonial power. Lastly, a Greater Malaysia might form a stable bloc of anti-communist territory in geopolitically significant South-East Asia (264, 265). As commissioner-general, Malcolm MacDonald had for many years (and perhaps as far back as 1947, though even then he was not the first to propose a consolidation) propounded some such theory, calling it ‘the grand design’. In February 1958 he publicly committed himself to a Borneo federation, the ultimate objective being a confederation of five territories. But clearly the British could not take the initiative in its consummation. Hence the decisive importance of the Tunku’s public conversion to the scheme on 27 May 1961 (264).

There was, however, considerable opposition in Borneo and from its neighbours in Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines (268). Brunei, recently oil-rich and apprehensive of Chinese influence, stood aside. Merger was a divisive issue in Sarawak, where communism was making extensive inroads into its large Chinese population. Local opinion was canvassed by a commission led by Lord Cobbold (recently retired governor of the Bank of England). The results were sufficiently reassuring for the scheme to go ahead.

The Greater Malaysia project was of close personal concern to Macmillan. He was looking for ‘significant economies’ in defence expenditure in South-East Asia (269): ‘our limited resources and our growing commitments elsewhere make it essential that we should gradually reduce our military and colonial responsibilities in South-East Asia’. He described himself as ‘extremely anxious that it should come off’. However, he was conscious of the practical difficulties, and was not going to superintend either the creation of a ‘partial power vacuum’ or a shot-gun wedding. At the end of 1961 he warned Lord Selkirk (commissioner-general, South-East Asia) that ‘Merdeka Day’, independence, could not realistically be achieved as early as August 1962: ‘it might well be fatal to the whole project if we appeared to be rushing our fences, particularly in relation to the Borneo territories’. Equally, though, he took a firm line with the faint-hearts. The governor of North Borneo, Sir William Goode, was suspicious both of federations in general and of the Tunku’s intentions, clearly reluctant to ‘hand over’ to him, complaining darkly that Borneo had already once been ‘steam-rollered’, by the Japanese. Unless the Tunku seemed more co-operative and prepared to give some real help to its people, ‘Malaysia must be off’. Macmillan picked up the two telegrams in which these views were advanced and he reacted crossly to what he thought was the governor’s lack of understanding of the realities of the situation:

I am rather shocked by [this] and the attitude it reveals. Does he realise (a) our weakness in Singapore, and (b) our urgent need to hand over the security problem there? The whole mood is based on a false assumption of our power. If this is the Colonial Office point of view, we shall fail.

This confidential note was meant for Brook, but by accident a copy of it was sent by the Cabinet Office to the secretary of state for the colonies. Both Maudling and the
CO staff were angered by it, Maudling replying to Brook that the governor was ‘fully aware’ of the importance of Malaysia.\footnote{119}

Indonesia officially declared its opposition to Malaysia on 13 February 1963, launching *Konfrontasi* (‘Confrontation’). There was armed incursion on the Kalimantan border on 12 April 1963, and British and Commonwealth troops were sent into Borneo (267, 270). President Sukarno withdrew his exhausted Indonesian troops in 1966, leaving Malaysia the victor of Confrontation. Meanwhile, Singapore had seceded in 1965.

\textit{(g) The West Indies Federation.} Few federations have failed faster than the West Indies, which lasted only from January 1958 to February 1962.\footnote{120} Though its antecedents extended back many years, its formal creation got off to a bad start. In Britain the Treasury, trying to save money, quibbled about the exact date when the Federation was to come into legal existence, but backed down (272). In the West Indies, at the federal government’s first press conference, its Barbadian prime minister, Sir Grantley Adams, shocked everyone by personal attacks on his political rivals and by threatening retroactive taxation.

The Federation had never been envisaged as ‘an end in itself’ (276), but rather as a device to enhance the prospects of West Indians for independence. These prospects were reviewed in the CO in May 1959 (275). Doubts were expressed as to their readiness, while Home at the CRO was anxious about the impact of early moves to independence on his Central African problem (273, 277). A federal intergovernmental conference of constitutional review, held in September 1959, was not exactly a success—indeed Philip Rogers (an assistant under-secretary at the CO), who attended it, described it as ‘disastrous’. It settled little and in fact presaged the collapse of the Federation (279, 281). Governor-General Lord Hailes was determined to be optimistic, but this did not impress the CO or dent its gloominess. The CO would have preferred a more active attempt to promote the fragile Federation. Macleod was ‘not sure how I read the tea-leaves’ (281). In December 1959 Grantley Adams caused consternation by calling for Dominion status within months. Macleod paid a visit in June 1960 and said he would do all he could to speed the advance to independence. Macmillan toured the islands in March and April 1961; most of the concerns put to him were financial. The Lancaster House Conference in May and June 1961 quickly ran into trouble, causing Macleod considerable alarm. If the Federation failed, it would mean ‘balkanisation’, leaving behind a gaggle of indigent islands and a very anxious American neighbour. His colleagues would not allow him to divert funds from Africa—a clear demonstration of the low priority accorded to the West Indies. Agreement was, however, reached to strengthen the Federation and work for independence by 31 May 1962 (283). Everything was then overtaken by a referendum in Jamaica (19 September 1961) which voted 54.1 per cent to withdraw from the Federation. The British government decided it could neither stop the dissolution of the Federation, nor refuse Jamaica’s request for independence on its own (284). Macleod was saddened, but with the examples of Cyprus and Sierra Leone before him, felt he could not resist.\footnote{121} Dr Eric Williams, the historian-prime minister of Trinidad, declared a new arithmetical proposition—‘1 from 10 equals 0’—and withdrew his country too, which also had to be granted independence (286). A possible reconstruction into a federation of the remaining eight came to nothing (284–288). In 1967 St Lucia,
St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St Vincent, Dominica, and Grenada entered into ‘associated statehood’ with Britain.

Why did the Federation fail? On the face of it, the West Indies should have been eminently suited to co-operate in a single government. They had a common language, a common heritage, and a common devotion to cricket and calypso and (mostly) to Christianity. Air travel was beginning to reduce the distances between them. The total population (three million) was about the same as Canada’s at the time of Confederation in 1867, but with the advantage of not being afflicted with a communal problem like Quebec. The most immediate explanation for failure offered at the time was that ‘the leadership was awful’ (280). There is no denying this. The leaders were variously assessed in the CO as irresponsible, immature, impatient and inefficient. Adams was ‘not big enough for the job’, unimaginative, tactless, rude, vain and lazy, quite apart from his failing health and mental powers. Hailes reported that it was being predicted that Adams would become ‘a West Indian Mussadiq’, retiring to bed whenever things looked dangerous. Rogers complained of Sir Grantley’s ‘appalling inadequacy’. But as Rogers had also recognised from the outset, if Manley did not ‘go to the Federation’ and become its prime minister, ‘it will be so weak that its survival is doubtful’ (272). The leading politicians put ‘the second eleven’ into bat, and then unsportingly refused even to give any encouraging shouts from the boundary (276).

The failure of all worthy institutions and projects is, however, invariably ascribed to ‘poor leadership’, and as a historical explanation it does not take us very far. Did the fault lie rather with the compromising looseness of the federal structure? The West Indies undoubtedly had one of the weakest federal systems ever called into existence. There was no common currency or customs union. There were restrictions on inter-island migration. The only responsibilities of the central power were for external relations, communications between the islands, a university college, and a regiment, the last two together pre-empting half the federal budget. That budget was tiny, only one-tenth of the revenue of either Trinidad or Jamaica. No direct taxation was ever raised, no common postage stamp ever issued. Many federal powers were left dormant. But this structural laxity was an effect of the weakness of commitment to the Federation rather than its cause.

The roots of failure were in fact to be found in the fundamental unsuitability of the units for federation, their congenital incompatibility, the result of ‘centuries of isolation, mistrust and mutual ignorance’ and jealous ‘local particularism’. The ten were unequal in weight: Jamaica had over half the total population, Trinidad a quarter; both were far ahead of the others in economic development, nervous of having to bail them out. Once the large mainland colonies of Guiana and Honduras stood aside, the rest were mainly competitive and not complementary in their economies. Only five per cent of exports were between the islands. The smaller ones were highly disparate. Barbados, with a unique constitution, had been self-governing since 1639. St Lucia, a coaling station, had been disputed between Britain and France, and although British since 1814, it still relied on the Quebec civil code and Roman Catholic schools; its population mostly spoke ‘a queer patois of antique French warped by a rustic kind of English’. St Vincent was dependent on arrowroot. Montserrat was minuscule (only thirty-two square miles), dominated by a sinister mountain and, Hailes thought, ‘a strange kind of Irishness’; Nevis he described as ‘almost sullenly poor’. The Cayman Islands (some 200 miles west of
Jamaica), preoccupied mainly with tourism and turtle fishing, were neither wholly in nor wholly out. Technically members of the Federation, they were not represented in the federal legislature nor did they contribute anything financially.124

Colonial economic and social policies
The officials involved with colonial economic policy defined its purposes as follows: (i) raising the standard of living of colonial peoples, including productivity and diversification, (ii) strengthening economies to stand on their own feet for self-government, and (iii) maintaining the conditions for the inflow of external capital.125

Aid was given through a combination of Colonial Development and Welfare, grants-in-aid, the Colonial Development Corporation, access to the London loan market, and private investment. The mechanics of the way this assistance was given to colonies was carefully analysed for the benefit of the incoming secretary of state, Macleod, in October 1959 (306).

There was of course a fundamental problem. Desirable objectives were too great for Britain’s resources (302), and the external financial position was precarious (301). Macmillan during his premiership was never free from anxiety about over-stretched economic resources (42). This led him, for example, summarily to dismiss a plea to spend more on the High Commission Territories (482). A climax to this perennial problem was reached in the middle of 1961, with a balance of payments crisis, ‘more serious than at any time during the past ten years’.126 An emergency budget was introduced on 25 July 1961. Three days later the prime minister wrote to all spending ministers asking them to scrutinise their expenditure with the utmost stringency. The CO had already a year earlier set a ceiling on colonial expenditure (307), and the need for restraint on aid was well understood.

Another general anxiety concerned the state of the Sterling Area. Sterling was a volatile currency during this period. As a framework for British policy-formation, the Sterling Area was already beginning to fall apart. Gradually its Commonwealth side became less important, and the foreign side, especially the oil producers like Kuwait, became more important. The balances of the major African members of the Commonwealth declined slowly. Although the Sterling Area did not formally come to an end until 1972, ‘much of the rationale underlying [it] became redundant by 1958’.127 This was because the Montreal Trade and Economic Conference of Commonwealth ministers in 1958 recommended convertibility, in the interests of working together ‘in no exclusive spirit towards a multilateral trade and payments system over the widest possible area’. Most of the restrictive aspects of the Sterling Area system were dismantled, and sterling made convertible, soon after the Montreal conference, though Britain continued to give preference to investment in sterling countries. Economic planning generally moved further towards internationalisation. None of which made decolonisation any harder.

Uncertainty about the future behaviour towards the Sterling Area of colonies nearing independence gave rise to much debate. In this context, the Treasury reviewed the advantages of membership in October 1958 (305). There was anxiety about the possibility of newly independent countries like Malaya, Ghana and Nigeria leaving the Area (300, 304). These countries had been amongst the principal dollar-earners for the Sterling Area during the 1950s, and their continued earning power remained a matter of concern to other members. They had large sterling balances. If they ran sizeable balance of payments deficits and drew in their sterling balances—as
INTRODUCTION

India had done—this would become a serious problem for Britain and the Area. The chances of South Africa's leaving were also investigated (442). Most Treasury officials did not think it would technically matter too much—and certainly less than it would have done ten years earlier—if South Africa withdrew. The Bank of England showed more alarm than the Treasury, arguing that the defection of the world's leading gold producer would be seen as psychologically a major crack in the Sterling Area system. In the event, South Africa remained inside despite her departure from the Commonwealth in May 1961.

To illustrate what was happening in the field of economic development we have concentrated on a case-study. Swaziland was a notable example of intensive economic improvement under 'the late colonial state', which showed just what could be achieved, given the chance. The post-independence prosperity of Swaziland was almost entirely due to the measures taken in the years covered by this volume (see map, p 38, part II). Before the 1950s very little had been done, apart from setting up an asbestos export industry in 1938 at Havelock, which became one of the five largest asbestos mines in the world. Within a period of ten years, however, by the end of 1964 a trans-territorial highway and railway line to Mozambique, connecting Swaziland to the port of Lourenço Marques (Maputo), had been completed; a central power-scheme, a new iron-ore mine at Ngwenya, and a coal-mine at Mphaka had all been opened; and an industrial estate at Matsapa (with Swaziland's first cotton ginnery) was almost fully operational. The Ngwenya mine supplied high-grade iron ore to Japan. In 1950 a government-run cattle-holding area at Impala Ranch (25,000 acres) was established for cattle culled from over-stocked herds. The timber resources of 80,000 acres of forest in northern Swaziland were exploited from 1955. In 1959 the Usutu Pulp Company was formed to process the timber of a 107,000-acre estate of pine (and some eucalyptus), the largest man-made forest in Africa. Several irrigation schemes were completed, the biggest at Malkerns, over 6,000 acres, with a diversified output, notably rice and citrus fruits; there was also a large irrigated dairy-farming area in the north, and, a little to the south of it, the Vuvulane sugar-producing scheme. By 1962 sugar had become Swaziland's major export. Nearly all of these were Colonial Development Corporation projects, and among its few unequivocal successes. Central to all these developments was the completion of the freight railway operated by the Caminhos de Ferro de Mozambique. The track followed a route first surveyed eighty years earlier, along the Usushwane river valley out of the mountainous highveld, and linked many of the new industrial enterprises: 139.5 miles in all. It gave Swaziland an outlet to the sea independent of South Africa. The progress of the railway project was monitored at the highest ministerial level, with Macmillan taking a particular interest (310, 311, 323–326).

During the period represented here, government attitudes towards aid underwent a significant shift. Aid to developing countries was coming to be generally accepted as desirable. Amounts were increased throughout the world, and new international institutions were set up to handle it. Aid became a major new theme in international relations. For Britain, the politics of aid upset all economical calculations. Since both the communist and western worlds tried to attract the unaligned nations, the latter could in this competitive situation 'sell their favours dear', in Macmillan's sardonic phrase (541). Accordingly, as he explained to the Cabinet in February 1962 (in the context of Uganda), the costs of relinquishing colonial rule were proving to be high, but it was 'probably better to accept definite, if large, financial commitments on
independence than to take the risk of the indefinite and large expenditure involved in prolonging colonial rule against the risk of a collapse of law and order’ (134).

The traditional attitude of ‘no independence before financial viability and no aid after it’ was still in place in 1957, with the test of viability being the ability to raise money on the London Market. In May 1957 the Economic Policy Committee reaffirmed its opposition to any regular system of Exchequer assistance (government capital) for independent Commonwealth countries, and refused to empower the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) to start new development schemes in them (302). The Cabinet in June endorsed this hard-line policy (303). Accordingly, the White Paper of July 1957 declared magisterially and categorically, ‘the special responsibility which HMG has for colonial dependencies ceases when they achieve independence’ and further CDC investment would therefore be ‘inappropriate’.130 Parliamentary debates in January had already uncovered a lot of dissatisfaction over these rules, but the CO, the CRO and the Treasury had all agreed the Ghana Independence Bill should retain the clause precluding new CDC operations (327, 328). Only a short time afterwards, however, all these policies went into sharp reverse. The rapidity of political advancement made it virtually impossible in all but a few instances for colonies to borrow on the London Market, and it became politically necessary to continue giving aid after independence.

The major move forward came as a result of the policy inaugurated at the Montreal Conference of 1958 (313), after which colonies could continue to expect to receive, once independent, financial help much as they would have done had they remained dependent. Commonwealth assistance loans were provided for independent countries. In the light of this, by mid-1959 a good deal of pressure had built up to do more by way of financial help for newly-independent Nigeria than had been done for Ghana. The kind of assistance to be given was considered closely (330–332). Like Ghana, Nigeria did not get any aid, but it did receive one of the new Commonwealth assistance loans. The financial debate was extended early in 1960 to the West Indies Federation (333) and Sierra Leone (107, 334–335). Countries reaching independence were now generally allowed technical assistance (mainly the services of experts and advisers), and any unspent CDW allocation, together with a Commonwealth assistance loan. Otherwise there was a reluctance to move beyond this, and certainly to regard the more generous provision made in 1960 for Somaliland and Cyprus (239) as special cases. But then a transitional annually tapering financial grant for up to ten years was proposed for the West Indies Federation by the CO (333). This would be an important and unwelcome new departure, but seemingly unavoidable, given its circumstances. Improved financial assistance was still not easy to achieve, and the debate about it was regularly renewed (352). Both Tanganyika (August 1961) and Uganda (February 1962) obtained fairly generous settlements (134, 156). The chances of applying simple, uniform, minimal, arithmetical formulae were fast disappearing.

Plans for the renewal of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act were started by Lennox-Boyd in February 1958 (312), to cover the quinquennium 1959–1964. It was expected that the poorer countries would continue to need grants for as long as could be foreseen. The Treasury accepted in principle the need for further aid, but there was tough negotiation over (a) the amount, and (b) even more so, the ceiling on new Exchequer loans for approved development schemes, introduced (to the delight of the CO) in parallel with the Commonwealth assistance loans agreed at
Montreal. The points at issue with the Treasury were recorded in CO minutes in December 1958 (315, 319). Formal representations were made by Lennox-Boyd (316) for raising the ceiling on money available by an extra £80 million in grants (to £300 million) and for providing £125 million (or £25 million a year) to underwrite Exchequer loans for colonial development programmes. The Treasury was unconvinced, and a face-to-face meeting was held between the two ministers on 2 January 1959 (318). The CO did quite well in the bargaining (319). The 1959 CDW Act was the fifth since 1940 and provided an additional £95 million, together with £100 million for Exchequer loans, with an annual ceiling of £25 million. Officials met in the summer of 1962 to discuss the next CDW Act, to come into operation from 1 April 1963 in accordance with the usual one-year overlap procedure. The result was the Commonwealth Development Act, 1963, which provided £103 million. In his circular to governors (18 November 1963) Sandys asked them to submit integrated development plans instead of unrelated shopping-lists of schemes.132

The other change which reflected the general loosening predicated by the Montreal policy was the transmutation of the Colonial Development Corporation into the Commonwealth Development Corporation in mid-1963, when it was re-organised and freed to operate in independent countries. The debate about its future had begun in 1956.133 That the CDC survived in any form is perhaps surprising, granted its poor track record and huge losses. At least thirty out of thirty-five CDC schemes for producing food were failures. Whether or not the chairmanship of Lord Reith (to the end of March 1959) should be counted an asset or a liability is no doubt a matter for dispute. He was unpopular outside the organisation, over-persistent, aggressive and difficult to deal with. ‘Old Wuthering Height’ was how Macmillan referred to him; ‘is there no way of getting rid of this turbulent Peer?’134 Nevertheless, Reith’s tenacity undoubtedly saved the CDC. The CO, the CRO and the Treasury were all prepared to see it wound up, but it gradually became apparent that the CDC had too many friends in parliament, and it would not be politically feasible to kill it off (321–322). Macleod commented on a ‘mystic belief’ in it, or something like it, and a possible ‘great outcry’.135 Lord Sinclair of Cleeve was appointed to find a solution to its special losses account, running at about £9 million (321), though the government in the end took a tougher line than he recommended.

One other major new departure in the provision of aid should be noted. In April 1960 the CRO put forward a ‘constructive and positive non-political initiative’ for Africa: an economic plan for aid analogous to the Colombo Plan (1950) for South-East Asia, but restricted to Commonwealth countries both as recipients and donors (336). It was hoped this might help to persuade independent countries of the value of the Commonwealth, while at the same time spreading the load for Britain. This proposal was put before the Africa Committee and blessed by them, rather to general surprise.136 The response of the CO had been lukewarm, dismissing it as ‘economic imperialism’ or ‘window-dressing’. The FO disliked the exclusion of foreign countries and also thought it open to a charge of ‘neo-colonialism’. The Treasury was sceptical as to whether any substantial funds would be forthcoming from the Commonwealth, in which case it might be a discreditable flop (337). The scheme was, however, referred by the Cabinet to the Development Policy Committee for further study—mainly because Nkrumah coincidentally proposed, at the May 1960 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting, something similar (338). So it seemed that if Britain did not take a lead, Ghana, or even Canada, might make proposals prejudicial to British
freedom of action. The pros and cons were thus finely balanced. The official committee recommended a plan (in its ‘Report on Commonwealth co-operation in African development’, 15 July 1960) confined to technical (as opposed to capital) assistance, not necessarily restricted to Commonwealth countries, provided they were in the western camp (340). The scheme emerged from the Commonwealth finance ministers’ meeting in September 1960 as the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan (SCAAP), with the particular support of Canada, together with Australia and New Zealand. It provided some capital as well as technical assistance, ie, capital aid was not actually excluded. Many were disappointed by this limited outcome, but it was obvious that the resources for doing more were not forthcoming (343, 344).

Three other matters concerning the management of aid had to be considered. First, whether or not aid should be ‘tied’. In fact the traditional policy of not tying aid to British goods and services (307) broke down in mid-1962 in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1961 (349). Thereafter aid was tied. Untied aid had become a problem. It constituted a significant pressure on the balance of payments, and Britain was being badly left behind because all other donor countries were tying aid to their own goods and services or to the import costs of development. A distinct change of outlook was registered in the Economic Policy Committee on 31 October 1962 (350), when Home argued that aid should be treated like defence, diplomacy and information services—as an instrument of policy, to be used in the maintenance of British influence and strength abroad, ‘an essential part of our policy of maintaining our position in the face of the Communist threat’, and a means of reducing tension between the haves and have-nots. He wanted a greater proportion earmarked for non-Commonwealth countries. In discussion, the Committee thought Latin America might now be a more useful recipient than Africa. Africa was thus almost visibly slipping in importance (353), and the whole conception of ‘colonial’ aid was on its way out. Secondly, the government tried to persuade the Americans to contribute more to aid. The United States was prepared to help in the Caribbean, and if the West Indies Federation had survived, the Americans would have provided generous aid, regarding it as a barrier against Castroism (so the offer was withdrawn when the Federation broke up). By the same token, they were not willing to help Guiana, led by Dr Jagan, supposedly a communist. But they showed some interest in helping East Africa. Finally, there was the question of adequate publicity for aid. A good many ministers, MPs, and businessmen were concerned that the improved aid effort was not making enough impact, and an attempt was made to rectify this (347, 351).

To conclude on aid policy: by 1964, the amount of aid to developing countries had been greatly augmented, from £81 million in 1957-1958, to £161 million in 1960-1961, and about £170 million in 1963–1964. The proportion going to colonies remained considerable. The days of disinterested aid were, however, long gone, and officials were now debating whether aid should be used directly as a cold war weapon—overall policy was as yet unclear about that (353). Nevertheless, in the final analysis, aid was still not regarded as a matter of the highest political priority. An examination of the government’s record in social policy and research shows a striking decline in the bulk of archival material over that generated for the 1940s and early 1950s. These were spheres of action readily handed over to indigenous elites, and the demand for CO services was falling. Independence—even the
INTRODUCTION

approach of independence—meant an end to responsibility for colonial research. It also meant an end to any social engineering, to any justification for attempts to mould labour relations or colonial trade unions (355, 358, 359). The Trades Union Congress was contracting its overseas activities, and ‘under the impact of African nationalism any reversal of this trend is now out of the question’ (359). Not that there were no anxieties about the abuse of regulatory powers by independent governments. Ghana and Singapore virtually ‘nationalised’ their trades unions, bending them to their own political purposes, and this greatly shocked British officials. Tanganyika was also a cause of similar concern, but it could only be dealt with ‘informally’ (361). Also, by 1958, the idea of a royal commission to examine colonial education in Africa was thought too heavy-handed and likely to cause resentment by implying that Africans needed to be told what to do (356). An adequate education policy, though, remained a matter of high concern, since a sufficient number of educated people was obviously vital to the success of every newly-independent state. However, education was one of the first subjects to be taken over by local governments as they became more representative. This was probably just as well, since a more active policy of promoting colonial education—or indeed any other social welfare policy—would have been extremely costly for Britain. Sir John Maud failed to secure additional expenditure on education for the High Commission Territories (482).139

In the light of subsequent public preoccupations, the amount of attention given in these years to tourism, or even to the environment (360), was very small. But here too, at the time when these might have begun to surface as higher priorities, it was already too late for the metropolitan government to take a lead, still less to coordinate matters such as game preservation between various territories. By 1960 directives of this kind were recognised as ‘inappropriate today’ and ‘out of keeping with the degree of constitutional advance’ in Africa (360).

Ministers were, however, alert to human rights issues. In 1957, during the making of the Malayan constitution and negotiations for the future of Singapore, the local political leaders (including Tunku Abdul Rahman) demanded constitutional provisions which strengthened the executive at the expense of the judiciary and appeared to British ministers to put fundamental civil liberties at risk; these changes were only reluctantly accepted.140 As foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd early in 1958 placed the defence of free institutions and human rights (where they existed) alongside the preservation of world peace and stability as the objectives of foreign policy. Where human rights did not exist, British policy was ‘the encouragement of trends which will result in ordered progress towards them’ (379). Racial discrimination certainly existed in the dependent empire (eg, in Bermuda: 354), but nowhere on the systematic scale of South Africa. Mrs Bandaranaike of Ceylon saw the departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961 as driven by the unwillingness of other members ‘to compromise on an issue affecting human rights’ (457); Lord Hailes rejoiced that there had been ‘a clear affirmation of democratic principles... an unequivocal stand for human rights’.140

The Ghanaian constitution made no mention of fundamental rights. The first African constitution to do so was Nigeria’s in 1958, which embodied, indeed entrenched, virtually all the clauses of the European Human Rights Convention (103–105). This highly significant new development arose out of suggestions to the Willink Commission (investigating the anxieties of Nigerian minorities) made by
Christian bodies campaigning for a guarantee of fundamental rights. Willink’s comment was persuasive:

Provisions of this kind in the Constitution are difficult to enforce and sometimes difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, we think they should be inserted. Their presence defines beliefs widespread among democratic countries and provides a standard to which appeal may be made by those whose rights are infringed. A Government determined to abandon democratic clauses will find ways of violating them, but they are of great value in preventing a steady deterioration in standards of freedom and the unobtrusive encroachment of a Government on individual rights.¹⁴²

It is a matter for speculation whether the Nigerian constitution would have gone in this direction had Willink been swayed by the demands—made by almost all other witnesses—for separation and state-proliferation as the means of protecting minority rights. As it was, sixteen human rights were listed in the Nigerian constitution, covering life and liberty, the administration of justice, social freedom, religious rights, and discrimination. When Macleod moved the Second Reading of the Nigerian Independence Bill in July 1960 he went out of his way to praise the constitution’s ‘code of fundamental human rights’, adding that it had been extremely useful as a model for many of the constitutional conferences which he had presided over since.¹⁴³ Kenya (163, 164), Uganda and Sierra Leone rapidly adopted it; Butler insisted on a bill of rights for the Nyasaland constitution in 1963 (509). Thereafter it became almost mandatory.

Macleod also invoked ‘human rights’ as part of his reasoning behind the release of Dr Banda (495). The declaration of states of emergency involved having to satisfy the Human Rights Commission before a proclamation could made or revoked: alternative and less embarrassing procedures were explored, not least for Kenya (23, 24). What happened at Hola Camp had clearly breached the Human Rights Convention (159). There was concern too that breaches were alleged by the Greeks in 1957 protesting about the ill-treatment of detainees in Cyprus and the application of curfew (221). Conversely, consideration was given to the possibility that countries which attacked Britain for its ‘colonialism’ might themselves be vulnerable to counter-charges of contravening human rights (414, 415).

International policy
By ‘international policy’ we mean relationships with foreign countries concerning colonial questions, mainly those with America, with Europe and in the United Nations. All of these occupied important positions in British policy-making: the United States by providing financial underpinning and strategic cover, together with supportive advice and unwelcome irritation in about equal measure; Europe by acting as, in effect, a potential alternative to the Commonwealth; the United Nations by forcing the pace of decolonisation.

The post-war world was at once profoundly anti-imperial and in the West anti-communist. Fortunately for Britain, the Americans came to believe that communism was a more serious threat than ‘colonialism’, but anti-colonialism was a world-wide movement, exploited not just by communists, but also affecting countries which had never been colonies, and often led by those Asian and African states to whom Britain had given independence sooner rather than later. Thus even Hilton Poynton of the CO realised that the international climate had become ‘a more decisive factor’ to be
INTRODUCTION

taken into account in the formulation of British policy (405). Contextualising Africa
in cold war terms became almost an obsession, to the point where by 1961 Sir
Andrew Cohen was worried that ‘killing communism’ seemed to be the chief
objective of African policy, rather than the desirability of preparing stable and viable
regimes for independence (382). Analysis of Soviet expansion, its aims, methods and
success-rate, was repeatedly undertaken, together, where appropriate, with those of
Chinese communism. In particular, the situation in Africa was subject to close and
regular scrutiny (39, 132, 383, 387, 390). More specifically, Ghana was the object
of concern and intense interest. The high commissioner, Sir Arthur Snelling, quite
clearly identified Ghana as ‘a key battleground in the cold war’. The dilemma was: if
Britain did not help Ghana a clear field would be left for the Russians to appear her
only true friend; but helping the corrupt ministers surrounding Nkrumah, such as
K A Gbedemah and K Botsio, might well back-fire. Snelling’s valedictory despatch
raised the sombre possibility of Ghana’s leaving the Commonwealth and leading a
pan-African, anti-British movement (384, 386).

The prospects of communism in India were analysed closely by Malcolm
MacDonald (7). South-East Asia was examined reflectively by Fred Warner of the FO
towards the end of 1963 (388). Macmillan attempted a global over-view in a
memorandum he called ‘The grand design’ produced over the Christmas holidays,
dated 3 January 1961. It was a typically elegant but theoretical essay calling for co-
operation between the United States, Britain and France, because ‘the Communist
danger—in its various forms—is so great and so powerfully directed that it cannot be
met without the maximum achievable unity of purpose and direction’. In a sentence
which resembled one of Ernest Bevin’s, he called for ‘the great forces of the free
world’ to organise themselves ‘economically, politically and militarily in a coherent
effort to withstand the Communist tide all over the world’, and in particular to use
their economic power more efficiently. It is perhaps a little surprising that only three
years later his successor, in a notable speech in Canada, was able to identify a double
nearly at an end’ and ‘positive co-existence’ had emerged, signalling a foreseeable end
to the cold war. It was therefore time to move on and tackle the ‘problem of
problems’, the disparity between rich and poor nations (389). Reports of the death of
the cold war proved to be an exaggeration, but the worst was perhaps over.

Of all Britain’s international relationships, none was more vital than that with the
United States. In the aftermath of what Macmillan revealingly referred to as ‘the
Anglo-American schism’, the Suez Crisis of 1956 rebuilt the American
relationship was a top priority. One obstacle to this was what was regarded in
Whitehall as the negative, unreconstructed and prejudiced attitude of the Americans
(in at least some quarters of Washington) towards British ‘colonialism’. The CO
urged the prime minister not to flinch from tackling this as soon as possible (374,
375). The Bermuda Conference in March 1957 offered a good opportunity. The State
Department and the British Embassy in Washington collaborated in presenting a
paper on ‘Means of combating Communist influence in tropical Africa’. In it, they
agreed that ‘the best counter to Soviet aims is to pursue resolutely and systematically
the constructive policy of leading dependencies as rapidly as is practicable toward
stable self-government or independence in such a way that these governments are
willing and able to preserve their political and economic ties with the West’. At one
of the meetings, the foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd suggested that Africa was ‘likely
to be the great battle of the next ten years. The battle of the Middle East had caught us unawares; we must be ready for the battle of Africa'. The meeting agreed that the communists did indeed aim to dominate Africa; and the Americans accepted that the British ‘evolutionary’ approach to decolonisation was right (376). The British felt all this represented a considerable advance towards a better understanding between the two nations (377). By October 1957, Lloyd claimed that the ‘special relationship’ was restored. Macmillan believed with satisfaction that the two had agreed on their ‘interdependence’ (378). What this meant in practice never became entirely clear.

The Americans were increasingly interested in Africa, especially once Kennedy became president. Being more interested made them better informed, and this in turn meant, the British believed, that the US government was more understanding of and less ready to criticise British policy. They did not put pressure on Britain to proceed any faster with decolonisation (380). Even over Central Africa, where a legitimate critique could have been forcefully developed, they seemed to become more sympathetic and patient, perhaps because they had concluded that there was no immediate threat of communist infiltration.

The contrast between this relaxed indulgence over Rhodesia, and the truculent pressure the Americans tried to exert over Guiana shows just how far they evaluated British performance in cold war terms. Guiana posed a serious strategic risk to the Americans, since it would be as ideal a location for Russian missiles as Cuba, and because it could prove to be the thin end of the wedge for communism in Latin America. Home dealt firmly with the American attempt to retard independence in Guiana and instigate a CIA operation against Dr Jagan. Macmillan wrote ruefully in his diary, ‘The Americans are the first to squeal when “decolonisation” takes place uncomfortably near to them’ (295). In June 1963 Kennedy again insisted on pursuing his Guiana concerns with Macmillan, but the British had no profound interest in the territory and were only anxious to be rid of it. In any case, as Home pointed out, they could not possibly revert to direct rule without destroying Britain’s image as a decolonising power. Sandys, however, was not altogether unmoved, slowed things up a bit and made two visits. The voting procedure was changed to proportional representation—something the CO had hitherto opposed (299). As a result, Jagan held only twenty-two seats as against twenty-nine by his opponents, and on this basis independence was eventually granted in April 1966.148

Apart from this one exception, relations with the United States in the colonial field had become fairly smooth. Even so, the Anglo-American relationship as a whole in 1964 needed almost as much careful nurturing as it had in 1959 (13, 391).

Problems with the United Nations consumed immense quantities of time, energy and paper. One over-arching theme dominated British relations with the UN in this period: whether or not (in the mid-1950s) to resign from it, or one of its agencies, or (in the early 1960s) to withdraw from its specialist Committee of Seventeen (later Twenty-Four) which was charged with overseeing the termination of ‘colonialism’. In general terms, it was desirable that the UN should function as an effective guarantor of world peace, and so leaving it would be dangerous, ‘an abdication of responsibility’ (404). On the other hand, the hostility to British colonial policy displayed therein was embarrassing, and the UN’s determination to extend its influence over all colonial territories was an unqualified nuisance. The arguments were finely balanced, and there was no agreed British position. As permanent British representative on the Trusteeship Council (1957–1961), Cohen wanted a
modification of the previous rigid line. He recommended remaining forthright and firm, but also being forthcoming and flexible. Poynton disagreed (‘I have always been, and unashamedly remain, on the extreme right wing over this’), regarding Cohen’s approach as ‘extremely distasteful’. Macleod said he shared Poynton’s anxieties, but felt it would be wise to follow Cohen’s advice.\textsuperscript{149}

Then in December 1960 came the epoch-making Resolution 1514 (XV), demanding ‘a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism’, sponsored by forty-three Afro-Asian nations, Britain and the United States abstaining. The Resolution maintained that unpreparedness must not be made a pretext for delaying independence, and target dates should be set. How to deal with this was the subject of an anxious memorandum by Sir John Martin in June 1961 (406). The Committee of Seventeen was established to implement the Resolution, or at least to monitor progress (November 1961). However, in the General Assembly 1961 debate on colonialism, a Soviet-inspired resolution for an early and general target date (the end of 1962) was killed off. Even Krishna Menon of India opposed this, saying that immediate independence for South-West Africa and the High Commission Territories could only condemn them to indefinite South African domination.\textsuperscript{150} A Nigerian resolution for a date of 1970—which the British government could have accepted—was withdrawn (407). Similarly, in the 1962 Assembly, a target-date proposal was again defeated, failing to secure a two-thirds majority. An earlier motion by Guinea and the communist bloc for setting 24 October 1963 as the date encountered considerable opposition, including Nigeria’s.\textsuperscript{151} The upshot was that the Committee was merely instructed to report on all colonial territories the following year—so far it had concentrated on Africa. These were helpful ‘modifications’ of the Resolution 1514 from the British viewpoint, making it easier to remain in what had now become the Committee of Twenty-Four. Nevertheless, a chain of developments had been started which Britain could not ignore: if some territories at least were not ‘speeded up’ it would look as if no notice at all was being taken of Resolution 1514 (538).

Much of the internal debate was focused in the early months of 1962.\textsuperscript{152} It was triggered by Sir Hugh Foot’s memorandum of 22 December 1961 (409), arguing that although Britain could not tolerate interference in the administration of colonies, total non-co-operation must only be a last resort. This point had not yet been reached. In a Churchillian metaphor, he proclaimed his battle-plan: ‘We should fight on the resolutions. We should fight in the corridors. We should fight in the Committees. We should never abstain’. The CRO welcomed this, and wondered whether the initiative might not be taken by making a declaration of intent about colonial policy. Sandys himself drafted a possible declaration or resolution, committing Britain to a completion of the transfer of power by 1970. Both Macmillan and Home (who paid close attention to all UN matters) liked the idea (414). But Maudling did not, apparently influenced by Poynton, who reiterated that the only real choice was between co-operation or withdrawal (410). A declaration, it was also pointed out, might be dangerous (‘what would happen to the Falklands if they became independent?’), as well as self-congratulatory. The Africa Committee was asked to consider. It was unhelpful about the prime minister’s angle on this, perhaps being unwilling to give him an outright rebuff (416). The CO and FO were more blatantly dismissive (415). Maudling continued to press for a firm line against the Committee of Seventeen (410).
Foot had talks in London in March 1962 and found himself depressed by Poynton’s attitude (417). After an exchange of minutes (418, 419), Maudling and Home had talks on 30 March to try to resolve their differences. The only way forward was to present an agreed general analysis and let the pros and cons be argued out at Cabinet. The Cabinet in effect decided against Maudling’s more intransigent line (422). The possibility of a formal declaration of policy was discussed again in June 1962, but the CO reacted against it, thinking it would be counter-productive and seen as a hypocritical attempt to divert attention from Southern Rhodesia, on which Britain would be attacked by India, Tanganyika, and Ghana, all arguing it was the most important example of ‘colonialism’. Southern Rhodesia was certainly the principal reason for Britain’s difficulties, ‘an absolute liability’ (423). In August 1962 Foot expressed his concern that Britain was perceived as the friend of Welensky, Salazar, Verwoerd and Tshombe (428). In October 1962 he resigned, warning that the government was drifting to disaster over Southern Rhodesia. He thought Britain spoke with the petulance of a retired governess, ‘conservative’ in the worst sense, ‘negative, defensive, cowardly, sterile’.153

After Foot’s resignation, Sir Patrick Dean remained as Britain’s principal representative at the UN but his views were similar: the Committee was not a serious threat, so it would be more sensible to remain on it and act as a tormenting gad-fly, rather than behaving like an early Christian facing the lions. There was a major discussion on tactics again in July and August 1963, with the familiar array of arguments.154 The CO officials believed it was damaging to be exposed to such vehement attacks, and too much goodwill was being used up in trying to mobilise the support of friends. Opinion within the office was, however, divided between the options.155 The FO supported Dean, believing the communists would like Britain to ‘run away’; to leave would only make the Committee more extremist and tarnish Britain’s image as a modern, sympathetic, reasonable nation. In short, the conclusion of this latest round of exhaustive discussions was once again that the balance of advantage was in favour of ‘soldiering on’.

The Congo was the scene of the UN’s most high-profiled involvement during the early 1960s. In 1959, the Belgian government, faced with riots and revolts, offered self-government on a progressively telescoping time-table. Diverse political parties emerged. Their leaders—Lumumba, Kasavubu, Tshombe, Mobuto, Gizenga, Bomombo—all had utterly different intentions for the Congo’s future, and established competing power-bases (‘more like the Crazy Gang’ than anything I can remember’: Macmillan, diary, September 1960).156 Lumumba came to seem dangerous because he appealed for Soviet aid. Eisenhower and Macmillan agreed it would be good if he could ‘fall into a river full of crocodiles’.157 By contrast, Tshombe, who led the secession of the mining province of Katanga in July 1960, seemed much more congenial, able, and friendly to the West, and he kept fair order in his prosperous province. However tempting it may have been, the British government consistently refused to recognise his regime. African states would have regarded recognition of Katanga as a ‘colonialist’ attack on the unity of the Congo; but there was a thousand-mile border with Northern Rhodesia, and what if Northern Rhodesia broke with the Central African Federation and joined Katanga? (392).

* A group of five or six music-hall comedians (originally three double-acts: Flanagan & Allen, Nervo & Knox, Naughton & Gold), popular on the London stage in the 1950s.
Both Macmillan and Home were apprehensive of ‘another Korea’, and, in Home’s case, ‘another Spanish Civil War’, if the Russians supported the rest of the Congo against Katanga (394). ‘Russia was the whole problem’, or so Macmillan told Kennedy in 1962. Thus, from the beginning, the Cabinet supported a UN presence as the best hope of stabilising the Congo and preventing armed communist intervention and Soviet domination. To this extent the UN presence (opposed by the Russians) was a convenient instrument for the western powers to fill the vacuum. Britain agreed the UN could use a degree of force to maintain law and order, but not to impose a political solution (which might well fail). Katanga must be returned to the fold by negotiated settlement, Tshombe coaxed into co-operation with the central government, perhaps in a federal arrangement. A Foreign Office minister, Lord Lansdowne, had reported in September 1961 that any idea of an independent Katanga’s peacefully existing alongside a truncated Congo was a fantasy (396). The British government was opposed to the use of sanctions (399, 401).

Led by India and Nigeria, a number of Commonwealth countries were unhappy about British Congo policy (396). Malaya, Ghana and even Canada thought Britain guilty of equivocation. They were suspicious of pressure from the Central African Federation, sensitive about any supposed lack of co-operation with the UN. Home appealed to the United States for closer co-ordination of their policies (397), and, since stalemate persisted Macmillan repeated the appeal directly to Kennedy in May 1962 (398). By this time, Home and Macmillan favoured a package of financial aid and technical assistance, to which Britain would contribute, organised by the UN and channelled to a federal state (399). Both sides were to be offered economic aid for reconstruction as an inducement to co-operate in a negotiated settlement (400). Home claimed Britain was genuinely keen to see Katanga reincorporated: ‘we are not dragging our feet simply with a view to delaying the application of the “wind of change” to our own territories’ (40). Britain remained opposed to sanctions, but the UN held to a different view (401, 402), wanting to expedite the ending of the Katanga secession by increasing the economic pressure on Tshombe. The Cabinet agreed not to participate actively in an international embargo on purchases of Katangan copper or in measures designed to prevent by physical means the passage of exports from Katanga, because this would probably fail (403). Attempts at reconciliation of Tshombe came to nothing. The final UN campaign against him was relatively bloodless. The dire consequences feared by Britain did not materialise. Tshombe capitulated in the middle of January 1963. The Cabinet decided against British intervention or attempting to rescue Tshombe from the predicament he had got himself into, despite the support he had among some Conservative MPs. Sanctions would not be actively opposed.

The main concern of the government throughout the Congo crisis was to try to stabilise the situation. According to Home—who had a dim view of Africans in this part of the world—‘unless we are very careful we could get a belt of chaos from Angola, through the Congo, Ruanda–Urundi to Kenya. That would be a dreadful prospect’. The limits of British influence were, however, painfully obvious in that although the Russians were kept out, the crisis was resolved in ways largely outside British control. What happened in the Congo was a cautionary tale in several senses; governors were asked for their opinions about the lessons to be learned.

It is not possible within the confines of this collection to do justice to Britain’s first application to join the European Common Market (EEC). We have concen-
treated on a selection of documents recording the bare bones of the leading Cabinet decisions, of which the most important was on 18 June 1961, when the formal decision was taken (365). A major factor in moving towards Europe was that this was what the Americans (for cold war geopolitical reasons) wanted Britain to do. Another was the hope of savings on Britain's contribution to NATO defence (80). The Cabinet was divided, in part because of Commonwealth considerations. Much attention was paid to reconciling possible membership with the interests of Commonwealth countries, especially those of Australia (540, 543), New Zealand and Canada, all of which had serious worries about the consequences, not merely for their own trading relationships with Britain but also for the impact on the strength of the Commonwealth should British links with it unravel. African states indicated concern that the Community might perpetuate, through arrangements of ‘association’, their inferior relationship with their former colonial masters. In July 1961—following the precedent of 1949 when ministers were sent to Commonwealth countries to sound out opinion on the continuation of India's membership as a republic—Sandy's was dispatched to Australia, New Zealand and Canada, Thorneycroft to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Singapore and Malaya, Perth to the West Indies, Edward Heath to Cyprus, and John Hare to Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia (366). The results of this consultation were given to the Cabinet on 18 July 1961 (368). At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in September 1962 Macmillan, who had been prepared for ‘grumbling acquiescence’, was shaken by the vehemence of the doubts expressed. Nevertheless, an unusually full and informative communiqué recorded agreement that the application would go ahead (372, 373). The government's answer to Commonwealth criticisms was that initial shocks and adjustments could be overcome, and that in the long run British political and economic strength would decline outside the European Community, eventually leading to a permanent weakening of the whole Commonwealth. Consultations continued right through the period of negotiation until de Gaulle delivered his veto on 14 January 1963.

Southern African problems
Not many parts of the empire or Commonwealth saw such a catalogue of unexpected dramas as Southern Africa in the first half of the 1960s. Arriving as high commissioner in January 1959, Sir John Maud had no idea that within little more than a year a British prime minister would tell the South African parliament for the first time, and once and for all, that its policies were objectionable; that in just over two years South Africa would leave the Commonwealth; and perhaps most remarkable of all, that by the time his term ended in 1963, independence for the three High Commission Territories, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, would have become a live issue. During the decade of the 1960s historic objectives were achieved. For South Africa a republic, for Britain disengagement without too much dishonour, and for the Basotho, Swazi and Tswana peoples a fresh chance to live their own lives in their own way. Seretse Khama and Sobhuza II both emerged, against the odds, as national leaders, though in sharply contrasting modes, and did so at about the same time Nelson Mandela began his long imprisonment. British policy towards South Africa always walked a tightrope between cooperation and containment, between the demands of national interests and the necessities of international reputation. Any apparent condoning of apartheid put in
jeopardy British relations with Afro-Asian states; but there were plausible reasons for maintaining mutually beneficial economic and defence connections with South Africa, and above all for not provoking any South African hostile move against the High Commission Territories. The continuation of over-flying rights was also vital (and quietly confirmed after departure from the Commonwealth). By the end of 1959, South Africa’s patience was about to be tested by a combination of steps which would be extremely unpalatable: a multi-racial constitution for Bechuanaland, purposeful economic development for Swaziland, and the withdrawal of Britain’s ‘support’ in the international arena.

The substantive point of policy embedded in the ‘wind of change’ speech was a warning that South Africa could no longer expect British support at the United Nations. Cohen, as British representative on the Trusteeship Council, had wanted to put more distance between the British and South African positions. By November 1959 it was clear to officials that the balance between maintaining good relations with the Union and improving the British reputation at the UN needed correcting; but the CRO was anxious not to push South Africa to the ‘parting of the ways’ by handling this in the wrong way. Macmillan’s visit provided exactly the right opportunity for engineering the change of policy. A draft Cabinet memorandum was now turned by Home into a personal minute to Macmillan. It is the pivotal document of Anglo-South African relations in the ten years before 1961. Its most striking propositions were an admission that the Commonwealth would ‘undoubtedly be happier and closer-knit were the ugly duckling out of the nest’, and an argument that South Africa was ‘a liability to the West’ in the cold war.

The test of the new policy was not long in coming. When in April 1960 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the Sharpeville shootings in March, Britain voted for it. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in May 1960 Eric Louw (the South African foreign minister) raised the question of whether South Africa would be welcome as a member after becoming a republic. This was regarded as premature and ham-fisted, but the signs were not encouraging. Alarm-bells began ringing for Macmillan, and in the months before the next meeting he wrote letters to Diefenbaker of Canada and Nehru of India, urging them at least to come to it uncommitted on this serious issue, for ‘there is a real danger to the whole Commonwealth structure and the beginning of a break-up now’. Meanwhile, officials had been at work for some time assessing the probable effects of a South African departure. Maud’s advice was to try to keep South Africa in (as the best way of helping the Africans); while CRO officials briefed the prime minister to argue tactically to the last in favour of South Africa’s remaining, but, if it came to it, to follow majority opinion and acquiesce in departure, though ‘still with every show of reluctance’.

At the crucial Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in March 1961, the general mood initially was that South Africa might be given one more chance. Verwoerd threw this away, gratuitously causing offence on the afternoon of the first day by launching into a defiant defence of apartheid, and, in the evening, by refusing a last-minute appeal from Macmillan to agree to accept high commissioners from other Commonwealth countries. Next day, there was an appreciable hardening of attitudes, articulated in particular by Diefenbaker and Mrs Bandaranaike of Ceylon. Undoubtedly shocked, Verwoerd asked for time to consider his position.
overnight. The following day he formally withdrew his request for continuing membership as a republic. A despondent Macmillan was consoled by Home (459).164

The departure of South Africa did not solve the central problems of Anglo-South African relations. South Africa could not be treated as if nothing had changed (461), and, in Brook’s words, they had to avoid any suspicion that South Africa ‘having jumped out of the Commonwealth window, is being let in again by the back-door’.165 Nevertheless, the old imperatives to keep on terms as good as possible with South Africa, despite apartheid, in a reasonable working relationship, remained. The British government had to continue to treat South Africa as half-ally and half-untouchable at the same time, uneasily balancing on the tightrope between provocation and conciliation. Always, it had to be remembered that, in the long run, there would almost certainly be a black government in Pretoria. If British policy seemed to the Africans too unsympathetic they might turn to the communist bloc (463): ‘if an eventual explosion in South Africa (assisted no doubt by outside forces) led to the installation of a pro-Communist Black Government, this would be a crowning disaster’ (469). Hard decisions had to be taken about voting on UN resolutions about sanctions (464, 468, 470, 472). In June 1964 the government voted for a resolution in the Security Council condemning apartheid, but remained opposed to economic sanctions, mainly because it believed they would hurt Africans, and do ‘irreparable damage to Basutoland, and serious damage to Swaziland and Bechuanaland’. On arms sales, a distinction was drawn by the Cabinet between weapons which might be used for internal repression and those required for external defence (474).

The future of the High Commission Territories had for so long been considered in terms of their vulnerability to South African expansionist pressure and in the face of repeated South African demands to take them over, that it proved hard for all sides to adjust their policies to any other framework, even after the departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth put a formal end to the possibility of a transfer of administration (475, 479–481, 485). As late as May 1963 Maud saw the future of the three territories as ‘inextricably bound up with that of the Republic’, and self-determination as therefore probably ‘the most difficult of all our dilemmas in Southern Africa’ (462). Geographically and economically, Basutoland was particularly problematic: could it ever aspire to real independence? Nevertheless, with the encouragement of its constitutional adviser, Professor D V Cowen, and its resident commissioner, A G T Chaplin, this is what by 1962 it did aspire to. Modern political parties were founded in all three countries between 1959 and 1962, mainly in response to announcements of constitutional reform. Bechuanaland and Basutoland had Legislative Councils by 1961 (475, 477, 483), Swaziland by 1963. Further advances were agreed in 1964 for Bechuanaland and Basutoland (488, 491), though not without nervousness as to the South African reaction. The decisions were momentous, but South Africa kept quiet, and their progress was relatively smooth, leading to independence in 1966.

Swaziland dropped a little behind, and provides a fascinating exception to the classic pattern of fruitful co-operation between British proconsul and national leader in the transfer of power—Mountbatten and Nehru, Arden-Clarke and Nkrumah, Maurice Dorman and Milton Margai, Turnbull and Nyerere, Glyn Jones and Hastings Banda, even Peter Fawcus and Seretse Khama. That Brian Marwick, of all people, should fall out with Sobhuza was surprising. Marwick had grown up in Swaziland, and spoke siSwati perfectly; he had spent most of his career there (apart from six
years in Basutoland and three in Nigeria), and he had written the standard anthropological account of the Swazi. But his friendly relations with Sobhuza withered away in disillusionment as the latter became ‘too obsessed with his personal position to act in a statesmanlike manner’. The course for Swaziland had been set by Maud early in 1959: long-term policy was ‘the creation of a non-racial state’. Marwick also was firmly committed to ‘the establishment of a non-racial democracy’. Sobhuza, the Swazi National Council, and the European settler community, in more or less unholy alliance, would have none of it. They preferred a multi-racial power-sharing in a Leg Co divided 50:50 between Europeans and Swazis, and no elections on a common roll (486). This was completely at odds with British decolonisation policy in general, and all officials believed it would only pile up trouble for the future. There had to be scope, they believed, for meeting changes which were bound to develop rapidly in Swaziland as elsewhere, and the constitution had to commend itself to the rising generation of educated Swazi (490). Moreover, it was important not to fail in creating a non-racial state, if only because a successful Swazi model might have a beneficial effect on South Africa. A constitution was therefore imposed in 1963 by the secretary of state. Marwick refused to allow Sobhuza a plebiscite on this. In January 1964 Sobhuza went ahead with his referendum notwithstanding, asking the Swazi to choose—in effect—between ‘the lion’ (himself) and the ‘reindeer’ (Marwick). (It should be noted that while the lion was a recognised symbol of Swazi royalty, the reindeer is an animal unfamiliar to Africans.) The exact figures are disputed, but by any standards there was an overwhelming demonstration of support for Sobhuza. Marwick left Swaziland, angrily cursing ‘in some quarters, an impenetrable conceit, a clutching at crutches to support limping traditions, a Canutism in the face of the rising tides of new thoughts and experiences which are flooding our Swazi backwater’. In the end, in 1968, after a series of concessions by the Labour government, Swaziland became independent under Sobhuza as king.

The Commonwealth
According to Canada’s Lester Pearson, the Suez Crisis ‘brought the Commonwealth to the verge of dissolution’. This was not just because most of the other members were upset by the lack of consultation, but because they were shocked, and disapproved of the whole venture. In marked contrast to his exertions to restore the Anglo-American relationship, Macmillan did little to mend fences with the Commonwealth. His reflections at the time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in July 1957 were decidedly languid and rhetorical. What was to be the future of the Commonwealth?—clearly it was entering a new phase, an ‘inescapable evolution’: ‘the stream of gradual change was now to be augmented into a fast-flowing river, which might soon break its banks through its torrential force’. How could the mystique which kept the old organisation together be maintained? Well, he would have to try at least ‘to guide these disparate forces into a common faith’. In practice he did not do much. His tour of India, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand in 1958 was undertaken more to restore a show of governmental vitality ‘when things were at a low ebb’ than to strengthen the Commonwealth chain. He retained a sentimental attachment to his old Commonwealth relationships and was aware of the Commonwealth as a useful psychological cushion for the end of empire. Moreover, it was an increasingly valuable instrument to keep communism at bay. Its
unity was therefore important, and one of his main efforts as prime minister centred on the attempt to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth, thus running the risk of cutting himself off from the only element of ‘common faith’ which had any real potential, commitment to a multi-racial future. Of course the trouble was that Macmillan did not like the changes brought by Afro-Asian membership. In characteristically Edwardian metaphors, he complained privately that it was no longer like gaining admission to Brooks’s but joining the RAC (Royal Automobile Club).173 It had changed from a ‘small and pleasant country-house party’ into a ‘sort of miniature United Nations’ (541). Selwyn Lloyd was convinced that Macmillan and Macleod, for all their rhetoric, did not really care about the Commonwealth, and he urged Home upon becoming prime minister to effect a ‘change of emphasis’ and set about fostering Commonwealth links, despite the difficulties (549). Home was not unresponsive (550).

Those difficulties were of course formidable. As Lloyd himself wrote, the facts were ‘that the Africans are opposed to us over Southern Rhodesia, that Mr Nehru has never really liked us, that Australia does not buy our aircraft, that Canada discriminates against us, that there are wide differences over attitudes towards Communism’. Sir Patrick Dean deplored the lack of cohesion between Commonwealth members at the United Nations, where the attacks they led on Britain were a public demonstration that the Commonwealth concept was, he believed, ‘empty of political content’ (548). The ambassador in Addis Ababa, John Russell, reported that the Commonwealth delegates to the conference of thirty-two heads of independent African states in May 1963 were disunited; most of them avoided his embassy like the plague; ‘in Africa the expression of Commonwealth is about dead’.174 Sir Norman Brook thought the only common link with any continuing relevance was speaking the English language, which at least might carry ‘a constructive promise’ of openness to the same ideas (544).

It was against this background that officials wrestled to find a renewed role for the Commonwealth (550-553). Plainly it could not be made into a self-sustaining economic unit; it was not significant in power terms; but in theory at any rate it ought to give Britain enhanced standing in the world, and it could have a valuable function in keeping developing countries out of the Soviet bloc. It ought to be able to form a bridge between advanced and developing nations. It had roots in every part of the world except, marginally, Latin America. Its very existence might be a good answer to charges of ‘colonialism’. In a more visionary interpretation, its diversities might even be made constructively complementary (529). An officials’ investigation into the ‘intangible links’ in 1960 concluded that it was ‘a very vigorous social organism’, promoting useful contacts between professional people, students, and sportsmen, although too many of these relationships were only bilateral with Britain (535).

On the other side of the balance-sheet, the Commonwealth was threatened by the weakening of sterling, by the unreconcilable opinions and ‘unreliable behaviour’ of some the new independent leaders, and by intra-Commonwealth disputes, notably the ‘grim hostility’ between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (529). Above all there were the three problems of the increasing size of the club, of immigration into Britain, and of the European Common Market negotiations. The probable impact of British entry into Europe was disturbing because so incalculable, but it certainly seemed from the periphery as if the government might be prepared to go in on any
terms, regardless of Commonwealth interests. As to its growth, by 1962 the Commonwealth was ceasing to a relatively small group of relatively large countries (544): decolonisation had created the problem that the tail was now uncomfortably wagging the dog (542).

What could be done to make the expanding Commonwealth function more effectively? A declaration of principles was rejected (530). A Commonwealth court of appeal never got off the ground (533, 537). The possibility of a Commonwealth Youth Trust came to little, though the government did agree to build 5,000 new hostel places for overseas students (536). It was decided in 1958 that Empire Day must be renamed Commonwealth Day (531). Much the most useful achievements, however, were those of the Montreal Trade and Economic Conference in 1958, which pioneered the way for a better deal on aid for newly independent countries (p lxiv above), and took a significant initiative in the field of education. The British team, led by Home, put forward a plan which, according to him, was received with acclamation and has proved itself of very considerable value. The Conference proposed a scheme of studentships and fellowships (target: one thousand) to be funded by Commonwealth governments, in the hope that the Commonwealth would ‘increasingly furnish new opportunities for its young people’. The other recommendation was to encourage co-operation in education generally, especially the supply and training of teachers. A Commonwealth Educational Conference was held at Oxford in July 1959 to give effect these recommendations, followed by a conference held in New Delhi in January 1962 to review progress.175

‘Islands’, Macmillan once remarked, ‘can become rather a bore, whether in the Mediterranean or in the Pacific’. 176 What was known as the ‘Smaller Colonial Territories’ problem was undeniably intractable. At issue was the question of whether they could be members of the Commonwealth, or even independent at all. Two-tier membership was rejected by the Cabinet in 1955,177 but the idea refused to die; indeed, as the Commonwealth got bigger, the scheme revived, it being argued that it might be more acceptable once larger numbers of smaller units were to be excluded from the first tier (561). A concept of 'statehood' (self-government in domestic affairs, but dependence on Britain for defence and external affairs) had been put forward in 1955 for the small fry who would fall short of Commonwealth membership. At the end of 1958 the CRO suggested that Brook’s committee on the subject should take another look at ‘statehood’, in the context of the rapid growth of nationalism and a possible agreement on Cyprus. The prime minister approved, and serious work started in March 1959, a report being completed by June of that year. The committee preferred the CO’s title of ‘Commonwealth state’ to the CRO’s recommended ‘associated state’ (563) as the designation for a ‘comfortable half-way house’ between self-government and independence. Such states would not attend Prime Ministers’ Meetings. There was, however, by this time no question of any independent states being relegated to a second tier: such possible future members as the West Indies Federation, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. The report was never considered by ministers because of the impending autumn election, but in April 1960 Macmillan proposed that a group of Commonwealth (not merely British) officials should reopen investigations under Brook’s chairmanship. Brook’s study group concluded in July 1960 that within the next decade membership of the Commonwealth would probably rise from seventeen to twenty-four and could well double. Such an increase might not be unmanageable, and it was certainly desirable
in principle to grant only full membership to all (534). Cohen offered a critique suggesting that the timetable envisaged in paragraph 12 was too long drawn out and would make for ‘a rather hard road in front of us at the UN’:

We must not of course give way to international pressure which is irresponsible, but this kind of international interest will inevitably grow ... [and] seems likely to have its effect on opinion, in a number even of those small territories which have so far shown no signs of aspirations to independence.

For ‘international reasons’ therefore, finding a practical means of terminating colonial status would be a good idea, although a single ‘managed solution’ was impossible, Cohen thought, because of the policy of decentralisation, the special circumstances of ‘fortress colonies’, and the difficulty of concurrent international claims (he listed Aden, Honduras, Falklands and Basutoland).178

The estimates of July 1960 were, as Cohen had foreseen, quickly overtaken. Mauritius and Zanzibar were moving up the queue. In April 1962 the Chadwick Report revised the forecast to thirty or perhaps thirty-five Commonwealth members by 1970. This important document, ‘The evolution of the Commonwealth’, grappling with ‘a serious and immediate problem’, once again rejected all restrictions on membership. For the smaller territories, ‘free association’ was now the preferred term, because this could be aligned with a UN definition, and Western Samoa was now available as a model (545). Western Samoa became independent in January 1962 in a special agency relationship with New Zealand, approved by the UN. After consideration of the report in the CO (565), governors were asked in September 1962 for their opinions (566). Governors were informed that ‘mainly for international reasons’, the sooner ‘we can change our public posture the better’, since UN pressure was ‘likely to bedevil our international position for so long as we continue to be regarded as a colonial power’. Attacks might be pre-empted by removing the Smaller Colonial Territories as soon as possible from the purview of the UN. Pressure was building for ‘moving toward a final solution’ of this problem.179 One official described the whole notion of colonial status as now ‘a horrible embarrassment’ (565).

As luck would have it, the United Nations had itself provided a way out. Under Resolution 1541 (XV) of December 1960—not to be confused with the more general Resolution 1514 (XV)—a non-self-governing territory could become self-governing by (i) sovereign independence, (ii) ‘free association’ with an independent state, or (iii) integration with an independent state (46, 538). Integration with the United Kingdom as a solution scarcely survived its failure to be adopted for Malta, except as a possibility for the Falklands (565–567). The conditions of ‘free association’ were the consent of the state, ability to determine its own internal constitution, and to change its status at any time. These criteria did not seem too difficult to comply with, and ‘free association’ thus appeared to be a distinctly possible relationship for a number of British territories, among them the Falklands, St Helena, Pitcairn, Gibraltar, and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (46). Although the UN General Assembly debate in 1963 showed increasing concern over Smaller Colonial Territories, there was also a clear understanding that sovereign independence was not possible for all, and nothing was said which seemed to interfere unduly with the plans the British government were now working on. But there was a degree of urgency: the conditions of ‘association’ might be made harder to accept in future.180

One disappointment for Macmillan was that it proved impossible to arrange for
Australia and New Zealand to take over responsibility for preparing some of the Pacific islands for decolonisation (554, 565). It seemed to him an obvious way of reducing the colonial burden for Britain. In 1958, not only the prime minister, but Brook, the CRO, and the Official Committee on Colonial Policy—to say nothing of the duke of Edinburgh (9–10)—all hoped a ‘rationalisation’ of this kind could be achieved. But the CO opposed it and the Cabinet upheld the CO. An open battle developed between the CO and the CRO (555), the CO sticking to its traditional ethical concept of trusteeship, its duty to promote ‘political and economic advancement’ in the interests of the inhabitants, and arguing strongly that a transfer to Australia, with its ‘white Australia’ programme, would be dangerous (559). Nor were the Australians keen to acquire fresh responsibilities. It was decided in 1964 that the status quo would be preserved in the New Hebrides.

The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 removed the right of all British subjects, irrespective of colour or country of origin, to enter freely into the United Kingdom. For the first time a legal framework of restriction on immigration was enacted. Asian and black immigration had perhaps never been welcomed by British government, but for many years it was unwilling to check it by legislation. Between 1950 and 1961 ‘coloured immigration’ was discussed by the Cabinet on thirty-seven separate occasions, but the number of immigrants involved never seemed significant enough to justify taking such a problematic step.181 Although not finally able to influence immigration policy, the CO monitored the issue carefully, mainly from a West Indian perspective (568). Junior minister John Profumo acted as its representative on the Committee on Colonial Immigrants, which kept the general situation under regular review. Lennox-Boyd and Home had both played a crucial part in opposing a bill in 1955, and they were equally determined in 1958 that a similar bill—precipitated by a sudden increase in Indian and Pakistani immigration—should also fail (569). The Cabinet agreed once again in July 1958 that ‘legislation to control immigration from the Commonwealth was not yet required’ (571). Disturbances in Nottingham and Notting Hill (23 August to 2 September 1958) led to a reconsideration of this decision (572), but in fact the riots made it harder to make any major pronouncement about control. The CO worked hard to head off legislation by persuading West Indian governments to take administrative action as a means of reducing the flow at source (573, 574). Norman Manley agreed various ways could be found to produce a marked falling off from Jamaica.182 This administrative action was not ineffective, and there was a temporary drop in numbers. Although the Cabinet at around the turn of 1960 and 1961 found the position ‘disquieting’ (576), it was still reluctant to grasp the nettle (577, 578).

A brief prepared in the CO early in 1961 took the line that a stark choice lay ahead. Restrictions would create severe difficulties for West Indian governments and weaken the respect paid to Britain as the centre of the Commonwealth; but to leave things as they were could mean unacceptable and deteriorating social consequences at home. The issue was kept off the agenda of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in March 1961, but immediately afterwards Macmillan toured the West Indies, where Dr Eric Williams warned him legislation would result in ‘social revolution and a Castro situation’.183 In May 1961 Macleod successfully secured a delay in announcing legislation in order not to prejudice the results of the Jamaica referendum on its continued membership of the Federation. (Jamaica nevertheless voted to withdraw.) Macleod minuted in September 1961: ‘I have no doubt that the...
Cabinet will go ahead with this sort of a Bill. Sad indeed, but for myself I have thought it inevitable since the spring of this year'. And again, five days later: 'I detest the Bill and am painfully aware of its imperfections. But it is wiser to do it now than to wait'. Poynton agreed with him in 'disliking this intensely'. The Cabinet decision was taken on 10 October 1961 (580), on the basis of a memorandum by R A Butler, arguing that controls should be accepted as 'a sad necessity' because of the need to deal with the strain on housing resources and the danger of social tension created by large unassimilated communities. (The Treasury had expressly said there was no justification on economic grounds for restriction.) According to Butler, the bill was 'not inherently discriminatory': 'it purports to regulate flexible employment, but it will inescapably be seen as operating almost exclusively on coloured people'. The deciding factor was the rise in numbers: from 21,000 in 1959 to an estimate of more than 100,000 for 1961. In subsequent Cabinets, the resulting Irish anomaly was dealt with (581, 582); Macmillan—who found the whole policy 'hard and disagreeable'—was searching for the best way 'in common sense' out of a dangerous political position. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act did not solve the problem it was meant to tackle. This was apparent even before the Conservative government left office (583).
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

21 CAB 21/4634, note to Brook, 13 July 1961.
22 CO 35/7999, no 17, minute by Garner, 27 June 1956.
23 CO 352/1889.
24 CO 1032/202 & 203, minutes, Feb to Apr 1959; FO 371/146498, no 2 (1960).
26 CO 1017/770.
27 CO 1017/772.
28 CO 1032/144, no 9, minutes by Macpherson and Poynton, 20 Feb 1957.
29 CO 1032/146, minutes 23 & 25 May 1957.
31 CO 1032/144, no 12, Macpherson to Brook, 5 Mar 1957.
32 CO 1032/146, minute by Watt, 11 June 1957.
33 PREM 11/2617, minute, 4 Aug 1957.
36 CO 1032/167, minutes, 24 & 25 June 1958; FO 371/143707, no 75.
37 CO 1032/167, PM(59)25, 17 June 1959.
38 FO 371/143705, no 51.
39 FO 371/143707, no 72, minute, 22 Sept 1959.
40 CO 1032/170, minutes 24 July & 16 Sept 1959.
41 FO 371/152115.
42 CAB 134/1353, AF 8(59)3, 7 Apr 1959.
43 FO 371/137970, nos 5 & 12; 137973, no 31; 146505, no 4.
44 FO 371/146502, no 16.
45 FO 371/131550, no 4.
46 CAB 21/3155, to Brook, 1 Nov 1959.
47 CO 1027/143, nos 1 & 2.
48 CAB 21/3157.
49 CAB 21/3156, Maud to Hunt, 29 Dec 1959.
51 CO 1027/143, no 40; CAB 21/3157.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

56  CO 859/1477, minute, 8 Mar 1960.
57  CAB 129/101, C(60)66, 12 Apr 1960.
59  Quoted in Macmillan’s speech: see below, p 171.
64  FO 371/163972, memo by Sir R Stevens, 26 Mar 1962; FO 371/174489, no 27, note by W Morris, 2 Nov 1964.
66  FO 371/170165, no 13G.
67  CO 968/763, no 173.
68  FO 371/152131, no 38, minutes by Dean, 4 May 1960.
69  Shepherd, Iain Macleod pp 159–161.
71  CAB 128/33, CC 18(59)5; DO 35/7711.
72  CO 1027/177, no 11.
75  CO 936/572, to Eastwood, 26 June 1959.
76  DO 161/95, no 12, note, 30 Apr 1962.
77  Macmillan, Pointing the way, p 119.
78  CO 936/572, no 92, minutes of a meeting in CO, 20 May 1959; see also Eastwood’s remarks on 7 Apr 1959 (CAB 134/1353, AF 8(59)3), and Sir Leslie Monson’s recollections in A H M Kirk-Greene, ed, The transfer of power: the colonial administrator in the age of decolonisation (Oxford, 1979), p 29.
80  CO 1036/620, no 46.
81  Shepherd, Iain Macleod pp 168 & 181.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

83 CO 822/1450, no 249, to Turnbull, 25 July 1959.
84 CO 926/1310, no 1, minute by Huijsman, 1960.
85 Mansergh, ed, *Documents and speeches* intro, p 3.
87 CAB 129/75, CP(55)33, memo, 11 June 1955; FO 371/117635–117667.
90 CO 822/1450, no 254, tel to S of S, 29 Aug 1959, and no 274, tel to Monson, 9 Sept 1957.
91 CO 822/1449, no 227, tel to S of S, 10 May 1959.
92 CO 822/1450, minutes by Monson, 2 Nov 1959.
93 CAB 128/33, CC 60(59)8, Cabinet conclusions, 26 Nov 1959.
95 CAB 134/1560, CPC 1(61)2, minutes of Colonial Policy Committee, 6 Jan 1961.
97 PREM 11/3075–3078, & 3942–3945 are revealing.
98 Macmillan, *At the end of the day* p 295.
102 CO 1015/2233.
105 CO 1015/2274, no 61, 30 May 1960.
106 Macmillan, *At the end of the day* p 316.
108 CAB 130/189, GEN 775, no 1, minutes of meeting, 24 Oct 1962.
112 CO 1055/123, no 189.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

119 CAB 21/4847, M 161/62, minute to Brook, 21 June 1962.
125 DO 35/8409, brief.
127 Krozewski, ‘Sterling, the “minor” territories and the end of formal empire’ p 253.
134 PREM 11/4136, minute, 30 Apr 1957; Morgan, *Official history* vol IV p 139 n 135.
136 CO 852/2013, no 85A; DO 35/8777.
137 CO 852/1742 & 1743.
140 PREM 11/2659, PM(58)13, minute from Lennox-Boyd to Macmillan, 30 Apr 1958; CO 1030/486, Lord Reid to Lennox-Boyd, 8 July 1957.
144 DO 195/10, no 57A, Snelling to CRO, 10 May 1961.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

149 CO 936/679, minutes, 7 & 11 Feb 1961.
150 FO 371/166819, no 5, Dean to Home, 8 Jan 1962.
151 CO 936/877, no 1, circular from Sir J Martin to governors, 5 Feb 1963.
152 FO 371/166822, nos 64 & 77; 166824, no 106; 166825, nos 147 & 154; 166831, no 244.
154 FO 371/172591.
155 CO 936/877, no 1, circular from Martin to governors, 5 Feb 1963.
156 Macmillan, *Pointing the way* p 269.
159 CAB 128/37, CC 2(63)2, & CC 3(63)2, Cabinet conclusions, 3 & 10 Jan 1963.
162 FO 371/166326, 166327, & 167140, no 9.
164 Home, *The way the wind blows* pp 135–136; Evans, *Downing Street diary* pp 141–143.
172 CAB 21/3155, Macmillan to Brook, 1 Nov 1959.
173 CO 926/1196, recalled by Martin, minute, 11 Jan 1960; on other occasions Macmillan referred to Boodle’s rather than Brooks’s (PREM 11/3649, note by Bligh, 13 July 1960).
174 FO 371/167141, no 162.
176 Foreign secretary’s Private Office papers, FO 800/667, Macmillan to Sir R Scott, 9 Sept 1955.
179 DO 169/183, no 85.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

182  CO 1032/196.
## Summary of Documents: Part I

### Chapter 1 Colonial high policy, plans and surveys

#### (1) Future constitutional development in the colonies, 1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan to Lord Salisbury</td>
<td>Minute, future constitutional development in the colonies, + <em>Minutes</em> by Lord Salisbury &amp; Mr Lennox-Boyd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sir N Brook for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee</td>
<td>Memo, ‘Future constitutional development in the colonies’: general conclusions of survey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>P E Ramsbotham (FO)</td>
<td>Briefs for a meeting of permanent under-secretaries on future policy, + <em>Annex</em>: memos by CRO &amp; CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Officials’ report</td>
<td>‘The position of the UK in world affairs’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cabinet ‘General’ Committee meeting</td>
<td>Minutes, position of the UK in world affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mr M MacDonald (India)</td>
<td>Despatch, ‘Crystal-gazing in Delhi’: the future of India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan to Mr Selwyn Lloyd and others</td>
<td>Minute, future policy in the next ten years, + <em>Enclosure</em>: outlines for a study by officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan to Mr Lennox-Boyd</td>
<td>16 June 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Cabinet ‘General’ Committee meeting</td>
<td>9 July 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>CRO paper for Working Group (chairman, Sir P Dean)</td>
<td>30 July 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>R W B Clarke (T) to Sir P Dean</td>
<td>4 Aug 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Joint secretaries’ paper for Working Group</td>
<td>6 Oct 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>C G Eastwood (CO) to W A W Clark (CRO)</td>
<td>16 Oct 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>C Y Carstairs (CO) to Sir H Poynton (CO)</td>
<td>20 Oct 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>C Y Carstairs &amp; R J Vile (CO)</td>
<td>5–12 Nov 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Officials’ Committee report (chairman, Sir N Brook)</td>
<td>24 Feb 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Sir Gladwyn Jebb (Paris) to Sir P Dean</td>
<td>23 Mar 1960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) **Africa: the next ten years, 1959**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Cabinet Africa (Official) Committee meeting</td>
<td>14 Jan 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Officials’ Committee report (chairman, B SJ Trend)</td>
<td>20 June 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mr Selwyn Lloyd, P de Zulueta, Mr Eccles, Mr Macmillan, Mr Lennox-Boyd, Mr Heathcoat Amory</td>
<td>28 June–30 July 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>British &amp; Canadian officials’ meeting in Ottawa</td>
<td>26 Nov 1959</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## (4) Democracy and security, 1959–1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Mr Lennox-Boyd for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee</td>
<td>29 June 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting</td>
<td>5 Nov 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>C A G Wallis, R S Hudson, E R Hammer &amp; Sir H Poynton (CO)</td>
<td>14 Dec 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–4 Aug 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>FO paper for Planning Steering Committee</td>
<td>8 Mar 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>–1 Apr 1961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Mr Macleod (Labour) to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td>25 May 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Lord Home for ministerial sub-committee on Africa</td>
<td>25 June 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td>29 Dec 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan</td>
<td>3 Feb 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 9(60)2</td>
<td>16 Feb 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>CRO paper</td>
<td>[27 Apr 1960]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td>31 May 1960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### (6) The remaining British colonies, 1963–1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Memo, colonial problems in 1961</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Minutes, discussion of colonial problems in 1961</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Record of meeting, discussing African policy with the prime minister</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>‘Policy towards Africa south of the Sahara’ [Extract]</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Letter, commenting on situation in Africa</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Memo, ‘Future constitutional development in UK dependent territories’</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Minute, ‘The tasks ahead’</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Summary of Documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Memo, colonial problems in 1961</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Minutes, discussion of colonial problems in 1961</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Record of meeting, discussing African policy with the prime minister</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>‘Policy towards Africa south of the Sahara’ [Extract]</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Letter, commenting on situation in Africa</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Memo, ‘Future constitutional development in UK dependent territories’</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Minute, ‘The tasks ahead’</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**The remaining British colonies, 1963–1964**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Memo, colonial problems in 1961</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Minutes, discussion of colonial problems in 1961</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Record of meeting, discussing African policy with the prime minister</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>‘Policy towards Africa south of the Sahara’ [Extract]</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Letter, commenting on situation in Africa</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Memo, ‘Future constitutional development in UK dependent territories’</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Minute, ‘The tasks ahead’</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 2  Strategy and defence policies

(1) 1957–1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Mr Sandys to Commonwealth PMs’ meeting</td>
<td>8 July 1964</td>
<td>Statement on decolonisation: ‘The remaining British colonies’ 231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting</td>
<td>18 Mar 1957</td>
<td>Conclusions, statement on Defence White Paper, 1957 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Mr Lennons-Boy to Lord Selkirk (Adm)</td>
<td>28 May 1957</td>
<td>Minute, colonial implications of long-term plan for naval reductions 235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Gen Templer (CIGS) for COS Committee</td>
<td>11 Aug 1958</td>
<td>Memo, ‘A policy for the Middle East’  [Extract] 237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan to Sir R Welensky</td>
<td>31 Aug 1958</td>
<td>Tel (T 467/58), rejecting idea of an African defence pact to meet Soviet threat 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Mr Selwyn Lloyd (FO) to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td>9 May 1959</td>
<td>Minute, future military posture in the Persian Gulf 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Lord Home for Cabinet Defence Committee</td>
<td>5 June 1959</td>
<td>Memo, likely Commonwealth reactions to a military intervention in the Middle East, especially for the protection of Kuwait 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>F A Bishop (PM’s Office) to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td>8 June 1959</td>
<td>Minute, Middle East military plans: Kuwait and Iraq 243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting</td>
<td>23 June 1959</td>
<td>Conclusions, negotiations about establishment of an air staging-post at Gan (Maldives) 244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan for Cabinet Defence Committee</td>
<td>21 Aug 1960</td>
<td>Note, ‘Military strategy for circumstances short of global war’ 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Cabinet Defence Committee meeting</td>
<td>2 Nov 1960</td>
<td>Minutes, ‘Defence implications of West Indian independence’ 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>COS Committee meeting</td>
<td>6 Jan 1961</td>
<td>Minutes on the strategic importance of East Africa  [Extract] 254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) **1961–1964**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan to Mr Watkinson (MoD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Cabinet Defence Committee meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Mr Watkinson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Cabinet Defence Committee meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Cabinet (Official) Committee on Defence meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Sir R Stevens (FO) to Sir H Caccia (FO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 48(63)/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Mr Butler (FO) to Sir A Douglas-Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Cabinet Defence &amp; Overseas Policy Committee meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Interdepartmental paper for Cabinet Defence &amp; Overseas Policy (Official) Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Cabinet Defence &amp; Overseas Policy Committee meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Sir W Luce (Bahrain) to R S Crawford (FO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>D C P Gracie (FO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3  Administrative structures

(1)  *Overseas Civil Service*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Mr Lennox-Boyd to Mr Thorneycroft (Exchequer)</td>
<td>9 Apr 1957</td>
<td>Letter on HMOCs; proposed agreements with Nigerian government about serving officers, + Minutes by A R Adair, J Chadwick, W A B Hamilton &amp; J M C James (CRO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Lord Home to Mr Thorneycroft</td>
<td>16 Apr 1957</td>
<td>Letter on HMOCs; proposed agreements with Nigerian government about serving officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>CRO circular to high commissioners</td>
<td>30 Dec 1957</td>
<td>Tel (no 550), on proposed organisation for HMOCs (Overseas Service Bill)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 44(60)7</td>
<td>21 July 1960</td>
<td>Conclusions, proposed reductions in costs of Overseas Civil Service scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 46(60)1</td>
<td>26 July 1960</td>
<td>Conclusions, approval of Overseas Civil Service scheme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2)  *Whitehall organisation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Sir G Laithwaite (CRO) to Sir J Macpherson (CO)</td>
<td>25 June 1958</td>
<td>Letter on CO/CRO liaison in approach to independence, + Minutes by Mr Alport, Lord Home &amp; Sir G Laithwaite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Meeting between CO &amp; CRO officials</td>
<td>23 July 1959</td>
<td>CRO minute (by M E Allen): discussion of CO/CRO liaison on Nigerian affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>O R Blair (CRO)</td>
<td>8 Oct 1959</td>
<td>Minute, suggested amalgamation of CO and CRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Mr Alport (CRO)</td>
<td>[10 June] 1960</td>
<td>Memo, ‘Future of the CRO’, + Minutes by Lord Home, Mr Macmillan, Mr Macleod &amp; T J Bligh [Extract]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Cabinet Office paper</td>
<td>2 Mar 1961</td>
<td>Brief on Department of Technical Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan to Mr Vosper (Dept of Technical Co-operation)</td>
<td>12 July 1961</td>
<td>Minute, responsibilities of the new office of secretary for technical co-operation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4  West, East, and the Horn of Africa

(1) West Africa

100  Mr Lennox-Boyd for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
     7 May 1957  Memo, Nigeria: forthcoming constitutional conference 339

101  Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting
     13 May 1957  Minutes, Nigeria constitutional conference 343

102  Cabinet meeting CC 42(57)4
     22 May 1957  Conclusions, Nigerian constitutional advance 345

103  M E Allen, A W Snelling, Sir H Lintott, D L Cole & Sir G Laithwaite (CRO)
     8 Aug –21 Oct 1958  Minutes, on Nigerian political situation and constitutional proposals 346

104  Cabinet meeting CC 71(58)5
     11 Sept 1958  Conclusions, resumption of Nigeria constitutional conference 353

105  Mr Lennox-Boyd
     20 Oct 1958  Cabinet memo, progress of Nigerian constitutional talks 354

106  Cabinet meeting CC 81(58)9
     18 Nov 1958  Conclusions, relations between Ghana and Guinea 357

107  Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting
     18 Mar 1960  Minutes, finance and defence implications of independence for Sierra Leone 358
(2) **East Africa: general, Uganda and Zanzibar**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan 25 Apr 1960</td>
<td>Minute, briefing for visit of Sir Milton Margai (Sierra Leone) 359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan 9 May 1960</td>
<td>Minute, Nigerian defence agreement 360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>Mr Sandys to Mr Macmillan 28 Aug 1960</td>
<td>Minute (CRO note), Nigerian defence: proposal to meet costs of training Nigerian military personnel in Britain 361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Mr Macleod 12 Jan 1961</td>
<td>Cabinet memo, ‘Future of the Gambia’ 363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 2(61)6 24 Jan 1961</td>
<td>Conclusions, future of the Gambia 365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 15(61)5 21 Mar 1961</td>
<td>Conclusions, approving proposals for the future of the British Cameroons 366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 31(61)7 13 June 1961</td>
<td>Conclusions, future of Southern Cameroons on independence 367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 36(61)6 29 June 1961</td>
<td>Conclusions, future of Southern Cameroons 369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>Mr Lennox-Boyd for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee 10 Apr 1959</td>
<td>Memo, ‘Future policy in East Africa’ 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>Cabinet Colonial policy Committee meeting 17 Apr 1959</td>
<td>Minutes, future policy in East Africa 382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 2(60)4 18 Jan 1960</td>
<td>Conclusions, East African land forces 383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>Mr Macleod for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee 4 Feb 1960</td>
<td>Memo, proposals for constitutional reform in Uganda 390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting 8 Feb 1960</td>
<td>Minutes, discussion of the Wild Report on Uganda constitution 393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>J W Stacpoole, F D Webber, W B L Monson &amp; Lord Perth 11–26 July 1960</td>
<td>Minutes, current political problems in Uganda 395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Watkinson (MoD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Conference of East African governors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Lord Kilmuir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>Mr Macleod for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>Mr Macleod for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>B E Rolfe, W B L Monson, &amp; Sir H Poynton (CO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>J C Morgan, W B L Monson, Sir H Poynton, Mr Fraser, Lord Perth, F D Webber &amp; Sir J Martin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>Meeting between Mr Maudling &amp; Sir G Mooring (Zanzibar)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>W B L Monson &amp; Lord Perth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 17(62)/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>J C Morgan &amp; W B L Monson (CO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>Sir W Coutts (Uganda) to Mr Sandys</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>Mr Sandys to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td>16 Oct 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minute on future policy for Zanzibar constitutional development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>Mr D W S Hunt (Uganda) to G SJ Chadwick (CRO)</td>
<td>4 Dec 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter, prospects for East African federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>Sir B Trend for Cabinet Defence &amp; Oversea Policy (Official) Committee</td>
<td>4 Feb 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Note, ‘The policy implications of [security] developments in East Africa’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) **Tanganyika**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>Sir R Turnbull (Tanganyika) to W L Gorell Barnes (CO)</td>
<td>13 Jan 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter, proposed timetable for constitutional advance in Tanganyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>Sir R Turnbull to W L Gorell Barnes</td>
<td>12 May 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter, proposed constitutional advance, + Minutes by Mr Amery, F D Webber, W L Gorell Barnes, Sir J Macpherson, Lord Perth &amp; Mr Lennox-Boyd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>Sir R Turnbull to W L Gorell Barnes</td>
<td>4 July 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter, economic and financial issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>Sir R Turnbull to W L Gorell Barnes</td>
<td>13 July 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter, constitutional development, + Enclosure: letter from Sir R Turnbull to Sir F Crawford (Uganda), 9 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>Mr Macleod for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee</td>
<td>12 Nov 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Memo, ‘Constitutional development in Tanganyika’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>Meeting between Sir R Turnbull &amp; Mr Macleod</td>
<td>16 Nov 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CO note of discussion on policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting</td>
<td>20 Nov 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minutes, ‘Constitutional advance in Tanganyika’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>W B L Monson, Sir J Martin, Lord Perth &amp; Mr Macleod</td>
<td>3–18 July 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minutes, procedures for grant of Tanganyika independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148</td>
<td>Sir R Turnbull to W B L Monson (CO)</td>
<td>30 July 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tels (nos 125 &amp; 127), formation of new government, + Minutes by W B L Monson &amp; Mr Macleod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149</td>
<td>W B L Monson (CO) to Sir R Turnbull</td>
<td>25 Aug 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tel (no 137), constitutional advance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td>22 Nov 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minute, discussions with Mr Nyerere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [151–165]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>W B L Monson, J C Morgan &amp; Sir J Martin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 Feb – 7 Mar 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minutes, constitutional development: the title of prime minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Sir R Turnbull</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 Feb 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tel (no 67), alarm of the governor of Kenya about advance in the date of Tanganyika independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>Mr Macleod for Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 Feb 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Memo, ‘Independence of Tanganyika’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>Sir R Turnbull to Mr Macleod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 Mar 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Letter, title of prime minister for chief minister of Tanganyika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>W B L Monson (CO) to Sir R Turnbull</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Mar 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Letter, future of Tanganyika battalions of King’s African Rifles in relation to independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Selwyn Lloyd (Exchequer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Aug 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Letter, financial assistance to Tanganyika, + Minutes by W L Gorell Barnes &amp; Mr Sandys</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Dec 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minutes, constitutional changes in Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 33 (59)4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 June 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusions, events at Hola Detention Camp for Mau Mau detainees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 34(59)3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 June 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusions, policy of rehabilitation at Hola Detention Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan (in South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Feb 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tel (no 279), reporting on Kenya constitutional conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 Feb 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minute, briefing for prime minister’s meeting with members of New Kenya Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 64(60)9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 Dec 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusions, approval of land policy in Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163</td>
<td>Lord Kilmuir to Mr Macmillan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 Jan 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Note, ‘The East African problem—concentrated on Kenya’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>Lord Perth &amp; Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13–14 Apr 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minutes, the question of release of Kenyatta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Sir P Renison (Kenya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 Apr 1961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
166  Mr Macleod to Sir P Renison  19 May 1961  Letter, pace of constitutional development and handling of the Kenyatta question

167  Mr Macleod to Sir P Renison  14 July 1961  Tel (no 350), constitutional time-table for internal self-government; possible future progress [Extract]

168  Cabinet meeting  9 Nov 1961  Conclusions, Kenyatta and possible constitutional developments

169  Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting  15 Nov 1961  Minutes on the future of Kenya

170  Cabinet meeting  16 Nov 1961  Conclusions, agreement to hold a constitutional conference early in 1962

171  Cabinet meeting  19 Dec 1961  Conclusions, preparation of constitutional conference to arrange independence

172  Mr Maudling for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee  30 Jan 1962  Memo, objectives and recommendations for Kenya constitutional conference [Extract]

173  Mr Maudling  6 Feb 1962  Cabinet memo, policy objectives at the conference

174  Cabinet meeting  8 Feb 1962  Conclusions, timing of independence for Kenya

175  Cabinet meeting  20 Mar 1962  Conclusions, developments in the conference, and authorisation of compromise proposals for self-government

176  Cabinet meeting  5 July 1962  Conclusions, approval of scheme for Kenya land settlement

177  Mr M MacDonald (Kenya) to Mr Sandys  7 June 1963  Tel (no 336), East African federation and Kenya independence

178  Cabinet meeting  24 June 1963  Conclusions, arrangements for, and implications of, independence

179  Cabinet meeting  22 Oct 1963  Conclusions, Kenya independence conference

180  Cabinet meeting  21 Nov 1963  Conclusions, land settlement and the future of European farming land

(5) Somaliland

181  Cabinet meeting  4 Mar 1957  Conclusions, policy considerations in the Horn of Africa

182  W L Gorell Barnes (CO) to Mr Lennox-Boyd  16 May 1958  Minute, report on visit to the governor of Somaliland
Chapter 5  Aden, Mediterranean, Asian, West Indian and other colonies

(1)  Aden


189  W L Gorell Barnes to Sir W Luce  14 Apr 1958  Letter (reply), future policy  566

190  Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting  19 June 1958  Minutes, policy for Aden Protectorate  570

191  Mr Amery (CO) to W L Gorell Barnes  8 Dec 1958  Minute, possibility of keeping Aden Colony and the proposed federation apart, + Minute by W L Gorell Barnes  571

192  Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting  22 Dec 1958  Minutes, policy for Aden Colony and Protectorate  574

193  Mr Amery  10 Mar 1959  Minute, ‘Long-term policy in Aden’  575

194  Mr Amery to Mr Lennox-Boyd  27 Apr 1959  Minute, response to Sir W Luce’s comments on Mr Amery’s opinions  578

195  Mr Lennox-Boyd to Sir W Luce  13 May 1959  Letter, future policy in Aden  580

196  Mr Lennox-Boyd for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee  14 Aug 1959  Memo, future policy for Aden Colony and Protectorate  582

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>198</td>
<td>Mr Macleod for Cabinet Defence Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199</td>
<td>Sir C Johnston (Aden) to Mr Macleod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>Mr Macleod for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 29(61)8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>I Watt (CO) for Mr Maudling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>J C Morgan &amp; I Watt (CO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 52(62)1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>FO circular to overseas representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>CO paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>CO departmental paper for S of S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CM 9(63)2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>J O Wright (PM's Office) to Sir A Douglas-Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213</td>
<td>J O Wright to Sir A Douglas-Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>214</td>
<td>Minute, need to get to grips with the problem of Aden and the Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>Letter about surrender of sovereignty, + Minutes by Sir H Poynton and Mr Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>Conclusions, revised draft of parliamentary statement on Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217</td>
<td>Minutes, future policy for Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>Minutes, future policy for Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>Cabinet memo, a fresh initiative on Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>Conclusions, new approach to the problem of Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td>Joint Cabinet memo, allegations of breaches of European Human Rights Convention by government in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>Conclusions, draft parliamentary statement on Cyprus policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>Letter, need for a constructive plan for Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224</td>
<td>Minutes, future policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225</td>
<td>Minutes, continuation of discussion on future policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>226</td>
<td>Minutes, further continuation of discussion on future policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td>Conclusions, proposed policy of unitary self-determination outside bases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228</td>
<td>Memo (letter to Mr Lennox-Boyd), future policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229</td>
<td>Conclusions, various possible plans for settlement of the Cyprus problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>Conclusions, revised policy statement on Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231</td>
<td>Letter, comments on the approved plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OTHER COLONIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 67(58)5</td>
<td>12 Aug 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233</td>
<td>Meeting with Sir H Foot at Chequers</td>
<td>6 Sept 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>234</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 69(58)2</td>
<td>8 Sept 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235</td>
<td>Sir H Foot to J D Higham (CO)</td>
<td>6 Feb 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 9(59)1</td>
<td>13 Feb 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237</td>
<td>J D Higham, Sir J Martin, Mr Amery &amp; Lord Perth (CO)</td>
<td>4–8 June 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 3(60)2</td>
<td>26 Jan 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 38(60)3</td>
<td>30 June 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 47(60)6</td>
<td>28 July 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>241</td>
<td>Sir A Douglas-Home</td>
<td>27 Dec 1963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Malta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>242</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 38(57)7</td>
<td>6 May 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 43(57)9</td>
<td>29 May 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244</td>
<td>Mr Lennox-Boyd to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td>25 Nov 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Watkinson (MoD)</td>
<td>8 Feb 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247</td>
<td>Cabinet Defence Committee meeting</td>
<td>17 Feb 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>248</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 10(61)5 28 Feb 1961 Conclusions, report of Sir H Blood’s Commission on constitutional changes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>249</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 11(61)4 7 Mar 1961 Conclusions, approval for parliamentary statement on constitutional changes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan to Lord Perth 18 Jan 1962 Minute, commenting on Lord Perth’s views on defence issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>Mr Maudling for Cabinet Defence Committee 5 Feb 1962 Memo, ‘The effects of the new defence policy on Malta’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 44(63)5 4 July 1963 Conclusions, Maltese independence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>253</td>
<td>Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Sir A Douglas-Home &amp; Mr Thorneycroft (MoD) 21 Jan –17 Apr 1964 Minutes on independence for Malta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CM 35(64)5 7 July 1964 Conclusions, deadlock on discussions on independence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) *East and South-East Asia*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 15(57)3 4 Mar 1957 Conclusions, proposed constitution for Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257</td>
<td>H J B Lintott (CRO) to Sir P Liesching (South Africa) 2 Aug 1957 Letter, Commonwealth membership for Federation of Malaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258</td>
<td>J Chadwick (CRO) to Lord Home 29 June 1959 Brief, views on Hong Kong expressed at talks between Prince Philip and the prime minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>259</td>
<td>J C Burgh &amp; Lord Perth (CO) 23–24 Nov 1959 Briefs for Mr Macleod’s meeting with Sir R Black (Hong Kong): current problems in Hong Kong [Extract]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan to Lord Selkirk (South-East Asia) 17 Mar 1960 Letter, Eden Hall Singapore conference of regional governors: South-East Asian issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261</td>
<td>Lord Selkirk (Singapore) to Mr Macleod 24 Aug 1961 Letter about prospects for Greater Malaysia scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262</td>
<td>Lord Selkirk to Mr Macleod 16 Sept 1961 Letter about Greater Malaysia scheme and the problem of the Borneo territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263</td>
<td>Mr Amery (Air) for Cabinet Defence Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>264</td>
<td>Cabinet Defence Committee meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 63(61)6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan to Mr Sands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267</td>
<td>Sir B Trend (Cabinet Office) for Mr Macmillan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268</td>
<td>Lord Home (FO) to Mr Sands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269</td>
<td>Mr Macmillan to Lord Selkirk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270</td>
<td>Lord Head (Malaysia) to Mr Sands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CM 6(64)3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) *The West Indies Federation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>272</td>
<td>P Rogers (CO) to A D Peck (Treasury)</td>
<td>25 Sept 1957 Letter, grants-in-aid to federal government of West Indies [Extract]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>273</td>
<td>Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Home (CRO)</td>
<td>5 Nov 1958 Minute, dominion status for the West Indies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274</td>
<td>P Rogers, G W Jamieson &amp; Mr Amery (CO)</td>
<td>8 Dec 1958 Minutes, future policy in West Indies [Extract]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Feb 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275</td>
<td>CO paper</td>
<td>9 May 1959 Draft statement for use by Mr Lennox-Boyd, + Minutes by G W Jamieson, P Rogers &amp; Sir J Macpherson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>276</td>
<td>G W Jamieson &amp; P J Kitcatt (CO)</td>
<td>12–13 June 1959 Minutes, future of Federation, following Mr Manley’s statement on Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>277</td>
<td>Lord Home to Mr Lennox-Boyd</td>
<td>31 July 1959 Minute, fixing a date for West Indian independence, + Minutes by Mr Amery, Sir H Poynton, W B L Monson &amp; G W Jamieson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>278</td>
<td>Mr Amery (for S of S) to Lord Home</td>
<td>772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>279</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Lord Home</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>280</td>
<td>Mr Amery to Lord Hailes (West Indies)</td>
<td>776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281</td>
<td>P Rogers to Lord Hailes</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>282</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>283</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>284</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CC 52(61)4</td>
<td>785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>285</td>
<td>Lord Perth to Mr Maudling</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>286</td>
<td>Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>287</td>
<td>L B Walsh Atkins (CRO) for Mr Sandys</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>288</td>
<td>Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting</td>
<td>791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>289</td>
<td>Mr J K R Thorpe (Seychelles) to Sir J Macpherson (CO)</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290</td>
<td>N B J Huijsman (CO)</td>
<td>796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>291</td>
<td>CO (for S of S) to St Helena</td>
<td>797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>292</td>
<td>Sir H Poynton (CO)</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6) Other territories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>289</td>
<td>Mr J K R Thorpe (Seychelles) to Sir J Macpherson (CO)</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290</td>
<td>N B J Huijsman (CO)</td>
<td>796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>291</td>
<td>CO (for S of S) to St Helena</td>
<td>797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>292</td>
<td>Sir H Poynton (CO)</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>293</td>
<td>Mr Macleod to Mr Sandys &amp; Mr Macmillan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>294</td>
<td>Mr Maudling for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>295</td>
<td>Lord Home (FO) to Mr Dean Rusk (USA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>296</td>
<td>Sir K Maddocks (Fiji) to Mr Maudling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297</td>
<td>Mr Maudling for Cabinet Oversea Policy Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>298</td>
<td>Cabinet Oversea Policy Committee meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299</td>
<td>Cabinet meeting CM 3(63)3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

Colonial High Policy, Plans and Surveys

Document numbers 1–52

1 CAB 134/1555, CPC(57)6 28 Jan 1957
‘Future constitutional development in the colonies’: minute by Mr Macmillan to Lord Salisbury.¹ Minutes by Lord Salisbury and Mr Lennox-Boyd


It would be helpful if the Colonial Policy Committee could submit to the Cabinet their estimate of the probable course of constitutional development in the Colonies over the years ahead.

It would be good if Ministers could know more clearly which territories are likely to become ripe for independence over the next few years—or, even if they are not really ready for it, will demand it so insistently that their claims cannot be denied—and at what date that stage is likely to be reached in each case.

It would also be helpful if this study would distinguish those Colonies which would qualify for full membership of the Commonwealth, and would indicate what constitutional future there is for the others which may attain independence but cannot aspire to full Commonwealth membership.

I should also like to see something like a profit and loss account for each of our Colonial possessions, so that we may be better able to gauge whether, from the financial and economic point of view, we are likely to gain or to lose by its departure. This would need, of course, to be weighed against the political and strategic considerations involved in each case. And it might perhaps be better to attempt an estimate of the balance of advantage, taking all these considerations into account, of losing or keeping each particular territory.

There are presumably places where it is of vital interest to us that we should maintain our influence, and others where there is no United Kingdom interest in resisting constitutional change even if it seems likely to lead eventually to secession from the Commonwealth.

¹ Lord President of the Council since 1952, and chairman of the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee: Robert Cecil, 5th marquess; S of S for Dominion affairs, 1940–1942, 1943–1945, for Commonwealth relations, 1952; S of S for the colonies, 1942.
If your Committee will produce a report on these lines, the Cabinet might well devote the whole of a session to it without other business.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Colonial Secretary.

Minutes on 1

I append copies of minutes on this subject from the Prime Minister to myself dated 28th January, 1957 and the Secretary of State for the Colonies to myself dated 15th February, 1957.

The Colonial Office is now going ahead with a comprehensive review of this subject on the lines there indicated. I should be very grateful if all Departments concerned would give their full co-operation to the Colonial Office, to enable this very important survey to be completed as soon as possible.

S.
25.2.57

Lord President

The Prime Minister sent me a copy of his minute to you of 28th January, proposing that the Colonial Policy Committee submit to the Cabinet their estimate of the probable course of constitutional development in the Colonies over the years ahead.

2. I agree that a comprehensive review of this kind would be a great help. If it is to be worth doing, however, it must be done thoroughly; and it will take a good deal of time, and involve consultation with a number of Departments. If you agree, I propose to arrange for my Department, in consultation with other Departments as appropriate, to prepare a draft Paper. It will be necessary to approach the problem area by area in the first instance, and I attach to this minute (Appendix) a skeleton plan on which I propose to ask my Department to proceed. When the draft has been prepared, I suggest that it might be considered by the Official Committee on Colonial Policy, before going to the Colonial Policy Committee.

3. The skeleton plan, as you will see, implies one or two glosses on the Prime Minister’s minute, and I should perhaps indicate briefly the reasons for these.

4. The Prime Minister drew a distinction between those Colonies which would qualify for “full Membership of the Commonwealth” and those “which may attain ‘independence’ but cannot aspire to full Commonwealth Membership”. I have assumed that, in using the word “independence” in this context, the Prime Minister had in mind the status which we usually describe as internal self-government. It is generally recognised that, whereas some territories, by themselves or in federal arrangement with others, should eventually attain independence as full Members of the Commonwealth, there will remain other territories which, in the foreseeable future at any rate, appear unlikely, for various reasons, to be able to achieve anything other than a considerable degree of internal self-government, with the United Kingdom remaining responsible for at least their defence and external relations.

5. A “profit and loss account” for each Colonial territory must, as the Prime Minister observes, take account of economic, political and strategic considerations. It must also take account of the obligations towards the peoples of any given territory which the assumption of protection or annexation, as the case may be, can be said to have placed upon the United Kingdom. It would perhaps be going too far to say that
Her Majesty's Government should never withdraw protection from, or hand over sovereignty to, any dependent territory otherwise than in accordance with the wishes of its inhabitants. But we would I think all agree that nothing is more dangerous than to gain a reputation for forsaking one's friends; and if in any territory Her Majesty's Government were to withdraw without being able to hand over to a successor government, which could be expected to govern reasonably well in the interests of all its inhabitants, the repercussions would be serious and widespread.

6. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister. I suggest that you should circulate copies of the Prime Minister's minute of 28th January and of this minute to the Colonial Policy Committee and ask that the Departments concerned co-operate with my Department in this work.

A. L.-B.
15.2.57

APPENDIX

Skeleton Plan (to be followed in the consideration of each territory or area)

1. Political and constitutional
   (a) Outline of the present constitutional system;
   (b) brief description of the internal and external political pressures;
   (c) the way in which these pressures will be reflected in demands for constitutional changes.

2. Strategic
   (a) An estimate of the strategic importance of the territory;
   (b) a statement of Her Majesty's Government's strategic requirements;
   (c) an estimate of the extent to which retention of these strategic requirements is dependent upon Her Majesty's Government's retaining jurisdiction.

3. Economic
   (a) The effect of independence upon the interests of the United Kingdom in terms of:
      (i) direct effect on the Exchequer;
      (ii) the effect on the sterling area;
      (iii) trade between the territory concerned and the United Kingdom.

4. Obligations and repercussions
   (a) An estimate of the effect upon the political, economic and social development of the territory of the withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction, including the effect upon racial and tribal minorities;
   (b) The effect of the change of status in the territory upon the prestige and influence of the United Kingdom;
   (c) Whether the premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would leave a vacuum which would be filled by a country hostile to the United Kingdom and her Allies.

5. Conclusions
Future constitutional development in the colonies: report (CO print, GEN 174/012) of the officials’ committee (chairman, Sir N Brook) (CO(0)(57)5) [Extract]

This report—the central response to the prime minister’s request for a ‘profit and loss account’—contained an enormous amount of basic information and became a major reference-guide in government departments. It was organised into seven parts, viz: (i) West Africa, (ii) East Africa, (iii) Aden and Somaliland, (iv) Mediterranean, (v) Far East, (vi) Caribbean, (vii) Smaller territories. It is probably the most complicated document to be selected for the entire BDEEP project, 76 printed pages long in foolscap, with almost 500 paragraphs, and 463 sub-headings, many of them elaborate. Complete uniformity of layout between the different sections was not attained, and even the paragraph numbering broke down in part (vii). To simplify its presentation here, and make the document less unwieldy, much of the factual material has been cut, and most of the sub-headings have been omitted. Readers can bear in mind that the information (or opinion) for each section is always given in the sequence: political and constitutional, strategic, economic, obligations and repercussions, and conclusions, as set out in the Skeleton Plan (see previous document, appendix). Also in accordance with the Skeleton Plan, specific questions are being addressed, more especially the probable effects of a ‘premature withdrawal’ of British rule.

Part I: West Africa

A. Nigeria

(1) Political and constitutional

With a few relatively minor exceptions all the political parties in Nigeria want, or profess to want, self-government within the Commonwealth as soon as possible. Nigerians are, broadly speaking, loyal to the Crown, friendly to the British, and attached to the Commonwealth connection. The visit of The Queen and Duke of Edinburgh last year was a great success.

Two-thirds of the North’s 18 million inhabitants are Muslims and Islam is a vital factor in their outlook. The remaining 6 million—a sizable minority of rapidly growing political importance—are mainly pagans with some Christians. A small minority of the Muslims—but it includes some of the most influential and able—must be recognised as potentially hostile to us and what we stand for, and inclined to fanaticism and xenophobia. If so far they have resisted the blandishments and bribes of Egypt, this may be almost as much because they regard Egyptians as bad Muslims and Nasser\(^1\) as a King breaker and a cat’s-paw of Moscow as for pro-British reasons. For all their natural courtesy to strangers and good manners—so beguiling to the ordinary Englishman—this minority probably regard us as infidels, distrust us as democrats out to replace their traditional authority by the secret ballot and universal suffrage (including eventually votes for women), and tolerate us only because they feel insecure against the energetic and aggressive Southerners.

There is a small Communist-inspired party in Nigeria, the United Working People’s Party, but it has little influence. Potentially it could be dangerous, and constant vigilance is exercised. All the Governments in Nigeria have publicly condemned international Communism as a threat to their own freedom, and so far

---

Moscow has had little success. Efforts at infiltration continue, mainly in the trade unions and centres of higher education, but so far the situation has been well contained. In Nigeria (as in Ghana) the nationalist leaders have all come out firmly against Communism. We may be thankful for this and indeed take some credit for this result of our liberal policy on constitutional matters.

12. The reports of the United Nations Visiting Missions to the Cameroons Trust Territory have on the whole been most laudatory of the British administration. Their last report a year ago stressed the need for more economic and social development to keep pace with the rapid constitutional and political progress. The country is poor and undeveloped. There are considerable possibilities but these need more money than is available. On the political side the main features are fear of domination by the Ibos from Eastern Nigeria and the question of amalgamation with the French Cameroons next door. The two countries were of course one under German rule, and no political party in the Southern Cameroons can afford not to profess interest in ultimate unification with the French Cameroons. It is doubtful whether, if the Federation as a whole became independent within, say, the next ten years, the Southern part of the British Cameroons would decide to stay in it, such is the fear of Ibo domination. The Communist-inspired (and probably financed) U.P.C. (Union de Populations du Cameroun), which was banned in the French Cameroons following the 1955 riots there, constitutes by far the most serious threat to both administrations. It aims at the immediate unification and independence of the British and French sectors, but in the recent elections it gained no seats.

13. The Indians show interest in Nigeria on customary lines, and have a Commissioner in Lagos though there are not more than a few hundred Indians in the whole territory. Their written propaganda is tendentious and sometimes dishonest, but they need not be regarded at present as more than a minor nuisance.

14. The United States has shown signs of seeking to extend its influence and some of the leading Nigerian politicians were educated in America. Relations with the American Consul-General are good.

15. Probable demands for constitutional changes. In 1953 the two major Southern parties, Dr. Azikiwe’s2 National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.) and Chief Awolowo’s3 Action Group, formed a short-lived alliance to demand “Dominion status” for Nigeria as a whole by 1956. The majority party in the North, the Northern People’s Congress (N.P.C.), led by the Sardauna of Sokoto (now Premier of the Northern Region), opposed the demand knowing that independence so soon would mean domination of the North by the more “educated” Southerners. They put forward as an alternative formula self-government “as soon as practicable.” The acute crisis which resulted nearly split the country and there was serious rioting, with loss of life, in Kano which was prevented from spreading only by prompt and firm action. The crisis was eventually resolved by the then Secretary of State (Lord Chandos) at the London constitutional conference in August 1953, when he secured agreement to the present federal form of government and, as regards self-
government, to the following formula, recorded in paragraph 28 of the Conference Report (Cmd. 8934):—

“The Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the Conference that Her Majesty’s Government were not prepared to fix a definite date for self-government for Nigeria as a whole, the more so as the Northern delegation, representing over half the population of Nigeria, was unable to depart from its policy of self-government as soon as practicable. The Conference eventually accepted a declaration of policy that in 1956 Her Majesty’s Government would grant to those Regions which desired it full self-government in respect of all matters within the competence of the Regional Governments, with the proviso that there should be safeguards to ensure that the Regional Governments did not act so as to impede or prejudice the exercise by the Federal Government of the functions assigned to it now, or as amended by agreement in the future, or in any way make the continuance of federation impossible.”

*This formula is the key to the present political situation.*

16. A conference . . . to work out how to carry out the 1953 promise of Regional self-government, including the safeguards, . . . will now open, at Lancaster House, on the 23rd May.

17. At this conference the N.C.N.C. and the Action Group will both renew the demand for immediate self-government for Nigeria as a whole, and the question will have to be discussed; but in the face of expected Northern opposition the Action Group may and probably will be content with Regional self-government for the West, for which they have made careful plans, though they may raise objection to the strict safeguards which the United Kingdom delegation will put forward for the Federal Government and for the continuance of federation. . . . the Southern parties will urge very strongly that, if independence cannot be granted to the country as a whole immediately, 1959 should be the year for the final transfer of power. The grant of independence to Ghana will sharpen their demand. Indeed the Federal House of Representatives passed a resolution, *nem. con.*, on the 26th March, demanding independence for the Federation as a whole (within the Commonwealth) in 1959. There is likely to be heated discussion at the conference on this issue. At the London conference in 1953 Lord Chandos made the following statement:—

“Her Majesty’s Government did not intend to force self-government either upon any part of Nigeria before it felt ready for it or upon Nigeria as a whole so long as any substantial part of it did not consider the time opportune.”

He repeated this statement at the Lagos conference in 1954 and it gave great reassurance to the North.

18. If independence for Nigeria as a whole comes too soon, the North, or parts of it, may talk of secession, particularly if power at the Centre is going to be in the hands of the N.C.N.C. In fact it would be difficult for the North to set up an entirely separate existence since all their imports and exports pass through the southern ports but it is impossible to be certain how much weight would be given to practical considerations of this kind. It is possible that the Southern Cameroons might also decide to leave the Federation on account both of their fear of the Ibos and also of their hope of ultimate amalgamation, as an independent territory, with the French Cameroons.

19. It will be our aim to proceed with constitutional advances at Federal level as slowly as possible, if we can, conceding in 1957 only such major changes as the
creation of the office of Federal Prime Minister, and perhaps a Second Chamber in which all Regions would be equally represented. (In the Federal House of Representatives, the North, with over half the population, have half the seats.) We shall seek to secure that no date is set for self-government for the country as a whole. But success will not be easy.

20. There will be pressure at the conference for the creation of more Regions, or States. To some extent such demands will be prompted by genuine fear of the major tribes by minority groups. But mostly the demands will be made by the Southern parties in order to split the North. Few of these demands have any wide or agreed backing, and it will in any event be necessary for compelling administrative reasons to resist them: the machine of government in Nigeria has already undergone two major upheavals in the last five years because of constitutional changes, and a further upheaval, by the creation of more Regions, would prove more than it could stand, particularly in view of the declining numbers of experienced British officers.

(2) Strategic

21. The international airport of Kano (in Northern Nigeria) is on the air communications line to Uganda, Kenya, the Arabian Peninsula and the Far East. The importance of the trans-African air reinforcement route is great and in certain circumstances it would be vital for reinforcing East Africa, Aden and the Persian Gulf, the harbours at Lagos and Port Harcourt. Both of these sea ports are bases that it would be convenient but not essential to use in limited or global war. . . .

24. So long as the Federal Government remains dependent, our strategic requirements are constitutionally secure. After independence, we shall have to rely on goodwill; though if we are prepared to continue, and Nigeria is prepared to accept, some financial and other forms of aid to Nigeria’s defence forces we may possibly be in a stronger position.

(3) Economic

... 28. The sterling area would suffer a moderate loss of dollar exchange if Nigeria were to leave it; departure from the Commonwealth, without leaving the sterling area, would have little or no effect on the latter. . . .

... 32. The Nigerian market is a valuable one for United Kingdom manufactured goods. There are also important United Kingdom interests in trading and lesser interests in mining. United Kingdom trade would be affected if independence were accompanied by hostility to United Kingdom traders, but it is to be hoped that there will be no such hostility. After independence there might be a greater tendency to protect new Nigerian industries at the expense of imports and this might affect certain United Kingdom industries, but taking the longer view the interests of both countries in developing the trade between them are great, and these interests seem unlikely to be appreciably disturbed by independence. . . .

(4) Obligations and repercussions

35. As in Ghana, self-government is the declared objective and at the Regional level is likely to be reached in the East and West this year and in the North in 1959. The effect of full self-government for the Federation as a whole depends very largely on how soon it comes. The fissiparous forces are very strong in this large country and if Federal independence comes too soon the Federation may break apart.
36. Until the final transfer of power to the Federation, it should be possible, if we are firm enough at the conference—and decent Nigerians will not forgive us if we show weakness to the more extreme and self-interested politicians—for the United Kingdom Government to retain power to suspend the Constitution of any part or the whole of the Federation in case of failure. But it would be politically impossible to use this power in a self-governing Region unless things had gone really badly wrong, enough experienced officials were available to set them right, and the Nigeria police could be relied upon to carry out the United Kingdom’s intentions as conveyed to them through their senior officers.

37. When the Regions are self-governing but the Federal Government is still dependent, the machinery of government may work at least as well in the West and the North as it seems likely to do in Ghana. But in both cases, and particularly in the North, much will depend on how many British officials will be willing to stay on for a good many years to come until trained and experienced Nigerians are available in sufficient numbers to take over.

38. In the East, where already only a thin red line of British officers stands between the Regions and chaos, things are likely to go downhill fairly rapidly. If, as seems virtually certain, most of the remaining British go on or soon after Regional self-government, i.e., by the end of this year, chaos must be considered more likely than not within two or three years; and if the power still remains to the United Kingdom to suspend the Constitution of the Region, that step may be necessary. Alternatively, the Federal Government may have to intervene under the powers which we hope to secure for it to safeguard the Federal interest, as envisaged in the 1953 promise of Regional self-government (see paragraph 15 above).

39. We have made, and shall continue to make, great efforts to persuade experienced British staff to stay on and various expedients have been devised to induce them to do so. But the inducements to go are strong. They can retire with compensation for broken career when the Secretary of State ceases to have responsibility for them and conditions in Nigeria and the utterances and behaviour of Nigerian politicians are all too often such as to quicken their desire to take this compensation and go.

40. It was said earlier that Nigerians generally were loyal to the Crown, friendly to the British, and attached to the Commonwealth connection. That is true, and they have many admirable—and indeed lovable—qualities, in particular a keen sense of humour and the capacity to laugh at themselves. But there is a darker side, which must not be overlooked.

41. Barbarism and cruelty are still near the surface, as is shown by happenings such as these during the past two years: villagers beat to death a well-known Nigerian barrister whose chauffeur-driven car had accidentally killed one of the villagers; the fellow-villagers of a couple found to be receivers of stolen property sewed them together and then clubbed them to death; and the Premier of the North (where some large local government bodies had been asking for the branding of thieves) spoke wistfully, in a speech in the Northern House of Assembly, of the days of slavery and the mutilation of thieves “before the British came.” There is in fact likely to be much less real freedom, especially for the under-privileged, the weak and minority groups, after “freedom” has been achieved.

42. If the danger of administrative breakdowns is greatest in the East, there are no less disquieting dangers of another kind in the Muslim North. The great Emirs
may not tolerate government from Kaduna (the Regional capital) by popularly-elected commoners when the British Governor no longer has his reserved powers. As a shrewd Sudanese observer said recently, “When the British go, the Emir of Kano will rebuild the city walls.” Current proposals for devolution of power from the Regional capital to the Provinces are framed to counter this danger, but much depends on whether there will be time to implement them effectively. 1959 is the date for Regional self-government in the North.

43. The position in Muslim courts in the North is unsatisfactory. They apply much of the full rigour of conservative Muslim law to the detriment in particular of non-Muslims. It is more than doubtful how far it will be possible before self-government to carry through the fundamental changes that are required.

45. To sum up. If the British withdraw in the next half decade, it is quite on the cards that the North, or large parts of it, will secede, and if this happened a general disintegration might well follow. There is in any event likely to be a general lowering of standards everywhere, which might result in complete breakdown in the East and will almost certainly mean less freedom for minorities everywhere. In some parts there may be a reversion to much of the barbarism of pre-Colonial days. The outward forms of democracy may remain but, as has been suggested by the Governor of the East, the recent general elections there gave the people what may well be their last opportunity of making a relatively free and fair choice of Government.

47. The continuance of our prestige and influence, which are at present high, will depend to a very large degree on how far we succeed in these efforts and on how long we can retain ultimate power at the Centre. So long as there is a restraining (British) hand at the Centre, backed by some constitutional sanctions and a reliable machine (civil service and police), there is a fair chance that Nigeria can be held together, and that something like democratic (if not “honest”) government will develop. The best hope for Nigeria lies in the present student generation who, one may hope, will as the politicians of the future be less divided among themselves tribally and less self-seeking than the present set. Our restraining hand is thus really needed for a generation. But it is unrealistic to expect that we shall have so long.

(5) Conclusions

52. In spite of its great promise, and several encouraging features, one cannot avoid forebodings as to the outlook for Nigeria, for the simple reason that we are unlikely to have long enough to complete our civilising and unifying mission. The pass in British West Africa was sold when the Watson Commission Report on the Gold Coast was published in 1948. The recommendations of that Commission were very radical. They set the pace in the Gold Coast and by so doing they lost us a vital fifteen to twenty years in Nigeria. Successive Governments since have taken the line that the risks of going too slow were probably greater than the risks of going too fast; and it remains true that a slow pace would lose us the great goodwill we have at present and cause much friction. But in West Africa the pace set by the fastest (Ghana) is certainly more than the vast and unwieldy Nigeria looks like being able to take.

53. Loss of the present airfield facilities at Kano would have a most serious effect on the ability to safeguard British interests in the Indian Ocean area.

---

B. Sierra Leone

(1) **Political and constitutional**

... 57. There has been some talk of “self-government in 1961,” *i.e.*, five years after the 1951 Constitution was originally due to expire. This however is not a general cry and full internal self-government and independence are at present no more than fairly distant objectives. There is, however, significant pressure for *some* further constitutional advance.

There are as yet no significant external political pressures. But the example and influence of Ghana are likely to be increasingly felt. Sierra Leone would also not indefinitely acquiesce in lagging behind the political progress of the neighbouring French territories under the *Loi Cadre*... .

(2) **Strategic**

59. Sierra Leone is of some importance on the trans-African reinforcement route. Freetown is one of the largest and best natural harbours in the world and lies on the route which would have to be used by shipping to the Middle East and beyond if the Mediterranean or the Suez Canal were closed. On present planning the port would in time of war be used primarily as a base for stores and as a NATO convoy assembly anchorage, but the Admiralty do not intend to establish a naval base there.

(3) **Economic**

... 66. ... United Kingdom firms have important interests in trading, and in mining for iron ore, chrome ore and diamonds, and United Kingdom trade would be adversely affected if hindrances were placed on the activities of these firms, or if the territory were to leave the Commonwealth and the sterling area and preferences were discontinued. There is however no reason to think that political independence would lead to Sierra Leone deliberately hindering British firms or leaving the sterling area; Ghana shows no signs of doing either, and Sierra Leone would not be in such a strong position as Ghana to take an independent line....

(4) **Obligations and repercussions**

67. A withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction at the present stage of political, economic and social development would be likely to have grave results and could not be regarded as compatible with her responsibilities for the welfare of the inhabitants. Considerable animosity remains between the Creoles in the Colony area and the indigenous inhabitants of the Protectorate, and, with the withdrawal of British jurisdiction, friction between the two communities would increase and probably lead to violence. There would be violence also in the Protectorate, where recent disturbances have demonstrated the widespread and often justified lack of confidence by the people in their chiefs. Apart from this, responsible government could not be carried on in a territory where the educational system can still produce only 40 students of matriculation standard a year, and where African politicians have as yet had very little experience of political and governmental responsibility.

68. From all reports it would appear that a large proportion of the population of Sierra Leone would view with disfavour any early ending of responsibility by Her Majesty’s Government, and a premature withdrawal would be disastrous for the prestige and influence of the United Kingdom in the territory.
69. A premature withdrawal by the United Kingdom leading to anarchy or near-anarchy in Sierra Leone might well be regarded by the French, whose territories border two of the three land sides of Sierra Leone, as a threat to the stability of their territories. It would be unlikely that a country hostile to the United Kingdom would fill the vacuum caused by United Kingdom withdrawal, but it is not inconceivable that the French would feel bound to do so. There might also be some attempt by Liberia to exert influence. At the best Sierra Leone would become another Liberia, possibly like Liberia, with American backing.

(5) Conclusions

70. The ultimate future of Sierra Leone is harder to determine than that of many other territories. It is a borderline case, and cannot be said to fall clearly either into the category of dependencies which can obviously become fully independent in time or into the category of those which obviously never can do so. The most realistic goal to set before us at present is that of internal self-government, the achievement of which will depend largely upon the speed at which the economic resources of the territory can be developed, educated Africans produced and the gap between Freetown and the Protectorate narrowed. It is therefore unlikely that such questions as the retention of strategic facilities need become pressing for some years to come, and even when the stage of internal self-government is reached it is unlikely, unless there is a notable change in the political climate meanwhile, that there would be serious difficulty in devising acceptable machinery for the preservation of United Kingdom interests.

71. Nor need vital United Kingdom economic interests be at stake in the political game. British trade with West Africa preceded British administration, and there is no reason why it should not continue after it provided that we so conduct ourselves in the meanwhile as to leave behind us a stable and friendly Government. . . .

73. The maintenance of good relations between the United Kingdom and Ghana will be an important background factor in safeguarding the orderly development of Sierra Leone. Friction between us could well be reflected in internal stresses in Sierra Leone.

C. Gambia

. . .78. Gambia at the moment is a happy backwater, but it cannot expect to be permanently immune from the general political awakening which is going on in West Africa. It is too small and too peculiar a shape ever to be able to stand entirely by itself. . . .

86. A withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction within the immediate future would be likely to result in a complete collapse of Government and a cessation of all form of development.

87. A withdrawal would be regarded with complete disfavour by public opinion in the Gambia. The prestige of the United Kingdom there would greatly suffer.

88. A vacuum caused by the premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would almost certainly be filled by the French. Anarchy in the Gambia would prove an irresistible invitation to them to extend their influence into the territory.

89. By virtue of its size, the narrowness of its economy, and the precariousness of its financial position, the Gambia is a territory which as far as can be foreseen can
never aspire to full independence. Given that dependence on a bigger country is
unavoidable, there is no evidence that Gambians wish to change the United Kingdom
for somebody else. It is possible that when economic, educational and political
development has proceeded much further than it has at present some form of
internal self-government may be possible, if no other form of association with the
United Kingdom has been evolved. The people of the Gambia are very pro-British and
proud of their connection with the United Kingdom, a factor which is of importance
in considering the future of the territory. It is also probable that Gambia would be
interested in joining any future West African Federation if ... that should ever
become a practical possibility.

Part II: East Africa

(1) Political and constitutional

... 91. Looked at regionally and broadly the external pressures and influences are
those inevitable to a zone of dependencies exposed to the anti-colonial propaganda of
the Middle East and the attractions to evolving Africans of the body of dogma
propagated by what is loosely called the Afro-Asian block of the United Nations. More
potent than Communist doctrine in a nationalistic setting, are the egalitarian
philosophies of bodies such as the Africa Bureau and the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions. In view of the relatively few leaders of local opinion, personal
contacts and influences have a great importance; every ambitious African can find his
Brockway.5 The question of external pressures is considered more closely below in
relation to individual territories. ...

94. Kenya. Internally the political pressures are those of an unstable multi-racial
society. For the first half century of Kenya's existence the struggle was between a
white settled community, wishing to entrench their position against Asian
competition, and a Colonial Government bent on a sometimes sterile impartiality
and subject to fluctuating direction from Westminster. The African was a bewildered
spectator, gradually acquiring the vocabulary of Western politics and the "felt needs"
of Western political theory. With the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, which gave both
Asian and African a place in the policy-forming organ of government, a step was
taken which ruled out for all time the prospect of self-government for the European
Kenyan alone. This settlement was accepted by the Europeans, after a split in their
ranks, welcomed by the Asians and at first rejected by the Africans, who subsequently
acquiesced in African participation. Before the recent African elections those Africans
who had participated declared their support of the Lyttelton formula as an interim
measure. They were not returned by the electorate. The habit of compromise is
growing and if the races can remain yoked in a pattern subject to control from
Westminster for long enough the habit of co-operation and acceptance one of the
other may become a natural order of things. This prospect is menaced by the theories
of democracy which the African has avidly accepted and which many encourage him
to pursue. The move to a common roll, the hallmark of stable multi-racialism, must
be gradual to be enduring. The theories of quantitative democracy lure the African to

5 Fenner Brockway, MP (Lab) for Eton & Slough since 1950; pacifist; chairman of British Centre for
Colonial Freedom, 1942–1947; first chairman of Congress of Peoples against Imperialism since 1948;
chairman of Movement for Colonial Freedom since 1954; prolific author.
stand out against co-operation until he can dominate by numbers. The task of statesmanship in the next decade is to manipulate European fears, Asian timidity and African impatience to a delicate but changing balance which allows no member of the team to run off the field.

95. The pressures for constitutional change will therefore be towards a greater proportionate role for the African. This will be symbolised by the move to break "parity." The main African demand will be greater representation in Legislative Council and the African is likely to realise that adherence to communal voting in more and more constituencies is the course most likely to result in the victory of numbers over quality. The counter-move most likely to preserve European influence in the long term is development of the common roll, at first with high qualifications, which will oblige all candidates to court a mixed electorate. Whether the resident Europeans will recognise this soon enough and have the wisdom to urge this line of constitutional change is the big question.

96. Uganda. Legislative and executive power is still in the hands of the Governor. He legislates by and with the consent of a Legislative Council, with a government side of thirty members composed partly of officials (all at present European) and partly of unofficials (some of them Ministers) of all three races who owe their position to an undertaking to vote with the Government on an issue of confidence. The representative side also number thirty; the Governor, as presiding officer, has a casting vote. These representative members are of all three races, all nominated by the Governor, although the African members are presented for nomination by various forms of indirect election. Of the entire council one half of the members are African. In the Executive Council of fourteen, eleven are Ministers; of these six are officials (all European); three African Ministers, one Asian and one European are unofficials. This structure was introduced in 1955 and it was then announced that no major change was contemplated before 1961. In Uganda at present the mystic term "parity" means an equal number of Africans to an equal number of others....

98. Internally the great debate is over the future as a unitary or federal State. This expresses in constitutional terminology something not really thought out in such terms. It reflects a basically tribal problem, i.e., the assertiveness of Buganda, which has had a generation's lead in absorbing the education of the West, and the fear and envy of Buganda on the part of the other tribes of the Protectorate. Her Majesty's Government have declared that they envisage the Uganda of the future as a united country, which only thus will have the resources and the size to stand independent among the nations. Buganda feels that alone they have all the attributes which merit independence in the present age and that their association geographically with the rest of the Protectorate is being used as a pretext to hold them back. The other tribes resent the privileged position of Buganda and think that if only they could acquire the same status they would have the same power and could face self-government without the fear of exchanging Buganda dominance for British "imperialism."...

99. Demands for constitutional change will be expressed in self-contradictory forms so long as there is no genuine country-wide political party with a positive programme for self-government; the Uganda National Congress does not yet meet this definition. On the one hand Buganda will claim a greater measure of internal self-government; this has already reached the limit short of separation from the rest of the Protectorate. This effort will be represented to the outside world in "national"
terms which will cloak its parochial intent. On the other hand the other tribes in the
Protectorate will press also for greater local self-government (i.e., an attempt to give
national characteristics to organs of local government) while showing an attachment
to Protectorate institutions and a strong Central Government, which they will regard
as a shield under which they can develop their separate strength rather than an
expression of their collective interest and growing maturity. The task of the
protecting Power must be to develop the central institutions in such a way that they
are regarded as an expression of the unity they must yet create and so design these
institutions that the immigrant communities, notably the Asians, find in them a
niche which they regard as secure, and in which they are recognised and accepted by
the African population. The next proclaimed stage in achieving this objective is the
inauguration of elections to the representative side of Legislative Council in 1961 on
a common roll in a manner which will entrench the fundamental interests of the
minority communities.

... 101. Tanganyika. The main external pressure on Tanganyika comes from the
United Nations, whose Trusteeship Council annually examines a report of the
territory and every three years sends a Visiting Mission to inspect and report on its
development. These reports are also considered, more cursorily, in the General
Assembly, which tends to attempt to stretch Tanganyika on the Procrustean rack of
anti-colonial resolutions of general application to all trust territories. The United
Nations is also invoked, under the petitions system, as a court of appeal by the
disgruntled and ambitious, who are vastly encouraged to excesses by the anti-
colonial pack. The trust status of the territory shakes the confidence not only of
external investors but also of the immigrant communities who long for some solid
reassurance of the endurance of a British connection. The malign influence of United
Nations interference has not hitherto been allowed to distort policy but the fear that
it will and the need to have some regard to United Nations sensibilities have retarded
confident advance. Developments in adjacent territories both north and south can
have an unsettling effect on the racial harmony which has so far prevailed; but
conversely solid demonstration of a working partnership in Tanganyika could bring
stability and hope to East and Central Africa. Internal political pressures are not yet
highly developed. Only a small proportion, say 5,000, of the Europeans are settled as
farmers on the land and they have not developed a collective political personality
comparable to that of the Kenya Europeans. They are leaderless and unassertive. The
Asians are supine but have wealth and a readiness to use it to promote political
stability. The Africans have little national cohesion but strong tribal affinities and
have as yet shown little response to the doctrines of African nationalism purveyed by
the Tanganyika African National Union. But this movement could grow rapidly and
dangerously in the event of economic distress or the absence of an alternative
political vehicle for political self-expression. This exists in embryo in the United
Tanganyika Party, founded recently by Europeans and Asians to seek African support
and present a non-racial front when elections are introduced. This party may succeed
if it can recruit effective African leadership.

102. Demands for constitutional change on the part of the great bulk of the
inhabitants are likely for some time to be small and capable of satisfaction by the
progressive introduction of the electoral principle and the association of local
opinion, particularly African, with the policy-forming organs of government.
Strident demands for the introduction of universal adult suffrage and the immediate
attribution of executive authority to Africans may develop from a minority, who can only draw strength if United Nations interference is not kept in bounds and if the extension of the very inadequate social services, notably education, cannot be financed. The task in the next few years is to anticipate rabid African nationalism by mobilising the basic goodwill between the races in an active non-racial political development, which is sustained by but does not outstrip economic and social progress.

103. **Zanzibar**. . . . Constitutional development, long stagnant, has recently been rapid. The Sultan’s Government is now conducted by an Executive Council, of which the British Resident is President, with seven official members and three unofficial members (Arab, Asian and African) who have been associated with the work of certain departments. The Legislative Council has recently been enlarged, with thirteen official members and twelve representative members, of whom six are to be elected in common roll elections on a qualitative franchise, in July 1957. After the results of the elections are known, the remaining six representative members will be appointed by the Sultan on the advice of the British Resident.

The Arabs of Zanzibar are exposed to Egyptian propaganda, notably from Cairo radio. Their response is mild recalcitrance, which dares not find expression in a manner displeasing to the present Sultan. They have urged constitutional change, have got most of what they asked and may be beginning to doubt its value in face of a growing feeling on the part of the traditionally subject African majority that democratic processes may be the revenge for slavery.

(2) **Strategic**

104. The East African region has great potential strategic importance, situated as it is to the south of the Middle East air barrier and with an aspect towards the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Climatically European forces can well be held in Kenya which also provides ample training facilities and possibilities of accommodation and local food supplies. The region contains three major airfields, Entebbe, Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam and two others at Mombasa and Kisumu with very fair facilities. The ports of Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam are well equipped to deal with commercial traffic and the former has certain rudimentary naval facilities which could be improved with some expenditure of time and money. The possibility exists that an oil refinery may be built at Mombasa. At the present time the airfields of the region are essential links in the air reinforcing route from South Africa to the Middle East and from Europe and West Africa to the Arabian Peninsula and the Far East. The existence of the air barrier necessitates the deployment of substantial forces to the south of the Red Sea, and for administrative and climatic reasons about a brigade group will in future have to be maintained in Kenya as a reserve for East and Central Africa, Aden, and the Persian Gulf. Strategically, therefore, the region has acquired greatly enhanced importance in Commonwealth defence. The sources of the Nile in Uganda constitute, while under British control, at least a psychological threat to Egyptian ambition. . . .

(3) **Economic**

. . . 117. East Africa is almost the sole supplier of sisal to the United Kingdom and the principal supplier of coffee. The relative importance of East Africa in the United Kingdom market for some [other] commodities is a post-war phenomenon, resulting
from the dollar shortage, but as far as can be seen there will always be a substantial advantage in having these sterling sources of supply at competitive prices. In 1938, for example, only 39 per cent. of the United Kingdom’s imports of coffee came from East Africa, the principal source of supply being Costa Rica. If East Africa left the sterling area, this would affect the pattern of the United Kingdom’s imports. If the possibility of denial of supplies is envisaged, the principal difficulty would arise with sisal, for which there are no obvious alternatives available in the sterling area.

(4) Obligations and repercussions

118. Looking at the region as a political whole it stands out as a testing ground for the possibility of multi-racial or non-racial development lying geographically between the Union of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the anti-colonial influences of the Middle East and the sub-continent of Asia. The failure of inter-racial partnership in this region, particularly in Tanganyika, would intensify the pull of the Union of South Africa on the Central African Federation, which would then feel itself threatened with hostility from the north and a need to recoil for support on the south. It would also in effect extend the frontiers of turbulence south from the Middle East, place the source of the Nile at the mercy of Egypt, which would feel an urge to secure it, and even perhaps provide a vulnerable area for the expansionist ambitions of India, provided that the Indian bridgehead is not earlier engulfed by African nationalism. Failure would, therefore, produce an important area of instability which would be a grave threat to Western interests in the continent of Africa.

119. At present the balance between racial groups is maintained only by the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. Were this withdrawn prematurely that balance would dissolve into conflict and elimination of the weak minorities in Uganda and Tanganyika. In Kenya the European settled element would go down fighting. Since the major tribal groups in the territory have not yet been welded into any national cohesion, tribal jealousies would succeed the subjection of non-African minorities with as a minimum result social disintegration and economic bankruptcy. In all this, so long as it retains jurisdiction, the United Kingdom is the “power of last resort,” which by its very existence as an arbitrator prevents recourse to violence and by its experience can often find a way through local antipathies which could not otherwise be reconciled.

120. It can be seen from the foregoing that the premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would lead to a disastrous decline in the prestige and influence of the United Kingdom.

121. Whether this vacuum would be filled by a country hostile to the United Kingdom and her allies is difficult to say. Soviet Communism has as yet little foothold or influence in the East African territories, but it is traditionally quick to exploit a situation of chaos and poverty and there is no doubt that there would be potent groups in the abandoned territories who would look to Moscow for advice and support. The Hindu populations would also no doubt appeal to India to come to their rescue, with what result it is hard to predict. . . .

(5) Conclusions

123. It can be briefly concluded that the withdrawal of United Kingdom influence from East Africa would bring to a shabby conclusion an important and
hopeful experiment in race relations, with repercussions locally on the Central African Federation and a decline in United Kingdom prestige much more significant and enduring than the self-congratulatory applause of the anti-colonial, anti-Western world. African gratitude would be felt only by the self-seeking and expressed by none. An expanding market for United Kingdom goods would contract and become even more sharply competitive; British business connections would be unlikely to survive in any strength the chaotic mismanagement of successor States. (Even in Uganda, often regarded by some as of West African ripeness, there are less than a dozen African civil servants above the subordinate grades.) The Middle East air barrier would be extended southward and might be virtually impossible to overcome. The flank of Africa would be thrown open to subversive penetration from the Soviet Union and others hostile to the West. The Belgian and Portuguese positions would be cruelly undermined.

124. A strengthening of United Kingdom interest would, however, pay dividends. The scope for worthwhile investment in East Africa is illustrated by the growth of the Kenya economy even through the Mau Mau troubles (£8 million new investment, excluding reinvested profits, in manufacturing industry alone in the period 1952–56). The remunerative investment desirable over the next five years on Government account alone has been assessed in the light of the Royal Commission report at £250 million. Minimum loan requirements for the period 1957–60 have been squeezed down to £112 million to bring them within sight of assumed resources, but a realistic assessment of the essential provision to sustain wise policy would be £150 million. In terms of recurrent expenditure Uganda can work within its revenue, Kenya can respond to a declining scale of aid on the present curve but strong efforts will be needed if Tanganyika is to tide over a period of inelastic revenue while its undeveloped resources are brought into play. If these financial conditions can be satisfied the stage is well set for a discharge of our obligations.

Part III: Aden and British Somaliland

A1. Aden Colony

134. . . . it is the policy of Government to move as quickly as practicable to internal self-government with appropriate safeguards in the realms of External Relations, Defence, Finance, and Internal Security. The policy was clearly stated in the statement made by Lord Lloyd, on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government, in the Legislative Council on 19th May, 1956, which defined the aim as “a considerable degree of internal self-government” but stated that “the importance of Aden both strategically and economically within the Commonwealth is such that Her Majesty’s Government cannot foresee the possibility of any fundamental relaxation of their responsibilities for the Colony.”

135. The strategic importance of the Colony of Aden in peace and war lies in the fact that it is British territory providing an important base from which naval, military and air forces can protect British interests in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula and ensure the stability of the Somaliland Protectorate. Restrictions on bringing troops by air through the Middle East air barrier greatly increase the importance of Aden in this connection. In addition it is an air-staging post on the trunk route to the Far East. A naval fuelling base under British control in this area is of value, as also are the oil storage, and refining capacity of the port. It may well be
necessary in the future to increase the responsibilities and status of the military headquarters at Aden.

... 142. Removal of British influence from the Colony would certainly greatly diminish the prestige of Great Britain in the Middle East and its influence for stability in the area. Moreover it would render the military task of safeguarding British interests in the Persian Gulf scarcely feasible.

143. Premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would certainly leave a vacuum which the Government of the Yemen would immediately seek to fill and the Saudi Arabians would be encouraged to pursue more energetically their designs on the Buraimi Oasis.

144. Taking all considerations into account, particularly strategy, economic interests, and prestige and influence in the Middle East, Her Majesty’s Government have a strong interest in the maintenance of control of Aden Colony for an indefinite future period. This interest is not, however, inconsistent with granting to the Colony the highest possible measure of internal self-government.

A2. Aden Protectorate

... 163. There is a clear obligation on Her Majesty’s Government to maintain and uphold its treaties with the Protected States for as long as they themselves wish to remain in that association with Her Majesty’s Government. It would not be possible unilaterally to abrogate these treaties, although it may be possible in time to evolve a different kind of relationship.

164. Further, Her Majesty’s Government has a general kind of obligation to assist and develop these small and weak States so far as may be possible towards a stronger form of economic and social condition. This has to be done by means of tactful advice and financial aid.

165. Subject to the foregoing, Her Majesty’s Government has an interest in continuing to exercise its authority in the Protectorate; but primarily as the hinterland of Aden Colony, and a buffer between that Colony, the Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

B. Somaliland Protectorate

... 167. The main political and economic problem is presented by the fact that the livelihood of the nomadic inhabitants of the Protectorate depends substantially on their enjoying access to the Haud and Reserved Area which were recognised by the 1897 Anglo–Ethiopian Treaty as forming part of Ethiopia. The rights of the tribes from the Protectorate to graze and water in Ethiopia were established and recognised by the 1897 Treaty. By the 1954 Agreement, the Ethiopian Government accepted that the tribal organisation set up by the Protectorate Government should continue to function when the tribes were in the Haud and Reserved Area, a liaison organisation being established to preserve the link between the tribes and the Protectorate Government and to transmit to the tribes the instructions of that Government on internal tribal matters. In spite of these concessions by Ethiopia the inhabitants of the Protectorate as a whole deeply resent the fact that these vital grazing areas have been recognised as being Ethiopian territory, a resentment which is increased whenever the Ethiopian authorities do not keep to the spirit of the Treaty and the Agreement in regard to the rights conferred on the tribes from the Protectorate by those instruments. Somali leaders suspect the Ethiopian Government of wishing to
put pressure on the tribes from the Protectorate in the Haud and Reserved Area with a view to compelling them to accept Ethiopian nationality, this being the prelude, they suggest, to a move on the part of Ethiopia to take over the Protectorate.

168. Another important external factor is the movement towards independence in 1960 of Somalia. This country already has a very considerable measure of self-government, and the leaders of the dominant political party have as their aim the unification of all Somalis in a greater Somalia, an aim which is supported by most Somalis everywhere. The ability of the indigenous administration to govern the country effectively after 1960 and to maintain a real independence is doubtful, especially in view of the extent to which they are likely to continue to be dependent on external financial and economic support. Nevertheless, political development in Somalia acts as a spur to the political leaders in the Protectorate who want similar rapid development for their own country. They have been promised a considerable measure of economic and educational development, details of which are still being worked out, and have been told that the primary object of all these developments is to make the Somalis of the Protectorate ready for internal self-government. They have also been told that Her Majesty’s Government is not, however, laying down a definite timetable for political advances but that Her Majesty’s Government will review the position in consultation with the people of the Protectorate within a reasonable time after 1960. The Somali leaders have made enquiries concerning the views of Her Majesty’s Government regarding the possibility of some form of association between Somaliland and Somalia some time after 1960. In reply to these enquiries Lord Lloyd said in a statement approved by the Cabinet and made in Hargeisa in August 1956 that

“when the time comes to consider such matters, the views of the Somalis concerned will be one of the factors of decisive importance in determining Her Majesty’s Government’s attitude towards any proposals which may be put forward on this subject. Her Majesty’s Government would certainly discuss any such proposals with representatives of the people of the Protectorate; and if political and economic conditions were propitious, and the proposals were both well-conceived and favoured by the Somalis concerned, Her Majesty’s Government will be ready to support them in principle.”

170. The Somaliland Protectorate offers strategic advantages somewhat similar to those of Aden, except that its port facilities are not sufficiently developed to be of any value to the Royal Navy, although the Navy’s need to secure port facilities there would become actual if we lost the facilities now enjoyed in Aden. As our influence in the Suez Canal area diminishes, so the Southern Red Sea area assumes for us an increasing importance. The preservation of our strategic interest in the Horn of Africa generally is not merely a question of the defence of Kenya (which marches with both Ethiopia and Somalia, and contains some 60,000 Somalis in its Northern Frontier Province) or the importance of insulating the area from unfriendly influences, particularly Egyptian. It is also, as the Chiefs of Staff have emphasised, a question of over-flying and air-staging rights in the Protectorate, together with the right to station forces, to secure concessions in respect of oil and mineral production and pipelines, and to safeguard the use and development of ports and anchorages. Because of the air barriers now erected against us at the eastern end of the Mediterranean air-staging and over-flying rights in the Protectorate, including staging rights for troop carriers, have become important for the reinforcement of the
Persian Gulf, via Nairobi and Aden. Staging facilities might also be required for short-range aircraft, *e.g.*, for the defence of Aden and the Aden Protectorate. 

173. As the range of aircraft increases, the importance of their staging rights will be correspondingly diminished, but on the assumption that our strategic policy in the Middle East as a whole remains unchanged, and that our interests in the Persian Gulf area continue to be substantial, we are likely to need these rights for at least the next ten years. 

*Part IV: Mediterranean territories*

A. *Gibraltar*

... 195. ... If withdrawal were accompanied by assumption over Gibraltar of Spanish sovereignty, economic and social development would be bound to suffer even if expenditure on the base continued, and independent political development would cease. If United Kingdom jurisdiction and expenditure on the base both ceased Gibraltar would be likely to become a slum very rapidly, like parts of Southern Spain.

196. Any change of status which seemed to satisfy the Spaniards’ claim would momentarily increase the United Kingdom’s influence with Spain; but it would permanently and disastrously diminish the United Kingdom’s prestige internationally. In view of the loyalty of the Gibraltarian population to the Crown and the sentimental attachment of many people in the United Kingdom to the Rock, cession of Gibraltar to Spain is unthinkable. But if it were to develop into some kind of “City State” this would be unlikely to have any effect one way or the other on the United Kingdom’s prestige and influence. 

198.—(i) Spain is bound to continue with its claim to Gibraltar. But any proposal to concede it would run counter to strong loyalist feelings in Gibraltar and here and would have a disastrous effect on British prestige. 

(ii) Constitutional demands in Gibraltar itself are not likely to be for more than gradual extension of local responsibility, *e.g.*, possibly by the introduction of a limited Ministerial system. 

(iii) Gibraltar is strategically important since it helps to ensure the security of vital Commonwealth sea and air communications. Provided Spain remains in friendly relations with the United States, Gibraltar is not of equal strategic importance to NATO as it is to Her Majesty’s Government.

(iv) Her Majesty’s Government requires to maintain a naval and maritime air base in Gibraltar together with refuelling facilities, a headquarters and a wireless station.

(v) Though Spain has offered to lease Gibraltar as a base to Her Majesty’s Government, and our strategic requirements could theoretically be maintained without retaining sovereignty, such an arrangement in so small a territory would present serious practical difficulties and would become impossible if Spain subsequently became unfriendly.

B. *Malta*

... 207. [HMG’s strategic requirements] arise from Malta’s importance as a United Kingdom naval and NATO base in the Mediterranean, and to a lesser extent from the usefulness of the Admiralty Dockyard at Valletta. Malta is also an air-staging post on the main trunk routes to the Middle and Far East, and the airfields are suitable for operating bomber aircraft.
208. Her Majesty’s Government’s strategic requirements cannot be met unless Her Majesty’s Government retain jurisdiction in the field of defence and foreign affairs. This is the basis of Her Majesty’s Government’s interest in the integration plan, which would retain the final authority in the reserved field of defence and foreign affairs to the United Kingdom Parliament and Government....

212. [If UK jurisdiction were ended:] This would mean withdrawal of United Kingdom use of any defence facilities in Malta. This would have the most serious political, economic and social effect on Malta. In the foreseeable future, it would mean economic ruin and widespread unemployment, unless some other Power stepped in. Politically, it would lead the Maltese to look around for “the highest bidder” and probably in the first instance to Italy.

213. If integration is unsuccessful, it will lead to difficulties in the use of the defence facilities of Malta and to a deterioration of Her Majesty's Government’s prestige and influence in the Middle East. ....

C. Cyprus

217. [Pressures] are reflected in an unusual way (as far as colonies are concerned) in demands for constitutional changes. The Turkish Cypriots are completely satisfied with the status quo, and are nervous of any constitutional advance. The extremists among the Greek Cypriots (the only ones who have been free to give voice in the last two years) disclaim interest in any advance short of union with Greece. In fact, there is little reason to doubt that, given the end of terrorism and a moderation of pressure and propaganda by the Orthodox Church, many moderate Greek Cypriots would welcome orderly advance along the general lines of Lord Radcliffe’s proposals. It is generally recognised by all moderate opinion both in and outside Cyprus that the existing form of government, with no elective element at the centre, is anomalous in present times. But because Greek agitation has centred so much on “self-determination” for Cyprus, the present situation is that constitutional advance may lead on to self-determination by both main communities, i.e., the partition of the island. It is only by acceptance of partition as an end contingency that the Turks have been persuaded to accept the principle of constitutional advance along the Radcliffe lines.

218. British control over Cyprus was acquired in 1878 to aid Turkey in defence against Russian aggression; the support of Turkey and hence of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area against Russia remains the chief strategic importance of the island to the Western Powers. Cyprus as the third in the chain of British bases across the Mediterranean has acquired the post-war strategic importance of serving as a base for protection of British interests in the Near East, for support to the Baghdad Pact, and for the defence of the southern flank of NATO. ....

223. Independence, whether or not by partition, would most likely increase tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and lead to less stable internal political and economic conditions. Withdrawal of British administration and capital investment would slow down economic and social development; and the economic effect of cessation of defence expenditure has already been noted. It is doubtful if

---

4 C J Radcliffe, lord of appeal in ordinary since 1949; constitutional commissioner for Cyprus (1956); his proposals envisaged a very wide measure of self-government.
Cyprus would be viable, especially with the running out of its copper ore in the next few years, unless it had ties with some country that could offer a measure of economic support to it. . . .

225. The vacuum would be filled in the first place by Greece and/or Turkey. The former cannot be relied upon for support in the Middle East so long as she can be blackmailed by Egypt through the large Greek population of Alexandria, and to surrender Cyprus to Greece alone would hence be particularly damaging. It may be that under the Eisenhower plan British withdrawal would lead to greater United States influence on an independent Cyprus. Most likely there would be attempts by Russia to keep internal affairs in Cyprus in a ferment through AKEL, the local Communist Party. It is not inconceivable that Nasser might find an outlet for Egyptian imperialism in Cyprus—there are strong trade links with Egypt, and Nasser has given covert support to EOKA.7

Part V: Far Eastern territories

A. Hong Kong

... 231. By virtue of the Colony’s geographical position, history and population, the chief political consideration which influences almost every problem is the relationship of the Colony to China. The present Chinese Government, like the Nationalist Government before it, considers Hong Kong to be Chinese territory awaiting reincorporation with the “motherland.” We have no indication of China’s timetable for such reincorporation and it seems likely that she hopes to bring it about in due course by peaceful means, awaiting a suitable opportunity to bring the matter to a head. In the meantime, she loses no opportunity of building up her influence within the Colony, particularly in the trade unions and in the schools, and of enhancing her appeal to the local population as “compatriots” of China proper.

232. While there are a number of convinced Left-wing (Communist) and Right-wing (Nationalist) adherents, the majority of the population are politically inactive and unorganised with survival as their major aim in life. So long as the British administration maintains its position and appears to be determined and capable of doing so they are likely to be content with the present position. In any emergency, however, a desire to join the winning, or at least to avoid the losing, side is likely to play a large part, and if there seemed to be a possibility of the Chinese Government shortly taking over the Colony there would be a strong move to reinsure with them. Any signs of weakening on the part of the Hong Kong Government or Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom is therefore likely to have damaging consequences. . . .

234. The Colony is quite unsuited for any form of self-government. It is too small in area and resources to stand alone and there are no other territories with which it could combine. The only alternative to British rule is return to China. In any case most of the Colony’s water supplies, most of its agricultural land and most of its industry are in the “New Territories,” the lease of which expires in 1997. There is virtually no prospect of any Chinese Government renewing the lease, and without the leased area the Colony would be neither economically viable nor militarily defensible. . . .

7 AKEL, Reform Party of Working People; EOKA, Greek initials of National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters.
236. The Colony has a first-class harbour and in peacetime is useful as a naval and air base. It is a centre for communications in the area and a link in our communications with Japan and the Pacific providing the only satisfactory service and repair facilities for shipping and aircraft, other than those at Manila, for thousands of miles. The Colony is also useful as a source of intelligence close to China. In cold war terms the retention of Hong Kong is of great importance to our position in the Far East.

241. . . . [With the end of British jurisdiction,] Hong Kong would also be lost as the chief base in the Far East for United Kingdom industrialists, traders, bankers and shipowners; and the heavy but incalculable capital investment associated with those occupations would have to be written off.

243. The Colony provides a demonstration adjacent to a Communist country of what can be done by good administration combined with intelligent private enterprise. It is an example of the rule of law and respect for individual freedom. It has, largely at its own expense, done outstanding work in absorbing and resettling the flood of refugees who have confidently turned to it for asylum. It is a valuable asset in the “cold war” and its loss would in many ways be as serious to the Western cause as the loss of the Western sectors in Berlin. While few Asian Governments would be prepared openly to support our colonial position, and none to do anything to prevent the reincorporation of Hong Kong into China, its loss would certainly be widely regretted, and would be a serious blow to our prestige and influence in the area.

245. By ordinary colonial standards Hong Kong is both tractable and useful. No trouble is to be expected from pressure for constitutional development, and economically the Colony makes few demands. Owing to its position vis-à-vis China it stands, however, in much greater danger from external pressure than any other colony, and this danger is accentuated by the composition of its population and the inevitable struggle for the latter’s allegiance.

246. Short of the collapse of the Chinese Communist régime and a disintegration of government within China it must be accepted that in due course the Colony must return to China, at least when the lease of the “New Territories” expires in 1997. There is likely, however, to be Chinese pressure for its return before then and this pressure is likely both to increase and to meet with a reader response from the population if there is any serious setback to the Colony’s well-being, or any failure of confidence in the determination and capacity of Her Majesty’s Government to maintain their position. If the Chinese were to force us out of the Colony this would be a severe blow to Western prestige in the Far East and a substantial practical loss in terms of British capital investment and communications facilities. We cannot be sure how long we may be able to maintain our position if the Chinese seek to force the issue, but any actions on our part which diminish the Colony’s economic well-being and the confidence of the population in Her Majesty’s Government can serve only to encourage Chinese pressure and to create conditions in which it will no longer be possible to resist it.

B. Singapore

254. . . . Singapore together with the Federation [of Malaya] are most important in the defences of Australia and New Zealand, although their defence policy is oriented on SEATO, whose area also includes Thailand and South Viet Nam. Singapore is the
headquarters of the Commanders-in-Chief, Far East; it possesses the largest and most comprehensive naval dockyard in that part of the world and it provides a base from which our air and land forces in the Federation and elsewhere in the Far East may be supplied and deployed. The United Kingdom’s strategic position in the Far East depends upon the maintenance of our military presence in Singapore.

261. If the United Kingdom were to withdraw prematurely, leaving the democratic elements to the mercy of the Communists, the effect on its reputation would be serious, not least in the Federation of Malaya. If, however, the United Kingdom were to withdraw in circumstances which provided reasonable security for the life, liberties, and economic well-being of the people of Singapore, its prestige and influence in the area would be enhanced rather than lowered. Without the full use of military facilities in Singapore the United Kingdom could not fulfil its strategic requirements in the Far East.

262. There is a serious danger that such a premature withdrawal might lead to the Communists in Singapore gaining control. These Communists, like the vast majority of the population, are Chinese and would look to China. If they were to gain control, the vacuum left by the United Kingdom withdrawal would in effect be filled by Communist China. The Federation of Malaya would not be strong enough to prevent this.

C. The Borneo territories (N Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei)

298. (i) The stage reached in constitutional and political progress in the three territories makes it unlikely that there will be any local demand for independence in the near future.

(ii) No obstacle is accordingly foreseen at present to the fulfilment of the United Kingdom’s strategic requirements, for which the territories offer possibilities.

(iii) Premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction, i.e., before the people are sufficiently advanced educationally and politically to be capable of administering stable and effective Governments of their own, would have very little if any direct effect on the United Kingdom Exchequer, but would seriously prejudice political, economic and social development, and react to the detriment and oppression of racial minorities, probably resulting in armed conflict.

(iv) Premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would damage United Kingdom prestige and influence in the territories and evoke adverse criticism elsewhere, not excluding the anti-colonial countries.

(v) United Kingdom withdrawal would leave a vacuum which would be filled almost certainly by a Government of Communist character or possibly by Indonesia, which has laid claim to Sarawak and would undoubtedly be attracted by the Brunei oil. The Philippines claims to North Borneo, held to be groundless, might also be pursued unless the United States exercised restraining influence.

Part VI: The Caribbean territories

A. The West Indies Federation

... 302. The Federation as initially established will not have strong governmental powers. Its main field of activity will be in economic planning and the co-ordination of West Indian trade interests, but it will have enough power to establish itself firmly if there is a will for it to do so.
311. The West Indies at present cost Her Majesty's Government on average about £4 million per annum. Of this over £3 million consists of direct grants in aid of normal administration, grants for special purposes (particularly hurricane rehabilitation) and C.D. and W. grants; the remainder represents the cost to Her Majesty's Government of the present defence arrangements. Although the method of administering grants in aid will change when the Federation is established there will be no change in the volume of aid required from Her Majesty's Government. Theoretically, the whole of this could be saved on the granting of independence. In practice, however, increased assistance for economic development would almost certainly be sought in other ways (in particular public loans) as soon as these more direct forms of assistance ceased. Some of this would be likely to come from the United States and Canada; there would however be likely to be a continuing call on United Kingdom sources and thus the apparent saving would not be likely to be fully realised although it might well remain substantial.

320. The movement towards closer association through Federation and towards independent status is a healthy one, as showing an out-growing of the effects of slavery and of the isolation in which the small units of the area have existed for so long. The withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction in due course from a soundly established West Indies Federation may be expected to stimulate rather than to impede local efforts towards development. The greatest danger politically is the growth of a class of political bosses on the Latin-American model, and that the present healthily developing local Civil Services may be affected by nepotism and jobbery. The association of the United States and Canada with the territory after independence is likely to grow and there may well be some friendly rivalry between these two Powers for a predominant place—a rivalry which might well be to the advantage of the West Indies.

B. British Guiana

334. [The effect of a change of status] would be a question of degree; if done as part of a general withdrawal from a number of the smaller territories, it would have a damaging effect on United Kingdom prestige and influence. In particular it would be likely to impair our relations with the United States, in view of their interest in preventing the establishment of any Communist Government in the Western Hemisphere.

335. In view of the possibility that a premature withdrawal might be followed by the development of a Communist-inspired State on the South American mainland, the United States Government might well step in.

336. Withdrawal before a stable and friendly Government is established (whether or not as part of the West Indian Federation) would result in some saving to the Exchequer but would be seriously damaging to United Kingdom relations with the United States and the West Indian Federation. It would also risk Commonwealth material interests (considerable United Kingdom investments, and Canadian investment in bauxite). Withdrawal after the establishment of a stable and friendly Government would, of course, be another matter.

Part VII: The smaller territories

337. There are numerous small Colonial territories, practically all islands, scattered around the surface of the globe, the considerations affecting which are set
out below. Some of these Colonies have strategic value either to us, the Commonwealth or NATO, e.g., Bermuda and Fiji. Some are dollar earners (e.g., Bermuda and the Bahamas). Some have frankly no material value to the United Kingdom as far as we can see to-day and call for (usually very small) assistance from United Kingdom funds, e.g., St. Helena. Practically none could hope to maintain themselves with a stable administration if we withdrew, and certainly not those which represent any call on our funds. Withdrawal from all, even if practicable on strategic grounds, would represent only a relatively small saving to United Kingdom funds and, particularly bearing in mind the internal chaos which would in many cases result, could only represent a negation of our responsibilities and indeed be degrading.

Falkland Islands and Dependencies

... The strategic importance of the Falklands to the United Kingdom is primarily as a base from which to support Commonwealth interests in the Antarctic, and depends on a régime attached to the United Kingdom connection. ...

The population is almost entirely of United Kingdom origin with a high percentage of persons born in the United Kingdom. An independent Government would be entirely British and would involve no loss of United Kingdom prestige or influence. Provided the withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction did not also involve withdrawal of United Kingdom protection, there would be no vacuum to be filled by an outsider. If, however, protection were also withdrawn, the Falkland Islands would be in danger of occupation by Argentina, and the abandonment of a racially British population to such a fate would be discreditable and severely damaging to prestige. ...

The strategic value of the Dependencies depends partly upon the possibility of discovering minerals of strategic importance. For the rest, its strategic importance is largely negative, i.e., it is important to the Commonwealth to deny it as a base to a potentially hostile Power. ...

Our withdrawal from Antarctica would mean a loss of United Kingdom prestige and influence, especially in scientific circles. It might also involve the loss of strategic minerals, but this will be easier to evaluate when the results have been assessed of the work done during the International Geophysical Year.

Argentina and/or Chile, which have claims (partly competing) to the Dependencies, would probably step in if the United Kingdom withdrew.

St Helena with Tristan da Cunha

... United Kingdom withdrawal would certainly leave a vacuum in these islands. This might well be filled by the Union of South Africa in the case of Tristan da Cunha and Gough Islands. This would be hard on the Tristan islanders who are coloured within the meaning of the South African apartheid policy. It is unlikely that there would be an immediate claimant to St. Helena but abandonment of this poor and loyal community would be degrading. ...

Seychelles

... The Colony is too poor in human and material resources to stand satisfactorily on its own and would probably decline into a tropical slum if United Kingdom jurisdiction were withdrawn. The small property owning class of French origin
would have to come to terms with the majority, which is of mainly African origin. Withdrawal from Seychelles would affect the prestige and influence of the United Kingdom only in so far as it would be regarded as an abdication of moral responsibility. …

**Mauritius**

… United Kingdom withdrawal under present conditions would lead to a violent upheaval in Mauritius with unpredictable results. The amount of bloodshed might be limited but the effect on the economic and social development of the territory would be likely to be very serious, and prolonged. …

Our present policy is to fit Mauritius for full internal self-government. Withdrawal cannot be recommended.

**Fiji**

… It is too early to contemplate Fiji becoming fully self-governing. If we relinquished our administration to New Zealand we should presumably be able to retain, with her agreement, the use of whatever facilities we required. Whilst the Colony remains under our administration no difficulty in controlling our strategic requirements is foreseen. …

To [withdraw and] leave the Fijians and Indians to fight it out among themselves, when it was we who introduced the racial problem by importing Indian labour, would have a deplorable effect. The Fijians are intensely pro-British and our departure would for them mean betrayal.

The effect of United Kingdom withdrawal would depend on whether New Zealand were to replace us in Fiji. If not, there is the likelihood of strife between the Fijians and Indians and the lapse of the territory into chaos. …

**British Solomon Islands Protectorate**

… If the United Kingdom [withdrew and] was not replaced by Australia the Protectorate would revert to a primitive mode of existence with little prospect of advance.

The effect on United Kingdom prestige would probably not be great, but, since it would involve allowing the territory to slide into anarchy, it would be discreditable. …

**Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony**

… [If the United Kingdom withdrew:] The islands would relapse into primitive savagery with little hope of advance unless another civilised country assumed the administration.8

The effect of withdrawal on prestige would be probably very little, but to permit the Colony to relapse into savagery would be degrading.

---

8 The resident commissioner objected to this statement, commenting that the influence of Christian missions and government was now so great there could be no question of this (CO 1036/331, no 4, governor to Sir J Macpherson, 3 Mar 1958). In the CO, D J Derx specifically objected to the phrase; ‘near primitive state’ would be better, he thought (ibid, no 22).
High Commission Territories: Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland

... Representative institutions are at an early stage of development in all three Territories. There are demands, in varying degrees, for increased powers for Africans. We are endeavouring to encourage the growth of representative institutions but the question of eventual self-government is not likely to be a practical one in the foreseeable future. Other considerations apart, any suggestion that self-government for the Territories was our aim would, of course, be taken badly by the Union.

The practical question in connection with the High Commission Territories is not, therefore, whether they will one day become self-governing but whether they will one day be handed over to the Union of South Africa. . . .

If we were to agree to transfer the Territories in present circumstances it would improve our relations with the Union of South Africa, but we should be regarded by many people in the United Kingdom and overseas as having betrayed our trust. Our prestige and moral standing would be damaged, particularly in the eyes of the peoples of the Colonies and of the Asian and African self-governing members of the Commonwealth.

Because of the damage to our prestige which would result and because it would, in fact, be a betrayal of our trust, we cannot agree to the transfer of the Territories to the Union until the two conditions to which we are pledged have been fulfilled, i.e., until the United Kingdom Parliament has had an opportunity of expressing its views and the African inhabitants have been consulted. Feeling among the African inhabitants and in the United Kingdom about the native policies of the Union of South Africa is such that we are unlikely to be able successfully to fulfil these conditions in the foreseeable future.

3 CAB 134/1556, CPC (57)30 6 Sept 1957

'Future constitutional development in the colonies': memorandum for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee by Sir N Brook

[In all, four papers were generated in response to the prime minister's directive (document no 1), each of them drafted in the CO:—CP(0)(57)5 was a factual statement following the 'skeleton plan', circulated to ministers as CPC(57)27, dated May 1957 (document no 2);—CP(0)(57)4 was a more specialised factual overview of 'economic and financial aspects', and became CPC(57)28, dated 26 July 1957;—CP(0)(57)3 was an attempt to be more analytical, with attached summaries: this was never circulated to ministers, and it was decided at the officials' meeting on 11 July 1957 to replace it by a much more schematic general paper;—CPC(57)30, dated 6 September 1957, was this general paper, signed by Sir N Brook (document no 3, printed here). Brook's paper incorporated some of the points made in the officials' discussion, particularly by the Treasury representatives, Sir F Lee and W Armstrong, but also the late addition of a rather specific CO doctrine about the desirability of not transferring power until a colonial people 'could live together in harmony' (para 15). It was also pointed out that capital assistance requests might not cease at independence (CAB 134/1551, minutes of Colonial Policy Official Committee meetings on 5 June & 11 July 1957). The three papers which were circulated to ministers were inter-related parts of the full response to the prime minister's directive, and not a sequence of papers which modified or qualified each other. The 'economic' paper CPC(57)28 is not reproduced here, its substance being represented in Brook's final paper. It had four sections: (i) colonial balance of payments (of which it was said 'any assessment of an individual territory's standing was too hypothetical for realistic analysis'), (ii) sterling assets of colonies, (iii) UK financial...]

07-ConGov-Doc 1-28-cp 18/10/00 2:03 pm Page 28
assistance, (iv) special position of Hong Kong. It is fully summarised, with statistical
tables, in Morgan, vol 5, *Guidance towards self-government in British colonies,
1941–1971*, pp 98–100; Brook’s paper is summarised at pp 100–102. All three papers are
Trebilcock, eds, *Understanding decline: perceptions and realities of British economic

1. In his minute of 28th January, 1957 (C.P.C. (57) 6), the Prime Minister asked
that an estimate should be made of the probable course of constitutional
development in the Colonies in the years ahead, and that this study should set out
the economic, political and strategic considerations for and against the grant of
independence.

2. The Colonial Office, with the co-operation of the Departments concerned,
have prepared a comprehensive review of all the present Colonial Office territories
(save the Federation of Malaya, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) and also of the
High Commission territories in South Africa. This review has been circulated
separately (C.P.C. (57) 27). It suggests some conclusions regarding individual
territories. But any further examination of the problems of any territory, or region,
with a view to a reassessment of policy, would require special consideration after
consultation with the Governors concerned.

A separate study of the economic and financial considerations has also been
circulated (C.P.C. (57) 28).

3. On the basis of these detailed studies the Official Committee on Colonial
Policy have attempted to suggest certain general conclusions, under the headings
Constitutional, Economic, Strategic, and Political. I was asked to submit these on
their behalf. The strategic sections (paragraphs 9–12) have been approved by the
Chiefs of Staff.

Constitutional

4. — (a) Independence

(i) The following territories are likely to obtain independence within, and become
candidates for membership of, the Commonwealth within the next ten years:—

- Federation of Malaya, in August 1957.
- Nigeria, perhaps in 1960 or 1961 (or quite soon thereafter).
- West Indies Federation, perhaps in 1963.
- Singapore, if it joins the Federation of Malaya.

(ii) Central African Federation. The print (C.P.C. (57) 27) does not deal with
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which are parts of the Central African Federation.
The Federation is already self-governing in all matters which have been agreed to be
federal (though in relation to certain types of legislation Her Majesty’s Government
have powers of veto which were inserted into the Constitution to ensure that African
interests were safeguarded); and a great measure of responsibility in respect of
defence and external affairs has been delegated to it. Most matters concerning the
African population are, however, reserved to the territorial Governments (Southern
Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland). The Commonwealth Secretary retains
certain responsibilities for native affairs in Southern Rhodesia and the Colonial
Secretary retains ultimate authority for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The
Federal Constitution contains a provision for its review by an Inter-governmental Conference which the Federal Government and the United Kingdom Government have agreed should be convened in 1960 to consider a programme for the attainment of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth.

This does not, of course, commit Her Majesty's Government then to grant such a status to the Federation. But there will be strong pressure for it from the Federal Government, and Her Majesty's Government will have to shape their policy so as to reconcile the desire for independence among the Europeans in the Federation with the desire of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for continued protection by Her Majesty's Government and with the safeguards incorporated in the Federal Constitution of 1953. The preamble to the Constitution provides that:

“Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue, under the special protection of Her Majesty, to enjoy separate Governments for so long as their respective peoples so desire, those Governments remaining responsible (subject to the ultimate authority of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom) for . . .”

A later passage in the preamble runs:

“. . . the association of the Colony and the Territories in a Federation would . . . enable the Federation, when those inhabitants so desire, to go forward . . . towards the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth.”

Her Majesty's Government are committed to interpret “when those inhabitants so desire” as meaning “when a numerical majority of all the inhabitants of whatever race so desire.” At present there is no prospect that such a majority would favour independence for the Federation at any rate if it involved either the independence under predominantly non-African control of the Northern Territorial Governments or the disappearance of those Governments or the transfer of further responsibilities from them to the Federal Government.

On 6th February, 1957, the Colonial Secretary said in the House of Commons that Her Majesty's Government could not abandon their ultimate responsibility until they were satisfied that Africans in the Northern Territories had transferred their loyalties from Westminster to the Federation and their own territorial capitals. At present it cannot be claimed that this transfer has been made.

(iii) Uganda. Although Uganda is not named here among the candidates for independence within the next ten years, there will almost certainly be African pressure for rapid advance, which may take the form of demands for a considerable measure of self-government in 1961 and independence in, say, 1967. Uganda cannot be expected by then to have acquired the skill in government, or to have developed the racial harmony, which would justify the United Kingdom Government in relinquishing their authority. They may, therefore, be obliged to maintain their authority in the face of opposition and criticism. In a lesser degree similar considerations might apply to Sierra Leone.

(b) Internal Self-Government
The following territories, listed geographically, appear the most likely to show significant developments in internal self-government during the next ten years:—
Constitutional Development, 1957

Singapore  
Cyprus  
Gibraltar  
Kenya  
Uganda  
Tanganyika  
Zanzibar  
Malta  
Sierra Leone  
The Gambia  
Aden Colony  
Somaliland Protectorate  
Mauritius  
British Guiana  
British Honduras  

Malta has had internal self-government for ten years, and the integration scheme would maintain this arrangement.

The general classification in this sub-paragraph allows for a large variety of political changes, as must be expected in such differing territories. Singapore may join the Federation of Malaya and move into the independent class; Somaliland may be joined with her neighbour in a “United Somalia” enjoying some sort of independence, probably outside the Commonwealth; the future international status of Cyprus has yet to be determined; British Honduras, which at present has the opportunity to work a constitution with a large measure of responsible self-government, may suffer a set-back; the future of British Guiana remains uncertain until its people have made a second attempt at representative government; in the East African territories, particularly in Kenya, the devolution of responsibility will largely depend on the growth of inter-racial confidence, which cannot be predicted in terms of time. What can be said is that in all these territories there are political forces making for progress in internal self-government, and that neither economic nor strategic considerations need inhibit its orderly development.

(c) The Remaining Territories

Such forces are less apparent in the remaining territories; in most of them there are no discernible signs of pressures for significant advance in self-government within the next decade. The most distinct change could perhaps be expected in Hong Kong but, if it comes, it will hardly be of a kind discussed in the previous sub-paragraph.

Economic

5. It is difficult to present economic and financial considerations territory by territory, or even region by region. The print circulated under cover of C.P.C. (57) 28 discusses in some detail the main features of the Colonial balance of payments, the Colonial sterling assets, present and likely demands for United Kingdom financial assistance to Colonial territories, and the special position of Hong Kong. The main considerations involved in the question of granting independence fall under the following headings:—

- Budgetary implications for the United Kingdom.
- Effect on flow of investment funds from the United Kingdom.
- Effect on the use of sterling balances.
- Effect on sterling area balance of payments.
- Effect on United Kingdom trade.

Some of the general points under each heading are set out below, but it may be pointed out at the start that, with the exception of the budgetary implications for the United Kingdom, the economic and financial implications of the grant of independence to Colonial territories do not flow from the grant of independence...
itself but from the policies which may be followed by the particular countries after independence.

6. — (a) **Budgetary implications for the United Kingdom.** The cost of the Colonies to the United Kingdom Government in terms of expenditure through the Colonial Development and Welfare (C. D. & W.) Vote, the Colonial Services Vote and the Colonial Development Corporation (C.D.C.) is at present running at about £51 millions a year. Ministers have decided against any regular pattern of Government-to-Government aid for independent Commonwealth countries, and by corollary against the C.D.C. embarking on new schemes in such countries. Moreover, it is established policy that territories on attaining independence or leaving the Commonwealth cease to be eligible for grants-in-aid or C.D. & W. funds. The further this process goes, the greater the reduction in the burden on the Exchequer on this account. But the net saving in the foreseeable future would almost certainly be considerably less than is generally imagined. The reasons for this are various. In general, the territories which are nearest to the attainment of independence tend to be least in need of Exchequer assistance. Thus, Ghana had no territorial allocation under the 1955 C.D.W. Act, and the C.D.C. had inconsiderable investments there. But if we decide to give independence to a territory before it can hold its own financially, there are likely to be special reasons for our decision — reasons which might also lead us to continue financial support after independence. Thus the Federation of Malaya will continue to need, and has been promised, considerable financial assistance in connection with the Emergency and the building up of her armed forces. The West Indies also have asked for financial assistance on a considerable scale after independence.

(b) **Effect on flow of investment funds from the United Kingdom.** Grants made available under the C.D. & W. Acts in the current period (1955–60) to all Colonial Governments account for only one-sixth of their expenditure on development. The remaining five-sixths are being found from their own resources and external loans. (This is the overall picture: in the case of some of the smallest and poorest territories C.D. & W. assistance provides almost the whole of the capital required for development.)

It is estimated that the needs of Colonial Governments for loan finance on the London Market will run at about £25–30 millions a year over the next few years. The need for loan finance on this scale would not, of course, disappear with the grant of independence. Independent Commonwealth countries are permitted to come to the London Market for loans, and Colonial territories after attaining independence would still wish to do so, if, as we would hope, they so order their affairs that their credit stands high enough to make this a practical proposition. The experience of the past two years, however, suggests that the London Market may not be able to meet all the demands likely to be made on it.

(c) **Effect on the use of sterling balances.** The Colonies are large holders of sterling assets: the total of Colonial sterling assets at the end of 1956* was £1,311 millions (of which £160 millions was held in Dominion and Colonial securities). Of this total £1,115 millions was held on public account and £196 millions on private account. We

* Throughout this section, references to Colonial sterling assets, balance of payments and trade figures up to the end of 1956 include Ghana and the Federation of Malaya.
have encouraged the Colonies to make the maximum possible use of their sterling assets in the financing of their current development programmes, but there are certain definite limitations, arising from the nature of some of these assets, on the extent to which this is possible. Our present estimate is that, excluding the Federation of Malaya, Colonial Governments may draw some £130 millions net over the next three or four years from the funds available in one way or another for development expenditure, provided that present plans are executed at the rate proposed and no sudden increases in revenue occur. This does not mean that total Colonial sterling balances are likely to fall by this amount, since there are other official and private balances which may follow different trends. What the overall trend will be depends upon the course of commodity prices, internal inflation, capital inflow, &c., and is virtually unpredictable. The mere fact of the grant of independence should not in itself make any appreciable difference to the trend except in so far as it must be expected that standards of prudence would probably fall after independence. It would certainly be possible for a Colony which became independent and pursued rash policies of over-development and Government expenditure to get quickly into an inflationary situation leading to a rapid fall in its sterling holdings and, in terms of a call on resources, a considerable strain upon the United Kingdom. It should be borne in mind that any running down of sterling balances represents a real but inescapable burden on the United Kingdom. It does, however, seem probable that this factor may be less important as regards the remaining Colonial territories after Ghana, Malaya and Nigeria are excluded.

(d) Effect on sterling area balance of payments. The Colonies as a whole have contributed to the strength of the Sterling Area in recent years. During the period from 1951 (when balance of payments estimates for the Colonies were first compiled) to 1956 the Colonies have had a net current account surplus in their balance of payments owing to a succession of boom conditions in various Colonial commodities. They have also attracted non-sterling capital for investment. If any of these territories after the grant of independence decided to leave the Sterling Area—particularly those which are large dollar-earners—the consequences for the United Kingdom and the rest of the Sterling Area could be serious. The chief danger would be that the country concerned would wish to convert its balances into dollars either directly or indirectly by retaining its dollar earnings and running down its sterling holdings. This could be a serious threat to sterling. Fortunately, however, there is no reason to believe that any of the present candidates for independence would find it in their interest to leave the Sterling Area after independence. The Government both of Ghana and the Federation of Malaya have stated clearly that it is their intention to remain in the Sterling Area at present. In general, if there were a premature grant of independence which resulted in a serious deterioration in political and economic conditions, this might easily cause a serious loss to the Sterling Area's dollar reserves. On the other hand, postponement and any pique resulting from it would be more likely to lead to abandonment of Sterling Area connections. Again, however, when Ghana, Malaya and Nigeria are excluded this factor may well be less important as regards the remaining Colonial territories.

(e) Effect on United Kingdom trade. The Colonies are of considerable trade importance to the United Kingdom. In 1956 United Kingdom exports to the Colonies were valued at £422 millions or 13 per cent of total United Kingdom exports. Of this figure, £343 millions were in manufactured goods, which also represented 13 per
cent of the total exports of these goods from the United Kingdom. In 1956 the United Kingdom imported from the Colonies goods to the value of £376 millions or 10 per cent. of the United Kingdom's total imports: of this figure, £190 millions were in basic materials and represented about 17 per cent. of the United Kingdom's total imports of these materials. The United Kingdom's share in Colonial trade is about one-quarter of the total.

Any premature transfer of power which resulted in serious political troubles and a lasting deterioration in a territory's economic circumstances would of course seriously affect United Kingdom trading and financial interest in that territory. On the other hand, assuming an orderly transfer of power and no appreciable falling-off in a territory's economic activity, the grant of independence need not adversely affect the United Kingdom's trading position in the territory concerned. We do not enjoy any formal advantages over our trading competitors in the Colonies, save to the extent that we benefit from Imperial preferences. The great majority of Colonies grant preferences to a greater or lesser degree, though the value of such preference to the United Kingdom varies greatly, but these preferences would not necessarily be affected by the attainment of independence. But though the United Kingdom possesses no formal guarantee of trade advantage in the Colonies deriving solely from their status as dependent territories, we undoubtedly possess certain intangible advantages over our trade competitors in the Colonies: for example, the employment of British administrators and technicians means the adoption of British standards and practices over a large field, and this, coupled with the strong financial and economic links with the United Kingdom, results in a natural tendency to "buy British." Such intangible trade advantages might well be diminished in many cases with the grant of independence. The dangers of this should not, however, be exaggerated. So far as the import of British goods and services on private account is concerned, the Colonies already pursue a very liberal trade policy and are not restricted as to the source of their imports except to a minor extent on balance of payments grounds. So far as imports and services financed on Government account are concerned, there is no doubt a considerable intangible advantage in the fact that Colonial Governments are required to place their orders through the Crown Agents for Oversea Governments and Administrations, though the Crown Agents themselves do not restrict their tenders to British firms. There is, however, no reason why a Colonial Government after independence should not continue to make use of the services of the Crown Agents. This is true even if the country were to go outside the Commonwealth. The Crown Agents still handle Government business for Ceylon and even Iraq. Once more, it is not so much a question of the grant of independence itself, but the policy pursued after independence.

7. To sum up, the economic considerations tend to be evenly matched and the economic interests of the United Kingdom are unlikely in themselves to be decisive in determining whether or not a territory should become independent. Although damage could certainly be done by the premature grant of independence, the economic dangers to the United Kingdom of deferring the grant of independence for her own selfish interests after the country is politically and economically ripe for independence would be far greater than any dangers resulting from an act of independence negotiated in an atmosphere of goodwill such as has been the case with Ghana and the Federation of Malaya. Meanwhile, during the period when we can still exercise control in any territory, it is most important to take every step open to
us to ensure, as far as we can, that British standards and methods of business and administration permeate the whole life of the territory.

8. **Sharing the burden.** Total demands for investment from all quarters are well beyond the present capacity of the United Kingdom’s resources; and unless it proves possible to obtain sufficient help with long-term investment in the Colonies—much of it bound to be unremunerative—their economic standards may fall. Thus, leaving political considerations apart, any arrangement which served to transfer to some other Commonwealth or foreign country some part of the Exchequer burden, or the demand for investment, would be welcome. It would be particularly helpful if Canada could be brought more into this field and could be persuaded to share part of our burden, and the possibilities of securing Canadian help merit further study. It must be pointed out of course that, except in the case of Canada which is outside the Sterling Area, the mere transfer of the investment burden to other Commonwealth countries within the Sterling Area may not represent full relief for the United Kingdom, since these countries are themselves importers of sterling capital from the United Kingdom, and would increase their demand for such capital in order to discharge their increased responsibilities. Such a transfer would, however, as has been pointed out, relieve the Exchequer burden on the United Kingdom.

**Strategic**

9. The Colonies provide an essential contribution to the facilities required to maintain and control United Kingdom world-wide sea, air and wireless communications. In certain areas they also provide the bases where British forces are stationed in support of United Kingdom interests and of United Kingdom contributions to regional defence organisations. The territories of East and West Africa are also the greatest potential sources of military manpower within the Colonial Empire. Whether we could rely on making use of this manpower in wartime would depend upon the circumstances in which we were involved in war.

10. The most important Colonial territories for military reasons are:—

- Gibraltar
- Singapore
- Malta
- Nigeria
- Cyprus
- East Africa
- Aden

As indicated in the constitutional section of this paper, all these territories are expected to show significant developments in internal self-government in the next ten years, and Nigeria and Singapore (if it merges with Malaya) may cease to be dependent territories during that time.

11. There are certain Colonies, mainly smaller islands, whose strategic value is of a negative character in that their occupation by an unfriendly Power would be detrimental to the United Kingdom or to her Allies, *e.g.*, the West Indian territories, the Pacific islands covering Australasia, the Falkland Islands, the Somaliland Protectorate and the small islands in the Red Sea and its approaches administered as part of the Aden Protectorate.

12.—(a) The value of Gibraltar in controlling Commonwealth and NATO sea and air communications in the Atlantic and Mediterranean would not be diminished by an orderly progress towards internal self-government. Cession to Spain, however,
would reduce its strategic value to the West and would certainly make it of no value whatsoever to the United Kingdom for her own interests.

(b) Malta is unlikely seriously to demand independence in view of her financial reliance on the United Kingdom. The proposal for integration is unlikely to interfere with the fulfilment of United Kingdom or NATO strategic requirements.

(c) It is the military view that United Kingdom strategic requirements in Cyprus can only be fully met by British sovereignty over the whole island. Any system of partition or condominium would seriously restrict the use of the island as a base from which to support the Bagdad Pact or British interests and, to a lesser degree, NATO. Nevertheless, if we were forced by political considerations to do so, we might be able to group the more essential military facilities within enclaves, relying on treaty rights for the remainder. Whatever arrangements are made, however, it is important that we retain responsibility for the external defence of Cyprus.

(d) The importance of Aden as a headquarters and support base for the protection of British interests in Arabia, the Somaliland Protectorate and the Persian Gulf and as an air-staging post has recently been much enhanced by the potential air/sea barrier and in proportion to the increased Saudi and Yemeni threat. Our essential military requirements could not be guaranteed were complete independence to be granted, but some degree of internal self-government with proper safeguards for British military requirements might be acceptable.

(e) There is no present practical alternative to Singapore as a base for the deployment of naval and air forces in support of SEATO and ANZAM. The Borneo territories are geographically suitable, but virtually no facilities exist at present. Singapore cannot be viewed in isolation from Malaya, and military facilities in both are complementary. In the event of a merger between the territories, a development which Her Majesty’s Government have indicated that they would favour, it would be expected that the Malayan Defence Agreement would be extended to cover Singapore. The danger inherent in a merger with the Federation of Malaya is that a later Malayan Government might deny the United Kingdom continued use of Singapore as a base.

(f) The emergence of the potential air/sea barrier in the Middle East has emphasised the importance of the reinforcement route through West Africa and the deployment of ground forces in East Africa. No foreseeable political developments in East Africa should prejudice United Kingdom military requirements.

(g) In Nigeria the question of independence may call for a decision on United Kingdom strategic needs in the very near future. Kano is essential to the Central African air-route. Even this in certain circumstances depends on the use of Dakar. If Kano is denied to us it will be necessary to consider a route round Africa via Gambia or Sierra Leone, Ascension Island and South Africa (which would be practical only for long-range aircraft) or, alternatively, across French West and Equatorial Africa. Neither alternative would leave us freedom of action.

Political

13. Successive Governments in the United Kingdom have for many years pursued, with a broad measure of public support, a Colonial policy of assisting dependent peoples towards the greatest practicable measure of self-government. It is presumably not intended to depart from this general policy, nor to weaken it, as
regards individual territories, by imposing any delays which could be interpreted as artificial. A complementary aspect of the same policy, it is suggested, is that we must retain some measure of jurisdiction or protection where this is patently required in the best interests of peoples whose system of government, of law, or administration, and of political habit, derive from United Kingdom custom and advice. The United Kingdom stands to gain no credit for launching a number of immature, unstable and impoverished units whose performances as “independent” countries would be an embarrassment and whose chaotic existence would be a temptation to our enemies.

14. In many territories it is only British authority and administration which enables peoples of different racial or tribal loyalties to live in peace with one another. The United Kingdom bears some past responsibility for encouraging directly or indirectly, the immigration and settlement of non-indigenous peoples. The present responsibility is to persuade the races to tolerance and co-operation; this is a slow process. Conditions in East Africa, Mauritius, and Fiji, for example, are such that it would be irresponsible to remove jurisdiction and control before the process has been carried well beyond the present stage.

15. In sum, it should remain our aim to maintain our authority in each territory until a transfer of power can be shown to be generally desired by its people and they have shown that they can live at peace with one another and are capable of sustaining independent status with a reasonable standard of government. In most of the smaller territories there is at present no widespread desire to escape from ultimate dependence on the United Kingdom. It might at first sight seem attractive and advantageous, in the interests of both the United Kingdom and the territories concerned, that responsibility for certain dependencies should be transferred to other Commonwealth countries; for example, Canada might assume responsibility for Bermuda, or New Zealand for Fiji. It is, however, far from certain that the countries of the older Commonwealth would be prepared to assume complete responsibility of this kind, and such transfers would be repugnant to political opinion in this country and to the peoples affected. They would, too, need to be carefully assessed against the opportunity which they might provide for India to propose a like arrangement in, say, Mauritius or Fiji, or for South Africa to intensify her claim to the High Commission territories. As already noted in this paper, it would, however, be worth seeking some Commonwealth participation in the financial burden at present borne by the United Kingdom alone, in respect of Exchequer aid to the Colonies and Colonial investment.

16. Any premature withdrawal of authority by the United Kingdom would seem bound to add to the areas of stress and discontent in the world. There are territories over which jurisdiction might be surrendered without prejudice to the essentials of strategy or foreign relations, and at some modest savings to the Exchequer. But would we stand to gain by thus rewarding loyalty to the Crown which is an enduring characteristic of so many Colonial peoples? The United Kingdom has been too long connected with its Colonial possessions to sever ties abruptly without creating a bewilderment which would be discreditable and dangerous.
FO 371/135624, no 9 3 Feb 1958

[Overseas interests of the UK]: FO brief for a permanent under-secretaries’ meeting to discuss future policy. Annex: CRO and CO memoranda

[In the summer of 1956, apparently on the initiative of Macmillan (chancellor of the Exchequer) and Sir W Monckton (minister of defence), a high-level ministerial ‘Policy Review’ committee was set up, with prime minister Eden’s support, to make a reappraisal of defence policy and British overseas commitments. Officials under Sir N Brook produced a report, ‘The future of the UK in world affairs’ (see D Goldsworthy, ed, The Conservative government and the end of empire, 1951–1957, BDEEP, 1994, part I, document numbers 20 & 21). The work of the committee was incomplete owing to the Suez Crisis and the change of government. In Nov 1957 Brook—prompted by Sir F Hoyer Millar of the FO (CO 1032/166, letter to Brook, 9 Oct 1957)—suggested to Macmillan that a fresh review might be appropriate, in the light of changed circumstances: ‘Our position in the Middle East has undergone a radical change. A new phase of Anglo–American co-operation is opening. We are being compelled to review our earlier conception of the capabilities of the Soviet Union as a technological rival. We are facing renewed economic difficulties. And we are drastically modifying our defence programme’. The FO was keen to have a comprehensive assessment of essential overseas interests and the deployment of resources. The permanent under-secretaries of the FO, CO, CRO, the Treasury and Defence could undertake it. Macmillan agreed, provided it did not lead to too many or too lengthy papers or to overburdening of officials (PREM 11/2321, minutes 25 & 28 Nov 1957). Despite this, when the report arrived in June 1958 (see document no 5), Macmillan appears to have been dissatisfied with it; at all events, in June 1959 he called for a more comprehensive review of overseas policy as something needed for consideration by a new administration after the autumn election (document no 8). Although Sir N Brook was put in overall charge of this large investigation, the main input was from a Working Group chaired by Sir P Dean of the FO. It started by collecting such papers as the previous report on the position of the UK in world affairs, the Africa Committee’s report on ‘Africa in the next ten years’ (document no 20), and despatches from Malcolm MacDonald in India (documents nos 7, and 529 in Part II). The planning exercise was given the title of ‘Study of Future Policy, 1960–1970’; the intention was to produce something akin to a blueprint, or at least a ‘crystal-ball’, for future overseas policy in all its aspects (FO 371/143702, ZP 25/2, 3, 10 & 12).]

The papers

3. (a) The Foreign Office contribution. This consists of a covering paper (pages 1–13a) discussing our aims, our principal political and military commitments and the use of our resources, and a series of detailed annexes (pages 14–75). The Annexes can probably be ignored for the purposes of this meeting. The most important passages in the covering paper, which it is hoped the Permanent Under-Secretary will have time to read in full, are paragraphs 5–8 and 41–42. Mr. Ormsby-Gore’s comments on the first draft of the paper were included.

4. (b) The Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office contributions. These are interesting papers, on which a number of comments could be made, but they do not bear directly upon the principal issue which confronts the Foreign Office (see paragraph 6 below). A look through the attached summaries will probably suffice. An important question, not discussed in the C.R.O. paper, is whether India, in her struggle to maintain her First-Year Plan, will be such a drain on the Sterling system as to frustrate our hopes of building up our reserves.

5. (c) The Treasury contribution. This is a very good and important paper and should be read in full, as any summary might be misleading.

1 This brief was by P E Ramsbotham. The meeting was chaired by Sir R Makins (T) on 4 Feb.
The main issue
6. The main issue is whether the economic situation and the financial policy which has been designed to meet it can be reconciled with the expenditure overseas which will be necessary to maintain the United Kingdom’s position in the world. Our object should be to ensure that the Foreign Office and the Treasury stand together in agreeing that neither foreign nor financial policies can be weakened if our ultimate objectives are to be attained.

7. We should therefore express full agreement with the Treasury paper, subject to certain clarifications (para. 8 below) since the paper does not set out a point of view incompatible with our own. Their line of thought seems to be that, if Sterling weakens, the United Kingdom will not be able to maintain its present commitments either at home or overseas, and that economies must be found if this is to be prevented. We should agree, but the question is where are the economies to be found? In our view, the exercise should reach agreement on the essential nature of both financial and foreign policies, recognise that both may need intensifying in certain directions and conclude by presenting to Ministers the choice of cuts in unproductive home expenditure or severe damage to our interdependent foreign and financial positions.

8. In general, the Treasury paper does not seem inconsistent with this line. It concentrates naturally upon our economic aims, and some correction of this emphasis is needed to bring it into overall perspective. Thus the paper rightly emphasises the basic importance to our economic aims of foreign confidence in our belief in the Sterling Area (paragraph 14). Equally important to the same aims, in our view, is foreign confidence in our political future as a power with world-wide influence and interests. Similarly, in paragraph 17, the Treasury state that additional external investment would secure us greater dividends than additional expenditure on anything else. Our acceptance of this thesis depends upon how widely investment is defined. If it is defined widely so as to include action to support our political position abroad which in turn supports our commercial position, we can accept it. If not, i.e. if it is to be confined strictly to putting money into Government or private enterprises in the financial sense, we could not do so.2

The Foreign Office paper
9. In introducing the Foreign Office paper, therefore, the Permanent Under-Secretary may wish to emphasise and seek to secure agreement on our basic and subsidiary aims (para. 5–7 of the paper) and go on to make the following points:

(a) The needs of foreign policy cannot be totally subordinated to the need to build up our financial resources. Both foreign and financial policies depend on each other’s success. Merely holding on to our present international position is bound to become increasingly expensive because

(i) costs are rising;

---

2 Sir P Dean minuted that he agreed with paras 6–8: the FO and Treasury views were ‘already pretty close’, but ‘we cannot go so far as they would wish in saying that everything must be sacrificed to reinforce sterling during the next few years and that this means that there can be no increase in our expenditure overseas’; some (comparatively small) increase might be necessary ‘if we are not to lose a great deal in other fields while the financial situation is being restored’ (3 Feb 1958).
in a sharply competitive world we have to do more in order to maintain our relative position; like the Red Queen, we must run very fast in order to stay in the same place (para. 8 of Foreign Office paper). There are cases where failure to spend now may mean total loss later.

(b) Given the position, population and organisation of the United Kingdom, the cost of maintaining our position abroad is astonishingly small (the Foreign Office vote and Grants and Services Vote in 1957/8 were estimated at £30.5 million out of a total of £80–100 million on all civil expenditure overseas). Compared with Defence (£1,629 million) it is a cheap way of maintaining our security; compared with consumption (£13,409 million) it is tiny. Moreover, we are at present in a position to spend money profitably if we can find it. All over the world friendly Governments, especially in the Middle East and Asia, are clamouring for help in development, defence, etc. We cannot, and indeed should not, do more than a very small fraction of what they want, but there are both big dividends to be won at little cost by modest but rightly directed response, and risks of eclipse if we fail to respond at all.

(c) The policy of Anglo–American interdependence is likely to involve us in some extra expenditure if it is to remain Anglo–American. There is the policy of “containment”, towards Syria, to which we have not yet made any significant contribution, and the Economic Measures Working Group in Washington may soon be recommending action in individual cases involving expenditure. The United Kingdom will have to prime the American pump; we cannot expect United States co-operation in these important fields of policy unless we can contribute something, however small, to meeting the costs (paras. 17–18 of Foreign Office paper).

(d) There is a pressing need for a contingency fund (paras. 41–42 of Foreign Office paper). Unforeseen and unforeseeable requests for new commitments are constantly arising, and our success or failure in meeting them can make all the difference to the achievement of our aims. The problem of aircraft for Iraq is a current example. If we had been able to help the Iraqis and forestall United States intervention, we should not have risked losing a valuable commercial connexion, and perhaps also political influence in a quarter in which specifically British influence is valuable to the West. Other recent cases have been Polish credits, our inability to provide Nepal with rope-ways, and our insistence on being repaid £2,000 by the Libyans for a locust-control operation. In the last case we presented this absurd bill a year after the event and lost a good deal of face. There are two points here:

(i) occasionally we need to be able to help on a big scale, and stand to suffer a really important setback if we cannot; this has to be dealt with ad hoc.

(ii) periodically we are confronted with smaller but urgent demands: if we can meet them it helps enormously to cement good relations, while if we cannot, it loosens them. It is for this that a contingency fund is needed. There is already the A. 10 subhead for counter-subversion contingencies, but its use is narrowly defined and it is small (£20,000 annual limit).

(e) The Foreign Office votes are lower this year than last and will be lower again next year. We are doing all we can to achieve economy. Despite increased salaries and rising costs, the estimates for the Foreign Office vote for 1958/9 will be below the net expenditure of the previous year. The Grants and Services votes for 1957/8
were only £15 million (compared with £25 million the previous year), and the
estimates for 1958/9 will be down to £12 million, though there will have to be
supplementary votes of £3 or £4 million in July (Libya etc.). We are, in fact, one of
the few Government Departments to have carried out the economies required. But
we are doing so at a risk. The downward trend cannot continue without damage to
our prospects of achieving our aims, including those in the economic and financial
field.

The handling of the exercise

10. It is important that the exercise should not drag on. The Prime Minister
agreed that it should be held provided that it did not take up too much time and
paper, and there is already a tendency on the part of the Treasury to insist that
proposals for new expenditure should await its outcome. We should therefore press
on with it as quickly as possible.

11. The best method of handling it might be for the Cabinet Office (perhaps Mr.
Trend) to collate the various papers with the object of arriving at

(a) agreed aims
(b) an agreed list of essential commitments
(c) an agreed minimum figure which must be set aside for overseas expenditure if
our aims are to be fulfilled.

It may be desirable, if this proves necessary, to provide officials from the Foreign Office,
Treasury, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office to assist in this work.

12. It would not be desirable to turn the work over to existing official
Committees such as the Africa Committee and the M.E.O.C.:—

(a) there are no such committees for Asia and it would take too long to set them up;
(b) The Africa and M.E.O. Committees are not suitably constituted. They have on
them representatives from departments which are not concerned with this
exercise;
(c) the basic papers having now been produced, it should be possible to reconcile
and collate them without referring the work to further committees.

P.E.R.
3.2.58

Annex to 4

A. Summary of memorandum by the C.R.O.

1. Objective: maintenance of cohesion and United Kingdom leadership of
Commonwealth. If Commonwealth disintegrated, United Kingdom would lose status
superior to that of a continental European power. Association with Commonwealth
greatly enhances our influence with our other allies and with our emerging colonial
territories, with whom we could not continue to be linked if the Commonwealth
framework was not in existence.

2. Different values attach to different links with individual territories. Politically,
some members are actively anti-Communist, others “uncommitted”, but at least the
existence of the Commonwealth keeps them “uncommitted”. Economically, all are
important. Any defection from it would greatly weaken its value. To keep all members
within the Commonwealth will require us to stress different elements of policy to different members, but overall policy must be to maintain its cohesion.

3. **Cohesion depends on continued United Kingdom leadership.** Responsibilities of leadership are entailed by its advantages for us. No Commonwealth association: no world power status. No world power status: no Commonwealth. No Commonwealth: no strong pound. No strong pound: no Commonwealth.

4. **United Kingdom leadership depends on:**
   
   (a) **Political.** Retention of influence with U.S.A. and other allies and in playing leading role in handling relations between Soviet and Western blocs. Hence we must have an independent voice in world affairs, but this depends on our remaining a nuclear power.
   
   (b) **Strategic.** (For certain members) on maintaining reasonable defence forces in certain areas. But our defence policy already takes account of these requirements.
   
   (c) **Economic.** Maintenance and expansion of trade within Commonwealth. This depends on:
      
      (i) a strong pound. If we do not exert the effort others will not either. “The conditions for this, and the reasons required are well known”.
      
      (ii) maintenance of long-term investment in the Commonwealth. Given the world economic situation, we should encourage members to seek capital from non-United Kingdom sources even, possibly, from Russia. But the United Kingdom must make major contribution. Level of investment in Commonwealth (now c. £200 million a year [it is not clear if this means United Kingdom investment only]) must be maintained, even raised. We must be able to respond to special appeals for help and on occasions pre-empt Russian offers where likely to do serious harm (though generally economic and cold war considerations should be divorced). We must make scientific and technical know-how available to less developed members.
      
   (d) **Sentimental.** We must foster exchanges and visits, cultural, parliamentary, scientific. Small sums spent on British Council, teaching of English, information work etc. will reap heavy dividends.

B. **Summary of memorandum by Colonial Office**

1. **Description of United Kingdom colonial policy.** Objective is to promote achievement of independence (within Commonwealth) or of maximum degree of internal self-government for Colonial territories too small to be reasonably self-sufficient, in conditions of political stability, rising standards of living and freedom for individual. Hence to assist territories to stand more and more on their own feet, politically, economically and socially.

2. **This policy is a moral obligation** but

3. **It is also in our interests to adhere to it for**

(a) **Economic reasons.** Although high current account surpluses for colonial territories are unlikely to occur again in the foreseeable future and there will be some drawing on colonial sterling balances, our remaining colonial territories are likely to be in many, if not most years, net contributors to our gold and dollar reserves. Premature withdrawal would lead to collapse of markets and sources of supply for the United Kingdom. Withdrawal too long delayed might have this result also, and would in addition encourage newly independent territories to leave
the Sterling Area. In some cases this could be very serious. Timely grants of independence would not endanger economic links with the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom must make sacrifices to maximise long-term investment in colonies. Total capital investment in recent years on private and public account from all sources has averaged £200 million p.a., of which £40 million each from United Kingdom Government and dollar sources. Needs for external loans will exceed £25 million over next few years. Non-United Kingdom sources are being encouraged to help (e.g. Canada for the West Indies) but United Kingdom must assume large part of the burden if economic development is not to be seriously hampered.

(b) **Strategic reasons**. Specific strategic needs may change, but the United Kingdom has an overall strategic interest in maintaining stability and goodwill without which strategic requirements cannot be assured, before or after independence.

(c) **Political reasons**. It might be argued that the United Kingdom should relinquish colonial responsibilities as soon as possible, in view of post-war attacks on us for being a colonial power. But the constructive nature of our colonial policy is being increasingly recognised and to abandon it would mean a great loss of prestige, play into the hands of the communists and extreme nationalists and jeopardise “evolving Commonwealth” policy which offers best hope of reconciling emergent nationalism with our interests.

4. There are some colonial territories where it might seem to be in United Kingdom interest to abandon our obligations. But to do this anywhere, would undermine confidence and imperil our policy everywhere. Policy must be maintained as a whole, even if detailed application to particular territories must be considered in relation to those territories.

5. Increasing importance must be attached to this policy in its own right and as part of wider Commonwealth policy “which provides for the world, hope of continuing stability and, for the United Kingdom, the only alternative to progressive political and economic deterioration”.

---

5 CAB 130/153, GEN 624/10 9 June 1958

‘The position of the UK in world affairs’: report by officials

**Introduction**

The purpose of this study is to assess the role which Britain can play in world affairs to-day and to examine how our resources can best be used in support of that role.

2. We can no longer operate from the position of overwhelming strength—military, political and economic—which we enjoyed in the heyday of our Imperial power. But, although we no longer have superiority in material strength, we can still exercise a substantial influence in world affairs—partly in our own right and because of our position in Europe, and partly as the leader of the independent Commonwealth. We must now bring that influence to bear, in support of the superior material strength of the United States, in the world struggle between the forces of freedom and those of tyranny.

We could not hope to exercise that influence—or to put to their best use the
advantages of our special position, either as a link between Europe, the Commonwealth and the United States, or as the guardian and trustee of dependent peoples—if we took refuge in the neutrality and comparative isolation of the purely commercial Powers such as Sweden or Switzerland. Nor could we do so if we failed to maintain our position as a world trading nation and the centre of an international trading currency.

But, if we are to exercise our influence to the full, we need to have a larger measure of flexibility and greater freedom of manoeuvre in our oversea policy. In the nineteenth century we had the power to impose our will. By contrast, we now have to work largely through alliances and coalitions. We must therefore be more ready to improvise, to adapt our tactics to changing situations and be quick to take advantage of fleeting opportunities to strengthen or improve our position almost anywhere in the world. We shall not maintain our influence if we appear to be clinging obstinately to the shadow of our old Imperial power after its substance has gone.

3. The basic aims of our oversea policy may be briefly defined as follows:

(a) We must, in concert with our friends and allies:

(i) prevent global war and defeat the efforts of Russia and China to dominate the world;
(ii) maintain the stability of the free world, especially Western Europe.

(b) We must ourselves:

(i) preserve and strengthen the cohesion of the Commonwealth;
(ii) further our trading interests throughout the world;
(iii) maintain the sterling area and the strength of sterling.

These political and economic aims are inter-dependent. To achieve them maximum Anglo–American co-operation is indispensable. But the Commonwealth association is equally vital to the position of influence which we seek to maintain. Commonwealth cohesion and Anglo–American solidarity are therefore major aims in themselves.

4. At present our pursuit of these aims is suffering from lack of resources, and some further expenditure is immediately necessary in support of our oversea policy. But we cannot achieve a fully effective external policy without stronger economic backing; we cannot provide this without improving our external monetary position; and this in turn depends upon our internal policies.

5. It is not possible to draw up any absolute order of priorities for the use of our resources in support of these general aims. For:

(a) We are not starting from scratch; we have a highly complex structure of existing commitments.

(b) Many of our commitments are so different in kind that they are incommensurable, e.g., the cost of the Colombo Plan and the cost of troops in Europe.

(c) There are many fields of activity in which a certain minimum of expenditure is clearly necessary if there is to be a return. But there is no method of assessing exactly how much this expenditure must be or at what point the return is likely to fall off.

But, while there can be no graduated list of priorities, some broad conclusions emerge from the following list of our main political and economic commitments.
Our principal existing political commitments

6. (a) The Commonwealth.—The Commonwealth system provides an important link both between the interests of Afro-Asian countries and the West, and between the United Kingdom and the Colonies. Its cohesion is necessary to ensure our position as a world Power and its disruption would have a major effect on the status of sterling. It is of special importance that the Commonwealth should continue to provide a framework within which countries following the neutralist line can be accommodated.

(b) The colonies.—We have an economic interest in the continued stability and development of the Colonies; a political interest in their continuing evolution within the Commonwealth, and a strategic interest in the maintenance of necessary bases and staging rights. Africa is of special importance.

(c) United States.—Anglo–American “inter-dependence” should in the long-term save us resources through the sharing of burdens which we could not carry alone. If, however, we are to retain our influence in the Alliance, we shall have to make our contribution towards the execution of agreed policies.

(d) International.—We are a Founder Member of the United Nations and pledged to its support. It is of special importance in our relations with the United States and certain Commonwealth countries. On balance its activities help rather than hinder the achievement of our aims. The extent of our participation in the work of international agencies should be determined by a realistic appraisal of the extent to which this will serve our general political and economic interests.

(e) Europe.—We aim to strengthen our ties with Europe, and are seeking to negotiate a European Free Trade Area. We support the North Atlantic Alliance as the bulwark against Soviet encroachment in Europe. NATO involves the United States in Europe and upholds the confidence of European nations which might otherwise go neutral or lapse into Communism.

(f) Middle East.—The Bagdad Pact is our principal instrument for resisting the spread of Communism in the Middle East and the subversion of existing régimes in the name of nationalism. Either of these developments would threaten our oil supplies. The “containment” policy towards the United Arab Republic, and our treaty obligations towards Libya (in return for which we enjoy essential air staging rights) have the same object. In the Persian Gulf and in the Colony and Protectorate of Aden we have a special need to maintain our position in order to protect our oil supplies and to safeguard our strategic interests in East Africa and the Indian Ocean.

(g) South-East Asia.—The South-East Asia Treaty Organisation has a political as well as a military value in deterring Communist aggression and securing United States involvement in South-East Asia. It is important also to Australia and New Zealand, with whom we are associated in ANZAM and who contribute together with ourselves to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya and Singapore. By the Malaya Defence Agreement we are committed to assist in the external defence of Malaya and to contribute to the expansion of her armed forces. We also assist in the suppression of terrorism by direct military support and financial help.

Economic commitments

7. The main facts which face us on the external side are:

(a) We have now entered a long period of repayment of the dollar loans we have contracted in the last twelve years. The details are described in paragraph 10 below.
(b) We have the $1,000 millions still available, but undrawn from the International Monetary Fund and from the Export-Import Bank. These lines of credit are available for drawing until the end of the year, and any extension would need to be negotiated. A drawing of the larger element, namely the $760 millions from the I.M.F., could cause loss of confidence. We cannot count on any further significant dollar borrowing.

8. Given the low level of our reserves, the need for a continued high level of external investment, and the probable calls on our resources by the running down of sterling balances as Commonwealth development gets into its stride, the meeting of these obligations will be a major task. Yet it is essential that we should meet them if we are to maintain our own standing and that of our currency in the world.

9. On the other side there are however two important factors of strength:—

(a) Our industrial base has been greatly strengthened by the high level of domestic investment in recent years.

(b) In the last twelve years we have had to carry out first the major task of post-war reconstruction and in the more recent years very large defence and housing programmes, which have consumed much of the normal increase in our national wealth. With reconstruction mainly past, and the defence and housing programmes stabilised, we should be able to devote a greater proportion of our resources to strengthening our currency.

10. The details of the above commitments, which of course are additional to the expenditure involved in support of the political commitments set out in paragraph 6, are as follows:—

(a) Debt repayment. Our major debts are:—

(i) The North American Loans: these will cost over £60 millions in dollars to service annually until 2002—we can defer six annual payments but not more;

(ii) the International Monetary Fund drawing of £200 millions in dollars: this was all drawn in December 1956 and must be repaid within three to five years from then;

(iii) the Export-Import Bank loan of £90 millions, drawn in October 1957 and to be repaid by 1965. The service of this loan rises from about £4 to £20 millions in dollars annually.

(b) Long-term overseas investment. We have hitherto been working on the basis of a figure of rather over £200 millions a year. In 1957 the figure rose to about £260 millions, and at least the same figure is forecast for 1958. We are re-examining two of the main elements in this, namely oil investment (£160 millions) and deals in sterling securities through the free markets (£65 millions). It is however clear that we must allow for long-term overseas investment a figure nearer £300 millions than £200 millions.

(c) Withdrawal of sterling holdings. We must be able to finance these whether they are made by the rest of sterling area or by non-sterling countries. It is a commitment difficult to predict as it depends on the balance of payments position of the creditor countries and on the general climate of confidence. In the immediate future it is likely to constitute a very large claim indeed owing to the effects of the present world recession in Commonwealth countries of the sterling area. They may reduce their holdings by £300 millions in 1958. This follows a
reduction of £220 millions in the second half of 1957. Such withdrawals do however reduce our liabilities.

(d) *The gold and dollar reserves.* These are demonstrably too low in relation to our liabilities and we must remedy this weakness in our external monetary position. Ideally we want to increase the absolute level of the reserves themselves; but in present world conditions we may have to content ourselves with taking a large proportion of the improvement by way of a reduction of our liabilities.

The *distribution of resources available to the United Kingdom*

11. In round terms defence in 1957 cost £1,550 millions and the current balance of payments surplus was £250 millions. These items formed part of a gross national expenditure (at factor cost) which, in 1957, was distributed broadly as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>£ millions</th>
<th>Per cent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consumers’ expenditure</td>
<td>11,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross internal investment</td>
<td>3,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other public current expenditure</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current balance of payments surplus</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>19,250</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last item (1\% per cent.) has to meet our external investment and provide for improving our monetary position. Included mainly under other public current expenditure is a total of about £90 millions for the Foreign, Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Office and related Votes: as a proportion of total national product this is less than 0.5 per cent, but the bulk of it falls on our external balance and in total it is equal to half of our oversea current surplus in the last five years. (The table in Annex 1 gives an analysis of our oversea expenditure by regions.)

*The adjustments needed*

12. An adequate current balance of payments surplus is the key to meeting our economic objectives. How much we should aim at in any particular year depends on the general economic conditions expected at home and abroad. The £250 millions earned in 1957 was for example plainly insufficient in the conditions of last year. In addition to the drawing down of the oversea sterling holdings, we had to meet a heavy capital flight from sterling, and as a result sustained a crisis which we were able to overcome only by means of long-term borrowing, of one sort or another, of £200 millions. Broadly, we believe that in the years just ahead we require an average annual current surplus of £350–400 millions if we are to put sterling on a sound basis—and even more in good years. A high level of exports will be vital.

13. If we cannot achieve a larger surplus in our oversea earnings, we cannot meet all our external economic objectives, and we shall fall short of our political objectives oversea. But at the same time, unless we can intensify our effort in the foreign policy field during the period when we are building up our reserves (and making military reductions which must involve us in some loss of prestige), we run the risk of weakening our position in world affairs, with a significant loss of

1 Not Printed.
confidence which will make it harder to increase the strength of sterling. Moreover, with costs rising all over the world, we have to spend more money to achieve the same effect on the ground.

14. Our policies must in particular be designed to counter, in selected places, the growing economic and technical potential and the political power of Soviet Russia. Thus:

(a) We need to be able to meet contingencies of a political or economic nature and to give our overseas policy the tactical flexibility required to secure essential United Kingdom interests, especially against Communist threats—e.g., by small-scale but expeditious aid in time of crisis to countries which are of strategic or political importance to the United Kingdom.

(b) Some expansion of our expenditure on development and technical assistance to those countries (including the Colonies, for which we have special responsibilities, as to which see paragraph 16 below) whose internal political stability depends on economic progress and is an important interest to the United Kingdom in the cold war. We have in mind particularly South and South-East Asia (Colombo Plan) and Africa and, with the addition of some degree of military aid, the Middle East (Bagdad Pact Countries, the Persian Gulf and South-West Arabia, including the Aden Protectorate).

(c) Where it is politically possible, assistance by means of military training is far less expensive than direct military support, and helps to avoid calls for it. It brings political benefits and sometimes commercial orders. Even where the Americans supply the equipment it may promote off-shore purchases from the United Kingdom.

(d) Further co-operation in security and counter-subversion with Middle East and South-East Asian countries should pay good dividends in increasing the stability of friendly countries.

(e) Further expansion of information and cultural activities, particularly in the Middle East and South and South-East Asia. Investment in the teaching of English could be particularly fruitful.

15. For these purposes we have in mind additional expenditure of some £5–6 millions a year, divided between the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office roughly in the proportion of 3:1, though the first year’s expenditure would not necessarily reach this total. Of this sum £2–3 millions would be for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 14(a) above. It is difficult to provide for contingent expenditure by ordinary budgetary means, and there would be constitutional and administrative difficulties in establishing anything in the nature of a reserve fund for this purpose. The need could, however, be met by a general Ministerial directive that sympathetic consideration should be given to applications for Treasury approval of projects for furthering our overseas policy in the directions indicated in paragraph 14. The cost of so intensifying our effort is relatively small and the advantages to be gained are very great. The Policy Review of 1956 acknowledged the need for a switch of emphasis from military to civil in expenditure in support of our overseas policy.2

---

So far as the Colonies are concerned, the main need is for more loan finance for development. We estimate their needs for external loan finance at not less than £20 millions per annum over the next few years. There seems little prospect that the market will provide these amounts, and special measures of one kind or another will be needed if development is not to be very seriously curtailed. Apart from this there will be a continuing need for assistance in the form of grants-in-aid of administration and for emergency expenditure of various kinds. By their very nature the amounts required for these purposes cannot be foreseen with accuracy. But there is no doubt that we are not providing enough for several of our poorer territories.

Possible redeployment of resources

No very serious difficulties should be involved in making available the limited additional sum envisaged in paragraph 15 to meet the plain and immediate needs. In the longer term, however, real flexibility in our oversea policy can only be achieved through a general strengthening of our external financial position on the lines indicated in paragraph 12. For this purpose we have already noted that we cannot count on further significant dollar borrowing (paragraph 7 (b)). To free resources of our own on the scale required we must either take appropriate measures internally to increase our external earnings, or we must reshape our external political policy with a view to disengaging from one or more of our major existing oversea commitments.

Heavy force reductions have already been decided upon in Germany, Libya, Malaya, and Hong Kong. No further substantial savings can be looked for short of major policy decisions concerning withdrawal from Germany or abandonment of the nuclear deterrent, or unless a comprehensive disarmament agreement is achieved. Our comments on particular possibilities are as follows:—

(a) Withdrawal from Germany.—Total withdrawal of British forces, or their reduction to the level of a purely token force, would in present circumstances threaten the basis of the Atlantic Alliance and damage our political and economic association with Europe. In the absence of full support cost payments Germany will become a net addition to our oversea commitments. The terms of a possible settlement for the next three years have been agreed between the United Kingdom and Germany. These provide for a substantial Deutschmark payment by the Germans in the current year and, in the second and third years, a reduction in the strength of the British forces and a German contribution of about one-third of their local costs. Strong opposition to the reduction is, however, expected from NATO and W.E.U., but there is a possibility that the Americans may agree to pay the extra foreign exchange costs, in the second year, of maintaining the forces at their present level. The additional burden on the United Kingdom budget and balance of payments will be about £35 millions in the current year and £25 millions in the second and third years.

(b) Abandonment of the nuclear deterrent.—This would free resources (e.g., scientific man-power) which could be used, among other things, to increase our exports. On the other hand, it is by no means to be assumed that a defence policy which relied solely on conventional forces would cost less than our present defence effort. The maintenance of our nuclear capacity is moreover a key element in our relations with the United States and may become so in relation to Europe,
where the French and the Germans together are likely to develop some nuclear capacity in due course. The deterrent itself at present accounts for less than 10 per cent. (£145 millions) of our defence expenditure; its protection (by Fighter Command) involves about the same amount.

(c) Defence research and development.—Total expenditure on this is £240 millions. It is now being reviewed. Substantial savings are not likely. We should however get better value for our money in the nuclear field by the pooling of information with the Americans if the McMahon Act is suitably amended.3

(d) Colonial.—Some small savings may accrue as territories become independent. In certain territories, such as Cyprus and Hong Kong, we have military commitments which are a considerable drain on our resources; the same applies to Singapore, though this commitment is not primarily a Colonial one. Other Colonies (e.g., British Honduras) may have no economic or strategic value to us. But premature withdrawal would have consequences for our imperial and foreign policy which would be felt far beyond these territories themselves.

(e) Commonwealth.—Australia and New Zealand are at present making a very small contribution to defence and information work in South-East Asia and the Far East. An increase would be welcome, but there would be considerable local political difficulties in these two countries if a much increased contribution were sought at the present time. We should encourage Canadian participation in the economic development of the British West Indies.

(f) Foreign.—It may be possible to redeploy some of the resources used overseas (e.g., in broadcasts to Western Europe) to meet more urgent requirements elsewhere, but the scope for this is limited.

19. The above review shows that additional resources of a continuing kind on a scale sufficient to achieve our long-term aim of strengthening our external financial position cannot be found from further reductions in oversea commitments. We have considerably reduced them since 1945 (e.g., in Austria, Trieste, the Canal Zone, Jordan and now Libya). We could not do much more without significantly undermining our international position.

Conclusion

20. It is sometimes suggested that we should do better to rely on our trading position, withdraw from the nuclear club and from our oversea commitments and reduce our status to that of a European Power with a standing similar to that of the Netherlands or Sweden. But comparison with other Powers differently situated from ourselves is dangerous. Our trading position is inextricably bound up with, and sustained by, our roles in Europe and in the Commonwealth and as the centre of the sterling area, none of which can be abandoned or modified in isolation. The question is however one of degree. We are already running down our oversea commitments as fast as circumstances allow us to do so with safety. But to do this wholesale would undermine the position of sterling and could break up the sterling area. We could not recommend such a policy as a fair risk.

3 The McMahon Act (1946) made the export of atomic information illegal, but this was in apparent disregard of wartime commitments made to Britain.
21. We are therefore driven back to the question of priorities. In our view it would be wrong to give our overseas, Commonwealth and Colonial commitments a lesser degree of priority than they have: indeed, their priority should be increased. Defence is the residual activity on which the axe is apt to fall when economies in other fields cannot be found. We consider that on the present defence policy, especially with the additional problem of paying for British forces on the Continent, no major reductions below those already contemplated over the next two or three years are likely to be achieved.

22. There remains civil expenditure at home. We recognise that earlier efforts to reduce expenditure on the social services and education have achieved little, and there are great difficulties in reducing other forms of domestic expenditure. Nevertheless, there are areas (e.g., agriculture, and prices in the nationalised industries) in which subsidies are being paid by the Exchequer on a very large scale. These, and the movements in earnings on the home front, involve sums compared with which those required to sustain our present external policies are quite small. Nor have we touched on the question of taxation. We suggest that it is in these wider fields that an answer to the problem of our world position is to be found rather than in abruptly seeking to reduce our overseas and defence expenditure below their present level.

Summary

23. From the foregoing considerations four points emerge:—

(a) The need for limited further expenditure in support of our overseas policy and for a Ministerial directive on this subject (paragraphs 13–16).
(b) The need to strengthen our external monetary position (paragraph 12).
(c) Further economies may become possible in our overseas expenditure over the next few years, but they appear to offer little or no scope for savings on the scale required to strengthen our external financial position (paragraphs 17–19).
(d) In seeking economies for this purpose from our total national resources attention should be directed first to civil expenditure at home before further reductions are sought in defence and overseas expenditure (paragraphs 20–22).

6 CAB 130/153, GEN 659/1st 7 July 1958

‘The position of the UK in world affairs’: minutes of a Cabinet committee meeting

The Meeting had before them a report by officials which sought to assess the present role of the United Kingdom in world affairs and the best use of our resources in support of it.¹

The report drew attention to the need for some immediate but limited further expenditure in support of overseas policy to give greater tactical flexibility and to allow for some expansion of expenditure on development and technical assistance to countries whose political stability was of importance to us and on information and cultural activities, including the teaching of English. It also emphasised the need to

¹ See previous document.
strengthen our external monetary position in the years ahead. But it pointed out that
the further economies likely to become possible in our oversea expenditure over the
next few years seemed to offer insufficient scope for savings on the scale required for
that purpose. It therefore recommended that, in any re-distribution of our total
national resources, attention should be directed to the possibility of securing
economies in civil expenditure at home before further reductions were sought in
defence and oversea expenditure.

In discussion there was general support for the view that some limited further
expenditure, for example, in support of the Bagdad Pact or in the Horn of Africa
would be justified by the importance of safeguarding the very large financial interests
which we had at stake, especially in the Middle East. Particular emphasis was laid on
the following points:

(a) A sustained attempt should be made to secure and maintain a stronger
information effort in the Middle East. The radio facilities there available to ourselves
and our allies still did not match those available to Egypt.

(b) The possibility should be studied of an expanded programme for the teaching
of English overseas both in Commonwealth and foreign countries, with special
reference to the needs of Africa, India and South-East Asia. There were few directions
in which better value could be obtained for expenditure. It should be our aim to
secure that, as dependent territories passed from our administrative control, they
retained the English tongue as their official language. This would serve both as a
political link for the Commonwealth and as a means of furthering our trading
interests. The provision of teaching staff was no doubt a problem, but there had in
recent years been great advances in teaching techniques and it might be possible to
concentrate more on the provision of suitable courses in this country.

(c) Some further expenditure would be necessary on political intelligence and
counter-subversion.

(d) Assistance in military training was both a cheap and effective means of aiding
friendly countries. Attention was now being given to the need for more realistic
accounting arrangements between the Departments for this purpose.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer\(^2\) said that he was in sympathy with these needs
and would be ready to examine in due perspective proposals for limited further
expenditure to such ends. It was however necessary to bear in mind the steady
increase in the size of our financial commitments as a whole. It had already been
necessary this year to accept additional expenditures of the order of £4–5 millions for
aid to dependent or allied States, and the latest forecasts for Government expenditure
in 1959–60, which he would shortly be bringing before his colleagues, showed a
significant increase over the current year. It was of great importance to ensure a
decline in total Government expenditure as a proportion of the gross national
product if reductions in taxation were to be possible, and it seemed manifest that we
were at present trying to do too much in too many directions. Experience on the
occasion of the last Estimates review had shown how difficult it was to secure any
major economies in the civil field. We might therefore be driven further to examine
some of our defence expenditure.

\(^2\) D Heathcoat Amory. Also present: Mr Butler, Mr Lennox-Boyd, Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Lord Home, Mr Sandys,
 together with Sir N Brook and Sir F Hoyer Millar (FO).
In further discussion the following points were made:—

(e) There had been a very large increase in the numbers and cost of our representatives abroad during and since the war. A thorough review should now be made of the specialised and ancillary posts (Attachés etc.) attached to British Embassies abroad. There was scope here for a reduction in overseas expenditure.

(f) It was for consideration whether the oil companies could not make some further financial contribution towards our oversea policies, e.g. by expenditure on non-military measures in support of the Baghdad Pact in furtherance of our political effort in the Middle East.

(g) The Colonial Secretary drew attention to the conclusions reached in last year's review of future constitutional development in the Colonies regarding the undesirability of premature withdrawal from our dependent territories (C.P.C. (57) 27 and 39 (Revise)). He would be examining separately with the Chancellor of the Exchequer the Colonies' need for special sources of loan finance, which had recently been emphasised by the difficulties experienced in floating a Jamaican loan on the London market.

(h) It would be hard to prevent an increase in defence expenditure in the coming financial year without major alterations in policy, for example in the nuclear programme.

(i) It was possible that in the long term reductions might be achieved in civil expenditure by relieving the burden borne by the Exchequer in respect of agricultural subsidies and the nationalised industries. But in the short term it would conflict with the Government's policy of holding down price levels to pass on to the consumers the cost, for example, of subsidising wheat production in this country.

(j) With the present inadequate size of the sterling area reserves periodical crises of confidence would continue unless the credit facilities of the free world could be expanded. The United States Government were aware of this need for increased liquidity, and it was desirable that they should take some fresh initiative in respect of it in time to allow the Commonwealth Economic Conference in September to follow, rather than to attempt to instigate, such a lead. . . .

3 See document nos 2 and 3 above.

7 DO 35/8916, no 69 6 Oct 1958
‘Crystal-gazing in Delhi’: despatch (no 55) from Mr M MacDonald (India) to CRO about the future of India [Extract]

3. Parliamentary democracy in India. None of the Asian peoples are by nature fitted to govern themselves by a system of Parliamentary Democracy on the Western model. . . . So the present Parliamentary regimes ruling various of the newly independent Asian nations are likely to be only a passing phase in their histories. They will not necessarily disappear completely, but they will be either suddenly or gradually altered, in at least most countries, to suit Asian conditions.

4. Of all the Asians, the Indians are most likely to continue working most satisfactorily for the longest period a Parliamentary Democracy. . . .

5. . . . Provided that India remains united, it is therefore likely to continue in the
predictable future as the foremost champion in Asia of roughly democratic forms of
government, as distinct from the other political giant on the continent, China, which
is now the apostle of Communist totalitarian forms. To that extent India will be a
check on the spread of Communism across the continent, and by the same token will
remain a more or less friendly link with the Western democracies.

6. ... But I must express some scepticism as to the chances of this colossal
multitude of people remaining a wholly compact nation. ... 

8. I do not mean to suggest that India will break-up into numerous separate
fragments. Its constitutional unity is likely to be preserved; but over the years the
power of the Central Government will probably dwindle. The administrative
inefficiency of many of India’s ill-trained lower-grade civil servants will encourage
this relapse towards a sort of inglorious glorified “parochialism”.

9. **Communism in India.** There is another factor which must contribute to doubt
whether India will remain both entirely democratic and strongly united. If India’s
ablest future leaders belong to constitutional Parliamentary parties, they should be
able to uphold Indian freedom as well, one must hope, as Indian unity. But supposing
these parties split into ineffectual factions and the Communist Party therefore
becomes the dominant political force in India; or supposing the most masterful
Indian politicians of the next decade or two feel attracted by Communism, and so
make the Communist Party in any case stronger than its democratic rivals—what
will happen then? ...

10. ... When the unifying force of Mr. Nehru’s\(^1\) personality disappears his
disparate Congress followers are more likely to divide into several factions; and in
that case the chances of the well-organised, disciplined and zealous Communists
making themselves, by fair means or foul, the strongest single party in several Indian
States, and later in the Union itself, would improve.

11. So there are some reasons for reassurance but others for apprehension about
the prospects of the Communists ultimately emerging victorious in India. The issue
is still unsettled, and will be determined not by events which have already occurred
or by facts which are at present established and measurable, but by trends and
developments still to take place—hidden, latent and unpredictable in the future. In
any case the Communists probably cannot come quickly to power; they may need
many years of further hard work by themselves, as well as of errors by their
opponents, before they can win the confidence of India’s widespread agricultural
masses. And many things can happen in the interval to alter circumstances one way
or the other.

12. **India and China.** The eyes of all Asians will be turned on affairs in India
during the next decade or two. Smaller Asian nations will be influenced to some
extent in their attitudes to their own national affairs, and also to international
relationships, by the degree of success or failure which appears to attend India’s
efforts to remain independent and grow prosperous. If India stays united, and
therefore continues to be a significant major state, and if by more or less democratic
means its leaders give India’s population expanding well-being, then those other
Asian nations will be impressed and will strive to copy India’s methods in solving
their own problems. But if India slides into smaller, ineffective units, or if India fails

\(^1\) Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India, 1946–1964 (died).
by democratic methods to improve the economic and social lot of her people, then those other Asian nations will tend to look elsewhere for a better example to follow. And if the Communist experiment in China seems to be prospering, they will be strongly inclined to try a similar experiment themselves—especially if by then the Indians also have decided to entrust their destinies to local Communist leaders.

15. **Steps to strengthen democratic India.** The foreground in the picture that I have sketched above has mixed patches of sunlight and shadow, and I do not attempt to make any dogmatic or confident forecast as to whether the brighter or the darker patches will expand as time passes. It is true that in the background of the scene I have painted a stormy prospect from India’s point of view, with threatening clouds blowing from the direction of China. But that threat is still at a distance, and it may be that a break in political climatic conditions in China, or an improvement of the prospects in India itself, or other changes in conditions elsewhere, will avert the danger. In any case I suggest that, whilst being aware of it, we should not be overawed by the danger. On the contrary, it (like other elements in the present-day situation) should prompt us to do everything in our power to assist the more liberal, democratic political forces in India to maintain their present predominant influence there. It is a major and indeed vital interest of Great Britain and other democratic Western nations that India shall remain an example of a free way of life in Asia, that it shall continue therefore to be a harmonious Union, that it shall preserve friendly relations with the West through such associations as the Commonwealth, and that it shall continue to be a counter-force to China in Asia, at least so long as China remains Communist and anti-Western. We can help in certain ways to maintain these characteristics of contemporary India. Our conscious and deliberately planned aim should be to assist the present and prospective democratic leaders of India to maintain their prestige and authority with the Indian masses, so that they continue to secure adequate majorities in successive parliamentary General Elections. The most important ways in which we can do this are by helping the Government in Delhi to make a success of their series of Five-Year Plans for economic and social development, so that progress in India at least does not compare too unfavourably with that in China; by remaining impartial between India and Pakistan in their quarrels over Kashmir, Canal Waters, etc., and so avoiding a situation in which Russia appears to be India’s indispensable friend; by showing a tolerant understanding of India’s foreign policy and consulting with her as far as possible in international affairs, so as to avoid head-on clashes with her in those fields; by supporting her legitimate claims to be recognised as a power of major influence in world affairs; and by developing our close, co-operative partnership with her in an expanding Commonwealth of free, fraternal nations representing many different races, faiths and cultures.

16. Our efforts in these directions may well affect significantly the internal situation in India. In this uncertain, changeful period, when opposing political ideas and interests are vying against each other in Indian national life as well as in the wider world, and when the balance of strength between one faction and another in India may often be fairly even, our discreet but firm support of the democratic, anti-Communist elements may tip the balance in their favour. . . .

---

2 Mr Macmillan minuted that he thought this ‘a most valuable and interesting paper’ (DO 35/8916, no 74, Bligh to CRO, 3.11.58).
FO 371/143702, nos 2 & 3 10 June 1959
[Future policy in the next ten years]: minute (M 202/59) by Mr Macmillan to Mr Selwyn Lloyd (FO) and others. Enclosure: outlines for a study by officials

About a year ago we had a report from officials on the position of the United Kingdom in world affairs.\(^1\) I thought it would be valuable if a somewhat similar study could now be undertaken, which would look rather further ahead and provide the basis for a comprehensive review of our oversea policy. I discussed this at Chequers on Sunday last with senior officials and representatives of the Services\(^2\) and, as a result, the attached paper has been prepared to indicate the scope and purpose of the study which I have in mind.

I do not think it necessary that Ministers themselves should be troubled with this in the period between now and the Election. What I propose is that officials should study these problems during that period with the aim of drawing up by the end of the year a report which would be available for consideration by the Ministers of a new Administration.

The Secretary of the Cabinet will organise this work on my behalf. Its progress will be supervised by a Steering Committee which will include the Chiefs of Staff and the Permanent Secretaries of the Departments directly concerned (including your own). Under this there will be a working group under the chairmanship of Sir Patrick Dean (Foreign Office), and each of the members of the Steering Committee will be invited to nominate a representative who can be called upon to assist in the work of this group.

I thought you should know that this work was being put in hand. I think you will agree that it will be valuable to the members of a new Administration to have its results as a basis for the review which they will have to make of our oversea policy as a whole.

Enclosure to 8

A. The setting

What developments can we foresee during the next ten years, and what is likely to be the resulting situation in 1970, under the following heads:—

1. What will be the relative positions of the two major competing countries, the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., in terms of their military strength, their nuclear sufficiency and their economic capacity? How far will the Soviet Union have succeeded in catching up with the U.S.A., and how far will these two countries have increased their lead over the others?

2. In the light of the answer to question 1 above, should we expect to see new developments in United States or Soviet policy either towards each other or towards their friends and allies?

---

\(^1\) See document no 5 above.

\(^2\) Meeting on 7 June with Brook, Makins, Hoyer Millar, Sir P Dean, P Ramsbotham, Lord Plowden, and COS representatives. This minute was drawn up by Dean.
3. What changes will there be in Western Europe? Can we foresee modifications in the structure of the North Atlantic Alliance, or economic developments which would have political and military implications?

4. What position is China likely to reach over this period? How far might China's policy produce difficulties for the Soviet Union, and what measures of reinsurance might the Soviet Union need to take against this? What effect is China's development likely to have on the policy of the U.S.A.?

5. What will be the main trends of development in:
   (a) South and South-East Asia and the rest of the Far East?
   (b) The Middle East?
   (c) Africa?

6. What changes can we foresee in the cohesion of the Commonwealth and its ability to make an effective contribution to world peace? In particular, what developments might there be in India and South Africa?

7. What are the prospects of:
   (a) a suspension of nuclear tests?
   (b) nuclear sufficiency on the part of the powers concerned?
   (c) effective disarmament?

8. What will be the likely development of the United Nations and other international organisations? Will world opinion be able to exert an increasing influence by these means?

9. How will the economic capacity of the United Kingdom develop during the next ten years?

10. In the light of the considerations above, what will be the standing and position of the United Kingdom in the world in general?

B. The objectives

11. In the light of the answers to questions 1–10, what should be the objectives, during the next decade, of:
   (a) our foreign policy?
   (b) our Colonial policy?
   (c) our strategic policy?

12. These three main headings comprise such questions as:
   (i) What is the future of Anglo–American interdependence? What differing degrees of emphasis may we have to set on maintaining our relations with the U.S.A., with Europe, and with the Commonwealth?
   (ii) To what extent should we reassess our essential interests in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East? For example, should we in the next decade regard Middle East oil as a vital interest of the United Kingdom, or as a collective Western interest?
   (iii) By what means should we maintain our essential interests in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East? What form should our commitment in these areas take? How far can we rely on conventional bases (even in our own territories) or our present methods of supply—and how far might these be replaced by other means?
(iv) Should we concentrate more on giving political and economic assistance to the under-developed countries and less on supporting certain of them by military means? What are the probable demands on the United Kingdom as a source of finance for overseas development?

(v) What would be the effects of a discontinuance of nuclear tests, and of the achievement of nuclear sufficiency? If (a) the Soviet Union and (b) the Western Powers acquire so great a nuclear capacity that each side is afraid to attack the other, by what means do we maintain this balance of tensions? In those circumstances should we still need to make an independent contribution to the Western deterrent? If so, what form should it take, e.g. should it be on the lines of BLUE STREAK, BLUE STEEL, or POLARIS? Alternatively, should we need a greater degree of interdependence in this field—with the U.S.A., or with the Commonwealth, or with Europe? Will there be a specifically European contribution to the deterrent, and what will be our relation to it?

(vi) What commitments, short of global war, should we plan to meet, either on our own or in association with allies; and what Forces do we need for these purposes?

C. The Means

13. How much of our economic resources can we reasonably expect to be able to afford to devote, over this period, to:

(i) defence?
(ii) assistance to the under-developed countries?
(iii) "prestige" civil projects (for example, atomic energy, a supersonic airliner, space research, Cunarders)?

Can we reasonably expect to be able to:

(i) maintain the present allocation of money for these purposes?
(ii) maintain the present proportion of gross national product?
(iii) increase the proportion of gross national product?

14. Within these totals, can we expect to be able to maintain or increase the level of overseas military and political expenditure?

15. What changes within (i) the United Kingdom economy, (ii) the sterling area, or (iii) the world economy would invalidate the answers to questions 13 and 14?

9 DO 35/8095, no 1, M 213/59 16 June 1959

[Future of Hong Kong and territories in the South-West Pacific]: minute by Mr Macmillan to Mr Lennox-Boyd

I have recently had some interesting talks with Prince Philip about the impressions which he formed during his world tour earlier this year.

There are some points which I should like to follow up at an informal meeting with you and other Ministers concerned. I attach brief notes which I have made of these points. I suggest that we should meet to discuss them in a week or two’s time.

I am sending copies of this minute and the enclosures to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Commonwealth Secretary and the Minister of Defence.
British colonial territories in the South-West Pacific

There is much to be said for a rationalisation of Colonial responsibilities in this area.

1. The British Solomon Islands are of no strategic importance to the United Kingdom. They are, however, of direct strategic interest to Australia. And the trend of their economic development is likely to bring them into closer association with Australians in business, commerce, etc. Australia is already responsible for other dependent territories in this area and is spending proportionately far more on development in their territories than we do, or are likely to do, in this part of the world. There is therefore something to be said for asking Australia to take over responsibility for these Islands. The transfer would probably be of advantage to the inhabitants. Transfer to another member of the Commonwealth need not involve loss of prestige to the United Kingdom.

2. The same arguments apply to our share of the Anglo-French condominium in the New Hebrides. These Islands are of no importance to us. It would be preferable that they should be administered by Australia.

3. If we continue to be responsible for these Islands, we shall have to increase our grants and subventions. Otherwise the disparity between our standards and those of the Australians and the French will become so marked that the inhabitants may become disaffected.

4. If we transferred to Australia our responsibilities in the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands might be rejoined to Fiji. They are too small to have an independent existence and linking them again to Fiji would secure a co-ordination of United Kingdom dependencies in the South Pacific.1

The future of Hong Kong

The question here is “how long?”. The lease of the New Territories runs out in 1997 and it is inconceivable that any Chinese Government, whatever its complexion, will agree to renew it. It is unlikely that the rest of the Colony, shorn of the New Territories, could continue as a viable entity; and in any case when China gets back the New Territories she is certain to agitate for the whole of Hong Kong. There is therefore an absolute limit of thirty-eight years to the life of the Colony. The Chinese in the Colony would be agreeably surprised if it lasted as long as that. Ought we not soon to be giving serious thought to this problem—how are we to retire gracefully before events crowd in upon us?2

1 See CRO comment in document no 556, in Part II.
2 See also document no 258 below: CRO note.

10 DO 35/8095, no 6
9 July 1959
‘Future policy in Hong Kong and the South-West Pacific’: minutes of a Cabinet committee meeting (GEN 690/1st)

The Meeting had before them a minute by the Prime Minister covering some observations which Prince Philip had, at the Prime Minister’s request, made of his impressions following his recent world tour.1

1 See previous document.
The Meeting considered first the situation in Hong Kong.

The Colonial Secretary said that the territory of Hong Kong could broadly be divided into that part, including the island of Hong Kong, under perpetual British sovereignty; and the much larger area known as the New Territories, leased from China for ninety-nine years to 1997. The New Territories included the Colony’s water supply and it would not be possible to sustain the British owned area if the New Territories were controlled by an unfriendly power. It appeared to be generally recognised in the Far East that an armed attack against Hong Kong by China would be likely to precipitate a world war, and it was in our interests not to dispel that impression. A more likely threat to the life of the Colony in the immediate future, however, was unemployment, caused mainly by the very large influx of refugees from the mainland which it was impossible to stop. It would be comparatively easy for the Chinese Government to make trouble for the Hong Kong Government through the agency of these refugees, though this did not appear likely at present since it suited the Chinese to maintain the existing status of Hong Kong as a valuable source of foreign currency.

The following were the main points made in discussion:

(a) From an economic point of view it was probably to our advantage that the present situation in Hong Kong should continue. Although Hong Kong had a small unfavourable balance of payments with the non-sterling area, she maintained £150 millions in sterling balances which we should not wish to see rapidly reduced.

(b) We needed to keep troops in the Colony both to assist the police in the event of riots, and to delay any military move against Hong Kong by Chinese troops so as to gain time for consultation with the United States Government on the full implications of the position. A reduction of the garrison in Hong Kong could only be contemplated if the troops were moved to Malaya, but this would be more expensive since new accommodation would have to be provided there for them.

(c) Politically, the future of Hong Kong must be considered together with that of Formosa and the other off-shore islands. Our prestige in South-East Asia would suffer if we were to be forced out of Hong Kong, and it was important that in the eyes of the world we should appear to be determined to maintain our position and that we should not be thought to be making plans for a withdrawal.

(d) Although there would be some advantage in Hong Kong being included in the informal exchange of views on South-East Asia at the military level which the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Far East (Air Marshal Bandon) was shortly to have with the United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific (Admiral Felt), in view of the nature of the issues involved it would be better for any discussions with the United States authorities to be conducted, at an appropriate time, at the political level.

Summing up this part of the discussion the Prime Minister said that the problem of Hong Kong was part of the more general problem of the maintenance of Western interests in the Far East. Sooner or later the United States would no doubt have to reconsider her policy towards the Peoples [sic] Republic of China, and at that stage it should be our aim to secure a joint Anglo/United States review of Western policy in the Far East as a whole. In the meantime we should not take any action which might weaken our position in Hong Kong or prejudice the outcome of any such discussions. . . .

The Meeting then considered the future of the British Colonial Territories in the South-West Pacific and in particular the suggestion that responsibility for
administering the British Solomon Islands Protectorate and the British share in the New Hebrides Condominium should be handed over to the Australian Government.

In discussion the view was expressed that we could not indefinitely undertake the financial commitment of administering territories which were of no particular strategic significance to us, and which could be much more appropriately administered by other Commonwealth countries. Although these territories did not constitute a heavy financial drain this was partly because our standards of administration and of accommodation for expatriate Colonial servants were not high. The Australian Government was spending more per head of the population in the territories they at present administered than we spent in ours, and the transfer of responsibility to them might well be of material benefit to the peoples concerned. On the other hand it was argued that the existing immigration policies of the Australian Government would not incline the peoples of British South-West Pacific territories towards the suggested transfer, and that in the case of the New Hebrides there might be difficulty vis-a-vis the French Government in handing over our share of responsibility to a Government other than the French.

Summing up, the Prime Minister said that the future of the British administration of these territories was a matter which it would be desirable for officials to cover in their current study of United Kingdom policy in the period 1960–1970, which was being prepared for the attention of the next Administration.2

Because of the continuing disagreement between CO and CRO on this issue, the ‘Future Policy Study’ made only limited reference to it: document no 17, para 75 (b).

11 CAB 134/1935, no 15(15) 30 July 1959

... Politico-economic considerations

10. There is one recurrent theme with local variations in Commonwealth relations. In the first flush of independence, the dominant attitude towards us of the governments of countries we previously ruled is not one of gratitude. On the contrary, they mostly remain suspicious of us, apprehensive lest we still think that we can order them about, resentful of statements by public men and in the press in this country which appear either to take them for granted or to criticise the way they are conducting their affairs, watchful and sensitive about anything we do or say which can be taken as meaning that we do not fully recognise their sovereign independent status. This attitude of critical suspicion persists in many countries for a long time after independence; even in the twenties and thirties Canada and South Africa were displaying signs of it. India showed it for some years after her independence; Ghana, only two years free of British rule, currently exhibits the same symptoms in glaring form. We should be prepared to allow for Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the West Indies and other newly independent members of the Commonwealth going through the same phase in future. But it is only a passing phase. All the old Dominions have now grown out of it; with India we are over the hump and already
the virulence of the accusations she levelled against us six or ten years ago because of our Colonial policy has mellowed. Ghana has taken up the anti-Colonial theme where India left off, with her eyes particularly on Colonialism in Africa, and it seems too much to hope that an independent Nigeria will throw all her weight on our side. But if we display the same patience and forbearance as we have managed to exercise in the past, there is no reason why we should not win through to a second phase of lasting confidence and respect.

11. Our relations with Canada, Australia and New Zealand have now settled down into a pattern which seems unlikely to be disturbed in any major respect within a decade. Canada will no doubt oscillate between a pull towards the United States and a pull towards the United Kingdom. Her two political parties may already be coming to represent these rival attractions, but whether one or the other is in power is likely to make only marginal differences to the trend of events in Canada. Economically, penetration by the United States will continue but will not always generate goodwill, and Canada will at times be resentful of her large, powerful and apparently indifferent neighbour. Barring a United States slump, more and more United States capital seems likely to flow into Canada and with Canada’s increasing domestic resources of capital and oil, there seems little doubt that the pace of economic growth can continue to be rapid.

12. Australia and New Zealand have a less certain economic future, but many past prophecies of an impending decline in world demand for their primary products and of a consequential slowing down in their rate of economic growth have proved false. New Zealand’s future, without heavy industries, is less bright than that of an industrialising Australia. Because Australian and New Zealand politics so closely parallel the divisions between right and left in the United Kingdom, there will be periods when their Governments are out of step with each other and with the Government of the United Kingdom, and consequently periods of particularly close relations, one of which exists at present between us and Australia, are likely to be interspersed with periods of less warm friendship. The development of closer ties between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and the United States or Asia on the other will be slow but steady. It holds no long term menace to our relations with the Antipodes.

13. South Africa too has a record of giving the lie to prophets of imminent disaster. The South African tragedy will continue to unfold, but only slowly. Relations between blacks and whites and between the two white races themselves will continue to worsen throughout the foreseeable future, but the day of the great trek of English-speaking whites out of South Africa or of the blood-bath when the blacks rise and overthrow their white masters is unlikely to come within the next decade. The external pressures upon the Union Government can certainly be expected to intensify. Abortive attempts in the United Nations to induce them to change their racial policies will give way to economic pressures. But the Afrikaner people, conceiving themselves to be defending their race and culture from the barbarians, will not abandon the belief that they have a God-given mission to fashion their country their way. A steady intensification is to be foreseen of the enmity between South Africa and the tropical Commonwealth, which may grow to the point where South Africa leaves the Commonwealth. If this looks like happening our attitude will be crucial, and is likely to depend to a considerable degree on whether we have ourselves succeeded in fashioning a genuine alternative to racial discrimination and
white domination in those multi-racial parts of the Commonwealth, particularly the Rhodesian Federation and Kenya, for which we may still be exercising some responsibility.

14. The future of the Indian Sub-Continent is perhaps the most important question-mark overhanging the Commonwealth in the next decade. India poses the more important problem for us in the area. Her attachment to Western ideals conflicts with her opposition to certain aspects of Western external policies. This attitude, together with motives of self-interest lead her to a policy of positive non-alignment. She also believes that by remaining non-aligned she can help to reduce international tensions. (Admittedly recent events in Tibet and on India’s north-east frontier have given India much cause for thought, but it seems very unlikely that China, persuaded by Russia, will risk forcing India away from her policy of non-alignment). The economic system she has evolved to raise her living standards also rejects both the capitalist freedom of the United States and communist totalitarianism of Russia and China. She is thus poised between East and West in both political and economic terms. This dual non-alignment leaves her free to negotiate economic aid from both blocs. If only because of her size and population (the second biggest in the world), what happens in India will greatly influence the smaller countries of Asia and probably of Africa too. The latter are under equal pressure to find rapid means of advancing economically and politically. India’s democratic experiment, despite the emphasis given to the public sector in her economic programme, is a middle way course. If it is even moderately successful, it is probable that other countries in the area will adopt her example. If it fails, and if India should go communist it will be exceedingly difficult for other uncommitted countries in Africa and Asia to resist communist encroachment. Although India is not committed to the Western camp, it is therefore of crucial importance to us and to the West that her democratic experiment should not fail.

… 21. In Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaya it seems probable that we shall have to deal with governments that are in some degree authoritarian over the next decade. If we decide that only those countries that appear to us to be fully democratic can be our friends, we shall probably cease our present friendly relations with these countries (and indeed with many African countries too). If we decide that members of the Commonwealth have the right to choose the form of government suitable for their own circumstances without forfeiting our friendship, there is no reason why these three Asian countries should not remain co-operative and developing parts of the Commonwealth.

22. In West Africa the largest and most important country, Nigeria, may prove more co-operative and well disposed towards us than Ghana. If she holds together, as we hope and expect, there will be a struggle for influence between her and Ghana, and it is not at all certain that she will be able to stand aside from or swim against the tide of Pan-Africanism. The Commonwealth countries in West Africa will be influenced by and will in turn exert influence upon what happens in surrounding French territories. Two views are possible on the course of events in the area as a whole. Balkanisation with a dozen or more newly independent members of U.N.O. in West Africa, could lead to a shifting pattern of alliances and considerable inter-territorial friction from which Commonwealth countries in the area would not be immune. At the other extreme, the idea of a West African Federation may have taken root within a decade; if the rulers of the new states are willing to give up to each
other some of their recently won sovereignty. Perhaps both these courses will be followed in different parts of the area. Nigeria, once she feels her strength, will exert a powerful influence but it is too early to say in what direction.

23. Our relations with an independent Sierra Leone may be as difficult as with Ghana in the early years of independence, and we shall have to live through the phase of suspicion with racial undercurrents. Their demand, and that of some of the other independent African countries, that the formula “one man one vote” should be applied in the territories for which we still exert some responsibility down the eastern side of Africa from Kenya to the Rhodesian Federation will strain their relations with us. If we insist for a full decade on refusing to hand over the reins of government to black majorities on the Eastern side of Africa or if we do transfer power to white minorities, it is difficult to see how we shall be able to maintain good relations with West Africa. But if the West Africans can be convinced in a decade, as the Indians were convinced within that period, that we genuinely intend to transfer power on a wide scale without ourselves being animated by racial considerations, we should be able to live through the phase of suspicion and criticism and to win through to conditions of mutual trust and respect.

24. The West Indies are likely to confront us with the problem whether to grant fairly widespread financial assistance to territories which have advanced politically to a point at which we no longer feel ourselves able to deny them independence. If we face them with a choice between independence coupled with destitution and continued dependence with subsidies, there is no doubt that they will choose the former. The West Indies might then look for and perhaps receive United States aid; we would forfeit their friendship. And our investments there would probably be endangered. If we can bring ourselves to the point at which, perhaps in concert with the Americans, other members of the Commonwealth and international organisations, we can see our way to granting them economic aid after they attain independence their relations with us should settle down to conditions of mutual respect and confidence within a decade.

25. A note is attached on the future of the Irish Republic.

Commonwealth cohesion

26. This account of possible developments during the next ten years shows how inextricably entangled political and economic factors are in each of the main countries of the Commonwealth. But it is possible to separate the main political and economic threats to the cohesion of the Commonwealth that may emerge in this period.

27. The chief political threats for the most part concern the tropical Commonwealth and can be listed as follows:

(i) The possibility that one or more independent members may be attracted out of the Commonwealth. This seems improbable within the next decade. For membership does not debar Commonwealth countries from joining other alliances or associations, except perhaps the Communist bloc, and only Ceylon seems in danger of turning in that direction in the next ten years.

(ii) An intensification of East-West tension, apart from a third world war, would probably be the major threat to Commonwealth cohesion if it led the U.K. to adopt policies which alienated the uncommitted Asian and African members. The
attitude “he who is not with me is against me” can serve only to change benevolent neutralists into antagonists. Any military undertaking on the part of the U.K. in circumstances which did not command general international approval would endanger Commonwealth cohesion.

(iii) An intensification of peripheral disputes would obviously be damaging. With prospects in sight of an Indus Waters scheme being started, it is possible for the first time in twelve years to have real grounds for hoping that Indo-Pakistan enmities over Kashmir will begin to die down. But strains between South Africa and the tropical Commonwealth on racial issues may be expected to increase, and perhaps to come to a head within a decade.

(iv) Finally there is the threat of racialism and anti-Colonialism to our relations with the tropical Commonwealth. The assumption to which we are working that at the end of the next ten years there will still be over 30 territories with a total population of perhaps 30 millions to whom we shall not have granted independence presupposes that we can resist anti-Colonial pressure for this period without disrupting the Commonwealth. There can be two views about this. To be reasonably certain of being able to avoid a situation in which we have to take painful decisions on this subject, we may need, perhaps during the first half of the decade, to devise new forms of government for multi-racial societies capable of inspiring equally in black majorities and white minorities sufficient confidence to enable them to face independence without fear of each other.

28. The main economic threats to the cohesion of the Commonwealth in the next decade concern our relations with the temperate as much as with the tropical Commonwealth. In a sentence, they are that Commonwealth countries may come to think that the material advantages they derive from their membership, from the point of view of finance and trade, are diminishing. This could come about in several ways:

(i) A weakening of sterling, especially if it occurred in circumstances in which the U.K. drew most of the blame, could have far graver consequences in the sixties than in the forties, for the widespread disruption of the second World war would no longer be an alibi.

(ii) The Commonwealth would be damaged if the belief were to become widespread that the U.K. could no longer make a significant contribution to the needs of the perimeter for capital. It is already generally appreciated that the U.K. can no longer supply the bulk of the needs of Commonwealth countries for external capital. But there is a vast difference between a little and nothing. And the political kudos we get for the capital we can invest would be minimised if it all went out through international institutions such as the I.B.R.D. and I.D.A. Moreover, a new range of problems, to which we have so far given little thought, would confront us if sterling were to become stronger to the point at which we permitted borrowers from outside the sterling area to obtain a significant part of the funds we have available for investment abroad. Many Commonwealth countries have held their balances here in bad times as well as good (and we have been greatly strengthened thereby) and, as the banker for the sterling area, we owe a primary obligation to our depositors. The banker who lends as freely to non-depositors as to depositors is likely to lose some of his depositors. It is therefore important that we should preserve the privileges of membership of the sterling
area. But we need to think a good deal about the dilemma of strong versus weak sterling from the point of view of Commonwealth relations.

(iii) A marked decline in the proportion we were able to import of the produce of Commonwealth countries would weaken the economic links of the Commonwealth for example, if it were decided to step up the level of our domestic agricultural supports. Moreover, part of the need is for the temperate and industrialised Commonwealth to feel that our market is still expanding for their primary produce, and for the tropical and undeveloped Commonwealth to see some prospect of growth in the market here for their manufactured goods (e.g. textiles).

(iv) Commonwealth unity would be weakened if the feeling grew in other Commonwealth countries that, as a result of reaction to the creation of the European Economic Community, the U.K. was beginning to attach more importance to maintaining and developing her trade with Europe than with the Commonwealth. The proposed Free Trade Area of the 17 was somewhat reluctantly accepted by the Commonwealth on the basis that it would be confined to industrial goods and that the Commonwealth would in practice be compensated for limited losses of industrial preferences in the U.K. by the benefits to them of an expansion of the U.K’s trade. But the contemplated content of the European Free Trade Association of the Stockholm Group, with its associated bilateral agreements on agriculture, risks being regarded, especially in Australia and New Zealand, as an indication that the U.K. may become increasingly willing to prejudice the trade interests of Commonwealth countries in the U.K. market to promote the U.K’s interests in Europe. If the Free Trade Area of the 17 is secured without further entrenchment on the Commonwealth interest in the U.K. agricultural market, this fear will die away. Apart from this, some Commonwealth countries, in particular Australia and New Zealand, are anxious to gain greater access to the Continental European market for foodstuffs. They may seek to reach that goal by bargaining with the preferences they give to us. This could arise in a number of different ways. These countries might feel impelled so to use their preferences if the Continental European market were expanding faster than our own, e.g. if we failed to secure a wider Free Trade Area, or if the balance of advantage in our trade agreements with them altered against them, or if they thought that we were sacrificing substantial Commonwealth interests in order to secure a wider Free Trade Area. Alternatively, the use of these preferences might be proposed in that context to help secure Free Trade Area arrangements on lines which would be advantageous to the Commonwealth. Such developments would hasten the slow attrition of the Imperial Preference system which seems anyhow inevitable.

29. Preservation of the cohesion of the Commonwealth, as of any other political association or alliance, thus demands that all its members should regard it as worth preserving, and should be prepared consciously to direct their policies to that end. The biggest effort must naturally come from the U.K. Government, as the leader of the Commonwealth. The major policy requirements for us are to do all we can to minimise both East-West tensions and peripheral disputes within the Commonwealth; to devise political solutions for multi-racial territories which will serve to reduce racial and anti-Colonial feeling in the tropical Commonwealth; to
It is important to keep sterling strong; to preserve the privileges of membership of the sterling area, including the provision of a reasonable amount of capital; to maintain our imports of primary produce from the Commonwealth; to be prepared to admit more Commonwealth industrial products; and to do our best to convince Commonwealth countries that we do not intend to sacrifice our trading arrangements with them in order to improve our position in European trade.

30. Is the Commonwealth connexion worth this effort by us? Is the Commonwealth, politically and economically, more of a liability than an asset to us? Would it be better, from the point of view of the welfare, prosperity and safety of the people of the British Isles for us to go our own way and to cease from making the effort which the task of preserving the cohesion of the Commonwealth imposes upon us?

31. Our international political influence depends greatly on our position as the centre and originator of the Commonwealth, and upon a continuance of the belief on the part of foreigners that we can hold it together. A short view often suggests that even now there is in reality very little Commonwealth cohesion. When the members of the Commonwealth all cast their votes in different directions in UNO, when India loads the pack against us in New York over Suez, or when the newest members of the Commonwealth publicly spurn our advice, the political influence of the Commonwealth looks like an illusion. But on a longer view the respect in which we are held internationally depends to a very large extent upon our knack of being able most of the time to get on particularly well with, and to maintain the respect and cooperation of, most of the peoples in other continents whom we have ceased to govern. The United States in particular probably listens closely to us for this than for any other reason; if the Commonwealth breaks up—or if it shrinks to countries solely of British settlement—we shall become in American eyes no more than one among a dozen or so smallish countries competing for her attention.

32. The Commonwealth is also good business. It still is by far the largest source of our overseas investment income. We are earning perhaps 10 or 15% a year on our original investments in the Commonwealth, which bring us in well over £200 millions a year; the catalogue of losses on the capital we have invested during the last century in Latin America, the continent of Europe and the foreign parts of Asia only serves to highlight the enormous profitability of our Commonwealth investments. The Commonwealth is our biggest market from which we earn £1m500 m.[sic] a year. Almost without exception, Commonwealth countries take from the U.K. a higher proportion of their total imports than do their foreign neighbours. We keep our Commonwealth markets not merely because of tariff preferences, which may dwindle during the next decade, but also because of all the hidden preference we derive from sharing a common language with our customers, trading with people who have come from this country or been trained here or who work in feet and inches and not centimetres or who have grown up to want the sort of things we produce, made in the way we make them, or who, like many Australians and New Zealanders, rarely think of looking elsewhere for what they want before seeing if they can get it from us, because we are their best customers. In 1949 we might well have doubted whether these factors would still be as important as they in fact still are in 1959, and there seems no reason why they should dwindle to insignificance by 1970. Since India, Pakistan and Ceylon became independent our exports to them have increased several times over; no doubt when the newer Commonwealth countries in Africa have settled down the same will happen there.
33. There is no doubt that we can maintain the cohesion of the Commonwealth during the next decade if we wish. The effort we must make to this end, politically and economically is small in relation to the political and economic benefits we derive from the existence of the Commonwealth. Although the Commonwealth is not, and can never be, a monolithic structure comparable in its unity to the United States or the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, it is a bridge that we have built between the tropical and the temperate world and between a group of peoples in different continents, different stages of advancement and above all with different coloured skins. It must be a major objective of our policy to strengthen and maintain this unique association which is our chief twentieth century contribution to the comity of nations.

Annex to 11

1. It is now little over ten years since Mr. Costello took Eire out of the Commonwealth and severed her links with the Crown. Since then, with general Commonwealth consent, the Irish Republic has been in a “non foreign” relationship with the U.K.

2. On a quick view this “non foreign” relationship looks like an arrangement under which the Irish Republic get all the benefits of membership of the Commonwealth without incurring any of the obligations. There is no restriction or indeed control over the movement of persons between the Irish Republic and the U.K; the Republic still enjoys tariff preferences here; it is a member of the sterling area; its citizens who are here even have the franchise.

3. But in fact this odd relationship was devised because it suited us and it still does. Under conditions of full employment in the U.K. Irish labour is welcome; in addition to a million or more Irishmen who are permanently resident here, we obtain great benefits from the seasonal movement of Irish people into this country—the men particularly into the building trade, the girls into summer employment in hotels, and both sexes into agricultural employment in the West Country. We not only give the Republic tariff preferences but receive them from her, and she imports from us over £100 m. of goods a year. She enjoys the rights of membership of the sterling area because our two economies are so mixed up; Bank of England notes circulate in the Republic and she is making a loan to us to the amount of such circulation. We give the Irish the vote because it is administratively impossible to disentangle Irishmen from Englishmen when compiling the Electoral Roll.

4. Our political relations with the Republic are likely for at least the next decade to continue to be dominated by the issue of Partition viz. by her desire to rule Northern Ireland. The departure from active politics of leaders of 1916–1922 vintage, and especially of Mr. de Valera, is not likely to involve a diminution in bitterness against the British because of anti-British propaganda and slanted history books, in many of the schools. Terrorist activity against the North by the I.R.A. is likely, as now, to flare up from time to time. There seems no prospect within a generation of a change of heart taking place in the Republic towards Partition or towards the North.

---

The leaders in Dublin will no doubt continue to make appeals to the North to join the Republic, but such pleas will all be rejected in view of the religious differences between North and South (though there is a substantial Catholic element in Northern Ireland); and because of Ulster’s deep attachment to the Crown.

5. Economically the Republic will stand still while the rest of the world goes by. It is improbable that either agricultural or industrial development will within a decade make it possible for persons who remain in the Republic to enjoy a significantly higher standard of living. Indeed the market for Irish agricultural products in the U.K. may shrink if we admit more European produce duty free. Continued emigration will keep the population about stable, and may prevent income per head in the Republic from falling. Any new barriers to Irish emigration would cause an economic crisis in the Republic. Meanwhile if Northern Ireland continues to share the economic expansion of the rest of the U.K., the contrast between conditions of life North and South of the Border will become more marked.

6. The obsession with Partition will continue to prevent the Republic from entering NATO or any similar alliances of which we are members. In the event of war or threat of war, even though this should come from the Communist world, we must be prepared as in 1939 to find a neutral isolationist and outwardly unhelpful neighbour on our immediate western flank. But there is reason to hope that the Lemass Government if it remains in power will be anxious to see an improvement in relations, and while no compromise is possible over the Partition issue, we can probably continue in other respects to hope for reasonably good practical relations with the Republic.

12  FO 371/143705, no 58  4 Aug 1959
[Future Policy Study: assessment of emerging conclusions]: letter from R W B Clarke (T) to Sir P Dean. Minutes by C O’Neill1 and Sir P Dean

Before signing off until the end of the month, I have been trying to collect my views. O’Neill sent me a very interesting draft on A.8, on which I have commented, and from which it should be possible to get a very useful and sufficiently agreed paper. This really completes the ‘A’ Section.

Reading through this mass of papers, I have been rather interested and, I am bound to say, surprised, to find a few conclusions beginning to emerge. Here they are, very tentatively:—

(1) In the next decade, the West will find it very difficult to hold Russia and China.
(2) The West will have to work very hard to keep the under-developeds in our camp—or outside the Russians’.
(3) To achieve (1) and (2) we shall need the full military and economic power of Western Europe and Japan.
(4) Western European economic, military and political unity is best for (3)—but unlikely to happen unless it suits the French.

(5) If (4) fails, Europe’s contribution to (1) and (2) will fall short, with extra burden on U.S.A. and U.K. Complete European failure to get and keep unity would be a great set-back for the West.

(6) But if (4) happens, the Six will oust U.K. from the No. 2 place in the Atlantic Alliance, and U.S.A. may well choose to work with them more than with us.

(7) Difficult for U.K. to decide how best to exert its influence (with declining relative power) and make its best contribution. External financial stability is of paramount importance.

(8) Commonwealth is not significant in power terms, but of great importance in the crucial relationship between the advanced West and the under-developeds, and thence for (2)—this role not helped by thinking of the Commonwealth as an exclusive or discriminatory bloc. Most important are India (size, geography and democratic commitment) and East Africa (test case for multi-racial community).

(9) U.K. must in any case continue to develop Commonwealth relationship on lines of (8). Consistently with this, U.K. will probably in the course of the decade have to choose between:

   (i) Closer integration (political, military, economic) with U.S.A. (and of course Canada).
   (ii) Closer integration (political, military, economic) with Western Europe—not “limited-liability” integration, like the free trade area or N.A.T.O.
   (iii) U.S./U.K./France triumvirate, with rest of Europe associated (not “integrated”) via N.A.T.O. and all-European free market.
   (iv) Acceptance of No. 3 role in N.A.T.O., and concentration upon political and economic influence, especially via the under-developeds.

(10) These courses are mutually exclusive. We cannot rely upon being able to get (i) or (ii) or (iii) even if we wanted them; and some courses will be more possible than others at different times.

Anyway, this is how I read it so far—although I cannot really say that any of the prospects in (9) are very alluring.

Minutes on 12

I should accept a good deal of Mr. Clarke’s tentative conclusions, but I have some comments on them. I think point (2) could be better formulated. Not many of the underdevelopeds are “in our camp” at present. I think our object must be not so much to keep or bring them into “our camp” as to keep them uncommitted. I feel a bit doubtful about the alternative courses in (9). In particular I rather doubt whether “closer integration” with the U.S.A. is going to be available to us as a practical course, even though we might choose it if it were. Most of the forces which may operate to compel us to choose between one course and another are likely at the same time to make it harder to achieve this one. If we maintain our present close association (not integration) with the U.S.A. we shall do well; I doubt if we can really expect to make it closer. I also doubt whether alternative (iii) is really a starter. I should be inclined to say the three alternatives are really Mr. Clarke’s (ii) or (iv) or the maintenance of things as they are to-day with a strong accent on our association with the U.S.A.—
which we should also seek to retain to the greatest possible extent even if events push us towards (ii) or (iv).

C. O’N.
13.8.59

I agree that there may be difficulties about our being able to achieve “closer integration” with the U.S.A. in the next ten years but I do not think we can disregard this possibility without very careful thought. “Integration” may be the wrong word and I should prefer something more like “association”. The present position is that we have achieved very close association with the U.S.A. and it seems to me that in spite of temporary setbacks, sometimes very serious ones like Suez, the association steadily becomes closer. Logically, as our relative power in the world declines and the advantages which we at present enjoy as the centre of the Commonwealth become less obvious and perhaps disappear, the Americans may feel less attraction for us and tend to put their weight, money and influence behind a united Europe or some other grouping. But logic is not decisive and so long as we can maintain our reputation for good sense, produce really first-class brains and ideas, particularly in the scientific and technical field, & above all show ourselves as reliable & worth-while allies against Communism, I think the Americans will tend to look more to us and not less. Again, logically, this might lead to our passing from a position of an interdependent of the U.S.A. to a dependent, and it is certainly for consideration whether this is the fate which is best for this country. In such a case it might well be better to merge ourselves more in the continental European group and to assert our influence as part of that grouping, maintaining, as far as possible, a special association with the Americans. I do not think, however, that one can be sure. I have a feeling, however, that we may at the moment be rather too much influenced by the great change which has come over the European scene in the last year and take it perhaps a little too readily for granted that E.E.C. will lead to a more or less politically-integrated Europe. This may force us to change our policy but I am concerned that we should not lightly consider throwing away the bird in hand of the Anglo-U.S. interdependence and special relationship for the as-yet bird in the bush plan for much closer association, leading perhaps to integration, with Western Europe.

P.D.
15.8.59

13  CAB 134/1935, no 15(28) 6 Oct 1959
‘The future of Anglo-American relations’: FO note for Future Policy Study Working Group

For the last yeo [sic; last two] years Anglo-American relations have been extremely good. We have succeeded in consolidating and extending our position as the first ally of the United States and the coordination of policy between the two Governments has never been so far-reaching and satisfactory.

1 The authors were J S Orme, P E Ramsbotham and R W L Wilding of the FO Planning Section. It became an FO print, dated 5 Jan 1960.
2 Deduced from typewriter keyboard.
2. As long as this situation continues, the basis of our position in international affairs will remain sound. Apart from economic considerations, our interests might not perhaps be seriously harmed if we remained on indifferent terms with France and outside the increasing intimacy of the Common Market countries, provided that the Americans continued to attach paramount importance to their relations with us. But Anglo–American partnership is not a law of nature, and our present position is one which we could lose. Unless we are careful to shore it up, it may run into danger over the next few years. There are several reasons for this:—

Possible causes of friction

(a) Europe

3. The attitudes of the two Governments towards the problems of Russia in Europe are fundamentally the same. They will be the same if a Labour Government comes to power at the next election. But both political Parties in the U.K. differ (though not to the same extent) from the U.S. in their tactical approach to these problems. The Labour Party's difference of approach, with its emotional and historical overtones, is much greater, and may, if they return to power, impose considerable strains upon Anglo–American cooperation. But the same danger exists to some extent for Her Majesty's present Administration, as the recent differences of opinion over European security and Berlin have made clear. Those differences might matter less if Western Europe were largely in favour of our own more flexible approach. But despite recent indications that our Allies are now ready to admit the need for some flexibility, the French and Germans are at one with the U.S. Government in regarding our approach with some suspicion; there is a risk therefore that our position may come to suffer from their counsels being preferred to ours.

4. In particular, there is a tendency to suspect our reliability in the sphere of NATO strategy. Our move to reduce the number of U.K. troops stationed in Germany began this process; our ideas about thinning out and control (widely misinterpreted as betraying a sneaking desire for disengagement) continued it. This is not to say that such ideas are politically or strategically unsound; our strategic and political thinking rightly changes with a changing situation. But these changes give our allies an impression of restlessness—an irksome quality in an alliance where there is a premium on not making trouble. Admittedly, our willingness to accept U.S. air squadrons which the French have refused should help us here; so should the general lack of cooperation which the French have on occasions been showing. But over the long term this remains a thing to be watched, bearing in mind that, if we are unlucky or unskilful in our tactics, we may cause doubts in American minds about the reality of our opposition to Communism.

5. Secondly the Americans are basically unsympathetic to our attitude towards European integration. This lack of sympathy is partly reasonable, partly not. It is reasonable in so far as they attach great importance to the ideal of a Europe made immensely more powerful by greater economic and political unity; we cannot expect them to take as full account as we must of our own Commonwealth and domestic difficulties. It is unreasonable in so far as their vision is distorted by their own federal achievement; they cannot easily understand that what was right for the U.S.A. need not be right for the radically different condition of Europe. But, reasonably or unreasonably, they blame us for standing aside.
6. Anglo–American relations may therefore suffer if our efforts to create a wider European Free Trade Area are unsuccessful and Western Europe is split into two economic groups, i.e. the European Economic Community and the Stockholm Group. Should this happen, three consequences will probably follow:—

(a) O.E.E.C., the chief forum in which we can influence U.S. economic policy towards Europe, could hardly survive, at least in its present form;
(b) if forced to choose, the U.S. would tend to support E.E.C. rather than the Stockholm Group;
(c) such a breakdown of economic cooperation could hardly fail to have an adverse effect upon NATO solidarity.

7. At the same time, the Americans have so far displayed neither opposition to nor any marked enthusiasm for the creation of a wider Free Trade Area through the linking of the E.E.C. and the Stockholm Group. We should not assume that, even if we succeed in creating a wider grouping, this will be entirely welcome to American opinion, which tends to be unfavourable to regional economic groupings, particularly if a preferential or discriminatory element is involved. The Americans have been prepared to support E.E.C., despite these considerations, because of the political appeal of the federalist element in the E.E.C. concept. A wider economic grouping, still excluding the U.S. and lacking this political content, would be a different matter.

(b) Far East

8. Our differences over China need no description here. So far our agreement to differ has remained amicable. But Anglo-American relations may run into trouble if, as may soon happen, the U.N. General Assembly decides to delay consideration of the question no longer. If the U.S. Government maintain their present attitude, a U.K. vote for Peking's representation, or even abstention, might do great damage to our standing in American eyes, regardless of the prior warnings and explanation which we would have given them.

(c) Middle East

9. There are also potential differences between us over the Middle East due primarily to differences of circumstance. Most important of these is that American interest is overwhelmingly absorbed in the Communist threat and that the Americans tend to regard everything else as of subordinate importance, whereas two other problems figure largely and assume coordinate importance in our thinking: radical nationalism, and the security of our oil supplies which is threatened both by Communist penetration and by radical nationalism. This difference is reflected in our attitudes towards Nasser, and towards the new Iraq as it was towards the old. It is latent in our attitudes on the Yemen, and could again affect our views on Syria if, as is very possible, Syria resumes its historic role in Egyptian/Iraqi rivalry. It also affects our views on the future of Jordan. Other potential sources of differences are:—

(i) U.S. involvement with Saudi-Arabia;
(ii) our special responsibilities in the Arabian Peninsula;
(iii) the relative weights of financial responsibility for keeping Jordan afloat falling on the United States and on the U.K.
But it has been successfully shown since Bermuda\(^3\) that these differences of emphasis need not, if handled carefully, cause fundamental policy divergencies. We have a common interest in stability, checking the growth of Communism, the survival of Israel, peaceful evolution rather than violent change, stable relations between oil companies and producing countries, access to oil on acceptable terms, and the economic development of all countries in the area. It is probably safe to forecast that the Arab–Israel problem, damaging as it is to our common interests, need never in future be a source of Anglo-American friction.

(d) **North Africa**

10. We have in the past found ourselves trying to persuade the Americans to temper their sympathy for local nationalism in North Africa with more understanding of French difficulties. The advent of de Gaulle's regime\(^4\) has reduced the need for this. To some extent American strategic interest in their Moroccan and Libyan bases has also acted as a brake. In the case of Libya, we carry the bulk of political responsibility and a large share of the economic, although the strategic interest is now predominantly American. This is a potential source of difference.

(e) **Africa south of the Sahara**

11. In Africa the Americans have come to respect our policies and to collaborate increasingly with us. The danger of our falling apart is more distant; but it exists. The present political developments in the French and Belgian territories suggest that nearly all the African territories without substantial numbers of European settlers will have reached independence within about ten years; the heat of the anti-colonial movement will then inevitably be turned on to the remainder. To the extent to which we find ourselves unable to adopt some particular policy which might appear liberal, whether directly in East Africa or because of our association with the Central African Federation, the Americans may come to regard us as no longer willing to collaborate in achieving the U.S. aim in Africa—the creation of a solid pro-Western bloc of states, or at least of stable and benevolently neutral countries which can stand up to Communist blandishments. It is not that the Americans ignore our contribution to ultimate stability and the value to native interests of a slower timetable and continued association with the U.K. But the inborn tendency of Americans to distrust colonial rule, and their desire to keep in with the Africans and Asians, may lead to American pressure on us to be more flexible and to put what they consider general Western interests before specifically U.K. ones. But such pressures on us will be stronger from the new Commonwealth and elsewhere than from the U.S. The remedies in the case of America are skilful presentation of our steady progress towards agreed goals, and increasing collaboration with American organisations in the field. The difficulties will be worse if we try to keep the Americans at arm’s length.

**Changes in the balance of power**

12. Possible Anglo-American differences of the kind contemplated in paras 3–11 above would matter less if the U.K. remained an indispensable partner because of her

---

\(^3\) Meeting between British prime minister and President Eisenhower, 20 Mar 1957.

world-wide power and because the Americans could find no alternative. But, in at least three respects, this will not necessarily always be true.

(a) Partnership in Europe

13. With the growth of her army, Western Germany is rapidly becoming the main military power in Western Europe. She is the main economic power already. If, in addition, the U.S. found German policies more to their liking than those of the U.K., Western Germany might not impossibly take our place as first ally in Europe. Such a community of policy is quite likely. As the prospect of reunification recedes, the political forces representing Catholic Capitalism are entrenching themselves even more firmly in power; they are natural political allies for the U.S. Moreover, granted the continued division of Germany, both the present and future West German administrations are likely to cling even more closely than before to U.S. involvement in their defence as their only means of security. They will therefore probably take pains to make their policies acceptable to the Americans and to build up a more extensive relationship of consultation and trust. We shall soon be rivalled in this respect; if things go wrong, we could be supplanted.

14. The future development of the “Six” must also be taken into account. If political and economic integration really goes ahead, this group could become a major political power which would be a strong pull on the U.S. away from the U.K. This might particularly be the case if the U.K. fails to reach an economic accommodation with the E.E.C. (para 6 above). It is, in any case, becoming increasingly doubtful whether Europe can continue to be organised as a distinct economic unit under the O.E.E.C., in which U.K. influence has been predominant. The authority of O.E.E.C. was badly shaken by the break down of the Free Trade Area negotiations. The recent moves towards convertibility will make it increasingly difficult to achieve further advances in tariff and quota questions on a regional basis, while preferential or discriminatory regional arrangements will become hard to reconcile with the universal GATT obligations in a convertible world. A further decline in the influence of the O.E.E.C. will inevitably affect the U.K.’s standing in Europe.

(b) Partnership outside Europe

15. But a part at least of our present standing with the Americans derives from the fact that we are a world power, in the sense that we can bring military strength to bear in different parts of the world through our overseas bases, and are also responsible for ruling colonial territories in important places. Our status as a world power in this sense has dwindled during the past twelve years and will decrease further as, of deliberate policy, yet more territories reach independence. If, for instance, we were obliged to abandon our large base in Singapore, the value to the Americans of our contribution to the Alliance in Asia and the Far East might be sharply reduced. There is therefore a danger that our influence on American policy will diminish with the extent of our territorial power, unless we can compensate for this by increasing our standing as technical and political experts helping the U.S. to build up independent and viable countries in Africa and Asia.

(c) Nuclear partnership

16. At present we have considerable standing with the Americans because, in addition to our contributions to space research and other scientific and technological
developments, we are the only other Western power to have developed a military nuclear capacity. Both Governments desire to prolong this situation; the U.S. Government are not at present prepared to give weapons or information to “fourth” countries. But the situation is unlikely to be permanent. Even if the U.S. keep to their present policy, other powers may, sooner or later, develop a nuclear capacity of their own. Only a few could do so on such a scale as to rival the U.K. But, in terms of resources, both France (certainly) and Western Germany (though there are serious obstacles to be overcome) could do so, and, in terms of politics, probably will do so one day. Moreover, without local manufacture, any state which is in the future given nuclear weapons under its own control, will exercise correspondingly greater weight in international affairs. There is already an unofficial school of thought in the U.S.A. which favours a change of policy which would enable certain European NATO countries to possess their own nuclear weapons though subject to some form of NATO control. We cannot therefore be sure of holding our present unique position indefinitely.

Positive factors

17. At the same time, there are positive factors which the U.K. should be able to exploit.

(a) The first is our position as manufacturer, trader, banker and investor. At present we are sharing with the U.S. the main burden of providing the means for settling international debts and capital for under-developed countries. It would greatly help to buttress our position in American eyes if we can maintain an efficient and expanding economy, able to contribute its full share of capital to the rest of the world, and to sustain sterling as one of the most important means of international payment.

(b) The second is the steadfastness of the U.K.’s opposition to Communism. In many ways this is the chief criterion by which the Americans judge other countries; they look not just for a powerful ally, but also, and even more, for a reliable partner. So long as the Americans continue to feel that our assets and influence (even if they diminish) are firmly ranged beside theirs in the struggle against Communist imperialism [sic] our special position in their eyes should be maintainable.

(c) Thirdly, it would be quite unrealistic to assume that the other countries in the Western camp which could supplant the U.K. in U.S. eyes will themselves make no mistakes or will uniformly pursue policies which find favour in Washington. It seems unhappily clear that General de Gaulle will do no such thing, and probable that his successors (of whatever political colour) will follow his footsteps at least to the extent of insisting upon the special position of France to the embarrassment of the Americans. Nor is the docile cooperation of Western Germany a certainty for all time. There is reason to expect that, provided that we can maintain a generally steady course in international affairs, we shall still be “there” when other possible close allies have disappointed the U.S. Administration of the day.

Conclusions

18. The analysis of the various dangers and difficulties with which this paper begins, necessarily requires more argument than needed for the favourable factors.
This does not mean that there are less reasons for confidence than for concern. It is reasonable to conclude that, taking the possible risks of friction (paras 3–11) and the factors which can be manipulated to our advantage (para 17), the position of the U.K. vis-à-vis the U.S. will not be in great danger of deterioration during the next few years. For while there are not a few possibilities of disagreement, it seems probable that the basic steadiness of U.K. policy and the vagaries of our European allies will continue to uphold our value as a reliable and trusted ally.

19. There is however another factor to be taken into account: the changes in the balance of power described in paras 12–16. To what extent will these changes affect our future influence and standing in the Anglo-American partnership?

20. It is probably true to say that what really counts in this partnership is our general reliability as an ally in the struggle against Communism, and that, while it may be true that we carry more weight in proportion to our ability to act as the spokesman or leader of a larger group, it is our influence and knowledge of the world outside Europe, especially in the Commonwealth, which has most value today in the eyes of the Americans who no longer expect us to lead in Europe.

21. Another point in our favour is that, despite development of ICBM's 5 and Polaris submarines, the U.S. will probably become increasingly dependent upon her friends and allies. Not only will she be economically less self-sufficient and consequentially more concerned with assistance for under-developed countries, but, with Russia's growing strength, she will not be able to afford to risk any serious weakening of the Western alliance. The U.K. will certainly remain at the top of the U.S. list of the inexpendables.

22. This in itself should ensure that, provided we remain economically strong and politically reliable in their eyes, the U.S. will continue to maintain the practice and machinery of Anglo-American interdependence or at least the habit of prior discussion with us on all major issues. Moreover, the importance of our relations with the U.S. should not deter us from standing up to them when we disagree with them and have a good case—provided always that they have no cause to doubt the firmness of our opposition to the Communist threat.

23. Even on the military side it is highly improbable that, at least in the next decade, any other Western power could supplant us as the U.S.' nuclear partner (para 16). But we shall have to work to keep our position and it may prove to be in our interest to join with the U.S. in building up some new form of N.A.T.O. nuclear association within which we could play a leading role.

24. At the same time it would be short-sighted to suppose that it will have no effect on the Anglo-American partnership if our relations with Western Europe deteriorate. Whereas we are probably now doing all we can to develop the Anglo-American relationship, there is certainly room for improvement in our relations with Europe. We must expect to see the U.S. fostering closer relations with the E.E.C. powers in proportion as their economic strength develops. A more intimate association will probably grow up between the U.S. and Western Germany, more especially if, as is quite possible, the Germans rather than the French emerge as the natural leaders of the Six in Europe. We shall then be relatively less powerful, some of the exclusive war and post-war links will have been weakened and the U.S.

5 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.
may be less inclined than at present to take account of U.K. interests, more
particularly if they felt that we were responsible for maintaining the split in Europe
and thus weakening N.A.T.O. solidarity (para 6). They will want to see us included in
any new political grouping in Europe and in the closest possible relations with the
Six.

25. But it is hard to draw any useful conclusions as to what steps might be taken
now to improve our relations with Europe in the interests of the Anglo-American
partnership. So much depends on the future of the E.E.C. and the extent to which
the supra-national element within it may develop. Nor is the American attitude to
such developments predictable. They may be obliged to face the dilemma of having to
choose between building on NATO or on a narrower European union. If we were led
to make unsuccessful attempts to thwart the Six, or if, on the contrary, we decided to
join them and found ourselves having to support them against the U.S., our position
vis-à-vis the Americans would be weakened. For the present, therefore, we would
probably be wise to concentrate on working with the Americans in Europe through
the medium of N.A.T.O., while seeking, through the Stockholm Group, to establish
an accommodation with the E.E.C. countries. We should not rule out the possibility
of some closer association with the Six, e.g. through a revivification of W.E.U.

26. In the light of these conclusions it is possible to list some of the policies and
practices which are calculated to preserve the Anglo-American partnership:

(i) Demonstration of reliability as an anti-Communist ally. This means that we
should be chary of policies e.g. of increasing trade and credits to the Communist
world which could, if taken too far, damage U.S. confidence in this respect.

(ii) Maintenance of an efficient and expanding economy. To this end we should (a)
Keep up the payments on loans to this country. (b) Abolish, as soon as possible,
discriminatory quantitative restrictions against dollar imports. (c) Move, as soon
as we can, to as free a regime of trade and payments as possible. (d) Avoid creating
new regional discriminatory arrangements mainly damaging to the U.S. (e) Keep
to internal economic policies compatible with these external ends.

(iii) Ability to meet the U.S.' increasing expectation of contributions from her
Allies towards the task of assisting the under-developed countries. We must
therefore take a significant share in international aid operations of this kind.

(iv) Maintaining our reputation as the technical and political experts with
influence in and knowledge of the world outside Europe. We must cooperate
closely with the U.S. in building up independent, viable countries in Asia and
Africa (this could be seriously undermined if we fail to solve our problems in East
and Central Africa). We must retain the leadership of an expanding
Commonwealth; do all in our power to support India as the counter-attraction to
China in Asia; and maintain the closest possible relations with Canada, Australia
and New Zealand who will rely increasingly on the U.S. for their defence.

(v) In the field of defence and technology, we must, while maintaining the special
nuclear partnership, work harder to enhance our value in U.S. eyes through
contributions to technological research, outer space and other scientific projects.

(vi) Maintaining the quality and vastly increasing the quantity of the scientific
and technological expertise needed to fulfil our purpose under (iv) and (v) above.
At the moment, the high level of our scientific and technical thought is one of our
most considerable assets but every year we fall further behind the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. in terms of scientists and engineers per head of population. Unless an energetic effort is made to reverse this process we cannot continue to play the major role in this sphere which today we still enjoy.

(vii) In our relations with Europe we must do nothing which would seem in American eyes to lead to a weakening in European strength and self-sufficiency. We cannot afford to be excluded permanently from any new European political grouping. For the present, therefore, while not ruling out some closer association with Europe, we should concentrate on strengthening European cohesion through N.A.T.O. This requires not only a political effort; we must also be careful not to fall behind in fulfilling our defence commitments to N.A.T.O.

27. To sum up. There are solid reasons for hoping for, and believing in, Anglo-American cooperation, which, if maintained, would bring far greater benefits to this country than could strictly be accounted for by our own direct contribution. Anglo-American partnership is not a law of nature and we must work hard to preserve it. But if we are steadfast in our opposition to Communism, maintain and improve the expansion of our economy and trading position and continue to produce people of the first quality in politics, science, industry and administration, the Americans will continue to believe in our ability to remain an indispensable ally.

14 CO 1032/174, no 16 16 Oct 1959

Minutes by P Selwyn, T B Williamson and A Emanuel

[Extract]

[The CRO paper, document no 11, was thought contentious by the Working Party, particularly because of the assertions in paras 31 & 32 which seemed to exaggerate both the international value and economic importance of the Commonwealth. The CRO had revised its paragraphs on India, but the Working Group still could not accept the paper in its present form (FO 371/143707, no 72, minute by P E Ramsbotham, 22 Sept 1959). The CO also had reservations.]

...Para. 23. ... We ourselves would not expect that our relations with an independent Sierra Leone would be as difficult as with Ghana in the early years of independence, and we would be more inclined to equate Sierra Leone with Nigeria in this respect (compare first sentence of para. 22). One cannot of course be sure, but we would have thought that, unless we ask or expect Nigeria and Sierra Leone to do unreasonable things on our behalf, they will remain more friendly and less neutral in sentiment than Ghana.

In the latter part of this paragraph some reference to the dangers of economic collapse in East Africa as a result of a too hurried “hand-over of the reins of government to black majorities” might be appropriate.

Para. 24. The recent Conference on the future Constitution of the West Indies Federation which has just been held in Trinidad was not a success. We feel that the paragraph should be revised on the following lines:—

1 The paragraph numbers in this document have been amended so as to refer to the revised version of the CRO paper, printed as document no 11.
“Whether or not the Federation survives in the present form, the West Indies are likely to confront us with the problem whether to grant fairly widespread financial assistance to territories which have advanced politically to a point at which we no longer feel able to deny them independence. If we face them with a choice between independence coupled with destitution and continued dependence with subsidies, the outcome would be unfortunate for U.K. political and economic interests, whichever the West Indies were to choose. If they chose independence coupled with destitution their standard of living would undoubtedly decline, probably to the accompaniment of industrial and political troubles and/or they might become dependent upon aid from foreign sources which would be bound to act unfavourably on the British connection. If they chose dependence with subsidies the fact that it was their choice would not prevent a gradually increasing tide of discontent and aggressive criticism of the U.K. attitude which would damage our position politically. Furthermore this course would almost certainly be increasingly expensive for us.

If we can bring ourselves to the point at which, perhaps in concert with the Americans, other members of the Commonwealth and international organisations, we can see our way to granting them economic aid after they attain independence their relations with us should settle down to conditions of mutual respect and confidence within a decade.”

Para. 28 (iv). As I have said above, there may be rather under 30 territories with a population of not more than 10 millions. As regards the last sentence it is not a question that “we **may** need, perhaps during the first half of the decade, to devise new forms of government for multi-racial societies” but that we **do** need to and are doing our best to do so with some urgency. I suggest that you should omit all this sub-paragraph except the first sentence and that the last one should read, “It is urgently necessary to try to devise new forms of government, etc.”

Para. 32. I have read with some surprise the statement that “we are earning perhaps 10 or 15% a year on our original investments in the Commonwealth”. I dare say it is true: it was news to me.

While it is probably historically true that the greater part of U.K. investments have been in the Commonwealth and that investors in other regions (e.g. Latin America and Egypt) have burnt their fingers, the value of U.K. investments in the United States is greater than in any Commonwealth country except Australia and Canada, and conversely a very important element in the investments of some Commonwealth countries comes from outside, e.g. U.S. investments in Canada and the West Indies.

While U.K. investors in Latin America and Egypt have suffered losses, is it certainly the case that investments in some Commonwealth countries (e.g. India, Pakistan, Ghana, Ceylon) are any better secured than those in some countries outside, e.g. Burma, Israel?

We wonder whether it is altogether true that, almost without exception, Commonwealth countries take from the U.K. a higher proportion of their total imports than do their foreign neighbours. If the non-Commonwealth countries are members of some other trading system (e.g. the franc area) then this is clearly so, but if such factors are not present, it is less evident. To take the Indian sub-continent and the Middle East, for example, in 1958 imports from the U.K. as a proportion of total imports were 20% in India, 18% in Pakistan and 24% in Ceylon. At the same time they were 18% in Burma, 27% in Iraq and 17% in Jordan (all sterling area

---

2 ie, Under (rather then over) 30 territories still dependent in 1970.
countries at the time), 13% in Iran, 12% in Israel, 17% in Lebanon and 11% in Syria. It would appear from this that sterling area countries tend to buy more from the U.K. than do non-sterling area countries, but not that Commonwealth countries tend to buy more than non-Commonwealth countries. Commonwealth Membership seems to be only one factor among many influencing the direction of trade: it will not influence members to buy U.K. products which they do not want, and non-members are not deterred from buying U.K. products if they are competitive.

Minutes on 14

... In general, this paper leaves me in a mixed frame of mind. I agree with a great deal of it, but the authors seem to me to be guilty of some special pleading in their attempt to show the importance of the Commonwealth connection,—at least in the economic field. I have the following comments on the economic sections of the paper. ...

Paragraph 24. My own impression is that the paragraph is highly coloured, and I agree with Mr. Galsworthy that the dangers are far less acute than the paper suggests. The real question is less whether the wealthier West Indian islands could carry the poorer ones. The issue is surely whether they will be willing to do so. That is, it is more a political than an economic question.

Paragraph 28. I think that this analysis of the main economic threats to the cohesion of the Commonwealth is mainly correct. I would add another. As sterling becomes more and more convertible, so the advantages of being in the sterling area become less for the dollar spenders (as opposed to the dollar earners.) Sterling currently earned by non-residents is, I believe, already convertible into dollars, so that access to the dollar pool by sterling area members is of no significance.

Paragraph 32. This seems to me to be the weakest section of the draft, making a number of assertions without a great deal of evidence. Is it, for example, true that Commonwealth countries tend to buy more from us than neighbouring non-Commonwealth ones? If the non-Commonwealth countries are members of some other trading system (e.g. the franc area) then this is clearly so. But if such factors are not present, it is far from evident. I think that it would be useful to have an objective study of the interests that the U.K. and other Commonwealth members have in the maintenance of the Commonwealth (e.g. the real value of Imperial Preference), and it is one of the weaknesses of the CRO paper that it doesn’t really get to grips with this.

P.S.
25.8.59

I have little to add to the three foregoing minutes, with which broadly speaking (if I may say so) I agree; though I must confess that I have had to look at these papers very hurriedly.

On paragraph 28(ii) of the C.R.O. paper, I would agree most strongly that the continuance of bilateral capital aid to the Commonwealth is important. Almost equally important, perhaps, is the continuance of bilateral ‘technical assistance’, because good (British) men can influence thinking and policy formation generally in the countries to which they are supplied.
As regards access to the London money market, I believe a decision is imminent here in favour of allowing some of the Scandinavian countries to raise loans. But as against this innovation (if it materialises), we have of course the new system of Commonwealth assistance loans to the independent members of the Commonwealth, and Exchequer loans to the Colonies.

On paragraph 28(iii), it is in our view vital to keep the U.K. market open to the manufactured products of under-developed Commonwealth (including Colonial) territories. The classic case is that of Hong Kong textiles. It is not much use offering aid to under-developed countries if, at the same time, the industrialised countries shut out their goods. The position on this matter was well summed up in an article which I read earlier this year, which ran something like this—‘The whole future balance of international manpower is likely to depend on one factor: on whether the poorer nations can be offered the prospect of getting richer within the free world’s economic and political system than they would within the Communist one. The delusion of Western politicians is that, to achieve this prospect, the main problem is going to be to lend these countries money; instead, it is going to be far more important, and often far more awkward, to open markets to them.’

This may have been slightly over-stating the case, but essentially it is true.

I would like to add that I agree very much with paragraph 33. I am not a sentimentalist; but there are imponderables which count. I am strengthened in this view having attended the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference at Montreal a year ago, and several other Commonwealth economic meetings.

T.B.W.
11.9.59

As regards para 10 the C.R.O. tend to think of all non-white Africa as tarred with the same (black) brush & therefore to assume that each country which becomes independent will follow the same path. They may of course be right, since who can tell? But we think of Nigeria as probably being less struck by inferiority complexes than Ghana & therefore more likely to be sensible (though inexperienced) in international affairs. Sierra Leone may well be independent much earlier than 1970 and will begin in a much less emotional attitude than did Ghana. What the attitudes of both Nigeria & S.L. will be towards the cold war & us will itself depend on the way that ‘war’ develops & it seems rather far fetched to assume that conditions will be exactly the same in 1970 as now. I would have thought that, unless we expect or ask Nigeria & S.L. to do unreasonable things on our behalf they will remain more friendly & less neutral in sentiment than Ghana. But it is anyone’s guess.

A.E.
28.9.59
this study? The idea of a radical review of what our policy should be over the next 10 years, with the object of using our relatively shrinking resources to the best advantage, requires no justification; but it seems that such an enterprise, if it is to be really useful, should start from the very beginning and not somewhere along the road. I fear that the latter is what has been happening. The study is to begin, it seems, with an elaborate analysis of our resources, and the resources and probable intentions of other countries, and our policy is presumably to be deduced from and follow on the implications of this preliminary analysis. But surely resources only have meaning in relation to purposes, and unless these are clearly stated at the beginning and the discussion of resources etc. related thereto, the study is to my mind bound to lack cogency. Moreover, lacking a preliminary statement of purposes, that is to say of our general policy, policy assumptions are bound to creep in to the analysis itself and colour the implications to be drawn from it. We may therefore be left with a policy seemingly derived from an objective recital of facts, but in fact deriving from relatively unscrutinised and un-thought-out policy assumptions which in fact govern the choice and the presentation of the facts themselves.

I have hitherto read the papers in vain for anything approaching a clear statement, not shirking platitudes, of what the governing objectives of policy of a U.K. Government must be. I now find one, however, in parenthetical form, in paragraph 3 of the “Outline of Part Two,” (FP(A) (59)2 of the 16th of October). This passage runs “. . . what must always be the ultimate aims of the United Kingdom itself, viz. the security of these islands from foreign domination or attack and the prosperity of the British people”.1

I think that this statement has much to commend it, and further that something on these lines should preface the study as a whole, and not come in as a subordinate clause somewhere in the middle of the exercise. But I think it needs a bit of elaboration and working out, and I suggest the following points to that end. First, I think that the emphasis on the interests of the U.K. itself is healthy, and enables us to cut away a lot of the humbug which bedevils much talk on overseas and particularly on Commonwealth and Colonial policy, humbug which is apt to get into policy pronouncements but not into commensurate action. It is surely clear that the first duty of any U.K. Government must be to the people of the U.K. to whom, and to whom alone, it is answerable; and if we build on that foundation, I think we build solidly. I think, to put it briefly, that we are only likely effectively to discharge our obligations to others, to the extent that we have any, if in so doing we also do our duty by ourselves.

The quoted parenthetical passage is to my mind sound on this point, but insufficient in its summary of what the aims of a U.K. Government should be. Clearly, it must seek to safeguard the independence and prosperity of the U.K., but I feel that in any statement of ultimate aims should figure also some statement covering the liberties to which in my opinion the peoples of these islands attach as much importance as they do to independence, and without which independence would lack meaning, that is to say the rule of law, freedom under the law and the Parliamentary system of government. It might be argued that this is not fundamental, as compared with independence and security, against that I would

1 This became para 1 of part III: see document no 17.
suggest that a considerable number of people in this island, whether or not the
majority I would not care to guess, would rate these matters at least as high as
independence and would regard independence otherwise than as a liberal and
democratic state as not being worth any ultimate sacrifice.

Earlier in this minute I have apprehended that these comments might be deemed
academic, but I do not think they are, since from our concept of ultimate aims would
derive, I think, conclusions of importance on how we should dispose of our
resources. As it is, I think that what we should like to see prevail in the world, purely
from the point of view of the interests of these islands, are, in equal priority, peace,
an international rule of law and brisk world trade, the latter requiring in its turn a
state of affairs in as many countries as possible conducive to lively economic
development.

I may be entirely deceiving myself, and it may be that more thorough study of the
papers than I have had the opportunity to give them would show that any valid points
I may have made have already been taken, but I have the feeling that if the study were
recast so as to put these principles, or platitudes, in the forefront we could then
arrive at a more logical and coherent analysis of the world forces working for and
against our interests, so defined, and of the best means of deploying our total
resources so as to influence affairs in the way we should like them to go.

16  CO 1032/172, nos 102 & 116  5–12 Nov 1959
[Draft report on Future Policy Study]: minutes by C Y Carstairs and
R J Vile (CO)

I am glad to see that the “ultimate aims” section has been expanded and brought up
from a parenthesis to the prominence of the introductory paragraph. I still have the
feeling that it should not be expressed so much as our “aims” as what, taking one
year with another, the people of this country will require of the Government of the
United Kingdom. From that point of view, I think allowance should be made for what
I can perhaps best describe as the desire of the people of this country to be able to
look themselves in the face. Rightly or wrongly, realistically or unrealistically, there
is at all times a strong section of opinion in this country which is uneasy at the
contemplation of opposition, unavoidable poverty etc., etc., in any part of the world
and it will only be happy if it feels that the Government of the day is doing what it
reasonably can to put an end to such things. This may or may not be sentimentality,
but I think it is there, and to make no allowance for it in any statement of aims of
Government policy is not being “realistic”, but being guilty of what I might call
inverted sentimentality. In terms of practical politics—a large section of opinion in
this country will never be easy if it feels that our liberty or prosperity depend directly
or indirectly on the servitude or poverty of others; and a policy which gives rise to
such feelings will for that reason not in the long run be capable of steady and
effective pursuit ....

1 See previous document.
2 'Oppression' may be meant here.
Paragraphs 10 to 12.\footnote{These became paras 8–10 in the final version of part III.} In discussing the importance of the United States partnership, it is well to bear in mind, as indeed is recognised in paragraph 12, that in any alliance one is the leader and the other the led; and in this case quite manifestly we are not the leader. This points to the desirability of not putting all our eggs in one basket; the more other groups we are happily involved with, the less wholly dependent we are on the United States and the more they must pay attention to what we have to say. This is in some respects brought out in paragraph 16, sixth sentence; but I think it needs bringing up to the forefront of the discussion of our relationship with the United States.

... The argument in [para 19] and elsewhere that all alliances, groupings etc. are in a way subsidiary to the Western European and through that to the relationship with the United States, is most important, as is the clear statement at the end of the paragraph that the Atlantic alliance ranks above the Commonwealth connection (and, presumably, above our responsibilities to dependent territories). If this is the considered view of the Working Party, it should, I think, be made even more explicit and striking.

C. Y. G.
12.11.59

... 3. From the colonial point of view I think we possibly have a much greater interest in the maintenance of the strength of sterling and the economic development of the Commonwealth than we have in our ability to meet a number of the military commitments which are described in the papers. I think I would go further than this if pressed and say that from the broader United Kingdom point of view I think it would still be wise to place more emphasis on economic development than on the ability to meet military commitments. From the economic point of view expenditure financed from United Kingdom funds will in large measure create assets of lasting value, help to raise the standard of living of the colonial peoples and encourage the growth of world trade. In other words there is I think likely to be an appreciable economic gain of a direct nature to the United Kingdom in this way. On the military side on the other hand it seems to me that the present papers bring out to some extent the element of wishful thinking in much current military thought and that in particular there has as yet been little attempt apart from the Ministry of Defence paper to think at all carefully about the order of priority of our commitments and in some cases about the actual nature of those commitments over the next 10 years.

4. What I have just said may appear to be sweeping but I think I can justify it at least to some extent by quoting a number of cases. I would like to start first in the colonial field by looking at Singapore. There are references to the fact that we need Gurkhas over the next 10 years to maintain internal security in Singapore. I know that all of us are deeply influenced in our thinking about Singapore by the fact that it takes nine major units fully deployed to deal with a major internal security crisis and that we cannot produce that number of units without using Gurkhas. On the other hand we can be certain that the present Singapore Government will attempt to govern in such a way as never to create an internal security crisis of the first
magnitude. If they are successful in this as I think we all hope they will be then in 4–5 years’ time we may well find that the internal security requirements of Singapore will be assessed in a very different light indeed. In short therefore I think that in this case there may well be an element of over-insurance from the military point of view and if as I suggest this element of over-insurance exists in other cases then the final picture of the total military forces likely to be required over the next 10 years may to some extent be inflated. I suggest too that in other cases a similar concentration on purely military points may lead us to overlook other considerations. To go outside the colonial field I take the case of Kuwait. Here we have a commitment for military intervention, that as far as I can tell has no clear positive policy. It is surely to be expected within the next 10 years that developments in Kuwait will materially change the present dominance of the ruling family and that it is likely to be in our interests to do everything we can to ensure that such change comes about peaceably and to recognise that in any circumstances of internal crisis in Kuwait (leaving aside the question of external aggression) military intervention on our part might well in say 1964 or 1965 only serve to exasperate the situation to our grave disadvantage. Mr Eastwood tells me that in the discussion of the paper on M.E. oil considerable doubts were expressed about the feasibility of the Kuwait plans.

5. In the Ministry of Defence paper reference is made to the possibility that limited wars in which we engage will be of limited duration measured in weeks. I think you should know that the J.P.S. who originally fathered this conception justified it by saying that either world opinion would effectively stop hostilities very quickly or that we would go into a limited war with the intention of asking the U.N. to take over at the earliest opportunity. The Chiefs of Staff have not signified their agreement to this concept and the impression I got from their last discussion is that they would find it very difficult to accept it as it now stands. I think they are probably right. In certain cases we might well be able to count upon United Nations support but in most cases I think we might well find ourselves condemned by the United Nations.

6. The element of wishful thinking also appears in the discussion of over-flying and staging rights. In essence I think the problem here lies in the fact that those countries which have given us these rights will effectively only allow us to use them so long as our policies are not offensive to them for any reason. This I think puts a restriction on our freedom of action which is hard to define in advance.

7. Although I dislike the word co-ordination yet I think that to some extent the reference to co-ordination contains at least part of the policy which for one reason or another I think we have to pursue. Here again I should like to mention the economic side of affairs as well as the military. It is I think now clear in broad terms that funds for economic development can best be made available through international agencies although this does not mean that national governments cannot usefully provide funds of their own to their own dependent territories. I wonder whether the facts of the situation are not much the same on the military side where if anything we are less able to discharge our responsibilities than we are on the economic side. If we can use organisations like the I.M.F. and the I.B.R.D. for economic development might it not conceivably be very much in the U.K. interest to work for the creation of an international defence agency to which member countries would subscribe as much as they do for the I.M.F. and the I.B.R.D. and which would be able to give assistance in the field of defence to member countries in exchange for firm and enforceable
pledges about the use of those countries’ armed forces and their cooperation with their neighbours. In making this suggestion I recognise that it involves a very considerable change in military and political thinking and I would be the first to recognise that there are many disadvantages in such an idea. On the other hand I am more than convinced of the necessity from the United Kingdom point of view of securing international action to deal with those world problems of direct interest to us. I think the present papers show a high degree of vulnerability on the military side, the likelihood that that vulnerability will increase over the next 10 years and the need to secure something more settled and permanent than a continuation of the shifting pattern of alliances which we have had hitherto. From the point of view of our colonial and Commonwealth responsibilities over the next 10 years I think such an idea might have a positive advantage of reducing the likely burden on us from our Defence Agreements with Malaya, Nigeria and possibly Sierra Leone and if the international defence agency really began to work it might relieve our fears of external aggression in other parts of the world.

8. If I may sum up what has become a fairly lengthy minute the main points I have tried to make are:

(i) we need figures of likely resources and costs before any worth while conclusions can be reached in relation to defence matters;
(ii) subject to that there seems good reason to suppose that we are still trying to do rather too much;
(iii) we must be careful that in our assessment of all our likely military commitments there is not some inflation of military requirements;
(iv) some order of priority among military commitments seems necessary;
(v) we cannot be safe through our own efforts and must work with other Nations;
(vi) the suggestion is made that instead of relying solely on existing military alliances some kind of international action through a United Nations agency might be contemplated.

R.J.V.
5.11.59

17 CAB 129/100, C (60)35 24 Feb 1960


[This major report, which was not at first released under the 30-year rule, was discussed by the Cabinet on 23 and 25 Mar 1960—the Conclusions still have not been released. The report was signed by: Sir N Brook (chairman), Lord Mountbatten of Burma (chief of UK defence staff & chairman of COS Committee), Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Lambe (first sea lord and chief of naval staff, 1959–1960), F-M Sir F Festing (chief of the imperial general staff), Marshal of the RAF Sir D Boyle (chief of air staff), Lord Plowden (chairman of Atomic Energy Authority, 1954–1959), Sir R Makins (T), Sir F Hoyer Millar (FO), Sir A Clutterbuck (CRO), Sir H Poynton (CO), and Sir R Powell (MoD to 1959, then permanent secretary, BoT from 1960). The principal drafter, however, was Sir P Dean. In briefing the foreign secretary about it, Dean stressed a number of points: (i) part II might seem over-technical, but nothing like it had been undertaken before on this scale ‘to balance defence and aid programmes against other claims on the future national product, and to analyse the overseas component of public expenditure’ in the face of an aid burden which would
continue to grow; (ii) Lord Hailsham had criticised the report for being too pessimistic about the economic future, but Mr Heathcoat Amory had effectively disposed of that criticism; on the other hand, Hailsham was right that they had not allowed for scientific and technological progress over the next ten years, and ‘nobody would dispute . . . that a much greater contribution will be required from science and technology and that only H.M.G. can effectively obtain it’; (iii) the report stressed vigorously the importance of ‘one comprehensive Atlantic community’, which was more important than the Commonwealth politically and militarily—there was no room for sentiment, and ‘the truth is that the Commonwealth is not and will never be a source of power in absolute terms comparable with say the U.S.A. or possibly Western Europe’, but with luck and the right policies it could ‘greatly increase the power and prestige of the UK; conversely if we are unlucky or make bad mistakes we may find the Commonwealth more of a weakness than an asset’; (iv) strategically, there was marked fragility in Asia and the Far East, and we should discuss how the Americans and the Australians might help, while in the Middle East there should be no interventions in force to stop communism or restore British interests; ‘while we have now no alternative, we should work towards terminating our political obligations in the Persian Gulf, if this can be done without causing too much damage; and we should try to engage the Americans further in the defence of the area’ (PO 371/152133, no 45, minute 15 Mar 1960).]

Part I: The international setting

The Western camp

(A) The United States

7. The United States will continue to be the backbone of Western resistance to Communism. But the Americans will become more rather than less dependent upon the rest of the free world. As their economy expands and their indigenous natural resources diminish, their imports and so their interest in the continued security of the raw-material-producing countries will increase; though this will not have much impact upon United States policies during the next 10 years. Even more important, as the world-wide struggle continues, the United States will attach increasing importance to the containment of Russia and China both for the sake of their own security and because, more generally, they cannot afford to appear to be losing the struggle for ideological and political mastery. It is therefore highly improbable that the United States will deliberately adopt an isolationist or “Fortress America” policy. Only the development of neutralist or third-force policies in Western Europe (see paragraph 10 below) might cause the Americans to withdraw their troops and lose interest in Europe, but even then they would maintain their interest and their influence in other parts of the world.

8. As always, the United States will continue to look for allies who are strong and stout-hearted opponents of Soviet ambitions. They will also expect their allies to do more in promoting the development of backward countries. If disputes or tensions force them to choose between their allies, they are likely to throw their weight behind the ally for whom they have most respect as an actively powerful opponent of Russian and Chinese expansionism, and as a large contributor to the joint aims of the free world. The continued intimacy of Anglo–American co-operation will only be possible provided that we can satisfy these conditions; in the last resort we must be ready to use our available resources in support of American efforts to halt a forward thrust by the Communist Powers. . .
The Commonwealth

11. Some Commonwealth members do not regard themselves as part of the Western Camp. But the Commonwealth may be considered in this context as an entity both of particular value to the United Kingdom and contributing generally to the stability and survival of the free world.

12. The importance of its role in both respects is difficult to assess. While the Commonwealth would not survive if its ties were made definite and tangible, their lack of definition makes their value largely imponderable. But the likely course of events over the next 10 years may illuminate the nature of the Commonwealth in the following respects:

(a) It is not and with its present and prospective membership will certainly not become a political or military unit. Indeed, as more colonial territories gain independence or internal autonomy, the formal ties both political and military will tend to become looser. Nor is there any likelihood of a united policy in the struggle between the Sino-Soviet bloc and the free world. Some new members of the Commonwealth as well, naturally, as the old, are likely to remain closely aligned with the United Kingdom; for instance Malaya and Nigeria. But in Pakistan there is a risk that the present régime might collapse and a period of instability ensue. India, Ceylon and Ghana will follow a policy of non-alignment. If, however, Russia and China adopt conspicuously aggressive policies a greater degree of Commonwealth political and even military co-operation will be a possibility.

(b) The Commonwealth is likely to become less of an economic unit. We shall probably maintain a high and increasing level of trade with members (although imperial preferences are likely to continue to dwindle), and continued preferential access to the London money market, the tie of healthy sterling and sizeable United Kingdom contributions to economic development would help to keep the Commonwealth together. But a Britain which is slipping backwards in relative economic power cannot expect to increase her proportion of the trade of other Commonwealth countries, and the next 10 years may see a decrease in this proportion.

13. Those assets of the Commonwealth connexion which are capable of surviving are perhaps the following:

(a) Its continued existence can demonstrate to coloured and not least to colonial peoples the possibility and advantage of an independent but close relationship with white Western Powers. As the colonial character of the Commonwealth increasingly disappears, it should be possible to achieve a more wide-spread community of sentiment and fundamental approach to international problems.

(b) The Commonwealth will continue to provide an exceptional forum in which advanced and backward countries can plan economic development on a basis of equality and collaboration. This could be of real importance if India achieves a measure of economic success and the Commonwealth connexion is seen to have contributed to it.

(c) To be prosperous, the United Kingdom must continue to be a power with world-wide economic, and so political, interests. The Commonwealth can continue to be a useful instrument for maintaining this world-wide “presence”, though as it loses its colonial character, its military character will also decrease.
(d) Intimate co-operation with Canada, Australia and New Zealand is likely to continue. The United Kingdom can expect to benefit from the economic expansion of these countries.
(e) The combination of (a), (b) and (c) above will enhance our general political standing and in particular our value as an ally in United States eyes.

14. These assets may be threatened in various ways over the next 10 years.
(a) By 1970 the Commonwealth will consist of 700 million coloured and 100 million white people, and the gap between their standards of living will have steadily widened. This fact in itself will be a danger to the Commonwealth connexion.
(b) Anti-colonial and racial disputes could destroy the value of the Commonwealth relationship for coloured people. There is little the United Kingdom can do to influence South African policy, which may lead to South Africa leaving the Commonwealth. But the crux for the United Kingdom will be East and Central Africa, where failure to solve the problems of multi-racial communities could strain and even destroy the Commonwealth by directly involving the United Kingdom in an irreconcilable division between white and coloured.
(c) The defence and economic interests of Canada, Australia and to a lesser extent, New Zealand will involve them increasingly with the United States. If it ever came about that any or all of these three had to choose between the United Kingdom and the United States in an issue which vitally affected their security or prosperity, they might well, albeit reluctantly, choose the latter. Aggressive Chinese expansionism would accelerate such tendencies on the part of Australia and New Zealand.
(d) Any severe weakening of sterling or (as regards the new members) failure by the United Kingdom to provide a reasonable contribution to their economic development would have a damaging effect.
(e) India is very important. If India fails to make economic progress and falls apart or is lost to Communism, all South and South-East Asia is likely to be effectively lost to the West. If the worst comes to the worst and India leaves the Commonwealth, many of the other new members are likely to go too. If, on the other hand, India is reasonably successful, the outlook for Asia and the Commonwealth will brighten.

15. Our relations with Eire will continue to be dominated by the issue of partition, but no important changes seem probable.

16. To sum up, the future of the Commonwealth over the next 10 years will depend chiefly upon the course of events in India, East and Central Africa and the Union of South Africa, and the economic strength and policies of the United Kingdom. If these go well, the Commonwealth can continue to contribute to the maintenance of our position and to the stability of the free world. . . .

The confrontation of East and West

. . . (B) The uncommitted and backward countries

29. On the assumption that there is no general war and no major Russian advance in Europe, the main struggle will be for influence and power in the countries outside Europe. They vary immensely. But certain features are almost universal.
(a) Most of the uncommitted countries and some of our allies are waiting to see which side wins. They will die in no last ditches. They have little or no ingrained attachment either to Marxist or, with certain exceptions (e.g., India and Israel), to Western liberal ideas.

(b) Nearly all of them are in urgent need of capital for economic development and they will accept it from any quarter without regard to political alignments. While Western generosity will probably not by itself win new friends for the Western camp, the lack of it may cause additions to the ranks of our enemies.

(c) The gap between the advanced countries of the West and the Soviet bloc, on the one hand, and the under-developed countries of Asia and Africa on the other will widen. This is not likely to be conducive to international political stability.

(d) The dominant political motive will continue to be national independence, and great advantage will accrue in the next 10 years to the side which successfully represents itself as its champion. This will cut both ways. Colonial Powers which appear to be clinging to their remaining possessions, or which fail to solve their multi-racial problems, will suffer; but if this can be avoided, the growing awareness of peoples and Governments that Sino-Soviet imperialism is the real threat to their independence should tell on our side.

(e) The trend away from parliamentary government is likely to continue.

**Africa**

30. The division between North and Tropical Africa will remain. In North Africa events will chiefly depend upon the outcome of the Algerian War. If no solution emerges, there will be a risk that rabid nationalism fomented from Russia will pose a grave threat to the southern flank of NATO.

31. South of the Sahara, territories which are now colonies will have obtained their independence, but are likely to remain separate States rather than to form closer associations, pressure for greater unity being frustrated by local rivalries. African sentiment and (in many independent States such as Ghana and Guinea) practice are likely for the main part to be neutralist. But Nigeria with its 35 million people will be a relatively large and stable community within the Commonwealth, likely to exercise increasing influence in our favour in the rest of Africa. It is, however, early days to predict the attitude of other territories which have not yet gained independence. Much will depend on what happens in East and Central Africa where there is the complicating factor of the white settlers. The attainment of independence by countries elsewhere in Africa will act as a spur to African nationalist aspirations in these areas. If we are able to effect a peaceful and satisfactory settlement there, and if we and our friends can produce enough capital to meet their needs, the uncommitted countries may well remain friendly towards us. But if we fail in these two respects they are likely to offer an easy prey to Russian blandishments...

**South-East Asia**

34. The danger-points are the former Indo-Chinese States and Indonesia, which for different reasons are highly vulnerable to Communist penetration, and Singapore, a key position where future stability is uncertain. It is possible that the United Kingdom will be able to retain bases there until 1970, but it would be unwise to base policy for the end of the period upon this assumption. In other parts of the area the struggle seems at present likely to take the form of prolonged economic
competition rather than of sudden political shifts. The latter cannot however be ruled out. In particular, while most Asians are firm neutralists, they will nevertheless watch keenly for any sign of Western weakness. Their policy is made possible by the existing balance of power; if it alters against us, defections will follow rapidly. Much will also depend on what happens in India. . . .

Conclusions
41. Since there is no reason to believe that the period 1960–70 will be any more predictable than previous decades, any forecast will certainly be mistaken in detail and may well be so even in its whole approach. Certain elements of the above section—those relating, for instance to population changes or industrial development—rest on a reasonably solid base. Other parts are more controversial and sometimes amount to little more than guesswork.

42. In general it is believed that the picture of the 1960s presented in this section—one of military equilibrium in the struggle between the Sino-Soviet bloc and the West, with the under-developed countries as a main area of economic and ideological conflict—represents the least unlikely course of events in the international scene. It cannot, however, be over-emphasised that this picture, including the part to be taken in it by the United Kingdom, might be completely falsified by some major and unforeseeable disturbance. The chief and most devastating of these would be global war; for reasons given in this paper we do not think that this will happen. There are other possibilities which, though less devastating, could also radically change the whole picture and thus any considerations of policy which may arise out of it. . . .

45. . . . Certain conclusions seem to emerge:
(a) The struggle in all its aspects—military, political, ideological and economic—between the free world and the Communist bloc is likely to intensify rather than slacken. One of the main arenas will be the under-developed countries. The West collectively may find it harder than before to contain the Russians and Chinese. It is clear that the United Kingdom will need to make a substantial contribution.
(b) The gap between the advanced countries of the West and the Soviet bloc on the one hand, and the under-developed countries of Asia and Africa on the other, will widen. The West will face increasing pressure to devote a larger proportion of its resources to helping close this gap.
(c) The United Kingdom's relative power in the world will certainly decline, though it does not follow that our status need necessarily do the same. The main problems for United Kingdom policy are likely to be not so much how to defend our interests by the use of our own resources, as how to do so by combining with friends and allies.
(d) We may therefore before 1970 face difficult choices. As regards our own resources, there will be a danger that by spreading them too thinly and too widely, we may fail to preserve our most important interests. As regards friends and allies, we may find that the centre of gravity of our international relationships has to shift, to the extent that our links with one cannot be greatly strengthened except at the expense of our links with another.
(e) The greatest problems in this context are posed by our relationships with the United States, the Commonwealth and Western Europe.
Part II: The resources of the United Kingdom

3. If the world conditions are reasonably favourable, the United Kingdom should be able to take advantage of them. The national economy has recovered well since the war. Our industrial and technological resources are stronger and better attuned to world demand than for a very long time—perhaps even since the early years of the century. The prospects for economic growth in the next decade provide a fair expectation that the gross national product in 1970 will be significantly higher than in 1959. There are internal risks as well as external—the United Kingdom cannot claim to have solved the problem of combining full employment and rapid economic growth with internal price stability. In order to earn our living as a relatively smaller Power, subject to the danger that capital and skilled resources will be attracted to the greater agglomerations of economic resources, we have to show greater adaptability and readiness to change our traditional practices than in the past. It is reasonable, however, to suppose that output per worker (i.e., productivity) will continue to increase at about the same rate (2 per cent. per year) as in the post-war period.

The significance of sterling

4. Of all the major Powers, the United Kingdom has the most vulnerable economy, because of the weakness of the external financial position—the legacy of World War II. The gold reserves are less than one-third of the sterling liabilities to other countries—precarious backing for an international currency that by its nature must take the strain of political and financial pressures throughout the world.

5. Experience in the last 10 years has shown how vulnerable sterling is and how damaging sterling crises are to the United Kingdom's foreign policy and military position. Moreover, sterling provides the currency reserves of the British, and formerly British, countries of Africa and Asia, from Freetown to Singapore, and weakness in sterling strikes directly at their financial and therefore their political stability.

6. It follows that the United Kingdom's first economic responsibility, and the necessary condition for maintaining our place in the world, is to keep sterling strong. This means keeping commitments within resources. If the future claims on the economy are allowed to accumulate so that the prospective increases in resources are already mortgaged in advance, there will be no margin available to meet unforeseen needs or to cope with adverse changes in circumstances—which are bound to happen some time in a ten-year period. Such overloading, whether it creates expenditure inside or outside the country, always hits the external financial position sooner or later.

7. Thus, in order to make the most effective economic contribution to the defence of British interests and those of the free world, the Government must strike a balance between the risks of doing too little, and those of doing too much and so creating a situation in which all its purposes are frustrated and its international influence and authority undermined by a further series of sterling crises. This does not mean that the Government can never contemplate taking a deliberate risk; there may be occasions on which it would be more dangerous to refrain from spending than to spend. Nevertheless, we must constantly watch the state of the external financial position and the course of the balance of payments; they are likely to forbid any ambitious expansion of overseas spending and to limit internal spending too.
B. The burden of support for security and foreign policy

8. The range of Government expenditures which contribute directly to the support of the United Kingdom's security and its overseas policies includes defence, economic aid, diplomatic expenditure, the overseas information and cultural services, civil defence, &c. They are listed in Appendix A.¹

9. These expenditures—described subsequently as the “aggregate”—are estimated to amount to about £1,750 millions in 1959. This is about 8½ per cent. of the gross national product at factor cost²—i.e., the national output of goods and services of all kinds (some £21,000 millions). . . .

Part III: The main objectives of the UK's overseas and strategic policy

A. Aims and standing of the UK

1. The ultimate aims of any Government in the United Kingdom must always remain the security of these islands from foreign domination or attack, the prosperity of the British people and the protection of our individual freedom and liberty. The following paragraphs consider how best these aims may be safeguarded over the next 10 years, in the light of the international situation depicted in Part I and the estimate of the United Kingdom's material resources in Part II.

2. In order to fulfil our ultimate aims we must strive—:

   (a) to play a full part in the free world's efforts to counter the growing power of the Sino-Soviet bloc;
   (b) to maintain the strength of sterling and to further our trading interests throughout the world;
   (c) to preserve and strengthen the cohesion of the Commonwealth.

Whether we like it or not, our interests are inextricably linked with those of the whole free world. We cannot hope to preserve them by our own independent action, and we are much too important a part of the free world to be able to retreat into a passive role like Sweden or Switzerland. Our duties and responsibilities will be very different in the future from what they have been in the past, but they will be no less onerous and no less demanding of our highest efforts.

3. By 1970, though our national economy will have expanded, our colonial empire will have shrunk still further. The population and economic, political and military power of the United States and the Soviet Union will grow faster than the United Kingdom's. If the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) consolidates itself into an effective political unit it will dwarf the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom will be a small Power in comparison with the three giants—the United States, the Soviet Union and E.E.C. (with the fourth giant, China, moving up fast).

4. But despite the contraction of our former strength and resources the United Kingdom still has many of the responsibilities of a world Power; and our influence need not shrink in proportion to our material strength. Provided that we live up to our own highest standards, our resources will not lie in material things alone. Our leadership of the Commonwealth, the progressive fulfilment of our Colonial responsibilities, our special relationship with the United States, our European

¹ Not printed.
² Compared with 11½ per cent for the USA (para 14).
associations, the legacy of our Imperial past, the maturity of our political experience outside Europe, our national quality of rising to an emergency and our reliability in the defence of freedom and justice: all these can continue to justify for the United Kingdom a leading position among the Powers and a higher place in their counsels than our material assets alone would strictly warrant.

B. World groups and forces

7. Our friends. There are three main groups or Powers with whom we must work in concert if the interests of ourselves and of the Free World are to be preserved.

The United States

8. Our partnership with the United States is an existing source of power and is capable of still further development. It is our first interest that it should remain as close as possible. In many cases, the United States will be the only Power capable of supporting our interests in the world outside Europe. We shall become increasingly dependent on their support, as perhaps they will on ours, and our status in the world will largely depend upon their readiness to treat us as their closest ally. They will be the more ready to do this, if we play our full part in the international groups to which we belong.

9. But Anglo-American partnership is not a law of nature. In the past we have had sharp differences with the Americans over the Middle East and divergences over Colonial policy. For the moment these have been largely resolved, but they could again become acute so long as our interests are not identical and we have commitments not shared by the Americans. Thus in the Middle East the United Kingdom and the United States share common interests in resisting the Communist threat and preserving oil supplies for the West, but the Americans are more interested in the former than in the latter. And, although the Americans are now showing a much better understanding of our Colonial problems, the day may come when our responsibilities towards the white settlers in Africa may force us into policies antipathetic to certain influential sections of United States opinion.

Europe

... 13. It is impossible to be sure that Western Europe will continue along its present path towards integration. Our tactics must, therefore, be adjusted to suit the needs of the moment. But the development of the E.E.C. will confront the United Kingdom with new problems:

(a) we shall have to adapt ourselves to the idea of living alongside a very powerful West European group;
(b) though it may be inconvenient to us in the short term, the movement towards West European unity foreshadowed in the E.E.C. is to our interest since it is the best means of guarding against German neutralisation and a Russo-German rapprochement, an eventual recurrence of Franco-German enmity, a resurgence of German militarism or of Communism in Italy, and the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance;
(c) it would seriously weaken our own standing in the Commonwealth and in the Atlantic Alliance and the cohesion of the Alliance itself if we found ourselves excluded from Europe;
(d) as a relatively small economic Power, we shall be increasingly vulnerable to the economic and trade policies carried out by the E.E.C., and shall risk serious damage if we fail to establish a satisfactory association with it;
(e) We cannot say whether we shall be able to negotiate a European agreement that would give us the advantage of such association and minimise the risks of damage. But we are most unlikely to be able to get such an agreement without difficult concessions in agriculture and horticulture; we should probably have to make concessions also in Commonwealth Preference (although this is now less significant to our export trade than it was 20 years ago, it would still raise political and economic difficulties with the Commonwealth).

The Commonwealth

14. The Commonwealth is neither a military entity nor a source of military power comparable to America or Western Europe. But some members make small but valuable contributions to the Free World’s defence alliances and it furnishes bases of the highest strategic importance. Economically, though Commonwealth Preference will be a wasting asset, Commonwealth countries will be important to us because of the high proportion of our trade for which they account and the network of trading and financial interests based on past associations and on sterling.

15. The Commonwealth association is a very important source of political influence which buttresses our standing as a Power with world-wide interests. It can make a valuable contribution to the problems arising out of the relationships between advanced and backward countries and between different racial societies. But the fact that it is a conglomeration of often disparate and occasionally incompatible elements, each with its own interests and points of view, means that this influence can rarely be applied directly with any precision. Indeed, politically it can sometimes be more of an embarrassment than an asset. Nevertheless, this unique association of independent nations undoubtedly contributes to world stability. We should lose much, both in terms of direct economic interest and of wider political influences, if the Commonwealth association were to disintegrate. Our exclusion from Europe would probably lead to such disintegration or, at any rate, to a weakening of our leadership.

16. The Commonwealth association assumes special importance in the ideological and economic struggle for influence and power in the countries outside Europe, with the opportunities it offers for the propagation of our ideas and ideals and for intimate association with developing countries in Asia and Africa. It can help to keep away from Communist clutches a very large part of the world’s population which might otherwise be more vulnerable.

The balance between our friends

17. It will not always be easy to retain an equally close relationship with these three different groupings. One basic rule of British policy is clear: we must never allow ourselves to be put in a position where we have to make a final choice between the United States and Europe. It would not be compatible with our vital interests to reject either one or the other and the very fact that the choice was needed would mean the destruction of the Atlantic Alliance. The continued cohesion of that alliance, though not necessarily in its present form, is essential. We must therefore work to ensure the continuation of the United States presence in Europe and the
development of a wide economic and political community of interests embracing both the United States and Western Europe. In so far as the United Kingdom can help to keep Western Europe steady in the alliance we shall enhance our own standing in American eyes.

18. This is the core of our policy and we must be prepared to adapt our plans and actions to it. If we can uphold it successfully, our influence on the United States will be considerable and we shall not need slavishly to follow their line, though we should always consider their susceptibilities before making policy decisions. In particular this is true where no essential interests of our own are involved: for example, it might be inconsistent with this policy for us to press for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations if we were doing so against strong United States opposition. Even where essential interests are involved we should never ignore the American point of view. Similarly, to secure our position vis-à-vis Western Europe, as well as the United States, we must continue to maintain our military contribution to NATO at a level acceptable to our Allies even if this means a disagreeable strain on our military and economic resources. And we must be prepared to adapt our traditional trading and domestic policies if, by failing to do so, we should run a serious risk of being isolated from the rest of Western Europe.

19. All other alliances or groupings are to some extent subsidiary. Prima facie, there is no reason why our responsibilities towards the Commonwealth should be incompatible with our place in the Atlantic community. We should do all we can to ensure that they are not and should try to guide the policies of our Atlantic Allies so that they command the support of the rest of the free world and, in particular, carry appeal for the uncommitted countries. But if such a clash of interests should arise then we should never forget that the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance is, in the last resort, the most basic of all our interests. . . .

The United Nations

26. The final major element in this world pattern is the United Nations. It has been said in Part I that the Organisation is likely to grow in power over the next 10 years. It is unlikely to develop into an instrument either of Western or Soviet policy but will remain largely uncommitted between the two. Irritating though we may find its attitude on certain problems, we should remember that the Communists probably find it equally unsatisfactory on other scores and that they, as well as the Americans, will have to pay increasing attention to the voice of world opinion as expressed through the United Nations and personified in the Secretary-General. We must be prepared therefore to endure and answer ill-informed strictures on our colonial policy, to work patiently for a proper appreciation of Communist imperialism and to encourage the Organisation to participate more vigorously in those fields where we feel it can do useful work (e.g., multilateral aid to the under-developed countries or the scotching of minor wars before they become dangerous).

27. Our own position and influence within the United Nations will, to a large extent, depend on our success in handling our colonial problems; on our record in respect of the use of force; and on our attitude towards countries which are "black sheep" in the United Nations. If we fail to maintain a good record in these respects, we shall lose influence rapidly in the United Nations whatever other virtues we may display. . . .
C. Contribution of the UK: particular policies

Africa south of the Sahara

...45. The general interests of the West will be to check Sino-Soviet infiltration, to keep local Governments and populations on our side or, at least, benevolently neutral, and to promote trade and economic prosperity.

46. Our own policy should be to foster the stability and freedom of the independent countries, and to establish self-governing societies throughout Africa on a basis which will ensure the maximum respect for personal liberties. In territories with multi-racial communities the immediate problem is to reduce the inter-racial tensions, since only when this has been done can there be progress to self-government or full independence.

47. Our insistence that time is needed to allow integrated multi-racial societies to develop in Eastern and Central Africa leads us into difficulties with impatient African nationalists. This in turn may lead to a conflict with the general Western and Commonwealth interest of ensuring that the new countries in Africa retain their Western ties, or at least, remain benevolently neutral.

48. Over the next 10 years this area is going to present the West with one of their greatest challenges which will impinge on us with particular force because of the executive responsibilities which we shall still bear. The tempo of change is gathering momentum and it may not be long before we find ourselves alone with Portugal and Spain in retaining colonial territories in Africa. Pressures may well so build up that we shall find it difficult to pursue the more orderly and less precipitate progress towards independence which we judge to be desirable in East and Central Africa.

49. Claims on United Kingdom resources for defence and aid. Our defence responsibilities in the area will be mainly limited to the protection of our remaining colonial responsibilities. They will generally be met by local forces, reinforced from the Strategic Reserves; but the theatre reserves based in Kenya may be called upon, if not committed to their primary role of reinforcement of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. It is, however, conceivable that one of the recently established Commonwealth Governments in the area could call on the United Kingdom for military support in the face of a local threat to its territory.

50. The needs of the area for economic aid will, however, be great and, because of our position as a colonial Power, many of them must be met by us. We are committed to provide Commonwealth Assistance Loans to the independent Members of the Commonwealth and Exchequer Loans to dependent territories. We shall also have to finance schemes of technical assistance to Ghana and Nigeria and to provide grants to dependent territories under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts and for other purposes. In all we are likely to have to spend at least £24 millions to £28 millions a year during the period and there is likely to be pressure to increase this figure.

The Middle East and North Africa

...61. At present the United Kingdom is committed to the protection of the Ruler of Kuwait and other Persian Gulf Sheikhs. It is quite certain that if we withdrew this protection or showed our intention of so doing, the local rulers would hasten to make the best terms they could with their larger neighbours. It would be wrong to abandon them without making adequate provision for their protection (the
Americans could certainly not take over the commitment) and to do so would endanger our wider interest outlined above. However, any allied support for our intervention in the area would be unlikely except in the improbable event of the Arab countries combining to cut off the supply of oil. If it were not thought feasible to intervene in Iraq or Iran we could in any case only protect a part of the supplies of the Middle East oil and of our profits from them (annual profits from Kuwait amount to £45 millions out of a total of about £100 millions for all Middle East oil). The presence of our forces however also protects other potentially oil-rich areas (especially Abu Dhabi.)

62. These commitments have disadvantages in themselves. For one thing our position in the Persian Gulf is an obstacle to good relations with the rest of the Arab world, and, to a lesser extent, with Iran. For another the need to retain supporting military facilities may become a serious obstacle to the working out of our Colonial policies in Aden and possibly also in Kenya.

63. While we have at present no alternative to maintaining our political obligations to the Persian Gulf Rulers, and particularly to the Ruler of Kuwait, it should be the object of our policy over the next ten years to create a situation in which they can be terminated without undue damage to the security of our oil supplies and the general political stability of the area. In view of the large American interests in the area we should try to engage them further in its defence. In the meantime, to prevent revolutionary pressures from building up, we should continue to encourage the Persian Gulf rulers to modernise their régimes...

68. [Claims on UK military resources.] If the function of the United Kingdom forces in the Middle East is limited to the tasks set out above, the forces required are not great. To meet the maximum commitment we are not likely to need reinforcements of more than a total of two brigade groups, and the duration of any intensive fighting, if it occurs at all, is likely to be weeks rather than months. If, however, on our own or in association with allies, we are to be prepared to intervene in a country in order to prevent it going Communist or to invade it because it had taken some action very harmful to the United Kingdom the commitment could be very large. We should have to be prepared not only to overcome the armed opposition of the country itself, but also to remain there, holding it down by force, until a Government which could preserve itself on its own had been established.

69. If our defence effort is to be kept within bounds, we believe that we must be prepared to forgo the possibility of engaging in operations of this last kind. With the exception of those and possibly intervention in the Levant, we believe that the United Kingdom should, though trying to reduce her commitments, be prepared to discharge the tasks which she does to-day in the Middle East on approximately the same scale throughout the period. However desirable it may be to associate allies with us in any action we may take, it is extremely unlikely that any of them either would or could station land or air forces in the area permanently. It is probable that apart from countries in the area itself (e.g., Turkey, Pakistan) only the United States will either wish or be able to provide forces to meet specific emergencies. Even in the case of the United States there will be both political and practical difficulties in deploying forces quickly, certainly south of the air/sea barrier. We should retain our capacity to intervene alone for the protection of Kuwait (and, conceivably, of other Persian Gulf sheikdoms) but should not plan on the assumption that we might engage alone in a war with any country in this area on a scale beyond that required for this...
Asia and the Far East

75. The United Kingdom has two particular interests of her own in the area:—

(a) . . .\(^3\) Short of that, our position is vulnerable to subversion and, on that account, a garrison of eight units is needed there. Without the leased territories the Colony is not viable: the lease expires in 1997 and we cannot hope to negotiate an extension of it. Nor is there any prospect of our being able to transfer sovereignty to an independent Hong Kong, or fit it into any eventual solution for Formosa. We might in due course consider making a public declaration to the effect that we would stay until 1997 and then withdraw altogether. But, in the foreseeable future, such a declaration would be unwise. We should not even prepare for any new move because this would destroy the confidence on which our present position rests and might prejudice the outcome of any joint Anglo–United States review of Western policy in the Far East. Our position in Hong Kong may be expected to give us some influence over the Americans when they are ready to reconsider their policy towards Communist China and Formosa. Meanwhile, we have no choice but to remain in Hong Kong and should, without provoking the Chinese, show that we intend to do so.

(b) Our colonial territories in the South-West Pacific cost us about £1 million a year for little economic return. Strategically, their value is greater for Australia and New Zealand than for us. In view of our moral responsibilities it may be difficult to divest ourselves of this burden. We should, however, do all we can to involve Australia and New Zealand in this area though, in the end, the people of the territories concerned will have to decide their own future . . .

78. In the Indian sub-continent more than in any other area the provision of economic aid to under-developed territories will prove a heavy burden for us. Indian needs, in particular, are enormous. The Indians are thinking of a Plan costing some £7,500 millions, which would involve a foreign exchange deficit of some £1,875 millions, all of which would need to be met out of foreign assistance. On the present pattern of lending we should have to provide £385 millions of this, or £75 millions per annum if India's needs were to be met in full.

79. This is too large a proportion of the total amount which we can make available for economic aid. For the period 1960–63 it is calculated that our average annual contribution may have to be between £35 millions and £55 millions. Pressure for it to reach the higher figure will be great. This would account for between a third and a quarter of all our economic aid. The question whether the United Kingdom should devote so large a sum to India is difficult. There are other, smaller countries to which a small proportion of this sum would mean a real economic advance and a real promise of political stability. But the considerations of the importance of India, outlined in Part I of this study, lead clearly to the conclusion that this is a sector on which the West as a whole should concentrate over the next decade, and in which the United Kingdom should play a large part, though not to the exclusion of all other claims. As far as the rest of the sub-continent is concerned, Pakistan may need £5 millions per annum and Ceylon up to £3 millions.

85. [Claims on UK resources for defence.] . . . There is a danger that in future the

\(^3\) Sentence on Hong Kong (presumably), a little over two lines in length, removed from public view under section 5(1) of Public Records Act.
effort involved in maintaining our position in Singapore may be out of proportion to our interests in doing so particularly if political developments in Singapore or Malaya were to lead to serious restrictions on the full use of the base facilities. Before the end of the decade we may have to abandon it as a base.

86. If this happens no substitute would be entirely satisfactory. To create a major new United Kingdom base in Australia would be enormously expensive and, anyway, it might be too far away. We might be able to maintain some defence effort in the Far East by co-operating with the United States and the Commonwealth, developing facilities in Australia and making greater use of Borneo. Such dispersion would reduce our dependence on Singapore but might still leave a military and political vacuum which the Americans and Australians would not be able to fill. The development of a forward naval operating base at Addu Atoll in addition to the existing airfield at Gan would go some way towards redeeming our military position.

87. It seems clear that it is in our interest (and in that of the West as a whole) to stay in Singapore for as long as possible. If, however, it were desired for any reason to disperse some of our forces now in Singapore to Borneo or Australia, this should be done gradually since the employment that these forces give in Singapore is an important reason for our being not unwelcome there. In general we should develop close consultation with the Americans and Australians and discuss with them the form which the Western political and military presence in South and South-East Asia should take. But in doing so, we should make clear the radical difference which the denial of facilities in Singapore would make to the Western position in the area as a whole, unless our friends and allies can find a viable alternative. If Singapore were lost altogether to us as a result of Communist expansion throughout South-East Asia, including Malaya, the political consequences in the area would be such that our whole position in the Far East should be reconsidered.

Latin America

… 91. We have a few minor commitments (e.g., British Honduras and British Guiana) which involve no essential national interest, yield no significant economic benefit and tend to act as an irritant in our relations with the Latin American neighbours. The United Kingdom would gain if these territories could be brought into the West Indian Federation and if Canada could take some responsibility for the economic development of the territories of which it is composed.

Part IV: Conclusions and recommendations

… 6. … we must make what is seen to be a significant contribution to countering the growing power of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Even though our reduced material strength will mean that we must work mainly in combination with our friends and allies, we shall still have an important role to play. By exerting the strongest influence we can over our allies we can, in concert with them, maintain a better status than we can hope to have on our own. The problem will be to maintain, and improve, the effectiveness of the main groups in which we participate, especially the Atlantic Community and the Commonwealth. There are important British interests to be sustained throughout the world, but we may have to be more ready to subordinate them to the general interests of the West in order to carry our friends and allies with us.
The United Kingdom’s foreign policy

7. Our material contribution to the Western effort will consist of two main elements—defence and overseas aid—but its value will depend largely on our external policies. Therefore, in considering the broad conclusions which stem from the earlier parts of the paper, account should be taken of the following principles which it is suggested should govern our foreign policy over the next decade.

8. The core of our foreign policy is and must remain the Atlantic Alliance. Whatever happens, we must not find ourselves in the position of having to make a final choice between the two sides of the Atlantic. For this, it is essential that the American presence in Europe be maintained. We must continue and develop the Anglo–American alliance, but must never allow ourselves to be excluded from Europe. These twin objectives may face us with disagreeable political and economic decisions, as, for example, over Communist China or our agricultural policy: we must be prepared to take these in the interests of our basic requirements.

9. The value, and the problems, of the Commonwealth association have been described in paragraphs 14–19 of Part III. The Commonwealth can continue to help us in applying our policies in the rest of the world. But these advantages will diminish unless we make a conscious effort to maintain them. It may not always be easy to maintain the balance between the claims of the Commonwealth and of the Atlantic Alliance.

10. In the New Commonwealth countries and in the rest of the free world our policies should be governed by the overriding importance of countering the threat from the Communist world. In Africa, the task will be made more difficult by the problem of multi-racial relationships; in the Middle East, by the susceptibilities of Arab nationalism. In South-East Asia and the Far East there will be the most direct danger from the power and attractions of Soviet and Chinese Communism. But in all these areas alike we must foster the stability and freedom of the independent countries, and disengage so far as possible from their internal politics and from dissensions between them. While not concerning ourselves unduly if the individual countries find “undemocratic” solutions to their constitutional problems, we should always encourage the sort of social reform which will remove the root causes of discontent and instability. We should not press them unduly to declare themselves as our allies: in many cases benevolent neutrality may be the best we can hope for.

11. As for the Communist world, we must distinguish between aggressive Communist ideology and Russian and Chinese nationalism. The former can best be eroded away by exposure to another system which is shown to be equally successful and more attractive: the latter must be met by the unity and strength of the West. We should welcome a détente in Europe, but we must guard against its potentially disruptive influence. We must not imagine that it will make our task easier in the rest of the world. We must not let it inhibit us from doing what little we can to limit the further consolidation of Russia’s domination of her Satellites in Europe or from telling the uncommitted world what is happening in Eastern Europe.

The United Kingdom’s contribution

12. As our part of the Western effort to limit the power of the Sino-Soviet bloc we must deploy our limited resources as efficiently as we can while at the same time exerting the greatest possible influence on our allies. It will not always be easy to
reconcile these two requirements. Some of the problems involved are discussed in paragraphs 13–28 below.

Conclusions on defence

13. The main defence commitments of the United Kingdom at present are:—

(i) A strategic nuclear striking force and its defence.
(ii) A contribution to NATO forces.
(iii) A military presence in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and South-East Asia; and a capability for reinforcement.
(iv) A number of small garrison commitments.

If all these commitments, and the plans for the Service Departments to meet them, remain unchanged they will entail a Defence Budget rising from a little over £1,600 millions in 1960–61 to about £1,800 millions in 1970 (calculated on present prices and rates of pay).

14. Within the total of the Defence Budget, expenditure overseas cannot be assessed in figures comparable to those given for overseas economic aid, because the forces and their equipment are to a large extent mobile and can be sent where needed from the central strategic reserve or transferred from one role or theatre to another. For example, the cost of the deterrent and air defence in the United Kingdom is at present about 20 per cent. of the total defence budget; but this takes no account of the fact that both the bombers and the fighters can also be used for limited war operations in overseas theatres. In most cases it is not possible to identify costs with particular roles performed by the Services in one area or another.

15. Within the total defence programme over the next ten years there will be problems of priority and choices to be made in the allocation of limited resources in terms of money, manpower and scientific effort. The present study does not aim to consider in detail what should be the size or nature of particular elements. But three general principles emerge:—

(a) First, and most important, British influence in the Atlantic Community and the cohesion of the Alliance as a whole will gain if the United Kingdom continues to make a significant contribution both towards the Western strategic deterrent and towards the Shield Forces of NATO.

(b) Secondly, forces will still be needed to safeguard the most important of the British and Western interests outside Europe. There is not necessarily a conflict between these two principles; the existence of our nuclear deterrent force is a significant factor in the maintenance of our world-wide military position. But we must ensure that a proper balance is struck between the cost of the strategic nuclear deterrent and that of providing adequate and properly equipped forces as a whole.

(c) Thirdly, the cost of introducing complex and expensive new weapons systems should not generally be accepted, in any role, if they will only be effective for a limited period. Long-term planning should take into account not only the requirements of the next decade but also the resources (e.g., in scientific effort) required for research and development into weapons and delivery systems likely to be needed after 1970.

16. The following points are of special importance:—
(a) The strategic nuclear deterrent.—Our purpose should be to maintain a strategic nuclear force which is accepted by the Americans, and by the Alliance as a whole, as a significant contribution to the Western deterrent. Without this, our standing in the Alliance would suffer and we should lose a valuable means of influencing American policy in the event of serious disagreement with them over the importance of a particular Communist threat. This would not mean (except in the view of one of those associated with this study) that we were aiming to provide a force capable by itself of deterring Russia. Nevertheless, a United Kingdom contribution, significant in American eyes, would also have significance for the Russians.

The size and shape of our strategic nuclear deterrent during the next decade should be determined on the following principles:—

(i) To retain our status in the Alliance, we must make a significant effort in the field of the strategic nuclear deterrent.

(ii) To retain this status, it will not be enough simply to make a scientific contribution, however outstanding. We must maintain a viable force in being, under our ultimate control, which is sufficiently large to accomplish our political purposes.

(iii) We should therefore maintain, at the least, the ability to provide British warheads for whatever weapons systems may be adopted; but

(iv) We can accept that there may be periods during which our deterrent will not be maintained at the strength which we are now about to achieve if that strength could only be maintained by introducing costly new weapons systems which would be effective only for a limited period. . . .

Conclusions on aid

17. It is at present estimated that by 1963 the United Kingdom will be giving economic aid partly in grants, partly in loans, at the rate of between £170–£190 millions per annum. These figures are tentative. On the one hand they will need to be reviewed from time to time in the light of the prospective load on the balance of payments. On the other, although they include estimates of future requirements which are not yet firm, there is no reason to believe that they are exhaustive. They make no allowance for sudden changes in the political and economic scene which might well bring for the United Kingdom new and pressing claims: on past experience it would be surprising if no such changes took place. Moreover, and perhaps most important of all, they implicitly assume a continuance of United States effort at its present level and make no allowance for what might be required of the United Kingdom if the level of United States aid were to decline. After 1963, the prospect is even more obscure. But the effort required of the United Kingdom is likely to increase still further, rather than diminish.

18. Three-quarters of this total (£130–£150 millions out of a total of £170–£190 millions) is expected to go to the Commonwealth. Colonial territories are a direct responsibility of the United Kingdom. The independent Members of the Commonwealth have a major claim upon our resources, not least because other potential donors regard them as being largely our responsibility. This allocation of our aid seems justified, but it is possible that over the decade changing circumstances may make it desirable for us to give an increased proportion to countries outside the Commonwealth.
19. During the next ten years overseas aid will continue to be provided by the United Kingdom for the Colonies on a bilateral basis. The same will apply to many of the independent under-developed members of the Commonwealth, though there may be occasions when it will be found appropriate for aid to them as to other Commonwealth members to be channelled multilaterally, either through international organisations or by consortium arrangements. It should be our aim to adopt, so far as possible, arrangements of this latter kind for aid to foreign countries, though occasionally bilateral aid will alone bring the full political advantage to the United Kingdom. In general multilateral aid is most likely to bring forward the maximum contribution from other countries. Further it reduces the economic risks to ourselves by giving the best opening to our exports. Experience shows also that it may be more acceptable to the recipients and thus politically more effective.

Balance in the allocation of resources

20. Broadly, there are three main elements in the resources allocated to defence and overseas policies. In 1959 defence itself cost £1,550 millions (plus about £20 millions for home defence). Economic aid cost £131 millions. Diplomatic information and cultural activities cost about £35 millions. All these claims are complementary. Basically they all have the same object—that of keeping the free world out of the Communist camp. All are charges on economic resources and on our balance of payments. Given the fact that we have limited resources to devote to the support of our security and foreign policy, they are in competition.

21. In this competition, diplomatic information and cultural expenditure has a special place. It has an importance out of proportion to its size. But because it is small, the main rivals for the allocation of resources are defence and economic aid.

22. In practice, this competition relates primarily to the world outside Europe. Some form of strategic nuclear deterrent and our contribution to the forces of NATO are essential on any reckoning. What is in question is the best way of making our contribution to the general Western cause in the Middle East, in Africa and in Asia.

23. Economic aid has some particular arguments in its favour. First, we have both political and humanitarian obligations to under-developed countries, and public opinion is becoming increasingly inclined to accept this fact. Secondly, in contrast to expenditure on defence, aid can bring us economic returns. On the other hand, economic aid is a direct burden on the balance of payments. Some military expenditure overseas is also a direct burden but it is more properly considered as part of total defence expenditure, which imposes an indirect burden on the balance of payments through its claims on the economy as a whole.

24. In practice no amount of economic aid will do our cause any good if Communist arms are unopposed. For the West as a whole, defence must come first. This has special implications for United Kingdom policy since we and, in a different way, the Americans have widespread military commitments outside Europe which no other Power can take over and which, if they were abandoned, would leave dangerous vacuums. It is important that our allies should give us credit for our world-wide effort.

25. It is difficult to determine at any given time the right balance between defence and aid. There are no precise criteria for measuring the risk involved in reducing one commitment or the advantages to be gained from increasing another. The problem is long-term and global in character: it will rarely if ever pose itself in
simple terms as, for instance, whether the presence of our troops is of more value to Malaya than the help we give under the Colombo Plan. In order to determine whether the present overall balance is about right, it is necessary to consider what the effect of changing it would be. What would be the risks and advantages at stake in switching a significant block of resources from defence to economic aid between now and 1965?

26. Certain preliminary considerations stand out. For political and economic reasons flexibility in our expenditure is limited. Changes would have to be made gradually; for instance the sudden abandonment of any of our defence commitments might start a chain reaction which we should not be able to check. Changes would also have to be co-ordinated in advance with our allies; in certain cases we could only afford to give up or reduce one of our commitments if someone else was prepared to take it on. Nevertheless the possibility over a period of time of switching resources from defence to economic aid without complete dislocation of our policies undoubtedly exists. The question is whether it is right.

27. If such a switch were being considered it would be necessary to decide which part of our defence effort should be cut. It can be argued that the \textit{raison d'être} for our forces outside Europe is, in the last resort, less convincing than the case for the strategic deterrent and our contribution to the NATO shield forces. In a sense our military presence outside Europe is the residue of the large forces which we deployed in those areas in the post-war decade and indeed of the pre-war period, when the Indian Army was the mainstay of our defence in the Middle East and the Far East. Part III of the Report has shown the risks inherent in our Far East position—Gurkha manpower and the uncertain tenure of Singapore as a base. Whatever representations we may make to them, Australia and New Zealand are unlikely to add much to the small defence contribution they are making at present. The picture of the future is perhaps less precarious in the Middle East, though taking into account, for example, what has been said in Part III about the uncertain future in the Persian Gulf, the capacity to fulfil our present commitments in that area cannot be guaranteed.

28. But there is another side to this. There is an increasing need to maintain mobile, self-contained units able rapidly to meet threats to British or Western interests in any corner of the globe. Our presence in the Middle East and Asia and our possession of a chain of bases means that we are specially qualified to provide such forces. By doing so we support the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, it seems hardly feasible in practice that the Americans or any other member of the Alliance could, even if they wished, relieve us of all these commitments during the next decade.

29. The previous paragraphs only touch on a complex problem. Even if the balance between defence, aid and other overseas activities is rightly struck at a particular time, the situation is always liable to change, either because the Sino-Soviet bloc change the direction of their threats or because of some major dislocation in the taut and over-extended framework of our own commitments. If we are to hold a proper balance in the forward planning of resources allocated to these purposes, the position should be kept under regular review.

\textit{General conclusions}

30. Underlying all these problems of the size and nature of our contribution are certain fundamental conclusions which have recurred constantly in the three Parts
of this Report and apply to every facet of our policy. It is these which should determine our actions over the next 10 years:—

(a) We must work increasingly with and through our friends and allies. Our defence and overseas policies must be adapted to this concept.

(b) The core of our policy is the Atlantic Alliance. Our main task in the next decade will be to maintain and make more intimate the association between North America, the United Kingdom and the continental countries of Western Europe. We must therefore work to ensure continuation of the United States presence in Europe, effective co-operation between ourselves and the continental countries, and the development of a wide economic and political community of interests embracing both the United States and Western Europe.

(c) We must do all we can to strengthen the Commonwealth, which can be a valuable instrument for maintaining our influence as a Power with world-wide interests and for propagating our ideas and ideals, and can form a bridge between the Western world and the developing countries of Asia and Africa.

(d) The main area of conflict will be the under-developed countries. To keep them in the non-Communist world will call for a sustained and expensive effort of economic aid and the complementary political, information and cultural activities. The United Nations can be of positive assistance, but to ensure this will call for a careful approach by the United Kingdom.

(e) All this aid could be wasted if it were not backed by an adequate defence effort by the West.

(f) The total burden on the United Kingdom is unlikely to get lighter. If we are to maintain our present external policies we cannot expect to reduce the 8½ per cent. of the Gross National Product now devoted to defence, aid and other overseas activities. Part II shows that—if the public can be brought to accept the implications—the burden can be carried. In the light of Part III, the inescapable conclusion is that it should.

(g) To lighten it as far as possible we must make the best use of our resources—material, intellectual and scientific. Our effort must be selective, and we must rely more heavily on interdependence with our allies if we are to make do with our limited means.

(h) The ability of the United Kingdom to play its full part in meeting the commitments of the West over the next decade will largely depend on the cooperation of our friends and allies. If they do not make comparable efforts, in defence and aid, our prospects of carrying out our own programmes will be jeopardised. Most of them are doing less than their fair share and we must aim to make them realise this and do more.

(i) Our economy must be kept strong and in balance if the required effort is to be maintained. This will call for restraint on the part of the public. If these are to be accepted, the policies of Her Majesty’s Government will need to be presented in such a way as to command the widest measure of understanding and support.

(j) The main problem is to keep the balance right between the competing claims, domestic and external, on the national resources and, within the resources applied to the support of external policy, between the claims for defence, for economic aid and for other overseas expenditure.

(k) It is recommended that this Report and its conclusions, as finally approved, should be kept under regular review.
It's later than you think!": letter from Sir Gladwyn Jebb (Paris) to Sir P Dean (FO), commenting on Future Policy Study 1960–1970 Report

Very many thanks for sending me a copy of your “Future Policy Study 1960–70” which I found extremely interesting and (not surprisingly, given the signatures at the end of it) admirably written and presented. I have only three points to make—one large, two small—as follows:

On page 1, paragraph 2, you observe that: “The United States and the U. S. S. R. will increase their already formidable lead over the rest of the world: the United Kingdom and Western Europe will continue to grow, though more slowly . . .”. Immediately below in paragraph 3 (b), however, you observe that the European Economic Community will (alone, apparently) “if they continue to grow at their recent pace . . . approach and perhaps reach the present United States level by 1970”. Thus Western Europe as a whole will, it seems, be producing in 1970 more than the United States produces now. Would you really maintain that Western Europe is going to increase its production less rapidly than the U.S.A.?

Another point more or less arises out of this. The statistics you give in paragraph 6 show that the U.S. are likely to increase their population from 171 million in 1957 to 204 million in 1970. In the same table the equivalent increase in the population of the European Economic Community is stated to be from 164 million in 179 million only—i.e. not much more than half the rate of increase. Are you sure that these statistics are correct? I have always been led to believe that in France, at any rate, the birth-rate since the war has been very high and is likely to continue to be high. From 46 million now, I believe she will probably equal the population of Western Germany in a few year’s [sic] time: and surely the birth-rate of Italy (at any rate Southern Italy) is colossal? Over the whole area of the E.E.C. one would have thought, on the face of it, that the birth-rate was no less impressive than that of America. Is it not therefore more likely that the Six will number something like 200 million in 1970 and thus become from the point of view of mere size almost the exact equivalent of America?

The larger point may be summarised as follows. If the Six do not cohere and if, for instance, either France or Western Germany becomes a “rogue elephant”, the only future that we can foresee for our Island is to become a sort of poor dependency of America. If, on the other hand (as you hope) the Six make a success of it and in ten year’s [sic] time become something like a federation, then it must be evident that whatever our desires may be we shall in practice have to make some kind of “final choice between the two sides of the Atlantic”. (See paragraph 8 on page 41). We can in such circumstances, no doubt, if we concentrate on that end only, “continue and develop the Anglo–American alliance” but I am afraid that there would be every chance of our having to face the fact that in practice we should be “excluded from Europe”.

It may well be that this is not a choice which confronts us immediately, but I am inclined to believe that it may, sooner than we think. It might therefore be quite useful, if only as a study, to think out which alternative would have the fewer disadvantages.1

1 Sir P Dean replied that it was too early to think of having to make ‘a final choice between two sides of the Atlantic . . . and I think we can avoid such a choice’. He questioned whether the Six would ever be a federation (5 Apr 1960).
The next ten years in Africa: minutes of Africa (Official) Committee meeting to discuss procedure for study

The Chairman said that it was important to be clear about the purpose of the study on which the Committee was embarking of the situation in Africa over the next ten years. The study had been generated by a view that Africa was likely to be the next object of Soviet attack and influence in various forms, and that it was, therefore, timely for the interests of the United Kingdom to be clarified, in consultation with the United States, and for the means of defending these interests in the next ten years to be decided upon. The conclusions of the Committee's work might be regarded as constituting a brief for discussions with the Americans in an attempt to secure an agreed Western policy towards Africa over the next ten years.

In discussion, it was suggested that the Committee's study would also serve the purpose of enabling Departments to formulate the United Kingdom's own policies— for example, in regard to political advancement in the territories for which we were directly responsible, and in regard to decisions about defence facilities—against a background of a comprehensive policy for Africa generally.

While consultations with the Americans were clearly necessary, it was important that we should not give the impression of allowing these to determine unduly our future policy towards our own colonial territories. We should, therefore, have settled our own proposals firmly before holding discussions with the Americans, but, as regards East Africa for example, our proposals were at present only in a formative stage; however, firm decisions would have to be taken, in relation to Tanganyika at least, by about March and this made it desirable for the African background which the Committee was setting out to paint to be completed before then.

In the light of this, it might be desirable to consult the Americans in two stages: first, we should ascertain their views (and probably those of the French and the Belgians) on what the future situation in Africa might be; and secondly, when we had settled our own policy proposals, hold talks with them about future policies in Africa. In any preliminary discussions with the Americans we could inform them that we were not ready to discuss our policies for British territories but, nevertheless, we might suitably discuss, for example, the future position in French, Belgian and Portuguese territories in order to assist the formulation of our own policy. It should be borne in mind that discussions with the Americans would also give us the opportunity of influencing their thinking and this underlined the importance of crystallising our own ideas in advance, even in regard to forecasts of the future situation in Africa. The difference between formal consultations with the Americans and regular diplomatic exchanges needed to be borne in mind: talks in Washington between the Americans and the British and French Ambassadors were already in prospect and would by mutual agreement be covering African questions.
It would be important, before holding discussions with the Americans, to consult independent Commonwealth countries in Africa: we were under constant pressure, for example, from the Central African Federation to exchange with them our views on the future of Africa.

In addition to consultations with the Americans, talks with the French would be desirable for political reasons, although the French might not prove to be very forthcoming. Discussions with the Belgians would also be desirable in spite of the indications, at least until very recently, that it would be difficult to ascertain much information about their future plans. Talks with the Portuguese were unlikely to yield anything useful, but partly in view of the importance of some of the Portuguese provinces in Africa to the interests of the Central African Federation, we should be seen to hold discussions with them also.

Summarising the discussion up to this point the Chairman said that it must be assumed that, subject to the views of Ministers, we should have to consult various foreign Governments at a suitable stage; further consideration would have to be given later to the precise line we should take in such consultation.

The Committee then turned to a consideration of the United Kingdom’s interests in the African continent which, for the immediate purposes of the study, it was agreed should be regarded as excluding the Mediterranean littoral. These interests could be divided into three broad groups, namely, political, strategic and economic.

(i) Political interests
In discussion of the United Kingdom’s political interests, it was suggested that these might be defined as the maintenance of stability and of a pro-Western outlook in African territories. It was probable however that over a large part of the continent a pro-Western outlook would be too much to hope for and we might have to accept neutrality of the kind now practised by India. The ultimate outcome would be different in different territories, as it now was between India and Pakistan on the Indian subcontinent, and our aim should be to secure the maximum pro-Western sentiment that was possible. This led to the question whether our interests would best be served by the retention of control in the dependent territories or by withdrawing control; this was a matter which needed separate consideration in respect of each territory. It should not, however, be assumed that a withdrawal of control from the dependent territories would necessarily be the best way of ensuring a pro-Western or politically neutral Africa; in East Africa, in particular, where there was as yet no reasonably educated middle class, withdrawal would lead to administrative chaos and a dangerous vacuum which would open the way to anti-Western influences—the repercussions in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would also be very serious. On the other hand, it had to be recognised that control of the dependent territories could not be retained indefinitely; our aim should rather be to stay long enough in each case to build up an adequately educated middle class capable of administering the territory after independence, and to promote measures such as the reform of land tenure. If we could demonstrate that this was our aim, the period before control was relinquished and during which anti-Western infiltration could be prevented would be likely to be longer, with the result that the final outcome would be more in accord with our general political interests than would otherwise have been the case.

In this part of the discussion the following additional main points were made:—
(a) The building up of a middle class in African territories might not prove to be
the best insurance against a spread of anti-Western influence; the acquisition of
the rudiments of education could assist the spread of hostile propaganda. In Ghana
the existence of an educated middle class had not prevented the growth of
authoritarian Government. On the other hand, other newly independent states
might not develop in the same way as had Ghana, and in any case it could be held
that authoritarian Government was preferable to administrative chaos.
(b) It was suggested that in those areas where there was a European settler
population the United Kingdom could not lightly consider withdrawal of control,
particularly in the light of the encouragement given in the past to those settlers to
establish themselves there. On the other hand, in East Africa the European
population was too small relatively to the African for it to be likely that a
satisfactory multi-racial form of Government could be maintained over a long
period.

(ii) Strategic interests
In discussion of the United Kingdom’s strategic interests in Africa it was suggested
that if, as the Committee’s earlier discussion showed was possible, a tropical Africa
emerged which was to a great extent neutralist, the United Kingdom might be unable
to maintain its present defence rights and facilities there. The question therefore
arose of how essential it was that these rights and facilities should be preserved.

Mr. Wright1 said that the United Kingdom’s strategic interests in Africa were set
out in A.F. (59) 1 and principally comprised the stationing of the strategic reserve in
Kenya and the possession of over-flying and staging rights in certain territories. The
need to retain the strategic reserve in Kenya depended wholly, and that of over-flying
and staging rights partly, on the extent to which the United Kingdom would in the
long term be prepared to safeguard its oil supplies in the Persian Gulf by the use of
force; this matter was currently under consideration at a high level. It was his
personal view that, provided suitable control of Aden were retained, it would
probably be possible to meet our requirements in the Persian Gulf and to safeguard
our interests in the Far East by other means; to do so would, however, be extremely
expensive. The important thing was to be able to plan on a long term basis; the
Committee’s study would be particularly valuable in this respect.

In this part of the discussion the following further main points were made:—

(c) Pending a final decision by Ministers, the Committee should proceed on the
assumption that for the foreseeable future the United Kingdom would continue to
be prepared to use force, in the last resort, in defence of its oil interests in the
Persian Gulf. It must be recognised, however, that this might make it difficult to
retain defence facilities in pro-Arab parts of tropical Africa.
(d) The United Kingdom’s defence requirements would be best met by a pro-
Western Africa; this would be the ideal outcome. But in aiming at this ideal we
might in the event lose the opportunity of securing the least satisfactory solution
that was acceptable from a defence point of view. It was for consideration,
therefore, region by region, whether it would not be wiser to adopt in the first
place political aims which would ensure that our minimum strategic requirements
were met, rather than to risk losing all by aiming too high.

1 C W Wright, assistant secretary, MoD, since 1951.
(iii) Economic interests

It was felt that while substitutes or alternative sources of supply might be available for some of the raw materials produced in Africa, there was little doubt of the permanent importance of Africa as a market and of the continuance of an African desire to trade with the West whatever the political future. Our economic objectives would be met if success were achieved in ensuring stability in Africa and in preventing a pro-Russian attitude from developing. It was likely that the pressure for capital assistance from the West would increase, especially after independence, if only because such assistance would be offered from other sources. Although the example of India might be misleading in this respect, African politicians were bound to profess to favour economic development, partly as a result of their association with China through Afro-Asian conferences, and the United Kingdom’s attitude to such requests for help would colour the African views of our political ends.

On the other hand, withdrawal of European administrators was likely to limit the capacity of African countries to absorb capital on a grand scale. [Although they should look at Africa] as a whole the Committee should base their consideration of the problem upon the different interests involved, in relation to particular areas; by this means it would be found whether, for example, our political and strategic interests were in conflict in regard to any territory. For example, the time might come when the United Kingdom should support political groupings which fell short of those which we should regard as ideal, in order to prevent a much worse outcome; in such a case economic or strategic interests might to some extent have to be sacrificed in the interests of preserving political stability. In a territorial approach it would, however, remain necessary to bear in mind the likelihood that the situation in one territory would in some respects often be inter-related with that in others; staging rights at Kano would, for example, be of little value if no over-flying rights were accorded by other territories.

The Chairman, summarising the discussion, said that it would be useful at the next meeting to consider the outlook in a particular region of Africa, though the effects in any one region of the various cross-currents—such as Islam, pan-Africanism and racial questions—would have to be taken into account. West Africa seemed the most appropriate region for discussion first. The papers already before the Committee would provide most of the material needed, but it would be useful if the Foreign Office were to circulate a more detailed paper on the future of the French and Belgian territories insofar as this affected the West African problem. It would be appropriate for the Committee to meet weekly for the present, and at their meeting after next the problems of the Central African region could with advantage be discussed. There was a gap in the papers before the Committee relating to the economic considerations which might affect our African policies, and the Board of Trade should prepare a memorandum on this subject, looking forward to the next five and ten years. As far as possible this should cover all African territories, and it would no doubt have to make certain assumptions relating, for example, to the political future of the French territories and to the development of the European Common Market. . . .

2 The Committee held further regular meetings, the ninth being on 9 April 1959.
The report occupied 30 printed pages of foolscap. The historical section (i) and the ‘current influences’ (ii) are both omitted here. The latter included: pan-Africanism, European racialism, Soviet penetration, Islam and the UAR, social and economic change. In sections (iii) and (iv) detailed analysis of foreign territories is omitted. The conclusions (v) are printed in full.

1. The purpose of this report is to survey the African scene over the next ten years—not in order to make detailed recommendations on individual problems but rather in order to provide a framework within which we can discuss with our Commonwealth friends and with our allies, the policy which the West should adopt towards the rapid march of events in the African continent. It is limited to Africa south of the Sahara, since the Mediterranean littoral is a geographically separate area and its problems are rather different; but it can, if necessary, be made the subject of a separate enquiry.

2. The report is divided into five sections:

   I. A brief historical introduction.
   II. A survey of the influences currently at work in tropical Africa.
   III. A forecast, in general terms, of the probable outcome of these influences during the next ten years, i.e., a rough picture of Africa South of the Sahara in 1970.
   IV. An attempt to define both the interests of the West in Africa and the problems with which the continent confronts the European Powers, particularly the United Kingdom; and to suggest possible means by which the Western position in Africa might be safeguarded during the next ten years.
   V. A conclusion summarising the main considerations which emerge from the survey.

Part III.—The next ten years

42. In this section of our report we attempt to forecast the manner in which Africa south of the Sahara may react over the next 10 years to the various influences which we have outlined in Part II. Any attempt to peer into the future is bound to be speculative; and in the case of Africa it is particularly so for a variety of reasons. In the first place the African peoples have little in the way of common history; and they have no significant inheritance of shared culture or religion. In other areas of the world where the Western Powers have transferred sovereignty to the native population—e.g., in India and the Far Eastern territories—the political immaturity of the new society has been to some extent compensated by the fact that the peoples have an indigenous culture of their own, with roots stretching far back into the past. They have inherited a tradition of social organisation, even if they have had little experience of political unity. In most of tropical Africa this element of stability is lacking; and in transferring sovereignty to the local inhabitants the West will in many cases be surrendering power to peoples who are not far removed from primitive savagery. Moreover, the outstanding personalities are few and disproportionately important; and much will depend on what happens to a handful of key men—Dr. Nkrumah in Ghana;\(^1\) Abubakar, the Prime Minister of

---

Nigeria; M. Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast; and half a dozen more. If these few men were to disappear from the African scene, the whole future of the continent would be affected. It is considerations of this kind which make it particularly difficult to predict with any confidence the future of Africa in 10 years’ time.

43. With these reservations, however, we would hazard the following forecast of the political pattern in Africa as it may emerge during the next decade. For convenience we have divided the territories concerned into two main areas—first, the predominantly black area north of the Congo, extending from Senegal in the west to the Somali territories in the east; second, the area south of the Congo which is, and is likely to remain during the next 10 years, an area of multi-racial societies dominated, though to a decreasing extent, by the European element.

(a) North of the Congo

44. Looking 10 years ahead, we believe that we can discern in this area an emerging patchwork of independent or semi-independent States, the principal exceptions being relatively unimportant—Portuguese Guinea, the Spanish Possessions and, possibly, French Somaliland. And even these are likely to be under pressure by 1970. Most of the French African territories may have reached independence within some form of association with France. They may have established some kind of federal link between themselves; and, if so, they will probably have constituted two main federal groups, comprising some (though not all) of the territories of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa respectively. The tendency towards federation is likely to be encouraged by the legacy of French administrative practice, which has established “capitals” at Dakar and Brazzaville, and by the fact that the organisation of the native political parties and Trades Unions transcends the frontiers. It would also be more in conformity with natural economic alignments, which are distorted by the present artificial territorial frontiers. But economic and other forces will not be wholly in favour of federation. Rich territories such as the Ivory Coast and Gabon dislike sharing their wealth with poorer areas. Thus, the Federation of Mali, which was originally intended to include four Republics, has now been reduced to two (Senegal and Soudan)—Dahomey and Upper Volta having yielded to economic and political pressure from the Ivory Coast and to the fear by the Christian ruling class of the two Muslim partners. This episode admirably illustrates the cross-currents of nationalism and sentiment through which Pan-Africanism will have to steer its course.

45. In Sierra Leone all the political parties are pledged to independence as their ultimate aim; and in the light of recent developments elsewhere in West Africa, particularly in the French territories, it seems likely that the United Kingdom will be asked, in 1960, to name a date for full independence not later than 1963. Hitherto the Government of Sierra Leone have maintained a fairly non-committal attitude towards Ghana and Guinea; but, if their request for independence is granted, the Colony may enter into some form of association with the neighbouring territories during the decade.

46. The Gambia provides one of the more striking examples of territorial anomaly in Africa. The Protectorate is a thin strip of land, no more than 20 miles

---

3 Felix Houphouët-Boigny, first president of the Ivory Coast from 1960 for more than 30 years.
wide at its maximum breadth, extending for some 180 miles inland on both sides of
the river. The result is to hinder the efficient use of the only important river in the
area, to make it impossible to develop the only good natural harbour, to create a
small enclave of territory which can only with difficulty sustain an economic
existence and to maintain an artificial barrier between peoples of the same race.
Hitherto, however, the Protectorate has shown a considerable sentiment of loyalty to
the United Kingdom; and since from every point of view—social, constitutional and
economic—it is a backward and impoverished country, its real interest may lie in
maintaining the British connexion for as long as possible. On the other hand, it is
wholly surrounded by Senegal; and Senegal is now governed by Africans themselves.
The Prime Minister of Senegal has already spoken in public—albeit in moderate
terms—of the possibility of establishing “Senegambia”; and although the economic
interests of the two countries do not entirely coincide, we must recognise that some
form of closer association between them will become increasingly probable.

47. In Ghana it seems probable that the present political system will be
maintained, a semi-authoritarian control being enforced by a “democratic” party
under the leadership of some dominant personality (possibly still Dr. Nkrumah); and
that the Government will continue to ensure that the Opposition is demoralised and
that the tribal chiefs are eliminated, except for ceremonial purposes. Ghana should
therefore be capable of maintaining internal political stability, for as far ahead as one
can reasonably foresee, by a continuation of the present methods of administration.
Her relations with her neighbours, however, will probably involve new forms of
association; and the results are not easy to predict. It is unlikely, on balance, that the
association of Ghana and Guinea will mature into a federation in the conventional
sense; but it may form the basis of a wider and looser grouping of several states with
little or no real merging of sovereignty. We are perhaps on surer ground in
forecasting that, although Ghana is likely to remain a member of the
Commonwealth, she will probably become a Republic at some point in the next five
years; and that the forthcoming exchange of formal diplomatic representatives with
the Soviet Union will not prevent her from suppressing internal Communist cells as
a threat to the régime.

48. By 1965 Nigeria will have had five years of independence. Regional
patriotism will still remain strong, but with the passage of years the sentiment of
Nigerian unity will probably have grown. The Federation will have held together; and
the conservative North will probably be playing the major part in the Federal
Government, although it may have had to ally itself with the leading party from one
of the other Regions. Although authoritarian tendencies may have increased in the
Regions, it will probably be necessary to maintain a coalition at the Centre; and this
may ensure the continuance there of parliamentary government. There is little or no
evidence at present to suggest that Nigeria wishes to become a Republic; and this is
unlikely to happen during the first half of the decade. On attaining independence she
will have signed a defence agreement with the United Kingdom; and, if we have
played our cards well, she will still, in 1965, be a fully co-operative member of the
Commonwealth, although much will depend on our policy in East and Central
Africa. Preoccupation with her own internal problems may at first reduce her
influence outside her own frontiers; but by virtue of her size and position she should
be beginning to play a leading part in the affairs of tropical Africa. By 1970 it is
conceivable that she may have become a Republic, although—we repeat—there is
no present evidence of such an intention. In addition, the aristocratic party may no longer be dominant in the North (and hence in the Federation) but may have had to give way to a more “advanced” party, a development which may affect to some extent Nigeria’s attitude to external affairs. But—again if we have played our cards well—she should still be a loyal member of the Commonwealth. Moreover, the country should be wealthier, particularly if oil resources prove to be large. In addition, the sentiment of unity should have grown stronger; and, being less preoccupied with her own problems, Nigeria should be able to exert a greater influence outside her own borders. In any event she is likely, throughout the decade, to be deeply concerned by, and opposed to, the designs of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic. . . .

50. Further to the east, European influence is also likely to have diminished by 1970 in the Sudan and the Horn of Africa. The Sudan has become more aware of its African connexions since it achieved independence. Its future depends essentially on whether the standards of administration can be maintained and the economy can be developed sufficiently rapidly. The future alignment of the Sudan should not be unfavourable to the West, provided that economic assistance can be provided and used in such a way as to diversify Sudanese production. The Sudan, probably under military Governments, will play a fairly important part in African affairs as a genuinely independent country, following a Nationalist and neutralist external policy not unfriendly to the West, but maintaining cordial political and trading relations with the Soviet bloc. Relations between the Sudan and Nigeria may become of special importance.

51. Somalia will become independent next year; and the British Somaliland Protectorate may shortly afterwards be united with it. Somalia would inevitably be the dominant partner in the union; and the Somali Youth League would probably establish the familiar African pattern of one-party government. Somalia will be strongly Muslim and, at least culturally, pro-Arab; economically unviable; and politically committed to furthering the plan for a Greater Somalia which would include French Somaliland, a part of Ethiopia and certain areas in Kenya. Economic realities, however, may force the Somalis to reach an accommodation with Ethiopia, in order to preserve the grazing rights in Ethiopia which are essential to the tribes in the present British Protectorate and are guaranteed to them by treaty. . . .

(b) South of the Congo

53. In the non-Commonwealth territories the pace of political advance will probably be rapid—particularly in the Belgian Congo as a result of the far-reaching plans for constitutional advance which were announced by the Belgian Government in January 1959. . . .

54. The form and pace of constitutional advance in much of British East and Central Africa are likely to vary from those typical in other parts of Africa owing to the presence of considerable non-African settled communities on which most of these territories are largely dependent both economically and administratively. A review has recently been undertaken of the position in the territories which comprise British East Africa. This has rejected, at one extreme, a policy of rapid withdrawal of British control and, at the other extreme, a diehard policy of “digging in” and refusing to contemplate any possibility that we may relinquish our control in the foreseeable future. The review came down in favour of a “middle of the road” policy, implying that we will continue to promote the constitutional advance of the
territories step by step but that we will also seek sufficiently to prolong the period in which the United Kingdom will retain control in vital matters to ensure that the territories will be reasonably equipped to discharge the responsibilities of self-government by the time they achieve independence. The British East African territories are to a large extent economically interdependent; and constitutional developments in each of them will have a profound effect on the other two. For this reason, if for no other, policy must be directed to promoting constitutional advance at roughly the same pace in all three territories. But although they are all primarily African States, Tanganyika is a Trust Territory, Kenya contains an important non-African settled population (on whom the economy largely depends and to whom we have special obligations) while Uganda, dominated by the powerful Buganda Agreement State, is comparatively advanced. These differing factors make the policy of approximately equal advance particularly difficult to achieve.

55. In **Uganda**, if the present conflicts persist, on the one hand, between the traditionalists, headed by the Rulers, and the nationalist movements drawn from the young educated elements and, on the other hand, between Buganda and the rest of the Protectorate, it is unlikely that by 1965 full internal responsible self-government will have been reached. But it will probably be attained by 1970. If, however, these conflicting elements come to terms, the United Kingdom may be forced to grant internal self-government rather earlier, although this at present seems unlikely.

56. In **Kenya**, our policy is to build up a viable, non-racial State, in which the interests of all communities will be secure, and to maintain full responsibility until this has been achieved. Our aim is unlikely to be realised by 1970; and on present indications Kenya will lag behind Uganda and Tanganyika in attaining responsible self-government—as is probably inevitable if the legitimate interests of all communities are to be safeguarded.

57. In **Tanganyika** the African nationalist movement is particularly strong and undivided; but the people are educationally backward. Here the main retarding factor will be, for many years, lack of personnel capable of governing with any hope of success. Even so the pressure for advance is likely to result in the territory's being well on the way to responsible government by 1965. By 1970 it will probably have achieved internal self-government but will still rely largely on external economic and administrative help.

58. Thus, if we succeed in holding to our own policy against both internal and external pressures, by 1970 Tanganyika and Uganda will have attained internal self-government and Kenya will be moving in that direction; but, owing to the backwardness of the majority of Africans in all three territories and the multi-racial nature of Kenya in particular, British authority will remain and will still, in the last resort, prevail. If these forecasts are reasonably accurate, the interests of the West should be reasonably secure in East Africa. But the pressures for more rapid advance will be considerable; and great skill and judgment will be required in order to prevent a dangerously rapid advance which can only result in economic and political chaos and throw the door wide open to influences hostile to the West.

59. In **Central Africa** the circumstances are different from those in East Africa; and they present even greater difficulties. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland consists of Southern Rhodesia, a self-governing colony which took its present shape after conquest, with an independent, strong, numerous and rapidly increasing European population; and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which are British
Protectorates. The politically vocal part of the European population, unlike the Europeans in East Africa, are anxious for independence from United Kingdom control, although they are intensely loyal to the Commonwealth. The Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the other hand, look to the United Kingdom connexion to protect their interests against encroachment by local Europeans—although there is at the same time a rising pressure for universal adult franchise leading to African political control and independence. The Federation was created as a compromise between two different forms of possible association between three territorial units whose economies are uneven but to some extent complementary. The Europeans in Southern Rhodesia and those in Northern Rhodesia wished to amalgamate, with or without Nyasaland, in a “Dominion”; but the Governments of the two Northern Territories preferred a looser type of association which promised economic advantage but did not imply political links. As a result the compromise concept of Federation was evolved; and it was argued in its favour that it would bring economic and political benefits to the area as a whole and that, by promoting the development of multi-racial partnership based on “civilised standards,” it would prevent Southern Rhodesia from passing under the control of the Union of South Africa and would avoid a direct clash between a white-dominated Africa south of the Zambesi and a black-dominated Africa to the north.

60. While the Federal experiment is of vital importance to the maintenance of stability in this area, and, indeed, in all Africa, and while it already has considerable economic achievement to its credit, it is bedevilled by African fears of being dominated by local Europeans and by European fears of being submerged by an “uncivilised” African nationalism. It is in order to counter these fears that the United Kingdom has insisted, on the one hand, that, as stated in the pledges contained in the Preamble to the Constitution and reiterated by United Kingdom Ministers when that Constitution was debated in Parliament, our protection of African interests will be maintained so long as the majority of the people so desire and, on the other hand, has agreed to a high qualification for the franchise, based on a necessarily arbitrary interpretation of “civilised standards.”

61. In 1960 a Conference of the Governments concerned is to review the Federal Constitution, to agree on the constitutional advances which may be made and to “consider a programme for the attainment of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth.” If this Conference succeeds in finding a course which is both acceptable to the Federal Government and compatible with our pledges to the Africans, we may perhaps infer that by 1965 the Europeans will still be providing the main driving force of government in Southern Rhodesia and in the central Federal Government; that the United Kingdom Government will still be in ultimate control of the Governments of the two Northern Territories; but that in Northern Rhodesia Africans will probably be playing an increasingly substantial part in the Legislature as well as participating in the Executive and in Nyasaland will be likely to have a majority of the unofficial members in the Legislature and to be playing a prominent part in the Executive. In the following five years the position should remain reasonably stable, with African influence gradually increasing in the Legislatures and Executives of the Northern Territories and in elections to the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Legislatures but Europeans still providing most of the effective direction in the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments.
62. But, if the 1960 Conference fails to find a solution which is both reasonably acceptable to the parties concerned and capable of providing stable and progressive administration, the picture grows darker. For in that event the Federation will be rapidly subjected to an increasing strain which may soon become intolerable. Confidence between the races will deteriorate sharply; there will be a grave risk that the Europeans will adopt increasingly restrictive policies; and in the end they may attempt to force the issue by declaring the Federation, or at least the two Rhodesias, fully independent under predominantly European Governments. The Africans (if they have not already taken the initiative themselves in seeking to disrupt the Federation) will then react no less vigorously in the opposite direction by adopting the more extreme forms of resistance; and the white population will be compelled to resort to force in order to maintain their position—to the discredit of the United Kingdom, to the detriment of the Federation’s economy, and to the embarrassment of the policy of moderation which we shall be trying to pursue in East Africa. Alternatively, the Federation may simply break up under the mounting pressure of the internal conflict of opinion; and in that event either Southern Rhodesia may gradually drift into the orbit of the Union of South Africa or some general regrouping of territories may take place on more specifically racial lines. On either assumption the South African racial policies will then have advanced northwards to the edge of the Zambezi, towards the heart of Central Africa.

63. The policies of the Union of South Africa seem unlikely to change for as far ahead as one can see; and the relationship between the Union and the black independent States is likely to continue to be one of increasing bitterness. At the same time economic expansion will probably continue steadily; and the material welfare of the African population may well improve faster in the Union than anywhere else in Africa. As a result the Government of the Union may be able so to develop their economic plans for the native population (through resettlement in native areas, &c.) that the Africans will have both less chance and less desire to rise against their white masters. And, although tension between the black and white communities is almost certain to increase, it is unlikely that the Africans in the Union will be able to rise against the Europeans on a scale with which the latter could not deal. Under the influence of these pressures the Union will be liable to retreat deeper and deeper into isolationism. By 1970 it may have become a republic and may well have resigned permanently from the United Nations. It may seek to maintain links with the United Kingdom and Portugal as its last remaining friends in the free world, though we should hope that it would wish to stay within the Commonwealth.

64. In this context the future of the three High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland is likely to continue to present a delicate problem. We must expect the Union Government to maintain their pressure for the incorporation of the three territories in the Union; and our reactions to this pressure—particularly in view of our commitment to consult the inhabitants of the territories before taking any such step—will be regarded internationally as a critical test of our sincerity.

Summary

65. The picture which finally emerges is a picture of a continent which, in ten years’ time, may—at least as far as Black Africa is concerned—be largely
balkanised,” i.e., divided into a large number of nominally independent States, in which the black peoples will have achieved de facto control and will have established governments which, though professing to be democratic, will in fact be largely authoritarian in their outlook. But they will not necessarily be any the less stable on this account; and although it would be unrealistic to assume that newly independent African States will be either able or willing to sustain the full burden of responsible representative government as it is known in the Western democracies, their authoritarian régimes will probably command a wide measure of popular support. Nigeria alone may be an exception, in that, although the Regional administrations may well be semi-dictatorships, the central Federal Government (which is likely to constitute the real focus of power and authority) may be established on a basis of parliamentary democracy.

The States constituting this patchwork will be likely to be linked more or less loosely together in various forms of federal association or, more probably, in shifting alliances; but it would be unwise to assume that, at least by 1970, they will be integrated into a relatively small number of competent and viable units. There will be a good deal of jealousy and friction between each State and its neighbours, mainly over issues of boundaries and frontiers; and this will be liable to manifest itself in the accumulation of arms and, possibly, a tendency towards military adventures. In Ghana and Guinea the old structure of tribal loyalties will have been largely overthrown; but elsewhere the tribal chiefs, although often in conflict with the new authoritarian politicians, will probably survive and may, indeed, assume a new importance, albeit in a modified and more sophisticated form, as an alternative source of psychological reassurance when European protection is withdrawn.

In the areas of Africa settled by Europeans the picture in ten years’ time is different. In East, Central and Southern African the risk is not, as in Africa north of the Equator, a risk of the “balkanisation” of a large number of self-governing black communities but a risk of conflict between, on the one hand, black majorities and, on the other hand, either dominant white minorities or Colonial Governments seeking to ensure that constitutional advance proceeds in an orderly and moderate manner and that the legitimate interests of minorities are safeguarded. In British East Africa there is perhaps a reasonable chance that, given patience and goodwill on both sides, the problem can be resolved without excessive friction and that by 1970 the three territories may have advanced, by peaceful and constitutional means, significantly nearer to what is almost certainly their ultimate status, i.e., non-racial but mainly African States largely controlled by the African majority. But in South Africa there is no likelihood, so far as can be foreseen at present, that the Union Government will modify their policy of apartheid within the next decade. The pattern of development in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is therefore critical. It is impossible to predict that pattern; but, if the concept of Federation can be sustained and can be encouraged to take organic root in the three territories with the consent and support of their inhabitants, 1970 may see a primarily multi-racial community interposed, as a shock absorber, between the European-dominated Union at the southern extreme of Africa and the predominantly black societies which will be emerging in the central part of the continent. But if, by the end of the decade, the Federation has disintegrated, the racial separatism of the Union will be directly confronting the new black states; while, if it is maintained under white domination by force and without the consent of the African inhabitants, the whole of the Western
position in black Africa, even in those territories (such as Nigeria) which are at present well-disposed towards us, will be gravely shaken.

68. But, whatever the course of events, the West will need to remember that the new African States, although deficient in administrative experience and organisational ability, will be proud of their independence and abnormally sensitive to anything which they regard as threatening it or derogating from it. This will largely condition their reactions both towards the cold war (where positive neutrality and non-alignment will be the watchwords of many) and towards offers of economic and financial assistance, on which they will be very heavily dependent. It will also tend to make them less attractive to the foreign investor. And if the battle between the West and the Soviet bloc for Africa will turn mainly on the ability of the democracies to solve the acute racial and constitutional problems in East and Central Africa, its outcome will also depend partly on the extent to which the West is able to provide appropriate economic assistance on terms acceptable to the pride and self-consciousness of inexperienced and newly-awakened peoples.

Part IV.—Problems of policy for the West in Africa

69. The countries of the West have certain common interests in Africa; and they face certain problems which, although differing in detail from one area to another, present much the same fundamental features. The purpose of this section of our report is to define Western interests in Africa; to outline the problems which confront the West; and to suggest how these problems should be approached.

The interests of the West in Africa

70. These can be summarised as the maintenance of peace, stability, economic security and goodwill, and the exclusion, so far as possible, of Soviet and other hostile influences. . . .

71. The United Kingdom has particularly close interests in Africa—partly as a result of the special responsibilities imposed on us by history and by our present or past possession of large parts of the continent; and partly for strategic reasons. These interests can be grouped under the following headings:—

(a) Our share in the general Western interest in the maintenance of peace and political stability in Africa, the exclusion of subversive influences and the encouragement of pro-Western sentiment.
(b) The maintenance and development of our trade with Africa and the encouragement of British investment.
(c) The safety and welfare of white settlers and other minorities in present or former British territories. We have a particular responsibility to do everything we reasonably can in order to ensure that peoples of all races who have made their homes in such territories with the encouragement of successive British Governments will be able to live there in security and to contribute to the development and prosperity of their own part of Africa.

72. In addition, we have certain defence requirements in Africa which need to be examined in rather more detail. They derive partly from considerations of internal security and partly from considerations of global strategic policy.

73. It is unlikely that, except in cases of emergency, we shall wish to introduce
British troops, solely for purposes of internal security, in African territories after they have achieved internal self-government within the Commonwealth. It is even more improbable that British armed intervention will be either necessary or feasible in former British African territories which have achieved full independence within the Commonwealth, except conceivably at the invitation of the Government concerned if it was threatened or attacked by an aggressive neighbour. On the other hand, so long as a territory remains dependent and our consequent responsibility requires and justifies the use of British troops for the maintenance of internal security, we shall require facilities for the accommodation, training and reinforcement of forces for this purpose. It may become progressively more difficult to insist on our right to use these facilities as the territory in question approaches nearer to independence. But, formally, the responsibility for internal security will remain with the United Kingdom; and, so long as this is so, we shall need to retain the means to discharge that responsibility.

74. In the wider context of global strategy our current defence policy requires that:

(i) In certain circumstances we should be in a position to use armed force in Arabia and the Persian Gulf. This implies, given present logistic possibilities, that we need to maintain in Kenya an element of the Strategic Reserve in order to reinforce the small detachment which we can station in the Persian Gulf; and to retain certain modest but important naval facilities which we at present enjoy at Mombasa. We also need over-flying and staging rights in certain African territories in order to be able to reinforce Kenya and Arabia by a route otherwise than via the air barrier of the Middle East.

(ii) We should be able to reinforce South-East Asia by air easterly from this country. This requirement similarly calls for over-flying and staging rights in Africa.

75. During the next ten years the only aircraft so far planned which are likely to be available in quantity will have ranges which require, for rapid reinforcement, the use of Kano (Nigeria) and either Entebbe (Uganda) or Nairobi (Kenya); or, alternatively, if the airfields were developed, either Bathurst (Gambia) or Freetown (Sierra Leone) and Nairobi. Another possible means of reaching East Africa would be by the route Gibraltar, Bathurst, Ascension Island, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya; but this would involve costly engineering work at Ascension Island. There will, however, be a continuing need to retain the existing intermediate staging posts in order to stage medium-range aircraft of all types to Kenya and Aden. The requirement for staging and over-flying rights will not, therefore, change materially during the next ten years.

76. In short, our present defence policy and resources require the presence in Kenya of elements of the Strategic Reserve; staging rights in Nigeria, Gambia (or Sierra Leone) and Kenya; and rights to overfly territories between the staging points.

77. While the ability to station and reinforce troops in Africa for the maintenance of internal security is essential so long as our responsibilities require us, and our authority enables us, to exercise the right of intervention, the requirement deriving from our global strategic policy is a relative one—for two reasons. In the first place, we may find in the long run that, in relation to independent African governments, we are more likely to achieve our primary objectives of goodwill, commercial and
economic security and the exclusion of Soviet influence if we refrain from using or demanding certain defence facilities and meet our defence needs by means which do not involve a use of particular African territories. (The practicability of developing these alternatives needs further investigation. They would certainly involve substantial expenditure and would take time to complete; and the decision to develop them would depend on a balance of many conflicting factors.) Second, our defence requirements in Africa, as we have defined them in the context of global strategy, depend on the assumption that it will remain our policy to be able both to apply force in the Arabian Peninsula and to reinforce South-East Asia direct from the United Kingdom or Africa. But it is not certain that these elements of our current policy will remain unchanged; and, if they are modified, our defence requirements in Africa will be correspondingly reduced.

78. Over the next ten years, therefore, we should be able, if we so decide, to maintain a Strategic Reserve in Kenya (part of which may need in any event to be stationed there during this period for internal security purposes) and to secure the requisite staging and overflying rights. But we must expect political pressures to build up increasingly against us, even though in Kenya they may be mitigated to some extent by the economic benefits which the territory should derive from the presence of British troops. Moreover, we may find it expedient to modify our strategic requirements in Africa in the interests of conciliating African opinion and promoting political goodwill in the longer term; and our defence requirements may therefore have to be modified in the light of other more fundamental needs of our future policies in Africa. At the same time our strategic policy as a whole may change; and Africa may become less important in relation to our defence requirements in other parts of the world. We hope, therefore, that the extent of our strategic needs in Africa during the next decade will be examined in greater detail in the light of the considerations in this report. At the same time we must recognise that it may become necessary to apply force in the Arabian Peninsula before any alternative to the use of our facilities in Kenya has been developed. In that event we may expect violent criticism from some of the independent African countries, which may have repercussions on internal security in Kenya itself.

The problems of the West in Africa

79. The impact of European power and civilisation on Africa and the rapid social and economic revolution in the life of the African peoples which has resulted have created acute stresses within the continent and have confronted the West with grave new problems. Basically, these problems are two—first, the pace and timing of the progress of still dependent countries towards self-government in the context of the inter-racial problem; second, the means by which the West should seek to retain the sympathy and support of newly independent States in Africa and to prevent them from being subverted by Soviet influence. These problems need separate discussion.

Constitutional advance and racial tension

80. The colonial policies of the United Kingdom have themselves led the African peoples to believe that independence is the ultimate goal to which they are being directed. And the other European Powers who are involved in Africa are equally tending to grant the Africans an increasing degree of responsibility for the management of their own affairs. But it is essential both to the completion of the
task of colonial trusteeship and to the safeguarding of the general interests of the
West in Africa for the future that power should not be transferred until there is at
least a fairly firm prospect that the territories concerned will remain reasonably
stable and viable and will be capable of standing on their own feet. If power were
handed over before these conditions were satisfied, internal chaos would develop and
the territories would be a prey to the hostile external forces which are now seeking to
penetrate the continent. The rising African politicians, however, stimulated by
internal and external pressures, naturally desire to achieve independence in their
time. In seeking, therefore, to bring the process of “nation-building” in Africa to its
logical end, the metropolitan Powers face the dilemma of arousing bitterness and
hostility if they appear to be going too slowly: or, if they go too quickly, of failing to
fulfil their obligations and jeopardising the future of the territories both for their
own inhabitants and for the West generally.

81. This problem has not proved impossible to resolve in West Africa, where
there is no substantial settled non-African population and a substantial degree of
social and economic progress has already been achieved. All the French West African
territories are now wholly self-governing members of the French Community, apart
from Guinea, which is independent, and the French Cameroons and Togoland, which
are to become independent in 1960. Of the British territories Ghana is independent,
Nigeria is on the verge of becoming so, and Sierra Leone has an advanced
constitution.

82. But in the British East and Central African territories the problem arises in a
more acute form, partly because, for historical and economic reasons, the African
peoples in these regions are more “backward” and partly because in the eastern half
of Africa the problem of establishing a genuine partnership between Africans and
non-Africans in all walks of life and on a workable and equitable basis assumes a
particularly acute form. In East Africa there cannot be much doubt that the African
majority will ultimately gain political control of the territories. But, although it is
important that they should be raised to the economic, educational and
administrative levels at which self-government can be sustained, it is also important
to safeguard the future of the non-African minorities. These generate much of the
wealth of the territories and contribute much of the skill and enterprise which are
engaged in them. They play a vital role, therefore, in the prosperity and development
of East Africa. Moreover, in Kenya, in view of the economic and political power which
they wield at present, any attempt to sacrifice their essential interests might still lead
to serious political conflict. We shall only succeed in safeguarding the interests of all
parties and ensuring the prosperity of the territories if we can build up “non-racial”
States where the non-African minorities will continue to make their important
contribution to the general good of all the inhabitants.

83. The Belgians are faced with a similar problem in the Congo, where white
settlement, especially in the copper-belt, has created much of the wealth of the area.
Both the Belgian Government and the leading companies seem to be moving to the
conclusion that Belgian interests will best be served by fairly rapid moves towards
self-government on the principle of “one man one vote,” without attempting to
achieve over a period a defined basis for partnership. Indeed, Belgian policy now
tends to regard the non-alienation of the native majority and their moderate leaders
as the only effective safeguard for the future. As this policy is progressively
implemented it is bound to have major repercussions in British East Africa,
especially in territories where the white minority is less important than in the Congo.

84. Further to the south, in Central Africa, the problem is even more acute—partly because the United Kingdom is not, as in East Africa, in sole control of the whole area and partly because the Federation includes one territory, Southern Rhodesia, where the numerical disparity between Africans and non-Africans is less pronounced. But here also, as in East Africa, the problem is essentially one of securing time for the further “development” of the African people and for the gradual evolution of the right kind of relationships between the African and non-African inhabitants. The handling of the Central African problem is therefore critical for the future interests of the United Kingdom and the West. In this area, sandwiched between Black Africa in the north and European-dominated Africa in the south, the stresses of European and African racialism meet and, as they become increasingly exacerbated, imperil the solutions which we are striving to reach. If the bold and difficult experiment of “partnership” and “federation” fails, Southern Rhodesia may be forced into the orbit of the Union of South Africa while the two northern territories in whole or part may join the African bloc in the north. On the other hand, if Federation is maintained by force and without the consent of the African inhabitants, the Western position in black Africa will be seriously weakened.

85. This risk is so grave that we are bound to underline it. It must not be forgotten that, after Nigeria becomes independent in 1960, the period of British leadership of the advance of African colonial territories towards independence will appear to be over; and unless we can solve the problems of East and Central Africa, our past record of benevolent government will be forgotten and it will be the French and perhaps the Belgians who will be regarded by world opinion as the leaders, while we may be classed with the Portuguese as the obstacles to further advance. Moreover, although conditions have hitherto enabled us to adopt an apparently more simple and unambiguous approach to the problems of black West Africa than to those of the multi-racial societies in East and Central Africa, the growth of Pan-Africanism on a continental scale will make it increasingly difficult for us to continue to pursue policies which, to the African mind, seem to differentiate between the two areas. We have emphasised earlier in this report that, given reasonable luck, Nigeria should emerge during the 1960’s as the most important power in Black Africa—but that she will watch, with increasingly influential concern, our handling of the racial tension which is steadily building up on the eastern side of the continent. If we fail to solve the problems of East and Central Africa in a manner which will satisfy all reasonable aspirations and will demonstrate that we are not seeking to perpetuate an unqualified white supremacy, we may lose West Africa as well.

The political alignment of Africa

86. The second main problem which faces the West is the problem of ensuring that, as the African States achieve independence, they retain an active sympathy with the free world and do not succumb to Soviet penetration. If our forecast of probable political developments in Africa is correct, this purpose may not be easily realised. If, as we have suggested, a large part of Africa resolves into a patchwork of independent States, politically at odds and economically weak, we shall not be able to take for granted either the will or the ability of their Governments to maintain internal stability and to resist external aggression. Moreover, we must assume that they will
follow a mainly neutralist policy, which might at best be vaguely benevolent towards the West but at worst would be actively hostile. On the other hand, the West has certain assets—a long connexion with Africa; the European personnel who occupy key positions; the large areas of territory which the Western Powers still control; the fund of goodwill which they have gradually accumulated over many years; and the economic assistance which they provide. How can they use these assets in order to ensure that, without detriment to the welfare of the Africans themselves, the interests of the West in Africa are safeguarded? It is not the purpose of this report to make detailed recommendations on specific issues. But certain general principles of association between Africa and the free world—political, strategic and economic links—suggest themselves.

87. The political link. The Western Powers will have done not a little to achieve their purpose if they succeed in solving the complex of racial and constitutional issues which obstruct the road towards independence—if they succeed, that is, in transferring power to African or multi-racial administrations in a manner which does not sacrifice political and economic realities to emotional pressure but also leaves no great legacy of bitterness behind. But even when independence has been attained the new States will be inexperienced and volatile entities, liable to be easily influenced and easily subverted. It should therefore be the purpose of the West to maintain some degree of formal political association between themselves and the independent African Governments. We have suggested, earlier in this report, that there will be a tendency for the new States to come together in various forms of federal grouping or regional alliance, although many practical difficulties will need to be overcome before these links are likely to be very close or, indeed, very permanent. This situation confronts us with another variation of the basic dilemma. From a purely mercenary and short-term point of view it might well be to the advantage of the Western Powers to encourage the centrifugal forces on the ground that they are more likely to secure the defence facilities which they need if they have to deal with a multiplicity of weak and divided States than if they are confronted with a relatively small number of organised and competent confederations, capable of bargaining on level terms. On the other hand, it can hardly be in the ultimate interest of the free world that Africa should disintegrate into a medley of feeble and quarrelsome communities, an easy prey to every kind of subversive intrigue; and there can be little doubt that the Western Governments would be wise to foster the forces making for unity and association wherever they can do so on the basis of a generally pro-Western sentiment. . . .

89. If the British territories—Central Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Somaliland, Sierra Leone and the Gambia—were to follow the pattern set by Ghana and Nigeria, they too would all eventually become sovereign independent States and members of the Commonwealth. But a development of this nature would create obvious difficulties. Many of the territories concerned would be very small and all would be to some extent immature and hypersensitive. The other members of the Commonwealth might well think twice about admitting all of them as full members of the Commonwealth. Indeed, it is hardly a practicable proposition; and, in any event, other destinies seem likely for Somaliland and, possibly, the Gambia. The Federation, if it holds together, will be a sizeable and viable unit. The same may prove to be true of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, especially if, as we hope, they eventually come together in some degree of association. The Commonwealth is in any event
changing, and we may hope that it should be able eventually to accommodate itself to receive this more limited number of new members.

90. It seems, therefore, that for French, Belgian and British territories there is a prospect of some form of association with the former metropolitan Power on the basis of equal political sovereignty. This association would no doubt retain the present economic links—in the case of the French and Belgian territories, a franc currency and access to the Common Market; and, in the case of the British territories, a currency based on sterling and the advantage of Imperial preferences. By different ways all the territories concerned may be converging on a common constitutional destination.

91. At the same time we must recognise the possibility that some form of union of independent African States may emerge, transcending the arbitrary and largely accidental divisions of European linguistic and administrative frontiers. The Ghana–Guinea experiment deserves close attention from this point of view because it proposes itself as a pilot scheme for a Federation open to all African States. In a milder form the same concept is advocated by President Tubman of Liberia. But a development of this nature would not necessarily disrupt the economic and cultural ties on a “Commonwealth” basis which individual States might still wish to retain with the European Powers; and the best hope of that stability in Africa which the West should seek to promote lies in maintaining and strengthening those ties.

92. The defence link. It is improbable that, at any rate for some years after independence, the new African States would wish to be parties to collective defence arrangements in association with any of the NATO Powers (although the Nigerian leaders are not at present neutralist and have undertaken to enter into a defence agreement with us). There are also dangers in our encouraging any efforts on the part of African States to associate with each other in this way. In particular, relations with the Union of South Africa and the Central African Federation would be a complicating factor. Moreover, it is possible that the emergence of anything in the nature of an African defence pact might make it more difficult for us to maintain overflying and staging rights in the independent African States. Our attitude towards any moves by African States in this direction would therefore have to be assessed at the time in the light of the risks to our defence interests and the counter-balancing factors.

93. But it is important that the African States should be encouraged to maintain sufficient local forces for their own security, and should, if necessary be assisted to do so. It is also vital to Western interests that they should be helped to devise their own security intelligence organisations, capable of meeting the threat of subversion, espionage and sabotage inspired by the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic. The links between the metropolitan security authorities and the intelligence organisations in African territories should be used to educate African administrators and to train African intelligence officers in the techniques of security intelligence organisation in order that an association may develop in step with constitutional changes and regional groupings as they emerge. Experience has already shown that professional liaison of this kind can create a degree of trust which cuts across political differences and not only ensures a pooling of security intelligence, which is of mutual value, but also provides the opportunity to guide the local authorities in their task of guarding against Soviet penetration. There are obvious risks in promoting a policy of this kind in partnership with inexperienced peoples; but they
are less than the dangers of inaction in the face of the growing threat of hostile subversion.

94. The economic link. The economic development of the independent States will call for a considerable degree of practical sympathy and support from the West if Africa is not to be driven to turn to the Soviet Union for advice and assistance. The Africans are ambitious to achieve rapid economic, as well as constitutional, advance; but they lack both the means and the experience to do so unaided. The policy of the West must therefore be realistic as well as generous, taking account of economic limitations no less than of political ambitions. At the same time economic advance must measure up to the conditions of political success; and, if self-government and independence are to be substantial realities, they must be accompanied and reinforced by progressive economic development and rising standards of living. It is impossible to predict the additional capital which Africa will need if these conditions are to be satisfied; and the statistical survey of the continent which is being undertaken by the Economic Commission for Africa, the newly-created agency of the United Nations, is not likely to throw significant light on this problem. But on any reckoning very considerable investment will be needed. This points to an international approach to the problem, designed to ensure that Africa will receive special consideration from the various international agencies such as the International Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the projected International Development Association and the United Nations Special Fund. (The International Bank, for example, has lent much less to Africa in the past than to any other continent.) An approach on these lines could have political as well as economic advantages to the West, particularly in those cases where capital provided through an international agency may be more acceptable to an independent State than bilateral aid. Moreover, international institutions may be better placed to give effective and acceptable advice on development planning than metropolitan Governments, whether individually or in association. The International Bank in particular has now had considerable experience of helping under-developed countries to formulate development plans on sound lines and of ensuring that the supply of capital is related to a realistic assessment of needs and potentialities and that individual projects are accommodated to the pace of economic development as a whole. It can therefore exert considerable influence in inducing under-developed countries to concentrate on a steady expansion of production and dissuading them from schemes on which they may overreach themselves. At the same time it would be unwise to assume that international sources will by themselves provide sufficient funds for African development; and it should therefore be one of the purposes of the United Kingdom to seek to stimulate the interest of the United States, Western Germany and other industrialised countries of the West in the development of Africa and to convince them of the necessity of providing capital on a much greater and more widespread scale than hitherto.

95. If capital will be needed for productive investment, it will be required no less urgently for social investment—for education; housing and home ownership (coupled with a review of systems of land tenure); and the other social services. Here again we should seek primarily to promote an international approach to this problem; and we should endeavour to secure the support of the proposed International Development Association for the social, as well as the economic, development of African territories. Education will be particularly important. To the aspiring African it is a matter of overriding concern. To the United Kingdom and to
other European Governments with interests in Africa (especially the French, who have suggested a greater co-ordination of our policies with theirs in this field) it offers an opportunity of promoting a sense of political responsibility and a means of controlling to some extent the subversion of the young. The dangers of a semi-literate proletariat are well known and well authenticated by experience; and it is as politically dangerous as it is financially extravagant to suppose that education is in itself a panacea for all other social and economic disabilities. But if it is carefully related to the needs of the recipients and properly integrated with other plans for their social and political advancement, it should pay a handsome dividend both in terms of economic betterment and in terms of a lowering of political tension. Education is the essential pre-condition of the most efficient use of all the other, more sophisticated, forms of assistance which the West will need to provide to Africa.

96. Technical assistance will, indeed, be required on a scale considerably greater than any which the West has so far envisaged. It is debatable whether Western interests will be best served by making such assistance available on a bilateral basis in each case or under the aegis of some multilateral organisation. There is much to be said in favour of the bilateral approach. It makes for speed and for relative simplicity of administration. It enables each donor country to direct its contribution to those areas of the continent, or to those sectors of an individual economy, in which it has a particular interest. It would obviously be desirable, for example, that Nigeria should look to the United Kingdom for the technical assistance which she will continue to need after attaining independence. (A scheme of this kind is, indeed, already being worked out in collaboration with Nigeria). On the other hand, bilateral assistance might be regarded by some of the recipient countries as perpetuating the appearance of dependence and tutelage; and they might be more disposed to accept assistance if it was offered not by a single Western Power from whose domination they had recently escaped but through some international agency. Moreover, a multilateral approach of this kind, while not necessarily resulting in any significant increase in the aggregate of assistance provided for Africa, might gradually help the donors to distribute their bilateral aid more rationally and equitably among the beneficiaries; and, given that resources for this purpose will inevitably be limited, there might be advantages, both of substance and of presentation, in an organisation which would be seen to spread the butter more systematically over the bread.

97. For this reason it has been suggested that some initiative corresponding to the Colombo Plan in Asia might be launched in Africa. But the circumstances in which the Asian venture was promoted were probably unique; and the analogy would be misleading. Moreover, a “Colombo Plan for Africa” would probably be interpreted by the Africans as implying that the West was prepared to allocate large sums of capital for which the African States could scramble. But the original Colombo Plan has never had a task of allocation of this kind; and although its Bureau has oiled the wheels of the Technical Co-operation Scheme, it has equally had no responsibility for allocating technical assistance, which remains on a bilateral basis.

98. This is not to say, however, that there would be no advantage in the existence of some organisation to foster mutual co-operation between the Western Powers and the independent African States on a footing of equality and partnership. Within such a framework the existing arrangements for the provision of technical assistance on a bilateral basis could continue substantially unchanged; but such assistance would bear the “stamp” of the new organisation in order to indicate that it was part of a
comprehensive attempt by the West, in partnership with the new States, to assist
them to promote their economic development. The nucleus of such an organisation
may possibly be found in the existing Commission for Technical Co-operation in
Africa South of the Sahara (C.C.T.A.)—which comprises the main European Powers
with territorial interests in Africa; the Union of South Africa; the Federation; and
Ghana, Liberia and Guinea—and in the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa
(F.A.M.A.) which the Commission has recently established as a centre for arranging
technical assistance to the countries of tropical Africa. F.A.M.A. is still a very new
creation; and the scale of its activity is very modest. But it could be encouraged and
helped to grow, and the recent decision of C.C.T.A. to move its headquarters to Lagos
implies that it will be administered henceforward in the African State which is not
only the most favourably disposed to the West but is also likely to play a major role in
the Africa of the future.

99. If an enterprise of this kind were to succeed, it would need to be launched
with due regard to the risks which it might entail and to the susceptibilities of the
newly-independent states. In the past they have been suspicious of C.C.T.A. as a
“colonial club,” and, while these suspicions are diminishing as the black African
membership of the Commission increases, this development itself contains certain
dangers. The position of Ghana as would-be leader of the Pan-African movement and
at the same time a member of C.C.T.A. is an ambivalent one, and the Ghanaian
Government may at any time press for the extension of the Commission to include
the North African countries. Moreover, the association of the black African countries
and South Africa within the Commission is, naturally, not an easy one. Three, or
possibly four, more independent countries may join the Commission in 1960
(Nigeria, French Cameroons, Togoland and, possibly, Somalia); and this increase in
membership may be regarded as completing the evolution of the Commission into an
independent association of African states, albeit one which maintains special links
with the West.

100. Nevertheless, this development need not be to our disadvantage. If it is true
that it is the willingness of the West to provide economic assistance which will be
regarded by the Africans as the touchstone of our sincerity, it must be in our ultimate
interest to demonstrate that willingness as convincingly as we can and to be
prepared, for this purpose, to work with an organisation which African States have
helped to create and will increasingly control. And, while technical assistance outside
the United Nations must continue to be based on bilateral agreements, there may be
a part, even if a comparatively modest one, for a non-United Nations international
organisation to play. Such an organisation would associate the independent African
states with the West as equals in a mutual enterprise; and it would avoid any
implication that the help and encouragement which we were prepared to provide
were being imposed by a superior people for their own profit or were being offered in
a spirit of patronage. It might also engage the interest of the United States and other
Western Governments, including perhaps Canada and Western Germany, who are
likely to be both willing and able to contribute to the development of Africa. Properly
presented, a scheme on these lines could be of psychological value in demonstrating
the desire of the West to assist Africa on an organised and continuing basis and on
terms of equality.

101. The details of such a scheme do not lie within the scope of this report. They
would need to be worked out with care; and the scale and nature of the United
Kingdom contribution would need to be determined in relation to the considerable assistance which we are already providing to those territories where we retain direct responsibility and are likely to continue to wish to provide even after they have attained independence. Moreover, the venture would serve—at least initially—only a supplementary purpose as an addition to the main stream of bilateral assistance; and it would be foolishly optimistic to overrate its immediate practical effect. The relationship of Member Governments with C.C.T.A. will probably remain a loose one, and neither the Commission nor F.A.M.A. is likely to develop into a strong organisation for some time. But, subject to these reservations and to a more detailed examination of its implications, a scheme of this nature, providing for bilateral assistance to the African States under the aegis of an international organisation which might well be built gradually on the foundations of the existing F.A.M.A., could provide the opportunity for a useful gesture of practical and co-operative assistance by the West to Africa.

Part V.—Conclusion

102. The purpose of this report has been to survey the forces at work in Africa, to attempt to predict their outcome in terms of the African scene in 1970, to indicate the problems in Africa with which the free world will be confronted by these developments during the next ten years and to suggest certain basic principles by which Western policy should be guided during this period. We have not sought to solve individual problems; we have attempted only to set them in perspective. So considered, they appear as a series of dilemmas. It may be helpful to restate the more important of these as briefly as possible:—

(a) Racial relations and constitutional development.—The pace of the advance towards independence has become rapid in much of Africa. France has granted all her colonies internal self-government, with the right, at least in theory, to opt for independence at any time; and the Belgian Congo is likely to reach the same position in a short period. We ourselves have moved even faster in West Africa. But in the east and south the position is different. If, on the one hand, we retreat there too rapidly before the rising tide of Pan-Africanism, we shall run the risk of transferring power to local Governments before they are competent to exercise authority or to maintain stable and viable administration. We shall expose volatile and unsophisticated peoples to the insidious dangers of Communist penetration. And we shall jeopardise European interests and investments, which have made the major contribution to the development of large parts of Africa and can claim the main credit for the gradual improvement in the African standard of living. This danger is particularly acute for the United Kingdom in relation to East Africa. If, on the other hand, we are too intransigent in opposing African aspirations or, where European minorities are dominant, are too ready to appease them, we run the risk of being identified with the extreme racial doctrines of the Union of South Africa, of exacerbating African hostility towards the European and of provoking the African States, when they finally achieve independence—as in the end they must—to turn more readily towards the Soviet Union. This danger arises with particular urgency for the United Kingdom in relation to Central Africa. The West must therefore seek to steer a middle course between these extremes, bearing well in mind that, while the Soviet Union will be alert to seize every opportunity to
exploit our dilemma, Pan-Africanism in itself is not necessarily a force which we need regard with fear and suspicion. On the contrary, if we can avoid alienating it and can guide it on lines generally sympathetic to the free world, it may well prove in the longer term a strong, indigenous barrier to the penetration of Africa by the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic.

(b) The strategic interests of the West in Africa.—In the short term it may appear to be essential in the interests of the West, and particularly the United Kingdom, to demand the retention of defence facilities in Africa as a condition of conceding independence. But in the longer term we may well gain, rather than lose, the sympathy and support of newly independent States if we are able to refrain from seeking to acquire, retain or use facilities which appear to be necessary from a purely strategic point of view. On each occasion the West will have to choose; and the difficulty of the choice for the United Kingdom lends additional urgency to the need for a re-examination of our global strategy in an attempt to determine whether we can devise some alternative defence policy which will provide adequate protection for our world-wide interests but will make us less dependent on the good will of African States which are likely to be predominantly neutralist in sentiment.

(c) The economic development of Africa.—If Africa is to remain loyal to the Western cause, its economic interests must coincide with, and reinforce, its political sympathies; and one of the major problems of the relationship between the West and Africa will be to ensure an adequate flow of economic assistance, and particularly capital, through various channels to the newly emerging States. On any reckoning the amounts required will be considerable; and, if the Western Powers are unreasonably insensitive to the economic aspirations of independent Africa, the Governments of the new States may be compelled to turn to the Soviet Union for the assistance which they will certainly need. In the longer term the European Common Market may increase the flow of European capital for African development. But the commercial provisions of the Treaty of Rome, particularly the new preferential arrangements which it envisages, will be liable to work to the more immediate disadvantage of those States (particularly British colonial territories) which are debarred from entry into the Common Market. Here again the Western Governments will have to choose. If they attach sufficient importance to avoiding African disunity, they will need to negotiate some modification of the Treaty of Rome in order to mitigate its commercial effects. On the other hand, if the Six refuse any mitigation of the serious disadvantages for some African territories which may result from a changed pattern of trade, a dangerous new divisive element will have been introduced into the continent.

103. Each of these problems needs further detailed consideration. Moreover, they are all inter-related not only in terms of their impact on Africa itself but also in terms of their effect on the metropolitan Powers involved. Neither the United Kingdom nor any other administering Power in Africa can consider its policy towards African territories in the light of the issues arising in those territories alone; and the Western Governments must seek to strike a balance between their particular interests and obligations in individual territories and their more general interests and responsibilities both in other parts of Africa and in the world at large. For the United Kingdom it is especially important to harmonise our policies towards the emergent
countries of Africa with the policies which are prescribed by our relations with other colonial Powers in Africa. Until about 1957 the former factor hardly arose; and after 1965–70 the latter should largely have ceased to be relevant. But at the moment we are compelled to take both factors into account; and the problem is aggravated by the fact that the position and influence of the United Kingdom in the world depend to a large extent on what other countries think of us. Their reactions are liable to be brought into particularly sharp focus at the United Nations; and we can never afford to forget, for example, that Tanganyika, (like Ruanda-Urundi in the neighbouring Belgian Congo) is a Trust territory, whose welfare is in some sense the special concern of the United Nations and provides our enemies in that Organisation with an opportunity to indict our African policies before world opinion.

104. It is seldom profitable to attempt to peer very far into the future. And we do not claim that the forecasts contained in this report are any exception to the rule that expectations are often belied by events. Nor do we claim that there is anything novel in the policy proposals which we have made. The novelty lies rather in the situation which those proposals are designed to meet—in the unprecedented pace of political adjustment in Africa. It is impossible to carry out even a superficial survey of the continent without being impressed by two considerations—first, the long lead over the Soviet Union which the West at present enjoys in Africa after a century of association; second, the rapidity with which the African scene is changing under the impact of new political and social pressures. The former is an asset to the free world in the twentieth century; the latter need not be a liability if the Western Powers are willing to present a common front to the problems of Africa and to approach them with patience, imagination and courage.

21 PREM 11/2587, PM/59/72 28 June–30 July 1959

‘Africa: the next ten years’: minute to Mr Macmillan from Mr Selwyn Lloyd, enclosing the officials’ report. Minutes by P de Zulueta, Mr Eccles,1 Mr Macmillan (M 244/59), Mr Lennox-Boyd (PM (59) 33 & 39) and Mr Heathcoat Amory

I do not know whether you will yet have had time to look at the paper entitled “Africa: The Next Ten Years” AF(59)28 which has been prepared by the Africa (Official) Committee under Mr. Trend’s supervision.2 It gives the first comprehensive picture of “Black Africa” as a whole and I found it a most interesting and instructive document. It is quite an achievement that the views of all the overseas departments have been so closely harmonised and I am sure that much credit is due to all concerned and especially to the Chairman.

2. I do not know whether it is the intention that the paper should be formally considered by the Cabinet. But I hope that in any case we may be authorised to use it in our discussions on these African problems with the Americans and the French, etc.

---

1 P de Zulueta (PM’s office); D Eccles, president of the Board of Trade.
2 See previous document.
3. Indeed the genesis of the paper was the conversation which I had with Foster Dulles\(^3\) at Brize Norton in October 1958 when we agreed that we should try to take a joint look at Africa. The sooner we can carry things a stage further with the Americans the better. We have also agreed to discuss Africa with the French and have already started the processes of consultation with them. At a later stage, as Dulles agreed at Brize Norton, the Belgians and Portuguese might be brought in too.

4. The Africa Committee paper should provide the essential background for all these conversations—supplemented of course as the occasion may require by more detailed and up-to-date information. I should like to start the ball rolling by opening discussions with the Americans on the basis of the report. Thereafter we can go on to discuss things with the French, Belgians and Portuguese.

5. I should accordingly be grateful for your authority to proceed along these lines provided that our colleagues whose Departments were concerned in the drafting of the report and to whom I am sending copies of this minute raise no objection.

Minutes on 21

In spite, or perhaps because, of its length, this is not a very good paper. It is permeated by the unimaginative spirit of colonial administration in decadence. I am afraid that it will only result in wrong policies being adopted, or at best, in no policy.

The analysis of the African historical scene is adequate although much too long, and the analysis of the present day is politically and economically quite good. There is, however no attempt at all to compare the progress and success of the different colonial policies adopted by the European powers. For example, is the Congo system going, in the end, to give better results than that in Portuguese East Africa? Why have the French managed to produce a higher type of politician than we have? Is the French system of breaking down the tribal areas and superimposing their own administration more satisfactory than our method?

These questions may seem academic, but Africa is one of the few parts of the world in which we still have the power to influence events, at least to some extent.

It may be that in certain cases we ought now to reverse our policy of indirect rule through native Chiefs and try to build up politicians, who are more or less well disposed towards us: this might be a policy practicable in Nigeria. In Buganda on the other hand it seems as though the Kabaka is our best bet.\(^4\) Then again the experience of Ghana seems to show, if demonstration is necessary, that parliamentary democracy will not survive the end of colonial rule. Ought we not decide what we would like to see in its place instead of going on pretending.

Finally, perhaps the most curious feature of the paper is that it is proposed to discuss it first with the Americans and only then with the other colonial powers. No doubt the Americans will be more likely than the French to agree that it is essential to teach the Africans English (Paragraph 95 of the report). But the main American interest is to get a share in the exploitation of Africa’s mineral resources, and they have no direct experience whatever of colonial administration.

\(^3\) US secretary of state, 1953–1959.  
\(^4\) H H Sir E F W Mutesa II.
This is one subject, I should have thought, in which we could really begin to build a basis of inter-European co-operation; also our interests and those of the French are really closer in Africa than those of the French and the Germans.

I must say that I should like to feel that we could have had a sensible talk with the French, with a view to working out some sort of co-ordinated policy. For example, the role of Christianity ought to be very important in keeping Africa orientated towards Europe; the French are very conscious of this, but in this paper Christianity is dismissed in a couple of sentences in Paragraph 24.

Prime Minister

1. I welcome the course which the Foreign Secretary suggests in his minute to you of June 28th.

2. It is encouraging that the Americans and French in particular are anxious to consult with us about policy in Africa. I hope that we shall make full use of the opportunity to bring home to both the U.S.A. and France—and especially the U.S.A.—the dangers inherent in the policy of the European Economic Community about trade with their Associated Overseas Territories in Africa. Let the Six, if they wish, concentrate their investment in their own Associated Territories, but let them not also penalise the trade of other African territories with Western Europe.

3. I am glad to see that the Official Committee's Report brings out the dangers of dividing Africa which the Treaty of Rome will bring in its train unless it is modified. I am sure that it is most important for us, in the broad political context of the talks which the Foreign Secretary proposes, to enlist the interest of the Americans on this issue, and to persuade them to bring their influence to bear on the French and Belgians.

4. When we come to talk to the French the fact that it is they who are pressing us to discuss African policy should strengthen our position. We shall be better able to insist that co-ordination in the political sphere can be nullified if they fail to show more flexibility and understanding about the commercial and economic effects of the Treaty of Rome.

Foreign Secretary

I have now considered the Paper called “Africa—the next ten years” which has been prepared by the Africa Official Committee and about which you sent me a minute on June 28. I agree that this is a useful Paper and that it might be used as the basis for preliminary discussions with our Allies.

At the same time there are many important questions with which the Paper does not deal. African problems will undoubtedly become more important to us in the next ten years and this is one of the few parts of the world in which the European powers still have direct influence. Although I do not suggest that we could at this stage quickly readjust our policies in Africa I think that it would be useful if officials would now start preparing a further report on future policy.

In the first place I think that we should consider how far we can co-ordinate our policies with those of the other Colonial powers. This would involve considering
what territorial adjustments might be desirable in order to remove any anomalies which there may be in the present division of Africa. Secondly, we ought to examine the relative success of the various Colonial systems in developing a type of African political system capable of standing on its own feet and favourably disposed towards the West. Ought we, for example, to put less emphasis on indirect rule in some areas or should we rather try to build up the native rulers? Is the French system of breaking down indigenous tribal arrangements a good one? We should also consider whether it would be wise to encourage higher educational institutions in Africa or whether it is better to welcome African university students to Europe. The language question clearly also presents a problem. Thirdly, I believe that more thought ought to be given to the role of Christianity in keeping the Africans orientated towards Western ideals. Finally, as the President of the Board of Trade has pointed out in his minute of July 2, cooperation in Africa between the Colonial powers in the economic field is highly desirable. We ought to consider how far this will have to follow economic arrangements in Europe and whether African problems can be dealt with separately. It may indeed be that cooperation in Africa might help to prevent the economic division of Europe.

I am sending copies of this minute to the members of the Africa Committee, the President of the Board of Trade, and the Secretary of the Cabinet.

H.M.
3.7.59

Prime Minister

I support the proposal in the Foreign Secretary’s minute to you of June 28th that we should have talks with the Americans about Africa based on the report of the Africa (Official) Committee.

2. The Foreign Office will no doubt consult my Department about the timing of the talks.

3. I should be in favour of separate talks later with the French, Belgians and perhaps the Portuguese. I imagine that it is not suggested that there should be joint talks with them all together. I think these could be embarrassing, as the impression might be given that the Colonial Powers in Africa were “ganging up”, and this would lead to difficulties not only with Ghana but also with South Africa, if they were not included.

4. I agree with what the President of the Board of Trade says in his minute to you of the 2nd July about bringing home to the Americans, and subsequently at high level talks to the French, the danger of dividing Africa which the Treaty of Rome will bring in its train unless it is modified.

5. I am carefully studying your minute of 4th [sic] July and will be replying separately to it. . . .

A.L-B.
7.7.59

Prime Minister

I was most interested to read your minute of 3rd July in which you suggested that, as a follow up to the Africa Official Committee’s paper “Africa—the next ten years”, officials should undertake a further study of African problems—some of which you sign-posted.
2. I fully agree that the African problems will loom larger in importance in the next ten years or so, and that we should be diligent to prepare ourselves by study to be able to take decisions based on sound knowledge. I therefore agree that further studies would be useful and stimulating.

3. I have some reservations about your selection of subjects for study. It may or may not be possible for us to co-ordinate our policies with those of other Colonial powers. We should certainly exchange views freely. But I fear that it is fifty years too late for the Metropolitan powers to indulge in an exercise to adjust territorial boundaries. We know a good deal about the Colonial system of other powers and I honestly don’t think that any of them is better able, or as well able as ours to develop stable African Governments well disposed towards the West. But this doesn’t mean that a careful objective study would not be most useful.

4. This applies also to the question of a comparison between the system of Chiefs and native authorities, and tribal organisation generally, versus more modern systems—on which millions of words must have been written. (It is not easy to generalise on the subject). There is a wealth of information and opinions available, too, about whether there should be Universities in Africa or whether African students should come to Universities in Europe. The fact is that Universities have already been established in West, East and Central Africa.

5. The language question has been the subject of innumerable studies but it would be useful to collect the essence of these in small compass.

6. I agree that the role of Christianity is important in keeping Africans orientated towards Western ideals—although I doubt whether the Archbishop of Canterbury would agree that this was its role!

7. I warmly agree about the need to study economic arrangements for Africa in relation to developments in Europe.

8. I hope you will not think that these comments suggest in any way that I do not agree that further studies of the African scene will not be valuable.

A.L.B.
30.7.59

In general I agree with the Foreign Secretary that there would be advantages in our now initiating discussions on African problems with the Americans, the French, and possibly the Belgians. The terms of reference for the U.K. official team, appended to the Foreign Secretary’s minute of the 28th July, seem to me perfectly adequate for this purpose. But I hope that, in addition to making the point about the impact of the European Economic Community on Africa (which the President of the Board of Trade rightly stresses), we shall emphasise the desirability of a genuinely international approach to African problems, particularly as regards investment. All the evidence suggests that, if Africa is to be kept on an even keel during the next ten years, political advance will have to go hand in hand with economic development; and for the latter very substantial investment will be required. The more this can be provided through international channels—the International Bank and so forth—the more we may hope not merely to improve the standard of living of the African but also to promote a sense of partnership between black Africa and the West, which should be valuable in a political no less than in an economic context. . . .

D.H.A.
30.7.59
‘Africa: the next ten years’: minutes of meetings of British and Canadian officials in Ottawa to discuss the trend towards independence

[The meetings were chaired by J W Holmes; other members of the Canadian team were E W T Gill, G de T Glazebrook & D Stansfield. The British officials included A D M Ross (FO), C G Eastwood (CO) and D W S Hunt (CRO); the high commissioner was Sir Saville Garner. Further meetings on 27 Nov considered (1) Ghana’s relations with francophone Africa, the UN, South Africa, Liberia and Egypt, & (2) Canadian public interest and policy in Africa.]

(1) First Meeting

Mr. Holmes welcomed the United Kingdom team. The Canadian Government was paying increasing attention to Africa. There was already an African section in the Department of External Affairs and it was hoped soon to enlarge this to an African division. Canadian officials had been very impressed by the United Kingdom paper on Africa.

2. The High Commissioner introduced the members of the United Kingdom visiting team. He welcomed the growing consultation between the United Kingdom and Canada on African affairs. He doubted whether such consultation would have taken place, say 10 years ago, when the United Kingdom was reluctant to take other Governments into its confidence on Colonial affairs, and Canada for her part was reluctant to become involved in them. The High Commissioner explained the origins of the paper on which the present talks were based.

3. Mr. Glazebrook said the Canadians had prepared tentative agenda in order to focus attention on the points on which they particularly sought enlightenment. It was agreed that the first 5 items under the heading “The trend towards independence” might be taken together.

The trend towards independence: time-tables

4. Mr. Eastwood said the trend towards independence had been so speeded up recently that he found it a good working rule in estimating time-tables to ‘halve the number you first thought of’. It could not be assumed, however, that the tempo would go on increasing. He thought the timing of Ghana and Nigeria had been about right. But progress towards independence in e.g. the Belgian Congo might be too fast; independence there in four years might lead to chaos, and this in turn would have an adverse affect on progress, e.g. in Tanganyika. Progress towards independence in Kenya might move more quickly than the report suggested. Mr. Ross instanced Guinea as an argument for shorter rather than longer time-tables. Guinea had managed to find its own feet more quickly than was expected. Mr. Eastwood emphasized that in the march towards independence the emergence of strong personalities in the countries concerned was a vital factor. In multi-racial communities the United Kingdom felt bound to apply the brakes but might not be given the time to do so. (There were signs that in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland the African element themselves now wanted the brakes applied). Mr. Gill
thought that at least in uni-racial countries the speedier the progress towards independence the more likely it would be that close links would be maintained with the metropolitan powers.

5. Mr. Stansfield asked whether the United Kingdom accepted the primacy of African interests in Africa. The answer was clearly “yes” in West Africa. Even in Kenya and Central Africa the answer was similar because the African was in a majority. The hope was that in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland ‘majorities’ and ‘minorities’ would not in the future be distinguishable on racial lines but on party multi-racial lines. Mr. Hunt believed personally that even in the Union of South Africa primacy for the African must be the long-term trend. Short of global war, however, he doubted whether this would happen in the lifetime of any of those present. In Portuguese Africa there was not the slightest evidence of any change in, or desire to change, the status quo, but it was impossible to foretell how long this would last.

6. Mr. Holmes wondered what the effect of economic conditions was on the trend towards independence. It was agreed that as a whole the Continent was poor in resources; its people also were poor, though poverty was not so abject as in large parts of Asia. The wealthiest areas were those in which Europeans had settled. The Federation, thanks to investment in such schemes as the Kariba dam, was almost ready, in Professor Rostow’s phrase, to ‘take off’.1

7. Economic factors did not slow down the African nationalists’ drive towards independence and the gaining of political freedom very often produced an upsurge in economic effort. Some moves had been made towards economic interdependence, e.g. the Ghana loan to Guinea, but on the whole each African territory pursued its own economic ends without regard to its neighbours.

8. Mr. Holmes asked what were the economic interests of metropolitan powers. Would they, e.g. be better off economically if their territories secured independence? Mr. Eastwood said that no serious thought had been given to this question. This was perhaps significant. In some cases, e.g. the High Commission territories, dependent territories in Africa were a burden on the United Kingdom exchequer. But in fact questions of economic advantage were not a factor in deciding United Kingdom policies towards granting independence. In fact, provided the break occurred amicably, political independence made very little difference to economic relations between the United Kingdom and an African territory. From the point of view of United Kingdom business interests it was important that the break should be an amicable one.

The European Common Market

9. Mr. Eastwood emphasised that the overseas provisions of the Treaty of Rome were damaging to United Kingdom colonies in Africa; they were a divisive factor and tended to embitter the territories excluded from the common market against the Western powers in general. The United Kingdom’s protests against these provisions had so far proved unavailing. There were emotional factors involved, particularly insofar as General de Gaulle was concerned. The United Kingdom hoped to obtain some mitigation in the course of general tariff negotiations in 1960/61. It should be remembered that the Six genuinely believed that the provisions of the Treaty of

---

Rome would tend to bind Africa to the West. The United Kingdom believed that the discrimination against certain territories in Africa would have the opposite effect. Commonwealth preferences were of some value to United Kingdom territories but these advantages could not be compared with the advantages provided by the Treaty of Rome to territories of the Six.

10. The problem of finding an alternative Government to which the metropolitan ruler could transfer power, though it had proved acute in Ireland and India, was not arising to the same extent in African territories. There was a tendency towards authoritarianism in newly independent territories, but this was not necessarily a bad thing, since in the early days at least of independence, strong Government was vital.

11. The meeting then turned to individual territories:

(i) **Sierra Leone.** It was clear that Sierra Leone wanted its independence quickly and preferably within the next 2 years. It had a moderate Government who believed that if they were to play their due part in African affairs they must gain their independence. The United Kingdom Government had made no commitment yet to give Sierra Leone independence, but there seemed to be little alternative. Sierra Leone was a small country with a population of 2½ million people. It could just be regarded as financially viable without outside assistance. The United Kingdom would probably require certain defence rights in the country as a condition of independence. It was probable that Sierra Leone would wish to join the Commonwealth as an independent member and Commonwealth Governments would have to consider in due course whether to accept Sierra Leone.

*Mr. Holmes* said that, although obviously he could not commit the Canadian Government, nevertheless the evolutionary development of the Commonwealth had been accepted as inevitable, and he had no doubt that the Canadian Government would meet a request for membership by Sierra Leone with the usual sympathy.

The United Kingdom side pointed out that while Sierra Leone and certain other larger territories would perhaps pass the test for full Commonwealth membership, it was nevertheless going to be a difficult problem to find a suitable status for small colonial territories ranging from, e.g. St. Helena to Hong Kong. Any views the Canadian Government might have on this problem would be very welcome.

(ii) **The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.** *Mr. Hunt* outlined the present position. There was to be a review of the constitution in 1960 at what would obviously be a crucial conference. The United Kingdom Government believes that the Federation was going to be a success and that racial partnership would continue to develop in the Federation. There were three main reasons for this:—

(a) The Rhodesian white settlers were on the whole strikingly realistic and liberal; (although this could not be said of more recent British settlers); they were outnumbered by the Africans by some 28 to 1; the figures for the Union were 3 to 1;

(b) the central African was far behind the West African in social and political development;

(c) both sides understood that it was to their advantage to try and make Federation work.

Nyasaland was the problem. There was no present enthusiasm for federation in Nyasaland, but the United Kingdom Government’s view was that there was no future for the country except as part of the Federation.
12. Mr. Gill expressed some doubts about the liberalism of the Rhodesian white settlers. Mr. Hunt believed that there had been great improvement within the last two or three years. Most settlers now genuinely believed that colour-consciousness must be removed from the political scene. He agreed that nevertheless time for further enlightenment was still required. Mr. Glazebrook wondered whether the multi-racial pattern proposed for the Federation could resist opposing pressures from black Africa on the one hand, and the Union on the other. Mr. Hunt said that the Union of South Africa and the Federation were moving in opposite directions. United Kingdom business interests, and in particular the Rhodesian Selection Trust, were proving very liberal in their outlook. In general it was coming to be realised that inter-racial difficulties must be overcome before political independence was granted, and the pressure for independence in 1960, the original target date, had died away.

(2) Second Meeting

1. It was agreed to continue the morning meeting by looking at individual territories in Africa which had not yet been covered.

2. Northern Cameroons. Mr. Eastwood said that up to a year ago it was commonly supposed that the Northern Cameroons would opt to join Nigeria. In fact, in the plebiscite, there had been a vote of almost 2 to 1 in favour of deciding the territory’s future at a later date.

3. The United Kingdom Government was now faced with the problem of how to administer the small and scattered Northern Cameroons after Nigeria became independent in October 1960. No decision had been taken but the thinking in London was that the territory would have to be separated from Nigeria and temporarily administered by the United Kingdom. It might be that the administrator would be responsible directly to the Colonial Office or, possibly, to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Lagos. It was also thought that the United Nations should be asked, as in the case of the Southern Cameroons, to put two questions to the people of the Northern Cameroons not later than March, 1961:

   (i) Did they wish to join Nigeria?
   (ii) Did they wish to join the French Cameroons?

4. East Africa: Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. The United Kingdom had always hoped that these three territories might evolve into a federation but this now seemed unattainable.

5. The outlook for Tanganyika was encouraging. There was not the rigidity of racial feeling in Tanganyika such as existed in Kenya. The programme was expected to be somewhat as follows:

   (i) “Responsible Government”: to last 6–7 years with a mixed cabinet of officials and non-officials; Mr. Nyerere to be effectively Chief Minister;
   (ii) “self government”: i.e., a cabinet of non-officials with reserved powers for the Governor;
   (iii) full independence.

There was no fixed time limit for this programme.
6. The problem of Kenya was a much more difficult one because of (i) the legacy of Mau Mau and (ii) the existence of a powerful European right wing minority. The United Kingdom Government accepted that Kenya should have an African majority with political power. There was to be a constitutional conference in London in January 1961 which would be of crucial importance. Kenya lacked an African personality of the type of Mr. Nyerere.

7. Uganda also presented a difficult problem. There was no single leader who commanded general support. The attainment of full internal self-government by 1970 was only a pious hope.

8. French African territories. There was some discussion of French suspicions of the United Kingdom's attitude to her African territories, and to some extent of Canada's attitude also. Mr. Ross said the suspicions derived from Anglo-French disagreements in the Middle East in the first world war. In recent years the suspicions had been transferred to Africa. The French bitterly resented the United Kingdom supplying arms to Tunisia in 1957. They were convinced that the United Kingdom induced Ghana to suggest the Ghana–Guinea union and the French Prime Minister had even believed that the Bank of England had provided £10 million for Ghana to offer to Guinea. Suspicion still existed but the atmosphere had become more relaxed in recent months. The United Kingdom believed that the French had considerably altered their views since the date when the United Kingdom paper on Africa was written. They were no longer so hostile to the formation of new independent states in Africa.

9. Belgian Congo. It was agreed that the proposed 'pyramid' constitution for the Belgian Congo was good on paper. It was, however, very doubtful whether the plans for independence for the Congo in 4 years were practicable. If they were, then the prospects for satisfactory relations between Belgium and the West generally and the Belgian Congo were good. If they were not, then the Congo might break up into fragments.

10. The Portuguese Colonies. It was agreed that the proposed ‘pyramid’ constitution for the Belgian Congo was good on paper. It was, however, very doubtful whether the plans for independence for the Congo in 4 years were practicable. If they were, then the prospects for satisfactory relations between Belgium and the West generally and the Belgian Congo were good. If they were not, then the Congo might break up into fragments.

23 CAB 134/1558, CPC(59)6 29 June 1959

‘Security powers of colonial governors’: Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee memorandum by Mr Lennox-Boyd

A general problem was involved here, but a solution was urgent for Kenya and Nyasaland. Mr Lennox-Boyd wanted to dispense with the psychological disadvantages involved in proclaiming a State of Emergency, which involved the embarrassment of having to satisfy the Human Rights Commission that an emergency existed before a proclamation could be made (or revoked) (CPC(59)/5, memo of 9 June 1959). The issue was discussed by the Colonial Policy Committee on 1 July, when it was agreed governors should not be authorised to introduce legislation for the time being, despite the evident wishes of the two governors most concerned to have permanent powers enabling them to end Emergencies at an appropriate time (CPC 3(59)). The matter was raised again by Macleod in a memorandum arguing that at the beginning of Nov 1959 there was now 'a situation in Kenya on which we can build constructively'. What he felt was needed was security legislation which could be invoked as soon as the Emergency was formally terminated. He revived Lennox-Boyd's idea of a two-tier system: in one tier the governor would have some powers to deal with disturbances short of an Emergency; in a second tier there would be more drastic powers, including detention without trial (CPC(59)18).
The Kenya situation was discussed in the light of this proposal on 5 Nov 1959 (see next document). However, as far as Nyasaland was concerned, he believed the balance of advantage was to continue the State of Emergency (CPC(59)21, 17 Nov 1959).

Since the Committee's discussion on 18th June (C.P.C. (59) 2nd Meeting) I have been giving much further thought to this. I have discussed it with the Governor of Kenya and am in touch on it by telegram with the Governor of Nyasaland.

2. There is an acute dilemma. The dangers of allowing any Governor to publish, let alone pass, permanent legislation giving him powers such as that of detaining people without trial without actually declaring an emergency are patent. There is not only the possibility that some marginal votes in the forthcoming election might be affected. There is also a danger that the Labour Party would, with the election in mind, state their intention, if returned to power, to see that the offending legislation was withdrawn, thus producing in acute form that very state of uncertainty which the permanent legislation is designed to prevent.

3. There are, however, also, in the case of both Kenya and Nyasaland, dangers in the alternative course of restraining the Governors from introducing legislation and asking them to rely on keeping their declared emergencies in being. Thus:

(1) Whilst it is unlikely that a Labour Government would feel able to allow the Governors to introduce permanent detention legislation, they might well allow them to continue to make use of existing legislation. In fact, in Kenya at any rate, they would find it very difficult to go into reverse. Both Governors are convinced that they must continue to detain some people for a very long time if there is to be any prospect of their maintaining law and order in their territories.

(2) In Kenya the Governor announced in his speech from the Chair in October 1958 that permanent security legislation would be introduced during the Legislative Council Session—i.e. by October 1959. If this is not done, he will have great difficulty in explaining why; and, if it gets around that I have stopped it, there will be much despondency in non-African and in moderate African circles in Kenya and the African extremists will be given a big boost. Further, it will not, of course, be possible to bring the declared state of emergency to an end and, as the African Elected Members have gone on record to the effect that it would be difficult for them to take part in constitutional discussions till this is done, things might well go sour again on the constitutional front; and

(3) As regards Nyasaland the Governor constantly says that it is the belief that Hastings Banda and the other Congress leaders will soon return which prevents many Africans from coming round to co-operation with the Government; and that only the introduction of permanent detention legislation will serve to get rid of this belief.

4. A further consideration is that, even if permanent legislation is not introduced before the election, we shall certainly be cross-questioned about our intention by the Opposition. For it has been publicly stated that in both Kenya and Nyasaland detainees will be held as long as the Governors are satisfied that this is necessary for the maintenance of law and order and the Opposition know perfectly well that we have been considering legislation.

5. Possible compromises are:

(a) to authorise the Governors to introduce the legislation, but to give it a life of not more than, say, three years, unless renewed. This should considerably lessen
the row; indeed we might be able to convince people that legislation of this kind with a life of only three years was preferable to keeping on the emergencies; or (b) to authorise the two Governors to introduce their legislation (i) in the case of Kenya only if the Fairn Committee\(^1\) make it clear in their Report that continued detention for a long time of some people is going to be necessary and (ii) in the case of Nyasaland only if the Devlin Report has something in it to the same effect. (I would say that (i) is a good deal more likely than (ii)).

6. We must not forget that one of the main purposes of the proposal for permanent legislation was to enable embryo emergencies to be nipped in the bud without a full emergency having to be declared. But it is the post-emergency problem in Kenya and Nyasaland which is the more urgent and would really be prejudiced by delay.

7. I should welcome further discussion with my colleagues on this.


\[24\] CAB 134/1558, CPC 5(59)1 5 Nov 1959

‘Security powers in Kenya’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (59) 18) proposing that the State of Emergency in Kenya should be brought to an end at an early date and replaced by local legislation, first to enable the Governor to continue to detain the hard core of Mau Mau and other terrorists whom it would not be safe to release at present, and secondly, to provide the Governor with certain other security powers; and a memorandum by the Attorney-General (C.P.C. (59) 17) commenting on certain aspects of these proposals.

The Colonial Secretary said that as a result of his predecessor’s declaration of policy in April, 1959, which included a conditional promise of a constitutional conference now arranged to take place in London in January, 1960, and the subsequent emergence of moderate political groups, the political situation in Kenya had been transformed and there was now a good chance that the country could advance steadily towards more peaceful conditions. He therefore proposed that the Governor of Kenya should be authorised when opening the new Legislative Council on 10th November to announce the end of the formal State of Emergency. This could only be done if means could be found to enable the Governor to keep in detention the hard core of Mau Mau and other terrorists whom the Fairn Committee had agreed could not safely be released at the present time. It would also be necessary for the Governor to retain certain other powers such as those for the control of public meetings and societies. He proposed that these should be secured by enacting a local Preservation of Public Security Ordinance. It would be desirable in this Ordinance not only to provide for the Governor to take certain security powers which were necessary to deal with the present situation, but also to enable him to take more drastic powers, if this should prove necessary, in order to
deal with a possible deterioration in the situation, including the power to detain without trial.

In their previous discussion of the general problem of security powers for Colonial Governors the Committee had not favoured the suggestion that Governors should be empowered to assume whatever powers they thought were necessary to deal with the situation, including that of detention without trial, since this would invest them with the means of destroying the fundamental rights of individuals at their discretion and without notice. The local legislation he now proposed would get over this difficulty by providing a two-tier system of emergency powers. The first tier would enable the Governor, after making an appropriate announcement, to assume certain strictly defined powers, such as those concerning public meetings, societies, publications and movement, but not the all-important power of detention without trial; these powers would be used either in a situation where there appeared to be a gradual development of unrest, intimidation and lawlessness, or in circumstances such as those existing in Kenya at present, where certain powers were needed but a full State of Emergency was no longer necessary. The second tier would enable the Governor, after issuing the necessary proclamation, to assume more drastic powers, including the right of detention without trial, in circumstances where the safety of the nation was being endangered. This proposal was put forward to deal with the particular problem of Kenya, but it could be a model for other Colonial territories.

In discussion the following were the main points made:—

(a) The exercise of the limited powers suggested for the first tier would not involve derogation from the European Human Rights Convention, but the detention of persons without trial as part of the second tier proposals would involve such derogation; in order to comply with the Convention, the second tier would have to be preceded by an announcement by the Governor in terms which would be consonant with the requirements of Article 15 of the Convention—i.e. that there existed a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. The proposed legislation to enable Mau Mau terrorists to be kept in detention could be justified to the Human Rights Convention on the ground that setting them free at the present time would create a public danger threatening the life of the nation.

(b) The inclusion of the second tier proposals in the proposed Ordinance rather than allowing the Governor in circumstances affecting the safety of the nation to invoke the Emergency Powers Order in Council might result in Governors resorting to these powers at an earlier stage than they would otherwise have done. On the other hand there were presentational advantages in the local legislation being comprehensive and covering both lesser and graver emergencies; moreover this procedure would also assist the transference from a situation appropriate to the second tier to one appropriate to the first.

(c) Although it was hoped that the proposed legislation for the continued detention of Mau Mau terrorists would be of temporary duration, it would be advisable not to mention a specific term in the Bill. Mention should however be made of the intention to conduct a continuous review of individual cases and to release detainees as soon as could safely be done.

(d) There would be advantage in the Colonial Secretary making a statement on this subject in the House of Commons on the same day as that on which the
Governor made his announcement in Kenya; the Colonial Secretary might also make other appropriate arrangements for publicity.

Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that the proposals seemed likely to lead to a significant improvement in the situation in Kenya. It would be desirable for the proposed Kenya Bill regarding the two-tier security powers to be circulated to the Committee for information, and members of the Committee could send any comments direct to the Colonial Secretary unless they felt it necessary that the matter should be further discussed in the Committee. . . .

CO 1032/241 14 Dec 1959–4 Aug 1960
[Parliamentary democracy and the Westminster model in Africa]:
minutes by C A G Wallis, R S Hudson, E R Hammer and Sir H Poynton (CO)

Mr. Hudson
1. My visit to the Sudan in February of this year gave me an opportunity—too good to be missed—of enquiring what reasons the Sudanese were giving to themselves for their failure to operate a parliamentary constitution, Westminster model? How much blame, I wondered, did they ascribe to their own natures and how much to a faulty institution?
2. I did not write up my notes at the time, because the constitution of the Sudan did not directly concern African Studies Branch, but you have now, for a number of reasons, urged me to do so.
3. I attach therefore, for such action as you may think fit, a paper on the Sudan, a sort of case-study of the breakdown of the parliamentary system in one country. I also attach a note of a conversation with some Ministers in Nairobi. This, though strictly speaking "off the record", nevertheless follows on from the Sudan paper.
4. Parliamentary democracy has failed in countries which are so varied that, if there is a common cause, it is at least as likely to be found in the system as in the peoples. My own doubt is centred in the relationship between the Executive and Parliament.
5. In the Westminster model, Parliament is the matrix of the Executive. When this model is exported to dependent territories, we are forced in the transitional stages to modify it in the interests of strong and stable government. This we do by rigging the parliament through official majorities, a restricted franchise and so forth.
6. When the territory becomes independent it is usually to the accompaniment of a greatly enlarged parliament and universal suffrage, for which our system may not have been a direct preparation.
7. When the excitement of independence has died down, the successor government is brought face to face with the problems which faced us, for they are real problems such as lack of education and lack of nationhood. The new government cannot go back on universal suffrage but is as sure as we were that the parliament

1 Annexures not printed.
must be rigged, if government is to be at all possible. One method is by all possible means, e.g. suppression of the opposition, to ensure that the government party is dominant in the parliament and in local government councils also. If possible, this is done by constitutional means and the democratic system at least continues. If it is not possible the whole system breaks down and there is a revolution. Ghana is an example of the first situation: Sudan, Pakistan and probably France are examples of the second.

8. I do not pretend to be able to see more than a few bits of the problem, but a very tentative deduction, which I should like to see examined by those who can see the problem whole, is that in the sort of country of which we are thinking, the parliament must be rigged in some way or other. It might be a better and more lasting preparation for what always seems to follow if we, while we were able, adopted a different method of rigging and restricted the powers of parliament rather than its composition.

9. For example, parliament might cease to be the matrix of the executive, which could then be created separately and made much more independent of parliament. Parliament might be made more a consultative body and less the source of the government of the country. This in turn would lessen the dangers otherwise inherent in a wide extension of the franchise and we might be able to make early concessions in this field, thus ceasing to oppose ourselves to a contrary opinion which seems to be almost too massive for comfort.

10. If it is quite impossible to plan a different structure of government, and we must go on as we are, then possibly we should revise our ideas about party government. Do we perhaps over-emphasize the role of opposition in our system? In African territories one-party domination, so far from being a lapse into totalitarianism, may be the best way, without disrupting the constitution, of ensuring stable government for the period while the country is developing true nationhood. One-party government should perhaps be regarded with more sympathy as being the first natural substitute for the former benevolent colonial administration, an interim form of “indigenous” democracy replacing our system of “applied” democracy.

11. If the first alternative of changing the relationship between the executive and parliament proves impossible, I think that positive planning for one-party government might be more in accordance with the facts and might therefore help towards a more continuous and less jerky development. In that case we should look for counterweights not within parliament but outside it, in units of decentralized government, all of which will act as pressure groups. Our policy for local government and possibly for provincial government should therefore be pursued even more vigorously.

I urged Mr. Wallis to write up these notes on the Sudan constitutional developments because the lesson that the Westminster Model of parliamentary democracy is not necessarily that best suited to African conditions is well brought out and if ever we are to profit by it the time is now.

2. There is much to be said for a form of presidential government on American lines, with a strong executive divorced from the legislature and a safeguard against
central dictatorship by the dispersal of power before independence, where this is possible. I have always felt that party government on British lines was a non-starter in Africa

(a) Because party divisions are mainly on ethnic, racial, or religious lines and not on the lines of e.g. economic or social policy;
(b) because elected members do not conceive themselves as representatives of the territories as a whole but rather as delegates of those who send them to the legislature;
(c) because Africans have not learnt to abide by majority decisions.

3. I heard the head of an independent African State defending one-party government a few weeks ago. He said that this was in accordance with the African way of doing things; that the disputes on policy would go on inside the one party and the resultant decisions would represent the general view.

Professor Wheare speaking to the Cambridge Conference on local government some years ago\(^2\) said

“There are two possible ways in which a democratic government could go to the bad in these days; it could become a dictatorship or it could become a bureaucracy. Against both of these dangers a strong healthy system of local government is not only the most important protection, but is probably the only really effective protection. This is by far the strongest of all the arguments in the case for local government.” . . .

I think it will be found to have been a mistake not to have set up provincial councils in Uganda, Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia somewhat on the lines the Sudan is considering (paragraphs 10 and 11 of Mr. Wallis’s note.)

4. I fear it may be too late to change direction in the central constitutional structures in East Africa, nor would this be politically possible. It may be possible in Central Africa as a result of the present review of the federal structure. I doubt whether we can plan for a one party structure, as Mr. Wallis suggests, even if this were desirable, but it may not be too late to do more to disperse power to local government bodies so that whatever winds may blow at the centre the man on the farm, and in the street will be able to provide for his day to day needs in services and have a buffer against a dictatorship or bureaucracy.

R.S.H.
16.12.59

Seen with great interest. I attach a copy of a note of a meeting which Sir John Macpherson had with Under Secretaries earlier this year, which shows that Ministers have had very much in mind the question of whether the Westminster model of Parliamentary democracy is necessarily the best one for our Colonial territories, but that the general view of higher authority in the Office at the official level was that we now had very little room for manoeuvre in this matter, and that, in face of the demands of the Colonial peoples themselves for constitutional progress modelled on our own system, and taking into account also Parliamentary and public opinion in U.K., it would be extremely difficult for us deliberately to introduce a more

---

\(^2\) Sir Kenneth Wheare, rector of Exeter College, Oxford since 1956, formerly Gladstone professor of government and public administration. The summer school conference referred to was held in Aug 1951.
authoritarian regime or even any substantial variation of our own form of Parliamentary democracy in a Colonial territory.

2. I also attach a copy of a recent paper on Democracy in Backward Countries, which has been produced mainly by the Foreign Office. Paragraph 37 of this paper sets out various arguments against trying to set up authoritarian regimes in Colonial territories, but suggests that the United States system deserves further study. We have made one or two preliminary comments on this paper in the light of the note referred to in para 1 above; in particular, we have said that for us to attempt to deny the Westminster model to the Colonial peoples, in favour of such a distinct variant from our kind of democracy as the American system, could only engender suspicion of our intentions, and that we are doubtful whether the emergent territories would welcome the characteristic feature of the American system, namely, the divorce between the Executive and Congress. The paper has not, however, yet been agreed with us or the C.R.O.; in fact it is likely to be discussed between the three departments fairly soon... 

E.R.H.
18.12.59

In the available time before going on leave tonight I really cannot do this justice. I have ‘flipped through’ the F.O. paper, but have not had time to read Mr Branney’s. (I should like to do so when I get back from leave).

To my mind, the crux of the problem, in practical terms, is well set out in paragraphs 11 & 12 of the F.O. paper. To my mind it is quite unreal to think that we could promulgate a policy which in effect says to Africans (& other indigènes):

‘The UK is the Mother of Parliaments. The Westminster model is the best—for us & countries like Canada, Australia, N.Z. etc. But it is much too heady wine for you. We will devise a bowdlerized version of Parliamentary democracy for you’.

Even if we could ‘get away with this’ politically, would not the eventual result be that these territories when they come to independence would be not less authoritarian but more so? They surely have a better chance if they’ve been brought up on the right lines.

Are we to write off the whole work of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association & their (in my opinion) very valuable training courses? Is not the real problem to pick out what may be regarded as the essentials (or ‘eternal verities’) of British Parliamentary procedure—if one can agree on their identification—and plug those for all we are worth, leaving perhaps more latitude over traditional ‘frills’ which have grown up out of the history of Great Britain but which may have no particular appeal or value when exported. Easier to say than to apply, I admit.

I agree that the problem is aggravated where you have mixed racial communities. ‘One man one vote’ does not satisfactorily look after racial immigrant minorities. But, I suggest, qualitative franchises & other devices are not irreconcilable with the fundamentals of a democratic system.

---

3 See next document.
4 Paper by L Branney of the African Studies Branch: see also document no 27 below.
Finally, I believe that the building up of an effective local civil services is more than half the battle. Parliamentary democracy may break down even with a good Civil Service. It cannot operate without one.

These are some rather random & wayward thoughts which you [Mr Eastwood] may or may not find useful.

A.H.P.  
4.8.60

26 FO 371/152113, no 3  
8 Mar 1960  
‘Democracy in backward countries’: FO planning report, ‘implications for the future’  
[Extract]

[During the prime minister’s visit to Washington in June 1958, Foster Dulles expressed concern about the dangers arising from the introduction of democratic institutions into relatively backward countries. Accordingly, Sir N Brook chaired a committee to consider the issue with Sir A Clutterbuck (CRO), Sir H Poynton (CO) and Sir R Stevens (FO). He invited the FO to make this report in its Planning Section—where P E Ramsbotham minuted: ‘The emphasis we should give to “national independence” is part of the problem of reshaping our information policies to fit the new Soviet tactics of the Khrushchev regime’ (18 Feb 1960). Brook’s small committee decided in Sept 1960 that it was unnecessary to circulate the report (was it already out of date?), but a copy was sent to the US State Dept, who agreed with it to the point of discontinuing work on their own report—’the kiss of death’, Brook commented. The conclusions of the report are summarised in Morgan, Guidance towards self-government pp 185–186.]

...
DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY

151

of democracy in newly independent and backward countries can only confirm the view that independence has often been granted in the past before the recipients were really ready for it, this cannot materially affect United Kingdom policy over the timing of such grants in the future. The surest way to discredit democracy for ever would be to use it as a reason for refusing independence to those who felt themselves ready for it.

13. The question therefore is not whether, in the light of experience, the United Kingdom should delay the granting of independence until the territories concerned are capable of maintaining a stable democratic system. It is, rather, whether it would be preferable in the interests of stability to grant independence, when this becomes necessary, under some other kind of régime which might be less perishable than a constitution in the Westminster model.

14. On this subject generalisation is more than normally dangerous. Every territory has its peculiar problems, and a constitutional device applicable to one may be quite irrelevant to the needs of another. But certain broad considerations seem pertinent.

(a) Constitutional devices must not be confused with the realities of power. To dress up an authoritarian régime with the trimmings of democracy achieves nothing but discredit for the ideal to which it pays lip service.

(b) If therefore the United Kingdom were to instal in power an effective authoritarian régime, it would be extremely difficult in most cases to disguise this fact. But to do so openly would raise other difficulties:

(i) In the vast majority of territories, the politically vocal sections of opinion want fully democratic institutions, and would be content with nothing less.

(ii) Home opinion would find it difficult to understand the transfer of power to an authoritarian régime.

(iii) Such a policy would render the United Kingdom liable to attack in the United Nations and present the Russians with a propaganda advantage.

(iv) Our own traditions and habits of mind equip us singularly ill as mentors to future authoritarian rulers.

(c) There are of course varieties of democracy other than the “Westminster” model. But though some of these may be as effective, if not more so, the fact is that the countries themselves nearly always pay us the compliment of wishing to imitate our system. When a country embarks on self-government it is anyway perhaps more important what kind of party life it will have than what kind of institutions. Institutions only provide the framework, while the organisation of the political parties is the essential content. In some cases, there may be political institutions or habits in backward countries which could be adapted to democratic purposes.

(d) But perhaps the principal feature of the democratic system is the existence of a means whereby an alternative Government can lawfully come to power, and any constitution which can be called democratic must include it. As long therefore as any constitution introduced by the United Kingdom remains democratic it must contain that element of instability which is involved in the possibility that the Government will be thrown out. Assuming the absence of restraint referred to in paragraph 6(d) above, this will mean that the government will always be tempted to make sure by authoritarian methods that this does not happen.
There are however strong arguments for ensuring that the possibility of lawful replacement is a feature of any constitution introduced by the United Kingdom. First, if this is not the case, Governments can only fall unconstitutionally and almost certainly by violence. This is an obvious bar to any lasting stability. Governments always do fall sooner or later, and any régime which comes to power by force is likely to rule by force. Inasmuch therefore as moderate government is both desirable in itself and a necessary condition of lasting stability, there must be provision for replacement by lawful means. Secondly, if an authoritarian government set up by the United Kingdom fell or became highly unpopular, we should incur odium for having set it up. There would therefore be a considerable risk that its successor would adopt a policy of hostility towards the United Kingdom. Thirdly, the opposition under an authoritarian régime would be bullied, denied the opportunity for constructive public criticism, and possibly driven underground. In these circumstances it would offer an easy target for Communist penetration, with dangerous consequences when it ultimately forces its way to power.

15. The problem is complicated in the case of multi-racial communities, especially those containing a white settler population. This is, for us, the most crucial problem of the coming decade. If full democracy is introduced, the majority will oppress the minority. At first sight a more authoritarian régime therefore seems more suitable. But where is the power to lie? If it lies with the majority, the same result would follow; if it lies with a minority, the constitution will appear unjust and will only last for as long as the minority can maintain itself. In the last resort, it will only be able to do so by force. The best hope seems to lie in a modified democracy, which will balance the conflicting interests of all parties, but it is difficult to imagine that this will provide a permanent answer; constitutional safeguards are flimsy obstacles to the tendency of power to find its own level.

16. To sum up the preceding paragraphs, therefore, it appears that, the arguments in favour of some form of democratic constitution are overwhelming. Neither the democratic nor the authoritarian solution, however, offer an easy answer to the problem of multi-racial communities. …

26. It may also be that the struggle between East and West is gradually losing its ideological character and reverting to historical type as a more straightforward competition in national power. This is a speculative question which cannot be discussed at length in this context. But if it is true that, while preaching Marxism, the Soviet and Chinese leaders are now more fundamentally concerned with the national aims of Russia and China than with the promotion of world revolution as an end in itself, this development may be an advantage to the West in its task of influencing the backward countries.

27. For the theoretical case for and against Communism does not and probably cannot engage the thoughts and emotions of backward peoples in such a way as to make an important difference to their international alignment. It is frequently regarded as an alien and primarily “European” dispute between Great Powers, which has little bearing upon the less sophisticated problems of backward countries, and which the Great Powers use as a smokescreen to conceal their efforts to drag the rest of the world into their own quarrel. The internal problems which obsess the backward countries are raising the standards of living and obtaining an honest and efficient administration. Many of them are predisposed to try what Communism has
to offer, not because they believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat but because they believe that the Communists have succeeded in providing a solution to these material problems. Inasmuch moreover as they have already tried democracy and found it wanting in this respect, they are also inclined to close their minds to the ideological aspects of the counter-appeal from the West.

28. In this situation the importance of economic aid, technical assistance and tactful advice from the West are obvious. It will be important to the success of our projection of the West as a tried and reliable friend to do all that is possible to expand and make them effective. If we are to win the competition for the allegiance of the backward countries, we shall need to be able, and before very long, to point to the example of one or more of these countries which has succeeded, with the help of Western aid and without recourse to Communist methods, in solving its economic and administrative problems.

29. The conclusion which seems to emerge from this review of the West’s posture in the East–West struggle is that we shall have to depend in future less upon the ideological appeal of democracy and more upon a reputation for large and effective economic aid and the championship of national independence. At the same time we should not abandon our championship of democratic ideals. Our hope must be that in gaining the friendship of the backward countries by promoting their economic advance and defending their political independence, we shall vindicate in their eyes the political system under which we live.

30. Since there is a direct correlation between standards of living and of education, technical and administrative skill, and breadth of opportunity for ability on the one hand and the successful practice of democratic forms of government on the other, a policy which concentrates on the material requirements of the backward countries is likely, at least in the long run, to serve the best interests of democracy as well. This is not just a question of slogans but of political realities. Given the state of political maturity of the majority of the under-developed countries and territories, we cannot hope to see them operating a fully-fledged parliamentary régime for a long time. What is very much in our interest to see is that emerging governments (and others with whom we are on friendly terms) shall be stable and popular. Our efforts may be better directed towards that than trying to shore up parliamentary systems or universal franchise or encouraging their operation on a farcical or dishonest basis (as behind the Iron Curtain) which can only discredit both them and ourselves. We already work consistently and, by and large, successfully to create the preparatory realities of democracy (which include an efficient and independent army and police service, training of all kinds, technical assistance, legal and medical advice and education). This is more important than a finished facade. It is right that our conscious efforts should be directed at least as much towards making these countries less backward as towards making them more democratic.

31. Conclusions
(a) Westminster Democracy can not be expected to work well in countries with low standards of living and education. Among other causes of the comparative failure of democratic institutions in backward countries have been abnormal political and economic circumstances, the tradition of authority, the absence of restraint, the lack of maturity and the withdrawal of discipline in a political situation already predisposed to unrest.
(b) But, in many cases at least, governmental instability has been a reflection as much of the political, economic and social crisis which might well have upset any alternative system of government as of the unsuitability of democratic institutions themselves.

(c) The prospects for democracy in backward countries which reach independence in the future are no more encouraging. But in the present situation this cannot materially affect the timing of the granting of independence.

(d) It may be possible and desirable to introduce variants on parliamentary democracy but the arguments in favour of some form of democracy are overwhelming.

(e) The United Kingdom must maintain its open support for the democratic ideals which are a strongest suit for the rest of the world. But we cannot afford to alienate authoritarian régimes on ideological grounds, either inside or outside the Commonwealth, and we must find a means of accommodating them within our camp.

(f) This presents the West with a dilemma, especially in the context of the East-West struggle. The solution may lie first in stressing the basic needs of an independent judiciary, a non-political civil service, freedom to criticise etc. rather than constitutional forms, and secondly in placing relatively less emphasis on the ideological appeal of democracy and more upon our role as a reliable provider of aid and defender of national independence. Success in this may persuade the backward countries that democracy can work as well in their countries as ours if the minimum conditions of prosperity and stability are first achieved.

(g) We should concentrate more on the preparatory realities of democracy than the finished facade. The cause of democracy can best be promoted in the long run by raising standards of living, administration etc., in the backward countries.

27 FO 371/152115, no 18 15 Mar 1960
[Democracy in backward countries]: letter from T J O'Brien (CRO) to P E Ramsbotham (FO) commenting on draft paper [Extract]

... I think I must say here and now that there are still considerable differences between us in our approach to this problem. . . .

(a) The record. We still feel that your paper fails to do full justice to the record of newly-independent countries, and that it puts the wrong slant on the lessons to be learnt for the future conduct of United Kingdom policies. Maybe this is because countries formerly under British rule have developed different characteristics to those which never were. We can only speak with authority about the former. Possibly this makes differences between our respective views inevitable. . . .

Any such analysis, in our experience, leads to less gloomy conclusions than you have painted. Surely the bull-point is that the basic conditions of democratic life are still respected, still desired, and have in fact (in the new Commonwealth at least) survived tolerably well? Admittedly the formal institutions of democratic life have taken some hard knocks in a good number of cases. . . . But there is hope for the future simply because the authoritarian régimes that have been installed in their place are generally expected to aim towards social conditions analogous to those of
the Western democracies and usually refrain from regimentation of the sort practised by past or present totalitarian states. In itself this makes possible pressure for some form of popular government suited to the particular needs of the country concerned. This has already had results in Burma; it is having results in Pakistan. With any luck the evolutionary transition to whatever forms of popular government are best suited for these countries will be more rapid than it was in the United Kingdom!

To put it brutally, the conclusion that seems to emerge from your paper is that parliamentary government is only workable by westerners. We do not believe that our constitutional policy in the Indian and Colonial Empire was as misguided as all that.

(b) United Kingdom future colonial policy. We should start off by saying what our future colonial problems are. In point of fact we have not got a lot of room for manoeuvre—most of the horses have already bolted; and a number are already so far out of the stable that they cannot be pushed back again. Those that remain are either multi-racial (and represent an entirely new problem for us) or very backward or so small that they are unlikely ever to become fully independent.

We should go on to say that even if we wanted to, we have no opportunity of introducing any radical change in our colonial constitutional policy—it would not be tolerated either by the territories concerned (though perhaps Group-Captain Briggs\(^1\) might enter a dissentient vote here) or by public opinion in this country.

But the crux of our future policies lies in promoting parliamentary government (as we understand it) in multi-racial communities. Here we would like to give your paragraph 15 very much fuller treatment, drawing as necessary on the Prime Minister’s recent speeches in Africa.

Your paragraphs 11 to 14 seem frankly academic to us and very remote from what has been happening in Africa during the last two months.

(c) United Kingdom policy towards non-parliamentary regimes. We do not accept that we are presented with an embarrassing dilemma.

The conflict which you see between United Kingdom ideology and normal friendly associations with Ayub, Nkrumah, Sukarno and even Syngman Rhee seems very unrealistic to us. We have got to live with these regimes. None of them are committed to the self-perpetuating tyranny of communism. If we deliberately cut them off from the West, we may well propel them towards that precise form of tyranny. And if it were seriously suggested that the United Kingdom should associate only with the ideologically pure, according to your estimate of the record of democracy we would have to retreat into an exclusive Anglo-Saxon/Western European club and assume comparative indifference over the fate of the uncommitted under-developed world. I know you do not suggest we should do this. But the point is that nobody else is suggesting we should.

Part of this difference between us is that we are drawing different conclusions from the record (my (a) above).

Our thesis is that given time, stability, economic advance and education (and provided that the Soviet Bloc do not win the battle for the under-developed) most of these countries could evolve forms of popular government, not necessarily of the

\(^1\) Of Kenya: see document no 160, n 2, below.
Westminster pattern, but at least far-removed from totalitarianism. We must continue to present a picture that shows the United Kingdom as a working example of democracy, anxious to promote independence both in our own remaining dependencies and in the world at large. We must be tolerant of those who have not yet been able to go so far as we have, and must live in hopes that our example is the one that they wish and seek to emulate. Our real concern is with the realities of democracy rather than with its outward forms (the Prime Minister’s Cape Town speech is not irrelevant in respect of those who transgress these realities). The material contribution that we are providing is economic aid that can promote social conditions where there would be less need to lean heavily on authoritarian government.2...

2 By contrast, the CO commented that they were happy with the redraft as it stood.

28 CO 1032/242, no 2 3 Aug 1960 – 1 April 1961
[L Branney’s paper on British democracy and the Westminster model]: CO minutes by L Branney, A R Thomas, W B L Monson, C G Eastwood and J C McPetrie

I send you this Paper, at Mr Hammer’s request, with diffidence and apologies owing to its length.1

It originated in an attempt to comment within the limits of a minute on the General Dept. file concerning an investigation of the reasons for the apparent failure in various cases of the democratic constitutions, modelled as it is supposed on our own, with which we have endowed our former dependent Territories. It was stimulated in particular by what seemed to me certain serious misapprehensions in the contributions on that file, epitomised particularly in two propositions; one, a C.O. comment concerning the apparent need for a stronger Executive in these Territories, which observed that unfortunately we could not have one version of democracy for ourselves and one for export; and the second, an F. O. comment which characterized western democracy as consisting essentially in a universal franchise.

The first proposition seemed to me to evince a serious misapprehension about the nature of our own constitution and the supposed correspondence of these Colonial constitutions with it, and the second a serious error about the nature of democracy at least in our British tradition and institutions.

The Paper is therefore mainly concerned to point out the two quite different traditions of democracy in England and elsewhere in Europe, one of government by the people and the other by their consent; secondly that the position of the Executive in our constitution and the separation of powers which give expression to our principle of democracy is the essential characteristic of our constitution; that owing to 19th century propaganda this has been almost entirely lost sight of and so we have failed to reproduce...

1 ‘An examination of British democracy and the British constitution and their supposed application to the dependent territories’ (at no 1). This was 67-pages long, Branney was a research officer in the African Studies Branch. He left the CO in 1963, and Poynon minuted ‘on the whole I think we’d better quietly put this by’ (19.7.63); he believed it to be a stimulating but largely irrelevant piece of work, as the pattern of constitutional advance was already pretty well set (CO 1032/241, minute 20.9.60).
it in these Colonial constitutions, and to this in large part their failure is probably to be ascribed. Finally it is maintained that experience (our own especially) shows that the proper control of the Executive power, (which our system achieves without nullifying it), is far more the essence of democracy as we mean it than the mere machinery, like the franchise, by which popular participation in government is effected, and that such popular participation and effective government can—and safely—be combined in a system of what is in effect a separation of powers like our own.

To demonstrate all this adequately, and especially the nature of the separation of powers in our constitution which is so much more clearly portrayed in our history than it can be in any theoretical exposition, requires extensive reference to our political and constitutional history. This is the excuse for the length of this paper as it was the reason for the complete failure to put it in the original minute.

L. B.
3.8.60

... It seems to me that the degree of success which a newly independent country achieves in preserving a reasonable degree of democracy coupled with a sufficiently (but not excessively) authoritative government, depends far less on the form of constitution we bequeath (though that is important) than on the good sense and willingness to compromise on the part of the legislators and political leaders so that the former recognise the need to allow some initiative and scope for leadership on the part of the Government and the latter recognise their ultimate responsibility to the Legislature. Given a reasonable degree of this maturity, I should think that the misconceived "Westminster model" which we have been sowing round the place was probably as good a one as we could leave; and that without such maturity things were likely to go wrong whatever forms of constitution were provided. ...

A.R.T
29.9.60

... 2. Let me say at the outset that in the Departments with which I am concerned there is a very keen appreciation of the merits, particularly from the point of view of the protection of minorities with which Mr. Branney is particularly concerned, in separating the powers of the Executive and the Legislature in such a way as to avoid giving the latter full control over the former. Indeed this principle of reserving the ultimate authority to the Executive has been followed by us in the new constitutions we have negotiated for Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and Nyasaland, and I hope that, if we negotiate, as is likely, a new constitution for Northern Rhodesia in the coming months we shall again do it on the basis of firmly establishing the Governor’s power to act independently of his Legislature if the situation warrants it. It only remains for me to invite reference to the statement by the Secretary of State recorded in Footnote 1 to this minute which shows that his policy in these negotiations has been based very much indeed on this thesis of the separation of powers.

3. But it may be said with justice that in these particular constitutions we have been concerned with an interim stage during which we are giving the African majority a considerable amount of its head but at the same time trying to educate it

---

2 Statement in Zomba, 31 Mar 1960: ‘the reality of power would be retained in the hands of the government through the Executive Council’.
to discharge its responsibilities, particularly towards the minorities in its midst, when it has control of independent states. There has been, it is fair to say, no overt suggestion from our side that these reserve powers which are presently entrusted to the Governors under direction of the U.K. Government should be transferred to the Executive of an independent state. We have therefore got to consider the idea of the separation of powers from the point of view of building something into the constitution which would allow of such separation after independence. This means that we must negotiate, particularly if we are to protect minorities, with the majority in advance of independence.

4. From my own standpoint I find it difficult to persuade myself that such a proposition would either be negotiable or indeed practicable.

5. To take negotiability first, (though strictly speaking it is perhaps a second point) we want to get a system of government with the consent of the governed, that is to say we want in concrete terms to get a system, containing in it a separation of the powers of the Executive and the Legislature with particular reference to the protection of minorities, but which is at the same time acceptable to the bulk of the African peoples concerned. There is no point in our imposing a solution before independence if we are to think in terms of something which will be acceptable before independence and carried through into the independent period.

6. If therefore we are to negotiate something acceptable to the bulk of the Africans we have to consider how such a proposal for the separation of these powers would appear to the average African of influence politically. What the African Nationalist (for it is with the Nationalist that we would have to reach agreement) is fundamentally concerned with in politics is the removal of any idea that the African is an inferior type of human being. The belief that he is so inferior goes back into history far beyond modern “imperialism”. (The Semitic authors of the Book of Genesis had to dress up in the story of Noah’s [Ham’s?] drunkenness a justification for what was evidently to them an accepted truth viz. that the African was inferior to all other branches of the human race). With this long history of contempt behind him it is little wonder if his reactions in constitutional matters are often illogical. It is therefore understandable if he is inconsistent in sometimes claiming that he must have a constitution precisely the same as we give ourselves and at other times claiming that he is fully entitled to devise a form of constitution different from ours but which will give expression to the separate “African personality”. In so far as both these attitudes are found among politically conscious Africans they tend to rationalise their inconsistency by demanding that anything which we give them during the “Colonial” phase shall be what we would give ourselves but that after the Colonial phase they are fully entitled to change the constitution left behind to make it express properly the African personality.

7. What is quite certain is that they will not take from us something different from what we give ourselves simply because we say we have come to the conclusion that, while suitable for ourselves it is not suitable for them....

13. It looks in fact as though the best protection for minorities that we can devise, imperfect though it may be, is to be found rather in legal safeguards or entrenched clauses as recommended e.g. by the Monckton commission.3

W.B.L.M.
31.10.60

3 C G Eastwood added in the margin: ‘and embodied in the Nigerian Constr’.
The great danger to which an emergent country is exposed is “the tyranny of the majority”, as in Ghana—a majority which may (as also in Ghana) operate at the behest of a single person. It is going to be very difficult in any emergent country to get the pendulum swinging so that the government of today becomes the Opposition of tomorrow. (The Federal Government of Nigeria is, I hope, going to be an exception to this since it is likely to have to consist for a considerable time of a coalition of the principal parties of two out of the three Regions and the two coalescing may change from time to time. The Regions look like being almost as monolithic as Ghana.) Almost everywhere it is going to be very difficult to build up an effective Opposition in the initial years of independence because prior to independence the main objective of everyone has been to obtain independence: no politician has been able to oppose that; he will only have been able to oppose the way other leaders set about getting it and when the other leaders have been successful in getting it his criticisms will not carry much weight. For the first few years an Opposition will find it very hard to build themselves a platform and their efforts will, as Mr. Branney points out, risk being regarded as factious or even seditious—again as in Ghana.

These dangers are evident enough in a (relatively) mono-racial country like Ghana. They are greatly increased in a multi-racial country where there are racial minorities which can never expect to become a majority. Mr. Branney is very critical of the Willink report on minorities in Nigeria and I personally agree with some of his criticisms. But I believe that one of the safeguards which they recommended was the best that we have been able so far to invent for racial minorities, namely the laying down of a code of fundamental rights in clauses of the constitution so entrenched that they can only be altered if this is the will of something much more than a bare majority. . . .

I would hesitate to accept some of his generalizations. How the “Westminster model” works when exported must, it seems to me, depend to a considerable extent on the social, political and, perhaps, economic state of the territory to which it is exported. The exported product is recognizably like the original in some places, such as, for example, Jamaica and Barbados (to say nothing of the old Dominions). Furthermore, even in this country, the working of the Westminster model surely varies with the circumstances of the time. When the Government majority in Parliament is very small, then the Executive in this country would appear to me to be much more dependent upon Parliament than is the case when the Government majority is a comfortable one; and I would expect that to be reflected in Government policy and Government activity generally. It may be that what an African territory needs today is a strong Executive Government and it may be, as Mr. Branney contends, that the Westminster model is unlikely to produce this. But there is another side to the medal and I should have thought that if one strengthened the Executive Government at the expense of the legislature one would be taking a risk with the freedoms of the individual, which the legislative chamber (at any rate if it contains anything of an Opposition) would be more jealous to safeguard than would the Executive. In any case, like Mr. Monson I doubt whether we could get Africans to accept anything other than the Westminster model at our hands; though they might work out a different pattern for themselves once they had attained independence. . . .
There is rather a complicated story behind the Memorandum on African policy which I think has been sent to you by David Stirling, and I thought you might be interested to hear the full story.

"Black Africa" remains perhaps our most difficult problem as far as our relationships with the vital middle voters is concerned. It is the only one in which our policies are under severe criticism and for example the only one on which we are regularly defeated at the universities. Indeed the universities feel more strongly on this issue than on any other single matter. We have in front of us the Devlin Commission, now I believe expected at the end of July. I see in a recent issue of the Spectator that they say that this issue is the only one on which the Socialists can reasonably still hope to turn the tide for them and although I think this is rather special pleading unquestionably we are in a difficult position.

David Stirling as you know was a man of tremendous courage and with a genius for leadership in war and he is a dreamer in peace. But on the whole he dreams the right sort of dreams. There is only one sentence that matters in his policy and that is the suggestion that the rights of the individual should be secured to him by virtue of his position as a citizen rather than because of the colour of his skin or his membership of a particular community. This goes perhaps a little further than Blundell would like to go, but is really no different from Cecil Rhodes's old idea of "equal rights for all civilised men". It would mean the end of separate electoral rolls and no doubt it would mean in many territories African majorities on the unofficial side, and it would be necessary during the period of tutelage perhaps to have a fairly stiff qualification for the right to vote. But whatever it is it would be the same for everyone.

Stirling understands little or nothing about the realities of Party politics in this country and his idea is that all Parties should join hands now in a declaration along these lines before the General Election. He has talked in what he fondly claims to be confidence to Gordon Walker and Callaghan. His idea was for a press conference on

---

2 See document no 494 in Part II.
the 3rd June, to be followed by a Debate in the House of Lords, which I gather would be led by Ferrier and Boothby, and a public campaign to secure general acceptance of this principle. Such a programme could not fail to be extremely embarrassing and dangerous for us. I should also mention that Stirling is really behind the Opposition in the Debate in Edinburgh at the General Assembly today to the ideas of my namesake, Dr. Macleod,6 and he has drafted, in conjunction with Bernard Fergusson, an alternative and more right wing Motion. I do not know what will come of this but as you know it is a considerable issue in Scotland. Stirling calls himself a high Tory and I am sure that he is anxious if he can to help but I think for him Africa comes first. Knowing this when he discussed the matter with me and showed me a copy of his Memorandum, I suggested that the campaign he has in mind would be bound to end up as a Party squabble and that he would get nowhere. I went on to say that as we were going to win the next Election by far the most effective thing to do was to have some paragraphs in the Conservative Manifesto which would point the way to a liberal solution in Africa and I further suggested that he should, in view of this, send his Memorandum to you. I believe he has done this.

I think we must try if we can to persuade him to agree to something like this. Accordingly if you have the time, and because this subject is potentially so explosive, I would suggest that you see him yourself, and try to persuade him that his best interest lies in the line I have suggested to him and we then see how far we can go in the phrasing of some paragraphs to meet him. You may remember that when we discussed future policy just before the Whitsun Recess you said that our policy for Africa should be a form of “Blundellism”. I am sure this is true and we may be able to secure the right formula although no doubt the Colonial Office would have many reservations and it may be that the particular idea of Stirling’s goes too far at the present time.

I have discussed this matter with John Wyndham6 who knows Stirling and has seen his paper, and it may be that he can think of a better solution than the one in this letter but for myself I can see no other alternative that has a chance of avoiding what I am sure would be a very unhappy controversy.7

5 The Very Revd Sir George Macleod, DD, moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland since 1957, leader of the Iona Community since 1938.

6 J E R Wyndham, private secretary to the prime minister since 1957.

7 Macmillan and Home saw Stirling on 1 June. The prime minister said: the important thing was not everyone having the vote, but what sort of life they had; a simple majority parliamentary system would lead to the greatest instability in Africa; the whites would have to realise that ‘one day the black majority would have to make itself effective, although not necessarily right away’; ‘our objective was to induce the Europeans to accept something that was going to happen anyhow, and to assure the Africans that progress would be made towards the inevitable. … there must be a perceptible movement’; ‘there were two forces capable of operating to bring about a Civil War. If we pressed on too fast with the extension of the franchise, the more reactionary white people might try and join the Union [of South Africa]. If we did not move fast enough, the Africans would lead the disturbances’ (Note for the record, by T J Bligh).

30 DO 35/8039, no 5 25 June 1959

‘Constitutional development in Africa’: memorandum by Lord Home.

Annex: draft declaration on colonial policy

[This memo was personally prepared by Lord Home in his own handwriting, and the prime minister asked for it to be circulated to the Committee on Constitutional
Developments in Africa (a Cabinet ministerial sub-committee), but it was never discussed at the meeting on 1 July 1959 because of the rush of business about the Central African Federation. That committee was then dissolved, and no further action was taken until Nkrumah came to see the prime minister in August and was shown a copy. Nkrumah thought that without dates for independence being set it would lack the real meat. In Jan 1960 in Accra, Nkrumah again mentioned to Macmillan the possibility of a joint paper making a statement of policy—but this was thought out of the question; so what was left was a possible unilateral British declaration which Commonwealth prime ministers might perhaps endorse if it was discussed at their meeting in May. In fact Nkrumah did not raise it at that meeting. Sir A Snelling however warned that Nkrumah might revert to the question, so a draft was got ready, although on the whole it was thought better to let sleeping dogs lie.

When I talked to Dr. Nkrumah and his Ministers in Accra last month, I was struck by the extent to which their pan-African ambitions and their obsession with slogans such as “one man one vote” were tending to lead them towards the adoption of public attitudes directly in conflict with our own policies. The idea occurred to me that, against this background, some kind of clear re-statement of our African policies might serve, at the best to encourage people like the Ghanaians to take a more understanding view of our problems, and at the worst to deprive them of some of their ammunition in criticising us. In any case I found Dr. Nkrumah himself quite attracted by the idea of such a declaration, partly perhaps because he thought that in its drafting we might really find some common ground, and partly no doubt for less altruistic reasons.

Since then the Prime Minister has had a separate proposal from Mr. David Stirling about the urgent need both here and in Africa for a re-definition and declaration of the Government’s intentions regarding our African territories.1

I am far from convinced that it is in fact possible to produce a general declaration sufficiently sweeping in character either to have any significant effect on the attitudes of people like Dr. Nkrumah or to produce the dramatic impact on opinion which Mr. Stirling has in mind. However, in order to focus discussion on the problems that arise in attempting to work out any such declaration, I have prepared the attached preliminary draft for the consideration of my colleagues.

Annex to 30

*British colonial policy in Africa*

1. The goal of Colonial policy is self-government.
2. For those territories which are capable of standing on their own feet in the world this means independence and the hope and desire is that this should be independence within the Commonwealth.
3. What are the conditions for self-government? The short answer is good government. That means tolerable standards of administration and of justice, for these are the foundation of stability in society.
4. Protection can only give way to self-government and independence when the people accept the need to recognise and protect the political rights of minorities and of individuals.

1 See previous document.
There will be different forms of constitution and the United Kingdom does not insist on any universal pattern but the protection of minorities and the rights and duties of the individual in the community are the very essence of democracy.

(5) On the grant of independence safeguards must be written into the constitution but the only real safeguard that a country will maintain stability within and follow the policy of the good neighbour without is when the leaders have enough maturity to recognise the absolute obligation to protect minority rights and to respect the individuals.

(6) The franchise and the pace of advance towards the goal of “one man one vote” must be judged against this background.

(7) The aim of the United Kingdom as the protecting power is to create a situation in which the social and political status of the individual citizen is secure.

Progress will be made as fast as a sense of responsibility can be created by education. The complete universal suffrage is only meaningful when the individual voter can exercise a free and unfettered choice between parties and when voters in the aggregate have learned not to misuse the vast majorities which often emerge from free elections.

The United Kingdom objective is to create independent countries in which the people are secure in their rights and understand their duties.

(8) Where there are multi-racial communities where different races have a stake in the country and claim it as their home the rights and duties of the individual and safeguards for the different communities become even more important, for confidence in a future of partnership is based on tolerance and in particular on responsible use of the franchise which results in political power.

The aim of British policy is to achieve a “common role” where any individual of any race may exercise his political right on a basis of complete equality.

(9) As democracy can only survive in an educated society, there must be qualifications for the vote. In the United Kingdom it took 600 years to graduate from the qualified franchise to that of “one man one vote”. Today no one suggests such a lengthy apprenticeship but if democracy is to be secure education in its broadest sense must underpin the franchise.

(10) It is because the United Kingdom is anxious to advance its colonial territories to this state of maturity that it gives so high a priority to public education and to training in administration. Everything will be done to mobilise resources so that the scale of effort can be increased.

(11) This statement of the aims of United Kingdom policy reveals that the orderly progress to self-government in any Colonial territory is not so much a problem of blue-prints for constitutions or of systems as a problem of men, beginning with the understanding of the local leaders of the rights and duties inherent in democracy and ending with the full comprehension of the people.

(12) The United Kingdom will base all its legislation in its territories and any proposals for constitutional advance on such principles and it invites the cooperation of the people of all races as the way to attain a common end. The quickest road to a date for self-government is complete co-operation on programmes of education and development.

---

2 According to the draft in PREM 11/2588 this should have read ‘200 years’.
(13) Partnership between races devoted to noble principles of living and partnership between independent nations practising tolerance, liberty and peace will then be the gift of the Commonwealth to the world.

31 PREM 11/2586, PM(59)65 29 Dec 1959
[Reflections on policy in East Africa, Malta and Nyasaland]: minute from Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan

I thought you might like to have a short personal report on my first visit as Secretary of State to Malta and the East African territories.

**Malta.** Governor’s rule has been continuing here for a very long time and although there is little resentment shown about this except by Mintoff’s Labour Party, it isn’t a satisfactory form of rule, particularly for a people with such a very long history of representative government as the Maltese. On the face of it deadlock seems complete, because Mintoff demands independence before he will talk and, although he may have lost some prestige, he still remains the most likely person to emerge from ordinary contested elections. He refused to see me in Malta, but sent me a letter just before I left which I interpret as meaning that he would be glad if he could be rescued from the end of the limb along which he has crawled. I feel that we ought to initiate talks and try and feel our way back to representative government even if the talks break down. In this event we should have to see how we could make the existing regime more “democratic”. I feel myself that there is a very real difficulty in Malta when dealing with such wily politicians as Mintoff that traditionally the Governor is a senior Navy or Army man. At the present time this is very much a post for a career Colonial Office man or for a politician. However, I do not intend to put proposals for Malta forward to the C.P.C. until you return.

**East Africa.** The one common factor in the four East African territories is that in each of them something is happening about constitutional advance, but this is almost the only point they have in common and our approach to them will have to differ very widely. The constitutional problems of the territories in ascending order of difficulty are as follows:—

(a) **Zanzibar.** Early elections are due here in July, 1960. The Arab Nationalist Party is making much of the running, but in fact the Afro-Shirazi Party will almost certainly win the election by a very large margin. There is very little representative government and a good deal of grumbling about this; but everyone was very content with my assurance during my brief visit there that Sir George Mooring, the new Resident, who takes up his post in a few weeks, would examine the constitutional position urgently and report to me. I expect that we will have to move a short distance but that we need not contemplate anything drastic.

(b) **Tanganyika.** The Governor’s announcement went down very well, although there was, of course, some criticism about our rejection of the full franchise proposals. There were very large demonstrations when I arrived at the airport but in a sense these demonstrations (urging earlier and faster independence) were against

---

Nyerere, rather than me. Naturally, with the success he has had and is going to have, he has now become the target of the extremists, and this is the sad fate that awaits almost every African leader who is prepared to co-operate with us. But I think he can ride the storm. I do not even think now that it will be necessary to hold the Tanganyika conference in London in the spring because the ideas Nyerere put forward to me for the Council of Ministers were almost exactly those that in any case we intended to offer. There are two important matters still to be cleared up and if this can be done we could effect the decisions about Ministers by exchange of despatches without a conference. This would be very satisfactory.

(c) Uganda. When I arrived in Uganda it became clear to me that there was an utterly confused political situation, complicated by the position of the Kabaka and his central kingdom of Buganda and by the splintering of the weak political parties that existed. I decided that the Wild Report on Constitutional Reform should be published at once, partly to try and bring some certainty into a confused situation and partly because I was sure (as did in fact happen) that it would soon leak to the press, who were following me. It is to be debated in the Legislative Council in February and we ought by then to be ready with our decisions. I will, of course, put forward a paper to the C.P.C. Some of their recommendations go far beyond anything that we can accept, particularly in their proposals for Ministers. However, we can and should give them a major measure of constitutional advance and I would be reasonably confident about the future of this country were it not for the Kabaka. The combination of being weak and obstinate and a king is a difficult one to deal with. He is in fact running his Ministers and does not act as a constitutional monarch. Buganda plays no part in the Legislative Council and threatens that they will not do so unless they are granted virtual self-government. We are, in short, very nearly back where we were when Oliver Lyttelton deported him some years ago.

I had two interviews with him. At the first he was unpleasantly difficult and indeed uncivil, but I thought it worth going back to see him again at the end of my visit, and on this occasion he came to Government House and we established more amiable relations. But the fundamental difficulty of his position and that of Buganda still remains, and if there is a rock on which we will be shipwrecked in Uganda this is it. I have, however, some ideas for steering round the rock which I will include in my paper to the C.P.C.

(d) Kenya. This, of course, is the real problem for us. There is much weak thinking going on here at home about Kenya. When, for example, the Economist cheerfully says that the settlers in Kenya must accept the same position as in Tanganyika they forget:

(i) that Kenya is only just emerging from a seven-year long reign of terror and emergency;
(ii) that the political parties in Kenya are not united at all in the way that they are in Tanganyika;

---

(iii) that the problem of the settler and the European and Asian business man is far greater and more formidable in Kenya than in any other of the Colonial territories.

When I arrived in Kenya I made two simple points which I kept plugging to the end. The first was that Kenya's problems were peculiar to Kenya and the pace at which she moved must be one that suited her. This had to be said partly for the reasons I have outlined above and partly because of the uneasiness the Tanganyika announcement had caused. Secondly I asked people to come to the London Conference not completely committed in advance to their own particular solutions. As you know, the Africans are going to present a joint front at the Conference, but in fact that front is far from secure and there are many personal antagonisms clearly to be seen within it. I think in the end I had some success over this. In any event, when I arrived everybody was certain that the Kenya Conference was doomed to failure, and now people think—particularly in view of Mboya's statement that he now accepts the principle of reserved seats—that it has a true chance of success. I do not rank the prospects higher than this, but even so this improvement alone would have made my trip well worth while.

There is one comment that I should make on the Kenya Administration which we have discussed so often. It is in fact at all levels head and shoulders above that of any of the others I saw and Sir Patrick Renison, who will himself be a first-class Governor, tells me that it is far in advance of the Administration of any Colony that he has served in. Sir P Renison succeeded Sir E Baring as governor of Kenya at the end of 1959. He was previously governor of British Honduras, 1952–1955, and British Guiana, 1955–1959.

But I am sure it remains true that they thought little in the years of the emergency of the letter of the law and I know the Governor is taking steps to try and ensure a more orthodox approach to the security problems of the future.

Nyasaland. I remain very dissatisfied with the position here. I asked Sir Robert Armitage to come and see me at Dar-es-Salaam, but I fear that he is giving no real lead and his Chief Secretary is of poor calibre and is being replaced. C W F Footman. I am afraid also that Southern Rhodesia and the Federation are themselves too stubborn to appreciate the resentment that is building up in the Northern Territories against them. This will be our most difficult single problem to solve. I have put forward Cabinet papers and I envisage a sequence of events something like this:—

(a) the Governor to issue any day now a statement about the detainees giving evidence which he has agreed with me;
(b) that the programme of accelerated release should be announced about the time that you leave for Africa;
(c) the Monckton Commission will presumably be clear of Nyasaland, say, by April;
(d) by then we should be able to announce the end of the emergency, the release of Dr. Banda and the passing of special legislation for the hard core;

---

5 T J Mboya, Kenyan trades union leader, member of the Kenya African National Union.
7 C W F Footman.
8 See document no 495 in Part II.
9 See document no 498 in Part II.
(e) I will myself go to Nyasaland in June and start discussions on constitutional advance with the Administration and leaders of political parties, including, I would hope, Dr. Banda.

This programme, of course, can easily slip and we will be severely criticised for taking so long about it. It will be of the first importance to decide what you yourself say in Nyasaland when you are there, and whom you see. I am myself absolutely convinced that whether the Federation like it or not an imaginative offer on constitutional advance at a fairly early date is certainly the best, and perhaps the only, hope of holding the position.10

10 Mr Macmillan minuted: ‘I am grateful for a most interesting and imaginative report, wh. I wd. like to discuss further with you. H.M. 30.12. 59’.

32 DO 35/10570, no 53 3 Feb 1960
Address by Mr Macmillan to both houses of the parliament of the Union of South Africa, Cape Town

[The text of this speech was printed in an official souvenir booklet; although not recorded in the South African Hansard, it was frequently referred to in the South African parliament during March and April 1960—see House of Assembly Debates, vol 104. It has been reproduced in Macmillan’s memoirs, vol 5, Pointing the way, 1959–1961 pp 473–482 (appendix 1), and in A N Porter & A J Stockwell, eds, British imperial policy and decolonization, vol 2 1951–1964 (1989) pp 522–531 (document no 77). It has to be regarded as a major statement of government policy.]

It is a great privilege to be invited to address the members of both Houses of Parliament in the Union of South Africa. It is a unique privilege to do so in 1960 just half a century after the Parliament of the Union came to birth. I am most grateful to you all for giving me this opportunity and I am especially grateful to your Prime Minister who invited me to visit this country and arranged for me to address you here today. My tour of Africa—parts of Africa—the first ever made by a British Prime Minister in office, is now alas nearing its end but it is fitting that it should culminate in the Union Parliament here in Cape Town, in this historic city so long Europe’s gateway to the Indian Ocean, and to the East.

As in all the other countries that I have visited my stay has been all too short. I wish it had been possible for me to spend a longer time here, to see more of your beautiful country and to get to know more of your people, but in the past week I have travelled many hundreds of miles and met many people in all walks of life. I have been able to get at least some idea of the great beauty of your country-side, with its farms and its forests, mountains and rivers, and the clear skies and wide horizons of the veldt. I have also seen some of your great and thriving cities, and I am most grateful to your Government for all the trouble they have taken in making the arrangements which have enabled me to see so much in so short a time. Some of the younger members of my staff have told me that it has been a heavy programme, but I can assure you that my wife and I have enjoyed every moment of it. Moreover, we have been deeply moved by the warmth of our welcome. Wherever we have been, in town or in country, we have been received in a spirit of friendship and affection which has warmed our hearts, and we value this the more because we know it is an expression of your goodwill, not just to ourselves but to all the people of Britain.
It is, as I have said, a special privilege for me to be here in 1960 when you are celebrating what I might call the golden wedding of the Union. At such a time it is natural and right that you should pause to take stock of your position, to look back at what you have achieved, to look forward to what lies ahead.

In the fifty years of their nationhood the people of South Africa have built a strong economy founded upon a healthy agriculture and thriving and resilient industries. During my visit I have been able to see something of your mining industry, on which the prosperity of the country is so firmly based. I have seen your Iron and Steel Corporation and visited your Council of Scientific and Industrial Research at Pretoria. These two bodies, in their different ways, are symbols of a lively, forward-looking and expanding economy. I have seen the great city of Durban, with its wonderful port, and the skyscrapers of Johannesburg, standing where seventy years ago there was nothing but the open veldt. I have seen, too, the fine cities of Pretoria and Bloemfontein. This afternoon I hope to see something of your wine-growing industry, which so far I have only admired as a consumer.

No-one could fail to be impressed with the immense material progress which has been achieved. That all this has been accomplished in so short a time is a striking testimony to the skill, energy and initiative of your people. We in Britain are proud of the contribution we have made to this remarkable achievement. Much of it has been financed by British capital. According to the recent survey made by the Union Government, nearly two-thirds of the oversea investment outstanding in the Union at the end of 1956 was British. That is after two staggering wars which have bled our economy white.

But that is not all. We have developed trade between us to our common advantage, and our economies are now largely interdependent. You export to us raw materials, food and gold. We in return send you consumer goods or capital equipment. We take a third of all your exports and we supply a third of all your imports. This broad traditional pattern of investment and trade has been maintained in spite of the changes brought by the development of our two economies, and it gives me great encouragement to reflect that the economies of both our countries, while expanding rapidly, have yet remained interdependent and capable of sustaining one another. If you travel round this country by train you will travel on South African rails made by Iscor [see lines 8–9 above]. If you prefer to fly you can go in a British Viscount. Here is a true partnership, living proof of the interdependence between nations. Britain has always been your best customer and, as your new industries develop, we believe that we can be your best partners too.

In addition to building this strong economy within your own borders, you have also played your part as an independent nation in the world.

As a soldier in the first world war, and as a Minister in Sir Winston Churchill’s Government in the second, I know personally the value of the contribution which your forces made to victory in the cause of freedom. I know something, too, of the inspiration which General Smuts brought to us in Britain in our darkest hours. Again in the Korean crisis you played your full part. Thus in the testing times of war or aggression your statesmen and your soldiers have made their influence felt far beyond the African continent.

In the period of reconstruction, when Dr. Malan was your Prime Minister, your resources greatly assisted the recovery of the sterling area. In the post-war world now, in the no less difficult tasks of peace, your leaders in industry, commerce and
finance continue to be prominent in world affairs today. Your readiness to provide technical assistance to the less well-developed parts of Africa is of immense help to the countries that receive it. It is also a source of strength to your friends in the Commonwealth and elsewhere in the western world. You are collaborating in the work of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara, and now in the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Your Minister for External Affairs intends to visit Ghana later this year. All this proves your determination, as the most advanced industrial country of the continent, to play your part in the new Africa of today.

Sir, as I have travelled round the Union I have found everywhere, as I expected, a deep preoccupation with what is happening in the rest of the African continent. I understand and sympathise with your interest in these events, and your anxiety about them. Ever since the break up of the Roman Empire one of the constant facts of political life in Europe has been the emergence of independent nations. They have come into existence over the centuries in different forms, with different kinds of Government, but all have been inspired by a deep, keen feeling of nationalism which has grown as the nations have grown.

In the twentieth century and especially since the end of the war, the processes which gave birth to the nation states of Europe have been repeated all over the world. We have seen the awakening of national consciousness in peoples who have for centuries lived in dependence upon some other power. Fifteen years ago this movement spread through Asia. Many countries there of different races and civilisations pressed their claim to an independent national life. Today the same thing is happening in Africa and the most striking of all the impressions I have formed since I left London a month ago is of the strength of this African national consciousness. In different places it takes different forms but it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through this continent and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.

Of course you understand this better than anyone. You are sprung from Europe, the home of nationalism, and here in Africa you have yourselves created a new nation. Indeed, in the history of our times yours will be recorded as the first of the African nationalisms, and this tide of national consciousness which is now rising in Africa is a fact for which you and we and the other nations of the western world are ultimately responsible. For its causes are to be found in the achievements of western civilisation, in the pushing forward of the frontiers of knowledge, in the applying of science in the service of human needs, in the expanding of food production, in the speeding and multiplying of the means of communication, and perhaps, above all, the spread of education.

As I have said, the growth of national consciousness in Africa is a political fact and we must accept it as such. That means, I would judge, that we must come to terms with it. I sincerely believe that if we cannot do so we may imperil the precarious balance between the East and West on which the peace of the world depends. The world today is divided into three main groups. First there are what we call the Western Powers. You in South Africa and we in Britain belong to this group, together with our friends and allies in other parts of the Commonwealth. In the United States of America and in Europe we call it the Free World. Secondly there are the Communists—Russia and her satellites in Europe and China whose population will
rise by the end of the next ten years to the staggering total of 800,000,000. Thirdly, there are those parts of the world whose people are at present uncommitted either to Communism or to our Western ideas.

In this context we think first of Asia and of Africa. As I see it the great issue in this second half of the twentieth century is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa will swing to the East or to the West. Will they be drawn into the Communist camp? Or will the great experiments in self-government that are now being made in Asia and Africa, especially within the Commonwealth, prove so successful, and by their example so compelling, that the balance will come down in favour of freedom and order and justice?

The struggle is joined and it is a struggle for the minds of men. What is now on trial is much more than our military strength or our diplomatic and administrative skill. It is our way of life. The uncommitted nations want to see before they choose.

What can we show them to help them choose right? Each of the independent members of the Commonwealth must answer that question for itself. It is a basic principle of our modern Commonwealth that we respect each other's sovereignty in matters of internal policy. At the same time we must recognise that in this shrinking world in which we live today the internal policies of one nation may have effects outside it. We may sometimes be tempted to say to each other "Mind your own business", but in these days I would myself expand the old saying so that it runs: "Mind your own business but mind how it affects my business, too".

Let me be very frank with you, my friends. What Governments and Parliaments in the United Kingdom have done since the war in according independence to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya and Ghana, and what they will do for Nigeria and other countries now nearing independence, all this, though we take full and sole responsibility for it, we do in the belief that it is the only way to establish the future of the Commonwealth and of the Free World on sound foundations. All this of course is also of deep and close concern to you for nothing we do in this small world can be done in a corner or remain hidden. What we do today in West, Central and East Africa becomes known tomorrow to everyone in the Union, whatever his language, colour or traditions. Let me assure you, in all friendliness, that we are well aware of this and that we have acted and will act with full knowledge of the responsibility we have to all our friends.

Nevertheless I am sure you will agree that in our own areas of responsibility we must each do what we think right. What we think right derives from a long experience both of failure and success in the management of our own affairs. We have tried to learn and apply the lessons of our judgment of right and wrong. Our justice is rooted in the same soil as yours—in Christianity and in the rule of law as the basis of a free society. This experience of our own explains why it has been our aim in the countries for which we have borne responsibility, not only to raise the material standards of living, but also to create a society which respects the rights of individuals, a society in which men are given the opportunity to grow to their full stature—and that must in our view include the opportunity to have an increasing share in political power and responsibility, a society in which individual merit and individual merit alone is the criterion for a man's advancement, whether political or economic.

Finally in countries inhabited by several different races it has been our aim to find means by which the community can become more of a community, and fellowship
can be fostered between its various parts. This problem is by no means confined to Africa. Nor is it always a problem of a European minority. In Malaya, for instance, though there are Indian and European minorities, Malays and Chinese make up the great bulk of the population, and the Chinese are not much fewer in numbers than the Malays. Yet these two peoples must learn to live together in harmony and unity and the strength of Malaya as a nation will depend on the different contributions which the two races can make.

The attitude of the United Kingdom towards this problem was clearly expressed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, speaking at the United Nations General Assembly on the 17th September 1959. These were his words:

“In those territories where different races or tribes live side by side the task is to ensure that all the people may enjoy security and freedom and the chance to contribute as individuals to the progress and well being of these countries. We reject the idea of any inherent superiority of one race over another. Our policy therefore is non-racial. It offers a future in which Africans, Europeans, Asians, the peoples of the Pacific and others with whom we are concerned, will all play their full part as citizens in the countries where they live, and in which feelings of race will be submerged in loyalty to new nations.”

I have thought you would wish me to state plainly and with full candour the policy for which we in Britain stand. It may well be that in trying to do our duty as we see it we shall sometimes make difficulties for you. If this proves to be so we shall regret it. But I know that even so you would not ask us to flinch from doing our duty.

You, too, will do your duty as you see it. I am well aware of the peculiar nature of the problems with which you are faced here in the Union of South Africa. I know the differences between your situation and that of most of the other states in Africa. You have here some three million people of European origin. This country is their home. It has been their home for many generations. They have no other. The same is true of Europeans in Central and East Africa. In most other African states those who have come from Europe have come to work, to contribute their skills, perhaps to teach, but not to make a home.

The problems to which you as members of the Union Parliament have to address yourselves are very different from those which face the Parliaments of countries with homogeneous populations. These are complicated and baffling problems. It would be surprising if your interpretation of your duty did not sometimes produce very different results from ours in terms of Government policies and actions.

As a fellow member of the Commonwealth it is our earnest desire to give South Africa our support and encouragement, but I hope you won’t mind my saying frankly that there are some aspects of your policies which make it impossible for us to do this without being false to our own deep convictions about the political destinies of free men to which in our own territories we are trying to give effect. I think we ought, as friends, to face together, without seeking to apportion credit or blame, the fact that in the world of today this difference of outlook lies between us.

I said that I was speaking as a friend. I can also claim to be speaking as a relation, for we Scots can claim family connections with both the great European sections of your population, not only with the English-speaking people but with the Afrikaans-speaking as well. This is a point which hardly needs emphasis in Cape Town where you can see every day the statue of that great Scotsman, Andrew Murray. His work in
the Dutch Reformed Church in the Cape, and the work of his son in the Orange Free State, was among Afrikaans-speaking people. There has always been a very close connection between the Church of Scotland and the Church of the Netherlands. The Synod of Dort plays the same great part in the history of both. Many aspirants to the Ministry of Scotland, especially in the 17th and 18th centuries, went to pursue their theological studies in the Netherlands. Scotland can claim to have repaid the debt in South Africa. I am thinking particularly of the Scots in the Orange Free State. Not only the younger Andrew Murray, but also the Robertsons, the Frasers, the McDonalds—families which have been called the Free State clans who became burghers of the old Free State and whose descendants still play their part there.

But though I count myself a Scot my mother was an American, and the United States provides a valuable illustration of one of the main points which I have been trying to make in my remarks today. Its population, like yours, is a blend of many different strains and over the years most of those who have gone to North America have gone there in order to escape conditions in Europe which they found intolerable. The Pilgrim Fathers were fleeing from persecution as Puritans and the Marylanders from persecution as Roman Catholics. Throughout the 19th century a stream of immigrants flowed across the Atlantic to escape from poverty in their homelands, and in the 20th century the United States have provided asylum for the victims of political oppression in Europe.

Thus for the majority of its inhabitants America has been a place of refuge, or place to which people went because they wanted to get away from Europe. It is not surprising, therefore, that for so many years a main objective of American statesmen, supported by the American public, was to isolate themselves from Europe, and with their great material strength, and the vast resources open to them, this might have seemed an attractive and practicable course. Nevertheless in the two world wars of this century they have found themselves unable to stand aside. Twice their manpower in arms has streamed back across the Atlantic to shed its blood in those European struggles from which their ancestors thought they would escape by emigrating to the New World; and when the second war was over they were forced to recognise that in the small world of today isolationism is out of date and offers no assurance of security.

The fact is that in this modern world no country, not even the greatest, can live for itself alone. Nearly 2,000 years ago, when the whole of the civilised world was comprised within the confines of the Roman Empire, St. Paul proclaimed one of the great truths of history—we are all members one of another. During this twentieth century that eternal truth has taken on a new and exciting significance. It has always been impossible for the individual man to live in isolation from his fellows, in the home, the tribe, the village, or the city. Today it is impossible for nations to live in isolation from one another. What Dr. John Donne said of individual men three hundred years ago is true today of my country, your country, and all the countries of the world: “Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind. And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”

All nations now are interdependent one upon another and this is generally realised throughout the western world. I hope in due course the countries of Communism will recognise it too.

It was certainly with that thought in mind that I took the decision to visit Moscow about this time last year. Russia has been isolationist in her time and still has
tendencies that way, but the fact remains that we must live in the same world with Russia and we must find a way of doing so. I believe that the initiative which we took last year has had some success, although grave difficulties may arise. Nevertheless I think nothing but good can come out of its extending contacts between individuals, contacts in trade and from the exchange of visitors.

I certainly do not believe in refusing to trade with people because you may happen to dislike the way they manage their internal affairs at home. Boycotts will never get you anywhere, and may I say in parenthesis that I deprecate the attempts that are being made today in Britain to organise the consumer boycott of South African goods. It has never been the practice, as far as I know, of any Government of the United Kingdom of whatever complexion to undertake or support campaigns of this kind designed to influence the internal politics of another Commonwealth country, and my colleagues in the United Kingdom deplore this proposed boycott and regard it as undesirable from every point of view. It can only have serious effects on Commonwealth relations, on trade, and lead to the ultimate detriment of others than those against whom it is aimed.

I said I was speaking of the interdependence of nations. The members of the Commonwealth feel particularly strongly the value of interdependence. They are as independent as any nation in this shrinking world can be, but they have voluntarily agreed to work together. They recognise that there may be and must be differences in their institutions; in their internal policies, and their membership does not imply the wish to express a judgment on these matters, or the need to impose a stifling uniformity. It is, I think, a help that there has never been question of any rigid constitution for the Commonwealth. Perhaps this is because we have got on well enough in the United Kingdom without a written constitution and tend to look suspiciously at them. Whether that is so or not, it is quite clear that a rigid constitutional framework for the Commonwealth would not work. At the first of the stresses and strains which are inevitable in this period of history, cracks would appear in the framework and the whole structure would crumble. It is the flexibility of our Commonwealth institutions which gives them their strength.

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen, I fear I have kept you a long time. I much welcome the opportunity to speak to this great audience. In conclusion may I say this. I have spoken frankly about the differences between our two countries in their approach to one of the great current problems with which each has to deal within its own sphere of responsibility. These differences are well-known. They are matters of public knowledge, indeed of public controversy, and I should have been less than honest if by remaining silent on them I had seemed to imply that they did not exist. But differences on one subject, important though it is, need not and should not impair our capacity to co-operate with one another in furthering the many practical interests which we share in common.

The independent members of the Commonwealth do not always agree on every subject. It is not a condition of their association that they should do so. On the contrary the strength of our Commonwealth lies largely in the fact that it is a free association of independent sovereign states, each responsible for ordering its own affairs but co-operating in the pursuit of common aims and purposes in world affairs. Moreover these differences may be transitory. In time they may be resolved. Our duty is to see them in perspective against the background of our long association. Of this at any rate I am certain—that those of us who by grace of the electorate are temporarily
in charge of affairs in your country and in mine, we fleeting transient phantoms in
the great stage of history, we have no right to sweep aside on this account the
friendship that exists between our countries, for that is the legacy of history. It is not
ours alone to deal with as we wish. To adapt a famous phrase, it belongs to those who
are living, but it also belongs to those who are dead and to those who are yet unborn.
We must face the differences, but let us try to see beyond them down the long vista of
the future.

I hope—indeed, I am confident—that in another 50 years we shall look back on
the differences that exist between us now as matters of historical interest, for as time
passes and one generation yields to another, human problems change and fade. Let
us remember these truths. Let us resolve to build not to destroy, and let us
remember always that weakness comes from division, strength from unity.

CAB 128/34, CC 9(60)2 16 Feb 1960
[Report by Mr Macmillan on his African tour]: Cabinet conclusions

[The prime minister made a formal statement to the House of Commons on the same day,
stressing that ‘it would be wrong to try to apply a single and simple solution to a
multiform and complex problem’; he believed it was important that the UK should so
manage its economic affairs as to be able to make increasing contributions in aid to
developing countries—to be ‘the good neighbour overseas’ (H of C Debs, vol 617, cols
1132–1137).]

The Prime Minister said he did not propose at this stage to make a detailed report to
the Cabinet on the visit which he had just made to the four Commonwealth
countries in Africa which had attained, or were nearing, independence. Some of the
specific problems which he had been studying at first hand in Africa would come to
the Cabinet for decision in due course. Meanwhile, he would content himself with
giving a few of the impressions which he had formed during his tour.

Ghana, he thought, would have few serious problems to face. The politicians might
behave irresponsibly from time to time, in the first flush of independence; but this
was a country inhabited by a homogeneous population and rich in natural resources
and neither its political nor its economic problems need be serious.

Nigeria had a great future before it if, under its Federal structure, its various
peoples could work together in a spirit of national unity. It was a large country and
could exercise a valuable influence over its smaller neighbours. The new discoveries
of oil which had been made there might substantially strengthen its economy. Its
leaders were ready to accept continuing advice and assistance from the United
Kingdom, and there was good reason to hope that it would prove a loyal and useful
member of the Commonwealth.

In South Africa the main political problems arose from the doctrinaire policy of
the Nationalist Government on race relations. Though we could not endorse that
policy, we must remember that it was their responsibility, not ours. It would be a
tragedy if South Africa’s links with the Commonwealth were weakened by reason of
differences of opinion on that question. South Africa had a strong and flourishing
economy and had a valuable part to play in the Commonwealth.

In the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the United Kingdom Government
had a more direct responsibility for finding a means of constitutional progress in a
multi-racial society. This was a difficult task, and it had been made even more
difficult by the apprehensions aroused among Europeans in the Federation by the
rapid growth of national consciousness throughout Africa. It was now our duty to
find a way of constitutional advance which would be sufficient to satisfy the Africans
without unduly alarming the Europeans. In this, the work of the Monckton
Commission should prove to be valuable. The immediate need was to study European
opinion in these territories and to keep it stable while the processes of constitutional
review were being carried out over the next year. There was at present a real risk that
the future of Federation would be prejudiced before those processes could be completed.
The Cabinet:—
Took note of the Prime Minister’s statement.

34 DO 35/8039, no 14 [27 Apr 1960]
‘British colonial policy in Africa’: draft CRO declaration.1 Minutes by
G B Shannon, Sir A Clutterbuck, Lord Home and Sir H Lintott

1. The goal is freedom and independence.
2. We recognise as legitimate the aspirations of the peoples of the African
territories to manage their own affairs.
3. But before transferring power, we would wish to be satisfied that certain basic
principles of just and democratic rule will be respected:—
   – There must be no discrimination on grounds of race, colour or creed. Merit alone
   is the criterion of the place of the individual in society.
   – The rights of minorities, whether racial, political or religious, must be
   safeguarded.
4. Justice and statesmanship, and the practical responsibility of the United
Kingdom Government towards these future nations require that, when we withdraw,
it should be in the confident assurance that these principles will be observed.
5. But the establishment of independent nations observing these conditions
depends, not on written constitutions, but on the will, the character and the abilities
of the peoples themselves.
6. We have shown, and are showing, confidence in the ability of African peoples
to create independent nations which fulfil these criteria. Ghana is independent,
Nigeria will be in October, 1960; rapid progress is being made in other African
territories.
7. The transition to self-government and independence must take longer in the
territories where two or more races have their homes. That is because mutual
tolerance and respect between races take time to establish on a secure basis.
8. In these territories the aim of British policy is a steady increase in the part
played in politics and administration by the inhabitants of whatever race. But until
all races accept fully and unreservedly the principle of racial equality, there will have

1 See document no 30 above. This version was eventually passed by Lord Home: 'I think this is the best we
can do. H. 22.4.60'. Subsequently, however, the idea was dropped (see final minute).
to be constitutional checks to preserve a proper balance between the rights of the different communities.

9. This implies in particular that the extension of the franchise must be progressive. Complete universal suffrage (“one man one vote”) is only meaningful in a democratic society when voters and their leaders can use the majorities which they may command with wisdom and forbearance.

10. Extremists of whatever race will not help. The call is for tolerance, order and moderation. These will be achieved through the spread of education which stands high among our purposes. Education, too, will ensure that enough citizens are competent to take their part in all the complex activities of a modern society, and to achieve the economic stability without which independence is illusory.

11. These are the principles that guide our policy today. The United Kingdom Government are determined to pursue with vigour and confidence this great task of the creation of new, independent nations in Africa.

Minutes on no 34

I am sorry to have kept this so long. I am not very happy about either the idea or any of the proposed wordings of a declaration.

2. British policy in most spheres is empirical, and a declaration in set terms imports an element of rigidity. Declarations soon get out of date, and then either have to be deliberately scrapped, or replaced by new ones. The process can be uncomfortable. In the general political sphere, look at the Labour Party’s Charter. In the sphere of colonial policy, the Devonshire doctrine\(^2\) of the paramountcy of native interests did not last very long.

3. It is, moreover, difficult to devise and to defend a wording limited to dependent territories in Africa. We should be asked whether we will apply the same principles to dependent territories elsewhere, and, if not, why not, and what principles we would apply there. Even in Africa, it will be difficult to formulate a declaration which will include the High Commission Territories, without causing difficulties with the Union, whilst we could not specifically exclude them.

4. If there is to be a declaration of the kind suggested, the wording will be looked at under a microscope after it has been made and therefore needs to be examined with care before it is made, e.g., do we mean different things by “self-government” and “independence”? When we say “universal suffrage (one man one vote)” do we or do we not mean votes for women? I think too that something should be included about economic and technical support both before and after independence.

5. My conclusion is that, if there is to be a declaration at all, it should be in bombastic and high flown terms, which sound well but are not susceptible of detailed interpretation. It was with the intention of producing a draft on these lines that I kept the file, but pressure of other requirements has prevented me from producing it. I will not delay the file further, but shall be happy to attend any discussion on the subject.

G.B.S.
28.3.60

---

\(^2\) A declaration made in 1923 to the effect that ‘primarily Kenya is an African territory’ and that ‘the interests of the African natives must be paramount’.
Secretary of State: Much water has flowed under the bridge since the PM’s talk with Dr Nkrumah at Accra. We now have the Cape Town speech as our locus classicus, and no-one can say that our broad policy is not known to the world. Ministers have refused so far to put any gloss on, or add interpretations to, the Cape Town speech, and Dr Nkrumah, though given opportunity, has not returned to the charge. There seems much to be said therefore for avoiding any further “declaration” at this juncture—which indeed, however well-intentioned, might be highly dangerous in the present fluid and explosive situation in Africa. Moreover it would be extremely difficult to draft in a way which would hold the balance as one would wish and at the same time would not expose us afterwards to recrimination in one quarter or another.

This is not to say that we shd. not have in the background a “defensive” brief, to be agreed with the Colonial Office, giving an outline of our policy; but that is a different thing from taking the initiative & tying ourselves down to a declaration. Perhaps we could discuss with you before matters are carried further?

A.C.
13.4.60

I don’t much like the draft. I will take away & give some thought to it at the weekend. It may be right to put something up to Col. Sec. & P.M. but it will clearly have weaknesses & dangers of which all must be aware.

H.
14.4.60

Secretary of State

I don’t think you ever liked this Declaration much (nor, indeed, did those who drafted it). What I think you and your colleagues had in mind was that this text could be a useful standby at the time of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting in case either (a) Dr. Nkrumah reverted to the idea of a joint declaration and his January draft or (b) the discussion on South Africa at the Prime Ministers’ Meeting got so out of hand that a unilateral declaration of this kind by the United Kingdom could provide, outside the formal communiqué, a focus for the expression of views on the racial question.

As it turned out, it was not needed; Dr. Nkrumah did not revert to his draft or to the idea of a joint declaration, and indeed Sharpeville\(^3\) had entirely altered the context from that in which he had put forward his suggestion earlier.

Looked at in the light of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, this draft declaration seems even flatter and more platitudeous than before and I very much hope that Dr. Nkrumah will not return to the charge and, indeed, I should think it unlikely that he will.

We had better let Sir A. Snelling know what has happened (or rather not happened), but I think it would be better to conclude the draft letter opposite by instructing him definitely not to re-open the question of a declaration with Dr. Nkrumah and that, if the latter raises it, he should simply say that he would imagine that U.K. Ministers would feel that what with the Cape Town speech and all that was said in and around the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, everybody’s views on racial

\(^3\) See document no 477 in Part II.
problems in Africa had been pretty fully expressed and that any formal declaration
would be rather an anti-climax.

H.L.
23.6.60

I think any draft we could devise is likely to be ‘platitudinous & flat’ so I inclined not
to pursue the idea. If Dr. N. returns to it or if we have better thoughts we can look at
the possibility again. Could Mr Snelling improve the draft with the benefit of local
atmosphere?4

H.
27.6.60

4 A W Snelling left the CRO, where he was assistant under-secretary of state, to become high

35 PREM 11/3240, PM(60)33 31 May 1960
[Progress report on colonial policy]: minute by Mr Macleod to
Mr Macmillan

We are almost half way through the much-heralded year 1960 and I think you might
like to have a progress report on what has been done and on the problems that lie
ahead.

2. The emergency in Nyasaland will be brought to an end in a week or two. When
that happens, following on the ending of the emergencies in Cyprus and Kenya, there
will be for the first time for more than a dozen years no emergency in the Colonial
territories. This does not mean that there are not any number of trouble spots, but it
does mean that things have gone fairly well in a period of some tension. My
comments on the individual areas would be as follows:—

(1) Cyprus. You know how far we have gone here and how well Julian1 has done.
Frankly, I am not wholly convinced that we gave him the right instructions last time,
although naturally the Turkish coup would have made impossible the alternative of a
Foreign Ministers’ conference. The Turkish position, however, may work on the
whole for us rather than against us and the next few days will presumably clear this
matter up. If Julian can use the formula of cession as a way into further talks and
clear up the outstanding problems, that would be splendid. The Bill went through
Legislation Committee today and is ready for presentation. If on the other hand
Makarios pockets a formula on cession and begins to argue again on other and new
matters, I am sure Julian should break off and come home and we should consider
the summoning of a conference.

(2) The West Indies. As a result of the protracted Cyprus negotiations it isn’t
possible for Julian to go to The West Indies, and as you know I am taking his place.
On the other hand, this is a particularly convenient time for me to go and Hailes2 has
been urging it for some time. There are considerable tensions between Trinidad and

1 J Amery, parliamentary under-secretary of state at CO.
2 Lord Hailes, governor-general of the West Indies, 1957–1962; formerly P G T Buchan-Hepburn,
this country and much wild talk about taking Trinidad out of the Federation. The Federation itself is inefficiently led at the moment by Sir Grantley Adams and there is a strong move, which I hope succeeds, to replace him with Mr. Manley from Jamaica. In any event, I am glad I will be able to take my own soundings and also, I hope, to complete the Trinidad Constitutional Conference, which broke down in London last autumn.

(3) **Malta.** The deadlock here has gone on too long and I have decided that we must break it. I attach as Annex I to this minute a copy of my recent directive on this subject. The deadlock arises, of course, because of the apparent inconsistency between our defence needs and the almost universal cry for independence for Malta. I think we must feel our way towards a solution, probably via the calling of a National Assembly. My minute lays down the sort of timetable that I am aiming for.

(4) **West Africa.** Here almost all the news is cheerful. We had excellent conferences on Nigeria and Sierra Leone and managed to secure satisfactory defence agreements from both. Sierra Leone will become independent in April next year and then the only Colonial territory in West Africa will be the Gambia. It isn't easy to say what will become of this, although I believe the most likely solution is that, in spite of the physical separation, it will federate with Sierra Leone.

(5) **Somaliland.** The Conference went extremely well, although inevitably there was a slightly Edward Learish air about its proceedings. I was more impressed than I expected to be with the calibre of the leader of the deputation, but they are, of course, very unprepared for self-rule. However, they would be just as unprepared, say, in September, and we would have accumulated a store of bitterness towards ourselves for the future. I am sure the decision we have taken is right, although there is no doubt that Ethiopia is deeply suspicious that we have plots for the creation of a Greater Somalia.

There are, of course, problems in some of the distant and island territories, but they are not of great moment. The heart of the Colonial problems remains in the multi-racial communities of East and Central Africa. If we can solve these problems—and it is a big “if”—everything will fall into place.

(6) **East Africa**

(a) **Tanganyika.** This continues to be the brightest spot. They are to have elections with an African Chief Minister (the first in East or Central Africa) in October. Julius Nyerere will be the Chief Minister. He has always shown excellent cooperation with us and the Governor and a complete understanding of the economic needs of his country and the need for keeping British administration and Western capital and know-how. There is no reason why Tanganyika should not continue to go forward and prosper.

(b) **Uganda.** The problem here is an extremely complex and difficult one. In no other territory is the political picture so confused. No national African leader of any sort has yet emerged. In consequence the struggle goes on between the

---

3 Prime minister of the West Indies.
4 Premier of Jamaica.
5 ‘We must determine now that we will start the process of ending direct rule. This is not to be thought of as a delaying operation nor as an exercise foredoomed to fail. That way lies certain failure. The history of previous constitutional discussions on Malta is deeply discouraging’.
6 A conference by the end of the year.
traditional forces represented by the Kabaka and the other Agreement Rulers and the rising power of the political parties. We must try and keep the balance between these and not sacrifice either. Accordingly there are to be elections following on the recommendations of the Wild Committee, which you will remember, early next year. At the same time I am setting up a Commission to advise on the relationship between the territories which have Rulers and the rest of the country. In this way I hope to preserve an uneasy advance. But the situation is in my view potentially very explosive, although because there is no real colour problem involved it does not attract the headlines in the same way as events in Kenya and further south.

(c) Kenya. The political situation here remains turbulent. Amongst the Africans there is a struggle going on for political power and some encouraging signs that a monolithic African party is not going to emerge. The issue of Kenyatta will be stirred up by the Corfield Report, which appears today. In any case, as far as we are concerned we have given a completely flat answer that there is no question whatever of his release. European trading sentiment is probably not unfavourable to Blundell, but the European farming community (actually only some 2,500 families) is fairly solidly pro-Briggs. I do not think that Briggs, however, is the real danger. A more difficult person is Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, who is trying to form a sort of European alliance. He will come over here in the summer and will seek an interview with me and seek in effect the reversal of the Lancaster House agreement. I will, of course, receive him, but give him no encouragement whatever on his mission. Indeed, if he succeeds, I really believe the future of Kenya is hopeless. For there would be a return to purely racial politics and racial thinking, and it is the great achievement of Blundell and of the Lancaster House Conference that we began to lead Kenya away from this sterile approach. Blundell has (probably wisely) refused the offer of an award that was made to him. I hope very much that he succeeds, for in his policies lies the best, indeed perhaps the only, hope of inter-racial thinking.

(7) The Central African Federation. I think the clearest way of showing what my thinking is in relation to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland at the moment is to send you a copy of the letter that I have written to Sir Roy Welensky yesterday. I attach this as Annex II. I think the future largely depends upon two men. Firstly upon Walter Monckton, whose report will, I think, guide the whole of our approach to the Federal Review. If his report is both in favour of federation and yet sufficiently progressive, federation can reasonably be expected to win through. The second man

---

8 F D Corfield, Historical survey of the origins and growth of Mau Mau (Nairobi & HMSO, 1960; Cmd 1030). Corfield retired from the Sudan Political Service (provincial gov) in 1952; lived in Kenya from 1954; secretary to Game Policy Committee.
9 Gp Capt L R Briggs was a right-winger opposed to all concessions to the Africans; Cavendish-Bentinck was Speaker of Kenya Leg. Co, 1955–1960, and formed the Coalition Party.
10 In this letter Macleod made the point that 'the true problem is not really Nyasaland but Northern Rhodesia. We are still, of course, in the dark about what exactly will happen in the Congo. . . . In all my thinking about Nyasaland I have been concentrating upon what I call the realities of power as against the appearance of power: and I am sure that in Nyasaland that means firm retention of official control of the executive at the present stage'.
is Roy himself. A moment will certainly come when he will have to tell his party leaders in the two Northern Territories to fall in and follow him. If he will do that, again all will be well. But there is also, as you know, that dour and clever man Whitehead.\textsuperscript{11} I am afraid that his decisions will be taken mainly on a basis of Southern Rhodesian political calculations: to this extent he is unpredictable.

(8) Overseas Civil Service. You have sent me minutes expressing your concern at the possibility of a serious loss in morale here. I fully share this anxiety. This uneasiness has, of course, appeared in all territories as they begin to move towards responsible self-government or independence; but it is essential that we do what we can to meet it. I am putting my detailed plans to the Colonial Policy Committee, as you asked me to do, after the Whitsun recess.\textsuperscript{12} In brief, my main suggestion will be that we should take over the overseas and inducement elements of the pay and pensions of those serving overseas; in other words, we would offer a British officer to a territory, say, in Africa at the local price and pay the difference ourselves. This is what the United Nations do, for example, with their technical experts. It would, I believe, make the relationship between the Civil Service and the territories they worked for very much easier and would, of course, be a great relief to the countries themselves. But the cost is something of the order of £14 million and no doubt the Chancellor will wish to study this very closely, particularly as a portion of it is overseas expenditure.

This leads me to the last point that I wish to make. In territories like Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Kenya, where the final test of our policies will come, more money is needed. Not much more money—say £10 million in all, or the equivalent of the building of a few hundred council houses. But it is essential in these places to encourage African agriculture and African education more than we have been doing, and no expenditure would be more worth while.

This picture inevitably has light and shade in it, but I think it is not unhopeful and that we can look forward to the problems ahead of us with some satisfaction as a result of the first half of 1960.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} Sir Edgar Whitehead, prime minister of Southern Rhodesia since 1958.
\textsuperscript{12} This came to the Cabinet on 21 July 1960: see document no 85 below.
\textsuperscript{13} Mr Macmillan minuted that ‘this came more or less out of the blue. As far as I remember I did not ask for it, but I am glad to have it so as to know what is going on’ (to Sir N Brook, 4.6.60). Brook advised that it did not call for a written reply, but was best talked over with Macleod; he agreed it would not be wise to show it to Lord Home, as ‘it contains one or two passages which seem to imply regret that progress towards independence cannot be even faster, and the Commonwealth Secretary might perhaps find this somewhat disturbing’ (Brook to prime minister, 17.6.60).
East Africa

In each of the four territories the next few weeks are going to be of critical importance.

1. *Kenya.* The primary elections for the reserved seats will be held on January 19th–23rd and the open elections about a month later. On the whole the political news from Kenya has become more reassuring recently. On the African side it seems very likely now that the African opposition party which on the whole represents the smaller tribes (KADU) will obtain something like twelve or fifteen out of the 33 seats with the remainder going to the KANU party representing in the main the two largest tribes, Kikuyu and Luo. This means that the chances of a coalition Government, which would be perhaps the best answer, are very much increased. Equally on the European side the prospects of Blundell and the NKG and the various independents associated with him are somewhat brighter and he should get a reasonable number of seats. But Kenya politics have in the past depended entirely on personalities and the outcome of the reserved seats is difficult to forecast.

The Kenya financial problem is causing considerable concern. The actual drain away of money seemed to have stopped, and indeed been reversed, in October; but the budgetary position of Kenya is naturally as a result of the drop in income extremely weak. We will have to help in this field for the next financial year. It has never appeared likely that confidence would be restored this side of the election and it will, of course, depend very much on the attitude of African leaders whether it can be restored afterwards.

There is also, of course, the formidable problem of Jomo Kenyatta. The Governor wishes to discuss this matter while he is on his present visit to this country.

2. *Uganda.* The problem here is essentially a relationship problem between the Kabaka and to a lesser extent the other three minor Rulers and the rest of the Protectorate. The press in this country concentrates on the Kabaka and the manoeufrings of the Baganda tribe, but we must not forget that the rest of the Protectorate are deeply distrustful of the Baganda and are very much afraid that H.M.G. will give in to them. It was clearly necessary to turn down the request for immediate talks on secession, but I tried to do this in as soft a way as possible and on the whole, although the position in Uganda is somewhat Gilbertian as a result, we seem for the time being to have reached a satisfactory answer; that is to say, we have got over the D-day of New Year’s Eve without any trouble at all, whereas at one point it appeared likely that we might have to declare an emergency. It is of course my hope that through the medium of the Munster Commission¹ which is going out this month to Uganda we will be able to find a solution which will preserve the Kabakaship and the position of the other Rulers. The Kabaka himself knows and appreciates this but is not always strong enough to carry his more extreme Ministers with him.

3. *Tanganyika.* What will in effect be the Tanganyikan Independence Conference will be held in Dar-es-Salaam in March and I propose to take it myself. Tanganyika itself continues to be comparatively plain sailing, but the question of East African federation is one on which we shall have to take a position in March. The difficulty is that Nyerere claims that federation is not practicable until all the four territories are at the Chief Minister stage, although if things go well in Kenya and Uganda it might

be possible to appoint an African Chief Minister within a very short time. The balance of advantage seems to me to lie clearly in favour of federation, but again I shall be discussing this with the East African Governors at our conference. I am equally sure that until we are certain that it will succeed we should not proclaim our adherence to it too strongly.

4. *Zanzibar.* There are to be elections this month and a Chief Minister will be appointed after them. I do not anticipate any problems arising in this territory which we could not contain.

5. There is in addition the general problem of the Colonial Service in East Africa which partly because of the Congo and memories of Mau Mau is very jumpy indeed. Our proposals for taking over the inducement element of pay have gone some way to help and I hope that when we announce, as we will do in a few days, the results of the Fleming Commission\(^2\) on Civil Service Salaries for East Africa we may finally be able to convince them of H.M.G.’s good faith in these matters. But it is an uphill task.

**Central Africa**

1. *Northern Rhodesia.* The Territorial Conference will reassemble on the 30th January. The Monckton Commission unfortunately recommended an African majority in the Legislative Council and it is going to be very difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate anything less than this with the Africans. On the other hand it would be almost equally impossible to push the Europeans so far. The solution clearly is going to lie somewhere round parity and I am really thinking in terms of a token African majority amongst the elected members while preserving an official plus European majority through the official Ministers who would be members of the Council. We will really know in advance of the 30th January whether this conference is going to succeed or fail and with it whether the Federation has a chance or not, because if Sir Roy is prepared to accept and recommend something like this solution I believe we could push the Africans into a reluctant acquiescence. If he doesn’t, and the Conference fails, it is hard to see how Federation itself would survive.

2. *Nyasaland.* Elections cannot be held until early June. The UFP are trying by various devices to delay them and I am sure this is foolish. We may not get rid of the tension in Nyasaland after the election; we certainly are not going to get rid of it until the election comes and we must, I am sure, hold to the earliest possible date. The situation there is complicated by what appears to be a struggle for power between Dr. Banda, who with all his faults represents the moderate element, and Mr. Chipembere,\(^3\) who is going to be prosecuted for sedition in the near future and who advocates as he did in the emergency days, more extreme solutions.

**Malta**

I have now got the report of the Sir Hilary Blood Commission\(^4\) and will be circulating a summary of it to the C.P.C., together with my proposals, in a few days. I think it is an extremely competent bit of work and gives Malta an advanced and liberal


\(^{3}\) H B M Chipembere, elected member of Nyasaland Leg Co, 1956, treasurer-general of Malawi Congress Party, organiser of the return of Dr Banda; subsequently minister of local government.

constitution not far away from the Singapore pattern. I think Mintoff is almost sure to fight the election and he would be foolish to refuse to do so. But he may well after that either call a referendum on independence, assuming he wins the election, or decline to take office unless we make a forthcoming statement about self-determination. I will consider this further and report to the C.P.C. when I put my proposals before it.

The West Indies

Here, if the inter-governmental talks go well and if the Jamaica referendum is won by Manley (both of which seem probable, though neither is certain), we should be able to proceed to the West Indies Independence Conference in June or July and independence might come about nine months later. The successful conclusion of the West Indian Bases talks is a good augury for the future.

Colonial affairs are notoriously unpredictable and there may well be other candidates for the headlines. Aden and Fiji in particular may well cause us problems, although probably not quite yet. Moreover matters in the Far East might so develop that Hong Kong and Singapore create problems that we cannot foresee at this stage. But the list summarised above seems to me to be our major problems as we start the New Year. We will be fortunate indeed if we get through them all without major difficulty.

We have, I think, come through 1960 reasonably well. I have tried to define the pace of British colonial policy in Africa as “not as fast as the Congo and not as slow as Algiers” and we have in spite of many contrary pressures managed so far to hold to this. British territories in Africa have come to an uneventful and welcome independence. All the emergencies that existed in the colonial territories have been ended and now for the first time for thirteen years there is no emergency in any of the dependent territories.

But if we are realistic we must confront the fact that if there is to be a Congo in British territories it is most likely to happen in Kenya, and if there is to be an Algiers it is most likely to happen in the Central African Federation. Although African states have been brought successfully to their independence, no one has yet succeeded in bringing to independence a state which includes a large settler population. If we can achieve that then we will have succeeded in doing what the Prime Minister once defined as “turning an Empire into a family”. We must also recognise that pressure from the United Nations, now that Belgium and France are dropping out as colonial powers, will increasingly concentrate on us. And there will be echoing voices from their different viewpoints from both the extreme right and the extreme left in this country. 1961, then, is sure to be a year of drama and decision in the colonial field.

East Africa

The Colonial Secretary said that, apart from the Central African Federation, by far the most difficult problem would be East Africa and, in particular, Kenya. There was likely to be growing pressure on the United Kingdom in the United Nations to bring Colonial Territories to independence, but so far there had been no single instance of a country where a dependent territory with a sizeable white settler population had been brought successfully to independence. The basic difficulty was to achieve an orderly transfer of power to the Africans without losing the confidence of the Europeans.

In his current discussions he had found that the Governors of the East African Territories were reasonably optimistic about the future. It seemed clear that opinion in all the Territories was developing in favour of the formation of an East African Federation. This was a matter which he would have to bring to the Committee in the near future, since it would inevitably arise at the proposed independence conference for Tanganyika to take place in Dar-es-Salaam in March, 1961. He was concerned at the attitude of a certain section of the United Kingdom press to events in Africa, and he was considering what action could be taken. The recently agreed extension of the Overseas Civil Service inducement scheme to cover certain locally engaged staff in Kenya, together with the forthcoming report of the Fleming Commission on Civil Service Salaries in East Africa, would be likely to have a steadying effect on the administration and on the situation generally.

In discussion it was suggested that it would be politically impossible for the United Kingdom to disengage from Kenya as rapidly as the Colonial Office appeared to envisage. We ought therefore to take the decision to remain responsible for the administration of Kenya for another eight to ten years. This would allow us sufficient time to embark on a comprehensive scheme of training of young Africans who by the end of that period would be ready to take over responsible posts from expatriate officers. We should try to get other members of the Commonwealth to understand the difficulties facing us in such territories, and to secure their support in countering irresponsible attacks in the United Nations on our Colonial policy. The cost of conducting a rescue operation in East Africa as a result of handing over power to Africans too soon was likely to be much higher than that of maintaining our position there over a longer period. A premature withdrawal from Kenya would be likely to lead to the emergence of a Congo-type situation which would contribute to the instability of the whole of the African Continent. It was also important for our defence interests that we should have security of tenure of certain bases in which to station our strategic reserve south of the Middle East barrier. We were contemplating the expenditure of a considerable sum of money on such installations in Kenya, but the decision whether to proceed, or alternatively to seek some other solution, would greatly depend on the period for which we might reasonably expect to be able to use the facilities.

As against these arguments, however, it was pointed out that although we must retain our responsibilities in East Africa for as long as possible, it was not possible in practice to administer the Territories by military force. There could be no question in practice of our being able to maintain our position in Kenya by consent for anything approaching eight years. The success of our policy in Tanganyika had been largely due to our willingness to consider a progressive and early transfer of power to the Africans and to the fortunate emergence of a moderate African leader of exceptional ability.
The Committee were in general agreement that the main hope of achieving stability in East Africa lay in the formation of an East African Federation. Not only would this be of great benefit to the Territories economically but it would be much easier effectively to entrench in the constitution provisions regarding individual and property rights of European settlers. It would also give each territory in the federation a vested interest in preserving stability in the other territories. Thus any attempt by a future government of Kenya to expropriate European settlers might be resisted and restrained by the other territories because of the economic consequences to the Federation as a whole. The Europeans in Kenya might be more inclined to acquiesce in an early transfer of power to Africans if they thought that by such means they would facilitate the creation of a federal system likely to afford political and economic safeguards for themselves. The emergence of an East African Federation should also make it easier to secure a satisfactory defence agreement after independence, on the lines of that negotiated with Nigeria and proposed for Sierra Leone. It had to be recognised, however, that even with such a defence agreement we might not be able to retain full liberty of action in regard to the purposes for which the forces stationed in the Federation could be used; and this might considerably detract from the usefulness of the Federation as a location for the general strategic reserve.

In further discussion about the setting up of an East African Federation the Committee were informed that it was the view of the Chief Minister of Tanganyika, Mr. Nyerere, that all the East African Territories should be brought as soon as possible to the stage of having an African Chief Minister, so that they could all enter a federation at a somewhat similar stage of constitutional development, but before they achieved independence separately. Mr. Nyerere would be willing if necessary to defer the attaining of Tanganyika’s independence for a short period in order to enable this state of affairs to be brought about. But, especially in view of the fact that Tanganyika was a United Nations Trust Territory, it was most unlikely that we should be able to avoid conceding independence either to Tanganyika alone or to an East African Federation of which she was a part, for longer than a few years. Furthermore, if as seemed possible, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar were likely to move fairly quickly towards independence it would be impossible to justify to the Kenya Africans the maintenance of United Kingdom rule in Kenya merely on account of the presence of significant numbers of Europeans. It was pointed out that it would be essential to ensure that the Territories entered a federation as a result of the freely expressed desire of their inhabitants, in order to avoid a situation arising similar to that in the case of the Central African Federation.

**Malta**

The Committee took note that the Colonial Secretary would shortly be submitting proposals for a new constitution for Malta, following which elections would be held. It seemed likely that if Mr. Mintoff were to win the elections there might be an early demand for independence.

**Southern Rhodesia**

*The Minister of State, Commonwealth Relations Office,²* informed the Committee that the Southern Rhodesian Constitutional Conference had adjourned to Salisbury

---

² Mr C J M Alport.
where, during the course of the next two or three weeks, the Southern Rhodesia Delegation would be attempting to work out amongst themselves some agreed proposals which the Commonwealth Secretary would consider when he visited Salisbury towards the end of January.

Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that the Committee would wish to resume its discussion on Colonial problems generally at a subsequent meeting, particularly in the light of the outcome of the current discussions which the Colonial Secretary was holding with the Governors of the East African Territories. For purposes of defence planning, the best estimate it was possible to make at present was that we should be able to retain our facilities in Kenya, either by virtue of our retaining responsibility for the territory, or by virtue of a defence agreement, for about six to seven years in all.

38 PREM 11/4608 22 Mar 1961
‘Africa: Lord Salisbury’s “Watching” Committee’: record of a meeting of the deputation with Mr Macmillan

The deputation consisted of Lord Salisbury, Lord Coleraine (minister of state at FO, 1943–1945), Lord Milverton (formerly, as A F Richards, governor of Nigeria, 1943–1947), Lord Lloyd (parliamentary under-secretary of state at CO, 1954–1957), J A Biggs-Davison, MP (member of parliamentary delegation to West Africa, 1956), R H Turton, MP (minister of health, 1955–1957), Lord Hinchinbrooke, Sir R Grimston, MP, Sir John Barlow, MP, and J B Eden, MP. In writing to thank the prime minister afterwards, Lord Salisbury said: ‘I must say quite frankly that we got very little comfort from it’ (ie, what Mr Macmillan had said) (23.3.61).

Lord Salisbury opened the proceedings by thanking the Prime Minister for his courtesy in receiving the deputation at a time when he must be very busy. He added that the Committee was not a body hostile to the Government. He referred to the Watching Committee which used to meet under his father’s Chairmanship in the early days of the war. This was a Committee of the same kind which had now been formed to keep an eye on developments in Africa and to concern itself both with questions of general policy towards that continent and special problems that might arise both inside and outside the territories within our control there. The views of the members of the committee, nevertheless, reflected certain views which were widely held outside. Lord Salisbury thought that it might be helpful if in discussions of this sort some fears which were current could be dispelled. Lord Salisbury said that there were 4 questions which they would like to discuss:

1. What were the views of Her Majesty’s Government about the future of the Europeans in Africa?
2. The United Nations Organisation and the Congo.
3. What was really happening about the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland?
4. Kenya. Lord Salisbury said that in some ways they felt that Kenya was the most unhappy of all the areas which they had in mind.

In reply the Prime Minister welcomed the delegation and referred to Lord Salisbury as an old friend and most distinguished man whose name was a household word. The Prime Minister said that he would not comment on what Lord Salisbury had said in another place: he was not Disraeli [this was an oblique reference to...].
Disraeli’s remark in the House of Commons in 1874 about Lord Salisbury’s
grandfather—“He is a great master of jibes and flouts and jeers.”]¹

The Prime Minister went on to say that Lord Salisbury had posed some broad
and pretty difficult questions. What was the future of Africa? Well, what was the future of
Asia? He would like to remind them, however, that Mr. Macleod’s period of office has
been the only one which for many years had not been marked by civil strife in the
territories in Africa for which the Colonial Secretary is responsible.

The Prime Minister said that in those countries in Africa where the Europeans are
not settlers and did not regard the country as their homeland (for example, Ghana
and Nigeria) the problem had not been too difficult. Nevertheless of course
everything might be said to have gone too quickly. But the risks involved in trying to
hold the situation had been greater than those involved in advancing as fast as we
did.

For the rest, if a settlement of the Algerian problem were reached by France, the
heat from the East would be turned more on us.

The problem was to provide the basis for a reliable mixed society.

In the Congo the object was to prevent a Spanish or Korean kind of war—to
prevent the cold war turning into a hot war there. About this the Russians had been
confounded. Of course not only the Russians but pedantic legalists in other countries
were a nuisance in the U.N. The U.N. had failed to fulfil the purpose of its founders. It
was now a forum for the cold war. The Congo might turn into a federation or a
confederation. In the meantime life in Katanga went on. Shipments of copper were at
least normal.

About the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Prime Minister said that in
pursuing the object of federation Her Majesty’s Government was the only strong
friend Sir Roy Welensky had. The most important thing at the moment was the
relations between Sir R. Welensky and Sir E. Whitehead. The discussions about the
Northern Rhodesian Constitution cast a shadow over the Southern Rhodesian
Referendum. What Sir R. Welensky wanted most was the independence of the
Federation. It was the question of the independence of the Federation which had
hastened things on in its component parts. If we had postponed the Northern
Rhodesian negotiations, we should have had to postpone the next discussions about
the future of the Federation. In trying to make federation we had made for ourselves
a terribly difficult problem. What would happen if Sir E. Whitehead lost the
Referendum? Looking back some people might think that an economic Federation
instead of a political one might have been better. But one could not go back now.

About Kenya, the Prime Minister said that the elections had gone off quietly and
that money was beginning to flow in again.

The Prime Minister said that in the purely African countries the future of the
Europeans was quite good. The question was how to secure the future of the
Europeans in countries like Kenya and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He
was sure that the way to do it was not by force of arms but by influence; and our
future policy must be not to make haste too fast or too slowly.

In the course of the discussion which followed Lord Salisbury asked whether Her
Majesty’s Government envisaged an African majority in Northern Rhodesia now. The
Prime Minister replied that it should not be a question of the colour of people’s faces.

¹ Square brackets in the original.
Mr Turton said that Sir R. Welensky on his return to Salisbury had not been helped by headlines in the newspapers, “Welensky rebuffed”.

Lord Salisbury referred to the 1958 Lennox-Boyd Constitution for Northern Rhodesia which he liked. The Prime Minister reminded him that it had been an imposed constitution at the time—a thing which people were apt to forget now—and in any case we could not stand still.

Lord Salisbury then said that the people of whom he was thinking in particular were those who were fighting for the survival of their societies in our countries in Africa in which they had made their permanent home. The Prime Minister in reply mentioned all the blood and treasure which the French had spent to no avail fighting in Algeria. He did not think that armed force was the right way to go about it. Nor, however, for obvious reasons, could the Government guarantee to recompense settlers in the hypothetical case of their losing their farms.

Lord Salisbury said that he did not regard Algeria as an analogy because he thought the Algerian Moslems were more sophisticated than the Africans whom he had in mind. He added, with great emphasis, that there was a feeling among the settlers that our people were being abandoned: they had come and asked and gone away empty; anything that the Government could do to reassure them would be well done.

Lord Salisbury again thanked the Prime Minister for receiving the deputation and the deputation withdrew.

39 DO 168/60, no 1 A Aug 1961

‘Policy towards Africa south of the Sahara’: officials’ interdepartmental paper (FO, CO, CRO) [Extract]

[This paper was crystallised by a West Africa heads of mission meeting in London in May 1961 (see document no 382 in part II), as a revision of an original FO draft, incorporating CRO changes. Neither Home nor Sandys had time to comment, so it was not formally endorsed as an expression of ministerial policy.]

I Summary and conclusions

The problem

(I) The main importance of Africa lies in its political fluidity at a time when the rest of the world has adopted reasonably firm positions in the East-West struggle.

(II) The principal objectives for Western policy in Africa are:

(a) stability, and growing prosperity;
(b) benevolence to the West or, at least, genuine neutrality.

(III) The lack of capital resources and economic backwardness, in terms both of equipment and efficient manpower, prevent progress. They militate against stability, particularly because African leaders are determined to raise standards of living at almost any cost.

(IV) Africa is also inhibited from the achievement of stability and growing prosperity by tribal jealousies, international and bloc rivalries and difficulties of communication, both physical and linguistic.
(V) Pan-Africanism is potentially a counter-force to these and will always possess strong emotional appeal. At the moment, however, its championship by extreme anti-Western elements makes it more a source of disunity.

(VI) The achievement of benevolence to the West or, at least, genuine neutrality is made more difficult by such factors as:

(a) Dislike of colonialism and racial discrimination. In this connexion a smooth advance to independence in multi-racial British territories in Africa is vital.
(b) The policy of certain Western Governments.
(c) Fear of economic exploitation.
(d) Resentment at Western bases in Africa.

(VII) As a result of its history in Africa the West is judged by harsher standards than the Communists. But the Africans are not blind to the threat of Communist imperialism and few of their leaders or intelligentsia are attracted by Communist ideology.

(VIII) However, reliance on systems of State-control and traditional collectivism in agriculture produce an economic structure to which Marxist methods may seem naturally to apply.

(IX) The West still enjoys a valuable heritage in Africa. The Commonwealth provides a unique association of strength and depth. The French have, for the most part, been more successful in binding their former colonies to the West politically, but the very completeness of their success may work against its permanence.

Recommendations for policy—economic

(X) Aid, in itself, should not be considered as a political weapon, though its absence might be used as a weapon against us. The Africans are exaggeratedly conscious of the threat of neo-colonialism and will be on the look-out for any political content in Western aid.

(XI) The West should try to overcome African suspicions that Western aid is designed to perpetuate Western influence. There are considerable limitations on the use of multilateral organisations though the fact that Africans can play a part in them makes them theoretically more desirable. Purely Western multilateral organisations will be unlikely to win the confidence of the Africans.

(XII) On the whole, money spent by the West on technical assistance (which the United Kingdom is particularly well placed to provide) does more for our position in Africa than economic aid. In this field, as in aid generally, we should encourage the older Commonwealth countries, the Germans and other potential contributors in the Western camp who are not handicapped by colonial histories, and we should help to direct their effort to where it would have the best impact. We should also consider the advantages of some “spot treatment” of technical aid by applying it where it will be effective and noted.

(XIII) Aid is particularly valuable if devoted to the development of national administrations and to the laying down of the social infrastructure without which no lasting progress is possible.

(XIV) A really massive effort in the teaching of English and French would make a great contribution to co-operation and stability in Africa. Discussion with the Americans, the French and the other Commonwealth countries as to how this can best be done should be started forthwith.
(XV) Development of trade is a very effective form of aid. The West’s position will be proportionately stronger as it buys more raw materials from the African countries. Difficult though it will prove in practice, the West must aim to achieve some stability for basic commodity prices.

**Recommendations for policy—political**

(XVI) Politically the West, and, in particular, the United Kingdom has inherited valuable assets in Africa. It must be our aim to preserve our existing cultural, educational and commercial ties. The Commonwealth relationship is the most valuable means at our disposal.

(XVII) Nevertheless, in the interests of achieving benevolence to the West or, at least, genuine neutrality, it must be general Western policy to disengage as far as possible from African affairs. The Africans must see that we do not wish to engage them in the cold war and that we ask nothing better than that they should run their own affairs in their own best interests.

(XVIII) We should do our best to avoid taking sides in any African dispute since the side we support is likely to run foul of African nationalist feeling.

(XIX) Though we shall have to be careful not to damage particular countries by obviously favouring them and thus creating Governments as vulnerable as was the Nuri régime in Iraq, we should do what we can to build up certain pro-Western countries into positions where they can take the lead economically and politically. Nigeria, with its preponderance in area, population and economic potential, would clearly be a first charge: in “French” Africa the Ivory Coast, though smaller in scale, would repay similar treatment.

(XX) In line with the same general policy we should:

(a) examine critically the importance of the strategic objectives we are trying to achieve before deciding to ask for the bases or overflying rights which they necessitate;

(b) do nothing to promote the idea of an arms embargo for Africa unless some African initiative arises spontaneously or can be discreetly inspired;

(c) avoid any appearance of support in Africa or elsewhere for the policies of such countries as Portugal and South Africa;

(d) seek to educate the Americans in the political and economic realities of Africa so that they secure the best return for their efforts;

(e) keep away from any idea of a NATO or specifically “European” policy towards Africa;

(f) in general, maintain diplomatic representation of the highest possible quality; its scale being dependent on the complex of relationships which has been built up with the country concerned, whether foreign or Commonwealth.

... 

**III The importance of Africa**

3. Africa South of the Sahara is not so important as its area might suggest. Its population is some 160 million: hardly more than a third of India and little more than a quarter of China. Its rate of increase is far slower than either of these giants or of the under-developed countries in Latin America. Its exports of manufactured goods barely exist. It only exports 4 per cent. of the world’s raw materials. The Gross National
Product is less than quarter of that of Britain, and such wealth as there is is concentrated largely in South Africa, the Rhodesias and the Congo. Its production of diamonds, cobalt, gold, uranium, chrome and copper, to mention only a few, is of great significance to the economy of the free world, but none of these have anything like the same crucial importance as the oil exports of the Middle East. Nor is there much hope of any early and dramatic improvement: only in the three rich areas mentioned above does the proportion of the national income devoted to production investment approach that generally held necessary for the modernisation of a backward territory.

4. Strategically, Africa South of the Sahara holds somewhat greater significance, though this relates largely to the defence of interests such as the oil of Kuwait which lie outside the continent. Overflying rights at present seem essential for the maintenance of our position in the rest of the world, and the sea route round the Cape could, in certain circumstances, be of the greatest importance not only to ourselves but to the West as a whole. But with all this, Africa South of the Sahara is still not an area of prime strategic importance in the same sense as Europe or the Middle East.

5. The importance of Africa lies not in its strength but rather in its weakness and its consequent susceptibility to external influences. Africa is fluid at a time when Europe and, to a lesser extent, Asia have frozen into fixed attitudes towards the cold war and when Latin America is still largely confined by the position in which history and habit have cast it. It has not taken sides in the East-West struggle, nor has it even evolved a firm position from which it can decline to take sides. However, the beginnings of attitudes can be seen and “Africa for the Africans” represents a consistent underlying theme. Political objectives, for the most part, are less clear; nevertheless clarification is taking place and in the case of, e.g., Ghana, closely defined principles have been laid down, if not always respected. Five years from now the continent may have evolved into a more coherent pattern but for the moment the policies of a number of States are not necessarily more than ephemeral. Nigeria seems likely to remain in the middle of the road for the time being; Guinea on the one hand and Liberia on the other appear more or less to have committed themselves. But for the most part the Black African States might move rapidly and unpredictably towards East or West. This fluidity coupled with the rapid increase in the number of independent African votes gives the area particular importance in the United Nations.

6. The loss of all Black Africa to Communism would present nothing like so immediate a threat to the West as the loss of France or Germany. But France or Germany could only be lost to the West as the result of a cataclysm: the African countries could drift into the Communist camp without any violent upset or turn of fortune. It is for this reason that Africa is of such significance to the West and that it calls for an effort from us quite disproportionate to its intrinsic importance. In this paper Africa is considered above all as a target in the East-West struggle and our policy towards it in the light of the need to keep it out of the Communist camp.

IV The objectives of the West

The double standard

31. In theory several of these factors\(^1\) should militate against Communism as well as against the West. The Russians have in fact got colonies; they, far more than

\(^1\) i.e., ‘state-socialism’ and ‘traditional collectivism’ (summary, para VIII).
the West, are enemies of Islam; they have as their eventual object the subversion of the independent Governments of Africa. The more sophisticated Africans may believe this but even to this small group the facts do not seem very important or relevant to their situation. They do not care about the East-West struggle. The basic fact is that they want to stay out of it. The repressed minorities within Russia, even the fate of Hungary, do not mean much to the African leader harassed by his local problems and obsessed by his own national history. All they care about is that Russia has no history of colonialism in Africa, that it claims to make no distinction of race, colour or class, and appears to pose no immediate threat to African independence. On the contrary, the Russians appear to be seeking the immediate extirpation of colonialism from the continent and can therefore easily pose as the champion of African rights. Since they have few if any responsibilities they are more free to manoeuvre than the West and can allocate their relatively small contributions of aid to maximum political advantage. In this context the absence of local Communist parties from most countries of Black Africa is a positive advantage to the Russians in their efforts to get themselves accepted by the nationalist régimes.

32. The result is that, *vis-à-vis* the Russians, the West has to run twice as fast to keep the same place. The Africans are not blind to Russian interference in, for example, the Congo, but they will be far more ready to suspect it in the case of the Belgians. They are ready to accept that Soviet economic aid is genuinely disinterested, yet are quick to accuse the West of neo-colonialism. This is the unfortunate heritage of our colonial history. It should disappear with time and patient effort, but in the meantime there is nothing to do except recognise the handicap and work correspondingly harder to overcome it.

*The difficulties of the communists*

33. Not all the trump cards are in the Communist hand. For one thing, they are still learning about Africa and are certain to make at least initial blunders in their technical aid programme and attempts to influence the Africans. They have nothing to rival the complex of trading and other interests which the West still possesses in Africa—a complex which may at times offend the African by its very obtrusiveness and economic importance but which still provides an excellent means of retaining contact and influence with them.

34. For another the Africans, though more suspicious of the West, are aware of the threat of Communist imperialism. It was Nkrumah who warned the All-African People’s Conference in 1958 that “…imperialism may come to us yet in a different guise—not necessarily from Europe”. The African may find that, in foreign policy, his ideas tend to coincide with those of the Russians, but this does not mean that he accepts their rights to lead or wishes to adopt their methods. He may admire Communism as a system which appears to achieve rapid economic results but few Africans will find it very appealing ideologically or when viewed from the angle of religion.

35. The Chinese believe that, because of their colour and their own poverty and under-industrialisation, their help and presence will be more acceptable to the Africans than that either of “imperialists” or European Communists. There is some evidence that they are right though they are handicapped by such factors as physical remoteness, inexperience, language difficulties and shortage of foreign exchange. Certainly their effort in the area is growing rapidly. So far there is little evidence of a
clash of interest between Russia and China since both are pursuing the same objective of undermining the Western position. But variations in tactics—e.g., on attitudes towards “bourgeois nationalist” régimes—may grow into wider differences and the West should be alive to any possibility of exploiting rivalry between the two.

36. The determination of the Russians to wreck the United Nations should also be a handicap to them in their efforts to woo the African world. An independent voice at the United Nations should have greater value for the small African Power than a subordinate voice in the sort of “Afro-Asian bloc” at which the Russians are aiming. Though Russia will do its best to cloak its intentions, if the Africans suspect that it is Russia’s policy to deprive them of this voice then they may grow to be suspicious of Russia’s motives in other fields.

The significance of the Commonwealth

37. Finally, the Commonwealth and the grouping of former French colonies are very important to Africa as a whole and to the members of both groups. Moderate African Powers such as Nigeria, Tanganyika and Senegal, working closely in association with each other and with the former metropolitan Power, could act as a stabilising force in the continent. But the Commonwealth offers much more than the maintenance of links with the United Kingdom; it provides a positive influence operating in a multitude of ways on newly independent African Governments and representing to them a sort of “third force” which softens the hard choice between East and West. A country can be a member without falling victim to neo-colonialism nor does it thereby feel bound to grant some corresponding concession to Soviet interest so as to maintain an East-West balance. It is a bridge between “neutralists” and “imperialists” which the Communists would dearly like to see destroyed.

V A policy for the West

38. Africa to-day is very far from meeting the two main objectives of Western policy. The continent has shown itself apt to splinter into fragments and the disasters of the Congo have illustrated how quickly a major economic asset can be undermined or even destroyed. Guinea, Ghana and Mali, in their different ways, have moved towards Left-wing xenophobia over the last two years, the future of the Congo is a gigantic question-mark and few would put much money on the other former French colonies remaining as loyal to the West as they are to-day.

Economic aid and technical assistance

39. What can the West do about this? Anything which can be done to increase the wealth and stability of Africa would obviously contribute to meeting both our objectives. And yet the resources available seem so small compared with the immensity of the problem that it is hard to know how they can best be allocated. This is not the place to consider Western aid projects in any detail. Certain general considerations may however usefully be mentioned.

Aid is not a political weapon

40. . . . or rather, if aid is used as a political weapon, it will often boomerang on the user. The Africans are exaggeratedly conscious of the threat of “neo-colonialism”. They will claim aid as a right and will be righteously indignant if we fail to meet their
bills. But if we do give aid they will still scrutinise it suspiciously for any hint of political strings. If they think that it is being given simply as a counter to Soviet aid or so as to tie the recipient to the West, then they will probably continue to accept it but even the scanty harvest of gratitude which we may otherwise hope for will be cut off. On such conditions aid would still be worth giving since otherwise Africa would inevitably drift into economic disaster, chaos, primitive tribalism or Communism. But if we hope that aid from the West will generate goodwill in African hearts, then we have got to find ways of giving it which do not seem to aim for this end. Unfortunately, the “double standard” referred to above means that Communist aid is not yet subject to such harsh scrutiny. Where the African will tend to suspect that Western aid is:

(a) given as a recompense for generations of colonial exploitation and
(b) intended to secure a perpetuation of Western influence,

he will be ready to accept that Communist aid is more disinterested.

The pattern of aid

41. Hitherto, on a rough calculation, more than 15 times as much non-Communist bloc aid has been received by African countries bilaterally as through multilateral organisations (while the bloc effort has been exclusively bilateral). The bulk of United Kingdom governmental aid to African countries and territories (over £30 million in 1959–60, and probably about £55 million in 1960–61) is necessarily given bilaterally to our own dependent or former dependent territories. The same is true for the French (whose governmental aid to Africa, even excluding Algeria and the Sahara, is probably running at about £100 million a year). In our present balance of payments difficulties we ourselves cannot hope to make further substantial increases in our aid to Africa, nor to alter its pattern. We must face the consequences of this: they might well be serious.

Multilateral aid

42. This takes various forms: capital aid through the World Bank (and now through the I.D.A.); technical assistance through the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies; and through bodies specifically concerned with Africa such as C.C.T.A./F.A.M.A. and S.C.A.A.P.\(^2\)

43. There is room for both bilateral and multilateral aid. While in theory the latter may be more popular in Africa, in practice bilateral aid has many advantages, principal among them that it can be given more quickly. The less developed countries criticise rather the abstract idea of bilateral aid than any concrete bilateral aid they may themselves be receiving. With the inception of the I.D.A. and for other reasons the proportion of multilateral to bilateral aid in Africa may increase in the future. There is certainly scope for “consortium” operations, like that for the Volta Dam project, and even for “Colombo Plan”-type organisations as a forum where recipients and donors are associated on a basis of equality.

44. However, the following considerations operate in a limiting sense:

(i) we delude ourselves if we think that the burden of aid will be more equally shared between West and East by using such agencies. The Communist Powers are

---

\(^2\) Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan: see document nos 343 & 344 in Pt II.
only likely to use multilateral agencies if they can reap political dividends by so doing;
(ii) the means of the United Nations are limited and it is likely, particularly for special operations, to depend largely on Western support;
(iii) the I.B.R.D. may be viewed with some scepticism by certain African countries because of the disciplines it imposes in connexion with project loans. In addition none of the former French colonies is a member. The I.D.A. with its long-term, interest-free loans may be more popular;
(iv) aid organisations in which Africans do not participate are likely to be regarded with even more suspicion by Africans than individual donors;
(v) many African Governments want, for economic reasons, to take aid from both sides and for political reasons to be seen to be doing so;
(vi) individual Western countries must retain the ability and the freedom to provide bilateral aid *ad hoc* when asked to do so (e.g., aircraft for Mali, arms for Sudan). It is essential for the Western cause that a few key countries such as Nigeria, Senegal and Tanganyika should prosper and be seen to prosper;
(vii) the traditional pattern of aid (e.g., French to ex-French territories, British to East Africa and Nigeria) could not be broken from the Western side without adverse political consequences. If it can, however, be diversified without being reduced, by the participation of other countries or consortia arrangements, there would be political gain.

45. The (necessarily tentative) conclusions to be drawn from this are:
(i) there are considerable limitations on the use of fully international agencies as channels for multilateral aid;
(ii) the use of agencies in which African States participate and take some collective responsibility *for* the division of aid might be useful;
(iii) bilateral aid must be maintained and may need to be increased. The participation of other friendly countries such as West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan should be encouraged. The local political responses to bilateral aid coming largely or exclusively from one donor country should be carefully watched;
(iv) every effort should be made to show up the aid pattern of the Communist *bloc* as more political and self-seeking than that of the West. …

*Political tactics for the West*

54. The West has a valuable heritage in Africa. The United Kingdom in particular has many assets which good government has left it in its former colonial territories while the formal and informal ties which are part and parcel of the Commonwealth Association are invaluable assets in the case of independent members. It would be a grave mistake not to try to retain the cultural, educational and commercial links which have grown up in the past. But real though they are, they may still not stand an excessive strain. It must be our aim not to risk destroying them by demanding from them more strength or endurance than they can be expected to have.

55. The more one considers positive action by the West the longer becomes the list of things which the West should not do. In perhaps 95 per cent. of the political problems which confront us a negative policy of disengagement and hold-back will be most successful or—at any rate—least disastrous for the West. This is not a
56. In the context of the cold war this means that our objective must be to make the Africans realise that we have no objection to their following an independent policy and are not particularly anxious to enrol them in the Western camp. We must accept the fact that we will be doing well if most African countries adopt a posture of benevolent neutrality. In the United Nations, where the cold war will impinge most sharply on the African nations we should ensure that they know the Western case, but should not suggest that our friendship depends on their supporting it. Writing on November 17, 1960, of the decision to try to get Kasavubu’s credentials adopted by the United Nations, Sir Patrick Dean wrote:

“The realities are such that an active policy of this kind, however sensible, if based on Western votes and running counter to the major current of African and Asian opinion, may well impel that current towards the Soviet bloc and may result in a Pyrrhic victory if not in defeat”.

Though the factors described in paragraphs 23–29 above will mean that the Africans, if left to themselves, will often vote against us, we need not fear that this tendency will be invariable or permanent. “We are not voting for either of you, we are voting for Africa”, said the Foreign Minister of the Central African Republic. We must try to see that so far as possible our interests coincide. The results will not always be happy for the West but there is every reason to believe that, in the long run, they will be quite as uncongenial to the Communists.

Disengagement in practice

57. Unfortunately disengagement is sometimes more easy to preach than to practice. In the General Assembly, for instance, we cannot maintain a detached attitude on subjects such as the fixing by the United Nations of target dates on which the support of uncommitted Governments is a vital interest. In the Congo, the plain fact is not merely that Lumumba called on the Russians for help but that he wanted to eliminate all Western interests. However sincere their desire not to interfere, the West were inevitably jockeyed into a position where they had to support the rival faction. The megalomania of Lumumba and the inertia of Kasavubu led the West into policies which, even if they succeed in the end in the Congo, have put much strain on our relations with other African States.

58. In so far as any moral can be drawn from the Congo it is that we will always be in trouble if factions take shape in an African country and the West finds itself conspicuously supporting one of them. If the faction of our choice wins then it will be assailed by all the more vociferous African nationalists and even the moderates will hesitate to support it. It may win through to stability but the cards will be stacked against it. If the rival faction wins then we will be faced with a Government dedicated to an extremist anti-Western policy. In justice the same should apply to the Communists but here again the double standard applies. The Russians can get away with more interference than we can and their supporters in Africa will be more fanatical and more unscrupulous than our own. The object of the West should therefore be to avoid taking sides unless it is forced upon it. This may reduce our
chances of getting the best result but it will make it much more likely that we will end up with a Government tolerably well disposed towards us.

59. A consistent policy of political disengagement by the West can be applied to several of the problems which now face us in Africa.

60. (i) **Bases and overflying rights.** Obviously the United Kingdom cannot divest itself entirely of these so long as it still exercises colonial responsibilities in Africa, and commitments in other areas which may lead to requirements for reinforcing via Africa. But it must be our object to do so as far as possible. This has, indeed, already been our policy in Nigeria. It will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to find an alternative to Kenya for the defence of the Persian Gulf but it would be a mistake not to plan on the assumption that it may be politically impossible to hold on to a base in Kenya once independence has been granted. Where overflying rights are concerned it will be even more difficult to dispense with our commitments or meet them by other means, but we should be ready to contemplate the considerable extra cost and delay which would be involved in, for instance, reinforcing certain parts of the world by the west-about route. The situation may, of course, be different where an independent African State requests our protection but even in such a case we should be careful to avoid the appearance of propping up an unpopular régime against the current of “African” opinion. In the long run we might thereby do more damage to the interests of our allies.

61. (ii) **Arms embargo.** It would be very desirable if the flow of arms into Africa could be controlled and limited. But there is little initiative which the West can take in this direction since requests for arms, if refused by the West, would be likely to be swiftly acceded to by the Sino-Soviet bloc. Any attempt to press the Africans to accept such an embargo would be misinterpreted as a plot to keep them in a state of inferiority in which colonial rule could easily be reimposed. The most that we can do is to give encouragement and advice if any Africans seem disposed to launch the idea themselves and perhaps to preach it cautiously to a few exceptionally trusted friends. Even this would need to be handled discreetly since too eager support by the West could prove the kiss of death.

62. (iii) **Misbehaviour of our allies.** We must be energetic in dissociating ourselves from the policies of such countries as Portugal and South Africa. It is bad that a member of the West should be pilloried, but it will be still worse if their odium is spread over all their allies. We are already half in the pillory ourselves over our multi-racial colonies. But the argument that we should stick by the Portuguese and South Africans now so that they will stick by us then has no validity. For one thing, their support would be more of an embarrassment than an asset; for another, our support for them now would make more likely our own involvement in similar difficulties in the future. This does not mean that we should attack our recalcitrant allies, but we need not defend them either. Each case must be considered on its merits, but non-involvement should be our usual objective.

63. In the interests of winning the favour of the Africans, the Americans will probably press more urgently for the ending of colonialism than they really feel is wise. We should be able to avoid any direct clash and should certainly urge the Americans not to act in a way which would make our policy less likely to succeed. But we should recognise that it is in the interests of the West that the Americans should keep themselves aloof even from such relatively innocuous colonialism as our own. They are going to have their hands full resisting Russian charges of economic
imperialism without associating themselves with colonialism in its more traditional form. . . .

**Summary**

70. To disengage, to leave the Africans alone, to advise and help only when our advice and help is asked for is not a heroic policy. But neither is it defeatist. Nor does it involve any relaxation of effort. The first objective of our policy must be to convince the Africans that we have no designs on their continent—either economic or political, that we do not wish to engage them in our quarrels with the Communist bloc and that we are perfectly content that they should run their own affairs. Only when this has been accepted can we hope to reap the full benefit from what we are doing to help them and can we feel reasonably sure that they will not drift towards the Communist bloc and become ever more alienated from the West.

---

40  FO 371/161358, no 3  6 Mar 1962

[Situation in Africa]: letter from Lord Home to J H A Watson (Dakar)\(^1\)

I was very much interested in your letter of January 25 commenting on the last paragraph of Lord Head’s despatch No. 1 of January 11.\(^2\) Your first hand observations were most valuable and I agree with most of what you say. I fully accept that the belief among Africans that colonial rule is an anachronism today is very deep-seated and that it is this rather than anti-Western attitudes as such which prompts newly independent African states to act as they do. I also agree that we should not allow ourselves to become identified with positions which we do not believe are tenable and that if we were to do so it would adversely affect our relations with newly emergent African states.

The crux of the issue, however, lies in Lord Head’s phrase that colonial territories should have their independence as soon as they are politically and administratively ready (my underlining). If this test were applied in the abstract it might be argued that we ought not to go out for a generation. This will scarcely be practical politics and we shall run the risk that what follows may not be written up as a monument of British skill and good sense.

It is these considerations which make the pressure for immediate independence from African states in the United Nations and elsewhere (the motive for which I entirely understand) so very difficult to reconcile with our responsibilities and our desire to lead countries to orderly independence. I can only hope that little by little the lesson of the Congo will sink in and that those who regard independence as an end in itself will gradually come to see that it is desirable that there are other priorities which also have to be taken into account. I have been encouraged for instance to read in Pat Dean’s\(^3\) summing up of the recent debate on Ruanda Urundi

---


\(^2\) High commissioner in Federation of Nigeria since 1960; formerly (as A H Head) S of S for war, 1951–1956.

\(^3\) Sir P Dean, UK permanent representative to the UN, 1960–1964.
that in his view the last session has shown that the Afro-Asians are moving to a more constructive attitude. They are now intent on hastening independence, he says, with painstaking regard to the need to avoid breakdown and chaos. Whether this will be avoided in the case of Ruanda Urundi remains to be seen; but at least it is something that a more constructive attitude has been displayed in this particular instance.

I hope too that recent developments in connection with Katanga and the Central African Federation will have made it clearer to African opinion that we are not supporting Katangan secession, that we are genuinely anxious to see Katanga re-incorporated in the Congo by peaceful means and that with all the difficulties involved in a community where there are a large number of white settlers we are not dragging our feet simply with a view to delaying the application of the “wind of change” to our own territories.

The Portuguese overseas territories are of course in a special category and I am sorry to say that our attempts to persuade the Portuguese that they would be well advised at least to start on the long and difficult process of preparing their territories for self-government have been totally unsuccessful. Recent events, however, and notably the vote on the Angola resolution in the United Nations, the course of the C.C.T.A. meeting in Abidjan and the distinction drawn between the Portuguese and the Spanish on the one hand, and the French and ourselves on the other, during the political debate in E.C.A. at Addis Ababa, seem to me to show that African opinion is increasingly recognising the essential differences between our colonial policy and that of the Portuguese.

See document no 413 in Part II.

41  FO 371/166836, no 342  Oct 1962

‘Future constitutional development in the UK dependent territories’: CO memorandum for the US government

(1) *African territories*

*Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.* Within the last three years Executive and Legislative Councils (the latter with unofficial majorities) have been established in Basutoland and Bechuanaland, and a similar development is expected to take place shortly in Swaziland, where a multi-racial Constitutional Committee was set up in 1960 and its proposals for a constitution are now under consideration. It is the policy of the British Government to maintain the separate identity of the three High Commission Territories, and within the framework of that policy to entrust their peoples with progressively greater responsibilities for the management of their internal affairs. It is not, however, expected that there will be any marked change in the constitutional position of Basutoland or Bechuanaland in the foreseeable future. Swaziland will, it is hoped, get its first constitution at the turn of the year. (Its present form of Government was laid down in 1903 and there is neither a Legislative nor an Executive Council.)

*Gambia.* The present constitution, which came into force in May 1962, provides for a form of internal self-government. The British Government has accepted that independence in one form or another is the goal for the Gambia, but it is not yet
clear what form this will take or when it will come about. It is doubtful whether an
independent Gambia could ever be viable on its own; one possibility is some form of
union with Senegal, and the new Government of the Gambia has begun to discuss
this subject with the Government of Senegal. It is proposed as a first step to arrange
for a technical enquiry into the economic and financial problems which would arise.

*Kenya.* Following the Constitutional Conference in February/April, 1962, which
reaffirmed that full independence was the ultimate aim of the British Government
for Kenya, constitutional discussions were held in Nairobi. The constitution for
internal self-government is now being drafted, but it is impossible to say when it will
be introduced and the elections held. It will be for the new Kenya Government after
these elections to raise the question of the date of independence.

*Zanzibar.* At the Constitutional Conference held in London in March/April, 1962,
the British Government reaffirmed that full independence is the aim for Zanzibar. It
was not, however, then possible to fix dates either for internal self-government or for
independence because of the differences between the Government and Opposition
parties on the programme for further constitutional development. Unless these
differences were resolved, preferably by the formation of a Coalition of the parties, it
did not seem possible to secure a stable government in Zanzibar during the period of
internal self-government, which the British Government regarded as essential. It
now appears unlikely that it will be possible to form a coalition government but in an
effort to break the deadlock, the British Resident is continuing discussions with the
parties in Zanzibar.

(2) *Caribbean territories*

*Bahamas and Bermuda.* In effect these two territories already enjoy what is virtually
a form of internal self-government, though neither has a ministerial system. There is
no present indication of any general desire in either territory to move towards
independence.

*Barbados, Leeward Islands (Antigua, Montserrat and St. Kitts), and Windward
Islands (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent).* The decision of the people of
Jamaica not to remain in the Federation of The West Indies, followed by the announce-
ment of the Trinidad Government that they would not continue any association with
the other and smaller islands except on the basis of a unitary state, induced a deter-
mination on the part of those other islands (Barbados and the Leeward and Windward
Islands) to form an immediate federation of their own. Their proposals were discussed
with the British Government at a conference in London in May. Preparations are now
proceeding for the early establishment of fiscal and civil service commissions. When
their conclusions are available a reasonable time will be allowed for public discussion.
The authority of Parliament to establish a federation will then be sought if the British
Government is satisfied that there is a reasonably wide measure of support for the con-
ference proposals throughout the territories concerned, signified finally by approval
of the legislatures. After a federation has been established and a new elected Federal
Government is in office, the British Government will be prepared to enter into dis-
cussions concerning independence for the federation.

*British Virgin Islands.* These islands have shown no disposition to join the
proposed East Caribbean Federation referred to above. They are almost entirely
dependent economically on the American Virgin Islands, but are likely to continue as
a British dependency.
Colonial High Policy

British Guiana. It had been hoped that a further constitutional conference would take place in July, but the report of the Commission of Enquiry into the disturbances last February, which is germane to the conference, will not be available until early October. The conference has therefore had to be postponed and is now due to open on the 23rd October. British Guiana already enjoys internal self-government and the principle of independence was conceded in 1960.

British Honduras. A ministerial system has been established and a constitutional conference, which would discuss an advance to full internal self-government, is due to take place in 1964. It is expected that British Honduras will eventually become independent but it is not yet possible to say when this will happen.

Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands. After the decision to grant independence to Jamaica, the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands were given the opportunity to decide what their future should be. The legislatures of both territories unanimously requested that they should remain British colonies and this has been agreed to. They seem likely to remain in a relationship of dependence on Britain in the foreseeable future, although constitutionally they are likely to advance towards internal self-government.

Mediterranean territories
Malta. Under the present constitution which came into force in March, 1962, Malta enjoys internal self-government, and the constitution also provides for the delegation to the Malta Government of powers in the field of external affairs. Both the main political parties in Malta regard independence as their aim and in August, 1962 the present Malta Government made a formal request for independence. The British Government at once indicated its willingness to discuss the matter. A Conference is likely to be held in the fairly near future. Whether or not Malta becomes independent, the very serious economic difficulties confronting her will remain.

Gibraltar. There is an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council and a membership system, and unofficials have a large measure of responsibility for the administration of internal affairs. There is no indication that the local population desire any major constitutional advance beyond the point already reached. Gibraltar lives under the shadow of Spain and in view of its small size it is scarcely conceivable that it could ever become fully independent.

Far Eastern territories
Singapore, Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak. The British and Malayan Governments have decided in principle that, subject to the necessary legislation, the proposed independent Federation of Malaysia (comprising Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and, possibly, Brunei) should be brought into being by 31st August, 1963. To give effect to this decision the two Governments intend to conclude, by 31st January, 1963, a formal agreement which will provide for:

(a) the transfer of sovereignty in North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore by 31st August, 1963;
(b) provisions governing the relationship between Singapore and the new Federation, as already agreed in principle between the Governments of Malaya and Singapore;
(c) defence arrangements as already agreed between the British and Malayan Governments; and
(d) detailed constitutional arrangements, including safeguards for the special interests of North Borneo and Sarawak, to be drawn up after consultation with the legislatures of the two territories.

An Inter-Governmental Committee, on which the British, Malayan, North Borneo and Sarawak Governments are represented, has been established to work out the future constitutional arrangements and the form of the safeguards.

The British and Malayan Governments have told the Sultan of Brunei of the agreement they have reached and have made it clear that they would welcome the attendance of observers from Brunei on the Intergovernmental Committee and the inclusion of the State of Brunei in the new Federation.

Hong Kong. Hong Kong consists of a small area of colony (which is not viable by itself) and the New Territories, which are held on a lease from China which expires in 1997. It is not possible to forecast the future of the Colony, or, as things are, to conceive of Hong Kong becoming independent either inside or outside the Commonwealth. There is at present still an official majority on the Executive and Legislative Councils and local opinion is generally opposed to constitutional advance of any kind.

(5) Pacific territories
Fiji. At present there are still official majorities in the Executive and Legislative Councils, and among the unofficial members of Legislative Council there is parity between the three main races. By current standards Fiji is large enough to achieve independence, but it is difficult to say when this might come about because of the tension between the Indians and the less numerous and less energetic Fijians, which makes constitutional advance very slow.

British Solomon Islands Protectorate and Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. These are both very backward territories. Executive and Legislative Councils with official majorities have recently been established in the former. They do not yet exist in the latter but the High Commissioner is considering proposals for their establishment which we expect to receive shortly. Britain is doing what it can to develop these territories up to the point where they can make an intelligent and reasonable decision about what their own future is to be.

New Hebrides. This is a condominium which is being jointly developed by the British and the French. The question of what its ultimate future is to be has not yet been discussed with the French, though we hope to propose such discussion to them before long.

Tonga. Tonga is an independent kingdom, but is not fully sovereign because it is a Protected State in treaty relationship with Britain for major aspects of defence and foreign affairs and also for certain minor judicial and financial matters. There are at present no signs that Tonga wants to alter its status.

(6) Other territories
Falkland Islands and Dependencies. There are unofficial majorities in the Executive and Legislative Councils but no ministerial system. The population is entirely of European descent, mostly British. There is no reason to think that they will ever seek
independence. The British Antarctic Territory is now a separate colony but has no permanent inhabitants.

*St. Helena.* There is an Executive Council with an official majority and an Advisory Council, into which an elected element is shortly to be introduced. There is no reason to think that this territory will ever seek independence.

*Mauritius.* Mauritius already has a ministerial system, and seems likely to continue to advance constitutionally at its present measured pace, reaching full internal self-government during the period following the next elections, which are due to be held not later than 1964. Whether Mauritius will at some later date move on to independence will probably depend on whether the differences between the opposing communities in the island can be sufficiently composed.

*Seychelles.* There are at present still official majorities in the Executive and Legislative Councils. There is no present indication of any general desire for substantial constitutional advance, and even the introduction of a membership system is not yet in sight.

*Aden Colony and Protectorate.* It is the policy of the British Government to encourage the movement towards closer association between Aden Colony and the Federation of South Arabia (which comprises eleven of the States of the Aden Protectorate). This policy was recently discussed in London with Ministers of the Colony and of the Federation. Agreement was reached on proposals for the entry of Aden into the Federation and for further constitutional advance in Aden. The proposals were based on a scheme which the Federal and Colony Ministers had previously worked out together in Aden. Subject to approval by Parliament and by the Legislatures of the Federation and Colony, the British Government will be willing to conclude a Treaty with the Federal Government to effect the entry of Aden into the Federation. Certain minor preliminary constitutional changes are now taking place in Aden. Subject to the approval of Parliament, Aden is to accede to the Federation, and simultaneously achieve its constitutional advancement, on or before 1st March 1963. Under the original Treaty with the Federation the British Government have undertaken to assist development towards the ultimate achievement of full independence, but the Federation is so heavily dependent economically on the British Government that it is not possible to forecast when this will be achieved.

---

**42 **

**PREM 11/4412**

26 Dec 1962

*‘The tasks ahead’: minute by Mr Macmillan to T J Bligh (PM’s Office)*

[This minute was written by Mr Macmillan after his meeting with President Kennedy at Nassau in the Bahamas, 18–21 Dec 1962; it was essentially a list of things he had been pondering since his return. It was addressed to members of his private office, with whom he hoped to work out a plan—‘the more carefully we work out our plans the better we shall do’. The ‘Nassau Agreement’ referred to was an ambiguously worded arrangement whereby the Americans would supply Polaris missiles to the British government.]

We have a formidable programme ahead of us and not many months in which to complete it. A great burden will lie upon us all. I do not know when any Government has been so beset by problems at such a stage in its life. The object of [this] note is to set them out in some order so that you can study them collectively and separately and see that we keep up the impetus.

I have put them under various headings.
1. **Brussels negotiations on E.E.C.**

   I have written a letter to Mr. Heath,\(^1\) of which I attach a copy.\(^2\) I think we shall have to work out a detailed timetable. There will have to be a meeting of the Steering Committee in the middle of January, followed by a meeting of the Cabinet. Final instructions will have to be given to the Lord Privy Seal as to the points on which he is to stand firm and those on which he may give way. We shall have to consider carefully how these negotiations are to be broken off if this becomes necessary. Also what the date of this should be. I take it the end of January or the beginning of February. We shall then have to study what we shall do. Shall we demand a meeting of Heads of Government, so that the whole of Europe and the world may know where the blame lies if we fail? Can a final effort be made for a negotiated settlement? We shall also have to study what is called the “alternative”. This needs great care. We must not suddenly return to the Commonwealth like a dog with its tail between its legs. But we must have some imaginative approach on a wide scale. This is a very difficult problem, and we must start to work on it.

2. **Defence reorganisation**

   This must be pressed on with all vigour. I have seen the Chief of Staffs’ note which I do not find very convincing or very clear. However, we must get ahead with this. It is all the more necessary because of the situation caused by the Nassau Agreement.

3. **Polaris agreement**

   This raises a lot of problems, both technical and presentational. On the first I assume that the Minister of Defence and the Foreign Secretary together will be dealing with the next stage in making a more formal agreement than that which we reached at Nassau. This will follow the Skybolt lines. I attach a copy of a minute I am sending to the Minister of Defence on this matter. You will see from this minute the things that are in my mind. On the presentational point there is still the question as to whether I should broadcast next week, or whether we should use the Birmingham meeting for a considered case in preparation for the Debate in the House as soon as Parliament returns, probably January 23 or 24. All this we must think over very carefully.

   Apart from presentation publicly I wonder whether I should try and see Michael Berry and Lady Pamela Berry\(^3\) or ask them to luncheon or something? They have done well in *The Telegraph* and I would like to keep them on our side. I also wonder if I should ask to see Haley.\(^4\) I think I could put some arguments in his head. What is important is that we should not be afraid of the double argument. We are independent because that is the right of a Sovereign people; we are inter-dependent because that is the need of the modern world. (Incidentally, has anyone got a copy of what the President’s guidance was to the Press? I believe there was a telegram mentioning the Sovereign right of a state which might be very helpful for me to quote.)

---

2. Attachments not printed.
3. The Hon W M Berry (and his wife Lady Pamela), editor-in-chief of the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Sunday Telegraph*.
Finally, we have to consider what is going to happen about Skybolt. Maybe there will be such pressure in America to get on with it after the successful test that the situation will alter.

4. Modernisation of Britain
This is particularly urgent. I am to have a meeting I know on Monday but I must push on with things like ship-building and shipping, the Commissioner for the North East Coast, re-training (where the Minister of Labour’s plans seem to be too modest), rural transport (where I was impressed by the Speir deputation and something ought to be done). All this is a great field where we must keep the pressure up all the time. Actually it will be on this issue that the Election will be largely won or lost. The state of the economy is what the people worry about most.

5. There are some Defence oddments which I must not ignore:
   (a) the Beverley replacement. I understand that we were going to have a decision before the end of the year. As usual, we have not lived up to this. It affects Belfast particularly as well as, of course, a immense sum of money involved.
   (b) The future of the Gurkhas. This is important.

6. There are some overseas oddments which we must keep a careful eye on:
   (a) Malaysia, Brunei. Defence and political position.
   (b) Indonesia.
   (c) The recognition of the Yemen.

7. Central Africa
I think I can leave this safely in Mr. Butler’s hands though I must not appear to ignore it. I had a talk with him on the telephone and he seemed fairly happy. But what I am a little worried about is his visit to Africa, as this may coincide with some very vital decisions that may have to be taken about Europe, defence, and so forth. Will you find out what his present plans are? I must warn him that he may have to put off his visit so that he may be present at decisions on which the whole life of the Government may depend.

5 R M Speir, MP (Con) for Hexham since 1951.

43 PREM 11/4406 27 Apr 1963
‘Foreign affairs—1963’: record of a ministerial discussion at Chequers, by T J Bligh

At the Ministerial meeting at Chequers on Saturday, April 27, there was a somewhat general discussion about Foreign Affairs, and the Ministers seem to think it would be worth developing the following four lines of thought:

1 This was a ‘Chequers weekend’, attended by all Cabinet ministers and ministers i/c departments on Sunday, but only by senior ministers on Saturday. The main subjects discussed were industrial, economic and social questions, and government reorganisation.
(a) The rise and fall of Communism—the receding tide—the growing interest in the Soviet Union in bourgeois comforts. Insidious effect of Western “culture”, pop records, and the like. The great unfulfilled demand for consumer goods. The Westernisation of Russia contrasted with the growth (albeit with setbacks) of China.

(b) How important it is to glamorise the work of the Department of Technical Co-operation, Voluntary Service Overseas, and all that. We do a lot but say too little about it.

(c) The great contribution made to the peace of the world by our defence commitments, especially in the Middle East and the Far East.

(d) A rather loose idea of what might be called ‘The part Britain plays in the world’.

Meeting of ambassadors and high commissioners from tropical Africa, 21–24 May: general conclusions: Cabinet memorandum (Joint FO–CRO Paper)

1. —Pan-Africanism

Whether Commonwealth or foreign, the new African States share certain basic problems. Unlike other under-developed parts of the world they have no real history and no culture on to which twentieth century civilisation can easily be grafted. All of them are conscious, though they may not admit it publicly, of their dependence on the developed world. To most of them the withdrawal of non-African expertise would represent the creation of a dangerous vacuum. These are among the reasons which create the urge towards Pan-Africanism. There is an emotional desire to cling together, whether or not practical results are achieved. But the high point of the Pan-African movement had perhaps been reached during the colonial era, and there is now little prospect of any effective grouping uniting the countries north and south of the Sahara. Similarly any organisation for wider African unity which emerges from the Addis Ababa meeting is likely to be loose and vague. Present African leaders are above all concerned to maintain their status and their votes at the United Nations. Reactions to the problem of the Somali areas in Kenya illustrate how arbitrary boundaries inherited from colonial days tend after independence to become sacrosanct. But for all this, there is genuine emotion behind the movement for African unity.

II. —Commonwealth and foreign Africa

2. There are profound differences in outlook between the Commonwealth and foreign countries in Tropical Africa. British Africa looks on the Commonwealth as a world-wide association, not merely as a bilateral link with us alone. The ex-French territories, on the other hand, by virtue of their far closer ties with and greater dependence on France are more parochially minded. They are less inclined to become emotionally involved in Southern African problems; less ready to make the running—though they follow the majority—in the anti-colonial field and more inhibited about displeasing France. The Union of African and Malagasy States
(U.A.M.) group wish to maintain their cohesion but would not necessarily be opposed to closer co-operation with English-speaking Africans.

III. — *The French position*

3. French influence is directed towards keeping the U.A.M. together both to increase French weight in the world and to keep French Africa as a preserve for French business. French cultural imperialism is also a significant factor. General de Gaulle, moreover, is deeply interested in Africa and all important decisions are referred to him. The possibility for effective Anglo–French co-operation is, therefore, limited. Despite earlier fears that France might pursue neo-imperialism too hard and that the younger generation would quickly sweep aside the “Black Parisians” at the top, France’s position in her ex-African territories is still far stronger than many would have prophesied two years ago. While we need be less tender of French susceptibilities since January, the maintenance of the French position is on the whole a Western and indeed an African interest.

IV. — *Communist penetration*

4. At the moment the Russian bloc effort seems to have been held in check and there has been an improvement in the situation as compared with say two years ago. Nevertheless the Russians are still putting a lot of effort into Africa and we may be in for trouble later. The Chinese are also a threat in East Africa. The crucial factor is the resistance of the Africans themselves to foreign interference. Egyptian influence appears to be surprisingly slight.

V. — *Arms policy*

5. There is some case for international co-ordination over the supply of arms to African countries between the United States, the French, the Germans and ourselves. It is unsatisfactory that many poverty stricken African countries are spending more on arms than they can afford. But any attempt to ration them might only make them turn to other suppliers, of which there are plenty. We should lose the business and the goodwill. Moreover, we have to be careful not to seem to be refusing arms to black countries, while supplying them to South Africa (see below) and it would be hypocritical to impose limits on Tropical Africa. All we can do is try to use our influence to persuade African States not to arm unnecessarily. Some countries in Africa want arms mainly to compete with Ghana which they regard as a threat. There may be room for some limited co-operation with the French here since the French also want to limit arms supplies. We might start with an exchange of information with the French about types of arms supplied. We can also explain to the French that we do not want an arms race. An approach to the French on these lines is in preparation. In ex-French Africa, there is a desire to maintain French troops which have a stabilising effect.

VI. — *Arms for Southern Africa*

6. It is our arms policy towards South Africa and Portugal which inspires the gravest doubts. We could not boycott Portugal herself as a NATO ally, and a collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique might well precipitate Congo-type situations. But we would be in trouble at the United Nations if arms delivered to the Portuguese were turned to the suppression of disorder in their oversea territories. This applies with even greater force in respect of South Africa. In African eyes most
forms of military equipment delivered to South Africa are seen as intended for use against the Blacks in perpetuation of white rule. While we could not go along with any resolution on general economic sanctions against South Africa in the Security Council, we should avoid being manoeuvred into the position of having to veto a resolution calling for a ban on arms supplies. It would be useless to attempt to justify such a veto to African opinion.

VII.—Southern Africa

7. Southern Africa remains the main stumbling block to United Kingdom interests throughout Tropical Africa, especially in the Commonwealth territories.

8. We need to re-think our long-term interests. The Tropical African countries are likely to survive the next decade in some viable form. Can we expect the same of South Africa or even Southern Rhodesia? The question is whether to offend the rest of the world by pursuing policies towards South Africa conditioned by our economic and defence stakes there, or whether to take the calculated risk of offending South Africa in order to improve our position elsewhere in Africa. The penalty we risk by retaining close links with the present régime in South Africa is that we might as a consequence forfeit our increasing economic stake in Tropical Africa, and when white rule collapses, lose our stake in South Africa as well. Against this must be seen the 1962 figures for United Kingdom exports of £148 million to South Africa and £156 million to African Commonwealth countries.

9. In the defence field the continuing importance of the Simonstown arrangements\(^1\) was questioned. But on behalf of the Chiefs of Staff it was explained that these arrangements were considered to be important because of our interest in the security of the sea routes round the Cape and in possible air routes across and through Africa. The importance of being able to defend the sea route seemed, however, to rest on the perhaps unlikely assumption that we might become engaged in a major war of the old-fashioned kind, in which nuclear weapons were not used or not used with decisive effect in the initial phase. The air route, which might be required to deal with limited war in the Middle or Far East in the event of routes further north being ruled out for political reasons, was therefore of potentially greater importance than the Simonstown base. But our use of this route depended on ad hoc South African clearance for each flight.

VIII.—Southern Rhodesia

10. If independence were granted to Southern Rhodesia with no firm and prior commitment about the extension of the franchise, there would be a move by African members to leave the Commonwealth (or even to exclude the United Kingdom from it), and to break off diplomatic relations with us. Commonwealth countries are now realistic enough not to press for “one man one vote” overnight. But in their view, however little physical force we can exert on the spot, a strong card is still in our hands, namely, our ability to grant or withhold legitimacy to Southern Rhodesia’s independence. A real extension of the franchise visibly designed to put Africans in a majority in the foreseeable future is, therefore, an essential prerequisite to independence if the Commonwealth itself is to remain a reality in Africa.

\(^1\) For Simonstown (naval base) agreements, 1955, see Goldsworthy, ed, Conservative government and the end of empire, part I, document nos 79–81.
CAB 128/137, CC 51(63)4 1 Aug 1963

‘Commonwealth and colonial affairs’: Cabinet conclusions, reporting latest developments

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies informed the Cabinet of the latest developments in relation to the following territories:

**Malta.**—The Constitutional Conference had reached a deadlock and would probably have to be suspended without agreement. In these circumstances it would be right to postpone the date for the attainment of independence by the Island until May 1964. This would allow more time for a further attempt to resolve the outstanding differences, possibly by means of a referendum.

**Zanzibar.**—It was proposed to convene an Independence Conference for Zanzibar in September, in order that the Protectorate might become independent before the end of the year and might therefore be able to accede to the East African Federation at the outset of its existence.

**British Guiana.**—Although racial tension was gradually subsiding, it seemed unlikely that the Prime Minister, Dr. Jagan, and the Leader of the main Opposition Party, Mr. Burnham, would reach agreement in the near future on the form of future constitutional advance in the Colony. It was therefore proposed to convene a further Constitutional Conference in London in the autumn, at the conclusion of which it might be necessary for the United Kingdom Government to impose their own solution.

**The Caribbean.**—It was possible, although not certain that a sufficient measure of agreement might be reached between the members of the group of islands known as “the little Seven” (Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent) to make it possible to grant them independence, as a Federation, in 1965. It was proposed to convene a conference for this purpose in due course, possibly by the end of the year, if developments in the interval appeared to justify this.

**Malaysia.**—The Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had apparently been persuaded by the Prime Minister of the Philippines, Mr. Macapagal, and the President of Indonesia, Dr. Sukarno, to ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations how long it would take him to ascertain the attitude of the inhabitants of the North Borneo territories towards Malaysia. He had also indicated that, if some enquiry for this purpose could be conducted under United Nations auspices in the immediate future, he might be prepared to postpone for a short period the establishment of Malaysia, at present fixed for 31st August.

In discussion it was agreed that any postponement of the creation of Malaysia at this stage would be more likely to lead to an indefinite postponement of the project than to promote an early resolution of the current differences between Malaya and Indonesia. Moreover, a survey under United Nations auspices would not only be liable to take a considerable time but would also merely confirm that the inhabitants of North Borneo endorsed the concept of Malaysia. We should therefore impress on the Prime Minister of Malaya the importance of adhering to 31st August as the date for the formation of Malaysia and warn him of the dangers implicit in any further delay.

**India.**—Recent intelligence suggested that the Communist Chinese Government were now in a position to resume military operations against India. There was as yet
no firm evidence that such operations were likely to take place; but, if they did, Pakistan might be tempted to associate herself with China, at least to the extent of seeking to recover Kashmir by force. The United States Government might take steps to remind the Government of Pakistan of the guarantees which they had given at an earlier stage to protect India against Pakistani aggression and Pakistan against Indian aggression; but the applicability of these guarantees to a situation of the kind which might now develop must be open to question.

The Cabinet:—
Took note of these statements by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies.


[In sending a copy to Sir G Harrison (FO), C G Eastwood called this a paper produced ‘with some pain and grief. . . . With the best will in the world it looks as if it is going to be very difficult to do anything very dramatic in the very near future’. Although drafted by Eastwood, it was often referred to as ‘the Poynton memorandum’ because it was circulated by the permanent under-secretary. It was extensively summarised in Morgan, *Guidance towards self-government*, pp 199–202.]

*The problem*
There are still 40 British dependent territories. They are listed in Annex I which, it is suggested, should be read before the main part of the memorandum. Our colonial relationship with them is becoming outdated; it affects adversely our position in the United Nations and our relations with other countries. The United Nations show no signs of losing their interest in colonial questions and we must expect the Committee of Twenty-Four to discuss nearly all our remaining territories in the next year. This will inevitably produce local repercussions—as it has already done in Fiji, Aden and Gibraltar—which may well complicate matters for us. A number of the 40 territories are well advanced towards independence. For the remainder we need to devise new “post-colonial” forms of association which will honour our obligations to their peoples and preserve our interests, while gaining general acceptance both in Britain and among our friends abroad.

2. The Secretary of State wishes, if possible, to make a statement about our future relationship with the territories when he announces the decision to merge the Colonial Office and the C.R.O. in 1965.

*Prospects of independence*

3. For 24 of the 40 territories (category I of Annex I) independence, separately or in association, is the proclaimed or expected objective. If present policies are successful, most of them will attain it in 1965 or a little later, but in some cases our policies may not succeed.

4. The *East Caribbean Federation* would include seven of these territories and there will be an awkward problem if the Federation is not established. Our traditional attitude has been to welcome and assist local efforts to establish a Federation in the East Caribbean but not to force it on unwilling customers. In view of the present
lukewarm attitude of the Governments the question arises whether, because we want
to divest ourselves of our colonial responsibilities, we should be more positive and
press them to federate, and whether we should be ready to give them substantially
greater development aid than we had intended, if (as seems likely) this proves
necessary to persuade them to do so.

5. The prospects of an association of the Cayman Islands with Jamaica and of
Grenada with Trinidad or the Federation will depend, inter alia, on our insisting that
they cannot continue in their present status. The prospects of early independence for
British Honduras depend on the achievement of some sort of modus vivendi with the
Guatemalans over their territorial claim—which will not be easy.

6. The High Commission Territories are included among the candidates for
independence, but it is difficult to see how any of them could attain it by 1965, and
they will continue to be a serious problem for us. How far our difficulties are
increased by pressure in the United Nations or from other Commonwealth countries
will depend on how we deal with the complex of issues facing us in Southern Africa.

7. If our policies fail in the case of the East Caribbean Federation, the Cayman
Islands, Grenada, the Gambia or Brunei, we shall have to look for some other
solution for them. We have also to find a policy for the 16 territories in categories II
to IV of Annex I which are unlikely to achieve unqualified independence. The
problem is when and how we should try to remove the colonial label from these
territories.

The United Nations

8. We have accepted the obligation in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter
to develop self-government in those of our territories which have not yet “a full
measure of self-government”. We do not accept that this obligation has been
amended by the Soviet-inspired General Assembly Resolution [1514(XV)] of 1960
calling for immediate steps to end colonialism. In any case this obligation under the
Charter is to the peoples of our territories, not to the United Nations.

9. Our only obligation to the United Nations in this respect is, under Article
73(e) of the Charter, to provide certain information to the United Nations about our
non-self-governing territories. We provide this in respect of all our territories except
Tonga and the British Antarctic Territory, the former apparently because of a
fortunate oversight and the latter because it has no permanent inhabitants.

10. We have always held that it is for the administering government alone to
decide when a territory ceases to be non-self-governing and we recognise no
obligation to seek the approval of the General Assembly for ceasing to transmit
information in that event. The General Assembly has, however, frequently asserted
its right to express its views as to whether territories have ceased to be non-self-
governing and the United States and the Netherlands have, in fact, sought the
Assembly’s approval by resolution in the case of territories proceeding to a final
status other than independence. France, on the other hand, simply notified the
General Assembly of the cessation of information in the case of its territories, at the
same time supplying full information of the constitutional change being made. We
ourselves have had no case of a non-self-governing territory proceeding to any final
status other than independence either on its own or in association with others.

11. In 1960 the General Assembly endorsed a number of “Principles” which
should guide members in determining whether or not a territory is fully self-
governing. These criteria recognise that a territory may become fully self-governing by one of three means:—

(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent state;
(b) Integration with an independent state;
(c) Free association with an independent state.

12. If we want solutions for our territories capable of commanding international acceptance we should be guided by these criteria. The Western Samoa relationship with New Zealand is an example of a small territory becoming independent but remaining in treaty relationship with the former Administering Authority; it has been approved by the General Assembly and merits consideration as a solution for some of our territories. …¹

Candidates for a Western Samoa relationship

23. The most promising candidates that appear for this type of relationship are the Bahamas and Bermuda (where the implications for staffing and finance afford no problem) and it may ultimately prove the best solution for two or three others. The application, including the timing, of such a policy to the Bahamas and Bermuda would require careful thought and working out. The Bahamas will be embarking in January, 1964 on a new and radically different constitution from their present one and cannot be expected to take kindly to any suggestion for a further change of status until they have been allowed to operate their new constitution for some time. Bermuda is a stage behind the Bahamas in political development and is likely to require both time and an intermediate stage of development, before taking to a “Western Samoa” relationship.

Other types of relationship

(a) Integration with Britain

24. The other types of internationally acceptable relationship are “integration” and “free association” with the metropolitan country. In most places complete integration would mean the handing back to the metropolitan government of considerable powers at present exercised locally; from the administrative point of view it would be a considerable innovation and hardly an improvement. It would also raise the question of representation in Parliament at Westminster and the difficulties attendant on equalisation of social amenities and taxation. We were prepared to accept the disadvantages in the case of Malta in 1953 because at that time our defence interest in keeping Malta from independence seemed large enough to warrant it; and it was thought improbable that Malta would serve as a precedent. Integration is in fact unlikely to be practicable for any of our territories and is not a course which can be recommended.

(b) Free association with Britain

25. For those territories which cannot achieve independence even on the Western Samoa model it is within the category of “free association” that we must

¹ There followed a detailed analysis of the Western Samoa model in line with the conclusions in document no 345 in Pt II. Subsequent editorial cuts in this document also overlap with material in no 345 and other documents in ch 9(3).
look for a solution. (We can, of course, choose another description if we prefer to avoid using the United Nations jargon.) . . .

26. The following conditions would have to be met if a form of association is to be brought within the United Nations definition:

(i) there should be a clear demonstration that the people of the territory approve the relationship;
(ii) the territory should have a continuing right within the terms of the association agreed upon
   (a) to modify its status; and
   (b) to determine its own internal constitution.

In addition, to secure general agreement in the United Nations it would be necessary for the territory to have a large measure of self-government. Some comments on these conditions are set out below. . . .

31. “Free association” would appear to be a possible relationship for a number of our territories. Further detailed study is, of course, necessary to determine the constitutional forms it might take and to examine the constitutional problems that may have to be surmounted if these forms are to accord closely with United Nations theory. We might obtain some guidance from further examination of the nature of the association between the United States and Puerto Rico. We do not think the French arrangements of 1958 or the agreement that exists between the Netherlands and the Antilles provide any useful guidance.

Possible application of “Free Association”

32. Of the twelve territories in Categories III and IV of Annex I, the British Antarctic Territory is no problem in this context. The British Virgin Islands might join with the U.S. Virgin Islands. There is some evidence that most of the people and the U.S. Administration would favour this; it would make economic sense. It would of course simply mean the transfer of a dependency from one administering to another rather than the accession of the territory to full self-government, but this should in this case raise no difficulty, internationally or in Britain. The British Solomon Islands may, we hope, find a future in relationship with Papua/New Guinea. The territory is so backward that the people will not be capable of choosing their future status for several years, during which they will have to remain dependent on Britain. The New Hebrides is a problem that can be resolved only in consultation with the French.

33. This leaves the first eight territories in Category III of Annex I for consideration as candidates for “free association”. The Falklands, St. Helena and Pitcairn are so small that a Western Samoa relationship is impractical. The Gibraltar leader, Sir Joshua Hassan, has gone on record at the United Nations in favour of free association. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands suffer from such dispersion of population that it is hard to conceive of them as a unity other than that imposed by external administration. In all these cases, it should not be difficult to comply in large measure with United Nations’ criteria for “free association” and it is recommended that we should work towards this. It would also be the objective for the Seychelles if defence requirements make a Western Samoa relationship impracticable.

34. There remain the awkward cases of Hong Kong and Fiji. There is no alternative to the present status of Hong Kong other than its return to China and no possibility of complying with the United Nations’ principles for “free association”. In
Fiji, the Fijians do not want any constitutional advance for fear of the Indians, and although our ultimate aim should presumably be to bring the territory to independence, either on its own or in a Western Samoa relationship with Britain, even the mention of this is out of the question for some years. In the case of Hong Kong there is a tacit convention that the problem of its future should not be raised in New York since it would be to the benefit of no one and if we ceased transmission of information regarding it, at the same time preferably as we ceased transmission in regard to a number of other territories, we might escape criticism. There is not the same convention in regard to Fiji and discussion of it in the Committee of 24 has already caused us embarrassment. On the other hand we are assured that this discussion was not stimulated by any great pressure from India or any other country and if, at the same time as we ceased transmission of information about a number of other territories, we made a number of apparent changes of form in Fiji, there is a chance that we might escape criticism if we ceased transmission in regard to Fiji also. It must be admitted however that there is a risk of criticism in the case of both Hong Kong and Fiji, with inevitable local repercussions.

(c) Channel Islands relationship with Britain

35. We have in the last year considered the possibility of adopting for some of our territories a permanent relationship on the lines of that of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man with Britain, which lies somewhere between the United Nations categories of “integration” and “free association”. Such a relationship would probably not satisfy international opinion and it is doubtful whether it would have any particular advantage for overseas territories. In the case of Fiji, we are now seeking to move the Fijians away from the feeling that the status of the Channel Islands is a ready-made constitutional solution for them. We should rather try to evolve some simpler forms of “free association” suited in each case to the constitutional history of the territory concerned.

Possibility of general “decolonisation”

36. It is clear from the foregoing that we cannot within the next two years “decolonise” all our territories in a manner that accords with their or our interests and is internationally acceptable. In the case of Hong Kong, there is no possibility of decolonisation without giving the territory to China and in the case of Fiji and the British Solomon Islands no solution that is conceivable for several years. The timing and the way in which the High Commission Territories may come to independence cannot yet be foreseen.

37. There is no likelihood of anti-colonial pressure at the U.N. ceasing within the next few years. In the main this pressure has been in respect of Southern Africa, and to a less extent Arabia. Southern Rhodesia, the High Commission Territories, the Portuguese territories, Aden and the Federation of South Arabia between them are likely to continue to keep U.N. interest in colonial questions well to the forefront for several years, though the continued dependence on us of the High Commission Territories might come to be accepted if the alternative seemed to be worse. Most of our territories are now outside Africa and if we can devise a solution for South Arabia and if a substantial number of our remaining territories become independent or we succeed in devising other acceptable futures for them, then there is quite a chance that the U.N. will not be much interested in what happens to the rest. But we cannot
be sure of this and one or two countries may make use of the U.N. to pursue their
own interests, for instance their claims to British Guiana, British Honduras, the
Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. In these cases the facts of geography and power in the
area could well be as important as the precise constitutional relationship.

38. As already said, it is clearly impossible to carry out a general act of de-
colonisation now; nor would it be wise to declare now that we are going to make such
a move in 1965. We are doubtful if it will be practicable as early as that. Apart from
the territories which are so backward that it is not yet possible to foresee their future
destiny clearly, such as the Solomon Islands, and those which are enmeshed in wider
political complications such as the High Commission Territories, there are several
other territories in which it might be dangerous to force the pace too much, e.g.
Bahamas, Bermuda and British Honduras—and of course Fiji. Nor must we lay
ourselves open to the charge that we are abandoning the interests of people to whom
we have obligations. However, we can start now a policy which might make
practicable a significant move in a relatively short time. Unfortunately, on present
form it seems to us that this is not likely to be as early as 1965.

39. This policy would be:

(a) to bring to independence as soon as possible all territories capable of it,
including those for which a Western Samoa relationship is the goal;

(b) to bring into “free association” as many as possible of those for which this
seems the final destiny even if in some cases the conditions are somewhat
vulnerable to international criticism;

(c) to make whatever changes in form we can which will help to avoid criticism.
The Colonial Office will cease to exist in 1965. The word Colony might go too and
remaining places be known as “associated states” or some such word.

40. When the time came, we should then have reached a position where:

(a) a number of territories have become independent, are just about to become
independent or have independence as their declared objective. This would include
those within a Western Samoa relationship;

(b) a number of territories are in free association with us and it is the accepted
goal for most of the rest.

41. Many of our territories would then be off the U.N. books, and we should have
ceased transmitting information about them. We should be left only with those who
had not yet reached the declared objective—including Hong Kong and Fiji. The
impetus against British colonialism should then have lost most of its force and it is
possible that we might be able to make a general declaration which would pass
muster in the U.N. and enable us to cease transmissions in respect of the remaining
territories. We cannot judge this now.

Wider consultations

42. This is a memorandum prepared by Colonial Office officials. The Department
of Technical Co-operation has been consulted on the staff implications. It will be
necessary to consult the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the
Central African Office, the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence. Later, the question
will also arise of consultation with other friendly Governments, particularly the
United States, Australia and New Zealand, on the policy adopted.
Annex to 46

**Likely future status of British dependent territories**

The territories are listed in four categories on an assessment of the chances as seen at present:—

(I) Independence.

(II) Independence in contractual relationship with Britain (Western Samoa model).

(III) Continuing dependence on Britain (“Free Association”).

(IV) Other solutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territories</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Independence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. As separate States:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Assured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Expected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. British Guiana</td>
<td>559,000</td>
<td>Possibly 1964 or 1965.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. British Honduras</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>Possibly 1966 but see paragraph 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Aden Federation* (less British base areas)</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>Possibly 1965/66. The unfederated States are expected to join shortly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Northern Rhodesia</td>
<td>2,515,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Southern Rhodesia</td>
<td>3,849,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Nyasaland</td>
<td>2,921,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. In association with other countries or other territories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Gambia</td>
<td>284,000</td>
<td>Association with Senegal or separate independence in 1965.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Barbados</td>
<td>232,000</td>
<td>Federation with Leewards and Windwards or separate independence or Category II below. 1965 or later.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Perim and the Kuria Maria Islands are legally part of Aden Colony, but we may want to keep the former under British sovereignty in case it has some future military value and we want to hand the latter back to the Sultan of Oman. We may also want to keep the Island of Socotra for strategic reasons. Kamaran is merely occupied territory; the simplest course might be to give it to the Yemen if that was the wish of its few inhabitants.*
### Territories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leeward Islands</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. Antigua</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Montserrat</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>Federation with Barbados or Category II below (Category III for Montserrat). 1965 or later.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. St. Kitts</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windward Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Dominica</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. St. Lucia</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. St. Vincent</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Grenada</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>Association with Trinidad or the East Caribbean Federation or Category II below. 1965 or later.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Windward Islands</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20. Cayman Islands</td>
<td>8,510</td>
<td>Association with Jamaica or Category III below.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Windward Islands</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21. Brunei</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>Entry into Malaysia in year or two or transfer of present Treaty relationship to Malaysia or some revision of 1959 Agreement to bring it into Category II below.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Final form at present unpredictable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Windward Islands</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22. Basutoland</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>Possible candidates for Category II or III if, at a later stage of constitutional development they want it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Bechuanaland</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Swaziland</td>
<td>265,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### II. Independence in contractual relationship with Britain (Western Samoa model, probably no seat in the United Nations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Windward Islands</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25. Bahamas</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>New status might be granted within three years but see para. 23. If Turks and Caicos do not integrate with Bahamas they will fall into Category III below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Turks and Caicos Islands</td>
<td>5,670</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Bermuda</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REMAINING COLONIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territories</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28. Tonga</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>As a Protected State, it is already in a contractual relationship with Britain, but does not have the status of an independent State.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of the territories in Category I above might also fall into this Category if they do not join Federations and cannot maintain themselves as independent States without firm British support.

III. CONTINUING DEPENDENCE ON BRITAIN (“FREE ASSOCIATION”)

(i) Because of size

29. Falkland Islands and Dependencies 2,150 Argentina disputes sovereignty.

30. St. Helena, Tristan da Cunha and Ascension Island 5,040

31. Pitcairn 150

(ii) Because of special circumstances

32. Hong Kong 3,128,000 Ultimate future unforeseeable.

33. Fiji 394,000 Fijians (as distinct from Indians) want a continuing link with Britain without independence. We have agreed to consider “suitable arrangements” possibly with Channel Islands features.

34. Gibraltar 26,000 The Spanish claim to sovereignty may cause difficulty.

35. Gilbert and Ellice Islands 46,000 Geographical dispersion of islands and people militates against any independent status.

36. Seychelles 42,000 Defence interests may require dependence, but Category II not excluded.
### Territories Population Remarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Antarctic Territory</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>Having no permanent inhabitants this is not a ‘colonial’ problem.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. OTHER SOLUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Virgin Islands</td>
<td>7,920</td>
<td>Amalgamation with U.S. Virgin Islands, initially as U.S. dependencies or Category III.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Solomon Islands</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>Possible ultimate link with Papua/New Guinea; not for several years in view of administrative backwardness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hebrides Condominium</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>Final status for discussion with the French Government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**FO 371/172610, no 13 3 Oct 1963**

[CO memorandum about future of British colonial territories]: letter from Sir H Caccia (FO) to Sir H Poynton (CO)

Thank you for sending me a copy of your memorandum on the future of the British colonial territories. In your covering letter of the 27th September you asked for any first thoughts which we might have on this paper and I am writing now to let you have these.

Seen from here it is important that our colonial policy should be understood in the United Nations and the world at large; while we hardly expect to gain any credit such an understanding should at least mitigate the often ill-informed criticism which is at present directed towards us. You may therefore care to consider whether, when the Colonial Secretary makes the statement foreshadowed in paragraph 2 of the paper, he should not make some reference to the United Nations de-colonisation resolution No. 1514, of which I enclose a copy for convenience. He could point out that, while our de-colonisation programme has been conducted quite independently of United Nations pressure, our aim is nevertheless the same as that laid down by the United Nations. The only difference is one of timing.

My next point is one to which we attach considerable importance and concerns those territories where independence as a separate entity is not the right answer. Here it will be essential to demonstrate to the world that the solution proposed is in accordance with the will of the majority of the people of the territory. A referendum under United Nations supervision has advantages from this point of view. I can see that you do not wish to commit yourself to holding a series of such referenda, but in the international context it would be very helpful if the process of reaching whatever

---

1 See previous document.  
2 Not printed.
the next stage may be in each case could be planned to involve United Nations cooperation in some form.

In paragraph 31 of the paper it was suggested that it would be worth examining the association between the United States and Puerto Rico. We have had a look at this and at first sight it seems doubtful whether it would be a useful model for us, since the present status of Puerto Rico is a legal muddle, over which there is considerable controversy. Nor is it a final solution, since there is still discussion whether Puerto Rico should remain as it is or become a fully-fledged member state of the United States of America. A minority still favours independence. The present position is roughly that Puerto Rico has most of the rights of a constituent state of the Union, except the right of representation in Congress; it pays no Federal taxes, and is virtually a pensioner of the Federal Government.

As to the Virgin Islands, mentioned in paragraph 32, it seems to us that a merger between the British and American Islands could raise difficulties internationally and in Britain. As you know, British public opinion reacted unfavourably just after the war to a proposal that Bermuda should be handed over to the United States of America in settlement of Lease Lend debts, and there is the colour problem for the Islanders. This suggests things might need to be handled very carefully in the Islands and here...

---

48  FO 371/172610, no 17  16 Oct 1963

‘Future of the colonial territories’: letter from Sir S Garner (CRO) to Sir H Poynton, commenting on CO memorandum

In your letter of 27th September you asked for our first reactions to your memorandum on the future of the British Colonial Territories.

2. I entirely agree with you that we ought to be making a move on this front, and that we should try to get rid of the “Colonial” label. But it is only too clear from the memorandum that no general solution is possible, and that we cannot hope to “decolonise” completely by 1965.

3. It is only realistic to assume that, however fast we move, we shall remain subject to violent criticism so long as the racialists in Africa remain dissatisfied with what we do or say over Southern Rhodesia, Portugal or South Africa. They will seek any stick to beat us with from the Falkland Islands to Tonga.

4. We in the C.R.O. are naturally concerned to see some general policy emerge which will prove saleable to the rest of the Commonwealth—old or new. We must therefore be able to demonstrate to them that we are offering a degree of autonomy which meets the wishes of the inhabitants of the territories concerned. When our own objectives are clearer, I think that there would be much to be said for tabling the whole problem for discussion at some future Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting. If by then we were well on the road to an acceptable solution in Southern Rhodesia, we would have a strong case to put to other Prime Ministers that there remained far smaller territories, which for obvious reasons, could not hope to achieve full independence. We could surely appeal to our Commonwealth partners for support in striving towards a practical alternative series of solutions of which in the main some form of free association seems to offer the best hopes. This might
dissuade them from rocking our boat at the United Nations, and they might be prepared to participate in some more practical fashion. One possibility would be Commonwealth supervision of referenda in conjunction with, or instead of, U.N. supervision.

5. Of the solutions which are reviewed in the memorandum, we are less optimistic than the Colonial Office appear to be to that a solution on the Tonga model could be sold to the United Nations. In Tonga:

(a) British armed forces are guaranteed access;
(b) British Government approval is necessary for legislation relating to defence, banking currency and discrimination against non-Tongans;
(c) Britain has Courts with exclusive jurisdiction to deal with non-Tongans.

One can imagine Mr. Bing1 going to town over this.

6. We could be slightly more hopeful than you about the possibility of Australia being ready to shoulder our responsibilities in e.g. the case of the British Solomon Islands, provided that this was on a basis of free association. On a mere shifting of Colonial responsibilities, I would of course agree with you that there can be no prospect of other Commonwealth Governments being willing to share or to inherit the burden.

7. Although in paragraph 31 of the memorandum you dismiss the agreement which exists between the Netherlands and the Antilles for failing to provide any useful guidance, we ourselves wonder whether in fact the arrangements which exist in Surinam and Curacao would not repay further study. I am no expert in this sphere, but I am told that the relationship of these territories with the Netherlands is a fairly successful compromise between free association and integration. I am informed too that there is free movement of people between both sides; full internal autonomy and a system by which local Ministers are directly associated with a Dutch Council in the formulation of foreign, external trade and defence policies. Whatever the precise system, it seems to work well, and has not apparently brought down the wrath of the United Nations upon it.

8. We have reservations about the Western Samoa pattern as a possible solution at least as regards the very small territories. To begin with, it has not aroused enthusiasm among other Commonwealth Governments. It is untidy and at best temporary. And above all, it leaves hanging in the air the prospect of an application at any moment from the “Samoan” partners for Commonwealth Membership—a request which it would be difficult to turn down if at the same time the territory were to be admitted to the United Nations.

9. For the above reasons we are inclined to favour free association as the best practicable, if not ideal, solution for all those territories which do not qualify for full independence.

10. One further point. The phraseology used about “membership” of the Commonwealth sometimes leads to obscurity. The non-self-governing territories are, of course, all within the Commonwealth. Commonwealth Membership (with a capital “M”) comes after full independence and its hall-mark is attendance at Prime Ministers’ Conferences. There is nothing illogical therefore in a territory like Western Samoa remaining within the Commonwealth without full Membership.

The Colonial Office has, for some months, been considering the future of the remaining colonies and the possibility of devising new “post-colonial” forms of association with those small territories which are unlikely to achieve full independence. The possible ways of dealing with these territories and the problems are analysed in the Appendix to this memorandum.

2. The Appendix was prepared last September for consideration by Colonial Office Ministers. The Colonial Secretary has not yet reached decisions on its conclusions or on the terms of a possible public statement about Britain’s future relationship with the colonies. The conclusions in paragraphs 36–41 of the Appendix express only the official view in the Colonial Office and the suggestions as to the final status of individual territories given in Annex I to the Appendix are tentative.

Preliminary views of other departments

3. The Appendix was prepared in close consultation with the Department of Technical Co-operation. It was shown informally last October to the Foreign Office, Treasury, Commonwealth Relations Office, Central African Office and the Ministry of Defence. The following comments were then made about the choice for small territories of independence on the Western Samoa pattern or what the United Nations calls “free association”:—

Western Samoa

(a) The Treasury were inclined to favour the Western Samoa type of solution as likely to involve a lesser degree of financial obligation on the part of Britain than “free association”, although they recognised that it is doubtful whether the balance of financial advantage is likely to be sufficient to weigh the scales decisively between the two solutions.
(b) The Commonwealth Relations Office regarded the Western Samoa solution as untidy and at best temporary. They pointed out that it has aroused no enthusiasm among Commonwealth Governments and leaves open the prospect at any moment of application for Commonwealth membership. They felt inclined to favour “free association” for all territories not qualifying for full independence.

“Free Association”

(c) The Foreign Office considered it doubtful whether the association between Puerto Rico and the United States would be a useful model for British territories.
The present status of Puerto Rico is a legal muddle and is in question as a final solution.

(d) The Foreign Office thought that it would be essential, where territories are not proceeding to separate independence, to demonstrate to the world that the proposed relationship is wanted by most people of the territory. They believed that it would be very helpful internationally if the processes of reaching the new relationship could be planned to involve United Nations co-operation in some form.

Comment: The force of this is recognised in paragraph 27 of the Appendix, but there are strong arguments against permitting United Nations interference in dependent territories other than Trust Territories. Moreover, if the United Nations is once allowed to get a foot in the door in any one territory it will become virtually impossible not to “involve” them in all. Since we are not in a position to accept United Nations involvement in all territories, it would be better not to accept it in any.

(e) The Commonwealth Relations Office thought that, however fast we moved in pursuit of the aim expressed in the Appendix, we should be subject to violent criticism so long as African racialists are dissatisfied with us over Southern Africa. The Commonwealth Relations Office wanted a policy that would be acceptable to all Commonwealth members and suggested that, when our objectives are clearer, the problem might be put to a future Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting. If by then an acceptable solution in Southern Rhodesia was in sight they thought that we might get support for some form of “free association”, although it would be essential to demonstrate that the relationship was desired by the people of the territories concerned. In this regard they suggested the possibility of Commonwealth supervision of referenda, in conjunction with or instead of United Nations supervision.

Comment: The future relationship of small territories to the Commonwealth will have to be considered in deciding our policy and on that decision will depend how we handle the matter with the Commonwealth. It is, however, doubtful whether it will be possible to secure general Commonwealth support for solutions short of independence unless these comply strictly with United Nations’ requirements which we do not expect to be able wholly to accept. The Afro-Asian members have nothing to gain from allying themselves with us in supporting solutions which may prove contentious in the United Nations.

Events affecting the memorandum of last September

4. Since the memorandum attached as Appendix was prepared the following events of significance to it have occurred:—

(a) Zanzibar and Kenya have become independent.
(b) A date (6th July, 1964) has been announced for the independence of Nyasaland and the independence of Northern Rhodesia is expected later this year.
(c) Ministers have decided against a recommendation that we should hand our share of the New Hebrides to the French and are in favour of maintaining for the time being the existing arrangements (D.O. (64) 2nd Meeting Minutes, Item 1).
(d) New Zealand has announced new constitutional arrangements for the Cook Islands which, if endorsed by the United Nations, may well set the pattern for relationships of “free association” elsewhere. These new arrangements are to come
fully into operation in May, 1965 and as a probable model for a type of relationship suitable for many of our small territories, they deserve attention.

New Zealand model of “Free Association”

5. The Cook Islands are 15 islands with a total land area of about 90 square miles and a population of less than 20,000. 80% of the Islands’ revenues are provided by the New Zealand Government. Most of the Islands’ trade is with New Zealand and there is an annual outflow of migrants to New Zealand.

6. The main features of the new constitutional arrangements are:

(a) New Zealand will retain responsibility for the Islands’ external relations.
(b) Otherwise, the Islands will have complete self-government with a Cabinet under a Chief Minister, elected by and solely responsible to the Cook Islands’ Legislative Assembly. There will be arrangements for making New Zealand’s views on matters of common concern fully known to the Cook Islanders but New Zealand will retain no constitutional power to override local decisions, even in internal matters affecting external affairs or in matters affecting expenditure of New Zealand grants.
(c) The Islands’ Government will be free to amend the Constitution and will thereby have the power, at any rate in theory, to move to independence at any time without further reference to New Zealand.

New Zealand have not decided on the procedure for securing United Nations’ endorsement of these arrangements, but they may well invite a mission from the United Nations to satisfy itself that the Islanders want the new relationship. They may also, or alternatively, hold a referendum on the arrangements under United Nations’ observation.

7. These arrangements follow closely the United Nations principles of “free association” and the extent of self-government goes beyond what we have in mind for our territories as expressed in paragraph 30 of the Appendix. The New Zealand Government’s willingness to dispense with constitutional controls, save in respect of external affairs, is obviously affected by the facts that the Cook Islands have no racial or other serious internal divisions, are very heavily dependent on New Zealand for trade and aid and as an outlet for emigrants and have virtually no interest in international affairs. Despite these special factors we may expect criticism if we fall short of these arrangements in establishing some form of “continuing association” with our territories.

United Nations consideration of small territories

8. The United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism (the Committee of 24) will try this year to complete examination of all the colonial territories on its list. Most of these are small territories. The Committee may seek to examine each territory separately and to recommend the final status at which each should aim— independence or integration or “free association” with an independent State. This process will be complicated in certain cases by the claims of other States to certain of our small territories, e.g. Gibraltar, British Honduras and the Falklands. The Colonial Office see no possibility of being able to make a general statement of “decolonisation” this year. We can only do our best to prevent the Committee from reaching decisions which interfere with our efforts to work out the best possible solutions for our territories; solutions which as we see it will in a number of cases take several years to achieve.
‘Remaining colonial problems’: CO brief for Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting

(A) Malta
The anti-independence parties made a poor showing in the Malta Referendum in May, 1964, and the British Government therefore decided to proceed with the grant of independence, it being understood that British defence requirements will be safeguarded by a detailed Defence Agreement. It is expected that by the time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meetings these negotiations will be completed. It is also hoped that the present NATO H.Q. in Malta will remain there after independence.

On the constitutional side, the British Government have insisted on certain amendments being made in the Malta Government’s Independence Constitution. It is expected that the Malta Government will agree.

The real problem in Malta is not political but economic. The island is overpopulated and has no natural resources apart from its harbour and climate. Employment provided by the Services has declined, but the island’s economy still remains very greatly dependent on British Service spending, coupled with the very substantial aid being given by the U.K. to promote tourism, new industries, emigration, etc. The British Government is now also providing aid to the Malta Budget. Whatever Mr. Mintoff may say about the pleasures of neutralism, no thinking Maltese wishes the British Services to leave.

(B) British Guiana
The object of our policy in British Guiana is to grant independence as soon as we can do so in conditions of peace and stability. But since 1962 we have been held up by the inability of the Guianese leaders to agree on crucial constitutional issues—notably the electoral system.

2. Local divisions. A general election in 1961 gave Dr. Jagan’s Peoples Progressive Party (P.P.P.) a majority in the Legislative Assembly, but the other parties, Mr. Burnham’s Peoples National Congress (P.N.C.) and Mr. D’Aguiar’s United Force (U.F.), secured a majority of the votes cast. This situation called for compromise, but the issues between the parties—the communist connections of the P.P.P. and its identification with the East Indian community, and the personal rivalry between Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham—were too deeply felt. Each year since 1962, an outbreak of violence in British Guiana has obliged the Government to declare an emergency and to rely on British troops to restore order. The disturbances in February 1962 caused extensive damage in Georgetown but were over in a few days. In 1963 a general strike lasted three months and degenerated in its last few days into something close to a race war in the sugar areas. This year a sugar strike has led again to bitter inter-racial violence.

3. British forces. We have two battalions of infantry in British Guiana at present: we have no wish to prolong for a day longer than is necessary such a large commitment in a territory in which we have little economic and no defence interest.

---

1 DO(O)(64)53/PMM (UK)(64)A26.
2 See document no 255 below.
4. **Constitutional conferences.** At Constitutional conferences in London in October 1962 and October 1963, the Guianese leaders were unable to agree on the electoral system, on whether or not fresh elections should be held before independence and on the voting age. The first Conference was adjourned, and numerous efforts were made during the year which followed to bring Jagan and Burnham together. Mr. Sandys, Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad, the Governor and the United Nations Committee of 24 all tried to persuade the leaders to resolve their differences by negotiation. At the 1963 Conference, however, the Guianese leaders admitted that there was no prospect of an agreed solution and asked the British Government to settle the outstanding issues on their own authority and promised to abide by the British Government’s decisions.3

5. **The British government’s decisions.** The root of the trouble in British Guiana lies almost entirely in the development of party politics along racial lines. The aim of the settlement announced at the end of the conference (which has formed the basis of subsequent policy) was to stimulate a radical change in the present pattern of racial alignment; to encourage inter-party coalitions and multi-racial groupings, and to make it easy for new parties to form. To this end Mr. Sandys announced that proportional representation would be introduced, and that a fresh election would be held as soon as possible but special precautions—including the preparation of a new electoral register—would be taken to prevent cheating. Another decision was that before independence an additional force not drawn predominantly from any one racial group should be constituted.

6. **The implementation of the decisions.** The preparation of a new register of voters began in May and should be complete by late August. Legislation to change the electoral system and to substitute a single chamber for the present bicameral legislature will be made soon afterwards and all being well an election will be held towards the end of the year. After that we plan to hold another Conference to settle any remaining constitutional issues and to fix a date for independence. The new security force is being recruited.

7. **Commonwealth intervention.** We have welcomed efforts made earlier this year by President Nkrumah and Prime Minister Williams to persuade Dr. Jagan and the other Guianese leaders to compose their differences. Even when they do not succeed at once these efforts must in the long run make it harder for the Guianese politicians to hold out against common sense and the interests of their country.

8. **United Nations.** The United Nations Committee of 24 is apt to misrepresent the situation as one in which the Guianese are trying to throw off colonial rule. Our difficulties in British Guiana have now gone on so long that the facts explained above are becoming clear even to our keenesst detractors. Nevertheless we should be grateful for Commonwealth support when the situation is discussed in New York.

(C) **Federation and Protectorate of South Arabia**

The Protectorate of South Arabia was established during the nineteenth century and now contains 19 States under British protection. Before the 1950s it was not the policy to intervene in the internal affairs of the States. Since then however we have with their agreement actively sought to assist them in the establishment of orderly administrations and in furthering social and economic development.

---

3 See document no 299 below.
The Federation of South Arabia was founded in 1959 by six of the States in the Western Aden Protectorate. Subsequent accessions, including that of the former Colony of Aden (now Aden State) in January 1963, have brought the present membership to 14 States. There are treaties between Britain and the Federation providing for military and financial assistance to the Federation and binding the Federal Government to accept and implement British advice on matters relating to the good government of the Federation.

The legislature of the Federation (the Federal Council) is composed of representatives (usually 6) from each member State, but Aden has 24 representatives out of the total membership of 94. The executive authority is vested in a Supreme Council made up of 14 Ministers (including 4 Aden Ministers) elected from the Federal Council. There is no Prime Minister: each Federal Minister in turn becomes Chairman of the Supreme Council for one month at a time.

The constitution of Aden State is far more advanced than that of any other member State of the Federation. There is a Legislative Council with a majority of elected members and a Council of Ministers headed by a Chief Minister. The High Commissioner is normally bound to act upon the advice of the Council of Ministers, subject to his general reserved powers, but he remains responsible for external affairs, defence, internal security, police and the Aden public service. A general election under a revised franchise is due to be held in Aden State by October, 1964.

British policy is to lead the people of the Federation to sovereign independence as soon as practicable, and substantial amounts of financial and other forms of assistance are given by Britain to the Federation to this end.

Factors delaying progress. The constant threat from the Yemen, where the Republican authorities lay territorial claim to the whole of the South Arabian Protectorate, has interrupted constitutional progress. Interference from the Yemen has taken the form of numerous violations of the frontier, both by air and on the ground, and of substantial attempts to subvert tribes on the Federal side of the frontier with supplies of money, arms and ammunition. The revolt in Radfan is one of the results of this.

The Base. The base continues to be necessary for the discharge of our international commitments in the area, notably our undertaking to come to the aid of Kuwait if asked and our obligations towards the Rulers in the Gulf. It also provides an essential staging post between Britain and the Far East. It is an important factor in the maintenance of political stability in the region, and our position in Aden has the declared support of the United States Government.

United Nations interest. The United Nations Committee of 24 set up a Sub-Committee in April 1963 with terms of reference to visit Aden to ascertain the views of the population and leaders of the political parties. The British Government rejected the ensuing request to visit Aden on the grounds that the Committee has no competence to intervene in the administration of British non-self-governing territories. After visiting the Yemen and Cairo, the Sub-Committee produced a tendentious report unacceptable to the British Government.

The Committee of 24 again in April this year set up an Aden Sub-Committee, the Chairman of which has recently proposed a visit to London for discussion of the situation in Aden with the British Government. The request is still under consideration....
(C) Barbados and the smaller West Indian Territories (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Lucia, St Kitts and St Vincent)
Following the decision of Jamaica and Trinidad to seek separate independence, the remaining eight constituent territories of the former Federation of the West Indies proposed, in January 1962, to form a new Federation. H.M.G. agreed that if federation could be achieved on satisfactory terms this would offer these islands the best possible future. Our principal anxiety was that any new central government should be strong enough—the failure of the former Federation can be attributed in the main to the weakness of the central Government.

2. Grenada has since dropped out and is exploring the possibility of union with Trinidad and Tobago. The remaining Seven asked in May, 1963 that the new Federation should be independent from its inception.

3. Although we have agreed to consider a constitution for independence, agreement has not yet been reached on a constitution, particularly as regards the powers of the central government. The Premier of Barbados and the Chief Ministers of the other six islands were invited to a meeting with the Colonial Secretary in London in April, 1964, but have been unable to agree pending further discussions amongst themselves. A more detailed account is in Appendix III.2


5. The Trinidad representative's attack was based on four propositions summarised below with points made in our previous reply.

6. (i) Britain is thrusting independence on these islands without equipping them to sustain it.
[Comment:] So far from Britain thrusting independence on these islands, it is on their initiative that we are considering a constitution for independence.

7. (ii) The scale of British aid in the past has fallen short of what was estimated to be required.
[Comment:] In general, British aid to overseas territories warrants a modest pride. In particular, over a three-year period 1959–62, British aid in the Caribbean exceeded the level of aid estimated by the Government of Trinidad to be required at that time for the whole area. (In fact much the greater part of this went to Jamaica and Trinidad but (a debating point) would Trinidad complain of that now? To strengthen Jamaica and Trinidad could have been expected to strengthen the whole Federal area).

8. (iii) Grenada is seeking union with Trinidad but would require substantial aid to bring it up to the economic level of Trinidad and (by implication) that aid would not be forthcoming.
[Comment:] We have not so far been invited to consider whether financial assistance could be given to facilitate union of Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago.

9. (iv) Britain should leave these islands to settle what political institutions they want without interference—which they could do if only they they had assurances of the financial assistance required.

2 Appendixes not printed.
Comment: We recognised from the first that a federation of these islands would continue to need external aid both on capital and on recurrent account. At the London Conference in 1962 we volunteered assurances that we would continue to provide aid. Those assurances should be sufficient to enable the territories to complete their consideration of what form the federal constitution should take. The time to consider the level of aid to be provided is when it is clear what kind of federation is contemplated and what is its capacity to make good and effective use of money provided for development. It is not, therefore, in our view finance which is the obstacle to progress with Federation, but the difficulty of reaching agreement on a satisfactory federal scheme. A Federation is recognised as likely to offer these territories a better future than they could expect individually. But if Britain is to continue to provide finance it has the right to be assured that the federal arrangements give the central government sufficient power including power to ensure the co-ordinated development of the whole area. Naturally, it is difficult for seven separate Governments to reach agreement on a federal constitution; but the British Government would be failing in its duty if it did not seek to ensure that any Federation which may be established was in a form which gave it the best possible chance not only of survival but of a healthy development.

51 CAB 148/1, f 110 6 July 1964
‘The remaining British colonies’: minutes of Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee meeting (DO 31(64)1)

[Mr Sandys had not by the middle of June 1964 reached any decision about the conclusions presented in the survey of Sept 1963, as modified on 23 Mar 1964 (document no 49). But he raised the possibility of making a statement to parliament about Britain’s future relationship with the remaining (smaller) colonies, and to do so before the opening of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting on 8 July, at which it was already planned to make a statement about Britain’s ‘colonial record’ (CAB 148/6, ff 155–156, DO(O)(64)42, CO memo, 5 June 1964). Officials discouraged the idea of anticipating the Commonwealth meeting statement by a parliamentary one, which would be even harder to draft and would lessen the impact on the prime ministers it was hoped to impress (CAB 148/4, ff 61–62, DO(O)14(64)2, minutes of meeting of DOP(Official)C, 17 June 1964). A parliamentary statement having thus been stopped, ministers then discussed the terms of the statement to the Commonwealth meeting. Sandys explained the main purpose: ‘The issue of colonialism was at present one of the main causes of present attacks on the policies of the United Kingdom; and our international position would be greatly improved if it could be demonstrated that such attacks were now beside the point’. Some doubts were expressed by his colleagues as to the desirability and the wording of his statement, so it was decided that ‘further thought’ must be given before a decision was taken (CAB 148/1, f 102A, DO 29(64)1(vi), minutes of meeting of DOPC meeting, 1 July 1964).]

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (D.O. (64) 65), to which was appended the re-draft of a statement about the remaining British Colonies which might be circulated to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers after their arrival in London.
The Colonial Secretary said that he attached importance to making such a statement at the outset of the Meeting. A private discussion on this subject with the Prime Minister of Kenya, Mr. Kenyatta, on the latter’s arrival in London, had reinforced his view that, if we gave greater publicity to our record in granting independence to our colonies and emphasised the fact that this process had now
nearly reached completion, we might mitigate to some extent the criticism of the African and Asian countries and might encourage the more friendly members of this group to support us.

Discussion revealed a division of view in the Committee on the desirability of making this statement. On the one hand, it was primarily a factual account of our record and of the present position; and anti-colonialist criticism should be mitigated by a greater realisation of the fact that the remaining Colonial territories were either on the point of reaching independence or were so small that independence was doubtfully practicable for them. On the other hand, such criticism seemed likely, in any event, to continue for political and emotional reasons as long as we retained any colonial responsibility, and in particular until the issue of Southern Rhodesia was settled. Moreover, we might well require some of the remaining small territories for defence or other needs; and it might therefore be inexpedient to suggest in the statement that the choice of independence was open to all of them, however small. Nor would it be politic to make a statement which suggested that we were anxious to be rid of our responsibilities. If, nevertheless, a statement of some kind were desirable in principle, the draft appended to D.O. (64) 65 would require amendment in certain respects in order to meet detailed points made in discussion.

The Prime Minister said that he would prepare a revised draft in the light of the discussion, on the basis of which the Committee could give further consideration to the desirability of making a statement on this subject.

52 CAB 148/2, f 221 8 July 1964
‘The remaining British colonies’: statement on decolonisation by Mr Sandys to Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting (DO(64)65 revise)

[The minutes of the meeting are withheld in the PRO. The ‘final revise’ draft is therefore printed here. An earlier draft of this was printed by Morgan, Guidance towards self-government in British colonies (Official history of colonial development, vol 5), pp 207–208. A comparison of this with the quotation from the speech, pp 212–213, indicates that it was delivered more or less in this form, but with the omission of the second sentence in para 2, and with the addition of two prefatory sentences, viz: ‘Britain had almost completed the task of divesting herself of her Empire. She had done this of her own will, not through lack of power to rule, but because she wished to give others the freedom she so much prized herself’. Discussion by the prime ministers is reported in Morgan, Guidance, pp 213–214.]

Britain’s long declared aim is to lead her Colonies to independence. We have no desire to prolong our colonial obligations for a day longer than is necessary.

2. Already more than twenty countries, with a total population of some 700 millions, have achieved sovereign independence under British guidance. [In the same way, we are prepared to offer independence to all other British territories which desire it and are able to assume the responsibilities involved.]1

3. Malta will be independent in September, Northern Rhodesia in October, and the Gambia very soon after. Basutoland has been promised that she can have independence in about eighteen months’ time; Bechuanaland will be free to follow

1 Square brackets in original; words apparently not delivered.
when she wishes; and Swaziland’s new constitution has now set her on the same
course. An undertaking has been given to the Federation of South Arabia that it will
be independent within 3½ years. British Guiana will become independent as soon as
she is able to assure internal peace. Southern Rhodesia, which has had internal self-
government for over 40 years, will attain full sovereignty as soon as her
parliamentary institutions are sufficiently representative.

4. There are also other Colonies which already enjoy a wide measure of self-
government. These include the Bahamas, Barbados, British Honduras and Mauritius.

5. In fact, the only British dependency with a substantial population which is not
already on the way to independence is Hong Kong, where, owing to external factors,
the circumstances are exceptional.

6. In addition there are some twenty other Colonies and Protectorates with a
combined population of one and a half millions. Only two have a population of more
than 100,000, several less than 10,000 and the smallest, Pitcairn, under a hundred.

7. Some of these territories may feel strong enough to proceed to independence
on their own. Some may join with others to form larger and more viable units. Some
may wish to couple independence with a treaty of assistance, such as Western Samoa
concluded with New Zealand. Some may favour the form of independence described
by the United Nations as “free association with an independent state”, under which
Britain or some other country would agree to undertake certain limited
responsibilities. Some will for the present prefer to remain as they are. Each will, at
the appropriate time, make its own choice.
CHAPTER 2

Strategy and Defence Policies

Document numbers 53–81

53 CAB 128/31/1, CC 21(57)2 18 Mar 1957

‘Statement on defence, 1957’: Cabinet conclusions on White Paper

[This important White Paper on Defence was published as Defence: outline of future policy, Cmd 124 (PP, 1956–57 vol XXIII, 489). Extracts were printed in Porter & Stockwell, eds, British imperial policy & decolonization vol 2, pp 452–464 (document no 71).]

The Cabinet had before them a note by the Minister of Defence (C. (57) 69) covering a draft of a White Paper giving an outline of future defence policy.

The Prime Minister said that the White Paper was designed to set out in greater detail the new defence policy which he had already outlined to the Cabinet. It was important that this policy should not be presented in such a way as to reflect unfavourably on the record of Conservative Governments since 1952 or to alarm our allies in Western European Union (W.E.U.), to whom the progressive elimination of National Service would come as a surprise. The opening section of the White Paper should therefore be replaced by a longer introduction which would make it clear that the objective of our defence policy remained, as it had always been, the maintenance of compact and efficient fighting Services, but that the methods by which we should best attain this objective required radical reappraisal in the light of current strategic considerations.

The Minister of Defence briefly reviewed the main provisions of the White Paper, emphasising that, if the Services were to be manned in future by regular recruits, conditions of service would need to be substantially improved in certain respects, and some additional expenditure on this account would be inevitable. It would also be desirable to indicate in the White Paper the date by which we hoped to complete the elimination of National Service.

In the course of a general discussion the Cabinet reaffirmed their approval of the broad lines of the new defence policy. Its presentation would need careful consideration, however, and in this connection the following points were made:—

(a) The White Paper reflected a fundamental revolution in our defence policy, which might have far-reaching effects on our influence in world affairs and on our ability to maintain our position in the more remote Colonial territories such as Hong Kong.

(b) The impact of our proposals on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) might be unfortunate. NATO was the central pivot of our system of defence as a whole, and we should therefore seek by consultation to convince the other member countries of the advantages of our new policy. We should oppose any suggestion that the proposed reduction in our naval forces would warrant the transfer of certain NATO naval Commands to other countries.
(c) A reduction in military establishments on the scale indicated in the White Paper would give rise to considerable problems in the Services themselves, particularly in those branches which were manned predominantly by technical personnel recruited by National Service. The effect of the new policy on industry, particularly from the point of view of the unemployment which might result from the cancellation of contracts, would also need to be carefully reviewed from time to time.

(d) It was for consideration how far our allies in W.E.U. should be informed in advance about our intention to bring National Service to an end. Provided that we made an adequate contribution to the defence of Europe, the decision on the means by which we recruited the necessary forces lay with us and not with the other member countries of W.E.U. Nevertheless it would be advisable to give them some indication of our intentions shortly before the White Paper was published.

(e) The announcement of the withdrawal of two Territorial Army divisions as reinforcements for NATO would not be very opportune at the present moment. The extent to which Territorial Army formations should be available for emergency service overseas should perhaps be reconsidered in the light of experience during the Anglo–French operation against Egypt.

(f) The reference to Cyprus should be carefully considered in the light of the current discussions about future policy for the Island.

(g) The White Paper should include a reference to the need for close collaboration with the other Members of the Commonwealth in the development of our defence policy.

(h) The proposed reduction of our forces in the Far East would make it more difficult for us to discharge, in respect of our Colonies in that area, the responsibilities for their defence which we should retain even when they had attained a large measure of self-government.

(i) The treatment of civil defence in the White Paper would need further consideration, particularly in the light of the statement that the great cities could not at present be protected against nuclear attack.

(j) It was unlikely that all the transport aircraft needed for the Central Reserve could be provided by Transport Command; and the relevant passage in the White Paper might be amended to leave more scope for the contribution which could be made by air charter companies.

The Cabinet:

(1) Approved the general principles of the new defence policy outlined in the draft White Paper annexed to C. (57) 69.

(2) Invited the Minister of Defence to prepare a revised draft of the White Paper in the light of the points made in the Cabinet’s discussion and of other comments which Ministers might communicate to him, and to circulate the revised text for their consideration at a later meeting.

(3) Agreed that publication of the White Paper should be deferred until not later than 5th April.
Several departments were concerned about the political and security implications of proposed reductions, which seemed to signal evidence of the decline of British power—which would be serious for Hong Kong—and a growing inability to protect vital interests.

I am grateful to you for sending me a copy of your minute of the 3rd May to Duncan Sandys on the long-term plan for the Navy. I share many of the reactions which were contained on page 5 of your minute: these reductions come at a time when British Army strength in the Colonies is being reduced to about 37% of its present numbers, and both on that account and on their own merits they cause me much concern. None of the Colonies is planning to effect anything like a compensating increase in their own local forces for internal security purposes—indeed most of them have not the means to do this if they would. The effect, therefore, of simultaneous Army and Navy reductions is bound to become evident, and in itself is likely to encourage disruptive elements in the Colonies.

2. We in the Colonial Office do not feel confident that we are entering a period of peaceful development when the calls on our naval forces will diminish. There is of course no stopping the process of political devolution on which we are now well set, and in addition to the accompanying restlessness we have to realise that it is going to be very difficult to maintain the politically essential impetus of economic development. This in itself aggravates the effects of reductions in a large labour force like a dockyard, but is of course of more general importance in that the internal security situation becomes that much more finely balanced. The withdrawals therefore come at a critical and unfortunate time.

3. The naval contribution to our power in the Colonies has been particularly valuable because of the widespread affection and respect that Colonial people have for our ships and our sailors. It has often been enough that a warship is in harbour so that a ship's company marches through the town for an immediate effect to be seen in local confidence. The value only a few weeks ago of the Bigbury Bay, at St. Lucia, to which you yourself referred, is a case in point. A situation ugly enough to be beyond local control but not sufficiently ugly to warrant the flying in of troops, or in extreme cases of the “Fire Brigade” from the United Kingdom, can often be controlled, with the minimum of fuss and the least local exacerbation, by the Navy. It is therefore a very disturbing thought that in so many vital areas of the world the cuts proposed would mean that we should no longer be able to call on you.

4. Turning to the particular effect of the reductions which you have indicated, and leaving aside the case of Hong Kong which we are taking up separately, I would like first to deal with the surrender of the naval dockyards at Singapore and Malta. In neither of these cases are we worried on this account by the direct effect of such withdrawals on the internal security position; but the indirect effects of such substantial numbers of people being put out of work are most serious indeed. In these overseas yards there are no or very few other occupations in which manpower can then be productively employed. The reductions will weaken the economy of these
places, and I would like to emphasise this, since David Eccles\(^1\) minute to you of 21st May points out that by concentrating reductions in the Home Yards we can use the labour released to strengthen our economy. 5,000 at Singapore and 6,400 at Malta represent, I understand, about 70% of the present personnel employed on these dockyards. The Malta cut is 8% of present total employment in the Island.

5. The Chief Minister of Singapore has already asked to meet representatives of the service departments in London next week to discuss current Admiralty dismissals in Singapore, about which he is gravely perturbed, although they are of course trifling by comparison with what is contemplated. One of the chief local arguments for the retention of our base in Singapore is the employment it provides.

6. As for Malta, you know how heavily dependent is its whole economy on the dockyard and you will have seen copies of recent letters from Mr. Mintoff which I circulated to the Malta Committee. In view of our commitment to give Malta substantial aid for development and to balance her budget, I am not at all certain that it would be financially prudent for us to close the dockyard there. I should certainly want to see this worked over in detail before I could agree to it.

7. I note that you are “reasonably hopeful” that both of these yards could be handed over to private firms. David Perth\(^2\) and I have already had a word with Knollys\(^3\) about this possibility in Malta. Such an arrangement would, of course, do a great deal to counter the economic effects of closure, and unemployment, and I should be grateful if you would keep me fully informed of your negotiations with likely firms. Colonial Governments will expect to be fully consulted on this and other aspects of the new plan and we shall certainly have to ensure that any inevitable run down in employment is spread over a number of years.

8. May I now turn to another painful topic—the closure of the station at Bermuda and the abolition of the post of Resident Naval Officer there? There are two main consequences of this. First, it will mean that the Royal Navy will sever a connection which has endured since 1767. We do not yet know whether we are to have a Marine garrison in Bermuda, but if not, and if the two frigates go, there will be no Service representation whatever in the island to keep our end up against overwhelming American representation. They have nearly 10,000 service personnel in the islands, and about 100,000 American tourists visit them each year. We will have no service representation at all. The younger generation are heavily pro-American and these withdrawals, indicating the decline of British power, must strengthen their feeling that their political future must lie, as their economic future already lies, Westward rather than Eastwards. I cannot be happy about this.

9. Secondly, it will deprive the West Indies of naval assistance in an emergency. We hope to minimise this disadvantage by re-forming the West India Regiment, and there is of course always the “Fire Brigade”. But the Navy gives us flexibility and enables us to reach islands which are inadequately served by airfields. The Windward Islands are particularly handicapped in this respect. The value of the Royal Navy is therefore great in the scattered islands of the Caribbean. The effect in the West Indies generally of the withdrawal on the feelings of the people towards us and the Americans respectively will be similar to that in Bermuda.

---

\(^1\) President of the Board of Trade, 1957–1959.  
\(^3\) Lord Knollys, chairman of Vickers, Ltd, since 1956.
10. The abolition of our naval headquarters in Cape Town, and the withdrawal of the existing frigates from the South Atlantic and South America station, will mean that we will be unable in war to protect our shipping routes via the Cape. If we cannot (as seems likely) use the Suez Canal, Russian submarines will have liberty to interfere with our shipping to East Africa, and the Far East. Although the South African Navy is concentrating on the protection of its coast line, this does not cover the whole of the area that is of importance to us, and in view of the known Russian submarine potential we must clearly expect considerable activity in “soft” areas.

11. Moreover there is the vital fact that the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Island Dependencies will be, as your note indicates, without naval protection. I take it that this does not mean that we shall be deprived of the armed net-layer, H.M.S. Protector, which visits Port Stanley for each summer season, but that you had in mind our ability to reinforce in time of trouble. At present a Naval stand-still agreement is negotiated each year with the Argentine and Chile, which places a restraint on the assumed ability of the three countries to increase their naval activity in the area. I do not see that we can expect this exercise in restraint to be accepted by our rivals when it is patent that we have no chips to bargain with. The whole area would then become subject to vigorous and overwhelming naval activity in support of claims by Argentina and Chile. I do not consider that we could sustain ourselves in the Dependencies without naval protection, and if we lost them the Falkland Islands to which the Argentine has a shadowy claim, with their 2,000 British settlers, would be the next target. The risk of this happening is unacceptable to me.

12. In short, what I want are:

(1) A detailed programme of reductions in Singapore to be worked out in consideration with the Singapore Government with a view to softening the blow.

(2) Complete reconsideration of the proposed reductions in Malta in the light of the economic effects on Malta and the political and financial interests of the United Kingdom.

(3) Retention of some naval representation in Bermuda.

(4) Ability to protect our sea routes round the Cape to East Africa, Aden and the Far East; and to control the situation in the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies. If at any time we lose our position in the Dependencies then the necessity of controlling the Falkland Islands becomes all the greater.

55 ADM 205/116, COS(58) 193 11 Aug 1958
‘A policy for the Middle East’: memorandum for COS Committee by F-M Sir G Templer¹

[Extract]

[In introducing this paper to a COS meeting on 12 Aug, Templer said he was convinced “that the real threat to the Middle East was from the continued expansion of Soviet influence; Arab nationalism was chiefly important because it had become a tool of Soviet policy. Appeasement could only lead to disaster and the point had been reached at which we must confront the U.S.S.R. with a firm Western policy. At the present time the United Kingdom had vital interests in the area, but the Russians had not. Our deterrent was still effective and he did not believe that the Russians would risk a global war by taking overt

action. The deterrent would not, however, prevent continued propaganda and subversion by the Russians. Whilst accepting the political assessment, Sir Caspar John (representing the First Sea Lord) expressed doubt about the military practicabilities and implications: 'any military adventure on our part might well cement the Arab world and so defeat our aims. It was desirable that we should try to obtain the assistance of the Russians in formulating a policy for the area because without it any stability we attempted to establish could only be shortlived'. The Chiefs agreed that a radical reappraisal of western policy for the Middle East should be pursued (COS 71(58) 3).

1. **Introduction.** This paper is written on the assumption that the aims which the Chiefs of Staff expressed in their previous report (COS(58) 183), have been accepted by H.M.G. Those were:—

(a) To secure long term stability in the Middle East by means of an overall settlement,
(b) To secure the unimpeded use of the Suez Canal and a corresponding air corridor above it,
(c) To guarantee the continued supply of oil.

2. A critical stage has been reached in the Middle East where the UK and US vital interests are threatened; and the effects of this will spread beyond the boundaries of the Middle East itself. We do not believe the US yet realise the full extent of the danger. . . .

15. **Summary of deductions.** The main deductions from the preceding paragraphs are as follows:—

(a) The Middle East is a battleground in the cold war between Soviet Russia and the West. There is a very real danger that the area will fall to Communism through subversion.
(b) Pan-Arabism, cemented as it is by the fear and hatred of Israel, is being used by Communism as the prime means of attaining its ends.
(c) The present ambitions of Nasser and his present Anti-Western policy are detrimental to the West.
(d) A solution to the Israel problem is essential to the stabilization of the Middle East; it will have to be imposed.
(e) Full realisation by the United States of the real dangers of the present situation is an urgent necessity.
(f) The need for the Arabs to sell oil to the West will not by itself render them impervious to Communist subversion.
(g) Public opinion is unaware of the Soviet threat, and not prepared for the strong measures needed.
(h) The United Nations organisation is powerless to take effective action.
(j) There is no likelihood of any action on the part of the West leading to global war, or of overt Russian military intervention, provided it is made abundantly clear to the Russians that this would lead to nuclear retaliation.
(k) Whilst the nuclear deterrent is credible today, in two or three years time it cannot be guaranteed to cover the Middle East. The West, therefore have little time left in which to adopt strong political and military measures.

---

2 Col Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, 1956–1970 (died); in 1958 he created a federation with Syria, the United Arab Republic, from which Syria withdrew in 1961.
(l) The loss of assured bases and staging posts for sea and air movement would cut off the UK and NATO area strategically from the Far East. The strategic repercussions of this would be far reaching.

16. **Courses open to the West.** It is concluded that there are three courses open to the West:—

(a) To do a deal with Nasser. . . .
(b) To issue an ultimatum to Nasser. . . .
(c) To break Nasser’s leadership of Arab nationalism by a less direct method than course ‘(a)’. . . .

17. **Conclusion.** Of the three courses, Course ‘(a)’ must contain serious risks and its adoption would fly in the face of all evidence of Soviet penetration and Egyptian intrigue. It cannot be recommended. Course ‘(b)’ would be likely to lead to war with Egypt but it is the certain course to achieve quick and decisive results and could be adopted now without danger of global war. Its adoption presents great political difficulties and the ground would have to be carefully prepared in conjunction with the United States. Course ‘(c)’ cannot be expected to produce quick results and it also requires political courage and determination. It is, however, the minimum course of action which can hope to safeguard the interests of the West and thwart the Soviet plan to dominate the Middle East.

18. Whichever course is chosen, there are three fundamental requisites:—

(a) Joint recognition by the United States, the UK and the Old Members of the Commonwealth of the Soviet danger.
(b) Similar joint recognition that there is no way of safeguarding the interests of the West through United Nations auspices.
(c) Co-ordination of US/UK political, economic and military strategy and a visible determination to defend their interests.

56 PREM 11/3239, T467/58 31 Aug 1958

[Proposed idea of an African defence pact to meet the Soviet threat]:
Mr Macmillan’s reply to Sir R Welensky

[Sir R Welensky made his proposal on 16 May for co-ordinated action; but the FO, CO and CRO all agreed an ‘African Treaty Organisation’ was a non-starter, because of the difficulty of associating independent African states with the Union of South Africa in any effective organisation; in any case the defence of Africa should begin in the Middle East. This telegraphic letter was drafted in the CRO.]

Thank you for your further letter of July 17 about the threat to Africa.

At the time when you wrote your letter it did indeed look as if the revolution in Iraq might have fatally damaged the Bagdad Pact. But since then, we have held a meeting of the Council of the Pact, and, while Iraq was not represented, and her future attitude remains uncertain, I found our colleagues from Pakistan, Turkey and Iran in very good heart. You will, however, have seen the important statement of U.S. policy contained in the declaration which we signed at the meeting. Mr. Dulles has assured us that, so far as the signatories are concerned, this means that the United States are in the Pact with them. I agree that the future position of Iraq is uncertain
and we must certainly leave her out of account in looking at the credit side of the Pact. But the rest of us dispose considerable forces and these are backed by our unanimous resolve to make the Pact successful.

I fully share your view, however, as to the potential danger to Africa of the Middle East situation, and I have every sympathy with your anxiety to take positive and effective action to strengthen our position. But we have to consider what is practicable. I think that if we look at the attitude of the independent countries of Africa we see, beyond question, that an African Defence Organisation on the SEATO model is not practical politics. The North African countries would not come in. They are anti-communist and certainly not pro-Nasser. But they are Arabs, and they are not going to join a defence pact which is clearly directed against Egypt. Still less because of Algeria, would they consider joining with the French in a pact of this kind. Furthermore we must face the fact that most of the other African independent states are deeply committed to a policy of non-alignment. If we were to suggest that they should nevertheless enter a pact for their own defence, I think that they might well, for example, in return demand a public declaration by participants with Colonial Territories designed to commit them to giving those territories independence on a basis of universal suffrage in the very near future. We do not want to provoke this kind of counter action; and we may be sure that the French, the Belgians, and the Portuguese would feel just as strongly as we do on this point.

If, as we are convinced, an African Defence Pact is not possible, this does not mean that there is nothing we can do. We are indeed doing a good deal already. We are training and equipping the Libyan Army and we are heavily subsidising the Libyan budget. We help the Sudanese with arms. Ethiopia has western instructors for her Armed Forces and by diplomatic action we and the Americans, in particular, have encouraged the Ethiopian Government to see Nasser for what he is. We have been talking to the Americans and the Italians about Somalia and we hope that the position of the moderates there will be strengthened by economic aid from the West after independence. As regards our own territories, our intelligence organisation is kept under continual review, and we are also taking steps to make sure that each Government has sufficient information about the nature of the subversive influences threatening Africa to be able to set the right targets for their intelligence services. I am asking Metcalf to keep you fully informed as our thinking develops and I should be very grateful if you would talk this over with him and let him have your ideas.

As you know, I also have it in mind to send Oliver, the Commonwealth Secretary’s Principal Staff Officer, to Salisbury, possibly in the autumn.¹ He was recently V.C.I.G.S. and he will be able, when he does go, to give you a very much fuller background than I can give in this letter. He will also be ready to discuss with you any suggestions which you like to make for improving our collaboration in this vital field. If you could agree to receive him, I am sure it would be most useful and we could consider as a result of your talks what future action may be necessary and possible.

¹ Lt-Gen Sir William Oliver, principal staff officer in CRO, 1957–1959, high commissioner in Australia from 1959.
I am very glad that the Defence Committee will consider the problems in the Gulf and re-examine our military posture there.

2. I feel that we ought to have in the Gulf a British smaller edition of what the United States has in the Mediterranean in the shape of the 6th Fleet. In other words, a force which is capable of deploying its striking power in a matter of hours. We cannot without affecting our political position count on basing adequate troops on land for reasons of Arab nationalism, but nobody minds ships sailing about in the sea. This means that we have to have sufficient air-conditioned vessels. The trouble may come this year, next year or some time. But because we cannot be certain when it will come, I hope we will not postpone the production (which may take time) of a considerable striking force. It will have a substantial deterrent effect, and if it never has to be used it will have been much more successful than if it has to go to action. No doubt there are technical difficulties but I believe that they could be overcome.

3. What would be even better would be to have in addition to our smaller edition of the 6th Fleet a similar American striking force. It is urgent to bring the Americans in on all this. There have been considerable joint studies already undertaken and a long paper was produced on April 13 on which lengthy comments had been prepared by May 5.

4. I understand that there is a U.S./U.K. Military Contingency Planning Group in London which has suggested that Kuwait should be studied next. I am told that this might provide a quick method of starting joint military planning on Kuwait and we have agreed to get this going. I asked for an estimate of the time it would take and was informed that it might well take three months. It seems to me quite out of the question to accept this delay. I hope that you and the Minister of Defence will give the British side a strong impulse and if you agree I will speak to both Herter and McElroy\(^1\) in Geneva about the great importance we attach to a speedy discussion. .

Minister’s Plan C—which is the only situation with which this paper deals. Even although all the procedures at the U.N. which the Defence Minister proposes were followed, the following reactions are probable.

3. **Canada.** The Canadians are strongly opposed to the use of force in the Middle East and have expressed agreement with our current policy of disengagement from Middle East conflicts. It is improbable that we would be able to convince the Canadians of the rightness of any decision to take or threaten direct military action against an Arab state hostile to us in the Middle East unless such action were taken in extreme circumstances, in the closest concert with the Americans and with the blessing of the United Nations.

4. **Other “old” Commonwealth members.** We could probably count on the support of Australia, provided we could show that circumstances amply justified our action, and provided we consulted them properly in advance. South African support would probably also be forthcoming, but might be no more than tacit. The present New Zealand Government would not be happy, but would be unlikely to oppose us publicly.

5. **The “new” Commonwealth excluding Pakistan.** With the possible exception of Pakistan, both governmental and public reaction to any military action by us (or the threat of it) against an Arab state would be bitterly hostile throughout the new Commonwealth and could in certain cases notably India, lead to a break with the Commonwealth with all the wider consequences to this association that would be involved.

6. **Pakistan.** The Pakistan Government have shown understanding of our vital interests in the Middle East and particularly in the Persian Gulf. Pakistan is, moreover, a member of the Baghdad Pact. It is possible, therefore, that a Pakistan Government might not be opposed to military action by us in the Middle East in certain circumstances. But it is doubtful whether any Pakistan Government would be able to withstand the pressure of its public opinion and Islamic ties for long; in the end, however reluctantly, they would probably be forced to come out against us. Again, the possibility of a break with the Commonwealth cannot be ruled out.

7. **Conclusions.** To sum up:

(i) Canadian support would be unlikely. They would almost certainly drag their feet and might even actively oppose us. The full co-operation of the Americans in our policies and the mobilisation or at least the blessing of the United Nations would be essential if we were to have any hope of gaining Canadian support.

(ii) Reactions in the “new” Commonwealth would, by and large, be bitterly hostile and the possibility could not be ruled out that India and other countries might feel obliged to break with the Commonwealth.

(iii) We could probably count on support from Australia and at least tacit support from South Africa and New Zealand, provided our action was amply justified and there had been proper consultation.

8. We cannot exclude the possibility that, at the worst, United Kingdom military action against an Arab state could mean the break up of the Commonwealth as we at present know it, for the departure of one or more Asian members would set in train a disruptive process that would be disastrous.
59  PREM 11/2753  8 June 1959

'Middle East military plans': minute by F A Bishop (PM's Office) to Mr Macmillan, about Kuwait and Iraq

The memoranda by the Minister of Defence (D. (59) 13 and 14) deal respectively with the plans to meet an emergency in Kuwait, and with certain measures which might be taken to improve our state of readiness to carry out these plans.

We could take practical action (a) to meet a request by the Ruler for British troops to deal with an internal threat in Kuwait or to deter invasion from Iraq; or (b) to deal with the situation which would arise if the Ruler were overthrown in the course of internal disturbances in Kuwait. But the Minister thinks that, because it would take at least twenty-four days to assemble the necessary forces, it would not be practicable to reconquer Kuwait by direct assault if it were suddenly invaded and occupied.

In this latter eventuality, therefore, he thinks that we would, in the last resort, have to try to regain Kuwait by means of an air attack upon Iraq. There is an unpleasantly familiar ring about a plan of this sort. It clearly could not be undertaken in present circumstances without the full support of the United States Government. Even then, it would be a formidably risky operation. The difficulty of carrying world opinion is shown by the Commonwealth Secretary's estimate (in D.(59) 15) of the reactions of other Commonwealth countries.¹

The assertions that the Iraqi Government would not face the risk of war, and that the Russians would not resort to direct military intervention are, to say the least, of somewhat doubtful validity. We must assume that an Iraqi attack on Kuwait would not be likely to happen except with the full support of Russia. It might well not be politically possible for Russia to refuse to come openly to the help of Iraq.

The difficulties in the way of our taking action, once Kuwait had been invaded, make it all the more necessary to be able to act without hesitation or delay in an emergency before the invasion has taken place. Therefore all possible measures to enable us to react more quickly ought in principle to be adopted. To be able to act quickly in the Gulf is, indeed, of higher priority than anything else. You may wish to ask whether joint operational planning with the Americans (about which you sent a personal message to President Eisenhower, after the last meeting of the Committee, on 12th May) has in fact begun; and to what extent this joint planning affects the measures now recommended.

Certain of the measures suggested in D. (59) 14 would involve substantial expenditure, e.g., the provision of air-conditioned quarters at Sharjah would cost £3/4 million. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will no doubt wish to consider how far this expenditure could be found from within the defence budget.

Perhaps the provision of tanks for the Kuwaiti Government should be carefully scrutinised. These would of course be a valuable precaution, but only so long as they remained in the hands of authorities friendly to us.

Indeed, it is our dependence on a small number of local Rulers, or their advisers, which will continue to be our weakness. So long as the Ruler of Kuwait, and his brother, and the Rulers of Bahrein and Sharjah remain co-operative, and in control,

¹ See previous document.
the existing plans for an emergency in the Gulf may suffice. But control will sooner or later pass out of their hands. No doubt the problem of aligning ourselves with different forces in this and other vital areas will be considered in the wider examinations of future policy that are now going to be made.

60 CAB 128/33, CC 37(59)3 23 June 1959

‘Maldive Islands’: Cabinet conclusions about establishment of an air staging-post at Gan

[The construction of an air staging-post at Gan was begun in 1957 in the belief that Britain needed an Indian Ocean airfield immune from political interference from India or Ceylon. The evacuation of several hundred inhabitants was unpopular, and they were pressing for financial recompense. Falttering co-operation was ‘inconvenient’, but in Home’s opinion, ‘they are too primitive in organisation to be capable for a long time ahead of operating as an independent State’. However, if they ‘cut loose from us they might fall prey to Indian or Ceylonese expansionism’, so it would be good policy to retain their goodwill by financial generosity and willingness to talk about status (memo by Lord Home, 31 Mar 1958, CAB 131/19, D(58)22). The Defence Committee in a series of meetings in April and May 1958 urged that negotiations should be kept going, in the interests of reaching an amicable settlement; if force were used to evict people, the issue could be taken up at the UN (CAB 131/19, D 6(58)3, D 26(58), D 27(58).) Progress remained slow, but the prospects of eventual agreement were thought to be reasonably good, and meanwhile building was proceeding. Costs were expected to be £4.3 million, of which over £0.5 million was in compensation for eviction (CAB 131/20, D(58)74.)

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary (C. (59) 103) on the state of the negotiations with the Government of the Maldive Islands in connexion with the establishment of an air staging post at Gan.

The Commonwealth Secretary said that the Maldivian Government had suspended the negotiations on 17th March, but they had now indicated that they were willing to resume them and proposed to send a delegation to London for that purpose towards the end of July. The construction of the airfield was meanwhile proceeding and would be completed early in 1960. The work was being carried out with the full co-operation of the local inhabitants (the Suvadivans) who were now trying to assert their independence of the Maldivian Government. Although our legal title to establish an air staging post at Gan was soundly based, under the Protection Agreement of 1953 and under the preliminary Lease Agreement of 1956, it was desirable that we should, if possible, conclude a detailed agreement on the use of Gan. We should not, however, appear unduly anxious to conclude the negotiations. Even if the Maldivian Government eventually signed such an agreement, there would remain the problem of reconciling the dissident Suvadivans to the restoration of the authority of the Maldivian Government.

In discussion the following points were made:—

(a) Although our primary interest was to establish a staging post at Gan with the greatest security and length of tenure possible, we were also concerned to assert our right under the 1953 Agreement to be responsible for the external relations of the Maldivian Government. This was necessary in order to prevent a foreign Government, such as the United Arab Republic or even the Soviet Union, from establishing a staging post elsewhere in the Maldives.

(b) Although the dissident Suvadivans were at present more friendly, it would be
inexpedient to encourage their desire for independence. For this might call into question our rights under the 1953 Agreement, and might encourage the Maldivian Government to seek the protection of some other foreign Power. Nevertheless, in the outcome of the negotiations with the Maldivian Government, we should seek to protect the position of the Suvadivans.

(c) It was important that we should obtain as long a lease as possible of the airfield at Gan, and that we should secure some arrangement for its renewal.

(d) It would be unwise to delay for too long the resumption of the negotiations. It should, however, be possible to indicate to the Maldivian Government that, while we could not resume discussions at the exact date they had suggested, we would be ready to do so at about the middle of September. Before the discussions were resumed, we should consider in greater detail exactly how they should be handled.

The Cabinet:

Authorised the Commonwealth Secretary to invite the Maldivian Government to send representatives to resume negotiations in London in the middle of September.1

---

1 Lord Home reported on 26 Jan 1960 that a satisfactory agreement had been reached: the government of the Maldives ‘had undertaken to make over to us Gan Island and part of Hittadu Island as a gift for thirty years in return for our external defence of the Maldives, and would accept a permanent representative of Her Majesty’s Government in their capital. We would pay the Maldivians about £40,000 which had already been committed in connexion with resettlement from Addu Atoll. In return for the defence facilities we proposed to make them a gift of £100,000 (or, at most, £150,000) towards their general expenditure and a grant of £700,000 (or, at most, £750,000) for technical developments to be paid over a period of not less than five years. The authority of the Maldivian Government over the Addu Atoll would be restored over a period of years on conditions to be approved by ourselves’. In discussion, ‘it was recognised that it would have been preferable to have secured occupation of Gan for longer than thirty years. This period, however, was acceptable for defence purposes; moreover, it might be extended, since provision for this was contained in the proposed agreement. There was no question of developing a full-scale naval base on the island’ (CAB 128/34, CC 3(60)4).

---

61 DEFE 7/2231, no 32 29 June 1960


[This report was signed by Lord Mountbatten of Burma (chairman of COS Committee since 1959), Admiral Sir Caspar John (first sea lord and chief of naval staff since 1960), F-M Sir F Festing (chief of imperial general staff since 1958), and Air Chief Marshal Sir T Pike (chief of air staff, 1960). Their report, D(60)32, is still withheld from the public.]

The attached Study examines and makes recommendations on our military strategy for circumstances short of global war, on the tasks of the Services, and on the consequent force requirements during the coming decade. Part I, which forms the background of the Study, outlines the political aims of the United Kingdom, and is in effect a summary of the report of the Future Policy Committee. In Part II we have examined the complementary military strategy needed to fulfil our commitments, and in Part III we have assessed the forces required to implement the strategy.
2. The most far-reaching conclusion from the military point of view of the Study on Future Policy\(^1\) is that while our military commitments will remain at about the same level as to-day, we cannot count on the use of our overseas bases. This is an important conclusion and has very important repercussions, to which we refer again below. On a number of issues the Study on Future Policy was not sufficiently precise to enable us to evolve a strategy and the resulting force requirements without making a number of additional or clarifying assumptions. These are listed in full in the Summary of our Study and in Section A of Part III.

3. The most important assumptions which we have made are as follows:—

(a) That H.M. Government would not be prepared to embark on any operation requiring the employment, at least initially, of a United Kingdom force exceeding one Brigade Group with supporting naval and air forces.

(b) That H.M. Government would be prepared to take the risk of not being able to mount an operation on this scale in more than one theatre at any one time.

(c) That a limited war would not take place in any one of the three main theatres at intervals of less than two years.

(d) That any period of intensive fighting is unlikely to be prolonged (possibly a matter of weeks rather than months), except possibly in the Far East where it could be more prolonged if China were not openly involved. However, forces may be required to be poised for a considerable time before an operation, and may have to remain deployed for some time afterwards.

(e) That a long warning period cannot be relied upon.

(f) That Gurkhas will continue to be available at least as long as commitments in Singapore remain. We recognise, however, that there may be many circumstances in which we would not be able to use them.

(g) We have further assumed that it will be politically acceptable that:—

(i) Naval forces, although continuing to be earmarked for assignment to NATO on about the present scale, will be allowed greater permanent deployment outside the NATO area. (i.e.) Category A forces will be reduced.

(ii) Land forces in Germany will be maintained at about their present level and that, while this continues, up to one Brigade Group could be temporarily withdrawn for operational use elsewhere.

(iii) In extreme circumstances a further Brigade Group could also be temporarily withdrawn from Germany.

(iv) Some of the tactical strike and reconnaissance squadrons assigned to SACEUR could be withdrawn for temporary use elsewhere.

4. We cannot emphasise too strongly that the strategy we suggest and the resulting force requirements essentially depend on the acceptance of these assumptions. We must also stress that we have calculated the known risks and commitments and have little in hand to meet the unforeseen. In particular, for example, there are great risks in assuming that not more than one crisis unavoidably involving the United Kingdom would arise at the same time. Experience shows the unreliability of assumptions and the frequency of the unexpected, particularly when looking a long way ahead. While an assumption can be altered overnight, it would take years to adjust our military position and organisation. For example, current

\(^1\) See document no 17.
military manpower figures were based on having overseas fewer military units than we are now called upon to maintain (Germany, Libya and the Caribbean are examples).

5. There should be no misunderstanding of our intention to retain our present bases as long as possible and certainly until it becomes counter-productive to do so, and we do not believe that our proposals for our military policy during this period will give rise to any dissension as regards the Mediterranean and the Middle East generally. However, we feel that we should draw attention to the Far East which falls into a somewhat different category. In this theatre we are committed to support SEATO and hence we have to face the possibility of having to intervene militarily on the mainland of Asia. Whereas the scale of our possible intervention cannot be great, the cost could be very material, depending upon the way in which we decide to equip our forces. So far as possible we should avoid becoming involved in large-scale operations on the mainland of Asia, and if possible our operations should be confined to those of the nature of anti-insurgency and suppression of internal rebellion. But we have also to consider the question of the deterrent effect on the Chinese that our forces in the Far East will be able to bring to bear and, to some extent, the degree to which we might be able to influence American policy. Thus, whilst it would be sufficient, for the purposes of the operation in which we would be prepared to engage, if we were only to equip our forces with conventional weapons (and these of a relatively old-fashioned type), we have concluded that to do so would not be the best policy; you will accordingly see that we have recommended the provision in the Far East of nuclear weapons for all three Services (although we realise that there may be political difficulties over their storage in certain territories), and a sophisticated system of air defence.

6. Whether or not we are to retain a capability for intervention in Kuwait and in the Far East after the loss of our bases is a matter for decision by Ministers. Since we have based this Study on the conclusions of the report of the Future Policy Committee, which require such a capability, we have examined the means in which we can fulfil this obligation. Whilst we have not yet been able to study in detail the many practical problems involved, it seems that the only course which can offer the means of achieving our aim is to develop progressively towards a strategy based on the maintenance of small seaborne forces with floating stockpiles, and on the rapid movement by air over long distances of land and air forces. If further study shows such a course to be reasonable, we must stress that the speed at which we should progress towards it must be regulated so as to avoid prejudicing the retention of those bases which remain to us. We have no doubt that progressive development towards a “double stance”, as we have called it, could prove very expensive.

7. It is clear that, of our current commitments, the one which would be most difficult to fulfil and for which the preparations would be likely to be the most expensive, is that of intervention in Kuwait if Aden and our foothold in the Persian Gulf are no longer available to us (Kenya in this context is important, but not as vital to us as Aden). Nevertheless, if the course we have proposed, namely the use of seaborne plus airborne forces, should prove after further study to be impracticable, the only alternative to giving up the commitment would be reliance on a wholly seaborne force. While such a solution might be a practical proposition, it would be even more expensive.

8. We particularly wish to draw attention to the problem of nuclear weapons, to
which we have referred incidentally in paragraph 5 above, and which is considered in detail in Appendix ‘B’ of this Study.

9. The most important aspects of this problem concern the policy for their provision, their deployment and, of fundamental importance, their control. This last factor has particular significance in relation to the nuclear weapons for the land forces.

10. Although this Study examines only the force and logistic requirements for circumstances short of global war, we should point out that in many instances the forces required are the same as those which we already provide in fulfilment of our other commitments. For example, the bulk of the naval forces is assigned to or earmarked for NATO, but such forces as are required overseas are detached from the NATO area by general agreement; similarly, the bulk of the bomber force in the Mediterranean has the primary role of support for CENTO. These are complicating factors which must be borne in mind, but we have not specifically isolated them in this Study. Nor have we, in the assessment of our force requirements, taken into account other complicating factors, such as the need to maintain a reasonable home and overseas ratio.

11. In order to assist you in reaching decisions on the course which our future strategy should take, we are inviting the Ministry of Defence to prepare, as a matter of urgency, estimates of the variations in cost, compared with the figures in the current long-term costings, of the forces needed for our suggested strategy. We understand that rough figures, giving an indication of the orders of magnitude, can be prepared fairly quickly; more accurate costings, based on a revised order of battle, would take many months to prepare and must in practice await next year’s long-term costings.

12. When these figures are prepared, we have no doubt that they will not show any decrease on present costs; in fact the contrary is likely to be the case, particularly for the period 1965 onwards when expensive new weapons will anyhow begin to come into production. We would have liked to have been able to recommend military policies which would have shown economies; but defence is an expensive business, and as long as the United Kingdom continues to belong to the present number of “clubs” and as long as we have to contribute to them on a fitting scale we can see little hope of any reduction. The “clubs” to which we refer are well known to you and are all governed by political considerations: the nuclear deterrent club, the British Commonwealth, ANZAM, NATO, CENTO, and SEATO; and in addition to these we have to keep our own house in order in our dependent territories overseas, and we must be prepared to fulfil our obligations to friendly Governments who seek our help.

We do not dissent from the recommendations in the report of the future Policy Committee that we should continue to belong as long as possible to these various organisations for, in present circumstances, this is the only way to maintain peace and stability. But whether we should aim to maintain a military presence in an area in which, for political reasons, we have been obliged to relinquish our bases, is another matter and one which we suggest should receive further consideration by Ministers; meanwhile, we have indicated in this Study a possible strategy for the fulfilment of such commitments.

13. In this era of intensive political development we acknowledge that there can be no finality about such a study. We therefore recommend that both the Study and
the premises underlying it should be re-examined periodically. This should not, however, be allowed to inhibit the continuing development of those forces and facilities which are necessary to implement the currently recommended strategy.  

2 The prime minister minuted that he was pleased to get the report: ‘I have not had time to read it fully but it will clearly be of great help to us in settling a number of difficult policy questions in the defence field. I agree with the proposed procedure, namely to have a general discussion before the summer holidays. We should aim to reach final decisions before the Defence Estimates for 1961/62 have to be settled. H.M. 8.7.60’ (M241/60; no 37).

62 CAB 131/24, D(60)48 21 Aug 1960

[Military strategy for circumstances short of global war]: memorandum by Mr Macmillan for Cabinet Defence Committee

Minister of Defence

Since the preliminary discussion at the Defence Committee on 27th July, I have been thinking a lot about the problems raised by the Chiefs of Staff study of military strategy for circumstances short of global war (D.(60)32), in the light of your own paper (D. (60) 39). I venture to send you some provisional thoughts, in the hope that this might help us to make the best progress at the discussion the Committee will have at Chequers at the beginning of October.

The Chiefs of Staff study, as I understand it, has suggested certain assumptions, which, broadly speaking, are based on our existing commitments; it then draws certain deductions, expressed in terms of forces and equipment; and it raises the question of how these deductions would be affected if we were to lose some of our bases, and whether we should now begin to adopt what is called a “double stance”. It seems pretty clear (as the Chiefs themselves hint) that, even without moving to a “double stance”, defence costs, including overseas expenditure, would rise on the basis of this study.

Faced with this prospect, we really have no alternative but to re-examine our commitments, in as realistic a way as possible.

I have therefore tried to imagine, in each of the main areas, what sort of operations we might want to undertake in our own interests and might be able to undertake politically. Are we envisaging global war, limited war, or would it be “police” or “fire-brigade” action (either in our own territories, or in other countries by invitation)? According to the type of operations we would envisage in each area, so we can then think what shape and size of forces would be necessary, and what sort of weapons they would need. Then we should consider, in each area, whether we have international obligations or commitments, whether specific ones under some treaty, or moral ones, under which at present we have to plan to do more than what we would envisage doing on our own account; and if there are any such obligations which involve commitments of forces in excess of what we would envisage in our own purposes, then we should consider whether to seek some relief from these commitments.

That is the way I have provisionally approached these problems, and it has led me to the following provisional views in the main areas.

(i) Far East: We should never undertake a limited war on our own. In any operations involving China we would inevitably be very subsidiary partners to the
United States. For our own purposes, need we envisage anything beyond “presence” forces, and the possibility of “police” action including jungle warfare against guerillas? Although it is possible that Indonesia might give covert aid to disordered territories, we would not embark on anything like limited war against Indonesia on our own.

On this basis, surely we have no need for nuclear weapons of any kind in this area. If the Indonesian threat is regarded as serious, there may be a case for BLOODHOUNDS to defend the Singapore base, and perhaps for facilities for a Lightning squadron. For the operations themselves no sophisticated aircraft, but some less sophisticated types might be useful, both by their presence and for the general purposes in police type operations with the necessary transport aircraft. The Army units would have to be primarily suitable for police type operations, and would certainly not need sophisticated S.A.G.W.1 such as THUNDERBIRD.

We have no specific force commitments to SEATO although we have an understanding with the Australians to contribute to the Commonwealth brigade. We have obligations to maintain internal security in Singapore and the Colonies, and to defend these places and also Singapore and the Maldives against aggression. These commitments to not seem to exceed our own requirements in the area.

(ii) Middle East. Apart from the particular case of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait, the only military operations we would want to undertake would be of a “police” or “internal security” type, e.g. to deal with a rebellion in Oman. As regards Kuwait, we might envisage a “pre-emptive” operation on our own; this would be a “police-type” operation but strengthened to deter an Iraqi attack. But if an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had already occurred, how far would we contemplate what would amount to a limited war operation on our own to get them out?

It seems common ground that we do not need nuclear weapons in this area. We should need limited ground forces, suitable for police type operations, with great mobility and air transportability. The need to be able to make a pre-emptive intervention in Kuwait might justify the equipment of these strengthened “police” forces with more sophisticated weapons, e.g. in aircraft and anti-aircraft. Are any naval forces necessary either for protection or for landing troops? For these purposes retention of the Kenya base and Aden seem essential.

We have specific commitments to ensure the security of Kuwait, to support the Gulf Shaikdoms, and to maintain internal security in Aden and other Colonial territories. But all these commitments are really in support of our own interest in the security of Kuwait, and the question of relief from excessive commitments does not arise.

(iii) Africa. Apart from the possibility of a major conflict which might result from a Soviet incursion, e.g. in the Congo, the only operations we would envisage would be internal security ones in Colonial and High Commission territories.

Again, all agree that there is no case for nuclear weapons; but we want limited ground forces for “police” type operations, with great mobility and air transportability. Here again (apart from the possibility of some obligation to Nigeria) we do not seem to have any commitments which do not serve our direct interests.

(iv) Mediterranean. We need to maintain a military presence in certain areas, e.g. Libya. And we may conceivably need to be capable of an intervention of a “police” or

1 Surface-to-air guided weapons system.
“fire brigade” type, as in the case of Jordan. But a limited war in this area seems most unlikely.

Apart from “presence” forces, e.g. in Libya, and garrisons in Cyprus, Malta and Gibraltar, we might rely on United Kingdom-based forces (land and air) for rapid intervention of the Jordan type. There seems no need for naval forces for our own purposes, but we have to provide facilities for N.A.T.O. naval forces, including the British element. If we have to keep bombers in Cyprus (whether with nuclear or non-nuclear armament) in support of CENTO, then there may well be a case for some sophisticated air defence of the Cyprus base.

Our commitments in this area go somewhat beyond our direct interests, since we have specific commitments to support the present regimes in Libya and Jordan, and general obligations to support CENTO and N.A.T.O. in the Mediterranean. These general obligations may at present be construed in a way which is excessive having regard to our direct interests. In particular the forces in Cyprus may be unnecessarily large. There may be a case for seeking relief here.

I believe that an approach on the above lines might lead to deductions in terms of forces and equipment significantly different from those in the Chiefs of Staff study. Of course, the problem of how to carry out our obligations, even if they were reduced, in the event of the loss of any of our bases, would still have to be faced.

In all this we must remember that we are trying to work out a basis for planning. We cannot foresee how events may turn out. Whatever plans have been made, we must still be ready to improvise against an emergency.

63 CAB 131/24, D(60)50 12 Oct 1960
‘Future developments in South-East Asia’: summary of conclusions in officials’ report

22. Thus the Committee envisages the following main roles for British defence forces in the area by 1970—

(a) the security of remaining British territories;
(b) a contribution to the strategic deterrent;
(c) a much reduced contribution to land operations;
(d) training and otherwise strengthening defence forces of friendly countries.

23. The first is primarily a United Kingdom commitment. The others should be discharged in the closest co-operation with our Allies.

24. As regards bases, in the long run our strategy in the area must come to depend increasingly on airborne and seaborne forces operating from Australia and New Zealand, the only permanent and reliable Western bases in the Eastern Hemisphere. In addition, some centrally placed cantonment is needed for certain of the ground forces required to discharge our Colonial responsibilities, so long as they exist in the area. This cantonment should be as free as possible from risks of local political blackmail and insecure communications, and these considerations point to North Borneo. Although North Borneo cannot be expected to remain indefinitely free from political pressures, at least for the period under review it is likely to be freer from them than Malaya or Singapore. While nothing should be done which might
hasten the loss of facilities in Malaya and Singapore, these factors should be considered in connection with any future programmes for building permanent accommodation for forces in the area.

25. **Conclusions.** Western policy in the area, in which the United Kingdom must play her part, must continue to be to maintain peace and to sustain the free countries by political action, economic aid and military backing. In addition, the United Kingdom has certain special interests and obligations as the centre of the Commonwealth and to her dependent territories and as a signatory of various international treaties. She has a further special responsibility for the strength of sterling.

26. At least throughout the next decade it will be necessary for the United Kingdom to maintain a military presence and capacity to intervene in Eastern Asia. The long-term trend during this period should be towards reducing capacity to intervene in operations on the East Asian mainland with ground and tactical air forces.

27. The Committee is driven to the concept of a diminished British military presence in the area by 1970, not because interests and obligations will have been reduced but because man-power and financial difficulties, coupled with uncertainties about bases, force this upon the United Kingdom. The Committee further accepts the concept (subject to balance of payment considerations) of more stress on economic programmes. Such changes of role and of emphasis carry political and military risks. It is therefore necessary to do what is possible to lessen these risks by, for example—

   (a) helping the countries of the area to stand on their own feet and so lessen the need for intervention; and

   (b) sharing with friends and Allies commitments which in many cases are more vital to them than to us.

28. A major effort to improve the strength and efficiency of the defence forces of non-Communist countries in the area e.g. by military training would contribute to their stability and security. Our efforts in this direction should be co-ordinated as far as possible with Commonwealth and Western countries.

29. The Committee believes that Australia should make a bigger effort to provide for her own defence and vital interests, but does not favour putting pressure on Australia to do this. The United Kingdom could, and may have to, put itself in a position where pressure comes from Australia and New Zealand on the United Kingdom rather than vice versa.

30. There is every reason for the closest consultation with Australia and New Zealand as well as with the United States in formulating United Kingdom defence policy for the area. Our ANZAM obligations to Australia and New Zealand could not be modified without their agreement.

31. Increased United Nations presence in the area might promote stability and lessen the risks of incidents and hence the need for Western intervention or support. It could take many forms—technical missions, political observers, or even in some circumstances United Nations gendarmerie forces. American views on the advantage of increased United Nations presence, if it connoted neutralism, would be important and probably decisive. It is recommended that possible roles for, and consequences of, United Nations activity in the area be studied.

32. Finally, the Committee wishes to stress that policy towards Eastern Asia and
the scale of the United Kingdom effort there cannot be considered in isolation. They are affected by the political and military situation elsewhere and by the strength or weakness of sterling. For this reason and because the above conclusions flow from assumptions which only time will test, United Kingdom interests in and policy towards the area should be reviewed from time to time.

64 CAB 131/23, D 11(60)1 2 Nov 1960
'Defence implications of West Indian independence': Cabinet Defence Committee minutes

[The Defence Committee considered a memorandum by Mr Macleod, in which he pointed out that only the US base at Chaguaramas was still active, and this was much resented by the government of Trinidad under Dr Eric Williams, supported by the federal government; if agreement on bases could be reached this might influence Jamaica towards remaining in the Federation, and thus smooth the path to independence (27 Oct 1960).]

The Committee considered a memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (D. (60) 52) describing the current state of defence planning for West Indian independence and drawing attention to a possible request that we should join in creating some form of regional defence organisation in the Caribbean.

The Colonial Secretary said that the purpose of the London Conference, which was to start on 3rd November, was to undertake a broad review of the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States in so far as it affected the Federation of the West Indies. Provided the Conference was reasonably successful, discussions would be resumed later in Trinidad. If, as a result of the referendum which it was hoped would be held early next year, Jamaica decided to remain in the Federation, it was probable that the West Indies would become independent in mid-1962. It was very desirable to complete negotiations about the future of the American bases held under the 1941 Agreement before this date. Although there might be some difficulties between the West Indies and the United States authorities, particularly about the continued existence of the United States naval base at Chaguaramas, he believed that there was a reasonable chance that agreement would be reached. It was necessary, however, for the United Kingdom to decide what attitude it should take towards the suggestions which were likely to be made by the West Indians for making this agreement part of a regional defence organisation.

It was generally agreed in discussion that we should do our utmost to see that agreement was reached between the United States and West Indian representatives. The importance of the Chaguaramas naval base to the Americans was now greater than ever, since it was an essential link in their chain of defence against missile-carrying submarines. On the other hand, it was a most suitable site for the Federation capital. However, since both sides were anxious for an early settlement, it was reasonable to hope that this difficulty might be overcome.

It was also generally agreed that we should discourage as far as possible any form of regional pact which might lead to an expensive command structure and secretariat and to a demand for force commitments. It would be preferable for separate bilateral agreements to be concluded between the Federation and ourselves, and between the Federation and the United States, accompanied if necessary by a separate joint
declaration of common purpose. It was important that the Minister of Defence should be kept in close touch with the progress of discussions to this end.

65 DEFE 7/2033, COS 2(61)1A 6 Jan 1961 ‘Strategic importance of East Africa’: minutes of COS Committee meeting [Extract]

[The governors were in London for an East African Governors’ Conference—see document nos 124 & 126; on the question of East African defence, see minutes by Macleod, document no 123 below.]

Lord Mountbatten welcomed the Governors of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, the British Resident, Zanzibar and the Administrator of the East Africa High Commission to the meeting and said that the Committee was honoured by their presence. He recalled that they had kindly invited him to attend a meeting of the East Africa Defence Committee last September, at which the Chiefs of Staff’s proposals for the reorganisation of command arrangements in East Africa had been accepted; for this the Committee were most grateful.

He proposed that their discussion should be based on the brief which they had prepared on the future strategic importance of East Africa. . . .

In discussion the following points were made:—

(a) It was very difficult to forecast with any certainty the likely time scale of constitutional development in the East African territories. HMG had no specific timetable in mind, but had made it clear that they would move forward when the time and the circumstances were ripe. So far as Kenya was concerned it was clear that a predominantly African state would in due course emerge, but HMG was determined that every individual should have equal political status. Tanganyika was the most advanced of the three territories in constitutional development and might be ready for independence early in 1962. Uganda might be ready later that year or early in 1963 if the problems associated with the relationships of the four kingdoms could be resolved. Kenya was unlikely to be ready before 1964 or 1965. . . .

(e) The declared policy of the leaders of the principal African parties in East Africa was against the maintenance of British forces in their territories after independence. It was difficult to convince them of the wisdom of a contrary policy in this matter at present, but later when these African leaders became Ministers it was possible that they might modify their views. In assisting this process we could point to the considerable economic benefits which the presence of British forces brought.

Africans generally did not feel vulnerable to external attack and consequently were strongly opposed to the stationing of white troops in their countries. Moreover, they were under an illusion that they were not involved in the cold war. Their outlook had however been deeply influenced by the recent turmoil in the Congo and although they would not give it public expression, there was reason to believe that events there had shown them the dangers of too rapid a constitutional development or too complete a break with the Colonial powers. This applied especially in Uganda and Tanganyika. On the other hand the extreme nationalists
sought to lay the blame for the Congo, as for all other African troubles, on the West and were quite impervious to reason in this respect.

(f) There was real danger of inter-tribal fighting in all three territories; there were also separatist elements, e.g. in Buganda, and amongst the Somali inhabitants of north-east Kenya.

(g) It was difficult to assess whether the East African territories were likely to achieve independence before Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland or vice-versa, especially in view of the current series of constitutional conferences on the Federation and its constituent territories. It appeared however that if the Federation should break up, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland might well reach independence before the East African territories. Meanwhile, the reinforcement of the Federation and of the High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, would be greatly hampered by any restrictions on our military facilities and overflying rights in East Africa.

(h) The close co-operation between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force, which involved periodic detachments by the latter to Kenya and to the Arabian Peninsula, would be gravely prejudiced by the denial of overflying and staging rights in East Africa.

(i) East Africa, and especially Nairobi, was a link of major importance in the United Kingdom's strategic air routes and also in our communications networks. The loss of these facilities would call for major revision of our strategy.

(k) In considering the prospects for the continued stationing of British forces in Kenya in the future, it should be borne in mind that the Africans were likely to seek all possible material gain from the United Kingdom without giving anything in return. They would be sensitive to anything which tended to detract from their sovereignty or which might offend against the idea of pan-Africanism.

Any indication by us that we were considering abandoning our base in Kenya would probably serve to intensify the pressure for our departure. On the other hand, the economic benefits which the presence of British forces brought, the reassurance which they gave against the threat of external attack and dangers arising from the cold war, and the help which we might give in training and equipping the forces which the territories would be bound to maintain after independence, would all be useful arguments to be advanced in favour of our continued presence. Moreover, it might also be possible to use as a bargaining point the fact that at present the United Kingdom bore the cost of the King's African Rifles. If the East African territories were eventually to form a Federation, any negotiations on these matters would probably have more chance of success if they were deferred until the Federation had begun to take shape and were then conducted with the Federation leaders rather than with the individual territories. It was however too early to assess the prospects of success.

(l) Our bases in Kenya were of great importance for mounting and supporting operations, especially in the Persian Gulf and in the remaining colonial territories in Central and Southern Africa. For these purposes it was necessary to station considerable forces there and to provide for large scale strategic moves in the event of operations.

(m) Extensive building programmes for the Army and for the Royal Air Force were in hand in Kenya. Considerable expenditure had already been incurred on these projects, which were necessary if we were to continue to have an important base there.
In view however of the uncertain constitutional future of Kenya, Ministers were examining the matter and might well decide that further expenditure was not justified. The Governor of Kenya\(^1\) considered that the continuation of these programmes was absolutely vital, both politically and economically, to the future of the territory. In these and similar matters there was a conflict between the requirements of United Kingdom strategy and those of Colonial policy in advancing the constitutional development of dependent territories. Too often, as a result, both policies fall between two stools and it was satisfactory that the Governor was so firmly in support of the continuation of the building programme.

\(n\) With the reduced size of our forces to-day, we could not afford to station troops in any territory where political objections might, at a moment of crisis, prevent our using them.

Even in the case of Malaya, where we had what might be regarded as a model Defence Agreement, difficulties had already arisen over SEATO exercises. Nowhere did we seem to have absolute security of tenure and absolute freedom from strings. These factors raised doubts as to the value of fixed overseas bases and made more attractive the concept of relying to a greater degree on increased mobility of our forces. However it might well be that we were now too far committed in our present policies to make such a drastic reappraisal. . . .

\(^1\) Sir P Renison.

---

1. In the light of the discussions which I have recently held with the Ministers directly concerned we can now re-define the political assumptions on which our defence policy and strategy should be based. We cannot be sure that all the developments predicated in the following paragraphs of this paper will materialise—especially since some of them depend on future constitutional developments in the Commonwealth or on the decisions of other Governments. But I am satisfied that we shall make the best use of our limited resources if we re-cast our policies and plans for the medium and longer term on the basis of the assumptions set out in this paper.

**General assumptions**

2. We shall continue to rely on all-regular forces, of a strength not exceeding 390,000–400,000.

3. The level of defence expenditure will be that set out in the Treasury report on public expenditure and resources (C. (61) 88): annual oversea defence expenditure outside Germany should be reduced as soon as possible by £35 millions below the level of 1961–62.

4. We shall continue, throughout the 1960s, to maintain our independent contribution to the strategic nuclear deterrent of the West, at the level of expenditure now planned. This assumption will be reviewed early in 1962 when the future of SKYBOLT should be more precisely known.
5. We shall not be able to rely on using military bases or facilities in independent countries overseas for any purpose which is not in full accord with the policies and views of the Governments and peoples of those countries. Thus—

(i) For the period up to 1970 we may count on having unrestricted use, for military purposes, of facilities in:
- Gibraltar
- Malta
- Aden
- Adu Atoll
- Seychelles
- Bahrain

(ii) We must, however, expect to suffer restrictions on our freedom to use for military purposes facilities in:
- Libya
- Cyprus
- Kenya
- The prospective area of Greater Malaysia, including Singapore

We may, however, be able to use these facilities in global war and in some circumstances on a once-for-all basis for limited war.

6. Similarly, we must expect increasing difficulty in securing the exercise of staging or over-flying rights for purposes with which the Government concerned are not in sympathy.

Objectives of defence policy

7. The Commonwealth. We have an obligation to come to the assistance of any Commonwealth country, dependent or independent, which is the victim of external aggression. We should not, however, seek on this account to keep British troops in emergent Commonwealth countries. We should encourage dependent territories to take a greater share of responsibility for their internal security.

8. Europe. Our objective is to support the North Atlantic Alliance as a bulwark against Soviet encroachment.

Future plans should be based on the assumptions (i) that some détente will be secured, following some settlement of the Berlin question; and (ii) that on this basis our contribution to the land forces of the North Atlantic Alliance will consist of four divisions, each of two brigade groups, of which two divisions will be stationed in Germany and two in the United Kingdom.

9. Mediterranean. Our objectives are:
- To fulfil our commitments to NATO and CENTO.
- To retain the special wireless stations in Cyprus and Malta.
- To maintain our air staging and over-flying rights in Libya.
- To provide for the internal security of Gibraltar and Malta, and for the internal security and local defence of such parts of our sovereign base areas in Cyprus as it is necessary to retain.

10. Future plans should be based on the following assumptions:

(i) Malta will no longer be required as a major naval base. Our naval requirements west of Suez will be met from bases in the United Kingdom with forward facilities at Gibraltar and Malta.
(ii) We shall not mount any land operations from Cyprus.

11. **Middle East.** Our objectives are:
   - To safeguard our economic stake in Persian Gulf oil, and for that purpose to support the independence of Kuwait.
   - To discharge our obligation to protect the States in the Aden Protectorates and the Persian Gulf.
   - To preserve the countries of the area from Communist influence.
   - To retain air staging facilities in Kenya if possible.

12. Future plans should be framed on the assumption that Kenya will not be available as a military base after 1963, when it may be expected to attain independence.

13. **Far East.** Our objectives are:
   - To prevent Chinese Communist expansion throughout the area, by support of SEATO and other means.
   - To preserve our links with Australia and New Zealand and to contribute to their forward defence.
   - To safeguard Hong Kong against internal subversion.

14. Future plans should be based on the following assumptions:
   1. The project for a Greater Malaysia will come to fruition by 1963.
   2. Within a Greater Malaysia we shall retain naval and air facilities in Singapore.
   3. The Government of Greater Malaysia will assume responsibility for internal security in their territory (including Singapore).
   4. We shall maintain our contribution to the Commonwealth Brigade, which will for the time being continue to be stationed in Malaya; but we shall seek to secure the agreement of our Allies to a more realistic concept of land operations by SEATO on the mainland of South-East Asia.

15. I shall be glad if you will arrange for the Chiefs of Staff to prepare, on the basis of these political assumptions, proposals for a revised strategy to secure these objectives.

I am asking Sir Norman Brook to arrange for the civil Departments concerned to study, simultaneously, the implications for foreign, Commonwealth and Colonial policy.

The results of these studies, by the Chiefs of Staff and by the civil Departments, should be submitted for consideration by the Defence Committee as soon as possible.

---

67

CAB 131/27, D 1(62)1

12 Jan 1962

‘British strategy in the 1960s’: minutes of Cabinet Defence Committee meeting

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Defence (D. (62) 3) appending a report by the Chiefs of Staff on British Strategy in the 1960s.1

The Minister of Defence2 said that the Chiefs of Staff had prepared their report in accordance with the directive issued by the Prime Minister on 23rd October, 1961 (D. (61) 65).3 It had proved extremely difficult to devise a strategy which, while

---

1 Withheld in PRO.
2 Mr H Watkinson.
3 See previous document.
adequately directed to the objectives laid down, remained within the cost specified, especially since the assumptions made about the security of our overseas bases made it necessary to provide for greater flexibility in the use of our forces. He could see no alternative to the strategy proposed, which marked the first step towards reliance on seaborne and airborne forces using forward operating facilities rather than bases in the traditional sense. The costings which had so far been made could not be regarded as final and further work was proceeding on them, but the best available estimate was that the measures proposed would produce a saving of about £25 million in 1965–66, rising to about £28 million in 1970–71, as against the requirement for savings of £55 million in 1965–66. Even so, the strategy involved great risks and our forces would be stretched to the utmost. It was proposed to depart from the assumptions in the Prime Minister’s directive in one major respect. The proposal to provide for the support of NATO by stationing four brigade groups in Germany, with four in reserve in the United Kingdom, would, although producing saving in oversea expenditure, produce an increase in budgetary expenditure of some £7 million in 1965–66, rising to £15 million in 1968–69. He recommended that we should not seek to change our present deployment of seven brigade groups in Germany and one in the United Kingdom. He sought his colleagues’ endorsement of the new strategy in principle, so that further work on costings, for example those of the defence research and development programme, and other more detailed studies, could be put in hand, and the 1962 Defence White Paper drafted accordingly.

The following were among the points made in discussion:

(a) The most desirable strategy for the next decade, given the uncertainty of our tenure of our overseas bases, would be the double stance, which would provide, as an insurance against the loss of bases, large amphibious task forces capable in themselves of mounting operations on the scale envisaged in our current plans. The Chiefs of Staff had made an exhaustive examination of the double stance strategy and had concluded that it was beyond our available resources. The strategy proposed did not provide full insurance in this respect, but it would provide for a continuing presence in the Middle East and Far East. It would allow us to move later, if it proved necessary to do so, to a strategy in which our main bases were the United Kingdom and Australia, but under which we would retain some capacity, by the use of forward operating facilities, at for instance Addu Atoll and Labuan, for defending our interests in the Far East and Middle East. We could not at present contemplate accepting that the loss of a base, at whatever date it might happen, must be followed by the total withdrawal of our influence from the area affected. To announce a strategy which was clearly based on such an assumption would prejudice our relations with our allies in NATO, CENTO and SEATO.

(b) £120 million was included in the costings up to 1970–71 for the construction of aircraft carriers which would be commissioned after 1970. It had proved impracticable to design a ship which fulfilled the dual role of aircraft carrier and commando carrier, but those in mind were not intended as capital ships, nor would they be formed into a strike force. Although they would be allotted a role in global war, they were required principally for cold and limited war tasks, in which they would be used virtually as floating airfields. The aircraft they would carry would not be specifically designed for naval purposes, but would be types common
to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. They would form an essential part of an amphibious task force and could not in limited war be regarded as more vulnerable than any other naval vessel. The carriers would cost approximately £50 million each and the cost of their aircraft and of the vessels required to escort them would be substantial. If our main bases east of Suez had to be given up the scope for their employment might be limited. The requirement for carriers should be considered in detail at another meeting; it was in any case necessary to reach an early decision on the replacement of H.M.S. *Victorious* and this would provide a suitable opportunity for a fuller discussion.

(c) No provision had been made for research, development or production for the purpose of maintaining our independent contribution to the strategic deterrent when the system based on manned bombers using SKYBOLT came to the end of its useful life. The cost and complexity of strategic weapons was becoming so great that it might in any case prove impracticable for us to provide a successor to SKYBOLT; we might have to rely on the purchase of United States equipment and weapons. It might perhaps be our best policy to make the most effective political use of our possession of a strategic nuclear capacity within the next 10 years. For the present, plans should be based on the assumption that there would be no increased expenditure for a new generation deterrent; if at a later stage it became necessary to revise this policy, the allocation of defence finance in general would need to be reconsidered.

(d) It was generally agreed that it would be unwise to seek to reduce the British Army of the Rhine (B.A.O.R.) to four brigade groups with four in support in the United Kingdom. To do so would involve too great an increase in budgetary expenditure on accommodation in the United Kingdom and on providing equipment for the supporting brigades in both the United Kingdom and Germany. The best solution in the longer term would probably be to provide six brigade groups in Germany with two in the United Kingdom; this would provide a better balance within the Army between home and overseas service. It would not, however, be possible, for political reasons, to suggest any changes at present. The single brigade group now in the United Kingdom and nominally assigned to NATO did not involve any extra expenditure on NATO account. It formed part of the strategic reserve. It would be possible to sustain B.A.O.R. at its present strength at approximately 51,000 until the end of 1962; thereafter, on present recruiting trends, it would fall to about 47,000. It would be militarily inadvisable to attempt to maintain seven brigade groups at that figure and it might at that stage be opportune to suggest a reduction to six.

(e) The changes in deployment proposed would result in reducing of the strength of the Army to 173,000, which would involve considerable further problems of redundancy among officers and the further disbandment or amalgamation of units. Further consideration should be given to the timing of the changes involved and to the date at which they might be announced. The future of the Gurkhas should also be further considered; under the revised strategy only three Gurkha units were required, as part of the garrison of Hong Kong. It might not prove economic to maintain the overheads of Gurkha recruiting for this small force.

(f) *The Minister of Aviation*¹ said that some of the reductions proposed would be

---

¹ Mr P Thorneycroft.
unwelcome to industry; for instance, the order for BLOODHOUND would be halved. It also appeared likely that there would be no requirement for the Rotodyne; this was an issue of some importance which it would be advisable to consider in greater detail at a later meeting.

(g) The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs\(^5\) said that the proposed reduction of our forces in Malta might produce political reactions in the Island which might result in our having to forgo its use for military purposes altogether. The question of providing economic assistance to counterbalance the military reductions was being urgently considered.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer\(^6\) said that he was grateful for the speed with which the Chiefs of Staff had completed their studies and for the efforts which they had made to secure reductions in defence expenditure at the cost of painful readjustments to the size and shape of the Services. He was, however, concerned at the prospect that defence expenditure might continue to rise. Many of the measures proposed might well cost more than had been allowed for them; but even if this were not the case, the planned figure of £1,787 million for defence expenditure in 1965–66 would be exceeded by some £23 million. Further, no account was taken of prospective pay increases; if the current Services pay claim were to be met in full, the cost would be some £35 million a year. It was however clearly impossible at this stage to decide to reduce expenditure by abandoning any of our overseas commitments, but the overall manpower Bill should be re-examined; reductions in manpower at present rates of pay produced very large savings. Acceptance of the proposed strategy in principle need not involve increased expenditure in the immediate future and he was prepared to endorse it provided that further studies were put in hand, particularly on manpower, to reduce costs to the planned level of £1,787 million annually.

The Minister of Defence said that the proposals he had made already involved considerable risks. If, however, it was essential to make further savings, he was prepared to examine the possibilities of reducing Services manpower from 398,660 (as estimated by the Chiefs of Staff) to a figure nearer 390,000. He would also examine the possibility of making economies in the purchase of nuclear materials for defence purposes (to be effected in real terms, and not simply by transferring charges from military to civil account) and would set in hand a review of the research and development programme.

Summing up, the Prime Minister said that the strategy proposed was in general that best adapted to using the resources available to us for the maintenance of our influence in the coming decade. It did not go as far as the double stance, but it provided a reasonable measure of insurance against a reduction in the facilities available to us in overseas bases. A further effort should be made to reduce costs on the lines proposed by the Minister of Defence, and the Committee should consider separately, at a later date, the future of aircraft carriers and the requirement for the Rotodyne. As regards the strategic deterrent, our efforts should be directed towards maintaining the effectiveness of a system based on SKYBOLT for as long after 1970 as possible and no plans should be based at present on the assumption that we should provide for ourselves a further generation of strategic nuclear weapons. It would,

\(^5\) Lord Perth. \(^6\) Mr Selwyn Lloyd.
however, be open to Ministers to reconsider this question at any time in the next two years. The strength of the British Army of the Rhine should be left at seven brigade groups for the present.

The annual White Paper on Defence had perhaps outlived its usefulness, but it would be necessary to produce a fairly full White Paper in 1962, which marked the end of the five-year plan inaugurated in April 1957. It would be advisable to produce it as far as possible in the form of a statement of the general principles governing long-term strategy, and to avoid as far as possible commitments to specific weapons or to details of deployment. . . .

68 CAB 129/109, C(62)63 13 Apr 1962

‘Intervention in Kuwait’: Cabinet memorandum by Mr Watkinson

During my recent visit to Bahrein I was very impressed with the continuing necessity for our forces there and in Aden to be at a high state of readiness and for the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to have as much authority as we can properly delegate to him to act swiftly on the advice of the Political Resident, Persian Gulf. Although communications between London and Bahrein have been improved, they are by no means certain when conditions are adverse.

2. It is clear that the Iraqis have not lost their interest in Kuwait. Indeed while I was there they were carrying out photographic reconnaissance with MiG aircraft. If they press this form of surveillance our chances of carrying out successful interceptions will be slight.

3. Since my return, the Chiefs of Staff have re-examined plans for re-entry into Kuwait and are also examining various proposals for keeping our forces there at a high degree of readiness. One difficult political problem has arisen. However much we can reinforce the air defence of the Bahrein area, it is clear that with the Iraqi introduction of advanced types of Russian MiG fighters and with the extremely short flying distance from the Basra/Shabiba to the Kuwait frontier, it will be impossible to guarantee a favourable air situation over Kuwait at the time of the introduction of airborne troops without an attack on Iraqi airfields in this area very soon after any Iraqi attack has been mounted. I am advised by the Chiefs of Staff that the Iraqi air force available to support such an attack on Kuwait is likely to be one jet light bomber squadron and two jet fighter squadrons. What I am now proposing is that we should delegate authority to the Commander-in-Chief to carry out the necessary attack on Iraqi airfields in this limited area in order to destroy Iraqi aircraft on the ground and thus ensure a favourable air situation over Kuwait in the early stages of any Iraqi aggression. Provided that communications were possible, the Commander-in-Chief would obviously seek confirmation of his authority for this, as for other action, from London. However, should communications fail, I think we should give him the authority to act subject to two important safeguards:

(i) That the Amir must have formally requested assistance.
(ii) That the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, must have concurred in this action.

4. I therefore seek the approval of my colleagues to the extension of the Commander-in-Chief’s authority accordingly. I attach a copy of the revised directive to the Commander-in-Chief.
‘Future defence policy’: Cabinet Defence Committee meeting minutes

The Minister of Defence said that the Government’s present policy could be considered under three heads—the strategic deterrent; the forces in Europe under our commitments to Western European Union (W.E.U.) and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); and the forces required to meet commitments east of Suez. On the assumption that expenditure on the strategic deterrent had been already largely settled on the basis of the Nassau Agreement, the only scope for reductions in defence spending lay in the reduction of our forces in Europe or east of Suez. In terms of commitments, forces in all areas, including reserves held in the United Kingdom, were stretched to the limit. If commitments remained unchanged, the forces could not be cut. But if the forces could not be cut, defence expenditure could not remain constant; it would rise in step with the increasing cost of modern weapons and means of transport. A reduction in commitments was not impossible; but if, after examination, no acceptable reductions could be found, it would be impossible to hold defence expenditure at a level of 7 per cent of the Gross National Product (G.N.P.).

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that our major commitments could not be reviewed in isolation; the discussion must be informed by a realistic appreciation of the financial and economic background. The level of defence expenditure now forecast for 1963–64 represented a 10 per cent increase on the year before—an unprecedented rise in time of peace. Apart from France and Portugal, we were already carrying a heavier defence burden than any other European country. The failure of the Brussels negotiations was a serious set-back to our hopes of strengthening our international economic position. Moreover, in many parts of the world we were now carrying, in effect, the burden of defending the economic interests of our European competitors. Against this background the economy could not stand a rising level of defence expenditure; it should, if possible, be reduced, and at the very least held level. However painful military reductions might be, the progressive weakening of the economy would not only make it impossible to meet even the most essential of our military commitments but would have far more damaging repercussions in other fields. In examining our present commitments and the extent to which it might be possible to reduce them we should therefore examine realistically the benefits which other countries derived from expenditure to which they made no contribution, and ask ourselves against what enemy, in what circumstances, and with what allies, our forces would be called upon to act.

Europe

The Committee then considered the implications of maintaining our present commitments to W.E.U. and to NATO.

---

1 Mr P Thorneycroft.
2 An ambiguously-worded agreement with President Kennedy, under which the US would make Polaris missiles available to Britain, Dec 1962.
3 Mr R Maudling.
In discussion the following points were made:

(a) Our original commitment under the Brussels Treaty to maintain four divisions or their equivalent fighting strength in Europe had been modified by agreement. So far as W.E.U. was concerned it now consisted of a commitment to maintain 55,000 men in Germany. No further reduction would be possible except by agreement of a majority of the W.E.U. countries, who would be obliged by the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty to take their decision in the knowledge of SACEUR’s views. On the earlier occasion SACEUR had been able to certify that 55,000 men with modern weapons could be regarded as providing fighting strength equivalent to the 75,000 men provided for originally. It would not be easy for SACEUR to certify that a further reduction would satisfy the same criterion; but much would depend on the political background. If, for example, our W.E.U. partners and SACEUR himself, were anxious to make it possible for us to reduce our forces in Europe, the assignment of the V-bomber force to NATO could be used as a factor in the argument. Unfortunately, the present chairman of the United States Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, had declared himself as resolutely opposed to any reduction in our forces in Europe and was, indeed, pressing for an increase.

(b) The political consequences of a major reduction in Europe, if it were to follow so soon after the breakdown of the negotiations for our accession to the European Economic Community as to make it possible to connect the two, should not be overlooked. Any further reduction in Europe should be made with the support and agreement of our NATO and W.E.U. allies rather than forced through against their will. In the last resort we could abrogate the W.E.U. Treaty; but the effects on our position in Europe and on our relations with the United States Government would be damaging.

(c) Nevertheless, it would be right to seek to persuade the United States Government and our partners in W.E.U. that a major reduction in our commitment to Europe would be preferable to the reduction in our commitments east of Suez, which would otherwise become inevitable. If they could be persuaded to view the defence of the free world in global, not European, terms and could be brought to appreciate the extent to which they themselves benefited from the presence of our forces in the Middle East and Far East, they might be disposed to help us to maintain those forces by reductions in Europe. We should now consider therefore, how a more favourable climate of opinion might be created—perhaps by a series of bilateral discussions. In the military sphere the links which were already developing between NATO and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) might be of value in this educative process, particularly if a further link between NATO and the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) could also be brought into being.

(d) The economies which would result from a major reduction in Europe were difficult to assess and could easily be exaggerated. The savings would be more likely to show themselves in equipment than in manpower. The British Army of the Rhine (B.A.O.R.) was at present organised in two divisions, containing seven brigades. From a military point of view it would be more satisfactory to reorganise in three divisions each of two brigades. Under such an organisation there would be no reduction in manpower; and the commitment to W.E.U. would be unaffected.
But there would be a reduction in the commitment to NATO, which was at present expressed in terms of seven brigades. It would, however, be undesirable to begin negotiation for a limited reorganisation of B.A.O.R. on these lines if it was likely to prejudice our chances of success in subsequently negotiating much larger reductions in manpower.

Middle East

The Committee then considered the scale of our present commitments in the Middle East.

In discussion the following points were made:

(e) Our military commitments in Africa had substantially contracted. On the assumption that, in the event of serious disorder, Southern Rhodesia could look for support to the Union of South Africa, the only military operation which we might be required to undertake would be directed to protecting the settlers in Kenya; and after Kenya became independent such an operation, if it could be mounted at all, would not of itself require the maintenance of substantial forces in Aden.

(f) Historically, the importance of maintaining our position astride the Suez Canal, in Aden and in the Persian Gulf had derived from the need to protect the route to India. When India and Pakistan became independent this requirement was reduced; but no corresponding alteration had taken place in our military dispositions. The main reason for this had been the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf; and it was in terms of defending our oil interests, particularly those in Kuwait, that the maintenance of the military bases in the area was now justified.

(g) The economic validity of this justification, however, was questionable. The economic benefits, both direct and indirect, that we derived from our interests in the area might be found to be less than the cost of maintaining our forces; and a detailed study of this aspect of the problem should be made.

(h) A withdrawal from Aden would not necessarily lead to the severance of our communications or an interruption of our trade. Our ships still passed freely through the Suez Canal, although our bases in the Canal Zone had gone. We still traded with Africa, although our military presence in that Continent had been substantially reduced. The oil exporting countries would continue to need to sell their oil, whether or not we maintained troops in Aden; and, although the world demand for oil was rising, there was still a surplus of production, which would increase with the opening of new fields, e.g., at Abu Dhabi.

(i) But, apart from its arguable economic value, our military presence both in Cyprus and Aden was important as exerting a general stabilising influence in the Middle East and sustaining our continuing role as a major world Power. Our prestige would decline if we were thought to have been compelled to withdraw our forces because we could not afford to maintain them. It might therefore be desirable to link any withdrawal from Aden or the Persian Gulf with a reorientation of our policy in the Middle East, directed towards reaching an accommodation with the Arab nationalist movements instead of continuing to support the autocratic régimes in whose hands many of our economic interests were still concentrated.

(j) In any reassessment of our position in the Middle East special regard would
have to be paid to alternative means of discharging our treaty obligations to Kuwait. The most effective course might be to encourage the Government of Kuwait to raise its own national forces on a scale large enough to hold a bridgehead against attack until the arrival of reinforcements from the United Kingdom.

Far East

The Committee then considered the scope of our present commitments in the Far East. In discussion the following points were made:

(k) The forces based on Singapore had four main roles: to meet our commitment for the external defence of Malaysia; to discharge our obligations to SEATO; to discourage the aggressive designs of Indonesia; and to provide reinforcements for Hong Kong. With the possible exception of Hong Kong, it did not appear that any of these roles could be abandoned without a fundamental change in our policy. Moreover, apart from their military value our forces in the Far East had political and prestige significance. Their withdrawal would be regarded as a major political defeat and, quite apart from its serious effect on Australia, New Zealand and the United States, would encourage the spread of Communism.

(l) It was difficult to envisage a situation in the Far East in which we might be required to make, singlehanded, an opposed landing. In circumstances which called for operations of this kind we should either be at war (in which case more drastic and more effective methods—e.g., by air attack on the enemy's territory—would be needed) or we should be acting with our allies in SEATO (in which case we should not be required to provide a self-contained assault force). But the question was one of degree; we could not allow our forces to be run down to a point at which no assault operations of any kind would be possible, especially since landings in the face of opposition by guerrilla forces of the kind now operating in Brunei might be required at any time. Even on the assumption that in future we should only operate at the invitation of the local Power we could not afford to reduce the all-round capability of our forces. The local Power might not be in control of the situation; and our forces might meet unexpected opposition on arrival or be required, after arrival, to extricate themselves from an untenable position.

(m) For all these reasons, a major reduction in our forces in the Far East could not be secured except by a reduction in our political commitments. This in turn would involve the abandonment of our support of Malaysia; and it would make little sense to maintain our commitment to SEATO once we had abandoned Malaysia.

(n) Our commitment in Singapore had originally derived, like our commitment in the Middle East, from the need to safeguard our position in India. But, now that the total cost of maintaining our forces east of Suez was rising towards some £600 million a year, we should consider realistically the economic and political consequences of withdrawal. In the last resort the defence of Australia and New Zealand might be the only commitment to which it would be essential that we should contribute; and that by itself might require a military posture wholly different from that which we now maintained.

(o) If we must assume that the Communist Chinese Government would seek at
some point to seize Hong Kong, their easiest course would be to provoke internal disorder in the colony on a scale which it would be beyond the capacity of our forces to contain and then to invade the territory under the pretext that we had lost control of the situation. If so, the present garrison, which had already been reduced to the minimum required to maintain law and order could not be further scaled down. On the other hand it would not be unreasonable to assume that the Communist Chinese Government did not intend to subvert our position in Hong Kong especially since they derived considerable economic benefits from the present situation.

4 Approximately 2½ lines removed from Public Record Office copy under Section 5.1 of Public Records Act (1958).
5 A further sentence here similarly removed.

70  CAB 130/190, GEN 796 21 May 1963
'The implications of withdrawal from the Middle and Far East': minutes of a Cabinet (Official) Committee on Defence meeting

The Meeting1 had before them a note by the Chairman of the Official Oversea Co-ordinating Committee (GEN. 796/2) and a memorandum by Sir Robert Scott2 (GEN. 796/5) on the implications of withdrawal from the Middle and Far East.

In discussion the point was made that if it were decided that defence expenditure must be kept within 7 per cent of the Gross National Product (G.N.P.) the annual increase in such expenditure must not be greater than 2 per cent. Present estimates suggested that the increase would be nearer 4 per cent.

It was generally agreed that the Annex to GEN. 796/5 identified the changes in present planning assumptions which it would be open to Ministers to adopt and which would produce savings in defence expenditure of the right order of magnitude. It would not, however, be reasonable to suggest that decisions which would have serious political repercussions could be taken without a more accurate knowledge of the financial background.

The Ministry of Defence were now engaged in the annual costing exercise for the period up to and including 1968/69. This exercise was complex and could not be compressed or curtailed if it were not to be misleading. Once the detailed figures were available, it would be possible to produce for Ministers a paper suggesting ways in which defence expenditure could be reduced in order to keep it within 7 per cent of G.N.P., and giving a firmer indication of the levels to which defence expenditure would be likely to rise if planning continued on the present basis.

A reduction in defence expenditure implied some reduction in the ability of the United Kingdom to carry out its commitments. Any final paper for Ministers should therefore also show what effect the various possible reductions in defence

1 The meeting was attended by Lord Mountbatten (chief of defence staff), Sir H Caccia (FO), Sir H Poynton (CO), Sir S Zuckerman (M.D), W Armstrong (T), Sir A Snelling (CRO), Sir R Scott2, and M Stevenson (Min of Power).
expenditure would have on the United Kingdom's commitments. The issue for decision by Ministers would then be to what extent it might be necessary to accept the risks which would be involved in renouncing the ability to meet certain commitments in the interests of containing defence expenditure. Ideally such a balance between increased risk and increased expenditure should be struck in terms of the development of the political situation in five or six years' time, since only towards the end of such a period would the effects of any decisions now taken not to proceed with certain elements of the present defence programme make themselves felt in reduced effectiveness. It would not however be possible in practice to disguise for long the fact that decisions had been taken which would in course of time lead inevitably to reductions of this kind, because it would be observed that the action required to maintain our effectiveness in the long term, e.g. by the ordering of replacement aircraft or ships or the construction of new barracks, had not in fact been taken.

In further discussion, the following main points were made:—

(a) It was not possible to cost-account defence expenditure on a profit and loss basis. Nor was it possible to consider defence expenditure purely in strategic terms. Defence planning had to take account of wider political factors. Even without a specific reduction in commitments there might be room for some economies by a closer correlation of defence planning and political objectives.

(b) In the Middle East there was a clear economic interest for the United Kingdom in maintaining supplies of relatively cheap oil. But the importance of Middle East oil was not to be reckoned in purely economic terms; their security was more important than their low cost in view of Europe's dependence on oil and the inadequacy of alternative supplies. Complete Soviet control of the area could be disastrous and Arab unification could in itself be most damaging. In spite of pressures from Arab nationalism it might be possible to retain after 1970 a base in Aden as a sovereign area in an independent Aden federation, but this would no doubt involve increased expenditure on economic development for the Aden federation as a whole.

(c) There was no clear economic interest for the United Kingdom in the Far East. Our main concern was to secure the general stability of the area as a barrier to communism and the containment of Indonesia. There was a reasonable chance that we could retain a base in Singapore into the next decade but nevertheless Australia and New Zealand should do more to relieve the United Kingdom of some of its burdens. The Japanese were showing an interest in undertaking defence responsibilities in the area but this would raise wide political issues.

(d) Ministers had decided for political reasons not to make any reductions, at least for the time being, in British forces in Europe. But such a reduction might be possible at some stage if there were a general settlement in Europe. Meanwhile more intensive efforts should be made to persuade the other member countries of NATO that the defence efforts we made elsewhere than in Europe, (which in themselves were of benefit to the West generally, especially in protecting oil supplies) should be accepted as entitling us to provide a proportionately lower share of the NATO forces than was now the case.

(e) Although the cost of re-equipping the armed forces with modern weapons and maintaining servicemen increased faster than the growth of the G.N.P. there
might be some compensating factor to be found in the increased efficiency of automated weapon systems.

(f) An immediate saving might be found by limiting the proposed carrier programme to a replacement for *Victorious* in the first instance. If *Victorious* were not replaced it was probable that the Fleet Air Arm would have ceased to be an operationally effective force by about 1966. . . .

71 FO 371/170165, no 17 19 July 1963
[Review of Middle East policy, objectives and strategy]: memorandum by Sir R Stevens1 to Sir H Caccia

On his return from a tour of the Middle East the President of the Board of Trade2 expressed to the Permanent Under-Secretary the view that it would be generally advantageous if in our Middle Eastern policy our past imperialist traditions and associations could be put aside and we could make a new start based primarily on a mutually advantageous and straightforward commercial relationship. The Permanent Under-Secretary has asked me to make some comments on this thesis before I leave the office.3 Here they are.

2. The President's thesis is an attractive one and one to which I think most of us who deal with the Middle East would subscribe in principle. It has to be recognised, however, that, as so often, it is easier said than done.

3. In analysing why this is so it is necessary first of all to consider the various obstacles which stand in the way of the policy advocated. I would list these obstacles briefly as follows:

   (i) lingering traces of British imperialism;
   (ii) Israel;
   (iii) CENTO;
   (iv) oil and our position in the Gulf.

I comment on each of these one by one.

4. *Lingering traces of British imperialism*. We have gone a long way in the last five years towards disposing of the widely prevalent idea that no event of any consequence can occur in the Middle East but the British will it. We have I think made some impression on local opinion (though not, to judge from some fairly recent correspondence, in all cases on our own representatives in the field) with our policy of non-intervention in inter-Arab squabbles, and though private and press comment in this country has sometimes shown traces of a more imperialistic attitude of mind, we have consistently acted on the principle that our interests in the area are those normally prevailing between fully independent sovereign states. The point is not so much the policy we pursue as what the locals think we are up to. The theory that we have special political interests, that we are pro-monarchist and anti-republican, that we feel differently and more intimately about the Middle East than any other area in the world and that one day we may want to stage a come-back—all

---

1 Deputy under-secretary of state at FO.
3 ie, to retire; he became vice-chancellor of Leeds University.
this dies very hard. It must be admitted that when the Middle East is in its present state of turmoil and we have to maintain the best possible relations with a number of countries each of which is quarrelling with the other, it is very difficult so to conduct ourselves as not to appear to one of them to be taking sides with the other. Furthermore, the fact must be faced that on occasions our stand has appeared to be influenced by internal Middle Eastern political considerations. This said, it must be added that the Middle Eastern view of British policy does not always take a hostile form. It is for example the gratifying belief that we are still a considerable power in the world which causes countries like Lebanon and Saudi Arabia to ask us for military missions. It is because they believe we hold a lot of strings in our hands and know how to make our influence felt that disgruntled politicians in countries like Iran try to come to us to seek our support. The “traditional British rôle” is in short a state of mind in Middle Eastern countries which does not easily evaporate.

5. **Israel.** The existence of the State of Israel makes it difficult for the Arab, particularly in neighbouring countries, to think of the British as benevolent, disinterested traders whose one desire in the world is to sell them their products and buy their goods. It may seem unfair that the onus of responsibility for Israel should fall so heavily on us. It would seem that the Germans, for example, can effect a rapprochement with Israel without incurring Arab hostility. The reasons are however, as is obvious, historical. Israel is in a sense a lasting proof of the continuity of British imperialism. The Balfour Declaration, the fact that Palestine was under British administration and even the Tripartite Declaration all point ominously in our direction. To some extent feelings on this subject have run so high for so long that they are today in normal circumstances atrophied. I remember that Sir William Hayter found it possible to tour the Arab countries in early 1958 without hearing the word Israel breathed. Nevertheless it does not require much to start the nerve jangling again. The one thing more than any other within the limits of probability which would destroy any hope of a nice cosy long-term political relationship with the Arab States and bring us back starkly to political realities would be if, as a result of some collapse in Jordan, Israel went into the West Bank and we acquiesced in it without vigorous protest. What would be involved here would be not just our relations with neighbouring states but with the whole Arab world. The importance of relations with Israel in the Arab estimate of the British image cannot be over-stated.

6. **CENTO.** Ten years ago the Northern Alliance was a major obstacle to our relations with Egypt and other Arab states with the exception of Iraq. Since the death of Nuri Said and the departure of Iraq from CENTO antagonism has become less marked and there is in some quarters even grudging admission that this particular involvement in the Middle East is not wholly disadvantageous to the Arab world. Nevertheless it is viewed with some suspicion as an attempt to involve the Middle East in East–West squabbles and it tends to associate us with Turkish and Iranian sentiments about Arab countries. Since the Iranians in particular are anything but impartial as between the monarchies and republics in the Arab world, the existence of CENTO tends to reinforce the view that we too are inclined to take sides. This is a disadvantage with which we have to live for the sake of the benefits, such as they are, of CENTO itself.

4 1917, on a Jewish national home in Palestine.
7. Oil and our position in the Gulf. This in theory and on paper ought to be by rights the Achilles heel of the President of the Board of Trade’s ideal relationship. It could easily become so, particularly with the assistance of the Committee of Twenty-four, in the next few months. But at present and in practice it is not. The reasons for this are complicated and rather obscure, yet worth probing. One point unquestionably is that we are present in force. We have shown our determination to dig our toes in and it is not easy to throw us out. We have undoubtedly been helped by the geographical situation of the Gulf, namely its remoteness from Egypt, and by the fact that Nasser, Iraq and Saudi Arabia have been on consistently bad terms. Then again the rather grizzly consequences of revolutions in other Arab countries have given young revolutionaries in the Gulf pause. The combination of these factors has provided us with a breathing space and we seem for the moment to have arrived at a sort of modus vivendi with the major Arab powers who unquestionably in their hearts resent our presence in the Gulf and Aden and would like to see us gone—if they and not their rivals could take our place. Thus we have Saudi Arabia voluntarily resuming diplomatic relations with us despite Buraimi, we have Iraq asking us for arms despite Kuwait and we have Nasser speaking of the British position in the Gulf with an air of detachment and referring to the value which Egyptian finances derive from the passage of British oil through the Suez Canal. We must not be under any illusions about the fragility of this state of affairs but the longer it can be made to last the better. This suggests the conclusion that we should do nothing to disturb British arrangements in the Gulf and Aden, even if they appear to conflict with the ideal commercial relationship.

8. In fact I think I would go further than that and say that even if the major Arab powers were considerably more vocal than they are at present we should still hold our ground. If we were to dismantle our position in the Gulf and Aden, I doubt if we should gain anything very solid in terms of either goodwill or commerce—not enough to offset the advantages which we derive from our presence there which apart from oil includes a very flourishing trade with the Gulf States.

9. As to the general relationship between politics and trade, our best relative performance has been hitherto in those countries with which we have a former “imperialist” connexion (e.g. Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Jordan). I question whether political animus in the Middle East is a very serious obstacle to trade. Naturally if we break off relations with a country, e.g. Egypt or Saudi Arabia, there is a falling-off of trade. But apart from this trade does not fluctuate closely with the political barometer and any inclination to blame our failures on bad political management should, I think, be resisted.

10. These considerations point to the conclusion that the policy which we pursue towards the Middle East at the present time is not a serious obstacle to a satisfactory commercial relationship with individual countries and that a change of policy designed exclusively with this end in view would not produce appreciably better results and might have nefarious political consequences. This is true however only so long as we do stick to our declared policy, particularly our policy of non-intervention. If, for instance, we were to start taking sides openly in inter-Arab

---

6 The dispute over the Buraimi Oasis—on the boundary between Abu Dhabi and Muscat—became serious from 1952, when Saudi Arabia invaded it. As the protector of the Trucial Oman States, the British government in October 1955 decided to use the Trucial Levies to retake the oasis.
squabbles, it would arouse antagonisms and certainly increase our own difficulties in protecting our main economic interests such as oil. If we appeared to condone Israeli occupation of the [West] Bank that could have most serious consequences for our political and commercial relationship with all Arab countries. It could, inter alia, stimulate an Arab boycott of British goods.

11. It may be useful if in conclusion I take this opportunity to set down a few *obiter dicta* about British policy in the Middle East as of July 1963.

(i) In a sense Arab unity is a myth, and the almost certain failure of Egypt/Syria/Iraq federation vividly illustrates this in a practical sense. Nevertheless it is important to remember that in another sense each Arab state is a limb of the same body and anything we do in one country is likely to affect our relations with a lot of other countries at the same time. It is this factor which gives our dealings with Arab countries a sort of extra dimension. Anything which savours of airing or debating inter-Arab differences in non-Arab *fora* is strongly resented by all Arabs as washing dirty linen before an alien public. We can however quite safely take a public position in favour of a friendly negotiated Arab unity, though we may have private doubts about its realization.

(ii) In terms of degree of British involvement we must draw a distinction between the Eastern end of the Mediterranean and the Arabian Peninsula. (Libya is an exception to this generalisation in the sense that Britain and American forces are present but not in terms of their possible use.) In the first of these areas though there is a tendency in some quarters to imagine that we have some interest in the maintenance of the present régime in Jordan *per se*, our only real concern like that of the U.S. and the U.N. is to avoid the renewal of hostilities between the Arab States and Israel, or anything (like the partitioning of Jordan) which might lead to this and notably the development of sophisticated weapons. It seems inconceivable that we should ever want to intervene in the first by ourselves. In the Arabian Peninsula we have a special and unique (though not exclusive) British interest and we intend to keep in the area for as long as we can a military presence for quite clear-cut defined reasons which have nothing to do with Arab politics and everything to do with trade.

(iii) This said, it must be added, and underlined, that U.S. concern for the maintenance of the status quo in the Arabian Peninsula is a new and extremely encouraging aspect of the present situation. This bit of U.S. policy has received much less attention than their so-called appeasement of Nasser and their abortive efforts to bring about disengagement in the Yemen. Their policy is not so much a contradiction as a balancing act. By trying to keep level with the progressive forces in the Arab world, the U.S. Government has managed to improve its image in the region as a whole *à toutes fins utiles*; and by this means they can afford to cling the more tenaciously to their key positions. Their policy has also they believe caused Nasser to realise increasingly the importance of his economic relations with the West, which in turn has caused him markedly to moderate his anti-Western and anti-British propaganda in the last six months. Alignment of U.S.–U.K. policies regarding the Middle East is likely to be an increasingly important element in the process of safeguarding the British position.

(iv) At the moment our image is certainly more tarnished than that of the Americans, except at the top-monarchist level. One of the reasons why we are so
widely associated with the forces of reaction in the Arab world is because of the peculiarly reactionary character of most of the Persian Gulf rulers, with the exception of the Amir of Kuwait. Because of our military presence the Arabs assume that we are fully responsible for every action of the rulers. We might consider more carefully than hitherto whether we cannot do more with the assistance of our military presence to bring them up to date. This, it seems to me, is one field in which we might be able to improve our image in other Arab countries. I think this difficult problem should be discussed with Sir W. Luce when he returns.7

(v) We see no immediate threat to our ability to retain our military presence in Aden and our politico/military presence in the Gulf (though a change of Ruler in Kuwait could open a new chapter). Partly because it is so divided, Arab nationalism is not organised to eject us at present. The latest U.S. position tends to reinforce our own. Yet, at the centre of this problem there is a curious (and so far unexplained) paradox. The *raison d’être* of our presence is not political (politically of course we should be better off without it) but economic—viz to help to maintain the independence from each other of the oil-producing states and hence ensure as far as we can that oil is available not merely or primarily in terms of supply but above all on remunerative commercial terms. The latest forecast of the world oil position in 1970 brings out our clearly increasing dependence on Middle East supplies. And yet within the last few months the Treasury, the supposed guardians of our balance of payments and of the contribution which sterling oil makes to that, have been at pains to argue (in the defence context) that the present arrangements for obtaining oil from Middle East producers has little value for H.M.G. This case has been developed by innuendo rather than explicit statement. It is for consideration whether when the present defence exercise is over we should try to smoke out the Treasury a little more. It is not comfortable to feel that there is an unresolved argument at the very core of an important element of our policy. On the other hand, the status quo is based on F.O. rather than current Treasury theory and it may be better to let sleeping dogs lie.

(vi) It seems obvious to me and I think this view is shared by the Ministry of Power, that as long as Kuwait holds and as long as we can stay in Aden we should do so. But what happens if one or the other goes? If as a result of a change of régime Kuwait were to renounce the Anglo–Kuwaiti exchange of letters we would, I think, have to look very carefully at our military commitment to defend Kuwait and at the value of holding on in Aden from this point of view—in the light inter alia of other oil developments in other parts of the Gulf. If Aden were to go first (which is much less likely) I question whether we should want to try to construct an alternative method of defending Kuwait, e.g. an aircraft-carrier which would be both less effective and more provocative. It might at that stage be better to fall back on non-military forms of insurance.

(vii) As regards Egypt, Syria and Iraq, we cannot do more at the moment than hedge our bets. It seems fairly evident that the Arab world will be torn by divisive forces for a long time. Whether this is a good thing or not it is undoubtedly partly if not largely due to the fact that outside influences have held off thus allowing the

---

Strategies and Defence

One is tempted to say that the prospects for Arab unity under Nasser have never looked poorer since he came into power ten years ago; one must add that it is still just possible that these might prove famous last words.8

8 Lord Home minuted: 'I do hope that the President of the Board of Trade reads this excellent analysis'.
If, however, it were now decided in principle that a new carrier should be ordered, the expenditure involved clearly could not be absorbed within the limits of existing approved programmes. Either compensating economies would have to be found in the defence programme itself or social expenditure would have to be reduced or the balanced growth of the economy would have to be jeopardised.

The Minister of Defence\textsuperscript{2} said that, although our present strategy admittedly required us to sustain three roles, it might become possible to reduce our commitments in Europe in due course. But, so long as we sought to discharge the world-wide role and, therefore, to maintain a military presence east of Suez, the Navy could not survive as a fighting force without a carrier fleet. It could neither attack nor defend itself. The development of a missile capability, which the Navy did not now possess, might provide a partial alternative to the continued provision of carrier support; but the development of new long-range missiles and of the ships to carry them would be no less, and might be more, expensive than the maintenance of a carrier capability. The Navy had at present four carriers, of which two would continue in service until 1980. But the other two would reach the end of their effective life in 1970–71; and they could not be safely extended beyond that date. No more was at issue than the proposal to replace one of these two ships, with the result that the carrier fleet would in any event be reduced to three in the early 1970s. This reduction would itself involve some element of risk; but to allow the carrier fleet to contract to only two ships would make it almost impossible to maintain a naval presence east of Suez. Moreover, it would be very uneconomic, since the ships would have to spend much of their time in transit instead of on station. Finally, the prospective decline in the carrier strength could not be concealed; and it would be assumed that the Government had decided to dispense with carriers altogether in due course. This would have serious political repercussions; and it would be liable gravely to affect recruitment to the Fleet Air Arm. In military terms alone, therefore, a decision not to order another carrier might deprive us of the ability to maintain a military presence east of Suez at a comparatively early date.

It now seemed probable that an aircraft could be developed for the common use of the Navy and of the Air Force. This would not only make possible a more rational and flexible deployment of air power but would also lead to closer working relationships between the two Services in conformity with the purpose of the new organisation for defence. Moreover, it should yield substantial economies, of the order of £150 million, by comparison with the development of two separate types of new aircraft. These, coupled with a saving of an equivalent amount as the result of a decision, which could be accepted, not to replace the second carrier to be withdrawn from service in 1970–72, would more than offset the cost of one new carrier, together with its aircraft. In addition, it should be possible to defer beyond the present decade more than £70 million of defence expenditure which had been included in earlier plans.

In discussion the following main points were made:

(a) From the political point of view there was no scope for early reduction in any of our major commitments overseas. But by 1970 it might no longer be necessary to maintain forces in the Middle East for the protection of Kuwait; and in the Far East Malaysia might have reached a political understanding with Indonesia which

\textsuperscript{2} Mr P Thorneycroft.
would reduce the risk of war in that area. Moreover, no circumstances could now be foreseen in which we should be required to mount, unaided, a landing against opposition in any part of the world. Over the next 10 years, therefore, the need for a carrier force east of Suez might disappear. But developments of this kind were essentially speculative; so long as it remained possible that we might need to deploy a military effort overseas during the 1970s, it would be unwise for the Government to deprive themselves at this stage of the only means by which such an effort could be sustained. It would be preferable to cancel, at a later point, a decision which had been rendered unnecessary than to incur so serious a risk now.

(b) From the military point of view carriers offered advantages which no other weapons system could match. In the absence of missiles, aircraft support was essential to any kind of naval operation; and in many parts of the world only carriers could provide such support. Moreover, they made possible a wide range of political options, in that they were mobile; they could bring the threat of force to bear openly or discreetly as the situation might require; and they were not dependent on land bases, since they could stay at sea for periods of up to three months at a time and could be refuelled and restocked at sea from supply ships. The supply ships themselves would need access to ports; but a wide range of choice would be open for this purpose in the Far East, particularly perhaps in Australia. If provided with appropriate escorts, they would be capable of defending themselves against any form of attack likely to be brought to bear against them in the foreseeable future, short of conditions of total nuclear war. The possibility of fitting the new carrier with nuclear propulsion, which would enable it to remain at sea for longer periods, had also been studied. But, apart from the fact that this would delay its entry into service by at least three years and would add about 40 per cent to its cost, it had not been thought right that the Government should seek to gain its first experience of the problems of nuclear propulsion at sea in a ship of such strategic importance.

(c) The Secretary of State for Air said that, if it could be assumed that the defence budget would continue to rise, many of the operational arguments which had been advanced in support of a new carrier might be thought to be valid. But, if defence expenditure had to be stabilised or curtailed and more exacting priorities had therefore to be enforced, a carrier could not be regarded as of such high priority as to justify us in pre-empting on its behalf so large a proportion of the total resources available for defence. Its role, although important, would be limited; in particular, carriers found no essential place in any of the present contingency plans which had been prepared to deal with various military emergencies. Moreover, it would provide a relatively small capability in relation to its cost; and it would therefore aggravate the tendency to disperse limited resources among too many projects, a tendency which would result in our forces being weak in all roles and effective in none. A decision on a new carrier should therefore be deferred until certain studies now in progress, particularly into questions of air defence, had been brought to a conclusion.

(d) In favour of deferring a decision it was argued that the Navy would in any case have two carriers in service until 1980; that the case for a third carrier had not
been conclusively established; that it might be possible to keep at least one of the two older carriers in service longer than was at present envisaged; and that no order for a new carrier need be placed until 1965. As against these considerations, however, it was common knowledge that a decision had already been deferred for three years; it was improbable that the factors on which any decision would have to be based would be materially affected by any re-examination; and a further deferment would be bound to provoke considerable political criticism.

(e) The development of a common aircraft for the Navy and the Air Force would not be affected by the decision on the new carrier, except as regards the size of the order for such aircraft. A common aircraft would be developed in any case as a replacement for the Hunter and the Sea Vixen; and it would be capable of operating from the carriers now in service.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that what was now at issue was the structure and capability of the Navy not over the next few years but in the decade after 1970. In that period the relative importance of Europe in the world-wide confrontation between West and East might progressively diminish, particularly if the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Government on the prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons led gradually to some more general relaxation of political and military tension. But no similar prospect had yet presented itself in the Far East; indeed, the situation in that area of the world might develop in the opposite direction. If so, we should face a corresponding need to strengthen the defences of the free world east of Suez. It was in this context that it would be right to consider the proposal to construct a new aircraft carrier. On the other hand, the discussion had shown that it was possible to question the technical and professional assumptions underlying this proposal; and it had also emphasised the danger that, if we attempted to maintain a military role which we could not in the end afford, not only would our military influence be diminished but the economy might suffer a degree of damage which would weaken our position in the cold war even more than the maintenance of a world-wide military presence might tend to strengthen it. The Cabinet would wish to reflect further on these conflicting factors before reaching a final decision.

The Cabinet:—

Agreed to resume their discussion at a later meeting.

73 PREM 11/4907, PM/64/51 20 Apr 1964

‘British and American strategic interests in South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean’: memorandum by Mr Butler for Sir A Douglas-Home

You asked me to consider how we could spread the defence load in the Far East and South-East Asia by involving the Americans in some way in our bases there. You mentioned the balance of payments aspects. It has long been evident that the cost of our defence arrangements in the Far East is quite out of proportion to the British investment and trade stake in the region. This disproportionate effort is being deployed less in defence of British material interests than in support of our American and Commonwealth partners and in the general interest of the Free World, including
the underwriting of freedom to trade in the area by Germans, Japanese and others. The Americans, I believe, recognise our traditional rôle in the area from Suez to Borneo. They would like to see us do more but are doubtful of our capacity. I do not think it practicable, in view of their worldwide commitments, to ask them, or any of the other nations trading in the area, to help us out financially. I do however consider that there are prospects of persuading the Americans to associate themselves more closely with our defence arrangements in this area, either by making greater use of our existing strategic facilities, where appropriate, or, by the development of other facilities, at points where the inhabitants have no anti-colonialist complexes, or, better still, there are no inhabitants at all.

2. With this in mind, I should like, if you agree, to talk to Dean Rusk on the following lines when I meet him in Washington next week:

(a) I would open by welcoming both his helpful remarks in public on Malaysia at the SEATO Meeting, and his private words of encouragement to Carrington\(^1\) about the limited offensive action we may be forced to take against the Indonesian build-up. I would go on to assure him that we are doing our best to make certain that the case against Indonesian aggression is first properly on record with the Security Council, as well as in the press.

(b) While he knows we are committed to the defence of Malaysia, military activity will not of itself end confrontation and for this an acceptable political solution is needed. This could, as we agreed at Washington, be on “Maphilindo” lines.\(^2\) Sukarno must be forced or persuaded to withdraw his guerrillas and abandon his aggressive designs.

(c) The Americans have been very helpful to us with Sukarno but we hope that they can also do something, as they have promised in the past, to take a more positive line in support of Malaysia. For instance one simple step would be if the Seventh Fleet carrier task force now cruising in the Indian Ocean (Operation Concord) could call at Singapore on its return voyage about May 10. It may be on the late side to announce this now but I would repeat what I have previously said to Rusk, namely that, subject to clearance with the Malaysians, we would welcome visits by the Seventh Fleet in Singapore at any time.

(d) Once Indonesian confrontation has been abandoned and the Indonesian threat to Malaysia has ceased to exist, our Singapore base could cease to be directed to the narrow front in Borneo and could resume its wider rôle of assisting SEATO to contain Chinese Communism and of acting as a link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

(e) Consequently whether Indonesian confrontation ceases or not, we should welcome increased American use of our facilities in Singapore as a clear demonstration of United States/United Kingdom interdependence.

(f) It would also be as well to look rather further ahead. As a first step in this direction we welcomed the recent United States/United Kingdom talks on the Indian Ocean and are glad that the Americans are prepared to supplement, but not to replace, the traditional British strategic interest in this area, by the joint development of new facilities.

(g) We think the concept of a central “austere base” on Diego Garcia in the Chagos

---

\(^1\) Lord Carrington, first lord of the Admiralty since 1959.  
\(^2\) Malaysia–Philippines–Indonesia.
Archipelago flanked by air staging-posts on Aldabra Island to the west, and, if the Australians concur, on Cocos (Keeling) Islands to the east, would be a good insurance against a breach of the existing Aden–Gan–Singapore line, of which the weakest link at the moment seems to be Gan.

To sum up, to the extent that future United States/United Kingdom interdependence in round-the-world strategy may require land-based facilities, we should look for points where the local political scene has no anti-colonialist or anti-Western complexes, or, preferably, where there are no inhabitants at all.

3. I hope we may have a moment to discuss this before I leave for Washington on April 26.

4. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Commonwealth and Defence Secretaries since it so much concerns them and to the Secretary of the Cabinet.

74 CAB 148/1, ff 60–61 23 Apr 1964

‘The Indian Ocean’: minutes of Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee meeting (DO 18(64)2)

The Foreign Secretary said that the cost of our defence arrangements in the Far East was out of proportion to the British stake in investment and trade in the region. Our effort was deployed less in the defence of British material interests than in support of our United States and Commonwealth partners and in the general defence of the free world. He had therefore considered whether we could reduce our burden by persuading the United States to associate themselves more closely with our defence arrangements, either by making greater use of our existing strategic facilities, where appropriate, or by the development of other facilities at points where the inhabitants had no anti-Colonialist bias or, better still, there were no inhabitants at all. He therefore proposed, at his forthcoming meeting with the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, not only to re-emphasise the essential elements in our policy of support for Malaysia against Indonesian aggression, but also to indicate that:

(a) We should welcome increased United States use of our facilities in Singapore as a demonstration of United States–United Kingdom inter-dependence; and the United States 7th Fleet should be invited to visit the base.

(b) We should welcome the joint development of new defence facilities in the Indian Ocean.

(c) We favoured the concept of a central “austere” base on Diego Garcia, flanked by air staging posts on Aldabra and, if the Australian Government agreed, on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, as an insurance against a breach of the existing Aden–Gan–Singapore route.

The Secretary of State for Defence said that he agreed broadly with the Foreign Secretary. It would be unduly optimistic, however, to suppose that these proposals would provide any early relief from our burdens, since the United States authorities did not contemplate the completion of a base on Diego Garcia in less than five years at the earliest or the development of the flanking air staging posts in less than 10 years. Moreover, there were serious practical limits to the use by the United States Forces of our base facilities in Singapore. In the light of these considerations the
presentation of our views to Mr. Rusk might be slightly modified and amplified on
the following basis:

(d) Despite the pressures to which we were subjected as the result of Indonesian
policy towards Malaysia, our facilities in Singapore still provided an important
base for any operations which might be necessary under the South-East Asia
Treaty Organisation (SEATO); and they constituted an assurance of our capacity
and intention to contain Chinese Communism in South-East Asia. In addition
Singapore acted as a link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

(e) We should welcome an increased use by United States forces of our facilities in
Singapore (the extent of which was already known to them), although
constitutionally this would, of course, be a matter between the United States
Government and the Malaysian Government.

(f) We welcomed the readiness of the United States Government to develop new
facilities in the Indian Ocean which would enable them to supplement, although
not replace, British strategic interests in the area.

(g) The prospect of the joint use of these facilities would provide a valuable
reinforcement of our existing air routes, particularly if our overflying and staging
facilities in Libya and Cyprus were put in jeopardy.

(h) Experience of these new developments might indicate other opportunities for
United States–United Kingdom interdependence in the provision of land-based
facilities which would help both countries in carrying out their global strategy.

In discussion there was general agreement with the Foreign Secretary's proposal,
subject to the modifications proposed by the Secretary of State for Defence. It would
also be important to avoid allowing the United States Government to infer that a base
at, e.g., Diego Garcia would be in any sense a substitute for the existing bases at Aden
and Singapore.

In the light of the Foreign Secretary's discussion with Mr. Rusk it would be
necessary to consider how the constitutional relationship of Diego Garcia to
Mauritius might need to be modified.

75  CAB 148/5, ff 99–103  23 Apr 1964

‘US defence interests in the Indian Ocean’: Cabinet Defence and
Oversea Policy (Official) Committee memorandum by FO, CO and
MoD (DO(O)(64)23)

As a result of discussions between United Kingdom and United States officials in
London, from February 25–27 a Memorandum (Annex I)\textsuperscript{1} was agreed for submission
to Governments.

\textit{Background}

2. The Americans have at present no forces or bases between the Pacific and
Mediterranean, apart from a few naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. The United States
Administration supports our position in Aden and Singapore. Their interest in the

\textsuperscript{1} Annexes not printed.
Indian Ocean area has gradually developed over the past few years and gained impetus as a result of the Chinese attack on India in 1962. They have, however, been restrained by considerations of finance and, although they showed interest in establishing certain technical facilities on islands in the area, it was not until December 1963 that their strategic interest took the positive and public form of a decision to deploy a naval task force into the Indian Ocean from time to time. Formal notification to Her Majesty's Government of this intention took place on December 11 last and on December 19 the Foreign Secretary told Mr. Rusk in London that Her Majesty's Government welcomed the American decision and also confirmed our readiness to receive a group of United States officials to discuss the development of support facilities on islands under British control.

**Strategic importance of the Indian Ocean**

3. British strategy in this area has a three-fold aim:

   (a) To prevent the spread of communism by supporting the Central and South-East Asia Treaty Organisations.
   (b) To protect vital British and Commonwealth interests, for instance in the Persian Gulf and Malaysia.
   (c) To maintain an effective presence over the whole area so as to prevent the development of a power vacuum.

   This strategy depends at present on our use of the main bases at Aden and Singapore and on our intermediate staging posts at Mesirah and Gan. Should any of these facilities be denied us we should, if we wish to maintain our strategic aims, have to reprovide the lost facilities elsewhere in the area. The possible construction of suitably placed United States facilities across the Indian Ocean which we should be able to use would therefore provide a very valuable insurance policy at a relatively small premium against possible loss or limitation of use of any of these facilities. A map of the area is at Annex II.

**Analysis of United Kingdom/United States discussions**

4. The Americans, as shown in the Memorandum, contemplate a greater defence presence in the Indian Ocean to complement (but not in any way to replace) the existing British effort in the area. This is likely to mean over a period of time:

   (a) Periodic visits by a naval task force;
   (b) the installation of military communications and technical facilities;
   (c) the development of base facilities (together with air staging posts) to support United States forces.

5. It being established that Her Majesty's Government had already welcomed American intentions, the joint aim in the discussions was to find common ground for the development of United States support facilities on British island possessions in such a way that the United Kingdom would also enjoy the strategic benefits. It seems clear that, even if their pace is slow, the Americans will definitely enter the area in one way or another, and it is therefore in the United Kingdom's long term interests to strike the best bargain possible for the benefit of both countries.

6. The principles of such a bargain which the two delegations agreed to recommend were that it would be Her Majesty's Government's responsibility to
acquire land, resettle population and pay any necessary compensation. The United States Government would be responsible for all construction and maintenance costs. As regards joint use, the United States Government would share any facilities, during development and subsequently, with the United Kingdom, and the two Governments would consult as necessary about the establishment of any possible United Kingdom military facilities that might be required (i.e. separate facilities from those developed by the United States but in the same area).

7. From the defence point of view such a bargain should be extremely advantageous to the United Kingdom and the joint recommendations in paragraph 12 of the Memorandum have already been strongly endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff, though they point out that United Kingdom interests must be safeguarded during negotiations. From the international political point of view, the proposals are also attractive. American interest in the area is likely to increase in any event, but as shown in Annex B of the Memorandum the Americans are favourably disposed to consultation with us on the political presentation of their actions. By offering our cooperation we shall be able to influence these in a direction favourable to the policies of Her Majesty’s Government. This influence would, however, be weakened if we introduced unacceptable conditions before attempting to put into effect the recommendations in paragraph 12 of the Memorandum.

8. We must, nevertheless, not overlook the United Kingdom’s reputation as a Colonial power. It would be imprudent to expose ourselves to international and local criticism of trafficking in Colonial territory without regard to the reasonable interests of the colonies concerned (Mauritius and Seychelles). On the other hand we must look to our broader responsibilities to our remaining Colonial territories all over the world. As explained above, the United States proposals, if put into effect, would provide a valuable alternative means of maintaining the free world’s defence posture in the Indian Ocean and further East, which is essential if we are to continue to be responsible in the last resort for the maintenance of law and order in and defence of our remaining dependent territories in these areas.

**Future action by the United Kingdom**

9. There are, however, as the Americans recognised, considerable local political and economic problems to be settled before we can authorise the Americans to make any surveys. The principal difficulty lies in the fact that the most suitable island for development as an American “austere” base is Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago which, though about 1500 miles from Mauritius, is under Mauritius administration. We have to consider how best to arrange matters so that this island, if developed as a base, together with the surrounding Archipelago, can be freed from future political and economic encumbrances, which might nullify its strategic usefulness. We must also consider how best to proceed in order to avoid damaging our future political relations with an independent Mauritius, and, in particular, risking the security of our important Naval Communications station on that island.

10. The course which would best satisfy our major interests would appear to be to decide now to detach Diego Garcia (and other islands in the Chagos Archipelago), and possibly the Agalega Islands from Mauritius, well in advance of Mauritian independence, and to place these under direct United Kingdom administration. This could be done by Order in Council, which could provide for the new territory to be administered by a High Commissioner or Administrator who might be either a
Service Officer (cf. the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus) or the Governor of the Seychelles or of Mauritius (preferably the former) in his personal capacity (cf. British Antarctic territory). When this has been done, or sooner if politically possible, we should be able to tell the Americans that we were in a position to arrange a joint survey. The Americans may however press us to arrange a survey more urgently, before the constitutional action has been taken. We should therefore proceed with that action as quickly as possible.

11. Formally, we have the constitutional power to take action without the consent of the Mauritius Government, although it consists almost entirely of elected Ministers. To do this, however, would expose us to criticism in Parliament and the United Nations and damage our future relations with Mauritius. Moreover, in as much as there would still be a local population, albeit very small in number, in the Chagos Islands other than Diego Garcia, we might be criticised for creating for strategic purposes a new Colony with a less advanced constitution than it theoretically enjoys as part of Mauritius, and with no prospect of evolution. But this criticism would lose most of its force if the action were accepted by Mauritian Ministers in advance. It is therefore desirable to secure their positive consent, or failing that, at least their acquiescence.

12. If we are to do this we are bound to take them reasonably fully into our confidence at the outset. We have promised the Americans that we will consult them before this is done and on the terms to be used. The Americans will be reluctant to accept that the Mauritians should be told about the extent of United States participation or about their specific strategic interests. In the short term it might at first sight appear that, if only to avoid the risk of premature leaks, and the consequent raising of the price, it would suit us better to confront the Mauritians with a fait accompli or at most tell them at the last moment what we are doing. But the Colonial Office are convinced, as is the Governor, that this would do lasting damage to our relations with Mauritius and would adversely affect the facilities which our Services now enjoy in Mauritius itself. We have considered whether the Americans' share in the enterprise could be concealed, but since it would eventually become known, we could be charged with duplicity and the damage would be as great and possibly greater. We might, however, be able to frame our explanation to the Mauritians in language which the Americans would accept and which would refer to the United Kingdom/United States joint interest in the Chagos Archipelago for the defence of the free world in which the Mauritians might, as future members of the Commonwealth, be expected to share. Such an explanation would eschew any particular description of the nature of the strategic facilities or their purpose.

13. It must be recognised that there will be a demand for compensation, not only to the private land owners in the Chagos Archipelago (a Seychellois consortium), but to the Mauritius Government as the price of their consent, and possibly to the Seychelles Government for loss of export duty on the copra which is exported through Seychelles. There will also be a sizeable problem of re-settling the inhabitants of Diego Garcia. Consideration of all three might best await the initial consultation with Mauritius and subsequent surveys. We do not envisage asking the Americans to accept any part of this bill.

14. There remains the question of Aldabra Island, which is at present under the administration of the Seychelles. In paragraph 13 of the Memorandum the Americans agreed to consider further the location of a site for a staging post in the
Western Indian Ocean, to balance their separate interests in staging facilities, which we share, on the Australian-owned Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the Eastern Indian Ocean. The Americans considered Aldabra a potential site for the former purpose and were glad to receive a copy of the survey already made by the Air Force Department. If this idea were pursued, and we could achieve full and unimpeded use of Aldabra, it would be a most useful strategic asset to the United Kingdom on an eventual round Africa route to the Middle and Far East. The strategic importance of a staging post on Aldabra would be greatly increased if, after Mauritius gains independence, we found we could not rely on air staging facilities there in all circumstances. There would therefore be advantage in considering how best to ensure that Aldabra Island be retained indefinitely under Her Majesty’s Government’s direct control and at the same time encouraging the Americans to pursue their interest in Aldabra as an air staging post, which we would share. There might be advantage in detaching Aldabra from the Seychelles at the same time as we detach Chagos, and possibly Agalega from Mauritius but this needs further examination with the Governor.
increase if, as seemed likely, air staging posts in the Mediterranean became progressively more insecure.

(c) Even with United States assistance, however, the development of these facilities would involve substantial additional expenditure on the defence budget. It was therefore important that no commitment should be made at least until the outcome of the joint survey was known.

(d) Her Majesty's Government already had the constitutional authority to detach the Chagos Archipelago and the Agalaga Islands from Mauritius and Aldabra from Seychelles and to transfer them to direct United Kingdom Administration. Nevertheless, it was desirable that both the local Governments should be induced, if possible, to acquiesce in this excision. On the other hand we did not want to tell Mauritius and Seychelles Ministers more than was absolutely necessary or to inform them in any detail of the nature of the facilities to be created in the islands in question since, if our intentions became at all widely known, we might find ourselves under renewed attack from the Soviet Union and the United Nations.

(e) It had been agreed with the United States Government that we should consult them about the terms of the communications which it was proposed to make to Mauritius and Seychelles Ministers. It was also important to ensure that the United Kingdom enjoyed joint use of any facilities which the United States Government developed in these dependent territories and that the latter did not develop exclusive rights of access as in the case of Ascension Island.

(f) We must be ready to accept criticism in the United Nations that we were deferring indefinitely the independence of the islands transferred to direct United Kingdom Administration, although similar action had recently been taken without criticism in respect of Perim3 and the Kuria Muria Islands.4 We should seek assurances from the United States Government that they would support our position.

(g) It might prove preferable to move the small existing population of the islands in question to islands remaining under their respective Colonial Governments, in order to avoid any charge that we were preventing them from achieving independence. It would also be important to avoid recreating the problem of the political status of the local inhabitants by allowing the United States or United Kingdom Services to import labour from colonial territories for work at the bases.

The Committee:

(1) Took note with approval of D.O. (64) 35.

(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary, in consultation with the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence, to draft the terms of an approach to the Governments of Mauritius and Seychelles, informing them in general terms of our intention to transfer the Chagos Archipelago, the Agalaga Islands and Aldabra Island to direct United Kingdom control.

(3) Invited the Foreign Secretary to instruct Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington to consult the United States Government about the terms of this approach.

(4) In the light of the action taken under Conclusions (2) and (3) above, authorised the Colonial Secretary to approach the Governments of Mauritius and Seychelles.

---

3 In Gulf of Aden, at entrance to the Red Sea. 4 Off the coast of Muscat and Oman, Arabian Sea.
(5) Subject to the outcome of the approach under Conclusion (4), approved in principle the despatch of a joint survey party to the islands in question.

(6) Agreed to give further consideration to the issues involved when the results of the joint survey were known and an estimate had been made of the probable costs of the scheme.

(7) Agreed that, in the meantime, no financial commitments should be entered into.

77 FO 371/174488, no 13 17 June 1964
[Policy and strategy in the Gulf: Aden and Kuwait]: letter from Sir W Luce (Bahrain) to R S Crawford (FO) [Extract]

Thinking ahead, there are two possible developments in this part of the world either, or both, of which would have a very important bearing on our position and policy in the Gulf and our military deployment in support of them. As I imagine that there will be a review of British global strategy after the General Election, whatever the result, this is perhaps the right time to take a closer look at these things. The two possible developments I have in mind are:—

(a) the loss of our military facilities in Aden before perhaps the end of this decade without the establishment of an alternative base; and

(b) the abandonment by Kuwait of our military support under Point 4 of the Exchange of Notes of June 19, 1961.

2. ... As regards (b) above, the possibility of Kuwait deciding to dispense with our military support has long been in our minds and has been mentioned in correspondence a number of times. ... A combination of growing Kuwaiti confidence in their own military strength, continued good relations with Iraq, pressure from Egypt and an increasing tendency on the part of the Amir to defer to Kuwaiti opinion in the Assembly could, in my opinion, bring about the shedding of our military support even in the life-time of the present Amir. ...

3. Neither of the two eventualities I have mentioned would, as I see it, change our interests in the Gulf area. The loss of the base in Aden would not in itself do so though it would seriously affect the present means by which we protect the most important of those interests. The shedding by Kuwait of our military support would relieve us of our main and most difficult military commitment in the Gulf but would not ipso facto reduce our interest in Kuwait’s continued independence, though it might increase the threat to that interest; nor would it affect our other interests in the Gulf. Before I go further it might be useful to restate briefly British interests in this area. They are:—

(a) the exclusion of communism and Russian political influence;

(b) continued access to oil supplies on reasonable terms;

(c) the safeguarding of our military lines of communication through Masira Island.

These can be summed up in the primary interest of the continuance of political and economic stability in the area.
4. I see no likelihood that these interests will decline in the next 10–15 years. On the contrary, close examination in 1963 of probable future oil consumption and sources of supply showed that the free world, and Britain and Western Europe in particular, will within that period require from the Gulf area at least twice as much oil as they are getting now. As British and Western dependence on Gulf oil increases so Russian interest in penetrating the area will grow. Similarly, our interest in the continued stability of the area, far from declining, will grow stronger. It cannot be said too often that within the general instability of the Middle East the Gulf is inherently the most unstable sector of all. The seeming paradox of its present stability by comparison with the rest of the Middle East arises solely from our presence. It is in fact a power vacuum which we have filled for the past 150 years. With the realisation that it is also the world’s greatest source of oil, power pressures on the walls of the vacuum have increased and we correspondingly have had to fill it more strongly. I think that it would in fact be more correct to say that there is a vacuum within a vacuum; the outer vacuum includes Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia and is under pressure from Russia and Egypt; the inner vacuum includes only the Gulf States from Kuwait to Muscat and is under pressure not only from Russia and Egypt but also from the above three components of the outer vacuum. We ourselves fill the inner vacuum and, with one exception since 1958, the Americans and we between us go a long way towards filling the outer one. The exception is of course Iraq which is a weakness neither we nor the Americans can do much about at present.

5. It is a common theme in the British press and elsewhere today that the presence of British troops in the Gulf is not the best way to ensure the continued flow of oil, with the implication that it would be better to withdraw our forces and let the Arabs’ desire to sell their oil do the rest. This seems to me a dangerously facile and naive argument which ignores the realities of the situation. Of course no-one in their senses would suggest that the presence of British forces can in itself ensure the continued flow of oil or that these forces should be more than the barest minimum required to maintain our position. But political and economic stability, which I do believe to be essential to the continued flow of oil on reasonable terms both on the present scale and even more in the greatly increased quantities which will be required in the future, can only be maintained in a power vacuum by the exercise of power. Our political position here, based on treaty relations with the States, would collapse under external pressures were it not supported, and seen to be supported, by military power. In order not to be accused of begging the question I should state briefly the reasons for my belief that stability is essential to the continued flow of oil on reasonable terms. I have often expressed my conviction that without the stability we provide in this power vacuum the area would become a jungle of smash-and-grab; the longer I serve here the stronger that conviction becomes. Iran would seize the islands of Tunb and Bu Musa and would also quite possibly try to occupy Bahrain and parts of the Trucial Coast; Saudi Arabia would want Bahrain and Abu Dhabi; Iraq would be tempted to seize Kuwait; and Egypt would do her utmost to overthrow the traditional regimes and establish her own hegemony in their place. A chronic state of hostilities between Iran and the Arabs on the other hand and revolution and internecine disputes in and among the Arab States on the other would create a situation of such chaos that I simply cannot believe that the flow of oil would remain unaffected; pipelines and other oil installations are favourite targets for sabotage. I find it even more difficult to believe that the enormous additional capital investment
required over the years to double the flow of oil would be forthcoming in such conditions. Apart from the physical flow of oil, there would be two other threats; first, the concentration of the sources of oil in fewer hands and therefore a greater danger of the consuming countries being held to ransom; secondly, the nationalisation of the production of oil by revolutionary Arab Socialist regimes established under Egyptian or Iraqi influence, with all that this would mean in dislocation of the oil industry, capital loss to British interests and damage to the British balance of payments. Behind all this would loom the Russian and communist menace, for only they would benefit from such a situation. These may sound alarmist views to some but I am convinced that they are not exaggerated.

6. To return to the two eventualities I am envisaging, my conclusion from the foregoing is that they should not affect our ends and aims of policy but that they would inevitably affect our means of achieving them. Above all, they should not lead to the withdrawal of visible military support for our political position and influence in the Gulf; it is an obvious truism that it is better to deter trouble than to have to intervene to cure it. On the other hand, we must recognise that it would not be politically feasible locally, nor I imagine in H.M.G.’s wider interests, to build up a military base in the Gulf area in any way comparable with the present base in Aden. I will take first what I believe on the whole to be the most likely situation: the shedding by Kuwait of our military support before the loss of our military base in Aden. While this would put the future independence of Kuwait at greater risk and would therefore increase the threat to an important British interest, it would also relieve us of our heaviest and most difficult military commitment in the area, on the assumption that we would not go into Kuwait after Point 4 of the Agreement had ceased to hold good, and would therefore make the subsequent loss of the Aden base less harmful. We should have to rely mainly on normal diplomatic means to meet any subsequent threat to the independence of Kuwait, but I suggest that the continued presence of a British battalion, a squadron of ground attack fighters and some transport aircraft in Bahrain might still act to some extent as a deterrent against an attack on Kuwait. It would not necessarily be known to Iraq or Egypt that we would not intervene without the agreement of the Kuwait Government nor would they necessarily know whether we had arrangements for the rapid reinforcement of our forces in the Gulf. As for our oil interests elsewhere in the area, Kuwait oil has hitherto dominated our thinking but it should be remembered that within the next 10 years British companies in the southern Gulf might possibly be producing some 70 million tons per annum of sterling oil—40–50 million tons from Abu Dhabi, 12 or more from Qatar and 10 or more from Muscat, the latter being of course still problematical. To provide the necessary visible military support for our political position, to deal with possible internal security requirements in Bahrain and Qatar and to provide reinforcement if necessary for the Trucial Oman Scouts, I consider that our minimum requirements of land and air forces would be a British battalion group and the appropriate number of transport and communication aircraft. The continued presence of a ground attack fighter squadron would be valuable and, as I have suggested above, might provide some deterrent against an attack on Kuwait. Similarly, the continued presence of an armoured car squadron at Sharjah would be valuable as backing for the Trucial Oman Scouts. Any necessary reinforcement of these forces in the Gulf would presumably continue to come from Aden, though without the Kuwait commitment its scale and urgency would be greatly reduced.
7. The next situation to consider is where, Kuwait having already shed our military support, we lose the base in Aden. Our military requirements in the Gulf would remain as described in the preceding paragraph and the only new problems would concern their logistic support and their reinforcement if necessary. I imagine that neither of these would present any insuperable problems particularly if, as I believe would be politically feasible, logistic facilities in Bahrain were increased to a minor extent.

8. The third possible, and much the most difficult, permutation is the loss of the Aden base while we still have the Kuwait commitment. It would be for consideration at the time whether circumstances, such as the strength of the Kuwait forces, had altered to an extent which would justify a substantial change in our plan for intervention with a view to reducing both its scale and urgency and thereby mitigating the difficulties created by the loss of Aden. If no relief could be found in this way we should be faced with the worst case: the present plan for intervention in Kuwait without the use of Aden. …

9. It remains to consider the important question of the political effects which either or both of the eventualities I am discussing would have on our position in the Gulf and therefore on the political feasibility of the military ideas I have put forward. The abandonment by Kuwait of our military support would, I think, be regarded by the Gulf Rulers as a rash act but would not in itself be considered a reason for weakening their relationship with HMG. Indeed it could work the other way in that they might conclude that the increased threat of a take-over by Iraq or of a pro-Nasser coup in Kuwait would bring those same dangers nearer to them. The loss of the Aden base would be a more serious matter. …

If we were forced out of Aden our prestige in the Gulf would suffer severely and faith in our powers of protection would be correspondingly weakened; this in turn might cause the Rulers to change their attitude towards us or at least to resist committing themselves any deeper to us. …

10. You will note that throughout this letter, I have based my ideas on the assumption that we shall maintain our political and military headquarters in the Gulf in Bahrain. As long as we have the Kuwait commitment, the military requirements are decisive in this respect and it is hardly credible that if we had been forced out of Bahrain we should still have that commitment. I have considered whether, having shed the Kuwait commitment, there would be any necessity for or advantage in long-term planning for the loss of our position in Bahrain and Qatar and withdrawal to a last-stand position in the Trucial States and the Sultanate of Muscat. I have rejected this idea for a number of reasons:—

(a) The Ruler of Bahrain is and will probably remain, if handled aright, our most genuine friend in the Gulf; against this, Bahrain is at present more susceptible than the Trucial States to Arab nationalist subversion but I am reasonably confident that provided Saudi Arabia remains stable the Bahrain security forces, with the presence of British forces, can deal with any trouble which is likely to arise from the local population; in addition, Bahrain being a small island, internal security and defence are easier to control. Our security of tenure in Bahrain is therefore probably as good as anywhere in the Gulf;

(b) Our unilateral withdrawal from Bahrain and Qatar would be a gross breach of our treaty of obligations and a betrayal of our long-standing friendship with the Al
Khalifa and would so alienate the Trucial Coast Rulers as to make our position in that area untenable;
(c) Our abandonment of Bahrain would precipitate the danger of Iranian intervention and the risk of Iranian/Arab hostilities which, to say the least, would be acutely embarrassing to ourselves and the Americans;
(d) Apart from the above points, the cost of transferring our political and military organisation from Bahrain to the Trucial Coast would be great and I doubt if it could be justified for the sake of a last and necessarily precarious toe-hold on the south-eastern corner of Arabia.

I think therefore that for present purposes we should continue to regard our position from Bahrain to Masira as indivisible.

11. I think that it would not be out of place to add that while the first of the interests mentioned in paragraph 3 above directly affects the Gulf area itself, it also has many broader implications. The stability resulting from our presence in the Gulf and the continuation in power of Shaikhly regimes and a merchant class dependent on it makes the area unreceptive to communism at least until an educated proletariat emerges. But that same stability, and the presence of the military forces on which it is at present partly based, has a deterrent effect on possible Soviet ambitions in the surrounding area in the context of limited war and subversion. . . .

12. I do not propose to make this letter even longer by considering possible long-term policies for replacing the Pax Britannica in the Gulf area. This has been the subject of much thought and of recent correspondence. This letter has been written on the assumption that no such valid alternative solution for the stability of the area has been devised before either or both of the eventualities I have discussed occur.

13. To sum up my conclusions:—

(a) Neither the abandonment by Kuwait of our military support nor the loss of our military base in Aden within the next few years would change the nature or scale of our interests in the Gulf area though they would affect the present means by which we protect them;
(b) Continued stability in the Gulf area is the basic requirement for the protection of our interests; assuming that no valid alternative to the stability which we at present provide had emerged before either of the eventualities in (a) occurred, it would be essential that H.M.G. continue to maintain the stability of this inherently unstable area;
(c) Our special political position alone would not be sufficient to ensure stability in a power vacuum; it must be seen to be supported by some degree of military power;
(d) If we were relieved of the Kuwait commitment the necessary military deployment within the Gulf would be modest in scale and certainly no stronger than at present and should present no particular political difficulty;
(e) If we lost Aden but still had the Kuwait commitment the scale and urgency of our intervention plan would no doubt require a stronger deployment of British forces within the Gulf; political considerations rule out a base comparable with Aden and would impose a limit on the scale of deployment;
(f) In all the circumstances envisaged, the maintenance of our position in Bahrain is a factor of great importance. . . .
Our main interest in the Gulf is in regular supplies of oil on the best obtainable terms. Our subsidiary interest is in stability, which is valuable both in itself, and in support of our main interest.

2. These interests are best served by the survival of the Shaikhly regimes, because:

(a) They represent the status quo. Their downfall might be violent, with consequent disruption of supplies, damage to installations, and falling profits.

(b) Their overthrow would probably lead to the absorption of the Gulf States, by one or more of their neighbours, and a consequent increase in OPEC’s collective bargaining strength.

(c) They are less inclined to extreme oil policies than revolutionary régimes. The attitude of the Shah and Prince Faisal, for example, is much more favourable than that of men like Mussadeq (Abadan) Qasim (Law 80) Arif (Iraq’s OPEC policy) Nasser (Nationalisation of Shell) and Ben Bella. This attitude reflects in part the monarchists’ temperament, and in part their weakness. Their disqualification from the Cold War game makes them dependent on us. Moreover, extreme policies lead to instability, which threatens their survival.

3. It is therefore in our interest to honour our commitments to the Shaikhly régimes. We must however remember that these interests and this policy conflict with the ambitions of Nasser (and the growing number of Arabs, both in producing and non-producing countries, who think like him). We work for the status quo, disunity, and cheap oil; he for revolution, unity, and the maximum return on oil under his own control, or at least his influence. Our strongest ally is the self-interest of producing countries. His is Arab nationalism and xenophobia, whipped up by his propaganda machine, and expressing itself finally in subversive activities. Two consequences follow. First, our intervention must be kept to the minimum. If it is too blatant, self-interest is submerged in hatred, the strongest unifying force in the Middle East. Secondly, it is in our interest that the Rulers should not lose the support of their people. The more they do, the greater Nasser’s opportunities for subversion. Unfortunately, the Rulers are slow to reform, and we cannot compel them. The people of Qatar and Abu Dhabi, at least, are becoming alienated from their Rulers.

4. The instrument of our policy is our military presence, which deters Iraqi aggression on Kuwait and is at hand to support the forces of the Rulers of Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States in maintaining order. The removal of our forces would lead to a power vacuum, which might encourage aggression by Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. These considerations still outweigh the argument that foreign troops in Arabia themselves generate instability. At present, our forces are accepted by the Rulers (who need them); by the Shah and Prince Faisal (who find their presence

----

1 Arabian Dept.

reassuring) and so far by Nasser (who has not liked to see any of the Gulf States absorbed by Iraq, Saudi Arabia or Iran, and has himself been in no position to assume the commitment). If the 1961 defence undertakings to Kuwait were abrogated, we should have to examine whether the position could not be held by training missions, and plans for intervention from the United Kingdom, backed by diplomatic pressure from us and the United States. Until then, we should stay as we are, in a “hull down” position; i.e., our forces should present the minimum target to nationalist attack that is consistent with achieving our aim.

5. Our political presence in Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States consists of two elements: first, the conduct of foreign relations, which derives from the exclusive treaties; and secondly, jurisdiction, and a number of administrative functions, which derive partly from custom and partly from agreements other than the treaties. We have already begun to retrocede our jurisdiction and certain of our administrative functions; but since we are allowing the Rulers to set the pace, progress is very slow. Moreover, we have no plans to abolish the 19th Century Treaties, or to put the conduct of the Ruler’s foreign relations on a new basis. This paper argues that we should accelerate and extend the process we have begun.

6. The benefit to us from the political structure is nil. Although we say we are responsible for the foreign relations of the Rulers, we have no control of policy. The result is responsibility without power. We cannot persuade the Ruler of Qatar, for example, to adopt a moderate policy in OPEC. Our efforts to induce the Rulers of Bahrain, Qatar and Abu Dhabi to reform only embitter our relations with them. It is difficult to think of an instance in recent years where by virtue of our political position, we have been able to persuade any of the Nine Rulers to act contrary to their own inclination.

7. The decisive reason for dismantling the structure is that if he chooses, Nasser can use it as a fulcrum about which to exert pressure, first on our military position in the Gulf, and secondly on the Kuwaitis, to get them to abrogate the 1961 commitment. The 19th Century Treaties are much better material at the United Nations and on the “Voice of the Arabs” than 1965 Exchanges of Letters on the 1961 model, which Kuwait’s policy has made respectable. The Treaties (and the political structure as a whole) are offensive to Arabs because they treat a part of the Arab World as if it were still in the Indian Empire; because by excluding Arab Representatives, they interrupt inter-Arab relations; and because they supply convincing evidence that Britain controls policy in the Gulf, and is impeding reform in order to exploit Arab oil, through the provisions which give her control of award of concessions. Nothing could be more calculated to excite Arab xenophobia than a campaign against the Treaties. The result would be strikes, sabotage and general instability in the oil producing States of the Gulf. The fact that Nasser has not yet detonated this weapon should not prevent us from taking steps to render it harmless.

8. There are a number of other arguments for dismantling our political structure:

(a) By enlisting the cooperation of the Saudis, we might achieve a settlement over Buraimi, and a Saudi recognition of the independence of the nine States within their present frontiers. . . . This would be the first step towards the Arabian Peninsula solidarity, envisaged by Sir William Luce.

(b) Our political structure insulates the Rulers from international criticism,
induces in them a false sense of security, and blinds them to the need for reform. They thereby lose the support of their subjects, and store up trouble for themselves and for us.

(c) It is a nightmare to administer, because of its many anomalies, and because it allows us no power.

(d) It is contrary to our general policy of decolonisation.

(e) It will increasingly alienate the rest of the Arab world (and to a lesser extent Asia and Africa) and frustrate our policies there. Odium can be borne if necessary; but it is foolish for a trading nation to incur it unnecessarily.

(f) If Nasser can represent the Gulf as a Colonialist issue, we must expect indifferent support from the United States Government.

(g) If we reform of our own accord, we shall appear wise; if we are forced to reform, we shall be thought weak.

9. Those who defend our political structure generally concede that it has no intrinsic value, but argue first, that its abolition would prejudice our military facilities, and secondly, that it must be kept going until the States are viable.

10. According to the first argument, abolition of the Treaties would mean in the first place United Arab Republic and other Arab Consuls, who would incite opposition to our military facilities; and secondly, alarm among the Rulers, who would fear a scuttle, and would seek to “re-insure” by demanding the withdrawal of our forces. The proposal attached to this paper meets the first objection by suggesting that Saudi Arabia should, for the time being, represent the Rulers at the Arab League and other Arab countries, and the second by proposing a change which we can show is more one of form than of substance.

11. But the objections have in any case little force. Would United Arab Republic Consuls add so much to Nasser’s power to make trouble in the Gulf States? They are already full of his agents, and potential agents. His chief weapon is the radio, and diplomatic relations would, if anything, inhibit its overt use. If proof of his power is required, consider the strikes and demonstrations in several Gulf States in April 1963, or the cool touch of the Ruler of Qatar by Anwar Sadat3 for the Yemen War. A United Arab Republic Consul could have done no better.

12. It is not clear how or with whom the Rulers would “re-insure”. Their grant of military facilities is based on their need for money and security. Where else could they go for these? Kuwait’s size and wealth meant that she did not need the income, and could achieve the security by skilful diplomacy. Even so, she retained our commitment to her defence. The Ruler of Bahrain lacks the cards, the skill and the will to play such a delicate game. He is as dependent on us as the Sultan of Muscat, who though a sovereign Ruler accepts the presence of British troops. (Compare also Malaysia; and Libya, until she acquired an alternative source of income).

13. It is surely wrong to argue that our political structure should be kept going until the States are viable. As the paper has attempted to show, our political structure is in fact delaying progress by obscuring the need for it. The analogy with a Colony is misleading, for in the Gulf we have no power to compel progress. The administrations in Bahrain and Qatar were the work of the British advisers, not of the Political Agents, and things have been marking time since their expulsion in

---

1956 and 1960 respectively. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi treats his British Adviser with contempt.

14. I therefore conclude that for the reasons given in paragraphs 7 and 8, there is a \textit{prima facie} case that our political structure in the Persian Gulf should be dismantled; and I recommend that study should be given to the attached proposal.

\textbf{79} \hspace{1cm} \textbf{CAB 148/7, ff 28–29, 32–36} \hspace{1cm} \textbf{22 Sept 1964}

‘British policy towards South-East Asia’: memorandum by FO officials for Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee (DO(0)(64)59) \hspace{1cm} [Extract]

\textbf{Summary}

This paper seeks to redefine British policy towards South-East Asia in the light of the current situation and of likely developments over roughly the next decade.

2. It reaches the following conclusions:

(a) South-East Asia is of relatively little economic importance to Britain; but politically we have a substantial interest in preventing its absorption by Communism, and we need to maintain our effort in the area if we are to keep our position as a world power and the United States’ principal partner.

(b) Communist absorption of South-East Asia can best be avoided by working for the ultimate neutralisation of the area, in agreement tacit or formal between the West and the Communist powers.

(c) This means a recognition by the West that any excessive desire to retain a military presence and direct political influence in the area is likely to encourage an unnatural alliance between local nationalism and communism. In the long term Britain and her allies must accept that only a genuine non-alignment in South-East Asia can make the containment of communism an attainable objective.

(d) Meanwhile, however, a delicate balance has to be struck between these dangers of staying too long and the opposite dangers of withdrawing too fast. Any Western “defeat” in South-East Asia will equally render impossible the long term objective described above. Military measures will therefore remain essential until the prospect of eventual agreement emerges more clearly.

(e) The Americans will have to make the running in both the military field (SEATO) and the economic field (aid and technical assistance), but Britain’s power to influence American policy will depend on our making a respectable contribution.

(f) A British military contribution will require the continuation for the time being of our Singapore base, and also the continuation of our defence of Malaysia against Indonesian hostility; our economic contribution should be mainly concentrated on Malaysia.

(g) British policy must distinguish between what is attainable in the \textbf{Continental Region}, where the proximity of China is the dominant feature; and in the \textbf{Archipelago}, where the West is at less of a geographical disadvantage.

(h) In the \textbf{Continental Region} (Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) our objective should be the eventual emergence of régimes that combine being
sufficiently subservient to be acceptable to China with being sufficiently non-
Communist to be acceptable to the Americans; however unsatisfactory in other
ways, in this respect the present state of Burma and Cambodia provides a possible
illustration. In Vietnam it must be recognised that there is at present no third
alternative to American involvement or Communism; but it is not at all impossible
that, with time, this situation could change.
(i) In the Archipelago some form of loose association between Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines (“Maphilindo”) probably offers the best hope for their future
stability. This will not be achieved as long as “confrontation” continues against
Malaysia and it is a British interest to continue support of Malaysia against this.
But we must accept that part of the price for such an association will probably be
our military withdrawal from the area. Australian and Japanese influence in the
Archipelago may grow and become a useful counter to Chinese pressure.
(j) A neutral South-East Asia will only be able to stand on its own feet with
substantial economic and technical aid. But such aid and technical assistance
should so far as possible be co-ordinated with other donor countries. Some form of
consortium of Western donors (including Japan) could provide the best means of
achieving this.

II. British interests

...
elsewhere in the world and on American relationships with her other Western partners in the Atlantic Alliance. This impact would be particularly damaging to us if American opinion felt justified in attributing any substantial part of the responsibility for Communist success to a failure by Britain to meet her “responsibilities” in the area. This consideration, indeed, is related to our second major political interest in the area.

11. This is, by playing the fullest possible role, political, economic and military, in South-East Asia to contribute effectively to the global Anglo-American partnership and to maintain that influence in the shaping of United States policies that is cardinal to the conduct of our whole foreign policy. South-East Asia is of major interest to the United Kingdom as a scene of conflict between the United States and the Communist Powers which has in the past repeatedly given rise to threats of war and may do so again in the future. Because of the obvious danger that war starting in South-East Asia could ultimately imperil the United Kingdom, we have a major interest in being able to influence United States policy in that region. But the extent of our influence will depend, in the last resort, on the value to the United States of our political and military support for their policies in South-East Asia. There is no question of our military assistance being decisive or even perhaps significant. But successive United States Governments have always attached great political importance (mainly for domestic reasons) to British association with their military commitments in this area. As long, therefore, as our military presence in South-East Asia enables us to exercise a major influence on United States policies, it is worth retaining for this reason alone. There is also the important consideration that American support for British interests in other areas of the world is more likely to be forthcoming if we continue to afford them support in South-East Asia. They tend to regard this area as more vital than we do, but there are other parts of the world where the reverse is true, and globally, we need their support more than they need ours.

12. Thirdly, the denial of South-East Asia to a powerful enemy is vital to the interests of Australia and New Zealand, countries where British investment has increased in recent years and with which British trade will remain substantial; and to which Britain is strongly bound by ties of race and sentiment, expressed in their Commonwealth membership. Peace and stability in South-East Asia is of considerable importance to the maintenance of these links and to the protection of these important British financial and commercial interests.

13. Finally, we have a further positive interest which is to some extent the counterpart to the apparently negative one set out in paragraph 10 above. If we wish to deny the area to communism, it is essential that it should develop economically and enjoy reasonable political stability. Without these pre-conditions, whatever we or the Americans do will inevitably remain ineffective. So we have an important general interest in the prosperity and political stability of South-East Asia.

III. Singapore

14. The Singapore base and the substantial military effort deployed from it (see paragraph 8 above) were designed to safeguard these interests and in particular:

(a) to back up the efforts of the United States and SEATO in containing Communism in South-East Asia;
(b) to protect Malaysia, under our Defence Treaty commitment;
(c) to contribute to the forward defence of (and act as a link with) Australia and New Zealand;
(d) to keep open communications between the Indian and Pacific Oceans;
(e) to provide a rear link for our military presence in Hong Kong and a base for the defence of Fiji and other British Islands in the Pacific.

15. To examine these purposes in the reverse order, it is clear that (e) is nowadays of no more than marginal importance. The loss of Singapore would shake our position in Hong Kong and call in question our capacity to remain there; but the Singapore base facilities are not essential for our Hong Kong garrison to remain effective either for internal security purposes or as a trip-wire to identify Chinese aggression. The Pacific Islands are unimportant, although internal security and the denial of these islands to Communist strategy remain a Western interest.

16. The objective of (d) is important for our communications with Hong Kong and even more important, particularly to the Americans and the Japanese, for communications westwards to India. But communications between the two oceans are not dependent on the Singapore base and could no doubt be kept open in its absence.

17. As regards (c), Singapore is nowadays only one link in a chain of which many of the other links are steadily weakening. Circumstances in the Middle East and Africa over the next few years may bring us to the point where the only sure means of military communication with Australia in an emergency will be the West-about route via North America instead of east-about via Singapore; though an Indian Ocean route may emerge from present Anglo–United States discussions.

18. The importance of (b) above is self-evident at present. But in establishing Malaysia in order (among other things) to provide the right political environment for our strategic deployment in the area, we have in fact created a situation in which our strategy is largely nullified by the need to use most of our available forces to defend Malaysia. In the long run, our interests will be best served by a political settlement between Malaysia and Indonesia. The way in which a settlement could come about cannot be foreseen, but in some circumstances it might be incompatible with our continued tenure of the Singapore base.

19. The objective of (a) above, related as it is to our major political interest in South-East Asia, will remain valid for some time to come. Its effectiveness is diminished at present by the fact that the bulk of our land forces in the area have their hands too full with the Borneo fighting (or with internal security duties in Singapore itself) to be readily available for SEATO service. But the Singapore base itself is not fully occupied with Malaysia's war with Indonesia, and it would be valuable as a centre for the deployment in an emergency of SEATO forces, including British air and naval forces even if no British troops were available. Moreover, the existence and proximity of this Western base is reassuring to Thailand as well as to Malaysia.

20. British standing in the Far East has long been associated with the existence of a large British base in Singapore. If this were given up, countries in the area (and particularly Japan) might revise their policy towards us, although they would be less likely to do so if alternative facilities were available which allowed a British military presence in the Far East to continue.
21. At present, therefore, Singapore remains important to the protection of our interests in South-East Asia. But it seems clear not only that its long-term military value is declining but also that politically it is becoming, however gradually, a liability.

22. It is true that nationalist opinion in South-East Asia seems less militantly opposed to foreign bases than in the Middle East. Malaysia welcomes the base, at present, in its struggle with Indonesia; and memories of the emergency are still fresh in Kuala Lumpur. The base is also an important source of revenue and an element of stability in Singapore island. But this attitude cannot long continue. Future Malaysian Governments are likely to be more radical than at present and less tolerant of foreign military establishments. The retention of the base, even if we had not yet been specifically asked to leave, could progressively compromise our friendly relations with Malaysia. But without this friendship the base would hardly be tenable. Clearly our planning should be directed to establishing how our abiding political interests in South-East Asia can be protected by means other than the Singapore base, so that we shall be in a position to withdraw from it if possible before we are requested to do so.

23. Singapore, however, looms at present so large in British policy-making throughout South-East Asia that to devise policies for the day when we may decide to leave it requires a radical re-appraisal. This paper will not try to specify the point in time at which we can abandon all military interest in the area; nor to discuss how, meanwhile, we could deploy military force once we had left Singapore—beyond saying that, if we still thought it necessary and were prepared to pay the price (which would be very large) the improved logistic techniques of the future could make it feasible for us to keep an amphibious force in or near South-East Asian waters, operating either from an “austere base” in the Indian Ocean or from a more elaborate one in Australia. (The latter would of course require Australian agreement, but this seems likely to become easier to secure, as Australia grows increasingly aware of the threat from the north.) …
2. It will be seen that our terms of reference directed us in effect to make two distinct but correlated analyses. First, specific studies of three areas; and secondly, in the light of these, a study of the general principles by reference to which our future politico-strategic policy should be formulated and developed.

3. The three areas were the Far East, the Middle East and Europe. In regard to the Far East and the Middle East, we were instructed to assume that within the next decade Britain had been deprived by one means or another of the bases at Singapore or Aden or both; and on this hypothesis, to study how far the changed situation would permit us to continue to protect and maintain our interests and to discharge our remaining commitments; how far both the interests and the commitments would have to be contracted or modified; and by what alternative means, whether political, military or economic or a combination of all three, we could continue to make an effective contribution to the peace and stability of the region concerned. In the case of Europe, our purpose was to enquire whether Her Majesty's Government must regard themselves as indefinitely committed, for political or military reasons, to maintaining troops in the European theatre at the present level and whether (and if so, by what means) we could achieve a comparable political effect if their number were diminished substantially.

4. These terms of reference represented a distinctly more radical approach than that underlying previous studies of this nature in recent years. The main reason for this was that previous studies had tended, largely because their point of departure was the existing situation, to result primarily in a justification of that situation; or at least in a reasoned acceptance of the British commitments arising out of it. It was hoped that if the Study Group were asked to take as their point of departure, however hypothetically, a substantially modified situation, this might enable them to throw fresh light on the relevance of our existing commitments to our real interests. We believe that this approach has been justified.

5. Our terms of reference emphasised that three separate studies were required of three distinct problems. But each of these is also related to Britain's position in the world and the role she should seek to play during the next ten years; to the extent of the strain on our Armed Forces that the military backing necessary to sustain this role may entail; as well as to the financial problems involved in the maintenance of substantial armed forces overseas; and to the general economic situation of the United Kingdom. . . .

The three regional studies

9. The conclusions of the three studies which are circulated separately can be summarised as follows—

(a) Singapore. The main long-term British interest in South East Asia is that it should not fall under Chinese domination. . . .

(b) Aden. Our major interests in the area served by the Aden base are the prevention of Communist domination and the maintenance of the supply of oil on satisfactory terms.

These interests are best served by political stability in the area, by the Western orientation of Iran, by the existence of the major oil producing Arab countries as separate entities and by the maintenance of law and order in those countries.

Our military presence is an important factor in ensuring the continuance of the
uneasy equilibrium of the area around the Persian Gulf and a total withdrawal from the area would involve such serious risks that we could not voluntarily incur them.

There are two views on the contribution made by our military presence in the area to the support of our oil interests. On the one hand it is argued that it is not a major factor and that so far as oil is concerned we could withdraw our forces from the area and rely on normal diplomatic and commercial processes. On the other hand it is argued that unless we maintain a military presence, at least in the Persian Gulf area after a withdrawal from Aden, the probable breakdown of the present uneasy equilibrium would seriously affect our oil interests.

There remains the question, which would have to be decided at the time, what size our military presence in the Persian Gulf should be if we were going to withdraw from Aden. The main military effect of withdrawal would be that, while we could still go to the help of Kuwait if she were attacked, we should no longer have the same chance of preventing Iraqi conquest of Kuwait as the present military plan gives us. Our other interests and commitments in the area could however be supported and maintained by some increase in the forces now stationed in the Persian Gulf if certain alternative military facilities were built up in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf area. Capability to intervene in East Africa would be on a reduced scale.

A withdrawal would have to be preceded by political preparations designed to ensure that we could leave in good order, with the minimum disturbance to the area and with the cooperation necessary if we decided to create alternative military facilities. This would require some demonstration, in particular to the Shah of Iran and the Gulf Rulers, that our support for them would continue. It would also be necessary at the time of withdrawal to make some reassessment of our present degree of political and financial support for the Federal Rulers and the moderate Adeni politicians in the South Arabian Federation. . . .

(c) Europe. Major changes in Soviet policy towards the West that could justify reducing our present troop commitments are unlikely within the next ten years. Changes in NATO strategy, however, and in the distribution of effort within NATO may well have done so. But if we wish to reduce within the relatively near future this must be done by agreement with our allies and not unilaterally. Otherwise we risk both weakening the deterrent effect of NATO conventional forces in Europe and the cohesion of NATO; and compromising Britain’s major political interests in Europe and her relations with the United States.

Indeed, British troop commitments in Europe are more a matter of political than military necessity since we have a major interest in increasing British political influence in Europe and this in turn requires the maintenance of our military influence within NATO. We can to some extent mitigate our man-power problems by continuing to use outside the NATO area forces at present committed to NATO without major difficulties with our NATO allies. But to achieve modifications in the commitments themselves requires essentially political methods to meet what is essentially a political problem. This means a more direct British involvement in Europe, of which British entry into the European Economic Community, as soon as this becomes possible, would be the clearest possible demonstration. As members of the E.E.C. we should be likely to obtain a more sympathetic hearing; and we should have demonstrated with conviction our
political commitment to Europe. Moreover, an expanded E.E.C. might lead in due course to a closer integration of European forces than now exists in NATO; and to a situation in which British commitments could be substantially reduced. Entry to the E.E.C. may be barred as long as de Gaulle remains in power. But if we keep it as an objective, and meanwhile pursue our efforts for closer political association with our European partners, this policy may in the medium term help us to surmount some of the grave difficulties that will confront us if we seek to reduce our military commitments in Europe.

Britain's role in the world

10. In the light of these regional considerations we also have to take into account the general consideration discussed in paragraph 6(d) that a withdrawal might be required not primarily for reasons peculiar to the region concerned but because the strain on the British economy caused by the effort of maintaining these commitments had become unacceptable. These general aspects clearly involve the second part of our terms of reference and the consideration of the general principles, derived from our regional studies, on which our future politico-strategic policy should be based.

11. It is almost a platitude to say that Britain's world position has been fundamentally transformed as the consequence of the two great wars of this century. Whether or not we were before 1914 the greatest power, we were at least primus inter pares. Now our position is clearly more modest in relation to that of the two super-powers. Nevertheless a number of our commitments throughout the world still derive in part from the status we achieved during the nineteenth century. They, together with new commitments that we have undertaken in those areas, largely as a result of our continuing presence there, represent a substantial strain on our military and perhaps even more on our economic resources—the impact of this is discussed below. But they also play their part among the many factors, intangible as well as tangible, which for a variety of reasons enable us to exercise greater power and influence throughout the world than our relative military and economic strength actually justify; and conversely their abandonment would produce a disproportionate effect upon our influence. This is primarily because of the role that they enable us to play in an effective global partnership with the United States, and through the North Atlantic Treaty, with the major countries of Western Europe.

12. This disproportion between our real and our apparent strength, and the dependence on our allies and especially on the United States which is implicit in it, means that the choice of a future role for Britain can only be partly ours. It is unrealistic to think in terms of a completely independent British policy, whether in relation to our friends and allies or to our potential opponents. On the other hand, the same limitations apply in varying degrees to all other powers, not least to the United States and the Soviet Union. Provided therefore that Britain accepts realistically the limitations on her independence imposed by her own changed standing in the world, she need not find her pursuit of a constructive foreign policy substantially inhibited.

13. The prerequisite for such a foreign policy is a soundly based home economy. For Britain, as a medium-sized industrial nation vitally dependent on imported raw materials and sources of energy this implies two things. First, the ability to trade globally with the minimum of restrictions and on the best terms obtainable. This
itself means that Britain has a basic interest in peace and order and the sanctity of agreements everywhere. These are the conditions of flourishing trade and they form the economic basis for this country’s opposition to the advance of Communism, for its various Alliances and for its support of the United Nations. It is sometimes forgotten that Britain’s present ‘world role’ and world-wide commitments are largely the historical reflection of this situation. The political and military power built up by this nation has been intimately related to its economic requirements. But in the changed world conditions of today—and even more of tomorrow—this situation poses a twin problem: can Britain earn enough abroad to maintain world-wide commitments whether on the present or on a substantially reduced scale? and if she feels obliged to renounce them, will her power and influence in the world be so diminished as to endanger her economic and thus her political independence?

14. This dilemma involves the relationship between the military instruments of power and influence exercised in the conduct of British foreign policy, and the economic load that they impose on the country and the limitations that result therefrom in terms of British foreign policy. The Defence expenditure of the United Kingdom represents a heavy burden on the national resources. It amounts annually to about one-third of all Government expenditure and to about 7 per cent of the gross national product. (As a comparison, the figure for Germany is just under 6 per cent.) In economic terms three adverse influences can be distinguished. Firstly, the man-power directly employed and the equipment supplied represent a diversion of resources which might, alternatively, be adding to the national wealth. Secondly, such is the complexity of modern military equipment that a very high proportion of skilled scientific and technological man-power and a still higher proportion of the most highly skilled is engaged on defence work. (The arguments for the indirect benefits of technological “fall-out” have not been confirmed by experience.) It is estimated that the Defence effort on scientific and technological development represents, in terms of cost, about 40 per cent of all expenditure of this kind in the economy as a whole, and that about one-fifth of all qualified persons engaged in research and development throughout the country are employed on defence projects. Thirdly, there is a direct burden on our balance of payments arising from defence expenditure overseas, estimated at some £265 million. This is a significant figure in relation to the margins within which our balance of payments situation is normally to be found. Moreover, our recurrent difficulties in balancing our overseas payments and receipts compel us to borrow from countries which our foreign policy is engaged in influencing from day to day in the defence of our interests, or from international institutions on which those countries have a powerful say. United Kingdom influence in the world cannot for ever continue unaffected by this running pattern of need for financial help, internationally, at frequent intervals. Indeed, that influence depends not only on our military strength but also on our economic power and the respect (or lack of it) which other nations have for our economic performance. . . .

18. Britain’s present power and influence depend essentially on her relationship, political, military and economic, with three main groupings, Europe, the United States of America and the Commonwealth. (Geography and history place Europe first on the list, but the priority is not absolute as between the three.) With these areas we share, to a substantial degree, a common heritage of political thought, a desire to preserve our political freedom and a resistance to the pressures of international Communism, whether of the Soviet or the Chinese variety. This has been the
political and strategic justification for the network of alliances linking Britain with various countries in these areas and for our policies at the United Nations. It is unnecessary to speculate here on how these three relationships may evolve up to the end of the century, nor where our major interest lies. But they are not mutually exclusive for Britain, nor are they real alternatives.

19. If Britain allows herself to be excluded from Europe, she will be increasingly isolated from what is becoming one of the main political and economic power centres of the industrialised northern world. Such isolation will result in this country finding itself progressively of lesser importance in the determination of the great issues that have to be resolved between the United States, the Soviet Union and the major powers of Continental Europe. The political and military dangers for Britain of such isolation are clear. But the economic consequences can be just as damaging, in terms both of our trade with the other industrialised countries and of the competition which these powerful industrial complexes will present to our trade with other parts of the world.

20. Likewise, Britain’s relationship with the United States will be of vital importance to her for the foreseeable future. In one sense, it can be argued that it is more vital to us than our relations with Europe, in that, largely as the result of allied effort in NATO for the past fifteen years, the main threats to British and Western interests, now and in the foreseeable future, are likely to arise outside Europe, in areas where the total American preponderance in the Western effort is even greater than in Europe itself. But quite apart from the difficulty of weighing a threat to interests in one part of the world against the possible increase in a threat elsewhere (e.g. in Europe) it should not be overlooked that the United States themselves attach great importance to our connection with Europe. Our relations with the United States will, therefore, depend substantially on the political role we are prepared to play in Europe.

21. The third element in the equation is our relationship with the Commonwealth. This is not merely a question of history or sentiment but of economic, and political interest and military commitment. British trade with the Commonwealth still represents nearly a third of our world trade. The Commonwealth connection may in some degree strengthen our influence in areas which are already important to us economically, and to a lesser extent militarily, and whose significance to us commercially may well increase as their own development progresses; this connection may come to be an important factor politically in the establishment of a satisfactory long-term relationship between the under-developed and the industrialised worlds.

22. Moreover—and this illustrates the inter-relationship between the three groupings with which Britain is connected—we are able to turn the fact of our involvement outside Europe to our advantage by using it to support our claim to be sharing the global responsibilities of the United States more than any of her other Western partners. This is especially important in connection with the growing problem of Chinese power in the Far East, however small our contribution may be in relation to that of the Americans; as well as with the protection of Western interests in the Middle East, where our historical involvement gives us a foothold that the Americans could not take over if we were forced out; and in Africa where the Commonwealth connection also gives us a special position as compared with the Americans—however inconvenient this may be in certain other respects. The United
States seeks, to some extent, to share power and influence with any partner that is prepared to exert them in the general Western interest. Our willingness to do this contributes appreciably to our special relationship with the United States. The validity of this relationship is often questioned; and it would be a mistake to claim that the relationship of itself adds specifically to Britain's power in the world. But that the relationship exists is undeniable and it represents a major political advantage to this country. To abandon it—which would be one of the consequences of any decision by the British Government to withdraw from the world scene to a purely regional role—would completely change the American attitude towards us. We may be forced gradually in this direction through sheer financial inability. In the long run, this will result in a gradual lessening of our political stature, and a change in our economic role in the world at large. We could no longer claim to participate as a major partner in the crucial East–West negotiations that will be necessary before there can be any lasting settlement of outstanding world problems. The preservation of the Commonwealth depends almost entirely on the magnetic influence of Britain which in turn depends on our continued readiness to play a world role. This need for global involvement should not affect the need for Britain, through a close association with Europe, to keep a decisive influence in Europe's relationship with the United States. This role is important to us, but the more we withdraw from the exercise of worldwide responsibility in partnership with the Americans the less we shall be able to play it. Britain's interests are worldwide and she cannot protect them alone. But others will not help in their protection unless Britain herself is seen to be playing her part....

The balance of advantage

26. Our terms of reference themselves accepted a difference of degree between our position in Singapore and Aden on the one hand and in Europe on the other. We believe that politically Europe must, if largely for geographical reasons, remain our first priority. Our economic stake there is substantial, and growing greater. But it forms such an intricate part of the whole pattern of our relationship with Europe as to make its importance difficult to assess in isolation. On the other hand, the military justification for maintaining forces on the present scale in Europe is likely to remain low. They serve essentially political ends. It might be possible, as our report on Europe points out, to negotiate some modification of our present troop commitments in Europe, and thus substantially mitigate our problems of military resources and balance of payments, provided we were prepared to enter into some closer relation with Europe....

27. To make a choice between our interests in the Singapore area and those in the area of the Aden base is more difficult. To some extent they are obviously interdependent. For example, it would be idle to pretend that a British withdrawal from both bases would not have profound political repercussions throughout the area of the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Indian sub-continent. Two interesting points also emerge with some clarity from the two regional studies. First, in South-East Asia it can be argued that our military presence, however necessary for the time being, for both political and strategic purposes, is irrelevant to our economic interests; it is also substantially more expensive than our presence in the Persian Gulf. In the latter area, however, even if we find it politically or financially expedient to withdraw from the Aden base, the alternative military presence set out in the
regional study would support our political interests, and may be judged a prudent insurance for our economic interests. Secondly, in South East Asia our economic interests, though not small, are relatively marginal in terms of our global economic interests. The reasons both for our military posture in the area and for any continuing involvement there after our withdrawal from Singapore would be primarily politico-strategic; in particular the maintenance of our position in Australia and New Zealand, on the one hand; and of our relationship with the Americans on the other. But in the Persian Gulf, although there are powerful political and strategic arguments for a continuing British presence, our main interest is likely to remain economic—a major stake in the oil industry, dependence on Middle East oil for over 20 per cent of the total energy supply of the United Kingdom; and, if things went disastrously wrong, a possible balance of payments loss of up to £200 million a year. It is also a paradox of this general situation that, whereas on any assessment of British economic interests our need to maintain a military position in Singapore is less than in Aden, the political obstacles to our doing so seem likely to be substantially more intractable in Aden than in Singapore.

Summary of conclusions

28. It should be clear from the foregoing and from the relevant regional studies, that political pressures may well be the decisive factor for Her Majesty’s Government in reaching a decision to withdraw from Aden or from Singapore or both. Moreover, it results from the considerations in the preceding paragraph that to summarise the balance of advantage for Britain, if she were obliged to choose an area where withdrawal would least harm her interests, is in any case difficult without oversimplifying the issues. It is also bound to seem subjective, at least to the extent that it requires a judgment on the respective merits of economic and political interests, and of regional and global interests. To make such a judgment by a computation is virtually impossible. But we set out below in summary form what seem to be the main relevant considerations.

(i) Britain’s position in Europe, as was implied in our terms of reference, is of a different nature to that in South East Asia or the Middle East. But her troop commitments there are less relevant militarily, in the light of the likely military threats to her interests in the next decade, than politically. The problem of reducing them is essentially political. To meet it satisfactorily will call for a policy of active association with Europe, designed in particular to ensure close collaboration between Europe and the United States.

(ii) In the Middle East British interests will continue to be very substantial and the implications of damage to them very great for this country. On the hypothesis of a withdrawal from the Aden base, it seems likely that some increase in the British military presence in the Persian Gulf area will be required after the Aden base has gone.

(iii) In the Far East, the significance to our interests of the British position at Singapore is more politico-strategic than economic. While our policies in the short term will continue to require a substantial military involvement, it is reasonable to hope that in the longer term the need for this may greatly diminish in that a reasonably stable balance of power may have been reached. In the interim period the political climate for maintaining the base in Singapore will probably be
more favourable than in Aden. On the other hand, adequate alternative military facilities are likely to be less readily available and could be substantially more expensive. This would involve considerable help from Australia and New Zealand.

(iv) If in the long run a choice has to be made for financial reasons between defence expenditure in the Far East and the maintenance of a military presence in the Persian Gulf area, we believe that priority should be given to the latter.

81 CAB 148/4, ff 104–105 14 Oct 1964

‘Report of the Long-Term Study Group’: minutes of meeting of Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee

The Committee had before them the report of the Long Term Study Group (L.T.S.G.) consisting of a covering report (D.O. (O) (64) 72) and regional studies on Europe (D.O. (O) (64) 68), the Far East (D.O. (O) (64) 70) and the Middle East (D.O. (O) (64) 73). They had also before them a memorandum by the Foreign Office (D.O. (O) (64) 59) on British policy towards South East Asia.

The Chairman said that the Committee was much indebted to the departmental representatives on the L.T.S.G. for producing such a useful report. The considered views of the Chiefs of Staff on the report were still to come. He suggested that the Committee should have a preliminary discussion of it and should consider in particular how the report could best be submitted to Ministers.

The Committee first considered the three regional studies and endorsed their conclusions in general terms. It was agreed that the studies should be regarded as background information, prepared by the L.T.S.G., against which the covering report, as a self-contained document, could be considered by Ministers.

In discussing the study on the Middle East the Committee took note that an important issue was still unresolved between departments, namely the extent to which British forces in the area were effective in maintaining law and order and preventing the oil resources coming under unified control. There was, however, general agreement that the continued maintenance of some form of military presence in the area was more likely to preserve the present reasonably satisfactory position than a withdrawal. The consequences of a withdrawal could not be proved and the risks could not be accurately assessed.

A number of amendments to the regional studies on the Far East and Europe were agreed and the Committee endorsed the conclusions of the Foreign Office memorandum on British Policy towards South East Asia.

The Committee took note that the Government which would take office after the General Election would be faced with a number of urgent and interrelated problems. The most immediate would concern nuclear policy and the question of British participation in the Multilateral Force. The regional study on Europe took the line that it would be in our interests to become increasingly involved in Europe politically and economically if we were to have any chance of reducing our military commitments there. The arguments in the study were therefore relevant to the question whether the United Kingdom should join the Multilateral Force since the

---

1 See previous document. 2 See document no 79. 3 Sir B Trend.
Government's decision on this issue would be regarded as a test of the extent to which they were prepared to involve the United Kingdom in Europe as a matter of general policy. The Committee were to consider the question of the Multilateral Force at their next meeting and would need to decide how their recommendations on it should be related to the report of the L.T.S.G.

The new Government would also be quickly faced with the scarcely less urgent problem of dealing with a large balance of payments deficit and of considering ways in which the increasingly heavy burden of public expenditure generally might be reduced. This would involve consideration of the extent to which we could continue to support the strain on our limited resources caused by our overseas commitments. A balance would have to be struck between the pressing need to restore our own economy and the value to us, as a trading nation, of being able to continue to exert through our overseas commitments an influence on world affairs out of proportion to our actual resources. Since the war our policy had been broadly one of disengaging gradually from our overseas role with the least possible disturbance to our general political and economic interests. This policy had been pursued with fair success and there was no real option open to us other than a continuation of this process whereby we would seek to cut down our commitments to match our resources. This must be a gradual and orderly process since any abrupt abandonment of our commitments would endanger the maintenance of stability which it was in our interest to preserve. We therefore needed time to effect the necessary changes. Ministers should be asked to endorse this proposition as the basis on which planning for the future could be conducted. Since it involved the major assumptions that we should not indefinitely maintain our bases in Aden and Singapore, Ministers should be warned of the dangers involved, particularly of the difficulties which would arise should it become known that we were in fact planning on the assumption of an eventual withdrawal from the bases.

It would assist Ministers in arriving at a decision if the covering report set out clearly the budgetary implications of withdrawal from the bases. The regional studies on the Far East and the Middle East gave figures of £210 million and £75 million as annual costs attributable to our military presence in the areas. These figures were at variance with the figure of about £500 million as the cost of our forces East of Suez, which had been calculated previously on broadly the same criteria. Furthermore, if it were possible to do so, Ministers should be given some idea of the actual savings which might be made by the withdrawal of our forces from these two bases.

The covering note should also include a reference to the part played by our facilities in the Mediterranean, particularly in the chain of communications through the Mediterranean and the Middle East to the Far East.

Certain amendments to the covering report were agreed including those consequential on amendments to the regional studies.
CHAPTER 3

Administrative Structures

Document numbers 82–99

82  DO 35/7973, no 26  9 Apr 1957
[Overseas Civil Service]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Mr Thorneycroft (Exchequer) about proposed agreements with Nigerian government. 

Minutes by A R Adair, J Chadwick, W A B Hamilton and J M C James (CRO)

I am sorry to have to worry you at this time to ask your urgent intervention in a difference of opinion between our two Departments in regard to the proposed Agreements with the Nigerian Governments for a Special List of members of Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service serving in Nigeria.

Because, with constitutional changes, the Secretary of State will cease to have responsibility for overseas officers serving in Nigeria, they will have a right to retire with lump sum compensation. It is, however, vital that as many as possible should remain. Under the proposals, which you may remember were outlined in Command Paper 9768 published last year, these officers could, if they surrendered their right to retire with lump sum compensation, enter the service of the U.K. Government with certain assurances as regards their future careers and pensions, but so long as their services were needed by the Nigerian Governments they would continue to soldier on in their present posts. The background against which these proposals were framed is set out in Annexe A to my paper to the Colonial Policy Committee last year (C.A. (56) 6 of the 14th February, 1956) to which you may like to refer.1

The detailed working out of this scheme has been a prolonged business but we are now broadly in agreement with three of the four Nigerian Governments (the Government of the Eastern Region has not, owing to elections, been able yet to finalise its views) and with the Treasury save for the one outstanding point of salaries . . . .

The original draft Agreement drawn up at the time of the publication of the White Paper proposed, as is appropriate to a Service of H.M. Government, that salaries would be determined by that Government. In negotiation last autumn with the Nigerian Governments this proposal proved wholly unacceptable and to save a breakdown it was necessary to propose that, failing agreement between the Nigerian Governments and Her Majesty’s Government salaries should be determined by arbitration. This provision has been accepted by three of the four Nigerian Governments but not by the Treasury and that is why I am seeking your intervention.

1 G W StJohn Chadwick, generally known within CRO as ‘John Chadwick’.
I am not sure that I fully comprehend the arguments the Treasury have advanced against arbitration but as we understand them they are summarised together with the counter-arguments, in the enclosure to this letter. Even if the arguments were stronger than I now think, I could not possibly accept the Treasury proposal that salaries should be fixed "in consultation with the Nigerian Governments", leaving the latter with a veto over any increases. The record of the Nigerian Governments over this matter of salaries and allowances for overseas officers is, for political reasons which are understandable, quite unreliable. I could not be a party to sponsoring a scheme which invites overseas officers to surrender their rights to retire voluntarily with compensation when conditions in Nigeria become too difficult, unless at the same time it provides satisfactory safeguards for their conditions of service and in particular for their salaries.

I see no hope of persuading the Nigerian Governments to accept the original provision that salaries should be determined by Her Majesty's Government. I fear therefore that if it is not possible to agree that salaries should be arbitrable there will be no course open to me but to announce to Parliament that it has proved impossible to negotiate a satisfactory scheme with the Nigerian Governments. The effect of this on our relations with those Governments and on the morale of the officers concerned would be deplorable. Moreover, I must say that I would have the greatest difficulty indeed in justifying a breakdown on the point now at issue on the strength of the arguments advanced by your officials.

I would emphasise how disastrous it will be to Britain's economic interests if British officers—and therefore British guidance—are lost to Nigeria in the crucial years ahead for that country of 32 million people. We supply annually about 45% of Nigeria's imports, in terms of cash £50 to £60 million a year. If British officers leave, there may well be something like chaos in parts of the country. The Nigerian Governments will try to recruit Germans, Italians and others and such trade as there is will tend to follow the men. This will apply particularly to the big engineering and supply contracts, which are increasing in value as physical development proceeds. In hard cash we shall lose very much more than we shall gain if we cannot make this agreement.

The Nigerian Constitutional Conference begins on the 23rd May and it is essential that a decision on this matter should be made well before then. I should be glad to discuss it with you in more detail at any time.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Alec Home, who is of course closely concerned in view of the increasing likelihood of Nigeria's early independence.

Minutes on 82

This letter from the Colonial Secretary raises issues of fundamental importance in relation to the operation, so far as Nigeria is concerned, of the arrangements envisaged for the future of H.M.O.C.S., outlined in Command 9768. These arrangements are designed:

(a) to see that the interests of the officers concerned are safeguarded as and when territories in which they are serving become independent, and
(b) to prevent a general exodus of such officers, particularly at the transitional period when their services are most needed to ensure continuity and efficient administration.

2. The general problem was set out in C.A.(56)6 which was the origin of the whole scheme and was accepted by Ministers, subject to certain amendments, (CA.(56)15th Meeting). These decisions were embodied in Command 9768 and the necessary legislation to translate them into effect is now in embryo in the draft Overseas Service Bill.

3. The scheme envisages the setting up of a central pool of officers of H.M.O.C.S. who will be in the service of H.M.G. in the U.K. and seconded to employing Governments, the attraction from the officers point of view being that there would be a guaranteed career, the United Kingdom Govt. being responsible for finding employment for them as and when periods of their secondment to a particular territory came to an end, and in the last resort if suitable employment could not be found they would be kept on full pay up to a maximum of five years or until the age of 50 whichever was earlier.

4. Within the ambit of this general scheme is the creation of the “Special List” of officers already serving in Nigeria, which, because of the deterioration of the morale of the Oversea Service there and the numbers involved, is the territory where the problem is of most immediate concern. The conditions of employment are, however, subject to agreement of the employing Government and in the case of Nigeria (the Governments of which are in broad agreement with the scheme in general), the negotiations have reached the point of breaking over the question of settlement of salaries. They would apparently agree to the Colonial Secretary’s suggestion of leaving this to be settled by arbitration, and the Colonial Secretary, in the letter now under consideration, has set out the reasons for accepting this proposal.

5. From his letter it appears, indeed, as if the whole scheme, so far as Nigeria is concerned, may well break down unless the Treasury can be persuaded to agree. This, as is pointed out by the Colonial Secretary, would have a most serious effect not only on the morale of the officers now serving in Nigeria, but on our relations with the Nigerian Governments. The C.R.O. interest in this matter is the same as that of the Colonial Office in so far as after self-government is attained, we must hope that the Federation of Nigeria, as new member of the Commonwealth, will not only govern itself, but govern itself efficiently. We must, I think, accept the Colonial Secretary’s assessment of the results of the Treasury maintaining their objection to arbitration and, if so, it is for consideration whether it would not be as well now for our Secretary of State to add his weight to the already very convincing arguments in the Colonial Secretary’s letter. In case this is thought desirable, I submit a draft letter which would, of course, need to be cleared with the Colonial Office.

A.R.A.
10.4.57

You will see from the Colonial Secretary’s letter to the Chancellor that the Special List Scheme for Nigeria is once more in danger of breakdown, this time on the question of arbitration in the event of H.M.G. & the Regional Govts failing to agree on salary levels.

Mr Adair’s minute above summarises very clearly the background to the problem.
It seems to me essential that the Secretary of State should be advised to support Mr Lennox-Boyd’s refutation of the short-sighted arguments advanced by the Treasury. The situation in Nigeria is already sufficiently alarming. There will be a mass exodus of H.M.O.C.S. officers shortly if no adequate long term employment agreement is reached. This will not slacken local pressure—already heightened by the precedent of Ghana—for independence.

In short, unless the Colonial Secretary gets his way, the Secretary of State may be faced, by say 1962, with assuming responsibility for H.M.G’s relations with an independent but corrupt & disintegrating Federation of Nigeria. In such circumstances, it would be difficult indeed to persuade an already reluctant S. African Govt (and there would be others) to accept Nigeria as a fellow-member of the C’wealth.

A draft letter to the Chancellor is submitted.

J.C.
11.4.57

I can understand the Treasury difficulty about agreeing to arbitration on salaries, especially salaries in the higher ranges. But my view is that they must accept this, or in some other way underwrite the liability to pay a proper salary by U.K. standards. This is part of the price to be paid for premature independence and the retention of Nigeria in the Commonwealth. It is not a subsidy to an independent Nigeria, but part of the cost—payment deferred—of bringing Nigeria to competent independence.

W.A.B.H.
11.4.57

Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Chadwick and I all hope that the Secretary of State will intervene with the Chancellor in support of the Colonial Secretary’s appeal.

2. I know from my own experience what a difference this scheme would have made in Pakistan. All but eight or ten of the former British officers have left. The Pakistan administration is chronically weak and still deteriorating. Hence the repeated food crises and other, less advertised, failures in good government, which lead to crippling waste and inefficiency. All this notably reduces Pakistan’s usefulness as a member of the Commonwealth. More British officers would have stayed, but for doubts about their future, which their inclusion in a “special list”, underwritten by H.M.G., would have allayed. It is too late for this now in Pakistan, but the lesson is plain in respect of the other weak and doubtfully viable tropical territories which we shall inherit from the C.O.

3. My worry about making salaries arbitrable is that they are almost bound to be fixed by any arbitrator at a rate lower than what H.M.G. (and the officers) think is right. This would not produce the desired psychologically reassuring result. I have therefore inserted two amendments in the draft, designed to meet the point in Mr. Hamilton’s minute that if the Treasury do not agree to arbitration they must in some other way underwrite the liability to pay a proper salary by U.K. standards.\(^4\)

J.M.C.J.
12.4.57

\(^4\) Mr Alport minuted: ‘I agree fully’, and Lord Home initialled the file (15.4.57).
My dear Peter,

I have just seen Lennox-Boyd’s letter to you of 9th April about the Special List of members of Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service serving in Nigeria. Like him, I am gravely disturbed at the possibility of the whole scheme breaking down over the one outstanding point of determining salaries by arbitration.

2. While I appreciate the principle of the Treasury case against arbitration in a matter of this nature, I feel that the stake here is really too great to make this a breaking point. Surely we must accept the Colonial Secretary’s assessment of the Regional Governments’ reactions, should Her Majesty’s Government persist in refusing to meet them over this? Or if the principle that salaries should be arbitrable is too big a hurdle to get over, ought we not to find some other way of underwriting the liability to pay a proper salary by United Kingdom standards?

3. The future efficient administration of Nigeria is, of course, of very great long term concern to me. The omens are already far from good. The determining factor will be the retention for a number of years ahead of a reasonable proportion of the present Oversea Administrative Service. This, I am convinced, will in turn depend on the successful introduction of the Special List scheme.

4. A breakdown in the scheme at this stage would indeed be disastrous. Not only would it spell doom to efficient administration in Nigeria; it would also have far reaching consequences throughout the Commonwealth. However corrupt or disorganised the administration of Government might become following a mass exodus of expatriate officers, we should still have no eventual choice, now that Ghana has set the pattern for the rest of Africa, but to agree to Nigerian independence. We should then in some five to eight years time be left with the unenviable task of attempting to persuade other member Governments of the Commonwealth—and in particular South Africa—to accept an inexperienced and, at the least, ill-run African territory as a fellow-member. The effect on Commonwealth unity would be serious indeed.

5. Let me say that our experience with Pakistan and Ceylon leads me to place particular emphasis on Lennox-Boyd’s remarks about our economic interests. Today trade follows the technical adviser and administrator, just as in the past it followed the Flag.

6. I would therefore urge you, not only on the grounds which Lennox-Boyd has put forward, but also in the interests of our long term responsibility for relations with an independent Nigeria, to agree that the principle of arbitration must now be accepted, or alternatively that some other equally effective means should be found of producing the same result.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Colonial Secretary.

Yours ever,

Alec

---

1 See previous document.

2 Mr Thorneycroft replied on 9 May indicating that he was prepared to agree arbitration should be provided for on certain conditions (no 29).
'Overseas Service Bill': CRO circular tel (no 550) to high commissioners explaining proposed organisation of HMOCS

Attached are copies of this Bill which had its first reading in the House of Commons on the 6th December. The object is to provide legislative authority for the policy announced in the White Paper of May, 1956, (Command 9768) on the organisation of Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service which you will have seen but copies of which are also attached. That policy was approved by the Colonial Policy Committee in May, 1956, and the Future Legislation Committee authorised the preparation of a Bill.¹

2. There were two aspects of that policy. First it was proposed to prepare lists of qualified persons who are ready and available for service on secondment to Overseas Governments and, if the demand warranted it, to establish a central pool of officers for service overseas. It is intended to test the demand for such officers by improving the arrangements by which members of the Home and Overseas Civil Services could be made available to Commonwealth countries without prejudice to their pension rights. Clauses 4 and 5 of the Bill implement this intention so far as United Kingdom officers are concerned and Governments of Colonial and Dependent Territories will be asked in due course to make corresponding provision in their own pension legislation to preserve the pension rights of overseas officers who take up employment under the Bill.

3. The second aspect was the introduction of a Special List for officers serving in Nigeria. Agreements were signed with the four Nigerian Governments at the Constitutional Conference in June last and officers concerned have been advised of the terms on which they may apply to join the Special List. The Special List Scheme is a measure designed to assist the Governments of the Nigerian territories to retain experienced overseas staff who otherwise might leave the service with compensation for loss of career; chief among its attractions is an assurance by the United Kingdom Government that they will endeavour to assign to other suitable employment any officer who, due to Constitutional changes, is compelled to relinquish his post; it provides inter alia that the officer will be kept on full pay, for as long as five years, if necessary, while the United Kingdom Government are exploring the possibility of alternative employment. The scheme involves the United Kingdom Government in certain financial liabilities and the Overseas Service Bill includes legislative authority to meet such liabilities. An offer to consider similar, but not exactly identical, agreements has been made to the Governments of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore; the Government of Malaya have suggested that the scheme should be modified in certain respects and their suggestions are now being examined in London.

4. The Bill would in form be capable of application to appointments such as have hitherto been made by prerogative powers under the Colombo Plan etc. Such appointments are however of an entirely different nature from those intended to be covered by the Bill in that appointments made under aid schemes are financed entirely by the United Kingdom Government. It is therefore improbable that in practice we should wish the provisions of the Bill to apply to appointments made

under technical assistance schemes unless the circumstances were exceptional. For this reason the Bill has been drafted in such a way that its provisions need be invoked only if there are administrative or other reasons which make it more convenient for certain appointments to be made inside its scope (see Clause 1(5)).

5. It is also made clear in Clause 1(4) that appointment (to the central pool or the Specialist) of officers who are at the time in the service of another Commonwealth Government will require the consent of that Government.

6. You have discretion, if you consider that this would be useful, to give a copy of the Bill to Commonwealth/Federation authorities for their information. If you decide to do so you may draw on the above background to the extent that you consider desirable. The Bill will have its Second Reading on 21st January.

85 CAB 128/34, CC 44(60)7 21 July 1960

[Proposed reductions in costs of Overseas Civil Service scheme]:

Cabinet conclusions

[By the spring of 1960 various reports were received about the dangers of an administrative collapse in East Africa: progress in Africanisation was poor and European officers, anxious and uncertain about future prospects, were beginning to resign. Macmillan became worried about the morale of colonial service officers. From several points of view stability and continuity in civil services was desirable. He feared it was going to be impossible to keep the Kenya civil service going, ‘unless we can give some kind of general guarantee of employment. . . . Is there not a sense of hopelessness spreading through the remaining Colonies?’ (PREM 11/3237, minute to Macleod, M 173/60, 24 May 1960; see also DO 35/7972, draft letter to Sir C Ponsonby 26 May 1960). Macleod, apparently, had been greatly concerned about this and was preparing ‘some quite far-reaching proposals’ to deal with it (PM(60)32, 27 May 1960). Recognising that expatriate officers needed some inducement to stay on—at present there was positive disinducement because of the high compensation given for ‘loss of career prospects’—the CO proposed that the UK government should take over the expatriate element in an officer’s pay, leaving the local (independent) government to pay no more for a ‘European’ than it would pay for an African. Sir N Brook felt that this was a good plan to deal with the immediate East African problem, but doubted whether it need be extended to all colonial territories; since there was no one unified service anyway (despite the title), a comprehensive scheme was not essential (minute 20 July 1960).]

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (60) 116) about the position of Her Majesty’s Oversea Civil Service.

The Colonial Secretary said that expatriate officers recruited from the United Kingdom by the Governments of colonial territories were finding themselves in an increasingly difficult position as the territories progressed towards and emerged into independence. Their salaries and allowances, which were considerably higher than those of locally recruited officers, were borne wholly by the local governments, who, on attaining independence, were reluctant on grounds of economy to retain the expatriate officers in their employment. The consequent uncertainty about their personal future was having a damaging effect on the morale of the expatriate officers, who were resigning in increasing numbers when, or even before, their territories became independent. Since the standard of education and of administrative ability among the locally recruited officers was in many areas still at a low level, the point had been reached at which there was real danger of a breakdown of administration in some of the territories which were approaching independence, especially in those in East Africa. In effect, the whole of the United Kingdom’s colonial policy was therefore at stake.
In the past the Government had been preoccupied with their duty to do justice to the expatriate officer whom the new independent Government was unwilling to retain in employment. A new approach was now necessary—to make conditions of service such as would induce as many expatriate officers as possible to remain in the employment of the local governments and to induce the local governments to retain them. The Colonial Secretary therefore proposed that, for the future, the “expatriate” element in the emoluments of the officers in question—that is, the excess of their emoluments over those of locally recruited officers—should be borne, not by the local government, but by the United Kingdom Exchequer. The cost of this proposal was estimated at about £24 millions a year.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the rapid increase in expenditure overseas, together with the relatively small return it yielded, was resulting in an alarming deficit on overseas account. He could not contemplate an additional commitment of anything like the size proposed. If the situation in the Colonial territories was so serious that some additional expenditure must be undertaken, he could agree to it only on condition that compensating reductions were accepted in analogous expenditure elsewhere.

Discussion showed that there was general agreement in the Cabinet that some means must be found of averting a breakdown of the administration in the Colonial territories, especially in Africa. The political effect of a breakdown would be disastrous and it might in the long run involve expenditure far greater than that proposed by the Colonial Secretary. On the other hand, it might be possible to devise a scheme which would achieve the main object in view and at the same time cause less difficulty to the Exchequer. Could it, for example, be made selective and limited to those territories where the danger was greatest, i.e., to East Africa, or possibly to Africa as a whole? Alternatively, it might be possible to persuade the local governments, both before and after independence, to bear the whole or at least part of some elements in the scheme, e.g., the £7 millions estimated for passage allowances between the territories and the United Kingdom. On the question of compensating reductions, consideration should be given to the relative priority of the scheme proposed by the Colonial Secretary and, for example, loans for major capital development in the independent Commonwealth countries, which were unlikely ever to be repaid.

The Cabinet:

Invited the Colonial Secretary, in consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Commonwealth Secretary, to consider urgently in the light of their discussion how the scope of the scheme proposed in C. (60) 116 could best be reduced and whether compensating reductions could be made in oversea spending for which they were responsible; and to report to the Prime Minister.

86 CAB 128/34, CC 46(60)1 26 July 1960

‘Oversea civil service’: Cabinet conclusions, approving the scheme

[Macleod did not think he could possibly recommend confining the scheme to East and Central Africa: such a restriction would undoubtedly be interpreted as ‘designed to bolster up “imperial” interests and the interests of the white population there and this would do us immense harm’; moreover ‘the pressure upon us to extend it later to other territories would be overwhelming and we should merely reap ill-will instead of goodwill for
bringing it in only in response to that pressure'; in any case, the anxieties in places such as British Guiana were just as acute. He also urged strongly against cutting Nigeria out on the grounds that it would be independent before the scheme could come into operation: ‘Nigeria is a territory of cardinal importance to us in Africa’ and it would be ‘profoundly unwise’ to exclude it (PREM 11/3237, PM(60)47, minute to prime minister, 24 July 1960). With the agreement of the Commonwealth secretary, however, he proposed that if the government offered to pay only half and not the whole cost of passages the net cost of the scheme would be about £14 million a year. Macmillan was attracted to this idea, and urged the chancellor of the Exchequer to agree to it (M 254/60, minute 25 July 1960). After the Cabinet decision was taken, Macmillan wrote to Macleod: ‘I am sure we were right to accept your scheme in spite of the expense’ (M 260/60, 30 July 1960). Comments were then sought from governors (circular despatch from Lord Perth, no 923/60: CO 1017/770, no 110, 31 Aug 1960; see also next document.)

The Prime Minister recalled that at their meeting on 21st July\(^1\) the Cabinet had invited the Colonial Secretary to consider, in consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Commonwealth Secretary, what reduction could be made in the scope of the scheme proposed in C. (60) 116 for relieving Colonial Governments of the “expatriate” element in the emoluments of members of the Oversea Civil Service. At the meeting which had been held for this purpose the Treasury had been represented by the Financial Secretary, in the absence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on official duty abroad, and the Chancellor’s position had therefore been reserved. Subject to this it had been agreed that if (i) Colonial Governments were left to pay half the cost of passages of expatriate officers, and (ii) allowance were made for the consequential savings of prospective future expenditure on the Colonial Office Vote, and (iii) account were taken of the fact that the ultimate cost of pensions and compensation would be offset by an eventual decrease in the cost of other parts of the plan, the initial cost of the scheme could be presented as £14 millions, instead of £24 millions. The Commonwealth Secretary and Colonial Secretary were strongly in favour of proceeding with the scheme on this basis.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that, as the offsetting economies had not yet been identified, he was naturally reluctant to take them into account. Moreover, even if the budgetary cost of the scheme could be said to amount initially to no more than £14 millions, he would still be concerned at the strain it would impose on the balance of payments of the United Kingdom. It was not possible to estimate with precision what proportion of this additional money would in fact be spent outside the United Kingdom. In a sense, however, these were points of minor difficulty. His main concern was with the mounting cost of public expenditure as a whole and, within that, the rise in expenditure overseas. On several recent occasions he had felt obliged to draw the attention of his colleagues to the great danger which this represented to Government policy as a whole. He considered it his duty, as Chancellor, to warn the Cabinet that no fresh commitment involving expenditure should be undertaken at the present time unless it could be matched by a firm assurance that the cost could be offset by savings in other directions. He felt very strongly that the time was not far distant when the Government would have to consider seriously some major reduction in their oversea commitments. He doubted, for example, whether the country would be able for long to carry the existing burden of military expenditure both in Germany and in South-East Asia.

The Colonial Secretary said that, although this was not susceptible of precise statistical calculation, he was confident that the great bulk of the “expatriate”

\(^{1}\) See previous document.
allowances would be spent in this country and that the scheme would not impose a significant strain on the balance of payments of the United Kingdom. On the main question, while he respected the Chancellor's anxieties, he was convinced that without some scheme of this kind it would be impossible to maintain an efficient administration in the dependent territories for which we were still responsible. All recent experience confirmed the view that, unless something of this kind were done, an increasing number of expatriate officers would feel compelled to look for alternative careers elsewhere. In that event the administrative structure in territories emerging towards independence would be undermined.

Discussion showed that there was general agreement in the Cabinet that in present circumstances high priority must be given to the maintenance of an efficient system of administration in Colonies advancing towards independence. In recent experience in Africa and in Asia there was ample evidence that, without this, the structure of society in emergent countries could easily collapse. This could imply, not merely a failure of our Colonial policy, but serious damage to our investment in those countries—which would impose a much more serious strain on our balance of payments. Action on the lines now recommended would also help to re-establish confidence among the European residents in East Africa. For these reasons there was general agreement that the course recommended by the Commonwealth Secretary and the Colonial Secretary was one which ought to be taken, even though it carried with it an obligation to seek offsetting savings in other parts of the Colonial Office Vote or in other sections of our oversea expenditure as a whole.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he did not dissent from the view that high priority should be given to the measures necessary to preserve efficient administration in overseas territories dependent on the United Kingdom. He had however thought it right to warn the Cabinet that, in view of the balance of payments prospects, additional expenditure for this desirable purpose ought not to be allowed to increase the net total of our oversea expenditure.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Approved the proposals outlined in C. (60) 116, subject to the modification that Colonial Governments should continue to bear one-half of the cost of passages of expatriate officers in the Oversea Service.

(2) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to announce, in general terms, before Parliament rose for the summer recess, that the Government proposed to transfer to the United Kingdom Exchequer the “expatriate” element in the pay and allowances of members of the Oversea Civil Service.

(3) Invited the Colonial Secretary to consider how far the cost of this new policy could be offset by savings in other parts of the Colonial Office Vote.

87 CO 1017/771, no 171 31 Aug 1960
'Service with overseas governments': CO circular letter (from W L Gorell Barnes) to all governors. Minutes by Sir H Poynton and Mr Macleod (nos 205 & 297) [Extract]

There comes to you by this mail a despatch from the Secretary of State enclosing a draft memorandum which would form the basis of a White Paper about the future of...
the Overseas Service. (To describe it formally as a draft White Paper would be a breach of Parliamentary privilege). As you will see, this despatch seeks the comments of your Government and of Staff Associations on the scheme before it is settled and a White Paper laid before Parliament. We are grateful for the care with which Governors have examined our proposals sent to you under cover of Poynton’s letter of the 11th July and for the very large number of constructive comments and criticisms which they made. We have examined them all with great care and taken them into account in recasting our scheme. . . .

3. The replies have generally, indeed with only one exception, welcomed the scheme and we are very grateful for the terms in which Governors have expressed this. One or two Governors, particularly in West Africa, have regretted that it comes so late in the day, as indeed it does for West African territories in particular. As I think you know, we here share this regret that our many attempts in the past to obtain major schemes for the help of the Service failed to get Cabinet approval. Some other Governors felt that some of the scheme was hardly applicable to their own local circumstances. West Indian Governors felt indeed that their circumstances were so different that the scheme might not be acceptable to their Ministers. We are therefore only putting it to the West Indian territories very tentatively, by separate despatch. Indeed, the replies of many Governors show how extremely difficult it is to try and cover in one scheme local circumstances which vary so very widely. We feel, however, and I think the replies bear this out, that there is something in the scheme which is of value to practically every territory and that the moral to be drawn is that it should be made as flexible as possible. As you will see from the draft memorandum, we have made it a good deal more flexible and specifically state that we are not tied to its details but that within its general framework we are ready to discuss with any Government which wishes to take advantage of it how its principles can be adapted to the circumstances of that territory. This would include the possibility of adaptation to those territories where there is at present no form of inducement or expatriation pay, though we would not like to be committed at this stage to the extent or form of any such adaptation. I hope Governors will feel that we have done this appropriately. It is obvious that there will need to be quite detailed discussions with a number of territories about its precise working out and application to them. . . .

Minutes on 87

We have now been able to get out to Colonial Governments the first draft of a White Paper on the future of HMOCs. The initial semi-official replies from the Governors to our proposals have been almost unanimously in favour though there is still some hankering after a unified Commonwealth service accompanied by remarks on the lines that while the Governor concerned appreciates the force of the arguments against it the difficulties are not insuperable—but making no suggestions as to how those difficulties should in fact be overcome. Only one Governor (Sir W. Goode of North Borneo) poured cold water on the scheme saying that it was not only too late but much too little. Lord Hailes and the Governors of The West Indies feel on the whole that the scheme is not appropriate to conditions in The West Indies. In general, however, I think we can say that the scheme has had a good reception, though a number of Governors have raised points of detail which are being gone
into. In addition to the official circular despatch and draft memorandum, a copy of which I attach, we have sent a semi-official letter mopping up a number of points made by various Governors.

The scope of the draft memorandum is best summarised by listing the subheads:

- The existing arrangements for HMOCS
- The Problem
- The New Arrangements
- Compensation
- Procedure and Cost
- The resettlement of Overseas Officers
- The Development of local Public Services.
- Future Oversea Recruitment. . . .

This is a fine piece of work. I have no detailed comment now, but would like to see before it is finally prepared for laying before Parliament.¹

I.M.
9.9.60

---

¹ The final version referred not to ‘members of Her Majesty’s Service’ but to ‘members of a common Service under Her Majesty the Queen’ (para 10). This was in response to representations from Sir P Renison (Kenya) that staff associations were upset by omission of any reference in the draft to serving the Queen personally, whether before or after independence; the change was necessary to retain ‘for the future, all the good chaps whom we so tremendously need unless you succeed in getting this right’ (no 276, 30 Sept 1960).

---

88  DO 35/10457, no 1  25 June 1958

[CO/CRO liaison in approaches to independence]: letter from Sir G Laithwaite (CRO) to Sir J Macpherson (CO). Minutes by Mr Alport, Lord Home and Sir G Laithwaite

When we talked today about Nigeria, you asked me whether I was satisfied about liaison and I said that I had heard no particular complaint about that and I thought, in fact, that relations between the two Departments were very good.

But I promised to have a word with Snelling and the people who are handling Nigerian affairs and see if there was any suggestion that I could privately make to you.

Snelling confirms that there is good liaison and a very friendly personal relation, and that is obviously most valuable.

But he also makes a point which has, I think, got something in it. While we receive major despatches, etc., he says that he does feel that we are rather in the dark about day-to-day handling of decisions that could have a post-Independence importance, and I can quite see that this could be the case.

I am not quite sure what the right answer is to this sort of problem. We worked extraordinarily closely together in the latter stages of the Malayan experiment, but it would have been helpful to us here if that very close process of collaboration had
started even earlier. As you know, though I hope I may be wrong, I continue, in the light of my own past experience, to be obsessed by the fear that we shall be driven to accept Nigerian independence in April, 1960 (when she will be still more unready for it than she would be even at the end of 1960), and that, of course, has a very close bearing on the contingent arrangements we are always thinking about here—staff, etc.

Would there be anything to be said for some sort of small joint C.R.O./C.O. Working Party on Nigeria? I would undertake that our representatives on it would not butt in on what was your business. It would, I am certain, be very educative for us here and there are aspects which never occur to one unless one is testing a problem from a specific C.R.O. point of view which could be identified in an arrangement such as this and over which we could perhaps be of some assistance. The sort of topics we have in mind would not only be just political ones of the West Africa Department, but also things falling within the purview of the Colonial Services and Economic Policy Department.

I know that you are just off and that you will not want to give an answer to this before you go. But would you, with your usual kindness, brood over it and we might have a talk about it after you get back?

Minutes on 88

S of S
I think that the emergence of Nigeria to independent status will produce far more difficult problems for our department than in the case of Ghana or Malaya. I suggest that it is of great importance that we should be clearly associated as active partners (behind the scenes) with all that goes on in the future—perhaps even at Ministerial level.

C.J.M.A.
26.6.58

Sir G Laithwaite
Had I better send a note to Colonial Secretary or will your note to Sir J. Macpherson do the trick?

H.
27.6.58

I’d prefer to deal with Macpherson first. CPC ensures ministers are brought in on important developments.

G.L.
30.6.58

89 DO 35/10457, no 5 23 July 1959
‘CRO/CO liaison on Nigeria’: minute by M E Allen (CRO) on meeting between officials

Mr. Snelling and I went to the Colonial Office on 22nd July for a first meeting with Mr. Eastwood and other officials.
2. The Colonial Office were, as was of course to be expected, very friendly and helpful, and were entirely at one with us in the desire to make Nigeria's transition from Colonial status to independence as smooth as possible and as free of complications for the future as possible. They accepted that it was primarily the Colonial Office's responsibility, until Independence, to ensure that their own "subject departments" did not lay up difficulties for us in the future by e.g. making vague promises of financial aid to Nigeria, as had been done in the case of Malaya; they also agreed that it was primarily the Colonial Office's responsibility to stop other Departments like the Treasury or the War Office from laying up trouble for us after Independence, and to see that other departments cleared up situations such as the liquidation of War Office assets which might otherwise bedevil relations after we had taken over.

3. We for our part undertook to encourage our own subject departments, especially the Economic Division, to keep in touch with their opposite numbers in the Colonial Office as a double check.

4. Before the meeting we had written to the Colonial Office to say that we could not necessarily accept their view that, at the resumed Constitutional Conference with Nigerian representatives at the end of September, the C.R.O. should be content to have only an observer, who would not have the right to speak, on the U.K. Delegation. The Colonial Office did not commit themselves on this, since they would in any case wish to consult the Colonial Secretary. They suggested that the point might not in practice be of much substance since the Colonial Secretary himself would probably do nearly all the talking at the Conference. This question was therefore left for further consideration.

5. The Colonial Office have sent us copies of draft briefs for the resumed Constitutional Conference, and will welcome our comments on them. They will also welcome us at the small Departmental Working Parties which have been set up to examine various questions which may come up at the Conference, e.g. on U.K. defence requirements in Nigeria and on constitutional drafting points such as the position of the Queen in provincial legislatures.

6. We then went through a list of matters that had occurred to us in the C.R.O. on the basis of Ghanaian and Malayan experience as deserving attention. Sir G. Laithwaite will probably not wish to be burdened with details of all of these. The most important one was our concern at the slow pace of Africanisation of the Public Service in Northern Nigeria. Mr. Snelling expressed grave apprehension lest there might be a breakdown of the Administration in Nigeria shortly after Independence, and urged that, in addition to the Martin proposals designed to encourage expatriates to stay on, the Northern Nigerian Administration ought to accelerate their schemes for bringing Africans into the Public Service even if their educational and other qualifications were not up to normal standard. The Colonial Office said they were well aware of this situation, and that in fact the Northern Nigerian Administration had already started to do this very thing. They admitted, however, that it was most unlikely that by Independence the Northern Nigeria Administration would have been Africanised to a point at which we need no longer fear a disruption. We shall clearly have to keep stimulating the Colonial Office about this.

7. We also, with Ghanaian experience in mind, said to the Colonial Office that we doubted whether it was worth giving Nigeria a rigid Constitution containing a great many entrenched clauses; we thought that it became a goal of African politicians to
alter rigid Constitutions, since they appeared to be a limit on their independence. The Colonial Office pointed out that it was the Nigerians themselves who were asking for entrenched clauses in the Nigerian Constitution, as a protection one against the other. This would have to be discussed further.

90  DO 35/7999, no 18  8 Oct 1959
'Suggested amalgamation of the CO and the CRO': minute by O R Blair (CRO)

Mr. Chadwick
The arguments against amalgamating the C.R.O. with the C.O. can be summarised thus:—
(a) The existence of a separate office is living proof of the importance which the United Kingdom attaches to the Commonwealth connection.
(b) An amalgamation would be unwelcome to Commonwealth governments. Few are entirely free from eagerness to express their absolute independence at slight provocation, and in new members such as Ghana their victory in the so-called struggle for independence is usually described as “freedom from Colonial Office rule”. Existing members would tend to shun the amalgamated office and increasingly deal direct with the Foreign Office; this would blur and finally vitiate the principle that relations between Commonwealth countries are different in kind to those between foreign countries. (At flag A is a record of a hostile South African reaction to a proposed amalgamation, and at B of a hostile New Zealand reaction.)
(c) For the same reason emergent colonies might prefer to emerge into demonstrably complete independence—outside the Commonwealth.
(d) This confusion in overseas territories about the functions of an amalgamated office would be matched by increased public vagueness at home on the status and independence of such territories. On the other hand, foreign anti-colonial powers would not lose their prey through a mere change of name; and to try to baffle them by adding an organic change not only involves the pretence that our relations with Member countries are the same as with colonies or Commonwealth States, but threatens the Member countries with depreciation in the eyes of such foreign powers.
(e) The C.R.O. stands sentry for Member countries so that proposals affecting their interests may be challenged by its officials or in Cabinet. Where a Colonial policy raises such a conflict no Minister who was responsible for both Colonial and Commonwealth affairs could put the Commonwealth view as effectively as can an independent Commonwealth Secretary.
(f) The burden of ministerial responsibility for all Commonwealth territories would be too much for one man—indeed, the Colonial Office alone makes excessive demands on its head. Even if there were parallel offices under a Commonwealth and a Colonial Minister of State the head of the office would bear

1 The Canadian reaction was perhaps the most unfavourable, being suspicious of any hint of ‘old-fashioned colonialism’. India, Pakistan and Malaya were proud of their independence and wanted independent and non-independent members kept distinct. The government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, however, would welcome the disappearance of their ‘bogey’, the CO.
an inescapably heavy load, and would be expected to travel widely throughout all Commonwealth territories.

(g) Merger with the C.O. would (unless merely titular) so dilute the staff of the C.R.O. that its traditions and techniques might suffer. The C.O. is not much larger in total staff (it has only 14 more Administrative Officers in the 1959 Civil Service List), but its officers have not been recruited for or trained in the task of Commonwealth relations and many may be quite unsuitable for it. It has already been found that few are prepared to serve overseas, and there is thus a danger that the London Office would become a repository for officers without first-hand experience of the Commonwealth or desire to acquire it.

(h) It is likely that the staff of the C.R.O. would have their career prospects harmed by an amalgamation. This would affect the morale, and thus the efficiency, of the office.

2. You asked me to look at the arguments against a merger of the C.R.O. with the F.O. For ease of reference I record that all the above arguments, suitably modified, have been, or could be, applied. Additional stress would be laid on the fact that Commonwealth relations are different in kind from foreign relations, that C.R.O. technique is less formal and more informative, that co-ordination with home departments is more important, and that our special role in constitutional problems has no F.O. parallel.

91 PREM 11/3378, M 37/60 [10 June] 1960
‘Future of the CRO’: memorandum by Mr Alport on amalgamation with CO. Minutes by Lord Home, Mr Macmillan, Mr Macleod (PM(60)60) and T J Bligh (PM’s Office) [Extract]

2. There are undoubted attractions in the idea that we should work for the eventual amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations Office with the Colonial Office and the establishment of some sort of Commonwealth Service. I am very doubtful whether, if such an amalgamation took place, independent Commonwealth Governments, old and new, would be prepared to allow our diplomatic relations with them to be conducted by an Office which was also responsible for administering the substantial territories which will remain directly dependent for some time to come upon the United Kingdom. The Canadians, for instance, have occasionally indicated that they would like their affairs to be transferred to the Foreign Office. If this happened all the others would follow suit. The effect would be that the Commonwealth Relations Office as such would cease to exist and that all that would be left for a Commonwealth Relations Office amalgamated with the Colonial Office to handle, would be the residue of the dependencies which will remain in the Colonial sphere. . . .

4. If my forecast that an amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office would lead to a transfer of our present responsibilities to the Foreign Office, I believe the Commonwealth could lose its identity and concern with its special problems would make the Foreign Secretary’s burden almost
overwhelming. The only way in which this could be avoided would be to add to the immense responsibilities which the Prime Minister already carries. . . .

6. Whatever we may eventually decide, we cannot give effect to it without the agreement of the independent Commonwealth. As I have said, I do not think that they will easily accept an amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office. I believe that the elimination of the Commonwealth Relations Office with its present functions would be damaging to the cohesion of the Commonwealth and to British influence among its members. I feel sure that a reorganised and redesignated “Colonial Office” can play an important role in the future, particularly if it is equipped to organise administrative, technical and financial aid to the underdeveloped areas of the world. . . .

Minutes on 91

Prime Minister
The attached note, prepared by Mr. Alport, is a contribution to thought on a question which is being keenly debated at present. You will perhaps have seen the reference in the Economist to Mr. Alport’s speech at the Royal Commonwealth Society, which ends up by saying that it thinks that we must get down to tackling the obvious problems. It might well be thought therefore that the present is a good moment to launch some new thought on the subject.

The note is nonetheless sent to you for your consideration at leisure. I am not sending it at present further than you and Sir N. Brook as I don’t want to start a spate of ideas before you are ready.

H.
10.6.60.

There has certainly been a great deal of talk [see the opening sentence of the memo]—far too much of it by Mr Alport.

H.M.
11.6.60

Prime Minister
When I left the Office on Friday I had a parish of some 75 million souls but on coming back to the Office this morning I find my parish has dwindled to about 40 million.

It does not of course follow from this that the work of the Colonial Office has diminished by half over the weekend: indeed, in many respects I think 1961 will be the busiest year in our history. But at least two more large areas, Tanganyika and the West Indies, are likely to become independent by 1962, and the unfolding of events is having a very disturbing effect on the staff of the Department who wonder where their future lies. Many of the younger people here have virtually no prospects of promotion within the Colonial Office if it were to remain a separate and dwindling Department. I am worried too about the future of the many professional Advisers whose sphere of activity is also progressively dwindling but whose services could be of the greatest value to the newly independent countries if there were some way of making these services available without importing the continued association of Colonial status.
The Select Committee on Estimates has recommended a merger between the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office. This is but one of a number of recommendations in their Report. The other recommendations can all be dealt with fairly easily through the normal routine of consultation. The recommendation for a merger of the two Offices clearly raises issues of the highest policy and I hope that it will be possible for you to arrange a talk with the Commonwealth Secretary and myself in the very near future so that we may consider our attitude towards this recommendation and the question of any inter-departmental machinery that may be needed to follow it up. . . .

I.M.
3.10.60

Prime Minister

(1) **Main recommendations of the Select Committee:**

(a) The Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office should be merged on the lines of a tripartite organisation as below:—
   (i) the political side dealing with independent Commonwealth countries;
   (ii) the “responsible” side for dealing with the dependent territories;
   (iii) a functional side dealing with technical aid, social services, advice, etc., for independent and dependent territories alike.
This should be done at once. The new Department should be known as the Commonwealth Office with one Secretary of State and three or more Departmental Ministers.
(b) The Colonial Office should revise its recruiting methods for overseas Civil Service appointments, being more radical and energetic in recruiting locally and from other Commonwealth Countries.
(c) An urgent and comprehensive examination of the organisation and terms of service of the overseas Civil Service should be undertaken.
(d) A Committee of Enquiry should be set up to consider the establishment of a Commonwealth Advisory and Technical Service.

There are a number of other recommendations on the need to make better estimates and so on.

(2) **Arguments for and against a merger**

**Against:**

(a) The two Offices have different functions;
(b) In some fields a merger between the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office would be more appropriate;
(c) There would be too much work for one Secretary of State;
(d) The merger would be unacceptable to many independent Commonwealth countries.

**For:**

(a) There would be a net economy;
(b) It would assure the future of the Colonial Office staff;
(c) The Commonwealth Relations Office would gain correspondingly;
(d) Functions of the two Departments have close affinities;
(e) There are disadvantages in the term “Colonial Office”;
(f) Transition of dependent territories to independence would help in many ways, especially economic and technical;
(g) There could be unified representation of all Commonwealth countries in the international economic field.

The Committee did not appear to consider the possibility of a merger between the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office for which arguments are sometimes put forward—for example, the Canadians have suggested that all their useful contacts are with the Foreign Office and Foreign Office people. They think we would be much better off with a Department of External Affairs dealing with the independent Commonwealth countries and foreign countries; and a Commonwealth Office to deal with the dependent territories.

T.J.B.
14.10.60

92 PREM 11/3378, PMM(UK)(61)40 2 Mar 1961
‘Department of Technical Co-operation’: Cabinet Office briefing for Mr Macmillan on its setting up

[Late in 1960 it was noted in the CO that the US administration was streamlining its organisation of technical overseas assistance, and Macleod agreed it was important Britain should not lag behind the Americans in a matter of such obvious Commonwealth importance (Sir H Poynton to Sir A Clutterbuck, 14 Dec 1960). Macmillan believed a permanent technical department should be created, but regarded a merger between the CO and CRO as premature (M 380/60, 4 Nov 1960). Sir N Brook chaired the committee which set up the new department; his conviction was that aid to an overseas country could be an important aspect of relations with it (minute, 6 Feb 1961). The Cabinet decision was taken on 7 Feb 1961 (see document no 346 in Pt II). Sir Andrew Cohen (head of CO African department, 1947–1951, gov of Uganda, 1952–1957, permanent UK representative at UN Trusteeship Council, 1957–1961) wanted to be the permanent head, and this was acceptable. Consultation with the Commonwealth was essential because of the sensitivity of new Afro-Asian members—and especially perhaps Nigeria—to accepting British technical aid after independence. The reaction of the prime minister of Nigeria in fact proved to be neutral; Malaya raised no objection, and Nkrumah was uncharacteristically silent.]

Ministers have decided that Commonwealth Prime Ministers should be informed of the decision to set up a new Department of Technical Co-operation before any public announcement is made. It would be helpful if a sentence welcoming this decision could be included in the final communiqué of the Commonwealth Meeting.

2. The intention is to set up a central department to co-ordinate and direct the work of all United Kingdom agencies concerned in the provision of technical assistance to countries overseas, irrespective of their constitutional status. The Department will be concerned, not only with the provision of experts and advisers and the supply of equipment, but also with educational work e.g. the training of students and the provision of teachers. The Department will be called the Department of Technical Co-operation. It will be under the charge of a Minister, with the status of a Minister of State, who will be responsible for initiating proposals for technical assistance within the limits of policy laid down by the Secretaries of State in charge of the three Oversea Departments.

3. The new Department will bring together, under single direction, the work on
technical assistance which is now being done separately in the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office. It will also take over a small amount of work of this kind which is now being done by the Ministry of Labour. It will thus be able to provide a new central focus, and a fresh impetus and direction, for all the United Kingdom effort to provide assistance to countries overseas. It will account for its expenditure on its own Vote.

4. There is reason to think that some Commonwealth countries which have recently attained independence may have misgivings about an arrangement by which this new Department will be concerned with assistance to dependent territories—and especially perhaps about the proposal that it should take over the functions of the Colonial Office in respect of the Overseas Civil Service. These functions are the recruitment, terms of service, transfers and promotions of members of the Overseas Civil Service serving Governments of dependent territories; and the administration of the new Overseas Service Aid Scheme under which the United Kingdom Government will pay part of the cost of expatriate staff employed by overseas Governments. It has been suggested, for example, that the Opposition in Nigeria might make this the occasion to allege that our technical aid activities are tainted with “neo-colonialism” and are merely attempts to find employment for displaced Colonial officials.

5. Ministers decided that the best course would be to explain our intentions informally to one or two Prime Ministers separately before mentioning in plenary session the proposal to establish this new Department. The Prime Ministers of Malaya and Nigeria might be among those first to be sounded, since they are likely to be the most sensitive on the issue. In these discussions the following arguments might be put:—

(i) This is purely an organisational change within our domestic machinery in Whitehall. It is designed to enable us to co-ordinate and centralise our recruitment and other technical assistance activities which are at present dispersed over a number of Government Departments and other agencies. The objective is to give a better service to oversea countries and to enable us to satisfy their requests for technical assistance more quickly and more effectively.

(ii) In this country it will help to mark the importance which the Government attach to the provision of technical aid to less developed countries. It will also stimulate the interest and activities of unofficial agencies in this field.

(iii) Independent Commonwealth countries will have day to day contacts with the new Department. But broad questions of policy, including questions of capital aid, will continue to be dealt with by the Commonwealth Relations Office.

(iv) It is important that the new Department should handle the work of technical assistance to dependent, as well as independent, countries. We shall not secure maximum efficiency unless all this work is brought under single direction. And there is much knowledge and expertise which we have developed in relation to dependent territories which can be made available to independent countries, as desired, with great advantage to them.

(v) This does not mean that the new Department will be tainted with “Colonialism”. On the contrary, a main purpose of this organisational change is to separate these technical services from the Colonial Office.

(vi) In particular it should be easier under the new arrangements for newly-independent Commonwealth countries to accept the Overseas Service Aid Scheme
without risk of any “taint” of colonialism, since it will be administered by the new Department and not by the Colonial Office as at present.

(vii) It is not intended to make any change in the duties or responsibilities of the British Council or the Crown Agents.

(viii) This is not a preliminary to amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office. Indeed, it can be said that the creation of this new Department will meet one of the main practical arguments for such an amalgamation.

6. If after these arguments have been deployed there still appears to be anxiety on the ground that the new Department will be too closely associated with dependent territories and ex-Colonial servants, we could agree to make the following adjustment in the plan. It could be arranged that the Colonial Secretary would retain his existing responsibility for the transfer, promotion and discipline of members of the Overseas Civil Service in dependent territories, but would use the new Department as his agent for the recruitment of staff. The cost of the White Paper scheme in respect of staff serving in dependent territories would continue to be borne on the Colonial Office Vote.

7. Timing. It is important that the public announcement about the new Department should be made before 20th March, when a White Paper on our technical assistance activities generally is to be issued in which there is a reference to the decision to set up the new Department. We might therefore aim to make an announcement on, say, 14th March, and include a passage in the final communiqué of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting to be issued on 17th March. Legislation will be necessary, and a Bill should be introduced into the House before Easter and given a Second Reading after the Easter recess. It is proposed that the Department should start operation on 1st July.

93 PREM 11/3378, M 228/61 12 July 1961

[Responsibilities of the new office of Secretary for Technical Co-operation]: minute from Mr Macmillan to Mr Vosper1

On your assumption of office as the first Secretary of this new Department of Technical Co-operation, I should like you to know how I see the job which you are undertaking.2

2. You will be taking over a number of existing activities of technical assistance from the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office. You will also be taking over the work which the Ministry of Labour have been doing on the technical assistance activities of the United Nations.

3. Your general task will be to co-ordinate and develop the arrangements for providing technical assistance to Commonwealth countries, both dependent and independent, and also to foreign countries, as may be required. In this and other respects you will operate within the general policies of the three Secretaries of State. It will be

---

1 D F Vosper, MP, formerly minister of state at Home Office; leader of parliamentary delegation to West Indies in 1958; subsequently Lord Runcorn.
2 For the Cabinet conclusions on establishment of the office, see document no 346 in Part II.
your responsibility to consult closely with them especially on the political aspects of
your technical assistance activities in countries within their spheres of responsibility,
including questions of priorities as between countries receiving technical assistance
from us, and to act in agreement with them on these matters. You will of course be
concerned with policy relating to the broad field of technical assistance.

4. I expect you will find it profitable to encourage people in industry and
commerce, the professions, the universities and other sectors of our national life to
undertake a period of service overseas, and to seek to establish arrangements
whereby employers can be encouraged to release their staff for this purpose.

5. I attach some importance to the development of technical assistance on a
multilateral basis, especially within the Commonwealth. It will, I hope, be part of
your concern to see whether further arrangements are needed whereby help can be
channelled directly between Commonwealth countries.

6. The Select Committee on Estimates, in its Fourth Report, Session 1959/60,
developed certain ideas about the establishment of what it called a Commonwealth
Advisory and Technical Service, and recommended that the possibilities should be
fully investigated. It will be a function of your Department to make the appropriate
study.

7. This, of course, will find its place alongside your general responsibility for the
manning of the Oversea Civil Service. In this connection you will have noted that
there has been excluded from your concern for the Oversea Civil Service questions of
promotion, transfer and discipline in dependent territories, which are reserved to the
Colonial Secretary.

8. You are not, of course, inhibited from sponsoring new developments within
the general range of what is recognised as technical assistance and co-operation. It
will be open to you to shape these as may seem desirable, in consultation with the
appropriate oversea Department and other existing institutions. By these I mean not
merely other Departments of Government, but also organisations on the margin of
Government, such as the British Council.

---

94 PREM 11/3814 26 Jan 1962
[Possible transfer to CRO of responsibility for Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland]: minute by Sir N Brook to T J Bligh

In your letter of 23rd January you asked whether legislation would be required to
transfer from the Colonial Secretary to the Commonwealth Secretary the
responsibility for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. You also asked how long it
would take to make such a transfer.

2. This transfer could be made without legislation and, indeed, without any for-
mal legal instrument. For the Office of Secretary of State is, in constitutional theory,
one and indivisible; and any Secretary of State can exercise any of the powers of any
other Secretary of State. The transfer could therefore be made by a simple decision of
the Prime Minister, announced in Parliament—as was in fact done when responsibil-
ity for the High Commission Territories was recently transferred the other way.

I have ascertained that there are a few Orders in Council relating to the Federation
(drafted by the Colonial Office, not by Parliamentary Counsel) in which the expression
“Secretary of State” has been defined as meaning “the person holding office for the time being as Secretary of State for the Colonies”. These references would need to be corrected by an amending Order in Council; but this can be done at leisure. I cannot discover, without enquiry through the Colonial Office, whether any legislation in the two Territories themselves would require amendment. If this were necessary, there would be political difficulty in getting the amending legislation through.

3. The time required to complete the transfer need not be very great. In London, it would be a matter of transferring some staff and records from one Department to the other. In Africa, it would be mainly a question of changing cyphers, re-routing communications, etc.

4. You did not ask for my comments on the merits of such a transfer. For the trans- action of business in Whitehall, it would be a tremendous advantage to have undivided Ministerial responsibility for all three Territories. I need not enlarge on that. On the other hand, the political difficulties would be considerable. For example:—

(a) The preamble to the Constitution of the Federation incorporates our undertaking that “Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue, under the special protection of Her Majesty, to enjoy separate Governments for so long as their respective peoples so desire”. It is true, no doubt, that the obligation to safeguard the interests of the African territories is one which rests on the Government as a whole; but there is no doubt that African leaders in those territories, and their supporters in our Parliament here, look especially to the Colonial Secretary and his Department to see that that obligation is fulfilled. If it were transferred to the Commonwealth Secretary, this would certainly be read as an indication that we were shifting the balance of our sympathies in favour of the European interests in the Federation.

(b) The transfer would certainly be distrusted by officials in the two northern territories. The reactions of the Governors are unpredictable. At least one of them might well resign.

(c) Apart from disquiet at the political implications of the transfer, members of the Colonial Service serving in these territories would also be concerned about the effect on their status and careers. For example, could they preserve their existing opportunities for transfer to other Colonies?

(d) The Commonwealth Relations Office is not equipped to handle the direct administration of dependent territories. To give them this responsibility now in respect of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will not look consistent with the recent decision to relieve them of the responsibility for the High Commission Territories.

---


[Proposed new ministerial responsibilities for the Central African Federation]: letter from Mr Macmillan to HM The Queen

[Brook believed the Central African problem was straining the Cabinet system, and he urged the prime minister to put a single minister in charge, but not one from the CRO (‘this is not the moment at which to shake the confidence of Africans, or their sponsors in this country’). He recommended Butler, who should be regarded as ‘fairly impartial as between Africans and Europeans’: sympathetic to the latter as settlers, yet known as ‘the holder of liberal opinions’ (Brook to Macmillan, 1 Mar 1962). At a meeting between Brook, the prime minister, the chief whip, and T J Bligh on 7 Mar it was agreed Butler...]


would be best: he was very senior, had the ‘necessary art and skill’, would be acceptable to Welensky and probably African leaders. Alternatively there was Thorneycroft, but he could not be aviation minister as well; John Hare (minister of labour) was also thought very suitable. Macmillan saw the two existing ministers on 5 Mar. It was clear Home wanted to be relieved of responsibility for the Federation, but Maudling was less keen about giving up his two colonies, despite the obvious anxiety they caused him. In writing to Maudling on 9 Mar, Macmillan explained that the change was no reflection on his handling of matters, ‘but the division of responsibility between two Ministers inevitably threw a great burden on me personally. The world, alas, is too unquiet to enable me to devote all my attention to this particular problem, important though it is’.]

Madam

Mr. Macmillan with his humble duty to The Queen.

As Your Majesty knows, I have for some time been concerned with the difficulties thrown up by having two Secretaries of State responsible for different aspects of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For it is only natural that the two Secretaries of State and their Departments should tend to take slightly opposing views of any particular problem. The Commonwealth Relations Office feel bound to argue for the European-dominated Federal Government. And the Colonial Office feel strongly their position as protectors of the people in the Northern Territories. It is quite right and natural that the Departments should feel like this. But it has meant that policy questions in regard to the Federation have been capable of resolution only by collective decisions of Ministers, and, moreover, decisions based not on a single channel of advice but on two.

The Lord Chancellor has in the past been a great help to me by taking the chair at small Ministerial meetings in order to resolve, as far as possible, differences between the two Secretaries of State and thus to bring before the Cabinet a considered and broadly agreed recommendation. But this application of the Cabinet Committee principle has not always led to a suitable solution. Nor does it help, for example, to settle such questions as who would be the right person to meet Dr. Banda, the leader of the majority party in Nyasaland, when he visits London a little later on. Should it be the Commonwealth Secretary, who might feel it right that, as the Minister responsible for the Federation, he should have the task of trying to persuade Dr. Banda not to press for a secession? Or should it be the Colonial Secretary who might feel that, since Nyasaland is still formally a British protectorate, the leader of the main political party should be seen by him?

One possibility which occurred to me was to put the responsibility for the Federation as a whole and the three Territories under the Commonwealth Secretary, but although this would have led to all the advantages of undivided Ministerial responsibility there would have been considerable political difficulties. In particular the African leaders in the Northern Territories and their supporters in this country look especially to the Colonial Secretary and his Department to see that our obligations to them under the preamble to the Constitution are fulfilled. A change to the Commonwealth Secretary would have been, quite mistakenly, read as an indication that we were shifting the balance of our sympathies towards the European interests in the Federation. And in addition the Commonwealth Relations Office was not of itself equipped to handle the direct administration of dependent territories.

I decided, therefore, that the right course would be to arrange for a third Minister to take over from both the Colonial Secretary and the Commonwealth Secretary all their existing responsibilities for the Federation. This transfer of functions can be made without any formal legal instrument provided the third Minister is a Secretary.
of State. As Your Majesty will know, any Secretary of State can exercise any of the powers of any other Secretary of State. The transfer can therefore be made by a simple administrative decision.

There is power to appoint eight Secretaries of State. At present there are only seven. It would have been possible, therefore, to have appointed an additional Secretary of State and transfer the Federation to him. But it would not be possible to appoint an additional Minister in the House of Commons since, under the Disqualification Act of 1957, the Administration is only allowed to have twenty seven Ministers in the House of Commons and this number is already in post.

I have been considering the possibility of transferring one of the Departments, for example, the Ministry of Aviation, to a Minister in the House of Lords thereby leaving a vacancy for the appointment of an additional Secretary of State in the House of Commons. But in the end I rejected this solution since it seemed to be wrong to create a Minister with the sole responsibility of looking after the interests of the Federation as I am not sure whether this would be a whole time job. It should not be a permanent one because if the affairs of the Federation are satisfactorily settled it will in a short time become independent and then be dealt with by the Commonwealth Relations Office in the ordinary way. I therefore concluded that it would be necessary to transfer the responsibilities for the Federation to an existing Secretary of State. It was clear that this had to be someone who was both senior to both the Commonwealth Secretary and the Colonial Secretary. The only person who met this point was the Home Secretary.

As Your Majesty will remember, when the Government changes were announced last October Mr. Butler was relieved of his duties as Leader of the House of Commons and Chairman of the Conservative Party in order to devote all his time to running the Home Office and to giving me special assistance over a wide range of public duties. It could therefore be represented that in taking over the responsibilities of the two Secretaries of State Mr. Butler was really acting on my behalf and doing something which, had I the time, I would have done myself. I have asked Mr. Butler whether he would be prepared to take on the new job and he has agreed to do so.

I have it in mind to make a Statement in the House of Commons on Thursday, March 15 and to bring the new arrangement into operation on Monday, March 19.

I would like formally to recommend to Your Majesty this change in the Administration. I would propose to send personal messages in advance of my Statement to the Governor-General, Sir Roy Welensky and Sir Edgar Whitehead; and cause appropriate messages to be sent to Lord Alport,1 the Governors of the Northern Territories and the Federal High Commissioner in London.

I thought it would be right to set this out in a formal submission so that, should Your Majesty wish to discuss it with me, the Audience tomorrow, Tuesday, March 13, would be a suitable opportunity.2

With my humble duty,
I remain,
Your Majesty’s faithful and devoted servant,
Harold Macmillan

1 Formerly C J M Alport, who left the CRO in 1961 to become high commissioner to the Federation.
2 The Cabinet decision was taken on 13 Mar: CAB 128/36/1, CC 21(62)1. The parliamentary Statement was made on 15 Mar: H of C Debs, vol 655, cols 1545–1547.
This came as a very great shock and I must tell you that I, and all my immediate
advisers, regard this decision as most unfortunate and feel that, coming at this time,
it cannot fail to revive deep suspicion of H.M.G.'s intentions for Northern Rhodesia.

2. The consequences may prove unwelcome. I fear adverse effects, both on the
plan for a smooth introduction of the new territorial constitution with the co-
operation of all political parties and on the prospects for a Federal settlement.

3. Africans in Northern Rhodesia have always regarded the Colonial Office as the
special guardian of their welfare and the guarantor of their political advance. My
predecessor and I have both stressed on earlier occasions when the amalgamation of
the Central African Departments of the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations
Offices has been rumoured that the projected removal of Northern Rhodesia affairs
from the wing of the Secretary of State for the Colonies was bound to arouse the
fears of Africans and be looked upon as a sign that H.M.G. discounted their special
rights as protected persons.

4. I regard the decision as a very considerable blow to our relations generally
with the African people, and coming at a moment when the African political parties
and Barotseland have still not finally committed themselves to participate under the
new Constitution, I fear it may tip the balance against our winning their co-
operation. Unless the suspicions that will inevitably be aroused can be allayed, the
announcement may provoke anew the risk of serious disorders in the territory.

5. You invite suggestions as to points which might be made in presentation of
the decision in order to help local understanding of it and acceptance of the change
of responsibilities.

6. I hope that it will be possible to avoid over-emphasising that H.M.G.'s purpose
is to secure centralised direction of policy while the future of Federation is worked
out. H.M.G. must not (repeat not) appear to be regarding the federation as a unit
whose component parts may be disposed and reordered as will best serve the federal
concept, and without regard to their individual interests, wishes or integrity. The
separatist tendencies current in each of the three territories gained strength
precisely because of the over-centralised nature of our federal association and the
repeated and contemptuous disregard in Salisbury and, it is suspected, in London, of
the feelings of the constituent territories. The greatest care will be needed to counter
any impression that H.M.G.'s move buttresses the unitary concept of federation and
represents a “victory” for the Federal Government.

7. Secondly, I consider it necessary to nail from the start any suspicion that
H.M.G.'s move presages, as has already been strongly hinted, a last desperate attempt
to preserve a federal association by the dismemberment of Northern Rhodesia.

8. I therefore urge most strongly that the Prime Minister's statement should

(a) state positively that H.M.G. is determined to preserve the integrity of the
member states of the federation and will not countenance any plan for the future
of Central Africa which involves the dismemberment of Northern Rhodesia;
(b) Stress that H.M.G. will continue to regard herself as directly responsible for each of the three territories and that the new Secretary of State will retain an individual concern for the affairs of the two Protectorates;
(c) Make the point that each of the four Governments will continue to enjoy equal access to H.M.G. individually, the Federal and Southern Rhodesia Governments through High Commissioner, and the Protectorates through their own Governors respectively;
(d) Reaffirm that the recently announced Constitution of Northern Rhodesia represents H.M.G.’s definitive decision for next stage of constitutional advance in this territory and is not affected by the transfer of responsibility to the Home Secretary.

9. If it were possible for you to give me a personal message from yourself emphasising these four points from the Prime Minister’s statement, together with authority to broadcast it in your name to the people of Northern Rhodesia immediately after H.M.G.’s announcement becomes public here, I think that might also be of some help.

10. I am grateful to you and Lord Perth for personal message in your paragraph 4. It goes without saying that I most deeply regret this unexpected end to our close, and I believe successful, association.

Minute on 96

Although we know from experience that the governor is rather hysterical, it is important to meet his main points in text of statement and for supplementaries. How far can the 4 points in para 8 be met? Certainly (b)(c) & (d); not (I think) (a).\(^1\) H.M. 15.3.62

\(^1\) Bligh arranged for a few drafting amendments to be made.

97 PREM 11/4117 19 June 1962

[Conversion of Colonial Policy Committee into an Oversea Policy Committee]: recommendation from Sir N Brook to Mr Macmillan

I should like to recommend that the Colonial Policy Committee should now be converted into an Oversea Policy Committee with rather wider terms of reference.

For some time past the Committee has been concerned mainly with problems of constitutional development in dependent territories which are in the concluding phases of advance towards independence. While these are in a sense problems of Colonial policy, the decisions taken on them determine the future pattern of the independent Commonwealth and increasingly touch on broader questions of international relations. It is, for example, difficult in present circumstances to consider our Colonial policy in Africa without having regard to our policy in the United Nations and our relations with the Afro-Asian group and with the other European countries who still have interests in Africa. And, as we have recently seen, the Colonial problems of the Caribbean impinge directly on our relations with the United States.
I therefore propose that the Colonial Policy Committee should be abolished and that in its place we should set up an Oversea Policy Committee with the following terms of reference:—

To consider questions of oversea policy (other than defence policy) which concern more than one of the oversea Departments.

I have ascertained that the Foreign Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the Colonial Secretary would agree to this change.

If the new Ministerial Committee is established I would propose at the same time to establish a new Official Committee to be called the Oversea Policy (Official) Committee with correspondingly broad terms of reference. The existing Africa (Official) Committee would then be abolished.

If you agree with these proposals I will arrange for them to be put into effect.¹

¹ Macmillan minuted: 'I agree. H.M. 20.6.62'.

98 PREM 11/3816 5–6 Dec 1962
[Possible merger of CO and CRO]: minutes by P de Zulueta (PM’s Office) and Mr Macmillan

Prime Minister
The Chief Clerk at the Foreign Office has asked me to find out informally whether you had anything specific in mind when on November 22 in answer to Mr. Healey and Mr. Gaitskell¹ you spoke in terms of possibly amalgamating the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office.² The reason for the Chief Clerk’s enquiry is that the Plowden Committee³ have reached a tentative recommendation that the right amalgamation is between the two “diplomatic” departments namely the C.R.O. and the Foreign Office, rather than between the two “Commonwealth” departments. This is because the C.R.O. and the Foreign Office perform practically the same functions whereas the Colonial Office are engaged in the different task of administration.

May I tell Sir Francis Rundall⁴ that your observations were obiter?

P. de Z.
5.12.62

NO. I think the Plowden Ctee are on the wrong track—altogether. I should oppose strongly merging Commonwealth with F.O. Politically, it wd. be worse for us than the Common Market.

H.M.
6.12.62

² The prime minister said there was ‘a good deal to be said’ for amalgamation of CO and CRO: they now worked closer together, separate, but under a single minister: ‘I think this tentative movement towards getting the two offices together is a good experiment’ (22 Nov 1962, H of C Debs, vol 667, cols 1403–1405).
³ Lord Plowden, chairman of committee of inquiry into Treasury control of public expenditure, 1959–1961. Plowden recommended tentatively the amalgamation of CRO and FO, as the ‘diplomatic’ departments, different from the CO’s task of administration.
⁴ Deputy under-secretary of state at FO since 1959.
Many thanks for sending me a copy of your article for *The Times* on “The Future of the Colonial Office”. As you imply in your letter it takes a very different line from what I have consistently advocated ever since I succeeded Jock Macpherson in this post; and indeed lays particular emphasis on one or two of what I might term the standard C.R.O. theses which I have been at pains to try and knock down. I had hoped that I was now near to my goal of bringing an amalgamation of the Colonial Office with the C.R.O. Consequently I must confess that I find your article distinctly disconcerting, though I do not think it influences me to change my own beliefs.

In particular, I have been at considerable pains to try and remove the impression that the work of the Colonial Office is so different from that of the C.R.O. (or for that matter the Foreign Office) as has been frequently alleged, especially by successive past Heads of the C.R.O. like Liesching, Laithwaite or Clutterbuck, who always seemed anxious to keep the Colonial Office at arms length. Mercifully Joe Garner is much more sympathetic. I do suggest that the days when the Colonial Office was a direct administrative Department are long past. To give one example only, relations between the Colonial Office and Singapore are no less diplomatic than those between the C.R.O. and Kuala Lumpur. A very great deal of our work consists in negotiating with Colonial Ministers.

Then again, you suggest on page 4 that from the point of view of the dependent territories themselves it is not in their interests that British responsibilities for them should be in the hands of an organisation whose main emphasis necessarily lies on the separateness and independence of the countries with which it deals. You therefore appear to want to accentuate the distinction between independence and dependence. I, on the other hand, have always thought that it was right to play this distinction down, e.g. by allowing Colonial Governments to take part in Commonwealth conferences and so on. I can understand that the countries which are already independent might think that there was something derogatory in sharing a Secretary of State with the dependent territories. On the other hand I should have thought that from the point of view of the dependent territories it was rather an upgrading status to share the Secretary of State with the Commonwealth countries. In any case, there is already an enormous area of overlapping between the two Departments, particularly where you get dependent and independent territories in the same geographical region or where a particular dependent territory is progressing towards independence. Here I would say in passing that however much one may try to rule a line between those countries which can aspire to independence and those which cannot, the currency of sovereignty seems to get progressively devalued and we have already examples of dependent countries which only a few years ago we would have thought were totally incapable of independent sovereignty. I agree that the ultimate residual work of the Colonial Office will have a higher “administrative” quality and a lower “diplomatic” quality than at present, because obviously it is in respect of the bigger territories which are constitutionally more

---

advanced that the diplomatic element in our work predominates. Nevertheless, as our territorial responsibilities shrink, the size of the staff must shrink too. This process has been going on already for three years or more, during which I have had to find postings elsewhere in Whitehall for our own staff when and where I have been able to. While we are running the Office down to the size which may ultimately suffice to deal with the residual “rocks and islands” are we to dissipate throughout Whitehall all our redundant experience and first-hand knowledge of the territories which are graduating to independence within the Commonwealth? That would seem to me completely wasteful. But with no clearer future for the Office I can only play this run-down on a hand-to-mouth basis and the tendency is inevitably that I lose many of the best people first, because other Departments will only take the best. Obviously they would prefer to promote within rather than to take in an outsider.

Even if the residue of the Colonial Service were amalgamated with the residue of the Colonial Office as you suggest (and incidentally I don’t know quite what happens to the non-administrative branches of H.M.O.C.S.) I do not believe that even so one could make, on the basis of the smaller territories alone, a Department of sufficient political importance to warrant a separate Minister in the Cabinet. Nor would such a course do anything to allay the anxieties of the existing Colonial Office, who see little prospect of promotion in a shrinking Department and would, I know, be horrified at remaining land-locked in a sort of “rocks and islands” Department of the kind you envisage. But pooled with an expanding C.R.O. provided of course that the staff were willing to accept the liability for service abroad and were thought suitable for it, one can visualise an all-embracing Commonwealth Department with much wider facilities for staff postings, promotions etc; and the peculiar knowledge and experience of the Colonial Office staff could in that way continue to be utilised where it is most nearly appropriate i.e. in the C.R.O.

I am sorry to write at such length. None of this is yet settled Ministerial policy, but it is certainly my hope and ambition to bring this about before I retire and I shall continue to press this view which I personally believe to be the right one and which I know our own staff favour. I believe, too, that in the long run it will be more to the advantage of the smaller territories themselves to have a large Department of first class standing at the back of them in London rather than a thing of shreds and patches which is all that the Rocks and Islands Department could be.

P.S. A lot of the most valuable functions of the C.O. for small territories have already gone over to the D.T.C. which I suggest also weakens your argument against C.O./C.R.O. fusion.
CHAPTER 4

West, East, and the Horn of Africa

Document numbers 100–187

100  CAB 134/1555, CPC(57)12  7 May 1957

‘Nigeria’: memorandum for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee by Mr Lennox-Boyd on forthcoming constitutional conference

As my colleagues know, the Nigeria constitutional conference will open in London on 23rd May. It will be attended by some sixty to seventy Nigerian delegates and advisers, representative of all the more important shades of political opinion in the Federation, and will probably last till the end of June.

Outline of the present constitution

2. Since 1954 Nigeria—by far the largest of the dependent territories and with 33 million inhabitants—has been a Federation of three Regions (North, East and West), the Southern Cameroons, and the Federal territory of Lagos (the Federal capital). The residual powers are with the Regions.

3. This constitution was devised by my predecessor as the only way to save Nigeria from disintegration, such is the diversity of the country and the deep-seated distrust of the major tribes—Hausa/Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba—for each other (not to speak of the fears of the many minority groups for these larger tribes).

4. There are large Nigerian majorities in all the executive and legislative organs of government throughout the Federation, with the sole exception of the Southern Cameroons Executive Council where there are four British to four Africans. There are no British officials, except the Regional Governor, in the Eastern and Western Executive Councils, no British officials in the Legislative Houses of these Regions, and only three in the Federal and Northern Ministerial Councils (in addition to the Governor-General and Regional Governor respectively) and in their Legislative Houses.

5. The powers of the Federal Government include such matters—essential to the administrative unity of the country—as defence, external affairs (in so far as responsibility is delegated by the United Kingdom Government), the Nigeria police, major communications, ports, currency, exchange control, external trade and external loans.

6. The term “internal security” is unknown to the Nigerian constitution, but “public safety and public order” is a concurrent subject, and the United Kingdom Government’s ultimate responsibility for internal security is exercisable through the

---

1 Mr Lyttelton (S of S, 1951–1954), in 1954; see also document no 2(I), above.
Governor-General of the Federation who has full discretionary power over the “use
and operational control” of the Nigeria police. Police supply is handled by the Federal
Executive and Legislature in the normal Parliamentary way, but is within the
portfolio of the (British) Chief Secretary of the Federation.

7. The Governor-General and the Regional Governors still have full reserved
powers and considerable discretionary powers. The reserved powers have been used
on three occasions in the East under the present constitution.

The demand for regional self-government in 1957 and for independence for the
whole country in 1959

8. When the last London conference met in 1953, the two major Southern
Parties, Chief Awolowo’s Action Group\(^2\) (in power in the West) and Dr. Azikiwe’s
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.) (now in power in the
East),\(^3\) had presented a categorical demand for “Dominion status” for Nigeria as a
whole by 1956. The majority party in the North, the Northern People’s Congress
(N.P.C.), led by the Sardauna of Sokoto, now Premier of the Northern Region, had
opposed the demand knowing that independence so soon would mean domination of
the “backward” North by the more “educated” Southerners. They had put forward as
an alternative formula self-government “as soon as practicable.”

9. The acute crisis which resulted nearly split the country and there was serious
rioting, with loss of life, in Kano which was prevented from spreading only by prompt
and firm action. The crisis was eventually resolved by my predecessor when he
secured agreement for the present federal form of Government and, as regards self-
government, to the following formula, recorded in the Conference Report (Cmd.
8934):—

“The Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the Conference that Her Majesty’s
Government were not prepared to fix a definite date for self-government for Nigeria as a
whole, the more so as the Northern delegation, representing over half the population of
Nigeria, was unable to depart from its policy of self-government as soon as practicable.
The Conference eventually accepted a declaration of policy that in 1956 Her Majesty’s
Government would grant to those Regions which desired it full self-government in
respect of all matters within the competence of the Regional Governments, with the
proviso that there should be safeguards to ensure that the Regional Governments did
not act so as to impede or prejudice the exercise by the Federal Government of the
functions assigned to it now, or as amended by agreement in the future, or in any way
make the continuance of federation impossible.”

10. A conference was to have been held last autumn to work out how to
implement the 1953 promise of Regional self-government, including the safeguards,
but it had to be postponed because of the Foster Sutton Tribunal of Inquiry into Dr.
Azikiwe’s corrupt practice and Ministerial misconduct in relation to the African
Continental Bank.\(^4\)

\(^2\) Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Yoruba leader in Western Region, opposed to Azikiwe’s ‘Ibo nationalism’,
founder of Action Group, 1951.

\(^3\) Nnamdi Azikiwe, prime minister of the Eastern Region, 1954–1959, governor-general of Nigeria,

11. At the forthcoming conference the West and the East will claim the promise of Regional self-government, and my predecessor's undertaking will, of course, have to be honoured. At the same time I shall do my utmost to secure explicit provisions for "good" government, for example, by safeguarding the public services, the judiciary and the police from any form of political interference, and by preserving the independence of the Attorneys-General (in relation to criminal proceedings) and of the Auditors of Government accounts. (In the case of the Nigeria police this will mean keeping them as a federal force under the discretionary control of the Governor-General.) I also intend to insist upon adequate safeguards both for the Federal Government and for the continuance of federation—in accordance with the proviso to the undertaking given in 1953, as recorded in paragraph 9 above.

12. The Northern Region have said they do not want Regional self-government till 1959. But in view of the new demand for independence for Nigeria as a whole in 1959 (with which I deal below), it is quite possible that at the conference they will claim Regional self-government now. If they do, their claim will have to be met.

13. The most recent development, undoubtedly inspired to a large extent by the grant of independence to Ghana, is the demand for independence for the Federation as a whole, within the Commonwealth, in 1959. A resolution to this effect was passed nem.con., in the Federal House of Representatives on 26th March, the Northern members (who hold half the 184 elective seats) supporting.

14. Much at the conference will depend on how far the feelings of unity so evident in the debate of 26th March survive, and surmount, the various serious difficulties (e.g., on the allocation of revenues, the creation of more Regions or States, the division of powers between the Federal and Regional Governments, the control of the police) which are bound to come up when these controversial issues are discussed. Moreover there is no doubt that Nigeria will not be ready for independence, in any normally accepted sense of the term, so soon; and that there is real danger for a good long time to come of the country disintegrating, and of democratic institutions disappearing, if a guiding and restraining British hand is removed from the Federal Government (and probably from the North also). In addition there may be administrative chaos in the Eastern Region within a year or two of Regional self-government, thanks to the largely corrupt, inept and opportunist rule of Dr. Azikiwe’s N.C.N.C. in that Region.

15. On the other hand we cannot overlook certain factors:—

(a) the emotional pressure for independence is strong, certainly in the South;
(b) to resist too strongly and get all Nigerian politicians against us would be valueless and dangerous, for we could hardly control the country if the population were all against us; we must maintain a peaceful and quiet Nigeria, if only, to put it no higher, in our ultimate interests as a trading nation (United Kingdom exports to Nigeria run at the rate of £50–60 million annually). To lose the co-operation and affection of Nigerians would be to risk future good relations, when the country is independent.

16. This is the dilemma with which we are faced: either to give independence too soon and risk disintegration and a breakdown of administration; or to hang on too long, risk ill-feeling and disturbances, and eventually to leave bitterness behind, with little hope thereafter of our being able to influence Nigerian thinking in world affairs on lines we would wish.
17. After careful consultation with the Governor-General and the three Regional Governors, I have come to the conclusion that if the demand for independence in 1959 is put forward by the major Parties in unison—as I believe is likely—it would be dangerous to resist it overtly. Indeed to do so might only have the effect of uniting the Nigerians against us—at present our prestige and influence are high—and increasing the pressure. If, however, we appear to yield with good grace while making no unconditional promises at this stage, we should retain the present goodwill and may be able to postpone the final transfer of power, certainly until late 1960 and perhaps even till 1961 or 1962. (We know that Chief Awolowo, for example, does not really expect independence to be administratively possible till towards the end of 1960 at the earliest.) In the meantime anything may happen: if, for example, the Ghana experiment should fail, or administration break down in Eastern Nigeria, enthusiasm for early independence may cool.

18. In addition to the demand for independence in 1959, I shall be under pressure to agree to the removal of the three ex-officio Members (the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Financial Secretary) from the Federal Council of Ministers; and if the demand is pressed hard I think I must concede it, both to preserve goodwill and because Nigerians ought to have the opportunity to learn the hard way while a sufficient number of overseas officers are still there to help. The final change would not then be so sudden. I may be able to keep the Financial Secretary and the Attorney-General, and I shall if I can though I am not optimistic; but the Chief Secretary will almost certainly have to go, being replaced by a Prime Minister, and the post of Deputy Governor-General will then have to be created so that the holder can assist the Governor-General with defence (including the police), external affairs, and the Federal public service. (This would be on lines similar to what we had in the Gold Coast in 1954 until independence.)

19. It will probably be necessary, at some stage in the conference, for Her Majesty’s Government to make a declaration on these matters, and subject of course to how the conference may go, I would propose, if necessary, to go as far as a declaration on the following lines, bearing in mind that the life of the present House of Representatives is due to run till late 1959:

“The United Kingdom Government have noted the resolution passed in the House of Representatives on the 26th March in favour of independence for Nigeria within the British Commonwealth in 1959. In particular they welcome the increased sense of unity among the political parties which enabled the resolution to be adopted without a dissentient vote. For their part the United Kingdom Government have always firmly believed that it is in the best interests of the peoples of Nigeria that the unity of the country should be preserved.

The United Kingdom Government have agreed to certain changes in the constitution to permit the appointment of a Prime Minister at the Centre and the withdrawal of the ex-officio Members from the Council of Ministers during the period until the life of the present House of Representatives comes to an end. (These changes will take effect as soon as the constitutional instruments have been amended.)

If, in 1959, it is still the wish of the Nigerian people to attain independence within the Commonwealth, and assuming that in the interim the Governments in the Federation have demonstrated their integrity and capacity for good government, the United Kingdom Government will consult with all the Nigerian Governments about arrangements for the final transfer of power. These arrangements would have to include special constitutional provisions to safeguard tribal and religious minorities, and full
regard would be paid to the wishes of both the Northern and Southern sections of the
Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration and to the
United Kingdom Government’s responsibilities under the United Nations Charter and
the Trusteeship Agreement.

Meanwhile, certain preliminary administrative steps are being taken. It has been
agreed that the Government of the Federation will assume responsibility for the
Nigerian military forces on 1st April, 1958. An expert study of the problems connected
with the establishment of a Central Bank and of a Nigerian currency has already begun
with the assistance of an adviser from the Bank of England; and further measures will
be taken towards training Nigerians for a future foreign service.”

20. Subject to developments in the meantime, I would expect it to be necessary
to ask the United Nations to hold a plebiscite in the British Cameroons in 1959 or
1960.

21. I seek the concurrence of my colleagues in the course outlined above, and in
making, if necessary, a declaration on the lines set out in paragraph 19.

101 CAB 134/1555, CPC 7(57)2 13 May 1957
‘Nigeria constitutional conference’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial
Policy Committee Meeting

The Colonial Secretary said that the conference would begin in London on 23rd May
and would probably last until 27th June. There had been previous conferences in
1953 and 1954 during which his predecessor had felt obliged to promise that Her
Majesty’s Government would grant, with safeguards, regional self-government in
1956 to those Regions which desired it.2 The main task of the present conference
would be to give effect to this undertaking. Of the three Regions, the North had been
the least enthusiastic for regional self-government: although it was the largest, it was
also the most backward, and feared domination by the more advanced East and West
Regions. But a unanimous resolution had recently been passed in the Federal House
of Representatives demanding independence for the Federation as a whole, within
the Commonwealth, in 1959. It was, therefore, likely that the representatives of the
Northern Region at the forthcoming conference would not only now express a desire
for immediate regional self-government, but would also join with the representatives
of the other two Regions in pressing for Federal self-government in 1959. If,
however, the representatives of the Northern Region still held to their desire for a
slower pace of advancement, they should be encouraged to put their point of view
firmly to the Conference and should be supported, to the fullest extent possible, by
the representatives of the United Kingdom Government. In such event there would
be a better chance of securing some modification in the Nigerian demand for Federal
independence as early as 1959. The difficulties and dangers of conceding this demand
were very considerable. Controversial issues, such as the allocation of revenues, the
creation of more regions, the division of powers between the Federal and Regional
Governments and the control of the police, would all need to be settled. Some of

1 See previous document, which was being discussed.
274, Cabinet memo on Nigerian constitution (17 Aug 1953).
these, in particular the last two, would not be capable of quick solution; and it would no doubt be necessary to set up a financial commission to enquire into the allocation of revenues. The issue of the division of powers between the Federal and Regional Governments might, however, be settled at the conference itself in the light of the experience of the last three years. Apart from these difficulties, there was a real danger that the immediate grant of regional self-government, particularly if linked with the early achievement of Federal independence, would lead to an early administrative breakdown in the Eastern Region. On the other hand, resistance to a united demand for Federal independence would entail risk of serious disturbance and a legacy of bitterness and hatred when the country eventually achieved independence. The draft declaration set out in paragraph 19 of C.P.C. (57) 12 was based on the assumption that, if the demand for Federal independence in 1959 were put forward by the major parties in unison, it would be dangerous to resist it overtly.

The Commonwealth Secretary said that a declaration on the lines proposed in paragraph 19, to be made during the course of the forthcoming conference, held serious implications for the future of Commonwealth relations. The other members of the Commonwealth were already uneasy about the manner in which, as it appeared to them, the United Kingdom virtually committed them to agreeing to the advancement of individual territories from colonial status to full membership of the Commonwealth; and they were apprehensive that, as a result of this process, an Afro-Asian Bloc might gradually be created within the Commonwealth itself. The grant to Ghana of independence within the Commonwealth had been accepted under protest by the South African Government and with misgivings by the Australian and New Zealand Governments. To confront the impending meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers with a declaration that the United Kingdom Government would, on certain assumptions, be ready to consult with the Nigerian Governments about arrangements for the final transfer of power in 1959, might lead to considerable friction with the older Commonwealth countries. He was particularly disturbed that, on the timetable proposed, Nigeria would achieve independence before the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It would, therefore, be preferable for Her Majesty's Government to seek to stipulate that regional self-government in Nigeria should operate experimentally for a period of five years, and that at the end of this period a commission should review future developments on the lines proposed for the 1960 review in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

In discussion, there was general agreement that it would be desirable, if possible, for Her Majesty's Government to avoid making any commitment to grant Federal independence to Nigeria in 1959. For this purpose it might be possible to redraft the declaration in paragraph 19 of the memorandum in less precise language; in particular, the United Kingdom Government might confine their undertaking to consultation with the Nigerian Governments about a programme for further constitutional advancement in which a constitutional commission (comparable, for example, with the Reid Commission in the case of Malaya) might be made an essential element.

Summing up the discussion, the Lord Chancellor said that it would be useful if
the Committee could consider an amended version of the declaration in paragraph 19 of the memorandum, designed to reflect the points made in discussion. In the meantime C.P.C. (57) 12 should be circulated to the Cabinet under cover of a note stating that the proposed declaration was being further considered by the Committee. . . .

102  CAB 128/31/2, CC 42(57)4  22 May 1957
‘Nigeria’: Cabinet conclusions on constitutional advance

The Cabinet had before them:—

(i) A note by the Colonial Secretary (C. (57) 120) covering a memorandum on the constitutional development of Nigeria.¹
(ii) A note by the Lord Chancellor (C. (57) 122) to which was annexed a revised version of the draft declaration of policy included in the Colonial Secretary's memorandum.
(iii) A further revision of the draft declaration, circulated by the Colonial Secretary during the discussion.

The Colonial Secretary said that at the Nigerian Constitutional Conference in 1953 his predecessor had found it necessary to declare that in 1956 Her Majesty's Government would grant to those Regions of Nigeria which desired it full self-government in respect of all matters within the competence of the Regional Governments. At the forthcoming Conference the spokesmen of the East and West Regions would undoubtedly demand the fulfilment of this undertaking. The Northern Region, on the other hand, had intimated that they did not desire regional self-government until 1959. But it was not certain that they would maintain this attitude in view of the fact that the Federal House of Representatives had recently adopted, with the support of the Northern members, a resolution demanding independence for the Federation as a whole, within the Commonwealth, in 1959. In these circumstances, and in the light of the political immaturity of Nigeria, the Government were now faced with a difficult choice. Either they must concede independence too soon and risk the disintegration of Nigeria and a critical breakdown of administration; or they must seek to delay the grant of independence, in which event they would provoke increasing animosity and disturbance and would be unable, when independence was eventually conceded, to influence Nigerian policies thereafter. If, as was probable, it became necessary for the Government to make a fresh declaration of policy at some stage in the Conference, it would in his view be appropriate that this statement should be on the lines of the alternative draft which he had circulated during the discussion. This would make it clear that if, when the life of the present House of Representatives came to an end in 1959, there was a clear wish on the part of the Nigerian people for early independence within the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom Government would confer with all the Nigerian Governments to determine the processes whereby this wish might be attained; and that these processes might well include the appointment of a

¹ Originally CPC(57)12: see document no 100 above.
Constitutional Commission, which would be required to make recommendations for the framing of a constitution for a fully independent Nigeria, to review the working of government and of the constitution in both its federal and regional aspects in the light of the experience gained since the forthcoming conference, and to consider the constitutional and other changes which would be necessary to enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth.

In discussion there was general agreement that our objective at the forthcoming conference should be to seek to avoid any precise commitment to grant independence to Nigeria by a specific date. The Government of South Africa were already inclined to question the right of the United Kingdom to promote Colonial territories to independent status within the Commonwealth without the consent of the other self-governing members. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand had also shown concern about the increase in the coloured members of the Commonwealth and the risk that they might ultimately outnumber the older members. In Nigeria the issue was further complicated by the recent agreement with the Prime Minister of the Central African Federation that the decision on the Federation’s attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth should be deferred until 1960. It was essential, therefore, that Nigeria should not achieve self-government until after 1959. Moreover, it was not unreasonable that we should stipulate that an independent enquiry should be carried out by a Constitutional Commission before Nigeria could attain independence. Experience had shown that the technical questions involved in a major constitutional operation of this kind were liable to be numerous and complex; and it would be optimistic to assume that after only a brief period of regional self-government the Nigerian peoples would be competent to assume the responsibilities inseparable from full self-government on a federal scale. For this reason, it would be wise to limit any formal declaration of policy to the minimum of commitment and to undertake no more than that we would confer in 1959 with all the Nigerian Governments to determine the processes whereby Nigeria might attain independence within the Commonwealth. The nature of these processes and the period over which they would require to operate might be left for a subsequent and less formal statement.

It would also be important that, in the process of granting independence to Nigeria, we should retain such strategic concessions, in terms of over-flying rights, the maintenance of staging posts, &c., as were essential to the fulfilment of our defence policy.

The Cabinet:

Invited the Colonial Secretary to be guided, in the forthcoming conference on Nigeria, by the general sense of their discussion.

103 DO 177/84, nos 1 & 4 8 Aug–21 Oct 1958
[Nigeria]: minutes on political situation and constitutional proposals (C(58)171 & C(58)213), by M E Allen, A W Snelling, Sir H Lintott, D L Cole & Sir G Laithwaite (CRO)

[Re C(58)171]: higher authority will wish to see without delay this important paper by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Nigerian Constitution. No date has been fixed for it to be taken in Cabinet.
The paper gives an interesting conspectus of the political situation, of the scope of the resumed Constitutional Conference, and of the line which Mr. Lennox-Boyd proposes to take at that meeting. Sir G. Laithwaite will certainly wish to consider it before talking to Sir J. Macpherson about the various detailed points which are being submitted to him separately.

With regard to the general political situation, it must, I think, be said that Nigeria has not really reached a stage at which independence within two years would normally be contemplated. Her politics are disruptive and parochial, her personalities are at sixes and sevens, and the stability of her Administration is threatened by the exodus of United Kingdom officers. But the milk being spilt, our commitment to fix in 1960 the date for independence is virtually certain to lead to the grant of independence in that year. It may be some small consolation to remember that Somalia is also to become independent in 1960, and she will be even less ready to run her own affairs. It does not look, however, as if Nigeria will be able immediately to play the part in Africa for which her size, population and situation cast her. She will, after all, be far and away the most populous State in Africa, and she is situated at a nodal point of Commonwealth communications. She will be in a position to influence developments in Africa more profoundly than little Ghana on the periphery can hope to do. While we might at a pinch be prepared to contemplate relations with Ghana of less than perfect amity, we may need Nigeria’s friendship quite badly for strategic, economic and political reasons—and there may be competitors for her favours—so it is of the greatest importance that we should do whatever we can in the time that remains to ensure the emergence of a stable and friendly Nigeria.

Within these principles the line which the Colonial Secretary proposes to take at the Conference seems to be broadly such as gives the best chance for U.K./Nigerian relations after 1960, except that, as we have already remarked in another context, the emphasis does not seem to be sufficiently laid on the desirability of Nigerians reaching agreement among themselves and then getting us to rubber-stamp it. A settlement agreed among Nigerians is, after all, the only line that is likely to last any length of time after Independence, and I am inclined to wonder, for instance, whether, if the Nigerians all ask for the police to be regionalised (paragraph 10) it would be prudent to resist them. In most Federations, after all, and even in some unitary States like the U.K., the police is a regional affair.

The last sentence of paragraph 14 of the paper is of crucial importance. It implies that if we are not satisfied about the prospects of the new Federal Government to be elected at the end of next year, we must refuse Nigeria’s independence. We should certainly agree with this line.

M.E.A.
8.8.58

The Colonial Secretary has submitted to the Cabinet a paper—C(58)171—setting forth the line he proposes to take at the resumed Nigerian Constitutional Conference later this month. We do not dissent from the proposals specifically put forward in the paper; but there are some basic points on Nigeria which the Secretary of State could usefully make at the present stage, either at the Cabinet meeting or, perhaps better, to Mr. Lennox-Boyd alone at Chequers, on 7th September.

2. Should there be a “Lennox-Boyd Constitution” for Nigeria? The first and
widest point is the question whether we should launch Nigeria, as we launched Ghana, with a detailed and elaborate Constitution. The Colonial Office—and the Nigerians—are going on the assumption that careful constitutional drafting will continue on Nigeria, as with Ghana, until a very short time before Independence, and that when Nigeria does become independent she will be launched with as sophisticated and elaborate a Constitution as Ghana has (the Ghana Constitution is attached). We understand that there is no formal commitment to Nigeria to this effect; but constitutional and political progress in Nigeria has for years been based on this assumption, and there are groups in Nigeria, notably the minorities, who (even if mistakenly) look to the Constitution to be their future safeguard against oppression.

3. We accept, of course, that appropriate constitutional legislation must accompany political emancipation; but there may be something to be said for considering an alternative: that the United Kingdom should deliberately leave it to the Nigerians themselves to draft and enact their own Constitution after they are independent. This is what happened with India, Pakistan and Ceylon. India and Pakistan in particular were started off with only the briefest amendment of the constitutional provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, and both countries spent a number of years happily drafting Constitutions to suit themselves (the Pakistan Constitution is not even yet fully in effect). Ceylon admittedly had an interim Constitution in 1946, but even she became independent with only a small amount of legislation and then drafted her own Constitution. It could be argued that Nigeria as a Federation will need special constitutional attention; but India and Pakistan are also Federations; moreover, in India the major question of the Princely States was left constitutionally as well as politically unsolved at Independence. In Pakistan the whole fabric of the central Government had, of course, to be built up from nothing. Admittedly, however, in both countries one national party, with a distinctive philosophy of its own, commanded the loyalty of the vast majority of citizens. This is not yet the case in Nigeria.

4. We are inclined to doubt, therefore, whether it is incontrovertibly necessary to launch Nigeria with a detailed Constitution. It can also be questioned whether this is desirable. The history of Ghana's Constitution is not encouraging. Ghana's Constitution is, to begin with, not the kind of document to inspire the man-in-the-bush. It is dated (unavoidably but perhaps unfortunately in all the circumstances) from "the Court at Buckingham Palace", and starts with three pages of definitions, exceptions and revocations; there is then a whole page about the Governor-General, half of which concerns his salary and that of his staff, and the next section, entitled "The Executive", begins: "The executive power of Ghana is vested in the Queen". The Constitution contains no such statement as figures in, for instance, the Pakistan and Malayan Constitutions, of the purpose for which the State of Ghana has been formed or the ideals it sets before itself, and I think the only human right which it enshrines is that to compensation for property nationalised. So it is not surprising that the Constitution has not inspired amongst ordinary Ghanaians any germ of the devotion which, for example, Americans have for the United States Constitution, or that the Ghana Government have already taken the first steps towards thorough-going revision of their Constitution, notably in the direction of a Republic. Parts of the Ghana Constitution, particularly those dealing with the Regional Assemblies, have in any case never been put into effect, for cogent political reasons. So one cannot but ask whether there is any point in doing again for Nigeria the elaborate constitutional
work which was done for Ghana. If past experience is any guide, much of the work will be wasted at best, and it may at worst bring resentment upon the United Kingdom.

5. What is more, the Colonial Office are now proposing not merely to give Nigeria at least as elaborate a Constitution as Ghana; but also to suggest to Nigeria the entrenchment, as in Ghana, of substantial portions of it, even so insignificant a point as the provision that Government accounts must be audited by the Auditor-General. It seems to us that this attitude is liable to appear as either an expression of distrust of Nigeria’s ability to run her affairs, or as seeking to lay an intolerable strait-jacket upon the Government of an independent State. The history of entrenched clauses in other Commonwealth countries (e.g. South Africa) is not encouraging. Nothing should be entrenched that the Nigerians themselves are not asking for.

6. The Crown. The question of the Crown has also come up already. The Government of the Western Region of Nigeria have asked that, while consolidating the multifarious Constitutional Orders in Council which have been enacted in the past in respect of Western Nigeria, the Colonial Office lawyers should in the near future insert specific reference to the Queen when defining the composition of the Western Regional Assembly. The Colonial Office are prepared to accede to this request; and they say that in the interests of uniformity with the other Nigerian Constitutions that are being simultaneously consolidated, they must write the Queen into them all. This seems most undesirable. It is disproportionate that a request from one Regional Government should cause action to be taken in relation to all the other Regions, and the Federation, which none of them have asked for (indeed, if any of the others should say they do not wish the Queen to be written into their Constitutions, the situation could be most embarrassing). Moreover, we are not convinced that the objective of keeping Nigeria under the monarchy is best achieved by putting references to the Queen into the constitutional documents at every opportunity. Until now, no tropical country that has achieved independence has given any sign of wishing to keep the monarchy as Sovereign. It would surely be wrong to work on the assumption—that this is not to say that it is impossible—that Nigeria will not make some move away from the monarchy pretty soon after Independence. So there is everything to be said for reducing the apparent “weight” given to the Crown in the Nigerian Constitution, by deliberately referring to the Queen as few times as possible; and above all for the United Kingdom never pressing the Crown upon the Federation or any of the Regions. This course appears to offer both the best chance of keeping Nigeria within the monarchy by reducing the opportunities for critics to say that the United Kingdom is still running Nigeria by means of the monarchy—and—if Nigeria does decide to dispense with the monarchy—the best hope of minimising the embarrassment when she passes the necessary legislation.1

7. The foregoing covers two basic ideas behind the Colonial Secretary’s Cabinet Paper. The paper itself can be dealt with more briefly, and we agree with its recommendations.

1 Mr Alport minuted on an earlier discussion of this point that ‘the Ghana lesson’ was quite clear: ‘Dr Nkrumah is correct in saying that Anglo-Saxon ideas of monarchy are not appropriate to African States, & Nigeria could be a source of great embarrassment to us’. He also added: ‘I hope that the negotiations regarding the armed forces are going ahead. These new states must be made to face up to the full implications of independence. C.M.A. 15.8.58’.
8. **Date of independence.** The central question is, of course, the date of Independence (paragraph 13 of the paper). We can certainly agree with Mr. Lennox-Boyd’s intention not to go beyond the undertaking he gave at the Conference last year: that if in 1960 the United Kingdom is asked by Nigeria to fix a date for Independence, she will then fix it. What we know of the political situation in Nigeria does not encourage us to think that the country will have achieved any great degree of political cohesion by 1960, and we certainly should not wish the Colonial Secretary to commit himself now to any specific date for Independence. We do not want to run any risk of Nigeria becoming independent before the United Kingdom is confident of her fitness to run her own affairs.

9. **Minorities.** On the problem of minorities (paragraph 9 of the paper), the Willink Commission has now reported, recommending the creation of no new States, on the ground that this was not the way to remove the fears and grievances of the Nigerian minorities. We see no advantage to Nigeria in further regionalisation, and hope that the Colonial Secretary will be able to resist demands for it.

10. In view of the special circumstances of Nigeria we can agree with Mr. Lennox-Boyd’s proposal to resist pressure for the regionalisation of the Police.

M.E.A.
5.9.58

I agree fully. The experiment of settling a detailed constitution for Ghana before independence has not been a success. It has come to be referred to in scornful terms in Ghana as the ‘Lennox-Boyd Constitution’ & nearly every self-respecting Ghanaian wants to win freedom from it. It is regarded as the legacy of the Colonial Office from which Ghana has still to fight free. The idea of working out a detailed constitution in advance is a novelty, not followed in the history of any other Cwlth country. Relations in future years with Nigeria will certainly be happier if they have worked out their own constitution & cannot blame us for the many defects it is certain to contain.

Of course Nigeria must be launched with some constitution. There are already in force constitutions for the Federation & the Western & Eastern Regions. One for the Northern Region must be promulgated in 1959. The best course seems to be, as in the case of India, to have an instrument making the minimum changes necessary in these constitutions so as to launch Nigeria into independence & then to let her adjust them to her own tastes after independence.

I also agree very much with what is said above about the Queen. Because Ghana wants to become a republic & amend her constitution in other ways, the reaction of the Colonial Office has been that the Queen & other features should be entrenched even more deeply in Nigeria! This seems to me to be perverse in the extreme. It does no service to the Queen to ensure that every unpopular step taken by an independent Nigerian Govt is done in the Queen’s name. How can the man-in-the-bush on the Niger Delta be expected to adopt our sophisticated notions of the role the Queen in reality plays?

It seem to me to be worth making no small effort to ensure that our relations with

---

Nigeria are not dogged by the incorrigible paternalism of the Colonial Office & by the legacy of a constitutional straight-jacket of, at any rate in part, UK manufacture.

A.W.S. 5.9.58

**Secretary of State**
I agree with the above, which is in line with submissions which you have already approved & the substance of which I have already conveyed to the Colonial Office.

H.B.L. 5.9.58

The Secretary of State discussed this with the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary at Chequers on Sunday. He has since minuted as follows:—

“(1) I agreed to the Paper. (C(58)171)

(2) We thought that in the complicated circumstances of this Federation a Constitution would have to be worked out.

(3) The Colonial Secretary will try and keep the Queen out as far as possible.

(4) He thinks 1960 will bring independence and that he cannot hold it beyond that.”

D.L.C. 8.9.58

C(58)213: In this report the Colonial Secretary sets forth what has been achieved so far at the Nigerian Constitutional Conference, and seeks agreement to his informing the Nigerians that H.M.G. are prepared to grant independence to Nigeria “in the autumn of 1960”; he thinks this will mean October, 1960.

2. The proceedings at the Conference have revealed clearly that Nigeria still has a long way to go before the different peoples and tribes in the country can develop a proper national consciousness. There has been little evidence that the Nigerians have yet learned to raise their eyes from their internal political divisions and see themselves as a unit exposed to the cold winds of international life. Ideally, therefore, there is much to be said for delaying Nigerian independence for some considerable time. But as the Colonial Secretary points out, we cannot do this without gravely damaging United Kingdom/Nigerian relations; so the Secretary of State will probably wish to agree with Mr. Lennox-Boyd’s proposal for independence in the autumn of 1960. This is at any rate six months better than April 1960—the date we had feared.

3. The Colonial Secretary is certainly right in hesitating to assert that self-government will in Nigeria be good government. The proceedings of the Conference have already provided plenty of evidence to show that politics in Nigeria will be at least as tough as in the other African countries. Despite all the well-meant efforts of the Colonial Office to provide constitutional safeguards for minorities, it is fairly clear that minorities which seek to oppose the Governments of the majorities will, as in Ghana, find themselves last in the queue for the economic, social and other benefits which the Government is able to distribute. Nevertheless, so far as the United Kingdom is concerned it would appear that in the last resort we must make sure that the Government of Nigeria is strong, even if possibly undemocratic or unjust. The biggest danger facing Nigeria appears to be internal political disruption; it is therefore necessary to take risks in ensuring that the Federal Government has

---

1 See document no 105 below.
the power to keep Nigeria together. We have had a long running battle—which we do not pretend to have brought to a satisfactory conclusion—with the Colonial Office on this question. We think that in their concern to ensure the rights of minorities they have gone too far in binding down the Federal Government. Time will show whether they have been right in this course.

4. The Colonial Secretary’s paper also refers to the projected defence agreement with Nigeria. A separate paper is being submitted on this for the Secretary of State’s meeting with the other Ministers concerned before the Cabinet. The Nigerian Ministers have accepted in principle that there should be a United Kingdom/Nigeria Defence Agreement, and the Secretary of State will probably not wish to suggest in Cabinet that agreement to the date of independence should be made conditional on agreement being reached with the Nigerians on the details.

M.E.A.
21.10.58

I entirely agree with what Mr. Allen says.

The Constitution, which is in process of being agreed in Lancaster House, frightens me. It is the most rigid and therefore the most brittle Constitution so far as I know ever devised. All the Nigerians sitting round the table have been mainly concerned to limit the power that other Nigerians sitting round the table will be able to use against them after independence. Hence for instance the embodiment in the Constitution as “Fundamental Rights” of virtually the whole of the European Human Rights Convention (which incidentally we in this country cannot even apply in Northern Ireland), so deeply entrenched that no single human right can be abrogated (save in a declared public emergency) in the slightest degree except after a two thirds majority in both Houses of the Federal Parliament and a simple majority in the Parliaments in two of the three Regions. The Colonial Office have aided and abetted the Nigerians in fabricating this rigid structure because they all think that Ghana is going to the bad. We do not share this view, regarding strong government in these new countries as essential. Strong government in Nigeria as I see it will be impossible. Every law passed by the Federal or any Regional Government can be tested in the courts against the Constitution—on the model of the American Supreme Court. This is going to create tremendous uncertainty because it will in some cases be years (including time for appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) before it can be known whether a law that has been passed is legal or not. We have seen something of these difficulties in India. I fear that it may not be very long before somebody has to “do an Iskander Mirza” with the Nigerian Constitution.

A.W.S.
21.10.58

Secretary of State
I agree with Mr Allen and Mr Snelling’s comments. . . . As regards date of independence, if we can postpone till Oct. 1960, so much the better from every point of view. So far the Nigerians have been united on April 1960.

G.J.L.
21.10.58

---

CAB 128/32/2, CC 71(58)5 11 Sept 1958

‘Nigeria’: Cabinet conclusions on resumption of constitutional conference

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (58) 171) on the Nigeria Constitutional Conference which was due to reassemble in London on 29th September.

The Colonial Secretary said that at the Conference in the previous year it had been agreed that the Eastern and Western Regions of Nigeria should be granted regional self-government. The representatives of the Northern Region had now informed him that they wished to be given a similar status with effect from 15th March, 1959. In accordance with his predecessor’s undertaking, he was bound to accede to this request. As regards independence for Nigeria as a whole, an undertaking had been given during the 1957 Conference that, if at the beginning of 1960, the new Nigerian Parliament asked the United Kingdom Government to agree to full self-government within the Commonwealth by a specified date in that year, Her Majesty’s Government would consider it with sympathy and would be prepared to fix a date when they would accede to the request. It now seemed doubtful, however, whether he would be able to rest on that undertaking at the forthcoming Conference. The Governor-General had represented strongly that we should be prepared to announce during the Conference a date in 1960 on which we would agree to full self-government for the Federation as a whole. Public opinion in Nigeria was conspicuously loyal to the Crown and the Commonwealth connection, and it would be unwise to alienate this sentiment by reluctance to prescribe a date for the achievement of Federal self-government. A concession in this respect must, however, be dependent on our being satisfied that the administration of the Regions would continue on satisfactory lines in the interim and that, when Federal self-government was introduced, adequate arrangements would be made to maintain the unity of the country, to preserve the integrity of the police force and to assure us of the continuance of such defence facilities as we should need to retain. These included staging and overflying rights for our aircraft, together with the right to use the harbours at Lagos and Port Harcourt in war. It had been suggested that, in addition, we should reserve sovereignty in perpetuity over a small enclave of Nigerian territory which would provide a secure and permanent base for our forces. This proposal would need further examination; and its advantages would need to be weighed against the risk that it would appear to imply that we doubted whether we could rely on the continuing loyalty of Nigeria. For their part the Nigerians would need our help in building up their defence forces, particularly by seconding British officers on suitable terms.

The Minister of Defence emphasised the importance of avoiding any uncertainty about the defence facilities which we should need to retain in Nigeria as an essential part of our means of reinforcing the Middle Eastern and Far Eastern theatres. The Defence Agreement should, if possible, constitute an integral element in the constitutional instrument establishing self-government rather than a separate agreement to be concluded with Nigeria after the grant of independence. Moreover,

---

2 Mr D Sandys.
the strategic importance of Nigeria was sufficiently great to justify us in making every effort to retain an enclave of territory under our own sovereignty.

In discussion there was general agreement that we should adhere to the policy, to which we were committed, of granting full self-government to Nigeria, subject to being satisfied as regards the essential constitutional and military safeguards. It would be desirable, however, that further consideration should be given to the timing of the proposed Defence Agreement. It was arguable that this Agreement might well prove more reliable and command greater international respect if, on the Malayan precedent, it was signed or at least ratified, by the Nigerian Government in the exercise of their full powers after they had attained independence.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Invited the Colonial Secretary to be guided, at the forthcoming Conference on Nigeria, by the considerations which had emerged during their discussion.

(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to circulate periodical reports on the progress of the Conference and to seek further authority from the Cabinet if he found it desirable to prescribe, during the proceedings, a specific date in 1960 for the independence of Nigeria.

(3) Invited the Colonial Secretary, in consultation with the Minister of Defence, to arrange for a further examination of the best means of securing our future strategic requirements in Nigeria and of the most appropriate timing of the conclusion of a Defence Agreement.

105 CAB 129/95, C(58)213 20 Oct 1958

‘Nigeria’: Cabinet memorandum by Mr Lennox-Boyd on progress of constitutional talks

The Nigerian Constitutional Conference has now been in progress for three weeks. We aim to finish on Monday, October 27th.

2. The Conference has gone reasonably well so far. Satisfactory agreement was reached in the first week on the major question of the Police. The principle of a single force under the ultimate control of the Federal Government has been accepted under arrangements which will give Regional Governments a reasonable say in establishment, administration and day-to-day operational use. Safeguards are provided against improper political interference in Police matters. Agreement was also reached with relatively little difficulty on the important matter of revenue allocation. The recommendations of the Fiscal Commission headed by Sir Jeremy Raisman were accepted as they stood.1 We have agreed on the detailed arrangements for Northern Region Self-Government which will come into force on 15th March, 1959. We have reached agreement on a list of fundamental human rights which are to be entrenched in the Constitution. Their basic purpose is to protect the rights of the citizen against the State, but satisfactory provisions are to be included which should enable the State to deal with emergencies and subversive activities. We have dealt successfully with a wide range of lesser problems.

3. Discussions on such matters as the judiciary, electoral arrangements and the Public Service reflect a keen desire on all sides to ensure that these institutions are kept out of politics. I have been encouraged by the evidence that the Northern Region is ready to make a number of important reforms in its legal system which should bring the administration of justice more into line with modern ideas.

4. All this is very satisfactory, the more so since it has been apparent that there are still bitter and deep-rooted divisions, fears and suspicions among the different races and political groupings. These fears are of course in themselves the driving force behind the desire for a carefully worked out and detailed Constitution, the main principles of which will only be alterable with difficulty.

5. It is unlikely that the Conference will succeed in allaying the fears of the minority groups. I have a great deal of sympathy for the minority view but I can see no other solution than to endeavour to construct a Constitution which will provide a reasonable chance of fair treatment for all. Of greater importance, however, is the major conflict between the predominantly Western Region Action Group and the Northern People’s Congress, the major party of the North. It is apparent that for the time being at least the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons which forms the Eastern Region Government under Dr. Azikiwe is lining up with the North. Consequently Chief Awolowo, the Action Group leader, has every reason to fear that on independence the West may be faced with a North–East alliance. Partly, if not mainly, for this reason he has pressed with great vigour for his major objective—the weakening of the North by the creation of a Middle Belt State and for changes in the Northern system of government. In so doing he has aroused bitter opposition from the North and the Conference has at times (as I predicted) been a stormy one. At no time has the hostility been directed at Her Majesty’s Government.

6. The major question before the Conference has been whether the Federation should be broken up into more than the present three Regions. This remains at present unsettled. After over a week’s debate I have told them that there can be no question of new states being created before independence, if independence is to come by 1960. I have proposed, however, that it should be recognised that the present regional structure is not necessarily immutable and that provision should be made in the Constitution for an orderly (but lengthy and difficult) procedure enabling the changing of regional boundaries and the creation of new states. My proposals are still being considered by the Conference but I think that it is likely that something on the lines I have suggested will in the end be accepted.

7. This brings me to the question of the date of independence. At the public opening session all the leaders repeated in clear terms their request for independence by 2nd April, 1960. Since then there have been passing references to the question but they have been content to get down to discussion of the detailed problems requiring settlement without demanding that I agree to the date ab initio. In private talks with the Federal Prime Minister and the others it has
been made clear to me that the date 2nd April, 1960 is only advanced for bargaining purposes and that a date in the autumn of 1960 will in fact be acceptable. I have of course had doubts whether if a free choice were open to us Her Majesty's Government would be right to contemplate relinquishing control even by the end of 1960. It is clear that there are great and probably irreconcilable differences between the major groups and peoples. If the West continues to provoke the North and if Chief Awolowo were, as he hopes, to win power at the Centre at the end of 1959, the threat of an ultimate break-away by the North may become real. I would certainly not like to assert that self-government will in Nigeria be good government. There is a heavy responsibility on us therefore in taking a decision committing us to a definite date for Nigerian independence as much as two years ahead. I have given this matter very careful thought and have come to the conclusion that we should gain nothing by postponing a decision. All the parties in Nigeria are now firmly committed in public to securing at this Conference Her Majesty's Government's agreement to a firm date. Relations between this country and Nigeria could not be better than they are at the present time. To refuse the request would undoubtedly create an atmosphere of bitterness and distrust which would prejudice our future relations with an independent Nigeria and even if we were to refuse the request now we still could not delay independence for much longer. We would only have succeeded in giving the at present divided groups a common target—the United Kingdom—for political odium. To continue to govern a discontented and possibly rebellious Nigeria would also present wellnigh insoluble administrative problems in view of the transfer of effective power that has already taken place in the domestic field. It might even need substantial military forces.

8. I have, in accordance with the request of my colleagues at our last discussion, pursued the question of a Defence Agreement with the Minister of Defence. We have agreed on the list of facilities that we would want from Nigeria after independence and I have discussed with the Nigerian Prime Minister and the Premiers the proposal that there should be a Defence Agreement between our two countries. They welcome the idea in principle and are agreeable to our working out the details before independence with a view to having the agreement come into force at that time. The Minister of Defence and I propose to discuss the details further with the Nigerian Ministers during this week so that we can be sure that we shall get what we need before I make any statement about the date of independence. The proposed agreement will of course involve us in obligations to Nigeria. These are being examined in consultation with the Departments concerned but I believe that they will be such that this country must be prepared to accept if, on independence, Nigeria is to remain firmly inside the Western orbit.

9. I now invite my colleagues to agree that, provided the Conference is able to reach agreement on the outstanding questions and the Minister of Defence and I secure satisfactory detailed undertakings about Defence, I should inform them that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to grant independence to Nigeria in the autumn of 1960. I envisage that the date will be some time in October but I would need to fix the exact date in consultation with the Nigerian leaders.3

---

3 The Cabinet agreed 'that no useful purpose would be served by postponing this decision and forfeiting Nigerian goodwill. The balance of advantage lay in adopting the Colonial Secretary's proposal' (CAB 128/32/2, CC 76(584), 22 Oct 1958). The Conference concluded with agreement to grant independence from 1 Oct 1960. The target date was achieved.
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary (C. (58) 235) on relations between Ghana and Guinea. The Commonwealth Secretary said that there was reason to believe that the Prime Minister of Ghana, Dr. Nkrumah, was discussing with the Prime Minister of Guinea, M. Sekou Touré, some form of close association between Ghana and Guinea. The precise nature of this association was not known; but it might take the form of federation of the two States or even the complete absorption of Guinea within Ghana. Any proposal of this nature would be liable to raise serious issues of principle as regards Ghana’s membership of the Commonwealth; and Dr. Nkrumah had therefore been warned that the other members of the Commonwealth might react adversely to Ghana’s association with a foreign country which had no historical or cultural connections with the United Kingdom or any other Commonwealth country.

In discussion it was emphasised that any association between Ghana and Guinea at a time when the latter country had elected to become independent of France would be viewed with suspicion by the French Government and would be liable to embarrass us in our relations with them. Moreover, Guinea was economically a poor and backward country; and we should not allow M. Sekou Touré to suppose that, by association with Ghana, he could obtain from us the economic assistance which he had probably forfeited from France. Nor should we encourage Dr. Nkrumah in his ambition to create a federation of West African States which, under his leadership, might constitute a counterpoise to Nigeria after that country attained independence in 1960. Other African territories were already showing signs of alarm and resentment at this project.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that Dr. Nkrumah would probably adhere to his intention to declare Ghana, in due course, a republic within the Commonwealth. If he wished thereafter to develop the concept of a closer association between Ghana and Guinea, the matter could be further considered at that juncture. But in terms of Commonwealth membership it would be inappropriate that this project should be pursued while Ghana maintained its present form of allegiance to the Crown. It might be helpful if he sent a personal message to Dr. Nkrumah, advising him to weigh the possible consequences of his proposal with care before carrying the matter any further.
The Cabinet:—
Invited the Commonwealth Secretary to submit to the Prime Minister the draft of a personal message to the Prime Minister of Ghana about the implications, in terms of Ghana's membership of the Commonwealth, of his proposal to promote some form of close association between Ghana and Guinea.

107  CAB 134/1559, CPC 2(60)4  18 Mar 1960

'Sierra Leone': minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting on finance and defence implications of independence

[Under its 1956 constitution, the Sierra Leone Leg Co became a House of Representatives and included 51 elected members. In 1957 Sierra Leone was viewed by Lennox-Boyd as a difficult 'border-line case' (document no 2 (70) above), not yet ready for full internal self-government. In 1958 the ex officio members were eliminated; the Executive Council became purely African, under the chairmanship of the governor, Sir M Dorman, with Dr Milton Margai as prime minister. At the constitutional conference of Apr-May 1960, pre-independence constitutional changes were agreed; independence was reached on 27 Apr 1961.]

The Committee had before them a note by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (60) 6) suggesting that at the forthcoming Sierra Leone Constitutional Conference he should announce Her Majesty's Government's willingness to grant independence to the territory towards the end of 1961, subject to the conclusion of a satisfactory defence agreement.

The Colonial Secretary said that the main questions affecting the grant of independence to Sierra Leone were finance and defence. As regards finance Sierra Leone's future viability on current account depended on taking effective measures to prevent the illicit export of diamonds. Nevertheless, financial aid amounting to about £1⅓ million a year would have to be given for a year or two after independence; this was roughly equivalent to the present level of assistance from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds and for the upkeep of the Sierra Leone Regiment. The difficulties created by financial uncertainty were however outweighed by the wider political advantages of acceding at an early date to the Colony's demand for independence.

As regards defence our main interest was to retain the facilities of Freetown Harbour; Sierra Leone would have a reciprocal interest in obtaining undertakings from us to assist in her defence problems. It was for consideration whether these defence provisions should be contained in an agreement on the lines of that negotiated with Nigeria or should rest on an exchange of letters.

Subject to a satisfactory conclusion of discussions on financial and defence matters he proposed at the Conference to fix a date for independence towards the end of 1961.

The Financial Secretary, Treasury,¹ said that there would be no objection in principle to a tapering military grant after independence, but other financial aid should be confined to a scheme of technical assistance, to Commonwealth Assistance loans and to the completion of any commitments outstanding under Colonial Development and Welfare provisions. The terms of any announcement to the Conference on financial matters should be agreed with the Treasury.²

¹ Sir E Boyle.
² For the financial arrangements, see documents nos 334 and 335, in Part II.
It was suggested that there would be advantage in avoiding a complex defence agreement of the type used by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries, though it would probably be insufficient to rest the matter on an exchange of letters. Consideration should therefore be given to drawing up a simpler and more straightforward defence agreement covering at any rate our own requirements in the territory.

*The Prime Minister* said that it would be desirable for the proposals for Sierra Leone’s independence to be reported to the Cabinet, and bearing in mind that independence was unlikely to take place before the end of 1961, further consideration should be given to the question of her membership of the Commonwealth being raised at the forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

108  
PREM 11/4483, PM(60)24  
25 Apr 1960  
[Sierra Leone]: minute (brief) from Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan about premier’s visit

You are seeing Sir Milton Margai, the Premier of Sierra Leone, for a short time on Thursday. The Premier’s English is unfortunately not very good and you will, I fear, get an impression from him of vagueness. This is in fact quite wrong. He has led his people with great courage over the years and he has firmly refused to let them push ahead towards independence faster than he thought wise. The principle of independence was in fact conceded by Alan Lennox-Boyd a year or so ago and the effective date will probably be some time in the middle of next year. Sir Milton in the real sense of the word has been the father of his people. He is a doctor who took his degree at Durham and he has created in Sierra Leone an effective united front for the present conference which has ensured its smooth running. I concluded with him this morning without any fuss at all the heads of agreement on defence relating to Freetown and other matters. He has great understanding of the needs of his country and a full appreciation of her weakness. All the same, Sierra Leone could well be a sort of New Zealand in West Africa, certainly as long as Sir Milton holds the reins. He has a deep attachment to this country and has every intention of keeping the links as close as he can.

2. Sierra Leone is just viable economically and I hope we will be able to give her some small help with Commonwealth loans. It is particularly important to keep her with the West bearing in mind the potential threat in Guinea from Communist infiltration. There is no doubt that Sierra Leone will seek full membership of the Commonwealth and the paper that has been submitted for discussion before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting suggests that we should regard Sierra Leone as really the smallest of the territories that can so aspire. I am sure for all reasons of policy it would be wise for us to sponsor her, but Sir Milton of course understands that the formal position is that all must in due course agree. This would not in practice be until the May meeting of 1962, although a year from now Sir Milton, who would by then have become a Prime Minister, would be in the same sort of position as the Prime Minister of Nigeria is now.

---

1 Sir Milton Augustus Margai, recently appointed, and prime minister until his death in 1964; founder of the Sierra Leone People’s Party, 1951.
One of the most important points to be discussed with Nigerian Ministers in the next day or two is the preparation and signature of a Defence Agreement. Heads of Agreement were initialled by the Prime Minister and the then Regional Premiers during the Constitutional Conference in October 1958. They provided for the two Governments to afford one another assistance in mutual defence; we undertook to help in the staffing, administration, training and equipment of Nigerian forces; each party was to enjoy unrestricted overflying and air staging facilities and we were to be given leases:

(a) of a piece of land at Kano of up to 150 acres on which to build the staging facilities we needed and
(b) if we applied for it, of about a further 1,000 acres on which to build an airfield if for any reason Kano became unsuitable.

We were also in emergency to have such port facilities at Lagos and Port Harcourt as might be required.

2. Since 1958 sentiment has changed very much throughout West Africa. Great feeling has arisen about the giving of “bases” in Africa to outside powers. There is, I hope, no fundamental change in Nigerian goodwill towards us, but this change in general sentiment has naturally affected the attitude of Nigerian Ministers. Abubakar, the Prime Minister is our very good friend, but I am convinced, and so is the Governor-General, that we must broadly accept his judgment on what is politically practicable.

3. A draft of a detailed Agreement was sent to Nigeria in March for their comments. I only received them two or three days ago. Nigerian Ministers now propose a major departure from what was agreed in 1958. Briefly, while convinced that there is mutual advantage in a Defence Agreement, they do not think it would be expedient even to discuss at the forthcoming talks the subject of the United Kingdom being given a lease of land in Nigeria. They would however be ready to give us all the facilities we could want at existing airfields and, if desired, to expand them to our requirements at our expense. They would be ready to give us full over-flying and staging rights for normal movements but would want us to get their agreement for “extraordinary movements in times of emergency”. To put it crudely, as the Governor-General says, they would be very glad to see their airfields used to help us in a struggle in which we supported Blacks against Whites but might not like them used if we supported Whites against Blacks. They would like us only to have extra port facilities in emergencies “affecting both the U.K. Government and the Government of the Federation”.

4. My officials will be discussing the position in detail with officials in the Defence Departments and I will let you have my definite views as soon as possible. I

---

1 Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, first federal prime minister, 1957–1966 (died); a member of Northern People’s Congress.
2 Sir J Robertson, who continued in office until Nov 1960.
feel sure however that if we are to retain Nigerian goodwill (without which no Defence Agreement is worth anything) we shall have to drop the request for the lease of land and rely on their good faith for the use of their own airfields. There is a certain risk in this but the risk involved in holding to our request at this stage is greater, for they cannot now reasonably hope to carry their people with them in an undertaking to let us lease part of their land. They do indeed hint that it might be possible to do something more definite for us after independence. If we rely on their good faith, my first thought is that we could reasonably ask them in return to rely on us to do our best not to embarrass them in staging and overflying aircraft and that they should not seek to question our reasons for wanting to move aircraft through Nigeria; but I am doubtful whether we should be able to get wholly unrestricted facilities written into the agreement, or indeed whether it would be wise to try. . . .3

3 Mr Macmillan minuted: 'It is not very satisfactory but it may be the best we can get. H.M. 9.5.60'. Various ministers were consulted, and all seemed agreed that the goodwill of Abubakar was more important than paper commitments, so they should drop most of the proposals to which Nigerian ministers objected; they would have to send a British battalion to Southern Cameroons when Nigerian forces were withdrawn, despite the cost.

110 CO 968/715, no 13 28 Aug 1960
‘Nigerian defence’: minute by Mr Sandys to Mr Macmillan on the alteration of the agreement

Lord Home in his minute No. 48/60 of the 18th July to the Prime Minister spoke of possible dangers threatening our Defence Agreement with Nigeria. The Prime Minister directed that an examination should be made on the lines of paragraph 4 of that minute, namely that proposals should be prepared recommending the minimum which we need to do to secure the passage of the Agreement. This has now been done.

2. In a personal telegram the Governor-General of Nigeria takes the view that the passage of the Agreement will not be prejudiced by the extent to which Her Majesty’s Government are unable to lighten the financial burden of Nigerian defence. He goes on, however, to say that he has no doubt that the Agreement will be more welcome, and therefore more valuable to the United Kingdom, if, when it comes to the legislature, Ministers can point to the tangible financial advantage flowing from it. He has made two proposals which are in line with requests already put forward by the Nigerian Delegation which was here in June, viz

(a) the United Kingdom should pay part of the cost of British servicemen seconded to the Nigerian Military forces.
(b) the United Kingdom should pay the cost of training Nigerians in this country.

3. We have considered the proposal in sub-paragraph (b) above together with officials of the other Departments concerned, and agree that we should help Nigeria in this way. What is proposed is not a departure of principle, but that as far as Nigeria is concerned we should set the ceiling of what we are prepared to spend under the existing scheme for military training assistance in the United Kingdom for Commonwealth countries at such a level that in fact we do train all the Nigerians with whom we are asked to help (and for whom we can find places) free of charge.
4. The total cost of all the training facilities asked for by the Nigerian Government in this country in the year 1960/61 is estimated at £71,000 (that is, Army £36,000, Navy £35,000, there is as yet no plan to start a Nigerian Air Force). Increases in the number of places we shall be asked for may cause this figure to grow slightly each year in the next few years. We can in fact find all the places we have been asked for in this current year. We are already committed to some expenditure on training of Nigerian servicemen under the existing Commonwealth Relations Office scheme. The expenditure proposed above can be compared with the present cost to us of training Pakistan servicemen in this country of £35,000 per year and of training Malaya's of £15,000 per year.

5. This expenditure will be well worthwhile. This year has demonstrated plainly enough the vital importance of Africa, and especially of Nigeria as the largest, and in the long run perhaps the most influential, of the newly independent countries of Africa. Events in the last few weeks in the Congo have shown the value of British trained African troops. Nigerians are already convinced of the value of the British service connection. But if they feel they are not getting all the benefits they should from the Defence Agreement, they know that there are other countries who are prepared to offer training facilities on most generous terms. We have seen in Ghana in the last few weeks how quickly in an African country, apparently firmly inclined towards the West, a substantial body of opinion can grow up in favour of seeking assistance from the Soviet Union.

6. If this proposal is accepted the Colonial Secretary will inform the Nigerian Prime Minister that we will train all the Nigerians for whom we can find vacancies without cost to the Nigerian Government. At the same time he will seek the Federal Prime Minister’s agreement to a public announcement on the same lines.

7. Though we may be faced afterwards with requests for similar treatment for Ghana, Pakistan and Malaya, we need not consider ourselves obliged to help these countries more than we are doing at present. Ghana is in comparison with Nigeria a rich country whose armed forces are (as they have recently demonstrated) on the way to being well established. We help Pakistan already not only with the training of officers under the Commonwealth Relations Office scheme but also to the extent of about £11,000 from our CENTO Military Training fund. Our financial assistance to Malaya has been very substantial. But it has to be recognised that if we do help Nigeria in this way it may be difficult to refuse similar assistance to Sierra Leone where there may also be special circumstances, and whose financial problems are not less than those of Nigeria. We may possibly have to help the West Indies also, to go no further.

8. The first of the Governor-General’s two proposals, that the United Kingdom should pay part of the cost of British servicemen seconded to the Nigerian military forces, raises more complicated problems and involves a departure from our past policy for which however there may be a case on general grounds. Some preliminary study of what would be involved has been made by the interested Departments. It is proposed that this study should continue and that it should be directed towards the consideration of a general offer, not peculiar to Nigeria, with recommendations as to the best way of doing more to help newly emergent Commonwealth countries with the cost of seconded British officers, and that estimates of the costs of the different proposals which may emerge should be prepared.

9. This note has been agreed at official level with the Treasury, Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Ministry of Defence and the three Service Departments.
‘Future of the Gambia’: Cabinet memorandum by Mr Macleod

[Both the CO and CRO had given some thought to the future of the Gambia before the end of 1958 (CO 554/1516, esp no 19; DO 35/5418, no 55). In the autumn of 1960, the governor, Sir E Windley, raised the possibility of telling the Leg Co that HMG would not stand in the way of closer association with a neighbouring state, ie, Senegal (though he had previously thought of Mali). A union with Senegal might seem logical, but there were obvious practical difficulties in linking with a foreign country in the‘franc zone’. The FO advised doing nothing to obstruct such an association (FO 371/146486, no 2). The CRO also felt it would be a sensible solution for this ‘impossible country’, a mere ‘comic strip’ (DO 35/5418, no 67). The CO view was more equivocal. It was important that it did not become an indefinite financial liability to Britain (FO 371/146484, no 7): currently a grant-in-aid was given of £200,000 pa (expected to rise to perhaps £500,000 in the following year), quite apart from nearly £600,000 from CD & W. ‘From a purely mercenary point of view, the sooner we could be quit of the Gambia the better’, wrote Eastwood, ‘but of course mercenary considerations are by no means all. It would be no light matter for the UK to divest itself of a country which has been associated with it for very many years, and, like marriage, it is not an enterprise to be lightly or inadvisably embarked on’ (FO 371/146485, no 20). Macleod—recognising that it was ‘only a river and an extension of its banks, scarcely a territory in the ordinary sense of the word’—was surprised more attention had apparently not been paid to a possible union with Sierra Leone; he was informed that it had been twice administered from Sierra Leone, and twice abandoned (1821–1843, 1866–1881); reconsideration in 1940 had also foundered on the opposition of the governor and the people of Bathurst (CO 554/2150, minutes by Macleod, 26 Sept 1960, & P A Carter, 1 Oct). Clearly it was not an economic asset, and it was becoming a political liability, as more territories in Africa became independent. Macleod drew Macmillan’s attention to the problem (PM(60)18, 6 Dec 1960). Macmillan directed it should be considered by the Cabinet. Macleod produced a paper for the Colonial Policy Committee (CPC(60)26, 15 Dec 1960), substantially the memorandum printed here, minus paras 9 & 10. Presenting it to the Committee, he argued that it was becoming more and more anomalous: ‘we should be wise to formulate our own solution to the problem before pressure in the United Nations and elsewhere began to build up against us’ (CAB 134/1559, CPC 8(60), 22 Dec 1960).]

The Gambia consists of the Colony, a small area round Bathurst, the capital, which has been British for some 200 years, and the Protectorate, which has been British for 65 years; this is no more than 20 miles wide at its maximum breadth but it extends for some 180 miles inland on either bank of the Gambia River, right into the heart of Senegal, which lies on either side of it. There are altogether about 250,000 inhabitants.

2. The people value the Commonwealth connexion but it is a backward and impoverished country, dependent now on a grant-in-aid from us. It is obviously a geographical anomaly and a thorn in Senegal’s flesh. Its existence hinders the efficient use of the only important river in the area, makes it impossible to develop the only good natural harbour (Bathurst), creates a small enclave of territory which can only with difficulty sustain an economic existence and maintains an artificial barrier between peoples of the same race.

3. The Gambia is too small and too poor (65,000 tons of groundnuts are its only export) to become independent by itself. But when Sierra Leone becomes independent next April it will (apart from Portuguese and Spanish possessions) be the only Colonial dependency, British or French, left in West Africa. The people of Senegal on either side of it are racially the same. The Gambia River could be of use to Senegal and economically the country would probably gain by joining with Senegal, for they might get the benefit of the subsidised prices paid by France for the 800,000
tons or so of Senegalese groundnuts. Clearly there are strong arguments for the Gambia joining Senegal.

4. It is no light matter to suggest that a country which has been British for many years should join a foreign country, and there would clearly be practical difficulties, of language, law and systems of administration. To harmonise the two economies would also have its problems. Nevertheless, I have been reluctantly forced to the conclusion that some kind of association with Senegal is the only possible future for the Gambia. Sierra Leone, its nearest British neighbour, is too far away (300 miles) and too weak financially to be able to take on this liability. Anyhow the geographical anomaly would remain, and the people of the Protectorate have no kinship with those of Sierra Leone.

5. The Chiefs of Staff consider that, although it is desirable that we should not prejudice our staging rights in Bathurst unless there are compelling reasons for doing so, there are no strategic reasons for obstructing association between the Gambia and Senegal. They consider that it would be important to do what we could to prevent the penetration of the resultant State by Powers hostile to the West. Our Ambassador in Dakar advises that the present régime in Senegal under President Senghor and Premier Momadou Dia is well disposed towards the West and likely to pursue a moderate course in African and international affairs and not to be receptive to Communist influence. The Senegalese authorities would welcome closer association with the Gambia. The people of the Gambia itself despite their attachment to the British connexion increasingly realise that their future must lie with Senegal.

6. The Governor and three of his Ministers recently came here for financial talks and during the course of these I took the opportunity to discuss this question with them. The Ministers were quite clear that it is one which must now be faced. A good deal of local discussion will be necessary before a generally acceptable policy crystallises, but the Ministers, who were of different parties, were agreed that their country ought not to be merged completely with Senegal but should maintain some degree of separate identity and, if possible, its Commonwealth connexion. They had in mind some kind of federal arrangement which would be achieved gradually, leaving time for the two countries to grow together. The first step might be assimilation of the two tariffs and interchangeability of the currencies (special arrangements will in any case have to be made for the Gambia's currency when Sierra Leone becomes independent).

7. Gambian Ministers at present have only limited powers and they want “full internal self-government” within the next year so that they will be able to talk to Senegalese Ministers on terms of reasonable equality. I have promised to talk with them about this some time in the summer. If things go well, I may at least be able to agree to the appointment of a Chief Minister. In the meanwhile I expect no startling developments.

8. The Gambian Ministers are clearly right in thinking that the process of association should be a gradual one and the Governor and I would also wish to feel our way. It is difficult to see the end of the process. We must recognise that, despite the present wishes of Gambia Ministers, it might well be complete integration with Senegal and separation from the Commonwealth. I think we must face this possibility. The people of the Gambia should of course know of the difficulties in maintaining the Commonwealth connexion if their relationship with Senegal takes
the form of political union or federation and a final decision on their future should not be taken until it is possible to determine clearly the wishes of the people.

9. The Governor and I feel however that we must be ready to take an initial step soon. My immediate proposal is that we should take the initiative to the extent of letting the people of the Gambia know that Her Majesty's Government do not rule out the possibility of their seeking a future with Senegal. The Governor has advised and I agree with him that this would at least help to set minds working in the right direction. I would wish to leave the timing of any such statement open. It may well be best not to make it until the talks about constitutional development, but it might possibly be better made before that if a suitable occasion arises—e.g., a speech by the Governor in his legislature.

10. If my colleagues agree with my view on the future of the territory, I would propose to inform the Governor that Her Majesty's Government's view is that if, after the Gambia has advanced constitutionally, it appears to be the clearly expressed view of the inhabitants that their future lies in an association with Senegal, Her Majesty's Government would not stand in the way, but would assist in any way they could in initiating discussions on the subject between Gambian and Senegalese Ministers. I would ask the Governor to consult me further on the precise timing and nature of any public statement.

11. I shall be grateful for the approval of my colleagues to this course of action.

112 CAB 128/35/1, CC 2(61)6 24 Jan 1961
[The future of the Gambia]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (61) 5) about the future of the Gambia.1

The Colonial Secretary said that, when Sierra Leone attained independence in April, the Gambia would (apart from Portuguese and Spanish possessions) be the only remaining Colonial territory in West Africa. The Gambia was too small and too poor to become fully independent alone, and Sierra Leone, the nearest British territory, was too far away and not sufficiently strong economically to accept the liability of a federation between the two countries. There were strong geographical and ethnic reasons for the Gambia becoming part of Senegal, and this might provide substantial economic benefits to both countries. The Chiefs of Staff considered that there were no strategic reasons for obstructing an association between the Gambia and Senegal, though they emphasised the need to prevent the development of Communist influence there. The Senegalese authorities would welcome closer association with the Gambia, and the people of the Gambia, despite their attachment to the British connexion, increasingly took the view that their future must lie in some form of association between the two countries.

Constitutional discussions would be held with Gambian Ministers during the summer, and it was possible that some progress towards full internal self-government, perhaps by the appointment of a Chief Minister, might be made early in 1962. Gambian Ministers, of various parties, themselves thought that any process of

1 See previous document.
association with Senegal should be gradual. But this process might well end in complete integration with Senegal and separation from the Commonwealth. It would be desirable at some stage, perhaps in the course of the constitutional discussions, to let the people of the Gambia know that the United Kingdom Government would not rule out the possibility of their seeking an association with Senegal. This was in accordance with the views of the Governor of the Gambia, who would consult further about the timing and nature of any public statement to this effect.

Discussion showed that it was the general view of the Cabinet that, while separation from the Commonwealth would be a matter of great regret, the best prospect for the future of the people of the Gambia inevitably lay in some form of association with Senegal. It would be desirable so far as possible to maintain some degree of separate identity for the Gambia. It was suggested that it might be possible to evolve a special status for Bathurst, which might become a free city serving the interests of both countries. Moreover it would be unwise for the United Kingdom Government to appear in any way to seek to hasten this development. The people of the Gambia were well disposed towards the United Kingdom, and any impression that we wished to sever our link with them must be avoided.

The Minister of Defence said that it was highly desirable that we should not prejudice our staging rights in Bathurst. It was therefore desirable to try to provide for a continuation of these rights by means of a defence agreement which would be part of an eventual constitutional settlement.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed that the United Kingdom Government should not obstruct the gradual development of some association between the Gambia and Senegal if, after constitutional advances had been made in the Gambia, that appeared to be the wish of the Gambian people.

(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to consider further the timing and nature of any public statement about the future of the Gambia.

(3) Invited the Colonial Secretary, in considering future constitutional arrangements for the Gambia, to consult the Minister of Defence about provisions for the continuation of staging rights in Bathurst.

2 Mr H Watkinson.
Nations, the Northern Cameroons had voted for joining Nigeria and the Southern Cameroons for joining the Cameroun Republic.

The Cameroun Republic was disappointed at the result of the plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons and intended to challenge its validity at the United Nations. It should be possible to rebut any allegations against the propriety of the voting, but the Republic would almost certainly be able to rally the support, not only of the other French Community States, but also of France herself.

Administratively, there would be little difficulty in transferring the Northern Cameroons to Nigeria and it was in our political and financial interest to complete the transfer as soon as the agreement of the United Nations could be obtained. The transfer of the Southern Cameroons to the Republic would give rise to more difficulty. While the Republic at present appeared willing to co-operate in the transfer, difficult problems would arise over the constitutional, financial and defence arrangements and the future staffing of the public services and the police. All these questions would need to be discussed with France, Nigeria and the Republic. While it was in our interest that the transfer should be completed with as little delay as possible, great care would be needed if we were to avoid a breakdown in administration which could lead to a situation comparable to that in the Congo. The Colonial Secretary said that he proposed to consider with the Foreign Secretary how further discussions with the other Governments concerned could best be pursued.

Discussion showed that there was general agreement in the Cabinet with the course proposed by the Colonial Secretary. Further consideration should, however, be given as a matter of urgency to the best and quickest methods of reducing our military and financial commitments in the Southern Cameroons.

114  CAB 128/35/1, CC 31(61)7  13 June 1961
[Future of the Southern Cameroons on independence]: Cabinet conclusions¹

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Prime Minister (C. (61) 79) about the future of the Southern Cameroons.

The Prime Minister said that there was a serious danger that subversive forces in the Southern Cameroons, organised by Chinese Communists, would launch a campaign of terrorism when the territory became independent on 1st October and, in conformity with the result of the United Nations plebiscite, entered into some form of federation with the Cameroun Republic. Unless internal security could be preserved, the administrative personnel, the great majority of whom were British, would leave the country, as would the representatives of British commercial interests there. It had therefore been suggested that the battalion of United Kingdom troops at present stationed in the Southern Cameroons should be allowed to remain, after 1st October, in order to maintain internal security during the transitional period while the proposed federation was established and to allow time for an adequate local security force to be recruited and trained. It was also suggested that we should establish an Aid Mission, consisting in effect of the existing administrative personnel, who would be invited to

¹ Previous reference: see previous document.
remain under the aegis of the new Department of Technical Co-operation. These measures would be additional to our continuing to finance the budget deficit of the territory, including the cost of maintaining the locally recruited security force. In default of action on these lines, we might well be held to blame if there were a breakdown of administration in the Southern Cameroons and perhaps in the neighbouring Cameroun Republic, leading to the emergence of a Communist-dominated régime in this area which would be particularly dangerous to Nigeria.

There were, however, strong financial and military arguments against accepting these commitments. The cost of the proposed measures would amount to nearly £2 millions a year, and any addition to our oversea expenditure was particularly unwelcome at present. The responsibility for ensuring stability in the Southern Cameroons ought to be undertaken by the United Nations, and we had already stated publicly that the United Kingdom forces would be withdrawn when our trusteeship came to an end. There could be no question of leaving the battalion unless both the Prime Minister of the Southern Cameroons, Mr. Foncha, and the Prime Minister of the Cameroun Republic, Mr. Ahidjo, agreed to request it; but even then there was no precedent for putting British troops under the command of a foreign Government in time of peace, and we would be likely in any case to be criticised for maintaining a military force in the territory. There was also a danger that relations between Mr. Foncha and Mr. Ahidjo would deteriorate, and that our troops might become involved in a personal struggle for power. Moreover, if terrorism broke out on an extensive scale, a single battalion would be inadequate and would have to be reinforced: and this, in the light of our other commitments, would be extremely difficult.

United Kingdom representatives were to discuss the future of the territory at a meeting later that week with Mr. Foncha and Mr. Ahidjo, at which it was hoped that French military representatives would also be present. It was therefore necessary to decide whether to withdraw the United Kingdom battalion on 1st October and to confine our assistance to such modest financial support as we could afford, or to undertake these substantial additional responsibilities for the security and administration of the territory for some further time.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) British investment in the territory amounted to nearly £20 millions; nevertheless these interests were not enough to warrant the continued deployment of British forces after 1st October. The main issue was whether we could afford the risk of the dangerous growth of Communist influence in this area.

(b) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff\(^2\) said that conditions in the territory would make it necessary to relieve United Kingdom troops every six months. It was very doubtful whether a local security force could be recruited and trained in a short time. There was no doubt that a single battalion would be inadequate to maintain order if serious terrorism broke out, and in that event it would be necessary to send two further battalions to reinforce it. In view of their interests in the Cameroun Republic, it would be greatly preferable that the French should accept the responsibility for security, including the training of a local force.

(c) Even if the current Army recruiting objective were realised, it would not be possible to reinforce a battalion in the Southern Cameroons without losing our

---

\(^2\) F-M Sir F Festing.
capacity to meet other military commitments which ought to have priority. For example, it would be of greater importance to provide reinforcements for Zanzibar. (d) It was very desirable that the training of a local security force should be undertaken by the French authorities, on behalf of the Cameroun Republic. Although the French maintained that they could not accept additional commitments, they might be persuaded to undertake responsibility for security in the Southern Cameroons if they thought that we would in any case withdraw when our trusteeship came to an end.

(e) The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that if it were necessary to undertake further commitments in the Southern Cameroons, offsetting reductions would have to be made in overseas expenditure elsewhere. Nevertheless, he would agree that some modest contribution, up to £½ million, might be afforded as a final measure of assistance to the territory upon becoming independent.

The Prime Minister, summing up, said that it was the general view of the Cabinet that, on balance, it would not be justifiable to undertake the additional commitment which would be involved if a United Kingdom battalion were retained in the Southern Cameroons after independence. The United Kingdom representatives at the meeting with Mr. Foncha and Mr. Ahidjo should conduct their discussions on the basis that it was our intention to withdraw the United Kingdom battalion after 1st October. They should seek to ascertain what measures were contemplated by Mr. Foncha and Mr. Ahidjo for the maintenance of the administration and of internal security, and how far they were agreed about future arrangements for the territory and its association with the Cameroun Republic. They could indicate that we would be prepared to provide financial assistance amounting to £½ million to the territory during the first year after independence, either to enable our expatriate officers to continue in the administration or to support the budget. It was to be hoped that, in the face of this attitude, the French authorities would realise that there was no alternative but for them to accept future responsibility for security in the Cameroons, as well as in the Cameroun Republic.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed that the United Kingdom battalion in the Southern Cameroons should be withdrawn after 1st October, and that our support for the territory should thereafter be limited to financial assistance of not more than £½ million.

(2) Invited the Lord Privy Seal to formulate instructions for the United Kingdom representatives at the meeting with the Prime Minister of the Southern Cameroons and the Prime Minister of the Cameroun Republic on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister.

115  CAB 128/35/1, CC 36(61)6  29 June 1961

[Future of Southern Cameroons]: Cabinet conclusions¹

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Lord Chancellor (C. (61) 86) about the future of the Southern Cameroons.

The Lord Chancellor said that the United Kingdom representatives who had taken

¹ Previous reference: see previous document.
part in recent discussions in Buea had found that there were serious differences between the Prime Minister of the Cameroun Republic, Mr. Ahidjo, and the Prime Minister of the Southern Cameroons, Mr. Foncha, about the relationship between the two territories when the United Kingdom trusteeship came to an end on 1st October. It had not therefore been possible to discuss the establishment of a Southern Cameroons security force to be trained by the authorities of the Cameroun Republic, and it did not seem likely that Mr. Ahidjo would agree that there should be a separate Southern Cameroons force. In accordance with the Cabinet’s previous conclusions the United Kingdom representatives had announced that the British battalion would be withdrawn on 1st October; and, although a formal request for the retention of the battalion had been made, it had subsequently become clear that Mr. Ahidjo would not favour this course. It was likely that, when it was realised that the British battalion was to be withdrawn on that date, officials of the present Administration, including expatriate police officers, would begin to leave and most expatriate employees of British firms would probably do the same. In these circumstances it would not be practicable for us to provide an Aid Mission.

As a result of their discussions, the United Kingdom representatives had recommended that military action should be taken before 1st October against one camp of 200 terrorists which had been located in an isolated area, that a consular post should be opened at Buea on 1st October, and that the decision to withdraw the British battalion should be announced immediately so that the expatriate officers and employees who wished to leave might have reasonable time to make their arrangements. These recommendations had since been approved by the Colonial Policy Committee. The Committee had rejected a further suggestion that the British battalion might be kept in the coastal area for a further year. There were serious military objections to this proposal which, in any case, would have involved the risk that British forces might become involved in disputes between Mr. Foncha and Mr. Ahidjo. The Committee had also decided that we should offer £1/2 million aid to the Southern Cameroons, to meet their immediate needs on the termination of our trusteeship, and that we should proceed with transitional arrangements for the ending of Commonwealth preferences in order to assist the Southern Cameroons over the period during which alternative markets for their products could be developed.

The Colonial Policy Committee had also considered the possibility that Mr. Foncha, if he were unable to compose his differences with Mr. Ahidjo, might appeal to the United Nations to extend our trusteeship beyond 1st October. It had been suggested that it might be in our interests to encourage Mr. Foncha to make such an appeal, so as to provide a further period in which to work out transitional arrangements to prevent conditions in the territory from developing in a manner favourable for Communist exploitation. It had, however, been pointed out that if this possibility were raised in the United Nations it would arouse criticism and suspicions of our intentions. In any event there was no certainty that at the end of an extension of our trusteeship the situation in the Southern Cameroons would have become less difficult.

The Colonial Secretary said that, although it was highly probable that, with the withdrawal of the British battalion and the departure of expatriate officials and employees, the Administration in the Southern Cameroons would collapse, thus providing an opportunity for Communist exploitation, there seemed no alternative but to accept these risks in view of the serious military and financial objections to continuing our presence in the Southern Cameroons. It would, however, be worth examining
a further proposal that had now been made, that during the period before their withdrawal the British battalion should train, so far as possible, an additional security force of some 120 reliable Africans which it was now thought might be possible to recruit.

The Secretary of State for War said that the British force commander was prepared to undertake the military action which had been proposed against a camp of 200 terrorists. In view of the local conditions, the chances that this operation would achieve worthwhile results were not great. It should only be authorised on the understanding that it would not prejudice a firm decision to withdraw the British battalion in any event on 1st October, and provided that a careful explanation of the limited nature of the operation was given to the troops involved.

In discussion there was general agreement that the decision to withdraw the British battalion on 1st October should be confirmed. It was also agreed that it would not be in our interests to encourage Mr. Foncha to seek an extension of the trusteeship status of the Southern Cameroons. The proposal that in the meantime the British battalion might train a small locally recruited force of reliable Africans should, however, be further examined.

As regards the proposed operation against the terrorists’ camp, it was suggested that it might be inadvisable to risk arousing strong terrorist reactions with which we were not prepared to deal after 1st October. It was explained that the operation would be more in the nature of a police action, and was more likely to result in the dispersal of the terrorists than in their capture. It was also pointed out that we had been asked to deal with this concentration of terrorists by the present Administration; and that, in view of our current responsibilities as the trustee Power, the request could not easily be refused. It would be unwise to pursue the operation if this involved risking a serious number of British casualties, and it should only proceed subject to the conditions mentioned by the Secretary of State for War. The operational instructions should be subject to his personal approval and that of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The Cabinet:

(1) Approved the recommendations made in paragraph 10(a) of C. (61) 86.
(2) Invited the Secretary of State for War to arrange that the operational instructions for the attack on the terrorists’ camp should be subject to his personal approval and that of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
(3) Invited the Colonial Secretary to arrange for further examination of the proposal that the British battalion, before 1st October, should train a small locally recruited force of reliable Africans.
(4) Agreed that the Prime Minister of the Southern Cameroons should not be encouraged to seek an extension of the trusteeship status of that territory.

2 Mr J Profumo.
the weekend of 24–25 Jan 1959, known as ‘the Chequers meeting’. The record of the discussion was marked as EAC(59)1, a copy of which should have been filed in the CO under the internal filing-code 720, thus eventually finding its place in CO 822/1819, ‘Conference with East African governors on future policy in East Africa, 1957–1959’. Unfortunately there is no copy of the record in this file, nor any indication of where it might be, and the record has not been located."

On the 24th–25th January I discussed with the Governors of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda and the British Resident, Zanzibar, our immediate and long-term aims in East Africa. I have since been in correspondence with them and in this paper I seek my colleagues’ endorsement of the conclusions we have now reached. It will be convenient to examine the problem first in terms of the British interests involved.

**British interests**

2. The following is a suggested definition of the British interests involved:—

(a) The positive defence interest, *i.e.*, the need for over-flying and staging rights and the use of ports (vital for Her Majesty's Government to reinforce rapidly to protect its interests in Southern Arabia, the Persian Gulf and South-East Asia), and the need to station in East Africa the forward reserve (again for use in Southern Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Central Africa and the Far East), so long as there is no alternative method of effectively protecting those interests (*e.g.*, a kind of “sixth fleet” defence policy).

(b) The negative defence and economic interest, *i.e.*, the need to ensure that the area is as friendly to the West as possible and, at the very least, is benevolently neutral. Failure to secure this interest, even after the positive defence interest was no longer important, would seriously prejudice British prestige and influence and jeopardise British investments in the area.

(c) The need to do everything we reasonably can to ensure that people of all races, who have made their homes in these territories with the encouragement of successive British Governments, will be able to continue to live there in security and to contribute to the development and prosperity of the area.

3. All these interests can be secured for certain only so long as Her Majesty's Government successfully retain ultimate control, *i.e.*, so long as they or their agents are in direct control not only of defence and external relations, but also of law and order—the legal system, the Police and the internal security side of the work of the Provincial Administrations.

**Need for reviewing policy at this time**

4. Up to the present time it has been possible to make notable constitutional advances in East Africa (such as generally increasing the degree of unofficial representation in the legislatures, associating unofficials—in some cases as Ministers—with the executive work of government, introducing direct elections) while still maintaining *official control*. The existence, at present, of Government majorities in the Executive and Legislative bodies of all four territories means that Her Majesty’s Government still retain full control. But the time is approaching, certainly in Tanganyika and Uganda, when future constitutional advance will start the process in earnest of tipping the balance of power in favour of unofficials. So long as the territories are not allowed to advance beyond the stage of *internal self-government* Her Majesty’s Government’s control in the vital matters mentioned in
paragraph 3 will remain more or less unimpaired. But the experience elsewhere suggests (a) that once the balance moves in favour of the unofficials rapid progress to internal self-government is difficult to check and (b) that thereafter it is not likely that the state of internal self-government itself can be maintained “intact” for more than a very few years.

For these reasons it is important now, i.e., before full official control begins to be eroded, to consider the general policy that should be adopted in East Africa having regard not only to the long-term interests of Britain in this area but also (i) to the implied or expressed commitments in the past, and (ii) to the present fast-moving tide of African nationalism. Considerations arising from (i) and (ii) are discussed below.

**Likely effect of commitments already implied or expressed**

5. It would be inconsistent with general British colonial policy to retain these territories in perpetual colonial status. No date has ever been set by which self-government or even internal self-government, would be achieved, but it can no longer be doubted that both Uganda and Tanganyika will become fully self-governing in the foreseeable future and that by that time power will be in the hands of predominantly, if not wholly, African Governments. As regards Kenya (to which I return later in this paper) I have maintained the line that I do not see any prospect in the foreseeable future of Her Majesty’s Government’s relinquishing control; but it will become increasingly difficult to maintain this uncertainty once there is a significant transfer of power in the countries on her western and southern flanks. Zanzibar, because of her small size and the complication of the Sultan’s domains on the mainland, is in a special position and is separately dealt with in Annex I.1

**African nationalism**

6. The effect of this has to be taken seriously into account because:—

(i) its purpose is to secure a very early end of colonial status;
(ii) so far as the mainland territories are concerned, it seeks the creation of African-dominated States; and
(iii) it cannot be assumed that pressure for political advance arising from it will not be supported by recourse to organised and widespread violence.

7. The pressure of African nationalism, which will gain further momentum from external sources, notably when the activities of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa develop, is most evident in Tanganyika and Kenya, though the Arab nationalist campaign for early independence in Zanzibar constitutes no less a danger. In Tanganyika the Tanganyika African National Union, led by Julius Nyerere, dominates the political scene. It commands the support of the great mass of the Africans and its influence is apparent through the length and breadth of the country. There is no effective opposition either from moderate Africans or from the non-African communities. A country-wide campaign initiated by Nyerere led, early in 1958, to the widespread acceptance of the notion that Tanganyika should be “free” in 1959, and that all members of T.A.N.U. would be expected to take part in a campaign

---

1 Annexes not printed.
of “positive action” if freedom were not, in fact, achieved. Nyerere soon found that
the wave of nationalist hysteria he had set in motion was beyond his ability to
control, and it is doubtful whether he has made any whole-hearted attempt to check
it. Nyerere himself has been at pains to explain that he was misunderstood and that
all that he had in mind was “reasonable government,” by which he meant that the
official majorities in the Executive and Legislative Councils would give way to
unofficial elected majorities. He has made it clear that he expects this changeover to
be implemented within the next year or two and, more recently, he has been reported
as stating his intention of working for independence by 1963. The internal security
forces are weak and will require at least two years to be put on a sound footing. Steps
are being taken to expand the Police Force with all possible speed. Meanwhile the
Tanganyika Government could not engage in a real show of force with Nyerere
without invoking military assistance, with all the consequences this would be likely
to involve. In Kenya the situation is more complicated. The African nationalists,
supported, though only half-heartedly, by the Asians (excepting the Muslims) are
campaigning for a complete overhaul of the present constitution, their aim being to
break the present balance between the Europeans, Asians and Africans so as to pave
the way for a fairly rapid evolution of an African dominated country. Recent activities
of the African extremists suggest that they are preparing for a campaign of “Positive
Action” designed to put further pressure on the Government to yield to their
demands.

There may therefore develop a civil disobedience campaign which in the
atmosphere left by the Mau Mau rebellion is bound to lead to violence. Mboya’s² main
card is probably, however, a long continued political war of nerves designed to cause
Europeans with roots in the country to lose their nerve and of their own accord to
leave.

Some Europeans are counter-attacking with the demand that Her Majesty’s
Government should expressly declare their intention to remain in control for a long
period of years. The position is one of constitutional deadlock in a fairly explosive
atmosphere; though Kenya is better placed than Tanganyika is at present to deal with
a serious threat to order.

In Zanzibar the Arab nationalists are campaigning for immediate independence;
but the effect of this extremism is to some extent allayed by the fact that the Afro-
Shirazis, who command considerably more support inside the territory, are anxious
that self-government should not come before they themselves are sufficiently
advanced to be able effectively to use it to entrench their position at the expense of
the Arab minority. The political atmosphere is unpleasant at times and serious
trouble is not out of the question, but probably less risk than in either Kenya or
Tanganyika.

In Uganda the situation is different, but equally complex and potentially
threatening. The conflicting interests of the African politicians and the neo-feudal or
traditional elements, headed by the Hereditary Rulers and their cliques, have
checked the growth of outright and monolithic African nationalism in Uganda—as it
has also checked the advance of democracy. Added to this conflict between
“democratic” and “traditional” elements is the present dislike in which the Baganda

² Tom J Mboya, secretary of Kenya Federation of Labour and a campaigner for independence; general
secretary of Kenyatta’s Kenya African National Union.
and their Kabaka are held by most of the other tribes in the Protectorate, and the fear by the other tribes that premature self-government, before they have had time to catch up with the more advanced Baganda, might lead to Buganda domination. These conflicts serve as a check on demands for early self-government. But this is none the less the uniform desire of all vocal political elements and of the Baganda—who are pressing for separate self-government now in the hope that, if granted, they will then be able to dominate or govern the whole of Uganda when Protectorate self-government is reached. At present the political parties are divided, the two major parties on denominational lines, and are weak, ill-organised and without effective leadership. Notwithstanding they are capable of rousing the unthinking masses and to some extent they have found common cause with the Kabaka and the Omukama of Toro in attacking the Committee which has been set up to study certain aspects of the Constitution. Moreover, a new party called the Uganda National Movement and purporting to be nation-wide in scope has been giving cause for concern. Although latest reports suggest that it does not as yet command much support outside Buganda, its activities in that Province are following the customary pattern of boycott, intimidation and general defiance of authority. The Buganda situation is always fraught with danger and might lead to a recrudescence of the Buganda riots (although for different reasons) of 1945 and 1949.

The Governor [Sir F Crawford] has been having exploratory talks with the Kabaka in an endeavour to find some way through present difficulties and he is hopeful that if an agreed basis for discussion can be secured it may be possible to pave the way for a period of reasonable co-operation between the Kabaka and his Ministers on the one hand and the Central Government on the other.

Possible courses of action

8. In broad terms one of three general lines of policy in the field of constitutional development could be followed. First we could retreat before it and prepare for a rapid withdrawal of British control. In terms of time this would probably mean that the British would be out of East Africa by 1965. The consequences of such a policy (quite apart from the probable loss of a vital defence interest) are not difficult to imagine. Apart from the fact that there would probably be violence in Kenya we should have handed over throughout the region to governments incapable of standing on their own feet economically and lacking sufficient skilled manpower to run the countries efficiently. There would thus be a most dangerous political vacuum in a large area in Africa of which our enemies would be quick to take advantage and which would seriously prejudice the British position further south in Central Africa.

Such a premature abandonment of our responsibilities would lead to a sharp fall in the standard of living and consequently to widespread discontent. An impoverished country with a discontented population would provide ideal ground for mischief makers from Egypt or Russia.

9. A second choice would be to consolidate, so far as was possible, our position in East Africa and to make it clear, as has already been made clear for Kenya, that there is no prospect of the relinquishment by Britain of her ultimate control in the foreseeable future. This policy might have some appeal to extreme diehard opinion but its chief disadvantage is that it is probable that it could only be carried out if Her Majesty's Government were prepared and able to hold the area by force. In doing so we should be isolated from even moderate world opinion and when the time
ultimately came for us to withdraw, we should, in all probability, have left behind so much frustration and bitterness that we could hardly contemplate securing the area indefinitely as an area which was at least not actively hostile to us.

The policy of “gradualness”

10. I submit that both these choices should be rejected in favour of a third, namely, the adoption of a “middle-road” policy. This, in effect, means the continuation of our policy of step by step constitutional progress with the aim of meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Africans while at the same time (i) securing sufficient time for the countries to be more adequately equipped for the responsibilities of ultimate self-government; (ii) drawing out the period during which Her Majesty’s Government can retain control in vital matters.

In working out such a policy I submit that we should be guided by the following considerations:

(a) We should aim to control the pace of advance in Tanganyika and Uganda sufficiently for us to have a period of about 10 years before these countries are given more or less complete responsibility for their internal affairs, i.e., our planning should assume that by about 1969 the Executive organ in each of these territories will comprise elected Ministers (a majority of whom will be Africans) with the portfolios only of the Chief Secretary, Minister for Finance and Attorney-General reserved for officials.

(b) We should, so far as is practicable, ensure that the progressive advance towards self-government is subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, the most important of which are—

(i) that the institutions of Government we are evolving will not be abused by those who would seek to establish an authoritarian position,
(ii) that the rights of all who have made their homes in these countries should be properly safeguarded,
(iii) that these countries must be able in the long term to support reasonable standards of living from their own resources at any rate on recurrent account, and retain the confidence of investors, and
(iv) that there must be adequate numbers of local people to enable these countries to be run efficiently when the time comes.

(c) We should ensure that during the next 10 years the countries should be able to bring about such increases in their economic and social development as are practicable having regard to the needs of the territories and the resources that can be made available. At the same time we must avoid the danger that excessive and continued dependence on United Kingdom aid, especially on recurrent account, will mean that they can never become self-governing in any real sense.

(d) We should be prepared to be rather more forthcoming about time-tables of advance than we have hitherto felt to be practicable. I do not suggest that we should commit ourselves unreservedly to a date by which these countries will be given self-government but rather that we should be prepared to indicate when certain important stages (before the grant of full self-government) may be expected to be attained subject to the fulfilment of the essential conditions.

In constitutional terms the problem can be narrowed down to the crucial question when we should be prepared to consider the introduction of a majority of unofficial
Ministers in the Government. Uganda has set up a Committee to study certain aspects of the constitution, whilst Tanganyika is about to do so. I need not trouble my colleagues with details about them. The important point in this context is that, when decisions are announced after their recommendations have been considered, the Governor of Tanganyika (certainly) and the Governor of Uganda (probably) will be expected to announce when the next major steps forward (apart from the more incidental matters remitted to the Committees) can be taken. In Tanganyika the occasion for such an announcement will be approximately the end of this year, and in Uganda perhaps a little later. Tanganyika can, therefore, be regarded as the key to the situation in the sense that decisions announced for Tanganyika at the end of the year will largely determine the pace of development for Uganda and elsewhere in East Africa.

Constitutional programme in Tanganyika

11. We have been faced with a real dilemma in this Territory. On the one hand the country and its people are, generally speaking, by far the most backward in the region. On the other hand, against the background of the Government's present unpreparedness to have a real show-down with a highly organised country-wide pressure group which is not checked by non-African pressure, it is unrealistic to plan on the assumption that we can hold out against advances which, on strict merits, are manifestly premature. The essential problem has been to deal with the demand for a (virtually) immediate majority of elected Ministers in the Executive in such a way as to ensure that Nyerere is not provoked to begin a serious campaign of resistance and yet, at the same time, not to make concessions sufficiently far-reaching to start a landslide in Uganda and possibly elsewhere.

The present Executive Council comprises Ministers (all of whom are officials), other officials and some members nominated by the Governor. As from the 1st July this body will be replaced by a Council of Ministers comprising 7 officials and 5 unofficials (3 Africans, 1 Asian, 1 European, all of whom will probably be drawn from the elected members). This, although a major advance, falls short of T.A.N.U's idea of "responsible Government" by 1959, but Nyerere has been induced to accept this mainly on the strength of the Governor's undertaking (given when he announced this forthcoming change with other measures last month) to consider the question of further constitutional advances, to promise a statement on these and to include in that statement a forecast of when (if there is no untoward developments) it may be expected that unofficial majorities will be introduced into the Council of Ministers and into the Legislative Council.

I have considered very carefully with the Governor and with other East African Governors what the outline of that next statement should be. We are agreed that he should announce the intention to increase the number of unofficial Ministers from the 5 (who will take office in July of this year) to 7 (not necessarily, although probably, all elected) for the period 1961–65. During this period the number of official Ministers would remain at 7, so the officials and unofficials would be equally balanced. The Governor would go on to express the hope that nothing would prevent the Government from considering during the life-time of the 1961–65 Legislative Council the possibility of working towards an unofficial majority (7 unofficials and 5 officials) for the period, which would certainly be for at least the life-time of the Legislative Council, from 1965. These changes which would see Tanganyika through
until 1969 (at least) would be subject to law and order being maintained and to the country's showing (on grounds of performance, &c.) that they are justified. No commitment would be given beyond 1969, but the Governor would make it clear that the next stage would be a substantial measure of internal self-government so that people would not expect to be fully self-governing immediately after 1969.

It will be seen that the programme conforms with the considerations (a), (b) and (d) in paragraph 10 above.

Although the Governor has repeatedly told Nyerere that a very early introduction of an unofficial majority is not practical politics we cannot rule out the possibility that there may be the strongest opposition even to an announcement which is as forthcoming and forward-looking as the one outlined above; and that we may well be faced with the threat of a widespread campaign of violence to bring pressure on the Government to make even further concessions. I am quite sure, however, that it would be far better to stand firm and meet the challenge than to give way. It would I think be a little premature now to attempt to assess the risks in detail and to calculate what would be necessary to contain them. I am, however, remaining closely in touch with the Governor on this aspect and propose somewhat nearer the time when the matter will be put to the test to give my colleagues an assessment of the risks involved in pushing through with this programme.

Although a corresponding programme has not yet been formulated for Uganda it can be assumed that the Tanganyika programme would set the seal for a similar pace of progress in Uganda and possibly also in Zanzibar. It is not possible to judge the consequences in Kenya which I discuss in detail in the following paragraph.

For the moment I seek my colleagues' endorsement of the policy advocated in paragraph 10 and their general approval of its implementation for Tanganyika as outlined in the present paragraph.

The special problem of Kenya

12. The path of constitutional development cannot be seen so clearly in Kenya as in Uganda and Tanganyika. The essential problem is how to provide for greater participation by the Africans in political matters, while at the same time retaining the confidence, particularly of the Europeans, in Her Majesty's Government's resolve not to hand the country over in circumstances which would mean domination by Africans grossly ill-equipped to run the country effectively. The aims of the extremists on the African and European sides are in vivid contrast. Whereas the former wish to see us open the door to the creation of full democracy (i.e., African domination) the latter are unwilling to see a single change. I am sure that any policy which implied support for either would have disastrous consequences not only for Her Majesty's Government but for the great mass of the people in the Colony. I have been much encouraged by the statement of policy that was issued at the beginning of this month by a group of people of all three races, led by Mr. Blundell, who is resigning his position as Minister for Agriculture to take over the leadership of this group. In its general approach to a number of important issues including the political evolution of the country, educational policy and land policy, this group has evinced a most heartening liberal attitude which could augur well for future inter-racial co-operation. This approach has naturally attracted strong criticism from extremists on both sides and I believe it to be of cardinal importance that in the very near future I should make a statement of policy on Kenya which would, in its
essence, have the effect of lending support to the moderates; and I hope that I may have an early opportunity in Parliament of doing so. At the same time I should like to make one more effort to break the present constitutional deadlock. As reported in paragraph 7 the Africans and some of the Asians are very anxious that a full-scale conference should be summoned with a view, as it were, to making a fresh start. The position of the African and Asian Ministers has become more difficult as a result, and there is a danger that if I do nothing they may feel impelled to leave the Government. I have it in mind to suggest, when I make my statement, that a conference should be held at an appropriate time, making it clear that we cannot expect to have it in the life-time of the present Administration. I would also make it clear that any review of the present constitutional arrangements must be conducted against the background of those features of the present Constitution which I regard as fundamental to Kenya’s future. I refer here to the need to maintain the principle of a multi-racial Executive (although I envisage that in time the racial balance in the Executive must move in favour of the Africans), to prevent the extension of representation on a communal basis, to maintain and develop the principle of representation on a non-communal basis and, finally, to preserve in the Constitution a device designed to ensure that there is no racial discrimination.

In the situation outlined above it would be clearly premature to attempt to lay down for Kenya the kind of constitutional programme envisaged for Uganda and Tanganyika. Nevertheless our principal purpose must be to ensure that we can find a way out of the present deadlock not only to prevent an explosion but also to make it possible for the people in Kenya to move along at roughly the same pace as that envisaged for their neighbours.

Need for a general statement on East African policy

13. I have considered whether I should seek an early opportunity of making a general statement of policy covering the Region as a whole. I have concluded that such a statement is not necessary at this juncture. The time might, however, come later on when it might be useful for a general statement to be made and in that event I would propose to make one following generally the lines of the provisional draft attached as Annex II of this paper.

At this stage I merely ask my colleagues to note that I am keeping the possibility in mind and that, should it subsequently appear that a statement was advisable, I would consult the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in regard to the financial implications, before making it.

The long-term future

14. In view of Her Majesty’s Government’s long-term interests in this Region, and of the fact that, even with the controlled policy of constitutional development advocated above, it will not be long before a substantial transfer of power begins to take place, I believe that no time should be lost in trying to devise a method by which Her Majesty’s Government might retain for a considerable, if not indefinite, period some control in the area in matters of vital concern. Four possibilities suggest themselves:

(a) To maintain ultimate power in the vital matters in Kenya for an indefinite period, leaving the other (mainland) territories to become fully self-governing.
(b) To maintain control by Her Majesty's Government over Zanzibar, including Mombasa and the coastal strip, leaving the rest of Kenya and the mainland territories to become fully self-governing.
(c) To develop all the mainland territories, and possibly also Zanzibar, as fully self-governing territories but associated under a Federal-type structure controlled (for a time at least) by Her Majesty's Government.
(d) To abandon the idea of working towards any of these “physical” solutions, but to allow these territories to develop normally towards full self-government and rely on defence and other agreements for the securing of any interests which might still be vital to Her Majesty's Government.

East African Land Forces

15. The point raised in the preceding paragraph is a matter of long-term policy and I doubt whether it would be wise to try to reach definite conclusions for some time. But we must prepare for all eventualities by seeking to ensure that the control, which we now have, of the local defence forces is not prejudiced, particularly after the crucial period beginning in 1965 or thereabouts. To this end I believe that Her Majesty's Government should assume the cost of these forces from the earliest convenient date. The Governors and the British Resident are strongly in favour of this and the detailed implications are now being studied at the official level by the Departments concerned. I attach very great importance to this and hope very shortly to be able to make definite proposals to my colleagues on this subject.

Financial implications

16. In paragraph 10 (c) I referred to economic and social development. I cannot emphasise too strongly the importance of this aspect of our policy. If, through financial stringency, these territories have to cut back severely on their economic and social (particularly educational) programmes the whole aim of trying to secure a planned constitutional development will be gravely jeopardised. If the Governments are not able to demonstrate that their programmes, aimed at increasing prosperity and at bringing the local people on in sufficient numbers to be able more or less to run things for themselves, are being conscientiously carried forward, we shall be suspected of trying to hold African advancement back deliberately and, what is more important, African advancement will in fact be held back. The Governments are apprehensive on this score, more particularly in the cases of Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar where there is marked anxiety lest our whole aim of ensuring that constitutional advance shall be reasonably gradual should be frustrated through shortage of money.

The financial position of the East African territories is by no means strong. Revenues have suffered serious shortfalls as a result of the decline in world commodity prices; and the costs of maintaining even their programmes of social and other developments are mounting. Kenya will cease to draw Emergency aid and loan assistance from Her Majesty's Government after the current year but she is going to be hard put to balance her normal budget (even after making serious expenditure cuts) after 1960–61, let alone build up the reserves which went to help pay for the Emergency. Tanganyika is entering a period when her expenditure will outstrip her revenue for several years to come at least, and Her Majesty's Government will in any event have to come to her aid, particularly as she will have to incur heavy expenditure to get the internal security forces on a proper footing. Uganda, though
her reserve position is marginally better, has had to budget for a deficit this year and (having also to incur heavy expenditure on the internal security forces) will face a more substantial deficit next year which is bound to affect the previous level of expenditure on social and economic development—which has served in some part to keep that Protectorate tranquil so far. In Zanzibar the clove industry has received a severe set-back; clove prices have fallen drastically; there is a severe depression in the trade; and she is budgeting for a deficit in 1959. Her reserve position is still, however, relatively strong.

If it should be decided to take over the cost of the East African Land Forces that will afford some relief to the budgets of the East African territories. But I cannot rule out the possibility that further relief may be necessary, beyond this, on recurrent account. I have already referred to the fact that Tanganyika may well in any event qualify for grant in aid and her needs will be examined in consultation with the Treasury. I shall be making separate proposals in relation to Zanzibar. A detailed study is being made of the financial position in Uganda, and our conclusions will be reported to the Treasury when that is complete. So far as Kenya is concerned it is to be hoped that assistance on recurrent account will not be required after the current financial year. In this paper, therefore, it is not my purpose to seek anything more than the general endorsement of my colleagues of the policy that Her Majesty’s Government should be ready to give financial assistance, under such conditions as it may be necessary to prescribe, when necessary, to enable the local governments to maintain their normal services at acceptable levels and to carry the recurrent costs of reasonable development programmes. The need to assist these territories on capital account is well established and I hope that either through Colonial Development and Welfare assistance or by means of Exchequer Loans we shall be able to meet the bulk of their needs.

Conclusion

17. In summing up I invite my colleagues agreement to the following proposals:—

(i) That the gradual policy of step by step development in constitutional affairs should be maintained and that, in pursuance of this, the broad programme outlined for Tanganyika in paragraph 11, should be endorsed.

(ii) That, as regards Zanzibar, our aim should be, generally, as expressed in paragraph 9 of Annex I bearing in mind the considerations in paragraphs 10–13 of that paper.3

(iii) That Her Majesty’s Government should undertake, as and when necessary, to provide financial assistance on recurrent account to one or more of the four Governments, subject to normal consultation with the Treasury as the occasions arise, in order to ensure that the local Governments can carry out their economic and social programmes at acceptable levels.

I also ask my colleagues to note that I hope shortly to make definite proposals in relation to the cost and administration of the East African Land Forces.4

3 This stated that the aim (much as in Kenya) ‘should be to produce a society which is essentially non-racial in outlook. Too rapid an advance would defeat this aim, but concentrated effort must be put into the task of raising the educational and living standards of the Africans’; the qualification mainly concerned the sovereignty of the Sultan over a ten-mile coastal strip of Kenya.

4 See document no 118 below.
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (59) 2) in which it was suggested that our policy in relation to the future constitutional development of our East African Colonial territories should be one of gradual constitutional development, with the aim of meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Africans, while at the same time securing sufficient time for the countries to be adequately equipped for self-government, and extending the period during which the United Kingdom Government could retain control in vital matters. On this basis, it was recommended, in particular, that in Tanganyika “unofficials” should attain equality of representation with “officials” on the Council of Ministers in 1961 and that an “unofficial” majority should be permitted from 1965 to 1969, when the territory might be expected to attain a substantial measure of internal self-government, though not full self-government. In Zanzibar it should be our aim to produce a society which was essentially non-racial in outlook; the immediate task was to improve the educational and living standards of the Africans. Finally, it was suggested that the United Kingdom Government should undertake, as and when necessary, to provide financial assistance on recurrent account to the Governments of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar to enable them to carry out their economic and social programmes.

The Colonial Secretary said that the action we took in Tanganyika would determine the pattern of what would be expected in the other territories. The Governor had undertaken to make a statement later in the year on the question of future constitutional advances, and in particular on the date by which it could be expected that “unofficial” majorities would be introduced into the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Council. If his present proposals were broadly acceptable to the Committee he would bring the terms of the statement to be made by the Governor before his colleagues at a subsequent meeting. The future of Zanzibar might be especially important to us strategically, since the Sultan’s sovereignty extended to a strip of land on the coast of Kenya including the port of Mombasa; this might provide the means of our retaining a useful base for defence forces on the mainland if at a later date we were denied such facilities in Kenya.

In discussion the following were the main points made:—

(a) Considerable doubt was expressed about the validity of our positive defence interests as defined in paragraph 2(a) of C.P.C. (59) 2. It would be helpful to have a fundamental examination of what our ultimate strategic objectives were, and of whether it would be possible to safeguard these interests in some other way than retaining military bases, staging posts and over-flying rights on the African Continent. It would also be helpful from the point of view of planning the construction of expensive installations to have an appreciation of how long we were likely to be able to retain defence facilities in the various territories on the African Continent and in the Near and Middle East generally.

---

1 See previous document.
(b) It might be to the advantage of the satisfactory development of some of the territories in the African continent if an examination were made of the possibility of redrawing the boundaries; these had in the main been drawn up in the course of the nineteenth century without any particular regard to economic or ethnic considerations. The Government had already contemplated the possibility of British Somaliland linking up with Somalia at some time after 1960. However, the fact that other European powers besides ourselves, and other independent Commonwealth countries would in many cases be concerned with any proposed boundary changes made consideration of the subject very difficult.

(c) Over the last 200 years we had tended to follow the same pattern in our Colonial policy, i.e. leading Colonial territories by gradual stages from a purely direct rule by British officials to a system of parliamentary democracy based on that practised in the United Kingdom. It was open to question however whether this process of evolution was appropriate in present circumstances, and furthermore whether the United Kingdom's political system was necessarily the best form of democratic government for these territories, and in particular for those where difficult racial problems were likely to persist.

(d) It was important that the Government should take an early opportunity of making a public statement to the effect that the United Kingdom fully upheld the pledges and agreements which had been made with the Sultan of Zanzibar and his heirs in the past.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the long-term future of the African continent presented a sombre picture. The Committee were in general agreement that we should not surrender our interests and responsibilities in the East African territories, but that we could not maintain the existing position unchanged. Therefore our policy in regard to these colonial territories should be one of step by step constitutional advance. But we should consider in what way this could most safely be done, and should re-examine the nature of our interests which we should aim to preserve. Recent developments in other countries had raised the question whether our form of parliamentary democracy was necessarily the best for these territories, or whether some other form of democratic government might lead to their acquiring greater stability when they became independent of the United Kingdom. There would be advantage in studies being made of this problem, and also of the extent to which we needed to retain strategic facilities in Africa and the Near and Middle East. In the meantime the Colonial Secretary should proceed with his proposals in regard to Tanganyika and bring the text of the Governor's proposed statement later in the year before the Committee at a subsequent meeting.

118  CAB 128/34, CC 2(60)4  18 Jan 1960

'East African Land Forces': Cabinet conclusions on their future

[In his memorandum, Macleod argued that it was increasingly important ‘to insure against the risks of advance towards responsible government. Our position in East Africa may be gravely prejudiced if we have no effective means of controlling constitutional development in Kenya’. As a brake on advance, internal security forces should be insulated from local political control. Vital interests in the area would need to be safeguarded even after independence (CAB 129/100).]
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (60) 1) on the future of the East African Land Forces.

The Colonial Secretary said that in 1957 it had been decided that administrative and financial responsibility for the East African Land Forces (E.A.L.F.) should be transferred from the War Office to the local Governments. It was now evident that constitutional development must proceed less rapidly in Kenya than in the other two East African territories. In these circumstances there would be military and administrative advantage in our resuming control of the local forces; and he proposed that the United Kingdom Government should assume administrative and financial responsibility for E.A.L.F. from 1st July, 1960. As a matter of principle it might be thought that local contributions should be sought from the Colonial territories towards the cost of these forces, but he would prefer to have authority not to insist on any such contribution if it appeared that a concession on this point would help to secure a successful outcome of the forthcoming conference on the constitutional development of Kenya. In presentation, neither the political nor the financial aspect of his proposals need be stressed; they could be represented as an improvement in the organisation of the local forces. In fact, the financial assistance they would provide might have a decisive effect on the conference, since it would be recognised that our proposals would enable the local Governments to apply additional resources to more constructive purposes, such as the development of agriculture and education.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he would like to have further time to consider the financial implications of these proposals. The resumption of responsibility for these local forces seemed to be contrary to the policy normally applied in territories moving towards independence. If there were to be no local contributions, we should be committed to expenditure of some £3 millions a year. Moreover, this transfer might be regarded as establishing the principle of United Kingdom support for the local forces of other Colonies moving towards independence.

The Cabinet's subsequent discussion centred mainly on the political issues involved in this proposal. The following points were made:

(a) The measures now suggested would (however they were presented) seem to be a reversal of the policy adopted in 1957. Our resumption of full control of E.A.L.F. might be justified if it could be shown to be part of a general plan under which Colonies emerging towards independence would be guided towards accepting a continuing measure of United Kingdom authority; it would, however, be more difficult to defend in relation to territories moving relatively quickly towards complete independence.

(b) The movement towards independence was likely to proceed more slowly in Kenya than in Tanganyika or Uganda. In these circumstances there might be differences of opinion in the local legislatures about the continuance of financial support for E.A.L.F. On the other hand, even if financial responsibility were assumed by the United Kingdom it might, on political grounds, be difficult to maintain a composite force indefinitely. It was possible that local political opinion would become hostile to the continued recruitment of African troops if they were under British control.

1 Mr Heathcoat Amory.
(c) It would be useful to know whether leading African personalities in the three territories were likely to regard the financial attractions of the scheme as outweighing any political disadvantages. In Tanganyika and Uganda especially, the alternative to the resumption of United Kingdom control might be that opposition to expenditure on the forces would develop in the local legislatures. In that event the Governors would have to exercise their reserved powers to provide the necessary financial support for E.A.L.F.; and measures of this kind, taken in an emergency, might lend support to the view that the United Kingdom Government were adopting a reactionary policy.

Summing up the discussion, the Prime Minister said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have an opportunity for further consideration of the financial implications of this proposal. The Cabinet’s discussion had, however, suggested that its political aspects were even more important than its financial and administrative aspects. While it would have the advantage of removing control of E.A.L.F. from discussion in the local legislature, it could be presented as a reversal of the policy which we normally adopted when Colonial territories were moving towards independence. The weight to be attached to these opposing political considerations should determine the decision to be taken on the proposal and he suggested that the Cabinet should resume their consideration of the matter in the following week.

The Cabinet:

(1) Took note that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would give further consideration to the financial consequences of the proposal outlined in C. (60) 1.
(2) Agreed to resume their consideration of this proposal at a meeting in the following week.

119 CO 822/2262, no 8 15 Jan–30 May 1960

[Constitutional development in Uganda]: CO minutes by Sir H Poynton, J W Stacpoole, F D Webber, W B L Monson and Lord Perth

[Uganda had had a Leg Co since 1921; it was enlarged in 1953 and in 1955, when a ministerial system was introduced. In 1958 direct elections of African representative members were held, but Buganda held aloof. In 1960 Leg Co composition was broadened and membership confined almost entirely to elected members; the Executive Council became a Council of Ministers. A general election was held under the new arrangements in Mar 1961, resulting in a majority for Benedicto Kiwanuka’s Democratic Party. Internal self-government was attained in Mar 1962, with Kiwanuka as first prime minister; see further below, document no 133.]

… I assume as our starting point that we are all agreed that our objective is the development of self Government in Uganda, by as liberal and rapid stages as can safely be digested, leading towards ultimate independence if Uganda “has what it takes” to exist as an independent nation. This can be properly regarded as as issue of principle involving, if you like, the ethics of Colonial policy.

3. But in Uganda (and here again I think we are all agreed) there are two aspects of this problem which reflect an internal conflict—(a) the nature of the central structure or Government and (b) the relationship between the Kingdoms and the centre. Whether in striving for the agreed objective one should tackle (a) first and then try to fit (b) to (a); or vice versa; or whether one should try and tackle both
aspects simultaneously and comprehensively, is not in my view an issue of principle (or ethics) but a plain matter of tactical expediency and therefore of intellectual and political judgment. I would not myself be too alarmed about immediate political repercussions in Uganda over our handling of the matter if we can really convince ourselves that our tactics are the best suited to the objective. Mr. Webber’s memorandum is very cogent on paper but I do rather wonder whether it grips the longer term political realities.

4. For myself I am very anxious that we should not go too far on either (a) or (b) in isolation from each other; because the more that policy crystallises on either aspect the more difficult it will be to concoct an effective mixture. On the other hand (and here I agree with Mr. Webber) it would never do simply to shelve the Wild Committee Report1 while we set up a wholly separate enquiry on “relations of the Kingdoms with the centre”; because, among other reasons, that would be equally prejudicial and provocative the other way round—i.e. it might be taken as indicating that H.M.G. had decided to consign the Wild Committee Report to the waste-paper-basket and had come down in favour of the opposite approach.

5. Might it not, however, be possible to appoint a general Commission of enquiry from outside Uganda (United Kingdom or United Kingdom with other Commonwealth members) to go into the whole political and constitutional problem of Uganda, taking evidence and using the Wild Committee Report as one of the “Documents in the case”. This is not shelving the Wild Committee Report nor is it belittling its value. On the contrary, the very fact that the Wild Committee found it necessary to stray outside their strict terms of reference (aspect “a”—or a part of “a”) into “aspect b”—Part IV of the Report—lends support to the view that the two aspects are inseparable and that a comprehensive enquiry from without is desirable. I believe that with a little presentational ingenuity such a Commission could be represented as an adaptation of the recommendation in paragraph 182 of the Wild Committee Report itself for a Conference.

6. If we acted quickly on this (and particularly if membership were drawn from the United Kingdom only, though I think this would be a pity) we ought to be able to get a Commission into the field by the summer and I see no reason why they should not be asked to report by the end of 1960 which still gives a margin of time before the 1961 elections. The time-table is on the tight side, I agree; and one might have to consider whether the 1961 elections should not be held late in 1961 instead of early (as recommended by the Wild Committee in paragraph 55), so as to give adequate time for consideration, in Uganda and here, of the proposed Commissions’ Report.

7. There are, no doubt, bugs in this proposal. There always are. But my instinct is that something on these lines, designed to cover the dual approach without scrapping the Wild Committee Report as such, is essential if we are to get at the right ultimate solution.

A.H.P.
15.1.60

Mr. Webber
A decision on the Uganda franchise is now urgently needed and you asked me to summarize the issues. Elections have been promised “as early as can be arranged in 1961”. Before then Uganda must amend their electoral law and register their voters.

We have promised Sir F. Crawford\(^2\) to put the matter to the S. of S. as soon as possible. All that the S. of S. is committed to is “a further extension of the franchise.” I attach opposite a copy of the 1958 franchise provisions. According to official estimates, these already give the vote to 80 percent of all African men and 20 percent of women in the constituencies where registration took place in 1958. In Buganda the proportions might be higher. The present franchise is thus a very wide one. The choice now lies between going at once to universal adult suffrage, and stopping at some, rather awkward, half-way house. We have asked the Governor to suggest what this compromise might be, but so far he has not done so. The Wild Commission recommended universal adult suffrage. The Governor is strongly in favour of it and so are the Representative Members. The rulers have not declared themselves on the issue, but the demand for universal suffrage is one which they would find it no easier than we to resist openly. Apart from this wide local demand, the best argument in favour of conceding universal adult suffrage at once, is that to refuse it would be to forfeit goodwill which we badly need. There can be little reality in the distinction between a “qualitative” franchise including 80 percent of the male population, and universal adult suffrage. There is also the point that the physical task of registration would be much simplified if a comprehensive franchise were adopted.

The main argument on the other side comes from Kenya, Tanganyika and perhaps Central Africa (you may like to consult Mr. Watson about this). Mr. Coutts,\(^3\) in his letter at (3) on EAF 102/298/09, makes it clear that he feels that universal adult suffrage in Uganda would put the Kenya Government in a very difficult position. It should also be mentioned that the Cabinet’s agreement to any concession on franchise was somewhat grudging. If, therefore, he decided on universal adult suffrage, the S. of S. would no doubt wish to consult his colleagues again.

I am sceptical of the argument about repercussions. Extremists will be no more extreme, and moderates no less moderate because of advance in a neighbouring territory. When Uganda secured its present wide franchise the Governors of Kenya and Tanganyika prophesied woe, but I doubt whether that advance did much to excite similar demands elsewhere. The real effect of giving the vote to another million or so leaders [?electors] will be small in any case. The same people will ensure their election by the same arts. On the other hand, to deny the extension might well queer the pitch for the talks with the Representative Members in June. On balance, therefore, I hope we shall advise the S. of S. to come down in favour of universal adult suffrage.

As to timing, if we are not going all the way, we shall have to put proposals to the Governor at once. But if the decision goes the other way, there might be much to be said for withholding its announcement until the June talks (it would in any case be difficult to get Cabinet approval before the end of this month) even though this would make the timetable for registration etc. tighter.

J.W.S.

6.5.60

Please see Mr. Stacpoole’s minute above. I am sorry to have laboured under this problem for so long especially as we are running short of time.

---


2. I should like to make two general observations. First, on the face of it, Uganda has not lived up to the political expectations aroused some years ago. It was made clear some time ago that Uganda would be developed primarily as an African state and then it seemed a reasonably fair assumption that the Protectorate would move along pretty fast leaving Kenya and Tanganyika with their settlement problem some way behind. At that time Uganda was also financially on the crest of the wave. But the picture is quite different now both politically and economically. When one analyses the situation I think it must be admitted that Uganda have got very little to show for the fact that they have had a ministerial system for quite a long period. A handful of nominated Africans admittedly have gained some experience in ministerial duties, but we still have to wait for African elected Ministers to appear on the scene. This seems remarkably odd in a territory which was meant definitely to develop under predominantly African leadership.

3. Thus, notwithstanding, having fallen back in the race they are more and more sensitive over developments in Tanganyika. And even the Governor has warned us that the statement of the form of the constitution for Tanganyika may mean that he will have to advise going further than he expected would be necessary when considering earlier this year with the Secretary of State the decisions to be taken on the Wild Report. I think we must deal with the franchise question against the general background of what our line should be in June when we see the representative members. The crucial points are really the extent of the unofficial majority and the question whether there should be a Chief Minister. As regards the first of these points, I think that we ought to avoid stating in advance of the Uganda elections what the precise composition will be. But when the time comes I think we must try to get as many experienced African elected Ministers as is feasible. In a sense the other two territories are far more "Africanised" than Uganda. As regards the Chief Minister, I am quite sure that it would be a mistake to move any further from the present position.

4. It is on the assumption that we shall not move materially from the line already taken over the Wild Report that I advocate that Uganda should be allowed to move to universal suffrage. I need not elaborate the case on Uganda merits, but, so far as East Africa is concerned, we must clearly look at the possible effects on the situation in Tanganyika and Kenya. . . . I have discussed the point with Mr. Fletcher-Cooke. Mr. Nyerere is not for his part wedded to the idea of universal suffrage. But he is under constant pressure on this account from Oscar Kambona and others. Mr. Fletcher-Cooke considers his position would be weakened if Tanganyika had to fall behind Uganda in this respect. On the other hand, we clearly could not alter the present ruling in Tanganyika without delaying the elections for at least six months. Mr. Fletcher-Cooke thinks, however, that the more important consideration is the Trusteeship Council. If a decision could be postponed until the end of June, the situation could be "ridden" domestically in Tanganyika. But a decision which was announced while the Council was still considering the Visiting Mission’s Report would mean that a great amount of pressure would be brought to bear. So far as Kenya is concerned I think we would be in considerable difficulties if both Tanganyika and Uganda got universal suffrage on this round; but I should have thought myself that provided Uganda was isolated the difficulty would be considerably minimised. Although we could in fact concede universal suffrage in

---

5 Minister of education in first Tanganyika Cabinet, May 1961.
Kenya without altering the substance of the Lancaster House agreement, there would, of course, be a great outcry that the Secretary of State was, within a matter of months, making more concessions to the Africans, and the European position would, politically, become very difficult indeed.

5. The political advantages of making this concession in Uganda’s case are clear. The recent decisions on Tanganyika will strengthen the opposition of those who condemn the decisions on the Wild Report as not going far enough and at least the grant of universal suffrage would show that the Secretary of State was not being completely intractable.

6. Ministers may wish to discuss this. Subject to discussion I think we should:

(a) tell Uganda that the Secretary of State is hoping that it may prove possible to concede universal suffrage but that he would like to avoid making a decision public until towards the end of June. This, as well as easing the Tanganyika difficulty, would give the impression that the Uganda delegation were going home with something in their pockets. We should ask them whether a delay for that number of weeks could be managed from the point of view of mechanics;
(b) Give Kenya and Tanganyika arguments for going ahead in Uganda alone, saying that we would hope that any such decision would not be public until towards the end of June and asking for comments.

7. I have, of course, only dealt with the East African side, but I realise that the situation in Central Africa will also have to be taken account of. . . .

F.D.W.
26.5.60

. . . 2. The Secretary of State spoke to me about this subject during H.M’s Reception for the Corona Club last night and said that, while he fully recognized that in Uganda terms it was a complete nonsense to reject the recommendation for universal adult suffrage, he did not see how he could agree to this without both endangering the settlement reached in Kenya and prejudicing seriously his position for the Nyasaland Constitutional talks. (You will remember that the Secretary of State has promised Federal Ministers that he will not move to universal adult suffrage in Nyasaland and that if it were introduced in Uganda on the argument that Uganda was a predominantly African state the same argument could certainly be raised for its extension to Nyasaland).

3. With respect, while sharing Mr. Webber’s and indeed the Secretary of State’s own feelings on the matter, I can only agree with the Secretary of State’s views as I have recorded them. This will lead to the paradoxical position that in order to avoid being forced into giving a concession which would in fact make no practical difference in Uganda, we shall have to show a greater willingness to admit Africans to positions of real power and responsibility in the Executive. This is the line which Mr. Webber takes in his draft opposite, but I am afraid that this must just be faced. I therefore agree with the draft telegram opposite.

W.B.L.M.
26.5.60

I too am sure a qualitative franchise is necessary. I also believe any announcement should be after the Delegation’s visit here. . . .

P.
30.5.60
1. **Introduction.** Proposals for constitutional reform contained in the report of a Constitutional Committee ... will be debated in Legislative Council in the latter half of February. In this paper I shall recommend the line to be taken on the principal issues, and I will consider separately with the Governor when, in relation to the debate, our decisions should be made known. For the convenience of my colleagues I here attach a note on the general political situation in Uganda at Annex II.¹

2. **General considerations**

   (a) After the autumn elections the Legislative Council in Tanganyika will consist predominantly of Elected Members, the great majority of whom will be Africans. The present official majority in the Executive will be replaced by an Unofficial Majority (probably nine Unofficial Ministers²—including five Africans, one of whom may be “Chief Minister”—to three Officials).

   (b) If I can get an assurance of sufficient support from the main groups at the Kenya Conference I may be able to recommend certain important moves forward in Kenya, in particular:

      (i) a rearrangement of the Executive to provide for the inclusion of three or four African elected Ministers;
      (ii) a change in the composition of Legislative Council to give Africans at least parity with the other races combined;
      (iii) an introduction of a common roll on a very wide franchise (to produce the effect in (ii)), though counter-balanced by arrangements to ensure the return of an adequate number of members who have the genuine support of all communities.

   (c) It is accepted that Uganda must develop as a primarily African State.

   It is clear that important steps forward must now be taken though it may be neither prudent nor practical to go quite as far as has been agreed for Tanganyika. I envisage that the changes would be implemented after fresh elections to be held first half of 1961.

3. **The present constitutional position in Uganda**

   (a) **The executive.**—There is a majority of seven officials to five unofficials, the latter all nominated, made up of three Africans, one Asian and one European.

   (b) **The legislature.**—The “official” or Government majority is maintained through the appointment of nominated (back-bench) members. On the representative side the Africans are already in a majority over the Europeans and Asians combined.

   (c) **The franchise.**—Direct elections for Africans only were introduced in 1958 and were held (in the districts which opted in favour of this system) on a qualitative but wide franchise. ... There is no common roll: the European and Asian Members are nominated.

¹ Not printed. ² Unofficials: not civil service office-holders.
4. **The constitutional committee.** The main task of the Committee was to consider the possibility of establishing a common roll, how many members should be returned on this basis and how non-Africans could be adequately represented. It was not, however, excluded from advising on such subjects as the composition of the Executive or of the Legislature taken as a whole.

5. **Recommendations.** I have, for the sake of completeness, summarised in Annex I the principal recommendations in the Committee’s Report: but I need only trouble my colleagues with matters of major principle.

(a) **The executive.** I think that, as for Tanganyika, the principle of moving to an Unofficial Majority must be accepted and, as a consequence, we must accept a reduction of the officials to five. But the Governor should not be tied to selecting all his Unofficial Ministers from among the Elected Members. Thus the new Council might comprise seven Unofficials and five Officials. The Governor should, I suggest, aim at selecting up to five Africans from the Elected Members and be free to appoint, by nomination, one or two non-African Ministers (from within or without the Legislative Council). It is, of course, possible that if the present confused political situation in Uganda came to be reflected in the result of the next elections, or if there were not among the candidates who are elected a sufficient number of Africans capable of taking charge of Ministers, the Governor might well have to nominate some African Ministers from outside the Legislative Council.

(b) **The legislature.** We should accept that the Legislative Council should become predominantly elective in character; but that the Governor must retain his freedom to appoint a sufficient number of nominated members to the Government side to ensure a working majority. In choosing his Elected Ministers the Governor would naturally seek to appoint people (whether on a single party or “coalition” basis) whose followers would be prepared to sit on the Government side. This would obviate the need for extensive nomination.

(c) **Common roll, minority safeguards and franchise.** I am strongly in favour of having direct elections on a Protectorate-wide scale with no option offered of indirect elections. When the present franchise was introduced in 1957, District Councils were left free to decide whether or not they would accept direct elections in their Districts for the next Legislative Council elections, or whether they preferred the then existing system of indirect elections through District Councils acting as electoral colleges. If neither of these two courses open to the District Councils were adopted, the Governor had the power to nominate someone to represent a District. In the event, 10 members of the present Legislative Council were returned after direct elections; two after indirect elections, and one was nominated by the Governor. The present lack of uniformity only serves to accentuate the disunity in the country.

I agree that, in the circumstances of Uganda, no special electoral safeguards for non-Africans are called for.

My instinct (and that of the Governor) is to agree to universal adult franchise, particularly if I have to concede as much (for some of the common roll seats) for Kenya. The present franchise … is already very wide and not far off universal adult suffrage. We cannot concede less than has been conceded for Tanganyika and may well have to go further. An early decision will be needed if elections are to be held in the first half of 1961 but I may wish to defer a final decision until after my visit to Central Africa. I therefore propose that the Uganda Government should express themselves as very sympathetic to the principle of a wide extension of the franchise,
and that the detailed implications are now being closely studied with a view to reaching a decision in time for elections to be held during the first half of 1961.

6. **Buganda.** We can expect that there will be strong pressure from progressive and intellectual elements for the adoption of all the proposals in the Committee’s report (or, where there is divided opinion, the extreme proposals), but not from the Kabaka\(^3\) and the other rulers who have great influence in their areas. But I must warn my colleagues that even the lines of policy advocated in paragraph 5 will accentuate the present differences with the Kabaka and his Government, and even the most careful handling of the situation may not avoid a complete break. They (and indeed the traditionalists in the Agreement Districts of Toro, Bunyoro and Ankole)\(^4\) will see these changes as a decisive move to the transfer of power to democratic elements in the country as a whole whose first act on independence might be to destroy the hereditary rulers and their Governments. The Kabaka’s Government are campaigning for self-government now for Buganda in order to insulate Buganda from these dangers. They have hitherto, in contravention of the Agreements, refused to take part in Legislative Council and, generally, are in violent opposition to any constitutional development at the centre. Conversely, the democratic elements both in Buganda and throughout the rest of the Protectorate would be dismayed at any attempt to delay constitutional advance pending a settlement of our difficulties with Buganda.

There are two distinguishable problems:—

(a) To consider, having regard not only to past pledges that the status and dignity of the Rulers will be safeguarded in future constitutional changes, but also to the diversity and complexity of Uganda (Buganda and the Agreement Districts, tribal, ethnic, and language diversities) the best form of government which should be evolved for the country as a whole so as to ensure that, after British protection has been withdrawn, the Rulers shall be able to maintain their position and, perhaps more important, the country develop in peace and unity. This raises the question whether a “unitary” or “federal” type of government will be best for the future Uganda and what is to be the relationship of the parts (the “ordinary” Districts as well as those having Agreement status) to the whole; and where, for example, residual powers should lie.

(b) To review from time to time the arrangements incorporated in the Agreements for the administration of Buganda while the Protectorate, including that province, remains under British protection. The Governor is already negotiating with the Buganda Government for the revision of the present Agreements with a view to having a revised constitution for Buganda in 1961.

With the implementation of the proposals in paragraphs 5 Uganda will move away from “official” government towards early responsible government. The time is therefore shortly approaching when a full study should be made of the form of government that will be best suited to a self-governing Uganda. The Kabaka and his supporters prefer that if Her Majesty’s Government will not grant self-government to Buganda in isolation, such a study should be undertaken and completed before fresh

---

3 H H Edward Frederick W D W M L Mutesa II, kabaka of Buganda, crowned 1942; educated Makerere College, Uganda and Magdalene College, Cambridge; exiled 1953 to 1955; first president of Uganda, 1963–1966. For Macleod’s opinion of his obstinacy, see document no 31 above.

4 The ‘protected’ Agreements negotiated with HMG dated from 1900–1901.
EAST AFRICA: GENERAL, UGANDA AND ZANZIBAR 393

elections are held and constitutional changes at the centre implemented; and the other Rulers are equally nervous lest constitutional change should undermine their position.

Although I think that the announcement of Government policy on the changes advocated by the Constitutional Committee should be made soon, I also think that such an announcement should be linked with a renewal of the pledge to ensure the maintenance of the position of the Rulers and a statement of intention to set up the enquiry to consider the problem outlined at (a) above. I envisage that such an enquiry would be made by a small body of outside experts and not (as suggested by the Constitutional Committee) a large-scale conference. I should like to leave open the question of when the enquiry should start or finish, but without leaving any doubt that the constitutional changes at the centre arising from the Constitutional Committee’s Report would be made in the first half of 1961.

7. Conclusion. I invite my colleagues to endorse the proposals in paragraphs 5 and 6, and to agree that a statement by the Governor embodying them should be made on or about the 15th February.

121 CAB 134/1559, CPC 1(60)1 8 Feb 1960

[Discussion of Wild Report on Uganda constitution]: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (60) 1) regarding future constitutional development in Uganda.¹

The Colonial Secretary said that proposals for constitutional reform contained in the report of the Constitutional Committee (the Wild Report) were shortly to be debated in the Legislative Council and it would be necessary for the Governor to make some statement of intention in regard to the principal issues. Whilst it was generally accepted that Uganda must develop as a primarily African State, the local political situation was complicated by the special position of Buganda, constitutionally the most advanced province of the territory with its own Ruler (the Kabaka), parliament and ministerial system.

Although the majority of the Wild Committee had recommended that the leader of the majority party in the Legislative Council should preside over the Council of Ministers and have the title of Chief Minister, he would not propose to move as far as this at the present stage, in view both of the repercussions on Kenya and of the lack of suitable Africans of the required calibre; instead he proposed that there should be an unofficial majority in the Council of Ministers (seven unofficials to five officials) the Governor retaining power to select the unofficial Ministers either from within or without the Legislative Council. The recommendation that the Legislative Council should become predominantly elective in character could be accepted, but the Governor must retain freedom to appoint sufficient Nominated Members to ensure the Government a working majority. As regards franchise, his instinct was to accept the recommendation of the Wild Committee for universal adult suffrage, but in view of the repercussions that this would have on other territories he would propose that

¹ See previous document.
the Governor should state that the Government were very sympathetic to the principle of a wide extension of the franchise and that the detailed implications were being studied with a view to reaching a decision in time for elections to be held in 1961. This would give time for the matter to be considered in the light of developments elsewhere. The key to the situation would lie in the results of the Kenya Constitutional Conference. If universal adult suffrage were to be introduced for common roll seats in Kenya, he would propose that universal adult suffrage should be adopted in Uganda; but if the suffrage in Kenya were to remain at a level similar to that in Tanganyika, it would be necessary to devise some qualification, albeit very low, for Uganda.

The Governor's statement was unlikely to be acceptable to the Kabaka of Buganda and the Rulers of the other Agreement Districts, who had expressed concern at the transfer of power to democratic elements and who wished to preserve their position by obtaining self-government. He therefore proposed that when announcing the Government's intentions in regard to the Wild Report the Governor should also renew Her Majesty's Government's pledge to ensure the maintenance of the position of the Rulers and also announce the intention of Her Majesty's Government to institute an enquiry into the best form of government which should be evolved for the country as a whole. Nevertheless, it was not certain whether this would satisfy the Kabaka, and even the most careful handling of the situation might not avoid a complete break.

The following were the main points made in discussion:

(a) Although it would not be possible to move to a Chief Minister system in the Council of Ministers at the present time, it might be possible to move in that direction at a later date if a cohesive political group developed and a suitable African leader came forward as a result of the 1961 elections.

(b) There had been no demand from the European and Asian minorities for constitutional safeguards, although both communities had been represented on the Wild Committee. It would however probably be necessary for the Governor to nominate some non-Africans to the Legislative Council in order that these communities should be represented when questions such as taxation policy were being considered.

(c) An announcement of the extension of the suffrage in Uganda would have repercussions not only in the neighbouring East African territories, but also in Nyasaland and the other territories of the Federation, where it would be most difficult in the foreseeable future to go beyond some form of qualitative franchise for Africans. On the other hand it would not be easy to defend the retention of a qualitative franchise in Uganda, since the existing qualifications were already very low. Moreover, it would be embarrassing if the Governor, in addition to rejecting some of the more substantial recommendations of the Wild Report, had also to reject that for universal adult suffrage. It would be important to avoid falling between two stools in Uganda—satisfying neither the Kabaka and the other Rulers on the one hand nor the democratic elements in the country on the other. It would therefore be appropriate to announce, as proposed, the Government's sympathy with a wide extension of the franchise, and to take a final decision on the matter in, say, June 1960, by which time the franchise arrangements for the Central African Territories were likely to have been completed.
[d] If the Kabaka took action to oppose the holding of elections in Buganda on the lines to be announced by the Governor, and to prevent the electorate from expressing their will, a break with him might become unavoidable. In this event it might be desirable to take steps to have a new Kabaka appointed, rather than repeat the action taken in 1953 when we withdrew recognition temporarily.

e] The Katikkiro (Prime Minister) of Buganda had been given leave of appeal to the Privy Council on the question whether Buganda was required to submit representative members for appointment to the Uganda Legislative Council. It would be to our advantage to have this appeal disposed of as quickly as possible, and the question of speeding up the proceedings should be examined.

[f] The proposed Committee of Enquiry into the pattern of future Government in Uganda might take the form of a smaller version of the Monckton Commission. It might be largely composed of outside experts from the United Kingdom, but local advisers could be attached to it as necessary. Its main task would be to recommend whether Uganda should develop as a unitary or a federal state. It would be of great importance for the matter to be settled before we relinquished our responsibilities in the territory, since otherwise there would be a risk of subsequent civil war. Although we could not control the course of events after we left, our aim as regards the pledge to be given to the Kabaka and the other Rulers was to ensure their status as constitutional rulers insulated from local politics and safe from deposition.

[g] It was possible that the territories of East Africa might ultimately decide to join in a wider federation, but the time to consider this would be when they were approaching independence.

Summing up the discussion the Lord Chancellor said, that the Committee was in general agreement with the proposals put forward by the Colonial Secretary. In view of the Prime Minister’s particular interest in African affairs however and of the possible repercussions of developments in Uganda on the position in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, it would be desirable for the Colonial Secretary to mention the proposals at a meeting of the Cabinet as soon as possible after the Prime Minister’s return to this country, and for the Governor’s statement in the Legislative Council to be deferred meanwhile.

---

2 See document no 146, n 2, below.
3 At a Cabinet meeting on 18 Feb 1960 there was reaffirmed general agreement with the proposals for constitutional advance, ‘which would be slower than in Tanganyika but faster than that now proposed for Kenya’. Despite some misgivings, it was agreed on balance to be sympathetic to the principle of universal adult franchise (CAB 128/34, CC 10(60)5).
The practicability of this will now be tested: registration is to begin in Buganda on 1st August.

Merely to put our heads down and bash on with the election regardless seems to promise nothing but disaster. At the best, a successful election held despite the Rulers’ opposition might discredit them (but that is surely unlikely). Otherwise, an election which was successfully boycotted in Buganda would do none of the things we hope for from it; and at the worst the attempt to organise an election in face of opposition could lead to serious disorders and humiliating withdrawals. There could be few worse times for such a crisis, against the background of the Congo and coinciding with Nigeria’s independence celebrations. In fact, [part] of Mr. Kintu’s statement1 is a clear threat to boycott nominations, and the Buganda are experienced in boycotts. The most likely sequel to an unsuccessful election is a period in which the present political situation continued and worsened, and an atmosphere in which the Relationships Commission2 could not work successfully; in short a complete collapse of our whole policy.

I feel that the only hope of averting this is a direct intervention by the S. of S. with the Rulers. The Governor has tried very hard with them but he has failed. [A letter] suggests that the Rulers believe that they can drive a bargain with the S. of S., and does not close the door on the meeting with him which they originally proposed. I think there is room for negotiation with them. They want, in effect, federation before an election is held. We want the election to be held without prejudice to the federation issue. There is not much between us.

I submit a draft reply following so far as possible the Governor’s suggestions in his covering savingram but also designed to keep the door ajar; and a draft covering letter to the Governor, sounding him on the prospects of engineering a meeting between the S. of S. and the Rulers either before or during his visit in September. I am sure that the S. of S. would agree to this if he felt that it had a real chance of success.

J.W.S.
11.7.60

Please see Mr. Stacpoole’s minute above. We must deal with three main issues which are all linked:—

(a) How to get Buganda to take part in the elections (149).
(b) The reply to be made to the Rulers (142).
(c) The terms of reference of the Relationships Commission. . . .

3. It seems that Buganda Ministers have agreed to reserve their position over the elections against the possibility that they will get some assurances in advance which will enable them to take part. Their letter to the Governor shows that they want either a declaration now that Uganda should have a federal form of government or “successful” conclusion of the present talks; and they have been told that neither of these conditions can be met.

4. We are, therefore, left with the problem of how to get the Buganda Government to co-operate in the elections, bearing in mind that they have

1 Mikaeri Kintu, the Protestant katikiro (chief minister) of Buganda.
2 Lord Munster, formerly under-secretary of state at CO, 1954–1957; chairman of Uganda Relationships Commission, to consider relations between the kingdoms and the central government.
successfully resisted every persuasion and pressure to get them to send representatives to the present Legislative Council and that they are determined that Uganda should be committed to a federal form of government before they offer any kind of co-operation. The task looks pretty impossible to me and we should not build up any hopes that we shall succeed. The Governor's solution is in effect that the terms of reference of the Relationships Commission should be used as the medium for persuading Buganda that their position for the future is not being prejudiced because of the fairly imminent implementation of the 1961 constitution. . . . [T]he Governor expresses the view that the terms of reference must include a pretty pointed reference to the Buganda Agreements.

5. It seems to me that there is a lot of misunderstanding in Buganda minds, though I suspect that it is more deliberate than genuine. I doubt myself whether the Governor can effectively take matters much further with them and I think that the situation now calls for a personal intervention by the Secretary of State designed to spell out as clearly as possible how he sees the future taking shape. The best way would be by having the sort of discussions we had last month with the representative members. But they may be difficult to arrange in the near future and in any event the Buganda representatives at any rate would probably go on prevaricating before saying definitely whether or not they will come to London. In these circumstances we might I think start off with a written message to the Kabaka and get the Governor's reactions on this idea. . . .

6. Much of our problem is bedevilled by the continued harping on such meaningless words as “federal” or “unitary”. I think we have got to get over the fact that whatever is devised for Uganda there will be a central government of some sort and that government will be developed as closely as possible on Westminster lines. The essential question will, therefore, be how much rope the local governments will have. The next point is that we have got to be clear in our own minds about what we have meant by resolving to preserve the dignity and prestige of the Rulers. Although the Commission would doubtless tackle the question with an open mind, it is already implicit in the assurance we have given that Buganda and the other Agreement States are, so far as H.M. Government is concerned, going to enjoy a special position. But I think we are going to have the greatest difficulty in getting the willing acquiescence of the politicians in terms of reference which include this theme. If we go further, . . . the chances of getting “agreed” terms of reference are slight indeed. I agree, therefore, with Mr. Stacpoole that we must do what we can to avoid an issue over the terms of reference themselves and let the real contest take place when we have the Commission’s recommendations.

7. For my own part I have always envisaged that Buganda and the other States would remain in Agreement relationship with the central government so long as H.M. Government was in control. If the Buganda Government honour the Agreement (and even the present Agreement gives them a great deal of autonomy) they would stand a far greater chance of this special relationship surviving after independence. Furthermore, it ought to be obvious that their attempt to insulate themselves from developments at the centre is a political dead-end for Uganda, and that they will be wiser to devote their energies to ensuring that they gain as much influence as possible in the central government. . . .
Please see (149) and (150) opposite, in which the Governor reports on his efforts to stop the Kabaka’s Government “sabotaging” the holding of elections under the new Uganda constitution to the Protectorate legislation. He is trying to persuade them to withdraw their opposition and, among other things, asks the S. of S. to be ready to receive a delegation in the near future. The date-line for all this is the 22nd August when registration is due to begin in the rural parts of Buganda so that a delegation would, I fear, have to be fitted onto the end of the Nyasaland talks or follow directly on them.

2. Mr. Webber’s draft sets all this in the context of the other Uganda “negotiations” in which the Governor and the Secretary of State have been involved—with the Leg. Co. delegations and with the Rulers—and rightly concluded that the Buganda “crisis” could not be dealt with ad hoc. I agree with the general outlines of Mr. Webber’s review and in fact would have expected the Governor to have done this sort of thing for us. But I doubt if we should write to the Governor just as Mr. Webber proposes. He may feel that we are trying to do his job for him (certainly, as I have said, I think he should have done it) and he has of late shown himself hyper-sensitive over comments from here. I have therefore recast Mr. Webber’s draft in a form more directly related to the Governor’s savingram and transferred the bulk of Mr. Webber’s comments on the importance of the representative members (which the Governor seems to play down too much) to a separate letter from myself. But I would like to stress my indebtedness to Mr. Webber’s draft.

3. Even so, the reply is too long to be telegraphed, even despite the shortage of time, but as we and the Governor are in some danger of growing apart on these issues, it is worth while dealing with the matter at some length. We should warn the Governor by telegram of the mail on which the savingram leaves and of its substance.

W.B.L.M.
18.7.60

Secretary of State

This is all very difficult and I fear I haven’t had time fully to study the papers. Generally I think the line proposed is right as we do not want elections which fail and at the same time we must not give way to the Rulers.

Two thoughts occur to me:—

(a) A special message to the Kabaka alone does play up his importance. What about the other Rulers? In fact would it be wiser to include most of the draft letter to the Kabaka in a letter to the Omugabe as Chairman of the Rulers’ Meeting and send copies to the others including the Kabaka.

(b) As time is very short, with August 22nd as the day for registration and you yourself not being in Uganda until mid-September, I suppose I might help by seeing a delegation here at the beginning of August, if they wanted to come.

P.
19.7.60

Last Wednesday we sent off to the Governor of Uganda a number of communications (summarised in the Telegram at 157) suggesting that instead of pursuing a number of separate negotiations locally, he should seek to bring about a direct meeting
between the Secretary of State and the Rulers. We envisaged that this meeting would lead to an understanding (parallel to the understanding already arrived at with the “politicians”) about the next stages in constitutional advance in Uganda. The immediate problem was, and still is, what answer should be given to the open threat by the Buganda Government to sabotage the elections to be held next February. A crucial date is 22nd August when registration is due to begin in Buganda.

4. Whilst we were still considering how to reply to all this, a further telegram (No. 492) at 161 opposite arrived. This reports that the Kabaka has written to the Secretary of State asking that the Constitutional Committee discussions should be transferred to London. The Kabaka’s letter should arrive here tomorrow. The Governor asks for authority to refuse this request, not obviously in answer to the letter itself but in discussion with the Kabaka’s Ministers; at the same time, he would inform them that the Secretary of State would be willing to receive them early in August. He also foresees that the Kabaka may himself wish to come to London and suggests that this should be encouraged.

5. There remain, therefore, very few points of difference between the Governor and ourselves. The main ones are:

(a) that he still seems to see a possibility of disposing of Buganda’s opposition to the elections by satisfying them over the terms of reference of the Relationships Commission;
(b) that he wishes to continue the Buganda Constitutional discussions locally; and
(c) that he still thinks that the Kabaka’s Ministers might be invited rather than the Rulers.

6. The new factor is the personal intervention of the Kabaka. It is very hard to tell how for the intransigent attitude of his Ministers has his support. The Governor is no longer sure that the Kabaka will not be willing to come to London. I feel that given a little more time the Governor might have developed rather further the line he has taken in 161. Even though time is short, it seems imprudent to turn down the main request in the Kabaka’s letter before we have even seen it. It may well be that we shall have to turn it down in the end but it seems a pity to break off at once this correspondence which we ourselves wanted to open.

7. I suggest, therefore, that you might like to send a short holding telegram on the lines of the draft attached and that we should then wait until we have the Kabaka’s letter before considering further what the next step shall be.

J.W.S.
26.7.60

123  FO 371/146498, no 20  16 Dec 1960–12 Jan 1961
[East African defence and a federation]: minutes by Mr Macleod to Mr Watkinson (MoD)

Your minute of the 6th December.

2. I agree that the K.A.N.U. policy statement on this matter (the relevant extract from which is attached)

1 Not printed.
the security of tenure of our bases in Kenya. It is however difficult to make a valid assessment now. In a recent telegram the Governor says that it is impossible to forecast how K.A.N.U. will look at this question if and when they achieve power as much depends on personalities, the extent to which other demands are met and other imponderables.

3. As you know, the East African Governors will be discussing defence matters with the Chiefs of Staff during the informal conference I am having with them next month. I hope that that Conference will enable us (against the background of defence and other considerations) to clear our minds on the right way to move politically in the foreseeable future. One matter which will be very prominent in our discussions will be the attitude we shall take on the question of an East African Federation. My own tentative view is that if things went reasonably well over the next year or so there might be a strong chance of bringing a federation into being by late 1962 or early 1963. The constituent units in the federation would be self-governing, but independence for the federation as such might be deferred for 2 years or thereabouts.

4. These are very tentative views, but if we can achieve the creation of a federation on the lines I have described it seems possible that a Federal Government, which would no doubt be responsible for defence, might take a less extreme attitude than K.A.N.U. now does. Even so it would be asking a great deal of them to expect them to agree to the stationing of U.K. forces in East Africa unless those forces were committed in part if not in whole to the defence of the federation. We must also expect any Federal Government to be reluctant to allow the use of facilities in the federation for the conduct of “Colonial” operations. In short, therefore, I would expect even a Federal Government to drive a hard but not necessarily unacceptable bargain with us.

5. If a federation cannot be achieved and we have instead an independent Kenya with which to treat, it is not impossible that they will recognise a number of strong reasons for seeking a close understanding on defence matters with us. Much will turn on the general political climate in Africa (more so than if we have a Federation to deal with), but there should be scope for arrangements which maintained some, though not all, of the facilities we now enjoy. We cannot however expect facilities for “Colonial” operations and it must be doubtful whether we could station troops for use in the Gulf in an independent Kenya.

6. Whichever way the constitutional development of Kenya proceeds therefore I can see little prospect of our retaining the right to station troops in Kenya primarily for U.K. purposes. We may at best secure arrangements on the Malayan lines. Meanwhile I believe that we should be able to count on the use of our existing facilities until the end of 1965.

7. I know that you cannot wait long for a more definite assessment, and I must emphasise that even in January we shall be working to some extent in the dark insomuch as we shall still be uncertain of the political situation emerging in Kenya after their elections in the spring. In view of what I have said above, I would hope that it could be possible to defer a final decision over further commitments for new works services until say the early summer. If, however, this is difficult from your

---

2 See document no 65 above. 3 At Mackinnon Road Base, some 60 miles by rail from Mombasa.
point of view perhaps we could discuss. What I am particularly anxious to avoid is that overt action should be taken in the immediate future which would indicate that we were on the run. This would be yet one more very serious knock to confidence. On the other hand, I am not suggesting that we should openly take the uncompromising line that whatever Mr. Mboya says we intend to hang on to the base. This would make the position much more difficult than it now is. I only hope that we can find some way of walking the tight rope which will give us the best chance, when we have the elections over and new African Ministers in positions of responsibility, of negotiating something satisfactory to ourselves and East Africa.

I.M.
16.12.60

Thank you for your minute of the 23rd December about our security of tenure in Kenya.

2. I have now discussed this question with the East African Governors. The Governor of Kenya cannot at the moment say with any certainty whether KADU or KANU will emerge as the majority African party at the next elections. KADU have refrained from making any pronouncement about the future of the British bases in Kenya and there is no reason to believe that they would necessarily wish to demand the withdrawal of U.K. forces in terms similar to these used by KANU. Nevertheless their present attitude is one of suspicion and distrust, as they undoubtedly still fear that U.K. troops are in Kenya for the purpose of repressing them should the occasion arise. If KANU is successful in the elections, the Governor believes that there is every chance of their being brought to see in time the advantages to Kenya of having British troops stationed there; but he emphasised that in view of their election pledges it would be imprudent immediately to raise the question with KANU Ministers. He also thinks that they may come to appreciate the importance of the military assistance which they can obtain from the United Kingdom and that they may find substantial reasons for quietly dropping their present demand for the liquidation of the base. Similarly the Governor considers that KADU's present distrust can be overcome and that they too could be brought to the same attitude. The Governor therefore believes that there is a reasonable chance that we should be able to remain in Kenya perhaps indefinitely although we might well have to accept some restrictions on our freedom of action after Kenya achieves her independence.

3. We were agreed at the Governors' Conference4 that the aim of policy should be the establishment of an East African Federation, if this could be done without prejudicing the establishment of stable Government. The Governors all agreed that if we have to deal with a Federal Government on the subject of defence such a government would be far less likely to take an extreme view and that there was every chance that we could reach an acceptable settlement with it.

4. The Governors emphasised that it was fundamental to the success of their endeavours that African Ministers should not be rushed. They must first be educated in the realities of government and be brought to understand the many difficulties and problems facing them. When that point is reached they would then be more likely to appreciate the force of the considerations which should lead them to accept arrangements for close co-operation with the U.K. in matters of defence.

4 See next document.
5. The foregoing consideration is of particular importance in the context of the works programme. The Governor of Kenya has emphasised strongly to me that any falling off in the volume of work would immediately be interpreted as a sign that H.M.G. were thinking of pulling out and that this would strike a severe blow at confidence in Kenya as well as aggravating the serious unemployment problem which already exists. We cannot afford further damage to confidence in Kenya. Loss of such confidence in the last year has already led to embarrassingly large outflows of capital which have been barely staunched and the effect on Government revenue has been such that we have had to agree in principle to aid the Kenya budget to the extent necessary to avoid cuts in essential social services which would otherwise have been inevitable in view of the prospective revenue deficit of about £3 million on the current year. Increase in unemployment would of course add to the problem of maintaining law and order, which is so important in the present state of affairs in Kenya. For all these reasons the Governor therefore urged that we should continue to maintain the works programme at its present level. I fully support this view and very much hope you will feel able to meet me on it.

6. The Governor thought it might be possible to discuss with the new government of Kenya some time in the latter half of this year the question of the future development programme for our facilities, but he recommended that we should not raise it in the first few months of the new administration. This of course could only be decided in the light of events but I shall certainly keep the question under review....

I.M.  
12.1.61

---

124 PREM 11/4083, EAC(61)1 5 Jan 1961

[This conference was attended by Sir P Renison (Kenya), Sir R Turnbull (Tanganyika), Sir F Crawford (Uganda), Sir G Mooring (Zanzibar), E B David (KBE, 1961; administrator of the East Africa High Commission, 1959–1962), and CO officials.]

The Secretary of State, opening the Conference, said that it was one of a series held from time to time and would be conducted informally. It had been hoped that consideration of the Raisman Report1 would be virtually complete before the discussions took place, but this had not proved possible. In any case, many things had happened in East Africa on a much wider range of subjects on which it was important to take counsel together. Since last year constitutional developments in Tanganyika and the African pressure for Federation had broadened the scope of the Conference. It was important to form a common view on what Her Majesty’s Government’s attitude towards a possible federation of the East African territories

---

should be before the conference to be held in Dar-es-Salaam in March. The Secretary of State thought it essential that the initiative for a federation should come from East Africa. If possible, he would like to see Her Majesty’s Government asked to help in making plans for a federation in East Africa. He would welcome views on the likelihood of this.

An immense number of changes had taken place since the last Conference, two years ago, and the views and conclusions at the 1959 Conference had been rapidly overtaken by events. Important landmarks since then had been the setting up of the Raisman Commission, Tanganyika’s rapid constitutional advance, the Lancaster House Conference on Kenya, the Conference on the Public Service, the White Paper on the Overseas Service Aid Scheme, the appointment of the Flemming Commission and the constitutional changes in Uganda and Zanzibar.

The Secretary of State thought that the discussion should begin with a “second reading debate” in which Governors would give their views on likely political developments in the immediate future in their territories. They would have to make a number of assumptions. The most important matter of all was how long we were likely to remain responsible for East Africa. If it was possible to achieve a common mind about this it would govern all other considerations. Her Majesty’s Government’s responsibility in East Africa was not merely for defence and security; above all things, Her Majesty’s Government had to discharge its responsibility to all the peoples of the East African territories. We should be faced with a dilemma, namely, what should be done if for various reasons it proved impossible to remain for very long in any territory, but there was still much to be done if one was to feel confident about the state of affairs one left behind. The position of the public service would be particularly important. If, with the publication of the Flemming Commission’s recommendations and clarification of the scope of the Overseas Service Aid scheme, we could turn the attitude of the service towards staying on in East Africa, this would simplify the other problems. It was important, therefore, to achieve clear thinking about the objectives.

Sir Patrick Renison: how long [had we] in Kenya [?]. His answer was that we needed as long as we could possibly get and that the idea of Federation gave us perhaps a little longer breathing space than would progress towards individual territorial independence. In Kenya he wanted to move at the pace at which Africans could solve the problems facing them. Moral and treaty obligations made the problems far more difficult. He believed that the new Government would work with us on these problems if they were sure that we were going to help them to achieve their own objectives of a surely-based independence. The problems were the Masai, the coastal strip and Mombasa, security of land tenure, restoration of economic confidence, the land claims of minority tribes, the position of Her Majesty’s Government’s military bases, the Somalis, the future of the Overseas Civil Service and localisation and the future of the East Africa High Commission and the possibility of Federation. It was clear that Kenya was not nearly ready yet for full independence. The Kenya timetable might have to be modified if the opportunity to set up a Federation was to be grasped at the psychological moment.

Nyerere had talked to him as if a Chief Minister in Kenya and he could get together and work out the problems quite simply on their own; he did not appear to realize

---

1 See document no 346 in Part II.
2 On civil service salaries for East Africa.
that it would in fact be a major operation to plan and develop the structure of Federation.

Turning again to Kenya he said that he did not believe that the local African leaders wanted disturbances, bloodshed and a new Emergency situation. There was an extremist group of whom Oginga Odinga was the prime example who wanted African domination at any cost, if necessary at the cost of economic chaos, the driving out of all Europeans and the collapse of the structure of a modern state. The more powerful and more moderate group, among whom he would include Mboya, wanted to run their own country but wanted to run it as a modern state complete with its developed economic structure. The problem was to build up these moderate leaders and help them to get these ideas across. He mentioned that he was far more depressed by the apparent depression in this country about East Africa than he was about the East African situation itself. . . .

The Secretary of State said that he very much agreed about the need for a strong central federal government in any federation which might be set up. This had been one of the difficulties in The West Indies. It was suggested that, if the federal government were strong, local politicians would gravitate towards it especially if they saw the important economic consequences for their territories of the successful operation of federal services. There would be considerable attraction in appearing as East African representatives on the world stage rather than as representatives of their own countries alone. It was also suggested that there was more hope in East Africa for federation which, unlike the West Indies, had at least some common institutions to start with. The experience of Nigeria showed that it would be important to have direct elections to the Centre and that there must be important jobs to do there. If these two points were covered there should not be great difficulty in attracting able politicians to the centre. It was pointed out, however, that it would probably be difficult to find enough good men to cover both federal and territorial posts. It seemed likely that Nyerere would be keen to go into a federal government. He obviously had the idea of federation very much in mind and he was probably sincere about it.

It also seemed that Nyerere’s leadership was accepted for the moment by politicians in Kenya as a whole in the matter of Federation but it was possible that the elections were diverting their attention from the wider issues which would eventually lead to rivalries.

The Secretary of State said that this appeared to be a suitable moment to draw together preliminary thoughts on the future political timetable. This might be summed up by saying that we wanted to go “as slow as we dare” but that the possible prize of Federation might make us willing to go faster. There seemed to be no problem of timing in Zanzibar and the problem in Tanganyika was only one in relation to the other territories; but there were real problems in both Kenya and Uganda. The view of Sir Frederick Crawford was that we should aim at a final date of 1964 in Uganda and that there was risk in telescoping development, but it depended on the outcome of the conference in this summer of 1961. In Kenya we might perhaps be thinking also of 1964 as a possible Final date.

In the ensuing discussion the following points were made. In Kenya there were special reasons for avoiding undue haste. If there could be a cushioning period of internal self-government in all territories before the Federation became independent this might give us more leeway. Federation appeared to be our major objective with
separate independence a pis-aller if we could not obtain that goal. Federation would not only be a goal in itself but might help to hold the position at full internal self-government which in Kenya, for example, would give us more time to discharge our moral obligations before our responsibility there ceased. Nyerere wished to be able to talk federation to equals in Kenya and Uganda. It was possible that there might be an opportunity to have a Chief Minister in Uganda after the elections and this indeed might help in managing the Baganda. However, if it was not possible to have a Chief Minister in either Kenya or Uganda it might be that Nyerere would be willing to talk to Ministers whose voices combined would be held fairly to represent African opinion. The task in 1961 was to discover the African viewpoint in all the territories. If H.M.G. took the initiative it might well stampede them into an anti-Federation attitude. The sooner an agreed African view was secured the better: it must be from them that the request for the necessary steps prior to Federation must come.

*Sir Hilton Poynton* suggested that the Conference might think in terms of the following procedure. First, a request from Tanganyika after the March conference asking H.M.G. to get into touch with other East African Governments (and Opposition parties) to sound out opinion on the issue of Federation. The second stage would be the collection of African views and the third stage a Working Party, if possible set up at the request of the African politicians, which would lead to the fourth stage of a full-scale conference to examine the whole problem.

*It was agreed* that a paper should be prepared outlining the position reached so far in the discussions on federation.4

---

**Annex to 124**

... 2. *Sir Patrick Renison–Kenya*

(a) *Forthcoming general election*

(i) results to be announced on 27th February.

(ii) Probable result:

10 European seats: Cavendish-Bentinck Coalition Party and Blundell’s New Kenya Party about equal with Coalition Party probably having greater support.

33 African seats: Kenya African National Union seem to be leading in 18 and Kenya African Democratic Union in 13. (2 are Somali seats in the North—uncertain whether voters would go to the polls).

(b) Internal discussion in K.A.N.U. might lead to split after elections with consequent gains by K.A.D.U. K.A.N.U. majority would be better as K.A.D.U. Ministers would be second rate. If parties were about equal, coalition might have to be considered but would be very difficult to work.

(c) African politicians seemed anxious to avoid violence.

(d) The new Government would work with us on the many outstanding problems if they thought we would help them to achieve soundly based independence.

(e) The idea of Federation might perhaps give us some much needed breathing space in Kenya though African leaders did not seem to understand what it would involve. Europeans and Asians seemed keen on the idea.

---

4 Macmillan minuted on this report, which was 14pp long (foolscap, single-spaced): ‘I have glanced through this: but it is very long & hard to read. . . . At first sight, no-one seems to worry very much about the Europeans. H.M. 5.1.61’. He asked T J Bligh for a summary (which follows as the annex).
(f) A satisfactory public service must be maintained.

(g) If the idea of Federation should be accepted at the Dar-es-Salaam conference in March with a consequent demand for the early appointment of Chief Ministers in Kenya and Uganda, it might be possible to appoint one in Kenya by the end of the year (or possibly even by August if necessary) if the right man could be found.

(h) Kenyatta was the main problem. K.A.N.U. had said they would not accept ministries unless he were released. K.A.D.U. had not gone as far as this. K.A.N.U. might not carry out their threats for fear K.A.D.U. would form a Government but they might find they had built up such pressures that they could not come into the Government. A K.A.D.U./European coalition would not last.

(i) There was no need for extra troops in Kenya, but any necessary action would have to be swift.


(a) The Conference in Dar-es-Salaam in March could be followed by self-government in mid-May.

(b) Administrative staffing was one of the big problems in Tanganyika. European District Commissioners would have to be replaced by Africans—they were doing this. Displaced Europeans would be employed on other work.

(c) About 40% of the expatriates (mainly the best officers) would probably stay after independence.

(d) The immediate problem therefore was Africanisation and recruitment. An African Government would want to get technical staff from other than British sources—except police and educational staff.

(e) The present Government was generally doing well: if no progress could be made towards federation it would have to press for independence in 1961; this would have to be conceded by June 1962 at the latest. It would be important to have a Conference on federation before the end of 1961.

4. Sir Frederick Crawford—Uganda

(a) There was no prospect of a predominant African party in Uganda which was bedevilled by the problem of the four kingdoms, especially Buganda. The main problem was to sort out internal relations in order to produce a constitutional pattern for the future.

(b) The report of the Relationships Commission was an essential prelude to such a plan and would not be available until the middle of the year. Meanwhile attempts were being made to get more Africans into the Government and the Civil Service.

(c) After the February elections there would be an African majority in Legislative Council and an unofficial majority (probably African) in Executive Council. The Democratic Party and the Uganda People's Congress were running more or less level with the Democratic Party perhaps a little ahead. There were difficult tribal differences to be resolved.

(d) The programme seemed to be:

(i) constitutional conference mid-1961;
(ii) preparatory work until late 1962 followed by new elections;
(iii) in 1964, final negotiations for independence.

(e) A firm timetable might help remove uncertainty in Uganda which was affecting morale.
(f) It was possible that a Uganda representative could attend discussions on federation in the autumn. It would be important to discover African views on the subject as soon as possible.

(g) Uganda was fortunate in having well organised local government. Many expatriates would want to stay.

5. **Sir George Mooring—Zanzibar**.
   
   (a) No one party was expected to gain a majority at the general election on 17th January. A coalition was probable and the Zanzibar Nationalist Party had the most likely candidate for Chief Minister.

   (b) Zanzibar’s finances were precarious and if help did not come from the U.K. it would come from the Communists.

   (c) Zanzibar political parties were generally either in favour of federation or could be persuaded to accept it.

   (d) In a political vacuum, Zanzibar would move to independence in three to five years, but it seemed likely that they could fall in with a programme designed for East Africa generally.

6. **Mr. E.B. David—East Africa High Commission**
   
   (a) The High Commission had no separate political problems.

   (b) A Federation would be a very artificial creation which it would be difficult to establish. It would have to have a very strong centre....

---

125  PREM 11/4083, M 15/61  8 Jan 1961

[Cabinet differences on East African policy]: minute by Mr Macmillan to Lord Kilmuir. **Enclosure: letter from Mr Macleod (6 Jan)**

You were probably conscious in the discussion about Africa last week of certain differences, almost tensions, which may easily build up inside the Cabinet and the Party. I am sending you a copy of a letter which I have received from Iain Macleod for your private information. Alec¹ has not written to me but he has spoken to me since, of course from the rather different angle. He is thinking of a much longer period. Lord Salisbury has written to me a letter about the situation in Kenya actually on the limited subject of European education, but in fact clearly disturbed. There are considerable dangers here awaiting us, and I would like to have a talk with you about the whole situation when you have thought about it. We spoke on the telephone but this is just to put in on record.

Enclosure to 125

I was a little worried by the reasoning behind what Alec Home said last night in relation to Kenya. Of course it would be splendid if we could be sure of seven or eight years there, but I simply don’t believe that this fits in with the facts of life in Africa

¹ Lord Home, foreign secretary.
today. As you know, the neighbouring territories, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar, are all moving swiftly ahead not as a result of conferences with me—indeed my part, as you know, has been limited to reducing some of the proposals that were made—but as a consequence of their own parliamentary proposals which we have approved in the C.P.C. The Kenya Conference over which I presided deliberately went much slower than any of these and it was and is my policy that Kenya should move slower than anywhere else and in fact as slowly as possible. But this doesn’t mean eight years, and if we tried to achieve this we would in less than a year, because we could not keep our intentions secret, have a Cyprus on our hands again. I do not see how we can tell Kenya that because she has 1% of European settlers amongst her population, and even though her Africans are on the whole abler and better trained than the other territories in East Africa, she cannot have advance that is at least comparable with theirs.

As you know, we are holding the East African Governors’ meeting at the present time and we had decided by agreement to take as our main objective overriding all others that East Africa should be held as firm and faithful friends of the free world and should not become sympathetic to the Sino-Russian cause. I quote the consensus of opinion of all the Governors from an agreed memorandum:

“… there was a greater possibility of securing the objective if we were prepared to move reasonably quickly with the African tide (while at the same time getting the emergent Governments to fall in with measures designed essentially and exclusively to keep the new administrations stable) than if we sought to qualify independence by keeping some form of British physical presence. Sir Richard Turnbull expressed the matter as follows:

‘I think I should preface what I have to say in reply to your letter by endorsing the view expressed by Renison, David and Mooring in their recent letters to you, that to attempt to retain authority in East Africa by means of continued British administrative or economic control (however light it might be and however skillfully disguised) would be an act of great unwisdom.’ ”

David is the Administrator of the High Commission and Mooring the Resident in Zanzibar. Crawford, who is the Governor of Uganda and whose letter came later, agrees to the full with this. These five men are all professionals with a lifetime of service and I am certain that what they say is right.

It isn’t that I don’t share to the full the anxieties that Alec Home gave expression to. It is simply that I am quite sure that the path on which we have embarked is the right one. It isn’t enough to say that it is full of danger. Of course it is. But so is every other path in colonial affairs, as you well know. All we can do is to try and follow the road that seems the safest in front of us. I have felt for some time that many of the Party and some of my colleagues were looking for ways that provided us with a safe colonial policy. I wish there was such a thing; but I am sure there isn’t.

126  PREM 11/4083, PM(61)7  10 Jan 1961
[East African Conference of Governors]: minute by Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan. Enclosure: ‘Summary of principal conclusions’ (EAC(61)18)

The East African Governors’ Conference has concluded. It was an exceptionally useful one and all the Governors were satisfied that we now have a clear line of policy
in East Africa to pursue. The best summary of it is in the attached paper. Much of course depends on the conference at Dar es Salaam and whether we can persuade Nyerere, the Chief Minister of Tanganyika, to accept this line. He will be in London on the 23rd of this month and I am seeing him. I think it likely that he will be ready to do this.

2. All the smaller problems that we looked at, whether it was of the coastal strip or the future of the Somalis, and many other points, seemed to us all to be much easier to solve in a federal framework. In particular, both the European political parties in Kenya put support for federation into their manifestoes [sic] and the Governor of Kenya tells me that it would be very much welcomed by the business community. Nevertheless it remains of great importance that we are not seen to take any initiative in this matter. To do so would arouse all the old fears which did so much to bedevil Central African federation. It is our hope that we can make this appear throughout to be an African initiative. . . .

Enclosure to 126

I. Political and constitutional

1. The establishment of an East African Federation should be the aim of policy, but this must not prejudice the possibility of establishing stable government and particularly in Kenya of solving special problems.

2. No initiative should be seen to be taken by Her Majesty's Government.

3. The constitutional conference in Tanganyika in March, should, if possible, result in the following:—

   (i) the implementation (by mid-May, 1961) of internal self-government for Tanganyika, (namely no official Ministers; no reserved powers in internal matters; Governor and Deputy Governor to withdraw from the Council of Ministers at that date; Public Service Commission to become executive on 1st August, 1961);
   (ii) an approach by the Chief Minister of Tanganyika to other political leaders in East Africa, resulting in a request to Her Majesty's Government to convene before the end of 1961 a conference of all concerned in East Africa (including Zanzibar) to discuss the possibility of establishing a Federation. . . . It would be important to involve as many political leaders and leaders of special groups as possible;
   (iii) in the event of (ii) the March conference would not fix a date for independence for Tanganyika.

   (N.B. The United Nations would have to be got to accept this procedure.)

4. The Federation Conference, if it can be convened and if it is successful, should if possible avoid setting a target date for Federation but should set the date for the completion of the preparatory work. If, however, it is necessary to set a date for Federation political considerations at the time will affect it; the choice lies between, for example, 21st December, 1962 and 1st July, 1963. The Federation would initially be dependent and it would be made clear that from the date of its institution Tanganyika would have “regional independence”.

5. There should be no fundamental changes, other than the introduction of Parliamentary Secretaries, for the present in the executive organisation of the East Africa High Commission, but the Central Legislative Assembly should be
reconstituted by April, 1961 on the lines proposed by the High Commission at their last meeting, subject to the retention of the seven ex officio members.

II. Defence and internal security
1. The base in Kenya should be maintained and the works building programme should be continued as planned. In future, the term “facilities” should be used rather than “base”.
2. If possible, the retention of such continuing facilities as are required should be negotiated at independence, including the right to move forces across the territories by land, and to overfly and stage.
3. The present arrangements in respect of The King’s African Rifles should be maintained. On the attainment of full internal self-government by Tanganyika responsibility for the operational control of the Tanganyika battalions for defence should remain with the East Africa Defence Committee, and responsibility for the operational control of units of the K.A.R. made available by the East Africa Defence Committee for internal security in Tanganyika should rest with the Governor of Tanganyika in his discretion. The constitutional implications of this should be discussed further with the Governor.
4. If a Federation is established, the principles governing the deployment of the armed forces of the Federation in defence and internal security roles should be as follows:

The normal deployment of the armed forces of the Federation should be the responsibility of the Federal Government. For the purposes of the defence of the Federation the Federal Government should be free to change that deployment. At the same time the Federal Government must keep in close touch with territorial governments about their likely requirements for assistance from the Federal armed forces in internal security operations. The movement of Federal armed forces for internal security purposes should only take place at the request of the responsible territorial authority concerned, i.e. the Governor in his discretion before and during full internal self-government. Forces thus made available by the Federal Government should operate in support of and under the general directions of the territorial authority concerned in accordance with a directive previously agreed between the Federal Government and that authority.

III. Public Service
1. Every attempt must be made to ensure that a higher proportion of the Public Service should be prepared to stay on than at present appear to be contemplating doing so, particularly in Tanganyika. During the next two or three months the tide of opinion must be turned. Her Majesty’s Government has done much already to achieve this and will consider any further recommendations by Governors. But the main attack on this problem must now be made in East Africa.
2. Their financial position is unlikely to allow East African Governments to meet their full share of the bill for compensation schemes.

Particular issues arising on the Public Service in the individual territories and East Africa High Commission are covered in the Minutes.

IV. The Raisman Report
1. The Report is a “package deal” and every effort must be made to persuade East African Governments to accept it as such.
2. It should be sent to Governments under cover of a purely formal despatch accompanied by a Secret and Personal letter giving arguments to be used in persuading Councils of Ministers and legislatures to accept it.

3. The Report should be published simultaneously in the United Kingdom and the East African territories at the beginning of February. There should be no press conferences but the Press should be briefed similarly in all territories prior to publication on the basis of the background briefing referred to in paragraph 2.

4. The timing of territorial debates presents a problem. If the Report is debated by the present legislature in Uganda this should if possible be in such terms that the attitude of the new legislature towards it is not prejudiced.

5. The aim should be to implement the Report on the 1st July, 1961, and the necessary preparatory steps, including legal drafting, should be in hand as soon as possible.

V. Special minority problems

(a) Mombasa and the Coastal Strip

1. It was agreed that the best solution for Mombasa and the Coastal Strip would be for Mombasa to become a Federal port (though not necessarily the Federal Capital) and that the problem of making the Coastal Strip Federal territory should be further examined.

2. The British Resident would advise, after the new Government had been established in Zanzibar, whether the Secretary of State should make an approach to the Sultan during his visit at the end of March.

(b) The Somali problem

1. After the establishment of the new Government in Kenya the Governor should seek the views of African Ministers on the problem and should arrange for them to visit the area to show them that it was likely to remain a financial liability and that the Somalis would not accept administration by African District Officers.

2. African Ministers might then be ready to subscribe to an authoritative undertaking that the area should continue to be administered by British Officers, and, as the only practicable means of avoiding a movement for secession which no Kenya Government after independence could resist with its own military forces, to promise that administration by British Officers should continue after independence. The alternative policy of establishing the Somali area of Kenya as a separate entity under direct British Colonial administration after Kenya’s independence was unlikely to be acceptable to world opinion.

3. It was recognised that the situation in the area as independence approached might be such as to necessitate invoking the good offices of the United Nations to reconcile the conflicting claims of Kenya, the Somalis, Somalia and Ethiopia.

4. For the present, the Governor should continue to take the line that there was no question of separating the area from Kenya and that the position would be carefully considered before independence.

(c) The Masai

1. It was accepted that whatever the formal legal position might be it was essential that Her Majesty’s Government, which recognised the special position of the Masai, should continue to work for a new agreement between Her Majesty’s Government and the successor authority.
(d) **General conclusion**

1. If a Federation Conference were held in December, 1961, papers should be prepared for discussion on the general problem of minority groups and nomadic pastoral tribes in order to draw the attention of the African leaders to this subject.

---

**127 CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)7**

11 Apr 1961

[Personal impressions of East Africa and Aden after a visit]:

memorandum by Mr Macleod for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee

I am circulating for the information of the C.P.C. some personal impressions and notes on my visit to East Africa and Aden during the Easter recess.

I. **Tanganyika**

2. On the face of it everything seemed to go extremely smoothly, but in fact we had a good deal of hard, although very friendly, bargaining behind the scenes. In the end I am very satisfied with the result, particularly with the agreement which we have that we will make as few changes as possible in the relationship with the East Africa High Commission. This is of the first importance to the other territories and of course keeps all the doors open to Federation. There is a really remarkable spirit of friendship and goodwill and progress in Tanganyika, but there is one anxiety which bulks large in my mind and that is the complete absence of any form of opposition to the ruling party, who control every seat except one in the House. The present leaders, particularly Julius Nyerere, are of very high calibre and I do not doubt that their intentions are wholly admirable. But such a monolithic state of affairs is not very satisfactory. The influences that are strongest, apart from the British connection, seem to me those of India and Ghana and in both these cases one party has an overwhelming influence. Nationalism may well grow in Tanganyika, although certainly Nyerere himself is much more of the pattern of a Nehru than a Nkrumah.

II. **Zanzibar**

3. There were abortive recent elections in Zanzibar which finished in a dead heat between the two parties, the Afro-Shirazis and the Arab Nationalists. A caretaker coalition Government is working reasonably well, but there is to be another general election on the 1st June and this time the number of seats is to be made odd instead of even. Assuming this produces a result, we ought to have a government and its head will be a Chief Minister. There is something to be said for and something to be said against each of the parties. The Afro-Shirazis, who represent both the Africans and the original inhabitants of the island, are likely to win in the end because they represent greater potential voting power. On the other hand, the calibre of their leaders is very weak and they are not much disposed towards the Sultan. They are, however, more attached to the British connection and more dependent on us. The Arab Nationalist Party is largely thought of as the Sultan’s party. Its men are much abler and they are better organised; but it is to some extent under the influence of Cairo and there has even been some Communist penetration, although the British Resident does not think this has gone very deep. On balance I would prefer to see the
Afro-Shirazis win and it is Sir George Mooring’s view that this is the most likely outcome.

4. I stopped off in Kenya for an hour or two to meet in particular the leaders of the African parties who pressed on me the necessity for Kenyatta’s release. All arguments of political expediency point to his release, but for myself I am sure that we cannot yet contemplate it. After all, the logical consequence of the decision we took as a Cabinet not to release him at the time of the election is that we would not release him now in response to clamour. KANU, the slightly stronger party and much the more militant, wants him released and made Chief Minister. This of course is unthinkable. The prospects of KADU co-operation are rather more hopeful and I have been seeing Mr. Ngala, their leader, in London. They did surprisingly well in the general election and with European and Asian support, which they would get, a good government could certainly be formed and I am sure that confidence would return to Kenya.

5. It is worth noticing that European feeling about Kenyatta’s release is much stronger in Britain than in fact it is in Kenya, where the Sunday Post, which is the mouthpiece of extreme settler opinion, was the first newspaper to call for his release. Nevertheless I do not believe that we should bow to expediency and I will of course bring to the C.P. and Cabinet any major issue affecting Kenyatta which is raised. For the moment the Governor is concentrating on trying to find a formula which will leave his hands free in terms of his broadcast but yet will enable Mr. Ngala to whip his party in opposition to the inevitable motion for Kenyatta’s release which KANU would move at an early meeting of the Legislative Council. Obviously this is a very difficult formula to find.

III. Aden

6. I had a short but absorbing visit to the Colony and the Protectorates. Here our overriding interest is to preserve our strategic position for as long as possible and to this end to adjust our political thoughts and actions. Nevertheless this is a very difficult exercise to carry out because Aden is a very politically conscious place. The Governor, Sir Charles Johnston, and the C.-in-C., Middle East have together evolved a plan for doing this which I will not go into in detail in this paper because I intend to put a separate paper to the C.P. and Cabinet any major issue affecting Kenyatta which is raised. For the moment the Governor is concentrating on trying to find a formula which will leave his hands free in terms of his broadcast but yet will enable Mr. Ngala to whip his party in opposition to the inevitable motion for Kenyatta’s release which KANU would move at an early meeting of the Legislative Council. Obviously this is a very difficult formula to find.

7. It is worth adding that the T.U.C. movement, which had done so much to bedevil Aden over the last few years, seems completely out of the picture at present and there was a total lack of response to their call to demonstrate against my visit. Indeed I did not see a single hostile placard or hear a single cry raised while I was there. This is a result of the order forbidding strikes without previous recourse to conciliation or arbitration machinery which we introduced in the summer of last year.

1 R G Ngala, who became minister of state for constitutional affairs and administration after independence.

2 See document no 200 below.
Two matters of the first importance have happened in relation to East Africa in the last day or two. Both may have profound consequences for the future and they may represent something of a break in the clouds that have been surrounding Kenya in particular.

First of all, the talks in relation to the High Commission which became necessary because of Tanganyika’s coming independence have gone exceptionally well, as you may have seen from the press, and there was a remarkable spirit of friendliness amongst both Government and opposition from all three mainland territories. More significant still, there was a real desire to move towards East African federation, and all the various arrangements that we made about the future of what is at present the East Africa High Commission were planned deliberately by the conference to leave the door open for federation. As you know, it is the considered view of all the Governors in East Africa and of myself that virtually all the problems of East Africa will be easier to solve in the context of federation and it was encouraging to see this advance.

Secondly, for the first time both African parties in Kenya have shown a willingness to come together and a willingness to discuss matters relating to land and security of title. Naturally they put forward the usual demands in relation to Kenyatta, but his shadow seems to be growing a little smaller on the Kenya scene. If we can now get talks that may lead to agreement on the sanctity of land title it will be an immense advance and a real relaxation of tension both in Kenya and in the House of Commons. Lord Delamere, who is President of the K.N.F.U., is welcoming this new approach in a statement that he is issuing today and the people like Anthony Hurd and Patrick Wall1 to whom I have spoken in the House were also very pleased with this news and are writing to The Times to say that they hope this is the beginning of a better atmosphere in Kenya. It is at least encouraging that we have been able under the umbrella of the East African talks to have these Kenya discussions and they seem to bear some promise for the future. . . .2


2 Mr Macmillan minuted: ‘This is certainly encouraging. H.M. 29.6.61’.
I circulate for information a report on my discussions with Sir George Mooring, the British Resident of Zanzibar, about recent developments in the Protectorate, and especially the emergency situation which started with the riots of the 1st June.

2. A Commission of Inquiry is being set up to look into the causes and development of the disorders and the steps taken to deal with them. The Lord Chancellor has agreed to release Sir Stafford Foster Sutton from his duties as President of the Pensions Appeals Tribunals for this task. I expect the Commission to begin work in mid-September (an earlier start is not possible because of the necessity to dispose of criminal cases before the Commission begins to hear evidence) and the report should be available before the end of the year.

3. It would be premature to attempt a full assessment of the political forces at work in Zanzibar until the Commission of Inquiry has reported and there has been a longer period of adjustment after the disorders. But it seems clear that the riots were a symptom of the struggle between extreme elements of the two main political parties, the Arab dominated Nationalist Party and the African dominated Afro-Shirazi Party. The left-wing Arabs look for support mainly to Cairo and even to Peking and Moscow; the more extreme Africans fear and are implacably opposed to a foreign policy orientated in these directions and to undiluted Arab rule, and see their future in some form of alliance with the mainland African territories. This accounts for their close relations with the Tanganyika African National Union, which can exercise considerable influence on them. How far these extreme wings represent the main body of opinion in their parties is uncertain. The Nationalist Party relies greatly on its pro-Communist Secretary-General for political inspiration but there are signs of disagreement between him and the relatively moderate Arab leaders who have become members of the Government.

4. Meanwhile the situation is quiet but potentially dangerous and the two opposing factions are kept apart only by the presence of additional security forces in the form of a battalion of King’s African Rifles from Tanganyika. It may be necessary to replace this force by British troops later in the year. Special measures are in hand to strengthen the police force.

5. Political opinion in the Protectorate is at present confused. Out of a population of some 300,000 there are about 40,000 Arabs and possibly double that number of Africans who have recent or fairly recent connections with the mainland. In between these two racial groups is a substantial but undefined section of the population, who think of themselves primarily as Zanzibar citizens and as subjects of the Sultan, to whom they are in the main loyal, rather than as having any particular loyalties outside Zanzibar; these are somewhat loosely termed Shirazis. Political power lies in the votes of the Shirazis, and the Nationalist Party has shown considerable political skill in securing a substantial switch of support from the Afro-Shirazi Party, which swept the board in the 1957 elections, to the Nationalist Party, the June elections resulting as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar Nationalist Party</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party</td>
<td>3 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>so, coalition of above</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Shirazi Party</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Government has been formed with Mohamed Shamte, a Shirazi and member of the Z.P.P.P., as Chief Minister; the other four Ministers are Arabs and members of the
Z.N.P. The elections took place on a wide franchise and the British Resident does not think that universal adult suffrage, which might well be introduced before the next elections, would be unlikely to cause any substantial change in the situation.

6. The disorders have brought normal political life in Zanzibar to a standstill and the situation is worsened by the refusal of the Opposition to take their seats in the Legislature and co-operate with the Government. This attitude may have a serious effect on the security situation in the immediate future and the first task is to persuade the Opposition to seek a solution of their political problems by constitutional means.

7. The long-term task in Zanzibar is to secure the establishment of a stable Government capable of maintaining law and order and also one that would seek to maintain a satisfactory and appropriate relationship with the other East African territories. At first sight an African Government might appear to suit us better since there would then be little difficulty about Zanzibar joining up either with an East African Federation or with Tanganyika. But the Africans in Zanzibar have shown themselves to be inept and inexperienced politically and the British Resident thinks that if they could form a Government they would be constantly impeded by the predominantly Arab Civil Service. Furthermore the more extreme Africans are opposed to the Sultan and this might give rise to a difficult position involving H.M.G. in view of our Treaty obligation to protect and secure the throne of the Sultan and his successors in the dynasty. On the other hand the Arabs are more intelligent and energetic; many of them hold senior posts in the Administration and it is difficult to envisage a successful Government in Zanzibar without them. Perhaps the most hopeful aspect of the situation is that to remain in power the Arabs will probably have to rely on a substantial body of relatively moderate Shirazi opinion; it is encouraging that there are no Arab extremists in the Government and that the Arabs have voluntarily accepted a Shirazi as Chief Minister.

8. Providing the situation remains stable in the meantime, I hope to convene a Constitutional Conference in February or March, 1962, in London, to which all political parties and the Sultan would be invited. The intention to hold this Conference may be an important factor in securing the return of the Opposition to the Legislature and I will be considering with the British Resident how best to proceed on this. Subject to the outcome of such a conference, I do not envisage that Zanzibar should proceed to independence without first having another General Election, possibly on a wider franchise; nor that a date for independence could be either much before or much after Kenya’s independence.

9. Although it would be premature and undesirable to make any public reference to such a possibility at the present stage, the future of Zanzibar may be one of those problems for which a solution can be more easily found in the wider context of an East African Federation. Many of the Arab leaders must realise that a completely independent Zanzibar is scarcely viable, while the Africans might find less difficulty in reconciling themselves to local Arab dominance if they knew that, through participation in such a Federation, they had the protection and support of their kinsmen on the mainland. The delegates at the recent talks on the future of the East African High Commission Services agreed that, if the Government of Zanzibar wished to participate fully in the new Common Services Organisation, their Governments would be pleased to consider, in consultation with the Government of Zanzibar, the basis on which such participation might be arranged.
CO 822/2327, nos 159 & 164 22 Aug–13 Sept 1961

[Zanzibar’s demand for independence]: CO minutes by B E Rolfe, W B L Monson, and Sir H Poynton

2. Before considering the actual correspondence from Zanzibar it might be as well to set down the basic requirements from H.M.G’s point of view which should be met before Zanzibar can become independent. These requirements would seem to be:

(1) A policy directed towards closer association with the mainland territories;
(2) A stable security situation, i.e. H.M.G. would have to be satisfied that law and order was being and could be maintained after independence (or at least for a reasonable period after);
(3) There would be a settlement which would enable H.M.G. honourably to discharge its obligations under the 1890 and 1895 Agreements with the Sultan.

3. The position on (1) above seems to be reasonably encouraging since the Zanzibar Government have indicated their intention of joining the Common Services Organisation and Paragraph 4 of 158 shows that Ministers would be prepared to enter into an East African Federation. The missing piece is the failure so far of the A.S.P.1 to attend meetings of the legislature and co-operate in other ways in the Government of the country.

4. The Security position is still obviously confused and uncertain; but although racial animosities and tensions are likely to remain, a political solution satisfactory to the A.S.P. (the missing piece in (1) above) would go a long way to stabilizing the situation. It would seem undeniable that time is needed to enable passions to die down and the riots of 1st June to become fainter in the public memory. The problem of reinforcement in the event of serious disorders after independence will be a difficult one unless Zanzibar joins with the mainland territories in a Federation.

5. The future of the dynasty, and the two agreements—see (3) above—will depend very much on the political future of the Protectorate. It would seem to be a secondary although important matter and one that can only be settled when decisions about the political future have been taken—presumably at the Constitutional Conference early next year.

6. To turn now to further consideration of constitutional matters, at present there is a simple majority of elected members in the Executive Council and a substantial majority of elected members in the Legislative Council. To take the Legislature first, very few changes would be necessary in the Constitution of the Council if it were desired to press on with a transfer of power to local ministers; the number of elected seats would probably remain roughly the same and there might not be any great advantage in widening the franchise which according to advice we have received probably enfranchises more than 80% of those who would be eligible for the vote under universal adult suffrage. It would certainly be possible to introduce internal self Government on the basis of the existing legislature.

7. The present situation is therefore, that the stage of political advance now reached in Zanzibar can in theory be equated with responsible government; in

---

1 Afro-Shirazi Party.
practice because of the immaturity and inexperience of the recently appointed ministers and the tense political situation which has made it difficult for the Government to get down to ordinary ministerial routine, it cannot be said at the moment that responsible government actually exists. Conditions in Zanzibar are very far removed, for example, from those in Tanganyika after the elections a year ago. In these circumstances it is ridiculous to talk of independence in 1961 and this is not a request which should be taken seriously but rather a move in the political game. All the same it is odd that the paper circulated by the Civil Secretary to the Executive Council seems to accept what is implied in the demand, i.e. that Zanzibar can proceed direct from its present condition to full independence.

8. However, the pattern of constitutional development from now on may well be rather different in Zanzibar from that in colonial territories which have reached independence and it might be as well at this point to examine the implications of the introduction of full internal self-government.

9. At this stage not only do the ex-officio members withdraw from Executive Council (paragraph (2a) of the Ex.Co. note) but, far more important, the British Resident ceases to preside over the council. In Zanzibar the Sultan is the sole legislative authority and in carrying out this function he normally takes the advice of the Executive Council and the Legislature; nevertheless under Section 76 of the Council’s Decree his power to make laws without consultation or advice is preserved. The constitutional basis upon which the British Resident exercises his influence derives from his presiding over Executive Council and if he were to withdraw from the Council his power to affect policy and to intervene in internal matters would be removed and his functions would become purely advisory in this range of matters. As H.M.G’s representative he would still retain a formal right to advise on foreign affairs in accordance with the terms of the 1890 Agreement. He would retain none of the other last resort powers normally available to a governor at this stage of constitutional advance. In other words the British Resident, and therefore H.M.G., would at the stage of full internal self-government lose their power to intervene in the internal affairs of Zanzibar. The consequences of this would probably not be very serious except for the effect on the expatriate Civil Service for which it would obviously have important implications. . . .

B.E.R.
22.8.61

The questions raised by this despatch are being “processed” in the Department. . . . In the meantime Ministers should know that Sir George Mooring has proposed that our target in Zanzibar should be full independence by the end of 1962 and in any case not later than the date of Kenya’s independence, and to this end a constitutional conference should be held by the Secretary of State early in the new year.

Sir George Mooring was very unhappy about the prospects of what he called “scuttle” when he was over here a few months ago, but he has evidently now come round to the view that plans for an early withdrawal of British influence in Zanzibar is the lesser risk out of a series of risks which are very great indeed. He is probably right in recommending that Zanzibar should get its independence at much the same time as Kenya, if only because with Kenya gone our capacity to keep two battalions in reserve for Zanzibar’s internal security needs goes too. I am not sure that it is even a safe assumption that we will be able to keep, or wish to keep, troops in Kenya during
the penultimate stage of its development towards independence, but this is something which we shall have to consider in the Kenya context.

In any event, the route to independence in Zanzibar will, because of the peculiarly informal basis on which our influence in the Island rests, have to be pursued through a different route than that followed elsewhere—see paragraph 15 of the despatch.

I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr. Morgan, and asking him to bear in mind during his further examination of the question:

(i) that because of the coastal strip complication we shall probably be having a meeting with Kenya and Zanzibar Ministers in early December at the latest, and may be pressed then to express a view on the independence situation. We should not forget that since the coastal strip issue has been brought to a head by Kenya’s progress towards independence, Zanzibari pride is not going to let Zanzibar Ministers sit down silent about their own progress when an issue arising from Kenya’s is on the agenda.

(ii) Sir Andrew [sic; Alexander] Clutterbuck at an informal discussion with Sir Hilton Poynton recently asked that we should somehow steer Zanzibar’s progress to independence so that the road ahead lay clear to Federation, and that there would be no question of a country of 300,000 inhabitants being a candidate for full Commonwealth membership.

W.B.L.M.
11.9.61

... I think Sir G. Mooring is right in reaching the conclusion that the independence of Zanzibar must be closely synchronised with that of Kenya but I am not entirely convinced at present that the date of Zanzibar’s independence must be “in any case not later than the date of Kenya’s independence”. The date of announcing a date for independence may turn out in political terms to be just as important as an actual date of independence which could perhaps be a little later, though not much later, than Kenya.

I would agree with what Sir G. Mooring says in paragraph 12 that a continuation of British control will not solve the fundamental problem of Zanzibar, i.e. the racial and political conflict between Arabs and Africans. I am not sure however that I entirely agree with him when he says that it would in fact defer a solution of the problem and that the only hope for a solution is for the two groups to be forced by circumstances to work out a means of living together. If that means that we should just pack up and go leaving them to make the best of a bad job then I think there is a real danger that Zanzibar would degenerate into civil war after independence; that the Arab element would invoke (or receive unsolicited) help from the U.A.R. while the Africans would seek help from Tanganyika with the possible result that an international tension might be created between East Africa and the Middle East. In other words I am sure that during the remaining period of British control we must do everything we can to provide a basis on which the two groups can live harmoniously together; that presumably would be one of the main purposes of the constitutional conference which Sir G. Mooring suggests should be held at the earliest possible convenient date in the new year. (Incidentally, the department should keep in touch with the Legal Division about the timing of any such conference.)

This brings me to what Sir G. Mooring describes as “the second vital factor”
namely “no effort should be spared in trying to weld Zanzibar into an East African regional organisation and Federation”. Here I agree with Sir G. Mooring in general and as regards the regional organisation the first steps are already in hand. . . . It is difficult to see how the timing of this will work out but I am not sure that I would go quite so far as Sir G. Mooring when he says in paragraph 12 of the despatch:—“If the rest of East Africa forms a bloc before Zanzibar can join the difficulty of getting reasonable terms for Zanzibar may be increased, and the danger of Zanzibar being drawn off into some sort of Pan-Arab association may be increased”. I should have thought that what was wanted to aim at here was to get recognition from the mainland Governments (analogous to the procedure adopted in respect of the Common Services Organisation) that if Zanzibar wishes to join an East African Federation they will be welcome as a Unit territory in the Federation on the same constitutional level as the three mainland territories. This is in effect what Nigeria said they would be prepared to do for the Southern Cameroons if the Southern Cameroons voted in favour of joining Nigeria. If that is recognised from a fairly early stage in the proceedings and Zanzibar is given the opportunity of being associated with any discussions about the establishment of the Federation I should not have thought that it was of crucial importance whether Zanzibar joined as a foundation member or acceded rather later on; but these are all points to be considered when we know a little bit more clearly how the major question of East African Federation is going to develop.2

A.H.P.
13.9.61

2 The S of S minuted: ‘Very interesting. I agree entirely with Sir H. Poynton’s minute’ [nd].


We spent most of yesterday in discussing with Sir George Mooring the main lines of future Zanzibar policy. . . .

3. Sir George Mooring’s dominating theory is that further constitutional advancement can only be given to Zanzibar if there is a coalition of the two main Parties, and without an election before Independence. He has tried to persuade the Parties to come to the Conference in a coalition, but because of the activities of the left-wing of the A.S.P., this seems unlikely to occur. I will not attempt here to set down all Sir George’s reasons for pinning his faith to the coalition, but they are based primarily on the fact that Zanzibar is divided almost equally between the two Parties, both in an electoral and a population sense, and that even if the franchise is altered, that that situation will persist; and this is coupled with the fact that the division is not on a political but a racial-cum-social basis, something which cannot be changed for perhaps decades. His reason for saying that there must not be an election before Independence is that he could not guarantee at any time that such an election could be held without risk of bloodshed, or at any rate the need for substantial
reinforcements. Further, even if such an election were held, he holds that the situation would still not be altered and the Parties would still be approximately equally represented in the Legislative Council.

4. Sir George therefore recommends that the line to be taken at the Conference by the S. of S. is to say that he will only set a date both for “internal self-government” and for Independence on condition that a coalition of the Parties comes into existence and persists, without any election, throughout the whole period up to Independence. In the Department, we could readily accept that the existence of a coalition might be made the condition of a date to be given for the beginning of “internal self-government”; but we have had some doubts as to whether the imposition of such a condition would make it possible also to set a date at the time of the Conference for Independence. This is a very difficult question, but we have to bear in mind that it may be equally difficult, with or without the condition, not to set a date for Zanzibar’s independence, when progress on the mainland is so rapid. It is clear that Sir George himself wants the S. of S., on those conditions only, to set dates both for internal self-government and Independence.

5. Sir George and we recognise that there is a great risk in the course which he is proposing, which is that, after the coalition has come into being, one or other of the Parties (most likely at present the A.S.P.) will decide to break it up and try to force an election before the date of Independence arrives. It would have been made clear that in that situation the promise of an Independence date was no longer valid; nevertheless HMG would then find itself in the position of having to maintain order in Zanzibar through a longish period, involving a garrison, possibly even up to June 1964 when, unless the present Decree is amended, there must be an election in any case. If therefore the course recommended by Sir George is to be adopted, we shall have to get the assent of the defence authorities to accept the risks involved in the consequences of the failure of the “gamble” to get Zanzibar into independence with a coalition. On the other hand, Sir George thinks, and we agree, that it is not a feasible alternative to give independence to Zanzibar on the basis either of the present ZNP Government or, if circumstances should alter, so that the ASP were an equally narrowly based Government, an ASP Government. If Sir George Mooring’s arguments are finally accepted, we shall of course try to set out this argument in a way which disposes in turn of the various alternatives.

6. On the above assumptions, we considered the date. We still think that the date is related to the date of Kenya’s independence. We had thought that there might be reasons to make the date two or three months after Kenya’s independence. We now think however that there would be greater advantage if the date could be set two or three months before Kenya’s independence—this would mean that if things then went wrong we should still be physically in a position to intervene rapidly to maintain order. But it is not essential to twist the policy to gain the advantage, and by and large it would be acceptable if the date of Zanzibar’s independence were the same as that of Kenya.

7. But in relation to the date, there is one important consideration, which is that we must achieve a period of minimum of six months from the introduction of an executive Public Service Commission to independence, so that all entitled officers may be able to work out their period of six months notice before independence if they wish to do so. The reason for this is that all those officers know very well the basic fact that (unlike Tanganyika) the removal of actual British physical control from Zanzibar is likely to be the signal for disturbances and bloodshed.
8. On the question of the Sultan, Sir George now appreciates that the 1890 Agreement stands or falls as a whole. Both Parties in Zanzibar profess loyalty to the Sultan. It is therefore thought that it will be best if the Sultan can agree to remain in Zanzibar after independence as a constitutional monarch, that position being entrenched in the Constitution. He should however be afforded the opportunity of declining this honour. In other words, if he does not trust the situation and the entrenchment, he must be pensioned off by HMG. But rather than offering immediately to pension him off, it may be politically far preferable to tell him that he should continue to serve as a constitutional monarch on the basis of an undertaking by HMG to provide him with a pension if at some future date he is forced to abdicate. There may be difficulties about the acceptance of such a contingent liability, but we shall examine this further.

9. As to the form of internal self-government, we feel that we have now overcome most of the difficulties, and Sir George has accepted the view of the Department that any “normal” changes can be made in the present Council’s Decree, so long as we retain in the Decree certain provisions which maintain for the British Resident in his discretion a veto power in respect of certain legislation, and in particular in respect of external affairs, defence, and the use and operational control of the police; also the legislative framework of the Public Service. We shall be working this out in greater detail, but I may remark that this solution is very much on the lines of one which you recently suggested on the papers.

P.S. I should have mentioned that we don’t now think that there is a possibility of steering Zanzibar into Independence with East African Federation at the same time, unless we are prepared to ‘sit on bayonets’ for a considerable time while the movement for Federation develops, if ever it does!

J.C.M.
15.12.61

Sir Hilton Poynton
You minuted on the subject of Zanzibar’s independence on the 13th September¹ and may therefore be interested to see the note opposite in which Mr. Morgan has recorded the course of the latest discussions which we have had with Sir George Mooring during his present leave in this country. Sir George Mooring has moved, I think, somewhat closer to the view you expressed in the penultimate paragraph of that minute. In particular, he no longer feels that we must willy-nilly get out of Zanzibar when we leave Kenya which was the basis of his earlier advice and he is seeking authority to tell the politicians in Zanzibar that they will not get independence unless they form a coalition and that there will be no further election before independence. (As the note explains, the latter point reverses the provisional decision of the last Secretary of State).

The Department support Sir George Mooring but with respect I myself think the authority for which he asks goes too far. By all means let him continue to press the two parties to form a coalition, and by all means let him make it clear to them that if a coalition is formed the prospects of a successful outcome for Zanzibar at next March’s Constitutional Conference are going to be much brighter. But in the last

¹ See previous document.
resort one cannot force the political parties to be moderate if they are not going to be moderate and a straight statement of “no coalition, no independence” may in effect be counter-productive.

In short, I think Ministers should reserve until much nearer the Conference—possibly during the Conference itself—the decision whether they should insist on a coalition as a prerequisite of independence.

As regards the elections, if we get a coalition I agree that there is a very strong case for going forward to independence without holding further elections; if we don’t again I think Ministers would be well advised to reserve their position for the meantime.

If this view is accepted by Ministers, the note will require revision accordingly before circulation to other Departments.

As regards other Departments, two points arise:

(i) Commonwealth membership for Zanzibar. The Department suggest that we should tell the C.R.O. that, if they could devise a second-class Commonwealth status, we would not object to it being applied to Zanzibar. I understand the reasons for, and sympathise with the feeling behind, this view—but Zanzibar opinion is very touchy on being treated as second-class as compared with its mainland neighbours. The Zanzibaris in fact regard themselves as being superior characters to the mainlanders who for so long were, in their eyes, infidel slaves and barbarians. A refusal by the Commonwealth to give them the same sort of status as Tanganyika therefore would lead to resentment and might very well, particularly if an Arab Government was in power, make them turn completely over to the Egyptians. In my view, therefore, we should let the C.R.O. know this point on the other side of the ledger and leave them to strike the balance as to how British interests would best be served as far as Zanzibar membership of the Commonwealth is concerned. Mr. Pritchard2 in Dar-es-Salaam is anxious to visit Zanzibar and they might very well consider asking him to take a formal discussion on the spot and make his recommendations to them before they reach a final decision.

(ii) Defence. As far as this is concerned, we should work on the basis of providing Ministers with advice as to what military assistance from our own resources would be required to keep us in Zanzibar after we can no longer draw on the troops stationed in Kenya. I am somewhat frightened to see that Sir George Mooring considers a brigade would be the size of garrison needed to keep the peace during an election, but I suppose this is the major commitment we should have.

Our enquiries, on the basis that one is planning for the worst, ought to be on the assumption that we will not be able to draw on British troops in Kenya. It is true that the Secretary of State wishes to discuss with the Minister of Defence the preservation of some sort of British military presence in Kenya after independence. If this were achieved, it would facilitate our ability to hold on in Zanzibar but we would not know until after the Kenya Constitutional Conference at the earliest, and more probably not until after elections have been held in Kenya in say the autumn of this year, whether there is a hope of our keeping a military presence in the country. My reason for reaching this conclusion is that it would only be with the Government which

---

2 N Pritchard, high commissioner, Tanganyika, since 9 Dec 1961.
would carry Kenya into independence that we could negotiate an effective settlement of this kind.

W.B.L.M.
10.1.62

Minister of State
I find myself very much in agreement with Mr. Monson on this. . . . In general as I think you know my instinct with all these constitutional conferences is that it is a mistake for the Colonial Office to show its hand too early in the proceedings. If one does, one finds oneself defending a Colonial Office thesis against all comers and any changes which are made are interpreted as concessions wrested from H.M.G. If on the other hand the Colonial Office sits back and listens until the Conference, as is usually the case, shows signs of getting thoroughly snarled up because the local politicians cannot agree with each other then there is a much better chance in my opinion of the Secretary of State being able to get agreement to a ruling by himself as a deus ex machina and with less flavour of an imposed result. On the other hand unless we have some fairly clear idea at the back of our own minds before the Conference opens it may be very basic [sic; drastic?] in what I imagine may be a fairly short conference to go to the Colonial Policy Committee or Cabinet in the middle of the Conference. This is much easier with a long drawn out conference where a day or two's delay in the middle does not matter quite so much.

It is taken for granted in these memoranda and minutes that we shall have to agree that independence is the ultimate answer and I think that it is right. I do not, for example, think that it would be practical politics to make the independence of Zanzibar conditional upon Zanzibar becoming a state in an East African Federation. In other words I think we are committed to agreeing in principle that Zanzibar can become independent on its own. This brings me on to the point about Commonwealth Membership. In considering this I think we have first to recognise that if Zanzibar becomes an independent nation on its own it will be eligible for membership of the United Nations. Its small population will be no bar here since there are already one or two members of the United Nations with populations even smaller than Zanzibar, Iceland is one. Political immaturity or lack of economic viability would certainly be no bar to membership in an assembly which has a preponderant Afro-Asian vote. It is this fact which to my mind makes the question of Commonwealth membership even more difficult than it otherwise would be. Hitherto all departments and the other Commonwealth countries have been opposed to anything like second class membership—this was brought out very clearly in the report of the group of Commonwealth officials which met at Chequers in July 1960. Recently Sir Norman Brook has asked the United Kingdom Departments concerned to review the Chequers report and there is a Working Party which is studying this question.3 I am not sure offhand how far it has got and I am not delaying the papers for research though I am trying to find out separately. So far the only alternative which anyone has been able to think of (apart from halting the smaller territories at some status short of independence, like Singapore) is something on the lines of what New Zealand and Western Samoa have agreed upon, namely that Western Samoa was

3 See document nos 534 and 544 in Pt II.
made independent but then voluntarily asked New Zealand to look after its external relations and defence in return for which Western Samoa, I understand, is not applying for United Nations or Commonwealth membership. I am extremely doubtful however, whether such an arrangement would be negotiable with Zanzibar even as a temporary measure pending ultimate absorption into an independent East African Federation which would be a full member of the Commonwealth. We shall have to go into this more closely with the Commonwealth Relations Office between now and the opening of the Zanzibar Conference.

On defence I have no comments on Mr. Monson’s minute.

A.H.P.
11.1.62

I am not happy about the Zanzibar Paper. Concentrated and distilled the formula seems to look something like this:

(i) Elections = bloodshed.
(ii) If these cannot be avoided by a coalition — no independence; but
(iii) No independence = bloodshed.

Could we discuss?

H.F.
18.1.62

The more I read the intelligence reports the more I am struck with the constant reiteration of the theme of growing Communist influence.

If it is right and the Communists have decided to make a real set for Zanzibar with the thought that if they can win this small country (and because it is small it should not prove too difficult or expensive to do this), it would of course provide an admirable base from which to operate in Eastern Africa, all up and down the coast in fact.

I think we perhaps should have an urgent security appreciation of the risk of it going Communist and then consider whether we ourselves can face this or whether we should not be tough and hang on to Zanzibar, cost what it may. Our excuse of course would be the racial troubles and how we are not prepared finally to withdraw until we are much more certain that the country will stay quiet after independence. The trouble with all of this is of course that we would have perhaps to keep a large force there. In one way this would not be a bad thing as it would be relatively easy to move from there to East Africa. However I imagine climate and accommodation are both against stationing troops for any time.

Generally if we are thinking of hardening in any part of Africa as regards our policy, isn’t Zanzibar, which is small, the place to do it?

P.
25.1.62

... 2. On purely Kenya grounds, E.A.D. “A” take the view that Zanzibar’s independence should not come before Kenya’s; so it follows that if a date for Kenya’s independence is not given at the end of the forthcoming conference the same should apply for Zanzibar. But the issue is not very straightforward. It is conceivable that at the Kenya Conference the Secretary of State might have to take the line that
he cannot name a date for independence now, but he agrees that elections should be held as soon as practicable and is ready, at a convenient time, after those elections have been held, to hold discussions with the incoming government at which he would hope it would be possible to determine a date for independence. If this line were adopted in these terms also for Zanzibar, we might be in some difficulty since (subject to any particular Zanzibar complications over franchise, of which I am not aware) Zanzibar might be able to organise an election some months sooner than Kenya. In these circumstances—assuming Zanzibar acquiesced in the Secretary of State’s offer—although the “formulas” adopted for each country at the forthcoming conferences were in line, it might be difficult to hold Zanzibar’s independence until Kenya’s. If this proved to be the case and if for purely Zanzibar reasons an earlier date had to be set, this would be bound to react on Kenya, however readily at the conference they had accepted the Secretary of State’s delaying formula.

F.D.W.
8.2.62

I attach opposite the draft of a Cabinet paper for next week’s C.P.C. and which seeks in particular directions as to whether we are prepared to accept that the better course is to link Zanzibar independence with Kenya independence in timing whenever the latter comes. The matter was mentioned in discussion between the Secretary of State and Lord Perth on the one hand and the British Resident on the other on the 1st February (see (219), but I am not sure what views the Secretary of State himself holds. The paper has been drafted, however, on the basis of discussions in the Africa (Official) Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Trend, which reached the conclusion that Mr. Macleod’s earlier assessment that Zanzibar would have to become independent about the same time as Kenya was still sound.

Lord Perth had raised with the Department the question whether we should not make special arrangements to stay on in Zanzibar to counteract communist ability to use the island as a base to penetrate the mainland. This was also discussed with Sir George Mooring, who took the view that it was unlikely the communists would get control of Zanzibar and that they might, with the opening of Iron Curtain country Embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, switch the heat off Zanzibar.

We have touched on this aspect of the question in the draft and taken the view that we cannot, because of the latter consideration, make Zanzibar a bastion against communist penetration of the mainland. . . .

Mr. Webber raises in his last minute the question as to what we shall do if at the end of the day the Secretary of State does not name a date for Kenya’s independence but offers to hold discussions on the question after elections have been organised. I agree with him that we could not use the same formula for Zanzibar if we were to take as the governing factor that Zanzibar and Kenya independence should be more or less simultaneous in time; but if we did decide that this was the right course for Kenya, it would be perfectly possible so to arrange things in Zanzibar, e.g. by saying that we wanted experience of a certain length of time of internal self-government so as to estimate whether communal passions had died down sufficiently, that the two events could be brought together very closely in time. . . .

W.B.L.M.
8.2.62
Sir John Martin

I think I ought to put you in the picture as regards Zanzibar. We have submitted to Ministers the draft opposite which was based on interdepartmental discussion in the Africa (Official) Committee. That Committee reached the view that it was a practical impossibility for us to maintain our position in Zanzibar if and when we had left Kenya. As I said in my minute above, we drafted our submission to Ministers on the basis of these minutes.

Lord Perth’s minute of the 9th February above suggests, however, that we should make the establishment of a coalition or stable government after elections a prior condition of our granting independence in Zanzibar and the Secretary of State has asked us to consider further the reference to stable government—see Private Secretary’s memorandum of the 12th February opposite.

If Lord Perth’s suggestion is intended to be no more than a bluff which we would deploy against the Zanzibar politicians in order to force them into coalition or otherwise keep the peace, I would not object to it. If, however, this is to be H.M.G.’s firm policy, I cannot advise Ministers that we should pursue it unless we can persuade the Ministry of Defence to alter their present attitude that they are not prepared to commit British troops up to the battalion strength required plus the capital expenditure of their accommodation indefinitely in Zanzibar.

I ought to add that none of us in the Department here have any liking as Colonial Office officials for the decision that we should get out of Zanzibar willy-nilly. It goes against all our instincts and training but we have to accept that the ability to continue our protecting position in Zanzibar depends upon our capacity to exercise protection and unless we are provided with the tools to do this job in the shape of guarantee of British troops in sufficient strength, we could not advise our Ministers that they should commit themselves to staying on in Zanzibar.

W.B.L.M.
13.2.62

Minister of State

Please see Mr Monson’s minute above. In the circumstances I do not think we should tie our decision in any way to the outcome of the elections and recommend that the proposals in para 8 of the paper should stand as drafted.

J.M.M.
13.2.62

I agree no change—in fact if there is disorder we couldn’t go anyhow & I’ll make this point orally!

P.
13.2.62

132 PREM 11/4600 1 Feb 1962

[Zanzibar constitution]: record of a discussion at a meeting between Mr Maudling and Sir G Mooring (Zanzibar)

The Secretary of State’s brief for this meeting was the paper entitled “Zanzibar Constitutional Conference.” Lord Perth, Mr. Monson and Mr. Morgan were present at this meeting.
2. **Sir George Mooring** explained that the Zanzibar Government had agreed to coalition with the Afro/Shirazi Party and had offered coalition, but the Opposition Party would only agree on condition of the holding of an election in the period of interval self-government and before independence. This was in fact the only issue which now divided the Parties (except for a relatively minor difference of opinion as to whether the minimum age for the franchise should be eighteen (ASP) or twenty-one (ZNP)). There had already recently been two elections in Zanzibar, which had produced precisely the same results, a virtual tie. The differences between the parties were based on social and tribal factors and not on policy. The Shirazis, who supported the Afro/Shirazi party were those of more recent mainland origin; the true Zanzibaris of older Island origin tended to follow the Zanzibar Nationalist Party. Apart from the racial and social differences, the main difference between the Parties was that one was in and the other out. This situation was unlikely to change. If elections were held, this would relight the flames of controversy; the country people would tend to attack the landlords, and there were many old scores to pay off. There would be bloodshed even if the elections were policed to the nth degree. The British Resident would wish to avoid new elections if at all possible.

3. The Secretary of State suggested that the answer might be for Zanzibar to remain dependent for a period. **Sir George Mooring** said that this would be all right if H.M.G. were prepared to pay the bill and to provide the necessary troops for a garrison. He thought one battalion would be required, so long as there was the possibility of reinforcement from elsewhere. With such a moderate garrison and some money for development, it would be possible for us to stay in control of Zanzibar. Some people in Zanzibar were in any case fed-up with the politics, in particular the Asian community and the traders. These would be relieved if Britain stayed. The Afro/Shirazis would not oppose our staying with any strength, because the Africans would like the opportunity to catch up with the Arabs. They would of course have to make a show of objection. On the other side there would be an outcry from the Arabs, particularly the young left-wingers, and our continued stay was not likely to be a happy one. It was also relevant that there was no accommodation for troops in the Island.

4. In answer to a question from Lord Perth, **Sir George Mooring** said that he did not think there was a great chance of the communists imposing control over Zanzibar during the next five years. There was the possibility that the opening of Russian and Chinese Embassies in Dar-es-Salaam might take the heat off the communist effort in Zanzibar. But in certain conditions the Zanzibaris would swing towards the communists, for example, if they did not get financial assistance from the West, or if Commonwealth membership was denied to the country on independence. Generally the conditions for communism did not exist in Zanzibar. It was true that there was a landlord class, but the workers were also landowning, even if only as squatters. There was virtually no industry in the islands. Those who had flirted with communism had done so mainly to get some easy aid in their general “fight against imperialism”. Young men had found that they could not get scholarships anywhere else, and had therefore gone beyond the Iron Curtain. The reason for this was not merely that scholarships in the West were not available, but very largely that they were not themselves qualified to take them up. So it was the Zanzibar “rejects” who went to communist countries for training.

5. **Sir George Mooring** thought that it would be possible to retain control of
Zanzibar if they were given a reasonable measure of internal self-government; and the excuse for holding on would be the impossibility of holding elections in present conditions.

6. In reply to a suggestion from Lord Perth that there would be bloodshed in any case if the British left, Sir George Mooring again said that coalition was really the best thing for the Island from every point of view. Many people in Zanzibar agreed with this view and it was simply opposed by the Afro/Shirazi leaders’ insistence on elections before independence.

7. The Secretary of State mentioned the possibility of the forthcoming Kenya Conference breaking down. There was discussion of the possibility of giving Zanzibar independence even if it had not been given to Kenya. Sir George Mooring pointed out that it would be difficult to retain control in Zanzibar after Kenya had become independent, but, from Zanzibar’s point of view, it would not present difficulty if Zanzibar were independent before Kenya.

8. On the question of the Coastal Strip, Mr. Monson mentioned the manifesto of the Z.N.P. about the Robertson Report, stating that it was worthless; but this had been largely due to their dislike of the allegation in the Robertson Report that no one in Zanzibar had paid much attention to the interests of the Sultan’s subjects in the Coastal Strip.

9. There was a discussion of the difficulty of giving full Commonwealth membership to Zanzibar. Sir George Mooring stated that his attitude was that it would be most unfortunate if, in the event of it proving to be necessary to exclude certain territories from full membership of the Commonwealth, this were linked directly with an application for membership by Zanzibar. It was a question for the Arab/Zanzibari leaders of pride and face. The Secretary of State tended to think that despite the obviously unsatisfactory situation which was building up as to Commonwealth membership, it would probably prove impossible to deny such membership to Zanzibar if and when it became independent.

10. Sir George Mooring gave the Secretary of State some account of the character of the Sultan and the political leaders in Zanzibar, and referred to the generally cosmopolitan atmosphere of the islands.

---


---

**133** CO 822/2264, nos 265 & 266 2 Feb 1962

[Uganda]: minutes on ‘problems’ with chief minister, Mr Kiwanuka, by W B L Monson and Lord Perth to Mr Maudling

At (265) and (266) there are letters from Sir Walter Coutts in which he recounts his difficulties with his Chief Minister and proposes:

(i) that the constitution for internal self-government should be amended to retain the ultimate control in the Governor’s hands for the period between the 1st

---

1 Mr Benedicto K M Kiwanuka, president of the Democratic Party, who became chief minister in 1961, and first prime minister of self-governing Uganda in Mar 1962, but who lost the election of April 1962 to Dr (Apollo) Milton Obote (see note 3 below).
March and the new Government at the end of April when the elections will be over ((265), paragraph 19). (This in effect means no self-government until after the election, though the Governor would withdraw from the discussions of the Council of Ministers);

(ii) that the Secretary of State should threaten the Chief Minister with this unless he modifies his economic policies ((266), last paragraph).

Sir Walter Coutts’ letters should if possible be read in full.

The essence of his complaint is that the Chief Minister is ready to use all the short-term means available to let him win the election at the cost of:

(a) crippling Uganda financially;
(b) breaking the civil service machine;
(c) undermining the main principles of constitutional government.

Added to that is his apparent determination to break the Kabaka’s Government which jeopardises our policy for Uganda as determined at the last Conference.

Mr. Webber and Mr. Stacpoole think that the Governor is over-severe. I agree with Mr. Stacpoole that the Chief Minister was not too well handled by the last Governor2 but I doubt if comparisons with what the Leader of the Opposition might do have any real significance in the present discussions. The point is that Mr. Obote3 may be as dictatorial as Mr. Kiwanuka but if he took office after an election and with the prospect of a long time in office he would probably be more responsible.

I must agree too with the Governor’s view that all these difficulties spring from the decision to let the Chief Minister become Prime Minister before the elections (paragraph 17). The anti-British complex may be more recent but its effect on the expatriate service is just as alarming as the financial danger. I doubt in fact if we will in the short time left restore Civil Service morale.

Legal advice is that the Governor’s proposal could not be concealed by drafting and the change in policy would come out into the open.

The East African Department recommend against the Governor’s proposal and suggest in effect that the Secretary of State should give Mr. Kiwanuka a ticking-off but “more in sorrow than in anger”.

There are great risks in either course. The Governor’s proposal, while welcome to Mr. Kiwanuka’s opponents, would give Mr. Kiwanuka a magnificent election platform (“Vote for Ben, the victim of Imperialist bad faith”); he would take the policies for which he has been criticized to the electorate and his opponents would probably go one better (sic). The Department’s proposal may well have no effect, given Mr. Kiwanuka’s unwillingness to accept advice (paragraph 14 of (265)) and may also make him take this as his platform.

The matter is complicated by timing. The Order-in-Council will have to be made between the 22nd and 26th of this month.

Mr. Kiwanuka arrives this week-end to see the Secretary of State on his wages policy and on finance for the compensation scheme. We shall be advising the Secretary of State to support the Governor on the wages point and turn down Mr. Kiwanuka’s proposal: we shall also advise that the Secretary of State should try to get

---

agreement with Mr. Kiwanuka on a statement that compensation cannot be settled except in the general financial talks to be held in about three weeks’ time, i.e. about the same time as the Order-in-Council will be made.

We have one weapon in our hands in finance, if we assume, that is, that Mr. Kiwanuka as leader of a predominantly Catholic party is not thinking of help from behind the Iron Curtain and also if it can be assumed that no Western source of help will finance “unsound” projects. But the extent to which we should rely on this weapon will not be clear until the financial talks start and that is almost simultaneously with the date of the Order-in-Council.

So much for the background. I now turn to the tactics for Mr. Kiwanuka’s visit. I have not had the opportunity to discuss this with the Attorney-General, whose arrival today with further comments from his Governor has been delayed, but I will of course report further if he has anything to say which has a bearing on the line I have taken. Mr. Kiwanuka is being asked to see you at 4.30 on Monday afternoon. It will be virtually impossible to obtain Treasury concurrence to the line which the Governor wishes us to take on wages or on the statement we would like to negotiate about compensation in time for you to be able to give a decision to Mr. Kiwanuka. In the circumstances we suggest that on Monday you should primarily listen to what Mr. Kiwanuka has to say to you and promise to give him your answer at a subsequent meeting on Wednesday. These tactics will make it possible for you on Monday to talk in rather more general terms and I hope that after after reading the Governor’s letter, you may feel able to take a fairly robust line with Mr. Kiwanuka in spite of the risks this may involve. (It is as usual a matter of judgment which risk is the lesser of the risks that confront us but I think it is worthwhile trying to frighten Mr. Kiwanuka with the consequences of his conduct on his own position and, subject to whatever transpires in the talks, that we may find the lesser risk lies in accepting the Governor’s advice. I should add that on this I differ from the views of the East African Department as expressed in Mr. Webber’s minute above).

I suggest that opportunity might be taken of Monday’s meeting to remind Mr. Kiwanuka of the debt which he owes to the Colonial Office and of the way we have been in the past ready to show confidence in him.

He is in fact only in his present position because we refused to suspend elections to the Legislative Council in the face of a boycott by the Kabaka’s Government and our action in doing this plus the numbers of police and troops whom we moved into Buganda for the election secured him seats in Buganda which gave him a majority in the Legislature.

We also appointed him Chief Minister in a much shorter time after his party had won the election than any other political leader in like circumstances in Africa, including both Mr. Nyerere and Dr. Banda who had overwhelming victories in the elections, whereas he was returned on a minority vote. Finally, your predecessor carried through last September’s Conference proposals under which it was planned that Mr. Kiwanuka should become Prime Minister of an internally self-governing Uganda at the beginning of next month and in advance of the general election.

You may feel able to express your disappointment, in the light of this past history, over many of Mr. Kiwanuka’s recent actions, e.g. his action vis-a-vis expatriate civil servants, especially those described in paragraph 8 of (265); his attempts to secure public appointments without reference to the Public Service Commission (paragraphs 11 and 12 of (265) refer); actions such as these have caused both the
Governor and yourself concern about the effect which they will have on the expatriate staff which Uganda will continue to need after independence; you may like also to express your concern about the manner in which Mr. Kiwanuka seems inclined to disregard the long-term effect of his financial proposals and the manner in which he has not felt able to co-operate with the Governor on a number of these matters which are of great significance to the future of the territory; and in fact your concern has been that in these matters Mr. Kiwanuka may have been endangering the completion of the programme of work before Uganda’s independence which was agreed in London last September and October; reluctant as you would be to consider revision of that programme, it is a question whether the right course is not for you to reconsider your predecessor’s decision particularly as regards the move to internal self-government, at any rate to the extent of leaving more power than was contemplated in the hands of the Governor until the period when the election was over and Uganda politicians could take a more reasoned view of the problems which lie ahead of their country. . . .

W.B.L.M.
2.2.62

Secretary of State

In my minute set up on the file today about the Governor of Uganda’s troubles with his Chief Minister, I said I would report further on anything that transpired in the talk I was to have with the Attorney-General on his delayed arrival this afternoon.

I have now spoken to the Attorney-General and the main points which emerged from our talk were:

(i) The Governor wished the Attorney to emphasise the importance which he attached to his proposal that he should be given reserved powers to cover the period of internal self-government up to the election in order to save the country from reckless acts by the Chief Minister;
(ii) There is likely to be at least one further resignation from the Cabinet over the Chief Minister’s treatment of his colleagues. More significantly, perhaps, Mr. Obote, the Leader of the Opposition, had got to hear of the proposal to remove Mr. Simpson from the Uganda Development Corporation and had gone to the Governor asking that he should do what he could to prevent any decision being taken in this matter until the election was over;
(iii) The Attorney-General suggested that the Secretary of State might, in speaking to the Chief Minister, emphasise that it was not the normal practice of Governments, e.g. in this country, to introduce substantial and drastic changes in policy in the weeks immediately pending a general election; that in introducing self-government in advance of the election the British Government had assumed that this convention would be followed by Mr. Kiwanuka but if it was in fact his intention, once powers had been transferred from the Governor for the short period in advance of elections, to make substantial changes in policy, it would be necessary for H.M.G. to give the Governor powers to veto such of those changes as

---

were of such importance that they would normally be left for the Government returned at the election to consider and put into effect.

W.B.L.M.

2.2.62

Ben Kiwanuka’s visit.

I have not yet had the opportunity to read the Governor’s letters in full, but reading Mr. Monson’s minute, two things occur to me.

1. I am sure it is right to be tough about his action about the Civil Service.

2. The money questions are much more difficult. The fact is that Kiwanuka is fighting for his future. He has against him a pretty unholy alliance of Obote and the Yeka-Kabaka\(^5\) parties.

Kiwanuka got in the last time as he swept the board in Buganda, and great courage he showed in doing this and we owe him and his party a debt as but for their courage we would never have brought the Kabaka’s people to heel.

This time he will certainly get far fewer if any seats in Buganda against the Yeka-Kabaka Party. He has therefore to try and rally supporters outside, and the only way that he sees is by spending money. As you know he has been pretty clever in what money he proposes to spend and why and if we stop him he would have a good cry “The money belongs to the farmers; I want to give it to them but H.M.G. prevents me”. On the other side it must be remembered that he has shown great courage in introducing income tax on Africans. All in all I am not the least bit surprised about what appears to us irresponsible financial behaviour. But isn’t this one of the penalties of full internal self-government? I know it will be objected that if he does use the cotton and coffee funds now, the development of the country is threatened. This may or may not be true. After all Tanganyika didn’t go into independence with large reserves for development, nor will Kenya. Why should Uganda be the exception?

As I said at the beginning, I have not read the letters in full but I am not clear that Kiwanuka is wholly irresponsible, although I would repeat I entirely agree that he should be severely reprimanded on the Civil Service.

P.

2.2.62

\(^5\) Usually known as Kabaka-Yekka Party (ie ‘Kabaka Only’).

134 CAB 128/36/1, CC 17(62)4 27 Feb 1962
[Financial assistance to Uganda after independence]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (62) 40) on the extent of the financial assistance which might be offered to the Uganda Government.

The Colonial Secretary said that Uganda was due to achieve internal self-government on 1st March and to become independent in October. Discussion had been proceeding in London with representatives of the Uganda Government on the payments to be made by the United Kingdom Government towards the cost of
compensating expatriate officers and towards further economic development in Uganda, and if these could not be brought to a satisfactory conclusion the date for the introduction of internal selfgovernment would have to be deferred. It would be particularly unfortunate if postponement were caused either wholly or partly by difficulties in settling the amount of the United Kingdom contribution towards compensation for officials. The discussions had been based on proposals approved by the Treasury which in the case of compensation fell some £700,000 short, and in the case of development aid just under £2 million short, of what he himself had thought would be a reasonable amount. On the two heads taken together, the amount required, in his judgment, to make a settlement probable was £14.5 million and the offers so far made totalled £11.9 million. He believed that on a long view it would be to the advantage of the Government, both politically and financially, to improve upon these offers, which would be difficult to defend in the light of the more generous arrangements recently made for Tanganyika.

The Chief Secretary, Treasury, said that in his view the Tanganyika settlement had been unduly generous and would prove to be an embarrassing precedent unless its effect could be corrected by a more economical settlement for Uganda. The development scheme for Uganda which had been prepared by the World Bank was attractive but it would cost more than Uganda or the United Kingdom could afford in present circumstances. The development aid so far offered would enable more development to be undertaken than had been carried out in recent years and, although it might be reasonable to improve the Government’s offer under the compensation head, an improvement in the offer of development aid would be inconsistent with the Government’s stated aim of containing growth in public expenditure at home and overseas.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) It would not be practicable to settle the compensation question forthwith and leave development aid to be settled later. There might, however, be something to be gained in comparable negotiations with other territories if the Government accepted full responsibility for compensation from the outset. This would enable development aid to be considered on its merits and in a less emotional atmosphere.

(b) Although the amount of Government expenditure overseas was running ahead of the limit of £180 million which the Government had approved, the amount attributable to Uganda would be £4 million less over the next two years than under the Colonial Secretary’s earlier proposals.

(c) Colonial territories generally paid close attention to the amounts of aid given on independence and it was difficult to contest Uganda’s claim to treatment not less favourable than that given to the neighbouring territory of Tanganyika. It was important, however, that in other cases yet to arise the Cabinet should have in advance a clear statement of the scale of commitments to be expected; for it seemed clear that in relation to economic conditions in the United Kingdom the financial assistance which was being provided overseas was over-generous.

Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that, while the cost of relinquishing Colonial rule was proving to be high, it was probably better to accept

---

1 Mr H Brooke.
definite, if large, financial commitments on independence than to risk the indefinite and larger expenditure involved in prolonging Colonial rule against a risk of collapse of law and order. There seemed to be no acceptable means of varying the offers already made to the Uganda Government which would fall far short of the total proposed by the Colonial Secretary. But it would be intolerable if a further offer did not produce a settlement and he suggested that, in continuing negotiations later that day, the United Kingdom representatives should indicate that if this offer were not accepted forthwith it would be withdrawn.

The Cabinet:—

Agreed that the representatives of the Uganda Government should be offered the financial settlement proposed by the Colonial Secretary in C. (62) 40 on the basis that if it were not accepted forthwith it would be withdrawn.

135  CO 822/2328, no 234  1–23 Mar 1962

[Zanzibar constitutional development]: minutes by J C Morgan and W B L Monson

The Colonial Policy Committee paper on Constitutional Development in Zanzibar (CPC(62)2) concluded by recommending:—

1) that we should accept that Zanzibar be granted independence at about the same time as Kenya were granted independence;
2) that, if possible, a coalition of the existing Parties should be formed as a preliminary to independence;
but:
3) that such coalition should not be made a condition of independence;
4) that, therefore, if the Opposition Party are unwilling to enter coalition, I [Mr Maudling] should arrange at the Conference for elections before independence;
5) that I should have discretion to arrange for such elections either before or after a move to internal self-government.

2. When this paper was considered by the Committee on 16th February most of the discussion centred on the desirability of the period of self-government before the grant of independence being as long as possible. The Minutes reflect this and refer specifically only to the second of the recommendations set out above. The conclusions were:—

‘The Committee:—

1) Invited the Colonial Secretary, in the course of the forthcoming Zanzibar constitutional conference, to make every effort to secure a coalition of the two main parties as a necessary condition to the attainment of self-government.
2) Agreed that it should be a main object of our policy in the negotiations to secure the maximum possible duration of the period of internal self-government in Zanzibar’.

3. For clarification, Lord Perth wrote to Viscount Kilmuir suggesting that it had been tacitly understood at the meeting that if attempts to secure a coalition failed, it would be necessary to adopt the course of elections before rather than after

---

1 14 Feb 1962: see CAB 134/1561, memorandum by Mr Maudling.
independence, although whether those elections should be before or after the introduction of internal self-government would be left open. The Lord Chancellor has, however, replied that he does not consider the meeting to have authorised our proceeding on these lines. He suggests that the difficulty rests not in the timing but in the threat to security which holding elections presents and that, if the attempt to form a coalition fails, the Secretary of State should again approach the Committee with an assessment of the dangers of the elections and an indication of the troops necessary to maintain law and order.

4. These points were in fact covered in the Committee paper as follows. Given the racial background and the fact that disturbances took place in June, 1961, the holding of elections would very probably precipitate further disturbances. These could, however, be kept in check providing sufficient forces were available; two battalions would be required, one actually in the islands and one ready to reinforce. Further examination at the present stage is unlikely to alter this assessment.

5. The Department have consulted Mr. Monson, and in these circumstances we suggest that the Secretary of State should be prepared to reach a final conclusion as to elections during the course of the Zanzibar Conference itself, and in direct consultation with the British Resident, on both political and security aspects. He may think it necessary at that time to consult the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, assuming that time will preclude full reference to Cabinet or C.P.C. . . .

J.C.M.
1.3.62

. . . The British Resident is emphatic that, in the event of coalition (Mr. Morgan’s Case I) there will be considerable ill-feeling directed against us in Zanzibar if we do not fix a date for independence. We are in fact on the dilemma of having elections (and bloodshed) or coalition and independence which we have always foreseen.

As we are not fixing a date for Kenya, however, we shall, if we are prepared to stick it out and subject possibly to reinforcement of Kenya from Europe, be able to maintain our position in Zanzibar and as I understand it the C.P.C. considered that the governing factor should be not so much what happens in Zanzibar itself as the implications of a decision in Zanzibar on advancing independence in Kenya.

The best way consistent with the Cabinet decision to handle the Zanzibar Conference, if the parties agree on coalition, seems to me to be that the Secretary of State should welcome the coalition; should say that, as foreshadowed in his opening speech, we cannot ignore the events of last year and that he must see how coalition works in practice before he could agree to our giving up our protection of Zanzibar; but that he would, in the light of experience of the coalition and of internal self-government, be ready to discuss the timetable again towards the end of this year. (I suggest towards the end of this year on the basis of three or four months for drafting the internal self-government constitution plus say at least three months of internal self-government). In the event of deadlock (Mr. Morgan’s case II), I should have thought agreement on internal self-government on the basis of the present Administration but no date for independence was the right course to follow. . . .

W.B.L.M.
23.3.62

2 Lord Perth minuted: ‘I think we can delay fixing an independence date. P’ [nd].
CO 822/2266, no 378 8 Oct 1962

‘Uganda: future as an independent country’: despatch from Sir W Coutts to Mr Sandys

[Extract]

... 2. When I arrived in Uganda on 18th November, 1961, the first Uganda Constitutional Conference had already charted the course for Uganda’s transition to internal self-government, and your predecessor had already announced not only that Uganda would attain internal self-government on 1st March, 1962, but that, provided the necessary discussions could be completed and arrangements made in time, Uganda would attain Independence on 9th October, 1962. The time-table was fixed, and it is a matter for both congratulation and relief that Uganda’s dash to freedom has not been seriously checked. The preparation of the country for independence during the last year has called for an immense effort, in particular from members of the civil service, and the achievement of independence tomorrow is in large part due to their industry, patience and devotion.

3. Before I arrived in Uganda, I had the privilege of attending the Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House during September and October 1961 and thus had an exceptional opportunity to study Uganda’s problems before I reached the country, and hear about the conflicting attitudes and shades of opinion of the country’s various parties and regions. The outcome* of the conference was generally welcomed in Uganda as a most constructive way out of the difficulties that had threatened to hold up the country’s progress, particularly the question of the relationship between the Central Government and the kingdoms, notably Buganda. At separate talks in London at the time of the conference negotiations with representatives of Buganda were brought to a satisfactory conclusion, and a new draft Agreement initialled, by which Buganda’s place in Uganda was clearly defined.

4. It was most fitting that my predecessor, Sir Frederick Crawford, was able to sign the new Buganda Agreement, 1961, on 31st October, 1961, just before he left Uganda, as the burden of long, difficult and frustrating negotiations had fallen very much on him personally over the previous months. Although this new Agreement gave Buganda a very much freer hand to manage her own affairs without intervention from the Central Government it did retain sufficient overall control to the Central Government to make it possible for Uganda to look forward more hopefully to Independence as one country.

5. As it is not easy to describe the situation at my arrival and the events that followed without some description of the immediate past, I must give a brief account of the closing months of my predecessor’s term of office. The signing of the Buganda Agreement had brought to an end the sterile period of the previous two years, in which the leaders in Buganda had increasingly tried to insulate the kingdom from what was going on in the rest of the country. The most important expressions of these efforts were the Lukiiko declaration in the closing days of 1960 that Buganda should become independent on 1st January, 1961, the Kabaka’s Government’s boycott of the Uganda Relationships Commission, and later of the general election of March 1961. The Kabaka’s Government opposed the holding of direct elections in Buganda most bitterly and did all they could to prevent the people of Buganda from taking part.

6. The elections of March 1961 were the first in which all parts of the country and all communities voted directly, by secret ballot and on a wide common roll franchise for the members who were to represent them in the legislature. In spite of the open hostility of the Kabaka's Government, sufficient people in Buganda had registered as electors and stood as candidates for a member of the Legislative Council to be returned from each constituency. The political parties, which had already gained experience of electioneering in direct elections in a number of districts in 1958, urged their supporters to register in defiance of the Buganda Government's ban but only the Democratic Party had much success in mobilising their supporters. As a result the Democratic Party won 20 of the 21 Buganda seats outside Kampala.

7. In the rest of the country the elections passed off quietly, with large registrations and heavy polls. The Democratic Party won 24 seats and the Uganda People's Congress 34, the remaining three seats going to minor parties and independents. As a result of their success in Buganda the Democratic Party secured a substantial majority in the Legislative Council and it was therefore from their ranks that my predecessor appointed 10 Ministers to form, with the remaining 3 officials, a new Council of Ministers. . . .

24. The conclusions of the second conference have been published,* and it is only necessary for me to note that discussions followed the usual labyrinthine course of main talks, side talks, outside talks, boycotts and returns. Although much time was spent in discussing the demands of the Kingdoms and Busoga, the *leit motif* which ran through all the deliberations was the determination on the part of Buganda to improve its position and the equal determination on the part of the Government, backed by the rest of the conference, to concede nothing. Because of these strains it looked at the end of the first week as though Uganda would disintegrate into 14 separate kingdoms or districts. When it became apparent, however, that the time was limited and that if no agreement was reached by 27th June there would be no independence in October, some sanity and a measure of compromise entered the negotiations.

25. The main difficulty confronting the officials at the conference was to pursue a policy of restricting the Baganda without destroying the Kabaka Yekka–Uganda People's Congress alliance. Obote demonstrated to the full his political skill and astuteness in keeping the Baganda and, eventually even the Batoro, on the field of play.

26. Any one of the issues might have split the Government, but the one most likely to do so was that of the Lost Counties dispute. In the end your predecessor's solution did not satisfy either the Baganda or the Banyoro, but at least we were not all precipitated into the Reichenbach Falls. Altogether the conference, despite many difficulties, was successful in achieving agreement on almost all the matters before it, and in laying down the pattern for Uganda's Independence Constitution. Inevitably, some of the decisions merely put off the argument into the future, particularly on aspects of the Uganda–Buganda relationships, but sufficient agreement was reached to enable Uganda as a whole to look forward to the appointed day for independence with reasonable optimism for the country's future stability.

27. The end of the conference on 29th June brought to an end the tranquillity which had descended on the country while its leaders were away, and apart from the

pressing urgency of the preparations for independence, legislative ceremonial and administrative, the Government had to wrestle with security problems, and a wave of industrial unrest particularly in Kampala and the Eastern Province. Security forces were fully committed to containing incursions and preventing Hutu–Tutsi clashes on the Rwanda border, to the maintenance of peace in Toro district where separatist demands by Baamba and Bakonjo tribesmen had led to violence, and to the restraint of the raiding and lawlessness which threatened to become endemic in Karamoja. On the brighter side, the last months before independence saw the highly successful Nile Centenary exhibition at Jinja in July, the signing of a new Ankole Agreement in August and the departure of the Prime Minister to attend, as an observer, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in September at which Uganda’s application to join the Commonwealth was approved. A little over a fortnight before independence a final Toro Agreement was signed, the last in the line of agreements which ever since the beginning of the Protectorate have played so important a part in the constitutional history of Uganda, and have variously protected the rights of subject peoples, sustained tribal pride, entrenched privilege, and provided those parts of the country so fortunate as to be in on the game with an endless source of negotiation dispute and journeyings to London. I hope that the passing of the agreements will be duly mourned among the lawyers and the airline managers, and that no more malign fetish takes their place in the Uganda of the future.

28. Recently there have been renewed signs of political strain and division behind the outward show of national unity, as expressed in the new national flag (the earlier choice of colours under the Democratic Party Government having been modified by its successor) the national anthem and the coat of arms, the decorations and the plans for independence. In spite of the Uganda People’s Congress–Kabaka Yekka alliance in the Central Government the Buganda Government appeared to become increasingly disenchanted with the June settlement, and the lack of any tangible benefit to Buganda from the alliance, and showed disturbing signs of reverting to old habits of thought. The Kabaka’s Ministers pressed more urgently for police control in Buganda to be handed over to them and there were reports of overtures to the Democratic Party leaders. A sudden resurgence of argument over the wording of the Constitution, accompanied by statements and veiled threats, and a public dash to London in traditional style showed how little confidence the Baganda had in their nominal partners. Although the crisis passed almost as quickly as it arose, it revealed how deep is the conflict between Buganda’s aspirations and the emergent Uganda nationalism, and how shallow was the apparent acquiescence of Buganda in the October 1961 and June 1962 settlements.

29. It might be useful, at this point, to attempt some assessment of the equipment with which Uganda enters independence, and how the country stands after 60 years of British protection. First and foremost among its assets, I feel, must rank the charm, urbanity and good sense of its people: whatever its other deficiencies, Uganda has a heritage of good manners and lack of bitterness which many more opulent nations might envy. Nature’s endowment has been, however, more equivocal, apart from the considerable beauty of its scenery and the country cannot face the future with the prospect of wealth that once seemed so certain. Uganda is perhaps unfortunate in having enjoyed its economic boom too early: the period of high cotton and coffee prices in the late ‘40s and early ‘50s led to economic and social development on a scale that was not paralleled elsewhere in East Africa,
but that early promise has not been entirely fulfilled and Uganda faces a present
darkened by financial stringency and economic lethargy. Nevertheless, in relation to
its population the country is well endowed with fertile, well-watered land on which a
wide range of tropical products can be grown and livestock raised, with abundant
capacity for hydro-electric power, well developed towns and, by African standards,
 excellent communications. The abnormally high prices obtained for its two main
primary products a decade ago obscured the fact that in a tropical country like
Uganda it is easy, too easy, to maintain a subsistence level of life with a few frills and
additions, and very hard to pass from this to a growing dynamic economy based on
agriculture. In spite of very considerable advances in the development of Uganda's
natural resources over the years, an increase in the living standards of the people is
still dependent on an improvement of agriculture, and strenuous efforts will be
necessary to raise standards of husbandry, diversify crops, develop new agricultural
techniques and persuade the farmers to adopt them. Although Uganda derives useful
benefits from other parts of the economy, such as its valuable fisheries, forests and
plantations, no development in these fields can have the effect comparable to a
general raising of standards of farming and animal husbandry throughout the
country. .

31. Uganda at present offers little scope for a dramatic and large-scale
development of industry, but very solid foundations have been laid, both for the
processing of the country's main agricultural products such as cotton, coffee, sugar
and oil seeds, and in the complex of industrial undertakings, many under the control
of the Uganda Development Corporation. This corporation, wholly owned by the
Government, has been a most potent and impressive instrument of development in
Uganda, and includes cement and fertiliser production at Tororo, a cotton mill at
Jinja, a chain of hotels and widely distributed agricultural interests.

suggested the lines on which a Five-year Development plan might be drawn up,
giving pride of place to schemes designed to raise the output of peasant cultivators,
through improved agricultural credit, the encouragement of co-operatives and
increased extension services, and to develop such parts of the economy as would yield
the most rapid return, such as the tourist industry. On the basis of the World Bank
Report, a Development Plan has been drawn up, and it will be one of the most
important tasks of the independent Uganda Government to attract the outside
assistance which is vital if the plan is to be put into effect. Uganda's capacity to
finance development from its own resources is for the present negligible, with its
current Budget deficit estimated at half a million pounds, and reserves amounting
altogether to £3 million. To overcome the further heavy handicaps of being mentally
and physically so far from the outside world and of being politically uninteresting, if
not positively boring, the country will need all the sympathy and assistance that can
be given if it is not to relapse into a stagnant, if seemingly lush, equatorial slum.
There is evidence of a great deal of willingness to help on the part of the United
States and West German Governments. There is no need for me to rehearse the
massive and generous assistance which has been forthcoming from Her Majesty's
Government, but I would plead that British assistance should seem, as well as be,
magnanimous.

33. In the field of social services Uganda has achieved an enviable position in East Africa, which is undermined only by the present difficulty of paying for what has been achieved. Makerere University College has for long by its existence given Uganda the educational leadership of East Africa, and should have given her the intellectual leadership also. The expansion of education, particularly primary, junior secondary and technical, under the inspiration of Sir Andrew Cohen, laid the basis for the satisfaction of the country’s educated manpower requirements in the future. At the primary level opportunity exists for half the nation’s children to receive the basic elements of education, but the present need is for more secondary places, and the Five-year Development Plan, based on the recommendations of the World Bank Report, includes among its most urgent and important features a programme to double the secondary school places in five years. It is from this level that the leaders of the future emerge, and it is to the deficiencies at this level in the past that Uganda owes its present shortage of mature, trained and educated manpower. Although the educational system can be transformed in half a decade, as Uganda’s history has shown, it takes up to 20 years for that transformation to be evident in the country’s life, and it is here that the absence of dynamic (even if costly) educational policies in the 'thirties is most felt. The consciousness of present deficiencies finds its most potent outlet in the demand for overseas scholarships, and the enormous growth and popularity of overseas education in recent years, with the attendant problems, political overtones and opportunities for foreign countries in the East and West to seek influence in Africa by this means is too well known to need description here. . . .

35. In large part, the capacity of the country to sustain what has already been achieved, and to take advantage of every opportunity that offers for further advance, will depend on the Civil Service. The Uganda Service has been, like its counterparts in Kenya and Tanganyika, very heavily dependent on expatriate staff in the higher ranks, and in the professional and technical branches. Possibly it may have been overstaffed for present conditions, both political and economic, as a result of the expansion in all fields of Government activity in the 'fifties. A major step to promote Africans into the higher ranks was taken in August 1961 with the introduction of the Limited Compensation Scheme, and with the replacement of this Limited Scheme by the General Compensation Scheme in March this year the need to promote Africans to the highest levels of the Service became a matter of vital necessity. The rate of departure of expatriate staff under the General Scheme is heavy, but not crippling. Of the 1,260 expatriate staff on the permanent establishment, 110 left under the Limited Scheme, and a further 490-odd have left or will leave under the General Scheme by March 1963. The recruitment of replacements overseas, in cases where no local candidate is available, has been good and for this the country is much indebted to the Department of Technical Co-operation and the Crown Agents. The morale of those who remain is difficult to assess, but can best be described as wary. Although the Uganda People’s Congress–Kabaka Yekka Government, as soon as it came to power, made serious efforts to undo the damage done by its predecessor, and encourage essential expatriate staff to stay, there are already signs of disturbing trends that will almost certainly induce further departures. Generally speaking, it appears likely that very few of the “old” permanent and pensionable expatriate staff will be left by the 1963. So long as there is no development which puts Uganda in a bad light in the world news, there is no reason to assume that contract recruitment will diminish. But the brunt of the Government’s work in the future must inevitably fall on the
African Civil Service. What chance is there that men, often trained in a hurry and almost without exception without any real experience of the heavier responsibilities of Government, will stand up to the strains which are now being put upon them, and which will grow with almost geometrical progression as the months go by? The Africans in the Uganda Civil Service are split broadly into two groups: the privileged few who are now getting right to the top, and the very much larger number who hold posts in the medium and lower ranks of the Service. Those at the top or near it have the expatriate staff to help them at the moment, but the testing time will come next year, when they will stand virtually alone. It remains to be seen whether the few will have the sense to realise how difficult life will be, and will be able to keep the ship of state on a relatively even keel. The larger numbers in the lower ranks will, for the most part, continue as they have done in the past, to do a reasonable job of work; and at the routine level of Government the wheels, although grinding, should continue to turn. The Service of the future will then be very different from the Service of the past; a handful of well-educated, able but inexperienced Africans with a sense of power rivalled only by their political masters; a decreasing number of expatriates, mainly on contract, who will continue to supply the skills which Uganda does not have yet in sufficient quantities, and, one hopes, will continue to advise, help and train their successors; a corps of Asians, with the bleak likelihood of discrimination in the Civil Service and in public affairs alike, unless they are prepared to gulp the medicine of citizenship without real knowledge of its consequences: but no doubt willing, as so often in the past, to turn in a good day's work for its own sake; and a much larger block of well-tried and useful African junior staff, who may manage to keep services for the public going at a moderately efficient level; although things may be queasy further up. That this amorphous band will find it difficult to keep to the standards we have become accustomed to in the past, is undeniable; that they may find it impossible to stand up to the numerous strains of the coming years is likely, and in that case we may expect a kind of modified chaos in 1964 and beyond: but much more likely, perhaps, in the remarkable way of Africa, they will rise to the occasion and get by.

36. In no way will independence bring greater problems to Uganda than in defence and security. The last three years have brought great changes on its borders, and the country will face potential threats particularly on the Congo and Rwanda frontiers with only limited ability to reinforce its own slender forces. The Uganda Battalion of the King's African Rifles will provide an admirable Uganda Army, but even supported by the generosity of Her Majesty's Government, and with the planned recruitment of a further company, it will still be a tiny force when matched against the large and well equipped armies to the west and north. Should a combination of internal disorder and external threat arise, the Uganda Army and Police Force would be stretched to the limit, and if political considerations prevent reinforcement from Kenya or Britain the country would be very vulnerable. The Government will, I am sure, be very tempted to increase the size and improve the equipment of its army as soon as it turns its eyes to Uganda's position in Africa, and in the present financial climate will almost certainly turn for help to those who are ready to offer it most cheaply. There is every hope that Uganda will quickly arrive at a defence agreement or understanding with Tanganyika, and this in itself would reduce the country's isolation.

37. Uganda goes forward into independence with some political uncertainty. The
Prime Minister enjoys virtually unanimous support from his own Uganda People’s Congress Party, but this party does not quite command an overall majority in the National Assembly. The alliance of the Uganda People’s Congress with the Kabaka Yekka movement has shown no outward signs of splitting in the Assembly, and the Opposition Democratic Party has not fully recovered from electoral defeat and the elimination of all its Baganda leaders from the Assembly. Nevertheless a major crisis between Obote’s Government and the Buganda Government would throw an intolerable burden on the Uganda People’s Congress–Kabaka Yekka alliance. The Baganda leaders at Mengo might well then try to align their Kabaka Yekka members in the Assembly with the Democratic Party, and so bring down the Uganda People’s Congress leadership. Such a development cannot be ruled out, and the Democratic Party has indeed tried to bring it about, but a number of factors may make it unlikely for the time being. No occasion has yet arisen to determine the strength of the loyalty to Mengo of the Kabaka Yekka members of the National Assembly, particularly those who are Ministers of the Uganda Government: it is possible that in a conflict, many might not prove as amenable to the decrees of the Kabaka’s Ministers as the latter’s past experience with the Buganda Lukiiko might lead them to assume. Even the Kabaka’s personal influence might not be decisive with a few when not supported by the other means available within Buganda to secure obedience. It also seems likely that very considerable political manoeuvring would be required before a reconciliation with the Democratic Party was acceptable to many Kabaka Yekka members. This may, of course, be largely a matter of personalities, and there is as yet no serious challenger to Obote. It used to seem inevitable that the country’s leaders should come from Buganda, yet increasingly in recent years the Buganda system has discouraged the emergence of political leaders, as potential rivals to the Kabaka, and turned out instead what is on the surface is a breed of courtly and able sycophants. The only thing that can be certain is that Obote will take very vigorous and possibly unpalatable steps to consolidate his position after independence.

38. As Uganda’s Prime Minister, Obote has had so few months to develop from a veteran of the Opposition into the national leader, and is in character such a close man, that it is difficult to forecast how he will guide Uganda’s course in African and international affairs. As one who owes his position more to political astuteness and skill than to a consistent political philosophy, a tactician rather than a strategist, it will take a good deal of experience in the rough and tumble of world affairs for him to reach international stature. His Cabinet contains men of the extreme Left as well as, by African standards, conservatives of a deepish shade of blue. For the time, anyway the Government is likely to follow rather than lead opinion in East Africa, and to be much influenced by Tanganyika. Public opinion has been too much preoccupied with domestic issues to respond to remoter voices although a minority are admirers of the Nkrumah image.

39. Uganda therefore enters its independent future with its basic conflict of nationhood unresolved, a difficult legacy for the new State. As the conflict arose partly from history, and partly from the way Uganda had been developed under British tutelage, it did not, I think, lie within our power to resolve it. Whether Uganda can develop a proper sense of nationhood while it contains within its narrow borders such divisions of loyalty it is difficult to say. This applies not only to Buganda, but to all the other regional loyalties that are such a feature of the Uganda scene, and have led to the setting up of such a cumbersome machinery of
government for such a small, and poor, country. I think that one must before long
digest the other, and at the moment it seems that as Buganda missed its chance of
dominating and perhaps even swallowing the rest of the country, by turning aside in
recent years into dreams of separation and secession, it is now likely that the rest of
Uganda will gain a greater feeling of unity, and ultimately digest Buganda. So long as
individual Baganda continue to share in the Government of Uganda, both as
Ministers and civil servants, the separateness of Buganda will probably be eliminated
gradually, by slow erosion: but the possibility of an earlier convulsive incorporation
cannot be disregarded. However achieved, the growth of a sense of oneness is
without question Uganda’s most pressing need, exceeding even the urgent economic
difficulties that face every emergent African State, and it is to the encouragement of
this sense that the efforts of Uganda’s friends must chiefly be directed, even if in the
immediate future Uganda adopts policies repugnant to the British tradition, and to
Western ideals of tolerant democracy.

40. In conclusion I would pay a tribute to my fellow workers in all walks of life
but particularly to the Civil Service for their devoted work for Uganda during this last
testing period. I end by saying with Mark Antony “Unarm, Eros; the long day’s task is
done”.

**CO 822/2329, no 289** [16] Oct 1962

[Zanzibar constitutional development]: minute by Mr Sandys to Mr Macmillan

[The government would have preferred an all-party coalition to run Zanzibar up to
independence, believing that tension between the main parties had already resulted in
heavy loss of life in the mid-1961 elections and showed no signs of abating. Their refusal
to agree meant a constitutional deadlock, dangerous in so far as it increased the influence
in both main parties of their ‘extremist fellow-travelling wings who blame the deadlock
on us’ (CO brief, 8 Oct 1962).]

Last April my predecessor as Colonial Secretary¹ reported to the Cabinet that he had
not been able to secure a Coalition Government of the two main parties in Zanzibar
as a necessary condition of the attainment of self-government. He also told
Parliament on 12th April that, in the absence of agreement between the Zanzibar
Ministers and the Opposition delegates, it had proved impossible to settle the
timetable for further advance towards independence.

2. The British Resident has now reported that further efforts to get the main
parties to agree on a Coalition Government have failed. On the other hand the
Government Party has now submitted proposals envisaging the grant of internal self-
government to the present Government, to be followed by elections and immediate
independence thereafter. These proposals are unacceptable as they stand, especially
since we could not be committed at this stage to the grant of independence
immediately after the elections but, insofar as they recommend elections before they
are due in the normal course of events, the proposals represent a concession on the
part of the Government Party which might, if the Opposition can be induced to
agree, provide a way out of the present constitutional deadlock. The British Resident

¹ Mr Sandys succeeded Mr Maudling in mid-July 1962.
favours a programme covering the early introduction of self-government, to be followed by elections, after which negotiations on arrangements for independence would be started.

3. If such a proposal were to be accepted, the timetable for constitutional advance would be approximately:

- Internal self-government: January/March 1963
- Elections: June 1963
- Independence: Subject to negotiation but not before December 1963, at the earliest.

4. I see no major difficulty in acceding to a proposal on these lines if it represents an agreed approach on the part of both Parties. During the period of self-government the British Resident would retain control of external affairs, defence and internal security. With agreement between the parties the risk of disturbances should be greatly reduced. The date and conditions of Zanzibar’s independence will still fall to be negotiated after the elections. It has been the policy of the British Government to reduce the present dangerous tension in the Protectorate through agreement between the parties. If you agree, I therefore propose to authorise the British Resident to open negotiations with Government and Opposition parties on the lines that, although the Government’s proposals are unacceptable as they stand, the British Government would be prepared to consider a joint approach covering the grant of internal self-government under the present Government, followed by elections as soon as practicable and thereafter negotiations on independence.

5. I have examined possible repercussions elsewhere (e.g. Kenya, where internal self-government is not likely to be attained until October 1963) and have concluded that no major objections arise on that score.²

² Internal self-government was introduced in June 1963. After an election in July a coalition government was formed between the Zanzibar Nationalist Party and the Zanzibar & Pemba People’s Party, which had won a majority of seats (though not of votes) over the Afro-Shirazi Party. Final arrangements for the transfer of power were made at an independence conference in London in Sept 1963, and Zanzibar attained full sovereign independence on 10 Dec 1963 under the Sultan as head of state. The government was overthrown one month later in a coup d’état led by the Afro-Shirazi Party. The Revolutionary Council ratified the integration of Zanzibar and Tanganyika as a single state in April 1964, renamed the United Republic of Tanzania on 29 Oct 1964.

138 DO 168/75, no 240 4 Dec 1963

[East African federation prospects]: letter from Mr D W S Hunt (Uganda) to J Chadwick (CRO)

[On 5 June 1963 the prime ministers of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya jointly pledged themselves to a political federation in East Africa. However, Zanzibar (fearing being swamped) stood aside, while Obote’s enthusiasm soon evaporated. He feared that Uganda would be a junior partner, and he was influenced by Nkrumah’s opinion that it was a ‘neo-colonialist plot’. Meanwhile Hunt had taken over as governor in 1962.]

Stephen Miles¹ sent us a copy of his letter IP 43/8/1 of 22nd November to Norman Aspin on the subject of East African Federation and the desirability of bringing to

¹ F S Miles, East Africa High Commission Office.
bear such influence as we can to persuade Kenya and Tanganyika to pay the price for Uganda's membership.

2. The basic premise, I suppose, is that the establishment of a Federation of East Africa with a reasonably strong central government would be of advantage to Britain in that it should create a greater area of potential economic viability better able to defend itself. It would have, from our point of view, some administrative convenience in having one government instead of three to deal with on foreign affairs, economic aid and indeed such contentious issues as Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. We might hope (but no more) that a strong and reasonably self-confident Federation would give more scope for those African politicians who are open to reason on these matters and less scope to Nkrumah to play disruptive games. Finally, at the very least, it would mean two fewer votes against us at the United Nations, or three fewer if Zanzibar came in. Miles's point that, if there is no Federation of the three countries, Tanganyika is more likely to break up the East African Common Market than to federate with Kenya, and thereby affect the market for goods produced in Kenya with British capital, is no doubt a valid one; but it seems to me in the long term to be of less importance than the broader political advantages.

3. If we do for these reasons wish to see an East African Federation established, is there anything we can do to help it on? Miles suggests we might try to persuade Kenya and Tanganyika to pay Uganda's price; but what would that price now be? Certainly Entebbe for capital and a not less than number three job for Obote are essential so far as Uganda is concerned; but I am afraid that, though these might have been sufficient when I wrote my Despatch no. 4 in August, the price has, as I said in my Despatch no. 9 in November, since risen steeply. More basic fears have come to the surface. Uganda is worried that a federation might prevent her controlling the movement of unemployed or landless Kenyans into Uganda to compete, successfully because of their superior intelligence and diligence, for the limited amount of employment or to cultivate empty land, of which Uganda has a fair amount. She would therefore want to retain Ugandan citizenship, principally because distinct citizenship would be necessary for the exercise of inter-territorial control. Unless the federal constitution promised more effective machinery than the present industrial licensing system to control the distribution of new industrial enterprises Uganda would, I think, wish to retain her present freedom to compete by inducement for foreign industrial investment, a policy which is beginning to show some results. Several Ugandan Ministers, I know, are reluctant to contemplate a federation arrangement which would take from them the control of their own armed forces. And if there is one argument of Nkrumah's which really carries weight with Obote it is the undesirability of reducing the number of African votes in the United Nations. Uganda's price, therefore, may be so high as to make the use of the term "Federation" inappropriate.

4. For Britain to try to influence Obote in the direction of accepting an improved offer by Kenyatta and Nyerere would defeat our object. (I realise Miles is not proposing this.) We have now got Obote to say in public that he believes that Britain is prepared to leave the matter of federation to the free decision of the East African countries; but I believe that his suspicion that our interest, and the Americans', in federation is in some way sinister, is sufficiently near the surface to be revived not only by our raising the subject with him, in whatever general terms, but also by any word that might come to him that we had been urging federation on Kenya and
Tanganyika. Any approach to these two countries would, therefore, need to be extremely circumspect.

5. There is another reason for circumspection, if I may turn from Uganda to the other two countries. I believe both Miles and Stanley will confirm that there are anti-federation elements in both TANU and KANU. Le Tocq\(^2\) tells me that Adu\(^3\) has expressed to him the view that Nyerere must settle the federation business one way or another before the next general election in Tanganyika, for fear that it may become an issue which would divide his party. Adu's view was that if the issue could be settled in favour of federation in time it would not be a matter of controversy; but that if it is not settled, Nyerere might feel bound to take the line that he had done his best, that the other East African countries were unwilling, and that Tanganyika must now embark on a course of greater independence not greater inter-dependence. This might easily entail, as Miles fears, the break-up of the East African Common Market and the stultifying of EACSO perhaps to the point of dissolution. In Kenya, while Odinga has been committing himself more firmly to federation in recent speeches I doubt if his shirt is as firmly on federation as Mboya's. My point is that anti-federationists in both countries could easily seize upon any British pressure in the direction of federation as a means of discrediting the idea for their own personal advantage.

6. The foregoing seems to point to doing nothing as being our best means of fostering the enterprise. That is not to say that our people in Kenya and Tanganyika should not, if given an opportunity in an atmosphere they feel to be right, try out as a personal expression of views the proposition that Kenya and Tanganyika should improve on their offer to Obote; but I do think that anything in the nature of an initiative on our part would be more likely to lead to the outcome we do not desire. The conclusion is depressing but, I think, unavoidable....

---

\(^2\) E G Le Tocq, an official in the High Commission, previously an assistant secretary, CRO.

\(^3\) A L Adu, secretary-general of East Africa Common Services Organisation (EACSO), 1962–1963; a Ghanaian, one of the first African district officers, and formerly first permanent secretary in Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1957, and secretary of Cabinet, 1959. He served on Sir N Brook’s Commonwealth Officials’ Study Group in July 1960 as Ghana's representative (see document no 534 in Pt II).
of the world. The Americans have made it very plain that this is their view. If we shirk
this responsibility, our international standing is bound to suffer.

3. Moreover, we have direct interests of our own at stake. The safety and
prosperity of the British settlers in Kenya and other African territories depend on the
maintenance of order and the development of trade and international confidence. In
addition, we have substantial financial and economic interests in East Africa; and, for
strategic reasons, we wish to be able to continue to rely on existing overflying and
staging facilities in this area. For all these reasons we should be reluctant to
acquiesce in the establishment of an effective hostile presence in East Africa.¹

4. Against this background there is clearly a strong case for our responding to
requests for either military or economic help from the Governments concerned. But
it must remain a matter of judgment how far, given the present climate of opinion in
the United Nations and elsewhere, it would be in either our short or our long-term
interests to take an initiative in the absence of specific requests to do so.

5. There is no doubt that the Governments concerned have been badly shocked
by their inability to control events in their countries. It has been demonstrated that
law and order in these countries are at present fragile and that the existence of the
old K.A.R. battalions under their present control reduces rather than enhances
stability. The extreme weakness of the governmental and administrative structure,
including the police, has also been made clear. The great dangers to these
governments of the official and unofficial fostering of elements intended to subvert
other African countries has been made obvious.

6. The emergency intervention of British forces has momentarily saved the
situation. For some time ahead the local governments can, if they have the will, work
to restore their effective control under cover of the British presence; but that
presence of itself is bound to become increasingly distasteful to the mass of local
political opinion; and its effectiveness as a cover will consequently be reduced as time
goes on. The crucial question is whether the local governments have the capacity to
take advantage of this relatively short breathing space to take effective steps that will
enable them to regain and maintain control once the British forces have gone. If they
cannot do this, our intervention and presence will have done little more than to
postpone the day on which chaos arrives.

7. If any real good is to come from our intervention, therefore, the local
governments will have to take drastic and difficult measures during the short time
that we can remain. These measures will involve a degree of leadership that may not
be within the capabilities of the present Heads of the Governments. So far as we are
concerned, however, there are only two real alternatives—to cut our losses, on the
assumption that there is no hope for reasonable government in the area, or to go all
out to promote the stability of the present governments. The former alternative
would involve such drastic steps as an expensive and politically difficult campaign to
remove and compensate as many as possible of the white settlers and a general
abdication of our responsibilities in the area.

¹ This was certainly the view of Mr Sandys. He believed the risk of renewed insecurity to be very real, and
therefore ‘we must do what we can to sustain the present moderate Governments’. He added: ‘This will
undoubtedly cost money, but the alternative may be a collapse of the present order in East Africa. This
would seriously affect our interests and influence in that area, and might involve us in an extremely
expensive rescue operation to extricate British communities, and help in re-establishing them elsewhere’
8. For practical purposes, therefore, we consider only the second alternative. There are two main fields to be considered, military and governmental. In the military field the best means of promoting greater stability would seem to lie in fostering the existing tendency towards the formation of some joint security system, which would involve the federalisation of defence forces. If the three regional governments agreed in principle in the near future, it would be possible for us to build up, fairly rapidly, a system of training missions, which, given the continued acceptance by the governments of their responsibilities, might result in relatively loyal, if not particularly efficient, armed forces in the fairly near future. A continued British military presence in Kenya, perhaps on the basis of a battalion operating as a demonstration unit at the centre of the Federal defence system, might remain politically acceptable for rather longer than British forces in any other role and would lend stiffening to the training process.

9. In parallel with the training mission, special effort would have to be devoted, less obtrusively, to increased British assistance to local police forces and Special Branches. If an additional training mission for this purpose were accepted, it could work to some extent in parallel with the defence forces on the intelligence side and might assist in preventing a reoccurrence of the recent type of trouble.

10. In promoting measures of this kind we should be putting our money on the existing governments in the countries concerned and should be assuming that they have the will and the means to sustain their authority and to maintain law and order in their territories. In so doing, we might be mistaken; there can be no assurance that, whatever we may do to help them, the existing governments will survive and will not be overthrown by more extreme elements. On the other hand, they are at present well-disposed towards us even if only temporarily; and, by comparison with any visible alternative, they are moderate and uncommitted in their general sympathies. Moreover, we cannot wait; we must use the material that is to hand. But, if the defence measures which we have suggested are to have a reasonable chance of success, we must be prepared to supplement them with parallel measures to strengthen the political authority of the governments concerned. This means that we must be prepared to respond to requests for increased financial and technical assistance; and that we must be ready to take whatever steps we can—by means of our information services, both overt and covert, and by various techniques of counter-subversion—to present our intervention in the most favourable light and to convince local public opinion that it is evidence not of neo-colonialism on our part but of a genuine attempt to help the peoples of the area to live free and independent lives.

11. We must repeat, however, that our intervention, in both military and civil terms, will not be easily defensible, either in the countries themselves or in wider international circles, unless it is seen to be a response to explicit invitations from the countries concerned. From this point of view it is for consideration whether the circumstances offer the opportunity for some kind of Commonwealth initiative, since, if the operation were seen to be a joint endeavour by a group of Commonwealth countries rather than by the United Kingdom alone, this would not only ensure that the burden was more equitably shared but would also provide less opportunity for charges of neo-colonialism against ourselves. There are already indications that the countries concerned are thinking of seeking assistance from e.g. Germany; and, although we could not reasonably object to a NATO presence in the
area, we might be able to maintain closer control over developments if intervention were confined to the Commonwealth.

**Zanzibar**

12. The fact that the revolution in Zanzibar was successful in establishing a government that includes a number of Communists provides a source of real danger to the success of any efforts that we could devote to the re-establishment of stability on the mainland. We have therefore examined the policy that we should adopt towards the new regime in Zanzibar.

13. If there were immediate danger to British lives, we should, of course, intervene at once. Such action, in the light of recent events, would be politically defensible; and it would only be necessary for the military authorities in the Middle East to bring up to date plans that they had already made. Similarly, if the High Commissioner at any time judged that there was a risk that a real threat to British lives would develop, we should put ourselves in a position to evacuate British citizens.

14. Nevertheless, circumstances may not develop in this way. There may be no threat, either immediate or contingent, to the safety of British citizens in Zanzibar; but the situation may remain unsatisfactory in the sense that Zanzibar may continue to show all the signs of acute political instability without relapsing into open violence. In these circumstances we shall have to ask ourselves whether it is acceptable that a focus of hostile and subversive influence off the coast of Africa should be allowed to persist indefinitely. It is arguable that, provided that the mainland governments remain firm, no great harm would be done in leaving Zanzibar to go its own way. But it is equally arguable—and the United States Government hold this view emphatically—that it would impose an undue strain on the mainland governments to expect them to withstand indefinitely the pressure of an organised centre of disaffection so close to their shores. This is a matter of political judgment. But, on the assumption that Ministers endorse the latter view, we shall have to decide how best to deal with the situation.

15. For these reasons the disadvantages of intervention might be thought to outweigh the advantages unless it was not only made in response to a specific request from Karume but was also publicly endorsed and underwritten by the three mainland governments and commanded the full support of the United States. Even so, we might have to face considerable trouble in the United Nations.

---

2 Jan 1964; see document nos 137, n 2, and 390 (para 6) in Part II.
3 This paragraph, of approximately 24 lines, removed from PRO copy under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act (1958).
4 Sheikh Karume, leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party and president of Zanzibar since the January revolution.

140 CO 822/1448, no 166 13 Jan 1959

[Proposed timetable for constitutional advance in Tanganyika]: letter from Sir R Turnbull (Tanganyika) to W L Gorell Barnes (CO)

[Towards the end of 1956, the governor of Tanganyika, Sir E Twining, came to the unexpectedly drastic conclusion that the European and Asian communities were not strong enough to sustain a genuine multi-racial society; accordingly they should make a
transition towards relying on African leadership and start by 'co-opting' Julius Nyerere. The government, after due reflection, was disposed to accept this advice; see Goldsworthy, ed., The Conservative government, document nos 298–300. In 1957 the official members of the Executive Council were redesignated as ministers, and at the same time, six assistant ministers (four African, one European and one Asian) were appointed—they became ex officio members of Leg Co. The Leg Co which met in 1959 was composed of a Speaker, seven ex officio, sixteen nominated and thirty elected members; the latter, being a majority, together forming the Tanganyika Elected Members Organisation, led by Nyerere.

Meanwhile, Sir Richard Turnbull had taken over as governor in 1958, having come from Kenya, where he had been chief secretary, 1955–1958. Turnbull quickly decided to recommend speeding up the pace of constitutional advancement. Gorell Barnes accepted that this must involve the CO in an 'agonising reappraisal'; Perth thought there was a good practical case for proceeding slowly; Macpherson shared Gorell Barnes’s sense of dismay, and although he believed that 'the only effective way of dealing with African nationalism . . . is to roll with the punches and keep the initiative, he was 'at present' in favour of putting the brake on Turnbull's ideas. Lennox-Boyd agreed; recognising that quickening the pace of advance was 'a formidable issue' of the highest importance, he asked for a 'Chequers weekend' of discussions with Turnbull and his fellow East African governors, the intention being that this might be the most effective way of applying the brake (CO 822/1819, minutes 30 Dec 1958–5 Jan 1959). The Chequers meeting (24–25 Jan 1959)—see document no 116—did indeed seem to have the desired effect, but within months Turnbull returned to the charge: see next document.

I am writing to you on the difficult subject of a timetable for constitutional advance for Tanganyika. I fully realise how firm we have been in the past about refusing to be drawn on this matter and the reasons for our having adopted such an attitude; but I feel that the time is rapidly approaching when our interests—and I mean Commonwealth interests as well as local Tanganyika interests—will best be served by some indication of the sequence of the constitutional steps we have in mind, and when each step can reasonably be expected to be taken. Indeed, after the recommendations of the Post Elections Committee1 have been considered and adjusted, and agreed by the Secretary of State, we shall have no alternative but to make some kind of further constitutional announcement, and I do not see how, in making that statement, we can avoid presenting some specific plan for the years ahead.

I think it may help you in thinking about this matter if I set out a forecast of the phases through which we can expect to pass between now and April 1960. Assuming that the problem is not complicated by the intrusion of additional factors, such as a new political party or a deliberate campaign of subversion sponsored from outside the Territory, we can, I think, expect the following:—

**Phase I.** Starting March 1959. My announcement of the introduction of unofficial ministers (on a 2–1–1 basis) into the Government and of the terms of reference of the Post Elections Committee. I shall also have to make some reference to subsequent constitutional changes in relation to the further development of the Ministerial system and explain that this is a matter which should be dealt with by the Government and the Secretary of State rather than by a local Committee. Nyerere,2 in the debate on what I have said, will almost certainly ask for an assurance that these constitutional matters will be considered by the appropriate authorities at the same time as the terms of reference of the Post Elections

---

1 Chaired by Sir R Ramage: see note 7 to next document.
Committee are being considered by that Committee; he will also be likely to ask that an announcement on future constitutional matters will be made at the same time as we announce our acceptance, modification or rejection of the recommendations of the Committee. I do not think it will be possible for us to avoid giving these assurances.

Phase II. Starting July 1959. The beginning of the interim period, i.e. the replacement of the Executive Council by a Council of Ministers containing four unofficial ministers and the relegation (if you agree) of the Executive Council to a subordinate position. The present indications are that Nyerere will join the Government and do his utmost to make the new machine work until the Post Elections Committee and the body responsible for working out constitutional changes have reported. We can, I think, assume that he will do what he can to play down the cry of “self-government in 1959”; although, as I have already observed in another letter to you, the expectation of sweeping changes is so strong that however hard Nyerere tried he could not expunge the idea from the people’s minds. Generally, we can expect support from the responsible nationalist leaders during this period; but the irresponsible elements may well try to exploit the frustration which, in some areas and in some sectors of the community, will be felt when “uhuru” does not come in 1959. There is also a possibility of a new political leader using the situation to advance himself and to discredit Nyerere. (I have in mind Oscar Kambona who is due to return to Tanganyika this year).

Phase III. Starting between November 1959 and March 1960. The Government’s views on the recommendations of the Post Elections Committee are made public. The leaders of TANU, who still have very hazy ideas about the mechanics of legislation and of electoral changes, will imagine that it will be possible to hold an election forthwith. In fact, of course, we shall need a minimum of nine months to vary the constituency boundaries, amend the legislation and draw up new voters’ rolls. The very earliest therefore that an election could take place would be September 1960; even this would be a scramble and we might well have to put it off until 1961. The longer we can spin out the process, the better for us, provided—and the proviso is an important one—that we can carry the responsible nationalist leaders with us and get them to lend their support to our explanations of what is going on.

In spite of the hopes which have been placed in the Post Elections Committee the effect of its recommendations will be far less than the effect of the announcement of the results of our examination of the constitutional future. TANU has staked everything on securing a majority of elected members in the next Legislative Council and, at the same time, a majority of unofficial elected ministers in the Council of Ministers; and the strength of the movement should not be underestimated. The constitutional body will therefore have to decide whether to sustain the policy of the gradual approach by requiring that the arrangements for the interim period shall be continued for the life of a further Legislative Council before more unofficials are introduced into the Government, or to accept the TANU demand and see how it can best be modified and adapted to make the changes as least disadvantageous as possible.

I propose to have a look at the probable results of adopting each course. The effect of rejecting the TANU demand and of requiring the interim arrangements to be
continued for a further four years would, I am convinced, be most unhappy. Briefly we could expect the following:—

(a) Nyerere would lose face to such an extent he would be compelled to leave the Government;
(b) he might stage a walk-out of Legislative Council; if he did he would take all the African and Asian elected members and one or two of the Europeans with him;
(c) TANU would start on its long-promised campaign of positive action; the campaign would take the form of defiance of all authority—that of the Government and of the Chiefs and the Chiefs’ Councils, Courts, Government offices and Native Authority. Barazas would be boycotted; unlawful courts sponsored by TANU would be set up; the Unions would weigh in with strikes and the hooligans with noisy demonstrations; there would be intimidation of the loyalists and besetting of their shops and businesses. (I don’t exaggerate this; we have had a trial run in the Lake Province);
(d) The European and Asian plantation industry would be singled out for attack; I don’t see how it could survive if the campaign were in any way prolonged.

In other words we should find ourselves faced with civil disturbances on a very wide scale. It is not unlikely that they would be planned and assisted from outside the Territory, and timed to coincide with similar action in other parts of East and Central Africa.

The other alternative would be to accept TANU’s demand and to attempt to water down the ill-effects by bargaining for safeguards such as the Territorial Council and the introduction of the fully elected majority in two or three stages instead of at one single step. It is, I fear, inevitable that such a move, quite apart from forcing the pace in a way which we have all been trying to avoid, and presenting grave embarrassment to our neighbours, would bring with it many of those bad results which naturally follow the assumption of authority by those unfitted to exercise it. But I should be less worried about the behaviour of the new Ministers than about the reactions of the TANU adherents in the towns and the Provinces; for in this exercise we should not be dealing with rational disciplined men anxious for the dawn of an era of sweetness, light and co-operation, but with a collection of peasants with a very limited knowledge of Tanganyika, and almost none of the outside world; prominent amongst them, especially in the towns, would be hooligans anxious to turn the tables on those who, so they will have been taught, have been their oppressors. We could expect six months of disorder during which time the minor TANU officials in the Provinces would demonstrate their capacity to play a leading part in the government of the country by bullying and extortion and by insolence to District Commissioners.

How would we handle each of these two conjectural situations? I don’t want to appear alarmist but I should be deceiving myself if I said that I had sufficient force at my command to cope with the kind of situation which would arise if the full weight of TANU were organised against the Government. (One of the reasons for the Lake troubles having died down is that the central directive of TANU was on our side; here they would all be against us). The Police Force is so small that it scarcely makes itself felt outside the towns; there are no Tribal Police; the machine upon which we depend for the maintenance of law and order in the rural areas was designed for an earlier day, and cannot now be relied upon except in fair weather conditions; and we have no money. I could build up an organisation capable of containing anything that the
positive action men could produce in 1960; but I should want financial assistance on a substantial scale and a lot more men. The situation would be very different from that which existed in Kenya from 1950 onwards; for TANU would have a 90% following, and unless one wanted to provoke a civil war, it would be almost impossible to organise any strong body of loyalists. Indeed, we might not be able to recruit the extra Police we should need; TANU would prevent it.

We could certainly suppress the agitation but the cost would be prodigious; Egypt and Russia would encourage the malcontents; the Americans would sympathise with them; and the Labour Party would make an issue of it in the United Kingdom. We should end up with the population embittered and the plantation industry wrecked.

If we adopted the second alternative we should have to face, as I have said, a bad six months of arrogance and general showing off; but I think we should have the strength to deal with the sporadic kind of indiscipline that could be expected; and we should have all but the extreme nationalists with us. In these circumstances we could use our security forces promptly and vigorously without fear of serious repercussions in the Legislative Council. (I should explain that the African Back Benchers on the Government side are as scared of TANU as is the Indian Association).

With regard to the Central Government my feeling is that if we accepted the principle of an unofficial majority in the Council of Ministers it should not be beyond us to work out a programme which would ensure the continuance of a stable, sensible Government for a considerable time ahead. I don’t deceive myself that the move would not be premature; but these chaps will be little more ready for self-government in fifty years time than they will be in fifteen, and it may be better to take the chance of going ahead too fast than to risk a wholesale insurrection which would certainly destroy the economy of the country and might have even more dangerous consequences.

We should have to make the best bargain we could. If we handled the matter in the right way and had a fair share of the luck which so often determines what happens at these conferences, we might be able to get, in return for our acceptance of the principle of an unofficial majority, both the Territorial Council and agreement to a reasonably long period of continuing Colonial Office control. What I should hope to get would be:

(a) the introduction of the Territorial Council;
(b) the reorganisation of the Government on the basis of five official ministers, four unofficial elected ministers (i.e. the four we propose to appoint this year) and three unofficial nominated ministers; these nominated ministers would be replaced after the life-time of one Legislative Council by three more unofficial elected ministers.

The four elected ministers in the 1960/61–1964/65 Government would be the two Africans, the one European and the one Asian. For the nominated members I should like to have one European and two Africans; but I should be reluctant to commit myself on this point at present for our foremost need will be a Government that can continue to function efficiently. The seven elected ministers for the 1964/65–1965/69 Government would be four Africans and three others; and provided we chose the two European ministers aright we ought to be able to rely upon them to side with the Officials to prevent the Africans from perpetrating any major nonsenses.
All this brings me back to the question of the timetable. The arguments for it are these:

(a) For some years past we have stressed both here and at U.N.O. that we have accepted the duty of preparing the Territory for self-government as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible; we cannot go on putting off the announcement of a programme—even a tentative one—for very much longer.

(b) The nationalists learnt a lot at the recent Accra Conference and a campaign of “positive action”—if it were introduced—would be likely to be well planned and to cover the whole of the Territory.

(c) Even if we can avoid mentioning a date for self-government in connection with the British Somaliland announcement we shall not be able to avoid inferring a date; the nationalist leaders here have no illusions about the state of advancement of the Protectorate and would redouble their demands for a date for Tanganyika.

(d) The proposal to grant Nigeria independence in 1960 is well known and much talked about.

(e) If Nyerere accepts a Ministry and is to continue as a Minister for any length of time, it seems to be most desirable that I should agree with him certain matters of basic policy; and the most important of such matters from his point of view is certain to be future constitutional development. If he becomes a Minister in July 1959, and if, when, the outcome of the Post Election Committee's deliberations are made known, no announcement, acceptable to him as a compromise, is made as regards a constitutional timetable, it is unlikely that he would continue as a Minister. The probability is that he would resign from the Government so as to make a political sensation; there would then be a real danger of his embarking upon another exercise on lines similar to the present “self/responsible Government in 1959” which would soon get completely out of control.

(f) The African nominated members of the Government side in the Legislative Council are what I would call responsible nationalists. They are not members of TANU, but they are in sympathy with TANU's ultimate aim; I am advised by my Ministers that it is doubtful if they would accept the Government whip if by doing so it meant irrevocably antagonising TANU; indeed, on one occasion we have been forced into an ignominious climb down through our inability to be certain of their support. The announcement of a timetable would strengthen them and ensure their allegiance. If we have not their full support we cannot pursue the policy I think is necessary—that of constitutional carrots combined with a stern disciplinary whip.

(g) Both the Civil Service and the local investors are becoming very uneasy in their minds; it would reassure them all if they knew roughly what period of service under the Colonial Office they still had before them, and in the case of the plantation industries what programme of planting and developing they could safely embark upon.

(h) It can, I think, be argued that if we agree now upon a stage by stage programme of constitutional development in the Territory, the result will be that we will in fact retain our direct responsibility for Tanganyika for a longer period than we would if we did not; and that when the ultimate transfer of power takes place it will be made in a more harmonious atmosphere, thus preserving the British influence after full independence, than if we had not had a planned timetable.
(i) I have a feeling that Nyerere, who fully recognises how dependent he is upon the expatriate officials both as administrators and as technical men, would fall in with the programme I have suggested.

This, then, is the picture as I see it. Unless you feel that I am on quite the wrong lines I would like to include a passage in my March address to Legislative Council on the lines that:—

(a) The first constitutional change in the structure of the Government is about to be made.
(b) While the Post Elections Committee is at work I shall be in consultation with the Secretary of State concerning the possibility of further advances in this field.
(c) An announcement concerning these further advances will be made when the outcome of the Post Election Committee’s report is made known.
(d) But if there is a further outbreak of organised defiance of the law and contempt for authority such as occurred in the Lake Province, the Government will have to devote all its resources to keeping the peace and maintaining the rule of law, and constitutional change will just have to wait.

I am aware that a great deal of what I have said in this letter is conjecture and that much of it will be far from palatable to the Secretary of State. Briefly, we have to decide soon which of two possible alternatives we are going to adopt; one would be likely to result in civil disturbances on a scale which would be beyond our resources to cope with; the other would seriously endanger the whole concept of the gradual approach and could not fail to damage the position of the other East African territories. What I have suggested I should say in March commits us to neither line.

I should welcome your advice as to how we would set about studying the implications of the dilemma that confronts us.

141 CO 822/1449, no 229 12 May 1959
{Tanganyika: proposed constitutional advance]: letter from Sir R Turnbull to W L Gorell Barnes. Minutes by Mr Amery, F D Webber, W L Gorell Barnes, Sir J Macpherson, Lord Perth and Mr Lennox-Boyd

[Turnbull first indicated by telegram that he was making new proposals. This telegram went straight to the S of S via Gorell Barnes, who minuted: ’I do not believe that in the last resort we can stick out against the Governor’s wishes if he sticks to them, and if the other two Governors, having been consulted, do not raise any objections. On the other hand, I am extremely unhappy about the way things are going in Tanganyika’. He suggested that Turnbull’s convictions must be tested against ‘our doubts and worries’; he was particularly concerned about the “slippery slope” possibilities and repercussions elsewhere in East Africa. Lennox-Boyd minuted that it was ‘disturbing’: ’We gave consent at Chequers to the phased programme for Tanganyika on the assumption, almost the assurance, that there was a very good chance of delaying the approach of virtual internal self-government until 1969. I agree that it is essential to test the depth of Sir R Turnbull’s convictions on this & that a probing telegram should be sent at once. . . . I think the prospects of a showdown in Tanganyika are steadily growing’ (minutes, 6 & 7 May 1959, & 12 May). The very difficult decision to be made, then, was whether to stick with the Chequers Plan or take the calculated risk of accepting the ‘Turnbull Plan’ for a much speedier constitutional advance (minute by W B L Monson, 31 Aug 1959).}
I am writing to you to fill in the gaps of my long constitutional telegram to the Secretary of State. Let me start by admitting that I did not foresee that T.E.M.O.\footnote{Tanganyika Elected Members' Organisation.} would develop into the monolithic, strictly disciplined structure that it has become. We had hoped, judging on past performances and conversations prior to the election, that at least a few of the Europeans in Council would ally themselves with the interests of the Chiefs and would exercise a moderating influence on T.A.N.U.; I had envisaged a Right Wing of the Opposition which would have been strong enough either to have abstained from voting or on occasions to have voted with the Government. The Asians are so daunted by the whole nationalist movement that I did not expect to see them deviate in any way from the strict party line.

The fact that events have not moved as we hoped they would is largely due to the transfer of the Chiefs’ allegiance to T.A.N.U.; it took some time for the effects of the statement they made in the second week of March to sink in, but there can be no doubt that it had a profound effect on both Europeans and Asians. The result has been, as I indicated in my telegram, that T.E.M.O. has been immensely strengthened and that at present there is not one of its members who would be willing to incur its displeasure. The Europeans in particular feel that if their future in the Territory is to be assured they must now prove themselves to be the champions of constitutional advance; they must lead now lest they find themselves on the shelf in the future. They are therefore urging Nyerere ahead rather than attempting to put a brake on him. T.E.M.O. is in fact—at least to all outward appearances—an example of the precise kind of institution that we have for so long been advocating. It is a non-racial body of Tanganyikans, every member of which is dedicated to the development of a non-racial society, and has cheerfully subordinated his traditional feelings to the furtherance of the Organisation’s aims. Further, it contrives to give the outside and uninformed world the impression that all communities are at one in their demand for early and sweeping constitutional advances, and that the Government, for selfish and personal reasons, are deliberately delaying the developments that a united Tanganyika is so eagerly awaiting. The cement that binds T.E.M.O. together is not only a temporary and rather emotional loyalty, plus a fear of the consequence of defection, but a common determination to replace the present form of Government by one in which unofficials will have a numerical superiority.

Another factor which is influencing T.E.M.O. and the African politicians in their quest for the great panacea of an unofficial majority is the financial situation. There is a growing feeling, encouraged I suspect by the Americans, that it is better to be broke and independent than to be broke and have to rely on the United Kingdom; the latter plight may ensure enough help to provide the essential minimum but the former will open the way to entry into the Territory of untold millions of dollars. The whole thing is rather reminiscent of the attitude “If-only-I-had-an-airgun-I’d-be-happy-and-well-behaved”; and just about as susceptible of being explained away by rational argument.

There is at present no prospect of a split in T.E.M.O. The solidarity recently displayed in the debate on Section 63B is an example of the willingness with which even the more responsible European members will subordinate their opinions to those of the Organisation. Rocks upon which it might founder are those of revulsion from extreme statements, self-preservation and lessons of experience; but I have little
faith in any of them. Lady Chesham has already shared a platform with Mwakangale in which he gave vent to one of his usual anti-European tirades; one would expect the Europeans to recognise the need for a properly equipped Police Force, but the 63B episode is an indication of what is likely to happen when the Police Estimates are considered by Council in the forthcoming Budget debate; and lessons of experience take so long to sink in that we should be unwise to place any reliance upon them. We could, I suppose, break this unity by exploiting the places of weakness which cannot fail to exist between the Africans and the Asians, and the Africans and the Europeans, but there would be a grave danger in attempting to split the Organisation on racial lines, and I certainly do not contemplate a move of this sort. Generally, therefore, my forecast is that T.E.M.O. will hold together until they achieve their target of a majority of unofficial ministers; once that point has been gained, difficulties and jealousies are likely to arise, and the Organisation may perhaps split up into moderate and extreme factions.

Looking ahead until the end of the present session, it is clear that if we are to put through any matter which is in the least contentious, we shall have to use our official majority. I shall have no hesitation about doing so, but a point that we have continually to bear in mind is that our backbenchers are almost as committed to the idea of a majority of unofficial ministers as are the members of the Opposition, so that every time we use the majority we are likely to weaken the resolve of the men upon whom we depend to provide that majority. When the new session opens, we shall have to tread very warily; we shall in fact be in for a period of Government by agreement. If we come to some point of principle upon which it is impossible to compromise, we shall just have to grasp the nettle—but in doing so we must be certain in our minds that the circumstances are such as to warrant the jettisoning of the recent advances and a return to a fully official government. I need scarcely say that I should not like the idea of retracing our steps; we know by experience that a period of impasse must be followed by a period of negotiation and bargaining, and that the outcome is likely to be concessions on a far more lavish scale than we would originally have been prepared to grant.

It is possible that I may have misjudged the situation and that a change will be apparent after the entry into the Government of the five Unofficial Ministers; but the more experienced of our present Ministers feel that, unless we re-examine our strategy, we shall be faced with this monolithic block of opinion until a stage is reached at which there is an Unofficial Elected Chief Minister and a majority of Elected Ministers.

How then are we to extricate ourselves from the embarrassing position of Government by the permission of T.E.M.O; how can we devise a fulcrum upon which we can base ourselves in order to control this steadily rising pressure and at the same time secure the reasonable co-operation of the Elected Members? My present thinking inclines me to the view—a view which is shared by Trotman and Davies, as well as by Fletcher-Cooke—that the only way open to us is to divert the energies of

2 Mary, Lady Chesham, wife of the parliamentary secretary of state, Ministry of Transport, since 1959.
this monolithic force into channels in which it will have a feeling of responsibility and the appearance of responsibility, but in which it cannot tamper with matters of real importance, such as the maintenance of law and order, the Civil Service, the overall economic structure and the ordinary development of African Local Government.

Our first step should, I think, be to plan for an election in 1960. I am aware that we hoped in our Chequers talks to postpone this move until 1961, but it is now even more important to resolve the present impasse; and in any case, the pressure for an election as soon as is reasonably possible after the Post Elections Committee has reported, would be extremely difficult to withstand. Having appointed a Post Elections Committee and accepted, possibly in a modified form, the recommendations it makes, we could not, especially in the present political climate, deliberately hold off from going to the polls. It will take some time to amend the Order in Council, amend the relevant legislation and draw up new Electoral Rolls, but I believe that we would be subjecting ourselves to justifiable criticism if we strung this process out for longer than nine months. We have, too, to bear in mind that a U.N. Mission will be visiting the Territory in the summer of 1960.

You will remember that I proposed at Chequers that after this election we should move to an unofficial majority composed partly of elected unofficials and partly of nominated unofficials, and that I subsequently amended my ideas to provide for a parity of officials and unofficials for the next period. My reasons for dropping the idea of specifically nominated unofficial ministers was that it was apparent, even in February, that no African would accept a Ministry unless he had the backing of T.A.N.U. behind him. The idea of a half and half government is still an attractive one and would, I think, have been acceptable to a divided T.E.M.O; but it certainly won't to the present Organisation, for it has committed itself so often and so publicly to a majority of unofficial ministers that it now could accept nothing less. And since the five unofficial ministers who are about to join the Government will have to be associated with our December statement, I do not see how we shall be able to avoid moving to a majority of unofficial ministers after the next election; the majority would be of one only and there would be no question of T.E.M.O. forming a Ministry—Ministers would be appointed by individual invitation as at present. The racial composition would be four Africans, two Europeans and one Asian. There would be a chance, I am told, of Nyerere coming in if he could get the Educational portfolio. This arrangement would be expected to last for the life of one Legislative Council; towards the end of 1963 the whole position would be reviewed in order to consider what move forward should be made after the 1964 elections. 1963 may seem a little early, but we have to remember that in that year there will be yet another U.N. Visiting Mission in the Territory and that we shall wish at that time to have our politicians occupied with domestic matters of real weight and not with the cooking-up of imaginary grievances.

T.A.N.U.'s second major demand concerns the introduction of an unofficial majority into the Legislative Council. Here we come to the most difficult of our problems. Once having accepted a majority of unofficial ministers in the Executive Government, we could scarcely cavil at the introduction of a majority of elected members in the Legislature; and I doubt if there would be any point in retaining power to make extra nominations to the Government side, for by that time it will have become so difficult to find back-benchers willing to be enlisted for the express
purpose of defeating T.E.M.O. that we might just as well certify and have done with it. But we cannot allow ourselves to get into a position in which a majority of unofficial ministers supported by a majority of elected councillors could dictate policy which would touch the pockets not of Tanganyika taxpayers but of the United Kingdom. It is for this reason that I suggested that we might have to adopt some constitutional device, such as the diarchy principle, which would give Legislative Council full control over a wide range of subjects but would give the Governor sole powers in relation to others. The more I think of this idea the more I am attracted by it; it would prevent the ministerial majority or the parliamentary majority from monkeying with the Police, or the K.A.R. (if they are still under our control), and would enable us to take steps which would remove the growing misgivings of the expatriate civil servants. Unfortunately, I have never worked with such a system and am still not properly informed on its advantages and disadvantages, and its possible long term results; I shall be examining the idea in consultation with Fletcher-Cooke and Cole\(^5\) both of whom know something of its working, and will let you have more definite proposals as soon as I can.

In the 1960–1964 period it will, I hope, be possible for our energies to be devoted to solving some of the dozen major problems which are now being neglected while people shout for “Uhuru”, and the Government tries to avoid a campaign of passive resistance. I am well aware of the possibility of our having to contend in this period with extreme factions which, under the influence of Ghana, Nigeria, the Congo, or of countries further afield, will demand even more sweeping and even more rapid changes. Such a development would, one hopes, result either in dividing T.E.M.O. or in consolidating the Organisation in a moderate line; but in the present political climate of Africa the reverse might equally well happen, and I therefore come back to the desirability of some kind of diarchy in which the Budget would be broken up into Order in Council subjects and Legislature subjects. If we had the essential law and order matters under the Governor, and the remainder under the Legislative Council, we should be in a much stronger position than if we had to seek the authority of an unwilling, or possibly semi-disaffected, House every time we needed an extra Police vehicle.

The following period from 1964–1968 is too far ahead for any reliable forecast. The Legislative Council of those years will, I suppose, be the last one before internal self-government is thrust upon the country, and the way in which we weather the period will depend on a score of factors none of which can be properly evaluated today. There will be party politics, intense emotional demands for universal adult franchise, and constant interference from the Trusteeship Council; there may even be a Labour administration in the United Kingdom. The Chief Secretary will, I imagine, be replaced by a Chief Minister, who will become the Leader of the House, and will, with his political colleagues, be largely responsible for the formulation of policy in the non-reserved field. Civil Service ministers will retain the portfolios of Finance, Economic Development, Legal Affairs and Internal Security; and it will be up to us to ensure that there is proper minority representation in the Government. On the assumption that the country will still be in need of financial aid, it should not be difficult to extend the diarchy constitution into this period.

Mention of the Territory’s financial position brings me back to the point I made earlier about the supposed advantages of insolvent independence over insolvent dependence. The Africans are convinced that America will play the role of the fairy godmother; and some of them are already saying “And, of course, there is always Russia”. I know how strongly H.M.’s Treasury feel about being used as a milch cow for overseas dependencies, but I am convinced that if we are to hold the position here from 1960–1968, and to keep some reasonable degree of control when internal self-government is achieved, H.M.G. will have to put their hands fairly deeply into their pockets. An annual subvention specially intended for secondary education and for the training of local civil servants would probably make all the difference between an orderly ten years and a precipitate slide to premature self-government in the hope of getting aid from outside the Commonwealth.

There are a number of other matters I could usefully touch upon in this letter, but it is already far too long, so I will save myself for the next round. I should add that, on the assumption that the Post Elections Committee will turn down the idea of a Territorial Council, we should retain the Executive Council for the 1960–1964 period, and indeed for as long as T.E.M.O. retains its present monolithic quality.

Minutes on 141

I can’t help being disturbed by the contents, and even more by the tone, of these and other recent telegrams from Tanganyika. They seem to run counter to the conclusions which, as I understood them, we had reached at the Chequers meeting.  

2. I appreciate that the Governor is up against very great difficulties. What concerns me most is that his telegrams give the impression either that he doesn’t realise that we are being pushed off the Chequers line, or that he doesn’t greatly care if we are. We seem to be reverting to the policy of drift which the Chequers meeting was called to correct.

3. Should we stick to the Chequers line even if it involves using force? Should we abandon it in favour of more concessions? I don’t pretend to know the answer; but I do feel that we ought not simply to acquiesce in the abandonment of the Chequers line without very careful consideration here and, if necessary, with the Governors concerned.7

J.A.
13.5.59

Mr. Gorell Barnes

… 2. Before coming on to the main argument, I should like to make the following points in outline:—

(1) Timing of Governor’s next statement. There is no point at all in delaying this merely for the sake of delay. After all, at Chequers we consistently talked about

---

6 Held on 24–25 Jan 1959: see document no 116 above.
7 As a result of this minute, Gorell Barnes arranged for Mr Amery to see the whole file, to make it plain ‘that we have all been worried by this and that, as yet, no passes have been sold’ (14.5.59).
“January 1960”. Furthermore, if the Ramage Committee finishes its work by the end of July, there will be, as the Governor says in his letter to Sir Frederick Crawford (233), five months of the present year in which to do the business. But having said all that, I feel very doubtful whether it would be right to aim at a further statement this year. We must not forget that the Post Elections Committee will be doing some extremely important work in connection with the representative side of Legislative Council and the minorities representation, and that we shall have to do our best to work out very carefully where the recommendations are likely to lead us. The abolition of the compulsory tripartite vote is one of Nyerere’s four demands. It is equally in our interest to abolish it if in so doing we can secure some effective representation of Asians and Europeans in the new Legislative Council which will not be the farce that the present representation of these races is. Therefore, we must put the Governor on notice that when he has got the report of the Committee in his hands we expect that his people will be doing the necessary statistical homework so that we shall all have a clear idea of where the recommendations may lead us so that, if necessary, we can have some effective alternatives to consider.

This is all bound to take time. So also will the necessary consultation with the East African Governors on all aspects of the matter. But this apart, there is the important question raised in (231) by Sir Frederick Crawford. I should have thought it very important that we should at least know where the Wild Committee is likely to take us before final decisions are reached on Tanganyika. If this is accepted we shall have to put this to both Governors with the aim of getting Tanganyika to be a bit more relaxed about the timetable and getting Uganda to complete their work with all possible speed. I think also that if Mr. Nyerere sees the Secretary of State he should be left with no expectation that final decisions will be announced before the end of the year; so he could be equally assured that Government is not dragging its feet.

(2) Date of next Tanganyika election. I do not much like the thought of an election immediately on top of a visit by the Visiting Mission. On the other hand, whether we have the election in 1960 or 1961 is not so important as the content of the Governor’s next statement. I think the principle we should work on is that as soon as decisions have been reached and that statement made, we should begin preparing for a new election and that in order to avoid putting too much strain on the Administration we should aim at having the elections in February 1961. On this basis the new Government would come in more or less at the outset of budget planning for the year 1961/62.

(3) Security. In coming to decisions now we must bear in mind that the Governor will have no significantly stronger police forces at his disposal at the end of the year than he has now. We had some time ago a full assessment by the Governor of what might happen and would be needed to contain it and we need not go over that particular exercise again. But we ought to find out from him whether, if we decided on a policy which fell short of T.A.N.U. demands, there was a reasonable prospect of his being able to nip in the bud large scale disaffection, e.g. by a sort of

---


9 See document no 121 above.
“crash action” involving the detention of T.A.N.U. committee men in all branches, or at any rate in the branches in the most difficult parts.

(4) No decisions on the next steps in Tanganyika should be taken without careful regard to the position of the Civil Service. Their deteriorating morale has been dealt an inadvertent blow by the Governor’s recent speech to the Association at which he assured them that there would be a need for expatriates for some years to come. This is not the assurance they wanted. They would like to see the air cleared by a definite statement of when self-government will be granted and an equally definite statement that before the date people will be given an option to take compensation worked out more or less on Ghana lines. They are not only worried about present cost of living; they are also worried about the gradual erosion of their conditions of service. They fear that it is not the intention to compensate them and that they will therefore be compelled to stay on in a Tanganyika where life will become more and more unbearable for themselves and their families. (If this were the case they would probably leave the country anyway despite the financial risk). The T.A.N.U. people are openly telling them that there will be no compensation and on the general political plane the Europeans have been told that they will be the house-boys in the new Tanganyika.

(I mention this here because it is no use talking about carrying on in an ordered way the policy of preparing the people for self-government if we have no effective instrument to carry that out. It may well be that Nyerere genuinely realises that without British help even after self-government the country will relapse into chaos. If that is the case it is important that the Civil Service should be, so to speak, a weapon that we can use effectively in any negotiations; and the best way of ensuring that would be to pay them compensation at some very early date and then put them all on a contract basis. For Tanganyika alone this might cost something of the order of £10 million. The money might not have to be paid at the time but could perhaps be funded against the time when they finally severed their connection with the country). What we do not want to happen is to have a long painful row about the “criterion” of readiness for self-government and find that through sheer desperation much of the Civil Service have decided to throw in their hands. We must find a way of building up their morale and confidence, ensuring that the best of them continue to serve the country and at the same time ensuring that they are not exploited by local politicians. I do not see how this can be done, if H.M. Government is not prepared to foot the bill. Another possibility is, of course, that of taking over the Civil Service charges including future pensions on a United Kingdom vote.

(5) The “new” situation described in the Governor’s letter is not in fact markedly different from what he described to us at Chequers or what we could reasonably have assumed would develop from his analysis then. It is true that subsequently the Chiefs came out in favour of T.A.N.U. and that the so-called Independents have equally joined forces with the other Elected Members. But at Chequers Sir Richard Turnbull had had no great hopes in the Chiefs forming a moderate counter-weight or indeed in there being any kind of solid opposition to T.A.N.U. in the months to come. So we must not be unduly persuaded to think that the Chequers’ strategy should be revised because of a so-called new situation. The Chequers’ strategy was devised with pretty well full knowledge that T.A.N.U. was a monolithic creation with a very powerful influence in the country. The two things which have
happened since March 17th and which are of considerable significance are (a) Nyerere's refusal to join the Government and (b) the continuing all-out onslaught on the Government since the March 17th "concordat". We realised at Chequers that the programme would lead to trouble at the end of the year but we were not sure whether there would be earlier trouble in March. In coming out into the open immediately after their grudging acceptance of the March 17th agreement, T.A.N.U. and their adherents have, I think, shown their true colours; and we must keep this point in mind.

3. The crucial question to be decided is whether the next step (it does not much matter whether it is 1960 or 1961) should be to introduce an unofficial majority in the Council of Ministers and whether to safeguard vital interests we should put into operation the kind of diarchical system the Governor is now thinking about. On strict merits the country will not be ready for an elected majority in 1960 or 1961. Unfortunately the same is true of 1964 or 1965. So those of us who are aware that we have been working on a programme which would delay the introduction of an elected majority until 1965 are bound in all honesty to ask ourselves whether (realising that on merits both timetables are ludicrous anyway) it is worthwhile having a serious row for the sake of four years when to all intents and purposes everyone on the other side is united and happy and giving such a wonderful example of multi-racial co-operation. Is it not better to preserve this precious asset (people will ask) even if it means fore-shortening the period when power will be transferred? Have we not said all along that we shall not relinquish our responsibilities until we are satisfied that the races have learnt to live with each other?

I doubt if we could attempt to answer this question at this juncture. I rather agree with Sir Richard Turnbull that there will probably not be a half-way house (e.g. parity of unofficial and official Ministers) between the position as from the 1st July and an unofficial majority. But until we have seen the outcome of the Post Elections Committee Report we should not necessarily rule out the original Chequers’ possibility of having an unofficial majority in 1961 but partly nominated. More important, by the time we come to consider that report and to make final decisions on Tanganyika's Ministers, we shall be very close to a general election here if we are not in fact in the throes of one, so no final views can be taken now. Sir Frederick Crawford told me on the 31st May that if Tanganyika advanced their timetable by four years he would in all probability have to do the same though there would be no case for doing so on the strict Uganda merits. There would almost certainly be pressure for a major advance in Zanzibar and we should have all this hanging over the Kenya conference.

My own view on this is that leaving aside the repercussions in the other territories it would be a complete abrogation of responsibility to launch responsible government so soon as 1960 or 1961. We have gone very quickly in Tanganyika and we must consolidate—in the interests of the people themselves. I do not believe that Nyerere is a moderate and I think that once he gets control the Europeans and Asians will have a very bad time of it. We can after all face the world with a clear conscience on Tanganyika.10 We have gone a long way to meet the desire of the nationalists for greater responsibility and we have more than sufficiently carried out our obligations.

10 Sir J Macpherson wrote in the margin against this sentence: 'This is very important'.
By the time we are ready to reach final decisions the unofficial Ministers will have
been in operation only a very few months in the course of which there may well have
been only one meeting of Legislative Council. They will not have had to take any
share in the formation of even one budget. Except in isolated cases, there is no
effective local government. The output from the educational system is still
appalling inadequate.

4. If because of reluctance to have a major clash in Tanganyika T.A.N.U. must be
given its head, I doubt whether it would be quite so simple as agreeing that there
should be an unofficial elected majority after the next elections. There would in fact
be a terrific tussle about the 7 unofficial portfolios. I doubt myself whether even at
this stage Nyerere would join the Government. The most that we could expect from
him is that he would join the Government under these circumstances provided that
he was accorded a position of leader of Government business or equivalent. I feel
quite certain that he will not accept a portfolio until he is or within sight of being
Chief Minister. Anyway, assuming some sort of concordat was reached at the end of
the year on the basis of 7 unofficials to 5 officials, the Government would from that
point onwards be subjected to the same kind of pressures as now. “The presence of 5
officials in the Government holding important portfolios would be anachronistic in
modern Tanganyika, etc. etc.” Attacks in the countryside would be intensified against
the Government and the Civil Service and we should remain under pressure to
declare a date for full self-government and, for example, to convene a large scale
London conference within a few years to work out details. In the meantime little
progress will have been made to localise the Government machine and to keep the
country economically on its feet. If, therefore, our minds are thinking in terms of
giving way on the unofficial majority issue, we should not assume that that will give
us any reasonable breathing space to prepare a long term policy for organising
extended control by H.M. Government over vital matters affecting the area as a
whole.

5. You will doubtless wish to send these papers forward with a view to discussion
with Ministers. Subject to that discussion I think that the points to be made in reply
to the Governor are as follows:—

(a) We recognise his difficulties but he will not be surprised that his letter has
caused some alarm and despondency here. We shall be interested to see his further
thoughts about a diarchical system. We shall study those with great care though
our first reaction is that we stand a greater chance of success in preserving H.M.
Government’s vital interest in Tanganyika or the area as a whole if we move by way
of controlling transfer of power rather than by at the outset dividing power. It is
probably very difficult to put into force any kind of a formal diarchy in a country
where we are committed to the eventual grant of full self-government.
(b) We cannot come at this juncture to a clear decision on the content of the
Governor’s forthcoming statement (a) because of possible election complications
this end and (b) we should first have digested the Ramage Committee Report. For
the moment, however, he should work on the basis that the official majority will
not be relinquished on the next round.
(c) We hope there can be some gentle toughening up vis-a-vis the more
outrageous utterances of T.A.N.U. so that they can be immediately forthrightly
denied.
(d) We are concerned that police expansion is not going ahead as rapidly as we had hoped. If we foresaw a real row at the end of the year has he plans to nip it in the bud by e.g. the rapid arrest of T.A.N.U. leaders (assuming, of course, the proper legislative preparation).

(e) We are very concerned about the Civil Service. We understand there is a petition on its way to the Secretary of State and assume he will soon be letting us have his comments on it.

(f) We know that they are all keen to have the statement come out in the magic year 1959, but with the best will in the world we cannot guarantee that. Here make the points in paragraph 2 (1) of this minute. Therefore we hope that anything that is said locally from now on on this point will be to lower rather than to raise expectations.

(g) As regards the date of election, we quite see his point about having no unnecessary hiatus. We are rather dubious about having an election in the year of the visiting mission; and in any case if the statement should be delayed until January or February there may not be all that amount of time. Is there any reason why we should not plan for an election in February, 1961?

(h) We might tell the governor that the Secretary of State if he sees Mr. Nyerere intends to give no ground away at all and to emphasise the present unpreparedness of the country for first stages of responsible Government.

6. In addition to the discussion with Ministers I now propose, I think we should also discuss with O.S.D. the service aspects. This need not be confined to Tanganyika. There has, as you know, been correspondence with Kenya and others about the compensation scheme and so on, but I feel that we should have a fresh look at this in the light of what I have said in paragraph 2 (4).

F.D.W.
10.6.59

In my view Mr. Webber has made a most able analysis of an extremely difficult and dangerous situation. The Secretary of State will, I feel sure, wish to have a discussion on it, and in the meantime I do not feel that I would help by adding to Mr. Webber’s minute. Indeed the only comment I would like to make at this stage is that, whatever the ultimate decision, I feel fairly certain that, even if it is taken during the next two or three months, it should not during that period be promulgated or probably even communicated in definite form to Sir R. Turnbull. Whilst we have to do what we feel is right in Tanganyika, we must, I think, also try so far as possible to avoid in present circumstances any action which would lay us open to the accusation, however unjustifiable, of provoking trouble in the one territory in East and Central Africa which, to all outward appearances, is “getting along happily”.

W.L.G.B.
10.6.59

I agree with Mr. Gorell Barnes’ comment on Mr. Webber’s excellent analysis. My only comments, in advance of discussion, are as follows:

(i) It is, of course, much easier for us in London to say “Apply the brakes and have a show-down” than it is on the spot. We can write a minute or draft a telegram and then leave the Office and go to our safe home surroundings. If we are woken in the
night it will only be to consider the terms of a further telegram to the Governor. I recall that a stage was reached during the 1953 Nigerian Conference when Mr. Oliver Lyttelton—as he then was—decided to break off negotiations because the Nigerian delegates were being very difficult. He said to me “Jock you can go back and govern with troops”. I replied “That is a very agreeable prospect—for six months or a year. Then what? You can’t govern indefinitely with the aid of machine guns. The time will come to resume negotiations, and these will almost certainly have to be with the same characters”. This memory is inspired by the references in Mr. Webber’s minute (para. 2 (3) and paragraph 5(d)) to crash action involving the arrest and detention of TANU leaders.

(ii) The situation in Tanganyika is unique in my experience, in that the Governor has no one, except his officials, opposing the head-long rush to “Uhuru”. The Europeans and Asians are buying “protection” by jumping on the TANU bandwagon and the Chiefs also have capitulated. In no other Colonial territory that I know of (even all-African territories) has such a situation occurred. As Sir Richard Turnbull remarks TEMO presents to the outside world the achievement of what we have long been aiming for—a non-racial organisation dedicated to the development of a non-racial society. And they are united in desire for constitutional advance (cf. the bouquets handed out, from both sides of the House of Commons, in the recent adjournment debate). The only opposition to this is the Governor and his officials, and I have a strong feeling (strengthened by what Mr. Webber has told me of his experiences during his recent visit) that it is known to, or suspected by, TEMO and TANU, that the Governor is more ready than we in this Office to make concessions. And the overseas civil servants, as a whole, feel that the skids are on, and are thinking about “golden bowler”. (Paragraph 2(4) of Mr. Webber’s minute).

(iii) In spite of what I have said above I am not in favour of any quick easy surrender to pressure to accelerate the pace of constitutional advance. Even ignoring the fact that Tanganyika is part of East Africa, the Chequers programme was pretty speedy, given the position in Tanganyika regarding Civil Service, economic viability, educational standards etc. As Mr. Webber says, we can face the world with a clear conscience. It won’t be easy to get our case accepted but we can be very forthright, and we might do some lobbying—in the Commonwealth countries and perhaps more widely in the U.N.—so as to put Nyerere back in the dilemma he was in when the Governor made his statement on 17th March. . . .

J.S.M.
15.6.59

All v. difficult! & with Nyerere soon over an early meeting is necessary—if only to decide what to say to him after consultation with the Governor. I feel v. much with Sir John Macpherson in (iii) above but there is much to be considered.

P.
15.6.59

I have been greatly helped by Mr Webber’s excellent minute & am ready to discuss.

A.L-B.
18.6.59
[Tanganyika: economic and financial issues in constitutional policy]:
letter from Sir R Turnbull to W L Gorell Barnes

In starting this second part of my letter I propose to assume that we are agreed that our objectives should be:—

(a) to restore the economic viability of the country in the shortest possible time;
(b) to enlist the active support of TEMO and TANU in our economic development; and
(c) to prevent any decline in the confidence of the Overseas Civil Service.

I shall consider against this assumption what form financial aid from H.M.G. should take in order to achieve the objectives I have described.

My first observation must be that when looked at from this angle, the form of financial assistance outlined in Webber’s letter to me, EAF. 63/7/01 of the 15th April, and confirmed in his Secret telegram No. 387, seems to be open to serious criticism. It appears to us that we are in danger of being required to adopt two policies which are virtually contradictory; on the one hand we are to aim at putting Tanganyika “back on its financial feet within five years” and (to quote paragraph 5(b) of Webber’s letter of 15th April) to keep services “at a level consistent with this aim”; and on the other, we are proposing to proceed with a policy of step-by-step constitutional development accompanied by an expansion of the Police Force over the next four years, and a complementary increased expenditure on education. The methods by which it is proposed we should be assisted are:—

(i) close control by H.M. Treasury to secure all possible economy;
(ii) a “built-in” economy factor in the form of interest free loans, presumably repayable after five years; and
(iii) the diversion of C.D. & W. funds, on which our capital programme must largely rely, to finance recurrent votes, thus reducing the capital monies available for our development, and, so it will be asserted in the Legislative Council, handicapping our chances of recovery.

We ourselves hope to be guided by the World Bank Survey Mission as to the course we should follow to make the country viable in the shortest possible time. I have little doubt that the Mission will recommend capital expenditure in various directions, and particularly for the development of water resources and roads; but apart from the assurance in your Secret telegram No. 387 that any recommendations the Mission might make would be carefully and sympathetically considered on their financial merits, there has been no indication from the London end that assistance will be given in a form specifically designed to accelerate the pace of economic development so as to increase wealth and taxable capacity.

A local re-examination of our financial prospects suggests that Tanganyika would have a reasonably good chance of being able to stand on its own feet if two major conditions could be satisfied; they are:—

(i) that some, if not all, of the burden attributable to an expensive expatriate civil service and of the army should be lifted, and that in other respects Tanganyika
should be required to stand on its own feet and to limit its level of services to the available finance; and
(ii) that in addition to the new C.D. & W. allocation of £6 million already announced, a loan should be provided, interest free for ten years, for key economic development.

I propose to comment briefly on the fulfilment of these conditions, in reverse order.

Our capital programme has been financed in recent years approximately one third by C.D. & W. grants, one third by miscellaneous receipts and the draining down of reserves, and one third from loan. No further reduction in reserves is practicable; those which remain must be held against the possibility (and in one instance—Uruwira Minerals Ltd.—the virtual certainty) of contingent liabilities having to be met. And because of our difficulties on recurrent account, loan expenditure will have to be severely restricted. Development effort will therefore have principally to rely on our new C.D. & W. allocation at £6 million. Generous as this allocation is, I am convinced that, in our circumstances, some supplementary assistance for key development—notably for the development of water resources and roads—must be an essential part of any aid programme which is to become effective by the time Tanganyika achieves self-government. I do most strongly urge that the need for such special assistance should be accepted. We should, of course, be guided in the use of it by the recommendations of the World Bank Survey Mission as endorsed or modified by your own economic experts. I would add that an announcement that H.M.G. had decided to make a special interest free loan to assist in financing the recommendations of the Mission would serve to dispel both the mistrust of H.M.G.’s intentions presently entertained by the elected members and the general feeling of uncertainty that is manifested in the commercial world.

The other condition for placing Tanganyika back on its financial feet is closely related to the problems facing the expatriate civil service. We are examining every possible means of accelerating local recruitment to the higher posts; but it is plain that it will take at least ten years before anything substantial is achieved, and even then reliance on overseas officers is likely to be far greater than at the corresponding stage of constitutional progress on the West Coast. Our foremost needs, therefore, in the difficult transitional period ahead of us are to improve the prospects of recruitment, to encourage existing Overseas Officers to remain in the Service, and to persuade them to continue in service after self-government has been achieved. May I once again urge that H.M.G. should seriously consider granting aid in the form of an acceptance of the responsibility for inducement allowances, passage costs, and such education allowances as may be decided upon; you will remember that I originally made this proposal in paragraphs 32 and 33 of my Secret despatch No. 1091 of the 3rd November, 1958. It could be made a condition of such aid that the Local Government would be required to accept the full liability in respect of pensions. If this were done, the financial commitment to H.M.G. would gradually taper off as the number of expatriate officers diminished, and the principle that permanent subsidisation of services should not be accepted would be preserved.

I am confident that if these steps were taken, the anxieties about compensation
for loss of career in the Civil Service which are now tending to loom so large in the minds of officers of junior and middle seniority, could easily be allayed. I understand that the stage at which compensation has been offered in other territories has been the point at which the Secretary of State through an official minister—normally the Chief Secretary—has ceased to have a final say as to the terms and conditions of service of officers appointed by him; but I can see no reason why events in this territory need follow the pattern that was established on the West Coast. The major figures of TEMO, in particular Nyerere himself, have admitted, on any number of occasions, the extent to which they are dependent on overseas officers remaining in the Tanganyika service; and I am confident that in expressing these views they have been completely genuine. They realise, too, how inexperienced even the best candidates for Ministerial office are, and Nyerere can foresee the difficulties that he would have to face on this account when he becomes Chief Minister. It seems to me, therefore, that he would be willing to accept the somewhat illogical position in which, even when there is an unofficial majority, led by a Chief Minister, the Secretary of State, through an official minister in the Government, or through the Deputy Governor, would retain full control insofar as overseas officers were concerned. The need for compensation for loss of career would not then arise until full internal self-government was achieved. If by that time Nyerere and his Elected Ministers had learnt to face their responsibilities realistically, and had been seen to be ready to protect the Civil Service from the damaging attacks to which it is now being subjected, the prospects of persuading overseas officers to enter the service of a self-governing Tanganyika should be greatly improved.

I do not think I need stress how important it is that we should apply ourselves early to these civil service problems. If we cannot hold off an unofficial majority after September/October 1960—and I am convinced that we cannot—it is imperative that we should start now to prepare the Service for the change; the longer we delay, the more difficult will be our task in dispelling rumours, allaying imaginary fears and restoring morale generally. The greatest danger that faces Tanganyika is a move to responsible government without the backing of a trained upright civil service, large enough and experienced enough and patient enough to see the country through the uncomfortable years of transition. We must not risk a melting-away of the Overseas Civil Service because Kenya or Uganda can't keep in step or because the pattern of H.M.'s Treasury's thinking has not yet caught up with the realities of 1959.

I must apologise for raising in one letter so many fundamental issues. But the lines of constitutional advance, economic development and civil service morale are now converging upon a point; and that point is likely to be reached some time between October and December this year. It is of the utmost importance that we should devise plans now that will ensure that when the time comes, these three essential elements of orderly progress can be combined into a harmonious whole.
143  CO 822/1450, no 246 13 July 1959
[Tanganyika: constitutional development]: letter from Sir R Turnbull to W L Gorell Barnes. Enclosure: letter from Sir R Turnbull to Sir F Crawford (Uganda) (9 July)

I have sent a somewhat rough and ready reply to Freddie Crawford’s letter No. 1202 II of the 25th June which he copied to you, Baring and Potter.1 I had not intended to pass copies round until we had settled some of the points raised in my two letters to you of the 3rd and 4th July;2 but on reflection I think you at any rate should see right away what I have said. Briefly, the point is that if we move too fast we shall embarrass our neighbours; but if we don’t move fast we shall lose the chance of developing on the lines we have set ourselves. Present indications are that in 1960 we could without much difficulty form a Government with an unofficial majority, on the 7:5 basis, in which three of the seven would be non-Africans; by 1962 after three years of certain bickering and probable disorders the chance would have passed. TANU or its successor party (which would certainly be an advocate of some kind of “black” nationalism) would, as I foresee it, be most unlikely to accept either the 7:5 ratio or a three sevenths proportion of Europeans and Asians amongst the unofficial Ministers; and the only kind of advance open to us at that time might well be an unofficial majority which was exclusively African or in which non-African representation was token only.

The “partnership-principle” is already under attack here by the left wing of TANU, and Nyerere is being criticised for his co-operation with the Europeans and the Asians. At present he can hold off the extreme elements of his party, but the longer he takes to bring home the bacon the less will be the authority he can exert. And influences outside Tanganyika which are ill-disposed towards partnership are likely to become stronger rather than weaker during the next few years; Ghana and Nigeria, French West Africa, the Congo, Egypt and Russia, are all likely to increase their championship of a black African solution to all the political problems of the Continent. We don’t want to find that in waiting for Uganda we have missed our own bus.

Enclosure to 143

I shan’t be in a position to send a detailed and properly reasoned reply to your letter of the 25th June until I have concluded some exchanges I am at present having with the Colonial Office about the form of our financial aid. I am therefore sending you an interim answer to many of the points you have raised; I am not copying it elsewhere.

1 In this letter, the governor of Uganda expressed ‘considerable concern . . . seriously alarmed at the prospect of a purely arithmetical and purely political solution in Tanganyika, because of the adverse effect it would have on our attempts to hold the position here’. He then told Turnbull that the proposed speed for Tanganyika would be a ‘definitive embarrassment’, going beyond the orderly ‘step by proved step’ agreed at Chequers, and unrelated to the availability of a sufficient number of experienced African administrators; it was folly to put Africans in a dominant position in the executive and legislature if suitable men were not available.

2 See previous document.
First, the timing of the statement which we have undertaken to make—if we can—at the end of the year. I don’t honestly think that we can put it off until after December. Nyerere and TEMO are about to embark upon a campaign for the introduction of an unofficial majority into the executive Government before the end of this year, and the adoption after an early election in 1960 of an arrangement whereby:

(i) with the exception of the Ministers for Defence, External Affairs and Legal Affairs (not, you will notice, Finance) the Government would be entirely composed of unofficials; and
(ii) every member of the Legislative Council, except for those three official Ministers, would be elected.

This, I need hardly say, is quite beyond the bounds of possibility; I have already told Nyerere that I don’t propose any changes until after the next election (which, as we see it, could not possibly be held before September, 1960). I shall have to make this point in public many times in the next few months. But if I am to hold the present position, that is to say, keep the five unofficial Ministers in the Government, and prevent a defection of our African backbenchers, I must announce the nature and date of the next constitutional move before the end of the year; and, in my opinion, that move will have to be an unofficial majority in the executive Government (5 officials and 7 unofficials) after an election in September, 1960. TEMO won’t much like it, but by working on the five unofficial Ministers I may be able to induce them to agree. As I think I mentioned in an earlier letter, TEMO now represents all the elected members of Legislative Council without a single exception; and TANU, of which TEMO is now the Parliamentary party, has behind it all the Africans (except a few extremists), all the Chiefs and all the Native Authorities.

Would there, I wonder, be any chance of your hurrying up your Constitutional Committee so that you would not be left behind when our proposals are made known?

Secondly, the composition of the elected side of the Legislature. This will, of course, depend on the outcome of Ramage’s committee. What I have to bear in the back of my mind is that in a year’s time it may have become quite impossible for us to get any Africans of repute to accept nomination to the Government side of Legislative Council for the purpose of forming a majority so that a predominantly official executive Government could outvote TEMO. I cannot think of a single potential nominated member who is not in sympathy with TANU; and if I tried to enlist a corpus of backbenchers for the purpose of outnumbering the nationalists, the whole system would be unlikely to survive the first division. (The African backbenchers have already reached a stage in which they speak in sympathy with the opposition and then reluctantly vote with the Government). It is my intention to retain the power to nominate, but merely for the purpose of seeing that communities such as the pastoral people, the Arabs, the Goans, etc., who may not be popularly represented amongst the Elected Members, still have a look-in; but it is apparent that in Tanganyika we shall not be able much longer to go on using Nominated Members as a device to achieve a majority.

For a working majority I think we shall have to rely upon these members of the opposition who are in sympathy with the moderate nationalists (under Nyerere) crossing the floor and sitting on the Government benches. The Government side
would then be composed of official Ministers, unofficial Ministers, Nominated Members and Government supporters from amongst the Elected Members. The decision who should cross the floor and who should remain is one that will have to be made by the executive of TEMO. After the election it should be fairly clear who are prepared to accept the Government policy (and TANU’s present policy) of a co-ordinated effort by Africans, Europeans and Asians, and who are likely to form the nucleus of an extreme group. I would hope that Nyerere would bring the moderates across with him, leaving the wild men to form an opposition. TEMO won’t much like this, for it will be the first time that their unity has been assailed; but it seems to me to be the logical starting point for a second party. Incidentally, there are already signs of a split in TANU on these lines; Nyerere is being accused in certain TANU circles of being too ready to listen to the Europeans and Asians, and something like a minor revolt in the party may develop.

In your third paragraph you ask what TANU mean by “a majority of elected members in the Legislature”. What they have in mind is a combined total of 82 members of whom all but three would be elected. I myself would like to see about 45 Elected Members, and I hope that, in spite of the intense pressure that will be exercised upon it, Ramage’s committee will be able to recommend something of this sort; indeed, without going wildly outside their terms of reference, they cannot very well do otherwise. As I mentioned in an earlier paragraph, one of our greatest anxieties concerns our inability to find men who will allow themselves to be nominated to the Government side in order to preserve a clear Government majority. I could easily fill Legislative Council with Heads of Departments, but that would make the Legislature quite ridiculous and would probably result in a break-down of the whole box of tricks. I shan’t be able to form a clear picture on this issue until Ramage has reported and until I see how the unofficial Ministers stand up to TANU’s demand for an unofficial majority in the Government in 1959.

Fourthly, you stress the need to make a real attempt to co-ordinate the rate of political progress with the rate of economic development and of the Africanisation of commerce and industry and of the public service. I agree with you entirely that this would be the only rational way to lay down tolerably solid foundations. Nothing would please me more than to be able to announce that we proposed to defer all constitutional advance until we had in the country a sufficient number of Africans of experience, ability and integrity to fill posts in the public service, and in commerce and industry. But I cannot see that happy position being achieved in less than twenty years. And what would happen in those twenty years? There would be at least two major insurrections; the first in 1960 or 1961, working up from a series of strikes, boycotts and campaigns of positive action; and the second in 1970 by which time the nationalists would have profited from their earlier experiences and would have laid on something that we should not have a chance of holding; it would be a combination of Mau Mau and the Maji Maji rebellion,3 with all the support of modern techniques in guerrilla warfare, sabotage and fifth column activities. You, I know, are in the happy position of having a number of dissentient groups; but here every African is a nationalist and we should be faced with a situation very much like that in Cyprus but without the Turks. I cannot imagine that H.M.G. would be willing to see all the

---

3 Maji-Maji Rebellion in German East Africa, 1905–1906, in which between 200,000 and 300,000 Africans died.
East African Forces and the Middle East Strategic Reserve deployed in Tanganyika to look after sisal estates and Greek tobacco plantations when they should be available to protect our vital oil interests in the Persian Gulf; nor could H.M.G. possibly defend such a situation in the Trusteeship Council.

I agree that there is a danger that the standards of administration in Government services will drop, but looking at the examples of Ghana and Nigeria, it doesn’t seem to me that they are going to drop any further in the 1960’s than they would if we deferred any further advances for another twenty years. In any case, as I have said, we could not hold off without paying a price in bloodshed and military involvement which would be out of all proportion to the results likely to be achieved, and, in the long run, utterly pointless. We are, after all, under an obligation to make Tanganyika self-governing, and it would be better to reach that consummation too early with the people on our side than after a campaign with the people irrevocably against us. Our first interest must surely be to maintain peaceful conditions and public confidence so that the solutions to political problems can be sought in a tranquil atmosphere, and so that when the final change comes about, Tanganyika will look to us and not to the Soviet bloc to keep the country supplied with technicians and as a source of manufactured articles.

Fifthly, the question of Africanisation. I share your apprehensions about the lack of Africans of education and character, to run the public services, and the problem of producing enough of the right kind of men. In fact, I know that it can’t be done within the time at our disposal; I am therefore once again in correspondence with the Secretary of State about the position of the Overseas Civil Service, and am attempting to get it reorganised on a basis whereby H.M.G. would be responsible for inducement pay and leave passages, and would guarantee suitable compensation terms at an appropriate time. When I say “an appropriate time” I have in mind that compensation should not be offered until we have got through the period of responsible Government and are approaching full internal self-government with a totality of Elected Ministers.

I now come to the main point you raise in paragraph 7. Is it right, you ask, because of purely political considerations and a doubtful security situation, to move towards responsible government and hand over a country before it is anywhere near ready to stay on its own feet? The answer, as far as we are concerned, must be that if the alternative is to undergo a period of insurrection in which British influence would be seriously damaged, and local European and Asian interests virtually destroyed, it is not wrong. You say that the answer, as far as Uganda is concerned, is that premature self-government would be likely to lead to a civil war; the answer, as far as Tanganyika is concerned, is that to defer self-government too long cannot fail to lead to a civil war or its equivalent. If we do not accept the risk involved we may lose the chance that we now have to co-operate with a moderate form of nationalism and lay down the basis of some kind of partnership. It is essential for us to use Nyerere whilst he is still powerful; if we wait too long, he will be ousted by the extremists; and with him will go all hopes of an enduring European influence in Tanganyika. Indeed, 1960 may present the last chance we shall have to prevent Tanganyika from becoming a purely African state. If we got into a shooting match here, Nyerere would quickly be displaced as a leader, and instead of him we should have a group of hairy men demanding “Africa for the Africans”.

I agree entirely that our common problem seems to be how best to hand [sic] on,
and for how long; it is also at what point to hang on. In the past two years there has, in Tanganyika, been a gradual dissociation of Government from the people, and the only hope I see of re-establishing a proper relationship is to get the nationalists into the Government while their brand of nationalism still follows the pattern that we have been advocating.

Turning to your eighth paragraph, it seems to me that during the past two or three years the problems of Tanganyika and Uganda have been getting less and less alike. You have a multiplicity of political parties and a complicated dynastic problem which, although doubtless extremely tiresome in their own way, do provide a kind of built-in brake. We, on the other hand, have the monolithic nationalist party with virtually no competitors, supported by a Parliamentary organisation of Europeans, Asians and Africans, which function as a kind of built-in accelerator. If we go too fast, it is damaging for you; yet if we hold the position to a point at which we are driven into an Emergency, you will be equally damaged and so too will Kenya and the Federation. But the main difference is this. Uganda is going to be an African state; you can afford to hold on for twenty years and to undergo boycotts, strikes and passive resistance; at the end of it your prospects of being an African state will be undamaged—they may even be improved. But in Tanganyika we aim to be a partnership state; if we hung on for twenty years, we should, at the end of that time, emerge not as a partnership state but as an African state—and a very embittered one—with no hope of re-establishing the European interests and influence that would have been destroyed.

I agree that it would be extremely useful for us to meet and talk over these matters; I am planning a couple of days at the end of August at the Seronera National Park Camp in the Serengeti Plains. Would you care to join me there? There is an excellent airstrip and some magnificent scenery.

Coming next to your suggestion that TANU might be cut down to size by re-establishing and re-asserting, possibly with Police assistance, the former undoubted power and authority of the Native Authorities, this device was exploited by Twining between 1954 and 1958, but without success. The Native Authorities are designed to cope with all kinds of situations but not with politicians; and the result was a gradual weakening of the Chiefs and the Authorities, and an increasing unwillingness to counter TANU propaganda, until, in March this year, the Chiefs Conference threw its hand in and publicly announced its wholehearted support of TANU and of all TANU’s policies. On the occasion of TANU Day, earlier this week, Marealle sent the President a flamboyant telegram indicating his full support; and Fundikira, one of the more influential Chiefs and now a Minister, is completely and openly committed to TANU.4

I don’t propose to discuss the diarchy principle in this letter. On further study of the matter it looks to me too as though it is almost certainly a non-starter; in any case, I have produced various financial ideas to the Colonial Office which, if accepted, will obviate the necessity of any constitutional juggling of the kind that I had first contemplated.

We, like yourself, contemplate moving gradually towards a position in which Ministers from the Elected Members of the Legislative Council will cross the floor in increasing numbers to join the Government. We already have five. As I have said, it

4 Chief A S Fundikira, chief of Unyanyembe, 1957–1962, member of Leg Co since 1958.
looks as though in October 1960 we shall have seven. The remaining five Civil Service Ministers would be the Chief Secretary and the Ministers for Finance, Legal Affairs, Provincial Affairs and Security. How long we should be able to hold that position, I don’t know. It will depend on what kind of a rival party sets itself up when we introduce the unofficial majority, on our finances, on the outcome of the survey by the World Bank Mission, on the findings of the U.N. Mission which comes here in the summer of 1960, and on events in Nigeria, Ghana and the Congo. Like yourself, I foresee the three civil Service Ministers remaining during the last stage of responsible government, followed by a period of full internal self-government in which there would be no Civil Service Ministers at all and in which the Governor, assisted by a Deputy, would retain control of a number of reserved subjects. The Civil Service would be protected by a Public Service Commission based on Order in Council legislation and not on a local Ordinance. . . .

144  CAB 134/1558, CPC (59)20  12 Nov 1959

‘Constitutional development in Tanganyika’: Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee memorandum by Mr Macleod

Introduction

The Colonial Policy Committee at their meeting on 17th April, 1959 (C.P.C. (59) 1st Meeting), approved a programme of constitutional advance for Tanganyika and invited my predecessor to bring before them at a later meeting the text of a proposed statement by the Governor which was to include a forecast of when unofficial majorities might be introduced into the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Council. . . . Since then there has been considerable pressure from Tanganyika for the statement to be made before the end of this year. The Tanganyika African National Union (T.A.N.U.) gave its supporters a pledge at the last election that they would achieve “responsible government” in 1959. Before my own visit to East Africa was announced the leaders of the Tanganyika Elected Members Organisation (T.E.M.O.) offered to come to this country to put their case before me. The Governor has warned me that I shall be expected to make some kind of statement when I go to Tanganyika. I have invited him to come to London for prior consultation in the week beginning 16th November.

Developments since April 1959

2. The programme approved by the Colonial Policy Committee in April was broadly as follows:—

(1) An announcement would be made early in 1960 that—
(a) the number of unofficial Ministers would be increased from 5 to 7 for the period 1961–65. The number of official members would remain at 7 and there would be an equal balance between officials and unofficials;
(b) consideration would be given during the 1961–65 Legislative Council to the possibility of working towards an unofficial majority of 7 unofficials to 5 officials for the period 1965 to 1969.
(2) These changes would be subject to law and order being maintained and to the country showing on grounds of performance, &c., that they were justified.
(3) No commitment would be given beyond 1969. The Governor would make it clear that the next stage would be a substantial measure of internal self-government so that Tanganyika would not expect to be fully self-governing immediately after 1969.

3. The Governor's present recommendations to me are:—

(1) that an unofficial majority in the Council of Ministers of 7 unofficials to 5 officials should be introduced in the autumn of 1960;
(2) that within 2 years from that date the unofficial majority should be increased to 9 unofficials to 3 officials; but
(3) that if Mr. Nyerere is not prepared to join the Government except as Chief Minister, we should accept in 1960, as an alternative to (a) above, the 9:3 ratio of unofficials to officials as the ratio appropriate to the introduction of a Chief Minister post;
(4) that, subject to points of detail, the recommendations of the Post-Elections Committee which, under the chairmanship of Sir Richard Ramage, has recently reported on the racial composition of the representative side of the Legislative Council and on franchise qualifications should be accepted. The main recommendations of this Committee are summarised in Annex I.1 (I draw particular attention to the expansion of the franchise which is proposed.)

4. The main reason why the Governor has so significantly revised the views which he expressed at Chequers in January has been the unexpectedly united front shown by the elected members of all three races in the Legislative Council in pressing for rapid constitutional advance and in which the European and Asian elected members have been no less vocal than members of T.A.N.U. members. This has been accompanied by a rallying to the support of T.A.N.U. of the Chiefs and other traditional “responsible” elements in the country who might have been expected to favour a more gradual progress. The five unofficial members of the Council of Ministers have in general behaved in a sensible and responsible manner. The Governor's officials advisers generally consider that, if we were to reach an accommodation with T.A.N.U. (as he thinks we would on the proposals set out in paragraph 3 above), there would be a better prospect of holding the position for some years at least, during which political controversy would be stilled and energies devoted to much-needed economic development and to building up a firm system of local administration. As the Governor sees things, it would be essential to the success of such a plan that Nyerere should himself join the Government and, though he would oppose as strongly as he could a move to the appointment of a Chief Minister at the next stage, he would be prepared to accept it if there was no other way of securing Nyerere's acceptance of a Ministerial post —hence the recommendation in paragraph 3 (3) above.

The alternative before us

5. The risks in adopting the Governor's proposals are obvious. In the first place Tanganyika and its people are, generally speaking, by far the most backward in the East African region, and in particular the financial position looks like being

1 Not printed.
extremely difficult over the next few years. Secondly, although Nyere’s leadership of T.A.N.U. has so far been comparatively responsible, there are considerable “wild” elements within it and the pressure for constitutional advance this year has derived, at least in part, from the wish to satisfy them. The party might therefore not be content to stay put for a further period of years but might agitate for an early advance to full self-government. Thirdly, the advance would inevitably have repercussions in other territories in East Africa. Constitutional matters are currently under review in Kenya and Uganda. So full a measure of advance as is now proposed would certainly not make it easier to pursue a policy of prudent gradualism in Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar. Kenya with a constitutional conference immediately pending might be particularly embarrassed by the franchise proposals. The latter could have repercussions too in Central Africa where we have so far accepted, e.g., in the Northern Rhodesian Constitution, the premise that the franchise should be confined to “responsible” persons and have adopted a comparatively high set of qualifications for that purpose. In the face of so wide an extension of franchise in Tanganyika as is now proposed it would be difficult to resist the application of similar standards in Nyasaland when we come to consider constitutional advance in that territory and this might in turn prejudice the position already achieved after considerable controversy in Northern Rhodesia.

6. Despite this sombre prospect it seems to me that the risks in the opposite direction are the greater. T.A.N.U. could undoubtedly take “positive action” sufficient to lead to a virtual break-down of administration. With the inadequate police resources at our disposal we should be hard put to contain the emergency and world opinion would blame the resultant widespread disturbances on the obstinacy of Her Majesty’s Government in the face of a united demand from Tanganyika which had been pressed by constitutional means and in a “reasonable” manner. The counter-arguments about the repercussions on the rest of East Africa are very difficult to make sound convincing and have already been largely discounted publicly by Nyere. We should not underestimate the chance which a change would give us to get the energies and undoubted prestige of Nyere and his associates devoted to the real tasks of government in Tanganyika which lie in economic and social development.

7. The Governor’s assessment that, if we do not concede the unofficial majority (and announce in the very near future our intention of so doing) we may be faced with serious disturbances and may lose the opportunity of some years of constructive effort, seems to me to be soundly based. I feel sure therefore that we should abandon any hope of securing accommodation with Nyere on the programme referred to in paragraph 2 above, and that we have no choice but to move straight to an unofficial majority in 1960. I am impressed by the need to ensure that the changes we introduce will result in Nyere’s joining the Government, and, if it were the only way to secure this, would accept him as Chief Minister. I doubt whether any change which left him on the Opposition side could be anything but very short-lived. If we are to pin our faith on him there is everything to be gained by doing so at the outset.

8. If we do so, can we be sure that we will not be faced with pressures for a very

---

2 This was very much the language of Sir R Turnbull: in a telegram of 20 Aug 1959 he referred to his intention to ‘smack down’ the ‘wild men’ of TANU, i.e. the ‘lunatic fringe’ and those ‘not under proper control’ from the centre, who were threatening ‘positive action’ (CO 822/1450, no 254, to S of S).
early grant of independence? I have referred in paragraph 4 above to the hopes for a period of stability following the changes in 1960. Nyerere told my predecessor that he envisaged that he would first work towards the elimination of the three official Ministers, which he hoped to achieve by about 1963; there would follow another period of about three years during which there would be a wholly elected Council of Ministers and internal self-government. He would thus expect to achieve independence in 1966 or thereabouts. My provisional view is that if events were to conform broadly to this pattern, we could at least ensure that they moved in four-year stages which would correspond to the normal life of the Legislative Council; on this basis if everything went well with Nyerere we should have to accept independence by 1968. We are bound to be pressed from about 1960 onwards to telescope the time-table but I think that we would have every justification in digging our toes in. Having yielded to the demand to have the major share of responsibility we should be on much firmer ground in resisting further premature changes, particularly if it became manifest that Nyerere was falling down on the task of building up sufficient human and material resources to make independence a reality. Indeed the difficulties of this task may become so important in future that we should find ourselves when the time came in a position where we could justifiably stave off the grant of independence beyond the 1968 date suggested above. Moreover the grant of the major responsibility in the administration to elected members may very well bring to the surface the latent jealousies, fears and clash of interests that at the moment are concealed within the “monolith” of T.E.M.O. If this happened our ability to meet outside criticism of a deferment of independence would be at least enhanced. With so many imponderables in the situation I see no reason why we should limit our scope for manoeuvre in future by any public announcement of a programme for constitutional advance as contemplated last April (see paragraph 2 above). Nor do I think that we should be pressed (except in the United Nations) to make such a statement; though Nyerere may have revealed his thinking to my predecessor, the Governor tells me that he has never publicly referred to a date for independence and has been careful to avoid mentioning one in private discussion with Government representatives. His motives may be different from ours but our interests march together in avoiding commitment to a time-table.

9. The Governor’s recommendations on the Council of Ministers are the crux of the matter but any statement on the next constitutional steps will have to have regard to the introduction of an unofficial majority into the Legislative Council and to the recommendations of the Ramage Committee. The first of these issues raises no difficulty if it is agreed that we should concede an unofficial majority in the Council of Ministers. For in that event there would be little purpose in (and indeed strong objections to) perpetuating the present arrangements whereby a Government majority in the Legislature is secured by nomination. The point in the Ramage Committee’s recommendations which raises difficulty is the franchise. The difficulties arise mainly from repercussions outside Tanganyika. I shall explore with the Governor the possibility of reducing these, e.g., by restoring a literacy qualification but I doubt if this is worth pursuing à l’outrance in face of the unanimous finding of the Committee. It is clear at any event that an extension of the franchise could hardly produce a more “nationalist-minded” legislature than that produced by the present limited franchise. It might indeed possibly throw up some more conservatively-minded Africans and give a little more stability to politics.
10. The other Governors in East Africa will, I believe, feel that we must accept the inevitable in Tanganyika but would prefer that decisions were not announced until their own immediate constitutional problems had been solved. But the Governor of Tanganyika has, with the authority of my predecessor, given an assurance to his Legislative Council that these matters will be dealt with at this end with all possible despatch and I do not think that I can possibly hold up decisions on Tanganyika until February or March. I will keep the other Governors and the British Resident in Zanzibar informed of my discussions with Sir Richard Turnbull. There might be some room for manoeuvre in the actual terms of my announcement so as to minimise the repercussions outside Tanganyika, though I do not suppose that I shall be able completely to remove the other Governors’ misgivings.

11. I ask my colleagues to agree that I should discuss with Sir Richard Turnbull on the basis of the proposals outlined in paragraph 3 above, and that I may have discretion, if I think it necessary, to go so far as (3) in that paragraph; and to agree further that I should make an appropriate announcement when I am in Dar-es-Salaam in December.

3 Macleod minuted on a draft of this memo: ‘I approve this paper—I like it very much. 10.11.61’

145 CO 822/1451, no 308 16 Nov 1959

[Tanganyika]: CO note of a discussion on policy between Mr Macleod and Sir R Turnbull

The Secretary of State opened the discussion by saying that it was his intention to put proposals relating to constitutional development in Tanganyika to the Colonial Policy Committee in the near future and, if necessary, later to the full Cabinet. He was convinced that there ought to be a substantial step forward and that there was everything to be gained by making it as quickly as possible. There was a risk that the announcement of detailed proposals for Tanganyika in December might prejudice the possibility of the Kenya Conference producing useful results and it was therefore his view that an announcement should be made in December indicating that H.M.G. were prepared to agree in principle to the introduction of unofficial majorities in the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Council after the elections in 1960, and were prepared to accept the recommendations of the Ramage Committee subject to certain minor modifications. The detailed proposals for the constitution of the Council of Ministers’ allocation of Portfolios and other related matters would be left to be worked out at a Conference to be held in London in February to which Mr. Julius Nyerere and a small number of his colleagues would be invited.

2. The Secretary of State said that he had originally intended that he should make a statement on these lines during his visit to Dar-es-Salaam in December; but after discussion with the Governor he now felt it would be right for Sir Richard Turnbull to make an announcement at the opening of the Legislative Council on the 15th December, i.e. two days before the Secretary of State arrived in Dar-es-Salaam.

3. The Secretary of State said that this would be a dramatic step and a very great advance on the programme agreed at Chequers. He therefore invited Sir Richard Turnbull to comment on recent political developments in the Territory and explain why the rate of advance now proposed was thought to be right.
4. **Sir Richard Turnbull** pointed out that since the Chequers meeting there had been significant changes in conditions in neighbouring territories. There had been a great upward surge of nationalism in the Belgian Congo which had not been foreseen. There had also been trouble of a rather similar kind in Nyasaland; and now Ruanda Urundi was in a state of turmoil. On the whole these developments had not greatly influenced the thinking of the leading political people in Tanganyika because their minds had been directed to their own internal political problems. But if H.M.G. failed to produce an acceptable answer to those problems, then it could not be expected that Tanganyika would remain immune from the trend of events elsewhere in Africa. Mr. Nyerere had started his campaign in 1957 with a demand for independence in 1959 but once the war cry had caught on he had brought down his sights to achieving responsible Government in 1959. There was complete unity in the Territory on this point.

5. Sir Richard Turnbull then turned to the question of the Chiefs. At the time of Chequers he had hoped that a combination of traditional native Authorities and some of the Europeans in the Legislative Council might result in the adoption of a somewhat more gradual pace of advance than that advocated by T.A.N.U. In the event he had been proved wrong, the switch over of the Chiefs to T.A.N.U. (which was understandable and right from their point of view) taken with the complete unity of all representative members in the Legislative Council had led, if anything, to a quickening in the pace of advance.

6. In his view the country was nine-tenths behind Mr. Nyerere but there was a minority, which should not be under-estimated, who were opposed to his multi-racial approach and who took a purely black African nationalistic line. The focus of this opposition was probably Oscar Kambona who had just returned from a course of study in the United Kingdom and had taken over his old post of General Secretary of T.A.N.U.

7. Generally speaking, Mr. Nyerere still had a great crusading appeal in the Territory and his hand would be strengthened with a promise in 1959 of responsible government. In reply to a question from the Secretary of State, Sir Richard Turnbull confirmed that in his judgment it was both expedient and right to promise unofficial majorities in both the Councils. He added that the Conference of Provincial Commissioners, which was not an easy body to convince, were unanimous in their agreement on such a policy. In reply to a later question Sir Richard said that the concession of unofficial majorities in principle would be sufficient to satisfy Nyerere.

8. Discussion then turned on the statement to be made on the Ramage Report. The possibility of deferring a detailed statement until after the Kenya Conference was considered, but Sir Richard Turnbull advised strongly against such a course which would hold up preparations for the election. It was most important in his view to make a substantive statement on the Report in December. The possibility of modifying the Ramage proposals in certain respects in order to decrease any adverse effect they might have in neighbouring territories, particularly Nyasaland, was examined. **Lord Perth** suggested that it might help the Nyasaland situation if a literacy qualification could be included in Tanganyika, the public justification for such a course being that nobody who had been enfranchised under the existing arrangements should be disenfranchised under the Ramage proposals. The **Secretary of State** considered that this idea should be further examined and that a telegram should be sent to Sir Robert Armitage seeking his views if this seemed desirable.
9. The Meeting concluded with a summing up on the basis of paragraph (1) above. The additional point was made that the advantages of the 9:3 formula would not emerge until after the Kenya Conference. The aim should be at the February Conference to embody final decisions on this and other points in a package deal with Mr. Nyerere; in the meantime early consideration should be given to the preparation of an outline of the matters to be discussed at the Conference.

146 CAB 134/1558, CPC 6(59)1 20 Nov 1959
‘Constitutional advance in Tanganyika’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting

The Committee had before them memoranda by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (C.P.C. (59) 20 and 22) proposing that a statement should be made in Tanganyika in the following month to the effect that Her Majesty’s Government accepted the principle that unofficial majorities should be introduced into the Council of Ministers and into the Legislative Council of Tanganyika after the 1960 elections, that the precise arrangements would be discussed with representatives from Tanganyika at a Conference in London in February 1960, and that the recommendations of the Ramage Committee would, subject to certain detailed amendments, be implemented.

The Colonial Secretary said that all communities in Tanganyika were agreed on the desirability of making an early move towards responsible government, and there was general support for the Tanganyika African National Union (T.A.N.U.) under the leadership of Mr. Nyerere. It would therefore be important to induce Mr. Nyerere to take office after the 1960 elections even if this meant appointing him Chief Minister in the Council of Ministers with an unofficial majority of nine unofficials to three officials. As regards the conclusions of the Ramage Report, the most difficult item was the suggested widening of the franchise to increase the electorate to about 1½ millions. Agreement had however now been reached in the Council of Ministers for rather more stringent tax qualifications and for a literacy qualification, with the result that the electorate would amount to just under one million. It was not considered that the proposed advance in Tanganyika would create any serious difficulties in Kenya, where it would obviously not be possible to make such a rapid advance, but it was proposed to minimise any repercussions on the Kenya Constitutional Conference to be held in January 1960, by deferring any more detailed announcement until negotiations had been held with Tanganyikan representatives in February.

In discussion it was pointed out that the proposed changes in Tanganyika, and in particular the widening of the franchise, might hamper the work of the Monckton Commission and have grave repercussions on the future of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Tanganyika was one of the most backward territories in East and Central Africa and the widening of the franchise in the way proposed could

1 See document no 144 above.
2 Sir Walter Monckton, chairman of Advisory Commission on Central Africa, 1959: see document no 495 in pt II.
not fail to give rise to similar demands in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was most unlikely that these could be conceded, in view of the existing state of relations between Europeans and Africans in those territories, and in any event they would not be acceptable to the Southern Rhodesian Government. There would therefore be advantage in delaying the announcement of any changes until the Monckton Commission had reported, and in limiting the extension of the franchise as narrowly as possible.

On the other hand it was argued that conditions in Tanganyika were quite different from those in the Central African territories, in that the proposed constitutional advance was supported by all sections of opinion in Tanganyika and that there was general confidence in Mr. Nyerere’s ability to guide the peaceful development of the country on multi-racial lines. Moreover, Tanganyika was a Trust territory and we were continually being asked in the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations for a timetable of its constitutional advance. It would be difficult to justify our actions to world opinion if we refused to take the present opportunity of making a peaceful advance towards Tanganyikan self-government which had been put forward in a reasonable and constitutional manner. The alternative course of resisting the present requests and retarding the rate of progress carried the distinct risk that T.A.N.U. would adopt a policy of non-co-operation or even violence, leading to a breakdown in the administration which, owing to the inadequacy of the police and the general lack of sympathy which we should encounter not only in Tanganyika but in the United Nations, we should find it hard to contain.

In further discussion it was pointed out that it would be important to ensure that, if the proposals were implemented, the Governor retained adequate reserve powers to enable him to deal with any deterioration in the situation. The present proposals in fact provided for the crucial portfolios of Defence, Law and Provincial Administration to be retained by officials.

Summing up the Prime Minister said that before reaching a decision on the matter it would be useful to have a further discussion at which the Governor of Tanganyika should be present. It would also be helpful for the Committee to be provided with information on the existing qualifications for and extent of the franchise in Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Kenya; and the views of the Governors of Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be obtained on the possible repercussions on their territories of the proposals set out in the Colonial Secretary’s memoranda. It would also be useful for the Committee to know what reserve powers the Governor of Tanganyika would retain until Tanganyika obtained independence. . . .

3 The Cabinet endorsed the recommendations of the Colonial Policy Committee: see CAB 128/33, CC 60(59)8, 26 Nov 1959.
self-government say from the 1st July (1961) and independence say 12 months’ later (1st July, 1962). This contrasts with the view put forward in the S. of S.’s paper for the Colonial Policy Committee only eight months ago which envisaged that we would have to accept independence by 1968 and that, while we should be pressed from now onwards to telescope the programme we would have every justification for digging our toes in. (The reasons given for such optimism were that Mr. Nyerere himself wanted “to go slow”; that the grant of responsibility might bring to light the latent jealousies within the TEMO monolith and that our position would become stronger if it became clear that Nyerere was falling down on the job of building up the human and material resources, required to make independence a reality).

The change in thinking seems to have come with the gloss the Visiting Mission put on the S. of S.’s remarks to them. . . . I was not here when the S. of S. met the Mission or when his brief was prepared and cannot therefore judge how far the telescoping of the programme, which was envisaged last November, was accepted then. But it is worthwhile looking again at the reasons which seemed last year to give us hope for delay and consider what validity is still left in them. Mr. Nyerere has destroyed the first of the two reasons in the bracketed part of the last paragraph by moving pretty well in line with the pressures of his “wild men” while at the same time adroitly preserving his reputation as an “enlightened” nationalist; there remains the lack of native resources in Tanganyika to run an independent state. This is certainly no less obvious now than it was last November—if anything, with the decline in morale of the expatriate service it is the more evident. There is however little sign among public opinion that this would be accepted as a reason for resisting TANU demands (as we thought eight months ago it might); if anything opinion seems rather to put the onus on H.M.G. to see that countries like Tanganyika keep their present administration after independence.

This does not exclude the possibility of a change in view as Congo affairs develop—but this could cut both ways. The course of events in the Congo argues for a “testing period” for the Tanganyika new style government but it seems likely that the U.N.O. will have, in addition to separating the Congolese and the Belgians from each other’s throats, to mount quite a large scale exercise in re-establishing administration in the Congo and they may feel that, if they can do this in an independent country, a fortiori they can do it in one of their own Trusteeship Territories, if the local politicos and the administering authority fall out over the speed of advance to independence.

If therefore Ministers feel that it is not practical politics (and with respect this is essentially a political decision) to try and arrest for more than a short period the pace of “emancipation” on the grounds of administrative immaturity there is everything to be said for keeping to the sort of time-table envisaged in the drafts. Tanganyika will not be significantly more “ripe” for independence in 1963 than in 1962 and it is not worth H.M.G.’s while needlessly to incur odium by arguing for 1963 rather than 1962, once the decision has been taken that we cannot hold the position until Tanganyika’s native resources are sufficient to the needs of an independent state.

---

1 See document no 144.
But this decision will have repercussions on Tanganyika’s neighbours and for that reason, I propose also a second “Chequers” with East African Governors in December.

W.B.L.M.
21.7.60

... It is startling to read again paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State’s memorandum circulated to the C.P.C. last November, and realise how far and how fast we have travelled since then. The idea of staving off the grant of independence till 1968 or even later now seems wholly unrealistic. It is clear now that we are dealing not simply with Nyerere but with TANU as a whole over which it is not too easy for him to maintain his leadership; but the changed outlook derives principally from the series of events in Africa since the C.P.C. paper was written. I think we must now recognise that it is necessary to plan on the assumption of independence in 1962. It is already known in UN circles that we are thinking in these terms. I agree that this points to the need for a second “Chequers”—if possible before the end of the present year.

J.M.M.
22.7.60

Congo events may dampen the enthusiasms of U.N.O. for very early independence? I like the idea of Nyerere & one or two others coming over say in October & going home with the promise of a meeting early in 1961. It would give us a chance to talk over with him the problem of the EAHC & why we feel we must play things a bit slow—think out the implications of the Raisman report2 which won’t be ready until October. In this connection it will be recalled Nyerere has shown anxiety on this whole question of the E.A.H.C.

Generally I think the drafts are on the right lines tho’ if the above thinking commends itself we may want slightly to recast the letters. Furthermore before they go or at about the same time shouldn’t we at least inform C.P.C. of what is in the wind remembering only 9 months ago we said 1968?

P.
27.7.60

I agree with the idea and the timing of the meeting of Governors. But I am a little doubtful about the procedure for the motion for ‘Tanganyika. It is, of course, a precedent that will tell against us at once, particularly in Kenya, where they will go for a similar motion. But it may be that it is the right answer.

I am not too concerned with the inconsistency between now and last November. The wind has been gathering force since then and in any case I told the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, and they accepted it without comment, that Tanganyika would be independent by 1962 or 1963. So the thinking of us all has speeded up and I do not think I need special permission from the C.P.C. for this proposal, although it may at an appropriate moment be right to mention it to them.

I think independence by July 1962 is reasonable, but I am much less happy about full internal self-government by the 1st July, 1961. I should have thought that the

---

2 On an East African common market.
constitution just coming in should run for a year and that we should aim at October. In any case, knowing the Administration in Tanganyika, if we tell them we are thinking of July we will certainly never get a date later than July and I feel therefore that that date should be altered to October.

If this is acceptable I have no other proposals on the drafts, which can go ahead. Naturally we can have a discussion if the department wish.

I.M.
28.7.60

148  CO 822/2040, nos 38 & 46  30 July–2 Aug 1960

Tanganyika: formation of a new government: telegrams (nos 125 & 127) from Sir R Turnbull to W B L Monson (CO). Minutes by W B L Monson and Mr Macleod

[Governor Turnbull suggested (tel no 34, 21 July 1960) that a ministry might be formed before the general election on 30 Aug; he argued that 87% of the electorate had expressed its wishes, with fifty-eight TANU candidates being unopposed, so the outcome was 'academic'; to anticipate the result would allow ministers to get down to work earlier. When the S of S refused to agree (tel no 123, 28 July) Turnbull pressed again. The election resulted in an overwhelming victory for TANU, winning 70 out of 71 seats.]

(1) 30 July 1960

I recognise that action suggested is not in accordance with precedent and agree that constitutionally speaking it has its unusual aspects. But I cannot agree that there is any possibility, theoretically or otherwise, that the person emerging after Polling Day as likely to command majority support will be other than Nyerere. Surely our whole constitutional exercise is based on this assumption.

2. If there is trouble in Nyasaland all eyes will be focussed on that territory. There will be wave of sympathy with replaced Africans; and Europeans and Asians who are already naturally somewhat jittery as a result of the Congo debacle may display open apprehension and mistrust. Result would be most damaging for the good racial relations which in spite of outside influence we are still managing to maintain. To avoid this situation I shall need something to occupy the public mind and distract it from speculation on the rights and wrongs of federation issues. I also have in mind points made in paragraph 2 of my Personal No. 117.

3. I trust therefore that you will not dismiss the possibility of forming a new Government before the General Elections have been completed. Indeed unless Federation affairs settle down I shall probably have to press for it. Nyerere is not making an issue of this matter but he too is worried about the effect federation and the Congo upsets are having on European and Asian morale and about the excuses they may provide for Townships spivs to misbehave.

(2) 2 Aug 1960

I have had further discussions with Nyerere and Vasey¹ about our present uncomfortable situation in which, as a result of nomination day, TANU has power but no executive responsibility.

2. Nyerere recognises that there are bound to be many issues in which TANU as a Government will not be able to follow the lines advocated by TANU as a party. But in the present circumstances he is inhibited from taking a TANU Government line and is compelled to continue to give some support to the party line even if the latter is extreme. Example is the question of South African boycott over which TANU as a party are trying to outbid Ghana in ferocity of their threats.

3. Although Nyerere and the present elected Ministers are doing all they can to maintain confidence by appropriate speeches, they would be infinitely more effective if they could speak as members of the new Government.

4. In these circumstances I am now firmly of the opinion that unless constitutional obstacles are unsurmountable we should ask Nyerere to proceed with the formation of the new Government as soon as constitutional documents have been completed.

Minutes on 148

The minutes above deal with the suggestion that Mr. Nyerere might take up office as Chief Minister in Tanganyika on the 8th August, rather than the end of September which was the date previously in mind. Sir Richard Turnbull, after in (34) saying he would like if possible to avoid this step, two days later in a Top Secret telegram recommended that he should be given authority to make such a change. The United Kingdom Press at the same time reported that this question had been “referred to Cabinet”.

2. The minutes above are, on the whole, against a change to the earlier date. I would not myself make too much fuss about moving to the August date if, by so doing, we either avoided a row or collected any goodwill.

3. Having said this, however, I find it difficult to assess the weight behind the Governor’s recommendations. It is not clear to me whether TANU will in fact make a row if they have to wait until the end of September. The fact that their leader is behaving decently with the Governor suggests that they wouldn’t. On the other hand, I do not believe that if we let them into office at the beginning of August that we would reap any positive goodwill for this move. Secondly, Sir Richard Turnbull’s recommendation for the move seems to me to be based on his fears of repercussions of security trouble in Nyasaland which we may well be able to avoid anyway.

4. In this, as in other matters, Sir Richard Turnbull is at the moment at a “volatile” stage of his thought (the authorship of the phrase should be attributed to the S. of S. rather than to myself), and I agree that he might be invited, as in the draft, to take the United Nations implications of his move into account before making a final recommendation.

W.B.L.M.
26.7.60

I think it would be wholly improper for Sir Richard Turnbull to appoint Mr. Nyerere at this stage. As a politician the suggestion offends me very much and it seems to me beyond argument unconstitutional. The election has not taken place and, although people may be pledged to a certain individual, they can—and indeed it has happened in the past—withdraw their support. There is, of course, no likelihood that they
would do this, but we must not anticipate the actual holding of the election, nor be thought or seen to influence it. I would like to see a re-draft of the telegram putting this point firmly to the Governor. Unless we do this I am afraid we will go dithering on.2

I.M.
27.7.60

2 The reply to the governor stated that after careful consideration the S of S ‘remains unshaken in his belief that it would be wrong to adopt the course you propose’. There was ‘reasonable hope of a respectable settlement in Nyasaland’, which should remove Turnbull’s main ground of anxiety—but if not, would it make any difference? The S of S was ‘frankly not impressed by line taken by Nyerere. Indeed, if it is a matter of showing enough leadership to restrain spivs in the townships or wildmen in his own party, one is surely entitled to look to Nyerere showing this, whether he is leader of the majority party or Chief Minister as well’ (CO 822/2040, no 40, tel no 130, 2 Aug 1960).

149 CO 822/2299, no 16 25 Aug 1960
‘Tanganyika: constitutional advance’: telegram (no 137) from W B L Monson (CO) to Sir R Turnbull

Have discussed letter under reference [9 Aug] with Secretary of State.

2. We are agreed with you on

(a) constitutional conference in London in March; and
(b) an announcement to that effect when you address Legislative Council on 11th October.

We also had implicitly accepted aim in (c) of your paragraph 2.1

3. We accept further that in any statement we should:

(a) endeavour to avoid ruffling the newly-fledged feathers of your Legislature by implying that they are on trial by making performance a prior condition of any conference though this has presentational difficulties for us vis-a-vis United Kingdom opinion—see 4 (a) below—and
(b) that, since the next stage of constitutional development in Tanganyika clearly cannot be anything else but self-government, we might as well reap such credit as we can by using that phrase in any announcement about the conference.

4. The Secretary of State sees, however, very great objection to your proposal (paragraph 4 of your letter) to name a date for self-government in advance of the conference for two following reasons:

(a) The procedure of naming a date for self-government and leaving the details to be worked out at a conference in six months’ time strikes the Secretary of State, and would also strike his colleagues in H.M.G. and Parliament, as well as the public here generally, as painfully reminiscent of the way the Belgians announced the independence of the Congo and of the procedure which has led to the lamentable debacle which now has embroiled us all. (At the moment people have

1 This stated that the S of S ‘should have an opportunity of demonstrating that his actions match the statement he made to the members of the United Nations’ Visiting Mission on the 25th April this year’.
given Nyerere credit for advocating policies far different from those of Lumumba and H.M.G. credit for having brought the people of Tanganyika forward with a greater sense of realities than the Congolese. With respect we doubt whether much of the credit would survive the public use of arguments in paragraph 3 of your letter. It might be accepted that the elections have returned a Council where experience of public affairs is very much the exception rather than the rule, but view would be held that Nyerere might have been expected in these circumstances to show greater powers of leadership over his less sophisticated followers.)

(b) The Secretary of State is worried also about the possible effect on the Civil Service of announcing a date before we have any experience of how the new Government will work. We hope that the recent announcement about H.M.O.C.S.② (and in due course the Salaries Commission) will put new heart into them but obviously the period in which they will require most careful nursing is at hand as the new Government and Legislature are finding their feet. If the certainty of compensation in October, 1961, is firmly fixed in their minds, how many are going even to try and make the readjustment?

(c) In this connection we also had doubts about proposing that the conference would by its terms of reference have to review “progress of the financial and administrative adjustments”. By thus playing down the transition to self-government, we see a risk of deterioration in relations between Ministers and Civil Service and of encouraging the latter to leave, since the emphasis on “adjustments” of the kind suggested gives politicians an opportunity, they may well like to take, to blame lack of progress to self-government on the Civil Service’s failure to get on with the job fast enough to suit the uninformed views of the electorate.

5. In the light of the above the furthest any statement in October could go, seems to us to be:

(a) To repeat assurance to Visiting Mission (but in the Secretary of State’s own words).
(b) Make clear H.M.G.’s sympathy to Tanganyika’s aspirations and readiness to help.
(c) Stress many important issues of policy to be determined by the new Government within the sphere of responsibility now entrusted to it; in addition there are many policy issues directly arising out of any proposed future advance which will require examination and to which Ministers will no doubt also wish to address their minds in coming months.
(d) That in these circumstances a taking stock of the position in March, 1961, would be appropriate.
(e) Secretary of State therefore will summon a constitutional conference in London in March for the purpose of advising him on the attainment by Tanganyika of self-government and of considering the steps which would have to be taken to prepare the way for independence and the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.

6. My immediately following telegram contains text of statement which might be

② See document no 87 above.
made on these lines. It is of course open to amendment within the limits indicated by Secretary of State’s view in preceding paragraphs.

7. We should be grateful for your advice whether action on these lines will be sufficient to forestall independence resolution. If it doesn’t, we may not be so distressed since, ever since the Secretary of State made his statement to the Visiting Mission, we have recognised that resolution of this kind might in any event be passed as a bargaining counter. United Nations reaction to statement may be more important and we should be grateful for United Kingdom Mission comments whether statement on lines suggested would be sufficiently positive for Fourth Committee purposes (events in Congo may have damped a little enthusiasm at United Nations for very early independence?).

8. As to letter to Nyerere, Secretary of State would be ready to write himself if it can help. There is risk, however, which he is anxious to avoid that unless ground has been thoroughly prepared correspondence will be used for horse-trading and we think it important to be much clearer about probable reactions of Nyerere and his colleagues before letter from the Secretary of State is sent. The Secretary of State feels that, in any case, any letter he sends should be shorter than your draft, e.g. it might keep to lines of proposed statement in my immediately following telegram, leaving details of self-government and matters for study to be explained by you. We imagine in any event Nyerere is certain to consult you before Legislative Council meeting and if it then appears that independence motion is likely to be moved early this might be appropriate time for opening negotiation with him by means of a letter…

150 CO 822/2300, [no 108] 22 Nov 1960
[Tanganyika: discussions with Mr Nyerere]: minute (PM(60)64) by Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan

You have probably seen that Julius Nyerere, the Chief Minister of Tanganyika, was here for a few days. He came partly to discuss what would happen at the Constitutional Conference for Tanganyika to be held in March and partly to tell me his ideas for East African federation. He is, as you know, probably the wisest and best of the African leaders that we have, at least in East and Central Africa. He believes firmly in federation for Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar and is prepared to put back Tanganyika’s independence, which is clearly not far away, to achieve this. He has been sounding African leaders in the other territories and believes they will all agree, but he doesn’t feel that a conference on federation could have much effect until they were all at the Chief Minister stage. He, of course, is already a Chief Minister; Zanzibar is just about to have one, and Uganda will probably move to one after the elections in the first quarter of next year. Kenya, of course, is unpredictable, but most people now seem to hold the view that on the whole it would be easier to move fairly swiftly to an African Chief Minister for Kenya and then to play independence along. I have not finally made up my mind on this but I rather think

1 The record of meeting with Macleod states that ‘Mr Nyerere conceded that the East African territories need not go at the same pace, but he felt that their feet should be on the same road’ (no 94, 18 Nov 1960).
that this judgment is right. For one thing, it would largely dispose of the problem of Kenyatta, who otherwise is a candidate, even in detention, for such a position.

2. Obviously federation for East Africa is a wonderful prize and I have always wanted to achieve it. I believe we can, but I am sure that we must not show ourselves too anxious now. You will remember how one incautious sentence from Oliver Lyttelton about federation in 1953 caused a furore which took years to die down and was partly responsible for the Buganda troubles at that time. Moreover, with Central Africa in mind we must not be seen to impose or be thought of as imposing federation. But if we can get the impetus for this to come from the Africans themselves—and I believe we can do this—then all will be well. This explains why the papers, very wisely and very helpfully, have been describing our position as one of "cool interest". This is the position that I am sure we must maintain, but in fact nothing would suit our plans better. Many of the problems, including the racial and tribal ones in Kenya and the troubles in Uganda, could fall into place in the wider setting of a federation.

3. Accordingly the March conference becomes more important. I am sure it would be right to hold it in Dar-es-Salaam and I would go out myself for a short time to take the chair. We would have no difficulty in agreeing (indeed Nyerere and I agreed on everything while he was here) as to what should happen in the steps for full internal self-government. We would then cover the position of independence by giving a date for independence but following it with a formula which would indicate that if plans for a federation in East Africa matured they would take precedence. This will need careful wording, as a Trust Territory to the United Nations. It is very much our showpiece there and we must not be suspected of dragging our colonial heels. If this programme works out—and I will, of course, be consulting the East African Governors on it—then it may be that in March we could start an initiative towards federation for East Africa. It would, of course, have the incidental but very important effect of adding cohesion to the movement for federation in Central Africa. . . .

2 Lyttelton was S of S for colonies, 1951–1954. In 1953, in citing the supposed virtues of the Central African Federation, he casually referred to the possibilities of a federation in East Africa; the kabaka felt he had to take a stand against this. See Goldsworthy, ed., Conservative government and end of empire, Part II, document no 294, for Cabinet conclusions of 19 Nov 1953.
(1) There is something astray in the logic of the drafting which seems to imply that had Mr. Nyerere been prepared to go ahead with Federation we would have been willing to concede independence for Tanganyika, presumably as part of a federation as early as 1961. Quite the contrary is the case and we think the point which has to be put to Sir Richard and to Mr. Nyerere is that we are now dealing with a situation de novo.

(2) It is clear that Mr. Nyerere is going to press very strongly for the 31st December 1961 and, important as Sir Patrick Renison’s points are, they will be equally valid against a date in 1962. At some stage therefore we have got to give Tanganyika its head as against Kenya (and in fact Kenya Nationalists have had Tanganyika held up to them as an example of how fast they can go if they followed Lancaster House policies). In the last issue, therefore, a difference of three months ought not to be significant one way or the other as between Mr. Nyerere and ourselves provided always we can get the necessary administrative work done within the time. A December dateline for this will run us pretty hard but we think it might just be done.

We therefore feel that we should not say flat out at the moment to Mr. Nyerere that he can not have 1961 but that we should warn him that he is unlikely to get it in the situation with which we are now confronted.

(3) There is also the question of the Premiership v. Prime Ministership. You yourself spoke to me about this this morning and hoped that we should not turn it down out of hand at this stage. The Secretary of State referred in his discussion to complications which this question would have in British Guiana, and we shall be looking further into this. In the meantime again we think we ought to warn Nyerere that it is not so simple as he thinks and as in fact the Governor (who admittedly has not been fully briefed by us on this) may have given him to think.

I submit a revised draft telegram with these points in mind.

W.B.L.M.
10.2.61

At the Secretary of State’s meeting with the department this afternoon about the policy for Tanganyika’s independence, Federation, and the future of the East Africa High Commission, he indicated that he would wish to send immediately to Sir R. Turnbull a telegram stating his views on (1) the timing for independence and (2) the title of “Prime Minister” or “Premier”. He said that on the former point the telegram should be somewhat “truculent”, although less so on the latter. It was also our understanding that he wished to send this telegram immediately, and not to defer it until the paper, now in preparation on the general policy, has been discussed by the C.P.C.

2. It is our understanding that this telegram is, however, only the first round in carrying out the staged argument with Mr. Nyerere, through the Governor, on which the S. of S. decided at the meeting. The first stage is to insist on both the March 1962 date and the title “Premier”. If however Nyerere resists on either or both of these

---

1 Sir J Martin wrote in the margin here: ‘I don’t altogether agree. (It is not just a question of 3 months, but of the year 1961 as against the year 1962)’.

2 Sir J Martin commented here: ‘I think this shows the red light clearly enough for the moment. J.M.M. 10.2.61’.
points, then, at the second stage, we are to fall back on the concession of title “Prime Minister” on the understanding that Nyerere does not press for the 1961 date. If thereafter it appears that Nyerere will be really in extreme difficulties, with consequential disorders, etc., in Tanganyika, we are to fall back on the third stage, which is to try to reverse the concession so as to give way on the 1961 date, but to continue to insist on the title “Premier”. If, finally, this will not work, for the reasons indicated above, then we have to go, at the fourth stage (absit omen) to conceding both the 1961 date and the title of Premier...  

J.C.M.  
7.3.61

The thinking, as I understand it, of the S. of S. on the subject of the title of “Prime Minister” at the self-government stage in Tanganyika, is revealed in my minute of 20th February, which records the attitude adopted by the S. of S. at his meeting on that date. Briefly, the S. of S. is not prepared to make an ultimate sticking point of either the date for Tanganyika’s independence or the title of “Prime Minister”; but he could, according to circumstances, use either of these points as a bargaining counter for gaining the other. On the whole it is more important, although not vital, to get Nyerere to agree to March 1962 as independence date rather than to get him to agree to the title of “Premier”. Thus, if the S. of S. continues to argue for the title of “Premier”, he may at the end be able to “bargain” “Prime Minister” for the later date for independence.

2. We have not heretofore revealed any of this reasoning to Sir R. Turnbull, but have set out the open arguments by analogy which are contained in Mr. Monson’s letter at No. 130 (to which Sir R. Turnbull refers) and in the telegrams Nos. 131 and 136. It would of course be possible now to reveal this tactical reasoning to Sir R. Turnbull, but I am strongly inclined to think that it would be unwise to do so. I therefore suggest that the S. of S. should reply in “non-committal terms” as in the draft herewith, without arguing any further at this stage, but with the intention of letting Mr. Nyerere know that the matter will be discussed with him privately before it has to come up in open Conference (if at all). So draft herewith.

J.C.M.  
7.3.61

I agree with Mr. Morgan that we should not reveal our tactics to Sir Richard Turnbull at this stage otherwise we are liable to find him “upping” the title of Prime Minister!

2. I am rather surprised after our correspondence previously to see Sir Richard Turnbull discounting so heavily the British Guiana arguments and the arguments as regards possible repercussions in Kenya and Uganda of the adoption of the title of Prime Minister at the next stage. It is very much for consideration whether we should pursue these matters further with him in correspondence, but if it is thought worth while it might be done as in my m.s. addition to the draft opposite. This is deliberately pursuing the tone of “truculence” which we adopted at an earlier stage.

3. On the other hand I would myself discount heavily the argument which he himself adduces at A/ on page 3 of his letter. I have confirmed with Mr. Rogers that already in preliminary correspondence we seem to have successfully cleared up all the points on which Tanganyika Ministers might want hard bargaining with us at the Conference. (This is not to say that we shall not have hard bargaining there, but it
will be with the European Civil Service Association, whose attitude is not likely to be
affected in the slightest degree by the grant of the title of Prime Minister to Mr.
Nyerere).

4. Sir Richard Turnbull has a point that we did not comment or criticize the use
of the term in correspondence at an earlier stage. For this oversight I must take the
blame.

W.B.L.M.
7.3.61

Secretary of State

... With reference to [the penultimate sentence in para 2] in Mr. Monson’s minute
I think it would be better not to argue the point further with Sir Richard Turnbull
now. It seems pretty clear that you will in fact have to concede the title “Prime
Minister” though it will be for decision at Dar-es-Salaam at what point this
concession can most profitably be traded in. I would therefore omit Mr. Monson’s
manuscript addition to the draft and limit it to the first (type-written) paragraph.

It is however for consideration whether it might not be well to comment on Sir
Richard Turnbull’s apparent acceptance of the view that the prospect of federation
has fallen away. It might be worth while adding to the reply sentences as follows—

I hope that in referring to the prospect of federation as falling away, you do not mean
that you think we should abandon the idea of working back to federation after
independence. It may be that the opportunity has been lost, but I still feel that an
ultimate federation of the three East African territories is a great prize which we should
not lightly abandon.

J.M.M.
7.3.61

152 CO 822/2301, no 127
11 Feb 1961
[Tanganyika: advance in date of independence]: telegram (no 67) from
Mr Macleod to Sir R Turnbull about the alarm felt by Sir P Renison
(Kenya)

I very much appreciate the grounds for anxiety which Renison has expressed.1

2. My discussions with Nyerere in London were on the basis of a programme
whereby Tanganyika would proceed to independence within an East African
Federation and would only reach independence when the Federation became
independent as a whole, though within the Federation it would proceed as quickly as
possible to the widest measure of regional independence which we could devise.

3. The proposals which are now being discussed would bring Tanganyika to
independence on its own and at a rate faster than had been contemplated even for
regional independence within a Federation. This is a new situation which H.M.G. will
have to consider and in that consideration they will not only have to take into
account the programme of legislation etc., referred to in the second sentence of

1 See no 123 on this file: tel to S of S from gov of Kenya (tel 131), expressing alarm about advance of
Tanganyika date into 1961, when Mar 1962 ‘was had enough’.
paragraph (f) of your note of your meeting of 6th February with Nyerere but also
satisfy themselves that the date ultimately negotiated will not be detrimental to their
responsibilities in other parts of East Africa. I do not want Nyerere to be under any
illusion that against this background it is going to be a quick and easy matter for him
to pocket a date in 1961 for independence and I should like you to tell him from me
that, though I am considering the changed situation as rapidly as I can I do not think
that I will find it justifiable to proceed as rapidly during 1961 as he has in mind.

4. I should like you to warn him at the same time that I attach greater
importance to the title of Prime Minister than he appears to do. I should find it very
difficult to establish a precedent in East Africa for moving directly from Chief
Minister to Prime Minister status and, if Nyerere argues that this is an unimportant
step that argument can be turned round the other way as a reason for not taking it.

5. I hope to be communicating with you and the other Governors further within
a week or so but am most anxious that you should take holding action indicated
above in the meantime.

153 CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)5 27 Feb 1961
‘Independence of Tanganyika’: Cabinet memorandum (C(61)32) by
Mr Macleod

In “Colonial Problems in 1961” (CPC(61) 1)\(^1\) I surveyed the situation in East Africa
and the Committee agreed (CPC(61) 1st Meeting) to resume discussion in the light
of my discussions with the East African Governors.

2. This paper deals mainly with Tanganyika. (I shall be presiding over a
constitutional conference in Dar-es-Salaam towards the end of March).

**East African Federation**

3. At the conference in January the Governors agreed that the aim of policy
should be the establishment of an East African Federation.\(^2\) There were two
important qualifications: (a) it would be essential to ensure that the territories enter
Federation as a result of the freely expressed desire of the inhabitants, in order to
avoid any accusation that Federation had been imposed in the interests of the United
Kingdom; (b) the aim to establish a Federation should not prejudice the possibility of
establishing stable government, particularly in Kenya, and of solving certain special
problems with which that country is faced.

4. When advocating Federation Mr. Nyerere had expressed the view that if the
countries deferred coming together until after they had severally gained their
independence the chance of Federation would probably be lost. Therefore, his
argument was, they must move to Federation and independence at one and the same
time. Since Tanganyika could already look forward to independence in the very near
future, the other territories (Kenya in particular) should be brought rapidly to a
stage of constitutional development roughly (not necessarily precisely) corres-
ponding to the stage that Tanganyika had now reached. He knew that Kenya and
Uganda were following somewhat behind Tanganyika and, for the sake of securing

\(^1\) See document nos 36 & 37 above.  
\(^2\) See document no 126.
the prize of Federation, he was ready to defer the date of Tanganyika's independence. I am certain that in speaking of such deferment he did not envisage more than a short delay.

5. I have not been able to give Mr. Nyerere any assurances about the possibility of further constitutional advance in Kenya or Uganda. Even when I am taking the Tanganyika constitutional conference, the new Kenya Government will barely have been in office and the Uganda elections will still be ahead of us. In these circumstances the Governors and I had hoped that it might be possible to bring about agreement at the Tanganyika conference as follows:

(a) Implementation by mid-May 1961, of full internal self-government for Tanganyika.
(b) A statement, the purpose of which would be to set a notional date for Tanganyika's independence, subject to its possibly having to be adjusted if in the light of subsequent events it should prove practicable to lay definite plans for an East African Federation.

6. While the Governor of Kenya could naturally not commit himself about the immediate future in Kenya, our hope was that it might prove possible for there to be, perhaps before the end of the year, a conference of all concerned to discuss the possibility of a Federation. If the conference proved abortive, we should inevitably have to set forthwith a date for Tanganyika's independence.

7. Since my discussions with the Governors I have had further talks with Mr. Nyerere. He is quite certain that a date for Tanganyika's independence must be set at the March conference and he now insists that it must be before the end of 1961. He is also disheartened at the apparent failure of African leadership in the neighbouring territories—in Kenya in particular. He does not necessarily rule out ultimate Federation but he feels that it is no longer for him to go on taking the initiative. He has told the Governor that he would like Tanganyika to remain in the East Africa High Commission after its independence. This would preserve links which could help the later establishment of a Federation. I think he fully understands that, certainly at this juncture and possibly for some time, it may not be possible for H.M.G. to make forward moves in Kenya, still less in Uganda, of a nature that would make him reasonably certain that there could be a general East African preliminary conference during this year.

8. I think we must accept this and we, therefore, now have to consider (1) our future policy for Tanganyika itself and (on the assumption that before Tanganyika is independent it will not have proved possible for any definite steps to be taken in relation to Federation); (2) the relationship of an independent Tanganyika with Kenya and Uganda through the East African High Commission.

Policy in Tanganyika

9. The next move in Tanganyika is the introduction of internal self-government. Mr. Nyerere has asked for the arrangements to be completed in April; there are important local reasons connected with the budget session of the Legislative Council for meeting him, and I propose to accept that date.

10. Mr. Nyerere has asked that with the introduction of internal self-government the post of leader of the Government should be designated “Prime Minister”. There are some objections to this and although I don't intend to make a major issue of it, I hope to persuade him to accept “Premier”.
Date of independence

11. Mr. Nyerere is insisting on independence before the end of this year. If it were not for the very great difficulties arising over the future of the East Africa High Commission, it is just possible that all the administrative and legislative arrangements could be completed by the 31st December. But these difficulties do exist and cannot be ignored. Moreover, I cannot ignore the effect on Kenya and Uganda if a date were fixed at the March conference for independence in 1961. In Kenya in particular, until the new Government is well into the saddle, firmly capable of maintaining law and order and with the tide of confidence turning, it is vital to do nothing to encourage the expectation of early further constitutional advance. Since the Kenya African National Union are themselves pressing for independence in 1961, a decision in this sense for Tanganyika would clearly give such encouragement. Therefore, I am sure that I must try very hard to secure agreement to a date early in 1962. Indeed, if it became clear that by insisting on this date there was no chance of reaching agreement in Tanganyika, where I am sure we must not at this stage impose a solution, we should have to consider bringing the date forward say to the 31st December, 1961. We shall have to get a resolution terminating the Trusteeship Agreement passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which will be in session at the time of the conference and just after. Provided Mr. Nyerere is satisfied, I do not foresee undue difficulty in getting their agreement to either date. I believe the decisive argument should be its effect on Nyerere’s own position. His continuance in power is vital to us in East Africa, and if independence by the end of December 1961 is essential to maintain his position I am sure we should agree. I should add that the Governor believes the 1961 date to be essential, but I wish to confirm this for myself.

Relationship of an independent Tanganyika with the East Africa High Commission

12. If Tanganyika is to become independent by the spring of 1962 or earlier, we have to consider the future of the East Africa High Commission and of the Common Market in East Africa. The present structure is described in the Appendix.\(^3\)

13. Mr. Nyerere has told the Governor that he wishes Tanganyika to remain in the High Commission structure including the Central Legislative Assembly and that he regards the maintenance of the Common Market as vital. He foresees this as a means of keeping in existence inter-territorial co-operation which could provide the basis on which Federation could later be constructed. Insofar as we regard the establishment of Federation as being in the interests of H.M.G. and of the East African territories, we should try to meet him on this. Unfortunately it is impracticable to secure the result Mr. Nyerere wishes by a simple maintenance of the status quo. The High Commission is a “colonial” institution subordinated to Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. This is reflected in the provisions of the High Commission Order in Council under which (a) the High Commission is required to observe instructions given by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State, (b) the High Commission has reserved legislative powers, (c) the Crown acting through a Secretary of State can disallow High Commission laws, and (d) High Commission laws prevail over territorial laws and may amend or suspend them. Further, the High Commission is constituted for all three territories by Order in Council; after independence it would probably not be appropriate for Her Majesty in Council to have legislative powers over Tanganyika.

\(^3\) Not printed.
14. We have, therefore, to devise a solution which is practicable, which preserves the substance of the existing arrangements as far as possible which does not prejudice the discharge of our responsibilities for Uganda and Kenya while they are still under our control, and which at the same time will be defensible in the United Nations as not derogating from the sovereignty of Tanganyika. The United Nations is likely to be suspicious on this question and we may face difficulties.

15. There are only two practicable solutions. The first would provide for the High Commission to remain for Kenya and Uganda only, and for Tanganyika to use its services on an agency basis. We may have to fall back on this. The main disadvantages are that in practice it is likely to be difficult to reach a satisfactory agreement about the costs to be borne by Tanganyika and we should have to introduce immediately a compensation scheme for any members of the staff who did not wish to continue to serve in Tanganyika and who could not be absorbed in Kenya and Uganda. The second alternative, which I at present favour, is that a new joint organisation should be established by Agreement between Kenya and Uganda (acting with the authority of H.M.G. in the U.K.) on the one hand and independent Tanganyika on the other. This solution also has its difficulties, particularly as to reconciling my responsibility towards the staff of the present E.A.H.C. with a scheme likely to be acceptable to the United Nations. I am now consulting the East African Governors, the Administrator of the E.A.H.C. and the U.K. Mission to the United Nations on this scheme, and cannot formulate a final view until I receive their advice.

16. I invite my colleagues to agree that at the March Conference I should agree that Tanganyika will become independent not later than the spring of 1962; and to take note of the lines on which I am trying to work out a solution to the problem of the future relationship between independent Tanganyika and a regional organisation akin to the East Africa High Commission.4

---

4 This paper was discussed by the Cabinet on 7 Mar 1961 and the proposals approved (CAB 128/35/1, CC 11(61)7).

154 CO 822/2301, no 138 2 Mar 1961
[Tanganyika: title of prime minister]: letter from Sir R Turnbull to Mr Macleod

I hope you will forgive me for addressing you upon a subject which I know you will wish to regard as closed; I refer to the title by which the Chief Minister should be known when we enter into the period of Internal Self-Government.

In spite of the view you have so clearly expressed in your recent telegram,1 I feel it my duty to report to you once again the misgivings I feel at the course of action that is proposed.

May I again set out the arguments I have used in favour of the adoption of the title “Prime Minister” rather than “Premier”. For the past year or more it has been taken for granted by the public, the Ministers, the Civil Service and myself, that “Prime Minister” would be the title used at the stage of Internal Self-Government. I have used the term in conversation with the Chief Minister and in correspondence with

---

1 This paper was discussed by the Cabinet on 7 Mar 1961 and the proposals approved (CAB 128/35/1, CC 11(61)7).

1 See document no 152.
him and other Ministers, and, without comment or criticism, in correspondence with the Colonial Office. The Permanent Secretaries and others who are engaged upon the reconstruction of the Ministries necessary for the next constitutional move all employ the term “Prime Minister”, and in the working papers relevant to the changes, the expression “Prime Minister’s Office” constantly occurs. The term appears in both the English press and the vernacular press when constitutional changes are being discussed; and I myself have not hesitated during the past twelve months to employ it in both public and semi-public utterances concerning the changes which will be introduced in the next constitutional phase.

I agree that had there been a prospect of the East African territories moving into Federation, it might well have proved embarrassing for Tanganyika to have had a Prime Minister on entering into Self-Government, for when the other territories reached that particular point in their constitutional progress, they, too, would have demanded Prime Ministers, and we might have reached the ridiculous position in which there were four, or even five, such appointments within a single constitutional framework. But surely, when the prospect of Federation falls away, so, too, does the objection to “Prime Minister”. I have examined the argument set out by Monson in his letter of the 17th February, but it seems to me that the case against having a Prime Minister for British Guiana rested largely upon the hope that later, and in any case before final independence, British Guiana might join the Caribbean federation.

What causes me concern is this: the whole country—the people, the politicians, the Civil Service and the press—are keyed up to expect an announcement that when we enter the next constitutional stage the Chief Minister will become the Prime Minister; and an insistence upon the title of “Premier” rather than “Prime Minister” will inevitably arouse widespread disappointment and dismay, and will provide the opponents of the Government (particularly the Communist-supported African National Congress) with an excellent opportunity to declare that Nyerere had been the dupe of a Colonialist trick, and that the imposition of the title of “Premier” rather than “Prime Minister” means that full Self-Government has not in fact been achieved. Sensible men will be unaffected; nevertheless, an atmosphere of suspicion will be created, and, although I do not suggest that the Conference would founder on this point, the hard bargaining which faces us, especially in regard to Civil Service matters, would become correspondingly more difficult. I accept that the demand that the Chief Minister should become a Prime Minister rather than a Premier is largely an emotional one and that the Ghana precedent may be one you do not wish to follow; but Africa is an emotional country and Ghana is regarded by every African as having set the perfect pattern for constitutional development. If I thought there were any prospect of our seriously embarrassing Kenya and Uganda by our using the term “Prime Minister” in what is, after all, the ultimate stage in our move to independence, I would be less importunate; but, as things are, I remain of the view that by requiring Nyerere to call himself Premier, we should be importing into the March Conference an unfortunate and avoidable possibility of discord.

2 Macleod replied that since Nyerere was being ‘non-committal’, ‘you will not expect me not to be equally non-committal at this stage’—he would discuss on arrival in Dar-es-Salaam. He added: ‘I hope that in referring to the prospect of federation as falling away you do not mean that you think we should abandon the idea of working back to federation after independence. It may be that the opportunity has been lost, but I still feel that an ultimate federation of the three East African territories is a great prize which we should not lightly abandon’ (no 139, 8 Mar. 1961).
[Future of the Tanganyika battalions of King’s African Rifles in relation to independence]: letter from W B L Monson (CO) to Sir R Turnbull

One of the subjects to be mentioned at the Constitutional Conference, in relation to the further stage of independence, is the future of the Tanganyika battalions of the King’s African Rifles. We understand that Nyerere has said that he may not wish to maintain an Army after independence, and will be prepared to rely for internal security, and presumably local defence, on the police (possibly augmented by a gendarmerie recruited from the present K.A.R.). We also are aware of the strong feeling when EALFO\(^1\) ran the force that Tanganyika was not getting value for money in respect of its military contribution, and that it would be more economical to replace the K.A.R. with Armed police units.

2. We have given this question a good deal of thought and have come to the conclusion that it would be very unwise, to put it mildly, for Tanganyika to embark on independence without an Army. In the first place, there will be a continuing requirement for a military force to support the police in internal security situations, and the psychological value of “calling in the military” is far greater than merely bringing in an additional armed police unit. Secondly, the situation in the Congo (and possibly Ruanda Urundi) is such that Tanganyika must expect to have at least for some years a threat of armed incursions from that quarter mounted by military forces, which can only be successfully resisted by her own military forces. Looking further ahead one cannot ignore the possibility of serious disorders in Portuguese East Africa which might well have repercussions across the border. We have found in similar circumstances in the Southern Cameroons that a military force is essential to deal with such problems. Finally, if Tanganyika is to play the important role in African affairs that its size and population warrant, it will require to have the resources of a small and efficient Army at its disposal. There is no other Commonwealth country, and probably no other independent country in the world, which has found it possible to dispense with an Army and we feel that Tanganyika will be making a grave mistake if they give up the K.A.R. for reasons of economy. From the U.K. point of view (and I believe this would go for all other members of the Commonwealth) a Commonwealth member which could not defend itself with military forces would be something of an anomaly. We think therefore that when this matter is touched on at the Constitutional Conference the Secretary of State should urge the Tanganyika Government to retain the K.A.R. as a military force and should make proposals to this end.

3. We have considered, in consultation with the War Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office, the implications of such a decision, and I enclose a paper\(^2\) (in a form of a draft brief for the Secretary of State) which sets out our agreed view. We shall be grateful for your comments and the comments of the G.O.C. on this paper. It does not claim to be more than a very brief outline of the problem; if its general lines are agreed at the Conference we envisage that East Africa Command

---

\(^1\) East Africa Land Forces Organisation, which consisted of the ministers i/c defence in the three territories.
\(^2\) Not printed.
will have to prepare a detailed plan, possibly in consultation with a joint Working Party from the War Office and the Colonial Office for further discussion with Tanganyika Ministers. We therefore intend that the Conference should not get involved in details at this stage. We also hope that the financial implications can be left for inclusion in any general financial settlement. Meanwhile we hope that you will feel able to speak to Nyerere about the importance of keeping an Army and the need for a detailed examination of the problem. . . .

156  CO 822/2218, nos 119 & 122  1 Aug 1961
[Financial assistance to Tanganyika]: letter from Mr Macleod to Mr Selwyn Lloyd (Exchequer).  Minutes by W L Gorell Barnes (CO) and Mr Sandys (CRO)

[In Mar 1961 the government announced that Tanganyika would become independent in Dec 1961 after seven months of internal self-government, during which Nyerere was the first prime minister. In June 1961 the National Assembly declared its desire for Tanganyika to become a member of the Commonwealth. However, the Tanganyika government was so dissatisfied with the proposed financial assistance after independence that it threatened to withhold co-operation over Colonial Service compensations. Macleod argued that this would have ‘very serious’ consequences: amounting to ‘a complete breakdown of our policy in East Africa and very probably to the loss of our influence in this area to the Iron Curtain countries’. He did not like blackmail, but thought that the British government could at least meet them by letting Tanganyika draw both the £5 million development loan offered and the balance of their CD & W allocation up to mid-1964 (£4.75 million); and by giving some help on service compensation. Reasonable generosity, he argued, was essential: the House of Commons clearly felt ‘it would be a tragedy if we lost the friendship of the one territory in East and Central Africa whose progress towards independence has been smooth and peaceful’. So a substantial contribution to the financing of Tanganyika’s development plan ought to be made (CO 822/2218, no 106, minute to chancellor of the Exchequer, 27 July 1961). The Cabinet accepted the substance of these arguments. Turnbull was ‘profoundly grateful’ to Macleod and Perth for the risks they had been prepared to take, and ‘for proving such bonny fechters1 on our behalf’ (CO 822/2219, no 116, tel to Macleod, 16 Aug 1961).

With further reference to my Minute of 27th July, Edward Boyle2 will have told you that it was finally decided that the Governor should come to London. He has now arrived, and I have been consulting with him.

2. Sir Richard Turnbull reports very gloomily. He is convinced that unless the Tanganyika Ministers are given their “minimum” terms or something equivalent to them, they will reject our offer of aid and repudiate all the agreements they have made with us about the Overseas Service. If this happens the Service will leave en bloc and we shall certainly be faced with a breakdown of administration and indeed of law and order. Nor will the consequences be confined to Tanganyika. What line the Tanganyika Government would in such circumstances take about the arrangements for inter-territorial co-operation in East Africa which we were so happy to secure a few weeks ago, I do not know. But certainly the repercussions in the other two territories of the events which would follow in Tanganyika would be very severe and we might well be faced with the same situation in those two territories. If that happened then our East African policy would be in ruins and in one way or another the cost to the Exchequer would be very large indeed.

3. I am afraid that we have to deal here with a situation in which resentment at what Nyerere considered the smallness of our offer produced emotional and pathological consequences in his mind and in those of his Ministers and resulted in a state of mind which does not respond to reason and amounts to a very dangerous degree of incipient antagonism.

4. Time too is not on our side: Sir Richard Turnbull tells me that the delay in any announcement and the rumours which are current have led to this rising feeling of resentment and suspicion spreading from the Government outwards towards the public in Dar-es-Salaam. He believes that if we do not do enough to reverse this trend within the next few days it will be too late. The Opposition are putting down an official motion and will no doubt raise it in tonight’s debate.

5. As Edward Boyle knows, Vasey has been doing his best to put our offer in a favourable light to Nyerere but has met with no success. I have seen a letter which Nyerere wrote to Vasey and in which he made use of the most bitter expressions relating to what he evidently regards as extreme meanness on the part of H.M.G. and has made the particular points that our present “poverty” cannot be compared with the real poverty of Tanganyika (average national income of £19 per head), and to the glaring contrast which exists in Tanganyika itself between the living standards of the African population and those of the expatriates, particularly the Civil Servants for whom they consider so much is being done.

6. In these circumstances I am afraid that the proposal which I put to you in my earlier minute will not be enough and that we shall have to give much more in grant than we had previously contemplated. If you can agree to the balance of the C.D. & W. money all being paid within the current C.D. & W. period—i.e. by the middle of 1964, we can take credit for about £1m. from this. I am sure however that we must meet Nyerere’s figure of an additional grant £5m. by providing £4m. over and above this. To offset this in some degree I would propose that the Commonwealth Assistance loan should be offered only as something we should make available if it is necessary for the fulfilment of the Tanganyika Government’s development plan of £8 million per annum over the next three years and that the maximum should be reduced from £5m. to £4m.—but of course all drawable over the next three years if it is in fact required.

7. I realise that this is a formidable proposal to put before you in the present circumstances and I would not be putting it if I were not convinced that failing to act along these lines would have the disastrous consequences I have indicated above.

8. If you accept these proposals the effect will be to increase the grant money by £4m. beyond what was originally provided for in our earmarkings of C.D. & W. money and in the figures on which our current “ceilings” are based. In present circumstances I must do everything I can to help and therefore I am prepared to contribute £2m. from the exiguous unearmarked C.D. & W. reserves still remaining to me. Taking account of the proposals I have put forward for Kenya Land Settlement and for interim schemes for the small islands in The West Indies (two expenditures which certainly cannot be avoided) this would leave me with only £1½m. in the unearmarked reserves which have to last until March, 1963. With all the problems that are likely to face me over the coming months this is to take a very big risk. But in view of the high stakes I feel I must take it and I shall do my best to avoid having to come to you again: indeed I would not do so save in an emergency as serious as the present one.
9. Even so I am afraid that there is still a gap of £2m. and I feel I have no alternative but to ask that that be provided by newly voted monies. As against this we are of course saving £750,000 a year as from March next in respect of the cost of Tanganyika’s share of the East African forces and under the new proposals the Exchequer will get back approximately £264,000 a year (at current rates) in respect of the £3m. loan for commutation of pensions instead of nothing under our original proposals. Further, there is the possibility that we may save some part of the Commonwealth Assistance loan for the Tanganyika Development plan through the attempt to treat it as money of last resort. . . .

Minutes on 156

I must say that I still think that a £4m. parting present taking account of, but not related to, various items—e.g. military, diplomatic, subscriptions, etc. would in some ways (notably creation of precedents) be easier for the Treasury as well as for us. And there is the Sierra Leone precedent for such an approach to the problem. W.L.G.B.

31.7.61

The Minister of State, Sir Richard Turnbull and I went over to the Treasury this morning to discuss with Sir Edward Boyle and Mr. Taylor the Secretary of State’s minute of this morning to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sir Edward Boyle had not actually seen the minute and we started by giving him a copy to read.

2. At the Minister of State’s request Sir Richard Turnbull described the atmosphere in Dar-es-Salaam and the psychological causes of it.

3. The Minister of State said, that, whilst we were convinced that we now had to do more than was strictly arithmetically necessary and to do a lot of it in grant form, we had constructed our proposals in such a way as to give the Tanganyikans an incentive, if the Americans and Germans came forward in proper fashion, not to draw more of our loan money than was absolutely necessary. He said that, if the plan now proposed was agreed, he proposed that a message should at once be sent to the American and German Governments telling them what we had had to do and why and saying that we relied upon them not to take advantage of the size of our offer but to do as much as possible themselves and so render it unnecessary for us to put up our loan money.

4. Mr. Taylor pointed out that if our proposals were accepted, this would be a breach of the ceiling on overseas aid which the Chancellor was trying to establish. We admitted this but pointed out that, if we had been allowed to make the offer we had originally proposed and which we believe would have been accepted at that time, this would have involved no breach in the ceiling. Mr. Taylor was inclined to question this.

5. Mr. Taylor also tried to argue that the full £4m. of additional grant could technically only come from C.D. & W. funds. I said that this was not correct. Our

---

2 Macmillan telephoned Macleod to say he supported him on this and had notified the chancellor accordingly.
3 See document no 107.
4 A W Taylor, under-secretary at Treasury since 1957.
£6.75m. would no doubt be drawn on first and then, if what we proposed was agreed, the C.R.O. would later on need to take a Vote in respect of the remaining £2m.

6. Sir Edward Boyle clearly understood the nature and causes of the African reaction to our offer. He said that what was worrying him was whether we were in fact strong enough to play the sort of role which Africans in former Colonial territories seemed to expect us to play and whether we should not rather have to insist on sharing that role with other Western powers. I said that I was sure that we should have to adopt a consortium approach to emerging and newly independent countries in Africa and indeed elsewhere as quickly as we could. We had already more or less succeeded in getting on to this basis with the Canadians and Americans in The West Indies. The Minister of State had been working very hard to sell the idea to the Germans and we were in constant touch with the Americans. There were difficulties. In the Colonial period other powers were loath to help on any considerable scale and we on our side had to hold back on one or two key points to avoid our authority being undermined. Against this background the difficulty was to get the other Western powers sufficiently involved before independence discussions actually took place. After independence it was much easier, and in this particular case of Tanganyika I thought we would have succeeded in establishing a firm consortium approach before independence if we had been a little more lucky. We certainly tried to do so.

7. The Minister of State in reply to a question from Sir Edward Boyle said that what we did would no doubt have some bearing on what we afterwards had to do for other East African territories just as the size of our present aid to Kenya and the recent £5m. grant to Nigeria had been factors in influencing the Tanganyikan reaction to our original offer. He was determined however that we should press on as hard as we could with developing a consortium approach to these problems and he certainly hoped that it would be possible to adopt this approach in the final settlement with The West Indies.

8. Sir Edward Boyle said that he could not of course give an answer to the Secretary of State’s proposal this morning. Indeed it was a matter which raised questions of the highest policy concerning on the one hand our policy in Africa and on the other hand our ability to place some limit on our overseas aid expenditure. He would report the discussion to the Chancellor and in particular explain to him the emotional factors involved.

W.L.G.B.
1.8.61

I have seen the Colonial Secretary’s two Minutes of 27th July and 1st August.

2. We must obviously do our utmost to ensure that Tanganyika achieves independence in a spirit friendly to the West. A well-disposed Nyerere could play the same moderating role in East Africa as Abubakar in West Africa. Ill-disposed, he could become an East African Nkrumah, the more dangerous in that we have continuing responsibilities for Tanganyika’s immediate neighbours. It will besides be most damaging to our standing in Africa and elsewhere if we have to admit a moral defeat in a territory which has been regarded as a pattern for orderly and rapid development towards independence within the Commonwealth.

3. I very much hope therefore that you [the Chancellor] will be able to approve the Colonial Secretary’s proposals.

D.S.
1.8.61
The first African elections in Kenya took place in March 1957, but deadlock ensued when the African minister on the Council of Ministers was defeated, and none of the eight newly elected members to the Legislative Council was prepared to accept office. After Mr Lennox-Boyd had held talks in Nairobi without reaching agreement, constitutional changes were inevitable. These came into force in April 1958: the number of African elected members of the Legislative Council was increased from eight to fourteen, 'specially elected' seats were introduced, and a new Council of State set up, designed to protect communities from harmful discriminatory legislation.

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (57) 35) about the method of nominating candidates for election to inter-communal seats in the Kenya Legislative Council and the composition, functions and powers of the new Council of State for Kenya.

The Colonial Secretary recalled that the Cabinet had endorsed his proposals for constitutional change in Kenya, which included the creation of twelve inter-communal seats to be filled in equal proportions between the three races through election by the whole Legislative Council, but had asked that the Colonial Policy Committee should consider his detailed proposals for the nomination of candidates for election to these seats, and also for the composition, functions and powers of the Council of State which would, amongst other things, be responsible for approving any alteration in the total number of inter-communal seats or in the method of filling them (though the proportion between the races would remain fixed for ten years).

As regards the nomination of candidates for the inter-communal seats the possibility had been considered and rejected of requiring a measure of racial support for nominations, since this would tend to work against the nomination of moderate Africans, and also of allowing official members of the Legislative Assembly to take part in this process, although it would be both proper and desirable that these members should be allowed to vote at the electoral stage. It was proposed therefore that candidates should be nominated by five members of the Legislative Council who were not Government officials, and that there should be no requirement of support by a minimum number of members of the race concerned. At the moment African candidates for communal seats had to comply with fairly high qualifications related to the highly selective roll upon which they were elected. Qualifications for candidates of other races were less exacting. To adopt existing racial qualifications for candidates for the inter-communal seats would be held to perpetuate discrimination between the races. He therefore proposed to require only a simple literacy test together with the age limit of twenty-five years in force for African elected members, relying on the method of nomination and election to ensure that suitable candidates were in fact put forward.

The Council of State, which would be essentially a political rather than a judicial body, would have to consider whether or not a measure differentiated against any one race in the light of the definition appended to C.P.C. (57) 35. But though it would be given powers of delay, their duration would be limited to twelve months, and the final decision on proposed legislation would rest with Her Majesty acting on the advice of the Colonial Secretary. It would be important that the Council's
composition should not be based in any way on sectional representation and it was proposed therefore that appointments to it should be made by the Governor. Since the Council of State would not form a standing second chamber in constant session, there should be no serious difficulty in building up a suitable membership.

In discussion there was general agreement with these proposals. It was however suggested that it would be advantageous to work towards the removal of the differential qualifications required for African candidates generally for the Legislative Council and the Colonial Secretary undertook to consider the possibility of having a uniform age of twenty-one years for election to both communal and inter-communal seats. It was also suggested that a somewhat shorter definition of a differentiating measure might be appropriate.

In discussion of the general question of the future of the multi-racial society in Kenya the following points were made:—

(a) Continuance of a system of communal representation alone was bound to involve further pressure for additional African seats and so to the swamping of European interests by the mass African vote. The present plan aimed to channel African racial aspirations into a system of parity between the races, and might lead ultimately to the creation of a common roll with votes cast for candidates of all three races on the lines now being tried out in Tanganyika. Such a system must depend for its success on the creation of moderate African opinion based on a solid economic stake in the country, and the ten year period of parity between the races represented in the new inter-communal seats should provide an opportunity for this.

(b) Although to start with the European element might be expected to have the dominant voice in elections to the intercommunal seats, this would not necessarily remain the case as more seats on the Government side came to be filled by Africans.

(c) It would be valuable if the Committee could have a further discussion of this general topic with a view possibly to formulating a statement of policy on the future of Colonial territories for presentation to the Government’s supporters. . . .

158 CAB 128/33, CC 33(59)4 4 June 1959
[Kenya: events at Hola detention camp for Mau Mau detainees]:
Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs (C. (59) 92) on the events leading up to the death by violence on 3rd March of 11 Mau Mau prisoners detained in the Hola Camp in Kenya.

The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs said that on that date 85 prisoners had been taken out of the camp under escort to work on digging a trench. On their refusal to work they had been beaten by warders, with the result that 11 had been killed and 23 seriously injured. As part of the process of rehabilitating the prisoners in this camp, a senior superintendent in the Kenya Prison Service, Mr. Cowan, had

1 Lord Perth.
drawn up a plan which “assumed that the party of detainees would obey the order to go to work but, should they refuse to work, they would be manhandled to the site of work and forced to carry out the task.” This plan had been approved by the Kenya Minister of Defence, without reference to the Governor, but it had not been seen by Mr. Sullivan, the Camp Commandant who was to be responsible for putting the plan into effect. The use of force to compel detainees to work was illegal, but the Kenya Government maintained that Mr. Cowan’s plan must be read in conjunction with the Prison Standing Orders and Ordinances, which made it clear that men could not be forcibly made to work by beating them. There was no evidence that the oral instructions given by Mr. Cowan to Mr. Sullivan contemplated the beating of the detainees. Moreover, Mr. Sullivan had disobeyed his instructions in failing to inform the detainees in advance that they were to be put to work and in taking them to the site of work in a single large party instead of a number of small groups. It was also open to question whether the orders on the use of force which he had given to the warders in charge of the party were within the law. A senior examining magistrate had conducted a full enquiry into the incident and had found that some of the force used was illegal. But the surviving detainees had refused to give evidence and the magistrate, whose findings had subsequently been accepted by the Attorney-General of Kenya, had concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to justify the prosecution of Mr. Sullivan or any of the prison officers under his orders. The Kenya Government had instituted disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Sullivan and his assistant, the findings of which would be published as soon as they became available towards the end of the present month. A strong independent committee had also been appointed to advise on the future administration of the detention camps; and the Kenya Government were considering whether an enquiry should also be held into the incidence of scurvy in the camps, which the medical evidence suggested might have contributed to the deaths of the 11 detainees. Meanwhile, the Opposition had tabled a Motion of Censure on the Government, and it was known that it was their intention, when this was debated, to press especially the argument that the Kenya Government had authorised the use of illegal force.

In discussion it was recognised that a distinction must be drawn between the responsibility of Mr. Sullivan and his subordinates and that of the senior officers of the Kenya Prison Service and the Kenya Government itself.

On the first point, discussion showed that the preponderant opinion in the Cabinet was that the available evidence was insufficient to justify the institution of criminal proceedings against individuals, and that no further enquiry instituted by the United Kingdom Government was likely to secure enough evidence for that purpose. But it was clear that Mr. Sullivan had been present at the killing of the detainees and further evidence bearing on his responsibility for their death might emerge from the disciplinary proceedings against him, which were to begin that day. No final decision on the position of Mr. Sullivan and his subordinates could therefore be taken until the result of the disciplinary proceedings was known. The Opposition had been unwilling to defer their Censure Motion on that account because these proceedings were, in accordance with regular practice, to be conducted in private.

On the second point, it was recognised that action taken against subordinate officers of the Kenya Prison Service would not in any event suffice to allay the public anxiety which this incident had aroused in this country. The general feeling of the Cabinet was that on the considerations then before them the Government would not
be able to defend the action of the Kenya Government but should concede that the Cowan plan ought never to have been formulated or approved. It was therefore for consideration whether the United Kingdom Government should assert its authority over the Government of Kenya or, alternatively, should institute some form of enquiry into the whole conduct of the Kenya Government in relation to the detention camps. In addition to the primary issue of the use of force on these detainees, such an enquiry might also cover the incidence of scurvy in the camp and the unfounded statement issued by the Kenya Government immediately after the events on 3rd March that the deaths of the detainees were attributable to the drinking of contaminated water.

The Prime Minister said that he would prefer to postpone further consideration of these aspects of the matter until he had been able to discuss them with the Colonial Secretary after his return to this country.

The Cabinet:—

1. Agreed that debate on the Censure Motion tabled by the Opposition in the House of Commons should be deferred until 15th June.
2. Agreed to resume their discussion at a later meeting after the Colonial Secretary's return to the United Kingdom.

159 CAB 128/33, CC 34(59)3 11 June 1959

[Kenya: policy of rehabilitation at Hola Detention Camp]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Colonial Secretary (C. (59) 97 and 98) on the policy which had been followed for the rehabilitation of Mau Mau detainees by forced labour and on the line which the Government might adopt in the forthcoming debate in the House of Commons on the Motion of Censure tabled by the Opposition as a result of the death by violence of 11 prisoners in the Hola Camp.

The Colonial Secretary recalled that in 1954 the Cabinet had authorised the policy of compulsory labour as part of the process of rehabilitating the 70,000 Mau Mau members and sympathisers who were then held in detention camps in Kenya. This policy had proved eminently successful and the number held in detention had been reduced to under 1,000. He proposed, in the debate, to describe the history of the emergency, to justify the policy of rehabilitation and to emphasise its success. But it was likely that the Government would be pressed to institute some further enquiry, of a judicial nature, in addition to that already carried out by the examining magistrate in Kenya and to the disciplinary proceedings which were now being taken against the Camp Commandant, Mr. Sullivan, and his assistant, and to the enquiry which was to be undertaken into the future administration of the detention camps. Acceptance of a request for a further enquiry might call into question the whole policy of rehabilitation by forced labour. On the other hand, as it was not possible, in advance of the results of the disciplinary proceedings, to assess how far the Kenya Government, or the senior officers concerned, bore any responsibility for the events

1 Previous reference: see previous document.
at Hola, refusal of a further enquiry might fail to convince public opinion that the matter had been fully and properly investigated.

In discussion it was pointed out that a further enquiry could not be expected to elicit any relevant facts additional to those which had emerged from the examining magistrate's investigation. Nor was it likely that the results of the current disciplinary proceedings would throw any more light on the responsibility of senior officers of the Kenya Government or of the Kenya Government itself, since Mr. Sullivan could not now plead that he was acting on the orders of his superiors without contradicting the evidence he had already given before the magistrate. Moreover, the main criticism of the Opposition would be directed to the plan drawn up by Mr. Cowan, a Senior Superintendent in the Kenya Prison Service, which contemplated that if the detainees at Hola refused to go to work they should be "manhandled to the site of work and forced to carry out the task." The Kenya Minister of Defence, who had that day been invited by the Colonial Secretary to forward a statement explaining why he had approved the Cowan plan, would probably argue that the plan was to be read in conjunction with the Prison Standing Orders and Ordinances, which made it clear that men could not forcibly be made to work by beating them. The interpretation of the plan would, however, be affected by a letter written by Mr. Cowan in 1957, which was available to the Opposition, describing an earlier occasion when batons had been used and injuries inflicted on prisoners at another detention camp.

On the other hand, if the Government were to take the line that an enquiry was unnecessary since all the facts were known, it followed that the Government must accept the findings of the examining magistrate. This implied that disciplinary action might have to be taken, not only against Mr. Sullivan and his assistant, but also against Mr. Cowan and other senior officers. Whether criticism of the Kenya Government would be justified would depend to some extent on the reply received to the further enquiries which the Colonial Secretary had already made. There was much to be said, on political grounds, for not ruling out entirely the possibility of some further investigation. The Government might take the line that, in the light of the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Sullivan and his assistant, they would not exclude a further enquiry if this were necessary to decide where responsibility for the events at Hola lay.

As regards the legality of the policy of rehabilitation by forced labour, which the Cabinet had approved in 1954, it was open to question whether the Kenya regulations constituted a breach of the Forced Labour Convention of 1930, or the Convention on Human Rights. But there could be no doubt that the way in which the regulations were put into effect at Hola on this occasion involved a breach of both Conventions.

Summing up the discussion, the Prime Minister said that the Government should emphasise in the debate the successful rehabilitation of the great majority of the Mau Mau detainees through the policy of forced labour. This policy had, however, become progressively more difficult to operate as the detainees were reduced to a hard core. The policy should not be repudiated; but, in the light of the recommendations of the Fairn Committee,2 it might well be necessary to modify its operation in the future.

The Government would have to admit frankly in the debate that the way in which the policy had been applied on this occasion at Hola had undoubtedly been wrong. In due course the Government would have to decide where the responsibility lay. But the facts were known, and there was therefore no need for a further enquiry on this account. When the results of the disciplinary proceedings were available, the Government would have to decide what further action to take; and, if it were not then possible to decide where the responsibility lay, the possibility of a further enquiry would not be ruled out.

The Cabinet:—

Agreed that in the forthcoming debate on the Motion of Censure in the House of Commons the Government spokesmen should follow the line indicated in the Cabinet's discussion.

160  PREM 11/3030, T 161/60  8 Feb 1960

[Kenya: constitutional conference]: tel (no 279), report by Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan (in South Africa)

[In a previous telegram to the prime minister, reporting on the London conference, Macleod had said he was afraid the Europeans were ‘being very unimaginative’. He was ‘deeply anxious to protect the position of the New Kenya Party but this cannot be done by standing still and I must try and chart some way to achieve this and at the same time for the move forward [sic] in Kenya without which a major explosion is certain’ (T 116B/60, 1 Feb 1960). Macmillan thought this ‘very interesting’ and asked what he thought the effect would be in Southern Rhodesia (T133/60, 4 Feb)].

The Kenya Conference is now in a much more promising situation than seemed possible at the beginning or even a week ago. This does not mean that agreement will be reached, although that is not impossible, but that there is now a good chance of the main groups agreeing to work whatever constitution we finally lay down. The Conference itself, consisting of more than fifty members, is hopelessly unwieldy and I have in fact been operating mainly with meetings with small groups. The most encouraging thing is that Blundell’s New Kenya Party¹ and the African elected members have at last begun to talk between themselves and Blundell is now showing real leadership and a new understanding of how swiftly things are moving in Africa. I think it would help him and me very much if you would send him a message through the Home Secretary and I suggest a draft in my immediately following telegram.

2. Probably about Wednesday of this week I will put forward a final paper which will be something of a compromise between the points of view of the New Kenya Party and the Africans. At many points their own plans are now surprisingly close. Nothing of course, could bring Group Captain Briggs² into this, because he opposes all forms of advance for all races except Europeans but he has no sympathy whatever here. The Asians and the Arabs are on the sidelines and would accept whatever is finally agreed. I had a very large meeting with our Party a few days ago, and, although some of them are understandably anxious about the pace of events in Africa, it turned out to be a very good meeting. All this of course, may go wrong, particularly if

¹ M Blundell, leader of the New Kenya Group/Party, formerly minister of agriculture, 1955–1959; a businessman whose hobby was botany.
² L R Briggs was founder of the United Party (1959), dedicated to opposing any concessions which might lead to African rule.
Mboya3 decides to play the situation for a break, which he may well do. But at present we have a reasonable chance.

3. You ask what effect this will have on Southern Rhodesia. I am afraid there is naught for their comfort4 wherever Southern Rhodesia looks in Africa today, and Whitehead’s5 speech shows that he realises this. The pace of events in Somalia, Tanganyika, Uganda, which we are considering today in the Colonial Policy Committee,6 and above all in the Congo, are bound to have serious effects on the future of Central African Federation, and the territories within it. All the papers here applauding your speech7 comment with one voice that “things in Africa can never be the same again”. Somehow we must try and get this into the heads of the men in Salisbury, but I do not underestimate for a moment the magnitude of the crisis that is now very close to us in the affairs of the Federation.8

5 Sir E Whitehead, prime minister of Southern Rhodesia since 1958.
6 Document no 121.
7 The ‘wind of change’ speech, see document no 32 above.
8 Mr Macmillan minuted about this sentence that it was ‘rather formidable, but probably true. H.M. 9.2.60’ (M 22B/60).

161 PREM 11/3031, PM(60)7 17 Feb 1960
[Brief for prime minister’s meeting with New Kenya Party]: minute by Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan

Rather unexpectedly, the New Kenya Party had rejected the plan (‘wholly satisfactory to HMG’) presented by Macleod to the constitutional conference with the support of its leader, Michael Blundell, and accepted reluctantly by the African elected members (led by Ngala) and the Asians. The Party eventually came round, provided safeguards could be reached on rights of minorities. (The Cabinet briefly discussed the possibility of safeguarding Europeans after independence ‘either by some form of bicameral government or by the introduction of some residual power or veto analogous to that proposed for the Turkish minority in Cyprus’: CAB 128/34, CC 8(60)2, 12 Feb 1960, & CC 9(60)7, 16 Feb). Macleod asked Macmillan to see Blundell and the NKP, because ‘they are going to have a very tough time when they go home, for they are taking a much more courageous line than any Europeans have dared to take in the complex problems of Africa, and much hangs on their success’ (minute, 16.2.60). In his detailed briefing for the prime minister, he described Blundell—whom ‘you know quite well’—as having shown ‘tremendous qualities of leadership in the past week and I think now will go through with it. But he is trying to ride many different horses. He has considerable vision but no grasp of detail’. The other members of the Party were W Havelock, H Slade, M Amalemba and C B Madan. At their meeting Macmillan ‘spoke of the extreme importance of the multi-racial approach and thought that the success, or otherwise, of Mr Blundell’s party might set the pattern for the whole future development of Africa. If the multi-racial approach failed the likelihood was that the whites would be driven out of Africa and this could only be of profound detriment to the black. It was therefore of extreme importance to have patience . . .’. This he followed with a characteristic exhortation about the Commonwealth as the best hope for world peace (note for the record, 17 Feb 1960).]

You are seeing five members of the New Kenya Party this evening and this will be very helpful.

Their position as a party is that provided reasonable agreement is reached on the safeguards they will accept the basis of the proposals that I have laid down, which as
you know are a major step forward but retain all real power, particularly in the Executive, firmly in the hands of the Government and the Governor. None of the major demands with which the Africans arrived here, i.e. universal suffrage, Chief Minister and, above all, responsible government, have been met; but it is wholly right for Kenya to move away from the basis of communal representation to that of common roll. As you know, it is a major aim of our policy that, although we must move fairly swiftly, yet we should move more slowly in Kenya than anywhere else in East Africa, or perhaps indeed in any other of our territories. All the same, for reasons which you know well, the settler community in Kenya will be seriously disturbed for a time and this is bound to be reflected in what I hope will be only temporary support for Briggs. Briggs has in fact no following whatever in the House of Commons, and not even the Suez Group would support him. All our support is for Blundell's non-racial approach and I am sure you could make this clear. You might add that you intend to give the interview with Meadows,\(^1\) which will emphasise the importance we attach to this approach.

The group, however, have had tremendous stresses put on them in the last month, partly because they represent so many different communities and because the New Kenya Party is the only genuinely non-racial party that I know of in Africa; and also one must remember that many of them are really very small people and are particularly sensitive to the criticism that of course comes to them from their constituents. In short, the message is “Courage, mes braves”. If they will play this situation hard they will certainly slay Briggs and hold Kenya for the future. But they are very worried people.

\(^1\) P H Meadows, deputy permanent secretary in PM’s Office.

---

162  CAB 128/34, CC 64(60)9  15 Dec 1960
[Kenya: land policy]: Cabinet conclusions

[Perhaps alerted by a visit from Blundell early in July 1960, Macmillan asked if anything could be done to reassure Europeans in Kenya, an aspect of the problem ‘made all the more important by the situation in the Congo’ (PREM 11/4329, M 244/60, minute to Macleod, 9 July 1960). On 14 July, the Cabinet agreed that in future ‘land use should be governed by economic principles’, i.e., that the Highlands should be opened ‘to good farmers of all races and tribes’. Resettlement schemes on land at present unused or under-used would be worked out; but there remained the problem that European farmers were deeply concerned about future security of title to their land (fearing wholesale expropriation or unfair compensation or limitation of holdings to an uneconomic size). The economy was under serious threat and capital was being withdrawn. The Cabinet therefore accepted that an alleviation of these worries would be ‘both fair and economically necessary’, and asked Lord Kilmuir to chair a committee. Various options were put forward, but their conclusion that essentially all would depend on goodwill stopped far short of what the settlers wanted, which was a financial guarantee by HMG against expropriation. The government ruled this out on grounds of excessive cost, and as possibly a measure even providing an incentive to a future Kenya government to seize European land (CAB 128/34, CC 42(60)3, 14 July 1962; PREM 11/4329, minute by F Bishop to prime minister, 14 Dec 1960).]

The Cabinet had before them a note by the Lord Chancellor (C. (60) 186), to which was annexed a report by a Committee of Ministers on the future security of title to land in Kenya and a draft of a statement to be made by the Government.

The Lord Chancellor recalled that, in accordance with the Cabinet’s request at
their meeting on 14th July, a Committee of Ministers had been appointed under his chairmanship to study the problem of the future security of title to land in Kenya. The Cabinet had previously agreed that various schemes suggested for compensating property-owners or guaranteeing their title could not be accepted, and the Committee had therefore considered alternative methods of safeguarding property rights in Kenya and reassuring investors and the owners of property.

Provisions which would give reasonable protection to property could be entrenched in the fundamental law of an independent Kenya. There would, however, be no certainty that a future Kenya Government would not ignore or abolish these safeguards, and a formal agreement under which they undertook to observe the constitution would give rise to special difficulties. Economic sanctions against a breach of property rights must be expected to be more damaging to the United Kingdom than to an independent Kenya. The most practical way of proceeding seemed, therefore, to do everything possible to encourage a sense of responsibility in the African leaders in the territory. The example of Tanganyika, help in securing assistance from international organisations, and the offer of a conference on the economic development of Kenya might serve as inducements. But certain recent statements by African leaders had not been helpful in reassuring property-owners.

Meanwhile, it had become necessary to make some further statement, as promised by the Colonial Secretary, before the Christmas recess. A statement on the lines of the draft annexed to the Committee’s report, emphasising that constitutional advance must be conditional on a reasonable attitude towards the continued protection of fundamental rights, including property rights, would serve to reinforce a recent statement of the Kenya Government to the effect that land belonged to those of all races who held legal titles to it and not to the Africans as such.

In discussion the Cabinet reaffirmed their view that any form of guarantee to the European property-owners in Kenya would be beyond the resources of the United Kingdom Exchequer and might even serve as a direct incitement to expropriation. The draft statement prepared by the Lord Chancellor’s Committee went as far as it was possible to go and might help to restore confidence among investors and property-owners in Kenya. It might, however, with advantage be amplified by the inclusion of a passage indicating that the United Kingdom Government were concerned, not only to protect the rights of property-owners, but with the whole policy of land settlement and development in Kenya.

The Cabinet:

(1) Approved the proposals in the report annexed to C. (60) 186.
(2) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to make a statement on the lines of the draft annexed to the report, amplified by the addition of a suitable reference to the Government’s general concern with the whole policy of land settlement and development in Kenya.

163 PREM 11/4083 11 Jan 1961

‘The East African problem—concentrated on Kenya’: minute by Lord Kilmuir to Mr Macmillan

I. It is essential to state the difficulties and consider the chances of overcoming them.
(1) The short period before the estimated date of complete independence (Tanganyika 1962, Kenya 1964, Uganda 1964, Zanzibar 1964/6) presents two difficulties.
   (a) As Tanganyika is a trust territory, any extension there may rouse suspicion at United Nations.
   (b) The shortness of the period will alarm the settlers and their supporters in Britain.

(2) It is difficult to envisage an efficient and capable Chief Minister for Kenya after the elections next month.
   (a) Mboya and Gichuru\(^1\) are inexperienced and unstable.
   (b) The K.A.D.U. leaders are "second rate".
   (c) There is the shadow of Kenyatta\(^2\) in the background.
      (i) If, as generally believed, he is a bad and reckless man, his release would do nothing but harm and probably cause bloodshed. He will not do a Monck.\(^3\)
      (ii) If he is not released, the K.A.N.U. leaders have said that they will not take ministries.
   (d) It is said that a European/K.A.D.U. coalition would not last.

(3) This raises the third difficulty, namely with whom from Kenya can Nyerere negotiate the preliminary stages of a federation (which after the C.A.F., it might do better to call a "Federal Union", but I continue to use federation in this note).

(4) The fourth difficulty is that a federation must be an African inspiration and not a British idea far less imposition; and therefore cannot be played as a heaven-born piece of statesmanship on our part but only as our desire to forward an African idea which we think is good.

II. Our objective must be to find a solution which
   (1) Is obviously beneficial to Kenya and East Africa;
   (2) Provides the maximum protection for settlers and their property;
   (3) Is recognised by the Party as being intellectually respectable and positive action, and not merely a drift into surrender.

III. Immediately after the Kenya elections next month it should be possible:
   (1) To refuse to release Kenyatta;
   (3) If it is known that Nyerere is likely to request Her Majesty's Government to sound out opinion on a federation after the March conference, that this may allow the K.A.N.U. leaders to take office without loss of face.
   (4) To include the human right of property provision in the constitution, and announce the entrenchment of the constitution by the necessity of a ¾ majority of the Legislative Council. The latter may present difficulties at the ‘Chief Minister’ stage where the Legislative Council is de jure advisory but de facto the Governor does

---

\(^1\) J S Gichuru, first president of KANU (a teacher at the Alliance High School, whose pupils included R Njala and O Odinga); became minister of finance in 1963.


\(^3\) General Monck, first duke of Albemarle, who deserted the royalist cause in the English Civil War; but was then instrumental in bringing about the restoration of Charles II.
not reject the advice of Ministers commanding a majority except in extreme circumstances, but in spite of such difficulties it is not impossible.

IV. The situation without federation

1. If federation were not being considered the programme would as I understand it be in these three stages—
   i. a chief minister period,
   ii. a period of full internal self-government with defence and foreign affairs reserved and probably something like the Singapore arrangement as to internal security,
   iii. full independence.

2. It is contemplated that Kenya should reach stage (iii) in 1964.

3. A sidelight on this from my own angle is that there are 700 African barristers in Nigeria, but out of 300 qualified lawyers in Kenya, only 10 are African.

4. There would in 1964 be an obvious danger of expropriation (some settlers probably fear something much worse) against which the only safeguards would be the fear of losing external investments, and any entrenchments in the constitution which could be subverted by a united African vote in the legislative.

5. On the other hand, a strong “official-on-the-spot” view is that an attempt seriously to lengthen the period of incubation for independence would mean rebellion and bloodshed in addition to a loss of the friendship that exists for Britain and the West.

6. It is difficult to believe that the position vis-à-vis the European population would be appreciably better in 1967 or 1968.

V. It seems to me therefore that it is worth our while to give serious consideration to federation:

1. The advantages of federation are fairly set out in E.A.C. (61)16 para. 2.

2. I believe that if states voluntarily enter a federation, the chances of maintaining a constitution containing human rights and fundamental freedoms (including property) are real because all the various stresses in favour of the rights of the federation, the rights of the states and the rights of the individual create a desire to leave the constitution of the federation unaltered.

3. Therefore a voluntary federation with human rights as to property as part of the constitution and a strong federal court to pronounce on these rights has a real chance of being effective in defence of European property.

4. I had written the foregoing before seeing the Principal Conclusions of the Governors’ Conference. These do not affect my view that the procedure and timetable elaborated in E.A.C.(61)16 in paragraphs 3, 7 and 10 should be our aim.

5. I feel that we must not forget that our inspiration and achievement in the twentieth century is making nations who voluntarily remain our friends.

---

4 See document no 126.
The more I think on Kenyatta the more I am convinced we are right to bend all our efforts to get KADU and others to form a government. Once it is formed we have got to be prepared to give it every backing so that when Kenyatta is released it will nonetheless carry on unflinchingly. What you would in effect be doing is backing the Rest, who are in fact in the majority, versus the Kikuyu and Luo (two-thirds versus one-third). Knowing the fears of the Rest such a government might, if launched and strongly backed, last a long time. It certainly represents the best chance for European interests.

At the moment the formula is of top importance. In a sense the best person to judge its drafting is Ngala himself, the only difficulty here being just how far you or the Governor can tell him what is in mind. In this connection I find the latest telegram to you from Renison (No.52) somewhat disappointing in that he is worrying that Kenyatta is the same as he was in 1952 and hence urging caution on the form of release. I think I would have been surprised if he were not the same, and the only way that I see to deal with this is either to keep him indefinitely restricted, which is scarcely on now, or a strong government of the Rest which sticks it over the next months, and over the next years can produce the goods for its followers.

Since early March the Governor has been attempting to form a new Government.

After the elections the Kenya African National Union had 19 seats and Kenya African Democratic Union 15 seats, the New Kenya Party (7 seats) and at any rate some of the Asians would be prepared to support the African party which was willing to take portfolios in the new Government. So, with this support, either of the African parties could command a majority in the Legislature.

After protracted discussions the K.A.N.U. representatives have told the Governor definitely that they will not co-operate in forming a Government unless Kenyatta is released immediately. The K.A.D.U. representatives have always taken what seemed to be a fairly uncompromising stand on this, inasmuch as they too were pressing for Kenyatta's release; but on the 7th April the Governor reported that the prospects of co-operation by K.A.D.U. were improving.

There is a distinct difference in the approach to the Kenyatta problem between the two African parties. K.A.N.U. want immediate release and have urged that Kenyatta should be enabled to assume political leadership. K.A.D.U. from various motives, also press for his release but, representing by and large the group of tribes who are fearful of Kikuyu/Luo domination in the country, have no desire that Kenyatta should come back, into power. To say the least, therefore, K.A.D.U. are uncommitted on the question of Kenyatta's political future.

Mr. Ngala (the K.A.D.U. leader) has been in London during the last few days. I have seen him on several occasions and it has been noticeable that he has, while pressing for immediate release, not gone so far as to say that unless Kenyatta is released immediately his Party will not co-operate in forming the Government. I and the
Governor have felt that it might well be possible to produce a formula which would enable Mr. Ngala to offer to co-operate; and I have been discussing with the Governor the precise terms of such a formula. Its basic component would be a sufficiently clear indication to Mr. Ngala that Kenyatta’s release, given fulfilment of the Governor’s conditions, was a matter of months rather than years. I am hopeful that if we can give him enough to enable him to show to his followers that through co-operation he has produced reasonably concrete results we shall be able to solve the present deadlock. He may be able to win some support from the K.A.N.U. side and, all in all, I believe that an alliance of K.A.D.U. with the moderate Europeans in a new Government is in Kenya’s long term interest. . . .

I.M.
14.4.61

1 Macmillan minuted: ‘Many thanks. This is a difficult question both in Kenya & at Westminster. No doubt you will discuss with me before any decision is taken. Certainly the Governor seems to have played it very well so far. H.M. 15.4.61’ (no 62).

165  CO 822/2235, no 76  26 Apr 1961
‘Our next moves in Kenya’: letter from Mr Macleod to Sir P Renison (Kenya).  Annex: draft statement for governor  [Extract]

... This idea of coming over here before Legislative Council meets coupled with your reference to KADU’s “tentative” agreement with your provisional text leads me to ask where you stand with KADU. I had assumed that present negotiations were complete and that it was now a question of settling the portfolios. Is this the position, or, as paragraph 2 of Griffith-Jones¹ telegram personal No. 67 seems to suggest, are KADU sticking out for further concessions before finally committing themselves?

If this is the case the position is not at all healthy and emphasises to my mind the need for caution. As I said in my telegram personal No. 183, I am with you on the sort of timetable you have in mind for the next (limited) steps. But before definite decisions are taken on these matters we must be quite clear where all this is taking us, bearing in mind that African pressure for very early self-government is going to intensify. Can you let me know as soon as possible how you see things developing over the next two to three years, given reasonably stable government? The two constitutional “adjustments” you have in mind are in themselves relatively small matters from the purely constitutional point of view. Politically, and in Kenya terms, they are of immense importance. The Africans will not be content to stop at a composition of 6 Africans to 3 Europeans in the Council (I assume the Europeans will not seek a quid pro quo but wouldn’t bet on it). The argument will be that now that there is an African Chief Minister it is clearly time that the constitutional arrangements, including the franchise, were altered to fit the new pattern, that a Chief Minister obviously cannot operate within the archaic Lancaster House framework, etc; and my guess is that, whatever the NKP may think about London conferences, the Africans will want one in a matter of months.

Do you see things necessarily going so fast? Or putting it another way, if we do open the flood gates is there any hope of reconciling the Europeans to it?

The other associated question relates to Kenyatta. He is now essentially a political rather than a security problem. When he is released will we be able to hold out against the inevitable pressure to change the law so that he can sit in Legislative Council? Will KADU remain a sufficiently coherent and determined force to enable us to ride the pressure for fresh elections and indeed to make it clear to all the world that in the view of H.M. Government Kenyatta has no place in the leadership of Kenya?

I hope you will forgive these random questions, but I do think it is important that any constitutional concessions now must be viewed in the general context of the pace of development which we are prepared to swallow in Kenya. Do you, for example, consider that having backed KADU and set in train a fairly quick process of constitutional revision it would pay us (say once we have Chief Ministers in both Uganda and Kenya) to work definitely for an early Federation conference?

I have written in this sense because I am quite sure that once you mention publicly the possibility of discussion on the appointment of a Chief Minister and broadening the base of the government, these will be taken as concessions already granted. I am therefore extremely anxious that your reference to the possibility of some limited adjustments should be put less directly. I have tried my hand at some alternative words in the enclosure. You will see that I have also altered the passages about constitutional conferences and avoided the suggestion that H.M. Government will gladly rubber stamp any agreed proposals the Governor is able to put up. Would you telegraph your comments?

I realise the difficulty that KADU will, as I understand it, have seen your earlier version. If it would help I should have no objection to Ngala being told “in confidence” that I am very sympathetically disposed to the idea of making a fairly early appointment of a Chief Minister and of adding two Africans to the Council of Ministers but that I am quite sure that to announce these changes (or discussion of them) straight away would seriously impair the Government’s chance of getting off to a good start. If confidence is undermined by precipitate changes Ministers will be seriously handicapped in their plans to strengthen the country’s economy. Crawford and I have taken much the same line, over the appointment of a Chief Minister, with Kiwanuka in Uganda.2

Annex to 165

The Lancaster House Constitution has been brought into being because Her Majesty’s Government themselves recognised that a sufficient measure of agreement had been reached among the groups present at the 1960 Conference, that it should be the next stage in Kenya’s constitutional development. Nor, of course, will it be the last stage and now that a government has been formed it is natural that the people should begin to consider the methods and timing of future constitutional advance. Our first task is to govern the country sensibly and in so doing restore confidence in it. The sooner we can do this the sooner we shall be able to build on the foundations laid down at Lancaster House. I am sure that we can do this and so prepare the way

---

2 See document no 133 above.
for advancing as surely to a sound independence as has recently been accomplished to our admiration in other countries of the Commonwealth.

I believe that in charting the course to our next major target it may well be natural and fruitful to consider some adjustments here and there within the broad framework of the constitution now being inaugurated; and I intend in the reasonably near future to discuss possibilities in this direction with my Ministers. If, as I hope, we can reach a sufficient measure of agreement, I believe that adjustments could be made without the necessity for full-scale conference negotiation. Thus I contemplate that given stability and good government we will be able progressively to broaden the base of our new government pending our next great step forward.

**166**  
CO 822/2241, no 7  
19 May 1961  
[Kenya: pace of constitutional development and the Kenyatta question]: letter from Mr Macleod to Sir P Renison

Thank you for your letter of the 12th May. I am most grateful to you for meeting me so fully over the text of your speech at the opening of the Legislative Council, and for the extremely interesting letter which accompanied your draft. I have been thinking about the crystal-gazing which you attempted, and I should like in this letter to put to you the points that have occurred to me. They concern the future pace of constitutional development, and the handling of the Kenyatta question.

As regards constitutional development, we are in agreement both about the nature and the timing of the next steps, namely the appointment of a Chief Minister and the possibility of additional African seats in the Council of Ministers. And I also very much agree with what you say about the possibilities of Federation. I am not, however, absolutely sure of your provisional thinking as regards the pace. In paragraph 6 of your letter to me you envisaged, given stable government, progress after the appointment of a Chief Minister at the sort of speed that took place in Tanganyika. This, of course, would be pretty fast: Tanganyika had their Chief Minister in September 1960 and internal self-government this month—something like 9 months later, and there will be an even shorter period before independence. But I see from your letter of the 5th May to Garson¹ (about the Chief Secretaryship) that you think that it may be 2 years or so before Kenya moves to complete internal self-government. I fully recognise that, given the special problems of Kenya which you explained so clearly at the Governors’ Conference in January,² such a timetable might well be the answer if we could consider Kenya in isolation and I certainly do not want to suggest that we should force the pace. But I wonder whether it would be wise for us to bank on having even this period of grace. My experience is that once you have reached the stage in which Kenya is now, events develop an impetus of their own. For example, I think we are likely to find that there is pretty consistent pressure from K.A.D.U. for fairly rapid constitutional progress on the grounds that this is necessary if they are to maintain their position and not to be branded as ‘stooges’ by K.A.N.U.

Secondly, apart from the internal political pressures, we may, as we recognised at the Governors’ Conference, find it desirable to move faster than we should otherwise

---

¹ A D Garson, assistant secretary in CO, 1948–1962, in charge of appointments and transfers in Colonial Service. He was a low-profiled successor to Sir R Furse.  
² See document no 124.
have done in order to secure federation. We shall have a clearer idea of how this will work out after the discussions in June.

You also indicate in paragraph 7 of your letter that K.A.D.U. would wish all the various changes to take place without a conference or fresh elections. I do not feel too sure about this. I should have thought that a conference in preparation for internal self-government (and perhaps also to name the date for independence) was almost inevitable. Furthermore, although we may be able to make the immediate adjustments we have in mind without any great fuss, sooner or later I think that we are bound to be faced with pressure to reconsider the electoral system. This of itself would be a major matter and could not, I think, be decided without a full scale conference.

As regards Kenyatta, it will be excellent if the timetable works out as you hope. Here again, however, K.A.D.U. may well feel that their survival in the face of K.A.N.U. pressure will depend on their keeping the initiative and I think that it may be difficult to resist moving him to Kiambu as soon as the house is finished unless there is a difficult security situation in the Kikuyu areas. It is most encouraging and obviously right that you have been able to associate Ngala with Government policy over Kenyatta. Although it is unavoidable, it seems to me that this may in due course present us with something of a dilemma, particularly when the time comes to make the actual decision about his release. The difficulty that I have in mind is that, although this decision will have to be reached primarily in the light of the situation in Kenya and the conditions which you laid down in your broadcast, we shall not be able to ignore completely the repercussions outside Kenya. I have in mind both the state of public opinion here both in parliament and in the country and also the sort of consideration described in the telegram of the 25th April from the Acting High Commissioner in Salisbury which was repeated to you. I do not for one moment wish to suggest that such external considerations should dictate timing. But I do want to sound a mild note of caution; it is possible that for reasons of this sort I and my colleagues may feel bound to urge a fairly short extension of his restriction after the date you might have in mind, and the problem therefore is on the one hand to continue to carry Ngala with us and on the other to avoid being too closely committed with him when the decision about the date of Kenyatta’s release has to be made.

I shall be very interested in your reactions to these thoughts and I look forward to having a full discussion of these questions when you are here in June. Meanwhile you may like to talk this over with Hugh Fraser, and I enclose an extra copy of this letter for you to show him.


167 CO 822/2235, no 120
14 July 1961
[Kenya: constitutional timetable for internal self-government and possible future progress]: tel (no 350) from Mr Macleod to Sir P Renison

…4. It may be of value if I now clarify my views on desirable course of events in Kenya in immediate future, particularly in relation to achievement of internal self-government:—
(a) I hope that before the end of year it will prove possible to have Chief Minister and broaden base of Executive. I do not contemplate that Governor and all (repeat all) ex officio members should then leave Council.
(b) I am opposed to an election this year.
(c) Grant of internal self-government will have to be preceded by detailed discussion (or conference) and by resolution of certain outstanding special problems e.g. protection of minority rights, the Coastal Strip and the position of the Civil Service. If K.A.D.U. can remain firmly based, it may be possible to go into internal self-government without serious amendment of present constitution e.g. in relation to representative basis of Legislative Council. But, for your own information, it would be prudent not to discount the possibility that, despite our best efforts to avoid it, the turn of political events may force us into major amendment of Lancaster House constitution before internal self-government is achieved.
(d) I do not wish to have discussed this year either in Nairobi or London date for independence.
(e) I contemplate that there will be full scale conference after self-government has had a “run” in order to negotiate independence, and that such independence should be preceded by elections. . . .

7. So far I have dealt only with what, from my point of view, would be ideal, and I realise that my conception may present serious difficulties for K.A.D.U. and discount pressure we are likely to get from K.A.N.U. As regards latter, there are two factors to be considered:—

(a) Following release of Kenyatta there may (repeat may), despite all we can do to build up your present Government and their contribution to making the release possible, be some shift of support from K.A.D.U. to K.A.N.U. This would put them in strong position to press for immediate full-scale re-negotiation of constitution and elections.
(b) K.A.N.U. have strong card in desire of many to get from them satisfactory assurances about property. If you, as I, believe that effective assurances from that Party are of crucial importance to a settlement, we cannot blink our eyes to the fact that we may have to pay a heavy price.

8. A further consideration is our own desire to get effective federation going. Some optimism was expressed in London based on assumption of extent to which Kenya (and Uganda) would have moved by or before new organisation was set up. I have the feeling that Nyerere is not prepared to press for federation conference until he is satisfied that Kenya at any rate is in sight of full internal self-government, i.e. Council is no longer advisory to the Governor, representative basis of Legislature is “democratic” and H.M.G. have lost power of disallowance in internal subjects. If we fear that delay may put Nyerere off federation altogether, this, of course, will also affect what we finally want to get out of forthcoming constitutional discussions in Kenya.

9. I fully realise, of course, that paragraphs 7 and 8 argue against more limited terms of reference proposed in paragraph 4 above. Here is a real dilemma. It really amounts to this. It would be wrong to let K.A.D.U. down. It is impossible to give them internal self-government, as the term is normally understood, this year. On the
other hand, K.A.N.U. and external pressures, including our own desire not to prejudice federation, may force us to agree to discussions the outcome of which might well be fatal to K.A.D.U.

168 CAB 128/35/2, CC 61(61)6 9 Nov 1961

[Kenyatta, and possible constitutional developments in Kenya]:
Cabinet conclusions

[At a preparatory meeting of the Colonial Policy Committee, Macmillan said that the proposed removal of a disqualification for election to the Leg Co of anyone who had served a sentence of imprisonment for more than two years would enable Kenyatta eventually to became chief minister—'a thoroughly distasteful prospect'. But it was recognised that, as the new S of S Maudling said, debarring him from full participation in politics was illogical, and he would be less dangerous inside the Leg Co than outside it (CAB 134/1560, CPC 11(61), 7 Nov 1961).]

The Colonial Secretary said that tribal tensions were increasing in Kenya and the best hope for the future was to work for a constitutional conference in the early part of 1962 to devise satisfactory safeguards for minority interests. There would be little chance of guiding such a conference to a successful conclusion unless Kenyatta, who was the elected leader of the majority party, was enabled to sit in the Legislative Council by the removal of the disqualification now applying to anyone who had served a sentence of imprisonment of more than two years. When the Cabinet had authorised Kenyatta's release from restriction it had been hoped that an African Chief Minister might have been appointed before this disqualification was removed. However, in view of the failure to effect an accommodation between the majority and minority parties in Kenya, this had not been possible. The Governor and the minority parties agreed that in these circumstances it was advisable that the disqualification should now be removed. They believed that Kenyatta's performance as a member of the Legislative Council would not enhance his stature in the eyes of Africans generally. If the disqualification was to be removed, it seemed desirable that this should be announced without delay.

In discussion grave misgivings were expressed about the possibility that Kenyatta might become the Prime Minister of an independent Kenya. It seemed highly undesirable that the United Kingdom Government should take any positive action which might contribute towards that result. It was true that his current visit to London was attracting comparatively little publicity, and that he was strongly opposed by the minority parties in Kenya. On the other hand, he had become the leader of the majority party and was accepted by other African statesmen as the spokesman of Africans in Kenya.

It was also suggested that it was doubtful whether the removal of the disqualification would increase the chances of bringing the constitutional conference to a successful conclusion. Kenyatta was an evil man who must be held responsible for the brutalities of the Mau Mau movement. It would be impossible for the European minority in Kenya to rely on constitutional safeguards under a Government controlled by him.

1 The foreign secretary, Lord Home, had said precisely this at the meeting of the Colonial Policy Committee.
In further discussion the following points were made:

(a) The continuance within the Commonwealth of an independent Kenya under the leadership of Kenyatta would seem to many people to be inconsistent with the moral principles which had hitherto been the basis of the Commonwealth association.

(b) If we were to avoid chaos in Kenya, the only alternative to working for a satisfactory constitutional settlement leading to early independence was to continue our colonial rule. But this would involve a heavy financial and political burden.

(c) The best framework for satisfactory safeguards for minorities in a constitutional settlement would be the delegation of substantial powers to the various tribal regions of Kenya.

(d) In the longer term the best hope for stability in Kenya lay in some form of federation with the other East African territories.

(e) The European minority in Kenya might well think that, faced with the prospect of a Government led by Kenyatta, their only real safeguard was the maintenance of British troops in Kenya.

(f) If it were agreed that the removal of the disqualification was inevitable, the timing of any announcement would need careful consideration. Such a decision might be more acceptable, especially to certain sections of opinion in this country, if it were not taken until the Colonial Secretary had personally visited Kenya and consulted with the various interests there.

The Cabinet:—

Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for the question of removing the disqualification on Kenyatta to be considered further, in the context of the nature and timetable of likely constitutional developments in Kenya, at a meeting of Ministers in the following week.

169 CAB 134/1560, CPC 12(61) 15 Nov 1961

[The future of Kenya]: minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee

[The Committee considered a memorandum by Maudling, 'Kenya' (14 Nov), in which he argued that the situation was ‘explosive and deteriorating’ and could lead to ‘great disorder in Kenya, possibly reaching even Congo proportions’. He believed it was ‘quite impracticable to contemplate ruling Kenya for an extended period’; they were committed to independence as a goal, and a delay of more than 18 months was impossible, as Uganda would become independent ‘next year’. A conference therefore seemed unavoidable. That Kenyatta would ultimately become prime minister might be unpleasant, but it could not be prevented, and was ‘inescapable’.]

The Committee considered a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (61) 30) on the future of Kenya. In it he expressed the view that there were only two ways of restoring confidence and avoiding great disorder in Kenya—either we should continue for some years to rule Kenya and provide the necessary forces for this purpose, or we should, through a conference, find a solution upon which both majority and minority interests could agree. The latter would require the removal of the restriction preventing Kenyatta from becoming a member of the Legislature. He
recommended that our policy should be to concentrate on holding a conference and making a success of it. The alternative would lead to another outbreak of Mau Mau and leave us in no better position when it had been crushed at great cost and effort.

The Prime Minister said that this was a valuable paper setting out clearly the grave dangers of the Kenya situation and the issues which faced us in dealing with them. The Kenya problem was very intractable; more than almost anywhere else it consisted of a combination of problems each of great difficulty in itself—there was the problem of the white settlers; this was complicated by the fact that Kenya was a poor country, its economy depending upon the sale of crops produced by Europeans; there was the problem of tribalism; and there was a grave security problem. He agreed with the Colonial Secretary that the right course was to aim at a solution by means of a constitutional conference early next year, even though this meant the removal of Kenyatta’s disqualification for membership of the Legislature. But if the conference were to succeed we must try to obtain agreement on a form of constitution which did not include unfettered Parliamentary sovereignty on the Westminster model. If there were to be any hope of allaying the anxieties of minorities (and especially the European minority, particularly when faced with the prospect of an independent Kenya with Kenyatta as Prime Minister), it would not be enough to include adequate guarantees: it would also be necessary to ensure that the guarantees were deeply entrenched by provision which made it as difficult as possible for the local Legislature to amend the constitution in those respects. The terms on which England and Scotland had united proved successful because both parties to the union were, on the whole, reasonable people, but in relation to Kenya something more like the constitution of the United States of America seemed desirable.

The Lord Chancellor agreed that the right course was to hold the proposed conference and that for this purpose Kenyatta would have to be relieved of his disqualification from membership of the Legislature. In his view there were four main principles by which to judge fitness for independence—a viable economy; an independent judiciary; a workable form of parliamentary government; and a general stability which in principle allowed for the protection of minorities from oppression. On the whole he would accept that Kenya could survive economically, especially if it could be brought into an East African Federation. The quality and independence of the judiciary were at present satisfactory. The achievement of a workable form of parliamentary government would be one of the main aims of the conference, as would also be provision against the dangers of tribalism and the oppression of minorities. In all these matters the balance was finely poised, but he did not think that we could contemplate a long period of United Kingdom government by force and the only alternative aim of policy seemed to be a successful conference.

In discussion it was generally agreed that of the choices before us the right one was to relieve Kenyatta of the disqualification from membership of the Legislature as a necessary element in aiming at a successful constitutional conference early next year.

The following were the other main points made:—

(a) Every effort must be made to ensure that any constitution for an independent Kenya, particularly under Kenyatta as Prime Minister, should contain safeguards

1 Lord Kilmuir.
for minorities which were both adequate in themselves and accepted as such by the minorities. Moreover, the constitution should be so drawn as to put the maximum difficulty in the way of any abrogation of those safeguards. It was suggested that, when independence had come, only force could in the last resort prevent a ruthless and determined government from tearing up the constitution and imposing their will on the country; but against this it was argued that it would be a mistake to undervalue the importance of adequate constitutional checks upon the sovereignty of parliament, since even a thoroughly ill-intentioned government might to some extent be deterred if the only way to the achievement of their evil ends involved flagrant illegality.

(b) It was generally recognised that the security problem was complex and serious. We had to face the risks not only of a general collapse of law and order—for example, if the police force were suborned or otherwise became incapable of effective performance of its duties—but also of irresponsibility or misuse of local armed forces: we had seen an example of this kind of danger last year in the Congo where the Army had revolted despite the fact that the *loi fondamentale* was not at all bad in itself. In Kenya today the local forces were quite good but this depended entirely upon the presence of British officers, whose withdrawal would reduce the local forces to an armed rabble. We had perhaps been somewhat slow in training local officers and we should at once endeavour to remedy that difficulty with all possible speed, although this would inevitably take time and we might still be faced with a grave situation if there were a gap between withdrawal of British officers and the provision of sufficient reliable African officers to take their place. We might be faced with a difficult choice between the involvement of British officers in internal affairs and the acceptance of serious disorder if the local forces were left to operate without British commanders or other support. The position might be better if Kenya entered an East African Federation as a result of which internal security became a Federal responsibility, but it was doubtful whether such Federal forces as were likely to be available could deal effectively with a major breakdown of law and order in Kenya. All these considerations raised the question whether we could agree in the proposed conference to arrangements for independence for Kenya which, however satisfactory in other respects, did not include adequate provision for the maintenance of law and order and the protection of the constitution against violation.

(c) There was some discussion of the land problem and it was agreed that our aim should be to achieve acceptable safeguards for the position of the 3,500 European farmers who in effect largely supported the whole country: without safeguards sufficient to induce them to remain, the state of the economy would rapidly become disastrous. On the other hand it was also agreed that, so long as the Kenya African National Union (KANU) adhered to their promise not to adopt measures prejudicial to the use of land fully developed by Europeans, there was much to be said for doing everything to meet KANU’s demands that all undeveloped land should be made available for Africans to farm.

(d) It was noted that independence was likely at once to bring the Somali problem to a head. The Somalis would not placidly accept black African rule in Kenya, and the new rulers of the country would find it difficult to deal with a move by the Somalis to take the Northern Frontier Province out of Kenya into the Somali Republic.
(e) Discussion also touched on the question of bases. We had assumed that we could not hope for any length of time to maintain our existing bases in an independent Kenya, although their loss would have damaging repercussions upon our ability to maintain a proper reserve in the area and consequently upon our capacity to operate in the Persian Gulf. It might be worth while seeking to retain some land in the coastal strip on which we could maintain an air strip and a refuelling point. It was recognised that, although this might be of some use for a crash operation, it would not contribute to the long-term need in Kenya for stabilising security forces. The Minister of Defence undertook to consider the point and send a note on the subject to the Colonial Secretary.

Summing up the Prime Minister said that this had been a useful discussion of an extremely intractable problem. The Colonial Secretary’s memorandum should be circulated to the Cabinet and he would raise the subject in Cabinet on the following day. . . .

170  CAB 128/35/2, CC 63(61)5  16 Nov 1961
[Kenya: proposed constitutional conference early in 1962]: Cabinet conclusions

The Colonial Secretary said that the minority tribes in Kenya were increasingly fearful of Kikuyu domination and the European settlers were increasingly concerned about their own future. The economic situation was deteriorating and capital investment was lessening with the growing loss of confidence. In this situation the only alternative to continuing colonial rule, and providing the necessary troops to enforce it, was to work for a constitutional conference which would lay down adequate safeguards for minority interests. These safeguards should be enshrined in the constitution in such a way as to make it as difficult as possible to override them after the country achieved independence. A constitution that gave adequate protection to the African minorities would be likely to afford reasonable protection to the European settlers. He would be in a better position to consider what form these essential safeguards should take after his forthcoming visit to Kenya. His aim was to hold the constitutional conference in the early months of 1962.

If this constitutional conference was to have any prospect of success, it would be necessary to remove the disqualification which at present prevented Kenyatta, and others who had served a sentence of imprisonment of more than two years, from becoming members of the legislature. Subject to the Cabinet’s agreement, he proposed to announce just before his departure for Kenya that this disqualification would be abolished.

Discussion showed that the Cabinet were in agreement that the best hope of resolving the potentially dangerous situation in Kenya lay in working for a constitutional conference in the early part of 1962. They also agreed that, if such a conference were to have any prospect of success, it was necessary to remove the disqualification which applied to Kenyatta, repugnant though this step would be to many sections of opinion in this country.
Serious doubts were however expressed about the likelihood that agreement would be reached, at a constitutional conference, on safeguards which would be regarded as satisfactory by the minority interests in Kenya. Moreover, even if safeguards were entrenched in a constitution, there could be no assurance that they would not be illegally overthrown by the majority party once Kenya had become independent. Nevertheless, a satisfactory constitution, which might in some respects follow the United States model, would provide at least a legal obstacle to the abolition of minority rights, and a study should be undertaken urgently of the best form of constitution for this purpose.

It was recognised that the African minorities, and certainly the European settlers, were likely to feel that the only reliable safeguard would be the continuing presence of British troops or of security forces under the control of British officers. But, given the leadership of the majority African party, it was unlikely that British personnel would want or would be allowed to remain after independence. The situation would be different from that in Tanganyika, where the Prime Minister was prepared to rely on British officers to maintain law and order.

In further discussion the following points were made:

(a) The possibility of maintaining some British forces in Kenya after independence should be seriously considered. Even if they were retained only for training purposes, and even though their value in an emergency might be limited to rescuing European settlers, their presence would give some degree of confidence.

(b) It was suggested that no reliable safeguards could be provided for European or other minorities after independence unless provision were made for land resettlement which the majority African party accepted as equitable. European settlers could not hope to retain their existing holdings intact, even though it was true that the economy of Kenya depended on the agricultural production of these holdings.

(c) If the European settlers decided to leave, through fear of the future or because their land was expropriated, the Government would be under heavy pressure to pay them compensation. This would be a precedent for similar claims by settlers displaced from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

(d) The financial implications of the various courses which events might take in Kenya would have to be worked out by the time a constitutional conference was held. The cost of maintaining British forces there, meeting claims for compensation, and providing financial assistance to an independent Kenya could involve, in the aggregate, an intolerable burden to the Exchequer.

The Cabinet:

(1) Agreed that the disqualification from membership of the legislature which applied in Kenya to anyone who had served a sentence of imprisonment of more than two years should be removed; and authorised the Colonial Secretary to make an announcement to this effect in the following week.

(2) Agreed that the Colonial Secretary should aim at convening a constitutional conference on Kenya in the early part of 1962, with the object of reaching satisfactory safeguards for minority interests.
The Colonial Secretary said that, while there were still differences of view between them, the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union were making a determined effort to narrow the gap. There was now some hope that workable proposals would be put forward from the African side before the opening of the constitutional conference in February. If the conference went well it would be possible to envisage elections in the later part of 1962 leading to independence in 1963. The position of British forces in Kenya after independence might be difficult. The Africans would be reluctant to become involved in a conflict between the great Powers; but they were anxious to remain in the Commonwealth and it might be best to leave this question until the constitutional conference had been held and in subsequent discussion to emphasise the Commonwealth rather than the British purposes of the military facilities which we wished to retain.

In discussion the following points were made:—

(a) The future of the European settlers would turn on the safeguards to be written into the Constitution. These would not, however, be sufficient to re-assure them unless there was a reasonable prospect that they could be enforced. Though progress was being made with the training of African officers for the King’s African Rifles it would be impossible to produce by 1963 enough middle-rank and senior officers to be sure of maintaining disciplined forces under African control. It would be preferable to plan for the retention of a proportion of European officers. To re-assure the European settlers it was also desirable that we should be able to retain at least some British troops.

(b) The breakdown of law and order in the Congo had awakened opinion in other African countries to the dangers of conferring independence too quickly. The Nigerian Government were sponsoring a resolution in the United Nations suggesting ten years as the period within which it might be reasonable to aim at independence for all African States. It was possible that a move on our part to slow down the timetable for the independence of Kenya might command more support than had been assumed hitherto. There was, however, a serious risk that such a course would lead to an explosion. The business community in Kenya were in favour of an early settlement, which they believed to be preferable to a continuation of the present uncertainty.

(c) It would not be easy to maintain that British military installations in Kenya were meeting the needs of Commonwealth defence; nor would it be acceptable to do so if this resulted in restrictions on our use of these facilities. It might be better to abandon the idea of keeping a base in Kenya and to rely on periodical training to maintain some British military presence in the country.

The Cabinet:—

Invited the Colonial Secretary to circulate before the opening of the constitutional conference in February a paper setting out his proposals for a Constitution in Kenya and assessing the risks involved in delaying independence beyond 1963.

1 Previous reference: see previous document.
At their meeting on the 19th January Cabinet invited me to circulate a paper setting out my proposals for the Constitutional Conference and assessing the risks involved in delaying independence for Kenya beyond 1963.¹

The objective

2. In a sense the primary purpose of the Conference will be to decide on the full internal self-government constitution for Kenya. But the political groups have been considering many issues which relate to the full independence constitution. I do not believe that it would be in our interests to regard these issues as outside the terms of reference of the Conference, given what I believe must be our ultimate objective in Kenya. I would define this objective in the following terms. It is not possible for us, even if we wished, to secure the continuance of European political power in Kenya. That passed away at the last Lancaster House Conference. Arithmetic and African nationalism are against this. The best that we can hope to achieve is the orderly transfer of power to a securely-based and African-dominated Government which is genuinely anxious to see Kenya develop as a modern state, to avoid chaos, civil war and a relapse into tribalism, and genuinely prepared to respect the rights of individuals of any race. Nor is it likely that we shall see in Kenya a Government which is actively pro-Western in its foreign policy. The most we can expect is one which is not committed to either side in the East/West struggle and one which, because it is reasonably stable, does not offer too many opportunities for exploitation and penetration by the Communist powers. I therefore believe that the constitutional proposals for which we seek acceptance at the Conference, the tactics which we adopt during the Conference and the timetable which we have in our minds should be primarily directed towards this ultimate objective. . . .

The date of independence

12. I have discussed in the preceding paragraphs the sort of timetable for independence that is likely to be practicable in different political situations. It is governed by the mechanics of arranging a general election and by the question whether or not new political groupings emerge. I do not believe that it would be in our interests to attempt to delay independence beyond the dates which political and administrative practicabilities indicate. Any suggestion that we were deliberately dragging our feet would be likely to unite African opinion against us and might seriously prejudice our chances of achieving our ultimate objective. It will not improve the economic position of the country, nor can it be in the ultimate interests of the European community in Kenya, for us to give any impression that it is their presence which results in Kenya progressing less rapidly than Tanganyika and Uganda. Furthermore, such a delay might give the Kikuyu extremists an excuse for adopting terrorism once more and lead to their securing an increased number of adherents in the country—as well as external support.

¹ See previous document. The meeting was on 19 Dec, not 19 Jan.
13. In view of recent events in Tanganyika, I do not believe that by setting an early date for Kenya’s independence we should facilitate the establishment of an East African Federation with Uganda and Tanganyika, but in any case, with the Kenya situation as it now is, I believe that the practicable timetable for Kenya is virtually dictated by purely Kenya considerations.

14. It is inevitable that I shall be pressed at the Conference to name a date for independence. Whether or not this will be practicable will depend on the course of events during the Conference and on whether it ends in general agreement on the constitutional proposals. I believe that if there is general agreement, it would be impossible for me to refuse to set a date which might be in general terms and would almost certainly have to be subject to conditions. In certain circumstances it might be impossible to defend setting a date later than the end of 1962 or the early part of 1963; in others a later date might be defensible. But I shall have to see how events develop before I can make a firm recommendation on this point.

Recommendations

15. I invite my colleagues to endorse my general proposals as described above and in the Annex and, in particular, to agree that:

(1) We should seek to achieve the orderly transfer of power to an African-dominated Government commanding the widest possible support in the country and having as its objective the development of Kenya as a modern democratic state;
(2) Our tactics during the Conference should be directed towards this end and we should take every opportunity to bring about any new political alignment which offers a sound prospect of our attaining our ultimate objective;
(3) We should have particular regard during the constitutional negotiations to the necessity to secure adequate safeguards for fundamental rights including property rights;
(4) We should not seek to delay the date of independence beyond what is practicable in the light of purely Kenya considerations and we should be prepared, subject to progress during the Conference, to fix a conditional date before the Conference concludes. I attach the greatest importance to our reserving our position on this because (see paragraph 5) if there is no change in political alignments and the Kenyatta group seem likely to achieve power, we shall have to consider the implications of this for our future policy very carefully.2

2 At the Colonial Policy Committee to discuss this memorandum, Maudling stressed the importance of making a success of the conference, since ‘failure would leave us with an even more intractable problem than at present’: the extremists in KANU might obtain ‘a real ascendancy’. The Committee regarded the financial outlook as ‘extremely sombre’ (CPC 4 (62)4, 16 Feb 1962).
elsewhere the conference, if successful, would be followed by a new General Election based on revised franchise arrangements, a period of full internal self-government starting either just before or just after the elections, and then further negotiation with Her Majesty's Government leading up to ultimate independence.

2. It is widely believed that the date we have in mind for independence is some time in the first half of 1963.

3. The people who most impressed me during my visit to Nairobi two months ago were the Provincial Commissioners. They gave me their unanimous advice:

   (i) That the rate of advance to independence, which they assumed would come in the spring of 1963, was too rapid.
   (ii) They could think of no way in which it could now be slowed down.

Must we really accept this advice, or is there some way, either of taking some of the dangers out of independence, or of retarding the date, or of doing both? This is the question we shall have to settle in the course of the coming months.

4. The dangers themselves are not difficult to see. In political maturity the indigenous people of Kenya are far behind even the West Africans. The number of trained administrators, and the number of officers and senior non-commissioned officers available are very small. There are strong tribal antagonisms that can easily be fanned into violence by irresponsible leaders and they are based on fears, that have much substance, of Kikuyu domination. There is a large European population with a great and long-established stake in the country. Land-hungry Africans are casting jealous eyes on the European lands, but it is European agriculture that provides the foundation of Kenya's economy. Over everything broods the threat of Mau Mau, the influence of the ex-detainees in the Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.), and the persistence of personal violence. Small wonder in these circumstances that confidence is rapidly disappearing and that the economy of the country is running rapidly downhill. The European farmers and the European administrators, upon whom the country depends, have little incentive to stay.

5. These dangers can be avoided only if we can ensure an administration that is adequately efficient and incorrupt (standards are bound to fall to a considerable extent in any case), a Constitution which provides reasonable protection to the individual and to minorities and which cannot be taken away by legal means, and reasonable confidence that law and order can be maintained by security forces operating under the control of a Government that itself respects the Constitution. We shall have ultimately to decide whether in our view there is a reasonable chance of this being achieved on independence. If we think there is not, we shall have to face up to all that is involved in postponing independence and continuing to govern ourselves, probably in such circumstances by decree and without any African co-operation.

6. I think it is important that we should take our decisions in stages and in the right order. For example, the question of maintaining facilities for British forces in Kenya cannot be tackled adequately until there is a responsible Government with whom to negotiate. Approaches at the moment to the two political parties cannot produce anything but a rebuff. The stage we are now facing is the Constitutional Conference, and our aim in this, I suggest, should be to try to frame a Constitution which gives the maximum of legal protection to minorities and to individuals.

7. The two parties—K.A.N.U. and the Kenya African Democratic Union (K.A.D.U.)—have been working hard on their constitutional ideas with the
assistance of Sir Ralph Hone, whom I sent out as constitutional adviser, and other legal experts whom they are employing. While I am encouraged that they should be tackling this task so seriously, it must be admitted that their ideas are still far apart. K.A.D.U. are pinning their faith to what they call a federal or regional system, while K.A.N.U. are in favour of a single unitary system of government, with substantial powers for local government units entrenched in the Constitution.

8. But though their views are at present wide apart, I believe, myself, that underneath it all there may be more potential agreement than appears at first sight. If we can sweep away the verbiage about federalism and unitary state, and so on, and come down to the hard facts of powers and safeguards, we may be able to reach some agreement. What K.A.D.U. and their supporters need is protection for minority tribes in such matters as land rights, tribal customs, etc., in a form which cannot be destroyed. K.A.N.U. are prepared to make reasonable provision in these matters, and the problem will be to ensure that this provision is lasting. I doubt if a provision that amendments to the Constitution can be made only by say a 75 per cent. majority will be adequate, but I believe it should be possible to devise a system whereby features of the Constitution which affect minorities can be changed only with the consent of certain bodies outside the central Parliament, e.g., the local or tribal authorities. If this can be done we shall have achieved something really worthwhile for the minority tribes.

9. The position of the Europeans is more difficult. K.A.N.U. obviously are determined to separate the Europeans from the African tribes, and if they wish to do so, I don’t see how it can be prevented. Protection for the Europeans must lie in a Bill of Rights and an independent judiciary. Both these are provided for in the K.A.N.U. and, I understand, K.A.D.U. proposals but the problem from the European point of view will be to ensure that in practice they will be fully effective. This, it seems to me, is the real debt we owe to the European community in Kenya.

10. I conclude, therefore, that so far as the present conference is concerned, we should try hard to get agreement on a Constitution that provides, so far as any legal system can provide, protection for tribal minorities and for European individuals.

11. Looking to the future, the great question will be, to what extent it is likely that an extremist group or party would overthrow such a Constitution, thus leading to a breakdown of law and order on a major scale. On our answer to this must depend the view we take about the date of independence and the future of British forces. I suggest we cannot make this assessment now, until we have seen how the conference goes, and until we have had a few months’ experience thereafter. In the meantime, however, there will be clear advantage if the “moderate” wing of K.A.N.U., led by Mboya, can be split off from the party generally, and in particular from the extreme group—men of violence and of Communist contacts—led by Kenyatta, Odinga and Ngei. The Governor thinks that this could perhaps be done. While I would not rate the chances very high, it would be so much advantage for the future of Kenya and for the solution of our problems there, that I think the possibility is well worth pursuing, and I shall take any opportunity of doing so that presents itself at the conference.

1 Sir H Ralph Hone, assistant legal adviser to CRO and CO since 1954; governor of North Borneo, 1949–1954, with previous Colonial Service experience in Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Gibraltar and Malaya.
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (62) 22) on constitutional development in Kenya. The Colonial Secretary said that the Kenya Constitutional Conference would open in London on 14th February. Its object was to settle a Constitution for Kenya during the period of internal self-government. In the light of precedents in other territories it would be generally assumed that the transition to full independence would take place about a year or 18 months after the attainment of self-government. Refusal to accept an early date for independence would probably lead to further outbreaks of violence, which would further reduce confidence in the country’s future and intensify its economic problems. On the other hand, the early grant of independence might leave Kenya with an unstable and inefficient government, which would be equally disastrous to the economic prospects of the country. The first task was, however, to seek agreement on a Constitution with strong safeguards for African minorities and for the European settlers. It would then be a matter for judgment how far such a Constitution was likely in the event to be overthrown by unconstitutional means. Much would depend on the encouragement of moderate African opinion. The Colonial Secretary said that he intended to do all he could to isolate the extremists in the Kenya African National Union and to persuade its more moderate members to make common cause with the Kenya African Democratic Union.

The Chief Secretary, Treasury, outlined the financial prospects of Kenya. On the best assumptions Kenya would need economic aid at the rate of about £30 million a year for many years ahead. Unless some confidence in the country’s stability could be restored, it would decline into complete bankruptcy. The cost of compensating European settlers for their land alone would amount to about £140 million. It was therefore important that the gravity of the situation and the need to restore confidence should be impressed from the outset on those attending the Constitutional Conference and that no promise should be given or implied that the United Kingdom Government would compensate displaced European settlers or increase the level of economic aid. We would continue to accept the obligations which flowed from our responsibility as a Colonial power; but we could not accept responsibility for additional aid which might be called for as the result of mismanagement by an independent state.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) The question of safeguards was vital in the framing of a Constitution for self-government. So far as possible such safeguards should be independent of the legislature, particularly where the rights of African minorities were concerned. It would be difficult to devise stronger safeguards for the European settlers than a Bill of Rights and an independent judiciary, but the possibility might be considered of conferring on the European members of the legislature some right of veto on measures affecting the vital interests of the European settlers. It must, however, be recognised that any Constitution now devised might break down during the period of self-government, thus requiring us to resort to direct rule. Even if it survived into

---

1 See previous document.  
2 Sir E Boyle.
the period of independence, it might be overthrown by revolution. It should be remembered, however, that predictions of political breakdown following the grant of independence to other territories—most recently, for example, the Cameroons—had not been borne out by the event; and in terms of administration, of public services, and of training Africans for the duties of government we had laid in Kenya a stronger foundation than in African territories administered by other Powers. Kenya was, for this reason less likely to relapse into the kind of chaos which had followed the grant of independence to the Congo. It would not be possible to form a proper view of the prospects until the Conference had started and had made some progress; much would depend on the emergence of a moderate African leadership.

(b) The grant of early independence to Kenya would be dangerous in the extreme. Responsible local opinion was unanimous that the advance of independence was too fast but there was almost equal agreement on the dangers of trying to slow it down. From every point of view it would be preferable to lengthen the period of self-government to something of the order of five years if means could be found of doing this without provoking a violent African reaction which would have the effect of further weakening confidence in Kenya and accelerating its economic collapse. It might be possible to devise some form of trusteeship under international, Commonwealth or United Nations auspices which would be acceptable to African opinion. Short of this, it might be possible to associate some other countries, in an advisory capacity, with our continuing administration of Kenya. These possibilities should be examined.

(c) The threat to Kenya's economic stability was of paramount importance. It put Kenya into a different category from other territories whose independence had already been granted or promised. The Government would be justified in withholding independence from territories which were not economically viable and had no reasonable prospect of becoming so. It was for consideration whether a frank explanation of Kenya's economic difficulties would not be accepted by world opinion and even by the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations as justifying delay. There was, however, a real danger that this might cause the Soviet Government or the Chinese Government, which was known to be taking an increasing interest in African affairs, to offer such economic aid as was needed to support the economy of an independent Kenya. We might then find ourselves obliged to grant early independence to Kenya in circumstances which would draw the country into the Communist camp. Even so, there would be advantage in obtaining a more general recognition of the economic difficulties facing Kenya and to this end it might be helpful if some independent authority, possibly the World Bank, could be invited to make an objective survey of Kenya's economy and prospects.

(d) During the period of self-government it would be possible to use British troops to maintain law and order. It would be more difficult to arrange for a British military presence after independence. But, if we made it plain that we were not proposing to retain a military base in Kenya after independence, it might be possible to arrange for a number of British troops to be stationed in the area, particularly for training purposes. Even so, the main burden of maintaining law and order in an independent Kenya would fall on the King's African Rifles. By the middle of 1963 only half the officers of this force would be African and it might be necessary for the Government to second British officers at United Kingdom expense to maintain its efficiency. It would be in our interest to do this: the consequences of failing to main-
tain organised forces at the disposal of government had been shown only too clearly in the Congo.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Took note that the Colonial Secretary, at the outset of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, would emphasise the economic difficulties facing Kenya and would seek to concentrate discussion on the problem of a Constitution for the period of internal self-government.

(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to consider whether some form of trusteeship for Kenya during the period of self-government could be devised and whether it would be to our advantage to invite some international authority to review Kenya’s economy and prospects.

(3) Agreed to resume their discussion at a later meeting in the light of developments at the Conference.

175  CAB 128/36/1, CC 22(62)4  20 Mar 1962

[Kenya: compromise proposals for self-government]: Cabinet conclusions

[In the memo considered at this Cabinet, Maudling argued the case for working for a coalition, even though KANU would react violently: ‘But I believe that these risks must be faced. To go faster now would be inexcusably reckless. The consequences of slowing down may be serious, particularly as regards calls upon our limited resources of money and military manpower, but the consequences of going full steam ahead straightaway into independence might well be catastrophic’ (CAB 129/109, C(62)53, 19 Mar 1962).]

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (62) 53) on developments in the Kenya Constitutional Conference and the possible courses of action now open to the Government.

The Colonial Secretary said that the Conference had been unable to reach agreement on a constitution for self-government in Kenya and the delegations from Kenya were now looking for a lead from the United Kingdom Government. He proposed to put to them the outlines of a constitution which struck a balance between the proposals by the Kenya African National Union (KANU) for a strong Government at the centre and those of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) for a federal system of government. The details of any such compromise constitution would have to be worked out later with the active participation of both the main African parties. This could best be secured within a coalition Government, headed by an official, which would have the framing of the new constitution as its main task and would be more of a constituent assembly than a normal Government. If the constitution could be agreed in this way, elections would be held under it, possibly at the end of 1962, and the period of self-government leading to independence would then begin.

The least palatable feature of these proposals was that it would be necessary to include Kenyatta in the coalition Government. If, however, he joined such a Government, he would find it more difficult to satisfy his extremist followers, and the moderate element in the KANU party might gain greater influence. Whatever course was now adopted a serious security situation might well arise and there could be no question of withdrawing British troops from Kenya.
The Colonial Secretary said that he also envisaged a larger programme of resettlement of landless Africans who in present circumstances presented the gravest threat to security. It would be necessary to purchase European farms and to equip them for African use. It was likely in any event that some of the European farmers would leave the country and claim compensation; and in the absence of any scheme of African land-settlement fighting would be likely to break out for possession of the deserted farms.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) One possible course would be to adjourn the Conference, announce that it would be reconvened in, say, six months' time, and continue the present Government in office. The objections to this were that it would be likely to lead to early outbreaks of violence, since there would be no restraint on the extremists; that it would be a wholly negative policy; and that all the delegations to the Conference (including the representatives of the European settlers) and the Governor were strongly in favour of an attempt to bring in a coalition Government at this stage.

(b) The hopes originally entertained that Mr. Kenyatta’s influence would decline once he had been released from confinement had not been fulfilled. He could not be relied upon to honour any undertakings or to respect any constitution if he once attained full power. It could therefore be represented as unprincipled as well as dangerous to offer him any position of responsibility. On the other hand it would not be practicable at the present stage to contemplate the formation of a coalition Government without him. He was still the acknowledged leader of his party, and his political influence was still considerable. His powers were, however, declining; and if he took office in a coalition Government his capacity to cause trouble would probably be less than if he were free to act independently. Even the representatives of the European settlers now accepted the impossibility of excluding him.

(c) It would not be easy to form a coalition Government, and the attempt might well fail. From some points of view this might be an advantage, particularly if the failure came about in such a way as to divide the extremist from the moderate element in the KANU party. If such a division in KANU led to a substantial weakening of their general position in Kenya it might be possible to encourage KADU to continue in office at least for the time being and to entrust to them the task of working out the details of the new constitution, possibly with the assistance of the moderate element in KANU. These possibilities could not, however, be seriously discussed until the attempt to form a coalition Government had been made and the likelihood of success or failure could be judged more accurately.

(d) The financial implications of a large resettlement programme would need careful examination. Considerable expenditure would be involved and it would not be easy to frame the resettlement proposals in such a way that they did not lead inevitably to demands for compensation from the European community as a whole.

(e) In any event the security situation was likely to be dangerous. It would not be possible to contemplate the withdrawal of British forces at any time before independence and there might even be need for reinforcement. The possibility of withdrawing troops from Germany for this purpose should be considered; if this were impracticable, present plans for reducing the Army to a strength of 173,000 might have to be re-examined.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to present to the Kenya Constitutional Conference proposals for a self-governing constitution in Kenya based on the best attainable compromise between the proposals of the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union.
(2) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to explore the possibility of forming a coalition Government in Kenya to work out the details of such a new constitution.
(3) Took note that the Colonial Secretary would discuss with the Chief Secretary, Treasury, a programme for the settlement of Africans on land to be purchased from Europeans.
(4) Invited the Colonial Secretary to report to the Cabinet the outcome of his enquiries under Conclusions (1) and (2) above.1

1 Only towards the very end of the constitutional conference did Kenyatta demand that a firm date should be set for Kenya’s independence. In view of the difficulties of making any new constitution work, the Cabinet believed this was an ‘unreasonable demand’ which must be refused; if Kenyatta also insisted that Oginga Odinga should be included in the coalition government this would also be refused, as Odinga ‘was known to be in touch with the Soviet Government’. The Cabinet thought the Kenyans were concentrating too much on political and racial issues to the exclusion of facing up to the ‘critical economic situation of Kenya and the urgent need to re-establish confidence in its future’ (CAB 128/36/1, CC 20(62)A, 8 Mar; & CC 25(62)7, 30 Mar 1962).

CAB 128/36/2, CC 44(62)6 5 July 1962
[Kenya: land settlement scheme]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (62) 101) outlining a programme for the settlement of Africans on land to be purchased from Europeans in Kenya.

The Colonial Secretary said that he had discussed this scheme with the Chief Secretary, Treasury. He proposed that over the next five years funds should be made available for the settlement of about 70,000 African families on 1 million acres of mixed farming land now owned by Europeans, and that the Government should indicate their willingness to participate in an extension of the scheme at the end of this period, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. The rate of settlement and the expenditure involved would be spread evenly over the five-year period. He hoped that arrangements could be made for existing schemes to continue and to be co-ordinated with the new scheme. The cost of buying and settling 1 million acres was estimated at about £16.55 million, of which £7.55 million would be grant and £9 million loan; but the total amount of additional money required would be about £12.65 million, since funds for some existing schemes would be absorbed into this larger plan.

The administrative resources of the Kenya authorities would be fully stretched by a scheme on the lines proposed and he did not think that anything on a larger scale would be practicable. The scheme would not resettle all the landless unemployed Africans and it would not affect more than about half of the mixed farming area...
owned by Europeans. It should, moreover, be recognised that the substitution of African for European farmers would involve some decline in the general standard of farming, with corresponding loss to the Kenya economy. But, if there were no scheme of this kind, large numbers of European farmers would abandon their farms and the local tribes would fight for possession of them. The scheme would also have the advantage of offering a means of dealing with the claims of some European farmers who might otherwise make a strong case for direct compensation from the United Kingdom Government. He sought authority to discuss the outline of the scheme with Kenya Ministers and to make an announcement about it during his forthcoming visit. Further discussions would then be held both with the Kenya Government and with the Treasury about the detailed arrangements for putting the scheme into effect.

In discussion there was general agreement that it would be right to proceed with a scheme of this kind. It was not possible to estimate at this stage how many of the 3,000 European farmers at present in Kenya would wish to stay, but it was believed that a fair proportion would be encouraged to do so by the knowledge that this scheme would guarantee a reasonable market in land for at least five years. The scheme offered the best hope of avoiding in Kenya a situation comparable with that which had arisen in Algeria through the dissatisfaction of European settlers. Care should, however, be taken to ensure that the proposed announcement carried the concurrence of the Kenya Government and that it was presented, not as a scheme for rescuing European farmers, but as one to secure the orderly settlement of Africans. The Kenya Government should be left in no doubt that this commitment would be a first charge on the financial assistance to be provided by the United Kingdom Government for development purposes.

The Cabinet:

Approved the proposals outlined in C. (62) 101 for a scheme of land settlement in Kenya.

177  PREM 11/4083  7 June 1963

[East African federation and Kenya independence]: tel (no 336) from Mr M MacDonald (Kenya) to Mr Sandys

It is true that when you were in Nairobi I thought it might be possible to carry on with internal self-government until well into next year, and possibly until the middle of it. If independence for Kenya could be kept as an isolated problem, that programme might be practicable and agreeable to all concerned here. For example, about two months ago Bruce McKenzie told me that KANU leaders were beginning to realise that independence in 1963 would not be possible, and that some time in 1964 would be wiser.

2. However, partly no doubt owing to their own political emotions, and partly owing to pressure from the Tanganyika and Uganda Governments, Ministers are now clearly thinking of independence towards the end of 1963. I believe that a prime motive in this change of attitude is desire to establish federation. President Nyerere stayed with me at Government House a couple of nights ago; he, Mboya and
Kambona1 dined privately with me; and I also had a talk with Nyerere alone. This all followed their conference and agreement on federation that afternoon. When I put to Nyerere that it might be difficult to reach the political agreements between the three Governments and to make all the practical and constitutional arrangements necessary to establish federation within a comparatively few months, he agreed with this, but said the three Governments must succeed in a very early achievement of federation. He said that at the moment enthusiasm for federation amongst their publics had grown again, and that Ministers must seize this opportunity to achieve actual federation before doubts arise and zeal wanes once more. He and Mboya both told me that Uganda had made difficulties earlier, but is now in agreement that federation should take place; and, again, they wished to make speed with federation before that situation might change. On the other hand federation cannot actually take place until Kenya is independent, and therefore the time-table depends in part on date of that independence. My three dinner guests all expressed strong hopes that the British Government would appreciate the position, and that H.M.G. would put no obstacles in the way of attainment of Kenya's independence at the earliest practical date, not only for its own sake, but also so that federation can be achieved at the same time or immediately afterwards.

3. No doubt there is an element in all this of putting pressure on us to speed up Kenya's independence; but in my judgement African leaders' zeal to achieve federation at or about the same time is equally sincere and serious. They are making arrangements to get on at once with practical preparations for federation. Thus a working party of six Ministers (two from each territory) is being established forthwith to begin negotiations. A working party of officials will do all the detailed work under their guidance. The working party of Ministers will all regard this as their top priority, and will meet at frequent intervals, chiefly in Nairobi, where they will have the active help of Adu2 and EACSO experts. As you know, it has been announced that the three Heads of Governments with their principal colleagues will hold a further conference in the third week of August, in the hope that they will then be able to reach a firm and final agreement on terms of federation. After that the detailed instruments will be prepared as rapidly as possible.

4. Mboya has told me privately that Kenya independence conference should follow not precede this federation conference. I have no doubt that the East African Ministers all hope and intend that independence conference should therefore take place in September at the latest. I have emphasised to Mboya that date must be one which is convenient to U.K. Ministers as well as to Kenya Ministers and I have mentioned that Ministers in London are liable to have many long-standing commitments round about that time of the year. Mboya understands this, but very much hopes that you and your colleagues will appreciate the need to work to a programme which enables Kenyan independence and East African federation to take place without undue delay.

5. It seems to me, however, that we are in a position to make our agreement to an independence conference in, say, September or October at least partially dependent on federation conference in August (or whatever date it is held) having achieved reasonable results. No doubt it would be imprudent and impracticable to

---

1 O S Kambona, Tanganyika minister of education, etc.
2 Adu: see document no 138, n 3.
make that a firm condition but we could have an understanding with Kenya Ministers that the two problems are to some extent linked together. I need not spell out details now.

6. A sound East African federation is, of course, a dream answer to many of our Kenya problems. I, therefore, believe we should show ourselves co-operative in aiding establishment of that at earliest practicable date. If Mboya is speaking the truth (as I believe he is) in saying that their intention is that independence and federation should be established on the same day, or within a very short while of each other, our policy might well be that, on present form, we regard the two aims as linked together, and that date for independence might depend a bit on date when federation also can be achieved.

7. I think it important for us not to appear to be dragging our own feet, or to wish to make the East African leaders drag their feet on federation. So I hope it will be possible for you to see Mboya on one of the dates proposed about ten days from now, with a view to reaching some at least tentative understanding on date for an independence conference. If we show this readiness, I believe we shall maintain the confidence which your recent visits to the East African territories have established in H.M.G. and that, at the same time, we shall lose nothing substantial in the way of an unnecessarily hasty timetable for independence. Unless I am mistaken, I think that the East African Ministers will find that just about the whole of remainder of this year at least will be needed to complete all necessary preparations for federation, and this circumstance should put some brakes on too much haste towards Kenya’s independence. In any case it would be imprudent to contemplate a postponement of Kenya’s independence beyond sometime in the first half of next year, and if it comes a few months earlier in return for establishment of a sound federation, the gain will be greater than any loss.

178 CAB 128/37, CC 41(63) 24 June 1963

[Kenya: arrangements for and implications of independence]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (63) 105), to which was appended the draft of a communiqué announcing that, subject to the necessary steps being completed in time, Kenya would become independent on 12th December, 1963.

The Colonial Secretary\textsuperscript{1} said that, in the light of developments in recent weeks, there was now a reasonable prospect that a Federation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika would be established. Such a development would be welcome since, apart from its economic advantages, a Federation would tend to reduce the risk of tribal dissension in Kenya and to reinforce the position of other minority groups.

The three Governments hoped to bring the Federation into being by the end of the year, in order that it might be represented at the United Nations in the 1964 session. If objections on our part delayed the independence of Kenya and, therefore, the establishment of the Federation beyond the end of 1963, we should incur the odium of appearing to frustrate the Federation and should lose the goodwill of all three countries concerned. For these reasons we must now contemplate an earlier date for

\textsuperscript{1} Mr Sandys, holding the office jointly with the CRO since mid-July 1962.
the attainment of independence by Kenya than we had previously envisaged. We should accept 12th December, 1963, as the relevant date and should publicly announce our intention to take the steps necessary to this end, including a conference to settle the final Constitution of Kenya in September.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) So far as possible the safeguards for minorities contained in the present Constitution of Kenya should be preserved. Some concession might have to be made to the view of the Kenya African Nationalist Union (KANU), from whose members the present Kenya Government was largely drawn, that the present safeguards were unduly restrictive in that they virtually precluded future constitutional changes of any kind. But the fact that the Constitutional Conference would have to reach conclusions very rapidly might help to keep changes to a minimum. Moreover, membership of the Federation would itself restrain a future Government of Kenya from making arbitrary constitutional changes; and this in turn would tend to strengthen the position of the minorities. The European inhabitants of Kenya would be likely to welcome the establishment of the Federation as tending to promote greater stability in the area as a whole.

(b) The problem of Zanzibar's nominal sovereignty over the region of Kenya known as the Coastal Strip could probably be solved by an arrangement with the Sultan of Zanzibar under which, subject to a process of consultation yet to be worked out in detail, sovereignty would be effectively ceded to the Government of an independent Kenya.

(c) It would be necessary to enter into consultation with the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia in an attempt to find a solution to the problem of the Northern Frontier District before the attainment of independence by Kenya. The establishment of the Federation might also be of value in this context, since the Northern Frontier District, while representing a substantial area of Kenya, would form a less significant part of a Federation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika; and this fact might make it politically less embarrassing for the Government of Kenya to accept the secession of the District to Somalia.

(d) The acceleration of Kenya's independence by some six months, which the timetable now proposed by the Colonial Secretary involved, would make it the more important to decide our future military dispositions in Africa and the Middle East. It had always been envisaged that, when Kenya became independent, United Kingdom troops would be withdrawn over a period. Under the earlier plans this withdrawal would probably have had to be completed in six months, i.e., by the end of 1964. It might now be possible, however, to extend this period to 12 months, i.e., from the end of 1963 to the end of 1964. It would remain important, however, that the troops withdrawn from Kenya should be transferred to Aden, where new accommodation would have to be provided for them. It would also be desirable to build up Kenya's own military forces, a process which would take at least 18 months; to ensure that, once the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops had started, it should be brought rapidly to completion; and to negotiate with the Kenya Government satisfactory arrangements for our retention of longer-term military facilities in Kenya itself, in particular the continuation of over-flying rights, the maintenance of certain radio stations, the provision of training facilities and the right to establish and make use of leave and rest camps. The strength of our negotiating position in these respects would be likely to depend on the extent to which we should be prepared to provide
assistance to the Government of Kenya in connection with the equipment, organisation and training of their own forces.

(e) The most serious difficulty to which the proposed acceleration of the timetable would give rise might be in relation to the current negotiations about the future of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It would now become difficult, if not impossible, to defer the grant of independence to Nyasaland for as long as would otherwise have been desirable; and this would in turn intensify pressure for corresponding acceleration in the case of Northern Rhodesia, to whom it might become necessary to concede a self-governing Constitution in the autumn of 1963. The problem of Southern Rhodesia would then become even more intractable than at present. Further discussions with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Winston Field, and with the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky, were due to start in the next few days. If a public announcement that Kenya was to attain independence in December 1963 were made on the eve of those discussions, the task of our negotiators would become even more difficult. It would be helpful, therefore, if the public announcement could be delayed for at least a week or 10 days, during which we could inform Mr. Field and Sir Roy Welensky of our revised intentions as regards Kenya, together with the justification of the course which we proposed to adopt.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the balance of advantage appeared to lie in arranging for Kenya to attain full independence in December 1963. But no public announcement to this effect should be made until the First Secretary of State had had an opportunity of ascertaining the probable reactions of Mr. Winston Field and Sir Roy Welensky. The Government of Kenya could reasonably be asked to accept the short delay involved, on the ground that we required further time in which to assess the implications of the redeployment of United Kingdom troops in Kenya on the basis of the revised timetable.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed, in principle, that Kenya should be granted independence in December 1963.
(2) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to make a public statement to this effect in the near future.
(3) Agreed to defer a decision on the precise form and timing of this statement until the First Secretary of State had been able to ascertain, and to report to the Cabinet, the reactions of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the Government’s decision to accelerate the attainment of independence by Kenya.

2 R A Butler, as minister i/c Central African affairs.
produce a KADU revolt; refusal of any changes would probably lead to revocation of the constitution by KANU on independence; to delay independence could provoke a unilateral declaration of independence by KANU. The situation thus seemed critical (CAB 128/37, CC 60(63)3, 15 Oct 1963). However, an acceptable settlement emerged from the conference, and Kenya became independent on 12 Dec 1963).

The Colonial Secretary said that at the conclusion of the Kenya Independence Conference the representatives of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) had accepted a limited number of changes in the Constitution approved at the Lancaster House Conference in 1962. These changes were less drastic than those which they had originally demanded; and, if we had refused them, the Kenya Government might well have declared the independence of the Colony by a unilateral act. In that event it would not have been realistic to seek to hold the country by force; but our relations with the local Government would have been endangered, the European population might have had to be withdrawn and the minority tribes would have been deprived of the protection offered by the Constitution as it now stood.

On the other hand there remained a danger that the representatives of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), who had not accepted the limited changes in the Constitution, might seek to provoke tribal disorder. There appeared to be a division of opinion within KADU itself, however, between those who favoured recourse to violence and those who advocated moderation. The longer a decision was delayed the less was the risk that large-scale disorder would break out; and such isolated incidents as might occur should be capable of being dealt with by the Kenya police and the Kenya African Rifles.

In discussion the Cabinet expressed their appreciation of the skill and persistence with which the Colonial Secretary had brought exceptionally difficult negotiations to a more successful outcome than had at one time appeared possible.

The Cabinet:—

Took note, with approval, of the statement by the Colonial Secretary.

180 CAB 128/38, CM 7(63)5 21 Nov 1963

[Kenya: land settlement and the future of European farming land]:

Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Colonial Secretary (C.P. (63) 18) and the Chief Secretary, Treasury (C.P. (63) 19) on the future of European farming land in Kenya.

The Colonial Secretary said that recent developments in Kenya, especially in the central Kikuyu region, were giving rise to growing anxiety about the future of the European mixed farmers. Increasing numbers of landless Kikuyu were invading this region; and thefts of stock, destruction of fencing, and attacks on property were becoming increasingly frequent. Resistance by the European farmers might precipitate racial disturbances; and the Government would be faced with a critical situation if military intervention became necessary in order to protect European lives. Apart from the practical difficulties of such an operation, the political effect of using United Kingdom troops for this purpose after Kenya had become independent would be very damaging. These developments were disappointing, particularly in the
light of the earlier expectation that there would be a secure future in Kenya for the European farming community. But it was now clear that, at least in the central region, the position of the Europeans would gradually become untenable; and the Government therefore had no alternative but to take prompt action if law and order were not to break down.

For this purpose we should immediately announce that we would assist the Government of Kenya to purchase some 350,000 acres of land in the central region over the next 3\(\frac{1}{2}\) years, at a cost of about £3.1 million. We should also indicate forthwith that the projected review of the existing land resettlement schemes would be advanced to a date early in the following year, thus implying that we contemplated further substantial transfers of land in the near future.

The Chief Secretary, Treasury,\(^1\) said that, whereas the Government’s policy of land purchase in Kenya had hitherto been intended to settle Africans on land previously occupied by European farmers, the present proposal would be seen to be designed primarily to compensate European farmers for the effects of constitutional change. Such a modification of policy would be liable to have wider repercussions. In particular, the inducement to the local government to maintain law and order would be removed; and there would be no justification for confining the proposed action to the central region of Kenya or for refusing similar treatment to European farmers and business men in other parts of Kenya and, in comparable circumstances, in other territories. Moreover, progress with the main settlement scheme did not justify its sudden expansion. Of the 650,000 acres bought under the scheme only 100,000 had so far been settled by Africans. There was no reason, therefore, why the 350,000 acres now in question should not be included in the main scheme if it were necessary to give priority to settlement in the central region. Some extension of the scheme might become necessary in due course; but, if so, it should be discussed with the Kenya Government in the context of the financial arrangements which would have to be negotiated between the United Kingdom and an independent Kenya.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) If the Kenya Government were unable or unwilling to restrain the Kikuyu tribesmen who were gradually invading the central region, the knowledge that European farmland was to be bought and resettled by Africans over a period of 3\(\frac{1}{2}\) years might not lead to any easing of tension. Indeed, it might merely encourage the Kikuyu to take over the farms immediately by force. On the other hand local opinion inclined to the view that the announcement of an extended settlement scheme would tend to reduce the danger of violence.

(b) If we were to avoid creating the impression that the main purpose of the new arrangements was not to resettle Africans but to compensate Europeans, with all the dangers of repercussion which this would entail, we should present our action in relation to the central region of Kenya as being part of an accelerated review of the settlement scheme in general. We should therefore refrain, if possible, from specifying either the acreage or the expenditure involved.

(c) The risk of repercussions should not, however, be exaggerated. If the pro-

---

\(^1\) Mr J Boyd-Carpenter.
posed new scheme secured a relaxation of the present tension in the area, it might become possible to stabilise the situation of the European farming community elsewhere in Kenya and so to limit the size of the United Kingdom's commitment. On the other hand, a breakdown of law and order in the central region at this stage would be more likely to lead to disorders elsewhere, possibly extending even beyond the borders of Kenya. If the situation deteriorated to a point at which it became necessary to contemplate the total withdrawal of the European farming community, the assets at risk might amount to some £140 million.

(d) It was arguable whether it would be to our advantage to seek to link the proposed extension of the present settlement scheme with the financial negotiations which we should have to undertake with the Kenya Government on or after the Colony's independence. If the two issues had to be considered together, the urgency attaching to the extension of the land resettlement scheme would compel us to advance the date of the wider negotiations. If so, we might be compelled to make concessions in those negotiations in order to secure a rapid solution of the problem of the resettlement scheme. If, on the other hand, the issues were dealt with individually, the total cost of two separate negotiations might well be greater than the cost of a single, combined settlement.

(e) Any payment to European farmers under the proposed arrangements should, if possible, be confined to United Kingdom citizens. There might be objection to providing from the United Kingdom Exchequer compensation for, e.g., South African farmers in Kenya.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that there was general agreement in the Cabinet that action must be taken to alleviate tension and anxiety in the central region of Kenya and that it should be based on some extension of the present land settlement scheme to include more European farming land in the affected areas. An early announcement to this effect would be desirable; and the Ministers concerned should therefore give further consideration to its precise terms, particularly the extent to which it should specify the degree of commitment which the Government were prepared to assume and should be linked with the wider financial negotiations which we should shortly have to undertake with the Government of an independent Kenya.

The Cabinet:—
Invited the Colonial Secretary, in consultation with the Chief Secretary, Treasury, and in the light of the considerations which had emerged from their discussion, to submit to the Prime Minister the draft of statement, to be made in Parliament at an early date, about land settlement in Kenya..

181  CAB 128/31/1, CC 15(57)5  4 Mar 1957
[Somaliland and the Horn of Africa]: Cabinet conclusions on policy

[Burke Trend and his officials faced a problem of reconciling conflicting interests. Good relations with both Ethiopia and the Somali peoples were essential, if only for British strategic overflying rights (Nigeria–Nairobi–Aden); Ethiopia was in addition valuable as traditionally anti-Egyptian and therefore an obstacle to Egyptian or communist penetration of Black Africa via the Nile. But the Somalis wanted to unite on
independence, and this was opposed by Ethiopia—and also by the USA, France and Italy; yet Britain had to protect Somali tribal grazing rights in the Haud of Ethiopia. Moreover, if an enlarged independent Somalia fell into unfriendly hands, this would have serious consequences for the defence of Kenya. The officials’ report could see no answer except to make Somalis and Ethiopians work together (PREM 11/2582, minute to prime minister, 1 Mar 57). In the event the Ethiopians felt the British Government was doing much for the Somalis but nothing for them.)

The Cabinet had before them a report by officials (C. (57) 38) about the Somaliland Protectorate and the Horn of Africa.

The Colonial Secretary said that the approaching independence of Somalia made it urgent to evolve a firm policy for the Horn of Africa. Our efforts to maintain our position in the Aden Protectorate would be frustrated if the Somali peoples united under influences hostile to us. He therefore endorsed the recommendation in paragraph 39 (a) of the report that we should make a sustained attempt to induce the Ethiopians and Somalis to work together, and that we should seek to persuade other Western Powers to join with us in promoting this objective. The prospect that a Greater Somalia, if it came into being with our encouragement, would have expansionist designs on the Ogaden could be used as a means of persuading the Ethiopian Government to carry out more satisfactorily their obligations in respect of the Haud under the Agreement of 1954. Although elements in British Somaliland would doubtless continue to press, on racial grounds, for the union of all Somali peoples, the strength of this agitation would be reduced if the grievances relating to the administration for the Haud by Ethiopia were removed. As regards other possible courses of action, the support of the French would not be forthcoming for the union of the Somali peoples, and the Italians would not be prepared to retain responsibility for Somalia when their trusteeship came to an end in 1960.

The Foreign Secretary said that it would not be to our advantage to foster the creation of a Greater Somalia which would need to be supported by a substantial subsidy if it was not to come under Arab domination. Our interest lay, therefore, in building up Ethiopia as a counterpoise to Arab expansionism in the Horn of Africa. The Ethiopian Government were themselves anxious to restore friendly relations, which had deteriorated solely because of the local difficulties which had arisen in connection with the administration of the Haud.

Discussion showed that the Cabinet were in agreement with the views which had been expressed. If, however, the course proposed was to be followed, some further consideration might need to be given to modifying the guardedly encouraging statement which Lord Lloyd had been authorised to make in the previous year about a possible association between the Somaliland Protectorate and Somalia after 1960.

The Cabinet:—

Approved, subject to the points made in their discussion, the recommendation in paragraph 39 (a) of C. (57) 38, and authorised the consequential action outlined in that paragraph.

SOMALILAND

182 CO 847/74, no 13

Report on a visit to Somaliland: minute by W L Gorell Barnes (CO) to Mr Lennox-Boyd

16 May 1958

On Sunday last, May 11th, I flew over to Hargeisa for the day from Aden and spent some 3 or 4 hours talking to the Governor, Mr. Carrel, and Mr. Drysdale, who had come in for a few days from Jigjigga.

2. The road from the airport to Government House goes right through the whole length of Hargeisa. In view of the alarmist speeches which Mr. Bernard Braine has, I understand, been making, it may be worth while recording that throughout the length of our drive there was hardly a group of Somalis who did not salute the Governor or wave to him as the car went by with the Union Jack flying.

3. The Governor and his advisers asked me to look into a number of points concerning C.D. & W. schemes and so on, which are being pursued in the Department and with which I need not trouble you. But the greater part of the discussion was taken up with two subjects—constitutional development and relations with Ethiopia.

4. It looks as though the mixed commission which has been set up to go into the question of making the Legislative Council more representative, and is at present taking evidence, will recommend that an official majority should be retained at the next stage, and that of the unofficial Members one-third should be indirectly elected through the tribal organisations, one-third directly elected on a qualitative suffrage in the towns, and the remaining one-third nominated. This is apparently in accordance with the wishes of most of those who have been consulted.

5. The Governor and his advisers are at present considering whether at the next stage they should recommend a start of Somali participation in the executive, e.g. by appointing some Parliamentary Secretaries or something of the kind. Mr. Carrel fears that anybody who accepted such posts would become labelled as “Government stooges”, and that their position would be prejudiced when constitutional development goes further. I myself, however, am inclined to feel that we should not be deterred by this and that, provided that any Somalis who accepted the post do so with their eyes open about possible short-term prejudice to their future careers, it might well be a good thing to have 2 or 3 sound Somalis in the executive.

6. The Protectorate Government are also thinking of suggesting that, when the arrangements for the next stage as eventually agreed between us are announced, there should also be announced, as was done in Tanganyika, an intention to appoint fairly soon thereafter a commission to start considering the next stage thereafter.

7. We all agreed that the need at the moment in the Protectorate was:

(a) that there should be some change next year but that it should not be so radical that there is any danger of our losing control of the government;
(b) that, whilst refusing to go too far next year, we should give an indication that we were considering further advances at some future date; and

---

1 Sir T Pike, since 1954.
3 J G S Drysdale, British liaison officer in Somaliland since 1955.
4 MP (Con) for SE Essex.
(c) that we should undertake in 1959 no definite commitments about future advance or about eventual union with Somalia, but should be ready to make fairly rapid advances in both these respects if and when we are really satisfied that the independent Somalia is both capable of existing as a country and reasonably friendly.

8. In my view the sort of proposals which the Protectorate authorities are considering are well conceived to meet this situation. But we are in no way committed and the Governor, when he has made up his mind on outstanding points, will of course submit his proposals for the Secretary of State's consideration.

9. The situation in regard to relations with the Ethiopians is, I am afraid, much less satisfactory. The new Vice-Governor of Harar, though more ready to talk "off the record" than his predecessor, is at least as determined to get control of the tribes, and shows no sign of wishing to operate the 1954 Agreement in a friendly and co-operative manner. He has told Mr. Drysdale off the record that there is no prospect whatsoever of the Ethiopians ever agreeing to a list of Protectorate tribes which would be acceptable to us. Mr. Drysdale is fairly certain that there will, within a month or two now, be another challenge to the position of the Liaison Officers such as took place two years ago; and he does not believe that on this occasion there is much hope of high-level intervention leading to a détente, as it did in 1956 when you spoke to the then Foreign Minister.

10. None of us were any more able to think of any solution to this Haud problem than we have been over the last 3 or 4 years. We were all agreed, however, that it was better to put up with the strains caused by operating the 1954 Agreement rather than to give up our rights under that Agreement, and leave the Somali tribes to the mercy of the Ethiopians; and this was the best message we could think of giving Mr. Drysdale to take back to his staff who, I gather, are a little apt to become depressed and wonder where this whole business of the Haud is going to end.

11. The fundamental importance of the Haud has recently become a little overlaid by the greater, immediate importance of aid to Somalia. But we must not let it get forgotten, and I have arranged for the Governor to send us a despatch setting out some of his worries for the future and, when it has been received, I will, if it seems suitable, circulate it to the Official Africa Committee as the basis for a further discussion of these matters there.

12. My hunch is that, whereas our own treaty obligations make it impossible for us to find any solution to this problem, it may be easier for the Americans eventually to take some fruitful initiative. I draw a crumb of comfort from the fact that the new American Consul-General in Mogadishu, a Mr. Lynch, whom I met in Aden on his way to take up his post, seemed to me to be a solid and sensible citizen. I told him that I knew our authorities in the Protectorate would be very glad to welcome him at any time and arranged for Sir T. Pike to ask him over when a decent interval had elapsed.
Aden Colony and Protectorate”. The report showed the military implications of political proposals for the Somaliland Protectorate and Aden.

A. Somaliland Protectorate

Lord Mountbatten\(^1\) said that the crux of the problem appeared to be one of timing. Political advancement in the Somaliland Protectorate would inevitably lead to a demand for advancement elsewhere, particularly in Aden. In view of the great importance of Aden from the defence point of view, it was desirable that advancement in Somaliland should not proceed more quickly than was absolutely essential.

Sir Dermot Boyle\(^2\) agreed, and said that since the Somaliland Protectorate was far less politically advanced than Aden, it would have been expected, looking at the matter objectively, that the granting of independence to the Somaliland Protectorate would have followed that of Aden.

Sir Francis Festing\(^3\) said he agreed that from the military point of view there were good grounds for delaying the grant of independence to the Somaliland Protectorate. In his experience we acquired very little good will by voluntarily abdicating our responsibilities in dependent territories; it was simply interpreted as weakness. This was particularly true in the Middle East.

Mr. Gorell Barnes (Colonial Office) said there were three reasons why it had become essential to grant independence to the Somaliland Protectorate in the near future. Firstly, we had ceded, in 1897, one-third of the territory to Ethiopia and never got it back. This precedent was the “Achilles’ heel” of our position. Secondly, whereas we had developed Aden very considerably, and the inhabitants were multiracial, we had created virtually nothing in Somaliland, where the population was almost entirely of one race. Thirdly, the neighbouring territory of Somalia, a United Nations protectorate administered by the Italians, was to be granted independence in 1960.

For these reasons the United Kingdom was compelled to move with the tide. Although in the event subsequent negotiations for union with Somalia might be long drawn out and even abortive, if we attempted to impose delay on the progress towards independence, not only might it involve holding the country by force of arms but it was likely that the U.A.R. would have an opportunity to make political capital by espousing the cause of Somaliland.

He agreed that advancement in Somaliland would lead to increasing demand for independence in Aden. Nevertheless, it had been estimated that such a demand would arise in any case within a year and consequently we had not a great deal to lose.

Since the draft Colonial Office paper had been prepared, it had been decided that, when the Colonial Secretary visited the Protectorate next February, he would not include in his statement any specific date for the achievement of self-government, nor would he make any promises as regards the implementation of proposals that might be made for association between the Protectorate and Somalia.

B. Aden Colony and Protectorate

Lord Mountbatten said it must presumably be accepted that eventually independence would be granted to Aden. When that occurred we would no longer be able to rely on

---

\(^1\) Chairman of COS Committee; first sea lord, 1955–1959; formerly last viceroy of India, 1947.
\(^2\) Marshal of the RAF, chief of air staff, 1955–1959.
using it as a military base, in all circumstances, whatever treaty rights we might enjoy. Obviously it was militarily desirable to retain our facilities as long as possible; he was doubtful whether it would ever be practicable to use force in Aden to insist on our defence rights. He believed that the Committee should now institute a study on alternative means of supporting military operations in the Persian Gulf without the use of Aden. Such an examination should be undertaken in the context of Part II of the study on Middle East policy by the Official Committee on the Middle East. At the same time the Committee's view on policy in South West Arabia should be brought up to date. When the study was completed it would then be possible for the Committee to advise Ministers on the military consequences of the timing of political advancement in Aden.

Sir Francis Festing said that during his visit to Aden he had been led to believe that there was no pressure from within the colony itself for independence. He did not see how it would be possible to evolve any strategy for the Persian Gulf which did not involve the use of Aden. The security of our tenure in Aden had always seemed to him to be more assured than almost any other colonial territory.

Mr. Gorell Barnes (Colonial Office) said that the Colonial Office were now inclined to accept the proposals of the Governor for progressive steps towards independence. The Governor advised that unless we did so we should antagonise the Arabs and drive them into the arms of the U.A.R. and so in the end be forced out even sooner. The situation had been adversely affected by the revolution in Iraq. There were obvious dangers in the Governor’s proposals and the Colonial Office were carefully weighing the arguments. There was less urgency in coming to a decision over Aden than there was in the case of the Somaliland Protectorate and no decisions were likely to be taken until the Colonial Secretary had visited the territory next February. The Colonial Office would welcome the further advice of the Chiefs of Staff after they had carried out the study suggested by the First Sea Lord.

184  CAB 134/1557, CPC 16(58)1  22 Dec 1958
[Somaliland Protectorate]: minutes of a meeting of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee, on policy

[At an earlier meeting of the Colonial Policy Committee (21 Nov 1958) Mr Lennox-Boyd explained that the governor considered that he should announce that acceleration of constitutional development was being considered: 'The timing of this further announcement would need careful examination, particularly in relation to the situation in Aden, where the Governor had reached the conclusion that we should now reverse our previous policy and allow the Colony to accede to the new Western Aden Federation, when it was constituted if the leaders in both the Federation and the Colony so wished. He was therefore anxious that no further announcement about the political and constitutional future of British Somaliland should be made before the Western Aden Federation had been established early in the following year. On the other hand it was desirable that such an announcement, if approved, should, if possible, be made before the middle of March, when elections were due to take place in Somaliland and a large part of the population migrated to the Haud and the Reserved Areas for several months. The content of the further announcement would also need very careful consideration. It was the considered view of the Governor of Somaliland that, unless we were prepared publicly to accept in principle a union between the Protectorate and Somalia after 1960, anti-British feeling in Somaliland would become dangerously high. The Governors of our East African territories recognised that a concession of this kind to Somali sentiment, coupled with the accelerated constitutional advance in the Protectorate which it implied, would
increase the difficulty of controlling the pace of constitutional development in East Africa. But they regarded this risk as preferable to the emergency (sic) of a hostile Somaliland, under Egyptian influence, in the near future'. The Committee agreed further consideration was urgently required (CPC 14(58)).] The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (58) 24) regarding our future policy in the Somaliland Protectorate.

The Colonial Secretary said that, in accordance with the Committee's decision at their last meeting, the Governor of the Protectorate had made a statement announcing the introduction of an electoral system into the Protectorate Government for the first time. He had also indicated that this step was designed to prepare the way for further advances, on which he hoped to make a further announcement before the end of March. The context of this further announcement now required consideration.

The Protectorate was of little value to us, and the defence facilities which we required there (mainly staging and overflying rights) were useless unless we could retain similar facilities in Ethiopia and acquire corresponding facilities in Somalia. The fact that Somalia was due to achieve independence in 1960 had given rise to a demand in the Protectorate for union with that country in a Greater Somalia, and the Governor was probably right in recommending that, in these circumstances, the right policy for the United Kingdom Government to pursue as regards the Protectorate was one of progressive disengagement. But both the timing and the method of this process required careful consideration. While the Governor believed that the forthcoming statement would only achieve its maximum impact if we were to fix a date (e.g. 1962) by which the Protectorate would achieve full self-Government, it might be wiser, and less damaging as regards our East African territories, that no specific date should be mentioned at this stage. As regards the method of disengagement the alternatives were to offer the Protectorate self-Government or the prospect of some association with Somalia. The Governor felt that nothing less would suffice than an unqualified undertaking that, at any time after the end of 1960, we would, if Somalia and the Protectorate so wished, promote discussions between the two countries about the possibility of a closer association between them. It might be preferable, however, to avoid too definite a commitment on this point until it could be seen how an independent Somalia developed. At the same time we should give private assurances to the Protectorate Somalis that we should not stand in their way if, in due course, they wished to associate with an independent Somalia. On these assumptions he proposed to make, during his forthcoming visit to the Protectorate, the statement at Annex B to C.P.C. (58) 24.

In discussion the following points were made—

(a) Need we, for the purposes of this statement, go beyond indicating that by 1960 there would be an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council and that Somalis would be given executive responsibility in the Government? In the light of our experience with other dependent territories, which we had guided to independence, it might be inadvisable to encourage the Protectorate Somalis to advance too rapidly to self-Government or to amalgamate with Somalia into a larger unit which might subsequently seek to absorb those areas in Northern Kenya and Ethiopia which were peopled by Somalis. On the other hand unless we made timely concessions to the growing pressure for constitutional advance in the Protectorate
we should face increasing hostility on the part of the local population; and the
Governors of our East African territories regarded this danger as less acceptable
than the risks inherent in an acceleration of the pace of constitutional advance in
the Protectorate. If we made it clear that self-Government (as distinct from inde-
pendence) was within the reach of the Protectorate Somalis, they were less likely to
adopt precipitate policies and might well prefer, on reflection, to remain to some
extent under our protection.

(b) It was important to retain the confidence of the Ethiopians, who were
potentially a more reliable barrier than the Somalis to Communist or Egyptian
expansion in Africa. It would therefore be desirable to discuss our intentions with the
Ethiopian Government in an endeavour to allay their suspicion that, by encouraging
the union of Somaliland with Somalia, we were threatening them with encirclement.
On the other hand, if the Somalis become aware of these discussions, they would
assume that we had been persuaded by the Ethiopians to adopt a less generous
attitude towards their own aspirations than we might otherwise have done; and from
this point of view it would be preferable to give the Ethiopian Government only a few
days advance warning of the forthcoming statement.

(c) It might be to our ultimate advantage to work towards a Greater Somalia
within the Commonwealth. It would be undesirable, however, to make any overt
move in this direction until Somalia attained independence in 1960.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that there appeared to be no
alternative to an advance in the constitutional status of British Somaliland; and in
these circumstances the Colonial Secretary's proposals offered the best chance of
maintaining our interests in the area and of influencing the Protectorate Somalis in
the direction of retaining a link with the Commonwealth after attaining self-
Government. The draft statement at Annex B of C.P.C. (58) 24 could therefore be
approved in principle, subject to further examination of points of detail. It might, for
instance, be desirable to refer, in paragraph 6, to the end of the United Nations
trusteeship of Somalia rather than to the territory's achieving independence. The
precise stage at which we should consult the Ethiopian Government required further
consideration; but we should give them a timely warning of our intentions in general
terms, in an attempt to convince them that it was in their own interests to recognise
that some form of association between the Protectorate and Somalia was inevitable,
and to press them to settle their frontier dispute with the Protectorate. It would be
helpful if such consultations were sponsored by the United States Government, who
provided substantial financial assistance to Ethiopia and were also committed to
provide economic assistance to an independent Somalia but were politically less
involved in the area than ourselves. . . .
The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs recalled that early in 1959 the Colonial Secretary had announced that if, when Somalia attained independence, the Legislative Council of British Somaliland resolved to effect some form of union with that country, Her Majesty’s Government would be willing to arrange for negotiations to take place. It had at that time been thought that the Italian trusteeship of Somalia would not be brought to an end until December 1960, and that thereafter the discussions necessary to effect union with the Protectorate could not be completed until towards the end of 1962. Now, however, Somalia was to become independent on 1st July, 1960, and public opinion in the Protectorate had turned strongly in favour of achieving both independence and union with Somalia on that date. A resolution calling for immediate steps to that end was to be moved that day in the British Somaliland Legislative Council. The Governor had reported that anything in the nature of an official declaration that this time-table was impracticable would provoke disturbances in the Protectorate which the local police and security forces could not be relied on to handle. The Minister of State therefore proposed that the Governor’s representative should be authorised to make, in the course of the debate in the Legislative Council, a more forthcoming statement which would be tantamount to agreeing that unofficial discussions between the Protectorate and Somalia might begin at once.

In discussion serious misgivings were voiced about this proposal. Such a statement would prejudice our relations with the Ethiopian Government, since we had given them to understand that we would do nothing to promote union before Somalia attained independence. It would also prejudice the relations between Ethiopia and the successor State, to the serious detriment of the latter. The situation would become even worse if the discussions on union were to lead to a joint declaration in favour of the creation of a Greater Somalia embracing, not only Somalia and the Protectorate, but also the Somali minorities in Ethiopia and Kenya. Moreover, there were many complex problems to be solved before the Protectorate could attain either independence or union with Somalia, and precipitate action could lead to administrative and financial chaos. To accelerate constitutional advance in British Somaliland under pressure of the kind which had developed would also have unfortunate consequences in other dependent territories in Africa.

On the other hand, it was clearly desirable to avoid a situation in which law and order could only be preserved by the transfer of British troops to the area. It might be possible to reassure the Ethiopian Government by a statement in the United Kingdom Parliament disclaiming any intention on the part of Her Majesty’s Government to encourage or support any claim for incorporation in a wider Somali union of any territory other than Somalia and the Protectorate.

Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that it was the general feeling of the Cabinet that some concession must be made to the demand in British Somaliland for independence and union with Somalia on 1st July. A statement on behalf of the Governor should therefore be made in the Legislative Council on the following day, to the effect that Her Majesty’s Government recognised that the resolution of the Council was a clear expression of the wish of the

1 Lord Perth.
people; that there were many practical problems to be settled before the
Protectorate could become independent and the Governor was willing to initiate
discussions about these at once; that union with Somalia would similarly give rise
to practical problems; that these were primarily a matter for the people of the
Protectorate themselves and if they wished to initiate preliminary, unofficial dis-
cussions with political leaders in Somalia, Her Majesty's Government would not
prevent that. Thereafter it would be necessary to decide in the light of develop-
ments whether it would in fact be practicable to grant independence to the
Somaliland Protectorate on 1st July.

The Cabinet:—

Invited the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, in consultation with the Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs, to prepare, and submit for the Prime Minister's
approval, the draft of a statement to be made in the Legislative Council of British
Somaliland on the lines agreed in the Cabinet discussion.

186   CAB 134/1559, CPC 4(60)1  27 Apr 1960

‘Constitutional development in Somaliland’: minutes of Cabinet
Colonial Policy Committee meeting

The Committee had before them a note by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (60) 12) in
which it was suggested that at the forthcoming talks in London with elected
Somaliland Ministers we were likely to be confronted with a request to grant the
Somaliland Protectorate independence towards the end of June in order that an
independent government of the Protectorate could make formal arrangements for a
union with Somalia immediately after the Italian trusteeship of that territory came
to an end on 1st July, 1960. The Colonial Secretary would stress to the Somaliland
Ministers the difficulties of making arrangements for independence in such a short
time, but if nevertheless they continued to press for this date, he considered that we
should accept it rather than lose Somali goodwill and risk the development of a
situation in which it might be necessary to use British troops for the maintenance of
internal security. The memorandum went on to suggest the way in which particular
matters might be handled in the forthcoming talks.

Although some misgivings were expressed about the speed with which we were
withdrawing our protection from Somaliland, and in particular on the consequences
for overseas officers serving the Protectorate Government, there was general
agreement that in the last resort we should accede to a request for independence in
time to enable the Protectorate to link up with an independent Somalia on 1st July,
1960. The following were the main points made in discussion:—

(a) It seemed likely that the Protectorate would form two of eight provinces in a
new united Somalia. Although according to legal advice the government of the new
state would be the heir at law of the Anglo/Ethiopian Treaty of 1897, the
Anglo/Ethiopian Agreement of 1954 which related to grazing rights would lapse. If
these rights were to continue after independence it would be necessary for a new
agreement to be negotiated between the Ethiopian Government and the Government
of the new state.
(b) We needed to secure overflying rights over the existing territory of the Protectorate and of Somalia and we also wished to continue to use the B.B.C. relay transmitter at Berbera. Such agreements would however have to be negotiated with the Government of the new state. This might be no easy matter, though we should endeavour to ensure that we were not committed to giving financial assistance to the new state until we had secured the facilities we needed.

(c) It would be necessary to continue some financial aid to the new state, partly in order to ensure that United States and Italian contributions were also continued. Our aid should commence at not more than £1.422 millions per annum, and should taper off over a maximum period of five years.

(d) We should make every effort to get the new Government to accept responsibility for the payment of compensation and pensions to the overseas officials who would be displaced, but it might be necessary for Her Majesty's Government to assume this responsibility, at any rate until the new Government was constituted. Any payments by Her Majesty's Government on this account would be set against the figure of financial assistance to be agreed.

(e) It was of great importance that we should do all we could to preserve and improve relations between the Ethiopian Government and the new Government of a united Somalia. We should also try to associate the Italian Government with the discussions and other arrangements which would be necessary before the union of Somaliland and Somalia took place. We should stress to the Italians the need for goodwill towards Somali aspirations and the dangers, if we failed to assist them, of the new state being alienated from the West.

(f) We should not wish the new state to become a member of the Commonwealth, and there was no indication at present that they would wish to apply for membership. If the matter were raised by Somaliland Ministers at the forthcoming discussions, the Colonial Secretary should say that the matter would be one for the Government of the new state; he should in no way encourage the idea that we should be in favour of such an association.1

Summing up the discussion, the Prime Minister said that in the last resort we must agree to a demand by Somaliland Ministers for independence in order that the Protectorate might link up with an independent Somalia on 1st July, 1960. If the Government were to be criticised for withdrawing our protection so early we should argue that the policy was entirely consistent with that adumbrated by the then Colonial Secretary in his statement on 9th February, 1959; that our action was fully in conformity with public opinion in the Protectorate; and that the timetable had necessarily been advanced by the decision that Italian trusteeship of Somalia should end on 1st July, 1960.

Subject to the points made in the Committee's discussion the talks with Somaliland Ministers should be handled on the lines suggested by the Colonial Secretary. It would be important to keep closely in touch with the Governments of other friendly countries, in particular the Italian and Ethiopian Governments, in order to enlist their sympathy and goodwill for the creation of the union, to preserve so far as possible Western influence in the area, and to prevent the new state from falling under the influence of Egypt or the Soviet bloc...
CAB 128/34, CC 34(60)5 2 June 1960

[Possible admission of Somali Republic to the Commonwealth]:
Cabinet conclusions

[When in January 1960 Macmillan heard that the US State Dept believed HMG should let it be known that the entry of the Somali State to the Commonwealth was not contemplated, he minuted: 'I cannot agree to [this]. Why can't the Commonwealth grow? I must be consulted about this. H.M. 6.1.59' (on tel from Sir H Caccia, PREM 11/2582). But the Colonial Policy Committee were opposed to entry (see previous document); so were the Chiefs of Staff—'an unworthy little place'. Macmillan, however, continued to favour the Somalis retaining some link with the Commonwealth.]

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C. (60) 91) about the admission to membership of the Commonwealth of the new Somali Republic which was to come into being on 1st July, when Somaliland and Somalia united.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said that the arguments against admission of the new Somali Republic to the Commonwealth were very strong. It would not for many years be a financially viable State but would be dependent on aid, not only from ourselves but also from the United States and Italy. Its admission to the Commonwealth would, moreover, antagonise the Ethiopians, the French and the Italians, the last of whom had made it clear that in that event they would discontinue their financial aid. While there was no evidence of any definite desire on the part of the Somalis to join the Commonwealth, it would be embarrassing to have to refuse a formal request if one should be made; and it was therefore proposed that the Consul-General at Mogadishu and the Governor of Hargeisa should be instructed to adopt a discouraging attitude if any informal approach were made to them.

In discussion it was suggested that, while admission of the new Somali Republic to the Commonwealth might do something to counter Communist infiltration, the reactions of the Ethiopian Government, who were already deeply suspicious of our intentions, would be so hostile that they in turn would be likely to become more subject to Russian influence. In view of the attitude of France and Italy, the balance of advantage therefore lay on the side of discouraging any advances which the Somalis might make, and our intention to do so should be made clear in strict confidence to the other Governments concerned.

The Cabinet:—
Approved the proposals in C. (60) 91.

1 Mr D Ormsby-Gore, ambassador to Washington from 1961.
CHAPTER 5

Aden, Mediterranean, Asian, West Indian and other colonies

Document numbers 188–299

188  CO 1015/1911, nos 4–6  27–28 Mar 1958
[Aden Colony and Protectorate: future policy]: letters from Sir W Luce (Aden) to W L Gorell Barnes (CO) [Extract]

[In a further covering note to this (in effect) three-part letter, the governor emphasised the ‘very serious threat’ to the whole British and western position in Arabia, Red Sea, and Horn of Africa: the loss of that position to the Soviet Union or Egypt would ‘create a new threat of great magnitude to our wider interests’; an urgent and thorough reappraisal was necessary. Gorell Barnes described the letter(s) as ‘important, long and rather shattering’.]

1. 27 Mar 1958
The almost bewildering series of changes which have taken place in the political structure of the Middle East during the last two or three years, the gathering momentum of Arab nationalism towards the goal of reuniting the Arab world, the shifting pattern of relations between the Arab States themselves and the strong interest which the Soviet Union and its satellites are displaying in them have inevitably had an unsettling effect on Aden and its Protectorate as also on the neighbouring territories with which Great Britain has ties of interest or obligation. The threat occasioned by these changes seems to me to make a reappraisal of our position urgently necessary in order that we may consider the shaping of our policy to meet the new situation.

2. In this letter I propose to set down my assessment of the present situation and in a second and accompanying letter to suggest in general terms how best we should meet it. A third letter will contain a specific proposal for action which I believe to be essential if our position is not to suffer an immediate and severe deterioration.

3. Before passing to the wider issue, it may be convenient to sum up the present policy of H.M.G. towards the Colony and Protectorate and the external forces which at present it has to face. In brief the policy is to retain control of the Colony for the foreseeable future in order to protect H.M.G.’s strategic and economic interests. To achieve this we must also maintain our position in the Protectorate to enable us to hold the Yemen at a safe distance from the Colony borders, and to fulfil our treaty obligations to the Protectorate Rulers.

4. In the Colony we are following the normal pattern of gradual constitutional development and H.M.G. have declared that this process will continue up to “a considerable degree of internal self-government”. It would however be idle to assume that the Colony Arabs will be content to stop anywhere short of full self-government
and thereafter self-determination. It would be equally idle to assume that having reached that point they would choose to be fully self-governing within the Commonwealth. Nothing seems less likely than that outcome, whatever some members of the Aden Association may say at the present time. The pull of pan-Arabism will be far too strong. It is my estimate that the “considerable degree of internal self-government” envisaged by H.M.G. will be reached at the beginning of 1963, with some further constitutional advance at the end of the four-year life of the new Legislative Council. Thereafter it might be possible to hold the position for a further 3 or 4 years, but in the face of a growing demand for full self-government and self-determination. To retain control of the Colony after 1967 will in my view involve a head-on collision with Aden Arabs, their physical repression and probably a constitutional breakdown. It is quite possible that such a situation will arise before 1967 if the local situation is subjected to strong external influences and if the Colony Arabs see no prospect but an indefinite continuation of British control.

5. In the Protectorate we have inherited a somewhat precarious position which deprives us of any effective control over the conduct of its internal affairs and which rests primarily upon the extreme indigence of most of the States and their dire need for financial assistance and upon their fear of being subjected to the tyrannical rule of the Zeidi Imam of the Yemen and their consequent desire for our protection. There is no political or economic cohesion among the States, most of which are primitive tribal autocracies riven by rivalries, feuds and jealousies. A small but ambitious intelligentsia based on Lahej is hand-in-glove with Egypt and is prepared to use the Yemen, in the pursuit of its own interests. For nearly forty years the British position in the Protectorate has been challenged by the Imam of the Yemen and in the past four years he has greatly increased his efforts to achieve his ambition of domination over the Protectorate, mainly by means of subversion of Protectorate tribes, and has constantly proclaimed his intentions with growing candour. In these four years there has been a steady decline in security in the Protectorate, particularly the western area; more and more rifles are being pumped in by the Yemen, some road communications are permanently cut and others are highly precarious, the public are being severely inconvenienced and development is being hampered. We ourselves have been forced to hand out large numbers of rifles to enable Rulers to hold the loyalty of their tribes, and our security forces are having to undertake increasing commitments both on the frontier and within the Protectorate.

6. In these circumstances the Rulers and their people are beginning to wonder what is to be the end of it all, and to feel that matters cannot be allowed to go on deteriorating in this manner. In seeking a solution, and being Arabs, the thoughts of many will turn, faute de mieux, towards the attractions of a wider Arab World and in particular towards the glamour of Nasser\(^1\) and his star. The Protectorate’s growing reliance on British protection against the Imam’s designs will become an increasing embarrassment to its Rulers and people, particularly in the face of intense propaganda from Cairo.

7. These are the basic features, as I see them, of the political situation in Colony and Protectorate. They indicate a growing threat to the retention of our control of the Colony in the years to come. But within the past twelve months new factors have

---

\(^1\) Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, 1956–1970. In 1958 he created a federation with Syria, the United Arab Republic (UAR), but Syria withdrew in 1961.
greatly increased this threat. First, there is the supply of Russian arms to the Yemen since May, 1957, followed by rapid political and economic penetration. Secondly there is the formation of the United Arab Republic and the Yemen's federation with it. The Russian advent on the Yemen scene can only be regarded as the latest move in Russia's present main assault on the Western Powers—the drive to the South through the heart of the Middle East, towards Africa and the Persian Gulf. The association of the Yemen with the U.A.R. is a major advance in Nasser's campaign for Arab unity under the leadership of Egypt. For the present Russia's and Egypt's aims are sufficiently in common for each to make the maximum use of the other; both wish to destroy the Western position in the Middle East and both wish to penetrate Africa. In pursuing these aims both will make use of the Yemen's ambitions in south-west Arabia, and it is Aden which will feel the first impact of the Russian/Egyptian drive to the South. In addition to the long-standing but limited threat from the Yemen, we are now faced with a double threat of great magnitude.

8. I am the first to recognise the instability of the Arab world and its politics, and the rifts which divide the present rulers of the Arab States. But in my view it would be the greatest mistake to continue to rely indefinitely on these factors to protect us from the accomplishment of Nasser's aims. Whatever we may think of Arab nationalism and its leaders, there is no gainsaying that it does represent a deep-seated emotional urge in the rank-and-file of the Arab peoples, and to the Arab emotion is the strongest of all motives. However unrealistic and unstable the U.A.R. and its federation with the Yemen may appear to us, there is no doubt that it has caught the imagination of Arabs generally and has enhanced Nasser's prestige as the embodiment of a vague longing for Arab unity. By contrast the federation of Iraq and Jordan is regarded as a defensive move by two monarchs to protect their personal position. Nasser is now in a stronger position to appeal over the heads of the monarchs to the people and to dissatisfied elements among the ruling classes and in the trial of strength which is now clearly beginning, the monarchs may be hard put to it to maintain their position. Saud\(^2\) would appear to have become a back number already. On the other hand, as you already know, I consider that neither Russia's nor Egypt's position in the Yemen is yet secure and that prompt and effective action on the lines I have proposed elsewhere could at least check their plans. But the sands are running out and in the absence so far of any decision on my proposals, I am assuming for present purposes that Russia and Egypt will be able within the next few months to consolidate their hold on the Yemen sufficiently to discourage or to deal with any serious spontaneous uprising among the Yemenis.

9. On the above assumption, my own assessment of the likely course of events is that Russia and Egypt will lend strong diplomatic support to the Imam in his claims on the Protectorate and Colony, will open a violent propaganda campaign appealing to Arab nationalism in south-west Arabia against British "imperialism", will supply the Imam with additional means to increase his subversive activities and will make the maximum use of our extreme nationalists, such as the Jifris, to embarrass our position.\(^3\) But for the time being I believe they are likely to try to restrain the Imam from over-provocative actions against the Protectorate frontier or serious sabotage

\(^3\) The Jifris were a ruling family, violently anti-British, who were especially influential in the Lahej, Haushabi and Alawi states.
and terrorist activities in the Colony for fear that we shall strike back at the Yemen really hard (I wish I could believe that their fears are justified) before they have completed their preparations for their next move. The preparations I have in mind are such as the construction of a harbour at Ras el Khatib, the construction of an airfield and probably other military installations in the Bab el Mandeb area, the improvement of other airfields and communications and a considerable build-up of their military strength in the Yemen, including of course aircraft. When those preparations have been made they will be in virtual control of the Red Sea and will be ready both to put extreme pressure on our position in Aden and to exploit the opportunity offered by Somalia's independence in 1960 to penetrate the Horn of Africa. If in the meantime Saudi Arabia, as now appears most likely, has joined the "glorious Egyptian caravan" then there will also be of course a severe threat to our oil interests in the Persian Gulf, which would be extended to the Eastern Aden Protectorate were oil to be found there.

10. To sum up, as I see it, Aden is in the grip of four powerful currents in the tide of world affairs. One is the evolution of the Colonial Empire from dependence to independence, either within or outside the Commonwealth, the second is Arab nationalism, the third is the decline of British power and the fourth is Russian expansionism. All these currents flow towards the same point, that is to say, the termination of British control in Aden. To swim against one would be hard enough, to swim against all four is, I firmly believe, beyond our strength. By fighting Arab nationalism we shall facilitate Russian expansionism. If we could rely on Aden as a secure base from which to resist the Russian advance into the Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea area, that would be a very strong argument for entrenching ourselves here indefinitely. But as it is, Arab ambitions constitute the more immediate threat to our position and by resisting them indefinitely we shall present Russia with the simplest means of furthering her own aims. Our aim should rather be to enlist Arab nationalism against Russian expansionism. Some would say that this is impracticable because anti-Westernism, and anti-Britishism in particular, is an essential component of Arab nationalism. Nevertheless, I believe that the Arab world will become aware of the dangers of Russian imperialism, but only when we have removed the main source of antagonism between ourselves and the Arabs, namely the remains of British political power in the Middle East. This seems to me to be also the inescapable conclusion to which we are carried by the third current I have mentioned above, the decline of British power in the post-war years. Those years have seen our surrender of the Palestine mandate, our withdrawal from Jordan and the Sudan and our evacuation of the Suez Canal base. Whatever the reasons for each of these acts we have set in motion a process of abandoning British power in the Middle East and any attempt to arrest it in its last stage will merely bring us the worst of both worlds. We shall deprive ourselves of any long term benefits which may accrue from making a virtue of necessity by finally exorcising British "imperialism" from the hearts of Arabs, and we shall be involved in a military effort which will rapidly become out of all proportion to the issues at stake and which will, in my view, end in disaster.

II. 28 Mar 1958 (1)
In my letter of yesterday's date, I attempted to set forth my views on the new situation which we have to face in the Middle East today and its implications for our position in Aden Colony and Protectorate. I concluded that all the forces and trends
ranged against us point in one direction, the termination of British control of Aden. In this letter I propose to consider the policy we should adopt to meet this situation. There appear to me to be three possible courses and these I will now examine briefly in turn.

2. The first is to hold to the present policy of retaining control indefinitely of Aden Colony and, consequentially, of maintaining our status in the Protectorate, in other words to dig in and defend our position, come what may. We must recognise that, if this course is taken, not only shall we be faced with growing military, political and propaganda pressures from outside but also the ground on which we stand will become progressively insecure. Not only will the Colony Arabs become increasingly restive but we shall lose the confidence of our best friends in the Protectorate. For, as I pointed out in my despatch No. 1909 of 11th December, 1956, federation and its long-term consequences are not compatible with indefinite retention of British control of the Colony; we should therefore have to reject federation to which our firmest allies among the Rulers are beginning to attach so much importance. In these circumstances we should be faced with growing military commitments, both to meet the mounting threat from outside and to suppress increasing opposition within both Colony and Protectorate. The strain on the loyalty of our Arab forces would become intense and we should have to rely more and more heavily on British troops whose presence would in turn only aggravate the situation. Apart from its cost, such a policy appears to me to be utterly bankrupt. As the security situation deteriorated so the strategic and economic value of Aden Colony to H.M.G. would decrease, and in the end there could be only one of two results; either we would be defeated or we would voluntarily abdicate our responsibilities. In either case we should do immense damage to our prestige, and in the process of holding on to the bitter end we should have given Russia and Egypt the opportunity to strengthen their hold on the Middle East and would have done untold harm to our interests in other parts of the Arab world.

3. The second possibility is a very early withdrawal. I am well aware that the rising cost of maintaining our position in the Protectorate and the possibility that soon the defence of the Colony itself may add an extra burden to H.M.G. might in the face of H.M.G.'s present economic difficulties make such a proposal superficially attractive, but it is to me unthinkable that we should ever thus abrogate our responsibilities and indeed our solemn engagements. Not only would we be breaking faith, not to mention treaties, with our friends in the Protectorate by leaving them an open prey to the wolves at the door and also be guilty of an act of ingratitude towards the Colony from which H.M.G. has derived immense advantages for over a hundred years but we should also be ruining any chance of retaining our economic interests in the Arabian world, especially in the Persian Gulf, where the last remnants of our prestige would be lost. I cannot conceive that H.M.G. would ever countenance such an act of despair.

4. We are left therefore with the third course of action which is to embark on a policy of gradual disengagement from our position in south-west Arabia, with the object of strengthening our friends in both Colony and Protectorate during the period of disengagement and of replacing thereafter our political power by a new relationship more in keeping with modern trends and with the realities of the situation.

5. It is my view that we should aim to complete this disengagement within a
period of about ten years, recognising that the timing of the process must be flexible if we are to secure the maximum political advantage from the policy. During that period we should do our utmost to build up a successor State covering both Colony and Protectorate to which we could transfer power and which would have a reasonable chance of determining its own future status. We should have to set up political institutions to which the responsibilities of government could be progressively handed over and through which, at the appropriate time, the future status of the territories could be decided. To ensure that this decision was reasonably free it would be necessary to maintain and develop as far as is practicable the economic assets and the social services of the territories, and to provide them with adequate defence forces.

6. To deal first with the Colony, we are already following the normal process of constitutional development on parliamentary democratic lines and the main requirement of a policy of disengagement would be recognition that the process will not stop short at “a considerable degree of internal self-government” but will continue up to full self-government and thereafter self-determination. At the same time it would be necessary to urge on the training of Adenese for Government service and commercial employment, including employment with the Port Trust, and to make arrangements for closer association between the Adenese and the directorate of the oil refinery. Steps have, in fact, already been taken to set all these processes in motion. At the same time we should aim to encourage and support those Arabs whose open or secret views coincide with our own.

7. In the case of the Protectorate the situation is much more difficult and complex, owing to difference of views and aims among the Rulers, and the lack of any political cohesion in the Protectorate as a whole. Nevertheless the recent revival of interest in federation and the approach of three of our closest friends among the rulers in the matter seem to me to afford an opportunity which we should and must take to offer to the Rulers and peoples of the Protectorate a goal of unity and eventual independence which would do much to dissipate the doubt and frustration which has spread over the land in recent years. My reasons for this belief and my recommendations regarding the steps which should be taken form the subject of a further letter.

8. But before concluding this letter it is obviously necessary to consider the effects of the policy I am advocating on H.M.G.’s strategic and economic interests in Aden which hitherto have been held to require indefinite retention of control of the Colony.

(a) Strategic interests

(i) As I understand it, Aden’s chief importance from this aspect is as a support base for the protection of British oil interests in the Persian Gulf. This is of course a matter outside my own particular sphere, but I would venture to suggest that the concept of military action to ensure the flow of oil from Kuwait is rapidly becoming outworn and unrealistic. Leaving aside the possibility of a major war with Russia, it seems to me that the danger to our Persian Gulf oil supplies is far more likely to arise from political nationalist considerations than from any overt military threat. In other words, I find it difficult to envisage a situation in which H.M.G. will actually implement their plans for large-scale reinforcement of the Persian Gulf area. We did not fight the Persians for Abadan
in 1951 and it seems most unlikely that we should fight the Arabs for Kuwait, particularly after a further decade has elapsed. I would suggest that the future security of our oil supplies must depend on diplomacy and on self-adaptation by the oil companies to changing conditions rather than on military action, bearing in mind that the oil-producing countries are unlikely to want to kill once and for all the goose that lays the golden egg.

(ii) A further strategic interest in Aden is that it forms a link in the chain of Commonwealth air communications. I am not qualified to say how important this factor is likely to be in ten years time, but it does not appear impossible that within that period an alternative route further south across the Indian Ocean will become usable by transport aircraft. So far as civil airlines are concerned, I see no reason to assume that Aden would not remain available as an international airport whatever status the territory might acquire after the transfer of power.

(iii) From the naval point of view Aden has no base or dockyard facilities and its usefulness is limited to bunkering services.

(b) Economic interests

(i) The oil bunkering service provided by Aden port for British shipping is presumably the most important economic interest. There is no reason to assume that a successor State in Aden would wish to destroy deliberately its most valuable asset, though the efficiency of the port might decline and there might be a tendency for shipping gradually to seek alternative ports. The danger that port facilities at Aden might at some time after the transfer of power be denied to British shipping for political reasons is in my view of no great importance for if an Arab State of south-west Arabia has taken such action it seems unlikely that the Suez Canal would at the same time be open to British shipping. As experience has shown, Aden is only important to shipping in relation to the Suez Canal.

(ii) A second economic interest is the oil refinery at Little Aden.\(^4\) I understand that considered purely as a commercial enterprise, some of the existing installations will have completed their useful economic life within the period of ten years which I have in mind. Thereafter considerable capital expenditure would be required to give the refinery a new lease of life. From the limited viewpoint of British Petroleum's interests, the refinery would therefore probably become expendable without undue loss within a period of ten years. On the other hand, the removal of the refinery would reduce to some extent the value of Aden as a bunkering port and would be a considerable blow to the economy of the territory; moreover, it would be politically undesirable to demonstrate such lack of confidence in the future of Aden. Provided that steps are taken during the next few years to associate Adenese closely with the refinery at both the technical and directorate levels (and this is already British Petroleum's policy), I see no reason why the refinery should not continue to operate usefully and profitably even if British political control were withdrawn.

(iii) Thirdly, there are general British commercial interests to consider. In the past the entrepôt trade of Aden has been an important source of wealth to a num-

\(^4\) See map on p 567.
ber of British firms and British banks in Aden have profited considerably from such transactions. Aden’s importance as a trading centre has, however, already decreased and it now seems clear that Yemeni economy will be tied more and more to Egypt and the Soviet bloc and indeed there are already reports that Egyptian banks are to open up in that country and that a paper currency is to replace the existing Yemeni and Maria Theresa dollars. Whatever future prospects may be, experience elsewhere has shown that the transfer of power to dependent territories does not necessarily mean that commercial interests are seriously damaged, provided that firms are prepared to adapt themselves to changing conditions and to give local people the greatest possible opportunity of employment.

From the point of view of trade with the United Kingdom, apart from the products of the oil refinery, Aden is of little significance. The total value of imports from the United Kingdom in 1957 was about £8 million and of exports to the United Kingdom (other than petroleum products) about £1½ million.

9. My conclusion from the considerations in the foregoing paragraph is that the relinquishment of control of Aden Colony within the next decade would not have such an effect on British strategic and economic interests as to make it preferable to retain control indefinitely in spite of all the difficulties and dangers inherent in such a policy.

III. 28 Mar 1958 (2)

... 3. ... [T]here is now a strong desire among our most friendly Rulers to form a federal organisation which will lead eventually to independence, and this desire has been expressed officially in very general terms. ... My and my advisers’ reaction to this is that we cannot possibly afford not to support and encourage this desire, particularly in view of the quarter from which it comes. When federation was last under active discussion two years ago, the Rulers were told that it was up to them to make the next move and we ourselves deliberately put the proposal into cold storage in the belief that federation would mean the eventual break-away of the Protectorate from our control and would therefore jeopardise our future position in the Colony (My despatch No. 1909 of 11th December, 1956). But since then times have changed and we are now faced with the situation described in my previous letter. In these circumstances I believe that federation now offers the best hope of retaining our influence in the Protectorate for a number of years to come, and thus enable constitutional development to self-government and self-determination to proceed as peacefully as possible. Its rejection will mean a serious discouragement to our friends and a rapid further deterioration in the Protectorate which would reveal the full precariousness of our position and might quite possibly make it untenable.

4. ... [I]t is quite clear that we cannot hope at present to obtain any form of political cohesion in the Protectorate as a whole; the approach must be empirical. The group of States [consisting of Audhali, Beihan and Fadhli] clearly offers the most favourable foundation on which to build and it is from this group that the initiative has now sprung.

5. To give a federal organisation the greatest possible chance of success and of attracting wide support, we must in my opinion be guided from the beginning by the following principles, which conform generally with the views of its three chief sponsors:
(a) The federal organisation must be a reality and not merely a façade; in particular it must not appear to be perpetuating the present situation under a new guise, but must be seen to be a major advance towards a new relationship between H.M.G. and the Protectorate. To this end H.M.G. should be prepared to enter into new treaty relations with the federal organisation.

(b) The federal organisation must be given teeth, both to defend its territory from aggression and to maintain internal security. All the emphasis at present is on the protection of the Protectorate and the maintenance of internal security by British forces; this total dependence on British aid is becoming an increasing embarrassment to the Rulers and makes them highly vulnerable to hostile propaganda. Our aim in future should be to shift the emphasis to enabling the Rulers and people of the Protectorate to do this as far as possible for themselves through the federal organisation, with British support in the background if required.

(c) It must be made clear that H.M.G. will in future put their money, both metaphorically and literally, on the federal organisation, as earnest of their determination to bring about a new relationship with the Protectorate, and also of course in order to encourage as many States as possible to join the federation. I must emphasise here that the federal organisation will require substantial financial assistance from H.M.G. if it is to become firmly established and to enlarge its scope in the future. To what extent this financial assistance might exceed H.M.G.’s existing expenditure on the Protectorate plus the additional funds mentioned above could only be determined in the light of detailed discussion with the sponsors of the federation scheme. I can only say at this stage that the total cost to H.M.G. of building up an effective federation is likely to be very much less than the cost of the British security forces which would in my view be required to maintain our position indefinitely on the present basis if the policy of digging in to which I referred in paragraph 2 of my letter of 28th March, 1958, were forced upon us.

6. I realise that the proposals I am putting forward are drastic, but in my view this is a time for bold measures. I do not suggest even so that it will be easy to launch a federation on these lines; on the contrary the process will be fraught with difficulties. There will be many problems in determining the precise form of the federal organisation and in negotiating H.M.G.’s relations with it and the degree of financial assistance to be given to it. But the greatest difficulty will come from the Imam of the Yemen who took the strongest exception to the original federation proposals, and it was on that account that he increased his activities against the Protectorate in 1954. It is known that the Imam has already reacted violently on hearing of the revival of the idea of federation by the Sherif of Beihan and the Audhali Sultan, whom he regards as his arch-enemies in the Protectorate, and that he has enlisted the Jifri family, with the Sultan of Lahej in their wake, to sabotage it by all possible means. In this the Jifris will also have the backing of their friends and paymasters the Egyptians. I would therefore expect that during the formative period we shall have increased trouble from the Yemen and from its friends within the Protectorate.

8. In spite however of the difficulties of bringing about this federation and of the almost certain need for further financial aid from H.M.G. I am firmly convinced that we must not let this opportunity slip of encouraging our friends in their aspirations. Indeed the eventual success of the federation and the consequent ability of the future State to stand on its own feet or make what terms it will with other entities are
probably of less immediate importance than the psychological and emotional impact which would be created by a definite announcement from H.M.G. that they were working for the eventual independence of the Protectorate States in a form which would enable them to take their rightful place in the comity of nations. With such a declaration behind them our friends in the Protectorate would be able to show their peoples that they were not “lackeys of imperialism” endeavouring to maintain Britain’s position in the Protectorate for their own immediate selfish ends but were leading them to an honourable future in the Arab world, with the disinterested help of that power which had long been their protector.

9. … I trust I have made it clear that there is little time to be lost if we are to avoid a very serious situation in the Protectorate and Colony, and that it is most important that we should not discourage our friends by appearing to drag our feet. I therefore should be grateful if the earliest possible consideration may be given to these proposals and if I may be authorised to discuss them in detail with the three Rulers mentioned and with any others who may indicate their sympathetic interest.

In my letter of 28th March, 1958, I have made it clear that in my opinion the only course to be followed is that of gradual disengagement in the process of which the formation of a federation such as that described above would be essential. I rejected two alternatives but I would emphasise here that those are the only two alternatives that I can envisage and it is unrealistic to suppose that we shall be able to continue as at present without adjusting our policies to meet changed circumstances.

189 CO 1015/1911, no 20 14 Apr 1958

[Aden: future policy]: letter (reply) from W L Gorell Barnes to Sir W Luce

You will already have gathered from the Secretary of State’s telegram No. 215 of the 5th April that we have been getting on as fast as we possibly can with consideration of your three very important letters to me of 27th and 28th March about future policy in Aden Colony and the Aden Protectorate. You will realise that it is bound to be a little longer before either we in the Colonial Office or H.M.G. as a whole can reach a considered view on your proposals. They have, however, already been given preliminary consideration both in this Department and at a first meeting of all the Departments in Whitehall concerned with south-west Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and I think it may help you if I let you know what first reactions have been.

2. We are very glad that you have not hesitated to set out in such fullness and with such lucidity your views of the developing position in the Arab world and your suggestions regarding the policy which, in the light of those developments, it seems to you best for us to follow in Aden Colony and the Aden Protectorate. Some of us have a feeling that, as is perhaps inevitable in a re-appraisal of this kind, you may possibly have over-simplified some of your assessments of feelings, intentions and probable developments in the Middle East, and I do not think that everyone in Whitehall would think it realistic to regard diplomacy and military potential in any area as quite as separable as is perhaps suggested in paragraph 8 of your second letter. Again, whilst no one here would like to prophesy how things are likely to turn out, the Foreign Office are far less certain than you appear to be about the likely trend of developments in Saudi Arabia or even in the Yemen. Nor would they agree with the thesis in your second
letter that the policy followed in 1951 at Abadan, which is undoubtedly foreign terri-
tory, necessarily implies that H.M.G. would never use force to protect their vital oil
interests in Persian Gulf territories under British protection.

3. What I have said in the preceding paragraph is not said by way of criticism of
your general analysis. All I wish to suggest is that the future trend of events in the
Arab world may be rather less certain than anyone attempting to prophesy is bound
to appear to think it is.

4. Against this background, there is a slight difference of emphasis, though not I
think more than that, in the approach of most of us here to the problems of future
policy in Aden Colony and the Aden Protectorate. You suggest that we should adopt a
definite policy of disengagement and, whilst retaining flexibility, should have in our
own minds a period of about 10 years as the period during which we may expect to
stay in Aden. We would agree with you that it is almost certainly unrealistic to
believe that we can stay indefinitely. On the other hand, some of us here think that, if
we play our cards rightly, it is possible that, when it comes to actions rather than
words, responsible Arabs both in the Colony and the Protectorate may let their
material interests outweigh their emotions for rather longer than that; and that in
any case, if we once get into the state of mind that we shall be out in 10 years, then
we are likely in fact to be out in 2 or 3; for, whatever their material interests, even the
responsible people are not likely to back us once they think we are on the way out. To
the general problem, therefore, our approach can perhaps be defined thus. Our aim
should still be not to get out within a specified period but to stay as long as we can
without forfeiting the goodwill of the responsible elements in the population. We
should, however, adapt our tactics from time to time so as to be sure of not forfeiting
that goodwill or making it impossible for responsible people to show it in their
actions, if not always in their words.

5. To turn now from the general to the particular, we do not think that this slight
difference of approach affects at all significantly our attitude to the views you have
expressed about policy in the Protectorate. In view of the developments you have
described in your letters, it seems clear that, if we do not make a positive response to
the approach you have received from the three Rulers most friendly to us, they will
be bound to make their peace with Nasser or the Yemen, or both; and that
consequently the position now is that encouragement of the movement towards
federation which they have initiated is likely to have the ultimate effect of making it
possible for us to stay longer in Aden Colony than would failure to encourage it. It is
difficult to be more specific than this before we receive the two annexes to your letter
No. [3] of the 28th March, and, before final decisions are reached, we shall certainly
need to know both what you think the financial cost will be and at what stage you
would expect the Levies and the Government Guards to go over to the proposed
federation, and, if at that stage the federation did not cover all the Protectorate
States, what you would propose to do about the security of the remaining
Protectorate States. We shall also wish to give further consideration to the exact line
which should be taken, both in private with the Rulers concerned and in public,
about the ultimate objective for the proposed federation. We accept that it will
almost certainly be essential to acknowledge that at some time or other such a
federation may look to becoming independent. On the other hand, we are disposed to
think that it is very important that any statements on this subject should be so
worded as to make it impossible for agitators and other ill-wishers to put it about
that we are on the way out; and in this connection we are glad to note the pretty
cagey wording used by the three Rulers in the third paragraph of their letter of the
21st February to you.

6. I now turn to the question of the future of Aden Colony. We agree with you
that we cannot expect to maintain control of the Colony indefinitely and that, if a
federation is successfully launched in the Protectorate with independence as an
ultimate objective, it seems very likely that sooner or later an irresistible demand will
grow up for the inclusion of the Colony in the federation, at any rate when it
ultimately becomes independent. We therefore also agree that we should be wise in
future to avoid statements suggesting that we intend to hold on to the Colony
forever, or even “for the foreseeable future”. On the other hand, we are doubtful
about the wisdom of getting the idea fixed even in our own minds that we shall be
out of the Colony at the end of a predetermined period, be that period 10 years or
some other period; for the Colony certainly could not stand on its own feet as an
independent State. Consequently, until we are sure that a federation has been
successfully launched in the Protectorate, we think it would be a very big gamble to
set ourselves a definite limit for our control of the Colony. We would be even more
dubious about any proposal to state publicly in present circumstances that we are
planning for the independence of the Colony, much less that we are planning for that
independence within a specified period. Clearly we must continue with the policy you
are so successfully following of helping the Colony to progress by stages towards
internal self-government as rapidly as it is capable of progressing. As regards any
target beyond that, if it is really essential to say anything at all, could we not say that
we do not regard internal self-government as necessarily the end of the road, but that
we consider it is too early, and conditions are too uncertain, to say now in what
direction, if any, it will thereafter be in the interests of the inhabitants of the Colony
for the Colony to march further forward?

7. As I explained at the beginning of this letter, which has not been submitted to
Ministers, these are very preliminary thoughts and may of course be subject to much
modification when we have received the annexes to your second letter, and when
study of your proposals both in the Colonial Office and in the other Departments
concerned has progressed further. We will write to you again as soon as we can.
Meanwhile, if you have any views on what I have said in this letter, please do not
hesitate to send them to me.

8. One further point, and that an urgent one. I realise that, for a particular
reason, you may be very anxious to say something quickly either to the three friendly
Rulers or publicly about future policy in the Protectorate. If, in the light of this very
preliminary expression of our views, you think there is anything you can usefully do
along these lines, I suggest that you should telegraph us a draft on which we would
attempt to let you have the Secretary of State’s views with the greatest possible speed.
You will, however, realise that it would be bound to take some time to get a decision
on any draft which involved further commitments on finance.¹

¹ After his visit to Aden, Gorell Barnes reported to S of S (14 May 1958), saying he was “much encouraged
. . . we have a chance of turning the tide & checking Nasser’s ambitions in this part of the world. . . . We
shall, I’m sure, be unable to maintain the Colony as a colony indefinitely. Its future lies neither in
perpetual colonial status nor in independence as an isolated unit, but in some form of closer association
with the Western, & perhaps also eventually the Eastern Protectorate, & possibly, though this is for the
F.O, even Muscat & beyond” (CO 847/74, no 11).
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (58) 12) proposing that Her Majesty's Government should accede to the proposal of the friendly Rulers in the Western Aden Protectorate for the formation of a federation with which Her Majesty's Government would enter into a treaty relationship and to which they would give military and financial support.

The Colonial Secretary recalled that in March 1956 Her Majesty's Government had suggested the possibility of federation to the Rulers of the Aden Protected States, but that it had not been thought desirable in any way to press this possibility and we had since concentrated more upon a policy of social and economic development. Those Rulers in the Western Protectorate who were most friendly to us had however themselves now taken an initiative in the direction of federation, believing that this would best serve to strengthen them against Yemeni pressure and, by offering their people a better future, enable them to contain the anti-Western influences of Arab nationalism in their States. Three of the Rulers concerned were now in this country and the fourth would be arriving shortly, and a formal expression of Her Majesty's Government's views was due to be given to them on 29th June. The proposals in C.P.C. (58) 12 had been agreed with the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence, but discussions with the Treasury had not yet been concluded. It was difficult to foresee with certainty our position in south-west Arabia in the long-term, but it was the view of the Governor of Aden that the present proposals offered the best means of preserving our interests there for as long as possible. The plan would leave it open for Aden Colony to join the federation later if this step appeared desirable, and since Aden itself would be the federal capital it was to be hoped that the moderate forces in the Protectorate would be able to exert a restraining influence upon extremist elements in the Colony. We should however remain free, if the federation did not develop in a way which accorded with our interests, to keep the Colony separate from it and under our full control, though this might require the use of military force. Although the Sultan of Lahej, the senior of the Rulers, was opposed to the plan, he was much disliked and distrusted by the loyal Rulers and his opposition would not be an effective obstacle to the creation of the federation.

It was the general view of the Committee that it would be desirable to support this progressive move on the Rulers' part. It was recognised that this would involve some reversal of our previous thinking, in that the creation of a more powerful political unit in this area was likely to lead to greater independence of British control, and our experience of federations had not been entirely satisfactory. On the other hand the Rulers' initiative had brought about a new situation: to repulse this approach would cause the present movement for unity in the face of the Yemen to fall apart; and our agreement to federation need not prejudice the future of the Colony. Moreover there would be political advantages if a new Arab State which was friendly to the West was created in this strategically important area.

In further discussion the following points were made—

(a) The Rulers had proposed that the federation should be known as the Union of Southern Emirates. But it would be desirable that the title should emphasise that a new Arab State was being created.
(b) The Minister of Defence\(^1\) emphasised the key importance of Aden Colony to our policy in the Persian Gulf. While he was disturbed at the prospects for our future position in south-west Arabia generally, he accepted that successive Governments might not be ready to incur the cost and odium which would be entailed in maintaining our control over the Colony indefinitely, if need be by force. No statement should however be made at this stage which would imply that the Colony would later join the federation. Moreover as a safeguard for the future it would be desirable not only to arrange for Perim (and with it possibly the Kuria Muria Islands) to be separated from the Colony, but to examine the possibility of excising a strategic enclave in the Colony itself, possibly consisting of the air base and part of the harbour, which we should retain in perpetual sovereignty under our full control. A suitable opportunity for this might occur on the occasion of the constitutional advance planned for next year. Though such a measure might be interpreted as a sign of our intention to withdraw from the Colony, it might well be easier to effect it now than at a later date when political advance and the pressures which went with it had progressed further.

(c) It was for consideration whether the Island of Socotra might not be reserved for a similar strategic purpose. This was however on an entirely different footing to Perim (which formed part of our Colonial possessions) in that it belonged to the Sultan of Quishn and Socotra with whom we had concluded a treaty of protection.

(d) The Chancellor of the Exchequer\(^2\) said that he recognised the difficulty of discouraging the Rulers’ approach and was therefore in general sympathy with the proposals in C.P.C. (58) 12. He must however reserve his position on the increased cost involved, which was at present estimated to be between £1–2 millions per annum pending further information about the details of the additional expenditure. This should cover the cost of the increases proposed in the Government Guards and the Aden Protectorate Levies, of political and administrative measures to support the federation and of the separation of the islands from the Colony, and should take account of any offsetting contributions from the States themselves. It would also be necessary to form some idea of the increased expenditure on social and economic development which might result from the survey now being undertaken. . . .

---

1 Mr Sandys.  
2 Mr Heathcoat Amory.

[191]  
CO 1015/1910, nos 23 & 24  
8 Dec 1958

Possibility of keeping Aden Colony and proposed federation apart:
minute by Mr Amery to W L Gorell Barnes. *Minute* by W L Gorell Barnes

I thought it might be convenient if I let you have a note of my thoughts on the possibilities of keeping Aden Colony and the proposed Federation apart.

I entirely agree that if some of the friendly rulers wish to federate, we cannot afford to discourage them. It may well be, indeed, that a merger of some of the petty principalities which make up the Protectorate would be to our advantage. The crucial question concerns the future relationship between Aden Colony and the Federation.

The Chiefs of Staff have made it clear that they regard the maintenance of our
defence facilities in Aden Colony as essential to the preservation of our position in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. No doubt these defence facilities might be maintained if Aden Colony were ceded to a friendly Aden Federation. But would such a Federation stay friendly? Recent experience in Egypt, Jordan and Ceylon suggests only too pointedly that overseas bases are only secure when they are under British sovereignty.

If I am right in this, the ideal solution would be to keep the Colony out of the proposed Federation. Is this practical politics? The Governor, I gather, does not think so: and I feel considerable hesitation, in view of my very slight personal experience of the Protectorates, in contesting his view. It occurs to me, however, that there may be a number of ways in which, particularly in the early stages, we could so influence the development of the Federation that it might grow apart from the Colony and the Colony apart from it. The following are examples of the kind of thing I have in mind.

1. The constitution. If the Federal constitution develops along “liberal” lines with executive and legislative councils, a modern civil service, and a modern judiciary, then the federal government machine will tend to be staffed by Nationalist politicians from Aden Colony. In due course it would then become their instrument. If, on the other hand, the Federation were encouraged to develop along more traditional Arab lines into an autocracy or tribal oligarchy similar to the monarchies of Muscat and the Gulf, the trend might well be the other way. The tribal rulers would be afraid of the townsmen in the Colony, and, given greater independence from British advice, would deal with any opposition after their own summary fashion. The townsmen, on their side, having enjoyed the law and order and relative freedom of Crown Colony rule, might well be reluctant to throw in their lot with what they would regard as a backward and arbitrary despotism. Aden Colony would thus continue along the normal path of development towards internal self-government. The Federation, meanwhile would go its own way under a constitution corresponding to the tribal and feudal ways of life of its inhabitants.

2. Composition of the Federation. Some of the states wish to federate: others as yet do not. Will it be our policy to encourage reluctant states to join the Federation or shall we leave the matter entirely to them? The more all-embracing the Federation, the stronger will be the tendency for the Colony and the Federation to grow together. If on the other hand some of the states stay out, we shall be on stronger ground in insisting on a special status for Aden Colony as the Port serving the whole Protectorate. This really raises the question whether we want to see an all-embracing Federation or whether, at this stage, our interests would be better served by limiting our objective to reducing the number of protected states by a merger of those states which now wish to federate.

3. Defence. The future of the Aden Protectorate Levies must largely depend upon whether we wish to see the Federation embrace all the states of the West (and East) Aden Protectorates or whether we should be content with a more limited merger. The more limited the merger, and the more the A.P.L. have to serve outside the Federation, the more control shall we keep over defence whatever its precise constitutional position. The A.P.L. would then tend to remain a British force based on Aden Colony and serving all the state, federated and unfederated alike.

4. The capital. It is, I understand, proposed that the Federation should have its capital in, or at any rate near, Aden Colony. The Federal Government would thus evolve behind the shelter of British law and order and under the influence of the
Aden press. Its leaders would be under continual pressure of Aden Colony public opinion and even of the Aden mob. These are circumstances which would seem to favour the fusion of the Colony and Federation and the predominance in the Federation of Nationalist townsmen from the Colony. If, on the other hand, the capital were located outside the Colony—say at Lodar—the Federal Government would evolve under the rougher auspices of Arab tribal society. Nationalist lawyers would find this inconvenient, uncomfortable and possibly dangerous.

The idea of locating the capital in Aden Colony seems to have come from the rulers themselves. Could we not explain to them that the Federation would seem unduly subordinate to British rule if its Headquarters were to be in British territory?

I appreciate, of course, that if Aden Colony is discouraged from joining the Federation it may well claim 'enosis' with the U.A.R. As far as British and world opinion, however, are concerned, this is a claim which it would be relatively easy for us to reject.

Perhaps we could discuss all this in due course.

Minute on 191

I find it very difficult to offer any very profound comment until Ministers have given the answer to the $64,000 question which is to be put to them in our C.P.C. paper.

Meanwhile I offer the following modest contribution:—

(1) With reference to the last paragraph of the introductory part of your minute, I do not think the Governor has ever said that it is not practical politics to keep the Colony out of the Federation, at any rate for the time being.1 I understand his view to be that it is not practical politics to maintain the Colonial status of the Colony for more than a limited period and that, if we do not steer the Colony into the Protectorate Federation, then it will either become independent on its own or else join up with the Yemen and the U.A.R.

(2) As regards your first point, it is impossible to start the Federation off as a monarchy, since there would at present never be agreement on who the monarch should be. It is, however, going to be started off as an oligarchy, since there will either be a President or a sort of Presidential Council consisting of the 6 Rulers and all the Members of the Legislative Council, and the Council of Ministers will be either Rulers or their nominees. Whether those moderate Colony leaders who are already pressing for the Colony to become part of the Federation yet realise this, I do not know.

(3) With reference to your paragraph 2, I am afraid I have always assumed that it is in our interests that at any rate the other States in the Western Protectorate should come into the Federation.2 If they do not, then I feel sure that, if only in rivalry and opposition to the Federation, they are bound to gravitate towards Cairo or the Yemen. The position of Lahej, if it does not come in, will be particularly tricky, particularly as it marches with the Colony and historically could work up some kind of a claim to the Colony.

1 Amery wrote in the margin here: ‘Would it be very difficult to say “no” to independence or enosis with the UAR?’
2 Amery wrote in the margin here: ‘I wonder. They might compete for our favour’.
(4) I have always been a bit doubtful about the location of the capital in the Colony myself. When I discussed this matter with the Governor last summer, he said that there could be no question of locating the capital in the fastnesses of the Protectorate, since it would be terribly expensive and administratively quite impracticable.3 I understand that what is actually happening is that the capital is going to be built in the Protectorate but just outside the boundaries of the Colony, which will not prejudice the future as much as if the capital were an enclave cut out of the Colony and which will be administratively practicable, but which certainly will not encourage separatism in the way you have in mind.

It might be as well if the Secretary of State were to see this exchange of minutes before our talk tomorrow. If we were going to change direction as regards the siting of the capital of the Colony, we should clearly have to move very fast indeed, if it is not too late already.

W.L.G.B.
10.12.58

3 Amery wrote in the margin here: 'The political gains of locating the capital “up country” might well justify the expense and administrative inconvenience’.

192 CAB 134/1557, CPC 16(58)2 22 Dec 1958
[Policy for Aden Colony and Protectorate]: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting

[This document should be read in conjunction with the COS discussion on 16 Dec: see document no 183.]

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (58) 23) regarding our future policy in Aden.

The Colonial Secretary said that, following the review of our policy in Aden Colony and Protectorate earlier in the year, the decision had been taken to set up a Federation in the Western Aden Protectorate but to retain direct rule in Aden Colony. But in the light of events in the Middle East during 1958, the Governor of Aden had formed the view that, unless we were prepared to ultimately to maintain our hold on Aden by force, our interests would best be served by following a policy of disengagement over a period of about ten years and allowing the Colony to join the Federation provided that the leaders in both territories were in favour of such a development. This course would have the further advantages that it would subject the extreme political elements in the Colony to the moderating influence of the more conservative Rulers in the Protectorate. The forthcoming announcement about a further constitutional advance in Somaliland made it desirable that a corresponding announcement of our intentions should be made in Aden as soon as possible, and the Governor had urged that an appropriate occasion would be at the inauguration of the Western Aden Protectorate Federation in February, 1959. On the other hand there would be advantage in deferring a final decision on the matter until the strategic consequences of the proposed policy had been studied in more detail and the outcome of the elections in the Colony and the inauguration of the Federation was known.
In discussion it was pointed out that from a purely military point of view the most satisfactory course would be to retain direct control of the Colony. But if it became impossible politically to maintain the present arrangements the proposals outlined in C.P.C. (58) 23 represented the best solution that could be devised. Our policy in Aden might, however, be affected by the review of our policy in the Middle East as a whole, which was at present under consideration between Departments and by the Chiefs of Staff. The result of this review might be to demonstrate that the importance of retaining Aden as a military base would diminish. If, on the other hand, our interests necessitated our keeping some permanent strategic facilities in the Colony, we should have to examine whether there was any other way in which our needs could be met, such as the retention of an enclave under our own control.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the policy of creating a friendly state comprising the Western Aden Protectorate Federation, and, if they so wished it, Aden Colony, had certain attractions, particularly since it might eventually be possible to accommodate such a State within the Commonwealth. No final decision as to our future policy for Aden should, however, be taken pending the review of our policy in the Middle East as a whole and the Colonial Secretary’s forthcoming visit to Aden and Somaliland. . . .

193  
CO 1015/1910, no 46  
10 Mar 1959

‘Long-term policy in Aden’: minute by Mr Amery

1. It is clear from discussions in the Chiefs of Staff Committee and in the Cabinet Committee on the Middle East that we shall need the full and unrestricted use of our military facilities in Aden, for as far ahead as we can see, to support operations in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula.

2. Experience in Egypt, Ceylon and Libya suggests that the security of defence facilities held under Treaty is inadequate. This is particularly so when, as in Aden, facilities situated in one Arab country are needed for operations against other Arabs.

3. The present Protectorate Rulers and the moderate politicians in Aden Colony are at present friendly to us. They and their successors may not always be so. Sultan Ali of Lahej1 was not an isolated phenomenon. A main cause of his defection was a belief that we were the losing side. Another setback in the Middle East, say the loss of Saudi Arabia, might well convince even stauncher Rulers that they had to make terms with Nasser. The friendship and influence of the Moderates in the Colony may prove even more ephemeral than that of the Rulers. No very long-term value can, therefore, be placed on agreements concluded with the Rulers or the Moderates. In these circumstances sovereignty would seem to offer the most secure basis on which to rest our defence facilities in Aden.

4. There is much to be said for making our defence facilities as unobtrusive as possible. How much of the Colony do we need for our military purposes? It may be that we could abandon Little Aden and Sheikh Othman, though both are fairly closely integrated into the economy of the rest of the Colony; and part of the water supplies are in Sheikh Othman. It would, moreover, be awkward if the frontier came

---

1 The senior of the Rulers, opposed to federation.
so close to Khormaksar as to bring the latter within range of mortar or small-arms fire. Any withdrawal besides, tends to whet appetites for more. It would in any case seem quite impracticable to abandon anything else. We need the neck of land connecting the main port of the colony to the mainland. It is the site of the airfield and most of the barracks. To have an Arab authority in Crater would only be to create a Tom Tiddler’s Ground or safe harbour for saboteurs and dissident elements. There would thus seem to be no basis for a partition of the Colony.

5. If it be agreed that British sovereignty should be retained over the Colony it will be necessary for H.M.G. and the Government of Aden to work systematically henceforth for the separation of the Colony from the Federation rather than for their closer association. This can be done partly by administrative measures, e.g. the judicious encouragement of non-Arab immigration, and the avoidance of services common to the Colony and to the Federation. But the main instrument of separating the Colony from the Federation will be political and constitutional.

6. If the Federation develops along “liberal” lines with executive and legislative councils, a modern civil service and a modern judiciary then the tendency will be for the Colony and the Federation to grow together. If, on the other hand, the Federation is left to follow more traditional lines and become an autocracy or tribal oligarchy reproducing some of the features of Muscat, the Gulf States, and indeed the Yemen, the Federation and the Colony may tend to drift apart. The tribal Rulers would be afraid of the townsmen in the Colony and, given greater independence from British advice, would deal with any opposition after their own summary fashion. The townsmen on their side, having enjoyed the law and order and relative freedom of Crown Colony rule, might well be reluctant to throw in their lot with what they would regard as a backward and arbitrary despotism. To do so indeed would be to risk their necks or their wrists! A process of mutual repulsion might thus be set up. The Federation might go its own way under a constitution corresponding to the tribal and feudal ways of life of its inhabitants. The Colony with its more modern economic structure would then continue along the normal path of development towards diarchy.

7. There is of course a risk that under a diarchy the Arabs in the Colony would begin to agitate for union with the U.A.R. Such a union would be unacceptable, but the demand for it might be turned to advantage. The Federation Rulers would be opposed to it. British public opinion—despite our history—seldom favours unions across the sea. If the diarchy got out of hand on the issue of ‘enosis’ [union] with the U.A.R. we should be able to suspend the constitution with the full approval of the Federation and without much opposition at home.

8. Nor should the maintenance of internal security in Aden Colony be too heavy a burden. One of the greater heresies of contemporary thought is that a base is useless if situated amidst a hostile population. I spent some time during the war trying to sabotage German port facilities in Greece. The population was 90% on our side but we never caused the Germans more than inconvenience. It may be said that the Germans were more ruthless than we could be. Our own experience in the Canal Zone, however, only confirms the German experience. The present C.I.G.S.,2 who served in the Zone at the height of the crisis in our relations with Egypt, tells me that

in the worst moments our labour force never fell below 70%. And this was in territory where the Egyptian police operated and the Egyptian writ ran.

9. By comparison with many bases, the security problem in Aden would seem relatively simple. The population is small—out of a total of 150,000 there can be only about 35,000 Arab males between the ages of 16 and 60. The Yemenis among them are liable to deportation. All are dependent for their livelihood on a highly organised commercial community. Under such circumstances it is difficult to believe that we could need more than two or in emergency three battalions to maintain our grip on the Colony.

10. A more serious problem may arise from the natural desire of the Federation Rulers to put their paws, in due course, on the port and wealth of Aden. Many of them, however, have ambitions in the Yemen. It would seem prudent, therefore, to encourage them to hope for expansion at the expense of the Yemen, thus deflecting their ambitions inland and away from the Colony.

11. There remains the problem of presentation. Hopkinson’s “never” though right enough in private should never have been allowed out in public. If we should decide to keep Aden Colony permanently out of the Federation it will in all probability be essential not to say so. Eve would doubtless have left the apple alone if it had not been forbidden. In so far as the initiative lies with us, the right course would seem to be to discourage speculation and take no steps, such as staff examinations into partition, which would tend to arouse interest in the subject. If we are asked what our policy is, we could perhaps reply:—

(i) that the Federation must be given time to find its feet before either the Federation or Aden Colony can be asked whether they want to join together;
(ii) that Aden Colony must be taken a stage or two further along the road to internal self-government before its people can be in a position to determine their own future.

12. My conclusions are:—

(1) We need Aden Colony as a base and cannot be satisfied with bases in Aden Colony.
(2) Our bases and other facilities in Aden will best be secured by the insistence of [sic] British sovereignty over the Colony.
(3) We must therefore work to separate the Colony from the Protectorate as much as we can both by administrative measures and more particularly by encouraging the Federation to develop along traditional South Arabian lines and the Colony along modern diarchical lines.
(4) The Arabs in the Colony may agitate for enosis with the U.A.R. We might then have to suspend the constitution. The Federation would probably support us in so doing. The size of the Colony, moreover, and the way of life of its inhabitants should make it possible for us to maintain ourselves there without undue effort.

---

3 Mr H L D Hopkinson, minister of state at CO, 1952–1955, who in answer to a supplementary question after a statement on Cyprus, went slightly beyond his brief by declaring: ‘it has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent’ (H of C Debs 28 July 1954, vol 531, cols 504–511, repr in Porter & Stockwell, eds, British imperial policy and decolonization vol 2, pp 319–325, document 44). Hopkinson left the CO at the end of 1955 and never held ministerial office again.
(5) We should encourage the ambitions of the Federal Rulers to expand at the expense of the Yemen. This will help to deflect them from coveting Aden.4

4 The governor was sent a copy of this minute, and commented that he thought Amery was reverting to Lord Lloyd’s policy of 1956; this militated against the government’s general policy of evolution to self-government and self-determination, as well as against the trend of its relations to the Arab world. Sir W Luce wanted, essentially, more flexibility, and warned against ‘divide and rule’; the further they took the Colony towards self-government in isolation from the Federation, the stronger the demand for independence would be, and ‘Nasserism would become the only alternative to British imperialism’; attempts to hold Aden Colony by force would have disastrous economic effects, and Britain could not rely on Federal Rulers for approval (no 60, to S of S, 14 Apr 1959). Amery’s reaction is the subject of the next document.

194 CO 1015/1912, no 61 27 Apr 1959
[Response to the governor’s comments on future policy in Aden]: minute by Mr Amery to Mr Lennox-Boyd

I return the papers from the Governor of Aden and Air Vice Marshal Heath,1 together with comments by Mr. Watt and Mr. Gorell Barnes. I attach at annex A & B2 my own comments on the detailed points raised by the Governor and the Commander.

2. This latest correspondence confirms that there is a major difference of conception between the Governor and myself. The Governor’s aim, as I understand it, is to build a viable South Arabian State out of a merger of the Colony and the Federation. Seen against the general background of British Colonial development and against the particular background of his own experience in the Sudan, this is a perfectly respectable aim. It involves, however, a radical departure from our traditional policy towards Aden. According to this traditional policy, Aden Colony is important to us primarily as a fortress; and the Protectorate should be viewed mainly as a glacis to that fortress. The fortress is vital today in relation to our oil interests in the Persian Gulf; but, so long at least as geography has any influence on strategy or politics, it will always be to our advantage, as a world power, to control the key position which Aden holds.

3. The Governor’s decision to recommend a radical departure from our previous policy is based on three main considerations:—

(1) As his earlier papers have shown, he regards our disengagement from the Middle East in the face of the movement towards Arab unity as inevitable. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of his latest note show that he does not expect or seek to hold Aden Colony indefinitely. His hope is that the Federation will remain under our protection or allied to us for about a decade. During this time we should enjoy the use of our present defence facilities. Thereafter we should be able to count at least on the benevolent neutrality of the independent Federal State. In all this the Governor seems to me to underrate the powerful forces which have always tended to keep the Arabs divided. The conflict between Nasser and Kassem3 has already largely made

---

1 Commander, British Forces Arabian Peninsula, who argued that the ‘real heresy’ was thinking an insecure Base could be made secure by use of a vast garrison. For the governor’s comments, see previous document, n 4.
2 Not printed.
3 General Qassim, the new ruler of Iraq.
nonsense of the assumptions on which most of Whitehall was working only a few months ago. As a result of this conflict, Jordan and the Persian Gulf States are breathing more freely. The Nasser–Kassem conflict may be shortlived; but historical trends have an odd way of not running their full course. Portugal’s Eastern Empire, for instance, began disintegrating nearly three centuries ago; but Goa and Timor illustrate how circumstances can favour tenacity. I think the Governor is also in danger of forgetting how often in British history the mood of weariness that so often follows a great war has been overtaken by a reversion to more retentive and even more acquisitive policies.

(2) The Governor holds that racial, geographical and economic factors make a merger of the Protectorate and the Colony ultimately inevitable. These factors are certainly strong. At the same time I think he still underrates the extent of the obstacles to such a merger. For one thing the social structures of the Colony and the Protectorate are wholly different. For another, Aden Colony lives from the sea far more than from trade with the Protectorate; while the Protectorate lives from its own resources—agriculture, raiding, etc. far more than from trade with or through the Colony. For yet another, the ambitions of the Sharif of Beihan and the Ruler of Mukeiras, the two most loyal elements in the Federation, lie towards the Yemen and not towards the sea.

(3) The Governor urges a third reason for promoting a merger between the Colony and the Federation. This is, that Moderates in the Colony will otherwise find their influence undermined and their position taken by the extremists. This argument, while quite possibly true in itself, seems to me in flat contradiction, at any rate in the medium term, with the view that a merger of Colony and Federation are inevitable. Its implication is that if the extremists predominate in the Colony they will either not want to join the Federation (presumably because they will be seeking to join the U.A.R.) or they would not be acceptable to the Federal Rulers, even if they did want to join. In all this I am inclined to think that the Governor underrates the extent to which the moderates may be forced to side with us in order to defend their interests against the extremists. This could happen, for instance, if Nasser or his successor were to join forces with the West against Kassem. I am also a little surprised that the Governor should foresee so much difficulty in dealing firmly with the extremists so soon after he had himself recommended proscribing the powerful nationalist trade union.

4. Arthur Balfour used to say that there were no differences of principle, only differences of degree. I have tried to apply this dissolvent method to my difference with the Governor. The result is not very different from the conclusions reached by Mr. Gorell Barnes. I would express it as follows:—

5. Let us accept that there are powerful forces making for a merger of the Colony with the Protectorate. Let us also admit that such a development is clean contrary to our interests in that it would in all probability herald the end of our unchallenged tenure of defence rights in Aden. On the basis of these two assumptions the right policy, I submit, would be:—

(1) to seek by every means to delay and where possible even to reverse the movement towards a merger.
(2) In so doing, however, to avoid getting into a Canute’s position of saying ‘no’ to the inevitable. Our overall strategic object would be firm—to keep the Colony
separate from the Protectorate for as long as possible. Our tactics, however, would have to be opportunist. We might have to make concessions at one time, while seeking to recover lost ground at another.

6. If it be once accepted that keeping the Colony separate from the Protectorate is our main purpose and more important in itself than, say, keeping the Moderates in power in the Colony or adding new members to the Federation, we could then consider how far existing pressures require us to make the kind of statement Mr. Watt and Mr. Gorell Barnes recommend. I would have no objection in principle to making such a statement on the basis of the policy described above, but I would think it quite wrong to do so in the spirit of paragraph 6 of the Governor’s letter to you in which he regards such a statement as a further step in the process of bringing about a merger. This means, I fear, that, despite the use of the Balfourian dialectic, an important difference still remains as to the way we should play the hand in the future.

7. I apologise for the length of this minute and its annex, but I felt it would make for an easier discussion and thus probably save your time if I set down my views in writing before we spoke.

195 CO 1015/1912, no 63 13 May 1959

[Future policy in Aden]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Sir W Luce

I have given a lot of thought to your letter of the 14th April and its enclosures about future policy in Aden.¹

I have the impression that all our thinking is beginning to come closer into line. It is important, however, that we should have a real meeting of minds and not just agreement on a formula reached as a result of correspondence about which there may later be misunderstandings. I would therefore like to talk about this with you when you are home. Meanwhile I am not proposing to take it any further with my colleagues. I assure you, however, that I am determined that you shall get firm policy guidance before you go back, and with that assurance I hope you will be able to hold the position and avoid taking on any commitments in the period before you come on leave.

I do not want to prejudge our discussions, but it may help if I tell you in this letter where I think we are getting to.

As you say in your comments on Amery’s Note, our aim is identical, nor does our political thinking include the word “never”. Again, we, like you, believe that our policy should be flexible so far as is compatible with obtaining our essential agreed objective. The need for flexibility in policy in British territories in Arabia hardly needs to be emphasised in times when political conditions in the Middle East are liable to sudden, and sometimes radical, changes. Not many experts would have predicted two years ago, or even a year ago, that the differences between Cairo and Baghdad would have displayed the shape and intensity which they do at present; nor would it have been altogether wise last autumn to assert that Jordan’s return to

¹ See document no 193, n 4.
something like stability was probable. None of us would now assert that the aims and methods of Iraq or the U.A.R. may not again change course quickly, or that Hussein’s country is secure. All I would say—and I am sure you will agree with this—is that conditions in that part of the world are sufficiently unpredictable and unstable for us to avoid commitments other than those which our fundamental objectives or interests demand.

Nevertheless we need both to be clear what our long term objective is and to have complete agreement between us as to what we should say about it in public as and when we need to say something.

The position in Aden as we see it at the moment is that the maintenance of colonial status in perpetuity or even some higher form of existence within the Commonwealth short of complete self-determination is not a respectable political philosophy for any town Arab and consequently the majority of Arabs of the Colony who would like to co-operate with us are looking for some alternative respectable political aim and they think they have found it in the ultimate inclusion of the Colony in the Federation to form an independent Arab State; and they tend to press us to commit ourselves to this objective and may before very long become somewhat importunate in this. The Protectorate Rulers tend to have the same ultimate objective but they have it for quite different reasons and at present at any rate they have no sense of urgency whatever in the matter. Neither party has probably thought at all seriously about the problems involved, or faced up to the political difficulties which will arise if and when a real attempt is made to incorporate a town with increasing parliamentary institutions into a Federation consisting of feudal states.

We here are all agreed that if and when it becomes clear that the continued separate existence of the Colony as a British Colony is no longer tolerable to the Protectorate Rulers, then our best hope of successfully maintaining our interests for any length of time may well be to encourage the entry of the Colony into the Federation. So long however as that is not the case, and we do not feel that it is the case now, some here think that our purpose should be to keep the present position or something like it going as long as we can and if anything to try to keep the Colony and the Protectorate apart rather than deliberately to bring them together.

That is not to say that those who hold this view consider that we should so describe our policy publicly or indeed do or say anything which would cause the public to realise that this was what we were trying to do. On the contrary, even those who feel like that would agree that if and when public statements about our policy have to be made, they must inevitably lean in the direction of encouraging rather than discouraging closer association between them. But what some feel is that such statements should not lean further in this direction or land us in more commitments than is absolutely unavoidable.

This may all sound a little Machiavellian; but I suspect that it is not really very far removed from your own train of thought. Anyway, let us have a really good discussion when you get home.

2 Jordan.
196  CAB 134/1558, CPC(59)12  14 Aug 1959

[Future policy for Aden Colony and Protectorate]: memorandum by Mr Lennox-Boyd for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee

1. In my memorandum C.P.C. (58) 23 I described the Governor of Aden’s proposals tending towards a merger of Aden Colony with the Protectorate Federation, first under our protection and later as an independent South Arabian State in treaty relations with us. I also set out the possible disadvantages of the policy to our defence interests in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. At its 16th Meeting (C.P.C. (58) 16th Meeting, Conclusions) the Committee agreed that I should make no announcement about future policy when I went to Aden.¹

2. I visited the Colony and the Protectorate last February and discussed future policy with the Governor and his official advisers. I also sounded the more reliable Rulers in the Protectorate and—in more guarded fashion—some of the moderate politicians on the Colony’s Executive Council.

3. The Rulers wish to see the Federation consolidated and extended before active steps are taken towards a merger with the Colony. Their eye, moreover, is mainly on the Yemen border. There is little doubt, however, that they would like “to put their paws” on Aden Colony. They see in it an important new source of revenue. They also fear that a weak British Government may one day fail to maintain itself in the Colony and let it fall under the hostile influence of Egypt or the Yemen.

4. The moderate politicians in the colony approach the problem rather differently. Accused by their extremist opponents as “Colonial stooges”, they see in the promotion of a merger between the Colony and the Federation a means of escaping from Colonial status and of appearing as the emancipators of Aden. Some of them also dream that the Protectorate may have oil. These moderate politicians would like us to make an early public statement in support of the merger.

5. The Governor remains convinced that, in these circumstances, it is no longer practical politics to maintain, as we have done hitherto, that Aden cannot expect more than a wide measure of internal self-government under the Colonial Office. To do so would, in his view, undermine the position of the moderate politicians in the Colony, play into the hands of the extremists and lead perhaps to serious industrial disturbances. I have already discussed the extent of this last danger in C.P.C. (59) 4. The Governor also fears that in the longer run such an attitude might alienate the Protectorate Rulers. Their appetite for Aden will grow and, with the passage of time, they too may come under increasing pressure from Arab nationalist opinion to take up an anti-colonialist position. It should not prove too difficult to maintain order in the Colony alone, if the Protectorate were friendly. The Commander B.F.A.P. has advised, however, that if the Protectorate as well as the Colony turned against us we should need substantial forces to protect our military installations. There would, then, be no accommodation in the Colony for troops destined for service elsewhere.

6. The Protectorate Rulers and the moderate politicians agree in private that it is to their interests that we should maintain our base in Aden. They would, no doubt, eventually agree to a treaty with us guaranteeing our defence requirements. How

¹ See document no 192.
long they would stand by it is another matter. They are Arabs; and Aden is a place from which operations against other parts of the Arab world might well be mounted.

7. In our discussions on the Middle East (M.E. (M) (59): 4th Meeting) we recognised that we should retain a major strategic interest in the Aden Protectorate and Colony and in the Persian Gulf States. Aden itself was described as “of practical and great importance to the United Kingdom”. For the purposes of planning future policy, therefore, I assume that we shall continue to require unrestricted use of our defence facilities in the Colony. The problem therefore is how to devise a policy which takes account, on the one hand of our vital defence requirements and on the other of the pressures building up in the Colony, and more slowly in the Federation, for a merger of the two and their subsequent independence.

8. The Governor and the Commander have considered whether it would be possible to partition the Colony with the idea of our retaining sovereignty over a military enclave. They have had to reject this as impracticable. The Colony is too small in area and the military facilities too closely integrated with the civil facilities to permit of division. Both the civilian and the military communities are dependent on Aden port and on Arab labour. The base is also dependent on the port and refinery of Little Aden; and the latter is itself a key point requiring protection.

9. I cannot, as at present advised, recommend that we should meet the moderate politicians in the Colony or the Protectorate Rulers by coming out at this stage in favour of a merger of the Colony and the Federation. The risks to our defence interests seem to me too great. Our best chance, indeed, of safeguarding these would seem to lie in keeping the Federation and the Colony apart. I agree with the Governor, however, that it is no longer practical politics to maintain that Aden will remain a Colony indefinitely. I am also convinced that we must not get into the position of publicly saying “No” to the idea of a merger of the Colony and Federation. To do so, indeed, would almost certainly have the effect of making the merger more attractive to Arab opinion.

10. In the circumstances I believe the wisest course will be to play for time and to avoid defining our policy too clearly. The Protectorate Rulers are not pressing us for a statement on the merger. They are busy consolidating and extending the Federation and playing their favourite game of border politics. The moderate politicians in the Colony will be more insistent. In the light, however, of recent discussion with the Adenese members of his Executive Council, the Governor now considers that he can avoid making a public statement on the merger for the next year or so. He would, however, wish to be able to indicate to the members, in confidence, that we should not stand in their way if they were to come forward with proposals for practical measures of co-operation between the Colony and the Federation in such matters as health, education and communications, provided these were sound on their own merits. I would propose to authorise the Governor to speak on these lines on his return should the Adenese press him and should he consider it politic to respond.

11. There are important factors in the situation which will assist a delaying action and may even tend against the merger. Neither the Colony politicians, nor the Protectorate Rulers have thought seriously about the practical problems involved. Politically and ideologically, moreover, the two parties are tending in opposite directions. Aden Colony, with a cosmopolitan and industrial population, is developing like other British Colonies towards internal self-government on
democratic lines. The Federation remains a traditional South Arabian feudal oligarchy, and there are no signs of departure from its traditional authoritarian ways. These social and political factors may well delay the merger for some time, and it is even possible that they may develop into lasting obstacles to it. How far we could or should encourage the development of obstacles to the merger would depend on circumstances; and it will, of course, be important that Her Majesty’s Government and the Governor should not be seen to be working against the merger. Should there be no merger, we may well be faced with strong demands for independence for the Colony alone. This would seem a rather unrealistic aspiration for so small a community—150,000 people—and we should have to try to limit it to something like the status accorded to Singapore.

12. I would accordingly invite my colleagues to endorse the line of policy indicated in this paper and more particularly the proposals at paragraph 10.

---

197 CO 1015/2392, no 1 3 Sept 1960


…9. H.M.G.’s prime purpose in Aden is to retain the free and unrestricted use of the military base so long as their strategic interests require that base. But I think we would all agree that in pursuing that purpose it is incumbent upon H.M.G. to help the people of this area to build the foundations of a State which will give them some hope of determining ultimately their own destiny. It seems to me unthinkable that we should make use of this area for our own purposes and then eventually abandon it to chaos and leave its people at the mercy of the Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R., to say nothing of the Communist bloc. If this thesis is accepted, then the basic problem is to reconcile the pursuit of H.M.G.’s interests in Aden with our duty towards its people. In seeking the solution to this problem I am sure that the first and most important thing is to recognise who are our friends in this area and who are our enemies. First and foremost among our friends I put the Rulers of the Western Protectorate, who are also the backbone of the Federation. Second to them I put the Colony moderates, led by Bayoomi1 who appears to me to be emerging steadily as a dominant figure in Colony politics. Our internal enemies are the extreme Arab nationalists, headed at present by the leaders of the A.T.U.C., who are in collusion with our external “enemy”, the U.A.R. I think it is essential to recognise that this group is irreconcilable to H.M.G.’s basic purpose here and that there is no hope of reaching any understanding with them which would not involve the defeat of that purpose. Having recognised our friends and our enemies, we must strengthen and encourage the former, and confound the latter. In the context of Aden, our enemies are also the enemies of our friends and we shall only lose their friendship if

---

1 Hassan Bayoomi (or Bayyumi), minister of labour and local government, the principal political leader in the Colony.
we show signs of weakness towards the common enemy, or follow a policy which gives him the opportunity of gaining power.

10. So far as the Federal Rulers are concerned, I believe that we can keep and strengthen their friendship, and through it retain our essential military requirements in the Protectorate, for many years to come provided that we give generous support to the Federation and help them to establish a position of “respectability” in the eyes of both their own people and the outside world. Self-interest and self-protection will be powerful factors in maintaining the British connection.

The retention of our friendship with the Colony moderates is a more delicate matter, for here we have to help in building up the prestige and power of men who, unlike the Rulers, have no innate or traditional claim to authority or the allegiance of the people. In addition, we have to help them too to become politically “respectable”, and this is a more difficult task when they are our partners in a colonial administration than it is with the Federal Rulers with their already semi-independent status. To hold and strengthen their position with the public, the moderate Colony politicians must be enabled to clear themselves, to some extent at least, of the extremists’ accusation that they are mere puppets of the British.

Finally, I would repeat that the active encouragement of our friends, in both Federation and Colony, must be accompanied by the active discouragement of our and their enemies; without this our friends will always doubt the real sincerity of our intentions.

11. Against the background of the above general observations, let us now look at the situation, which will arise towards the close of 1962, when the life of the present Legislative Council ends. It is obvious that at that moment something new must happen; nobody in their senses would believe that we could merely have a new Legislative Council elected on the basis of the present constitution. If we are to retain any friends in the Colony, there must be a change of some sort. On the normal pattern of constitutional development in Colonial territories, that change would take the form of a further step towards internal self-government, based on the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. I think it is clear from earlier paragraphs of this letter that such a step, to command the support and retain the friendship of the Colony moderates, would have to be a long one, carrying us virtually to full internal self-government. At the least it would, in my opinion, mean an almost entirely elected Legislative Council, with a wider franchise than at present, the retention of only two official members in the Executive Council (Chief Secretary and Attorney General), and a full Ministerial system with the Governor remaining directly responsible only for external affairs and defence, including, I would hope, internal security.

12. Would such a step help us to solve the problem I have posed in paragraph 9 above? I firmly believe that it would not; on the contrary, I believe that it would tend to make the problem insoluble for the following reasons:—

(a) It would be likely to play right into the hands of our enemies, the extreme nationalists; all the indications are that they have learned the futility of boycotting elections, and that they would take part in elections with a constitution of the type I have envisaged above. With a wider franchise, their influence over labour and the aid of Egyptian money, they could well secure a majority in the Legislative
Council. Such a result would be wholly inimical to H.M.G.’s interests and would lead rapidly to either a crumbling of the British position in Aden or the suspension of the constitution, with all its barren consequences. Our Colony friends would be powerless to help us, and would probably blame us for having let them down. It is clear from a recent conversation he had with the Chief Secretary that Bayoomi himself has seen these dangers and is now seeking ways to avoid them.

(b) The Federation Rulers would be bitterly critical of any such development and would regard it as an indication that H.M.G. no longer attached importance to their friendship and alliance. This could only result in grave harm to our position in the Western Protectorate and to the value of our military facilities under the Federation Treaty.

(c) Apart from the above considerations, another strong dose of parliamentary democracy in the Colony will only widen the existing differences between Colony and Federation, and so increase the difficulties of a constitutional marriage in the future. As you know from previous correspondence, I regard a coming together of these two units as the only development which can make political or economic sense of this area, and which can provide a reasonable foundation for the sort of State which, as stated in paragraph 9 above, I consider it both our duty and our interest to work for.

To sum up, it is my view that another, and inevitably big, advance by the Colony along the Westminster road will help our enemies, alienate our friends and rapidly jeopardise British interests in this area. I therefore conclude that it must be discarded as a solution of the problem.

13. What we need is something which will meet the views of our best friends, the Federation Rulers, enable our Colony friends to remain in power, facilitate the coming together of Colony and Federation and serve the long-term interests of H.M.G. I suggest that the only solution which can fulfil all those requirements is the conversion of the Colony into a Protectorate (a true Protectorate on the Aden pattern) before the end of the life of the present Legislative Council, say, in the autumn of 1962, with the further aim of bringing about a merger between the new Protectorate and the Federation. An alternative, and perhaps more desirable, course would be to extend the life of the present Legislative Council by Order-in-Council for a period of one year, having declared publicly H.M.G.’s intention of carrying out the conversion; this would allow more time for the complexities of the operation. The conversion would entail the relinquishment of British sovereignty over the Colony territory, and thereafter H.M.G.’s relations with the new Protectorate would be governed by the same kind of treaty terms (with appropriate additions and omissions) as those which now exist between H.M.G. and the Federation.

14. The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, would be as follows:

(a) We should hand over full control of the internal affairs of Aden (in the narrow sense of what is now the Colony) to our friends who are co-operating with us under the present constitution. H.M.G. would no longer be responsible for constitutional development and would thus be able to avoid the dangers of a further advance of parliamentary democracy which would be virtually inevitable were the territory to continue as a Colony after 1962. It would be for the successor Protectorate Government to decide what shape the future constitution should take, and when and on what basis there should be new elections; but it can
reasonably be supposed that our friends in the successor Government would so arrange these matters as to ensure as far as possible the maintenance of their own authority.

(b) Our friends in the successor government would have a freer hand to deal with their, and our, political enemies in their own way; they would not be so deeply influenced as we are by the principles of democracy, individualism and liberalism which, when strictly applied in the realities of a place like Aden, spell the defeat of H.M.G.’s main purpose here, and provide no sure basis for a stable independent State in the future.

(c) It would greatly strengthen the political position of our Colony friends, not only in the sense described in (a) and (b) above, but also by giving them the “autonomy” they seek and the credit and respectability of having gained emergence from colonial status and brought at least semi-independence to Aden. In the same conversation to which I have referred in paragraph 12 (a) above, Bayoomi showed that his own mind is moving in this direction.

(d) It would, if fully explained to them, reassure the Federal Rulers about our intentions for the Colony. Their great fear is that we intend to give it more and more democracy which to them would mean ensuring sooner or later the supremacy of their enemies, the extreme Nasserite nationalists who seek republicanism and the overthrow of traditional authority as the surest and fastest road to power for themselves. It is true that the Rulers would prefer to see the British remain in firm control of the Colony for some years to come, but they must be brought to see the impossibility in these days of standing still indefinitely, and the value to them of strengthening the position of the Colony moderates vis-à-vis the extremists. It is true also that they like to profess a certain blue-blooded contempt and mistrust of these self-made Colony politicians, but the fact is that some of them have quite close personal relations with Bayoomi and others, and I have little doubt that their common fear of Nasserite nationalism will increasingly draw them together.

(e) It would leave external affairs and defence in the hands of H.M.G., and also, for all practical purposes internal security. . . . It would also give H.M.G. all the military facilities they have at present in the Colony.

15. Though at first sight my suggested solution may seem drastic and revolutionary, I would point out that so far as my own thinking on the future of Aden is concerned, there is nothing new about it. The germ of what I am now suggesting was contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of my letter 12367/59–60 of 28th March, 1958, to Gorell Barnes.² My thinking about the future of the Colony in paragraph 6 of that letter was subsequently modified when the formation of a Federation in the Western Protectorate was approved by H.M.G. in the summer of 1958. . . . It is my firm conviction that these dangers [of taking the Colony any further along the road to full internal self-government] are a much greater threat to H.M.G.’s interests here than would be any risks which may attach to the policy I am advocating. The main development in my thinking on all this is in the matter of timing; and that seems to me now to be dictated by the ending of the life of the present Legislative Council at the close of 1962.

² See document no 188(3).
16. If it were argued that the security of H.M.G.’s military interests in Aden cannot be made the subject of an act of faith in the continued goodwill of our present friends here, I would reply that the British cannot in practice “go it alone” and still retain what they need here. We must have some friends in the future and we should do all we can to retain those we already have. It is not as if our friendship with the Rulers and Colony moderates were based solely on sentiment; it has a far more solid foundation in common interests and dangers, and in material considerations such as their long-term need for our military, financial and technical assistance. Moreover, in the last resort, we, through our best friends, the Federation Rulers, would have the whip hand over our second-best friends, the Colony moderates, should the latter try to let us down after they had emerged from Colonial status; the Federation will have the F.N.G. and its own Army which the ex-Colony would be powerless to resist once we had allowed them to be unleashed.

17. The final point I should like to make in arguing my case is that we should not be fearful of our enemies, either internal or external. A combination of ourselves, the Federation and the Colony moderates, supported by a large element which has strong commercial interests in stability and security, would far out-weigh any political forces which the extreme nationalists could range against us. The recent exercise of introducing our new industrial legislation has shown that there are definite limitations to the power of the nationalist T.U.C. leaders in the face of Government firmness and determination. We hold the very powerful weapon of the threat of deportation against their main body of supporters, the Yemeni labourers, and there was plenty of evidence during the Renown operation that the use of this weapon after the October, 1958, riots has not been forgotten. There is little in fact that Egypt can do, apart from propaganda and perhaps the supply of funds, to help the Aden extremists, and the Imam of the Yemen is unlikely to rupture our present improved relations merely to help people who are strongly hostile to his regime and whose ideas for the future of ‘Greater Yemen’ conflict sharply with his own. It is true that once we began public discussion of the idea of converting the Colony into a Protectorate within the lifetime of the present Legislative Council, with the obvious prospect of a merger between it and the Federation, there would be a vociferous outcry from the Nasserite nationalists and their Egyptian allies, but we should be prepared to face this; we certainly have the power to deal with any security risks which might arise, and we should not be afraid to use it ....

Minutes on 197

Mr. Melville

In this letter Sir William Luce tells us about recent political developments in the Colony and Federation, and looks to the future. We do not need to take executive action at present on this letter, but I think that higher authority and, in due course, Mr. Amery should see it.

In paragraph 15 the Governor refers to correspondence with the Office in 1958 and 1959. You need not, I suggest, trouble to re-read these back papers in detail; and it will, I think, be sufficient if you glance again at the two papers [in which] Mr. Lennox-Boyd sought confirmation from his colleagues that H.M.G. required the use of Aden as a base, and discussed the dilemma posed for us by political awakening in
the Colony and Federation. Two years ago, as Sir William Luce reminds us, he proposed to the Secretary of State an elaborate scheme of gradual disengagement, which included the merger of Colony and Federation under Protectorate status. Ministers did not feel that they could commit themselves to so definite a programme of disengagement, and, in fact, our present policy in Aden is to play for time without appearing to obstruct any local moves towards a closer association between Colony and Protectorate.

In fact, during the past year the Governor has not needed to indicate H.M.G.’s views on this last point, but recently, as he describes in his letter, the Government have had to show their hand in the Legislative Council and indicate the probability of constitutional change in the Colony when the present Legislative Council comes to an end at the end of 1962. This public debate sparked off the Rulers in the Federation to some typical remonstrances. These Rulers have, of course, for some time been identifiable as the political leaders in the Protectorate, and they are the people with whom we have come to terms over the Federation. Although I myself think that the younger generation of educated Arabs—many of whom are coming to this country for training—are perhaps as hostile to the conception of rule by the Rulers as to the British connection, I think that at present the Rulers are the people who have the power in the Protectorate. We cannot hold Aden Colony without a friendly Protectorate and for the present we must put our shirts on the Rulers.

In the Colony, however, it has not been so easy to identify the Arabs (or for that matter Indians) who have power. In part, of course, this is due to the fact that it is only in the past two years that Aden has emerged from Crown Colony government. Even now, there are no real political parties—apart from the Aden T.U.C.—and very few public men who command an assured following. Still the ‘quasi-Ministerial’ system which we have been operating for the past 18 months has given one or two Unofficials an opportunity to obtain some public backing. The best of them—as the recent Industrial Legislation business showed—is Mr. Bayoomi, and I would agree with the Governor that he is becoming a dominant figure in Colony politics.

The Governor indicates that, although there are still wide differences between the Rulers and the Colony moderates led by Mr. Bayoomi, there are some signs of the growth of some common understanding between them, and he implies that it is in our interest to devise a long-term policy which will establish them in power in the Colony and in the Federation. As a means of doing this, he recalls his earlier proposal for a Protectorate over the two areas. He suggests that it would be wrong to try to maintain our authority in the Colony by continuing to develop internal self-government on orthodox Colonial Office lines.

This idea of turning the Colony into a Protectorate has certain attractions. Arabs have not demonstrated any remarkable talent for Parliamentary government and, as I have said, there has been no real sign in the Colony of a political party system which could make Parliamentary government effective. On the other hand, I am not convinced that the mere change from Colonial to Protectorate status would of itself alter conditions in the Colony. In paragraph 3 of his letter the Governor refers to a hint by the Sharif of Beihan that the Colony originally belonged to two of the neighbouring States, and Mr. Lennox-Boyd indicated that the Sultan of Lahej might have historical claims to the territory which is now the Colony. The Sharif of Beihan is hardly an impeccable historian, but these doubts as to the traditional ownership of the Colony territory serve to remind us that, so far as I know, we have never entered
into Protectorate relationship otherwise than with an authority which existed before we came to the territory. In several parts of Africa we have employed the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, post hoc, to transfer Protectorates virtually into Colonies, but that is a different process from what the Governor seems to have in mind. I do not, at this stage, see how we could change the Colony into a Protectorate without taking some established authority under our Protection—and who is this established authority to be? The Governor implies that it should be the moderate Colony politicians but I foresee great difficulties in our establishing in advance, as it were, an authoritarian regime in the Colony with which we could enter into Protectorate relationship, and remain confident that it would endure and would be able to conduct itself, with consent, in such a way as to enable us to retain all we want in the way of defence, etc., facilities. There are admittedly dangers, as the Governor points out, in giving Aden Colony another dose of constitutional advance along orthodox lines, but I am not convinced as yet that this danger is greater than those which would be involved in trying to set up Mr. Bayoomi and his friends and then disengage ourselves into a situation where we could not come to their rescue.

On other papers, as you know, the Middle East Official Committee is examining our Persian Gulf commitments and their consequences. It looks, at this stage, as though the need for us to retain the use of Aden as a base, which has governed our policies hitherto, will be again emphasised. I hope that we shall be in a position to adopt a policy which will combine the need to do this with the need to govern in the Colony and in the Protectorate with consent. These two needs are the basis of the Governor’s suggestions.

It would, I think, be useful for the department to examine the historical point about the claim to Aden Colony were H.M.G. to ‘liberate’ it from Colonial status. Sir Bernard Reilly’s advice on this would be invaluable. It would also be useful, I think, to have examined more closely the principles involved in an exchange of Protectorate for Crown Colony status and, in particular, the question of what kind of authority would be required before the Sovereign could take a “neutralized” territory under Protection. I think that Mr. Branney could give us valuable advice on this point.

Looking a little further ahead, you yourself will be visiting Aden and no doubt find Sir William Luce’s suggestions useful in forming your own impressions, and for discussion with the new Governor. Looking further ahead still, I suggest that there is a good case for a Ministerial visit to Aden after Sir Charles Johnston has had some time to settle in and before the time comes when we have to take firm decisions of policy, i.e. before we have to decide finally what kind of Colony constitution is going to replace the present one at the end of 1962.

I.W.
13.9.60

The Governor’s suggestions do not, in my view, provide a workable basis for future constitutional development of the Colony and Protectorate. I agree with the objections pointed out by Mr. Watt but I would not go as far as he does in saying that we cannot hold the Colony without a friendly Protectorate and I would certainly not go with the Governor in placing all our reliance on the Western Protectorate Rulers

---

3 Resident/governor and C-in-C, Aden, 1931–1940. He continued to be used by the CO as an adviser until 1961.
as our best friends. They are all unpredictable and many of them are corrupt or incapable. The suggestion that our base rights might be preserved by letting them loose on the Colony with the Armed Forces paid for by us appears to me to be unthinkable. It would lead to chaos and defeat our objective.

Although the Protectorate Rulers and the Colony have many problems to settle between them, their interests are likely to be opposed and it seems pointless to expect that this will lead to a permanent basis for closer association.

As to the historical claims of the Rulers in relation to Aden Colony, I shall be very interested to hear Sir Bernard's views but it would, in my view, be fatal to concede such interests. Apart from anything else this would go far to undermining our own rejection of the historical claims of the demands of the Yemen and would lose us the friendship of the people in Aden Colony who have made their homes there under British rule.

I agree with the Governor that we cannot afford to let this problem wait too long or we shall be caught on the wrong foot. It appears to me to be largely aggravated by the creation of the Federation, which has greatly restricted our freedom of manoeuvre as well as frightening the Colony people into increasing their pressure towards independence so that they can protect themselves from the Federation. It seems to me questionable whether the Federation can hold together for long without the overall pressure of Her Majesty's Government's policy and it would have made more sense to think of uniting the Colony with Lahej and possibly one or two other adjacent states so that the Colony would have been the senior partner in the union and could have gradually extended its system of administration to take in the more developed parts of Lahej. This would have provided a basis for framing a Constitution with a block of traditionalists representing the states to balance the elected representatives from the Colony. The union of Lahej with the Colony would have safeguarded the Colony's trade with the Yemen and enabled the Colony to acquire more breathing space.

As things are we have little alternative but to devise a further constitutional advance for the Colony alone, as far as possible placing the power in responsible hands. In the circumstances of the Colony with its dependence on the port, the refinery and military base for its prosperity, and with no rural population to balance the large accretion of raw, uneducated, rootless people in the town, it would be folly to place power in the hands of a popular majority. Responsible people in the Colony are not pressing for a greater degree of democracy in the administration but a further step in the transfer of power to local hands as a concession to their nationalism. Our objective should therefore be a Constitution which confers further responsibilities on the local people but restricts the ability of demagogues to undermine the stability of the Colony.

Obviously, a Constitution of this nature would provide ammunition for our critics in Arabia but they will condemn any Constitution which does not provide the hostile Arabian Governments with the means of evicting the British from Aden. Similarly, any Constitution that would be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government is bound to be bitterly attacked by the Aden T.U.C. Unless, therefore, Her Majesty's Government intends to give way to these hostile and malign forces, it must discount all such hostile criticism and propaganda and select a course in the interests of the settled stable population of Aden Colony and of Her Majesty's Government. This may well involve the use of novel and possibly curious constitutional devices but if these fit the circumstances we should not reject them.
We should make up our minds that in the peculiar circumstances of Aden, where a very high proportion of the population have come into the territory from outside in recent decades, the determining voice in the Government should be that of the settled Adenis who have a permanent interest in the Colony and a vested interest in security and prosperity; these are the property owners, the businessmen and employees in reasonably responsible positions, together with the professional classes which, though small in number, have a major contribution to make. We should aim to create a strong Executive and a weak Legislature and a Constitution which will avoid dramatic upheavals and reversals of policy. Apart from providing the degree of stability needed in the Colony for its commerce and shipping interests, such a government would provide the best chance of developing closer relations with the Protectorate. Because of the very small number of men with experience in responsible positions in public life, the Constitution should provide for the retention of such men in public life even though they may not be elected representatives and should provide more opportunities for holding office and acquiring the necessary experience. It is of course essential that the next step should include a move towards a full Ministerial system.

Among the devices which might be examined I suggest the following:

(a) That seats in the Legislature should not be filled by General Elections but by elections in rotation of a proportion of the representatives, as in local government in the United Kingdom. This would have the advantage of avoiding dramatic changes, damping down the excitement of General Elections and it could be used to retain in power the present Arab leaders who are prepared to co-operate with the Government, for a period beyond the life of the present Legislative Council. The rotational system could be introduced by enlarging the Council so that none of the existing members would have to be called upon to vacate their seats for election.

(b) If it were considered essential to enlarge the elected majority, this should certainly be balanced by a restriction of the franchise. The latter should probably be introduced in any case. The residence qualification for British subjects and British Protected Persons should be increased from the present figure of two years’ out of the three preceding the election to something like five out of the seven preceding the election. This would go some way to meeting a grievance of the local Arabs that Indians and other British subjects can acquire the vote after only two years’ residence and it would also reduce the influence of newly-entered Protectorate people, many of whom are among the supporters of the Aden T.U.C. and would take their instructions on voting from that organization. No aliens should be given the vote and this would leave the Yemenis where they stand at present. A higher property and income qualifications should if possible be adopted in order to weaken still further the voting power of the T.U.C. and the irresponsible element in the Aden population.

(c) Another device to weaken the Legislature and strengthen the Executive might be the creation of an Upper Chamber something on the lines of the Portuguese Corporative Chamber, which includes representatives of the sectional interests of the community. This could be a nominated body which would bring into public life responsible and experienced people who would not be thrown up by the elections or who had lost their seats and it would make it possible for the Executive to
include nominated as well as elected members. Seats could be provided in this body for representatives of the Labour Movement so that there could be no valid criticism that there was no opportunity for them to express their views in a constitutional manner. The Upper House might have limited powers to delay legislation put up by the Lower House and also powers to initiate legislation. While all this would help to make the process of legislation and public discussion more cumbersome and reduce the possibilities of ill-considered action by the elected Chamber, it could not ensure the Executive a majority to carry through its proposals in the elected Chamber. It is for this reason that the restriction of the franchise is so important.

(d) It is also time that the Aden Government faced up to the job, which it continues to shirk, of finding out who the people are in Aden and what they are doing. If the Colony is to become politically stable and to run more of its own affairs, it is essential to its security that it should have control of the people from the Yemen and the Protectorate who come into the Colony. While the migrant labour will always, as far as one can see, play a part in the economy of Aden it seems desirable to maintain as sharp a distinction as possible between the settled population and the migrant labour and to prevent the growth of a large transitional class. Nobody knows how long the migrant labour are really staying now and how many of them tend to develop permanent connections with the Colony. This danger to Aden comes not only from the Yemen but also from the Protectorate and already one can see Protectorate families who might throw their lot against our protégés both in the Colony and the Protectorate and who have members in influential positions in both Colony and Protectorate organizations. It is far easier for people in the Colony and the Protectorate to find a common interest at this level than it is for the Protectorate Rulers to reconcile their vested interests with those of the Colony political leaders.

I have not so far commented on the definition of “Adeni”. The Governor's attitude is that no official definition can be adopted until public opinion has hardened on the subject and I do not believe that it is in Her Majesty's Government's interests to see a formal definition adopted. Indians and Pakistanis in the Colony, who might be excluded from any definition in deference to the majority Arab opinion, are more often than not people whose interests are identical with those of Her Majesty's Government and whose interests are beneficial to Aden.

Some of these thoughts may seem far-fetched but they are no more outrageous than those of the Governor and I am sure that we need a full examination of the problem from first principles without any preconceived solutions.

C.A.K.
15.9.60

Sir John Martin
I send this forward at this stage for you to see Sir William Luce's swan-song letter. Sir William Luce's analysis of the political scene and of likely future developments is keen and perceptive and I don't think that we could find much to quarrel with in it. It is over his conclusions and recommendations for future action that there seems likely to be disagreement. I myself know so little about Aden and the Arab world generally that I hesitate to express critical views. The short visit which I propose to
make to Aden in November will give me more confidence to do so although it is scarcely likely to fill in the gaps in my knowledge of Aden affairs. I must, however, say that I find it very hard to swallow Sir William Luce’s solution of translating Aden Colony into a Protectorate. Some of the arguments on this are set out in Mr. Watt’s minute of the 13th September and Mr. Kirkman’s minute of the 15th September above, both of which you should read. It seems to me that if we were to try to take this step, we should create more difficulties for ourselves than we should solve. The basic difficulty would be to find the authority to whom sovereignty could be transferred, and in the absence of a traditional sovereign such as we have in the Federated States and in other Sultanates it is hard to see how the Protectorate idea avoids the issue of conferring full self-government on some form of democratically elected executive government. There are indeed a number of strands in Sir William Luce’s argument which suggest a parallel with Singapore, both internally and in its relations with the Federation of Malaya. It is surely more in accordance with our traditional policy, and with the way in which we have hitherto devolved power in Aden, for us to direct future advances along Singapore lines.

As I think you know, the Official Middle East Committee have recently attempted to answer a number of questions by the Minister of Defence about the future defence of the Arabian Peninsula and particularly our oil interests in the Persian Gulf, on the assumption that our present military facilities in Aden were lost to us. The conclusion reached by the Committee, which I have no doubt will be endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff and by Ministers, is that alternative arrangements to Aden would be difficult and expensive to create and that our policy should therefore be directed towards maintaining our position in Aden as long as possible. The Committee have recognised, of course,—as we did in Singapore—that the free and unfettered use of military facilities can be assured only by the consent of the people of Aden and that there may come a stage at which we should be faced with the choice of remaining by force or getting out. In the meantime, moreover, it would be necessary, in order to retain the consent of the local people, to offer advances in self-government. All this is obvious enough and is, I think, an accepted doctrine by other Departments in Whitehall including Defence Departments. But the importance of Aden as a defence base means that we shall have to continue to carry the Defence Departments with us in the constitutional changes which will become inevitable in 1962. We should therefore bring them into consultation at a fairly early stage on our constitutional plans.

But first I think we must clear our minds in the Office on the issues which we have to face at the next stage of constitutional advance, in the light of Sir William Luce’s analysis and recommendations in his letter. I would propose therefore to ask Mr. Watt to set this in hand in consultation with the lawyers and then, after my return from Aden in November, to submit outline proposals on which consultation with other Whitehall Departments could take place. Before a final plan goes to Ministers, we shall of course have to consult the new Governor. But we must keep the discussions moving along fairly steadily if we are not to be caught short at the end of the present constitutional period; and we can most profitably take the new Governor’s advice when we have clarified our ideas here internally and with other interested Departments.

E.M.
30.9.60
I do not submit at this stage any recommendation on [Sir W. Luce's] suggestions about future policy, since these require further detailed study in the Department. *Prima facie* I share the doubts expressed in departmental minutes. The dangers of further advance towards parliamentary democracy are clear enough, but it is not so clear how we could hope to preserve our military position by handing over sovereignty to “our friends” the moderates, who are upheld neither by traditional loyalties nor by popular political support.

J.M.M.
3.10.60

This is an extremely interesting and important letter from Sir William Luce whose views on the future of the Aden Colony and Protectorate are clearly entitled to very great respect. I have never dealt directly with Aden affairs in the Office and I have never visited Aden so I do not feel very well qualified to express any opinion at this stage. Nevertheless my instinct tells me that Sir W. Luce is clearly right in urging that the future of the Colony and the future of the Protectorate must be considered in parallel and in relation to each other. For one thing, if it became necessary to grant independence to the Protectorate I should imagine it would be quite impossible to hold on the Colony. It is only the strong racial antipathies between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore which have enabled us to retain Singapore as a separate entity. If both States wanted to join up I am very doubtful whether we could retain our position in Singapore. The same considerations seem to apply in Aden.

But working from this premise I think where the subsequent argument begins to go a bit wrong is in a certain ambiguity in the meaning of the word “Protectorate”. As I read Sir W. Luce's letter I think what he has in mind with his Aden [?Sudan] background, is something much more like what we should normally call a Protected State (or a group of Protected States) with recognised local rulers with whom we can be in treaty relationship, e.g. the Federation of Malaya before independence, Tonga or Zanzibar. Unless there is some recognised arrangement of this kind under which the sovereignty and jurisdiction lie with the local rulers there is no escape from the fact that even if we turned Aden Colony into a Protectorate we should still have to devise some form of constitutional Government. Nyasaland is a Protectorate; so too is Uganda where perhaps one gets the nearest analogy of an area which contains local rulers whose jurisdiction does not cover the whole area of the Protectorate.

Nevertheless, there is a great deal of food for thought in Sir W. Luce’s letter and I entirely agree that his proposals should be examined in detail and the views of the new Governor sought when we are in a position to make any comment of our own.

A.H.P.
4.10.60

There is indeed much to be thought about. All of the thinking however, as I see it, should be based on the fact that we can hold the security situation if we have to. Starting from this premise, I would not unduly worry about my enemies who were always going to be enemies, or even worry too much about my friends! I do not mean by this that I do not want to keep my friends and indeed to strengthen them in every way possible, but it does seem to me that here is a situation where we are in control and can so remain over the next years. To this end continued friendship with the
Federal rulers is of obvious importance and firm action is something they understand and would welcome.

All the same one does not want unnecessarily to stir up trouble or makes things difficult; hence I agree that we should try to give encouragement to our political friends in the colony. This means a greater degree of self-government, although just how great a degree would need much thought. It also means, I think, cooking the elections to ensure that they remain in power. Mr. Kirkman’s minute of the 15th September has various valuable ideas in this respect. Whether in helping our political friends one has to talk about protectorate status, full self-government and all the other things, I am inclined to wonder.

One last comment. I am very clear that we must take the Federal Rulers along with us in any steps to greater self-government for the Colony, more especially if this is part of a plan for bringing the Colony and the Federal Rulers together. I know that the wind of change blows almost everywhere, but is this not a point where our friends (and I would include the Imam in this context!) do not want the rule of Princes too fast [sic] subject to the pressure of the rule of the people? Our enemies will always want us out and want change for that purpose.

P.
11.10.60

---

198 CAB 131/24, D(60)53 27 Oct 1960

‘Constitutional development in Aden’: memorandum by Mr Macleod for Cabinet Defence Committee

The Defence Committee has agreed (D. (60) 10th Meeting) that the protection of British interests requires the retention of our base at Aden and has invited me to submit a memorandum on the likely course of constitutional development.

2. In January, 1959, a new constitution in Aden Colony provided, for the first time, for significant participation by elected members in the Legislative and Executive Councils. There is an elected majority in the former, and in the latter five elected Members with responsibilities for departments. Defence, external affairs, internal security and the civil service remain in official hands. The franchise is confined to British subjects and British Protected Persons with two years’ residence in the Colony and a modest property or income qualification. The Arab Nationalist element, urged on by the Aden T.U.C., boycotted the elections for this Legislative Council and, as a result, persons of moderate disposition who were willing to work the constitution were elected. There is no real party system in the Colony, but the Nationalists form a coherent group deriving their support mainly from the labouring classes, most of whom come from the Protectorate or from the Yemen. This constitution has worked satisfactorily despite hostility and criticism by the Nationalists, who get regular support from Cairo Radio. The Members in Charge of Departments have shown that Adenese can, working in collaboration with the civil service, take charge of domestic affairs. They showed praiseworthy determination and responsibility in supporting industrial legislation to deal with strikes, and thus clip the Nationalists’ wings.

3. Recently there have been distinct signs of public interest in a further stage of
constitutional development. The trend towards self-government in other British territories, particularly in Somaliland, has had its effect. The leaders of the moderate element wished to go with this trend and thereby disarm their Nationalist critics. They suggested to Sir William Luce, the recently retired Governor, that the expiry of the lifetime of the present Legislative Council, in January, 1963, should be the occasion for a constitutional change which would give the Adenese responsibility for all domestic affairs, leaving H.M.G. responsible for all defence, external relations and security. They stated that they recognise that we should wish to continue to have the use of Aden for defence purposes, and that they would welcome our presence. This private approach was followed by a public debate in the Legislative Council, which brought unanimous support for a Government resolution looking to a new constitution in January, 1963.

4. The declared intention of the Nationalists is to force us out of Aden as quickly as possible, and to unite Colony, Protectorate and a “reformed” Yemen with the U.A.R. So long as we remain in Aden we must expect their hostility. Our problem is to devise arrangements which will meet the wishes of the moderates for further self-government, thus enabling them to work with us and at the same time retain public support from that considerable element of the population which, like ourselves, knows that, if the Nationalists obtained power, security and stability would disappear.

5. We must take account of the Federation of Arab Amirates of the South, which was created in February, 1959, and has since been growing in coherence and authority. Federal Government headquarters are virtually in the Colony, and this has contributed to making the people of the Colony and the Federal leaders more aware of each other’s existence, of some common interests, and of the possibility of a common destiny. The Federation Rulers are as subject to Nationalist hostility as are the Colony moderates, but the Rulers have the strength which comes from traditional authority in rural Arabia, and there is no overt sign that they cannot maintain it, provided we continue to help them militarily, financially and with discreet political advice. Just as it is important that the Colony moderates should be able to demonstrate to public opinion there that they can bring increasing self-government, so it is important for the Federal Rulers to demonstrate to the peoples of the Protectorate that Federation and the British link can bring them material benefits and a respectable political future. The Rulers are apprehensive lest we concede too much too quickly in the Colony; and any constitutional changes which gave the Nationalists an opportunity would make the Rulers doubt our purpose and might lead them to precipitate, irresponsible action. We have not yet been called on to give any public indication of H.M.G.’s attitude to a closer merger between the Colony and the Federation, but there are signs that the Rulers and the leaders of the Colony moderates are beginning to realise that they have a common political interest in resisting the Nationalists, as well as in more material affairs. We must handle the Colony so as to obtain at least the acquiescence of the Federal leaders.

6. The first important date in forward planning is January, 1963; and we shall have to make our intentions public before then. Merely to repeat the present constitution for a further four years is unlikely to serve, since to do so would disappoint and lose us the support of the moderates. There would then be little prospect of our being able to remain in Aden with any significant measure of consent.

7. There would, however, be grave danger in the grant of a further measure of
responsible government on the normal Colonial pattern. To enlarge the elected Membership of the Councils and widen the franchise would be to invite the Nationalists to strive for a majority. They might well succeed, and we would soon have a crisis. The Federation Rulers would not forgive our foolishness.

8. Our efforts should rather be directed towards devising arrangements which will meet the desire of the moderates to run domestic affairs, leaving us with control of external relations, defence and security. Such a scheme will not, we must assume, assuage Nationalist hostility, and we must pay particular attention to the maintenance, and if necessary, improvement of the police and security forces. I believe that it may be possible to make such arrangements, but I cannot yet make detailed proposals. I intend to examine the problem in consultation with the new Governor during the next few months and in due course to submit my recommendations to the Colonial Policy Committee.¹

¹ The new governor was Sir Charles Johnston. The CO had not agreed with Sir W Luce that the Colony should be turned into a protectorate or protected state—it would be too risky to the continuation of the use of Aden as a base (as ministers intended) by ‘premature’ withdrawal of ultimate jurisdiction (CO 1015/2392, no 8). At the Defence Committee meeting on 2 Nov, the prime minister said they should ‘take special care, in promoting the constitutional development of Aden, to safeguard our defence requirements’ and be prepared ‘if necessary, to make some moderate financial contribution to assist the development of the Colony and Protectorate’; there were ‘good hopes of maintaining our position by agreement’ (CAB 131/23, D 11(60)2).

199 CO 1015/2392, no 29 3 Mar 1961
[Tactics and methods for attaining long-term objectives in Aden]: despatch (no 399) from Sir C Johnston (Aden) to Mr Macleod. Minutes by I Watt, E Melville, Sir J Martin and Mr Fraser [Extract]

This appraisal was awaited with interest in the CO. Extensive extracts were published in C H Johnston, The view from Steamer-Point: being an account of three years in Aden (1964) pp 36–40. Johnston had formerly been ambassador in Amman.]

... 71. I submit proposals on these grave matters with much diffidence. I have only been in Aden four months. Conditions in Aden Colony are such that it is not possible for us to sound local leaders, however informally, on such problems without starting every kind of undesirable speculation. For these reasons I must emphasise that the present despatch should be regarded as a preliminary exercise in clearing the ground. In fact it seems essential that in this exercise we should preserve a high degree of flexibility and not commit ourselves to any detailed solution in advance of full consultation with Colony and Federal leaders. It will however be of advantage to us to clear our own mind as soon as possible. Even though our Arab friends here will certainly not accept our views on all points without demur, they will no less certainly expect us to give them a lead.

72. As regards “playing the hand”, there are certain factors of which we should I think take full advantage. It may be convenient to set these out in tabular form.

(a) We should use the Colony’s wish for early self-government to justify the handing over of power to the Colony moderates as soon as possible, with the effect of avoiding the holding of Legislative Council elections early in 1963 under the
present constitution, with the disastrous implications which they would almost certainly have.

(b) We should use the Colony's fear of being swallowed by the Federation to get the Colony moderates' support for the maintenance of a special British position in regard to our bases in the Colony not only during the transitional phase, but during the final phase as well.

(c) We should use the Federal Rulers' fear of the Colony going Nasserite to get their agreement to our retaining this special position in both phases. On present form they are unlikely to oppose this. They will be terrified lest, by granting self-government to the Colony, we are taking the first step towards pulling out of it. The more cast-iron we can make the position of our bases in the Colony, the better placed we will be to retain their confidence.

(d) We should use the Colony's wish for independence in order to shorten the transitional phase and expedite the merger with the Federation. This will mean making it quite clear to the Colony that we refuse to let it achieve separate independence. A firm line on this point will, in my view, be fully justified. It is not a question which can or ought to be decided on the basis of the Colony's interests alone, still less of what a mistaken majority believe those interests to be. The Federation, and the Protectorate as a whole, are also vitally concerned. They cannot survive in isolation from the Colony. We should be betraying our trust to them if we allowed the Colony to achieve separate independence, whatever its own majority may desire.

(e) In general we should use the conflicting fears and aspirations of Colony and Federation to produce a balance of forces giving us the position which we require.

73. I realise that the foregoing paragraph may sound cynical, Machiavellian and generally in line with the worst traditions of European diplomacy. Nevertheless I have thought it important to set down our assets frankly, together with my views on the way in which they can best be exploited. We need not, I suggest, be ashamed of our objectives. This is after all a special case in the history of the late-colonial era. Instead of conflicting, the true interests of coloniser and colonised are here in substantial agreement and point to the same solution: the continued co-operation of Colony, Protectorate and U.K., but on a basis more in keeping with the times in which we live. To put this solution into effect will nevertheless be an extremely difficult task, having regard to the irrational and hysterical character of the Arabs. There is every possibility of things going wrong, and some risk of our losing our position here altogether in the process. For that reason we must play all our cards for all they are worth. Given good management and—almost more important in the Middle East—good luck, we need not despair of obtaining our requirements in some such form as I have outlined.

74. I personally would very much hope we can do so, and for a reason which has nothing to do with strategy, or even with oil. In other parts of the world where we have had an imperial position—Africa, India, South East Asia—we have succeeded, or are succeeding, in achieving a happy new relationship with former subject peoples on a basis of independence and partnership. Although the Arabs, outside Aden Colony, have never been our subjects in the technical sense, we have played a predominant part in the Near and Middle East since 1882, and even in this short period have managed to leave an extremely long-term mark on the area, e.g. by the
creation of modern Egypt and modern Iraq, to say nothing of modern Israel. The latter part of our Arabian chapter has been an unlucky one. It would be useful for our historical record if we could end it on a happier note: if, for example, while maintaining our essential strategic facilities in Aden, we could at the same time establish in Southern Arabia an independent and prosperous Arab state in relations of friendly partnership with ourselves. Such a state could serve throughout the Arab world as an advertisement for the British connexion in a new form. It might have considerable attraction for other Arab states, starting with the Yemen.

75. The fact is that the Arabs are going to need foreign help for a considerable time to come, and that objectively speaking we British, with all our mistakes, seem better qualified to do this job than the Americans, the Russians, the Chinese or any of the other foreign powers who have attempted it. As long as we need the oil of the Persian Gulf we shall have a mercenary motive for keeping the idea of Anglo-Arab partnership alive. I would however not wish to rule out the possibility of such partnership continuing even after the end of the oil era. Our special national qualities will not die out just because atomic energy has supplanted oil fuelling and internal combustion. The Arabs will probably still need foreign help—perhaps more then than ever. It would be a fine thing if we were still in a position to give it, and still had a special relationship with parts of the Arab world which would make it natural for us to do so. This may seem looking rather far ahead; it is however a point of view which I have formed strongly as a result of observations in North and South Arabia over the past few years.

76. Conclusions. Starting from the assumption that it is essential for us to retain our strategic facilities in Aden Colony, I conclude that:

(a) Further constitutional advance in Aden Colony cannot be avoided, both in view of our general principles, and in order to keep us the support of the moderate leaders who are our best friends in the Colony.
(b) It is however essential for us to change our present course, leading as it would straight to fresh elections for the Colony’s Legislative Council early in 1963 which could be expected to produce an overwhelming radical nationalist majority and thus to lose us Aden altogether.
(c) The right solution, in the interests both of H.M.G. and of the peoples of the Colony and the Protectorate, is a merger of Colony and Protectorate into a single Union. This is also desired by a majority of these peoples as a whole, including the Colony moderates and the Rulers of the Federation.
(d) Nevertheless, taking the Colony separately from the Protectorate, radical nationalist opinion is so strong here at present that in a referendum it would produce an overwhelming majority against a merger with the Protectorate under its present pro-British Rulers and against any continuation of the British connexion.
(e) In the circumstances, we must accept some deviation from our democratic principles in our plans for the Colony’s future.
(f) Before a merger with the Protectorate can be effected, some transitional stage will be needed for the Colony. This should be unmistakably designed as an approach to the merger.
(g) One alternative would be to introduce a substantive transitional stage of internal self-government under British sovereignty, the main purpose of which
would be to ensure that the present moderate leaders should take responsibility for the Colony's entry into the Union. This course is likely to be that preferred by the Colony leaders themselves.

(h) The Federal Rulers on the other hand believe strongly that any transitional stage should be either a purely formal one, or else omitted altogether, and that after discussion between them and the Colony moderates the Colony should merge with the Federation as soon as possible into a Union where our military facilities would be assured to us by treaty.

(i) The alternative in conclusion (g) is recommended, as preferable both from the point of view of public presentation and also because it would ensure us the enjoyment of our military facilities in virtue of sovereignty for a proportionately longer period.

(j) Nevertheless, in order to meet the Federal Rulers’ position as far as possible, it is also recommended that at an early stage H.M.G. should make a statement stressing the impossibility of separate independence for either Colony or Protectorate; and that following this we should sponsor discussions between representatives of the Federation and the Colony Legislative Council on the question of a Union and the means by which it should be brought into being.

(k) When the Union was formed, the Colony should enter it not as just one more new state which is what the Federal Rulers wish, nor on a footing of equality with the present Federation as a whole, which will probably be the wish of the Colony leaders, but on a basis half-way between these two extreme solutions, taking account both of the Colony’s small permanent population and also of its great economic and geographical importance.

(l) Without prejudicing the cohesion of the Union, the special position of the Colony inside it should be safeguarded.

(m) As part of this special status for the Colony, appropriate means should be found of ensuring us that secure unilateral control over our strategic facilities in it which Treaties in practice do not guarantee.

(n) As it is impracticable to follow the Cyprus pattern and carve British sovereign areas out of the Colony, conclusion (m) implies that we must seek some limitation on the Union’s sovereignty in respect of our military facilities in the Colony even after full unity and independence had been achieved.

(o) Thanks to the existing balance of forces between Colony and Protectorate, we may be able to create the political conditions for a solution on these lines. If so, it would be a question of finding a suitable constitutional expression for such a solution, novel though it would be. The effort to do so will be worth making, since, failing a solution on these lines, the only course left us would be to fall back on a Treaty type of solution, with all the risks which that involves.

(p) The states of the W.A.P. outside the Federation should be brought into the Union as opportunity offers.

(q) The states of the E.A.P., including Socotra, should also be brought into the Union.

(r) The same applies to Perim and Kamaran; as regards the Kuria Muria Islands, the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, who at present administers them, should be asked to advise.

(s) The retention of our strategic facilities is unlikely to be achieved without considerably increased expenditure by H.M.G. in terms of aid to the Colony and increased aid to the Federation.
(t) The foregoing proposals represent a preliminary attempt to clear the ground. Our plans should be flexible and subject to amendment when the Colony and Federal leaders have developed their own ideas further.

(u) Throughout the exercise we must as always in the Arab world be ready with plans for the worst case. This may include suspending the Colony's constitution, and resuming direct administration of it, if things go wrong here during the transitional stage, as they easily may.

(v) Our ultimate aim should be, while maintaining our essential strategic facilities in Aden, to establish in Southern Arabia an independent and prosperous Arab state in relations of friendly partnership with ourselves. . . .

Minutes on 199

Mr. Melville

It is proposed to discuss the Governor’s despatch with the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and Treasury on 9th March; and to hold further discussions with the Chief Secretary next week.

In devising his proposals, the Governor has drawn upon the knowledge of H.M.G.’s views about Aden which he derived from consultations and study in the Office last summer, from his discussions with you in Aden in the autumn, and more recently from the reports we gave him (in your letter at (23)) of the talks here with Mr. Trevaskis¹ and Mr. Bayoomi in January. The despatch, I submit, shows that the Governor has fully apprehended the main points brought out in correspondence and discussions; and I think that his proposals should be accepted as much on the right lines.

In his Memorandum D(60)53 to the Defence Committee last October² the Secretary of State told his colleagues that it would seem likely that we should have to devise a special form of arrangement which would go with the desire of the Adenese for greater self-government, would yet keep out the Nationalists, and would commend itself to the Federation. The Governor’s scheme attempts to reconcile these intentions, as far as they can be reconciled in practice. You will recall that Sir William Luce, in seeking to achieve essentially the same objective, felt that the best way would be to take a leap and turn the Colony into a “State”, having the same kind of constitutional position as the various States in the Protectorates. We have told Sir Charles Johnston that we questioned whether such a proposal would work, and indicated to him that H.M.G. would probably be uneasy about relinquishing sovereignty in the Colony, so long as the Colony remained something of a separate entity. The Governor has acknowledged our point, and his scheme for the Colony would retain sovereignty.

Yet the Governor does argue that the only political way to encourage our friends to work with us and give us what we want is to bless a union of the Federation and of the Colony in principle. He harks back to the idea which Mr. Amery (when he was Parliamentary Under Secretary) put forward,³ that the best way for us to make sure of

¹ K Trevaskis, adviser and British agent, Western Aden Protectorate; subsequently high commissioner.
² See document no 198.
³ See document no 193.
what we want was to play upon such divergencies between the Colony and the Federation as, admittedly, exist. The Governor argues that this policy is now out of step with the facts, and in paragraph 23 of his despatch makes a new point—and I think a telling one—that unless the British foster a union in a sensible way, then it would not be long before the Federation Rulers brought it about in a far from sensible manner. When we had our talk with Mr. Trevaskis he was, as is to be expected, in favour of bringing about an early union between the Colony and the Federation before the Colony had time to draw breath. We told Mr. Trevaskis that we felt that it would be difficult for Ministers to bless so drastic a process, and paragraph 29 of the Governor’s despatch shows that this point of ours has also gone home. At the risk, therefore, of some grumbling by the Federal Rulers, the Governor suggests that the wiser thing is to give the Colony a period of internal self-government during which arrangements for a union can be worked out. He does emphasise that we should declare that it is an aim of policy that such a union should come about. The Governor suggests the outlines of a constitution for the Colony. I suggest that it is not, in principle, out of step with what is being done elsewhere, although even at a first reading there are a number of omissions which we will have to sort out very soon. We should not, I think, have any difficulty in reserving foreign affairs and defence in the Governor’s hands; the Governor also suggests that we could retain internal security. Here we come up against a familiar problem since I would imagine that the administration, at any rate, of the police would have to become a self-governing matter. I have spoken to Police Department who are going to let us have, in the course of the next few days, a comprehensive note of the ways in which problems of internal security and police have been resolved in recent constitutions, and we can examine these precedents in discussion with the Chief Secretary. . . .

As we might expect, the Governor has taken the opportunity to remind us that in his opinion (and in that of Mr. Trevaskis I am sure) H.M.G. does not provide enough cash to the peoples of the Colony and of the Protectorate. There has long been a feeling in Aden, which Sir William Luce shared, that somewhere, somehow, is a kitty in London which should be handed out for “development”. We have, I think, now got the Federation people to appreciate that our development funds are those voted by Parliament for Colonial Development and Welfare and that they are disbursed on a “project” basis. They have also learnt that the grant-in-aid which we give them has to be based on “need”, although the definition of “need” may vary from time to time. I should certainly regard any money which it was thought right to spend in the Colony or in the Protectorate in order to pay friends as well-spent—if it does the trick, but I do not expect that the Treasury can be asked to devise a new form of charity for Aden alone. So far as I am aware, the best we can do is to see that the Protectorate gets as generous a share of the remaining C.D. & W. money as can be made available (its present allocation is only until 1962); and that when we have the block grant negotiations later this year we shall show that we are willing to help with the provision of welfare services on perhaps a more generous scale than hitherto. I am glad that the Governor has given up the idea of trying to get the Service Departments to pay rent for the large pieces of Aden which they occupy, but I do not know how we can assist the Colony otherwise than we are doing at present, i.e. by C.D. & W. grants, Exchequer loans, and (perhaps) C.D.C. participation in housing. However, the Governor will of course expect us to examine seriously whether these present forms of aid can be increased, and if they cannot, whether some new category of assistance
can be devised. As I have said, however, I do not honestly feel that we can expect Aden alone to be offered some form of large-scale charity.

We have all along recognised that the most difficult decision to be taken in connection with the next stage of constitutional development in the Colony is about elections. We have indicated to the Governor that there are difficulties of principle about extending the life of a Legislative Council beyond its due expiry date, but we have acknowledged that it might be the lesser of two evils to do something like this when the lifetime of the present Legislative Council ends, rather than have another election on the present franchise which would, as the Governor acknowledges, probably be won by the Nationalists. What the Governor proposes is that before January, 1963, the Legislative Council should be reconstituted by replacing the present ex-officio members by five new members nominated to represent certain interests. It is implicit in this proposal that the Legislative Council thus reconstituted should then be given a further term of life. The Governor proposes that during this further term of life (which would, I assume, be concurrent with the proposed term of an internally self-governing Colony) the Government thus constituted should devise its own future electoral legislation (and devise it in such a way that they could be sure of winning subsequent elections). This proposal as the Governor recognises, will occasion criticism and is in any case risky. The only alternative in practice is, I submit, to go through with elections in the normal way at the appointed time of January, 1963, and run the greater risk of seeing a Legislative Council dominated by Nationalists who would, I would suppose, pass a resolution asking for independence and withdrawal of British forces. It might be argued that it would be easier for H.M.G. to adopt the second of these courses and then do a 'British Guiana', in order to prove that we had given the Adenese a chance to behave respectfully which they had not taken. I do not consider that to take such a great risk as this would be wise counsel at this time of day.

These are impressions from a first reading of the Governor’s despatch which on the whole I find sensible and encouraging. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Vile, Mr. Harding and Mr. Hammer. I should be grateful if Mr. Hammer would consider what useful lessons there may be in recent “internal self-government” constitutions such as Sierra Leone, British Guiana and British Honduras to deal with the problems of the Civil Service, internal security, a Governor’s ability to legislate on foreign affairs, defence and any other subjects which are within his discretion, and (I have already spoken to him about this) arrangements to resume legal authority should government break down.

I.W.
6.3.61

... Mr. Watt has attempted, very successfully I think, to crystallize the first reactions of other interested Departments, and our own provisional conclusions. ... In essence the Governor’s proposal is that, given the need to create a friendly state in our part of South Arabia and given in particular the need to keep our base facilities in Aden for as long as possible with the consent of the local people, we must now begin to move forward by stages to a merger between Aden Colony and the present Western Federation. In his view we cannot just sit still. Nor can we safely advance Aden Colony alone along the path of constitutional progress which we normally follow in other Colonial territories. His argument on this is fully and clearly set out in his despatch.
I am myself convinced that this approach is right; and I do not think that we shall meet much opposition to it from the Political Departments. But the Defence Departments and the Treasury are bound to ask whether this is indeed the way in which we can maintain ourselves in the Aden base for the longest possible time. I would expect that the Secretary of State for Air (who of course has the largest stake in the Aden base) would challenge the Governor’s proposition and would argue, as he did when he was in the Colonial Office, that it is illusory to imagine that constitutional progress of the kind now envisaged and the maintenance of secure base facilities are compatible; and in particular that we shall only be able to stay in Aden if we can keep a direct grip on the Colony and prevent a merger between it and any part of the Protectorate. . . .

Even if there is no frontal challenge to the essence of the Governor’s proposals, there must certainly be an assessment of the risks which they entail for the maintenance of sufficiently good relations between us and the Colony and Federation as would secure the free and unfettered use of base facilities in Aden.

The Governor rightly argues—and all our experience confirms—that base facilities are no good, or cannot long endure, without the consent of the local people. But at the same time he accepts that a majority in Aden Colony oppose our presence and indicates that they are not likely to be won over to accepting it. It is on this ground that he justifies his proposal to amend the Aden Constitution without holding elections in such a way as to give the Moderates the authority with which he hopes they can maintain themselves in power when elections are eventually held. This is obviously a risky process. If the opposition to our presence is genuine and indeed irreconcilable then its suppression from attaining political power, by whatever means we adopt, is bound to increase its strength. It is therefore a serious question whether, in the transitional stage while union is being negotiated between the Moderates and the Federal Rulers, and at the elections which follow, government by consent would in fact be possible in Aden Colony. A good deal will depend on the toughness and political skill of the Moderates, both of which are as yet untested; and on the part which the Rulers can play in influencing opinion in Aden Colony itself.

Assuming that the interim stage goes according to plan and that it results in a form of union satisfactory to us and accepted by the Aden Colony electorate (as it is then defined), the longer term risk to our continued military presence is whether, and if so how soon, pressures for complete independence of the new union will manifest themselves in such a way and in such strength that we have to give way to them. This in fact brings us back to the challenge of the Governor’s broad approach which may be expected from the Defence Ministers. What hope is there, we shall be asked, of our being able to retain sovereign defence rights within this proposed union until the end of the present decade—the period for which the Chiefs of Staff consider the retention of our base at Aden to be essential? Obviously we can give no categorical assurance on this. For the present the Federal Rulers, who will play a big part in shaping the policies of the new union, need and welcome our military presence. They will no doubt be prepared to give all sorts of general assurances that they will go on welcoming and needing it as long as can be foreseen. But it would be dangerous for us to assume that this means that we can be certain of retaining our base facilities as of right for as long as we want. At some stage, and

---

4 Mr Amery, from 28 Oct 1960, when he was promoted from the CO.
perhaps at an early stage, the idea of moving to a defence treaty arrangement is bound to be mooted and possibly pressed by the new union if only as a means of extracting more financial assistance out of us as a quid pro quo for our military use of Aden Colony. Our only way to turn this argument therefore is to demonstrate that, while we cannot guarantee that the Governor’s plan gives the complete answer to our military desiderata, it is the best answer which we can offer in the political circumstances of the area; and that no alternative plan—least of all standing still where we are—will give us as good a chance of keeping for as long the free use of the Aden base. . . .

E.M.
16.3.61

... We must expect strong opposition from Mr. Amery if proposals on the lines recommended by the Governor are put forward for approval by other Ministers.

I am not entirely convinced that the balance of the argument is in favour of the idea of a “transitional stage” before merger especially as it appears that the Rulers and the moderate leaders in Aden have already entered into discussions. In the Governor’s words in his paragraph 35 “if the two parties in these talks reached agreement, then clearly we should have to take another look at the question” . . .

J.M.M.
20.3.61

As to the Amery opposition I think the letter from Heath, then C-in-C B.F.A.P. & an airman, is good enough ammunition. . . .

As to the need for a ‘transitional stage’ I rather agree with you and Rulers that hostages to fortune could be unlimited. Obviously Govr’s scheme of balances is [best] theoretical stance but in an uncertain world unless or until I knew more about local personalities involved & certainties of managed or rigged elections I remain dubious. His point that storms political here would be less for his scheme than for Trevaskysis’s [sic] is beside the point. A storm in either case we’re going to have.

A.F.
21.3.61

5 See document no 194, n 1.

200 CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)10 3 May 1961
‘Constitutional development in Aden’: Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee memorandum by Mr Macleod

Following the decision of the Defence Committee last year (D(60) 10th Meeting Conclusions) that the protection of British interests requires the retention of our base at Aden, I undertook to examine the problems involved in constitutional development, and to submit my recommendations to the Committee (D(60) 11th Meeting Conclusions).1 I have already reported briefly to my colleagues (C.P.C. (61)7)

1 See document no 198, n 1.
on the visit which I paid to the Colony and Protectorate during the Easter Recess,\(^2\) and I now submit my detailed proposals for further measures which I consider are the most likely to enable us to secure our objectives.

2. Since he took up the Governorship in October, Sir Charles Johnston has devoted much thought to devising a scheme which will enable us to retain free use of our defence facilities in the Colony and Protectorate with the greatest practicable measure of consent for as long as possible during this decade. Before I visited Aden, he submitted to me the outline of a plan which was based on the belief that the best aim of policy is a merger of the Colony and the Protectorate into a single unit or Union. He rejected two other possible courses, namely: (i) to try to keep the Colony and Protectorate separate and continue to rule with a firm hand in the Colony; and (ii) that defence enclaves should be established in the Colony. He rejected course (i) because it would turn against us the moderate Colony politicians, who are disposed to see us continue to exercise responsibility for defence and external relations, but who insist upon advancing to self-government. He rejected course (ii) because it is physically impossible.

3. My main purpose in visiting Aden was to discuss these matters with the Governor, and to hear the views of the political leaders in the Colony and Protectorate. Having done so, I consider that the Governor’s plan is the best basis on which to proceed.

4. The five elected Ministers who have since 1959 been responsible for most of the civil departments of government, and their supporters in the Legislative Council and among the community generally, consider that a further measure of responsible government is their due. They feel that they must prove to the Arab world that Southern Arabia can emerge respectfully from dependence. They are bitterly attacked by the Arab Nationalist element, particularly the trade union movement, which wishes British rule ended as quickly as possible; and they argue that they can only continue to co-operate with us and pursue moderate policies if they are able to oppose their Nationalist critics with the evidence and authority of increased responsibilities. In expectation of constitutional changes, the Moderates have recently been organising themselves in political parties, and it was as party leaders as much as ministers in the Executive Council that they put their views to me. While they asserted that their ultimate aim can only be complete independence, they are realistic enough to recognise that Aden Colony by itself could not sustain independence in the modern world, and they acknowledge how much the Colony’s security and prosperity is linked with the British connection. It is as a means of achieving their ultimate aim without jeopardising the Colony’s stability that they look towards a Union with the Protectorate, beginning with the Federation which already consists of the States forming the Colony’s hinterland.

5. The moderates, however, made it clear that they could not enter into serious negotiations with the Federation until they can obtain a degree of political and constitutional responsibility in the Colony which will enable them to do so with adequate authority. Specifically, they propose that well before January, 1963, when the present Legislative Council is due to end, the constitution should be amended so as to transfer to elected representatives responsibility for internal matters. They are prepared to leave us with responsibility for external affairs and defence and suggest

\(^{2}\) See document no 127 above for the brief report on Aden.
that responsibility for internal security should be shared with H.M.G. They are anxious that this constitutional change should take place well before January, 1963, so that they may proceed to devise a new franchise upon which, in due course, they would propose to have an election in the expectation that they would then be confirmed in power after which they would negotiate a merger with the Federation. The keynote of their political philosophy is “Aden for the Adenese”. Translated into practical terms, this would mean replacing the present franchise which gives the vote to British subjects and British Protected Persons (on modest residential and property qualifications) by a narrower one which would confine the vote to those qualified by birth or by long residence and with an emphasis on Arab race or ability to speak Arabic. Such a narrow franchise would, it is true, exclude some of the Indian community, but the moderates would be prepared to see them and other minorities represented by nomination. More important, it would deny the vote to the itinerant labourers from the Protectorate who can scrape on to the electoral roll as it is at present, but who would be excluded if a longer residential period were stipulated. It is these Protectorate labourers along with the Yemenis (who, of course, would not get the vote) who form the main mass strength of the Nationalist opposition.

The moderates are not at present disposed to think of a rapid deal with the Federation. Indeed they indicated that they would expect a period of 2 or 3 years after the elections during which negotiations for a merger would take place.

6. I consider that, in essentials, the moderates deserve our backing in this plan. The expectation of further self-government is widespread and could not be thwarted without a serious risk that the moderates, disappointed, would be unable to sustain their position against the Nationalists. Indeed some of them might throw in their lot with the Nationalists. Admittedly there is a risk, which I do not under-estimate, that the moderates might not succeed even on the basis of a narrower franchise in winning an election; and to guard against such a possibility I would propose that under the new constitution we should retain ultimate sovereignty so that if need be we can resume control. Nevertheless, this risk, I consider, is less dangerous to our interests than would be the certain dangers involved in our refusing the moderates their wish for constitutional advance. I consider that in the first stage of self-government, the Constitution should have the following main features:—

(a) The present Executive Council to be replaced by a Council of Ministers, consisting of a Chief Minister and other departmental Ministers nominated by him. It will be a matter for negotiation whether the Governor normally presides, or whether the Chief Minister normally presides, but should the latter arrangement be decided, then the Governor would retain the right to summon meetings of the Council, and he would exercise this right whenever the Council discussed any of the matters in (b) below.

(b) The Governor to have sole responsibility for defence, external relations, internal security, the use and operational control of the Police, and the Public Service, and with reserved legislative and executive powers at least in respect of these matters. One of the Ministers could have departmental responsibility for the administration of the Police; it might also be desirable to create a consultative body such as a Police Council, on which the Governor and certain Ministers could meet.

(c) We should retain constitutional power; i.e. to make or amend the Constitution.
7. The Rulers, who have the power in the Federation, also wish to see a union with the Colony, but their present motives differ from those of the Colony moderates. The Rulers represented to me forcefully their concern at any changes in the Colony which would imply any weakening of the present degree of British authority and control. Their case is that the Colony is historically a part of the State of Lahej (one of the largest States in the Federation) and that, while they are content to see it remain under British sovereignty, they are not prepared to see us transfer authority to Colony politicians. They fear either that the Colony moderates will not succeed under self-government in resisting the Nationalists (who assail the Rulers as bitterly as they do the British) or that if they do succeed in doing so they will lose interest in union. Rather than run these risks they would wish us to force through a union before making any changes in the Colony. I assured them that H.M.G. were determined to frame their future policies in Southern Arabia on the basis of firm friendship with the Federation, that any changes in the Colony will take full account of the Federation’s interests and position, and that whatever we consider needs to be done in the Colony will be based on the consideration that we are determined that the Nationalists shall not acquire power and influence. I explained to them, however, that we could not exclude Aden Colony from the general aims of our overall Colonial policy and that we must give due weight to the principles of consent; and endeavoured to persuade them that, in essentials, their interests, those of the moderates, and those of H.M.G. are the same.

8. There remains some risk to our good relations with the Federal Rulers in giving the Colony moderates what they seek, but I believe that this is another risk which has to be taken, in the interests of our overall objective; and I intend to use to the utmost the good faith which the Rulers are at heart disposed to place in our intention and advice to carry them with us and bring them to see that such a step is in their own best interests.

9. I have considered whether it would be useful to appoint a Constitutional Commissioner to visit the Colony and make recommendations, but I believe that to do so would be neither appropriate nor wise. It is, however, most desirable that there should be a process of public consultation and discussion over the next constitution for the Colony, and it is important that the Federation should be associated with it. I consider that there would be advantage in convening a Constitutional Conference in London either towards the end of this year or early in 1962. The first part of the Conference would be attended by representatives of the Colony and its task would be to reach agreement on a new constitution for the Colony. The second part of the Conference, which would follow upon the first, would be attended by representatives of the Federation as well as of the Colony, and its task would be to reach agreement on a basis on which a merger should take place within an agreed programme; thus making it clear that the new Colony Constitution was to be regarded essentially as a step towards a merger. It will be essential, whatever the form of the merger, that our defence facilities shall not be, in the Protectorate and in the Colony, any the less assured; that our treaties of protection and advice with the Protected States and Federation shall be maintained, and that the position of the Federal Army (which in accordance with our Treaty with the Federation we are entitled to draw upon for defence and internal security purposes) shall not be impaired.

10. The Governor has emphasised throughout that an integral part of any constitutional and political plan which aims to strengthen goodwill and retain our
military facilities with consent is the provision of more financial help. Both the Colony political leaders and the Federal Rulers stressed the same point. The Rulers represented that they cannot as yet bring home to their peoples the benefits which Federation was designed to provide without greater funds for economic and social welfare development than we have been able to provide. They ask for an increase of C.D. & W. monies, and will undoubtedly expect us to be generous in our budgetary aid. The Colony leaders made the most of the argument that the Services in Aden get very many benefits, such as free use of land and various tax exemptions, and that several utilities (such as the airport and water and electricity supplies) have been expanded largely to meet the Services demands, while some welfare developments have had to be deferred for lack of funds. I think it important that we should be able in the context of the constitutional plan which this paper recommends to assure the Rulers and Colony moderates that we are ready to consider additional financial assistance, and I shall be consulting further with the Governor how far we can go in this direction, granted the other calls on our resources.

11. There is also considerable irritation that the Colony still has to pay what they believe to be an annual defence contribution of £40,000 to H.M.G.; this payment is in fact essentially for internal security and I recognise that it has thus a valid basis in principle, inasmuch as we are providing a considerable force for the Colony's security. It has however become a disproportionate irritant and we would, I believe, do well to dispense with it.

12. I did not discuss with the Colony politicians the position of the civil service under a new constitution. A scheme for training local people for higher posts in Government service already exists, but there is some impatience among the Colony politicians to see rapid results. So far it has not been found necessary to disregard normal promotion criteria in providing sufficient opportunities for promotion for suitable local officers. But as the number of these officers increases there may in the next year or so be a requirement for some special measures to give the Governor, while maintaining ultimate control of the Civil Service, some elbow room to provide for the rapid promotion of promising local officers. But there is no question at this stage of a transfer of control over the Civil Service which would involve a general compensation scheme for all overseas officers and, as I have said above, I intend to ensure that the Governor is provided with adequate discretionary powers to safeguard the position of the Civil Service as a whole under a new constitution for the Colony.

13. I realise that there are dangers and difficulties in this plan. We must expect hostility from Arab Nationalism within as well as beyond the Colony. It will not be easy to give the Colony moderates as much as they seek without prejudicing our own essential desiderata and without risking the displeasure of the Federal Rulers. We cannot guarantee that the Colony moderates will succeed in establishing their position, and we cannot, therefore, rule out the possibility that, if they fail to do so and lose out to the Arab Nationalists, we shall have no choice but to suspend the constitution and resume direct rule. Nor can we assume that we shall be able to guide negotiations between the Rulers and the Colony leaders in the precise direction which would be most beneficial to our interests. Nevertheless, despite these dangers and difficulties, I am convinced that the policy proposed is one which best enables us to exploit to the maximum advantage the several solid assets which we at present possess.
14. Hitherto our line has been that we would not openly encourage moves towards closer association between Colony and Protectorate. I consider that a necessary first step in implementing the policy proposed in this Memorandum is a public statement to the effect that the promotion of self-government in the Colony is the first step towards the ultimate objective of closer association and eventually union with the Federation, to which, with the consent of those concerned, the other parts of the Protectorate will be able to adhere. Such a statement is essential to our retaining the friendship of the Rulers. I propose also that the Governor be authorised forthwith to embark upon formal discussions with Colony political leaders and representatives, with a view to reaching the greatest possible measure of agreement upon a plan which would form the basis of consideration by a constitutional conference in London. He would, of course, keep the Federal Government fully informed and seek to obtain their support.

15. I invite my colleagues to agree to my proceeding on the following lines:

(i) A public statement be made that we favour the eventual union of Colony and Protectorate and that constitutional advance in the Colony is a first step to this end. (The precise timing of this statement will require further consideration.)
(ii) That we keep the Federal Rulers informed at every stage, and make retention of their friendship a consistent principle.
(iii) That the Governor begin discussions on the details of a new Colony constitution as quickly as practicable, with a view to his recommendations being considered at a Constitutional Conference in London in late 1961 or early 1962; the Conference would also seek to define the basis on which negotiations for union with the Federation might be begun.
(iv) The introduction of a new constitution for the Colony, early in 1962, giving a substantial measure of internal self-government, but with our retaining ultimate sovereignty as well as explicit responsibility for external affairs, defence, the Civil Service and internal security.
(v) That the question of the £40,000 defence contribution be urgently examined with a view to removing the irritation which it at present causes.

16. This paper has been drafted in consultation with the Treasury.
The proposals contained in C.P.C. (61) 10, which had been put forward by the Governor, were supported both by the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and himself. Their object was to unite the friendly elements in Aden Colony, represented by the moderate political leaders at present included in the Executive Council, with the Rulers in the Aden Protectorate, who were anxious to retain our protection. Aden Colony was however exposed to nationalist pressures, mainly due to the large amount of Yemeni labour which sought employment in the Colony, and it was important that new franchise arrangements in Aden Colony should be worked out before the next elections which were due to be held early in 1963, so as to preserve the moderate political leaders in power. There were undoubtedly certain risks in the plan, but both he and the Governor were of opinion that it offered a better chance of retaining our defence facilities in Aden for a number of years than if we sought to maintain the present position in the Colony. The plan carried with it certain financial implications and it would be necessary in order to keep the goodwill of both the Colony politicians and the Protectorate Rulers to consider additional financial assistance. He also hoped that it would be possible to waive the defence contribution of £40,000 which had been paid by the Colony annually to Her Majesty's Government and which had become a disproportionate irritant in our local relations.

He proposed that the Governor should be authorised to embark upon formal discussions with political leaders in the Colony with a view to reaching the greatest possible measure of agreement, as a basis for the holding of a constitutional conference in London to which not only the Aden Colony politicians but the Protectorate Rulers also would at a suitable stage be invited. It would also be necessary in order to retain the friendship of the Rulers to make a public statement to the effect that we favoured the eventual union of the Colony and Protectorate.

The Minister of Defence said that in view of the necessity to retain our defence facilities in Aden in peaceful circumstances for some considerable time to come he would prefer to leave matters in Aden as they now were, but if this was impossible he hoped that the pace of any constitutional advance in Aden would be as slow as possible. He suggested that it would be better to conduct such constitutional discussions as were necessary in Aden rather than to call a constitutional conference in London, where the nationalist element would be open to undesirable influences and where the importance of the occasion might make it more difficult to secure the agreement of all the Rulers.

In discussion there was general agreement in the Committee that some action would have to be taken as regards the franchise in Aden Colony before the life of the present Legislative Council came to an end in January, 1963, in order to avoid the nationalist elements achieving political power. Differing views were however expressed on the desirability of coupling this action with preparations for a merger between the Colony and the Protectorate. On the one hand it was argued that the Protectorate Rulers were strongly in favour of a merger and that it might be difficult to retain their confidence if we did not make every effort to achieve it; that it would be to our advantage to tie the more advanced and more nationalistic elements in Colony into a new and wider state dominated by the more stable element represented by the Protectorate Rulers; and that this policy was likely to be the more effective the

---

2 Mr H Watkinson.
sooner it was carried out, and in particular before the nationalist element in Aden Colony had acquired political power. It was also suggested that a central Government dominated by the Protectorate Rulers would be more effective in preserving internal security—a necessary condition for the effective operation of our military facilities—than if we were to grant Aden Colony internal self-government, but retaining the responsibility for internal security ourselves. On the other hand it was pointed out that the setting up of a new state to include the existing Protectorates and Aden Colony would be likely to increase the pressure and hence the pace of progress towards independence; and once independence had been conceded the retention of our defence facilities would have to rest on a treaty, in which case it might prove impossible to use them against another Arab State. Much would however, depend on the form of merger which was contemplated, the relative weighting within it to be given to the Protectorates and the Colony, and the distribution of powers between the central authority and the constituent elements.

It was agreed that there would be little point in summoning a constitutional conference in London unless there were reasonable grounds for believing that a settlement on the lines which we desired could be readily achieved. It would not in any case be the intention to invite representatives of the nationalist element to take part and there would therefore be little opportunity for Aden politicians to be deflected by undesirable pressure being brought on them in London; indeed they were likely to be subjected to even more undesirable pressures if the formal constitutional discussions were held in Aden.

In further discussion the following points were made—

(a) It was suggested in paragraph 7 of C.P.C. (61) 10 that the Rulers of the Protectorates would be much concerned with any changes in the Colony which would imply a weakening of the present degree of United Kingdom authority and control. But was it likely that the functions which it was suggested should be retained by the United Kingdom in the next stage of constitutional advance in Aden—namely, defence, foreign affairs and internal security—would represent a sufficient degree of United Kingdom control to satisfy the Rulers?

(b) Whatever constitutional arrangements were made for Aden Colony there would be advantage in dissociating from them the Island of Perim and keeping it under direct United Kingdom control. There would also be advantage in the territory on which United Kingdom defence facilities were situated being clearly retained under United Kingdom sovereignty, whatever the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Aden Protectorate and Colony short of independence. But a solution on Cyprus lines under which independence would be granted to most of the territory, the United Kingdom retaining certain sovereign areas, would not be practicable owing to lack of port facilities in those areas.

Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that further consideration should be given to future constitutional arrangements for Aden Colony and Aden Protectorate, and two alternative plans should be prepared for further consideration by Ministers.

The first should be based on the proposals put forward in C.P.C. (61) 10, including a merger at an early date between the Colony and Protectorate; it would be necessary to consider carefully the form which such a merger should take, in particular the relative influence which would be wielded by the Protectorate Rulers and the Colony politicians within such a framework, and the distribution of powers as between the
United Kingdom, the central government and the authorities in the Colony and individual Protectorate states. The second plan should be based on keeping the Colony and Protectorate separate for the time being, but introducing a measure of constitutional change in Aden Colony so as at the same time to restrict the franchise and to hand over more responsibility for the internal affairs of the Colony (other than internal security) to elected representatives. The Committee should then meet to consider which of those alternative plans was likely to preserve our essential defence facilities for the longer time. In the meantime no announcement of policy should be made.

202  CAB 128/35/1, CC 29(61)8  30 May 1961
[Course of constitutional development in Aden]: Cabinet conclusions

[Macleod wanted to support ‘the moderates’ and do everything possible to consolidate the goodwill of the Rulers who were prepared to work with Britain, and not incur their resentment by lack of support for their desire for union; this, he argued, was the best way to secure defence facilities. Amery, by contrast, took a ‘somewhat different view’: the merger should not be encouraged, because it was bound to lead to a demand for independence—though he conceded that there might be advantage in bringing a ‘potentially turbulent Colony’ under the control of a Federation whose Rulers were ‘loyal to the British connection’ (CO 1015/2387, no 98, CO brief for S of S, 29 May 1961).]

The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Colonial Secretary (C. (61) 68) and the Secretary of State for Air (C. (61) 70) on the course of constitutional development in Aden.

The Colonial Secretary said that our objective was to secure the use of our defence facilities in the Colony and Protectorate of Aden for as long as possible during this decade. The continued co-operation of the moderate elements in the Colony could only be secured if we acceded to their demand for some further measure of constitutional advance. They were, however, inclined to favour a closer association between the Colony and the Federation. The Rulers of the Federation were keenly interested in a merger, but they feared the development of nationalism in the Colony; they accordingly wished British authority over the Colony to be maintained and, if necessary, used to force a union with the Federation in which the position of the Rulers would be dominant. Some constitutional change in the Colony was inescapable, since it was important that new franchise arrangements should be worked out before the next elections to preserve the position of the moderate political leaders there. It would be expedient to encourage at the same time the idea of a merger with the Federation, partly because this was the best way of preserving the friendship of the Rulers and partly because a union of the British territories in Southern Arabia would hold out the best hope of retaining our defence facilities for the longest possible period. He therefore proposed that the Governor should conduct a series of discussions during the next few months with representatives of the Colony and the Federation, in which he would make it clear that we supported a merger, subject to the retention of our defence facilities. His purpose would be to reach agreement on a new constitution for the Colony, to come into force as early as practicable in 1962, which, in addition to the adjustment of the franchise, would allow for greater devolution of responsibility to the Government of the Colony, although the Governor would remain responsible for internal security, defence and
external relations. In order to give these discussions the best chance of success, a
delegation of the Rulers would be invited to a preliminary meeting in London: the
advantages of giving increased authority to the moderate elements in the Colony
could then be explained to them, and they could be informed that we regarded a
merger between the Federation and the Colony as a desirable aim of policy.

The Secretary of State for Air\(^1\) said that, although the moderate leaders in the
Colony and the Rulers were favourable to the idea of a merger, it was by no means
certain that they would agree on the form of such a union. The Rulers wanted to
annex the Colony to the Sultanate of Lahej, whereas the Colony leaders
contemplated entering the Federation as a principal member. Without our
encouragement a merger might not take place. Should we, in these circumstances,
extend our influence in favour of it? The creation of this larger unit would lead to
erlier demands for independence, in which event our defence facilities would rest on
treaty rather than on sovereignty. In view of the likely spread of nationalist
influences, it was doubtful whether we could place much reliance upon a treaty,
particularly as our defence facilities in Aden would be needed mainly for operations
against other Arab States. A merger might have the advantage of bringing dissident
elements in the Colony under the control of the Federation; but internal security in
the Colony would not be a substantial problem and, if we could avoid a merger, we
might be able to retain our defence facilities on the present basis for a longer period.
In his view, therefore, although we should not resist a merger if the moderate
elements in the Colony and the Rulers could agree to its terms, we need not actively
encourage such a development. We might be in a stronger position, both as regards
defence facilities and financial assistance, if we had not urged the benefits of a
merger on the Rulers and the Colony leaders.

The Minister of Defence\(^2\) said that, while it would suit us better if the present
position could remain unchanged, some constitutional development in the Colony
was inevitable if the influence of the moderate elements there was to be maintained.
This made some discussion of a merger unavoidable, and it seemed that if we did not
encourage this we might lose the friendship and support of the Rulers.

In further discussion it was pointed out that the Rulers would regard any
constitutional advance in the Colony as a betrayal of their interests, if it were not
accompanied by some progress towards a merger on the lines they favoured. In
practice, therefore, there was no real alternative but to say that we would welcome a
merger if this could be agreed between the Rulers and the Colony leaders. It would be
necessary to take account of the extent to which, in the preliminary discussions in
London, the Rulers themselves showed that they favoured merger in deciding how
warmly this aim should be commended by us. There was much to be said for treating
the Rulers frankly and explaining to them in general terms the purpose of the
constitutional developments which we proposed for the Colony.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed that, in the preliminary discussions to be held in London with a
delegation from the Aden Federation, the Colonial Secretary should explain in
general terms the purpose of the constitutional development proposed for the
Colony, and should further say that, if the Rulers wished to pursue the possibility

\(^1\) Mr J Amery.  
\(^2\) Mr H Watkinson.
of a merger with the Colony, the United Kingdom Government would welcome such a development and would recommend the Rulers to discuss the matter with the Colony leaders.

(2) Subject to Conclusion (1) above, endorsed the course proposed in C. (61) 68.

---

203   CO 1015/2388, no 206  20 Oct 1961

‘Future policy in Aden Colony and Protectorate’: CO submission for Mr Maudling. Minutes on policy and immediate problems by I Watt, Sir J Martin and H T Bourdillon

[Extract]

... 11. The timetable of political development which the [previous] Secretary of State and the Governor themselves envisaged was as follows:—

(1) Early in 1962 Colony to have a new constitution which would provide for a Cabinet of elected Ministers responsible for all departments of government other than defence, foreign relations, security and the Public Service.
(2) Between early 1962 and, say, mid-1963 the Government thus constituted would devise a new franchise, confining the vote to the “Adenese belongers” and thus doing its best to exclude itinerant Protectorate labourers who at present get a vote by virtue of being British Protected Persons and who also swell the Nationalist ranks. It would probably be necessary to extend the life of the Legislative Council beyond January 1963, perhaps for as long as 12 months.
(3) 1963–64, negotiations for bringing about Union with the Federation.
(4) In 1964, on the best possible estimate, the achievement of Union.

12. The Cabinet stipulated that even after the Colony had entered into Union we should retain sovereignty over it and responsibility for its defence, external relations and security. (We do not enjoy sovereignty over the Federation. Our rights in respect of the proposed Union would be those secured to us by treaty, not rights of sovereignty.)

13. The discussions in Aden with his two sets of Ministers, which the Governor initiated in July, made quite good progress initially, in that there was a disposal to agree on the departmental arrangements which, after Union, would deal with such matters as health, civil aviation, communications, etc. However, there were fairly soon signs that some of the Colony Ministers, in particular, were beginning to feel uneasy; in fact by the end of August, when the Governor was due to take home leave, it became clear that it was most unlikely that he could obtain agreement on the crucial point (to the Colony Ministers) of the size of the Colony’s representation in the Union legislature; there was also disagreement about how intermediate and higher education should be dealt with. Just before coming on leave, therefore, the Governor advised the Colonial Office that, should it not prove possible to get a sufficient measure of agreement to the Cabinet’s plan, we must have a respectable fall-back position. This fall-back position would be that, instead of introducing constitutional changes in the Colony in 1962, we should content ourselves with appointing a Select Committee of the Legislative Council to make recommendations...
for changing the franchise before the next elections. The Governor thought that the
Rulers would be content with thus going slow on the project of Union. An additional
point which weighed with the Governor in making this recommendation was that
Mr. Bayoomi, who had hitherto been confident that he could win an election on a
revised franchise and then take the Colony into a Union with the Federation, was
beginning to have doubts about his ability to do so.

14. During the Governor's absence in September we received reports from the
Acting Governor of what seemed a surprising development. This was that Mr.
Bayoomi and the Federal Rulers had come to a private deal. The terms of the deal
were that, a few months after Bayoomi had been made Chief Minister of the Colony
(in accordance with the constitutional changes which he expected H.M.G. to grant),
he would take the Colony into the Federation without running the risk of an
election. The most surprising feature of this deal was that it represented an *entente*
between the Rulers and a man whom they had hitherto spoken of with contempt. A
disquieting feature of the situation was that Mr. Bayoomi appeared to have cut
himself off from his own Ministerial colleagues and also from that moderate support
among the Colony public which, so we understood, he had hitherto relied upon
obtaining. The Governor came into the Colonial Office for a few hours just before
going back to Aden at the end of September and was shown these reports. Colonial
Office officials told him that at first glance they were not attractive, since if H.M.G.
were to back a private deal of this kind they would lay themselves wide open to
accusations of disregard of the principle of public consent. The Governor then
returned to Aden.

15. After considering this new situation in Aden, the Governor gave us his
considered views. He confirmed that the secret deal existed, because it had been
revealed to him by the Federal Rulers, who commended the arrangement as the best
one in the circumstances. The Governor analysed the various choices open to us and
has come down in favour of our also supporting a plan based on the secret deal. He
has told the Rulers that he is recommending in this sense to H.M.G. The main
reasons for his point of view may be summarised as follows:—

(1) The Nationalist opposition has been upset by the blow to Nasser's prestige in
Syria and we are therefore in a better position to get our way. As a further
consequence of this set-back to Nasserite nationalism, moderate opinion is now
rallying behind Bayoomi.

(2) The Bayoomi/Rulers secret deal represents an agreement between people of
authority and determination, who are disposed to remain our friends, who wish to
see the British military presence remain, and whose authority will increase with
success; in other words, if the British are seen to be backing Mr. Bayoomi, then
those other moderates who are at present not inclined to support him will in due
course jump on his bandwagon.

(3) If we do not support this deal, we will not only alienate Mr. Bayoomi but, what
is more important, will imperil our relations with the Federal Rulers, who are our
best and most reliable friends. . . .

19. While we see that it is important not to offend the Federal Rulers, we are
bound, as always, to look first and foremost to H.M.G.'s defence interests. We do not
believe that they will be as well secured as we should like if we bring about a Union as
early as 1963. Once Union between the Colony and the Federation is achieved, then
we must be prepared for political pressures for further advances in the direction of independence. Such pressures will come about anyway, but inasmuch as we want to hold on to Aden for as long as possible, we must pay out the rope as slowly as we decently can. The Governor’s proposal to take advantage of what may be a temporary situation, and please what may be a very narrow circle of our friends, does not seem to us to contain sufficient evidence of stability to justify our advising its acceptance at this stage.

20. If the Secretary of State decides that the right thing to do is to adopt some course markedly different from the one approved by the Cabinet, he will no doubt wish to consult his colleagues again. However, our advice would be that, before reaching a firm decision, it would be desirable to invite the Governor home for further discussion. Meanwhile our present view, among officials, can be summed up as follows:

(1) To support the Bayoomi/Rulers deal involves a greater risk to our interests than we consider justified by the arguments advanced in favour of our doing so. The Ministry of Defence are most uneasy about the implied shortening of the time in which we can continue to use Aden as we wish. The Treasury, who would be prepared to give a reasonable amount of financial assistance if it were a sure investment, share these doubts. The Foreign Office advise us that we ought not to discount Nasser’s continuing appeal to Arab Nationalism, nor probably that other Arab countries will continue to criticise and attack our policies.

(2) The Colonial Office share the views of these other Departments, and are much concerned about the effects of a blatant abandonment of the principle of consent to which Mr. Macleod gave public support in Aden and which is generally a key feature of our Colonial policies. We are not persuaded that Mr. Bayoomi’s credit or his powers of survival are sufficiently assured for us to support him. We believe that the better course would be to adopt the fall-back position, perhaps coupling this with a public statement to the effect that H.M.G. believe in and will support the movements towards Union between the Colony and the Federation, and certainly give a most thorough explanation to the Rulers of why we believe that this more limited scheme is in their own best interests. We could repeat to them our assurance that self-government will only be granted to Aden as part of a programme including Union and could point out to them that, if things go wrong in the elections on the new franchise, we should be better able to deal with the new situation with control of the Colony’s government still firmly in our own hands than we should be if, before the elections, we handed over authority to Arab ministers (as contemplated in their agreement with Bayoomi). Similarly, by conceding constitutional advance at this stage we should have largely lost our power to influence events should Bayoomi after all find himself unable to carry his people with him and to give effect to his part of the bargain.

(3) We are greatly concerned also about our ability to retain the expatriate civil servants in anything like their present strength after merger. The Governor himself recognises that after merger it may be impossible to avoid giving expatriate civil servants the chance to take compensation for loss of career. We might be able to avoid this course in the case of certain categories of official who would remain in the employment of the Colony Government alone, but all our experience is that, once the right to leave with compensation is given to any part of
the Public Service in any territory, it is difficult to persuade others to remain behind indefinitely. The run-down of the expatriate service would probably reduce the efficient administration of the government services of Aden, and thus affect our defence interests there.

21. We suggest that the further examination of the problem with the Governor is desirable before final decisions are taken, and that this could best be accomplished by inviting him to London as early as convenient.

Minutes on 203

... I have had a brief word with the Ministry of Defence and with Mr. Carstairs, who tell me that there is nothing in the current reappraisal of our overseas commitments to suggest that the Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Staff are changing their minds about the importance of Aden as a base.¹ We may therefore continue to regard political events in Aden Colony with as much self-interest as before. It is in this light that Mr. Formoy and I have discussed these recent telegrams. We do not think that H.M.G.’s interests would be served by permitting a very early union between the Colony and the Federation. We would, it is true, probably please the Rulers by conniving at a “shot-gun wedding”—and the importance of the Rulers’ friendship is not to be underestimated—but the Secretary of State did persuade them in the June/July talks to acknowledge the need for the appearance of consent on the Colony’s part, and I feel that this is a stipulation which the Secretary of State would wish, at this stage, to continue to insist upon. Nor do we see any necessity for this hasty “shot-gun wedding”. We are not faced with mass opinion more or less unanimously demanding a certain political course. If anything, mass opinion in the Colony is not prepared to see an early Union with the Federation. Admittedly such latter opinion contains a large nationalist element whose views we have already decided to discount, but there is only too much evidence that it contains a good many of the ‘moderates’ as well. We cannot, I suggest, afford to antagonise the latter.

I myself think that part of the trouble is that the talks in London and in Aden have up till now been confined to Ministers only. The Aden public, including Members of the Legislative Council, have not been told anything at all about the talks. They have been left to form their impressions from leaks by Mr. Bayoomi’s disenchanted colleagues and from the comments of the Aden Press which is not particularly authoritative or truthful. I think that there is something to be said for a public statement of policy by H.M.G. Hitherto the Secretary of State has said to the Colony and Federal Ministers in confidence that H.M.G. supports the principle of Union, and little more than that. The Governor’s original proposals provided for a full-scale public statement by H.M.G. blessing Union and putting constitutional advance for the Colony into the context of Union. However, this proposal was played down in the C.P.C. and deferred.² The people of Aden Colony are, like most Arabs in other countries, coffee house politicians whose views change with the mood of the hour. If

¹ Sir J Martin wrote in the margin here: ‘In the short term it may be even more important, if (as must be assumed) we do not retain a base in independent Kenya’.
² See document no 201.
they are left to form their own political ideas without any public statement of intention by H.M.G., then we should not be surprised if they chop and change their opinions quickly, form little groups and short-lived alliances, and give ear to every rumour. However, our experience has shown (and Sir W. Luce consistently made this point), that they do respect the law and they do respect authority. They have been more or less respectful of British authority for 130 years. We shall of course have to await the Governor's promised report next week, but, subject to that, I believe that we should consider seriously H.M.G.'s making a public declaration of policy. . . .

I.W.
29.9.61

I think it would be wiser to suspend judgment on this development and on our future course until we have the expected report from Sir Charles Johnston, who has now returned to the Colony. Meanwhile I should regard Bayoomi's shares as an extremely speculative investment.

J.M.M.
30.9.61

[The Governor] recommends that H.M.G. support the plan (which he understands unofficially to have been agreed upon between the Federal Supreme Council and Mr. Bayoomi) for an early achievement of merger, i.e. before any elections take place in the Colony. . . . Our main reasons for doubts are that the Governor's proposals seem to be based on very short-term considerations. Thus it would be a mistake to underrate Nasser, who is not so down and out that he could not make ample trouble in Aden if the political situation there were mishandled. His propaganda machine has certainly been centering on Syria during the past week, but he is unlikely to neglect any opportunities for attacking our policies in Southern Arabia, and I should like to be more convinced than I am at the moment of Mr. Bayoomi's ability to command and retain a large following before I would regard him as able to discount Egyptian attacks (indeed the Governor in the telegram at (194) admits that Mr. Bayoomi will remain exposed to dangers). . . .

With great respect, we question the Governor's assumption that we are not—to put this matter in its bluntest form—to put this matter in its bluntest form—knocking two years off our expected tenure of Aden. The Governor's present instructions contemplate merger taking place in 1964, and if that were adhered to we should have gone quite some way towards meeting the present defence stipulation that we hang on to our defence interests by right as long as possible during this decade. Mr. Formoy and I feel that we should have no illusions about the readiness of the Arab politicians to sit down quietly after merger and forget about independence. After internal self-government in the Colony and merger, they will have no other political objective to think about. . . .

The main purpose of the telegram to the Governor and of our talks among officials must be, I suggest, to assess whether or not the Governor's recommendation gives us the longest and most sure tenure of the base in Aden, with the greatest possible measure of common consent. We need not, at this stage any more than in the past, count on getting the consent of the Aden T.U.C. and the Nationalist element, but I am still uneasy that, by backing Mr. Bayoomi too much, in a very short time we shall lose the support of some of the Moderates, e.g. Mr. Luqman, whom I still think it important to try to carry with us. As I say, neither Mr. Formoy nor I, attempting to
judge these essentially political aspects from this distance, are as yet convinced that the Governor's plan is solid enough.

I.W.
6.10.61

... I share all your doubts and am aghast at the fact that the Governor has disclosed to the Federal Supreme Council that he had decided to recommend course (c) to the S of S. ...³

J.M.M.
7.10.61

... I am not, as yet, convinced that we could advise Ministers to go nap on a secret Bayoomi/Rulers deal, knowing that it is likely to lack supporters whose friendship and co-operation we have hitherto been concerned to maintain. What I think is for consideration, as a means of bridging the gap between plan (c) and the Governor's present instructions, is the idea of a public statement by H.M.G. saying that, whereas we do not consider that the Colony or Federation ought to aspire to independence separately, we do endorse their efforts to come together and build a united nation in South Arabia. (You will recall that the Governor made such a statement a feature of his own first proposals and that Mr. Macleod himself commended it to the C.P.C. Ministers, however, decided to defer the making of such a statement until after the Secretary of State's talks with the Rulers in London.) I should have thought that the Rulers would prefer such a public statement to some kind of private endorsement of their deal with Mr. Bayoomi. After all, if Mr. Bayoomi does come unstuck, then however much the Rulers may bluster there is little that they hold us to.

Such a statement might also make it easier for us to persuade all concerned in this plot that elections are desirable before merger. Mr. Macleod when in Aden said, in his public statements as well as in his private discussions, with the Rulers and Ministers, that the principle of consent in these matters was one to which H.M.G. attached importance. At the beginning of this minute I have indicated that we have from the first been prepared to see this principle diluted somewhat, but not to the extent that we should flagrantly deny the right of the “Adenese” to have some say about whether Aden should enter the Federation. The Governor’s present feeling is that Arab nationalism in the Colony has been rendered despondent by events in Syria and that those moderates who do not support Bayoomi at present will jump on his band waggon if it is seen to be travelling safely. The Foreign Office may care to predict how well founded is the Governor’s argument that Nasser is less likely to plague us than hitherto. There is, I think, a good deal in the Governor’s point that the Aden Arabs will jump on the best band waggon they can see. Nevertheless, I am not at this stage persuaded that we are in a position to assume that we can be too disrespectful towards the idea of displaying “consent” through elections before merger takes place.

The Ministry of Defence will, I should expect, show concern about the prospect of the merger taking place in 1963. Were I more convinced myself that the merger would gain us more friends than it lost us, or that it would stick in the way the

³ i.e. ‘the private deal’ by which Bayoomi and the Rulers would be informed in confidence that when a ministerial system was in operation in the Colony (with Bayoomi as chief minister) HMG would back him up if he proposed publicly that the Colony should join the Federation as early as possible.
Governor seems to think, I would not consider that the difference of a year in bringing it about was “time lost” to H.M.G. However, the Governor does not, I think, answer convincingly our suggestion that, once merger takes place whenever that is, the pressure for independence is going to be stepped up. I am not, for one thing, sold on the idea that because the Arabs will need H.M.G.’s money this is going to damp down their political ambitions. Nor do I care for the argument that, even after merger, suspicions between Colony and Federation are going to play into our hands.

The Governor returns again to the general line he took when he was first appointed, namely “massive economic aid” is a necessary part of all our political thinking for Aden Colony and Protectorate. I had hoped that the gradual instruction in Colonial Office methods of financial help which Mr. Melville and I have been giving him would by now have sunk in, but he reverts to his rather ambassadorial ideas and rather vaguely suggests that another £2 million a year would be well spent. Certainly we have to go through the usual difficult times with the Treasury which any grant-in-aid territory creates. In particular, we have been hammering at them for some time to lift the present £40,000 defence contribution which Aden Colony has paid to H.M.G. for many years. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury turned this down some months ago and we are about to return to the charge. If the Treasury would yield this up with a good grace, it would be helpful out of all proportions (the Colony Legislative Council are in fact unlikely to vote it much longer). I have just had the Governor’s advance proposals for the three-year block grant for the Federation. He asks for an extra £1,000,000 per annum, and this in spite of a clear warning about financial stringency which on the advice of Finance Department I wrote to him shortly after the Chancellor’s last statement. We shall have to do our best with the Treasury. …

I.W.
13.10.61

Sir John Martin and I discussed these recent developments with Mr. Fraser yesterday. The following were the main points in our discussion:—

1. Although the Governor admits that we should not grant constitutional advance “ad personam”, the plan which he is backing does in large measure amount to doing just this.

2. Although the Governor is advocating that merger should be accomplished before the next elections in the Colony, his timetable would mean that there would be probably a comparatively short interval between merger and the date when elections are bound to be held. This the Governor appears to admit, inasmuch as he says that such elections would provide the Colony with a means of “opting out of Union”. There would seem to be a danger that such an opportunity, given to those Colony voters who might feel that the Colony had been bounced into Federation, might bring an anti-Union vote coupled with a cry for early independence for the Colony.

3. The main difference between the Governor’s present proposals and his instructions from the Secretary of State remains the giving to the Colony voter an opportunity to say, before Union, whether he wishes to embark on it. We are not yet convinced that, if we accept the case for an early merger, the Union thus formed will be content to remain dependent for long. We would expect that fairly
soon after the Union was brought into being, there would be pressure for us to give up our Sovereignty over the Colony, thus bringing the Colony into the same position by Treaty as the rest of the Federation. Then, there would be further pressure for us to replace that Treaty by one appropriate to relations between two entirely independent countries. . . .

(5) It might be desirable to invite the Governor home for consultations (which could be presented as largely consequent upon the change of Secretary of State); alternatively there might be advantage in Mr. Fraser visiting Aden, although a Ministerial visit might well be taken locally as an opportunity to reopen the whole matter.

(6) The Governor’s plea for increased financial assistance comes at a very difficult time for H.M.G., and he is likely to be disappointed to some extent.

(7) It is desirable to obtain the views of other interested Departments before considering what advice should be given to Ministers. . . .

I.W.
17.10.61

I agree throughout with Mr Watt’s submission, to which I have only made one or two very small alterations and additions. The submission is long, but on this first occasion I think Mr Maudling will welcome the background it contains. To my mind the main point is that if we adopt the Governor’s new proposals we shall, I fear, be throwing over too readily, for the sake of a deal between one of the leading Aden Colony moderates and the Federal Rulers, the principle of consent. I am sure the late S. of S. was wise in attaching great importance to this principle in the context of merger between the Colony and the Protectorate, for the very practical reason that there can be no lasting basis of a settlement without it.

H.T.B.
20.10.61

S of S
[Mr Fraser is] inclined to think that the arguments in favour of proceeding as the Governor proposes are stronger than the [CO Aden] Dept suggests. . . . In the recent Ministerial discussions on future planning for Defence Aden was classified as a base of which we could rely on having unfettered use until 1970. In the light of political developments in the Colony, we in the Dept feel considerable doubt whether it is prudent to rely on unqualified freedom of tenure for so long. . . .

J.M.M.
23.10.61

204 CO 1015/2388, no 221B 8–10 Dec 1961
[Draft Cabinet paper on Aden]: minutes by J C Morgan and I Watt (CO)

... 2. The proposals in our draft Cabinet paper rest on the doctrine of the acceptance of the “lesser risk”. We propose to stake everything on basing assent to the Union in the Colony on a vote of the present unofficial members of the Legislative Council, and then proceeding to bring about the Union before there is a
general election in Aden Colony on a reformed franchise. The argument is that if we have a general election in the Colony before the Union is brought about, the Nationalists will win, and we shall lose the friendship of both the Bayoomites and the Protectorate Rulers. If we have the general election after Union, it is argued firstly that by then a number of people in Aden Colony will have shifted their allegiance towards the newly established authority, reinforced by the Arab sentiment for unity, and that in any event even if the Nationalists do win that election, we shall still have the friendship of the Rulers and the moderates. I think it ought to be realised however that on the basis of the information we have received from the Governor, and the general probabilities, it still remains likely that a general election held after Union in the Colony will be won by the extreme Nationalists (unless they boycott again). One reason for thinking this is that I do not really believe that a sufficient number of people in the Colony electorate will in fact shift their allegiance to the new authority after it has come into being, i.e. “join the bandwagon”. And part of my reason for thinking this is that I do not really believe in the alleged strong sentiment for unity in Southern Arabia; indeed, I was surprised when I heard the Governor recently (and Mr. Trevaskis) appealing to this sentiment as part of their argument, since it so strongly conflicts with the advice so frequently given by previous Arabists in positions of authority, notably Sir Tom Hickinbotham1 and Sir Bernard Reilly, that if there is a dominant motif in Arab character it is the fissiparous tendency to almost individual independence or anarchy—“every Arab is his own King”. I therefore think that the paper could possibly bring out a little more clearly that the gamble may very well not come off, and that if it does not, and if the Colony Nationalists win a post-Union election, we may then be in an extremely awkward position, and even with the support of the Rulers of the Protectorate be obliged to use force to maintain our necessary strategic interest in the base.

3. Because this risk is (in my view) so great, I think we are entitled to insist on the Rulers falling in with all conditions which we may seek to impose for fostering the Union. Among these I would rate at highest the necessity that the Governor should maintain for a period of years control of the Public Services in the Colony, the Federation, the Union, and the rest of the Protectorate. I have recently had an opportunity of seeing the papers on this subject, and have there minuted that it is a “must” to achieve this aim, particularly as our legal advice is that through proper constitution making it can be done. I would therefore ... suggest the following amendment from “Y” of the last page of the draft:—

“I consider it of the first importance that the Governor exercise control of the Public Services of the Union, the Colony, and the Protectorate, until the Union has been established for several years. It may be difficult to persuade the Federation Rulers of the necessity for this, but, if my scheme is adopted, I shall insist upon it as one of the necessary conditions of the formation of the Union. We should also ...”

J.C.M.
8.12.61

Thank you for these views, which, if I may say so, go very much to the heart of the business. ... Certainly there are Arab characteristics which, as we have all seen, cause

---

1 Governor of Aden, 1951–1956.
a remarkable amount of political instability. Yet the Federation has acquired a fair measure of cohesion and authority—more perhaps than you might have forecast three years ago. My own short experience in Aden, for what it is worth, makes me think that the motives behind the present moves for political union are perhaps more to be sought in Aden conditions than in something called ‘Arab psychology’. They are:

(1) the realisation by the Rulers that now HMG. is ready to deal with them as an established Federal government.
(2) the realisation by the Rulers that HMG. cannot maintain Colonial rule very much longer in the Colony—producing a determination to avert a Nationalist-dominated government there.
(3) the realisation by the Colony public of the above, leading to the deduction that the Federal Govt., with its existing pledge of eventual independence, has now to be taken seriously.
(4) a realisation by the Colony public that the Cairo-inspired Nationalists and the Yemeni labourers are not those to whom they want to see their fate entrusted.

These factors, I think, do give the present leaning towards union some reality. However, I agree with you that there is a danger that elections in the Colony after union may still go wrong; and have redrafted [Cabinet paper] again to bring out your point.

None of us dispute your point ‘X’, but at the moment I do not think the S of S. is in a position to make retention of the power to control the public service a sine qua non. The Governor is, as you know, having the facts of life drummed into him, and I think that we shall soon be in a position to lay down the law as you propose. But I would not wish, nor could I, take the Governor’s agreement to what you propose for granted; and we had better let him continue his present examination of this problem . . .

Perhaps, at this time, I might offer two general observations:

(1) G.H.² Aden (whoever is the occupant) is sometimes apt to say that such and such is ‘politically impossible’. My experience is that it is in fact rarely so. It is remarkable what can be done if we, H.M.G., show the Arabs that we know our own minds and display patience—great patience—in explaining things.
(2) the generality of Arabs in the Colony and Federation still have confidence in our integrity and intentions, and give us their respect.

I.W.
10.12.61

² ie, Government House.
The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs\(^1\) said that it was now proposed, and had been accepted by the Committee at their previous meeting, that our object should be to secure a merger of Aden Colony with the Aden Federation before further elections were held in the Colony. The Colonial Secretary had, however, been asked to report back to the Committee on two points; the possibility of retaining sovereignty over British military installations in Aden, on the analogy of the sovereign base areas in Cyprus, and the possibility of accelerating the proposed merger between the Colony and the Federation. Before turning to any detailed consideration of the base areas it should be borne in mind that the merger between the Colony and the Federation did not of itself involve any loss of British sovereignty; our proposals provided for the retention of British responsibility for defence, foreign affairs and internal security in the territory as a whole.

The Minister of Defence\(^2\) explained the practical difficulties which would be involved in the creation of sovereign base areas in Aden if the rest of the territory became fully independent. The present enclave at Khormaksar was overlooked by the heights of Aden itself and would be very vulnerable to attack; it had limited fuel storage and the road linking Khormaksar with the Federation would run through independent territory. It would be possible in theory to consider the creation of a base area at Little Aden but apart from the formidable cost involved—possibly amounting to £50 million—this presented difficulties of its own, particularly for harbour facilities, water supplies and the construction of a new airstrip. The conclusion which the Chiefs of Staff had reached, and with which he agreed, was that the only practical course of action in present circumstances was to retain effective control over the whole territory; this should be one of the main objects of the forthcoming discussions. In the longer term the possibility of establishing facilities at Socotra might have to be considered.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) Under present defence plans it would be essential to retain facilities both at Aden and at Singapore for a period of at least ten years and this should be borne in mind in negotiation. At the end of the ten-year period it might be possible to look forward to a strategy based partly on larger seaborne forces and partly on the provision of operating facilities in strategically placed islands.

(b) Although the Sultan of Socotra might at some stage have to consider linking his possessions on the mainland with the Federation, particularly if oil were found in them, there was no indication that he would want to do the same for the island of Socotra itself. The island was in any case five hundred miles from Aden. He would not object to the establishment of British facilities on the island and might indeed welcome them; apart from anything else they would bring him increased revenue. This possibility should be further considered.

Turning to the programme for constitutional development the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs explained that under the plan now envisaged the representatives of the Colony and of the Rulers would be invited to consider proposals for a merger; the result of their negotiations could be announced at the end of the year. At about the same time certain measures of constitutional advance in the Colony itself would be announced; only if these measures were carried out, and a new Government

---

\(^1\) Lord Perth. \(^2\) Mr H Watkinson.
formed, would it be legally possible for the Colony to give effect to the merger. But it would not be necessary to hold new elections; indeed when the proposed constitutional changes had taken place it would be possible to postpone until 1964 the elections which under present rules were due to be held in 1963. The next step would be for the Legislative Council in the Colony as well as the equivalent body on the Rulers side to accept the proposals for merger, which would then be put into effect. The whole object was to take advantage of and to strengthen the support which we were now receiving from the moderate element in the Colony; early elections might result in the return of a nationalist majority whose programme would include early independence for the Colony in isolation and the removal of British bases.

In further discussion the following points were made:—
(c) The general scope of the proposals was sound, and seemed most likely to secure the support of those elements in the Colony favourable to us and undisturbed possession and use of the military facilities.
(d) If against all present indications the proposals for a merger were not accepted by the Legislative Council in the Colony or by the representatives of the Rulers, or were altered in ways unacceptable to us, the United Kingdom Government would retain a power of veto.
(e) Not all the Rulers in the Western Protectorate and only one of the Rulers in the Eastern Protectorate had so far joined the Federation. It would, however, be open to them to accede at any time and it was our hope that an increasing number would do so. …

206 CAB 128/36/2, CC 52(62)1 1 Aug 1962
[Negotiations for a merger between Aden Colony and Aden Federation]: Cabinet conclusions

The Commonwealth Secretary said that there were two major questions of policy to be faced in the negotiations for constitutional development in Aden—the political implications of the proposed merger of Aden Colony with the Federation, and the safeguarding of the military bases and installations. On the first point it was known that a majority of the population of the Colony was opposed to the merger. The fact that it commanded support in the Aden Legislature was due to the fact that the elections had been held on a limited franchise and had been widely boycotted on that account, even by those entitled to vote. It must therefore be assumed that the merger would lead to unrest and possibly to disorder, which would have serious political repercussions in this country and in the United Nations. Nevertheless, the Government had now before them a request from the Aden Legislature that the merger should proceed and it had long since been decided that this would best serve, not only the interests of this country, but the interests of the population of Aden Colony itself and of the territories of the Federation. While he considered that the merger should go forward, he thought it right to warn the Cabinet that this might lead to serious political difficulties.

So far as the military base was concerned it was contemplated that after the merger Britain would retain sovereignty over Aden Colony and remain responsible
for defence, foreign affairs and internal security in the territory as a whole. But it was not to be expected that this situation could long continue. Pressures would develop for the transfer of sovereignty and full responsibility to the new Federation, and on a favourable estimate it was unlikely that we could maintain our position in the Colony beyond the late 1960s. If the Colony was not merged with the Federation the process would be more rapid and independence for the Colony could probably not be delayed much beyond 1965.

Against this background there were two possible ways of preserving our defence interest. The first would be to retain, on the analogy of the sovereign base areas in Cyprus, British sovereignty over those limited areas of the Colony in which our defence installations were concentrated. The second would be to rely on a defence treaty with an independent Federation or to introduce into the instrument under which independence would be granted some form of words recognising the continuing interest of the United Kingdom Government in the defence installations. There were, in his view, strong arguments in favour of the first course; the retention of sovereignty would secure to us a clear legal right to the unrestricted use of the military installations. All recent experience suggested that reliance on a defence treaty or some alternative arrangement on the same lines would be less effective and that our position under such a treaty would be progressively weakened by political action. It was noteworthy that the President of Cyprus had welcomed the fact that the existence of the sovereign base areas made it possible for him to refuse to accept any responsibility for British activities within these areas.

The Minister of Defence\(^1\) said that, while he accepted the critical importance of maintaining the viability of our defence installations in Aden, he doubted whether that object would best be met by seeking to retain British sovereignty over limited areas of the Colony on the lines proposed. In the first place, there would be the greatest practical difficulty in so doing. Aden Colony was small and densely populated, and the military installations did not form a compact whole. To retain sovereignty over the airfield at Khormaksar for example would produce immediate difficulties about the civil use of Khormaksar and about such matters as access and services, e.g., water supplies and fuel storage. Another area over which it would be necessary to retain sovereignty lay across the trunk road linking the two main centres of population in the Colony. Quite apart from these serious practical difficulties, for which experience in Cyprus provided no parallel, there would also be political objections. All the advice he had received was to the effect that a proposal at this stage to retain British sovereignty over defined military areas would make negotiations for a merger very much more difficult and would lessen rather than improve the prospects of a satisfactory settlement.

In discussion it was agreed that, in spite of the political consequences, negotiations for a merger of the Aden Colony with the Aden Federation should proceed on the lines already authorised.

The Prime Minister said that he would wish to discuss further with the Ministers concerned the question of retaining sovereignty over the military areas. It would be helpful to him if the Commonwealth Secretary, together with the Lord Chancellor and the Minister of Defence, could give further thought to the issues involved and to the relative advantages and disadvantages of the various courses open to us.

---

\(^1\) Mr P Thorneycroft, since mid-July 1962.
The Cabinet:
(1) Authorised the Commonwealth Secretary to proceed with negotiations for a merger of Aden Colony with the Aden Federation.
(2) Invited the Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with the Minister of Defence and the Lord Chancellor, to give further thought to the maintenance of United Kingdom control over our present defence facilities in Aden and to report their conclusions to the Prime Minister.

[Explanation of the government’s policy on Aden]: FO tel (no 325), circular to overseas representatives and high commissioners

In comment you should stress the following points:

(a) Aden and its hinterland, the Federation, form a natural unity, which has only been divided by historical accident.
(b) Unity in Arab brotherhood is undoubtedly an aspiration of all the people, even if some oppose the present Rulers in the Federation or Ministers in the Colony.
(c) The proposals therefore represent encouraging progress towards the commonsense solution of a merger which would be greatly to the advantage of the 500,000 inhabitants of the Federation and the 220,000 of the Colony. Continued separation would be a nonsense.
(d) The eventual goal of the Federation is independence, as stated in the Preamble of the 1959 Treaty. Aden, no longer isolated as a small colonial territory, can now aspire to share in the future nationhood of a larger country.
(e) The arrangements safeguard our important requirements arising from our wide defence responsibilities. They will assist us to fulfil our Treaty and other obligations in the Middle East. (One of our principal interests, the defence of Kuwaiti independence, is approved by all Arab states except Iraq).

2. The arrangements will be attacked by Arab nationalist propaganda, supported by a vociferous faction in Aden Colony and perhaps by anti-colonialist opinion elsewhere. You may make the following points in answer to criticisms:

(a) It cannot be denied that the proposed Union is right and in the true interests of the inhabitants of the area as a whole. The Federal and Aden Ministers have given a firm lead in this direction, with the support of Her Majesty’s Government. The initiative has been theirs, not ours.
(b) Ample time is being given for discussion in the Colony and elsewhere (see timetable, for your information, in following Saving telegram).
(c) It would be untrue to allege that the more advanced society of the Colony would be swamped by the predominantly tribal organisation still existing in the Federation. It is just as likely that the richer and more sophisticated Adenis will soon assume the leadership.

3. The following points are delicate ones on which it is not in our interest to have speculation or publicity:

1 This paper is unnumbered, and appears to be an interloper in this file.
(a) Article IX of the Draft Treaty provides that the United Kingdom Government might exclude or withdraw specific areas within Aden for defence reasons.
(b) The exclusion of Perim and the Kuria Muria Islands may arouse suspicion.
(c) The ultimate relations of the new Federation with the United Kingdom are undefined. Hostile propaganda may allege a plot to entice the new State into the Commonwealth.

4. If it becomes necessary for you to comment on any of the points above you should say (respectively):
(a) It is quite unnecessary to go behind the text, which speaks for itself.
(b) These islands have never been administered as part of the Colony or Federation.
(c) Any such talk is pure speculation. The future independent State will obviously decide its own future for itself.

5. The most damaging criticism may be the lack of any electoral process either before the Colony advance or before merger. We shall send guidance on the line to be taken in public in reply to this. Meanwhile you may draw on the remainder of this paragraph in conversation with reliable contacts. The present Colony franchise is unsatisfactory to all parties—too narrow for the left-wing, too broad for the moderate leaders who wish to exclude all who are not true Adenis—and the Aden Government must therefore review and completely revise it before new elections; this may take 18 months, and meanwhile merger cannot wait. Revision of the franchise and choice of the date of the next election will be entirely a matter for the new Colony Government. Provision is made for the possibility of Aden secession after six years' experience of Union.

208 CO 968/707, no 84A 21 Oct 1962

[Aden: possibility of sovereign base areas]: record of a meeting in CO with Sir C Johnston about defence facilities

[In Sept 1962 the Aden Legislative Council voted for the colony to join the Federation, ie, for 'merger'. On the very next day the Imam of Yemen was overthrown by a revolutionary republican coup backed by Egypt. The Aden TUC thus acquired powerful neighbouring support in its opposition. The governor later wrote: 'If the Yemeni revolution had come one day earlier or the Leg Co vote one day later . . . the agreement would never have obtained the support of a majority of local members' (C H Johnston, The view from Steamer Point: being an account of three years in Aden p 124). The British government agonised over recognition of the new Yemeni republic. The Americans and the FO were in favour, but the CO feared the price to be paid—weakening the British position in Aden and the Federation by disheartening the 'moderates' and encouraging the 'extremists'—was too great. (CAB 130/189, GEN 776, minutes of meetings, 31 Oct 1962 & 5 Feb 1963; CAB 134/2371, OP(63)2 & 4, memos by Sandys, 5 & 12 Feb 1963; OP 1 (63)3, minutes of Oversea Policy Committee meeting, 13 Feb 1963). The issue was settled for the government when in Feb 1963 the Yemeni regime evicted the British mission. Meanwhile, over Aden itself, the principal issue for the British government was whether the base areas should be included in the merger, which formally took place on 18 Jan 1963.]

The Secretary of State said his object in forming Base Areas was to confer on us bargaining power against the day that we had to give independence to the Federation. We should, however, aim at life going on as normal. He wanted to
examine how to ensure that the services which we required the Federal and State Government to carry out for us in the areas would be continued.

2. *The Governor* said that he must stress his belief that to proceed with the idea of excluding Base Areas from the merger would lead to a very dangerous situation. The Adenis might be fatalistic enough to accept our going ahead with merger and we should have the Federation with us over this, but the reaction if we attempted to set up Base Areas would be explosive. Nationalist and moderate opinion in the Colony would never submit to it and even, he feared, opinion in the Federation might not accept it.

3. *The Secretary of State* said he doubted whether adding the Base Area scheme to merger would materially worsen the explosion which merger alone would provoke. Nor did he accept as certain that the Federation would come out against Base Areas. His discussion with Mohammed Farid\(^1\) did not suggest that there was any likelihood of this. We should play the matter down as a purely administrative measure, the other side of the coin of Constitutional advance, and stress that everything would go on as usual without fences to demarcate the areas or any other difference.

4. *The Governor* repeated that in his view the merger proposals would be the last straw and might provoke a Cyprus-like situation. The Secretary of State questioned whether there would be any advantage in proceeding with merger but in some way reserving our power to exclude the Base Areas until later. Mr. Fisher\(^2\) thought that this might only lead to two rows instead of one. *The Governor* thought that in addition to losing all the Ministers but Bayoomi over merger, we would even lose Bayoomi over the Base Areas. He was a man capable of great bitterness and once he was gone, we should not be able to build back on him.

5. The possibility of excluding the Base Areas after merger, e.g. by means of a statement that the precise area to be transferred to the Federation would be for later demarcation, was discussed but was thought to be impractical, since the proviso about demarcation was bound to attract attention and we should have no explanation to give. *The Secretary of State* said that in his belief it was now or never with Base Areas. If they were ever included in the Federation it would be impossible to withdraw them. He did not agree with the Governor’s view that we could expect to bargain over them when we came to grant independence to the Federation. He said that whilst he had not reached a final conclusion on the matter he was inclined to think that if it was impossible to set up Base Areas then it would be unjustifiable to have any further expenditure on the Aden Base. This would be a source of regret in Aden, whereas in introducing Base Areas he would be able to explain that these facilitated continued expenditure.

6. *The Governor* said that there would be outcry for more development expenditure in the Colony anyway. Could it be expected that there would be very substantial extra payments if Base Areas were formed? *The Secretary of State* made it clear that there would not. They would be losing no revenue and they would not be in a position to bargain with us because we should not be taking anything from them that was not ours already. The Governor said that no Adeni would look upon the separation of Base Areas in this light: they would be viewed as a gift to us at their expense.

\(^1\) Ruler of the Upper Aulaqi state; federal minister of finance.

\(^2\) Under-secretary of state since mid-July 1962.
7. The discussion then turned to the legal implications of establishing Base Areas and the suitability of arrangements similar to those applied in the case of Perim was discussed. The Secretary of State queried whether these arrangements would put the Governor in a position to enforce our obtaining from the State or Federal Governments the facilities the Base Areas required. The Governor considered that in the Colony, since we retained sovereignty, he would have the necessary power to do so, but not in regard to Federal services, e.g. education. It was agreed, however, that this particular instance should not raise any difficulty because the number of Adenis living in the Base Areas would be so small (on the assumption that it would be possible to exclude the refinery and all the population of Little Aden from the Base Area). The Secretary of State emphasised that he wished to avoid giving grounds for negotiation having to take place before setting up the Base Areas.

8. There was discussion whether it would be possible to carry out the merger in stages, e.g. beginning with confederation between the Colony and the Federation. The Governor said this course had seemed to him to offer no advantages. The Secretary of State wondered whether we could avoid e.g. a boycott of the administration, by leaving open the timing in which the merger was applied in practice. It was considered however after discussion that it would be difficult to do this since upon merger the Colony would automatically lose the authority to wield certain executive powers. There would have to be an Exchange of Letters with the Federation modifying the terms of the proposed Treaty, but this would lead to a deep suspicion on the part of the Federation that we were beginning to hedge. Mr. de Winton suggested that the desired effect might be obtained by inserting in the Federal legislation, which merger would necessitate, provisions for transitional arrangements. This could be presented as a purely technical matter and yet would allow the actual hand-over to the Federation of certain Colony services to be phased in a way that would soften the blow to public opinion. The Secretary of State asked that the possibility of doing so should be urgently considered in consultation with legal advisers in Aden.

9. The Secretary of State examined maps showing the suggested Base Areas and asked that up to date maps showing precise figures of local population resident in the Areas should be prepared. By local population is meant here persons other than Service personnel and their families and British civilians employed directly by the Services. It would thus include both Adenis and Europeans other than military personnel and their families.

10. The Governor was authorised by the Secretary of State to sound out informally the Sultan of Lahej and Mr. Bayoomi to test their reactions to excluding Base Areas from the merger. The Governor should be free to choose his own time to do this.

---

3 M G De Winton, senior legal assistant in CO since 1961.

**209** CO 1055/129, no 95 7 June 1963

‘Aden: future policy’: CO departmental brief for S of S (with minutes by Mr Sandys)

[Mr Sandys wrote minutes or comments in the margins of this paper, reproduced here as footnotes. After merger in Jan 1962, the gov became high commissioner to Federation.]
The Federal Supreme Council’s proposals for further constitutional development are contained in a letter of 3rd June to the Secretary of State, the text of which is contained in telegram No. 560. A copy of the letter will be given to Mr. Bayoomi, Chief Minister, Aden, on his arrival in London tomorrow by sea.¹

2. As agreed in our recent discussions with the Secretary of State, Sir Charles Johnston has encouraged the Federal Ministers to put forward these proposals. They include the desired offer to the United Kingdom to exercise the legal right to excise the Base Areas over which British sovereignty may be retained after the grant of independence to the Federation and Aden.² The Federal Ministers recognise that the exercise of our legal rights in this matter would not be the subject of negotiations: nevertheless they ask that the Federal and Aden Governments should be consulted regarding the details before the Base Areas are excised. This seems a reasonable request:³ it would cause needless friction if it were to be rejected.

3. The proposals envisage the immediate grant of Protectorate State status to Aden, and complete independence in 1969. This course is an amalgam of the Third and Fifth Courses, the pros and cons of which were discussed in some detail in the Department’s memorandum of 17th May, 1963.

Removal of advisory clause of treaty

4. The High Commissioner in telegram No. 561 raises no objection but comments that the Qa’iti and Kathiri States would press for abrogation of their advisory treaties. The Department’s view is that although we would like to keep the advisory powers as long as possible as a safeguard, it must be recognised that they are of no more practical use than the reserved powers in Aden, since they could only be used in the last resort and at the risk of a crisis in our relations with the Federation. Moreover their retention is an irritant to the Federation. We considered that the balance of advantage lies in dispensing with the advisory powers now to secure the political benefits, namely agreement to the proposed programme including the excision of the Base Areas.⁴

5. We have considered the effect on expatriate staff of giving up our advisory powers. In view of the Exchange of Letters⁵ with the Federal Government relating to the conditions on which expatriate staff are made available by the High Commissioner, we do not think that the loss of the Treaty advisory powers would automatically involve the introduction of a general compensation scheme.⁶ Nevertheless we should recognise that it would probably bring nearer the introduction of such a scheme: individual cases are arising already. We would have to make it clear to the Federal Government that annulment of the Advisory Clause of the Treaty would not diminish the validity of the Exchange of Letters and that we would expect them to continue to abide by the agreed conditions on which staff have been made available.

6. If we give up our advisory powers in the Federation, there is no reason to object to giving up similar powers in the Eastern Protectorate States.

¹ I must see Bayoomi & he must be offered every courtesy.
² The Aden Ministers appear to ask for something “in return”. This we cannot accept.
³ Provided our right is recognised unconditionally, we can discuss their wishes separately.
⁴ I think this is probably right.
⁵ What is this?
⁶ Good.
Further constitutional advance in Aden

7. Detailed arguments for and against this proposal have been examined in the memorandum of 17th May. The High Commissioner discusses these arguments further in his telegram No. 562 and concludes that it is better to limit constitutional advance to the grant of internal self-government. The Department concur with the High Commissioner’s view on this point. It may however be questioned whether any form of constitutional change in Aden is absolutely necessary at this stage, unless it is clear that a concession must be made to obtain agreement on the Base Areas.

8. The Federal Ministers point out that the making of a new Constitution for Aden would involve a convenient delay in the Colony elections. What they really mean is, no doubt, that when the new Constitution was introduced there would be no elections at all. However, in either case we would not avoid the difficulties in Parliament and in international circles which we have already foreseen as the main disadvantage of this course.

9. This raises the main question whether we are to allow elections to proceed and accept the possibility of a PSP Government in Aden, or whether to take positive steps to prevent elections from being held, and face the inevitable criticism in Parliament and elsewhere. The answer to this question is relevant to the timing of the whole process of constitutional development, since it will determine whether we need to take any action before the end of the current year.

Independence in 1969

10. The High Commissioner does not comment on this proposal. The Department’s view is that it is acceptable on the assumption that no radical change in policy emerges from the Chequers’ review. The date proposed corresponds roughly with the end of the period allowed by Article X of the Treaty of Accession, relating to the withdrawal of Aden from the Federation.

Excision of base areas

11. This is the quid pro quo which the Secretary of State wishes to have in return for the prospect of further constitutional evolution. The High Commissioner comments that discussion with Federal and Aden Ministers of the details of the proposed excisions would be inevitable, although we should not admit any limitation of our full legal rights. See also paragraph 2 above.

Future assistance to the Federation

12. Federal Ministers seek a formal assurance that financial, military and technical aid would continue indefinitely after the grant of independence in 1969. The High Commissioner in his telegram No. 561 reiterates his familiar arguments about the need for a substantial increase in aid to obtain the necessary goodwill for the whole operation. The Department’s view is that any promise of future aid must depend upon the outcome of the Chequers’ review, and that it is likely to be

---

7 [Sandys appears to have placed a very large question mark against this sentence.]
8 [Sandys appears to have placed a large question mark against this sentence.]
9 No. I have never accepted that this is a “quid pro quo”. We have already given the “quo” in the form of merger and the recent constitutional advance. We are now entitled to the “quid” without further payment.
extremely difficult\textsuperscript{10} to obtain the Treasury's agreement to any open-ended commitment such as that proposed. We think that we can go only so far as to give an assurance that we will continue to honour our existing Treaty obligation to assist the Federation, and give an undertaking that we will review with the Federal Government shortly before the grant of independence the possibilities of continuing assistance after the attainment of independence.\textsuperscript{11}

Further accessions

13. The High Commissioner points out that this refers to the accession of the Qa’iti and Kathiri States. The Department’s view is that there is much to be said for allowing these States to join the Federation, but the benefit will accrue to the Federation rather than to HMG, who will have to shoulder an additional financial burden.\textsuperscript{12} We think that this point may be useful as a potential bargaining counter to secure some advantage to ourselves—e.g. some slowing down in the process of constitutional advance in Aden if that were desired.\textsuperscript{13}

Other preparations for independence

14. These proposals relate to a number of minor matters which are irrelevant to the main constitutional issues and which can be considered separately later on.

Use of Singapore constitution as model for Aden

15. The High Commissioner’s comments are in his telegram No. 563. This is a matter to which we need give detailed consideration only in the event of a decision to give Aden internal self-government as the next step.\textsuperscript{14} It is unnecessary for the Department to comment at this stage, but it may be noted that the High Commissioner proposes to retain an advisory Public Service Commission and that it appears that a satisfactory answer to the problem of security arrangements might be found when the time comes to concede internal self-government.

Timing

16. Even if we excise the Base Areas at the earliest possible moment (which we understand to be the Secretary of State’s wish), it might be possible to agree with the Federal and Aden Ministers on a programme which would allow a decent interval before the introduction of another new Constitution in Aden.\textsuperscript{15} The sooner the next constitutional change is made, the greater will be the pressure for earlier independence, and the difficulty of delaying independence until 1969 will be increased. As noted above, the question of deferring the next constitutional advance in Aden is bound up with a decision on the question whether elections are to be allowed to take place in the normal course. If, however, we were to attempt to fix a time for the next constitutional change perhaps one or two years hence, it would be necessary to give the local Ministers (particularly the Aden Ministers) some

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Impossible.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Yes.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} The money available is not unlimited. If this is their top priority, we should agree. But it will reduce money for other things.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} I am not sure that we do.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} We must study this before we decide whether to give Aden internal self-govt.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Let us discuss.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
concession which they could represent publicly as a *quid pro quo* for the excision of the Base Areas. This concession might perhaps take the form of an undertaking to call a Constitutional Conference at a specified date to consider the details of the proposed new Constitution, and such a conference would afford an opportunity to invite the Opposition factions to consultations. Even if this invitation were rejected, we would be in a better position to justify the postponement of elections in Aden.

210  CAB 128/38, CM 9(63)2  5 Dec 1963

[Constitutional status of Aden]: Cabinet conclusions

*The Colonial Secretary* informed the Cabinet that he would shortly have to initiate discussions with the Government of Aden about the constitutional status of the Colony. It was already included within the dependent Protectorate of the Federation of South Arabia, which would continue to look to the United Kingdom for support and protection; and he had it in mind that its position should now be assimilated to that of the other States which were members of the Federation. In so far as this change would imply the termination of colonial rule in Aden, it could be presented as in some sense conferring on the Colony the status of independence within the Federation; and this should help the moderate party\(^1\) to retain power in the forthcoming elections. But it would also have the advantages that it would transfer to the Federation the embarrassing responsibility for internal security in Aden, a responsibility which the authorities of the Federation would discharge with greater severity than we could afford to; and that, by further consolidating the union of Aden with the Federation, it might help to forestall demands by the extremist party\(^2\) in Aden for genuine and complete independence outside the Federation. It would be for consideration whether, at some point, we should preserve our essential interests in Aden by exercising our right to excise the military base areas from the territory to be transferred to the Federation and retaining these under our own sovereignty. For the moment, however, it would probably suffice to make it clear that we retained this right and that the change in the status of Aden implied no weakening of our purpose to retain a military presence there indefinitely.

In discussion it was suggested that there was no precedent for the conversion of a Colony into a Protectorate and that further consideration would need to be given both to the means by which such a change might be effected and to its possible implications. It would not necessarily be to our advantage to substitute a treaty relationship for direct sovereignty, especially since the military base areas were so intermingled with the rest of the habitable territory within the Colony that, if we were ever compelled to seek to give effect to our right to excise them, we might find it impracticable to do so. If, in these circumstances, the authorities of the Federation proved incapable of maintaining internal security in Aden and we were compelled to

---

\(^1\) The ‘moderates’ were led by Hassan Bayoomi until his untimely death in the summer of 1963, and then by Zain ‘Abdu Baharoon (Baharun), who succeeded him as chief minister in June 1963. The ‘moderates’ were a group rather than a political party, mostly middle-class merchants and businessmen.

\(^2\) The ‘extremists’ were led by Abdullah al-Asnaj, general secretary of the Aden Trades Union Congress, and leader of its political wing, the People’s Socialist Party (PSP), the main ‘opposition’ party. Al-Asnaj had been a clerk with Aden Airways until he was imprisoned for sedition, Jan–May 1963.
intervene, we might find that we lacked both the constitutional authority and the physical means to do so effectively; and we might be exposed to greater international criticism if our action had to take the form of external intervention rather than the assertion of direct sovereignty. Such a situation might be the more likely to arise in that our presence in Aden, in so far as it ensured stability in the Persian Gulf, was probably regarded by the Egyptian Government as, on balance, to their own advantage. If, however, we appeared to surrender effective control over Aden and the Egyptian Government believed that, as a result, the Rulers in the Gulf might be attacked by Saudi Arabia, they might feel compelled to intervene themselves; and in that event we should be ill-placed to deal with disorders which might be provoked in Aden by the extremist party with Egyptian encouragement.

On the other hand it was desirable to ensure, if possible, that the moderate party would be returned to power in the forthcoming elections and that any attempt by the extremist party to win support for the complete independence of Aden outside the Federation would be resisted not merely by moderate sentiment in Aden itself but also by the loyalty of the whole Federation. Moreover, if the United Nations sought to intervene in Aden, it would be possible to resist such intervention more effectively if Aden were only one member of a Federation which, as a whole, was concerned that a British military presence should remain in the area.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that further consideration should be given, initially by the Committee on Defence and Oversea Policy, to the issues which the discussion had exposed. In particular, the constitutional implications of the proposed change in the status of Aden should be examined in greater detail; the possibility of our retaining some degree of responsibility for internal security, even if the status of Aden were changed, should be explored; and it might be desirable, if only in order to avoid the legislation which might otherwise be necessary, to consider the alternative course of giving effect to the substance of the present proposal by an Order in Council conferring full internal self-government on the Colony.

The Cabinet:—

Invited the Colonial Secretary to circulate, for initial consideration at an early meeting of the Committee on Defence and Oversea Policy, a memorandum discussing, on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister in his summing up, the implications of, and possible alternatives to, the proposal that the status of Aden should be assimilated to that of other States which were members of the Federation of South Arabia.

\[211\] CAB 148/1, ff 35–36 26 Feb 1964

‘Aden’: minutes of Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee meeting on proposed constitutional changes

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (D.O. (64) 15) about his proposals for constitutional changes in Aden.

The Colonial Secretary said that in the light of his recent discussion with the High Commissioner for South Arabia he wished to make certain amendments to his previous proposals, which had been approved by the Defence Committee. It had at
first been thought that there was a prospect of the moderate elements in Aden winning the forthcoming elections, but it was now clear that we must plan on the assumption that the extremists would do so. This would make it difficult to use effectively our constitutional powers in the colony to prevent subversion, having regard to pressures upon us both internationally and in this country. He considered that the best way to maintain security was to give up certain remaining constitutional and treaty powers in Aden and in the Federation respectively. In the Federation the fact that we had under treaty powers of mandatory advice exposed us to pressure, both in international circles and in Parliament, to use it frequently in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Federal Government. He proposed that we should abandon this power save in respect of external affairs and defence, which would include power in respect of internal security to the extent that this might be necessary for the defence of the military base. We should not then be susceptible to pressure to interfere with the action taken by the Federal Government to maintain security. In Aden it would free us from political embarrassment if we handed over full control of day-to-day affairs to the local Government. Although this would increase the powers of an extremist Government, security throughout the Federation would be the responsibility of the Federal Government, which could also take over control of the Aden police in emergency. The retention of sovereignty over Aden itself would mean that we retained the right to excise in the future any part of the colony necessary for our defence interests. These proposals involved a constitutional change which would necessitate the introduction of a compensation scheme for members of the Overseas Service: this would cost about £1 million over five years.

The High Commissioner for South Arabia\(^1\) said that as long as the Aden Constitution gave us powers over internal security we were vulnerable to pressure from the extremists, who were adept at enlisting outside support for their cause. The transfer of responsibility to the Federal Government would ease the position, not because that Government would be likely to have to resort to the more frequent and sterner exercise of these powers, but because the Adeni extremists would be less likely to cause trouble if they knew that responsibility rested with the Federal Government. Furthermore, as long as affairs in Aden remained our responsibility it was a centre for subversion against our friends in the Federation, and it was difficult for us to control this without being subject to criticism for the infringement of democratic rights and freedom of speech.

In favour of the Colonial Secretary’s proposals it was argued that:

(a) The position in Aden did not present a parallel with that of a colony about to reach independence. It was a constituent state of the Federation with a constitutional status less advanced than the remaining states. The proposed transfer of powers would do no more, therefore, than put Aden in a position of parity with other members of the Federation.

(b) It was the retention of our military position in Aden which mattered to us, not the continued control of Aden affairs.

(c) All important powers would rest with the Federal Government which would be better able to control security throughout the Federation without the intervention of the High Commissioner (and therefore ultimately of the British Government) between it and the constituent states.

\(^1\) Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, since Aug 1963.
(d) As long as we retained sovereignty in Aden the position could be legally reversed at any time to enable us to resume control. The High Commissioner would, under the proposals, retain the power to appoint certain senior administrative and police officers.

(e) The introduction of a compensation scheme for British members of the Service which would enable them to retire at any time thereafter at six months’ notice was not only a commitment at a constitutional stage of this nature but was desirable in order to meet the present discontent in the Service and to facilitate the more rapid Arabisation of the senior posts.

(f) If we ignored the present pressure for constitutional advance there would be serious political trouble, in the face of which we should eventually have to give way. It would be better to make the advance now.

On the other hand, it was argued that:

(g) The Adenis might dislike coming more directly under the control of the Federal Government; and in any case constitutional changes now would not purchase their good will in the future.

(h) The Aden Government would under these proposals have day-to-day control of the Aden police and of Aden Port; and this represented a potential threat to our control of the military base.

(i) If, through the introduction of a compensation scheme, British members of the Service were allowed to leave, this would not only lead to a lowering of the standard of administration, with consequential effects on the base, but would leave us without any instrument available if we wished to resume control in the colony.

(j) In view of some recent popular manifestations in the Federation it was doubtful whether we could rely upon the present Federal Government remaining indefinitely in control.

(k) The form of the proposals represented a close parallel with the normal pattern of a colony advancing towards independence and would be represented as a British intention to withdraw completely in the near future.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the proposals presented certain difficulties in respect of our retention of powers necessary to maintain our military base in Aden and might be widely misrepresented. These difficulties would need to be considered further.

212  PREM 11/4679, ff 56–59  8 Apr 1964

[Aden, the Yemen, and Middle East policy]: minute by J O Wright (PM’s Office) to Sir A Douglas-Home

The Cabinet clearly took the right decision on Thursday about the Yemen.1 Equally clearly they took it a contre-cœur.

---

1 The Cabinet decided Britain should abstain on a UN Security Council resolution condemning the British attack on Harib (see next note), and should inform the US government that Britain would deplore it if the US supported the resolution, since in principle the action was similar to the American one in Cuba (see CAB 128/38/2, CM 21(64)2, f 189).
The fact is that our action at Harib left us friendless in the world; even in this country there has been not much support for it (e.g. the Sunday Times). This is not very good for a country like Britain which, at home, aims to have as bi-partisan a foreign policy as possible and, abroad, hopes to make friends and influence people by the balanced sanity and commonsense of its policies. Frankly, I think we are in as grave danger of failing to protect our true interests in the Middle East as we were in South-East Asia, before you met Bobby Kennedy and subsequently President Johnson. I think a fresh rescue operation on your part with the President may be necessary.

I think the first essentials in successful policy in the Middle East are:

1. To recognise and accept the sort of world we live in.
2. To get our policies aligned with those of the Americans, whose broad interests in the area are the same as our own.

With respect, I do not think we have done either at the moment. What we are in fact doing is making precisely the same mistake (and for the same reason) as we were doing in Malaysia–Indonesia namely over supporting our short term interests regardless of their impact on our long term interests.

We have really only two interests in the Middle East.

The first is access on reasonable terms to Middle East oil. The second is over flying rights across the Middle East barrier so that we may get to the other parts of the world where our presence is necessary. We also have a Treaty obligation to defend Kuwait.

The true security for our Middle East supplies of oil is the purely commercial consideration of willing buyer and willing seller. The great protections are first the fact that the Middle East countries have no-one else to sell the oil to in such quantity as they can to ourselves; and secondly that we could always import cheap Soviet oil if the Arabs get too troublesome. The military defence of Kuwait and the need to retain Aden in order to defend Kuwait are useful and should not voluntarily be given up. But I do not for one moment believe they are more than a secondary protection and I think we shall be fighting a rear-guard action to maintain them.

The Americans also have the same basic interests as ourselves in the Middle East: the reasonable access to oil and the general peace of the area. They recognise the value of peace and stability in the area and our base at Aden. Their only quarrel is the way we go about it.

Our present attitudes, seem to me to be based on a number of fundamental misconceptions. The first is that the Americans are hostile to our interests. The fact is that they are not. Secondly that the American policy in the Yemen has failed. It has no more failed than Egyptian policy has succeeded. The Egyptians are bogged down in the Yemen. There is a stalemate. The Americans recognise that there is a stalemate. This suits us very well. The measure of this is that when there was a possibility a week or so ago that Nasser and King Saud might be making it up, a

---

2 On 13 Mar 1964 the Yemenis bombed a frontier village in the State of Beihan. On 28 Mar, ostensibly on a request from the South Arabian Federation government, and after due warning to the locals, a reprisal bomb attack was launched on a government fort near Harib (known as Fort Harib) in the Yemen. The British had treaty obligations to the federal government. But the US government disapproved of the action.
quiver of apprehension ran through Whitehall. Whether or not American policy has failed, the result of American policy, the stalemate, suits us very well.

Thirdly there is an underlying trend in our dealings with the Middle East to have a bash at Nasser. This is very understandable but very unwise. We had a bash once and failed with ignominy. We must resist the temptation to do so again. Our only interest is to see that Nasser does not unite the Arab world under his leadership. There is really no prospect that the Arabs are ever likely to get united under any single person's leadership, least of all under the leadership of Egypt. The whole history in the Middle East in recent years shows that Nasser has had a series of setbacks in Syria. He has only got bogged down in the Yemen. Let us leave him alone and let him stew in his own juice. Above all do not let us become querulous about the American attitude to Nasser. We complained bitterly to them when John Foster Dulles cut off aid for the Aswan Dam. Are we now going to complain equally querulously if they give aid?

Policy for the future. I think we must recognise that the best way of protecting our interests in the Middle East is summed up in the phrase: “Softly, softly catchee monkey”. We must meet our Treaty commitments to Kuwait, to Libya and to the Arabian Federation but in a totally unspectacular and totally unaggressive and unprovocative way. It may be unfair that the world condemns Harib. The fact is however that Indians and Pakistanis can slay each other in their thousands. Hutus and Tutsis4 can murder each other with impunity and no-one cares. Equally, no-one would care if the Wars of the Roses broke out in England again. What the world will not stand is white men killing non-whites except perhaps at the request of a non-white government who happens to be in the right.

My recommendation would be that we ought to seize the opportunity of the review both by ourselves and the Americans of the Libyan Treaty to have a proper go over the ground of the Middle East with the Americans. The object would be not to bring the Americans round to our point of view, as this is unattainable and would in my view be wrong. The idea would be to re-establish a sense of common purpose in the Middle East on the lines of a sense of common purpose that has now been established in South-East Asia. The advantage of this is that it would be conducted by the Foreign Office which is the only Department in Whitehall which is making sense at the moment on this subject. The Colonial Office ought to be making Aden a better place to live in.5

J.O.W.
8.4.64

---

3 In 1956; the action precipitated Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.
4 In Rwanda.
5 The prime minister minuted: ‘I think Mr Butler and the Commonwealth Sec. should go over the whole of this ground with Mr. Rusk. I agree with a lot of this, but how do we defend the Aden Federation against attack from the air? A.D-H.[nd]’.
in Aden and the other states in order to hold the position (ff 148–149, tel no 347, 21 Apr 1964). Wright believed that without ‘more basic thought, we shall be hell-bent for disaster. The Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Ministry of Defence are all pulling in different directions at present’.

... There are so many currents and cross-currents in this problem it might be as well to start off from a basis of accepted fact. There seem to me to be three main factors in the situation:—

1. Our interest in Aden is not Aden itself, nor the Federation, but in the existence of the base in order to be able to protect our oil supplies in the Persian Gulf and specifically to meet our Treaty commitment to Kuwait.
2. It is the general objective of Nasser, and in this he speaks for most of the revolutionary and progressive sentiment among the Arabs, to get us out of Aden.
3. To judge from Sir Kennedy Trevaskis’ telegram, our policy in Aden and the Federation is virtually in ruins so that it looks as if we may have less and less support, not merely from the volatile urban Adenis but also now from the supposedly stable Federal rulers, for our continued presence.

Factors (2) and (3) are harsh and unpalatable but they must be faced if we are to make any sense of the problem. There are a number of alternative courses of action which we can take:—

1. We can try to do a deal with Nasser, by which he will agree to call off his subversive activity in the Federation in return for our agreeing to call off our subversive activity in the Yemen. This, as the Foreign Secretary said this morning, is the action favoured by the Foreign Office; but Mr. Butler said that he did not think we could go as far as that.
2. The second alternative is to hit back at Nasser in the Yemen. The Colonial Secretary has put forward a number of suggestions. But before we go into this retaliatory policy we must be absolutely clear in our minds that this means escalation. Where would such escalation stop? We have always set our faces against it elsewhere. Why should we think that it is now likely to be successful?
3. Disengagement and withdrawal from Aden. This would be humiliating in present circumstances. But clearly we are on shifting sands and a plan ought to be made whereby we can meet our Treaty commitment to Kuwait from somewhere other than Aden.
4. Granting independence to the Federation in the hope that we may be able to retain our base at Aden for a little while longer while we make alternative arrangements and are able to disengage with decency.

It would require the wisdom of Solomon to know what is the best course to take. All I would say is that the alternative which leads to escalation is, in my judgement, bound to lead in the end to disaster. The Americans would not support us. There would be an outcry in the whole Arab world. We should be in for trouble in the U.N. And we should end up by being booted out not only of Aden but out of Libya and Kuwait as well.

It is also, in my judgement, too early and too humiliating to contemplate immediate withdrawal.

This surely means that we must make a further effort to obtain a political settlement. This political settlement should, surely, have at least two ingredients:
first, the deal with Nasser and secondly the deal with the Federation rulers. I personally think this is the only way that we could salvage something from the wreckage of Aden. And meanwhile, as an insurance against the failure of policy and as a recognition of the inevitable, we should set the military planners to work to see how our Treaty commitment to Kuwait can be met without Aden.

Above all I firmly believe that, since Ministers are to take two bites at this cherry, one before Mr. Butler goes to see Mr. Rusk and the second after he comes back, this whole problem should be remitted to the Official Committee of D.O.P. for urgent study and recommendations. The foreign, colonial and defence requirements are in conflict and must be reconciled.

214  PREM 11/4680, ff 106–107  5 May 1964

[Need to get to grips with the problem of Aden and the Yemen]:
minute (M49/64) by Sir A Douglas-Home to Mr Butler (FO)

I think that the moment has now come for us to make a real effort to get to grips with the situation in the Arabian peninsula. We are in danger of losing sight of the main British interest, which is to protect our position in the Persian Gulf and East Africa and our communications to South East Asia.

The situation has two aspects: the internal aspect in the Aden Federation and the international aspect of relations with the Yemen and Egypt.

I think we should make a renewed effort at the United Nations to get the heat taken out of the international aspects of the problem. Whether we like it or not we have to face the fact that escalation of the Aden–Yemen trouble always redounds to Nasser’s advantage and not to ours, since it always rallies to him popular support, not least in Aden itself. At the United Nations we might make a final effort to see if we can make the disengagement plan succeed. Failing that our objective should be to get the United Nations interest fixed on the Aden–Yemen border. It would be best if we could get it demarcated and/or demilitarised but at the very least we should aim to have observers stationed there. I do not see why we should necessarily jib at having observers on our side of the border only. If we paid for them ourselves we should be able to control them.

In addition, I think we should now take a new diplomatic initiative in the Arab world. Our purpose would be to get our objectives across. We should stress that we have no quarrel with the Yemen and Egypt but that we do have treaty commitments with the Federation of Saudi Arabia which we intend to honour. The present brawl between Aden and the Yemen does no-one any good and we should seek Arab support at the United Nations for the initiative we are taking.

In Aden, we really have to make a serious effort to make our presence there worthwhile to the local inhabitants. Clearly we have not yet succeeded in doing so. But there is obviously no secure future for our base there unless we have at least the acquiescence of the local population. I should like to see a well thought out plan for the political advance and economic development of Aden which would give us a reasonable chance of keeping, for some time yet, the military facilities we need. I realise that for such a plan to succeed we would need the right man to put it into effect and that this may call for a change in Aden. . . .
Thank you for your Top Secret and Personal letter of 24th April.

I hope that we shall now be spared any demand for immediate independence on the part of the Federation. But I fear that there is no certainty that this will be the case since the rulers are in a touchy mood and it does not need much to upset them. In particular if things go badly and they feel that we are pulling our punches, they are quite likely to revert to a cry for immediate independence.

2. Should they do so the Adenese would obviously counter with a demand for the democratisation of the Federation; which would inevitably be refused. We would then almost certainly have to face up to a demand for secession on the part of Aden in the event of our conceding independence.

3. The Federation would, I think, argue that if we were to pull Aden out we would be breaking the Treaty. The Adenese would argue that the Treaty envisaged a dependent Federation and that independence would automatically invalidate it.

4. It would, I think, be impossible, even if desirable, to justify independence for the whole Federation including Aden in the face of Adenese opposition. On the other hand secession would certainly sour the Rulers to a dangerous degree. Consequently, I think what we should aim at, should the eventuality arise, is for Aden to remain attached to the Federation as at present.

Minutes on 215

I have seen Sir John Martin’s minute and Mr. Formoy’s paper of which you have copies.

2. My own conclusion is much the same as Sir John’s, namely that it would be better to give Aden Ministers the fullest possible degree of internal self-government, short of independence, without surrendering sovereignty. But I should like to analyse the reasons which have led me to this view.

3. If I may say so, I think there is often a lot of loose thinking about the phrase “surrender of sovereignty.” To whom is it proposed to make this surrender? In other words, what do we propose to put in its place? We can ignore the transfer of sovereignty to another Colonial power—that is not in contemplation. Even apart from that however, there are I suggest three possibilities:

(i) Full sovereign independence; this again is not in contemplation.
(ii) The status of a “protected state” in which jurisdiction as well as sovereignty would lie with the local government. This would put Aden State on the same footing as the other Arab states in the South Arabian Federation and is presumably what is proposed.
(iii) Status of a Protectorate comparable to some of the African territories, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, Swaziland or Uganda in earlier days. In these

---

countries although we did not have sovereignty we did exercise jurisdiction and were responsible for the affairs of the territory.

4. I do not, however, believe that there is really any incompatibility, so far as constitutional progress is concerned, between protected state status and internal self-government with British sovereignty retained. Does anyone propose that Aden State within the Federation should be more self-governing than say Malta or British Guiana in both of which British sovereignty still resides? In other words, so far as the objective is to transfer to the Federation responsibility for keeping order in Aden, it seems to me that this can be achieved just as well without the surrender of sovereignty as it could be by turning Aden into a protected state. But the necessary steps could be done by Order in Council whereas the surrender of sovereignty would require an Act of Parliament.

5. I am myself sceptical about the argument that the Federal Government would be able to act with greater severity than we could use ourselves. If it is thought that they would act with greater severity than we could defend to Parliament, then we ought not to transfer the responsibility to them anyhow whether by making Aden a protected state or by giving self-government as part of a Federation. I am also sceptical as to whether we can really continue to rely upon the Federal Government in such circumstances to continue to allow us full use of the base. The arguments in (iv) and (v) of Mr. Formoy’s note have considerable force.

A.H.P.
15.6.64

The real problem is, I think (as Sir J. Martin has minuted) that the Federal ministers demand this, and Mr Baharoon may also demand it. The S of S has authority from his colleagues to concede it.

I doubt if the future of the base is really in jeopardy either way. Owing to the economic advantages it brings, no-one is asking us to leave it, because the whole prosperity of Aden depends on our staying there. (Presumably Nasser would not spend anything like the £11m p.a. spent by our forces & their families there).

I do not feel very strongly about this either way. You will remember that we had decided to concede it last December, but in the aftermath of the bomb incident D.O.P.C. wd not agree. Now, I understand, they have agreed. I would like advice on the public service & the problem of a full compensation scheme. I am inclined to think that this will become necessary if we give any further constitutional advance.

If you & the Dept feel strongly, I think we shd have an early talk with the S of S before he commits himself.4

N.F.
15.6.64

---

1 See note 1 to document no 210.
2 At Aden airport on 10 Dec 1963, targetting federal ministers and the high commissioner, Sir K Trevaskis, as they were leaving for talks in London. The high commissioner was slightly injured in the hand, but two other people were killed and 51 injured. The incident precipitated the declaration of a state of emergency. Lady Trevaskis suffered prolonged neurological problems as a result, and this was one reason why Trevaskis was recalled by the Labour government (CO 967/433, Sir H Poynton to Sir H Caccia, 10 Dec 1964).
3 Sir J Martin pointed out that full internal self-government was favoured by Trevaskis; ‘prosperity’ did not mean evacuation of the base might not be demanded, because ‘sometimes Arabs’ emotions drive them to ignore self-interest’; there was ambiguity in the attitude of the DOPC: ‘S of S still thinks D.O.P.C. minutes are incorrect!’
Mr Fisher
I have discussed with Sir John Martin and Mr. Monson the points raised in your
minute of the 15th June about the surrender of sovereignty in Aden State and the
necessity for drawing up a full compensation scheme for the public service.

2. To take the latter point first, we agree with your view that a full compensation
scheme will become necessary if we give any further constitutional advance. The test
has always been the giving up of the Secretary of State’s ultimate power of protection
of the Civil Service and even in territories which are technically colonies (i.e. British
sovereignty) a compensation scheme has always been agreed to at the moment when
the public service commission becomes an executive body. In a sense therefore this
question of a compensation scheme for the public service is irrelevant to the
question of retaining sovereignty in Aden State. I submit for your approval for
circulation to the British Delegation at the Conference a draft brief on the public
Service which develops these matters in greater detail.

3. On the question of surrender of sovereignty as such, we still feel that this
should be avoided if possible mainly because it is irrevocable and the reason for
staying in Aden is to be able to use the base and our use of the base depends on our
being able to ensure internal security in and around the base area. Because we are
sovereign in Aden we have already been able to take by Order in Council powers by
which the High Commissioner can step in over the Federal Government to preserve
law and order in Aden in the interest of our defence responsibilities. We cannot
guarantee that even the Federal Government will always see eye to eye with us on the
needs of such measures. If we gave up sovereignty we should lose this position and
should have to depend on our right to give mandatory Advice to the Federal
Government. We have no means of taking quick action in an emergency if they are
not disposed to take our advice (the only sanction is the withholding of money which
is slow to bite).

4. In the circumstances, I think we ought to have an early talk with the Secretary
of State.

A.H.P.
19.6.64

Yes. I agree. We tried to introduce this matter at a recent mtg with the S of S but he
was non-committal & the talk was indecisive. Will you now arrange a further mtg
with him?

N.F.
22.6.64

216  CAB 128/31/1, CC 25(57)4  28 Mar 1957
‘Cyprus’: Cabinet conclusions on revised draft parliamentary
statement

The Cabinet had before them a revised draft of a Parliamentary statement on Cyprus.
The Prime Minister said that as compared with earlier versions this draft had the
advantage that, by omitting any detailed statement of the extent to which we
contemplated relaxing the existing measures, it avoided any impression that the
Government were prepared to bargain with Archbishop Makarios1 about the terms of his release. It should, therefore, be more acceptable to the Turkish Government. The statement could, however, be strengthened still further by omitting the reference to the wording of the Archbishop's appeal and the indication that the Government were prepared to take a liberal view of it, and substituting a simple statement that in present circumstances it was no longer necessary to continue the Archbishop's detention. It would be mistaken to pretend that the Archbishop had responded adequately to the original offer, and it would be wiser to base our action on a plain statement that we had decided, as an act of policy, to disembarrass ourselves of an individual whose continued detention no longer served any useful purpose. It was arguable that, whatever the ultimate objective of our policy as regards Cyprus, the release of the Archbishop would assist us in realising it. If we could envisage no more than a continuance of the deadlock which had been reached hitherto, the resumption of the constitutional discussions which we must shortly contemplate would probably contribute to this end, since we were bound to accept the Archbishop as one party to those discussions, and he was likely to insist on the condition, which we should be unable to accept, that Cyprus should be granted the right of self-determination within a limited period. If, on the other hand, our ultimate objective was a partition of the Island, we might succeed in securing agreement on this course more easily after the Archbishop was released, or, alternatively, the Greek Government would find the approaching prospect of partition so distasteful that they would reluctantly accept Lord Radcliffe's2 constitutional proposals without seeking to attach any condition that Cyprus should enjoy the right of self-determination within a definite period. In neither event, therefore, should the release of the Archbishop be an obstacle to further advance; and, provided that we succeeded in making progress towards our objective, it would be less important that this progress would inevitably appear to be, to some extent, a series of concessions to the Archbishop.

The Lord President3 said that he remained convinced that the release of the Archbishop would be a profound mistake. His appeal for the cessation of EOKA4 violence had been made conditional on our own willingness to bring the state of emergency in Cyprus to an end; and if we attempted to ignore that condition he would be free to withdraw his appeal at any time. He would therefore be free to exploit this situation to extract further concessions from us until he had completely regained the initiative. In particular, he would seek to insist that he should be allowed to return to Cyprus on the ground that he could not otherwise take part in further constitutional discussions and that, in his absence, no other individuals were entitled to represent the Greek community in the Island. Moreover, his release would be liable to alienate the Turkish Government and would be universally interpreted as a sign of weakness, which would react against us in the negotiations on other difficult international issues which we must shortly face. He could not, therefore,

---

2 C J Radcliffe, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary since 1949, constitutional commissioner, Cyprus, 1956; his proposals envisaged a very wide measure of self-government.
3 Lord Salisbury.
4 EOKA = Greek initials of National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters.
endorse a statement which, in his view, would be a prelude to a process of gradual retreat in the face of the pressure which the Archbishop would mobilise as soon as he was again at liberty.

In discussion it was suggested that, despite the embarrassment which would result from the release of the Archbishop, the balance of advantage lay in restoring his freedom. He had come some part of the way to satisfy our conditions, and EOKA terrorism had now been brought under control. It was the considered view of the Governor of Cyprus that, if in these circumstances the Archbishop was not released, sentiment in Cyprus would consolidate behind EOKA once again and terrorism would revive. We should then have lost an opportunity, which might not recur, of securing a permanent relaxation of tension in the Island. Moreover, we should have adopted an attitude which we might find it impossible to sustain. We were committed to a resumption of constitutional discussions, from which no useful result could follow unless the Archbishop was present. We were committed also to co-operate in the conciliation procedure in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and this procedure would be liable to be similarly frustrated by a refusal on our part to contribute, by a gesture of generosity, to bringing terrorism in Cyprus to an end. If we released the Archbishop on terms which would preclude his return to Cyprus and would not commit us to define the scope of the relaxation of security measures which might prove to be possible, we should be regarded by public opinion as acting from strength rather than weakness. If, on the other hand, we continued to detain the Archbishop indefinitely, it was impossible to foresee when, and on what conditions, we should be able to resolve the present deadlock. The strategic importance of Cyprus would progressively decline over the next decade and, apart from the importance of maintaining our control over a sufficiently large portion of the Island to enable us to operate an effective air base, we were unlikely to continue to need its facilities on a scale which would justify the indefinite continuance of repressive measures which were becoming increasingly repugnant to public opinion.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the arguments were evenly balanced. There were clear risks in releasing Archbishop Makarios. In particular, he would be bound to try to organise international support for his return to Cyprus—where, even if he did not instigate a revival of terrorism, his presence would be a considerable embarrassment. On the other hand, it might still be a considerable time before the forces of terrorism in Cyprus were completely eliminated; and public opinion, which might be disposed to accept the Archbishop’s appeal as broadly satisfactory, would be liable to be critical of the Government if they sacrificed an opportunity of breaking the present deadlock. It appeared to be the general view of the Cabinet that, in these circumstances, the wiser course would be to release the Archbishop without suggesting that we were in any way satisfied with his conditional response to our offer. At the same time, the Turkish Government should be informed that, while we now regarded the Archbishop as a greater liability in detention than at large, our objective remained, as before, either the partition of the Island or the implementation of Lord Radcliffe’s constitutional proposals on the basis on which we had originally put them forward and without any commitment about the ultimate grant of self-determination. Further constitutional discussions would contribute to the realisation of either of these objectives. But while, in releasing the Archbishop, we envisaged that he would need to be a party to these discussions, we should regard him as the representative of only one section of
opinion in Cyprus and should not be prepared to recognise him as in any sense the accredited spokesman of Cyprus or entitled to negotiate with Her Majesty's Government about the future of the Island as a whole.

**The Lord President** said that he was still convinced that the release of Archbishop Makarios in these circumstances would be an error of judgment. If this course of action were adopted, he would be unable to support it, and he would therefore need to consider whether he could remain a member of the Government.

The Cabinet:—

1. Agreed that Archbishop Makarios should be released from detention in the Seychelles.
2. Authorised the Colonial Secretary to make, in the House of Commons that afternoon, a statement on the lines of the draft which they had before them, as amended in their discussion.
3. Invited the Foreign Secretary to instruct H.M. Ambassador at Ankara to inform the Turkish Government of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, on the lines approved in their discussion.

---

217  CAB 134/1555, CPC 9(57)  29 May 1957

'Cyprus: future policy': minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (57) 15) covering a report by the Government of Cyprus on methods, costs and consequences of a partition of the island, together with a memorandum by the Minister of Defence (C.P.C. (57) 16) about the minimum military facilities which we should require to retain in a partitioned Cyprus.

The Committee also had before them Athens telegram No. 385, containing the text of a letter to the Prime Minister from Archbishop Makarios. In this letter, the Archbishop referred to the need to create an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression in accordance with the resolution of 26th February, 1957 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, called for the termination of all emergency measures in Cyprus, and declared his readiness to take part, on behalf of the people of Cyprus, in bilateral talks on the basis of the application of self-determination.

The Committee discussed first the general lines upon which future policy for Cyprus should be based.

**The Colonial Secretary** said that there were some signs that Archbishop Makarios was in a position of increasing embarrassment and was at a loss how to recover the initiative. For the time being, therefore, Her Majesty's Government could rest on their previous statements of policy, though we should continue to express our readiness to consider comments on Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals and to co-operate in the N.A.T.O. conciliation procedure. Partition might be useful as a threat; but it seemed doubtful whether it would be a practical proposition, unless we were ready to retain large forces in the island to enforce it, while if we withdrew to one or two military enclaves, as was proposed in C.P.C. (57) 16, their security, communications and supplies would be liable to be threatened by a hostile population.
The Foreign Secretary said that Archbishop Makarios was due to make a public statement on 30th May, in which he was likely to renew his demand for an unequivocal statement by Her Majesty's Government on self-determination, to offer to participate in a transitional scheme of self-government for Cyprus under international trusteeship as a prelude to full self-determination, and to call for action by the United Nations in the autumn. At the same time the terrorist leader in Cyprus was expected to issue a fresh proclamation, warning us that violence would be renewed if no action had been taken by Her Majesty’s Government before the matter came before the United Nations in September. In the light of declarations of this kind it would be difficult for us to make no further move in the coming months. But in considering what form such a move might take we must be satisfied whether partition was a course which we should be ready, in the last resort to adopt. It would be dangerous to employ the threat of partition if it had no reality behind it. Early self-determination leading to partition might in fact prove to be the only real alternative to the introduction of the Radcliffe constitution, since independence for Cyprus under international guarantee would almost certainly not be acceptable, particularly to Turkish opinion, while the indefinite maintenance of the present situation was likely to prove beyond our resources. But the prospect of a gradual concentration of Greek and Turkish Cypriots on either side of a partition line during a period of some ten years, as proposed in the report by the Government of Cyprus (C.P.C.(57) 15), was a very unattractive one if it involved continuing supervision and responsibility on our part. It would be more realistic to envisage a plebiscite, (in which the Turkish and Greek Cypriots would vote on separate electoral rolls) offering the choice between partition and a unitary constitution on the Radcliffe lines. If the voting favoured partition, we should then have to announce the partition line and the date for our withdrawal to our military enclaves, and invite the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to remove to their respective areas. It could then be left to the Greek and Turkish Governments to accept responsibility for the completion of the process of partition and resettlement.

The Minister of Defence said that we could not maintain the present establishment of troops in Cyprus indefinitely. We should not contemplate any plan for partition which left us with responsibility for the whole of the island, since this would perpetuate the strain upon our military resources while impairing the value of Cyprus to us as a single unit. If partition came about, we should retain merely the enclaves which we required for military purposes. The Akrotiri–Episcopi area would be suitable from this point of view, since it contained virtually no local population. We might, however, also require to retain the tip of Cape Greco and perhaps an area round the Cantonment at Dhekelia. There was no reason to foresee great difficulty in maintaining our hold on these bases, provided that suitable port and communication facilities were guaranteed to us by treaty.

The Prime Minister said that we must seek so to frame the next stages of our policy that, if we were ultimately compelled to enforce partition, it would be wholly clear that all other possible solutions had been exhausted. It was for consideration, therefore, whether we should now appeal to the Cypriots, to the Greek and Turkish

---

1 Mr Selwyn Lloyd. 2 G T Grivas, known as ‘Dighenis’. 3 Mr D Sandys.
Governments, to N.A.T.O. and to world opinion in general to accept the Radcliffe constitution, subject to any detailed discussion which might be desirable, and to agree to postpone, for a period of, say, ten years further consideration of the issue of self-determination. We should add that if this proposal was not acceptable we should partition Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, withdrawing ourselves to specified military enclaves which would remain under our sovereignty. This course would have the merit of bringing the issue to a head, and would strengthen our position in the United Nations. Agreement on these lines was not, however, very likely. The Turkish Government, in particular, would seek to hold us to our policy statement of 19th December, 1956, with its reference to partition as an ultimate possibility; and we might, therefore, only precipitate partition. Alternatively, therefore, we might announce our intention to implement the Radcliffe constitution towards the end of this year, and offer to hold ourselves available, for a definite period in advance, to receive any comments upon its provisions which any Cypriot individual or representative might care to make, in person or in writing. We should be prepared to carry this course through to the point of holding elections. If, however, these elections failed to provide the basis of a satisfactory administration of Cyprus, or if it appeared, at an even earlier stage, that the introduction of the constitution itself would not be feasible, we should fall back on partition. The advantages of this course were that we should be seen to have done our utmost to maintain unitary self-government in Cyprus, and that it was still not impossible that, when the time came, the Greek Cypriots would in fact co-operate. On the other hand, our prestige might suffer if Archbishop Makarios secured a boycott by the Greek population of our arrangements; and such a plan would necessarily be more protracted and less dramatic in its effect than the first. Further consideration should therefore be given to these alternatives and to their presentation. Under either of them we should also consider the possibility of taking early steps to redeploy our military installations in the proposed enclaves.

In the light of these considerations, the Committee approved the terms of the reply to be sent to Archbishop Makarios. This rebutted the accusation that Her Majesty's Government had made no conciliatory moves to match the suspension of terrorist activity in the island; emphasised that, in the light of the Archbishop's actions since his release from detention, the Government could not regard his offer as a genuine contribution towards a settlement; and, while rejecting his proposal that the future of Cyprus should be settled by bilateral discussions between himself and Her Majesty's Government, offered to consider any views which might be put forward by communities or individuals in Cyprus, including the Archbishop, on the Radcliffe constitution. It was agreed that publication of this reply should be synchronised with that of the Archbishop's letter. Its terms which excluded any suggestion of bargaining with the Archbishop, should be satisfactory to the Turkish Government, and when the Foreign Secretary, who would shortly be leaving for the meeting of the Council of the Bagdad Pact, met the Turkish Prime Minister, he should emphasise that it was still our desire to implement the Radcliffe constitution for Cyprus. . . .

The Committee had before them memoranda by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.(57) 19) and the Foreign Secretary (C.P.C. (57) 21) about future policy towards Cyprus.

In discussion there was general agreement that the Government must now take some fresh initiative in this matter in advance of the autumn meeting of the United Nations. The initiative most acceptable to the Turkish Government would consist of an invitation by ourselves to a tripartite conference between the United Kingdom, Greek and Turkish Governments; and there might be some advantage in our offering, as an initial step, to convene a conference of this kind. On the assumption, however, that it would probably break down, we should be prepared subsequently to move towards the implementation of the Radcliffe constitution, after further discussion of its details with the Cypriot leaders. It was for consideration, however, whether, as the Colonial Secretary proposed, the enactment of the constitution should be carried to the point at which elections would be arranged, or whether, as the Foreign Secretary preferred, we should abandon the attempt to institute the constitution as soon as it became clear that we could expect no co-operation from the local communities in its implementation. It was agreed that the decision on this question must depend largely on the practicability of an early partition of the island, since this would then constitute the only remaining solution to the problem. It could be argued that, if we made it sufficiently clear that, failing co-operation from the Cypriots, we intended to partition the island, the inhabitants might be induced to collaborate in bringing the constitution into effect. On the other hand, if the Turkish Government believed that we were prepared to contemplate partition in the near future, they would be the less willing to co-operate in the introduction of the Radcliffe constitution, for which they now felt little enthusiasm. In any event partition would be a difficult and unpleasant operation; before committing ourselves to any course of action of which partition might be the logical conclusion we should be sure that we were prepared to face the political and strategic implications of this course, including the risk of some degree of Russian penetration in the Greek Zone.

It was suggested that a partition of the island, which would be interpreted as a unique surrender by the United Kingdom of a Colonial possession, would have unfortunate political repercussions both in this country and throughout the Middle East. It was for consideration, therefore, whether, as an intermediate stage, a federal system of government could be introduced, in order that, in the interval during which this system survived we could redeploy our forces more systematically for the eventual solution of partition. On the other hand, the United Kingdom would then remain responsible for the internal security of the island, and we should not be able to look for any early release from the odium and expense which we carried at present. Moreover, there was no reason to suppose that the Bagdad Pact Powers would react adversely to a partition of Cyprus, provided that we retained adequate defence facilities. The alternative plan for an independent Cyprus, internationally guaranteed, which the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had propounded, would be wholly unacceptable to the Turkish Government, and would expose Cyprus to the risk of Russian infiltration.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the Committee would be assisted if they had before them a memorandum defining, with a precise indication of the timing involved, a programme of action on the following lines—

(a) We should initially offer to arrange a tripartite inter-governmental conference on the Cyprus problem.

(b) If and when this conference broke down, we should announce that we intended to introduce the Radcliffe constitution and were prepared to receive representations from the Cypriot leaders about its detailed implementation. We should appeal to all parties to accept a postponement of the issue of self-determination.

(c) We should make preparations to put the constitution into effect up to the point at which elections could be held if the co-operation of the Cypriot communities was forthcoming.

(d) If these preparations were frustrated—e.g., by a refusal of the local population to co-operate in the registration preliminary to the elections—we should hold a plebiscite which would offer a choice between the maintenance of British rule and a partition of the island (apart from our own enclaves) between Greece and Turkey.

(e) We should continue to study the detailed military preparations which would be necessary for the redeployment of our forces in the enclaves which we envisaged if partition was put into effect. This study should establish whether these enclaves would be adequate to our needs; whether they could be held in circumstances in which, even if the Turkish population were friendly, the Greek Cypriots must be assumed to be hostile; and by what date it would be administratively feasible to complete the withdrawal of our troops to these areas.

In the light of a study of this kind it would be possible to establish a time-table of action which should satisfy both our political and our military requirements. . . .

219 CAB 129/88, C(57)161 9 July 1957

[Cyprus: a fresh initiative]: Cabinet memorandum by Mr Macmillan

We must take a fresh initiative to break the present deadlock.

Cyprus is, as we know, not a Colonial problem but an international problem. No solution will be acceptable which does not satisfy the interests of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. Our interest is to secure our essential military needs and to reduce our Colonial commitment. Turkey, though she favours partition, is mainly concerned to ensure that the island shall never pass wholly under the control of Greece. Greece will continue to demand Enosis but must be convinced that it cannot be attained.

2. After discussion with those of my colleagues who are most directly concerned and after consultation with the Governor of Cyprus I recommend that we should now put forward new proposals on the following lines:—

1 Union with Greece.
(a) Our essential military needs in Cyprus are to secure the continued use of an operational air base, primarily for the support of the Baghdad Pact, and of certain wireless facilities for intelligence and propaganda purposes which cannot be provided elsewhere. These needs can be met if we insist on retaining exclusive British sovereignty over relatively small enclaves at Akrotiri-Episcopi, Dhekelia-Pergamos, Cap Greco and a few small establishments elsewhere which are required for wireless services. These areas would be small in extent and there would be few Cypriots resident within them.

(b) We should offer to surrender the rest of the Island to a condominium of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. The sovereignty would be vested in the three countries jointly. The indigenous population would acquire Greek and Turkish as well as British nationality.

(c) The whole of the Island outside the British enclaves would be placed under the government of a Governor to be nominated by the three sovereign Powers or, in default of agreement between them, to be appointed by the Powers (other than the three sovereign Powers) which are for the time being members of the North Atlantic Alliance. The Governor should not himself be a national of any of the three sovereign Powers. The Governor, once appointed, would be responsible to the three sovereign Powers (see below). His appointment could be terminated by the agreement of the three Powers or, in default of such agreement and on appeal from two of them, by the other North Atlantic Powers.

(d) The three sovereign Powers would appoint resident representatives to watch their interests in Cyprus. Their status and precise functions require further consideration. Their duties would probably range from consular work to the duty of advising the Governor on “reserved” subjects.

(e) Outside the British enclaves there would be a system of responsible self-government on the general lines of the constitution proposed in Lord Radcliffe’s report. This constitution would need to be adapted to accord with the concept of a triple sovereignty and Lord Radcliffe might himself be asked to advise what detailed changes would be required. If the general concept were accepted, the three Governments should offer to discuss these adaptations with representatives of all interests in the Island. Meanwhile, the essential features would seem to be as follows:

(i) As regards internal affairs (other than internal security) the Governor would act on the advice of Ministers responsible to an elected Chamber except where the constitution expressly provided otherwise.

(ii) The “reserved” subjects would comprise defence, external relations and internal security.

(iii) The constitutional responsibility for the external defence of the Island must rest with the three sovereign Powers. As, however, those Powers are all members of the North Atlantic Alliance it would be reasonable that they should look to the Council of the Alliance to interest themselves in its defence.

(iv) The external relations of the Island, so far as they raise any practical problem, would be conducted by the three sovereign Powers.

(v) On matters of internal security the Governor would have the assistance of an advisory body comprising the resident representatives of the three sovereign Powers and appropriate elected Ministers. He would be able to call on a force comprising British, Turkish and Greek contingents, in equal numbers,
who would be available to support the civil power in maintaining law and
order.

(f) These arrangements should not be subject to any limit of duration. They
should be designed to remain in force indefinitely—though provision would need
to be made for their amendment or termination by agreement between the three
sovereign Powers.

3. It will not be easy to secure agreement to a solution on these lines. But what
are the alternatives? To carry on as we are, in the hope that disorder will be
suppressed and the agitation for Enosis will die away? This would commit to Cyprus
a disproportionate amount of our military strength; it would offer no early prospect
of an easement of the internal political situation in the Island; and it would be
unlikely to produce any solution within the lifetime of this Parliament. The other
alternative is partition. This would be a confession of failure. Moreover, it would
involve a grave risk of open conflict between Greece and Turkey. And in the Island
itself it would mean great hardship, suffering and disorder—with widespread
bloodshed. I do not think we should ourselves accept the responsibility for this. If
partition were the only course open, I would wish that it should be undertaken by
some international agency.

The plan which I have outlined could be presented as a just and fair solution which
would avoid those evil consequences. If it were rejected we should be entitled to ask
either that the United Nations itself should assume responsibility for partition, or
that we should be allowed to continue to administer the Island under our own
sovereignty and be supported in so doing.

4. This plan could not succeed without the maximum of international co-
operation and good will; and all the influences making for this must be mobilised in
its support. We must rely especially on the United States Government and the North
Atlantic Council. At the outset, therefore, we must persuade President Eisenhower
and M. Spaak2 that an initiative on these lines, which calls for some sacrifice of
national interest by all the parties concerned, offers the best hope for the future
peace and stability of the Island and get their assurance that they will vigorously
commend it and, in particular, bring all possible pressure on the Greek Government
to accept it. We must recognise that Greek acceptance can be secured only by
American pressure. Simultaneously we should do our utmost to convince the
Turkish Government that this is a reasonable plan and that they have nothing to
gain—and possibly something to lose—by rejecting it in the hope that by their
obduracy they may achieve partition.

5. If we decide to adopt this plan we should do so, not as a mere tactical move,
but because we believe it to offer a sound and practical solution and are resolved to
do all in our power to make it work. We should make this plain to all concerned. We
must also move quickly. We should aim to complete our diplomatic soundings in
time to enable us to launch the plan publicly, with the maximum assurance of
international support, well before the next meeting of the General Assembly of the
United Nations.

2 P H Spaak, Belgian minister who became secretary-general of NATO, 1957–1961; one of the founding
fathers of the EEC.
220 CAB 128/31/2, CC 51(57)6 11 July 1957

[New approach to the problem of Cyprus]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Prime Minister (C. (57) 161) outlining a suggested new approach to the problem of Cyprus.1

The Prime Minister said that this memorandum was the result of consultations which he had held with the Governor of Cyprus2 and the Ministers mainly concerned during the past few days. Three possible courses of action were now open to us. First, we could continue to govern the Island ourselves on the basis that we had recently had some military success in the repression of terrorism and had also secured a political advantage by the release of Archbishop Makarios, who was proving3 an increasing embarrassment to the Greek Government. Secondly, we could proceed to partition—which would be an admission that our policy had failed and would be liable to provoke a new outbreak of communal conflict which it might prove impossible to localise. Thirdly, we could adopt the course outlined in C. (57) 161, whereby we would retain under our own sovereignty certain enclaves which were strategically essential to us but would surrender the rest of the Island to a condominium of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, who would jointly share the sovereignty between them. The whole of the Island outside the British enclaves would then be placed under the government of a Governor, to be nominated by the three sovereign Powers or, in default of agreement between them, to be appointed by the Powers (other than the three sovereign Powers) which were for the time being members of the North Atlantic Alliance. Outside the British enclaves a system of responsible self-government would be introduced on the general lines of the constitution proposed in Lord Radcliffe’s report; and, as regards internal affairs (other than internal security), the Governor would act on the advice of Ministers responsible to an elected Chamber, except where the constitution expressly provided otherwise. Defence, external relations and internal security would be “reserved” subjects. As regards defence, it would be reasonable that the three sovereign Powers, being members of the North Atlantic Alliance, should look to the Council of the Alliance to protect the Island. The three Powers would themselves conduct its external relations. On matters of internal security the Governor should be able to call on a force comprising British, Turkish and Greek contingents, in equal numbers, which would be available to support the civil power in maintaining law and order.

The Chiefs of Staff had informed the Defence Committee that from the strategic point of view they would prefer that British sovereignty should continue to be maintained over the whole Island. But they recognised the political difficulties of this course and the increasing burden which it was liable to impose on the resources of the United Kingdom. They were therefore prepared to accept the new proposals, subject to a more detailed examination of the exact boundaries of the proposed enclaves. It was now necessary to consider whether these proposals were likely to win support in the United Kingdom and abroad and, if so, at what point they should be made publicly known.

1 See previous document.
3 While resident in Athens.
In discussion there was general agreement that an attempt to maintain exclusive British sovereignty over the whole Island was likely to involve political and economic consequences which could not be tolerated indefinitely. An act of partition by ourselves must also be rejected, as unacceptable to public opinion in this country and damaging to our international reputation. In principle, therefore, an arrangement on the lines proposed in C. (57) 161 had much to commend it. Nevertheless, it would need further consideration from the following points of view:—

(a) It was uncertain whether these proposals would win even initial acceptance from the Greek and Turkish Governments. It would be necessary to bring all possible pressure to bear upon them for this purpose; and the declared support of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) would be essential to the success of the scheme. The Greek Government would be most susceptible to the influence of the United States, and we should seek to secure that the United States Government would use their maximum influence to ensure Greek co-operation in the new policy. Nevertheless, even though the United States appeared now to have abandoned their earlier support for the Cypriot claim to be unified with Greece, they remained favourable in principle to the concept of self-determination, and they might not be prepared to endorse whole-heartedly proposals which did not envisage self-determination of the Island within the foreseeable future. The Turkish Government would be most likely to be influenced by the consideration that, if they rejected the present proposal and were also given no reason to believe that the United Kingdom Government would proceed to partition, a subsequent Government in the United Kingdom might yield to the pressure of Archbishop Makarios for the unification of Cyprus with Greece. This possibility should be brought clearly to their attention. Nevertheless, it could not be assumed that our proposals would win acceptance from the Governments of Greece and Turkey; and it was essential that, before we gave any publicity to them, we should have defined the policy which we should adopt if they were rejected. It was open to question whether, in that event, we should resume the government of the Island ourselves or should propose that the United Nations Organisation should assume responsibility for its partition. Partition, however effected, would be bound to result in bitterness and bloodshed; but it was no less certain that we could not carry indefinitely the burden of sole responsibility for the administration of the Island.

(b) Alternatively, it was possible that the Greek and Turkish Governments would at the outset offer to co-operate, however reluctantly, in the working of an arrangement of the kind described in C. (57) 161, but that this arrangement would subsequently collapse in the face of a renewed outbreak of terrorism. In that event, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the United Kingdom to resume exclusive sovereignty over the whole of Cyprus. It could admittedly be argued that, if the Greek and Turkish Governments initially accepted our proposals, they would realise that it was in their joint interest that those proposals should prove effective in restoring peace and stability in the Island. They might be further restrained from conniving at any renewal of communal strife by the risk that their own nationals in other areas of mixed Greek and Turkish population outside Cyprus would suffer retaliation. Nevertheless we could not ignore the risk that communal strife might break out afresh in Cyprus after the system of tripartite sovereignty had been brought into effect; and it was therefore desirable that, if
a scheme on the lines proposed in C. (57) 161 was to be launched, it should pro-
vide some safeguard against this risk in the form of alternative arrangements
which would be even more unpalatable to the Greek Government than the scheme
itself.

(c) It might also be desirable that the scheme should enable the Governor, in an
emergency, to suspend the constitution. If so, however, it would be necessary to
decide whether, in that event he would be entitled to rely on British troops in the
enclaves as well as on the British component in the joint force to be created to
maintain internal security.

(d) The proposals might in any event place the Governor in a position of
considerable difficulty if, in a situation falling short of a major emergency, the
representatives of the three sovereign Powers who would be appointed to advise him
were unable to agree on the policy to be followed. This difficulty, which was implicit
in any system of tripartite sovereignty, might be overcome if British administration
of the whole Island could be maintained under a mandate from NATO. An
arrangement of this kind would have the further advantage that it would strengthen
our hold on the airfield at Nicosia and on the communications between the vital
strategic points in the Island and Famagusta which would be their main source of
sea-borne supplies. On the other hand, a mandate would not be consistent with the
maintenance of British sovereignty; and the complete surrender of British
sovereignty over Cyprus would be unwelcome to the Government's supporters.
Moreover, a mandatory system of this kind would too closely resemble a mere
continuance of the existing situation to be likely to command the acceptance of the
Greek and Turkish Governments. It was clear, however, that the powers of the
Governor as envisaged by the Radcliffe constitution would need to be reconsidered if
a solution based on tripartite sovereignty was adopted. Lord Radcliffe had undertaken
to examine this question.

Discussion then turned to the timing of publication of these proposals, if they
were eventually approved. The choice lay between, on the one hand, publishing
them in advance of the forthcoming debate on Cyprus in the United Nations and,
on the other hand, holding them in reserve, to be launched during or after the
United Nations debate, and limiting our action in the immediate future to proceed-
ning with one of the other plans which had been discussed at an earlier stage, e.g., a
tripartite discussion between the three Governments or an invitation to the Cypriot
communities to offer their suggestions for amendment of the Radcliffe constitu-
tion.

It was suggested that, since the Greek Government had recently indicated their
support for the plan of independence for Cyprus which had been put forward by the
Secretary-General of NATO, there might be some advantage in our holding our new
proposals in reserve. Moreover, the surrender of Cyprus to a condominium would be
liable to be criticised by the Government's own supporters unless they were given an
opportunity to reflect further on the arguments against any attempt to maintain
indefinitely exclusive British sovereignty over the Island.

The Prime Minister said that the Cabinet would need to give further consideration
to the important issues involved in the new proposals outlined in C. (57) 161.

The Cabinet:—
Agreed to resume their discussion at a subsequent meeting.
221  CAB 129/90, C (57)258  4 Nov 1957

[Allegations of breaches of European Human Rights Convention by government in Cyprus]: joint Cabinet memorandum by Mr Selwyn Lloyd (FO) and Lord Perth (CO)

The Sub-Commission of the European Commission on Human Rights, referred to in C.P. (56) 152, have been considering the Greek allegations that in certain respects our actions in Cyprus are in breach of the European Human Rights Convention and decided on 6th September that before they could conclude their report they wished to carry out investigations in Cyprus. The matters to be investigated are:

(a) the existence and extent of a public danger threatening the life of the Nation. (The existence of such a public danger is required under article 15 of the Convention in order to justify the detention of persons without trial. The extent of the public danger is relevant since the Sub-Commission are entitled to decide that it exists but that some of the Emergency measures are extreme and unnecessary);
(b) the circumstances in which the curfew regulations are applied.

The Sub-Commission have indicated by way of clarification that they desire to hear evidence not only from the Government but also from the representatives of the communities in Cyprus.

2. The report will be sent to the Commission on Human Rights, which will in turn report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, who have power under the Convention to make binding recommendations by a two-thirds majority. We are advised that the Sub-Commission are within their rights in deciding to visit Cyprus, and that there would be no advantage in seeking to prevent or even to defer the visit on purely legal grounds. Despite such arguments as we might deploy, it is virtually certain that the Sub-Commission will stand by their decision—and they have indicated as much in writing—and that an attempt on our part to change their mind would be resented and might tell against us when the report was being prepared. It is true that since the Sub-Commission made their decision there has been a renewal of terrorist activity, though not on a large scale. Further, a surrendered terrorist has revealed documents exposing EOKA's plans and preparedness for renewed violence. Nevertheless we are advised that to proffer this new proof of public danger would be most unlikely to deflect the Sub-Commission from their decision.

3. We have to decide whether we are going to allow the investigating Committee into Cyprus or not.

4. A further important and relevant fact is that the Human Rights Commission have now admitted as prima facie suitable for further examination twenty-nine cases in which the Greeks allege ill-treatment of persons in Cyprus, contrary to the Convention. Our attitude to the present decision of the Sub-Commission may serve as a strong, although not necessarily an irresistible, precedent if and when the "atrocities" case reaches the same stage. As matters stand we have been given two months for the preparation of our written pleading on these cases; if an oral hearing followed, as is likely, a longer period would elapse.

5. The Governor, Sir John Harding, recognises the disadvantage of rejecting the Sub-Commission's decision. He is convinced, however, that substantial dangers
would be involved in accepting the decision unconditionally at the present time. Copies of telegrams exchanged with him are attached.\(^1\) In brief, he represents that unconditional acceptance would involve a loss of British prestige in Cyprus in that the Greek Cypriots would be elated and conversely the Turkish Cypriots exasperated by the apparent British weakness; that the effect on the two communities in Cyprus would be reflected in Greece and Turkey with corresponding repercussions on the possibility of rational discussion of the Cyprus question in the General Assembly of the United Nations, or elsewhere; that, because of terrorist intimidation and lying witnesses the Sub-Commission would be unlikely to reach the truth; and that the visit might well lead to violence and bloodshed, particularly on the part of the Turkish community.

6. The Governor is particularly concerned at the prospect of an investigation on the present issues serving as a precedent for a local investigation of “atrocities”. Such a possibility he views with the gravest concern since it would raise in an aggravated form the disadvantages mentioned above, and in addition would have the most serious effect on the morale of the security forces. There is little doubt that Sir John Harding would consider that an investigation of this kind ought to be rejected outright.

7. We consider below alternative courses of action:

(i) **Immediate direct appeal to the Committee of Ministers over the heads of the Sub-Commission and the Commission:** This course is strongly advocated by Sir John Harding on the grounds that it is intolerable that the Greek Government should be able to pervert the spirit of the Human Rights Convention to put us in the dock, on charges which could never have been brought forward but for the Greek Government’s encouragement of armed rebellion. There is, however, nothing in the Convention which envisages such a direct appeal; the Committee of Ministers would be likely to refuse to interfere with proceedings still in the hands of the Sub-Commission. Further, we should be at a serious tactical disadvantage with the Committee because our appeal could only succeed if we had the support of two-thirds of the members, and in certain circumstances the unanimous vote of the Committee would be required. We should have to deploy our political arguments prematurely and sacrifice the advantage (which, at the ultimate stage in the normal course of events we should enjoy as “defendants”) of requiring only the support of more than one-third of the Committee to block any adverse decision.

(ii) **Rejection of the Sub-Commission’s request:** The practical and political arguments outlined in paragraph 5 above could be used to explain a refusal. On the other hand we should be in breach of the Convention and would incur odium on that account. The Sub-Commission would continue with their report and in the end might be more likely to find against us on the substance of the question. The refusal would be embarrassing in the United Nations where in previous Cyprus debates we have taken a strong line on the sanctity of treaties. We might, however unfairly, be compared to the Russians in the case of Hungary. We might try to make the refusal look better by saying that we would undertake to review the position later with the object of admitting the Sub-Commission if the situation in

\(^1\) Not printed.
Cyprus had by then improved; but we consider that this would be regarded by everyone including the Sub-Commission as a mere device to cover up a refusal.

(iii) *Unconditional acceptance:* This would be the normal course and would be of assistance to us when the substance of the case eventually came before the Committee of Ministers. The objections are those given in paragraphs 5 and 6.

(iv) *Acceptance subject to specific political conditions:* e.g., that the Greek Government which has been responsible for stimulating terrorism—largely directed against Greek Cypriots—which is the negation of the human rights the Convention exists to protect, should denounce violence in Cyprus and curb their propaganda. Any such conditions are unlikely of satisfactory fulfilment. There is no legal provision for such a procedure and the Sub-Commission would almost certainly regard any such conditions as a disguised outright rejection. If the Sub-Commission themselves decline to accept our stipulation, we should then still either have to accept or reject their request and to accept in these circumstances would be doubly embarrassing.

(v) *Acceptance without conditions, but playing for time:* i.e., negotiating to secure that the best possible arrangements on timing and procedure are reached. We could indicate to the Sub-Commission that while we accept their proposed visit in principle, we had to consider not only our responsibility to them for the practical arrangements connected with the visit, but also our wider responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Cyprus. We could expect to gain an interval in which developments might occur; e.g., if international discussions had begun, we might perhaps—though this is rather unlikely—persuade the Sub-Commission not to proceed with its proposal. In the end, however, we should, unless any really plausible reasons arise in the interval for refusing the investigation, have to admit the investigation.

8. Course (ii) above is the most attractive. Such a decision, however, would be used with great effect against us in the United Nations debate on Cyprus. It would be construed as an admission of guilt on the atrocity cases also. It would damage our reputation in the Council of Europe and among European parliamentarians, at an awkward moment in view of the wider issues now being debated. Therefore after carefully considering the alternatives we have reluctantly reached the conclusion that we should adopt the fifth alternative described above and accept the Sub-Commission's request to go, but play for time when it goes. We would wish to use such reasons as the change over of Governors to postpone any arrival until, say, the New Year. There seems to be a reasonable chance, particularly as we understand that the Sub-Commission does not at present have in mind an earlier date for the visit than the end of November, that we could succeed in this, by which time we might conceivably have made progress in negotiations and the United Nations debate should be out of the way. Furthermore, if there were a recrudescence of widespread violence in the interim, it would give us new grounds for reconsideration. If we did follow this course, we might consider asking the Committee of Ministers to appeal for the renunciation of violence in the Island, though not making this a condition of our acceptance of the Sub-Commission going. We may be able to manoeuvre in this way to the embarrassment of the Greek Government.

9. We must emphasise to the Cabinet that if this investigation on the spot is accepted it will not dispose in any way of the more serious possibility of subsequent
investigation into alleged “atrocities.” That case will take its normal course and we expect to be faced, in about two or three months’ time, with the decision whether to allow another local investigation on that account. It might be more difficult to resist an investigation on the spot on the “atrocities” application if one had been admitted on the first application particularly if the first investigation has passed off without incident and has resulted in a fair report. On the other hand, the United Nations Assembly will not be in session, and there may have been other developments. We are agreed about the effect on the morale of the security forces of such an investigation. We have already refused a Parliamentary demand for one. Our present strong view therefore is that we should have to refuse or prevent such an investigation, although obviously that decision must be completely weighed when the application is made and in the light of conditions at the time.

Recommendation

10. Her Majesty’s Government should accept the Sub-Commission’s request to visit Cyprus but negotiate to secure that the best possible arrangements in timing and procedure are reached in consultation with the Governor of Cyprus.

222 CAB 128/32/1, CC 4(58)2 6 Jan 1958

[Cyprus: draft parliamentary statement of policy]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (58) 4) covering a draft Parliamentary statement of policy on Cyprus, together with an outline of measures to be announced simultaneously by the Governor.1

The Colonial Secretary said that a new initiative by the Government was necessary if the situation in Cyprus was not seriously to deteriorate once again. The draft statement in Annex A to C. (58) 4, which had been approved by the Colonial Policy Committee and was intended to be made to Parliament on its reassembly, reaffirmed the Government’s intention to achieve a settlement of the problem of Cyprus on the basis of the principle of self-determination seven years after the ending of the present emergency, provided that—

(i) questions affecting the Turkish community in Cyprus would be fairly settled and the Turkish-Cypriots no less than the Greek-Cypriots would be given the right of self-determination as a community;
(ii) such bases and installations as might be required to meet the strategic needs of Her Majesty's Government and their Allies would be retained under British sovereignty;
(iii) the people of Cyprus showed during the seven-year period that they were ready to co-operate in working and maintaining a representative Constitution, the details of which would be for discussion, in the first instance, with the Governor of Cyprus in the Island.

At the same time measures would be announced in Cyprus by the Governor to bring the state of emergency to an end in a period of three months. These measures, which were outlined in provisional form in Annex B to C. (58) 4, would involve the progressive release of individuals detained under the emergency regulations and the revocation of the regulations themselves at the end of the period, after which Archbishop Makarios would be free to return to the Island on his assurance that he would use all his influence for the maintenance of peaceful conditions.

Proposals on these lines would not prejudice the final solution of the problem, while they would also make clear our readiness to accept at any time dispositions for the future of the Island which had the approval of the Greek and Turkish Governments and of both communities in Cyprus, provided that our requirement in respect of military bases was satisfied. They would also preserve the basic assurance to the Turkish community to which the Turkish Government attached such great importance. There were grounds for hoping, therefore, that they would enlist the support of moderate opinion in Cyprus and would create a new and calmer atmosphere in which genuine progress might be made towards an ultimately satisfactory solution.

The Foreign Secretary said that an initiative of this nature was not likely to be welcomed by the Turkish Government, for whom Cyprus has now become a major issue in domestic politics. At best we could hope to secure no more than their grudging acquiescence. To this end they should be given adequate time in which to consider the proposals, and these should therefore be communicated to them in the first instance by H.M. Ambassador in Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter the Governor of Cyprus should visit Ankara for consultation with H.M. Ambassador and for discussion, as necessary, with the Turkish Government about the new proposals. He should then make a similar visit to Athens, when he would take the opportunity to meet Archbishop Makarios. The Greek Government would probably reject the proposals outright, unless they were influenced by the Archbishop, who might fear that his own standing in Cyprus would be jeopardised if he rejected a plan which involved the end of the emergency in the Island. If so, it was marginally possible that the Greek-Cypriots would be given a genuine opportunity to seek a solution which was neither Enosis nor partition. On the other hand, if both the Turkish and Greek Governments reacted strongly against the proposals, it would be necessary to reconsider them. In any event it was essential that they should, if possible, remain strictly secret until it become clear whether it would be realistic for the Government to announce them.

In discussion there was general agreement that these proposals and the procedures for implementing them should, in principle, be endorsed. The following points were made—

(a) It might be pointed out to the Turkish Government that their interests would best be served by a settlement which might command a measure of bipartisan support in this country. It was for consideration whether they might also be offered a base in Cyprus.

(b) Any suggestion of negotiation with Archbishop Makarios must be avoided. His return to Cyprus at the end of the emergency should not, therefore, be made conditional upon his giving an assurance that he would use all his influence for the maintenance of peaceful conditions, and we should confine ourselves to providing that those individuals who had been excluded from Cyprus during the emergency, including the Archbishop, would be free to return when it was declared at an end. If, however, the Archbishop volunteered a statement of his readiness to work for peace in Cyprus, we should be free to use it as we saw fit.
(c) It was desirable that we should not commit ourselves even by implication, to continue to enforce law and order in Cyprus regardless of developments; and it might be politic explicitly to reserve our freedom of action if, during the seven-year period, the inhabitants of Cyprus made the orderly administration of the Island impossible. On the other hand any suggestion that we might be prepared to abandon our sovereignty over the Island would be politically damaging and might provoke the Turkish Government to renew intercommunal strife in Cyprus in the hope of forcing the issue of partition without further delay.

(d) It would be desirable to make it clear that the detainees to be released would be individuals who had not been legally convicted of any offence, that the least dangerous of them would be released first and that the process could be suspended if peaceful conditions were not maintained. Indeed, it was for consideration whether fresh powers should be taken to retain the most dangerous of the detainees after the end of the emergency, if the situation so required. In practice, however, it might prove difficult to single out these individuals; and all but a very small number of the present detainees could, in any case, be rearrested if the situation deteriorated again after their release. The balance of advantage, therefore, would probably lie in releasing all those now detained by the date when the emergency was declared at an end.

(e) The cases of those convicted during the emergency would fall to be reviewed by the Governor in Executive Council. But there would be no automatic amnesty for persons who had committed criminal offences during that period and were arrested after its end. It would, however, be desirable to maintain the previous Governor's offer of a safe conduct out of the Island for the leader of the terrorist forces if he surrendered when the new proposals were announced.

The Cabinet:—
(1) Approved, in principle, the proposals in C. (58) 4.
(2) Invited the Foreign Secretary, in consultation with the Colonial Secretary, to arrange for these proposals to be communicated to the Turkish and Greek Governments.
(3) Invited the Colonial Secretary, in revising the draft Parliamentary statement and in giving further consideration to the measures to bring the state of emergency to an end, to have regard to the points made in their discussion.2

2 At a meeting of the Cabinet on 22 Jan 1958 it was agreed that discussions with the Turkish government ‘should be so conducted as not to exclude the possibility of partitioning the Island, if necessary, at an earlier point than was envisaged, as a hypothesis, in our latest proposals. If terrorism broke out again in Cyprus, we could not afford indefinitely to devote military resources to its repression’. Since the Turkish economy was considerably dependent on US aid, it was hoped the Americans could influence the Turkish government’s attitude to the British proposals (CAB 128/32/1, CC 8(58)5).

223  CO 926/1062, no 962  3 Mar 1958
[Need for a constructive plan for Cyprus]: letter from Sir H Foot (Cyprus) to Sir R Allen (Athens)1

I was very grateful to you for your letter of the 22nd February, and I have been carefully pondering what you say. It is of course most important to us here to understand the views and attitudes of the Greek Government.

1 Ambassador to Greece, 1957–1961.
It would not help very much to enter into any long discussion on these terribly difficult matters in this correspondence, and I shall not attempt to do so, but I think I should say that all our thinking here is dominated by the dangers arising from the intense pressure of the Turks for partition. The Turkish Government has made its determination very plain, and it has given most positive assurances to the Turkish community in Cyprus that partition will be achieved. What is more there is good reason to think that the Turks will not hesitate to resort to violence in the Island if they don’t get what they want. Since we agree that partition would be a disaster it seems to me that it is essential to think very urgently of every possible means of fending off that danger.

On the other hand we cannot deny that Turkey has a real and legitimate interest in Cyprus, and it is for that reason that I believe that an invitation to Turkey as well as Greece to participate in some form in the administration of the Island must be considered. I believe that the principles of common interest and participation and partnership are sound in themselves—indeed I believe that in the end a solution will have to be found on the basis of those principles.

We cannot assume that there must always be a tug-of-war between Enosis and partition. Surely we must rather work on a constructive plan based on co-operation between the three Allied Governments in order to reach and work an agreed solution, and the initiative for a new approach must come from us.

I do not for a moment underestimate the difficulties of getting the Greek and Turkish Governments to agree with any new approach, but in the end I believe we shall have to get their co-operation if utter disaster is to be avoided. If we go on hoping that we can satisfy both governments from the start I see no hope of avoiding civil war in Cyprus and even worse results in the wider sphere of international relations. The fact that neither the Greeks nor the Turks wish to push things to a final break with us—or with the Americans—may make them stop short at the edge of the precipice.

It is because the dangers are so close and the possibilities so terrible that I feel that we must urgently think what new course would be sound in itself and justifiable to world opinion. I don’t suggest that what I put forward is necessarily the best course (it is obviously subject to many variations) but none of us can deny the need to find a new course—and find it very quickly.

I am sure that you will not mind my putting down the random comments which will at any rate help to show you how serious things look here.

224 CAB 134/1557, CPC 5(58) 13 Mar 1958

‘Cyprus: future policy’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting

The Committee had a preliminary discussion of the political principles upon which a settlement of the Cyprus question might be based. They had before them for this purpose a memorandum by the Prime Minister (C.P.C. (58) 5).

The Prime Minister said that in negotiation with the Turkish Government our object was to secure the abandonment by them of partition as their ultimate aim in Cyprus. This was unlikely to be achieved without the early concession of a Turkish
base in the Island. This might secure Turkish acquiescence in a fifteen year interim arrangement under which the United Kingdom would retain responsibility for the external affairs, defence and internal security of Cyprus, the remaining aspects of government being regulated by a new constitution on the lines proposed by the Governor in Cyprus telegram no. 319. If at the end of this period the people of Cyprus should opt for independence or union with Greece, Turkish (and United Kingdom) bases would be placed upon a permanent treaty footing, specific guarantees would be given of the rights of the Turkish minority and suitable arrangements would be made for the neutralisation of the Island on the Austrian model. Such a plan could be commended to the Greek Government as one involving the exercise of self-determination, albeit with certain safeguards.

In discussion there was general agreement that this plan merited further consideration. It was suggested, however, that the situation in the Island might make both difficult and dangerous an interim period of as long as fifteen years during which we should remain responsible for the Island’s security. Further consideration would be necessary subsequently of the military factors, but it was emphasised that the introduction of a foreign base at a time when we retained responsibility for internal security would be likely to create an impossible task for our military forces. It would be preferable therefore to move quickly towards a final solution of the Cyprus problem. One such might be the early application of self-determination to the Island as a whole, subject to appropriate safeguards in the event of union with Greece and in return for the grant of a suitable base to the Turks (we ourselves of course retaining another). It was thought however that this was by itself unlikely to induce the Turks to abandon partition as their ultimate aim, more particularly since it was not easy to see how a guarantee of minority rights could be enforced, and so long as the Turks maintained this aim we were bound by our declaration of 19th December, 1956.1

It might be however that a more promising line could be found in the concept of a tridominium which had never yet been propounded to the Turkish and Greek Governments. Such a plan might harmonise well with a constitution of the type envisaged by the Governor in his telegram no. 319, and might serve to transform Cyprus from a storm centre to a focus of active partnership inside the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which might set a useful precedent for the future. Once put into operation a tridominium should effectively prevent partition of the Island, and if two of the three powers concerned were prepared to accept such an arrangement there would be a strong incentive for the third power to participate. It remained true, however, that in the absence of co-operation from both Greeks and Turks Enosis and partition were the only solutions which we ourselves could implement.

It might be thought that the establishment of a foreign base would prejudice the working of a condominium or a constitution on the lines which the Governor had in mind: it would be preferable that we alone should retain a full-scale military base and that Turkish and Greek troops should form part of a properly integrated security force under neutral command. But though our initial proposals for a tridominium might exclude the grant of a base, it was unlikely that the Turks could be brought to relinquish a safeguard on which they had latterly come to lay so much stress.

1 To the effect that ‘the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed community [as Cyprus] must include partition among the eventual options’: H of C Debs, vol 562, cols 1268–1278.
It was agreed that the alternative solutions (by way of Enosis or a tridominium) which had been referred to in discussion should be set out in a paper for subsequent consideration along with the proposals in C.P.C. (58) 5.

225  CAB 134/1557, CPC 6(58)  21 Mar 1958
‘Cyprus: future policy’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Prime Minister (C.P.C. (58) 5) and a note by officials (C.P.C. (58) 6) setting out three possible forms of a political settlement of the Cyprus question together with a report by the Cyprus Committee on the implications of granting military bases in Cyprus to the Greek or Turkish Governments (C.P.C. (58) 4).

The Prime Minister said that leaving aside partition, which we should only contemplate as a last resort, there were three forms which a political solution might take. The first discussed in C.P.C. (58) 5, involved an interim period of continued British rule during which internal self-government might be introduced on the lines recently proposed by the Governor with a considerable measure of communal autonomy. It was unlikely however that the Turks would be disposed in present circumstances to defer their acquisition of a base in the Island for say, fifteen years, and the Chiefs of Staff had drawn attention to the grave military risk of our retaining responsibility for internal security for a prolonged period during which a Turkish base would afford both a standing provocation to the Greek community in the Island and a means for the introduction of arms for the Turkish Cypriot population. This consideration might be held to rule out such a plan from immediate further consideration, though if other solutions proved fruitless it might be necessary to fall back upon the simpler variant proposed in Cyprus telegram no. 319.

The Committee turned to consider other possible solutions by way of the union of Cyprus with Greece or tri-dominium.

The Foreign Secretary said that the possible form of settlement which he had discussed with the Greek Government envisaged the application of self-determination to the whole of the Island, less British and Turkish military enclaves, within the shortest possible period of years. The Cypriot people would have the option of maintaining their present status, becoming independent, or joining Greece, and suitable guarantees would be established of the rights of individual citizens and the demilitarisation of the Island less the agreed military bases. Such a solution would be so welcome to the Greeks that they were unlikely to make difficulties. It was hard to see however how the Turks could be brought to accept such arrangements, even with a base, unless its area could be considerably extended; and then the problem would be how to distinguish this from partition. Moreover such a solution might give rise to political difficulty in this country.

There was general agreement that tri-dominium merited serious consideration. Such a solution would avoid the political difficulty of complete surrender of British sovereignty, and could be represented as an entirely new approach to the Cyprus problem which might set a pattern which could be followed in other situations of comparable difficulty. Under such an arrangement it would be preferable that we
alone should maintain a full scale base, but all three sovereign powers would maintain troops in the Island. This solution should fully satisfy Turkish interests. It would not be attractive to the Greek Government; but if the difficulty of a solution by way of Enosis could be brought home to them, they might be induced to accept tri-dominium if it could be presented as a solution for a limited period at the end of which self-determination might be left open. The precise period and formula involved would require further consideration according to the bias to be given to the Greek or Turkish viewpoint. This might incline to the former, in that the tangible advantage of such an arrangement would lie with the Turks, who might for that reason begin to make some concession to Greek opinion. A similar consideration might govern the constitutional arrangements to be associated with tri-dominium: the protection which the Turkish population of the Island would automatically enjoy might make it unnecessary to adopt the special communal safeguards of the Governor’s latest plan, and a constitution on the Radcliffe lines might then be found adequate.

The Committee finally considered the next procedural steps. It was agreed that action should immediately be taken to disabuse the Turkish Government of their perhaps wilful misconception regarding our readiness to make an immediate grant to them of a military base in Cyprus. We should make it clear that we were only prepared to consider the grant of such facilities as part of an agreement embodying a lasting political settlement. This would lead to Turkish enquiries regarding our proposals for such a settlement, but it would be undesirable that we should engage in further negotiation during the period of the Greek elections. Although the plan involving union with Greece might need first to be discussed with the Turks, that of tri-dominium would best be discussed initially with the Greeks, and we should wish to avoid any such negotiations becoming an election issue. The Turkish Government should therefore be informed that while we had a number of ideas about possible political solutions, we proposed to defer discussion of these till after the Greek elections. A similar statement should be made in Cyprus. In the meantime we should give further consideration to the formula under which the tri-dominium plan should be presented and to the constitutional arrangements which would be associated with this solution, and should also examine the possibility, in a solution involving self-determination, of providing the Turks with a large military enclave which would yet fall short of partition of the Island. The Governor of Cyprus need not return for further consultations until our planning was further advanced. It was for consideration whether, when international discussion came to be resumed, we should abandon the technique of private negotiations and seek public discussion of our offers, perhaps by means of an international conference....
(58) 7) on the points raised by the Committee at their last meeting\(^1\) regarding presentation to the Greek and Turkish Governments of the concept of tri-dominium, the arrangements for the internal government of the Island which might be associated with tri-dominium, and the possibility of an enlarged Turkish base.

The Committee again reviewed the various forms which a political settlement might take.

In discussion, the following points were made:—

(a) Partition of the Island would satisfy our Turkish ally and might involve less military risks for us than other solutions. But the economic distress which partition would create in the Island would be to our discredit, and our prestige would suffer both in the Middle East and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. At worst, this solution might exacerbate the hostility of Greeks and Turks and convert Cyprus into a second Palestine: and in these circumstances the security of our base would be endangered. These considerations applied even more strongly to the alternative course of withdrawing our forces to military enclaves in the Island and leaving the Greeks and Turks to find their own solution. It would follow, therefore, that, if all other attempts at solution failed, we should have to continue to carry the present burden of responsibility in the Island.

(b) In telegram no. 447 the Governor of Cyprus had said that he regarded tri-dominium as unworkable. But his own plan for a partnership between ourselves, Greece and Turkey in the administration of the Island under continued British sovereignty was equally dependent upon Greek and Turkish co-operation. Moreover, there was a danger that the separate communal Assemblies which it contemplated would lead to a perpetuation, rather than a diminution, of antagonism between the two races. It might, however, constitute a preliminary to the establishment of a tri-dominium, with which it might later be combined.

(c) On the hypothesis of tri-dominium the problem of a final court of appeal in the event of a dispute between the three sovereign powers might be met by associating the United States and another Power with the three co-domini for this purpose as guarantors of the treaty establishing the condominium, suitable constitutional provision being made for a suspensory power in case of discriminatory legislation pending appeal to this final body.

(d) Tri-dominium would be likely to be more acceptable to the Turks than to the Greeks, though the former would be reluctant to abandon the idea of a military base under their own sovereignty. As a concession to Greek opinion the scheme might be presented as an interim one for a period of years, at the end of which the Cypriot people would be free to choose their future status. It might need to be conceded that, if this choice resulted in Enosis, the Turks would be permitted to transform such military installations as they might be occupying in the Island under tri-dominium into a military base under their own sovereignty.

(e) But if the tri-dominium plan, when presented to the Greek and Turkish Governments, was rejected by either or both of them, it would be impossible for us to substitute an alternative plan at short notice. It might, therefore, be wiser, before committing ourselves openly to the concept of tri-dominium, to explore the possibility of the remaining solution which would maintain unified sovereignty. Application of unitary self-determination would be accompanied by the grant of a

\(^1\) See previous document.
military base to the Turks, which might be somewhat larger than the minimum required for an infantry brigade, and, in the presumed event of Enosis, by suitable guarantees of minority rights and of Greek demilitarisation which would be under international supervision. In presenting such a solution to the Turks we should make it plain that, without retracting our declaration of December, 1956, we were most reluctant to contemplate the partition of the Island and that the grant of a base would represent a substantial and immediate advantage for them. It would, however, be very difficult for the Turkish Government, in present circumstances, to forgo their demand for partition, and maximum pressure would be necessary from the United States. Moreover, even if such a solution were agreed, there could be no guarantee that the Turks would not use their base to subvert the administration of the rest of the Island. The Chiefs of Staff had already expressed their anxiety about the introduction of a foreign military base in the Island, and its enlargement to a size which might satisfy the Turks would involve many of the dangers of partition. In addition, the Government would be liable to political criticism for the surrender of British sovereignty which this scheme would entail. There would, however, be general relief if a settlement could be reached. The scheme had the attraction of simplicity and satisfaction of the Greek demands, and it would be desirable to test Turkish reaction to such a plan before advancing the alternative scheme of tri-dominium.

The Foreign Secretary said that, as already agreed, he would make it clear to the Turkish Government that the grant of a military base was bound up with the conclusion of a durable political settlement. It appeared, however, that the Greek elections would not now be concluded until early in May and it would be difficult to defer embarking on any further discussions with the Turks until a new Greek government had taken office. He proposed, therefore, that as soon as the necessary preparations had been made for American diplomatic support, he should follow up his immediate communication to the Turkish Government with a proposal that they should receive a base in Cyprus in return for their acquiescence in a solution by means of unitary self-determination.

It was agreed that the Cabinet’s endorsement should be sought for a course of action on these lines. If such an approach to the Turkish Government proved unsuccessful, it would be necessary to take our stand publicly on the alternative of tri-dominium which should be further studied in the meantime on the lines suggested. …

227  CAB 128/32/1, CC 28(58)3  1 Apr 1958
[Cyprus: proposed policy of unitary self-determination outside bases]:
Cabinet conclusions

The Foreign Secretary said that, in view of the postponement of the Greek elections, there was now no prospect of an early resumption of negotiations with the Greek Government about Cyprus. It would be difficult to justify to Parliament a period of complete inactivity over this problem, and some means must therefore be devised of maintaining discussions with the Turkish Government in the interim. As a first step he had informed them that they were not entitled to interpret his recent discussions
in Ankara as offering them a strategic base in Cyprus except as part of a plan for a political settlement likely to command the acquiescence of the three Governments concerned and of both the Cypriot communities. The next step would be to indicate to them our own view of the possible basis of such a settlement. For this purpose we might suggest to them an arrangement whereby, in return for the establishment of a Turkish base in Cyprus, they would release us from our undertaking to accept a partition of the Island in the last resort and would acquiesce in a policy of unitary self-determination for the part of the Island outside the British and Turkish bases with the minimum of delay, subject to adequate guarantees, embodied in a Treaty, for the rights of minorities and to certain limitations of sovereignty as regards militarisation and foreign policy.

In discussion it was suggested that, if we put forward this proposal immediately after appearing to modify the undertaking about the establishment of a Turkish base in Cyprus, the Turkish Government would be likely to reject it and to adopt an even more intransigent attitude towards any other solution which might subsequently be suggested, including the conception of tri-dominium. Moreover, the proposal would imply that, apart from the British and Turkish bases, Cyprus would be free to achieve union with Greece; and if, as a result, communal disorders broke out or the Soviet Union sought to gain a foothold in the Island, public opinion in this country would be critical of an arrangement whereby, although we retained troops in Cyprus, we failed to intervene in order to restore law and order. For this reason it might be wiser to put forward the concept of tri-dominium at the next stage in the negotiations and to reserve the proposal outlined by the Foreign Secretary for discussion only if tri-dominium proved to be unacceptable.

On the other hand, this proposal was known to have the support of the United States Government. Moreover, it was likely to be more acceptable than tri-dominium to the Greek Government; and it could be regarded as deriving originally from a suggestion which the Turkish Government themselves had tentatively made at one point during the earlier discussions. There was no reason to suppose that, if the situation in Cyprus deteriorated again, a system of tridominium which would depend upon the full co-operation of the three Governments concerned would be any more effective in securing the maintenance of law and order.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the balance of advantage appeared to lie in putting this proposal to the Turkish Government not as a definite plan which we sponsored but as a suggestion which they themselves had originally made and we had subsequently been considering. This approach should be made as informally as possible, preferably through the Turkish Ambassador in London, in order to ascertain whether the Turkish Government were prepared to entertain it. If they rejected it, we should then have no alternative but to put forward publicly our own solution based upon tri-dominium, for which we should continue to make preparations.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Invited the Foreign Secretary to ascertain informally, on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister, the Turkish reaction to the proposal which he had submitted to the Cabinet.

(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to arrange for officials to continue their examination of the means of giving effect to the conception of tri-dominium.
I do hope that you managed to get some rest in Nassau—and that you had a great success there to add to the long list of your colonial trophies.

I am afraid that I have nothing encouraging to tell you from this corner of your Empire. For a week or two past the Turks here have been stepping up attacks on me, and I have little doubt that they have been encouraged to do so by Ankara. They are very confident and truculent and they would naturally react very fiercely to any incident in which a Turk were injured or killed—and that might happen any day. Our local Greeks on the other hand are depressed to the point of despair, and it looks as if Grivas has decided to take his own line in spite of any restraint which Athens may have endeavoured to impose upon him. The nightly list of explosions continues and increases, and it seems impossible that this can go on without anyone being hurt. I imagine that we must continue in this wretched state of uncertainty for another month or two (until the Greek elections are over and a Greek Government is back in position) but it is difficult to see how we are to steer a course through the dangers for that long while we wait for decisions and declarations.

Meanwhile I am filled with alarm about the line which is being pursued in discussions with the Turkish Government. I have always thought that a Turkish base in Cyprus might be an ingredient in a final settlement, and I understand the Greek case for self-determination. I see the attraction therefore in the possibility of a deal in which the Turks would get a base and the Greeks would get the rest, but I am bound to say that to attempt a solution on these lines seems to me to invite continuing conflict between Turks and Greeks—and if conflict continues the wretched Cypriots will get the dirty end of the stick all the time. I cannot persuade myself that under the sort of deal proposed the Turks would be content to leave it at that, and in any event we on our side have a clear obligation not to leave the Turkish Cypriots in the lurch.

Surely the right answer is to allow this small Island to enjoy the advantages of association in some form or other with the British Commonwealth and with Greece and Turkey too. Surely the right and sensible purpose is to enable the Island to remain undivided with a system of self-government in its internal affairs and with a good measure of communal autonomy. Surely the function of the three Governments concerned is to come together and co-operate to hold the ring. The aim must surely be that everyone should win and no-one should lose—and Cyprus should get the best of all worlds. And surely, since we have an obligation to the people whom we have governed for the best part of a century, we should take the lead and maintain the responsibility to achieve these obvious objectives.

It is a choice between conflict and co-operation. The Greeks must be made to realise that Turkey has a legitimate interest in Cyprus. The Turks must be made to accept the proposition that participation is better than partition.

---

1 Lennox-Boyd visited the Bahamas in April 1958 after disturbances and a general strike, and arranged for constitutional changes—the number of seats in the elected House of Assembly was increased from 1960.
Shouldn’t Great Britain declare that having tried every possible way to get agreement between the Greek and Turkish Governments we shall continue to carry our responsibilities for a set period at least, inviting the Greek and Turkish Governments to come in and help us and accepting the principles of internal self-government and communal autonomy and dual nationality? I believe that such proposals would command widespread approval in all parties and indeed in world opinion and we here would have a course to follow which would make it worthwhile putting up with anything.

It seems to me that for too long we have gone backwards and forwards between Athens and Ankara hoping for some bargain. What a wonderful thing it would be if we had a clear policy of our own.

I believe that the line which I have advocated might at first be received with consternation by both Greeks and Turks here, but secretly there would, I believe, be a good deal of relief and increasing support if it were clear that we really meant what we said and were not going to be pushed off it. And both Athens and Ankara would I suggest in the end, if not at the beginning, have no alternative but to go along with us.

As you know I have always tried to apply the overriding test of what is best for the people of Cyprus. Most certainly I feel convinced that on that test the line I have proposed is by far the best. I do hope that within a month or two we can declare such a policy and go ahead with it.

One last point. I know that there are many objections to bringing international authorities into this but the more I think of it the more I believe that it might be a good thing to state our readiness to place Cyprus under United Nations trusteeship so that a policy of common interest and co-operation can have international backing.

I don’t know whether you will wish me to come home later this month as has been proposed. I do hope however that I can be given an opportunity of arguing this case before any final decision is taken. . . .
Therefore been prepared. This plan provided that the international status of Cyprus should remain unchanged for seven years, during which internal security would remain under full British control; that the Greek and Turkish Governments should be invited to appoint representatives in Cyprus to co-operate with the Governor in a joint effort to achieve peace, progress and prosperity in the Island; that, under a new Constitution, the two Cypriot communities should enjoy autonomy in communal and cultural affairs, while matters of common concern should be administered jointly; and that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots should be given the opportunity of acquiring Greek or Turkish nationality in addition to their British nationality. In presenting this plan we should indicate that, if it succeeded, the initial period of limited partnership might be succeeded by a lasting settlement, based on the surrender of sole British sovereignty over the Island (apart from bases and military facilities retained for strategic reasons) and a full sharing of that sovereignty with the Greek and Turkish Governments. If, however, the plan failed and it became necessary to seek a final solution of the problem of Cyprus on other lines, we should regard ourselves as bound by our previous assurances in regard to the application of the principle of self-determination.

In discussion it was suggested that this new plan constituted, in effect, a reversion to the original proposal for the continuation of British rule in Cyprus, albeit with a different form of Constitution from that proposed by Lord Radcliffe. It could provide only an interim solution to the present problems of the Island, whereas tridominium might have proved to be a final settlement. The new plan might not, therefore, make so favourable an impact on world opinion as the concept of tridominium. On the other hand, it now appeared that a tridominium would not be acceptable either to the Cypriots or to the Greek Government, whereas the new plan was likely, in the opinion of the Governor of Cyprus, to be welcomed by the majority of the inhabitants of the Island. Moreover, it had the merit that it could be implemented in part if it was accepted by one community even though it was initially rejected by the other.

Doubts were, however, expressed about the desirability of including in the proposals any specific term of years as the limit of the proposed continuation of the present status of the Island. The Governor of Cyprus had proposed a period of seven years in order to allow a reasonable opportunity for stable conditions to be established and the habit of co-operation to develop; and he was inclined to feel that any shorter period might only encourage the more extreme elements of Cypriot opinion to continue to promote their own solutions of the problem by violent means. But, in the absence of goodwill on the part of all the parties concerned, it would become increasingly difficult to provide the necessary British troops in the Island to maintain law and order over such a period as seven years. Moreover, a statement of intention to maintain British sovereignty for this period would not commit any future Government in the United Kingdom and would not, therefore, necessarily ensure the internal stability of Cyprus to which the Governor rightly attached importance. It might be preferable, therefore, merely to indicate that the present status of the Island would be maintained for a term of years, without specifying any particular period. Moreover, it would be desirable to present the final stage of the plan, if it succeeded, as a sharing of sovereignty between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, and to omit any reference to the surrender by the United Kingdom of sole sovereignty over the Island. It would also be desirable to modify the reference to Cyprus as enjoying the advantages of “association” with the British Commonwealth,
since the Island was already, and would presumably remain, within the Commonwealth.

The attitude adopted by the Opposition in Parliament would be likely to influence the reception given to the new plan. The Leaders of the Opposition should therefore be given, in confidence, an outline of the new proposals.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Invited the Foreign Secretary, in consultation with the Colonial Secretary, the Governor of Cyprus and Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Athens and Ankara, to examine the proposals in C. (58) 106 in greater detail in the light of their discussion.

(2) Agreed that, subject to the results of the discussions under Conclusion (1) above, these proposals should be outlined in confidence, to the Leaders of the Opposition.

(3) Agreed to resume their discussion at a subsequent meeting.

CAB 128/32/1, CC 43(58)4 15 May 1958

[Cyprus: revised policy statement]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them a note by the Secretary of the Cabinet (C. (58) 109) covering a revised policy statement on Cyprus.

In discussion there was general agreement that the proposed experiment in partnership with the Greek and Turkish Governments in the administration of the Island represented the best course now open to us.

In further discussion of the details of the draft statement the Minister of Defence\(^1\) expressed doubts regarding the advisability of our undertaking a commitment to maintain British sovereignty over the Island for as long a period as seven years. The plan would depend essentially on the co-operation of the Cypriot communities, and, in default of such co-operation, might break down at an early stage. If we were nevertheless committed to maintain internal security in the Island for the balance of the seven years, we should be faced with a liability which was militarily unacceptable since it could not be reconciled with the policy of a progressive reduction in the strength of the Army. On the other hand it was argued that a definite statement of intention was desirable in the interests of stable administration in Cyprus and in order to reassure the Turkish Government. The balance of advantage therefore lay in retaining the reference to a period of seven years, but to making it clear that this period was itself part of the plan and was designed “to allow time for the new principle of partnership to be fully worked out and brought into operation under this plan in the necessary atmosphere of stability.” It was also agreed that the statement should be amended to indicate that the people of the Island would, through their representative institutions, be able to “exercise authority,” rather than merely “to have a voice,” in the management of the Island’s internal affairs.

The Cabinet were informed that the Leaders of the Opposition, who had been given in confidence an outline of the new proposals, had expressed some doubts about them on the ground that they might be regarded as an attempt to perpetuate British

\(^1\) Mr D Sandys.
sovereignty and to conciliate Turkish opinion without holding out any prospect to the Greek Government of the exercise of unitary self-determination. They had indicated that these objections might be reduced if the North Atlantic Council were willing to endorse the maintenance of British sovereignty for a seven-year period, and if the references in the draft statement to the ultimate future of the Island were non-committal. The text appended to C. (58) 109 might be regarded as going some way to meet this latter point, in that it no longer referred explicitly to the Government’s previous assurances in regard to the exercise of communal self-determination. But although it would be possible to maintain that those assurances were relevant only to the failure of the plan, there could be no question of the Government’s retracting their earlier pledge about the application of communal self-determination in the last resort. It might, however, be possible to arrange for the proposals to be communicated confidentially to the North Atlantic Council and to secure their general approval. This possibility, together with the other problems of presentation and timing involved, both as regards the Parliamentary statement itself and the prior diplomatic approach to the Greek and Turkish Governments, would require further study. It would be desirable, if possible, to avoid a Parliamentary debate on Cyprus before the Whitsun recess; and it might therefore be necessary to make an interim statement in the House of Commons on 19th May, promising a full statement of the Government’s policy at the earliest opportunity after the recess.

The Cabinet:—
(1) Approved the draft policy statement annexed to C. (58) 109 subject to the points made in discussion.
(2) Took note that the Prime Minister would discuss with the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary the problems of presentation and timing involved.

231  CO 926/1065, no 887  24 May 1958
[Cyprus: comments on the approved plan]: letter from Sir H Foot to Mr Lennox-Boyd

[On 16 May 1958, Foot sent the following minute to the S of S: ‘I am convinced that our hand will be greatly strengthened in dealing with disorder and violence once a clear and new policy based on good principle is announced. My main fear is that the developments of the past will bring about something like another Palestine in Cyprus. Civil war is an immediate possibility, and this might well lead to a war between Greece and Turkey. That is why I believe that it is essential to declare the new policy and pursue it, in order to make a last stand against the disaster of a clash between Greeks and Turks which would bring untold suffering and bloodshed’ (CO 926/1065, no 868).]

There are two or three things that I should like to say now about the plan for Cyprus approved when I was in London.
First of all I devoutly hope that the plan as it stands will not be varied because of adverse initial reaction in Ankara and Athens. We may expect complaint, criticism and possibly violent opposition from one side or the other or both, but if we were pushed off the decisions now taken I would see no hope at all for the future.
Secondly it seems to me essential that we should give as strong a lead as we can to the Americans and our other friends. I am bound to say that the text of the Foreign Secretary’s letter to Dulles given in telegram No. 721 worried me a great deal. It seemed to me that the plan was represented in that letter as a second-best scheme
rather than something which we strongly and positively believed in. In my opinion the plan is the last hope of preventing civil war in Cyprus possibly leading to war between Greece and Turkey. It seems to me that only if we represent and defend the plan as imaginative, generous and just can we hope to win the support in British and world opinion which is so necessary. I would hope that when the Prime Minister sees Eisenhower the President can be persuaded to give strong positive endorsement for our plan.

Thirdly it seems to me that we must make it quite clear from now that when the plan is announced we shall not be deflected by opposition, however violent, from either side. No one must be led to believe that the plan is dependent for its success on immediate acceptance. What we propose is to state the action which we think is right and then, over a long period if necessary, do everything possible to win support and co-operation. We can no longer go on begging the parties to agree—and dropping any proposal which they do not at once accept. That is why I was so concerned that the Foreign Secretary's letter to Dulles (see paragraph 3 of telegram No. 721) might be taken to suggest that the plan would be a failure if it did not lead to a rapid restoration of normal conditions.

The time has surely come to be tough with both the Greek and Turkish Governments, and to go flat out to win the support of public opinion for our own plan.

The position here and the situation as between the Greek and Turkish Governments are so bad that we cannot possibly hope to come through without making up our minds on the three things which I have emphasised in this letter—first not to allow our initiative to be destroyed by the first reaction of the Turks or Greeks; secondly to put forward and defend our plan with full confidence and determination; and thirdly to recognise that before the plan can succeed we may well have to ride through a lot more trouble.

I know that you very well understand these points which I have repeatedly emphasised before (you will remember the note I gave you on the 16th May, a copy of which is attached) and I hope that you will not mind my stating them again. The worst thing of all would be for the Turks or the Greeks to see us off again, and leave us to face an infinitely worse situation here with no policy at all.

232  CAB 128/32/2, CC 67(58)5  12 Aug 1958  
[Report of prime minister’s discussions with Greek and Turkish governments on Cyprus]: Cabinet conclusions

_The Prime Minister_ informed the Cabinet of the course of the discussions on Cyprus which he had held with the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey during his visit to Athens and Ankara.

He had not asked either Government to approve the plan for the future of Cyprus which he had presented to Parliament on 19th June. He had asked that they should acquiesce in it and encourage their respective communities in Cyprus to co-operate in working it.

The Greek Government did not like the plan because it embodied the principle of partnership between Greece and Turkey in Cyprus and recognised a Turkish right to
participation in the control of the Island’s affairs. They were, however, prepared to support the plea for cessation of violence and a seven-year interval before the future status of the Island was determined. On points of detail the Greeks had argued—(i) that on the Executive Council they should have a greater majority, since the ratio of 4 to 2 would not represent the proportions of the population; (ii) that some provision should be made for an elected assembly in which the population of the Island as a whole could deal with the subjects not reserved to the Governor; (iii) that the proposed provision for dual nationality would confirm the Turkish interest in Cyprus; and (iv) that representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments should not be accredited to the Government and, in particular, should not sit as members of the Governor’s Council.

The Prime Minister said that he had formed the impression that the Greek Government lacked the political strength to give active support to any plan which would solve the Cyprus problem. The Communists had improved their position at the Greek elections in May 1958 and Enosis provided them with a welcome theme for nationalistic propaganda. The Greek line was therefore to ask us to modify the British plan in directions favourable to them.

By contrast the Turks had welcomed the plan in its entirety and had been strongly opposed to any modifications designed to meet the Greek point of view.

The Prime Minister said that the Cabinet were now faced with a difficult decision. There seemed to be three possible courses of action:—

(i) To announce that, as his discussions with the Greek and Turkish Governments had shown no prospect of agreement, the United Kingdom would not proceed further with the plan which they had announced on 19th June. This would leave both Greeks and Turks entrenched in extreme positions. It would forfeit the opportunity to gain their support for a cessation of violence and a seven-year period of pause before the future status of the Island was determined. It would be a confession of failure.

(ii) To say that Her Majesty’s Government proposed to implement their plan as announced, without amendment. This course would ensure the full co-operation of the Turks, but it would arouse bitter opposition from Greece. It would also involve disregarding the views expressed in the North Atlantic Council and in the United Nations.

(iii) To say that we had decided to implement the policy already announced, while modifying it in certain particulars. These amendments would be designed to secure Greek acquiescence in the plan, while not making such substantial changes as would antagonise the Turks. Sound reasons for the amendments would have to be given in order that they should not appear to have been made solely for the purpose of meeting Greek objections.

The Prime Minister explained that the modifications he had in mind were contained in the draft statement which he had prepared before leaving Cyprus (telegram No. 1170 of 12th August from P.O.M.E.F. to Foreign Office). The main question was whether the suggested modifications would alienate Turkish support of the British plan. He had therefore sought the views of H.M. Ambassadors in Ankara and Athens on the likely effect of the draft statement on those Governments, and these had just been received (Ankara telegram No. 1284 and Athens telegram No. 620 of 12th August to Foreign Office). H.M. Ambassador in Ankara had given his considered opinion that the Turkish Government would not take the modifications as a pretext for withholding their support of the plan as presented in the draft
statement. He had, however, suggested two changes of detail, which were acceptable. H.M. Ambassador at Athens had thought that the draft statement afforded a reasonably good basis on which to approach the Greek Government, although he did not believe that they would accept it without argument.

The Prime Minister added that any of the three possible courses of action was likely to be followed by a period of increased disorder in Cyprus. But, horrible as the atrocities committed by EOKA were, they should be seen in their correct perspective: the British forces in Cyprus had incurred only 90 fatal casualties over the previous five years. From his personal visit to the Island he was glad to report that the British troops were in good heart.

Discussion showed that the Cabinet were strongly in favour of the third of the courses outlined by the Prime Minister, namely that we should make known our decision to put into effect the policy for Cyprus already announced to Parliament, modified on the lines of the Prime Minister’s draft statement.

On the question of procedure, the Prime Minister said that nothing was to be gained by attempting to secure the agreement of the Greek or Turkish Governments. He suggested therefore that he should despatch to the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers letters in the terms of the drafts contained in telegrams Nos. 1171 and 1172 from P.O.M.E.F. to the Foreign Office and should issue the draft statement very shortly thereafter.

The Lord Chancellor expressed the Cabinet’s gratitude to the Prime Minister for the mission which he had undertaken and their appreciation of the results which he had achieved. The outcome of these discussions had been more favourable than they had ventured to hope.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed that the Government should proceed with the plan for the future of Cyprus which they had presented to Parliament on 19th June, subject to the modifications approved in their discussion.

(2) Took note that the Prime Minister would inform the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers of this decision.

(3) Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for this decision to be announced at the end of the week.

1 Lord Kilmuir.
difficulties, particularly to the Greeks, and the test and symbol of this was the position of the Government Representatives under the plan. Rightly or wrongly, the Prime Minister had decided to take the risk of visiting Greece and Turkey. The Greeks did not wish to be brought to a point of decision in this way, and the Turks were at first very unhelpful. The Greeks had four objections to the Plan, but the real point was that they objected to any Turkish presence in the island although they were prepared to give guarantees to the Turkish minority. As a result of his visit, the Prime Minister had made a number of amendments to the original Plan to help the Greeks: this was a risk with the Turks, but it had succeeded. The position now was that the Turks accepted the modified Plan, but the Greeks opposed it. The question was should the Plan proceed.

This was not an easy decision. Certain even of the British Press (e.g. the Daily Telegraph) maintained that the Plan was now dead. If, however, Her Majesty’s Government did not go on with it, the Turks would think that they had been betrayed and it would be difficult to put any future plan forward. On the other hand, it could be said that the Plan had depended on tripartite partnership which was now impossible and the Plan could not be adopted. If the Plan was continued, the Turks would be all right, the Greeks would be bad. The Plan would help in UNO and in NATO, even though Monsieur Spaak might have to be carefully handled. In the island there might be serious trouble.

The Governor of Cyprus said that he agreed that the Plan should go ahead. There were great dangers in going on, but the Turks had been brought a very long way and it would be very difficult to tell them now that at the last minute H.M.G. had been pushed off their Plan by Archbishop Makarios. It was, however, no longer true to say that the Plan, as such, could be put into effect; it was not partnership which was being created, but rather safeguards for the Turks. But without these safeguards no further progress would be possible; these safeguards were satisfactory to the Turks, whereas paper guarantees would not be. It was true that even with the Plan there might be war between Greece and Turkey, but disaster was more certain if there was no Plan. The Turkish safeguards themselves were sound and in no way unfair. Perhaps the Government Representatives were not in themselves desirable, and justified the Greek view that they prejudiced a final settlement, but in return for the Representatives the Turks had given up much more. The Governor concluded that he was most strongly in favour of going ahead with the Plan. The Colonial Secretary said that he took the same view. . . .

The Prime Minister said that it had now become clear that the Greek Government would not accept any plan for the future administration of Cyprus which involved their sharing the government of the Island with Turkey or acquiescing in the physical presence in Cyprus of any symbol of Turkish authority. In these circumstances the Cabinet faced two major decisions—first, whether we should nevertheless pursue the plan which we had published; second, whether, if we sought to put it into effect, we should allow Archbishop Makarios and the other political exiles to return to the Island.
On the first issue the balance of advantage appeared to lie in continuing to promote our plan. We were committed to the Turkish Government to bring it into force; and, in view of our success in persuading them to abandon their more extreme demands for a partition of Cyprus or for the creation of a major Turkish base in the Island, it would be unwise, by abandoning our plan at this late stage, to compel them to revert to their former intransigence. Moreover, it was impossible to devise any effective alternative to the plan which we had published. It was no longer feasible to seek to introduce the Radcliffe Constitution; the Greek Government were powerless to suggest on their own initiative any constitutional scheme which would be likely to be accepted by the Turkish Government; and the indefinite continuance of British rule in an atmosphere of increasing communal strife could not be contemplated. The only realistic hope of achieving a solution lay in adhering to our plan but in implementing it as unobtrusively as possible. We should therefore abstain from any further declaration of policy and should allow the new arrangements to be seen to come gradually into operation, in the hope that the Greek-Cypriot community and the Greek Government would eventually appreciate the folly of refusing to accept the opportunity to play the major part in the government of Cyprus and of deliberately thwarting a plan which offered them their only safeguard against a partition of the Island.

On this hypothesis the desirability of allowing Archbishop Makarios and the other exiles to return to Cyprus would need to be reassessed. It would no longer be possible to argue, as in our published plan, that, if violence ceased, we should be prepared gradually to bring the state of emergency to an end and to allow the exiles to return, since we could not maintain that violence had ceased or that we were putting the plan into effect on the basis of the partnership between the Greek and Turkish communities which we had originally envisaged. The return of the Archbishop, if it was permitted, would therefore have to be justified by reference to our belief that, in the circumstances in which the plan would now come into operation, he would be less dangerous in Cyprus than he was at present in Athens, even though he would not be required to abjure violence or to co-operate in restoring peace and order in the Island. The Cabinet would need to consider whether this was in fact likely to be the case.

The Governor of Cyprus said that, in his opinion, a fresh outbreak of violence and terrorism was likely to occur in the period immediately ahead, in which the initial stages of our plan would be put into operation. The establishment of the Municipal Commission, the arrival of the representative of the Turkish Government, and the holding of the first elections would represent critical points during this period. Nevertheless, there was some hope that the Greek-Cypriot community and the Greek Government, when faced with the new situation which would thereafter exist, would hesitate finally to forgo the opportunity to play their part in the government of the Island. We must be ready to take advantage of any change of attitude on their part. We could not indefinitely govern the Island in collaboration with a minority amounting to no more than one-fifth of its population and in the face of complete absence of co-operation from the remaining four-fifths. Some means must be found of resuming contact with this majority element; and, as Archbishop Makarios was the only spokesman whom the Greek-Cypriot community would accept, it would be to our advantage to offer him the opportunity to return to the Island. He might well reject this offer; and in that case his prestige, which had grown, rather than
diminished, during his exile, should suffer a serious reverse. But if he agreed to return he would forfeit the position of power without responsibility which he at present enjoyed in Athens and would become subject to the growing pressure of the Greek community in Cyprus who were anxious, for both political and economic reasons, that the state of emergency should be brought to an end as rapidly as possible. On balance, it was to our advantage that the Archbishop should be compelled in this way to face his responsibilities rather than be allowed to continue to exert his dangerous influence over the Greek Government in Athens.

In discussion some doubt was expressed about the wisdom of allowing the Archbishop to return to Cyprus. In present circumstances it would not be possible to release the detainees or to terminate the state of emergency as rapidly as we had originally hoped. These measures would now have to be deferred until peaceful conditions had been restored. But there was little chance that the Archbishop would co-operate in establishing such conditions; he was more likely to launch a campaign for the immediate release of the detainees and to provoke bitter resistance to the introduction of our plan. It would be necessary, therefore, to make it clear that, if he returned to Cyprus, he would not be entitled to regard himself as above the ordinary law of Cyprus and beyond the scope of the Emergency Regulations and that, if he reverted to behaviour which was liable to disturb the peace and to subvert public order, he would be arrested or deported for a second time. On the other hand, it would not necessarily be easy to secure evidence which would justify his arrest; nor would it be politically possible to detain him within a short period after his return to Cyprus without provoking the suspicion that our consent to his return had been merely a device to enable us to imprison him again.

The timing of the Archbishop’s re-entry into Cyprus would also need to be considered. If we were to gain the maximum of advantage from such a concession, it would be desirable that he should return to the Island in the near future, soon after the representative of the Turkish Government had arrived on 1st October. On the other hand it was doubtful whether public opinion was yet prepared for such a change in our attitude towards the Archbishop. Moreover, there was risk of confusion among the Cypriots about his status and functions if he was allowed to re-enter the Island shortly after the arrival of the representative of the Turkish Government. For these reasons it might be wiser to defer his return until the safeguards for the Turkish-Cypriot community which our plan incorporated had been fully established, i.e., until a date early in 1959.

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that it would be premature to seek to reach a decision on these issues without consulting the Turkish Government. It was unlikely that they would formally consent to the return of the Archbishop to Cyprus; but it might be possible to persuade them reluctantly to acquiesce in a concession which appeared to offer the only chance of enabling us to re-establish contact with the Greek-Cypriot community and to overcome Greek resistance to our plan. He had asked H.M. Chargé d’Affaires in Ankara for his personal assessment of the probable Turkish reaction to a proposal on our part to allow the Archbishop to return to Cyprus; and in the light of the reply to this enquiry he would consider what further action should be taken.

The Cabinet:——

Took note that the Prime Minister would give further consideration to the desirability of consulting the Government of Turkey about the proposal that
Archbishop Makarios and the other political exiles should be allowed to return to Cyprus.

235 CO 926/721, no 36 6 Feb 1959
[Cyprus: timing of the approach to a ‘final settlement’]: letter from Sir H Foot to J D Higham (CO)

I have just received your letter dated the 3rd February about the Brook Committee¹ and I have looked through the enclosures. I shall now study them more closely and let you know as soon as I can what comments I have to make.

I have concentrated for the moment on possibly the most awkward problem of all—whether or not to press on to an early hand-over.

There is a number of precedents, I think, to show that once a decision to hand-over to an independent government is made it is best to go ahead at top speed, so that no-one can have second thoughts or suggest that Great Britain is giving something grudgingly. On the other hand we all know that Cyprus is unique and I am not sure that any of the lessons learned elsewhere apply here. From the time I came back here, and indeed even before that, it seemed to me that the problems were so difficult that there must be a fairly long interim stage. I still think that we should press for a period of years during which the final settlement can be worked out and put into effect. The possibility of agreement between Greece and Turkey and between the two communities in the Island can certainly shorten the seven year period we have proposed, but nevertheless some substantial interval will be essential, so it seems to me. Moreover I believe that in our conditions once the decision in principle to set up an independent state has been taken and announced even the Cypriots will be anxious to take it easy. I almost said particularly the Cypriots. They have been pushing against this door for so long that they take it for granted that it is permanently closed, and it will be a great shock to them if it suddenly opens!

It would be best I think to go for a period of five years, being prepared to reduce it to three or even possibly two in negotiation with the others concerned. With the best will in the world it would be impossible to work out and put into effect and start working institutions of the kind referred to in paragraph 15 of the paper in less than a couple of years.

I have imagined that once the Foreign Secretaries have looked at the practical problems in all their complexity they would come to the same conclusion as we did and, while stating the final goal, agree to a considerable interim period. I have seen from recent comments by Averoff² that the Greeks are attracted by the idea of a quick settlement but they still have to consider all the practical difficulties, and I think that they may possibly swing back to favour a fair period before the final stage is reached.

Finally I refer back to what I have said before about the need to achieve an orderly hand-over to a workable system. We owe that to the Cypriots and we owe it to ourselves.

¹ Working Party on Smaller Colonial Territories: see document no 562 in Pt II.
² E Averoff, Greek minister of foreign affairs.
You will understand that this first comment is very hurried, but I did want to reinforce the plea I have put before for an interval leading to a final settlement rather than to spoil everything by being in too much of a hurry.3

Foot followed this letter up with one to Sir J Martin in which he stressed their overriding interest in getting agreement between Greece and Turkey, because the Cyprus dispute was harming the western alliance and terrible damage was being done to the British good name; there was the risk of a war between Greece and Turkey, with appalling results; if we seriously fell out with either or both our position would soon be untenable. He would put no faith in enclaves in an independent Cyprus (no 19 in the file, 19 Feb 1959).

236  CAB 128/33, CC 9(59)1  13 Feb 1959
[Cyprus: details of the agreement reached by Greek and Turkish prime ministers]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them a note by the Foreign Secretary (C. (59)25) to which was appended an unofficial translation of the original French text of the agreement on Cyprus reached by the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers at Zürich.

The Foreign Secretary said that this agreement comprised four documents—the first defining the “basic structure” of the proposed new Republic of Cyprus; the second containing a Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic and the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey; the third containing a Treaty of Alliance between the Republic and Greece and Turkey; the fourth comprising a “Gentleman’s Agreement” between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers on certain specific issues. These texts should be considered from three points of view—the continuing commitment which they entailed so far as concerned the United Kingdom; the extent to which they safeguarded our own interests in Cyprus; and their implications as regards the transfer of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to the new Republic.

The United Kingdom commitment

Under Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee we should be required, jointly with Greece and Turkey, to recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus and “the state of affairs prescribed by the fundamental articles of its constitution.” Under Article 3 we should undertake to consult with Greece and Turkey on the action to be taken if any of the provisions of the Treaty was infringed but should be authorised, if it proved impossible to reach agreement with the other two Governments, to take independent action “with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs laid down by the present Treaty.” It would appear to follow from these provisions that we should be accepting a commitment to guarantee a Greco-Turkish agreement (on the fundamental articles of the Constitution) which we had had no part in shaping. Moreover, a right to intervene in order to re-establish the “state of affairs” prescribed by the Treaty might be embarrassing if we had no control over the Government of the Republic and no assurance that they would in fact be able to implement the Constitution in a satisfactory manner or to maintain law and order. On the other hand, the Treaty represented an honest and courageous attempt to establish a balance between the conflicting Greek and Turkish interests in Cyprus; and it gave us the right—though
it imposed on us no obligation—to take independent action if we had reason to believe that this balance was in danger of being disturbed. In addition it bound us to safeguard the security of the Republic against external attack.

The United Kingdom interest in Cyprus

We should seek to ensure that our strategic interests in Cyprus would be safeguarded by incorporation in the Treaty of Guarantee—particularly since the Treaty was itself to be entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic and could not therefore be amended by any legislative act of the new State. Our requirements could be indicated in general terms to the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers as follows:—

(i) We should need to retain certain substantial areas under British sovereignty as permanent military bases.

(ii) We should need to retain control over other isolated sites throughout the Island. It might appear anomalous to insist that these small areas should remain under British sovereignty; and the alternative course of arranging for them to be held on lease was open to the objection that it was difficult to specify a satisfactory period for such a lease. It might therefore be preferable to rest on the fact that our right to occupy and use those sites would be specifically provided in the Treaty and would therefore be coterminous with it.

(iii) We should need facilities for access to the areas mentioned in paragraphs (i) and (ii) above, for transit between them, for the supply of stores and services and so forth. The guarantee of these facilities might be similarly incorporated in the text of the Treaty.

(iv) We should need the right to use the airfield at Nicosia. It might be difficult to insist that the main airfield in the island should be retained under British sovereignty; but it would be essential to ensure that we—and, if necessary, Greece and Turkey—would be authorised to use the airfield, without restriction, for both civil and military purposes.

(v) We should need a satisfactory assurance that, if our strategic requirements changed, we should be enabled to acquire alternative sites in any part of the Island.

The transfer of sovereignty

The agreement between the Greek and Turkish Governments envisaged that the Republic of Cyprus should be established not later than three months after the signature of the Treaties. But many administrative issues would need to be resolved before the new State could come into being; and, although there would be a psychological advantage in fixing a definite and early date for the transfer of power, it should be accepted that any date provisionally selected at this stage might need to be reconsidered in the light of developments.

The more important problems which would have to be solved in the interim were as follows:—

(vi) Would the Republic of Cyprus be a member of the Commonwealth and of the sterling area? It would not satisfy the criterion for full membership of the Commonwealth; and it might be more appropriate that its status should resemble that of the recently reconstituted State of Singapore. On the other hand, the psychological impact of the political settlement would be enhanced if we could welcome the suggestion by the Governments of Greece and Turkey that Cyprus
should remain within the Commonwealth. Further consideration would need to be given to the wording of any public statement on this subject which might be made when the terms of the political settlement were published.

In the short term Cyprus would probably be a liability rather than an asset to the sterling area; but the balance of advantage would probably lie in allowing it to remain a member.

(vii) The Republic would continue to require financial and economic support for some time. Its revenue might suffice to finance normal civil expenditure; but its development programmes would require external support. We should avoid accepting an indefinite commitment in this respect and should perhaps seek to arrange for the annual grants which we had hitherto made to the Government to be progressively reduced over a stated period.

(viii) The agreement reached between the Greek and Turkish Governments appeared to make no provision for the Cypriots, numbering about 10,000, who were of neither Greek nor Turkish nationality. It was, however, accepted by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey that suitable provisions should be adopted in order to safeguard the rights of these individuals.

(ix) Many other issues, including the important question of our civil aviation rights in Cyprus, would need to be examined in greater detail before the new State could effectively come into existence.

In addition, the “Gentleman’s Agreement” between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey envisaged that “immediately after the signature of the Treaties” all the emergency measures at present in force in Cyprus should be lifted and a general amnesty should be proclaimed. The timing of any relaxation of the emergency measures would need further consideration, and any amnesty would be dependent upon a corresponding willingness on the part of the terrorist organisations in Cyprus to suspend their activities and to surrender their arms.

In further discussion it was agreed that our objective should now be to concert with the Greek and Turkish Governments as rapidly as possible the text of a statement of intention to give effect to the agreement reached by the two Governments, of which our strategic requirements in Cyprus would be deemed to be an integral part. This statement of intention might be initialled by representatives of the three Governments on 16th February. Thereafter it should be initialled by leading representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, who should be invited to visit London on 18th February for this purpose. Archbishop Makarios has already been informed of the scope of the agreement between the Greek and Turkish Governments and was said to have endorsed it. It might be generally expected that he would now be allowed to return to Cyprus. There were obvious risks in this course. On the other hand, there was no evident reason why the ban against his return should be maintained when he had initialled the statement of intention, and there might be certain advantages in requiring him, in effect, to defend to the Greek Cypriot community his acceptance of an agreement which should terminate his efforts to promote the union of Cyprus with Greece.

It would be preferable to defer publication of the various agreements involved until they had been formally accepted by the three Governments and by the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Appropriate guidance should therefore be given to the Press during the next few days. It might also be desirable to consider transferring to 19th February the Parliamentary debate
on foreign affairs which had been arranged for 18th February, in order that Government spokesmen might take that opportunity to make a considered statement about the successful outcome of the Government's policy towards Cyprus.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Invited the Foreign Secretary to continue his discussions with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on the lines indicated in their discussion, with the objective of enabling the three Governments to initial on 16th February a statement of intention to give effect to the proposals for the future of Cyprus which had been prepared by the Greek and Turkish Governments, and to the reservation to the United Kingdom Government of such strategic facilities in the Island as they might regard as essential.

(2) Invited the Minister of Defence to prepare, for the purpose of the action to be taken under Conclusion (1) above, a statement of essential strategic requirements in Cyprus.

(3) Invited the Foreign Secretary to concert with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers appropriate arrangements for the detailed examination of the administrative issues which would need to be resolved before the Republic of Cyprus could come into being.

(4) Invited the Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with the Foreign Secretary, to consider the wording of a possible public statement about the association between the future Republic of Cyprus and the Commonwealth.

(5) Invited the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to arrange for appropriate guidance to be given to the Press on the lines indicated in their discussion.

(6) Invited the Home Secretary to consider whether it would be desirable for arrangements to be made to enable Cyprus to be discussed during the Parliamentary debate on foreign affairs in the following week.

237 CO 926/928 4–8 June 1959

[Assessing the handling of Archbishop Makarios]: CO minutes by J D Higham, Sir J Martin, Mr Amery and Lord Perth

... I think ... Sir John Martin should see the letter at (456), which is in reply to mine at (453). This tends to confirm the feeling I have had ever since Makarios failed to appoint a Left Wing Minister and was apparently compelled by Eoka pressure to change the whole complexion of his Cabinet. Makarios's more recent failure to condemn the Ayios Ambroios murder; the Dervis attacks on the whole settlement, on the Greek Government, on municipal separation in particular; and the intervention of Grivas, confirm my feeling that Makarios is not an effective leader, and that in the last resort, whatever his good intentions, he may be unable to control his public and in the long run will be faced with the alternative of going along with his extremist Right Wing and becoming their puppet, or of getting out while the going is good ...

4. When I was in Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot told me that he was convinced of Makarios’s sincerity in operating the transition from colonial to Agreement rule. He said that Makarios never at any time questioned the Governor’s ultimate authority and was not attempting to take the line so common in situations of this kind that the
days of British power were numbered and that it was the new rulers who were masters even during the transitional period. The Governor had the impression that Makarios who had for so many years been surrounded by bad advisers who were in large measure responsible for his short-sighted and even nefarious actions, was positively eager to discuss his policies and opinions with someone whom he felt to be his interested adviser. I think there is probably a great deal in this view, but while the Governor’s influence is bound to do some good, Makarios is not sufficiently a dynamic leader to prevent him following the course which the most powerful elements in his following urge on him. . . .

J.D.H.
4.6.59

Since his return to Cyprus the Archbishop has been much better in his dealings with us as representative of the Greek-Cypriots than we could have dared to hope in the light of previous experience. But he is riding a tiger and he is still the same person who wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1955—“I am sincerely afraid that an official condemnation of events by myself would not find at the present stage the necessary response, but would involve the risk of exposing me rather unprofitably.” It does not follow that we should try to bolster him up by “making concessions” to ease his path as a leader who follows, but it would be disastrous if he were displaced by the wild men and it is obviously necessary not to make his position impossibly difficult e.g. by pitching our demands for military rights too high. Where there is a dispute we have an appeal to the authors of the Zürich Agreement, on whose good faith we can rely, but even they cannot enforce anything going beyond what public opinion in Cyprus can be brought to swallow.

J.M.M.
5.6.59

It is probably our interest to cooperate with Makarios and to make his path as easy as we can afford to. But:

(a) the London agreements represented the maximum possible concessions to Greek Cypriot opinion which we can afford to make, if Cyprus is to be of real use to us. There is no room for further concessions of substance.
(b) If Makarios is a weak leader and the prisoner of EOKA, it will in any case be no use making concessions to him. He will not be in a position to deliver the goods.

2. The Governor inclines to a gloomy view of the future. If he is right, the first principle of our policy now, as in the emergency, must be to keep in with the Turks—both in Turkey and in the island.
3. Meanwhile we should press on with (a) tabling our demands as to sovereign enclaves and other military requirements and (b) deciding and announcing what financial aid we can expect to give to Cyprus.
4. We have already waited overlong in tabling our military demands and the going will tend to grow stiffer the longer we delay. The announcement of what we have to give should be presumably be timed to soften the impact of what we have to ask.

J.A.
8.6.59
I agree Mr Amery’s minute; of course 3(a) & (b) need careful handling; (a) must be reasonable to the Turkish (& Greek?) Govt; (b) announcement of financial help may need to be in two parts, one soon one later.\footnote{Mr Lennox-Boyd minuted: 'I agree A.L-B. 10.6.59'}

P.
8.6.59

\footnote{Mr Lennox-Boyd minuted: 'I agree A.L-B. 10.6.59'}

\textbf{238} \quad \textbf{CAB 128/34, CC 3(60)2} \quad 26 Jan 1960

\textit{[Report on the course of negotiations with the Cypriot representatives]: Cabinet conclusions}

The Foreign Secretary made a report to the Cabinet about the course of the negotiations with the Cypriot representatives. The exact details of the United Kingdom’s requirements for the proposed sovereign areas had not yet been disclosed to them, though the Greek and Turkish Governments knew what our final position would be. Considerable progress had been made in the negotiations about sites and facilities, though certain points regarding training facilities, the control of Nicosia airfield, and the use of air space over Cyprus remained to be settled. The Cypriot representatives had been provided with a statement of our intention to permit or invite the authorities of the Republic to operate certain local administrative services in the sovereign areas; it was understood that this would not derogate from the principle of United Kingdom sovereignty in these areas, but he proposed to seek the confirmation of the Lord Chancellor on this point. Negotiations had also continued about a number of miscellaneous financial provisions, and he would seek to safeguard the position on all of these in reaching a final settlement. As regards financial assistance, the Cypriots had asked for a substantial but unspecified immediate capital grant, together with an annual grant of £3 millions in return for the retention of the sovereign areas and the use of sites and facilities in the Republic.

In view of the importance of securing a satisfactory settlement, he thought it would be advisable to increase the amount of financial assistance which we had hitherto been prepared to afford. The offer that had been made of Commonwealth assistance loans of £5–£6 millions for specific projects was not particularly attractive to the Cypriot representatives. While it would be best to leave this offer open, it would be necessary, in order to reach a settlement, to be prepared to make available a total grant of £8 millions, or even £10 millions in the last resort. The extent to which the Cypriot authorities could draw on this grant year by year could be restricted. A sum of £3 millions for the first year might be appropriate, but this should include £500,000 to be paid specifically to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, who had benefited less than the Greek Cypriots in the division of certain assets.

He proposed, if possible, to make clear to Archbishop Makarios what the final United Kingdom position was on all the above matters, including the amount of financial assistance, before the Archbishop returned to Cyprus, as he planned to do on the following day. That would allow the Archbishop about a week in which to reply, since the Bill to provide for the establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus on 19th March would have to be published on about 4th February.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that it was extremely difficult to contemplate financial assistance on the scale now suggested, especially if this was to be in addition to the loan assistance which had already been offered. There was no economic justification for any assistance by way of grant, and it would be an undesirable precedent to link assistance to the provision of defence facilities. It would hardly be possible, in view of the Estimates position, to accommodate this expenditure in the financial year 1960–61. If any payment by way of grant had to be made, it would be preferable for a large proportion of it to be paid before the end of the current financial year. It was also essential that any continuing payment should taper off over the next few years, and it might be necessary to insist on a longer period than five years. He was, however, unable to decide what assistance could be afforded without further consideration.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) Financial assistance on the scale now suggested would be an embarrassing precedent in future negotiations with colonial territories whose case for assistance might be more deserving. On the other hand, the circumstances of the Cyprus settlement were peculiar, and the defence facilities which we would enjoy were extensive and valuable.

(b) It was suggested that, if financial assistance were made available in return for the defence facilities, it would not be realistic to expect the assistance to be terminated after a few years. On the other hand, that might be the time when Commonwealth assistance loans would become of value to the Cypriot authorities.

The Home Secretary summing up, said that a satisfactory settlement was of the highest importance, not only for political reasons, but in the interests of international relations and world peace. Despite the financial difficulties, the Cabinet hoped that, if it was necessary in order to reach a settlement which safeguarded our essential interests, some additional financial assistance might be possible, even if this meant curtailing other expenditure. On the other hand, it was difficult to accommodate additional expenditure in the next financial year. It would therefore be necessary for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consultation with the Foreign Secretary, to consider to what extent and by what means the need to provide additional financial assistance for Cyprus could be met.

The Cabinet:

Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consultation with the Foreign Secretary, to consider to what extent and by what means the need to provide additional financial assistance for Cyprus could be met.

1 Mr D Heathcoat Armory. 2 Mr R A Butler.
financial aid to Cyprus. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies had already offered £10 millions, spread over five years, by way of general aid to the new Republic, plus a grant of £1 million for the Turkish Cypriots; and he had been authorised to offer a further payment of £½ million for Nicosia airfield. Archbishop Makarios was demanding £16 millions for general aid plus a total of £3.44 millions comprising the grant to the Turkish Cypriots, the payments for Nicosia airfield, the rehousing of such of the inhabitants of Akrotiri as wished to leave the village and the construction of a by-pass road. In order to achieve a settlement, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State now sought authority to offer a general grant of £13 millions (including, if possible, £½ million for Nicosia airport and £1½ millions for the Turkish Cypriots) plus specific payments amounting to £.84 million—a total of £13.84 millions or, if the grants for the Turkish Cypriots and Nicosia airfield could not be included within the general grant, £15.84 millions.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he had always regarded the retention of military bases in Cyprus as more of a strategic liability than an asset; and he was sorry that we had got ourselves into a position in which we were exposed to the pressures which Archbishop Makarios was now applying. He recognised that at this stage a settlement must be reached. But the figures now under discussion were alarming; and he felt obliged to express his disquiet at the tendency for countries attaining independence to expect continuing financial support from the United Kingdom.

The Colonial Secretary said that the grants now envisaged for Cyprus were out of scale with the level of assistance which we should be likely to give to other dependent territories which were more deserving of assistance. They could not fail to embarrass him in dealing with pending applications from Kenya, Singapore and Mauritius.

In discussion it was generally agreed that this opportunity of achieving a settlement in Cyprus must not be missed. We could not accept either of the alternatives—to continue to govern the Island, with the risk of renewed violence on a large scale, or to withdraw from it altogether. The problem of Cyprus was more international than Colonial: the objective of our policy in Cyprus over the last few years had been to avoid war in the Eastern Mediterranean. This distinguished Cyprus from other Colonial territories nearing independence. Even so, it was important that the price which we paid for a settlement should be no higher than was absolutely necessary.

In discussion of the tactics to be followed in the negotiations, a number of alternatives were considered. It was finally agreed that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State should be authorised to offer £12 millions spread over five years by way of general aid and that he should try to secure agreement that this figure should include the grant of £1½ millions to the Turkish Cypriots and the payment of £½ million for Nicosia airfield. He might offer in addition specific payments amounting to £.84 million. If he could not achieve a settlement at this figure, he could improve his offer up to a limit of £14.84 millions, but he should not go beyond that figure without seeking further instructions.

The Cabinet:

Invited the Foreign Secretary, in consultation with the Colonial Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to draw up instructions for the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies on the conduct of further negotiations on the amount of financial aid to Cyprus on the lines approved in their discussion.
The Cabinet were informed that the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus had now indicated their agreed desire that the Republic of Cyprus should become a member of the Commonwealth. They had asked that the United Kingdom Government should ascertain informally whether the other members of the Commonwealth were likely to look favourably on an application from Cyprus for Commonwealth membership. It was known that some of the member Governments might question whether Cyprus could properly be considered to be fully independent, in view of her special relations with Greece and Turkey; and it would be desirable on that account that the new Republic should first apply for membership of the United Nations, so that its international status would have been determined by an independent body before its application for Commonwealth membership was formally considered.

Discussion showed that there was general agreement in the Cabinet that it would be preferable that Cyprus should apply for membership of the United Nations before submitting a formal application for membership of the Commonwealth. There was also general agreement in the Cabinet that, once Cyprus had become a member of the United Nations, the member countries of the Commonwealth would find it difficult to oppose her application for Commonwealth membership. So far as the United Kingdom Government was concerned, a decision by an independent Cyprus to remain within the Commonwealth would be a final vindication of the Government's recent policy in respect of Cyprus. For this reason it was likely that a majority of Government supporters in Parliament would favour the admission of Cyprus to Commonwealth membership—though there would be some who would see disadvantage in this course, and there was some risk of an open division of opinion among Government supporters on this issue.

The Cabinet:

(1) Invited the Colonial Secretary to suggest to the Cypriot leaders that, after independence, they should first apply for membership of the United Nations before submitting any formal application for Commonwealth membership; but authorised him to add that, in the meantime, the United Kingdom Government would make informal enquiries to ascertain what attitude other member Governments of the Commonwealth were likely to take towards an application by Cyprus for Commonwealth membership.

(2) Authorised the Commonwealth Secretary to take informal soundings among other Commonwealth Governments as contemplated in Conclusion (1) above.

1 See also on this issue, document no 532 (27 Apr 1960), in Part II.
Makarios is so frightened that he will agree to work the Constitution as it is but I
doubt it. The Turks cannot agree to change because any alteration would put their
minority at a disadvantage.

It seems likely then that any Constitutional Conference will end in deadlock and
that the only possible solution will be partition.

If things turn out that way there will be no need for Guarantors and our presence
in the Island for any reason other than our own military convenience would be
superfluous.

What are our military needs? I suppose that the main one is to enable the
Canberras to cover Iran in the event of nuclear attack by Russia or as possibly a
staging post to the Near or Middle East. They seem rather thin.

I should like to see this re-examined urgently by the Chiefs of Staff. I should value
your thoughts.

242  CAB 128/31/1, CC 38(57)7  6 May 1957
[Malta: future policy]: Cabinet conclusions

[The prime minister of Malta, Mr Dom[inic] Mintoff, leader of the Maltese Labour Party,
was unco-operative in negotiations over the economic future, and Lennox–Boyd
suggested consideration of a phased integration of Malta with the UK (C(57)98), to which
Mintoff was not averse in principle. At a Cabinet meeting on 17 Apr 1957, the Lord
Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, said it ‘would be unwise to reject any opportunity of
encouraging a dependent territory to seek to develop a closer relationship with the United
Kingdom’, and the idea was carefully examined (CAB 128/31/1, CC 35(57)6). The Maltese
themselves in a referendum held in Feb 1956 had voted 76% for integration with Britain
and representation at Westminster, but the turn-out was only 44%. Negotiations broke
down in Mar 1958, both the governing Labour Party and the Opposition party, led by Dr
Borg Olivier, demanding independence.]

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (57) 113)
about the basis on which constitutional negotiations with the Maltese Government
should be resumed, together with a memorandum by the Minister of Defence, (C.
(57) 114) summarising his discussion of defence economies with the Maltese Prime
Minister during his recent visit to Malta.

The Colonial Secretary said that, if the Maltese Government were not prepared to
accept the offer of constitutional and economic development which we had made
during the recent negotiations, the suggestion that the political and economic
aspects of integration should be explored in successive stages was preferable to either
of the alternative courses which now appeared to be open to us, i.e., to rest on the
present dyarchy or to abandon integration and to allow Malta to become independent
subject to the conclusion of a defence agreement with the United Kingdom. On this
assumption we should now offer the Maltese Government a choice between, on the
one hand, the proposals for integration which we had put forward during the recent
negotiations and, on the other hand, interim arrangements designed to cover a
period of five years, at the end of which the two Governments would give further
consideration to the future of Malta. These arrangements would re-incorporate the
constitutional proposals which we had already put forward, subject to the exclusion
of Maltese representation at Westminster but with the possible additional concession
that Malta should be regarded as one of the British Isles which did not enjoy
representation in the United Kingdom Parliament. They would also renew the economic proposals which we had already made, although we should need to define with caution the extent to which we should be prepared to provide financial assistance in the event of severe unemployment developing in Malta as a result of the defence economies.

In discussion the following points were made:—

(a) The Maltese Government would show themselves unmindful of their own interests if, after their recent discussion with the Minister of Defence about the impact of the defence economies on Malta, they did not accept our offer of integration with the United Kingdom.

(b) On the other hand, we should not sacrifice the benefits to be gained from the defence economies by undertaking extensive commitments in relief of unemployment in Malta or by diverting to Malta defence work which could more economically be carried out in United Kingdom establishments. It was important that the Maltese Government should clearly understand that we intended to implement the economies which we had announced, and that, although we would co-operate with them in mitigating the effects as far as possible, we could not undertake to guarantee that Malta should be wholly insulated from the consequences.

(c) Nevertheless, if severe unemployment developed in Malta, we should be under a strong moral obligation to assist the Island to deal with the social and economic problems which would arise.

(d) Our new offer should be presented as a final effort to conclude discussions in which we had already treated Malta with great generosity. It should not be allowed to become the starting point of a new round of negotiations in which we should be expected to make further concessions to Malta.

(e) The final agreement with the Maltese Government would be embodied in an exchange of letters, the wording of which would need to be carefully considered by the Malta Committee.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Approved, subject to the points made in their discussion, the proposals in C. (57) 113.

(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to submit, for consideration by the Malta Committee, the text of the exchange of letters in which the final agreement with the Maltese Government would be embodied.

243 CAB 128/31/2, CC 43(57)9 29 May 1957

[Malta: negotiations about future constitutional and economic development]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet were informed of recent developments in the negotiations with the Maltese Government about the future constitutional and economic development of Malta.

The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs said that the Maltese Government had
again rejected the proposals for integration and had described the suggested alternative of interim arrangements covering the next five years as such a radical departure from previous policy that they would need to consult the Maltese people about them. They proposed therefore to publish, on 4th June, a White Paper on the recent negotiations. The Malta Committee had recommended that an immediate reply should be sent to the Maltese Government, expressing regret at their continued rejection of the proposals for integration, denying that the alternative arrangements represented any change in policy, and asking that publication of the Maltese White Paper should be deferred in order that the United Kingdom Government could prepare a White Paper for simultaneous publication in this country. The Governor of Malta considered that the Prime Minister of Malta might now demand independence for the Island, and that, in this event, he might obtain the support of the other local political Parties.

In discussion it was agreed that, if the Maltese Government were not prepared to postpone the publication of their White Paper, it would be necessary that the United Kingdom White Paper should also be published on 4th June. It would therefore be desirable to bring forward, to the following day, the meeting between the Prime Minister and the Labour Party members of the former Round Table Conference on Malta, in order to avoid any impression that the Government had reached a final decision before these members had been consulted.

In further discussion it was suggested that the alternative offer which we had made to the Maltese Government, involving substantial assistance from the United Kingdom Exchequer during an interim period of five years, might be more readily accepted by public opinion as a reasonable response to the Maltese demand for “economic equivalence” if it was coupled with some definite action on our part to foster the development of the Island and to increase the productivity of its industries. We might therefore offer to appoint an eminent industrialist or a small expert committee to encourage the establishment of new industries in Malta and to advise and assist the Maltese Government in the economic expansion of Malta during the interim period. This individual, or committee, could be asked to report on the progress achieved at the end of the five years, so that the two Governments could consider whether a reasonable degree of “economic equivalence” was practicable in the event of integration. The terms of reference for this task would need, however, to be carefully defined in order to preclude the Maltese Government from using the enquiry merely to assess the amount of subsidy required by Malta in order to achieve “equivalence” with the United Kingdom. An offer on these lines should be made forthwith to the Maltese Government, and the proposal should either be mentioned, if possible, in the forthcoming United Kingdom White Paper, or be announced as rapidly as possible thereafter.

Strategically, Malta was no longer essential as a naval base, and the implications of this fact could be made plain to the Maltese Government if they eventually declared a policy of independence of the United Kingdom. It would be important, however, that we should not allow the discussions with the Maltese Government to reach this point until we had clearly demonstrated that we had taken every reasonable step to satisfy their demands.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Invited the Colonial Secretary to arrange for a proposal on the lines agreed in discussion to be put to the Maltese Government.
(2) Invited the Lord Chancellor, in consultation with the Colonial Secretary, to take account of the points raised in discussion in the preparation of the White Paper to be published in this country on the recent negotiations with the Maltese Government.

244 CO 967/337, PM(58)62 25 Nov 1958

[Record of a meeting with Mr Mintoff about Maltese independence]: minute to Mr Macmillan by Mr Lennox-Boyd

I had a second meeting today with Mintoff and his delegation, at which I explained why I could not consider his demand for immediate independence as a basis for further discussion. I laid most emphasis on Malta’s heavy dependence on us for her livelihood and on the disastrous economic consequences of a severance of her ties with us. I purposely played down our defence interests, saying that in the hypothetical circumstances of independence there would be no prospects of our defence needs being adequately met in Malta and that it was highly unlikely in these circumstances that NATO would remain there either. I concluded by saying that it was apparent that, if H.M.G. were now to support a claim for complete independence, they would be condemning the Maltese people to appalling poverty, mass unemployment and the extremes of hardship. To do so would be completely contrary to our declared policy and would be regarded by the world as an irresponsible abnegation of our duties. Defence considerations apart, therefore, we saw no alternative in present circumstances to the maintenance of U.K. sovereignty over Malta in the interests of the Maltese people themselves. I went on to say that we were prepared, in addition to providing capital for the dockyard transfer, to continue to give Malta substantial capital assistance and to encourage the development of new industries; and that we were ready to introduce a constitution which would give Malta the highest degree of self-government consistent with our defence requirements and our obligations for the well-being and economic progress of the Maltese people.

2. Mintoff argued about the extent of our defence interests and tried to get me to say—which I refused to do—that we were turning down his demand for independence because we needed Malta as a base. When he saw that I was determined to leave him stuck with his own ridiculous demand, he tried to argue that, having presented his proposals, he should now be given ours. He refused to be convinced that his demand for immediate independence rendered useless any further discussion of constitutional arrangements based on the need, as we saw it, for continuing the present relationship between Malta and the U.K. Although I took the opportunity to emphasise that the form of constitution we had had in mind was an interim one and that it did not preclude independence some time in the future, if the conditions necessary for it were satisfied, I refused to put any detailed proposals to him and said firmly that there was no point in my doing so with his demand on the table. Mintoff made no move towards withdrawing his demand and I avoided asking him to do so. Instead I adjourned the meeting with the suggestion that he should consider what I had said again when the minutes were available and that if after that he wished to have a further meeting I should be very ready to see him again.
3. I think it is clear that Mintoff’s demand for independence was an opening bid which he did not expect us to accept but by which he hoped to raise the price against us and to retain the initiative. Having then heard our proposals, he would measure them against his own and, if he thought he could get away with it, reject them as being unacceptable to the Maltese people. This afternoon he was obviously jockeying to get us into that position. I think we successfully prevented him from doing so.

4. Although none of his delegation spoke up against him, some seemed uneasy and worried, especially the members of the General Workers Union who are over here for separate talks with the Admiralty and whom I agreed he might include in his delegation. The impression I was left with when the meeting adjourned was that Mintoff will not, as he threatened to, consider the Conference at an end but will ask for a further meeting. With this in mind I offered a discussion on the dockyard. We cannot, however, exclude the possibility that he will break off the talks and publish his own version of his reasons for doing so. I shall be ready with a statement of our case against that eventuality. It would, I think, stand up well to criticism in the press or in Parliament.

245 CO 926/797, no 17 [26]Sept–30 Oct 1959
[Malta: the dilemmas of attempting to restore elective government]:
CO minutes by N B J Huijsman, J O Moreton, and E Melville

[Mintoff resigned as prime minister in Mar 1958 to lead the Malta Liberation Movement. Protest led to the suspension of the constitution in 1959, and assumption of direct rule, after the Leader of the Opposition, Dr Borg Olivier, refused to form a caretaker government.]

… as I assume that [a restoration of elected government to Malta] would probably involve an advance beyond 1947,¹ I take it that it would not be very much out of place to look at the Maltese constitutional problem in terms of what our ultimate aims should be. …

3. I have hesitated to put forward any specific nostrum because it seems to me to be rather early days for such an exercise. Furthermore, I doubt whether my suggestions would be of much value, or would be unbiased. My only close contact with Malta and the Maltese has, I am afraid, led me to appreciate the delicate irony rather than the generosity of His late Majesty’s gift to the Islands;² it follows that my own hope is that integration will not be revived. The difference between the two peoples, and the distance between them are too great for anything but the loosest link between them to be desirable, or, I think, practicable. We tend to underestimate the differences between the Maltese and ourselves, in our desire to give the Maltese a square deal. Malta’s superficially European characteristics are the work of the Catholic Church, whose great triumph has been to impose on the Maltese an European code of morality and behaviour. With the increasing secularisation of Maltese life however—which our development, T.V., and other plans will do much to hasten—the moral discipline of the Catholic Church will increasingly tend to be

¹ The self-governing constitution of 1947 provided for a unicameral legislature elected by proportional representation. Defence, civil aviation, currency, immigration and nationality were all reserved to the governor acting for the British government.
² ie, the George Cross for civilian bravery in war.
ignored and the Maltese Urgeist (hitherto only displayed in full flower by Mr Mintoff and several of his associates) will, I fear, tend to regain the upper hand.

4. Leaving aside personal antipathies, I doubt whether integration would in the long run be any more successful than any other constitutional arrangement not giving the Maltese 100% of what they want — i.e. complete control over their destinies, preferably with someone else footing the bill. The cultivated classes in Malta may deplore the idea of sovereign independence, but in the century of the mass vote they do not count. It is the aspirations of the thousands of Maltese men in the street which will determine the future attitude of the Maltese people, and it would be a mistake to assume that they are any more immune than other Arabs to nationalism. We cannot count on an identity of views between them and the United Kingdom on the latter's defence rights in Malta, nor should we delude ourselves into thinking that there is a fundamental affection for the British connection among the Maltese clerks and artisans; the noted Maltese loyalty to the Crown has a certain element of cupboard love in it. For these reasons I feel that any future constitutional arrangements which do not hold out the prospect of full sovereignty within the foreseeable future will eventually break down, not because Mr Mintoff and his like cannot be trusted to work such arrangements, but because Mr Mintoff and his associates represent the broad aspirations of the Maltese people and will continue to be put into office to realise them. In other words Mr Mintoff is only a political problem because he has the backing of the Maltese masses.

N. B. J. H.
[26].9.59

... 2. The basic thought underlying Mr. Huijsman’s thesis is that full sovereignty has always been the aim of the Maltese and that nothing less will work. Against this background he examines possible solutions, but it is axiomatic that since all of them, in order to meet our defence requirements, fall short of full independence, none of them can be regarded as fully satisfactory. As a preliminary, a reversion to dyarchy is ruled out as leading to too much friction; and so also is the physical separation of local and imperial interests in enclaves as being impracticable. The remaining choices involve in the final analysis the subordination of Maltese to imperial defence interests. Advanced colonial status is thought to be unacceptable to the Maltese since it can only be expected to work as a stepping stone to full independence, which would not be the case in Malta. Commonwealth Statehood, with a local representative of H.M.G. responsible for dealing with the Malta Government on matters reserved to H.M.G., is not ruled out. Independence within or without the Commonwealth with a defence and foreign affairs agreement, has attractions provided it can be squared with our defence needs. Lastly, some form of closer association with the U.K. would, if complete, be unlikely to satisfy Maltese aspirations when seen in the historical perspective of their need to assert a Maltese personality; and if something less than this, would remain a continuing source of friction.

3. Since Mr. Hammer’s minute of the 2nd March on this file, the Working Party of officials has, as you will know, prepared a report for the Colonial Policy Committee on the future of the smaller colonial territories (CPC(59)7). I have placed opposite a note summarising the concept of Commonwealth Statehood advocated in the paper.

3 See document no 563, in Part II.
The Working Party were, however, doubtful about its suitability for Malta, since it offered little more than the 1947 Constitution, and its attraction in Maltese eyes would be lessened through its being of general applicability to other territories, in particular African ones. The report has not yet been considered by Ministers and clearly their decisions on it will have the closest bearing on future constitutional proposals for Malta.

4. The reading I have so far done tends to confirm Mr. Huijsman’s thesis that the Maltese have all along been consistent in their aim to achieve full sovereignty. I am, however, bound to point out that over the space of many hundreds of years they have not succeeded in doing a great deal about it. The fact remains that we are in a clear dilemma. Last December Ministers accepted the Ministry of Defence recommendation that our defence interests in Malta could not be safeguarded by an agreement with an independent Malta, with the consequence that within the foreseeable future external defence must be reserved to H.M.G. in the Constitution. But so long as there is this limitation on full Maltese sovereignty, whatever constitutional devices are dreamed up, there can be nothing but uneasiness and friction. (I have placed opposite the text of the Secretary of State’s statement to the Malta Constitutional Conference last December, which is the latest authoritative edict on Malta’s future and our defence requirements).

5. I am forced to the view that it is very difficult to see how we could get Maltese political parties to accept any constitutional proposals which would meet our defence needs, especially if we were to insist as well—as we did last December—on retaining safeguards for the police and public service. But if this is so, one is compelled to ask how long it will be possible to sustain direct rule. It is after all like keeping a cork in a bottle while all the time pressures are generating inside it, and the longer one waits the greater those pressures become. The time may thus well come when our insistence on defence needs being met by full sovereignty will be self-defeating. If the Maltese are united against us and there are strikes and riots with universal support for Mr. Mintoff, the strategic value of the island will be lost.

6. I would draw two provisional conclusions from all this.

(a) We must keep a very sensitive finger on the political pulse in Malta and watch closely for any danger signals showing the alienation of the moderates or a significant increase in support for Mr. Mintoff; and also for any hint of fuller cooperation in the sort of Constitution we are aiming at from other parties.

(b) We should keep under constant review exactly what our defence needs are in the Island and whether they must be equated with full sovereignty. If changes in defence policy and the world situation would enable us to rely on a defence agreement with an independent Malta, possibly linked with financial support, that might well prove to be the answer.

7. Like Mr. Huijsman, I have not discussed how we should reach any of these goals—i.e. the mechanics of switching from direct rule to representative government. I should like to give further thought to this and to the preparation of a paper for Ministers, putting up more positive recommendations on our constitutional aims, after I have been to Malta and had the chance of discussing all this with the Governor and his advisers on the spot.

J.O.M.
19.10.59
... The dilemma, for H.M.G., is clear. If—as I think we must assume—we still have a strategic need for Malta as a base (not a base in Malta), then we cannot risk negotiations on independence—at any rate without safeguards which, if they are to be effective, will be regarded by the Maltese politicians who count as intolerable restrictions on their independence. In this connection I see no future in the concept of a defence treaty relationship on the lines discussed in Mr. Huijsman's paper. We should, under Mintoff at any rate, subject ourselves thereby to constant blackmail of an even more dangerous kind than we experienced in the integration talks. On the other hand, as Mr. Huijsman's paper shows, there is little prospect of getting agreement of either of the main Maltese parties in any constitutional arrangement, short of independence, which would give us the necessary security in Malta as a base, far less fulfil the "fair play" undertakings to which we are, morally at least, committed (control of police, civil service and broadcasting through some authority independent of Maltese political pressures).

But, if the dilemma is clear, the way out is not. Indeed it is hard to see how we could get talks started again, even if we wanted that, without giving way on some principle or principles which seem to us to be vital.

My own view, at the moment, is that we should "soldier on" for a bit longer. I do not believe that we can gain much credit by doing so, in the economic or in any other field; but I don't believe that we must necessarily lose ground or that, beneath the surface, serious disruptive movements are being encouraged. The truth is, I think, that at least half the politically active population—and much more than half of the thinking people—are grateful for this respite from political strife, backbiting and undemocratic pressures from within the Government. They cannot, and will not, give up the aspiration of self-government—possibly independence—with financial aid from outside. But they are prepared to dream about that for a bit longer, freed from the bickerings, the responsibilities and the uncertainties which constitutional self-government has always brought them.

If this view is right, it does not, of course, mean that we should sit back smugly and let events take their course. We must, as Mr. Moreton says, keep our finger on the pulse so as to be ready to seize and maintain any new initiative that becomes possible. But I do not see that we can gain much by an over-elaboration now of possible alternative courses of action in circumstances which we might judge to be favourable for a new initiative. When the moment is opportune, we shall know within fairly precise limits what choices are open to us and will be able to decide, in the light of the circumstances at the time, on the tactics we should adopt with the local political parties.

E.M.
26.10.59

[This] was discussed at a meeting in Sir J. Martin's room yesterday. Mr Melville, Mr Vile, Mr Moreton, Mr Downie and myself attended.

The discussion confirmed that for the present the defence interest—which is an UK and not primarily a NATO interest—in Malta must continue to govern HMG's policy towards Malta. Under these circumstances the prospects of agreement between the Maltese political parties and HMG seems remote. Furthermore, the development of Maltese political ambitions suggests that we cannot, as on previous occasions, count on the device of a Maltese National Assembly both to gain time and to provide HMG with an acceptable, or at any rate discussable draft constitution.
The meeting agreed that perhaps it would be best to allow the interim constitution to operate for some time longer so as to enable the practical reforms in Malta to be prosecuted, and UK policy, especially in the defence field, to develop, but to keep a close watch on Maltese public opinion.

N.B.J.H.
30.10.59

246  PREM 11/3870  8 Feb 1961

[Defence interests in Malta and the report of the Constitutional Commission (chairman, Sir H Blood)\(^1\): minute by Mr Macleod to Mr Watkinson (MoD)]

Our officials and the Chiefs of Staff have been discussing the Report of the Malta Constitutional Commission and I am now circulating my recommendations to the Cabinet, but it may help if I give you in more detail my views on some questions relating to our defence interests.

2. I understand that the Chiefs of Staff have grave misgivings as to whether the kind of constitution the Blood Commission has recommended would adequately safeguard our defence requirements in Malta. I am under no illusions as to the difficulty of working any constitution in Malta; but we must make a move forward and it seems to me that the Blood Commission has done a good job in producing, within fairly tight terms of reference, proposals, which stand a chance of bringing about elections. I have no doubt that we shall be in for a trying time in dealing, on defence as on other matters, with whatever Maltese Government takes office and that we shall have to exercise a full measure of vigilance and patience to preserve a tolerable relationship. But I do not share the concern of the Chiefs of Staff that a constitution based upon the Commission’s proposals would not adequately meet our essential military requirements.

3. As for the future, I am well aware of your views that our defence requirements can only be met by retaining sovereignty. I consider however, that I must say something now to make it clear that ultimate self-determination is not excluded and indeed hold out some hope of advancement, conditional upon satisfactory operation of the Blood Constitution. I think the proposed form of words in Annex ‘B’ of the Cabinet paper is the minimum that I can say to make any effect at all in Malta.\(^2\)

4. The proposal that the United Kingdom and Malta should have concurrent jurisdiction in matters of defence is, from the point of view of presentation, the lynch-pin of our case. But the abolition of “reserved matters” over which (as in the 1947 Constitution) the Maltese have no jurisdiction should not, in my view and that of the Governor, result in any less effective U.K. control in the defence field. The responsibility for defence will remain firmly with the U.K. The interpretation of


\(^2\) ‘It is of course no part of Her Majesty’s Government’s policy to deny to the Maltese people the right to determine for themselves their own destiny in association we hope with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth family. But the immediate aim must be the restoration of elections and a substantial measure of self-government’.
“defence” will rest with us alone—this is in fact an advance on the 1947 position from the defence point of view. The Head of State will be required to reserve for approval in London any Bills affecting or appearing to us to affect the discharge of our defence responsibilities. Further, the fact that the Maltese Parliament will have competence to legislate over the defence field will help to reduce the area of friction between H.M.G. and the Maltese Government to matters which are actually in dispute. The arrangement whereby the U.K. Commissioner will have both legislative and executive powers overriding those of the Maltese Government is different in form, but not in substance, from the Singapore arrangement, where, you will recall, the local Legislature alone is competent to legislate on defence matters. (There is no machinery of concurrent legislation in Singapore and our long-stop control is suspension of the Constitution).

5. I have asked the Governor whether he considers that the U.K. Commissioner is likely to find himself unable to get his decisions implemented owing to the difficulty of getting the Maltese civil service and police to conform. His view is that the U.K. Commissioner will be in no worse position than the Governor under the old diarchy. Indeed, in so far as the provisions for an independent Public Service Commission and for taking ultimate control of the Police out of the hands of Maltese Ministers encourage the public service to resist improper pressures from local Ministers, the Commissioner should be in a stronger position than previous Governors.

6. As in Singapore, internal security will be the responsibility of local Ministers; but there will be no ‘Internal Security Council’ procedure. In Malta there is not, of course, the same problem of subversion as in Singapore, nor is there a third party who could take on the role of the Federation of Malaya in an Internal Security Council. Especially so long as a non-Maltese Head of State retains ultimate responsibility for the police, the U.K. Commissioner’s power to intervene by legislation and executive action in internal security matters affecting our defence interests will give us in practice in many ways a stronger position in Malta than we have in Singapore in relation to internal security.

7. One point that has been raised is that our right under a new constitution to occupy, acquire and use defence facilities (including new land acquisition) should be placed beyond doubt in the constitution. It is certainly my intention that this should be done in terms similar to those used in the case of Singapore.

8. Concern was also expressed that there should be provision in the new constitution whereby Maltese civil legislation adversely affecting our defence interests should not be binding on the Crown in the right of the United Kingdom or on Visiting Forces. I quite see the need for some such safeguard but I am not satisfied that the various alternatives discussed by officials would be satisfactory and I should like more time to consider the best way of solving this problem.

9. One of the points not covered by the Constitutional Commission concerns the calling out of troops in aid of the Civil Power or for the protection of defence installations, and their being safeguarded against the consequences of actions performed in the course of duty. This is not the sort of matter which is normally dealt with in a constitution, but I see the need for an agreed procedure. It seems to me, given the general similarity between the Singapore Constitution and the proposals drawn up by the Constitutional Commission for Malta, that there is no reason why the procedure evolved for Singapore should not, with such local modification as may
be necessary to adapt it to Maltese circumstances, apply in Malta. I understand that
this should meet your requirements.

10. I am of course aware of the importance of ensuring that the privileges and
immunities which we are bound under International Agreement to accord to Visiting
Forces, e.g. N.A.T.O., are made available. There have in the past been difficulties over
this and I cannot pretend that there will not be difficulties in future. But we shall
have the right to secure the status of Visiting Forces by legislation and executive
action.

11. As regards privileges for N.A.A.F.I. and kindred organisations, we shall, of
course, have the constitutional right to claim that their needs are defence needs. But,
as you know, this is a question on which strong feelings can be aroused in Malta (as
elsewhere) of which we shall have to take account. I could not, therefore, give a
blanket assurance that the requirements of the Service Departments will
automatically be met.

12. I hope that these comments and assurances will enable you to endorse the
line of action I am recommending in my Cabinet paper. . . .

247   CAB 131/25, D 4(61)4  17 Feb 1961
[Constitutional changes in Malta]: minutes of Cabinet Defence
Committee meeting

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Defence (D. (61)
15) commenting on the implications for defence policy of the proposals for
constitutional development in Malta contained in a memorandum by the Colonial
Secretary (C.P.C. (61) 3).

The Minister of Defence\(^1\) said that, as a result of the discussion which had
previously taken place in the Colonial Policy Committee about the proposals for
constitutional development in Malta, it had now been agreed that the Governor of
Malta (whom it was proposed to call the Head of State) should not be a Maltese as
long as this seemed desirable in our defence interests. This would meet to a
considerable extent the apprehensions that were felt by the Service Ministers and the
Chiefs of Staff about the effect of the proposed constitutional changes on our ability
to fulfil our defence responsibilities in the Mediterranean. It would, however, also be
essential that the Governor, while continuing to be non-Maltese, should retain
control of the police, and that such control should not be progressively delegated to
Maltese Ministers, as had been proposed by the Blood Commission. Without this
arrangement we should not have the power to enforce our defence needs. In addition
to this overriding requirement, there were a number of subsidiary constitutional
requirements, in our defence interests, which it was thought could be met; these
were set out in the Annex to D. (61) 15.

In discussion the following points were made:
(a) While overriding power as regards defence and foreign affairs would remain
with the United Kingdom, the Blood Commission proposed that the Maltese
Legislature and Government would have concurrent powers in these fields. The

\(^1\) Mr H. Watkinson.
Foreign Secretary suggested that this arrangement would be bound to lead to continual friction, and that it would be more satisfactory if foreign affairs, and perhaps defence, were entirely reserved to the United Kingdom Government.

(b) It was suggested that the relationship of the United Kingdom Commissioner to the Governor, even while the latter remained a non-Maltese, would be bound to lead to difficulty. The introduction of a United Kingdom Commissioner would make it more difficult to justify retaining the governorship to a non-Maltese, and the control which would be exercised over Maltese legislation which affected defence and foreign affairs would be more objectionable if exercised by a United Kingdom Commissioner and not by the Governor. The appointment of a United Kingdom Commissioner, in addition to a Governor, might therefore accelerate constitutional development in a way which would probably be inimical to our defence interests.

(c) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff explained that it was the fear that pressure for further constitutional development might prove irresistible, and the virtual certainty that Mr. Mintoff would reassume office, that underlay the anxieties that had been expressed on the score of defence. The value of Malta from the defence point of view would disappear if it became progressively more difficult for the Services to take advantage of the facilities in Malta. If this was likely to happen, it might even be preferable to abandon Malta as a base. But to do so would undoubtedly be a severe shock to the structure of our defence arrangements in the Mediterranean. It might therefore be preferable to refrain from any constitutional development in Malta at the present time which might impair our use of the island for defence purposes; even if this led to disturbances, the situation would be capable of easier control than the similar situation which had arisen in Cyprus.

The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs said that in addition to a firm understanding that the Governor would continue to be a non-Maltese, it would be understood that the control of the police would not be taken from the Governor without the concurrence of the Minister of Defence. It could not be denied that there would be internal security problems in Malta, especially when Mr. Mintoff reassumed power. But the fact was that if, following the Blood Commission’s report, all constitutional development were denied, the sympathies of all parties in Malta would be alienated. On the other hand there was considerable latent goodwill towards us among certain sections of the population, which might find more open expression if some constitutional progress could be made. The proposals were designed to begin to give the Maltese some share in government, while safeguarding our essential interests, including defence. Ultimately, the only alternatives to an indefinite continuation of the present constitutional arrangements for Malta were integration with the United Kingdom, which had not so far been found practicable, or independence.

The Prime Minister said that, apart from the question that had been raised about the practicability of concurrent powers, some anxieties had been expressed lest the implementation of these constitutional proposals for Malta might make it increasingly difficult for us to fulfil our defence responsibilities in the Mediterranean. A similar doubt might be thought to arise about the implication in the second paragraph of Annex B to C.P.C. (61) 3 that Malta could achieve complete

---

1 Lord Home. 2 F-M Sir F Festing 3 Lord Perth.
independence before it had become possible for us to relinquish our strategic interests there. The Colonial Secretary had undertaken to consider what modifications could be made to the formula in question in order to avoid that implication, and the whole question, including the defence aspects, would be further considered by the Cabinet.

248  
CAB 128/35/1, CC 10(61)5  
28 Feb 1961

[Malta: report of Sir H Blood's Commission on constitutional changes]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary about constitutional changes in Malta following the report of the Commission under the chairmanship of Sir Hilary Blood (C. (61) 26) together with a comparison of the Singapore Constitution and the Commission’s proposals (C. (61) 24).

The Colonial Secretary said that doubts had been expressed in the discussions in the Colonial Policy Committee and the Defence Committee about certain features of the proposals, namely the Maltese Government’s concurrent powers in defence and external affairs, the delegation of authority to conclude certain international agreements, and the division of responsibilities and functions between the Governor (or Head of State) and the United Kingdom Commissioner. It had also been suggested that the proposals, and the terms in which it was proposed to announce them, would encourage the pressure for subsequent constitutional advance which would be premature having regard to our defence interests.

It was unlikely that there would be much scope for legislation by a Maltese Government on external matters other than the local implementation of international agreements, for which the Maltese had authority under their previous constitution; the power of a Maltese Government to legislate on other external affairs would be subject to the over-riding authority of the United Kingdom Government. The principle of delegation was in no sense a new concept in Colonial government, and it would be for the United Kingdom Government to define and control the extent of it. In view of the fact that it had now been agreed that the Governor should remain a non-Maltese at least as long as we considered it necessary, and that he should retain in his hands the ultimate control of the police, the proposals provided full safeguards for our defence interests. It was beyond question that the constitution proposed for Malta would be safer in these respects than the arrangements obtaining in Singapore, where the security risk was greater.

As regards subsequent constitutional development, the Blood Commission, who were precluded from making recommendations except for the first stage, nevertheless thought that some indication about the Government’s long-term intentions would greatly improve the chances of success of the new constitution. Although the Governor of Malta would prefer that nothing should be said in this respect, on balance it was very desirable, in the interests of rallying moderate Maltese opinion, to make it clear that it was not the Government’s intention to deny to Malta, at the appropriate time, the right of self-determination. Such a statement would be consistent with the description which had been given to the United Nations of our policy for the advancement of dependent territories.
In discussion the following points were made—

(a) It was suggested that, although it would be both difficult and expensive, it might be possible for us to relinquish Malta and yet fulfil our defence responsibilities in the Mediterranean. But it would still be necessary to deny the facilities of Malta to the Soviet bloc and for this purpose our continued presence in the island seemed essential.

(b) It was likely, though by no means certain, that Mr. Mintoff would achieve office under the proposed constitution. Our defence facilities were so closely connected with the ordinary life of the island that there would be innumerable opportunities for him to be obstructive, if he so wished. It had to be accepted that, in these circumstances, the proposed constitution might have to be suspended and direct rule by the Governor reimposed.

(c) The Secretary of State for Air1 said that the introduction of a United Kingdom Commissioner, separate from the Governor, might give rise to great difficulty. It would be for the Commissioner to over-rule the Maltese Government, although he himself would have no power to enforce his ordinances. At the same time, the establishment of a Commissioner would be bound to weaken to some extent the authority of the Governor, who would then be less able to rely on the loyalty of the police and civil service.

It was suggested that, from this point of view, it might be preferable to reduce the Commissioner’s responsibilities by reserving the power to over-rule the Maltese Government directly to the United Kingdom Government, acting through the Governor, and not to their local representative.

It was pointed out, on the other hand, that the introduction of a Commissioner would help to insulate the Governor from political conflict. This, indeed, had been one of the main objects of the Blood Commission and the principle might even be carried further by entrusting control of the police and the responsibility for internal security to the Commissioner rather than to the Governor. The present Governor was, however, satisfied that the proposed division of functions between the Governor and the Commissioner would not give rise to serious difficulty.

(d) It seemed reasonably certain that, since the United Kingdom Government were to retain the power to over-rule the Maltese Government, the grant of concurrent powers in defence and external affairs and of delegated authority to conclude certain international agreements would not give Malta an “independent” status in international law. The opinion of the Law Officers should, however, be sought on this point.

(e) It was suggested that the introduction of a United Kingdom Commissioner tended to prejudge the question of subsequent constitutional development. Unless, moreover, it was seriously contemplated that Malta might at some time be given the right of self-determination, it might be unwise to indicate the possibility of this in any public statement. For these reasons, it might be preferable to substitute for the last three sentences of the draft reference which the Colonial Secretary proposed to make to the future status of Malta (in Annex C of C. (61) 26) a less specific reference to the future. This alternative would be more acceptable to the Governor.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Invited the Attorney-General to consider whether the proposals in C. (61) 26 would give Malta “independent” status for the purposes of international law.

1 Mr J Amery.
(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to give further consideration, in the light of their discussion, to the proposed references to the future status of Malta in the draft statement in Annex C of C. (61) 26; and to circulate a revised draft.
(3) Agreed to resume their discussion of C. (61) 26 at a later meeting.

CAB 128/35/1, CC 11(61)4 7 Mar 1961
[Malta: parliamentary statement on Constitutional changes]: Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Colonial Secretary (C. (61) 30) and the Attorney-General (C. (61) 31) on constitutional changes in Malta.

The Colonial Secretary said that the doubts that had previously been expressed about the effect in international law of granting to the Maltese Government concurrent legislative powers and delegated authority to conclude certain international agreements had been examined by the Attorney-General, who was satisfied that the implementation of these proposals would not confer on Malta the status of an independent sovereign State. The revised terms of the statement in which it was proposed to announce the Government’s acceptance of the constitutional recommendations of the Blood Commission were set out in the Annex to C. (61) 30. This statement did not now contain any reference to subsequent constitutional developments, but he would undoubtedly be pressed for some indication of the Government’s attitude on this point. He would first reply: “As I said when the Blood Commission was appointed, we are now concerned with the immediate future. I did not then and do not now suggest that the constitution I have just announced will be the final stage in Malta’s constitutional development.” If it proved necessary to give some further indication about the ultimate future of Malta, he would then say: “It is of course no part of Her Majesty’s Government’s policy to deny to the Maltese people the right to determine for themselves, at the appropriate time, their own destiny in association, we hope, with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth family.”

In discussion the following points were made:
(a) Although it seemed clear that the implementation of the Blood Commission’s recommendations would not entitle other countries to regard Malta as an independent sovereign State, it could be argued that there would be difficulty in withdrawing responsible government once it had been granted. There seemed, however, no legal foundation for this view, and in the past it had proved possible to withdraw representative government when it had been necessary to resume direct rule by the Governor, without challenge.
(b) There was general agreement that, on balance, it would be preferable to restrict the grant to the Maltese Government of concurrent powers to defence, and to provide powers in the field of external affairs only by specific delegation. The draft announcement of the proposals had been revised on this basis, but the position would be made quite clear if the relevant sentence were on the following lines: “The Maltese Government will be given concurrent powers in the field of foreign affairs, by specific delegation, and in that of defence.”

1 Previous reference: see previous document.
The proposed introduction of a United Kingdom Commissioner, who would be able to overrule the Maltese Government, although the power to enforce his ordinances would be reserved to the Governor who would retain control of the police, might be a dangerous innovation. On the other hand, this arrangement might well work satisfactorily unless the Maltese Government were deliberately obstructive, in which case it would almost certainly be necessary for the Governor to resume direct rule.

In view of the strategic importance of the island, it was not likely that Malta could be given the right of self-determination in the foreseeable future. It was therefore desirable that any further indication which might have to be given about the future should not refer to the right of the Maltese people to determine for themselves their own destiny. On the other hand, it would be valuable to hold out the prospect of some continuing association with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. The reply which the Colonial Secretary might make, if pressed to say something in addition to his first response about the future, should be on the following lines: “I hope that Malta’s future will always lie with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth.”

The Cabinet approved a number of drafting amendments to the statement and supplementary reply which the Colonial Secretary proposed to make to Parliament.

The Cabinet:

Authorised the Colonial Secretary to announce proposals for constitutional changes in Malta, as proposed in C. (61) 30, subject to the amendments agreed in their discussion.

---

I have considered your minutes of January 15 and 17—and also the minutes of January 15 from the Minister of Defence and January 18 from the Chief Secretary.1

The points which you now raise were put to the Defence Committee by the Colonial Secretary, when they considered this problem on December 19. The Committee took the view that the deployment of our forces overseas must be determined by the requirements of our strategy. I do not see how we can take any different view. We cannot maintain bases for which we no longer have any strategic need, or keep in particular places overseas forces larger than we need for military purposes, in order to provide employment for the local inhabitants. 2

2. In these cases, therefore, we must first decide what is the right course to take on grounds of defence policy. We must then make a plan for carrying out that decision and, in the case of Malta certainly, this will be a phased plan spread over a number of years. When we have that we can see what the economic consequences for the Island will be; and we shall certainly consider what steps we can take to mitigate those consequences. This is the procedure which the Defence Committee agreed to follow at their meeting on December 19; and the Departments concerned are under

---

1 Sir E Boyle.
an obligation to study and report upon the economic consequences of these changes—in Cyprus as well as Malta. When that report is available, there will be ample opportunity for argument on the financial point which you raise about the real saving; but we shall then have the information on which to judge the extent of the economic damage and also, I hope, the possibilities and the cost of mitigating it. And it will be open to you to put forward any proposals you like for compensating the islanders. I hope that the Minister of Defence and the Chief Secretary, Treasury (to whom I am sending copies of this minute) will do all they can to ensure that the preparation of this report is expedited.

3. One new point is raised in your minutes which was not mentioned to the Defence Committee—namely, that what is to be said in the Defence White Paper will deprive us of any ground for “refusing the demand of all major Parties in Malta that she should have independence”. I do not know whether the Minister of Defence has settled what he would like to say about Malta in his White Paper. But I am asking him to arrange for the Chiefs of Staff to consider, in consultation with the Colonial Office, what would be the implications, for defence policy, of granting independence to Malta.

251  CAB 131/27, D(62)8  5 Feb 1962

‘The effects of the new defence policy on Malta’: memorandum by Mr Maudling for Cabinet Defence Committee

The more I consider the likely effects of our new Defence policy on Malta, the more serious and far reaching they seem to be, not only for the economy of the Island but for its political future also. I cannot seek to have the whole Defence policy changed but my colleagues should realise the implications for this one small island.

2. One of the main reasons for the new Defence policy was to secure savings in overseas expenditure. The immediate result of the cuts in Malta would be an overseas saving of £7m. a year by the Services. From the balance of payments point of view, this may be more than counter-balanced by a reduction in our exports, a reduction in Maltese savings sent to this country and by the new expenditure on relief measures, which we shall be bound to undertake.

3. I attach a note about the economic effects (Annex I.) The Island imports some £30m. a year and exports under £5m. This great excess of imports is virtually entirely due to expenditure by the Services and at present provides us with a favourable balance of trade of over £10m. The living standards of the 330,000 people of the Island are almost entirely dependent on the Services and with the big reductions now planned, unless effective remedial action is taken over the next five years, 20 per cent of the working population may well be out of employment. Jobs would need to be found over five years for 14,000 men over and above the 7,500 for whom we are seeking to cater under our present plan. Under the present Development Plan (to which our contribution will be £29½m.) strenuous efforts have been made and very large sums spent and they have shown, depressingly, that industrialisation can only produce slow and limited results. After 2½ years we have created only 500 new jobs, though we hope this will soon rise to 1,500.

1 See document no 66 above.
2 Annexes not printed.
4. The White Paper only refers to Malta in very general terms—and I am grateful to the Minister of Defence for his drafting—but nevertheless it is certain to provoke immediate questions from the Maltese about the effects on them. The Governor and I are satisfied that it is necessary to forestall these questions. Many undertakings have been given over the last few years and we are obliged by these, if defence cuts raise unemployment in Malta above the U.K. level, to consult with the Maltese and to consider with them such remedial measures as may be feasible. I must ask for authority to make at the same time as the White Paper is issued a statement on the lines of Annex II to this paper, and I hope that the Defence Departments will join with my Department in consultations with Malta before active steps are taken to reduce our forces there.

5. Such a statement may give us a breathing space but it will only be a temporary one. The great difficulty is going to be to find measures which really will remedy so fundamental a blow to the existence of the Island. We shall find ourselves embarking on a policy which we shall have to pursue for many years and which will cost us much money. I would ask that I may have the co-operation of all Departments—especially the Service Departments—in working out measures which will help to ease such a situation, for instance by continuing to undertake work in the Dockyard which could be undertaken possibly a little more cheaply elsewhere. We shall need every bit of help we can get if the Island is to make both ends meet.

6. Politically the timing of the White Paper could not be more unfortunate since it is to be published the day after the Maltese elections are concluded. The Maltese are bound to think this timing was deliberate and our friends will be gravely embarrassed while Mintoff’s hand will be strengthened. As a result of these elections it had been hoped to implement the new Constitution, based on the recommendations of the Blood Commission, which would have restored to Malta after nearly four years of direct rule a considerable measure of self-government. Unless the statement I have suggested is made I am quite clear that there will be no chance of persuading the winning party—we now hope it will not be Mintoff—to form a Government and we could have an immediate political crisis on our hands coupled with grave unrest and very likely civil disorder.

7. Even with a statement we shall have a hard task to work with any Maltese Government. Both the main parties are committed to demanding independence for Malta within or without the Commonwealth. These demands will be strengthened to the extent that our defence needs in Malta seem less. As I understand it, our main defence needs are now forward and staging facilities in the Island and denial of its use to others. These facilities could, I suppose, be obtained if Malta became independent but only in return for heavy payments. All possible courses of action including some special form of association will need to be considered but I must repeat that economically any course will be expensive, while politically it is bound to give rise to acute difficulties.

8. To summarise I ask for:

(a) authority to make a statement at the time of the issue of the White Paper on the lines of Annex II;
(b) the co-operation of all Departments in working out possible measures of alleviation for Malta;
(c) the Defence Departments to join in consultations with the Maltese before active steps are taken to reduce our presence in Malta.

I have no doubt that I shall have later on to make more specific proposals to my colleagues on measures of alleviation and to put before them in more detail the problem of the political future of the Island.

---

252 CAB 128/37, CC 44(63)5 4 July 1963

[Malta: independence]: Cabinet conclusions

[A new constitution, giving self-government, was put into operation in March 1962, foreign affairs and defence remaining the ultimate responsibility of the British government.]

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (63) 112) about the attainment of independence by Malta.

_The Colonial Secretary_ said that in August 1962, the Government of Malta with the support of all the principal political parties in the Island, had formally asked for independence. For this purpose arrangements had been made to convene a conference, to which all parties now represented in the Maltese Legislature would be invited, in the second half of July.

Three main issues would be likely to arise at this conference; first, whether the official status of the Roman Catholic religion should be maintained; second, whether Malta should be granted membership of the Commonwealth; third, whether the Constitution should be monarchical or republican. It would undoubtedly be the wish of the majority of the inhabitants of Malta that the Roman Catholic religion should remain the official religion of the Island; and we had no reason to dissent, despite certain practical difficulties which would persist in relation to matters such as marriage and divorce. Nor should there be any objection to accepting an independent Malta as a member of the Commonwealth. A monarchical Constitution, however, although undoubtedly supported by a majority of the Maltese population, would be opposed by the Maltese Labour Party under the leadership of Mr. Mintoff; and it would be unfortunate if the monarchy were made a party political issue after Malta became independent.

It would be necessary to conclude a Defence Agreement with the Government of Malta under which they would agree that we should retain the right to station forces in the Island and that military facilities would not be granted to any other country without our consent. In order to ensure the validity of this agreement and to reduce the risk of its repudiation by a future Government of Malta it would be advisable that it should not be concluded until after the Island had become independent: and it might be desirable that the Government of the independent State should seek the endorsement of a referendum before signing it. It would also be necessary that we should undertake to provide continuing financial aid to Malta on a scale still to be determined.

---

1 Previous reference: see document no 249.

2 Dr Borg Olivier was prime minister, after the victory of his Nationalist Party at the polls: from Aug 1962 he was again calling for independence. Mr Sandys visited Malta in June 1963, and convened a conference in London for July.
In discussion the following main points were made:

(a) It would clearly be desirable that Malta should retain, after independence, a monarchical Constitution. If necessary, however, the question could be considered again when the forthcoming conference had provided an opportunity to test the strength of Maltese feeling on the issues involved.

(b) The maintenance of United Kingdom forces in Malta was no longer a paramount defence interest in itself, although it might constitute a convenient means of providing economic aid to the Island. The main purpose of the proposed Defence Agreement would be to prevent the Soviet Government from obtaining a military footing in Malta. From this point of view it was open to question whether the agreement should not be concluded until the Island had become independent; and it was doubtfully wise to submit the issue to a referendum. On the other hand it had already been made clear both to the Government of Malta and to Mr. Mintoff that any Soviet intrusion into the Island would not be tolerated either by the United Kingdom or by the other member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; and it was improbable that any Government of Malta would court the risks involved in entertaining any policy of this kind, particularly if the Defence Agreement had been endorsed by a referendum.

(c) In any event the only alternative course would be to reject the unanimous request of all the main political parties in Malta that the Island should now be granted independence; and the political consequences of such action would clearly be unacceptable.

(d) Consideration should be given during the conference to the preservation in the new Constitution of a right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council or to some alternative judicial tribunal, perhaps of a Commonwealth character.

The Cabinet:

(1) Approved, subject to the points made in their discussion, the proposals in C. (63) 112 for the attainment of independence by Malta.

(2) Invited the Commonwealth Secretary to report further, in the light of the proceedings of the forthcoming conference on the terms of independence for Malta, on the retention of a monarchical Constitution by the Island after independence.3

3 The conference broke up without deciding the final details of an independence constitution, but Mr Sandys suggested that the various Maltese parties should aim to settle their differences in preparation for independence by 31 May 1964.

21 Jan–17 Apr 1964

[Independence for Malta]: minutes by Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Sir A Douglas-Home (M 14/64) and Mr Thorneycroft (MoD)

Prime Minister

Mabel Strickland1 came to see me the other day. She said that she had written to you informing you that she was coming to see me. I cannot think why, except that we

1 The Hon M E Strickland, OBE, leader of the Progressive Constitutional Party in Malta since 1953; editor of The Times of Malta, 1935–1950.
have a mutual friend. The burden of her story was that there is a great revulsion in Malta at the present time against Independence. They have seen what has happened in Zanzibar. The police force in Malta is unable to control smuggling. If the country becomes independent that police force, a thousand strong, will be completely incapable of preserving law and order. Nasser will serve out arms to the dissidents and disaster will follow. The Governor has changed his mind about the advice he gave and Wakefield holds the strong opinion that to proceed with existing plans for Independence next May would be wholly irresponsible.

I have never known anything about Malta and have no idea how much weight is attached to her views. I suspect, however, that there may be something in them.

S.L.
21.1.64

I don’t much care for the speed of this either. I am asking the Commonwealth Secretary to inform the Cabinet about it. . . . I have some misgivings. We don’t want another Zanzibar in the Mediterranean.1

A.D-H.
22.1.64

Prime Minister

I attach a minute which I have received from the Secretary of State for War reporting on a recent visit to Malta by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. I am having examined the particular points which he raises. I am, however, anxious on more general grounds.

2. The granting of independence to former colonies has no doubt been right, but it has placed and is placing a very heavy burden on our defence forces. May I make a plea that the process might be slowed down at least until we have recovered our breath.

3. Is it really necessary to press on with independence for Malta? I should be glad of an opportunity to discuss the military implications of this. . . .

P.T.
28.1.64

I understand that on present plans Malta would achieve her independence on 31st May. It is my hope that these plans will be frustrated. The outcome of the referendum on the Independence Constitution which is to be held early next month may demonstrate that a postponement is desirable for political reasons but we cannot be sure of this.

2. Meanwhile developments in Cyprus and Libya cannot but weaken our position in both places. They could mean that Malta would become the only place in the Mediterranean east of Gibraltar where our forces had any prospect of security of tenure. While Malta could be no substitute for Cyprus and Libya, in a number of respects her importance as a staging post for long-range aircraft would be enhanced and the forward operating facilities for the Royal Navy would also assume greater

2 Sir E B Wakefield, commissioner for Malta since 1962.
3 It was feared Mintoff might stage a coup d'état shortly after independence. Zanzibar attained independence on 10 Dec 1963 under a coalition led by the Sultan—this government was overthrown by a coup d'état on 12 Jan 1964 led by Sheikh Karume and the Afro-Shirazi Party (see document no 139).
importance. She would be the only practicable alternative for a stockpile in the Mediterranean and would thus become the main United Kingdom base for the mounting of operations in the Mediterranean whether these were purely national operations or in support of an American intervention.

3. Officials have made considerable progress with the negotiation of a defence agreement with Malta. This is satisfactory as far as it goes but it can at best provide only a limited guarantee of our continued presence in Malta after independence. It seems probable that we could count on the continued co-operation of the Nationalist Party should they remain in power. There is a distinct possibility that the Malta Labour Party would abrogate the agreement if they were to secure office after independence.

4. I believe therefore that we should consider carefully in the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee whether there are not strong grounds for delaying the grant of independence to Malta or, if that is not possible, whether there are any measures open to us which would improve our chances of retaining the island as a base.

5. On the assumption that we can shelve the issue of independence, we must, I believe, be reasonably generous with our assistance to the island and show ourselves reasonably willing to make use of its military resources in order to re-establish a better relationship there for our defence requirements.

P.T.
17.4.64

I agree with this. I hope the referendum will be completely indecisive, but if not, we will have to try and delay independence again.

A.D.-H.
[nd]

254 PREM 11/4912 4–25 June 1964
Maltese independence: ministerial exchanges—Lord Perth, Mr Sandys, and Lord Boyd with Sir A Douglas-Home

Dear Alec,
I fear I am a bore about Malta and the attached suggestion comes, I know, at one minute to twelve! Nonetheless, I hope it will be very seriously considered. Such a bold move would solve Malta’s problems, be I am sure strongly welcomed in Malta, and I suspect gain widespread approval here.

I have talked things over with Alan,¹ shown him the memorandum and have his full support, but he said he felt he should not also sign this letter as he is plaguing you on another matter!

Yours ever
David
5.6.64

P.S. Don’t forget to find a day or two for the trout at Stockbridge—they are very fat & good fighters this year.

¹ Lord Boyd of Merton, formerly Mr A Lennox-Boyd.
The referendum on the Maltese Constitution has come and gone. Whether it showed that people do or do not want independence now is open to argument. Presumably a further referendum asking this simple question is not on the cards.

It is understood that in fact constitutional talks are going forward with the aim of granting independence shortly, and to this end a Defence Agreement and aid are also being negotiated. The former is acquiring new importance as Malta’s strategic value is again becoming apparent. If Mintoff is not party to this Agreement, if and when he comes into power he will surely repudiate it, and the fact that our aid was tied to it would make no difference. Malta is small and it would be easy for Russia to outbid. It may be argued that the Catholic island would not accept aid from such a source, but Mintoff’s presentation would surely be more subtle via the U.A.R. for example.

Is it too late to look at “integration” once again, plus the straightforward offer that in, say, five years social services for the Maltese will be the equivalent of those in the U.K.?

Integration would solve the constitutional difficulties: the Church would accept British practice if Malta were part of the U.K. Furthermore and most importantly, there would no longer be need for a Defence Agreement. The offer of social services equivalent to those of the U.K. would make an immense appeal to the people of Malta. In practice, its cost should be small—British Industry, particularly tourism, would readily go to Malta once political fears are removed, and the present nightmare of unemployment might soon vanish.

Borg Olivier is likely to agree. After all, he would still be Prime Minister (which is what he cares about) in control of internal affairs.

It is difficult to assess the House of Commons attitude, but once before they faced the issue and were ready to play. Generally, the country’s reaction might be one of welcoming those who want to join us—a change from the continual dismemberment of the Empire and large sums of money as parting gifts.

Prime Minister

David Perth’s letter of 5th June proposes integration for Malta with the offer of social services for the Maltese, equivalent to those in Britain, in say five years’ time.

2. Although they are divided on the Church issue, the two major parties in Malta, representing at least three-quarters of the voters, are in favour of Independence. To refuse Independence would run the risk of uniting them both against Britain, and, in particular, of provoking the hostility of Borg Olivier’s National Party, whose goodwill is vital to us.

3. Our offer of Independence must therefore stand and, as David Perth no doubt knows, the various outstanding questions are now being settled between the Maltese and ourselves.

4. Only if it were to become apparent that a mutually acceptable solution to the remaining outstanding problems could not be found, could we consider alternatives to Independence.2

D.S.
12.6.64

2 The prime minister replied to Lord Perth along these lines (16 June). He regarded Malta as ‘a small but terribly difficult problem’ (19 Feb 1964).
My dear Alec,

As he mentioned in it, I saw David Perth’s letter to you last week and fully endorsed it, and he has since shown me a copy of your reply.

I think the Maltese Referendum could be read in any number of ways, and I won’t bother you with all these in this brief note.

Last evening at your C.P.A. party I had a talk with Dr. Holland, one of Mintoff’s Labour members in the Maltese Parliament. He said he hoped nothing would be settled for Malta until the ‘uncertainties’ had been cleared up—Libya, Cyprus and the British Parliamentary Election. Tim Blyth \(^3\) was standing near and I asked Holland to repeat this to Tim, which he did. I then asked Holland whether he would say this sort of thing in Malta. He said that would not be possible but it was “what we feel.” I asked if by that he meant many members of the Malta Labour Party, and he said yes. With some knowledge of Malta I am sure this is the authentic voice of many of the Maltese people.

I do most earnestly hope that we shall not lull ourselves into the belief that if we give Independence to Borg Olivier’s Government now it will ensure the continuance of their Government any more than what has happened in Zanzibar. I still believe the solution in David Perth’s letter is the right one.

We both know how busy you are but if ever you have ten minutes to spare we would welcome the chance of a word on Malta.

Yours ever

Alan

23.6.64

My dear Alan,

Thank you for your letter of June 23 about Malta.

You may well be right in believing that the people of Malta don’t really want their affairs settled one way or another at the present moment. The trouble is, as you yourself pointed out, that none of their leaders dare stand up and say so in public. The consequence is that we have had to embark on the independence negotiations with Borg Olivier; the alternative would have been to have both Borg Olivier and Mintoff and their parties publicly against us, with all that that would have meant at home, abroad and on the island itself.

I fear that, whatever may be the right solution for Malta, if indeed there is one, independence looks like being the only possible one. We shall see. The negotiations are not yet over.

Yours ever,

A. [D.-H.]

25.6.64

\(^3\) Perhaps Sir Timothy Bligh, one of the prime minister’s private secretaries, is meant?

---

255  CAB 128/38/2, CM 35(64)5  7 July 1964

[Malta: deadlock on discussions for independence]: Cabinet conclusions

The Commonwealth Secretary said that his discussions with the Prime Minister of Malta, Dr. Borg Olivier, about the independence of the Island had now reached a
deadlock. Three issues were outstanding—a financial settlement; a defence agreement; and the constitutional status and privileges of the Roman Catholic Church in Malta, with which was linked the amendment of the Island’s electoral law which would be required in order to prevent the Church from exercising, by the threat of spiritual sanctions, undue influence during elections. The difficulties in the way of a financial agreement were not insuperable; and, since we had now succeeded in enlisting the support of the Vatican authorities for the amendment of the electoral law which we had in mind, it was possible to hope that this question also might eventually be satisfactorily resolved. But this issue should be kept open since, if the negotiations finally broke down, it would be to our advantage that they should be seen to do so on an issue on which the Government could expect the maximum of support from Parliament and public opinion in this country. Dr. Borg Olivier, on the other hand, would wish to be able to attribute the failure of the negotiations to our inability to accept his conditions for a defence agreement, particularly his stipulation that we should not be entitled to use Malta, after it became independent, for the storage of nuclear weapons, if we thought fit to do so. The Chiefs of Staff held that we could not afford to compromise on this issue, not merely because any limitation of our freedom of action in this respect would be unacceptable in relation to Malta itself but also because it would establish a precedent which could be employed to our disadvantage in relation to other military bases overseas where it would remain essential that we should be able to maintain stockpiles of nuclear weapons, if circumstances so required. Nevertheless, it would be embarrassing if Dr. Borg Olivier succeeded in creating the impression that it was on this issue that the negotiations had failed; and, if he went so far as to suggest that, while he was not prepared to compromise on the defence agreement, he would accept the proposed amendment of the electoral law and would dispense with a financial agreement altogether, we should then have no alternative but to indicate that we must insist on the incorporation in the defence agreement of acceptable provisions as regards nuclear weapons. It would thus become clear that the question of nuclear weapons was the real cause of the breakdown in negotiations; and the Government would then be in an embarrassing position.

In discussion there was general agreement that, if as a result of the failure of negotiations, Dr. Borg Olivier’s Government fell and was succeeded by an Administration under Mr. Mintoff, Malta would be likely to succumb to the influence of the United Arab Republic and, possibly, the Soviet Union. This made it very desirable to reach a settlement with Dr. Borg Olivier if at all possible. Alternatively, we could now abandon the negotiations and allow Malta to remain indefinitely in its present Colonial status; but this, too, might merely accelerate the fall of Dr. Borg Olivier and promote Mr. Mintoff’s prospects. Moreover, a breakdown in the negotiations on the issue of our right to maintain a stockpile of nuclear weapons in Malta would be as likely to bring this sensitive issue to public attention as the conclusion of a defence agreement which specifically limited our freedom of action in this respect. It was worth considering further, therefore, whether we need insist on an unrestricted right in this respect or whether we could afford to accept the limited facilities as regards the temporary transit of such weapons through the Island which Dr. Borg Olivier was apparently prepared to contemplate. This issue had to be considered in relation to the other overseas bases where it was essential that we should be free to exercise the right to store nuclear weapons, if necessary; and, in
reaching our decision, we must not overlook the interests of the United States Government, who were disturbed about the possible repercussions on their own overseas bases if we accepted any limitation on our right to store nuclear weapons in Malta.

*The Prime Minister*, summing up the discussion, said that the Cabinet would wish to have the advice of the Chief of the Defence Staff before forming a final view on the difficult issues involved. An early meeting would be arranged for this purpose.

The Cabinet:—

Agreed to resume their discussion at a subsequent meeting.¹

¹ Held later the same day; summing up, the prime minister said that it was ‘greatly in our interest to conclude an agreement on Malta’s independence, if this were possible on acceptable terms. In view of the embarrassment to which we might be exposed if we concluded a defence agreement which was qualified by an exchange of confidential letters about our intentions as regards the storage of nuclear weapons in Malta, it might be preferable to confine ourselves to incorporating in the proposed defence agreement a provision (with a corresponding clause in the proposed financial agreement) that it would be open to either party, in the event of any subsequent change of circumstances, to raise any issue that they wished, without commitment on either side to amend the agreement. He would be prepared, if necessary, to discuss with Dr. Borg Olivier an arrangement on these lines and would consider whether, if so, we could give him, orally, some additional private assurance about our intentions as regards the use of Malta as a nuclear base’ (CM 36(64).) Agreement with Dr Olivier was announced on 21 July 1964. His Nationalist Party won the 1966 election, but Mintoff was returned to power in 1971.

256  CAB 128/31/1, CC 15(57)3  4 Mar 1957

[Proposed constitution for Singapore]: Cabinet conclusions

[From early in 1953, Singapore had a large measure of internal self-government. The arrangements for moving towards full internal self-government are discussed here. The new constitution came into force in 1959, and Lee Kuan Yew became the first prime minister of ‘the State of Singapore’—which became a State of the Federation of Malaysia in Sept 1963, from which it separated again in Aug 1965. For Macmillan’s view of Singapore in 1960, see document no 260 below.]

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary about the proposed new constitution for Singapore (C. (57) 48).

*The Colonial Secretary* said that he hoped to resume discussions with the Chief Minister of Singapore¹ in the near future on the basis of the proposals outlined in his memorandum. The new constitution would be a form of dyarchy, in which defence and foreign affairs would be reserved to the United Kingdom Government, whose spokesman would be the Resident Commissioner, while local Ministers would discharge the remaining functions of government. The Governor would be a Malayan-born personage, who would be appointed by The Queen on the advice of the Secretary of State, would hold office during Her Majesty’s pleasure, and would be bound to act in accordance with the advice of Ministers. The ultimate authority to suspend the constitution would, however, vest in the Resident Commissioner, who would in that eventuality supplant local Ministers as the adviser to the Governor.

These proposals were acceptable to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand and were supported by the Governor of Singapore, the Commissioner-General in

¹ Mr Lim Yew Hock.
South-East Asia, and the Chiefs of Staff. They did little more than formalise the existing situation in which, for some time, we had been unable to use our reserve powers and had been compelled to rely, in the last resort, on the power to suspend the constitution. This power would remain with the Resident Commissioner and, together with the fact that he would preside over both the Defence and External Affairs Council and the Internal Security Council, should suffice to retain in our own hands an effective degree of authority in Singapore. At the moment the body of opinion in Singapore which was friendly to this country was growing, and it would be advisable to seize the present opportunity to establish a constitution which would be popular with liberal opinion in the Colony and would, at the same time, safeguard our essential interests.

In discussion doubts were expressed about the precedent which might be constituted by the unique arrangements proposed for Singapore. The Government of Malta, for example, might feel obliged to press for similar arrangements. But a constitution on the model proposed for Singapore would represent a regressive step for Malta, which already possessed most of the powers which, under the new constitution for Singapore, would be transferred to local Ministers. There appeared to be no other Colonial territory where the present stage of constitutional development would provide a basis for a claim to treatment comparable with that proposed for Singapore.

Doubts were also expressed about the extent to which the suggested constitution would provide a lasting solution of the problems of the Colony. It was proposed that local Ministers, although being consulted before the appointment of the Governor, should not advise The Queen on this appointment. Nevertheless, the Governor, once appointed, would exercise considerable power in such matters as the selection of a Chief Minister and the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. On the other hand, the Resident Commissioner would be empowered, without necessarily consulting local Ministers, to advise the Governor to reserve for The Queen's assent any measure affecting the responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government. The balance of authority between local Ministers and the Resident Commissioner would, therefore, be a delicate one; and although such an arrangement might prove feasible while the present Chief Minister held office, it was doubtful whether it would endure if he was replaced by a Chief Minister less well disposed towards this country. It was open to question whether a constitution of the kind proposed was likely, for all its ingenuity, to be compatible with either stability of administration or the maintenance of our own essential strategic interests.

It was, however, argued that, so long as defence and external affairs were reserved to the United Kingdom Government, our interest in Singapore as a major base should be adequately safeguarded. Moreover, the fact that the interests of the Federation of Malaya in Singapore were substantially the same as our own should ensure that, in most cases, our view would prevail in the Internal Security Council as well; and this, coupled with the arrangement whereby senior appointments to the Police Force would be subject to the approval of the Council, should secure our continued control over public order. We should enjoy a further and valuable safeguard in the stipulation, which had still to be negotiated with Singapore Ministers, that if any Bill passed by the local Legislature affected matters within the sphere of responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, the Resident Commissioner would be empowered so to inform the Governor, who would then be
obliged by the constitution to reserve the Bill for The Queen’s assent. With these safeguards the proposed constitution should enable us to maintain our essential interests in Singapore, without appearing to attempt to arrest the increasing tendency towards Malayanisation. It might not provide a permanent solution; but it should make possible a period of political stability in Singapore until it became practicable to advance towards the ultimate objective of unification of the Colony and the Federation of Malaya. At that time an essential condition of such unification would be our retention of the right to maintain a major military base at Singapore.

The status and powers of the future Governor were a concession to local opinion which was in no way derogatory to the Crown and, provided that the ultimate right of suspending the constitution remained in the hands of the Resident Commissioner, should prove a useful precedent for maintaining our interests in other cases where it was essential that we should retain a military base within a community which was advancing towards independence. The constitution would not itself specify that the Governor must be Malayan born; and if an emergency developed or if, in the event of the constitution having to be suspended, a Malayan-born Governor proved recalcitrant, there would be no impediment to the appointment as Governor, in his place, of any person whom the United Kingdom Government wished to recommend to The Queen. Nor were there grounds for supposing that the fact that the Governor would normally be Malayan born would provide Singapore with a juridical basis for seceding from the Commonwealth and appealing to the United Nations for recognition as a wholly independent community. Opinion within the Commonwealth, and probably elsewhere, would not endorse a claim by any nation to be wholly self-governing unless it controlled its own defence and external relations; and these subjects would, in the case of Singapore, remain reserved to the United Kingdom Government.

The Cabinet:—

Authorised the Colonial Secretary to open discussions with the Chief Minister of Singapore about the future constitution of the Colony on the basis described in his memorandum, on the understanding that, inter alia—

(i) the constitution would not itself prescribe that the Governor should be a Malayan-born person or debar the United Kingdom Government from recommending any person to The Queen for appointment as Governor;
(ii) the Governor would hold office during The Queen’s pleasure and the constitution would not preclude the United Kingdom Government from advising Her Majesty to terminate the Governor’s appointment and to appoint another person in his place;
(iii) the Royal Instructions, in conjunction with the provisions of the constitution, would oblige the Governor to act in accordance with the advice of local Ministers or, if the constitution was suspended, in accordance with the advice of the Resident Commissioner;
(iv) the constitution would expressly provide that if, in the view of the Resident Commissioner, any Bill passed by the Singapore Legislature affected matters within the sphere of responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, the Resident Commissioner would have the right so to inform the Governor, who would then be obliged to reserve the Bill for The Queen’s assent; and in such cases the United Kingdom Government would tender advice to Her Majesty.
Thank you for your letter of 14th March about Membership of the Commonwealth for the Federation of Malaya.1

We are very grateful for your timely comments on the Union Government’s likely attitude on this issue and for your further definition of Mr. Strijdom’s2 views on Independence within, and Membership of, the Commonwealth generally.

In answer to the request in paragraph 5 of your letter, we have had prepared, and I now enclose, a memorandum on the internal situation in Malaya which brings up to date the earlier paper of February, 1956, to which you refer. There has not been time to consult the High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur on its contents, but the note has been cleared with the Colonial Office and gives, I think, a fair and unbiased picture of the current Malayan situation. I hope that you will find it suitable as a basis for discussion with Mr. Strijdom.

As to the questions raised in paragraphs 2 to 4 of your letter, it is no use our denying that Mr. Strijdom has some logic on his side when he argues that H.M.G. should not promise “Independence within the Commonwealth” without prior consultation with other Commonwealth Members, because the mere fact that a country has been vouchsafed in advance the goal of full self-government within the Commonwealth, virtually commits other Members to granting it Membership in its turn. But political realities are more important than logic. To commit H.M.G. to the principle of prior consultation as a preliminary step to granting a Colonial territory its Independence within the Commonwealth, would, in practice, be tantamount to giving any member country the right of veto on United Kingdom colonial policy. Mr. Strijdom will hardly need reminding that it has for long been the policy of successive United Kingdom Governments that the colonial territories, as they reach the goal of full self-government and Independence, should remain within the Commonwealth. If, therefore, we were to admit that unanimous agreement among the existing Member countries was required for a newly independent ex-Colony to remain in the Commonwealth, we should be allowing other Members to obstruct the implementation of decisions about independence which are for the United Kingdom Government alone.

The above also answers the additional contention that colonies, once they cease to be administered by a Member country of the Commonwealth, can no longer remain within the Commonwealth. In practice, the Membership issue has in all past cases been settled before the date of Independence, so that a hiatus of the kind foreseen by Mr. Strijdom has in fact never arisen. Nor, of course, would it be our intention to allow things so to develop that a dangerous gap existed between the date of a Colony’s attainment of Independence and its acceptance as a Member of the Commonwealth. Clearly the Membership issue must on every count be settled before Independence is brought about.

---

1 See Stockwell, ed Malaya, document no 445.  
You will be the best judge of how to handle this matter with Mr. Strijdom so as to secure his agreement about Malaya while avoiding an intolerable theological argument. But subject to your views, we suggest that in presenting the enclosed memorandum to Mr. Strijdom, you might wish to speak to him on the following lines.

As the Prime Minister will realise, the decision to grant Independence to the Federation of Malaya was reached as long ago as February, 1956, when the Constitutional Conference, meeting in London, agreed that full self-government and Independence within the Commonwealth for the Federation should be proclaimed by August, 1957. Furthermore, the terms of reference of the Commonwealth Constitutional Commission, which were at the same time approved by the Conference, stated that the Commission should make recommendations for a form of Constitution “for a fully self-governing and independent Federation of Malaya within the Commonwealth”. The Union Government, together with all other Member countries, were kept fully informed at the time of these developments. . . . H.M.G. have no reason to believe that they gave rise to any doubt on the part of other Member countries as to the aim which H.M.G. were pursuing in regard to the Federation.

You might then go on to say that the United Kingdom Government do not fully appreciate the reasons underlying Mr. Strijdom’s suggestion that once a colonial dependency ceases to be administered by a Member Government of the Commonwealth, it should not be regarded as remaining within the Commonwealth. The policy of H.M.G., as repeatedly stated by successive Governments, is not only to bring the colonial territories stage by stage to the goal of Independence, but to ensure that when they reach that goal they shall remain within the Commonwealth. The U.K. Government, as the administering power, is in the best position to judge when a colony is ripe for independence. It is of course the hope of H.M.G. that each new candidate for independence within the Commonwealth will also be recognised by other Commonwealth Governments as a Member of the Commonwealth. It would be impracticable for the Membership issue to be left for discussion until after a Colony had obtained its Independence. So far this situation has been avoided. If Mr. Strijdom’s theory were to be accepted, very considerable practical difficulties would follow. A juridical and constitutional vacuum would be created. The precise status of the emerging territory would be open to question and the link with the Crown or Sovereign would be, if only temporarily, interrupted.

In expressing the hope that the Union Government will agree, as in the case of Ghana, to recognise the Federation of Malaya as a Member country of the Commonwealth as from the date of its independence on August 31st, you might, if you see fit, go on to emphasise the cogent political arguments which are advanced in the latter part of the enclosed memorandum in favour of this course.3 The case for accepting Malaya as a member of the Commonwealth in order to help her to resist

---

3 The final para read as follows: ‘It none the less remains true that Malaya is in the forefront of the struggle for Communist domination of South East Asia. It is therefore all the more important that the Federation should continue to have the benefit of the moral backing of the Commonwealth connection no less than the material support of Commonwealth forces to assist them in the struggle. The issue is really whether it is to the advantage of the Commonwealth as a whole that the newly independent Malaya should remain within the Commonwealth and so have this all important guidance and backing, or be left out on a limb to continue the struggle as an individual foreign country on their own. In the latter case, as Malayan Ministers themselves recognise, the chances of their being able successfully to resist the encroaching Red tide would be seriously reduced’ (no 2, 2 Apr 1957).
Communism and to become a viable independent state capable of withstanding external and internal trouble (in contrast with, for instance, Indonesia) is of course of more general application. You may find it useful in speaking to Mr. Strijdom to play up this argument.

I hope that you will shortly be receiving a message for Mr. Strijdom about possible dates for the next Prime Ministers’ Meeting, and that soon after we shall be able to let him have, through you, our suggestions for the items which might be included in the draft agenda of the meeting. It would certainly be our intention that the admission of Malaya to membership of the Commonwealth should be discussed at the next meeting, though whether we would put the item formally upon the agenda I do not yet know. I imagine that you might think it best to wait until we are in a position to put specific suggestions about the topics that might be discussed at the meeting before you deploy the arguments about Malaya.

In view of its general interest, I am sending copies of this correspondence to all our other posts for information.

258  DO 35/8095, no 5  29 June 1959  
[Hong Kong: views expressed at talks between Prince Philip and the prime minister]: CRO brief by J Chadwick for Lord Home

The Kowloon Lease on the Chinese mainland expires in 1997. The question is what will then become of the Colony of Hong Kong. Can we hold it even until that date, or should we think now of preparing to withdraw?

Basically (as the last War showed) we hold Hong Kong only by the grace of the dominant power on the Chinese mainland. We should probably continue to trade with the territory whether or not it was in our hands.

For the Commonwealth Relations Office the following points have to be borne in mind:—

(a) It would be essential to consult other Commonwealth Governments before any change in Hong Kong’s status was decided on.
(b) There is an emotional Canadian interest in the Colony (heavy losses in the defence of the Island in 1941; War Graves). Australia and New Zealand have in the past had a vital strategic interest in seeing that Hong Kong remained a Commonwealth bastion in a Communist dominated area (although the strategic value of Hong Kong is now rapidly dwindling). The large Chinese minority in Malaya (and even more so in Singapore) might well be influenced to our disadvantage if 2½ million anti-Communist Chinese in Hong Kong were to be sacrificed before they need be to Communist China. There is a small number of Indian and Pakistani citizens permanently settled in the Colony. They would probably not wish to find themselves behind the Bamboo Curtain.
(c) There is no desire on the part of the Colony to obtain any more advanced status. We are, therefore, not faced by agitation which might lead in the face of opposition to demands for absorption into China.
(d) There are in brief considerable Commonwealth arguments in favour of maintaining the status quo in Hong Kong for as long as possible. While we could not hope successfully to resist intervention from the mainland there seems no
reason to encourage the Communist Chinese, by overt action on our part nearly 40 years before the Kowloon Lease expires, to believe that we are packing up.¹

¹ See also document nos 9 & 10 above.

259  CO 1030/769, nos 6–9  23–24 Nov 1959
[Current problems in Hong Kong]: briefs by J C Burgh and Lord Perth for Mr Macleod’s meeting with Sir R Black (Hong Kong) [Extract]

I. Financial
Sir Robert Black will ask the Secretary of State to consider a grant of say, £2 million sterling to Hong Kong as a badly needed gesture to show Hong Kong that H.M.G. is not losing interest in it and is not on the way out.

2. The Chinese consider Hong Kong to be Chinese territory and no doubt intend sooner or later to regain control of it. They do their best all the time to build up their influence in the Colony and to condition its people to regard it as part of China. There is, however, no indication that the Chinese Government plan to try to regain Hong Kong in the near future. It is useful to them commercially, as a means of getting foreign exchange, and as a window on the world.

3. An attempt to take the Colony by force would carry the risk of general hostilities with the West, including that of nuclear attack. We wish to maintain that apprehension in the Chinese mind, but equally wish to avoid causing them to think that Hong Kong may be used as a base for attack against themselves since that might precipitate action by them against the Colony. Our policy towards Peking is therefore to be firm, but not provocative.

4. Overt aggression by the Chinese is less likely than an attempt to get the Colony by subversion. The Chinese Communists have it in their power to create serious disturbances in Hong Kong at any time owing to the penetration by communist unions of most of the essential services in the Colony and the communists’ control over the main sources of the Colony’s food supplies. They would hope to create a situation which could serve as a pretext for entering the Colony to restore order.

5. It is therefore vital for us to preserve law and order in the Colony. Our ability to do this depends essentially on the confidence of the local Chinese population in our intention to stay with them and support them and in our ability to defend them. The majority of them are politically inarticulate; their wish is to trade and to survive. They do not wish to be on the losing side, and once confidence starts to slip, in however small a way, the process will be cumulative and there will be an increasing tendency to make terms with the other side. Any sign of weakening of will on our part would have most damaging consequences.

6. It is the Governor’s view that a succession of things, done or not done, by H.M.G. in the last two years has in some respects shaken confidence in the Colony in our intention to remain there. An impression has begun to be created that it is “expendible.” . . .

11. The fact is that Hong Kong is a relatively wealthy Colony which over the last ten years has had annual budget surpluses. In relation to the needs for other British
Colonies no convincing arguments can be adduced for aid to Hong Kong on financial and economic grounds. We believe that Sir Robert Black himself recognises this, but in Hong Kong the failure to give financial help in their refugee problem is contrasted with, for instance, the price exacted for the naval lands.

12. Sir Robert considers that H.M.G. should take some action to restore confidence in Hong Kong. While any action must inevitably be expressed in financial terms, the reason for it would not be economic, but political. Sir Robert will ask the Secretary of State, and we support his request, for a grant from H.M.G. of, say, £2 million to help the Colony with its refugee problem in the context of World Refugee Year.

13. The Secretary of State will recall that the idea for the World Refugee Year came from the “Bow Group” and was taken up by H.M.G. in the United Nations where it received overwhelming support. H.M.G. has decided to contribute £200,000 and it has indicated to the organisers of the World Refugee Year Committee in the U.K. that they would like to see one-third of this amount devoted to the needs of refugees in Hong Kong.

14. World Refugee Year would be an excellent pretext for the political gesture desired by Sir Robert Black. It would eliminate the difficulty of creating a precedent for requests from other territories. It presents a combination of unusual, perhaps unique, opportunities. First, World Refugee Year is itself universally recognised as a once-for-all operation. Secondly, Hong Kong is the only British Colony with a refugee problem and one recognised to be of appalling proportions. And thirdly, a gift of this magnitude could not fail to redound to Britain’s credit internationally.

II. Immigration control

Approximately one million inhabitants, of a population of nearly three million, are refugees from China. They have entered the Colony during the last decade following the disintegration of the Nationalist Government in 1948/49 and the establishment of the Chinese People’s Government on 1st October 1949. This influx of people, intensified by the natural increase in the population, has posed tremendous problems for the Hong Kong Government, which has tackled them virtually unaided with great enterprise and imagination. Although perhaps 300,000 people are still living in wretched conditions as squatters on hillsides and rooftops, approximately the same number have been accommodated in vast new multi-storey resettlement estates.

2. The need for immigration control. The resettlement programme must be accompanied by strict immigration control. A large proportion of the Chinese refugees seek refuge in Hong Kong from the intolerable living conditions in China. They have done so in the past despite the economic miseries of life for many of them in overcrowded Hong Kong; and the better conditions are in Hong Kong, the more temptingly it beckons. But Hong Kong is too small to absorb yet more and more people; with its pre-war population of 1.6 million it was regarded as filled to capacity.

3. There are two other important reasons for effective immigration control. First, the Chinese will be quick to cash in on social discontent if the population swells to a point where its basic needs can no longer be met. Secondly, United Kingdom industries critical of Hong Kong competition find it difficult to understand why they should be undercut by products made largely by non-British, Chinese labour, albeit in a British Colony.

J.C.B.
23.11.59
(1) On the suggestion for a grant of £2m. sterling, this I suspect will be difficult to get agreed by colleagues who have not (including the Prime Minister) over much sympathy for a Colony which they rightly consider is rich. On the other hand the Admiralty do appear to have driven a pretty hard bargain, and if there were to be a grant it could clearly be a once for all related to the World Refugee Year. Incidentally the initial subscription of £200,000 by H.M.G. was only arrived at after a great deal of pressure on the Treasury.

(2) On the immigration question, I have personally been consistently worried about it, feeling that the people of Hong Kong have not really tackled it with sufficient energy. The Governor knows my views and indeed I had quite a talk with him about it a few days ago. Illegal immigration has been proceeding over the last years at around 100,000 a year and there is no obvious reason why this should diminish unless the strongest preventative steps are taken. These are estimated to cost £1m. a year and even then would not be fully effective.

Personally I believe that if this £1m. a year prevented half of the illegal immigration, it would prove immensely worth while both materially and from the point of view of the long term future of Hong Kong.

Materially the cost of housing over the next ten years for half-a-million refugees plus all the municipal services would certainly exceed the £1m. annually of the preventative service. Having said this, I do recognise that the coming of the refugees has other economic benefits to the Colony as a whole. The influx of new labour keeps down labour costs; the needs of food, clothing, housing etc., even if paid for by the Government, are a profit to many citizens, and so on. Indeed it is my belief that this is one of the reasons why the pressure to stop illegal immigration is not greater.

More important than the material argument is to me the fact that inevitably if immigration continues at the present rate there will come a moment when Hong Kong will be the ripest of plums to drop into the Chinese lap. If only we can cut down the rate of immigration, to that extent we would have a chance of putting off the date when the plum drops. Even today it is probably true to say that there are one million Chinese refugees in Hong Kong who have come in, often illegally, and who in a sense may well have their first loyalty to China as they have only recently come to Hong Kong. In another ten years the figure might be a further million unless a preventative service operates effectively. Furthermore I believe that this great influx of Chinese makes it extremely difficult for us to support the case of Hong Kong in our markets or the markets of the rest of the world. When their goods flood in we cannot truly say these are goods from colonial territories when we know that there is Chinese capital and Chinese people so largely producing them.

For the above reasons I believe we should press the Governor very hard to start the preventative service, even at a cost of £1m. a year.

(3) It occurs to me that no Colonial Minister has visited Hong Kong in a very long time. Would it help from the neglect angle if one of us—and I am quite a ready candidate!—paid a visit within say the next six months?
260 PREM 11/3276 17 Mar 1960

[South-East Asian issues]: letter from Mr Macmillan to Lord Selkirk

Thank you very much for your letter about the Eden Hall Conference which I was very interested to read. I am sure that these meetings are very useful because they help people to consider the problems of South East Asia as a whole. Of course it is a very important part of the world not only for us but for the West in general, and I was encouraged by what you told me. Certainly I think that our policy has been surprisingly successful and that we must continue to act as vigorously and intelligently as we can.

English teaching is, as you say, of great importance. Fortunately we have a scheme now being examined to set up an English Institute in South East Asia, possibly in Kuala Lumpur. I am not sure yet if this scheme will come off, but in any case we are planning a meeting of experts at Makerere College in Uganda in January, 1961. Equally important, perhaps, is the need to have more of our people speaking oriental languages. On this I have nothing concrete to report, but I hope that we shall be able to give you some help.

Service Attachés are also important and there is a plan to increase the posts in South East Asia by adding a Naval Attaché at Djakarta, an Assistant Naval Attaché at Rangoon, and Military Attachés in Vietnam and Cambodia. I hope that we shall be able to tell you soon that this increase has been possible, since we must do all we can to stiffen the South East Asian countries although I suppose that if we stress military aid too much, we may alarm the more timid. In this connection it is annoying that the Malayans will not co-operate and we are considering what can be done to change their mind. Perhaps we can talk to the Tunku1 at the Commonwealth meeting. Anyway, as you say we must keep his goodwill.

Economically it is more difficult. We have almost doubled the Government assistance to the less developed countries since 1957/58 and now we devote something like 1½ per cent of our national income to helping them. A large share of our future capital lending will go to India and estimates for the Colombo Plan technical assistance for next year are 10 per cent up. Really, of course, we are limited in what we do by our own economic position.

I am sure that you are right about Singapore. Some of our neighbours are understandably nervous but I think that they are wrong. The present constitutional arrangements really make it less likely that we shall have to decide soon whether to stay or go. If we had not given internal self-government we should by now have a Cyprus situation in Singapore with the Chinese playing the part of the Greeks. As it is, we at least have a Government in Singapore which is not pro-China. That Government is conducting our battle for us and although it may lose, we shall at least have gained time. The real difficulty is how to help the Singapore Government without appearing to do so.

I hear a lot about the vigour with which you are tackling the various problems which you have found. I am really grateful for all the hard work you are putting in and you know that we will do everything we can to help. Incidentally, I was very glad to know that you had a good reception from Ayub and Nehru; I am sure it is very important to keep as close to them as we can.

2 ie, in his journey across Pakistan and India. F-M M Ayub Khan was president of Pakistan, 1958–1969.

261 DO 169/10, no 78 24 Aug 1961

[Greater Malaysia]: letter from Lord Selkirk to Mr Macleod about prospects for the scheme

I think the time has come when it is necessary to consider how far a crash programme for the “Greater Malaysia” scheme is desirable and practicable. As I see it, the situation is as follows.

2. Lee Kuan Yew has not been successful in riding the Communist tiger and was in danger of being gobbled up. He has however now broken with the Communists and, if he can obtain merger on reasonable terms, is apparently prepared to take a firm stand. The original Communist concept was to accept merger as a long-term aim in the belief that, on the one hand, it would give them a broader base from which to work for the Communisation of the whole peninsula, and, on the other, that it was unlikely to be achieved in the near future. Meanwhile they would continue in Singapore to undermine the P.A.P.1 with a view to ultimately taking it over. In these calculations they may not have fully grasped the implications for them of giving the Tunku control of Singapore. At all events it appears that they have now realised that if the Tunku takes over internal security in Singapore, they will be much more directly threatened than they were by the present Internal Security Council.

3. Lee is now mad keen to achieve merger and indeed sees in it the only possible salvation for his own political future and his party, the P.A.P. If he fails to get merger by the end of the year, he will probably have to face a general election where he would lose to the new left-wing “Barisan Socialis”2 manipulated by the Communists. Alternatively, he may try to force us to suspend the Constitution and take over. We have to decide whether it is worth trying to save him. On balance, I think it is, though this opinion might have to be revised in the light of Singapore developments. Certainly, no other Singapore political leader (except Lim Yew Hock)3 would be likely to fight for merger. The successor to Lee will almost certainly present us with demands for a further measure of independence, if not more. The problem is, however, whether there is any hope of getting the Tunku to move in time.

4. Tunku Abdul Rahman is quite keen to take over Singapore since he now realises the political danger. But he believes it is politically impossible for him to do this unless he can explain to his Malay electors that he has some counter weight to the large chunk of Chinese who constitute the bulk of the population of Singapore. This means the Borneo territories.

1 People’s Action Party, founded in 1954, which came to power in 1959; its leader Lee Kuan Yew was prime minister of Singapore, 1959–1990.
2 A newly-formed party, with Lim Chin Siong as secretary-general.
5. All three Borneo territories are quite unfitted as yet to enter an association of this sort on the basis of popular representation. But they will continue to be so unfitted for many years to come. I should give Sarawak about ten years and North Borneo at least twenty years before a clear-out electoral opinion could be given on this subject. This means bluntly that if we proceed by normal constitutional methods, and assuming the Tunku will not compromise, merger between the Federation and Singapore is virtually out.

6. But I believe it may be possible to give the Tunku enough association with the Borneo territories to justify his closer association with Singapore in the eyes of his Malay population. In the sort of picture I have in mind, which is one which I have only tentatively formulated and which I am bound to admit contains many difficulties, Singapore would become a self-governing state of the Federation with much more extensive powers than the other States; something on the lines of Ulster. The Kuala Lumpur Government would, however, be responsible for defence, foreign policy and internal security. The powers of internal security would necessarily require to be fairly extensive to be acceptable to the Federation. The great advantage of the Tunku taking over foreign policy is that it would effectively prevent Chinese or Russian missions being set up in Singapore. The Borneo territories would be substantially in the same position, subject to certain safeguards. That is to say, they would send to Kuala Lumpur the same number of representatives as Singapore. If the Singapore representatives were increased, the Borneo territories should be increased. That should reasonably safeguard the parliamentary position. The Borneo representatives would of course have to be nominated, which Tun Razak4 quite specifically told me he would be perfectly satisfied to accept.

7. I can see at first sight that such an arrangement might not greatly appeal to the Governors, particularly in so far as it meant their being subordinated in some way to the Kuala Lumpur Government in respect of internal security. It is of course not the ideal for them, but failing some such solution the future of their territories will present an increasing problem to which it is hard to see the ultimate answer. I think in fact that their requirements could be met in fair measure by forming a Borneo Defence Council in Kuala Lumpur on which the U.K. High Commissioner would necessarily sit and which would be specially charged with the problems of defence and internal security of the Borneo territories.

8. Such a plan does, of course, involve a number of considerable risks. The Borneo territories might very well react violently against it. They have, however, had in Singapore recently a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference which has been open to the press. The representatives of the Borneo territories have come a very long way in saying that they support Greater Malaysia in principle, and there have latterly been several further indications that, if handled properly, the local peoples will be prepared to go along with the idea.

9. It would of course be essential that British staff should remain for some considerable time and should be assured of doing so. I have no doubt that the existing peace and quiet which runs throughout the Borneo territories is entirely due to the quality and manner in which the British staff carry out their duties.

Federation Government appear to be quite willing to give the fullest undertaking in regard to this matter and could be kept up to it through the Borneo Defence Council or some similar organisation in Kuala Lumpur. There would have to be, I do not doubt, a provision enabling any of the territories to opt out within a period of say five years if they should wish to do so. I should have thought something of this sort would be essential to satisfy local sentiment as well as to meet backbench criticism in the House of Commons. In any case I think it is a desirable safeguard.

10. This leaves the question of defence. On this subject there has been a great deal of discussion and I will not go into details here. But I believe that basically, if we can get the political organisation right, we can fit in defence requirements with the broad agreement of the people concerned. I think it is important that we do so and in any case, unless the defence arrangements are broadly accepted by the people, they will not be of long duration.

11. Of course all this is putting tremendous confidence in Tunku Abdul Rahman. We cannot foresee precisely his political life but he seems to be very reasonably established and we have to take a chance on the irresponsible remarks which he makes from time to time. There will be considerable difficulties and the scheme may seem so loose that it hardly constitutes a political unity. These are all risks which I think have got to be run. But I have come to the conclusion that, unless we are prepared to take a chance, we may miss the psychological moment in the tide of the affairs of men which would enable the foundations to be laid for the only stable evolution of these territories which seems to me and most of our advisers to be sound.

12. There is one further possibility, which has been suggested by Lee Kuan Yew, i.e. that if Brunei by itself were to join the Federation now, the Tunku might agree to early merger for Singapore if offered some prospect of North Borneo and Sarawak being brought in at a later stage and an assurance of our intention to work to this end. A union of Brunei with Malaya would not of course present the same constitutional, social or economic difficulties as exist in the case of the other two territories. It is by no means certain that the Tunku would be prepared to contemplate such a proposal or indeed that it would be acceptable on the Brunei side. But the possibility may be worth exploring.

13. Some of the above points have been touched upon in Melville’s letter of August 11 to the Governors and White, of which I have just seen a copy. It is encouraging to know that the problem is under active study in London. I am not sure however whether Melville’s main suggestion of a declaration of intent will go far enough to satisfy the Tunku. It may therefore be worthwhile to consider the admittedly more drastic and far-reaching solution which I have outlined above. . . .

262  DO 169/29, no 185A  16 Sept 1961
[Greater Malaysia]: letter from Lord Selkirk (South-East Asia) to Mr Macleod about the scheme and the problem of the Borneo territories

Dear Iain,

In my telegram No. 41 I have given a short answer to the point about relinquishment of sovereignty in your telegram No. 360 on Greater Malaysia. I am now writing to give you my further comments.
2. In my letter of August 24,¹ I said that I thought the time had come when it was necessary to consider a crash programme for “Greater Malaysia”. I should like first to recapitulate the various reasons why I consider that such a programme is necessary.

(i) We must look at the whole scheme against the background of our overall policy in the area. In my earlier letters and despatches on the subject I have made it plain that I believe that “Greater Malaysia” would be an important factor for stability in the area and that it would satisfy long-term British and Commonwealth interests.

(ii) Owing to the speed and manner in which the situation is now developing there is a serious risk that unless Greater Malaysia can be achieved in the near future, the opportunity may be lost for good. This is due to a combination of circumstances in the various territories involved, i.e., notably:

(a) For the first time we have governments in both the Federation and in Singapore that are actively in favour of Greater Malaysia; this may never recur.
(b) The present Singapore Government will almost certainly fall in the next few months if rapid progress cannot be made. If this happens there will be no prospect of merger as long as the Tunku remains in power in Kuala Lumpur.
(c) If we do not bring the Borneo territories in now (i.e. by 1963–64) so that the Greater Malaysia plan fails, the long-term alternatives for them would be independence or absorption by Indonesia or China. The first of these alternatives is not likely to be maintained and would probably lead to the second. Moreover it is certain that if we do not take the opportunity presented by the Tunku’s present initiative, we cannot expect to remain in the Borneo territories for another ten or twenty years. The Tunku’s proposals have already made their impact on political consciousness there and, whatever happens, we must expect demands for political change to come forward with much greater urgency than they have hitherto.
(d) The Tunku has, to a considerable extent, staked his political future and reputation on the success of his “Greater Malaysia” proposals. If they fail, it will be a set-back for him which could be damaging to his position at home. Moreover failure will be blamed on us, and this would mean a serious blow to our present good relations with the Tunku. We should be faced with an angry and resentful Tunku over Singapore and over other problems.
(e) This may be our last chance to prevent Chinese preponderance in the area which must inevitably involve a serious risk of ultimate Communist domination.

3. Before I set out my further comments on how the Borneo territories might fit into the Greater Malaysia concept I should like to say this about our own policy there. We must of course continue our efforts to train the peoples of those territories for self-government and to bequeath to them respect for the rule of law. But we have at the same time to face up to the fact that “one man, one vote” has not been a wild success in South East Asia. In my view therefore our greatest contribution to the future stability of the Borneo territories has been and will be made in the fields of administration and of education and in such economic spheres as communications, land utilization and agriculture.

4. I said in my telegram No. 41 that I thought we could surrender sovereignty in the Borneo territories provided that satisfactory arrangements were made for us to continue making this contribution until such time as the local people are ready to

¹ See previous document; and, for the background, the introductory note to the next document.
run their own affairs at the State level. We want the Tunku to assume sovereignty over Singapore and it would certainly be logical for him to want the Borneo territories to join a Greater Malaysia on essentially the same basis. Moreover, I doubt if it would be wise to share sovereignty with the Federation even in the unlikely event of our being able to induce the Tunku to do so, lest we lend countenance to the allegation that Greater Malaysia is a plot for the preservation of British imperialism.

5. The basic problem is how to ensure that the constitutional provisions for the Borneo territories are properly worked out, put to the territories for their consent and then enacted in such a way that the people in the territories can be assured that they will in due course be brought into full operation, while at the same time making progress as rapidly as the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew require. I suggest that the best way of doing this would be to negotiate now State constitutions for the Borneo territories with whatever State powers, financial provisions and so-forth that are desirable. These constitutions would include provision for representative institutions and for the Governors ultimately to be in similar positions to the Governors of Penang and Malacca. The constitutions would, however, come into force in stages and, in this way, the pace of constitutional advance could be suited to the territory. At the same time the important requirement of an assured ultimate constitutional position would be achieved by enacting these constitutions by means of appropriate legislative action in both the United Kingdom and the Federation. This legislation in the Federation would provide that these constitutions would be capable of amendment only in the same way as the Federal constitution itself, thereby entrenching them to the same extent.

6. If the suggestion I have outlined is constitutionally feasible it remains to determine to whom the Governors would be responsible for the administration of the Borneo territories at the State level until they are ready to administer themselves and the full provisions of their State constitutions have been brought into operation. In addition, there must be some means of deciding when each suspended section of the State constitution should become effective. Broadly speaking, there seems to be three possible alternatives.

7. The first of these is to trust the Tunku absolutely. By this I mean that we make the Governors finally responsible to Kuala Lumpur and leave it to the Tunku to decide when the State constitution can become fully operative. The difficulty here is that the Tunku does not want to take over colonies and the Borneo territories do not want to become colonies of the Federation (the Ians for example are not Moslems and do not relish being administered by Moslems). The other obvious disadvantage of this course is that it would probably undermine the morale of the expatriates in the Borneo territories with the result that our further contribution to their future stability would be much reduced.

8. The second alternative is that the Governors should continue to be responsible to London. In other words, although sovereignty was transferred to the Federation they would agree to derogate from it to the extent of leaving direction of State administration to H.M.G. for a transitional period. This would presumably reassure the local people and the administrators, but it would hardly appeal to the Tunku. Moreover, I should have thought that H.M.G., on the analogy of the Central African Federation, might not like it either.

9. Both these alternatives could, of course, be modified by various measures of joint responsibility and consultation. But if this is to be the case, it seems to me worth-
while to think in terms of formal machinery. This might be done by setting up by agreement with the Federation Government a Joint Trust Council for the Borneo territories. There are obviously various possibilities for the membership of this council which I will not go into at this stage, but I think it might well be necessary to give the Federation the chairmanship, at any rate on a rotating basis. The powers of the council would include the ability to give the Governors, who would, I hope, be prepared to continue in office in these circumstances, general guidance on State matters, the future selection and appointment of new Governors and the power to decide on the introduction of successive stages in the State constitutions. The Council would not however meet too frequently and the Governors should be able to conduct day to day affairs without interference from it. As a concomitant of this arrangement it would be essential to include in the constitutional arrangements provision for the establishment immediately of a Public Service Commission with powers to make recommendations only to the Governor and to have it agreed that the Governor would act solely in his discretion in matters affecting the Public Service. I would hope in this way to postpone for some time the need to introduce a scheme of compensation for expatriate officers, though I realise that in due course this would have to come as the pressure increases, as it surely will, for increased Borneonisation.

10. So far, I have been primarily concerned with the interests of the peoples of the Borneo territories. From H.M.G.’s point of view there is also the need for a satisfactory arrangement on Defence. This I envisage would take the form of an extension of the Malayan Defence Agreement to cover the Borneo territories, as well as Singapore. It must however be on a basis that would make it clear to the Federation Government that they were responsible for their own defence and that we were merely helping them to achieve their objective, probably through some form of Defence Council in Kuala Lumpur. It would also have to be understood that they would be prepared to undertake to co-operate in assuring the Defence and Internal Security of remaining British territories in this area. Such arrangements would necessarily presuppose goodwill and continuous consultation between the two Governments. Such goodwill is fundamental to the whole concept of Greater Malaysia and at this stage we must assume it.

11. I realise that it will not be easy to persuade the Tunku to accept the arrangements I have proposed above even though we are prepared to cede sovereignty over the Borneo territories. The opting out clause for the Borneo territories which I advocated in my letter of August 24 would obviously make the scheme very much easier to put across there, but I am seriously wondering whether, in the light of Tory’s2 telegram No. 651 of September 7 to the Commonwealth Relations office, there is any chance of getting the Tunku to agree to it. That being so, and since some way must be found of consulting the peoples of the Borneo territories before they are irrevocably committed to Greater Malaysia, the only alternative is some form of consultation within the next year or two. At first sight this may sound impracticable, but we should not forget the speed with which other former colonies at least as underdeveloped as North Borneo and Sarawak have been asked to decide their future. While still without any substantial experience of managing their own affairs, Singapore may hold a referendum towards the end of this year. Obviously, we could not move as quickly as that but popular consultation in the Borneo territories in, say, late 1962 would be a very different proposition.

---

2 Sir Geofroy Tory, high commissioner in Federation of Malaya since 1957.
This would mean that the Tunku would have to accept that the inclusion of the Borneo territories was subject to the will of the people there as expressed in 1962, but there would be no provision for opting out once Greater Malaysia had been chosen. Of course the risk of an adverse vote would have to be incurred but if we believe, as I think we do, that the people must be consulted at some stage, this would have to be faced sooner or later. The Tunku may not much like this, but since, as Tory has said in his telegram No. 652 of September 7 to the Commonwealth Relations Office he believes that we could swing public opinion in the Borneo territories in favour of Greater Malaysia, he might be prepared to agree if it comes to the point. There would still be the problem that the Tunku would presumably not finally accept Singapore until the outcome of the Borneo Consultation was known but this also need not be an insuperable difficulty.

12. If we had a crash programme on the lines I have described with such consultations as the Governors think fair in the Borneo territories in about twelve months’ time we should clearly have to try to ensure that the result was the one that we and the Tunku wanted. I am quite sure that the influence of the administrations in the Borneo territories is very considerable and that whatever is said about Greater Malaysia by Her Majesty’s Government, by the Governors and by their District Officers will carry very great weight with the local people. Conversely silence would be taken as disapproval of the scheme. I recall the criticism in the case of the Central African Federation that there had at the time of its introduction been no firm instructions to District Officers in the protectorate to take a positive line in support of it. I believe this point was commented on in the Monckton Report. It is therefore essential for its success that any Greater Malaysia scheme should have the full support of the local administrations on whom would fall the task of explaining its implications and of setting its practical advantages against the immense problems that would otherwise face the peoples of the Borneo territories when they became independent. I believe that the Greater Malaysia scheme would be in the long term interests of the Borneo peoples and that we can tell them this in all sincerity.

13. I realise that there are many other important aspects to be considered that I have not dealt with in this letter. A joint Working Party will clearly have to be set up to produce a detailed plan once the broad heads of agreement have been reached at the top level discussions. I think a scheme on these lines could be worked out and the prospective results merit the risks involved. The Tunku is very keen on this concept and would, I believe, co-operate in the organisational change. . . .

Geordie

P.S. I am sending copies also to Alec & Duncan.³

³ ie, Lord Home and Mr Sandys.
minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, spoke out publicly in favour of the project. Though he was worried about the Malay/Chinese racial balance, inclusion of the Borneo territories would act as a counterbalance against the Chinese. The Tunku’s initiative was broadly welcomed by the British government, though not by Mr Amery, who had long been keenly interested in the Singapore base. On 22 Nov 1961 the British and Malayan prime ministers issued a joint statement that they had agreed ‘Malaysia’ was a desirable aim, but they must first ascertain the views of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak and of the sultan of Brunei—a recognition that they could not force the pace of local opinion or bundle them into a shot-gun marriage. Meanwhile there was a hotly debated referendum in Singapore, where Lee Kuan Yew’s government favoured the merger but the opposition parties did not. The Cobbold Commission in the Borneo territories yielded positive answers, and in Aug 1962 the two governments announced that ‘Malaysia’ would come into existence by 31 Aug 1963.

South East Asia forms the land bridge between China and Australia in much the same way as the Middle East forms the land bridge between Russia and Africa. It also offers China the best access routes to India and Pakistan.

2. It is important to deny South East Asia to China:—

(i) because of our extensive investments (rubber, tin and oil) and commercial interests in the region;
(ii) because its fall would pose an immediate threat to Australia and to India and Pakistan.

3. The defence of South East Asia will depend mainly upon the United States; but it will be important for us to have the means of influencing American policy in the area. A British military presence, including nuclear power, will be necessary for this purpose. It will also be important to our relations with Australia and New Zealand. Besides, Britain, alone or at least with the help of Australia and New Zealand, is still capable of preventing the subversion of Malaya by the communists or the effective consolidation of a communist revolution in Indonesia.

4. Singapore constitutes the best and, indeed, the only effective base for a British military presence in South East Asia. It has excellent Naval, Air Force and Army facilities. Our legal title to it is unchallengeable. The predominantly Chinese population must indeed be regarded as potentially hostile in a crisis, but just because it is Chinese it cannot rely on the support of neighbouring Malaya or Indonesia, nor will it command much sympathy from world opinion.

5. The British presence in South East Asia today rests upon Singapore. It is now suggested that we should look upon Singapore as “no more than a forward operating base on the use of which we could not rely in all circumstances”. But what does this mean? If operational restrictions are accepted, they apply just as much to a forward operating base as to a main base. The fact remains that if we want to contribute to keeping the communists out of South East Asia and if we want to maintain our influence with Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and the United States on the other, we must have the effective use of Singapore. Without it our influence in the area could sink to the level of that of France.

6. The Committee of officials argues that political developments in Singapore already threaten our position and that Greater Malaysia “offers that only satisfactory prospect of settling the political problem of Singapore”. But how will Greater Malaysia settle this problem? If the Chinese communists in Singapore refuse to remain under the present very indirect form of British rule, are they likely to accept the more direct rule of a right-wing Malayan Government?

7. It is further argued that Greater Malaysia “would relieve us of a heavy and costly
military burden in the field of internal security” and so would help towards solving our manpower and financial problems. But would it, in fact, do so? If the Chinese communists in Singapore really constitute the formidable internal security problem for us which the paper alleges, is there any reason to think that the Tunku’s forces can keep them under control? We are, after all, still helping the Tunku to keep order in his own northern border province. Is it not more likely that we shall be called back to help, but only after the situation has deteriorated to what we now see in South Vietnam?

8. If we make deal with the Tunku, it will no doubt last as long as the Tunku remains in power. But how long can be and his friends hold the position? There is already considerable opposition to his regime among the Malays. In Greater Malaysia, the Chinese would be the largest as well as the most efficient single community.

9. The Tunku is our best friend in South East Asia and the fact that he has called for Greater Malaysia is the strongest argument in favour of the proposal. But what has brought him to his present view? In the past the Tunku was firmly opposed to any merger between Malaya and Singapore. H.M.G. has not always favoured a merger. On earlier occasions it has been held that it was a major British interest to keep Malaya and Singapore apart. It would appear from certain reports that the Tunku’s change of mind has been brought about by the belief that H.M.G. are no longer prepared to hold on to Singapore and that, if he did not seize the opportunity of a merger now, he would soon be faced with an independent State of Singapore probably under communist control.

10. All this leads me to the conclusion that Greater Malaysia would solve neither the political nor the internal security problems of Singapore. Instead it would lead to a loose confederation with a Chinese majority which it would be even more difficult to maintain under Western influence than the status quo.

11. For these reasons I deeply regret that we should already have gone so far to commit ourselves to the principle of Greater Malaysia. If therefore the course of the negotiations shows that the Greater Malaysia principle is not viable, I suggest we need feel no regret but should concentrate on ways and means of maintaining our position in Singapore.

12. If, on the other hand, the Greater Malaysia proposal goes forward, then we should surely decide in advance of talks with the Tunku what are our minimum defence requirements. It is no doubt right, as the officials’ paper recommends, to begin by asking for unfettered use of the bases. If, however, the Tunku refuses this, I question whether we should be wise to assume “that agreement can and will be reached and that we, therefore, need not delay such action as can be taken in other ways to promote the realisation of the Greater Malaysian concept”. The Borneo territories are our trump card in any negotiation with the Tunku. Ought we to facilitate their merger with Malaya regardless of progress over defence? Ought we not rather to conduct negotiations about the Borneo territories in parallel with the negotiations about defence? It may be that we shall not be able to get a satisfactory defence agreement out of the Tunku and that we shall have to face a breakdown. In that case we should be in a much better posture if it could be made to appear that any breakdown was connected with the interests of the Borneo peoples as well as with our own.

13. In considering the detail of a defence agreement we should give consideration to the creation of Sovereign Base Areas around the main Naval and Air installations. This would not be too difficult geographically; and the maintenance of Sovereign rights might enable the Tunku to turn the awkward political corner which our need to use the bases for S.E.A.T.O. purposes undoubtedly represents.
14. I conclude:—

(i) that the maintenance of the base in Singapore is essential to the protection of our interests in South East Asia, including our influence on Australia and on American policy in South East Asia;

(ii) that Greater Malaysia will not solve the political or security problems presented by the Chinese population in Singapore but, on the contrary, is bound to weaken our title to the bases without bringing any lasting relief of our manpower and financial difficulties;

(iii) that if nevertheless the Greater Malaysia proposal goes forward we should, in order to achieve a better bargaining position, conduct any negotiations over defence in parallel with negotiations over the three Borneo territories;

(iv) that we should give consideration to retaining the main Naval and Air Force installations in Singapore within one or more Sovereign Base Areas.

CAB 131/25, D 14(61)6 25 Oct 1961

‘Greater Malaysia’: Cabinet Defence Committee meeting minutes

[At a meeting in August, the Chiefs of Staff considered that ‘progress towards the “Grand Design” offers the best prospect of continued stability in the area’; the freedom of use and security of Singapore base would be adversely affected, but Australia and Labuan might provide some alternative (DO 169/28, no 110A, COS(61)259, report, 8 Aug 1961).]

The Committee had before them notes by the Secretary of the Cabinet covering a report by the Official Committee on Greater Malaysia (D. (61) 62) and a memorandum on Greater Malaysia by the Secretary of State for Air (D. (61) 66).1 They also had before them a directive from the Prime Minister to the Minister of Defence on defence policy and strategy (D. (61) 65).2

_The Commonwealth Secretary_ said that the present proposals by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, for a Greater Malaysia comprising Malaya, Singapore and the three British Borneo territories represented a striking change of mind since he had in January of this year discussed with the Tunku the possibility of a merger of Singapore with Malaya. The Tunku was then utterly opposed to such a merger despite pressure for it from Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,3 the Prime Minister of Singapore. In the meantime, however, the shift of political strength in Singapore away from Mr. Lee towards the extreme Left had evidently persuaded the Tunku that he must as a matter of urgency incorporate Singapore while it still had a Government with which he could agree terms acceptable to Malaya, the alternative being an increase in Singapore of Chinese Communist influence which he did not trust the British to control. At the same time, the Tunku was not prepared to take Singapore into the Federation of Malaya unless by then he could also incorporate the three British Borneo territories, in order that their predominantly non-Chinese populations should be available to counter-balance the overwhelmingly Chinese population of Singapore. This presented the British Government with a difficult problem of timing as the Borneo territories were far from ready for such an association: in the last analysis we must do what we thought right about that and not simply abide by local opinion in Borneo, but it would be important to carry local opinion with us and the Tunku must be made to understand

---

the need to do so. At present he over-rated the strength of Malaya’s attraction in the Borneo territories. More difficult still was the problem of our bases in Singapore. The Tunku clearly aimed at getting all the military and economic advantages of a major British military presence in Malaya and Singapore while subjecting to his veto our operational use of our bases and other facilities.

We could agree to the creation of a Greater Malaysia subject to reasonable arrangements for the Borneo territories and satisfaction of our defence requirements, but we should exercise great caution in the conduct of our first round of talks with the Tunku next month. He was now so bent upon achieving a Greater Malaysia that we could afford to insist that our needs, particularly in the field of defence, must be adequately met. These talks should be regarded as an exploratory operation, and we should be ready to reserve our position for further consideration at a later stage if the Tunku’s initial attitude proved intransigent and uncompromising. The situation in Singapore certainly imparted an element of urgency to the matter but was not itself immediately decisive.

The Secretary of State for Air said that the issue turned on whether we should be prepared to maintain our military position in Singapore, and whether we could in fact do so. In his view our whole position in the Far East, and our ability to exert any influence with our allies—especially the United States, Australia and New Zealand—depended upon the retention of nothing less than our present rights in both Malaya (where they were limited) and Singapore (where they were quite unfettered). It was an illusion to think that, if we withdrew our forces from their internal security role in Singapore, the Tunku could still safeguard internal security with his own forces. In a Greater Malaysia the influence of the Chinese was bound to increase and in due course to prevail. It was asking too much of the Tunku to leave this problem with him; and if we did so we should find ourselves having to move back again in difficult circumstances, such as those now facing the United States in South Vietnam. On the other hand, if we made the pivot of our policy a determination to stand firm in Singapore we could succeed in safeguarding our essential interests. The Tunku’s confidence in us would be restored; non-Communist opinion everywhere would support us; and in Singapore itself we could count on the advantages of the local economic importance of our bases and the fact that the Singapore Chinese were an isolated community surrounded by hostile neighbours in Malaya, Indonesia and other countries.

In discussion the general feeling of the Committee supported the view of the Commonwealth Secretary that in the first round of talks with the Tunku we should adopt a favourable attitude towards the principle of Greater Malaysia but avoid giving any impression that we were prepared to implement it forthwith at all costs. We should bring out into the open all the very real difficulties for us attending the project, notably the necessity for great care in dealing with the Borneo territories (where too forceful an approach could not only wreck the whole enterprise but turn local eyes dangerously in the direction of Indonesia) and the vital importance which we attached to agreement upon defence arrangements fully adequate to our needs.

The other main points made in discussion were:

(a) In the long-term we could not afford to go on defending Commonwealth countries which did not co-operate with us to the full. As was pointed out in the Prime Minister’s minute of 23rd October to the Minister of Defence, and as was clear

1 ie, document no 66 above.
from the Tunku’s declaration that in a Greater Malaysia our Singapore bases would not be available for SEATO purposes, we could not assume that our defence facilities in Malaya and Singapore would indefinitely offer a balance of advantage to us. We must therefore in any case reconsider our long-term position there but we must also make every effort to ensure that our present position was not meanwhile further weakened. In this connexion the Chief of the Defence Staff\(^4\) said that the island of Labuan had an airfield, a good anchorage, and only some 10,000 inhabitants; if necessary, Labuan might be to Singapore what Gan was to Ceylon. The island had been a gift to Queen Victoria, and recently had been administered by North Borneo purely as a matter of administrative convenience. The Official Committee’s report had recommended that no mention be made at present of the possibility of our wishing to retain sovereignty, although this might make it difficult to mention it for the first time at a later stage. This seemed to be a somewhat unrealistic approach.

(b) In the short term it was very desirable that we should be able to reduce our heavy commitment to maintain internal security in Singapore; and we should remember that, if that responsibility passed to the Tunku, he could be expected to find it much easier than it would be for us to take and sustain repressive measures. For that reason he could afford to rely upon smaller forces than we had to earmark for internal security. We needed to obtain this reduction in Singapore for two main reasons. One was the pressing requirement for the savings which it would represent in men and money. If we had indefinitely to keep forces in Singapore for internal security purposes on the present scale the whole balance of our long-term plans for the Services would be upset as regards both finance and man-power. The other reason was the urgent demand in other theatres for the forces thus tied up in Singapore. On these grounds the achievement of Greater Malaysia—if we assumed that it would relieve us of responsibility for internal security—would be most welcome. Moreover, if Greater Malaysia was not in sight before the review of the Singapore Constitution due in 1963 we were likely to encounter trouble there (as we could even earlier if Mr. Lee and his Government fell). In that case we should probably have to suspend the Constitution, perhaps for an indefinite period. Whether or not we suspended the Constitution we should be very ill-placed in Singapore (or Malaya) if we had to maintain our position in circumstances of local hostility. No doubt, as experience elsewhere had shown, we could hold the bases for some time—perhaps quite a long time—against the will of the local Governments and peoples, but this would inevitably make it extremely difficult to operate effectively from the bases. We should be in a particular quandary in Singapore since, although the Army could possibly be moved from the city into the naval and air bases, the bases themselves were so placed that reorganisation into a relatively compact and easily defensible pattern was impracticable. The idea of retaining sovereign areas in Singapore had its attractions, but an arrangement of that kind might not be of great help in practice.

(c) The paragraphs in the officials’ report dealing with finance were as fair a statement of this issue as was possible at this stage, and there appeared to be no decisive financial objection to the Greater Malaysia project.

Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that the matter was one of great difficulty since it seemed likely that we should be faced with grave problems whether or not Greater Malaysia were achieved. Further consideration by Ministers would be necessary before the discussions with the Tunku took place.

\(^4\) Lord Mountbatten.
‘Greater Malaysia’: Cabinet conclusions on discussions of the project

The Commonwealth Secretary recalled that the Cabinet had previously agreed that discussions should be held with the Prime Minister of Malaya about the project for a Greater Malaysia. This project had now been examined by the Ministers concerned, and exploratory discussions with the Prime Minister of Malaya were to begin on 20th November.

Broad agreement had been reached between the Governments of Malaya and Singapore about the terms for a merger. The main remaining problems which would arise in the coming discussions were—first, the need to retain our defence facilities in the territories concerned, including those necessary for the fulfilment of our obligations to the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation and for the deployment of the Commonwealth brigade; and, second, the means of securing the agreement of the Governments and peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak, in addition to the concurrence of the Government of Brunei, to their association in a Greater Malaysia.

As regards the former, the Prime Minister of Malaya no doubt realised that our ability to fulfil our obligations to the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation was an essential element in the defence of the whole area, including Malaya, but he had indicated that he would seek to impose limits on our freedom in the future to use our existing facilities in Singapore for this purpose. It might be that it would be more acceptable to him if these facilities were to be regarded in future as available to Commonwealth forces in the context of a defence agreement for the whole area in which Australia and New Zealand would join.

The Prime Minister said that it seemed desirable to proceed without delay with the exploratory discussions since an association of all the territories concerned, if it could be secured by agreement and in such a way as to provide for our defence requirements, represented the best hope of providing for the future stability of the area and avoiding a deterioration of the position in Singapore.¹

The Cabinet:
- Took note of these statements.

¹ The discussions were successfully completed by 23 Nov (CC 65(61)4).

[Ministerial responsibility for Greater Malaysia]: minute by Mr Macmillan to Mr Sandys

[Lord Cobbold (formerly C F Cobbold, governor of the Bank of England, 1949–1961) was chairman of the Malaysia Commission of Inquiry (1962) to ascertain views about a federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. Mr Sandys was urging strongly that Cobbold’s recommendation should be anticipated by putting the territories under himself as S of S for Commonwealth Relations at once. Macmillan got T J Bligh to write a ‘tactful’ minute, adding, ‘It might be worth your talking to him too as you are so good at soothing my colleagues down (24.3.62).’]

We had a useful discussion on Wednesday, March 21 about the state of play on Greater Malaysia.
I have been thinking further about the question of Ministerial responsibility for this. The first thing to be clear about is the timing. I believe it would be wise to wait until Cobbold has reported. The Cabinet will then have to consider in the light of this Report whether to go ahead with the scheme. Those of us who have been most closely concerned with this are extremely anxious that it should come off.

If the Cabinet accept the policy we shall have to decide how this is to be presented, whether the Cobbold Report is to be published, and so on. It would, I feel sure, be a great help in putting this across if we could give it a new impetus by having the whole scheme under a single Minister. It would all then have a new look.

I hope therefore that you will feel able not to press me for the time being on transfer of responsibilities. I fully understand the arguments and agree that we must do all we can to avoid a repetition of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.1

1 ie, with two ministers pulling in different directions. Sandys replied that he ‘entirely agreed’ with the prime minister’s proposed procedure (minute no 9/62, 27 Mar 62).

267 PREM 11/4183 23 Apr 1963

‘The future defence of Malaysia’: brief for prime minister’s talks with Lord Selkirk by Sir B Trend (Cabinet Office)

[Macmillan was ‘rather uneasy’ about future defence commitments to Malaysia; the USA and Australia were hesitant about helping, and Britain might be taking on a ‘formidable liability’, because ‘Malaysia was encircled unless Indonesia and the Philippines could be kept neutral’ (PREM 11/4347, minute M 131/63, 3 Apr 1963.)] Sukarno opened Indonesian ‘confrontation’ with Malaysia in Feb 1963.]

The discussion of this memorandum1 has been arranged as a preliminary to your talk with Lord Selkirk on Thursday.

The salient facts are as follows:—

(a) We are committed to bring Malaysia into being by the end of August; and we cannot now evade this commitment.

(b) We are also committed to help to defend Malaysia when constituted against external aggression. This is a potentially formidable commitment, since Malaysia is practically encircled by hostile countries—Indonesia to the west and south, the Philippines to the east and the rickety structure of Indo-China to the north. Of Malaysia’s enemies, Indonesia is the most dangerous.

(c) The chances of a reconciliation between Malaysia and Indonesia are very slight. But the Indonesian threat is more likely to take the form of infiltration (particularly of the North Borneo Territories) than of overt attack. Even so, infiltration may take place on a scale which would justify the Malaysians in regarding it as an “external” attack and therefore invoking our assistance.

(d) The United States will not help us to defend Malaysia except in the event of a major and direct attack. They will regard it as our business to deal with mere infiltration. Australia and New Zealand, who have from the first been doubtful of the political viability of Malaysia, have recently been taking a more robust line; but they too have so far avoided any specific commitment as regards defence of the new entity.

1 CP(63)6, by Lord Home.
(e) The Chiefs of Staff regard the British forces available in South East Asia as adequate to deal with infiltration (although replacement forces might have to be sent to Singapore from the United Kingdom). Anything more than infiltration would require further reinforcements, including V-bombers.

(f) It follows that as long as we are committed to defend Malaysia against attack we shall be unable—even if attack is limited to infiltration—to make any significant reduction in our forces in South East Asia. We recently decided that for very different reasons we could not hope for any saving on our troops in Germany in the foreseeable future. Little by little the defence “economies”, which the Chequers meeting undertook to secure, are being shown to be impossible as a result of our overseas political obligations.

In these circumstances we should ask ourselves two questions:

(1) Must we accept the political obligation to defend Malaysia as an indefinite commitment? Or is there some alternative policy that we could adopt? The tone of paragraph 10 (viii)—“we must continue to treat the Indonesians and Philippinoes both with firmness and with great care and courtesy”—is disappointingly negative. Can we not take or sponsor some initiative to promote greater political stability in the area and so enable ourselves gradually to reduce our commitment? Paragraph 9(a) of the memorandum indicates that once Malaysia is formed the Tunku is prepared to undertake tripartite discussions with the Indonesians and Philippinoes about Malaysia’s future relations with them. What could we do—either now or in the near future—to give some substance to these discussions and to ensure them some positive outcome?

(2) If we must accept our obligation to Malaysia as being for all practical purposes one of indefinite duration, should we not seek to share this burden with Australia and New Zealand? Their expenditures on defence are about 2.7 per cent and 2.0 per cent of G.N.P. respectively. If these figures were raised—necessarily over a period of several years—to our own level of 7 per cent of G.N.P., the additional resources made available would amount to about £320 million a year. This is just about half the figure which our own defence expenditure in the Far East will probably reach by 1970.

Here again the memorandum is disappointingly cautious—“it is probably wiser to wait until after Malaysia Day before applying a great deal of extra pressure on [Australia and New Zealand]”. But is any pressure at all being exerted at the moment? And even if we must wait until intensifying it, should we not already be considering how much of the burden we can realistically hope to shift onto Australia and New Zealand in the next year or two; and what form their contribution might best take?

2 Square brackets in the original.

268 PREM 11/4348, FS/63/58 24 June 1963

[Difficulties over negotiations for Malaysia]: minute by Lord Home (FO) to Mr Sandys

[In Sept 1962 a referendum in Singapore resulted in a decisive majority in favour of the merger; and Sarawak and North Borneo also confirmed in principle their willingness to join. The Leg Co of Brunei had previously also supported Brunei’s entry in principle, but negotiations were broken off by a revolt which broke out in Brunei in Dec 1962. Early in
Aug 1963 the presidents of Indonesia and of the Philippines put pressure on Malaya to allow the secretary-general of UNO to ascertain whether the people of North Borneo and Sarawak genuinely wished to join; he concluded that they both did. This investigation caused the starting date of Malaysia to be put back to 16 Sept 1963. Singapore left the new federation in August 1965.

You must be very concerned at the difficulties which have arisen between Malaya and Singapore over the negotiations for Malaysia, and also with the deadlock over Brunei. I see that it has been suggested that the Prime Minister should invite the Tunku, Lee Kuan Yew and the Sultan of Brunei to London, and you are no doubt considering what should be said to them, and in particular how we should handle the Tunku's suggestion that, in the last resort, Malaysia might be formed on August 31 without Singapore and Brunei. I presume that you will be strongly opposed to this, but I thought it might be helpful if I were to summarise the foreign policy implications of any solution of this sort. They would also apply to a decision to allow Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak to federate temporarily while pursuing the negotiations with Singapore and Brunei with a view to bringing the whole of Malaysia into being later on:

(i) If Singapore fails to get into Malaysia, now or at a later date, there is a strong likelihood that any arrangements for the continued use of our base there would fairly soon become unworkable. This would undermine our relationship with the Americans in the area and our ability to carry out our obligations to SEATO, and would greatly weaken our whole position in South East Asia.

(ii) The failure of our policy would lead the Indonesians and Filipinos to abandon any restraint and to go all out for their own territorial ambitions in Borneo. I do not know what our defence commitments would be towards a lesser Malaysia of this kind, but I would doubt whether we should be justified in getting involved in serious military operations with the Indonesians in defence of a Malaysia which did not include our base at Singapore.

(iii) While the Americans and Australians have made it clear that in the last resort they would be prepared to help us to defend Malaysia, I am not at all sure that they would wish to do so if it no longer served the purpose of giving a stable and permanent future to Singapore.

(iv) The idea of Malaysia is by no means popular with the uncommitted countries, but if it comes into existence rapidly and as now planned I think it will be widely accepted and will be received by the United Nations. But a lesser Malaysia would risk being considered a trick to terminate our own difficulties and would leave so many problems unresolved that neutral opinion might swing sharply against it, and I can foresee a very difficult time in the United Nations. . . .

---

269  PREM 11/4188  5 Aug 1963
[Reflections on the position after negotiation of the Malaysia agreement]: letter from Mr Macmillan to Lord Selkirk

Thank you for your very interesting letter of June 14 about this year's Eden Hall Conference. I thought it better to wait until we had finished our negotiations in London on the Malaysia Agreement before replying.

The risk in these negotiations that the Tunku might seriously try to go for a “lesser Malaysia” without Singapore has yet again underlined the significance of Malaysia
both for the immediate future of South-East Asia and for our own position there. If it failed to come off, we might find that our immediate position was untenable.

There can be no doubt about the immediate need for us to remain in Singapore to meet our current strategic commitments. Nor can there be any doubt about the need for us to try to ensure that Malaysia is successfully launched and, in particular, fulfil those obligations to the peoples of Borneo and Sarawak to which you rightly referred. I hope that you will agree that the financial arrangements which we have concluded should do a good deal to help. The point to which you do not refer, however, is the need for aid either from the United States or from Australia and New Zealand. I hope that, now that our own aid is settled, the Federation will take up these questions. I think it particularly important that both Australia and New Zealand should contribute substantially to an enterprise which must surely be of great strategic importance for both of them. The limitations on what both we and the Federation can do make it particularly necessary to get help from other Commonwealth countries which should have an interest in the success of Malaysia as great as or greater than our own.

In the longer term I hope that our interests will not be entirely dependent upon a continuing British military presence once Malaysia has been successfully launched. We are as you know anxious to effect significant economies in our own defence expenditure in South-East Asia and I would hope that, as the Federation comes to be established and accepted and as its defence forces are built up, we should be able to realise this ambition. You pointed out that our stake in India is less than in Malaya. But it is still pretty large (£300 million in India compared with £400 million in Malaya), and it has not proved necessary to preserve it through a military presence. Indeed, the amount of money we spend to keep British troops in South-East Asia over a few years probably comes to substantially more than our financial stake there.

On the other interesting points raised in your letter, I enclose a memorandum of comments prepared by officials here, with which I am in general agreement.

I could not end this letter, however, without saying how much I have valued your work and your advice over the last three years. They have been of crucial importance both in furthering our interests in South-East Asia generally and above all in helping to bring about Malaysia.

270 DO 169/242, ff 221–223 11 Dec 1963
‘Malaysia: Confrontation’: despatch from Lord Head (Malaysia) to Mr Sandys: future British defence commitments

[Extract]

[Lord Head (previously high commissioner in Nigeria), as high commissioner in Malaysia, reported that Sukarno (known locally as Bung)—‘an unpredictable, mystical demagogue with some resemblance to a minor Hitler’—intended by ‘confrontation, subversion and propaganda, to break up the new federation and absorb its fractured remains’ but without losing the support of those Western powers who regarded him as a defender of the region against communism. Sukarno was first president of Indonesia from 1945 to 1967.]

...
and taking account of the long period needed for training and expansion before Malaysian forces are anything like self-sufficient, I do not believe that for at least three or four years after confrontation stops we are likely to be able to withdraw any significant quantity of British forces from Malaysia. It would I think be unrealistic to assume that the cessation of confrontation would be any guarantee that Bung would not start up again or that at least he would not continue subversion and creating mayhem throughout. Whatever may happen we should, I suggest, be prepared to face the prospect of a lasting commitment even on the best of assumptions.

14. What is our likely commitment if confrontation continues? Although I do not wish to be pessimistic I think it would be very bold to rule out the possibility of confrontation lasting for three or four years. Confrontation is of course causing Bung very considerable economic difficulties; but dictators habitually seem capable of surviving such vicissitudes, especially when they have an external adventure to divert their suffering people’s attention. Furthermore, Indonesia has been blessed with abundant fertility and Bung seems to have a certain hypnotic effect on both his followers and waverers.

15. If it were to continue for a long period one cannot but assume that training and operational experience will increase the effectiveness and intensity of terrorist activity. I was closely concerned with our commitments in Mau Mau, Cyprus and Malaya and the anticipated requirements were in each case exceeded largely because operations were protracted and the enemy gained in skill and experience.

16. If one assumes a continuance of three or four years and that at some time during that period internal security problems arise, demanding the assistance of soldiers, I think it conceivable that the requirement in Borneo might go as high as 12 or even 14 infantry battalions. It is notoriously dangerous to make predictions in such matters especially as I am not the responsible military authority. Nevertheless I think it would be unwise to preclude such a commitment although, provided certain risks could be accepted in Hong Kong and the SEATO strategic reserve, assuming the three Malaysian and two Australian and New Zealand battalions were available, I understand that such a demand could initially be met from forces already in this theatre. If the commitment were to continue at this high level for any length of time some reinforcement from outside for roulement [sic; enrolment?] purposes would probably be required.

17. I would however stress that infantry reinforcements would be relatively ineffectual unless they were matched by an increase in the airlift, particularly helicopters. Without helicopter backing battalions become static. Helicopters are of critical importance in operations in Borneo and in view of the mobility they confer and the consequent economy in forces deployed, I would strongly recommend that their production and availability should be treated as a war-time emergency.

18. There is one further possibility which must be mentioned. Bung may become very desperate. Can one entirely rule out a desperate Bung launching an attack against Singapore? He could either prepare a planned attack by his air force at maximum strength (in all about 40 bombers) or he could launch a sudden unplanned attack by a few aircraft. We should get some warning of a planned attack and put up our defences. But an unplanned low level attack is more difficult to guard against. Having launched his surprise attack he might then lie that he had been aggressed, that his retaliation was justified and he would then yell for U Thant to come and stop the war. If he did and got away with it he might do considerable
damage to our face [sic] in South-East Asia, and avoid retaliation which I understand
would be likely to take us 48 hours to mount and despatch. The present air defences
of Singapore are inadequate to protect us from a surprise and unprovoked attack and
if it is decided that we are to remain in Singapore a long time this state of
unpreparedness seems of dubious wisdom in this somewhat troubled area.

*Is Malaysia worth defending?*

19. I venture into this field because it seems to form an inescapable part of any
consideration of the problem of confrontation. I fully appreciate, and indeed
apologise for the fact that I am straying into fields outside my direct responsibility.

20. I assume that both the creation and the survival of Malaysia are very closely
linked with our position in Singapore. I also assume that we are not staying in
Singapore as an asset in atomic war. Its complete lack of dispersion and absolute vul-
nerability to atomic attack would seem to preclude its usefulness in such an event.

21. It would therefore seem that our continuing presence in Singapore will be
valuable either in the event of conventional war somewhere in South-East Asia or
perhaps, most of all, as a politico-strategic base from which we can stem the spread
of Communism in South-East Asia and also retain our communications and our
close relations with Australia and New Zealand. It would also seem to have
importance in a complementary role with the Philippines as a system of retaining
Western influence and encouraging our friends; and incidentally the loss of
Singapore would greatly weaken America's hold in the Philippines.

22. So far as Malaysia is concerned the break-up of the federation would almost
certainly undermine and eventually destroy our position in Singapore.

23. Because our presence in Singapore is inextricably bound up with the
continuance and success of the new federation its prospect of survival must have
great strategic importance.

24. There are without doubt very many divisive elements within the federation
which demand tolerance and time before they can be reconciled. The Tunku and Lee
Kuan Yew are oil and water. The people in the Borneo territories dislike the Malays
and the Malays despise them. Right-wing Chinese hate Left-wing Chinese, Malays are
frightened of Chinese and the Left-wing Malays dislike the Tunku’s régime, &c.
Paradoxically, were it not for confrontation I believe that this new and disparate
federation might have had less of a sense of common purpose; but the presence of
large numbers of British troops in Malaysia, the fact that the Borneo territories do
not want to be occupied by Indonesia, the necessity for some degree of co-operation
and unity under present conditions has undoubtedly favoured cohesion. The
continuance of Bung's threat, even short of confrontation, and the presence of
British troops will, so long as they both last, favour the unification of the federation.
In my view this sort of situation is likely to continue for three or four years. During
this time I hope and believe that a number of Malaysia’s current antagonisms and
rivalries may be sorted out within this emergency climate and that it will thus afford
a favourable running-in period for this new and somewhat ill-assorted federation.

25. To sum up I think we should accept the possible financial and military
burden of underwriting Malaysia's future because:

(a) our position in Malaysia forms a vital part of the Western politico-strategic
defence of South-East Asia against Communism;
(b) Malaysia constitutes a most important link within the Commonwealth;
(c) the failure of Malaysia would seriously damage our prestige and trade in an area of great political and economic importance;
(d) its failure would afford a major opportunity for Communist expansion into the vital areas of Thailand, Burma and thus to the gates of India; and we all know what Lenin said.

Recommendations

26.—(i) I would submit that if it has not already been done a firm decision should be made about British long-term policy in Malaysia in the light of confrontation, ideally with the agreement of the Opposition, and that this decision should be forcibly expressed at a high level to doubter countries.

(ii) That any requests from the Malaysian Government for assistance in stiffening and improving the special branch, police and psychological and propaganda services in the Borneo theatre should be given the highest priority.

(iii) That the production or availability from other sources of helicopters for the Borneo theatre should also be given the highest priority. …

271 CAB 128/38/2, CM 6(64)3 23 Jan 1964

[Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia]: Cabinet conclusions

The Minister without Portfolio (Lord Carrington) informed the Cabinet that, as a result of the discussions which the United States Attorney-General, Mr. Robert Kennedy, had recently held with various Governments in South-East Asia, it had been agreed that a meeting of Foreign Ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines should be held early in February in preparation for a subsequent meeting of the three Heads of Government, at which they would make a fresh attempt to resolve their differences. It was not clear whether, in endorsing this project, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had waived any or all of the stipulations—e.g., formal recognition of Malaysia by Indonesia—which he had hitherto propounded as the conditions of his willingness to attend any tripartite conference. This aspect of the proposal, together with its other implications, would need to be further explored with Mr. Robert Kennedy during his forthcoming visit to London.

In discussion there was general agreement that, although we shared with the United States Government the common purpose of arresting the advance of Sino-Soviet influence in South-East Asia, there was some risk that the means by which the two Governments sought to achieve this objective would diverge. The United States Government were chiefly concerned to dissuade Indonesia from making common cause with Communist China; we attached greater importance to maintaining the integrity of Malaysia. If, as a result, we judged it right to seek to restrain the Government of Malaysia from making any concessions of substance to Indonesia in the forthcoming discussions, we might appear to the United States Government to be deliberately thwarting their own policy; and, if Indonesia succeeded by these means in promoting disunity between the United States and ourselves, our position in South-East Asia would be weakened. On the other hand it might be no less
endangered if we acquiesced in any settlement whereby the Government of Malaysia undertook to arrange for the withdrawal of United Kingdom forces from the Borneo Territories; for in that event those Territories would eventually be overrun by Indonesia, the integrity of Malaysia would be destroyed and our ability to maintain a military presence in South-East Asia for the protection of our interests and the discharge of our commitments in the area would be gravely weakened. It followed that, while we must continue to seek a political solution of the differences between Malaysia and Indonesia—if only because the alternative course of maintaining United Kingdom forces indefinitely on the Borneo frontiers would ultimately be intolerable—we must be on our guard against allowing the Government of Malaysia to pay too high a price for it.

The Cabinet:

Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for the latest developments in South-East Asia to be discussed in greater detail with the United States Attorney-General, Mr. Robert Kennedy, during his forthcoming visit to London.

Now that I have got back from leave I am replying to your letter of the 13th September ... about Caribbean Federation, since we discussed the matter before I went on leave. Although I realise that our general aim of policy in the West Indies is well-known to the Treasury, as well as all the political difficulties which have arisen from time to time about it, it may perhaps be helpful if at this point I try and put it on the record briefly. I think that in the light of that our views on the particular issue in dispute between us may be more readily explained than I fear we have been able to do so far.

2. Our major aim of policy in the West Indies is the establishment of the West Indian Federation and its development, as soon as consistent with good government in its broadest sense, to the stage of independent membership of the Commonwealth. That is based on three major aspects:

(1) our general aim of Colonial policy to lead Colonial peoples wherever possible to independence within the Commonwealth wherever consistent with good government;

(2) the hope that by this development we may establish in the western hemisphere a second, even if relatively small, independent member of the Commonwealth, with all the advantages that we would hope to gain from that to our wider Commonwealth interests, vis-a-vis the U.S.A. and Latin America;

(3) the hope that by the establishment of an independent State we may gain thereby some relief from our relatively heavy financial burdens in that part of the world.

3. It has taken us very many years to get even to the present stage when the Federation is about to be established. As you will know from our general discussions from time to time, the success of that Federation when established is far from
certain. West Indian leaders in particular are still highly suspicious of the U.K. Government and our aims in promoting Federation. In particular there are many, and particularly among some of the more influential politicians in Jamaica, who consider that our sole aim is to get the larger Islands to take over H.M.G.’s financial responsibilities in the smaller Islands and then wash our hands of our West Indian responsibilities. Any action on our part which gives reasonable colour or support to that point of view seriously weakens Federation. By that I do not mean that we can see anything now preventing Federation actually coming into being. We do not. But if the leading political figures in the West Indies, and especially Manley, do not go into the Federal Government, it will be so weak that its survival is doubtful. It is touch and go whether or not Manley himself will decide to go into Federal politics and we know that this particular aspect is extremely important in relation to his decision but, individuals apart, there is a tremendous weight of West Indian opinion which can be aroused adversely to Federation, with all that that implies for its failure if we play our cards wrongly before our final aim is achieved.

4. To go back now to the specific issue of our undertaking to help the Federal Government with the payment of grants-in-aid for a period of 10 years. This is designed:

(a) financially to meet the inevitable need of the Federal Government in its early years for assistance to meet grant-in-aids until such time as it will, we hope, be able to stand on its own feet;
(b) politically to reassure the fears, which are after all very natural ones, to which I have referred in the preceding paragraph.

5. The Treasury take the view that the form of our commitment means that our own assistance to the Federation in respect of grant-in-aid must cease at the end of ten years. The Colonial Office view, as you know, is that the undertaking means merely that all we are committed to is assistance for ten years, but that if the Federation were still a dependant State, and therefore a U.K. responsibility at the end of ten years, its needs would then have to be examined on the same basis as those of any other territory for which we are responsible. We do not regard the differences between us on this as anything other than academic however, except insofar as a public interpretation of the undertaking in the terms understood by the Treasury would have the adverse political repercussions which I have mentioned. We agreed at the time of the London Conference of 1956 that there was no need to pursue our differences on this aspect in view of its lack of practical importance except on the political handling of it. In fact it is clear from the way things are going, with Manley for example talking of independence in five years time, that the whole Federal Constitution and our own relations with it, including our financial ones, will have to be revised long before the end of the ten year period. It is for that reason that we do not for a moment consider that the commencing of the ten year period on the 1st January 1959 instead of the 1st January 1958, because of the arrival of the Governor General, and the consequent inauguration of Federation, in January next instead of this year, has any practical financial significance in the sense that it in any way increases our practical financial commitment. You are, of course, perfectly correct in saying that in theory it extends the period of the ten year guarantee until the end of

1969 instead of the end of 1968, but you have I know been so closely in touch in the
Treasury with Colonial affairs that you will understand that the pace of political
progress is such that the point is an academic one for the reasons I have mentioned.
What happens financially when the time for independence comes will depend on the
then circumstances, not on the date when the old ten year period came to an end.

6. In any case the commitment about assistance during the first ten years of
Federation was made long before any specific date was attached to it and I think you
will agree that at the time of the London Conference of 1956 it was not a point of any
importance between you and us, let alone mentioned to the West Indians as such
that the Governor General might take up office in the autumn of 1957 and the
Federation consequently formally be inaugurated then. The date then suggested for
the arrival of the Governor General was suggested purely for practical reasons in that
it was hoped that he would be able to take charge of the Pre Federal Organisation and
establish the administrative framework before Ministers took office. In the upshot,
the administrative arrangements have not worked out quite as was expected (this
cannot be said to be a reason either for surprise or misgiving) and it is now
abundantly clear that it would in fact be administratively very much more
convenient for the Governor General to arrive in January, as has been arranged. To
adopt some legal device, which would quite obviously be phoney, to bring Federation
legally into being before the arrival of the Governor General could obviously only be
done with one purpose in view, namely, to make our formal guarantee to the West
Indies end at the end of 1968 instead of 1969. (Any attempt to get the agreement of
the West Indians that the Governor General should go out earlier than January is
quite obviously impossible.) I should add here for the record that the date of Lord
Hailes Commission as Governor General2 will be the 1st October and that the S.F.C.
wished to pay him salary from that date in view of the amount of time and attention
which he has devoted to West Indian affairs while still in this country. Lord Hailes
has decided not to accept the payment of salary until he takes up office in the West
Indies but whether or not he had done so, that, and the date of his commission has
no effect on the issue we are discussing (neither brings Federation into being). To
revert after that digression to the proposal to adopt a legal device to bring Federation
into being before the arrival of the Governor General, we have no doubt that to take
this step would, as indicated above, give us no practical financial advantage but bring
with it immense political disadvantage and eventually, through that, financial
disadvantage, in that anything which weakens the Federation is to our financial as
well as to our political disadvantage. I hope you will agree therefore on further
thought in the light of what is, I fear, a rather lengthy letter, that the right course is
… be very much easier to work administratively and financially.

7. I hope I have made it clear that the question of “protecting the Exchequer”
does not arise any more because of this change of plan than it did originally. In other
words we have a financial responsibility and commitment to the West Indian
territories and to the West Indian Federation, which must be considered in the usual
way with, of course, due regard to present U.K. difficulties. Discussions of budgets

with delegations from the territories has undoubted political and administrative advantages, and I am sure the Treasury will agree that it enables both you and us to recognise the financial issues much more clearly than we could do solely by correspondence. I trust therefore you will agree that it is necessary to have these delegations over here in the late autumn as we proposed. ... It is becoming urgent for it to do so and I hope you will be able to let me have Treasury clearance very shortly....

273 CO 1031/2311, no 21 5 Nov 1958
[Dominion status for the West Indies]: minute by Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Home (CRO)

Your minute of 28th October¹ referred to the possible repercussions of early “dominion status” for The West Indies.²

2. The present Federal Constitution in The West Indies, and particularly the fixed Federal income of less than £2 million a year, means that the Federal Government is hardly worth the name. We knew this when agreement was reached to set it up; it was a price we knew we had to pay to get West Indian agreement. For the first year it does no harm when the Federal Government must concentrate on establishing its administrative machinery and finding its political feet. But unless we can increase the powers, and above all, the revenue, of the Federal Government very soon we run a grave risk of Federation failing, with all that that implies to our policy in that part of the world. The preponderance of political and financial power remaining with the unit territories means that some of them, and particularly Jamaica, may yet revive separatist tendencies.

3. The conference proposed for next year will, I hope and expect, concentrate primarily on relations between the Federal Government and the unit Governments, though the relationship of the Federal Government with H.M.G. is bound to come up, with a call for some changes. The conference will not only be the only way in which there will be a chance of increasing the powers of the Federal Government vis-à-vis the units, but it will also give H.M.G. an invaluable opportunity of making clear to all the delegates from the West Indian territories just how far they have to go before the Federal Government could be considered one that can properly be sponsored for full membership of the Commonwealth. I do not expect a demand for very early independence; the political sentiment on this in The West Indies is very different from that in say, West Africa. I have always made it clear, moreover, that there can be no question of independence for The West Indies until they are viable both financially and in other respects. I did this both during the 1956 London Conference and when piloting the present Federal Constitution through Parliament. The West Indies are very conscious of the financial and other burdens that

¹ No 20 in file: Lord Home argued that a constitutional review was not required within five years, and a ‘premature’ demand for independence should be avoided; in addition he thought it would create difficulties for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where first review was not due until late in 1960.
² The official designation was ‘the Federation of The West Indies’. This particular piece of governmental pedantry has not been followed editorially.
independence involves and none of the present members of the Federal Government are at all anxious to press for an early date for it.

4. As far as I can possibly foretell, therefore, I do not think you need be unduly concerned about the effects of this conference on the Rhodesian Federation. I will, of course, always have this in mind, but the extent to which we can control the pace of the movement towards independence in the West Indies by reason alone of possible reaction in Central Africa is very limited.

I know there is some risk in having the conference but I do not believe it to be great; and the advantages of and indeed the need for it, are so great that I am sure we ought not to seek a postponement.

5. I have discussed all this with the Governor-General, who agrees with my assessment.

6. I would welcome a discussion in the Colonial Policy Committee if you wish but there is little I could add to what is in this minute.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister. 3

3 Mr Lennox-Boyd regarded this draft as ‘excellent’. Mr Macmillan minuted: ‘It should be discussed in Colonial Policy Committee if Ld Home so wishes. H.M. 6.11.58’. Lord Home did not press for this discussion, satisfied that he had sufficiently signalled ‘the very great difficulties that would be involved in any acceleration of the timetable in the case of the West Indies and we shall have to keep a close watch on this’ (nos 22 & 23 in file).

274 CO 1031/2573, no 61 8 Dec 1958–15 Feb 1959 [Future policy in the West Indies: ‘Dominion status’ and ‘confederation’]: minutes by P Rogers, G W Jamieson and Mr Amery

(AO) [Extract]

... A promise of “Dominion status”. We have known all along that the prime reason for Federation is the enhanced political status which it will enable the West Indies to obtain. Going right back to Colonel Stanley’s dispatch of 1945, from which the official consideration of Federation starts, we spoke then of “the ultimate aim of any Federation which may be established (being) full internal self-government within the British Commonwealth”. That was as far ahead as we could look then and it meant a lot at the time. The Report of the Standing Closer Association Committee, which laid the foundations of the Federal Constitution, again declared forthrightly that the aim was Dominion status, and it may be useful to recall their words since they are the best definition of the political need for Federation and are words moreover signed by many leading West Indians of the day. The relevant extract from the Report is attached opposite. 1 Going further ahead it will be recalled that this again was one of the most important aspects of the London Conference of 1956, and that the Secretary of State’s Opening Address to the Conference on this subject contained a passage which had been very carefully weighed and approved by a Cabinet Committee beforehand. Again it may be useful to have the relevant passage available for

What holds The West Indies back from full Dominion status is essentially not our reluctance to grant independence on political grounds, but the financial weakness of the Federal Government and the reluctance of many West Indians, a reluctance which is quite understandable, to assume the full burden of independence. Because there are a number of West Indians who claim that the idea of Dominion status is merely a device on the part of H.M.G. to avoid their financial responsibilities, we have always been careful, as for example in the extract quoted opposite, to avoid the impression that H.M.G. is urging The West Indies on this path faster than they themselves wish to go. It is for that reason that I am very doubtful about the wisdom of Sir Jock Campbell's proposal that we should ourselves propose a definite date as target for independence. There is, moreover, the difficulty of the reaction of what we do here on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Secretary of State will recall his recent exchange of minutes with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on the subject. It is true that that correspondence was primarily concerned with the outcome of a revisionary conference next year and the embarrassment which that might cause to the negotiations with Sir R. Welensky in 1960. The setting of a target date for West Indian independence of say, 1963, would not be so embarrassing on that score, but I am inclined to think that it would still raise difficulties. Nevertheless the idea is one that needs further consideration and, I suggest, consultation with the Governor General. . . .

The critical question, of course, is what our attitude should be to a development of the kind I have suggested is possible in the months ahead. Firstly, perhaps one should say that it is not surprising that the Federation is bumping along badly at present. There are (on my count) some 15 federations at present in existence. These are, of course, of two kinds; ones which have been formed deliberately by the dissolution of a unitary state and those which are “genuine” federations formed by a number of independent units coming into voluntary association. I can only trace five such “genuine” federations coming into being in the last century (Canada, Australia, South Africa, Central Africa, The West Indies) and obviously The West Indies has a peculiarly difficult set of problems; it is the only federation without a continuous land-mass and it has a longer pre-federal history of separate existence with modern governmental apparatus in each of the units than any other federation. Most of the others were formed at a time when the State did (and took) less than today and where it engendered fewer controversies. Building a Federation in the mid-20th century is much harder than a century earlier and it may be that in the West Indies there is no real alternative to accepting a withdrawal for a period of years to a position of confederation in the hope that it will lead gradually to a re-introduction of true federalism. We should, of course, argue against this but if the West Indies leaders are determined to have a confederation, I cannot see how we can stop them or even (I know this is heresy) say that they cannot get Dominion status, when their Central

---

2 Sir Jock (John M) Campbell, chairman of Booker-McConnell since 1952; strong West Indian and sugar interests, president of West Indies Committee, 1957.
Government is not really what we consider seaworthy as a sovereign State. In other words, the tide is much stronger than we can swim though we should try to do what we can.

G.W.J.
6.2.59

... vy thoughtful and interesting minute by Mr Jamieson. ... I do not think we can usefully take specula further now. All these things are straws in the wind and we have not enough straws yet with which to build a haystack. However, I think there is a lot in what Mr Jamieson says about the way in which Mr Manley may be thinking, & I believe it to be highly dangerous.

P.R.
12.2.59

Mr Jamieson’s minute is very interesting. I don’t know enough about The West Indies to judge whether a Confederation system could be made to work there. I am, however, inclined to agree with the general proposition that, in the 20th Century, when the state interferes in so many fields, Confederation is easier to bring about than Federation and may even have certain advantages over the latter.

J.A.
15.2.59

275 CO 1031/2311, no 36 9 May 1959

[Draft statement on West Indies Federation and its independence]: CO paper for S of S. Minutes by G W Jamieson, P Rogers and Sir J Macpherson

It is now [x] months since the Federation came fully into operation with the inauguration of the Federal Legislature by Her Royal Highness Princess Margaret in April of last year. For some months before the inauguration a purely official Federal Government had already been in existence and before that the pre-Federal organisation, working under the able direction of Sir Stephen Luke,1 had done much to lay the foundation for a sound federal administration. Since taking over its full responsibilities the Federal Government has done a great deal of valuable groundwork planning.

2. Now that the Federal Government has begun to establish itself it is appropriate that we should have a further look at its goal. Opinion in The West Indies clearly takes this view from the terms of the motion which was unanimously passed in the Federal House of Representatives [x] months ago. This motion called for a conference “in order to achieve the goal of independence and Dominion status within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible moment”. The Federal and unit Governments are now considering in consultation with H.M.G. the arrangements for the holding of a conference or conferences for this purpose. Much detailed work,

hard thinking and willingness to make sacrifices for the common good will be
necessary to achieve at those conferences the success which all of us wish, both in
The West Indies and in this country without distinction of party. But those will not
alone be enough unless we keep clearly in view what is the goal and what is necessary
to achieve it.

3. Let me go back to the main reason why the people of The West Indies first
agreed to join in a federation. This has never been better described than in the classic
statement by those eminent West Indians who formed the Standing Closer
Association Committee. They said:—

… “We start from the assumption that the main underlying purpose of our task is to
seek the shortest path towards a real political independence for the British peoples of
the region, within the framework of the British Commonwealth—what is meant in fact
by “Dominion Status”. We assume further that we have been charged with this task
because there is general agreement that this object cannot be attained without some
form of federal association between the territories concerned, but that with Federation
its attainment becomes practicable. We are aware that in some circles there is a demand
for full independence, or for self-government, either in advance of or simultaneously
with Federation, on the basis of existing political units. While we reaffirm the view
expressed at the Montego Bay Conference that the political development of the units
must be pursued as an aim in itself, we are satisfied that the sheer force of
circumstances of the modern world makes independence on a unit basis a mirage.
Independence or self-government as a Federation is however a practical possibility, and
we have framed our proposals with this specific objective in view”…

Let me emphasise the view they took then, and it still seems to me to hold good
today, that none of the existing units of The West Indies, not even the largest,
Jamaica, could expect as independent countries to take that place in the counsels of
the modern world to which collectively their people rightly aspire. I believe today
that thinking West Indians would agree with the view expressed ten years ago by the
Standing Closer Association Committee on the basic reason for federation.

4. Yet federation by itself—the mere act of federation—is not enough in itself to
produce a state which can look to attain, and, once having attained, sustain
independence. I made it clear in the past, but it may be well if I reiterate, what is the
view of H.M.G. on this issue. Independence within the Commonwealth means
something more than the formal relinquishment by H.M.G. in the U.K. of
constitutional powers of control. It means the country must be able to stand on its
own feet economically and financially, that it has to finance its own administration
and that it is able and prepared to assume responsibility for its own defence and its
own international relations to the extent that either is involved by its geographical or
international standing. On the other hand in these days no country is independent in
the sense of being entirely self-contained and self-sufficient. Mutual help is one of the
great principles of the Commonwealth and there is no reason why one member or
group of members should not help others with their economic development, nor
does independence preclude arrangements for inter-Commonwealth commerce such
as the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. A state which relies for its very existence on
outside help is independent in nothing but name but there is nothing derogatory to a

2 See Hyam, ed, Labour government and the end of empire Part III, document no 254 (summary), esp
para 2.
country’s dignity in accepting the help of other partners to improve its economic situation and to develop its resources.

5. Since independence within the Commonwealth means at once burdens as well as privileges, let me repeat that H.M.G. in the U.K. would not think it right to urge the West Indies towards this status faster than West Indians themselves wish to go. But we have every sympathy with their aim and when they themselves wish to take on these burdens they will find H.M.G. in the U.K. very glad to sponsor their aims [sic] to full Commonwealth membership.

6. That however is not the full story. An independent member of the Commonwealth has to be accepted as an equal, by other members, and to play its proper part in Commonwealth activities. Similarly in the wider international sphere a nation state has to have certain minimum attributes of statehood if it is to be an acceptable member of the community of nations and to play a worthy part in the United Nations Organisation. I must say frankly that the Federal Government of The West Indies has not yet got those attributes and that the major obstacle in the way of its attaining them is not its constitutional ties with the U.K., but its Governmental weakness within the West Indies itself. No representative of the Government of The West Indies would have the standing in Commonwealth or international circles which is the due of the people of The West Indies, until he can speak for a Government which has adequate powers and resources in respect of the region which it represents. I look forward, we all look forward, to a representative of The West Indies playing a worthy part at the Commonwealth table but he will not do so until he has the full backing of The West Indies behind him. This does not mean the disappearance of unit Governments. The circumstances of geography and history mean that there will always be work for them to do. But I must say frankly that if The West Indies are to speak as an equal at the Commonwealth Conference table, the unit Governments must be willing to surrender to the Federal Governments some of their present powers and above all a field of revenue which can support a modern state. The factor which might well hold the West Indies back from independence within the Commonwealth is not a question of policy on the part of H.M.G. in the U.K. but a tendency on the part of unit territories in The West Indies who, however understandable their pride in the work of their governments, may be reluctant to endow the Federal Government with those powers and resources which alone can enable it to achieve the goal which West Indians and we in this country wish it to achieve.

Minutes on 275

... We should, I suggest, consider a little more fully the reasons for and against this proposal; they will in any case have to be fully set out in subsequent documents to the C.P.C., etc.

For the proposal it can be argued that such a statement will do something to clear the air. It will indicate to West Indian opinion who is holding up their achievement of independence. It will act as a prod to mental effort (one sometimes feels there is much talk but inadequate thought given to these problems in The West Indies). Finally it should be a highly useful piece of Federal ammunition for the purpose of trying to obtain a strengthening of the Federation at the forthcoming Federal Constitutional Conference.
Against the proposal is the possibility that it might be felt that we were trying to "bounce" The West Indies into independence, possibly to enable us to escape our rightful burden of making full amends for "the historic wrong" etc. etc.; Some might feel that this was not the juncture for the Secretary of State to intervene—there is, as we know, a growing opinion in The West Indies that they should sort these things out themselves without intervention from the U.K. There is finally an element of risk in laying down and closely defining a set of conditions which may be interpreted as both a minimum and as a sufficient set of conditions for independence. I have in mind that we could conceivably get into a position when the conditions to be fulfilled in the statement had in fact been fulfilled with a consequent demand for independence but that on the other hand there might be other reasons outside and beyond the terms of the conditions in the proposed statement which might have the effect of making us reluctant to a final hand over.

4. Nevertheless after weighing up all the pros and cons I think a statement is desirable as the most important thing at present is to strengthen the Federal Government's hand in advance of the Constitutional Conference. This may be a more critical occasion than the 1956 London Conference in that its decisions are likely to affect the shape of the Federation for a number of years to come and very likely beyond that period over which the Secretary of State will have any control.

5. There is however one difficulty which might result in the future from too definite a statement. There has been much talk in The West Indies about circumscribing the activities of the Federal Government, particularly in the economic field. Jamaica is known to hold such views and probably will receive support from some of the small islands. Trinidad is likely to take the opposite view with Mr. Eric Williams having his eye on the Prime Ministership (though one need not deny him other more altruistic motives in his belief that the Federation must be strengthened). The result of these contrary pressures is hard to predict. The Federal Government that emerges after the forthcoming conference may be stronger or weaker or just about the same as it is now. Whatever the result of the conference we should, I suggest, be prepared at least in our own minds for a fairly early demand for Dominion status, and it is quite possible that this will happen even though the result of the conference has been to do nothing, or very little, to improve the Federation's position. In such a set of circumstances we should be faced with having to decide either to refuse the request or alternatively to jettison the Statement of Policy that is the subject of this minute. When it comes to the pinch I cannot conceive more than a rather half-hearted rear-guard action by H.M.G. for I do not think we would have any alternative but to give in to the demand although it would mean the emergence of The West Indies as an independent State with a Central Government which was far weaker than we thought it should have. Important though these considerations are I do not think they should deflect us from issuing a statement, though we should have an eye to its wording in case it results in some undignified swallowing of words a few years hence. . . .

G.W.J.
10.3.59

3 Premier of Trinidad and Tobago, 1959 (chief minister from 1956); author of Capitalism and slavery (1944).
... the view I formed during the visit with Mr. Amery to the Federation last month [was] that West Indians now have a greater sense of urgency than hitherto about full independence. Lord Hailes does not appear to doubt that Dominion status will be called for at the Federal Constitutional Conference. As we know, Mr. Manley has condemned the present Federal Constitution as “colonial in character” and Dr. Eric Williams has been going about saying that independence ought to be proclaimed on the 22nd April next year, the second anniversary of Federation.

5. Our view in the Department has been hitherto that Dominion status is nothing like as close as the above would make it seem. This view—which I shared—was based in part on the recognition by us that it ought not to be rushed; it was furthermore reinforced by Sir Grantley Adams' near distaste for the subject when we tried to discuss it with him in April. He, I am sure, is no sound guide at present to feeling on this subject. His views are markedly more moderate than those of most of his government, and I submit that he will shortly have to come into line with the thinking of others on the subject in The West Indies, or risk being left out on a limb.

6. We should, I suggest, be prepared at least in our own minds for the worst. This could be a demand for Dominion status in Trinidad in September, repeated here a few months later, together with a demand that full independence be achieved within perhaps a year or eighteen months. It could indeed mean a demand for the introduction of Dominion status before the end of 1960, or perhaps early in 1961, which is a good deal earlier than we are geared to.

7. Such a demand would of course ignore the need to prepare the administrative structure of the new Dominion, enlarge its diplomatic apparatus, and build up its military forces, and it might be possible to delay it on such arguments. On the other hand, we are on something of a runaway train, the brakes of which are not very powerful.

8. I suggest that apart from simply taking the aforesaid into account in our calculations, the time has come to speed up action on the following questions, on the first two of which we have made a little progress, on the third none.

(a) the training of a Diplomatic Service and agreeing on interim foreign representational arrangements, should Dominion status overtake the Federation’s ability to establish its network of missions;

(b) the examination of the need for Armed Forces including the question of a Navy as well as the terms of such defence agreement as we and The West Indies may jointly require for our purposes.

(c) an examination of what forms of financial assistance H.M.G. can consider after Dominion status, and of what sums.

9. I hope this does not sound all too alarmist. On the other hand I feel that we will do best to start early with these preparations. If our predictions prove unduly pessimistic, we will have a bonus of time at our disposal. We must in any case have firm views on all three matters in para. 8 in advance of the main Federal Constitutional Conference in London, probably in January: and it would be desirable to have got the main lines sorted out before the September conference.

10. A major unstated assumption in the above is, of course, that the Federation

---

will survive the September conference. This is being discussed separately on WIS 175/01.

G.W.J. 26.6.59

Sir J. Macpherson
I have already informed you orally of the fact that the political pace seems to be quickening in the West Indies in respect of the approach of the Federation to Dominion status. Whereas previously the talk of political leaders has avoided mentioning specific dates, and even Mr. Manley has talked in general terms like “five years ahead”, Dr. Eric Williams has recently entered the fray as shown in paragraph 2 of the draft opposite. We know that Sir Grantley Adams at least still does not wish to hasten us, but he is losing political ground rapidly and it seems unlikely that he will be able to stand in the way, if, as we are informed is the case, there is a more general move towards the fixing of an early date for independence.

We are conducting a mammoth exercise on the implications for the U.K. as well as for the West Indies of such a move, and I will report on that as soon as our exercise is completed. In the meantime we should clearly inform the C.R.O. and, I suggest, leave it open to them to inform members of the Commonwealth in confidence if they so wish. . . .

P.R. 27.7.59

Mr. Amery
The purpose of the draft opposite is to keep the Commonwealth Relations Office informed of developments in the West Indies—but I think that, although our information is still rather sketchy, the indications of a change of mood in some quarters in The West Indies are clear enough to justify dealing with this now at Ministerial level.

2. In his minute of 28/10/58 to the Secretary of State at (20) Lord Home expressed apprehension lest the proposed review of the Federal Constitution might go beyond the question of relations between the Federal and Unit Governments, and that we might be met with a request for a date to be set for independence. Our reply at (21) recognized that there was a risk but we didn’t rate it at all high. It was decided not to discuss in the C.P.C. but to keep a close watch on developments (See (23)).

3. When we report to the C.R.O. (and to C.P.C?) that there are indications that a request for independence may be forthcoming as a result of, or after the September Conference on the Federal Constitution, we may be charged with having been too complacent. But until quite recently there was no sign of an urge to accelerate Constitutional advance for the Federation, and even now we haven’t got anything very explicit—except Dr. Eric Williams’ statement referred to in the draft opposite. I gather however, that Mr. Mordecai’s has confirmed that some of the people who are

5 See document no 273.
preparing for the September Conference are thinking in terms of a demand for a date to be fixed for independence.

4. The Department has set in hand a major study of what would be involved—particularly in the fields of finance, defence, representation abroad, international treaties etc. . . .

5. There are many imponderables—e.g. Mr. Manley’s recent manifesto about limiting the Federal Government’s power of taxation, and demanding greater representation in the Federation for Jamaica. We have yet to see what effect his comfortable majority in the Jamaican Election this week will have on his thinking about Federation. . . .

J.S.M.
30.7.59

276 CO 1031/2574, no 105 12–13 June 1959 [Future of the Federation, after Mr Manley’s statement on Jamaica]: minutes by G W Jamieson and P J Kitcatt (CO)

We now have the long awaited statement by Mr. Manley on Jamaica’s proposals for the review of the Federal Constitution which was foreshadowed in (98).

2. The proposals in this document (which has the spare elegance of all Mr. Manley’s compositions) are much as we expected; with the surprise addition of a call for early dominion status. Otherwise the proposals are those we feared and are clearly designed to turn the constitutional arrangements between the Federation, and at least Jamaica, into confederal rather than federal terms. On the other hand they do not require parallel modifications of the relationships between the Federation and all the other unit governments. Although the legislative lists in the Federal Constitution would have to be redrawn to suit Jamaica’s special case, each of the remaining units could voluntarily elect to retain the existing provisions, by invoking a provision on the lines of Article 58(1), of the present Federal Constitution; this Article allows unit governments to hand powers not set out in either the Exclusive or the Concurrent list to the Federation. The statement also clearly rejects that version of Customs Union propounded in the Croft Report,1 and calls for the Federal House of Representatives to be constituted on a population basis (see paragraph 2 of my minute of 12th May, and subsequent minutes, on this).

3. The first question to be answered is whether the statement is “serious” or merely electioneering tactics to be forgotten after the Jamaica General Election. Many competent observers hold the latter view. I do not because I believe that Mr. Manley has been thoroughly alarmed by evidences of Federal bumbling and incompetence, which, taken along with signs of Federal hostility or jealousy against Jamaica, represent in his mind (not entirely without reason) a serious danger to the success of his plans for the development of Jamaica, about which he and his Ministers feel more strongly than anything else. This minute is written on this major assumption that Mr. Manley means to stick to his guns. If it is falsified so much the better, but we should be prepared for the worst.

WEST INDIES FEDERATION

4. I do not myself feel that Mr. Manley is guilty of breaking some kind of moral bargain or faith in taking this new line. Federation is not an end in itself and if any unit comes to feel that the purposes it sought to achieve on entering into membership are not going to be satisfied I do not see why they should not attempt to review the contract. After all it was not Jamaica who asked for the forthcoming Federal Constitutional Conference. Nobody knew how the Federation was going to turn out. Even granted the way it has been constitutionally hamstrung, and politically underpowered (the second Eleven etc.) its performance has not been impressive. If I were a Jamaican I am not sure but that I would not support what Mr. Manley is seeking to do.

5. The statement caused a good deal of dismay in The West Indies, and there is no doubt that there will be even less sympathy than there might otherwise have been for Jamaica’s difficulties and point of view at the Federal Constitutional Conference. Sir Grantley Adam’s views are well known, and the possibility of spite and irresponsibility on his part must be reckoned a factor in the situation. Dr. Eric Williams is already reconciled to Jamaica’s secession, and probably even sees advantage in an East Caribbean Federation entirely in his own hands. Perhaps the only support or sympathy for Jamaica may come from people like Mr. Bird of Antigua, a determined defender of State Rights. It is all the more important, therefore, that such influence as this Office still has with the West Indies (and Lord Hailes thinks it is very little!) should be exercised to avoid an irreparable breach. Jamaica’s difficulties and fears are real, and not to be dismissed as electioneering. This point should be pressed on all possible occasions and to all concerned.

6. The stage nevertheless is set for a clash at the Federal Constitutional Conference between what are likely to be two irreconcilable points of view and there is now a greater possibility of the disintegration of the Federation. Mr. Manley is clearly trying to avoid such a crisis and his statement does have the merit of producing a formula which would enable a looser and constitutionally weaker Federation to work by the device of the voluntary surrender of powers other than those in the reduced legislative lists by the other units.

7. This device, however, may not be acceptable to the other units who can claim that Mr. Manley has turned his back on the 1956 Agreement and the whole development accepted at the series of meetings and conferences since Montego Bay in 1947. In anger they may take steps to finalise the breach. We must try to stop this. It may, for example, be possible to reach reconciliation by various more or less Heath Robinson constitutional devices. We might, for example, have to accept the secession of Jamaica from the present Federation, but work for a Confederation comprising Jamaica and the remaining Eastern Caribbean Federation. This would be cumbrous and expensive and a step backwards. But it need not be unworkable if it restricted itself to defence, foreign affairs, and the “common range of services which can best be provided for all” referred to by Mr. Manley. It would at least mean an association for the minimum purposes of sovereignty of two units of roughly equal size, which together, though not separately, could put on a reasonable face as a sovereign dominion. It would moreover be open to British Guiana to enter such a Confederation at a later date as a third partner. I suspect Dr. Jagan might welcome such a possibility speaking as he has done of being ready to accept a Singapore

solution for an interim period before final independence. In addition the Eastern Caribbean Federation would be able to draw much closer to a unitary pattern of government, without the presence of Jamaica within the actual Federation.

8. We are also faced with a clear cut rejection of the Croft Report. If I may confess to a personal heresy I have never been entirely convinced that Customs Union was an absolute essential for the success of Federation, though obviously it would have been very desirable. On the other hand, on Mr. Manley's proposals (as also in the "Federation within a Confederation" system) the way would still be open for the Eastern Caribbean to form their own Customs Union. As Jamaica will only accept a high tariff Customs Union and Trinidad will only join in if tariffs are low, we may have to accept that progress will only be possible towards an Eastern Caribbean Customs Union, despite what happens on the wider issues.

9. The statement also condemns the present Federal constitution as "Colonial in character" and calls for dominion status "as soon as is practicable and possible." From all indications dominion status is a good deal more in the minds of thinking West Indians than Sir Grantley Adams would like us to believe. Dr. Eric Williams talks of declaring independence on the 22nd April next year, though this need not be taken very seriously. Mr. Manley's statement too may include an element of window dressing on this score. We must however be prepared to deal with the real possibility that the Federal Constitutional Conference at its preliminary meeting in September, will call for dominion status within a fixed time, perhaps two years. There has, however, obviously been little West Indian thinking of the associated problems, particularly of defence arrangements. We are now examining these in the office, in the light of the Malayan arrangements, which enabled the United Kingdom to retain forces and bases in that country, in return for assistance in developing their armed forces.

10. The prospect is of heavy weather ahead. Mr. Manley will, I think, stand firm. The Federal leaders and the other units may well lose their heads or come to the end of their patience. Perhaps the last important service we can render the West Indies will be to persevere in trying to maintain some kind of continued constitutional relationship between Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean.

G.W.J.
12.6.59

I am quite sure that Mr. Jamieson is right in arguing that Mr. Manley's paper must be taken seriously. Mr. Manley may well have his eyes on the forthcoming General Election. It does not follow that his paper is designed primarily to secure the return to power of his own party and that, if he is successful in the General Election, Mr. Manley will cease to beat these particular drums. I suggest that if Mr. Manley thinks that these proposals will enhance the prospects of his party at the General Election it is because he thinks that they reflect popular feeling about Federation. In other words, if Mr. Manley is returned and this paper is one of the planks in his platform we may take it that it does in fact reflect public opinion in Jamaica, which is all the more reason for taking it seriously. Furthermore Mr. Manley can be quite conscientious about matters on which he has or has not been given the "mandate" of the electorate; and even if he were not so disposed over this particular issue, I strongly doubt whether public opinion would let him be otherwise.

2. I believe Mr. Manley to be quite serious and sincere in his approach to
Federation. I think that he believes in it, that he wants Jamaica to stay in it, and that in this paper he is trying to be constructive. I do not think that it is correct to regard him as a wrecker. His concept of Federation may not be the same as that which exists in the eastern Caribbean, nor may he share our own vision. Nevertheless I think he reflects a pretty substantial measure of Jamaican thinking on the subject. Because Mr. Manley does not wish Federal policies to harm Jamaica it does not follow that he wants Jamaica to harm the Federation and I do not believe that there is at present any strong pressure for secession. As evidence of Mr. Manley’s serious and constructive approach I would mention two facts. Very shortly before I arrived in Jamaica a professor of Constitutional Law from McGill University had visited Jamaica at Mr. Manley’s invitation to help him and his Ministers to study Federal/Jamaican relationships; secondly, Mr. Manley is having a detailed study of the implications of the Croft proposals made by the Central Planning Unit—whose Director is certainly not anti-Federation. I am sure that Mr. Manley is genuinely trying to secure a unanimous bi-partisan approach to this issue.

3. I am reinforced in my view by what has been said to me in private conversation on this subject by a number of Jamaicans, mainly but not entirely civil servants, both while I was in Jamaica and since. Their attitude is perhaps a variant on the thesis that what is good for General Motors is good for the United States. They think that what is good for Jamaica is good for the Federation. Jamaica must forge ahead economically and must not be retarded by the other units. When Jamaica is prosperous she will be ready and willing to help the poorer territories. This is of course a very attractive thesis if you are a Jamaican, but the snag is that, particularly with a rapidly increasing population, the time when Jamaica feels prosperous enough to help the other units may be a long way off. This way of thinking finds its expression in para. 7 of Mr. Manley’s paper.

4. The line which the paper takes on income tax and the development of industry, and the line which it takes about representation in relation to population, are in a sense two barrels of the same gun. They are both partly designed to secure that the Federation does not interfere with Jamaica’s development. If in one part of the Caribbean there is a tendency to regard Jamaica as fundamentally hostile to Federation, there is in Jamaica a feeling that the Federal Government is fundamentally hostile to them—that in effect Sir Grantley Adams says from time to time to his minions “go and find out what Jamaica is doing and make them stop it”. To Jamaica’s way of thinking his remarks about retrospective taxation were a classic example of this attitude. Jamaicans therefore hope that by removing these subjects from the Federal legislative list the Federal Government will not be able to interfere with Jamaican industrial development; and that if they do show any disposition to interfere in this or in any other matter the substantial Jamaican influence which would be secured by increased representation would be able to prevent them. There is also at the bottom of this the point of view which we have heard expressed before by Mr. Manley, namely that the Federal Government should move very slowly at first and should consolidate its position in the subjects which are of common concern like defence and external relations, leaving the units to get on with the things about which they know better.

5. At the forthcoming conference we shall have to guard against at least two dangers. In extreme terms, one is that the Federal Government may be reduced to little more than an organisation on the lines of the East Africa High Commission.
Opposed to that is the danger that, inspired partly by jealousy, spite, personal antipathy and personal ambition, the representatives of the other units and particularly Sir Grantley Adams and Dr. Eric Williams may try to engineer Jamaica out of the Federation. They may not find that a particularly difficult manoeuvre, and it may need considerable statesmanship on the part of H.M.G. to prevent it from happening.

6. I do not think that Mr. Manley will necessarily have to return to Jamaica from the Federal Conference having secured precisely the proposals in his paper, provided that he can say that he has achieved something which should have the same result. Leaving aside, at any rate for the time being, the question of representation (which is, as Mr. Rogers has said, primarily a matter for the West Indians to settle among themselves) would it be worthwhile to consider whether there would be a means of securing the results which Mr. Manley wants without taking income tax etc. off the concurrent list? Possibly an agreed statement of policy in this particular field might be drawn up and signed by the Federal Government and representatives of the units at the conference, including an undertaking to the effect that concessions granted by unit governments would be honoured when the time came to pass Federal legislation. Possibly some sort of Federal economic committee ought to be set up. I confess that I have no clear ideas on this, but I suggest that the Economists Section [sic] might be asked to consider the problem.

7. I fear that there is no easy solution to the central problem of economic planning. I very much doubt whether the Federal Government should be expected to channel investment to one part of the Federation rather than to another. But it would be quite an achievement if it could ensure that the unit Governments compete fairly for whatever investment was going, on the assumption that if this were so the investor would be able to make his own decision about where best to establish himself. Jamaica could not reasonably object to this, and would I think accept it, particularly if they were bringing more influence to bear within the Federal Government.

P.J.K.
23.6.59

277 CO 1031/2311, nos 44 & 48 31 July 1959
[Fixing a date for West Indian independence]: minute by Lord Home to Mr Lennox-Boyd. Minutes by Mr Amery, G W Jamieson, Sir H Poynton and W B L Monson

I am a bit disturbed by the indications which there have recently been that the Federation of the West Indies may be pressing for the fixing of a date for Independence, which would be much earlier than that which we have previously had in mind, i.e. 1964. In particular I have noticed the suggestion by the Premier of Trinidad, even if it need not be taken altogether seriously, that Independence might be achieved on the 22nd April, 1960.

2. I gather also that there may be pressure for a Constitutional Conference to be held in London next year, possibly even as early as January, 1960.

3. Either of these courses might be awkward in relation to some other parts of
the Commonwealth. The holding of a Conference in the early part of 1960 might well create embarrassment in relation to the Conference for the review of the constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which is contemplated for October, 1960, especially if the earlier Conference resulted in the fixing of a definite date for West Indian Independence.

4. Nor is this all. We can by no means be sure that, when the Federation of the West Indies achieves Independence all the Members of the Commonwealth will be willing to accept it as a fellow Member. This applies particularly to South Africa, especially in view of the recent action of Jamaica in imposing an embargo on trade with South Africa for purely political reasons, and the threat that some other West Indian Colonies might follow its example. The earlier the date suggested for Independence, the greater will be the difficulties in this respect.

5. It does seem to me, although I don’t want to delay independence unreasonably that there is a strong case for playing for the maximum time. What do you say and how do you estimate the timetable? If things are going to mature far earlier than we thought we in the C.R.O. must begin to prepare at once.

Minutes on 277

...2. In view of Lord Home’s minute the question will now have to be dealt with at Ministerial level. I should, therefore, be glad of a discussion with the Department—say, next Monday afternoon, with perhaps a further talk next day with the Department, plus Lord Hailes. We can consider how best to reply to Lord Home after these talks.

3. Meanwhile my first reactions are:—

(1) It would be absurd to embark on independence when:
   (a) there are no means of defence,
   (b) no provision for finance for the central government,
   (c) even no freedom of movement for goods or persons within the Federation, and
   (d) no provision yet for staff for overseas representation.

(2) It would be very difficult to “sell” this one to the rest of the Commonwealth.

(3) The West Indies and Central Africa must each be judged on its merits. Central Africa could be independent in the sense that it’s got the ships (guns and planes), it’s got the men, it’s got the money too. There are good reasons for withholding independence in Central Africa but we must be careful not to make the contrast with the West Indies absurd, by giving the latter a purely fictitious Commonwealth status when they have none of the means of supporting it.

(4) If faced with a demand in January for independence within twelve months, I should have thought we should be prepared to counter with a planned programme which would give the West Indies the chance of achieving the necessary criteria of independence by 1965. In practice we might be able to settle for 1963 or 1964; but I do not think that we should consider a further fall back position at this stage. The West Indies themselves still have plenty of hurdles to jump at the Conference and may not be in a position to put a united demand for full dominion status, quite so soon as some fear.

(5) Meanwhile I would be against sounding other Commonwealth Governments at
this stage. The Commonwealth has become a great whispering gallery and consultations are sure to get back to West Indies’ ears. This will only encourage them in their demand. If the C.R.O. feel they must consult their High Commissions, they should be asked to do so in the strictest secrecy.

4. These are only provisional and first reactions but the Department may like to take account of them before we hold our meeting.

J.A.
6.8.59

... 2. The Federal Government is having a conference with the ten Unit Governments in Trinidad on 28th September to consider the changes necessary in the Federal Constitution—“in order to achieve the goal of self-government and Dominion status within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible moment”. This is to be a preliminary to a full-dress conference some months later with H.M.G., probably here in London in the first quarter of 1960. The Federal Government has invited two U.K. observers to attend, but the invitation has not yet been accepted to give time to assess any adverse reaction to this step from the Units, some of whose leaders (notably Mr Manley and Dr Williams) may disagree with it on the grounds that it should be a purely West Indian affair.

3. On present indications the Trinidad conference will probably agree that Dominion status should come as soon as possible. This demand may be put in various forms. They may say as soon as legislatively possible, or alternatively by some fixed, and fairly early, date. It is possible but unlikely that they will agree to further period with a somewhat further advanced constitution before independence.

4. H.M.G.’s previous policy has been clear. It has been that we will not stand in their way as soon as they have reached a position when they can stand on their own feet economically and financially, and assume responsibility for the conduct of their own defence and foreign affairs to the extent required by their own geographical and international standing.

5. These criteria are vague. Their interpretation is going to be the trouble. We feel the present Federation doesn’t measure up to them but could do so if only West Indians wanted to. In preparation for the September conference we have tried to give the criteria greater precision in what we have entitled our “minimum criteria” namely

(a) A strong central administration capable of determining the lines of policy within the main fields of governmental activity. (This in The W.I. implies a Customs Union and Freedom of Movement.)

(b) Adequate financial resources at the disposal of the central administration including independent taxing powers sufficient to enable it to finance its own recurrent expenditure and obligations, e.g. Grant-in-aid. (This need not rule out occasional help from others in time of stress or some transitional help for a limited period at the outset.)

(c) A defence force capable of keeping the peace within its own boundaries and posing at least a nominal deterrent to an outside aggressor. (A rudimentary navy appears essential for these purposes.)

(d) A diplomatic organisation able to maintain external relations with the United Nations and the more important friendly and neighbouring countries.
6. Central Africa is a further complication. Lord Home has always been nervous lest the progress of The W.I. to independence causes difficulties for us in our relations with Sir Roy Welensky's government. He, our S. of S. and the Prime Minister exchanged minutes about this last year but at that time we were of the opinion that the West Indians were likely to concentrate at the conference on problems of the internal structure of the Federation. The C.R.O. have been told what we now fear, and Lord Home has again minuted the S. of S. We are considering what we can now advise the reply to Lord Home might be.

7. Mr Amery, Lord Hailes and Mr Rogers have discussed this earlier this week. Lord Hailes and the Department take the line that the negotiations subsequent to any demand for early Dominion status will be difficult unless we go into them ready to take a good deal on trust e.g. the West Indians will probably say that they will fulfil the “minimum criteria” if not before, then shortly after independence, and that there is little we can do but accept these earnest of intention, sceptical though we may be of them. Mr Amery is somewhat more inclined to take a strong line and tell them that Dominion status is just not on until they have fulfilled, or made a good measure towards fulfilling, the criteria. He takes the line that we have to put them up for the Commonwealth Club, and this being so, we are entitled to require clear evidence that the new state will be a respectably sea-worthy one.

8. Thinking on this is still inevitably rather fluid. We are preparing a long brief for the U.K. observers at the September conference and discussion of this should at least clarify some of these difficulties. This will be submitted up for approval of Ministers, and we hope to have Lord Hailes views on the second draft which should be ready within the next week.

G.W.J.
13.8.59

Independence of the West Indies. We did not discuss this in any great detail but Lord Hailes was extremely anxious that we should not hold back longer than was necessary on purely practical grounds. He was evidently a little disappointed that Mr. Amery had not been more encouraging at the meeting yesterday. He thought that The West Indian Ministers themselves were almost certain to announce a date as their goal during the preliminary Conference in the autumn, and it would be very difficult for H.M.G. to put the brakes on for any other than purely practical reasons. If we wanted to play it a bit slowly the best hope was that Dr. Williams would advocate so early a date as to be ridiculous (e.g. April 1960, which he has already mentioned) and that this would bring Mr. Manley into opposition and result in some compromise that might be more reasonable. He was aware of the timing difficulty with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland but while he seemed to appreciate the difficulty of The West Indies attaining independence (or having a date fixed) ahead of Rhodesia and Nyasaland he could not really see why it should be damaging in the Rhodesian context if The West Indian constitutional conference were held before the Central African Conference, the latter, I understand, being due for the autumn of 1960. He thought it would be impossible to defer The West Indian Conference later than March or April, i.e. pretty well immediately after the Princess Royal’s visit if that took place in January or February. I reminded Lord Hailes that in the case of Nigeria

1 See document no 273.
the date of independence had been fixed almost exactly two years ahead of the final constitutional conference, that the working out of independence was, in fact, quite a long drawn out process, not only in the preparation of constitutional instruments but in a whole lot of preparations that have to be made in the international field, including the training of diplomatic staff and the getting ready for the C.R.O. and a United Kingdom High Commissioner to take over. Anything less than two years seemed to me to be rushing it unduly, even if we should get reassured that the Federal Government would be sufficiently in control to take over. I instanced one or two examples including Chaguaramas, of the difficulties we found at this end over the perpetual jealousy between the Federal Government and the Unit Governments. On this latter point Lord Hailes expressed complete agreement. . . .

A.H.P.
13.8.59

2. A draft reply to Lord Home is set out opposite for consideration. I have assumed that Mr Amery would sign this.

3. It might be felt that the draft is a shade uncompromising in tone. This is intentional. There are indications that the CRO have not yet really understood how far things have gone in the West Indies, and that they overestimate HMG’s effective power to call a halt or put on the brakes. Unless we are quite explicit about the way we see the position there will be further misunderstandings. Nor have I given too much encouragement to hopes that the West Indians will see sweet reason, when faced with our list of conditions which they are to fulfil in advance of independence. Our position on these may well have suffer some erosion (Mr Bradshaw’s favourite word) to avoid a serious breach of friendship with the West Indies.

4. I have intentionally not given any explanation of the reason for our very different assessment of the situation compared with that given in the last minute sent to Lord Home (21). The plain fact is that we got out of touch with the way things were going, and that happened because of the virtual absence of any continuous attempt by the Federal Government to keep us up to date. They have now begun to send us regular political reports, but this is quite a recent innovation. I do not think we want to say this, at least in a minute of this kind which may be given wider circulation.

5. I have not referred to any possibility of discussion by the CPC, though this may be necessary after the September conference, and possibly before it if there is any question of the UK observers being given instructions that go beyond the existing policy of HMG quoted in the minute to Lord Home.

G.W.J.
19.8.59

1. On a drafting point I don’t like the comparative reference to Ghana and Nigeria in paragraph 7 of the draft—not that I dispute its truth but because it is precisely the point made by Federation and Southern Rhodesian spokesmen in relation to their prospects of independence and is quoted by the C.R.O. to us. Mr. Rogers would accept the alternative comparison which I have made on the draft.

2 R L Bradshaw, of St Kitts; federal minister of finance.
2. On the main issue raised by Lord Home with which I am concerned viz. that the holding of a conference in the early part of 1960 with the theme of independence for the Federation of The West Indies would be embarrassing in relation to the independence of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the criteria for the latter’s independence has been set by the P.M. in the Debate of 22nd July. ... Quite clearly none of the considerations set out in this statement apply to The West Indian situation. Also Sir R. Welensky has by now accepted that there is no question of independence for the Federation in 1960—but the 1960 conference is going to be difficult enough for us. At the official level we think that the future of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation depends on building up the Territorial Governments as against the Federal Government (even including reduction of the Federal Government’s present powers). The Federal authorities will resist this strongly and it would be embarrassing to us if the discussion took place against the background of the grant of independence to yet another “coloured” country of no great competence.

W.B.L.M.
21.8.59

I also agree—but I understand from the Private Office that the S of S will be back if not on Monday at any rate about the middle of next week.

A.H.P.
21.8.59

... By far and away the most important matter at present is the question of independence for the Federation and this note deals only with this question.

2. The Federal House of Representatives agreed in June of last year that a Constitutional Conference should take place within a year “to achieve the goal of self-government and Dominion status within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible moment”. The intervention of other matters, notably the Leewards/Windwards Constitutional Conference, have conspired to delay things beyond the time they had originally intended, but indications now are that they will almost certainly want to have this Conference probably in London some time in the first quarter of 1960.

3. As preparation for this the Federal Government has convened a preliminary Conference in Trinidad on the 28th September to co-ordinate the views of the Federal and Unit Governments. Subject to the agreement of the Units they have invited us to send two observers. Trinidad, however, has already objected and although Barbados, Dominica and St. Kitts have agreed to the invitation to the observers we still do not know the views of Jamaica or the other five Units. The invitation to send observers therefore, is in cold storage until the Federal Government has decided whether they can still issue it in the light of the views of the Units. Mr. Rogers and Mr. McPetrie would be the observers.

4. We had always hoped that this Conference would concentrate more on the question of the internal structure of the Federation dealing with such questions as the allocation of revenue and powers between the Federation and the Units, Customs Union, etc. But it now looks as if they will be much more interested in getting independence than we thought a few months ago. We now think that the September Conference may well demand immediate independence (i.e. as soon as the necessary legal and formal steps can be taken) or for independence by some fixed fairly early date (perhaps in eighteen months or two years). They may agree not to demand
either of these and accept something like full internal self-government for a final period of a few years before full independence. We hope they will do this so that they can get the Federation into seaworthy condition, but there are strong indications that they may not want to wait.

5. This has upset the C.R.O. and Lord Home has suggested we play for the maximum time. Mr. Amery has replied to Lord Home and I think the Secretary of State should read both these minutes.

6. If the C.R.O. can be viewed as taking one extreme view about this question it is probably fair to say that Lord Hailes takes the opposite extreme view. He argues that independence has got to come and that indeed, only early independence is likely to preserve the Federation intact and keep Jamaica a member. The Department's view is that H.M.G. would not be acting responsibly in agreeing to independence until we were satisfied that they had fulfilled certain conditions which we think are essential to the new state having a good chance of surviving.

7. We think these conditions are:

(a) A central administration capable of determining policy in those fields in which sovereign states normally negotiate with one another. This includes economic and financial policy and development which in The West Indies must include a Customs Union as well as freedom of movement. 
(b) Adequate financial resources at the disposal of the central administration including independent taxing powers sufficient to enable it to finance its own recurrent expenditure and obligations, e.g. grant in aid. (This need not rule out occasional help from others in time of stress or some transitional help for a limited period at the outset).
(c) A defence force capable of keeping the peace within its own boundaries and posing at least a nominal deterrent to an outside aggressor. (A rudimentary Navy appears essential for these purposes).
(d) A diplomatic organisation able to maintain external relations with the United Nations and the more important friendly and neighbouring countries.

8. The argument with The West Indies is likely to centre about these conditions and about the related question of how much financial help we will give them after independence.

9. A paper is being prepared on the complex issues which would be used as a brief to guide the U.K. observers at the September Conference. It will, of course, be submitted for the approval of Ministers.

G.W.J.
28.8.59
2. The position is that the Federal Government has invited all the units of the Federation to take part in a preliminary constitutional conference in Trinidad on the 28th September. Subject to the agreement of the unit governments (and Trinidad has already expressed its opposition) the Federal Government has invited Her Majesty’s Government to send two observers.

3. The relevant resolution of the Federal House of Representatives describes the purpose of this conference as: “to achieve the goal of self-government and Dominion status (sic) within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible moment”. It is the present West Indian intention that this September conference, which is to be a purely West Indian affair, should lead up to a full dress constitutional conference with her Majesty’s Government in London early next year. The present Federal constitution provides that such a conference should be held within five years of the inauguration of the Federation; and although 1960 is rather on the early side we do not think it would be politically possible to refuse a request for a West Indian conference on this ground alone.

4. The West Indian delegations to the September conference will have to deal with the highly contentious question of how power is to be distributed between the Unit and the Central governments. They will also have to resolve the differences that have arisen between Jamaica and the rest over customs union. We cannot foretell what the outcome of their discussions will be. It is possible that the conference will break down, in which case the request for a constitutional revision conference may be postponed for some time. It is equally possible that the degree of agreement reached may not be sufficient to justify the West Indian delegations in asking for Dominion status by a fixed date. My advisers, however, and the Governor-General, consider that the September conference is just as likely, if not more likely, to end in a demand for independence at once (by which they will mean as soon as the necessary legal and legislative steps can be taken) or by a definite date. We do not take the Premier of Trinidad’s statement about independence by April 1960 very seriously. We would not, however, be surprised if the date proposed were 18 months or two years from the Constitutional Review conference in London. Assuming this conference was held in the spring or early summer of 1960, this would mean independence some time in 1962.

5. Our observers at the September conference will not have the same status as the other delegates. Assuming, however, that they are invited it is our intention that they should in so far as the opportunity presents itself, make it clear that Her Majesty’s Government cannot agree to sponsor the West Indies for Commonwealth membership unless they have fulfilled certain conditions with regard to the weight of powers and revenues in the hands of the Central Government, the progress towards customs union, the provision of certain military and naval forces, and the strengthening of their administrative and diplomatic apparatus. These criteria are being worked out in greater detail in the brief for the United Kingdom observers at the September conference, and an advance copy will shortly be sent to your Office in case you wish to comment. This approach is in keeping with the Report of the 1956 London Conference on British Caribbean Federation, which said, in reference to the eventual independence of the Federation: “a country must be able to stand on its own feet economically and financially … finance its own administration and (be) able and prepared to assume responsibility for its own defence and its own international relations to the extent that was involved by its geographical or international standing”.
7. I recognise that early independence for The West Indies would not make our task easier in relation to Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This factor is being given due weight in our thinking. But you will appreciate that it will not count for much with West Indian opinion. The West Indies are in many respects (not least their standards of political life and internal stability) in advance of the general run of Latin-American states in their immediate neighbourhood who already enjoy full international status. This is the criterion that counts most with them.

8. I also appreciate what you say about the views of South Africa and how this might affect the reception of West Indian candidature for the Commonwealth. I made this point firmly to Mr. Manley and his ministers when I discussed the boycott of South African goods with them last May in Jamaica. The United Kingdom observers at the September conference will naturally lose no opportunity to reiterate Her Majesty’s Government’s views on the undesirability of any extension of the boycott by the rest of the West Indies. I doubt, however, whether the fear of a South African “blackball” will do much to restrain the West Indians. They are more likely to put their faith in Ghanaian and Indian support and if necessary even turn to them to sponsor their membership of the Commonwealth.

9. I agree with you that there is much to be said for playing for time in dealing with any demand for West Indian independence; and as you will see from the line we are proposing to take, we shall certainly do nothing to hasten the process. Our power of putting on the brake, however, is now very limited. Moreover, even where we still have it, we have to be very careful how we use it. The Federation is still a delicate plant and any excessive check at this stage to West Indian aspirations could have grave repercussions on the standing of the Federal Government and even compromise the existence of the Federation. While, therefore, we shall not neglect reasonable opportunities for delay, I am sure you would not wish us to pursue these to a point which risked injury to the Federation itself.

9. The September conference is due to meet in less than a month from now. I would, accordingly, submit that we should review the whole problem again as soon as the outcome of that conference is known. I do not know whether you will wish, meanwhile, to let our High Commissioners know our preliminary views. It might, however, be wiser not to discuss the problem at this stage with other Commonwealth Governments. Any leakage of such discussions which reached the West Indies would only spur them on in their quest for early independence.²

² Mr Amery made substantial alterations to the CO draft of this minute: the whole of para 4 was written by him, also the last sentence of para 7, and from the penultimate sentence of para 8 to the end. Lord Home accepted the reply (no 57 in file).

279 CO 1031/2311, no 60 5 Nov 1959
[Timetable for independence after a breakdown of West Indies Federation]: minute from Mr Macleod to Lord Home

Julian Amery wrote to you on the 27th August about the preliminary Federal Constitutional Conference opening in Trinidad on 28th September.¹ He suggested

¹ See previous document.
that we should review the likely timetable of independence for The West Indies as soon as the outcome of the conference was known.

2. Your Department has already had a full account of what happened from one of the United Kingdom observers. The Federal Government and the Trinidad Government who were pressing for increased federal powers achieved none of their aims. The conference failed to resolve the issue of representation in the Federal House of Representatives and the other items on the agenda were never reached. A complete breakdown was avoided only by agreement that all the issues on the agenda, including representation, should be remitted to two inter-governmental committees. One of these is to deal with constitutional and political issues, the other with economic and social issues. The committees are to report not later than the 31st March, 1960, and the conference will then be reconvened at the earliest practicable time to consider the committee reports and "discuss proposals which shall be put to Her Majesty's Government, including the setting of a date for Dominion Status".

3. The conference also agreed that the next stage of constitutional advance for the Federation should be "Dominion Status". This was however essentially a face saving formula to cover up the breakdown; and no date for independence has been set. The conference cannot now resume until about the middle of next year and indeed the Jamaican Government does not wish it to resume until the autumn. The full scale conference with H.M.G. which will then be necessary can therefore hardly take place until the end of 1960 at the very earliest. This means that even if The West Indies resolve their disagreements by the end of 1960—and it is far from certain that they will—the date for final independence can hardly be earlier than the first half of 1962 though an announcement might have been made early in 1961. We need not therefore fear any embarrassment to the review of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland provided this is not delayed beyond the first month or two or 1961.

4. We now face, however, the graver issue of the possible breakdown of West Indian federation. I do not expect it, but it is a possibility. Jamaica has made rapid economic progress in recent years. Even if it achieves broadly proportionate representation in the Federal House of Representatives, Jamaica may still be unwilling to see the Federal government assume extensive powers over taxation and industry. In this they might well have the backing of at least one or two of the small units. Some of the others, however, led by Trinidad, wish to see a strong federal government with a view to independence at an early date. It is just possible that they might go for a smaller Eastern Caribbean Federation, without Jamaica.

5. We are doing what we can to stimulate the expression of opinion favourable to federation and we shall do all we can to try and make the conference a success when it meets again. Some of my officials had a useful talk with yours and with Mr. Norman Robertson on 3rd November about the possibility of getting help from Canada on this.3

---

2 N Robertson, under-secretary of state for external affairs, Canada, since 1958.
3 Lord Home replied that he hoped that, 'despite the obvious difficulties, the situation will eventually sort itself out'; he thought the discussion with Robertson was 'undoubtedly useful' (no 61, 10 Nov 1959). The CO hoped the Canadians might be able to mitigate Jamaican isolationism: 'calling in the New World to redress the balance of the even newer!' (CO 1031/2574, no 136 C, Sir H Poynton to Sir A Clutterbuck, 26 Oct 1959).
280  CO 1031/2311, no 68  4 Jan 1960
[West Indies: announcement about dominion status]: letter from Mr Amery (for S of S) to Lord Hailes (West Indies). Minutes by P Rogers and G W Jamieson

Iain\(^1\) has not yet cleared up the aftermath of his African visit, so I am writing to thank you for your letters to him of the 11th and 18th December about Adams' announcement on Dominion status. I will show your letters to Iain in the next few days but I thought it might be helpful if I sent you some first thoughts meanwhile.

We quite agree with you that the suggestion that Dominion status could be achieved in the course of 1960 is preposterous, and that this Resolution of the House of Representatives faces us with the necessity for some plain speaking on Dominion status. The problem is when, and in what context and in what terms. I am not quite sure from your letters whether you have it in mind that the Secretary of State's first riposte should be specifically in answer to your despatch No. 864 in pursuance of Adams' announcement, or in some other way. I expect however that you will feel as we do that it would not be suitable for the Secretary of State to make some pronouncement to the House when it reassembles. This would be liable to be taken as a discourteous rebuff of the Federal Government's approach. While this might not be so in the same degree if the statement were made in answer to a Question in the House, there might still be (justified) suspicion that the Question was arranged and criticism that a specific answer should have been avoided until he had discussed the request with the Federal Government.

Assuming, however, that you have it in mind that whatever is said should be specifically an answer to the Federal Government's request, no one could then accuse the Secretary of State of gratuitous interference in the consideration by West Indians themselves of the future of Federation a matter on which I know you feel strongly—even if the content of the statement were to be criticised. A more valid and damaging criticism might be that we were anticipating the outcome of the actual Conference with H.M.G. about the constitutional future of the Federation. Indeed a great deal of the detail of any general statement would have to await that Conference. Unless however you feel on further thought that we ought to refrain from saying anything until then, we agree that there would be value in saying something fairly blunt in reply to the Federal Government's formal request.

If so, do you agree that the statement should be broadly on these lines? It might rehearse the previous statements by Alan\(^2\) at the 1956 Federal Conference and the Windward and Leeward Conference this year and refer to and endorse your own speech at the opening of the Trinidad Conference. It might then go on to explain that there are certain requirements of independence which are in no sense imposed by H.M.G. but by the facts of international life. It might at this point acknowledge that there is another kind of independence, such as that of several very small territories which really exist by sufferance of larger neighbouring territories but that H.M.G. feel, as they are sure The West Indies will feel, that this is not the kind to which The West Indies rightly aspire or which would represent the place which they would

---

\(^1\) ie, Mr Macleod.  
\(^2\) ie, Mr Lennox-Boyd.
rightly seek to take in the world. It is for West Indians themselves to say when they wish to give the Federal Government the powers which are necessary for it to sustain independence and presumably this will be discussed in detail at the forthcoming conferences between the Units and the Federation and later with H.M.G. Subject to allowing the time required to pass the necessary U.K. legislation and to bring into effect all the internal changes in The West Indies which are required, the date is essentially one for West Indians themselves to decide since H.M.G. are now, as they had already made it clear previously, ready to agree and sponsor The West Indies for independent membership of the Commonwealth when they are ready for it. Until however West Indians themselves decide when they will bring these internal changes into effect it would be inappropriate, indeed impossible, for H.M.G. arbitrarily to fix a date.

On the assumption that our reply should be broadly on these lines we are setting down to drafting something and we will consult you about it privately before we send it officially. What we would very much hope is that we should be able to get a statement with which the Federal Government were able to express publicly their agreement, but perhaps this is too much to hope?

Minutes on 280

…The uncompromising Jamaican attitude over representation and the nature and strength of Jamaica’s objections to the strengthening of the Federal Government and to institution of a Customs Union are certainly a major cause of the breakdown of the Conference and the present crisis in federation. This must be viewed against the appalling effect of Sir Grantley Adams’ statement about retrospective taxation and the vigour of the Jamaican economic development in recent years. Moreover account must be taken of the fact that the Jamaican Government as a whole, i.e. politicians and civil servants combined, is undoubtedly more efficient than that of any other West Indian Government (the Federal Government not excluded), and it is only human and indeed reasonable that they should be fearful of a less efficient government interfering (as they see it) in what they are doing.

A major cause of the blame must also be attributed to the Eastern Caribbean, partly through not having gone any way to meet the realities of the Jamaican political scene. Above all responsibility must rest on the present Trinidad Government for having put forward proposals which, however desirable in principle, are just not acceptable on timing and for pressing these just as uncompromisingly as Jamaica has pressed its points of view. In particular the view of some of the small islands e.g. St. Lucia, in looking upon federal government primarily as a source of doles for the small islands has understandably alarmed Jamaica and this attitude too must bear some part of the blame.

The third major cause of the breakdown, & at present the one which is probably the most important, is the lack of leadership and the political inefficiency of the Federal Government.

These causes are analysed at greater length in Lord Hailes’ recent despatch about the Conference and what he says is entirely in line with our own views.

P.R.
13.11.59
... 2. I am by no means convinced for the reasons set out below that Lord Hailes’ suggestion of a “firm blunt statement of fact on the matter of dominion status” is timely, though I do not dispute that we might one day have to advise the Secretary of State to take a somewhat more positive line with The West Indies than that they have been accustomed to in recent years, if they do not look like going a reasonable way to meeting our “minimum criteria”:

(a) If at all possible we should avoid having arguments with The West Indies about the date for their independence. To fall into this trap would be grist to the mill of the more extreme nationalists particularly Dr. Eric Williams; such a step might in any case be ineffective; and it could very well sour our present very good relations with the Federation which we hope to keep after their independence.

(b) It would not be wise to enter into an argument while the proceedings of the inter-governmental committees are still, so to speak, *sub judice*. They may after all come to a reasonable set of decisions which would implement the “minimum criteria”. I think it would be better to give this at least a chance.

(c) I cannot see how the statement could go very much further in substance and tone than the more recent statements of the Secretary of State’s predecessor on this subject (set out in (64) ). It could of course spell out in rather more detail what the statements in (64) generalise about, as was done by Lord Hailes when he opened the September Conference. I doubt very much if the mere repetition of all this would strike the West Indies as either fresh or arresting. It should, moreover, be borne in mind that we have on at least one occasion... got very close to saying that they could have independence *when they feel ready for it*.

(d) Is there in any case anything we should object to in the Prime Minister’s statement recorded in paragraph 2 of (63)? As long as the date for independence he has in mind is one which will allow reasonable achievement of the “minimum criteria” I am not sure that we should not instead welcome this move of Sir Grantley’s which does at least show signs of life, direction and purpose instead of the usual fumbling and ineffectiveness.

(e) I do not want to sound disrespectful but it seems to me there is a slight touch of panic in (63). This was entirely missing from Lord Hailes’ last communication to us in which he reproved the Office for having taken positive steps after the failure of the September Conference to ginger up exponents of Federation and told us that the time was past when intervention from here was likely to be either welcome or effective, and generally set out a point of view which Sir Kenneth Blackburne later neatly summarised (and incidentally supported) of “masterful inactivity” by the Office.

3. Despite all these doubts I do not think there are any overwhelming objections to going along with Lord Hailes’ suggestion, at least a little way. For one thing we do not want to give him any suspicion or feeling (and I fear he may be sensitive in this regard) that we do not trust his judgment. Also I do not think that in the present situation any action of this kind is likely to have very much effect, either good or bad. My impression is that at long last we now see a head of steam built up behind the concept of independence. I doubt if this is likely to be deflected from its goal by

---

general statements of policy though I am optimistic enough to believe that it may be
carried forward in a realistic way when the politicians really get to grips with what
one may call the technical aspects of the problem—training diplomats, getting their
defences improved, making a start with Customs Union, etc.

G.W.J.
17.12.59

281  CO 1031/2574, no 144  13 Jan 1960
[West Indies: assessment of present position and future prospects]:
letter from P Rogers (CO) to Lord Hailes. Minutes by G W Jamieson,
P Rogers, Sir H Poynton, Mr Amery and Mr Macleod  [Extract]

… 3. We entirely agree with you that “no solution which does not have its roots in
West Indian thinking and action is of any lasting value”. We also fully agree that
“West Indians are too far advanced to be greatly influenced in the last resort by
outside advice and (that) it is they alone who will make or mar Federation, and their
future”. Equally, I hope I am right in inferring from your letter that you will agree
that they can like the rest of us to some extent be influenced by outside advice and it
is perfectly proper either for H.M.G. or for other outside friends to offer that advice or
to try to influence events. The crux of the matter, and the point in doubt, is what
particular kind of advice and influence is likely to be effective. …

… 6. But a careful study of what has been said in the Debate in the House of
Representatives and on other occasions does still leave us with a feeling that there is
a very long way to go. For example, even Manley’s statement quoted in the Jamaica
Monthly Intelligence Report for November that “I regard this as an issue with very
deep and far-reaching conclusions to my country because a decision to leave Federation
is fraught with far-reaching consequences and a decision to stay in the Federation is
fraught with immediate and disastrous consequences”, makes it clear that, whatever,
Manley’s own views, he has to pay careful regard to powerful forces in Jamaica which
still seem to be opposed to the real implications of Federation. …

7. No doubt there will, as you say, be many ups and downs in the state of public
feeling in Jamaica and elsewhere about Federation as about other things, and on
balance in Jamaica there certainly seems to be something of an “up” since the
Conference; but does not the underlying seriousness of the situation still remain? …

11. The second aspect of the question is what, if anything, should be done to deal
with the situation. It is to this, I think, that your criticism is mainly directed. If we
have got the picture right—indeed even if it is rosier than the one I have painted—is
there not still a need to give encouragement to the Federation in any way that can be
done without being counter-productive? Your own letter of 21st November said after
all that “there is a chance—not stronger than that—that the Federation looks like
turning a dangerous corner by its own efforts”. If it is no more than a chance—
indeed even if things are by now better than that—are we really justified in confining
ourselves, to use Blackburne’s phrase, to “masterly inactivity”? As we see it here, it is
only you yourself who have given a lead within the West Indies in favour of
Federation. Governors and senior Federal civil servants are by the nature of their
offices prevented from doing this publicly and the public explanation and advocacy of
Federation by West Indian politicians and other unofficial leaders of public opinion has been seriously lacking (this criticism has been made to me by many West Indians and I am sure you will agree that they are right). What we have been trying to do is to stimulate such explanation and advocacy by West Indians themselves. We tried working mainly, though not solely, through expatriates because they are the persons with whom we are more easily in touch in London, and because we should not, in any case, do much directly. There is admittedly a risk here. But the particular expatriates we had discussed it with are all persons who, as I am sure you will also agree, are very well aware of just that background, who know that it is only West Indians themselves who can create their own salvation, and who are well accustomed to working accordingly. . . .

Minutes on 281

On the general question of whether the role of this office should from now on, in relation to the Federation, be purely passive or whether instead we should still try discreetly to push the Federation, I have to admit that in general I support Lord Hailes' central thesis that we cannot do much more than act when requested as honest broker (e.g. Mr. Rogers' role at the Trinidad Conference).

2. I would not, however, go as far as Lord Hailes does, as clearly all kinds of situations could arise in which the Secretary of State or this office acting on his behalf, might have to intervene in Federal questions because of H.M.G's continued responsibility for the area right up to the point of independence. I think it can be fairly argued that we were justified in abandoning our usual position of neutrality immediately after the conclusion of the September Conference. For despite what Lord Hailes says, there was a crisis atmosphere at this stage. The 50,000 people would not otherwise have turned out on the streets of Kingston to welcome Mr. Manley. On the other hand, I think it has to be accepted that it was a pity that we did not find time to consult Lord Hailes before embarking on the lobbying. But presumably those present at the meeting on the 21st October (recorded at (121) ) clearly felt that there could be no delay in setting about our reparative activity and Mr. Rogers embarked on his series of meetings with business men, etc., two days later.

3. We do, however, not want to engage in an argument with Lord Hailes at this stage, particularly when he has recently become so much friendlier and receptive towards the Department’s ideas. In any case, he is “the man on the spot” and if he is unwilling to admit that there was, or continues to be, an atmosphere of crisis, it is not easy to see quite how we can contradict him. He may of course be right that there is no atmosphere of crisis now, as matters appear to have improved considerably judging by the account of the inter-Governmental Committee’s first meeting in (138) and the general review of Lord Hailes’ visit to Jamaica in (139).

G.W.J.
2.12.59

... I much regret that I should have proposed action in the sense I did without suggesting that it be cleared first with Lord Hailes. I had not expected that he would do other than welcome it. Having said that, I am bound to say that I do not agree with him on the policy of “masterly inactivity”. When the situation is so serious that Lord Hailes
himself says that there is no more than a chance that the Federation will turn a dangerous corner by its own efforts, I feel that H.M.G. is not justified in being passive.

P.R.
21.12.59

... I realise that it is very difficult for us in London to form an exact assessment of the situation in the West Indies but the general impression that I get from talking to people in London, outside the Office with West Indian contacts, is that our rather pessimistic assumptions about the Federation are rather nearer the mark than Lord Hailes' rather more optimistic picture. ...

A.H.P.
23.12.59

Secretary of State

Frankly I think we are in danger of making a mountain out of a molehill.

2. The idea of stimulating propaganda in favour of federation was, I think, a good one. But plainly we were wrong to put it into practice without first consulting Hailes. We were also quite right to take the Canadians into our confidence; but, plainly again, it is awkward for Hailes if the picture we give them is in his view unduly alarmist.

3. On balance I agree with Hailes' appreciation of the situation and judge that under present circumstances and given the present distribution of personalities there is more to be feared from excess of zeal than from masterly inactivity on our part. Federation is after all a West Indian show; and though you can take the horse to the water you cannot make him drink.

4. I would prefer a much shorter letter simply saying that (1) we are sorry we didn't tell Hailes what we were doing; (2) we trust no harm has been done; (3) we are glad things seem to be going better and (4) we are still rather worried about the prospects of the Federal Civil Service.

J.A.
30.12.59

Mr. Amery

I think on the whole I would rather send Mr. Rogers's draft. It is my general experience that if somebody writes, as Hailes has done, a very long, involved and rather diffuse letter of complaint it is a good thing to send a long reply in return. I am not sure how I read the tea-leaves about West Indian Federation at the present time, but in any case I don't think we prejudice anything by replying as is suggested. If you agree, therefore, we will write accordingly.

I.M.
31.12.59

282 PREM 11/3236, PM(61)52 30 May 1961
[West Indies: result of the preparatory inter-governmental conference]: minute from Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan

The resumed Inter-Governmental Conference (attended by Colonial Office observers) ended on 16th May. In general its results are satisfactory. It agreed a new basis for
representation in the Federal Legislature, new arrangements for financing the Federation, a formula for the achievement of Freedom of Movement within the Federation, and a Customs Union plan. It also endorsed plans for the expansion of its military forces and for the establishment of a necessary minimum of diplomatic missions. Agreement on some of the more contentious issues was only achieved on a majority basis and these may well be re-opened at Lancaster House, though I intend to do my best to prevent it. There were also some (mainly minor) issues which the Inter-Government Conference did not resolve and which remain to be settled.

2. The Constitutional Conference with H.M.G. for which the Inter-Governmental Conference was preparatory starts at Lancaster House on 31st May. While there will be difficulties to surmount (not least over the control of Income Tax and Industrial Development), I am hopeful that this Conference will result in general agreement on the form of the Federal Constitution for independence and on an independence date. I understand that the West Indians have in mind some date between April and June, 1962. Subject to examination of the considerable constitutional drafting problem this necessitates, I hope it will be possible to fix the independence date within this period.

3. Unfortunately this is not the end of the road. There is still the Jamaican referendum which I now understand is likely to take place around August or September. Present reports are not optimistic about the probable result but the position may well change when Mr. Manley’s campaign in favour of federation gets into its stride. If Jamaica were to decide against Federation she would want independence fairly quickly as a separate state and we should have little alternative to letting her “go it alone”. In such a situation our main efforts would have to be concentrated on doing what we could to keep the rest of the Federation intact, though this would be difficult: indeed I understand that if Jamaica withdrew, Trinidad would follow suit. At present, however, there is no need to plan for this contingency though I shall keep my colleagues in touch as necessary with this aspect of the situation.

4. There is to be another conference in the autumn to discuss financial, economic and defence matters. I may be put under very heavy pressure at the Conference opening on 31st May to reveal our hand on the question of economic aid; I hope however to maintain the position that H.M.G. will not be able to discuss its post-independence aid plans for the Federation until the autumn conference.

5. I will report at regular intervals to you as the Conference proceeds.¹

¹ Mr Macmillan minuted: ‘Many thanks. Not bad, so far. H.M. 30.5.61’.

283 PREM 11/3236, PM(61)54 7 June 1961
[Report on the West Indies constitutional conference]: minute by Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan. Minute by Selwyn Lloyd (Exchequer)

The West Indies Conference at Lancaster House is at a critical stage. All conferences go through such a period, but as there is usually a unanimous wish on the part of the delegates to press on with constitutional advance or independence as the case may be, difficulties can usually be surmounted. But here there are so many personal conflicts and also such a difference of approach between the large and the small
islands that it appears very doubtful whether this conference will in fact end with sufficient agreement [to] arrive at the naming of a date for independence.

2. There are two possible rocks which might shipwreck us:

(a) the rather technical question of the transfer of matters from the reserved list. This particularly affects Jamaica, who were asked to consider at the inter-governmental talks in Trinidad a new formula. Jamaica, however, who like the idea of a very loose federation, have been unable to offer any advance at all and this is very much resented by most if not all the other delegates. Manley cannot move and I shall have to make an appeal to the Conference to understand his position and accept the Jamaican formula.

(b) However, the more serious matter, and the one that carries great risks for us, is that the Conference might break down on the issue of freedom of movement. As you know, there is very limited freedom of movement in the West Indies and Trinidad is the magnet for the poorer islands. But Trinidad has very heavy unemployment and heavy under-employment and does not feel, particularly in the absence of strong Federal powers for economic planning, that she can possibly accept free entry at this stage, nor indeed for some years to come. A tenuous 6 to 5 majority was finally achieved for a formula which in practice accepts this position in relation to Trinidad, but unfortunately goes on to link it with an interim plan for development of the small islands to be financed by the United Kingdom. This is in spite of the fact that agreement had previously been reached on the basis that financial matters were to be deferred until an autumn conference.

3. The Federal Government has now produced from the requests of the smaller units a plan which asks us to provide £6 million for the small islands alone for a one-year plan. This proposal cannot possibly be defended either in total or in detail and the amounts asked for are far beyond anything that we can contemplate, or indeed anything that the islands can spend. The needs in particular of the African territories, where the standard of living is much lower than in the West Indies, have far higher priority. In this move by the Federal Government and the small islands in particular there is a great deal of politics and a good proportion of blackmail. I know this and they know that I know it. Nevertheless we are not going to be able to get this item through the Conference without making a response that they consider satisfactory to this idea of an interim plan. Seven out of the ten territories are grant-aided and fear their future in a Federation dominated by Jamaica and Trinidad. They are therefore only really prepared to ask their Legislative Councils for endorsement of the plan for Federation if they can show something tangible on this item. I am quite clear that for the small islands this is the crux of the Conference.

4. One must, however, look at the other side of it. It seems to me very serious if our plans for Federation were now to break down, particularly as it would appear that they had broken down on our reluctance to find a very small sum of money. We would have contributed to the Balkanisation of the Caribbean and Jamaica and Trinidad, and possibly Barbados, would move to their separate destinies leaving us with a gaggle of small islands to grant-aid for ever, which would also land us with serious problems for their defence, subject as they would be to all the malign influences in the Caribbean. Moreover we would have lost the chance of making the Federation a magnet sufficiently powerful to attract British Guiana and British Honduras into it. Serious though the results would be for us, I believe they would be worse for America. She is
most closely concerned to see a successful outcome to this conference and would be profoundly disappointed if it failed. The Caribbean is an area of acute anxiety to her at the moment and to fail to create a Federation now would surely have disastrous effects on our relationship with the United States. Canada too, though in minor degree, would be very unhappy. America are going to be very helpful in terms of aid for the Federation and have undertaken to match £ for £ what we can do at least up to 1964. I believe in practice they will do better than this, but the difficulty is to make use of this accord at the present time. I believe present American thinking is that they should follow a successful conference here with an indication of their general interest in time, it would be hoped, to help Manley with his September referendum in Jamaica. But we have got to get through this conference successfully first.

5. So far Hugh Fraser, who has been in the chair for two days during my absence, has expressed surprise that this matter should be raised at all, has said that we cannot look at the sort of figures that they appear to have in contemplation, and has warned them that we cannot embark on detailed financial discussions now in advance of the autumn. This is certainly the right line for us to take and hold as long as we can, but I shall have to make a statement, perhaps on Tuesday of next week, at the conclusion of this part of the Conference, and what I say then will mean either that the Conference succeeds or that it breaks up. I am thinking of making a statement along the following lines:—

(i) of repeating again the points that Fraser has made to them from the chair;
(ii) of saying that nevertheless I recognise the importance of this matter to the West Indies and am prepared to send out a small survey team to study, in conjunction with the Federal Government and the unit Governments, a small and limited number of projects for the smaller islands for which special finance might be considered;
(iii) I could if I re-cut and re-shaped the plans that I have for African finance possibly find up to £¼ million, although this would be a very difficult and distasteful exercise. I have not yet decided whether to mention a figure of this sort to the Conference: the danger of mentioning it is that it would be taken as derisory against the requests they have put forward to us.

6. My judgment is that if the approach mentioned above seems insufficient, and I believe that it will be, I could in fact buy a settlement for a total of £2 million. It may be necessary to ask for an urgent meeting of Ministers, perhaps on Monday, to consider in the light of further progress at Lancaster House whether in the last resort what I might broadly call the foreign affairs aspect is to prevail and whether I should put forward such a proposal. I am almost equally reluctant to put forward a suggestion as to where this money should come from. There are only really two possibilities:—

(i) I would have to take money away from essential projects in East Africa to meet this comparatively undeserving case in the West Indies; or
(ii) we would have to treat it as we did Cyprus, as a case where we had to pay a certain amount of money because of the international importance of what we were seeking to achieve, and in that case I would have to ask for something like £1¼ million of new money from the Treasury.

1 H C P J Fraser, parliamentary under-secretary of state at CO, 1960–1962; husband of Lady Antonia Pakenham.
7. I will report further on this important matter as we make progress at Lancaster House.²

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Lord Chancellor, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary and the Lord Privy Seal, the Commonwealth Secretary and the Minister of Defence.³

Minute on 283

Prime Minister
You asked for my views on the Colonial Secretary's minute of 7th June about this Conference.

2. I think that we shall have to consider whether the threat is likely to be pressed to the point of breaking up the Conference; and if so whether, and to what extent, we shall be obliged to give in to it. I should hope that we could get away with sending a small survey team to study a few selected projects in the smaller islands; though even this could be embarrassing unless the team is carefully chosen and briefed.

3. If we cannot get away with this and have to make a cash offer, the purposes to which the money would be put seem to make it clearly appropriate for C.D. & W. financing. In my view therefore the money would have to be found from existing C.D. & W. resources, including the extra £19m. which is under consideration by you as an amount to be made available for the next two years.

4. The alternative of finding new money on the Cyprus model raises very great difficulties in the present situation regarding our overseas expenditure and balance of payments, as well as in other ways, and I very much hope that the Colonial Secretary will not find it necessary to pursue it.

5. Even if this alternative is not pursued, I think that Ministers will have to meet to consider whether we should give way at all to this pressure.

S.L.
12.6.61

² The conference concluded on 16 June with agreement in principle that the West Indies could move to independence by 31 May 1962; however, a further conference was fixed for Jan 1962 to deal with defence, financial, and economic matters, and international relations issues. The possibility of additional development funding would be examined meanwhile. Planning was overtaken by the referendum in Jamaica on 19 Sept 1961: 54.1% voted against remaining in the Federation.

³ Mr Macmillan minuted: ‘What does C of Exr say? I suppose ministers will have to meet. H.M. 7.6.61’.

284 CAB 128/35/2, CC 52(61)4
28 Sept 1961

[Implications of Jamaica referendum—withdrawal from Federation]:

Cabinet conclusions

The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (61) 142) on the implications of the referendum in Jamaica which had resulted in a decision that the territory should withdraw from the West Indies Federation.¹

¹ See n 2 to previous document.
The Colonial Secretary said that there could be no question of repudiating this decision which, although reached on a narrow majority of a low poll,2 was accepted both by the Prime Minister, Mr. Manley, and by the Opposition Parties in Jamaica. Given the precedents of Cyprus and Sierra Leone, and having regard to the size of the population, economic viability and relative stability of the territory, a request from Jamaica for full independence within the Commonwealth could not reasonably be resisted. He proposed, therefore, that in the discussions he would have with the Prime Minister of Jamaica in the following week he should indicate that the United Kingdom Government were willing in principle to agree that, after the necessary preparations had been made, Jamaica should become independent and would sponsor her application for membership of the Commonwealth. As some time would be required to resolve a number of legislative and administrative problems created by the withdrawal of Jamaica from the Federation, it would be possible to avoid a firm date for independence at this stage, but this would probably take place in the latter half of 1963.

The implications of the decision for the other islands in the Federation could not yet be clearly seen. He was discussing this problem with Sir Grantley Adams, the Federal Prime Minister, and hoped shortly to have the views of Dr. Williams, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. Subject to these consultations, it might be possible to establish an Eastern Caribbean Federation which might include British Guiana. A conference with representatives of the smaller islands might be desirable when opinion had had time to crystallise.

In discussion the following points were raised:—

(a) It would be important to maintain, in discussion with representatives from all the West Indian territories, the cautious attitude which had so far been adopted about financial assistance by Her Majesty's Government. There did not seem any case for providing assistance for Jamaica, and the poorer islands should not be allowed to suppose that in independence they could expect full financial support from the United Kingdom.

(b) The withdrawal of Jamaica from the Federation might make the inclusion of British Guiana in a federation of all the remaining islands a little easier.

(c) As the British Overseas Airways Corporation were losing substantial sums annually in supporting the West Indies airline, which aspired to the status of an international airline, it might now be possible to cut the rate of loss by reducing operations to the more modest level of an inter-island air service.

The Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed that, in his discussions with the Prime Minister of Jamaica, the Colonial Secretary should accept in principle that, after the necessary preparations had been made, Jamaica should have full independence and that in due course Her Majesty's Government would sponsor the admittance of Jamaica to Commonwealth membership.

(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to submit for their consideration at a later meeting a report on the prospects of establishing an Eastern Caribbean Federation which might include British Guiana.

2 The turnout was 60%.
I have read through West Indian Department ‘A’ paper on conferences and legislation concerned with the West Indies in 1962. As it says, it is in the main confined to timetables based on various half pledges and guesses about, for example, what Williams of Trinidad is going to do. It proposes a ministerial visit to see how local politicians react to Jamaica’s leaving the Federation and generally to explore the future.

But are we clear ourselves where we want to go?

I suppose the first question is what are our basic interests in the Caribbean—and I use the term Caribbean to include British Honduras and British Guiana.

Strategically, as I see it they are nil. Of course we don’t want to see them in unfriendly hands, but the U.S.A. and Canada must ensure this does not come about, although as friends and allies we should be prepared to help by influence and money.

Economically, to the Government the whole area is a constant and considerable drain whether by disguised subsidy or direct help. On the other hand there is a large (how large) private investment (real estate and oil) which may or may not bring in a handsome return. Clearly we do not want to jeopardise such investment, but is there danger of this?

Morally, there is of course a strong sentimental tie which must have some weight. The Immigration Bill will be straining the West Indian side of the sentiment.

I suggest we need now to review the whole of the West Indian position. The grand concept of Federation, perhaps ultimately to embrace British Honduras and British Guiana, is in ruins. Jamaica is out and other groups of islands, for example Bermuda and the Bahamas, were never in. Is it wise to try and salvage the rest of the Federation? In that event is it reasonable to expect Trinidad to carry the burden of the smaller islands? Surely she won’t without the promise of continuing and substantial aid. What do we want to do about British Guiana? Jagan is pressing for its independence. Geographically it is of course within sight of Trinidad. And then there is British Honduras with the prospect of tens of millions being spent for a new capital and for what purpose? There are of course lots of other questions which will need thought.

I can think of all sorts of other constitutional solutions than those which we are at present more or less drifting into, especially if we are prepared to be tough about the giving of aid and attaching strings to it. Strategically and probably economically we can afford to be tough and only sentimentally have we reasons not to be. At a time, and I think sooner rather than later, we ought to consult with the Americans and Canadians, but before this we should know our own minds.
The Colonial Secretary said that the defection of Jamaica and the refusal of Trinidad to participate in any federation of the Eastern Caribbean had removed any possibility of continuing the present West Indian Federation in any form. He proposed, therefore, to put forward a Bill dissolving the Federation and establishing at the same time a Commission to take charge of the existing federal services until such time as more permanent arrangements could be made for them. The Commissioner would in effect be a trustee in bankruptcy. So far as the future of the territories themselves was concerned the Government were already committed to provide for the independence of Jamaica and a conference was in session. It would be impossible to refuse the grant of formal independence to Trinidad, which was already independent for all practical purposes. The same applied to British Guiana. It was indeed ironical that the Government were delaying independence for British Guiana at the request of the United States Government; but action could not be long delayed. The real problems of the West Indies centred round the general question of financial viability and the particular problem of the smaller Islands, who could not support independence on their own without a continuing and indefinite subsidy and whose prospects would be profoundly affected by the dissolution of the Federation. The smaller islands had proposed to him the formation of their own federation; their ideas were still unformed but they were working on more definite proposals which they hoped to present to him shortly. They were aware of the economic problem and would take it into account. A possible alternative to such a federation was a re-grouping of some of the islands with Trinidad in a unitary state; it was unlikely that Barbados at any rate would accept such an arrangement but her financial prospects were less depressing. If it were accepted that negotiations for the independence of Jamaica and Trinidad should go forward he would propose to give further consideration to the problem of the other islands in the light of their own considered proposals for federation and of the possibility that when the bitter feelings aroused by the breakup of the main Federation had abated Trinidad and some of the smaller islands might be prepared to form a unitary state on their own.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) It would not be practical to withhold the grant of independence to Trinidad, but it should be our object to ensure that as many as possible of the smaller islands were grouped with Trinidad in a unitary state. The advantages to Trinidad were that the accession of other islands would help to counteract the rapid growth of the Indian population in Trinidad itself. The advantage to the United Kingdom would be that such a unitary state might be financially viable and would reduce to some extent the subsidy required to keep the smaller islands going. A separate federation of the smaller islands should not be ruled out but would need careful examination in the light of the scheme which they were now understood to be preparing.

(b) There would be no question of the automatic Commonwealth membership for West Indian territories attaining independence although we had already entered into an understanding with Jamaica to support her application. There would be particular difficulty about Commonwealth membership for British Guiana. No formal procedure for Commonwealth membership had ever been laid down; this had advantages and disadvantages, but at least it made it possible to look at each case on merit.

(c) The whole question of finance for the West Indies, both in terms of the cost of government, compensation for federal staff and subsidies, and in the broader context
of persuading the Governments of Canada and the United States to accept greater responsibility for an area which was now of more strategic importance to them than to us, needed fuller examination. It should be studied in detail by officials of the Treasury and the Colonial Office.

(d) It could be argued that it would be justifiable for the United Kingdom Government, in spite of the dissolution of the Federation, to grant independence to all the smaller islands of the West Indies as well as to Trinidad and leave them to work out their own future. As against this the Government could not altogether avoid a moral obligation to avert the chaos and bankruptcy in the smaller islands which might well ensue. In the particular case of Trinidad it would be difficult to make conditions about independence in the form of requiring her to accept responsibility for her smaller neighbours in view of the fact that for all practical purposes she was independent already.

(e) It would be possible to delay action on British Honduras for some time; efforts were at present concentrated on repairing the damage done by the recent hurricane and political questions had been put aside for the time being. It might in the longer term be to our advantage to accept a merger of British Honduras with Guatemala. It was no longer possible to think in terms of making British Honduras a member of the West Indian Federation and there was no prospect of her attaining a viable independence on her own.

1 The Cabinet reluctantly agreed ‘that the dissolution of the West Indies Federation could not be prevented’, and it would be ‘premature to describe the suggested federation of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands as more than a promising development’ (CAB 128/36/1, CC 11(62)3, 6 Feb 1962).

287 DO 200/111, no 2 10 Apr 1962
‘Federation of the Eight’: brief for S of S by L B Walsh Atkins (CRO)¹ on Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee memorandum

The problem
1. The withdrawal of Jamaica and Trinidad from the Federation of the West Indies poses the problem of what to do with the eight smaller territories, Barbados, the four Windward Islands units and the three Leeward Islands units. Trinidad has only half the size and population of Jamaica: and the Little Eight all together are smaller in area and population even than Trinidad. Though perhaps several times better off per head than many African and Asian territories they are by local standards (and particularly in contrast with Trinidad, with its oil) extremely poor, depending predominantly on the export of bananas and sugar, plus tourism. All except Barbados are now grant-aided. To put them on the same footing as Jamaica and Trinidad in the obsolescent Federation their advance to full internal self-government was accelerated; and in most of them financial irresponsibility and administrative incompetence are flowering. It is necessary to take an early view of the future of the “Little Eight” because of the break-up of the old Federation (the West Indies Bill has just been enacted) and because the governments of the Eight,

after meeting in Barbados at the end of February, have sent the Colonial Secretary a memorandum proposing a federation among themselves.

-Colonial Secretary's recommendations-

2. The Colonial Secretary sees three possibilities:
   (i) to reject any possibility of setting up a Federation of the Eight;
   (ii) to accept the proposals put forward by the eight governments as a basis of discussion;
   (iii) to put forward counter proposals of our own for a much stronger federation ("in all but name a unitary state"). Mr. Maudling recommends this last.

-C.R.O. points-

3. We can emphatically agree that the second possibility should be rejected. A loose federation of these little islands, with a total population of some 600,000, mal-administered and economically unviable, all except Barbados likely to "degenerate into little paradises for political boss rule" and run rapidly downhill would be an unacceptable liability both political and economic: economic, because even though on its attaining independence the Colonial Secretary, as he says, would no longer have responsibility for the mal-administration occurring, and however defined and limited in cash and time our aid to them might be, H.M.G. would still morally be at risk into the indefinite future to make some response to the pressing requests for further help which such poverty and chaos would provoke.

4. As between the other two possibilities, it would undoubtedly be preferable from our point of view that the long term solution should be the amalgamation of these little islands with Trinidad: their combined populations—at present approaching 1½ millions—would make a little more sense and Trinidad's wealth should do something to carry the other islands. It would not be much of a State but it would be better than the two we look like being saddled with. The Colonial Office, however, to whom this point has been put do not see much hope of it in the visible future as Trinidad has of late rather alienated the other eight; and also run itself into some financial difficulties. The only path to union with Trinidad is in fact course (i). Once the Eight became independent in any shape, vested interests in independence would grow up and the possibility of union with Trinidad would recede.

5. On the other hand, if the Eight's own plans are rejected and the prospect of unification with Trinidad is remote, the Colonial Secretary dislikes the prospect of being saddled with eight separate little units for the indefinite future especially as trouble might follow (and we are very short of troops to deal with any trouble). That leaves his third possibility—counter proposals by H.M.G. for a strong federation with the prospect of early independence. The main features of the counter proposals do not, curiously, say anything specific about the external financial aspects except that it would probably be necessary for the grants-in-aid to be given to the federal and not the unit governments (we should insist on this), the grant to taper over a fixed period of years and be immutable save in exceptional circumstances. He points out that to grant bilateral budgetary aid to an independent country, and to confer political independence on a country without hope of financial independence, are hitherto unprecedented. We need not perhaps take a stand on this in the present day. But we should recognise that there is no possibility in practice of our aid to an independent Eight being "immutable". We would be under pressure to increase it. In any case it is
not at all clear on what basis the Colonial Secretary proposes to determine the amount of the grant. The only basis mentioned is that of Professor Lewis (the distinguished West Indian economist) which was used by the governments of the Eight in formulating their own plan. But “it is extremely doubtful whether [Professor Lewis’s] assumptions are realistic” (though to do him justice he does hedge them). It would be illusory to base any policy conclusions on Professor Lewis’s forecast. We should also want to be sure that any financial settlement with a federation of the Eight was not so drawn (as was that for Tanganyika) that we provide untied the aid needed to meet local costs and any tied aid provided by the Americans or Canadians has the effect of diverting all the Government’s purchases away from their normal sources of supply in Britain.

6. Moreover neither Professor Lewis nor the Colonial Office make any reference to the effect of the Common Market negotiations on the West Indies’ crucial exports of bananas (they are not very efficient producers and depend greatly on the British protected market) and sugar. Two alternative proposals for bananas are being considered in the E.E.C. context. One would allow the British market to be segregated from the French. We could then continue our preferences and allow an expansion of supplies. The other would be more complex and might discourage a large increase in production. Sugar should not be affected by the E.E.C. negotiations since we shall seek to continue in effect the arrangement now existing under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. The West Indies are a fairly likely candidate for association with the Community.

7. Consequently before any decision is reached to adopt course (iii), some further investigation may be desirable in particular:

(a) Since grants after independence for purposes other than those of technical assistance would fall on C.R.O. votes, the Secretary of State may feel that a reliable assessment which Ministers could defend to Parliament really must be made before any commitment whatever is entered into, even if this takes longer than the “month or six weeks” which the Colonial Secretary contemplates. Is this not a case for a small economic mission of officials?
(b) The Secretary of State may also wish to consider whether, if (as the Colonial Secretary points out) we intend to depart from the recent practice of simply waiting for the West Indies to make proposals to us, the political aspects of the future of the Eight should not also be investigated by a commission before any counter proposals by H.M.G. are launched. The political and economic examinations could perhaps be combined in one commission.

288  CAB 134/1561, CPC 8(62) 11 Apr 1962
[West Indies: possible ‘Federation of the Eight’]: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (62) 14) setting out his proposals for dealing with the report of the recent Conference of Ministers of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands which had recommended the setting up of a “Federation of the Eight”.

The Colonial Secretary said that the proposals which the Conference had now
formally submitted to him envisaged a Federation in which substantial powers would still be retained by the local administration in each island; economic aid had been provided for on a diminishing scale, disappearing altogether in 1968. There were two main objections to the proposals in their present form. Firstly, they would involve the retention of the present corrupt, inefficient and top heavy administrations in smaller islands. Secondly, and partly in consequence of this, the economic assumptions on which the proposals had been framed were almost certainly optimistic. In practice it was likely that the economy of a Federation on the lines proposed would steadily deteriorate and that economic aid would be called for on an increasing and not on a diminishing scale.

There were broadly speaking three courses of action now open to the Government. Firstly they could reject the proposals of the recent conference and continue to administer the islands on present lines. Apart from the political difficulty of such a course, it would saddle the United Kingdom Government with indefinite responsibility for economic assistance and development to eight small and separate territories. Secondly, they could accept the proposals of the Conference. This had the advantage of making it easy to reach early agreement and, by accepting the proposals at their face value, to limit the scale and duration of economic aid to the territories. It had, however, the serious disadvantages already mentioned; if the economic situation deteriorated, as it almost certainly would, it was unlikely that the United Kingdom would be able to stand aside. We should then have the worst of both worlds; increased responsibility for providing aid and less control than at present over the ways in which it would be spent. The third possibility which he himself would recommend would be to put forward counter proposals for a federation under which greater powers would be given to the Federal Government, and the local administrations correspondingly reduced. They would thus be deprived of most of their present opportunities for corruption and chicanery and economic prospects for the area would improve.

At one time it had been suggested that the smaller islands, but not Barbados, might combine with Trinidad in a unitary state. This was no longer even a possible development in the short-term, although in the longer-term some association between Trinidad and a Federation of the Eight could not be ruled out. Trinidad was at present deeply divided on racial lines with all the likelihood of political conflict which that involved; although potentially a wealthy country her economy was at present in a shaky condition and she would certainly demand a high price for any agreement to assume responsibility for any of the smaller islands; finally, the personality of the Prime Minister of Trinidad was not such as to encourage the smaller islands to put themselves under his control.

If it were agreed that the best course of action in present circumstances would be for the Government to submit alternative proposals for a Federation of the Eight, it would be desirable to obtain as much advance publicity for them as possible. Although the local politicians in the smaller islands could be relied on to object strongly to measures which would necessarily involve a large diminution of their present powers, there would be likely to be considerable public support elsewhere for precisely such a development; the absurdity of maintaining the full apparatus of Ministerial Government in these small islands was widely recognised.

In discussion it was generally agreed that the course proposed by the Colonial Secretary was the best which could be devised in present circumstances; economic
issues were clearly of great importance and would need to be further discussed between the Treasury and the Colonial Office, particularly since the Eight would be likely to demand a greater measure of economic aid as the price of agreeing to proposals other than their own. It would also be necessary to make every effort to persuade the United States Government to support our initiative and to increase the level of her economic aid to the territories concerned.¹

¹ Although Mr Maudling announced on 16 Apr 1962 that a federation of Barbados, the Leewards and Windwards seemed to offer the best solution to the problems of the area, and its establishment was recommended by a conference of the representatives of the eight governments in London in May 1962, such a federation never emerged.

289  CO 1036/413, nos 1 & 2  10 Mar 1958
[Seychelles: long-term future and constitutional development]: letter from Mr J K R Thorpe (Seychelles) to Sir J Macpherson (CO).

Minutes by J H Robertson¹

Please refer to your Secret and Personal demi-official letter 3rd January, 1958, enclosing copies of three reviews connected with constitutional development in the Colonies.²

While we receive honourable mention as being, up to 1956, one of the small band of eight stalwarts who received no assistance of any kind (apart from C.D. and W.), the papers certainly bring home to one in a depressingly frank fashion the supreme unimportance of Seychelles in the imperial future! I had rather hoped that with the closing down of the East Indies Naval Station and other general defence re-appraisals we might have qualified for some increasing degree of strategic importance.

While I agree on the whole with the statement made under A (4) on page 68³ of “Future Constitutional Development in the Colonies”, I doubt the accuracy of the remark that “in general, Seychelles are African rather than Indian in atmosphere and outlook”. The atmosphere is definitely not Indian, and unless large scale Indian immigration were permitted there would certainly be no tendency to look towards India for a future link-up. Indian or an Indianised Mauritius would not take over with the consent of the people, but it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that they would do so by economic or physical force. On the other hand I doubt if the atmosphere and outlook can validly be deemed African. The majority of the people are of African descent, but I doubt if the outlook is any more African than, say, the West Indian outlook. Indeed, if I were asked to describe the situation in a few words I think I might say “the atmosphere is West Indian and the outlook (notwithstanding traditional French influence) is British”. I agree that our thoughts here turn eastwards to Africa rather than westwards to India as regards the future. It is on this peg that I would like to hang a few thoughts on our future political and economic development, and I trust I may be forgiven if this is not entirely the correct context in which to place them.

¹ A principal in CO, son of Sir J Robertson, sometime governor of Nigeria.
² See especially document no 2 above.
³ Not printed in document no 2.
While our internal constitutional development will doubtless follow the lines of the small West Indian Islands—probably at greater expense to H.M.G., and in an even more frustrating way to the people concerned, unless some new substantial enterprise alters the financial picture—the question still remains, what then? I would doubt if by any sort of modern standards the territory could be an economically viable entity. Before many years pass the pressure of population will be terrific. Federation à la West Indies, or integration à la Malta are scarcely feasible. The only possible line seems to be some form of closer association with East Africa.

This being the case it seems to me to be none too early to divert some thought to the question of what sort of association might be acceptable and practical. Where such small numbers are involved, East Africa as a whole should, without too much difficulty, be able to absorb enough Seychellois to keep the population here down to reasonable limits. It should also be able to supply such higher technical and administrative skills and know-how as may be required in the Government service and by private and public enterprise in Seychelles. It is more difficult to see what contribution Seychelles could make as a quid pro quo. Our market is likely to be too small to make a customs union attractive to East Africa. We might undertake to supply their needs in copra, if in fact they will not become self-supporting in this commodity. Complete “freedom of movement” would probably be objected to in East Africa, and might well result in swamping rather than depopulating Seychelles.

These, I am afraid, are little more than some random and undigested thoughts, but I hope to lick them into some kind of form before long. If one could get some idea of how the future might be shaped it would then be possible to work in at least the right direction. Our educational policy, for example, could be directed towards fitting out our citizens in the way which seemed most likely to be profitable to them.

Minutes on 289

Mr. Profumo will have seen from the other briefs on Seychelles that there is very much to be done in every aspect of internal development in the Colony before the question of its long-term future can sensibly be discussed at all. Economic, social and political development is still at a very early stage and indeed the question of any change in status for the Colony has not yet been raised locally or in the United Kingdom. Apart from this, the small population (about 40,000) of the Colony, its scattered nature and its isolation will inevitably put serious obstacles in the way of any proposal to change its present status, which is that of complete and direct dependence on Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

The strategic importance of Seychelles is almost entirely of a negative character in that although we would not wish anybody else to use the Islands for strategic purposes, we do not at present wish to use them for these purposes ourselves. Coetivy, one of the smaller Seychelles islands, was at one point considered as a possible alternative to Gan in the Maldives as an R.A.F. staging post but the Air Ministry now appear to have lost interest in this idea.

In order to develop the internal economy of Seychelles we must find some way of reducing its present isolation. It is to this end that determined efforts are now being made to improve the Seychelles' external communications in the form of shipping and possibly air services. In addition to the actual improvement of these services,
however, it is important that connections in every field between Seychelles and the East African mainland (which will always be Seychelles’ chief contact with the big world outside) should be strengthened. There are a number of ways in which this is already being done and in which the process can be stepped up. Seychelles is, for example, a member of the East African Tourist Travel Association and participates in the East African Meteorological service. The proposal has recently been put forward that the interests of Seychelles in the United Kingdom should be looked after by the East African Commissioner and his office. It may be possible to arrange for more frequent visits to Seychelles by senior East African technical staff when shipping services to the Colony have been improved.

Although it must continue to be our aim to strengthen wherever possible Seychelles connections with East Africa, it is far too early to say whether eventually it will be possible to associate the Colony politically and constitutionally more closely with any one or all of the East African territories. If Mr. Profumo is questioned when he is in Seychelles about Her Majesty’s Government’s ideas for the ultimate status of the Colony (which is, incidentally, very unlikely) it is suggested that he should reply that there is a very great deal to be done to develop Seychelles’ internal economy and its political and social institutions before any change in its present status can be envisaged.

In so far as we have been able to give any thought to the long-term future of the Seychelles we have always assumed that it would be in our best interest and in the best interest of the inhabitants if it were possible eventually to link it more closely than at present with East Africa. Such a closer link would always have been difficult to achieve in any way that would have made a practical difference to the administration or indeed the economy of the Island. Recent events in East Africa itself, in Aden and in the Maldives have prompted me to wonder whether we should continue even to aim at linking Seychelles more closely with East Africa.

2. In spite of the optimism which the Aden Government, the Colonial Office and the Service Departments have (rightly, if our present policy is to have any chance of success) about the future of Aden, in spite of the similar optimism which the C.R.O. and the Service Departments no doubt have about our future ability to use the airfield at Gan in the Maldives without let or hindrance by the local inhabitants, and in spite of our hopes that Kenya would grow into a multi-racial community with strong and stable links with the U.K., there must inevitably be some doubt whether we can really bet safely on being able to make use of all these places for military purposes for more than a limited number of years. In these circumstances it might be felt wise for H.M.G. to decide now before it is too late that the link between Seychelles and the U.K. must be kept as direct as possible and that the potentialities of the Seychelles as a military base, particularly for the R.A.F. and the Navy, should be safeguarded in case our other military installations in the North-west Indian Ocean area should ever cease to be available to us. Such a decision would obviously involve our making a determined effort at the cost if necessary of several million pounds to ensure that the loyalties of the people of the Seychelles were bound as closely as possible with the U.K. This would mean in the first instance that we should have to make a really big effort with economic development over the next few years in order
to remove the social and political discontent which appears sooner or later in every
under-developed society and which is just beginning to show its head in the
Seychelles.

3. I know that the possibility has been considered before by the Air Ministry of
building a staging post in the Seychelles and that the decision was made not to
proceed with that project, at least for the present. My present enquiry is, however, on
the more general subject of whether or not in view of the changing loyalties of the
peoples who live on the coasts of the Indian Ocean, and apparently in the Maldives
too, we should do what we can to make sure that in the Seychelles at least we would
be able, if the need arose, to site and use military, naval and air installations.

4. We are in any event hoping that the next five years will show an
unprecedented rate of development in the Seychelles. If we knew that the Colony was
regarded as being potentially of strategic importance in the long term we might be
able to make an even bigger development effort than we at present contemplate.

5. We shall shortly be considering specific proposals for economic development
in the Seychelles. . . .

J.H.R.
29.1.59

290 CO 926/769 1 June 1960
[Gibraltar: constitutional forward thinking]: minute by N B J
Huijsman (CO)

...2. The latest constitutional changes were introduced last year, and their import
is set out at (108). Since then the measure of financial devolution requested by
Gibraltar has been conceded and Mr Hudson will be going out to the Colony in July
to examine the relations between the Colonial Govt and the City Council. Gibraltar is
now, roughly speaking, at the dividing line between gubernatorial and ministerial
government.

3. The present constitution is working satisfactorily and the way is clear to
consider what the ultimate goal for the Colony should be. . . . [l]n so far as the
possibility of devising a general pattern of constitutional development, into which
Gibraltar could be fitted, is concerned it looks as if some time is likely to elapse
before any clear recommendations emerge from the intra-Commonwealth
examination that has started. It seems to me therefore, that Gibraltar’s ultimate
status will for the time being have to be worked out on the basis of the Gibraltarians’
own wishes and the realities of the situation.

4. It is fairly clear that the politically-minded Gibraltarians are aiming at an
advanced form of responsible government led by local Ministers. The realities (apart
from the political maturity of the Gibraltarians) of which account must be taken
are—HMG’s defence interest in the Colony, Gibraltar’s economic position, and
Spain. HMG’s defence interest in Gibraltar is even more pervasive than it is in Malta.
Gibraltar is also far more dependent on Service expenditure for its economic well-
being than Malta. With the possible exception of tourism there is no economic
alternative to the Forces. Were the latter to withdraw from Malta it might still be
feasible to keep the Maltese economy afloat by diversification of the economy; it does not look as if a similar possibility exists in Gibraltar.

5. A further factor to be taken into account is Spain. Ever since the Rock was transferred to UK possession by the Treaty of Utrecht [1713] it has been Spanish policy to secure retrocession. The policy has at times not been pressed—when Spanish governments were weak—but of recent years it has been reasserted more vigorously. The more tenuous the connection between the UK and the Colony, the more the Spaniards are likely to assert their claims against the latter.

6. On balance it looks as if UK and local interests coincide in aiming at a retention of UK sovereignty over the Rock. UK sovereignty would make the retention of a base at Gibraltar more attractive, would enable Gibraltar to rely upon the UK as a source of financial assistance, and would provide a measure of protection against Spanish claims.

7. Given the retention of UK sovereignty, how far could one go towards granting the Gibraltarians responsible government, and what would be the most useful constitutional framework into which to fit it? On present form I should have thought that one could go pretty far along the road towards responsible government without endangering UK interests. Apart from one storm in a teacup Gibraltar’s advance has been uneventful and the local elected Members have demonstrated responsibility and some political finesse. They have looked well after the Colony’s finances and the pressures exerted at different times by the Spaniards have kept them aware of the larger world outside the Colony, which has been helpful in broadening their outlook. There appears to be genuine goodwill towards the UK and there is adequate local experience of dealing with the Services on a friendly basis. Gibraltar therefore looks to be an instance of a territory where one could not only restrict the reserved subjects to a minimum, but where one could also go a long way towards limiting the UK Parl’s ultimate authority to legislate on local matters. The reservation of defence and external affairs, and the retention of an emergency power to intervene in or to take over the administration would appear to be adequate. As for the rest, I should have thought that the UK Parliament need ultimately only retain power to legislate in respect of the reserved subjects, internal security and finance.

8. As far as the ultimate constl set-up is concerned, there seems to be no particular reason to depart from the pattern of unitary govt established by the 1950 constitution. The Colony is minute, with a total population of about 25,000, and no particular purpose would be served by having in Gibraltar the type of dyarchical rule envisaged in the ‘Commonwealth State’ proposals. I should have thought that it would be acceptable locally to have the reserved subjects and powers vested in the Gov., provided Gibraltar ceases to be a Service governorship.

? Set our sights as above.

291  CO 1024/326, no 15 6 July 1960

[Constitutional change in St Helena: Advisory Council]: CO telegram (no 117) to St Helena. Minutes by C G Eastwood, Sir H Poynton and Lord Perth (CO)

[With the encouragement of a visiting Labour MP, Mr Cledwyn Hughes, a trade union, the St Helena General Workers’ Union, was founded in 1958, with Fred Ward as the
Advisory Council. I have now had an opportunity to consider this further in consultation with the Governor, and have reached the following conclusion.

2. The principle of including elected members in the Council has been accepted for some time; it is also accepted that there should be two ex-officio members, Government Secretary and Treasurer, and that it is clearly desirable that other officials could be called in as and when required by the business under discussion, to give technical advice and information. The outstanding question is whether to include non-elected unofficials. I understand that, while there is a considerable body of informed opinion which favours this course, there is opposition to it on ground that Council should be wholly representative if it is to have the confidence of the electorate. This objection however appears to me to overlook the need to ensure that Council is effective means of providing Governor with advice which will be required in reaching decisions affecting the welfare of the island. Experience elsewhere has shown that very useful advice is obtainable from persons who either may not wish to stand for election for personal reasons or who may be less popular than those who would be elected; normal practice elsewhere has therefore been to retain services of nominated unofficial members when elected members are first introduced. Moreover in St. Helena at present it is likely that in a wholly elected Council there would be no representation of any minority opinion.

3. I have carefully considered whether circumstances in St. Helena would justify a departure from the usual practice. I must however say in all frankness that I do not think they do and I believe that the best chance of making the new Advisory Council a success lies in accepting need at this stage for inclusion of nominated unofficial members. This would not of course prejudice possibility that in the future, when elective system has established itself and proved successful, consideration would be given to the abolition of nominated members; indeed it is intended to work towards that end.

4. I am therefore prepared to make arrangements for creation of Advisory Council consisting of two ex-oficio, eight elected, two nominated officials and four nominated unofficial members; if electoral districts are not increased to provide separate representation for Half Tree Hollow and Levelwood, total of elected members including two for Jamestown would be six and there would be two
nominated unofficial members. I am not at this stage prepared to dispense with nominated members and if there should not be sufficient local acceptance of my proposal only alternative is to continue for the time being on the present basis. In the latter case the number of Advisory Councillors might be raised from nine to ten within the existing Royal Instructions, and I hope that after dissolution and selection by you of district and friendly society representatives the General Workers Union would co-operate in the selection of as many Union members for some or all of the remaining three seats as you might think it advisable to nominate, after considering extent of representation achieved by Union through districts and friendly societies. In this case also the District Associations might be willing to hold meetings of residents including non-members to decide whom to recommend as district representatives.

5. I should be glad if in Governor’s absence you would conduct further discussion with interested persons and let me know which of above two alternatives appears to be acceptable. I must make it clear that since Union has been main protagonist of change I would not propose to introduce first alternative unless I were assured they were prepared to give new system a chance. It would clearly not be worth effort to establish new machinery if it were to be frustrated at the start by non-co-operation of substantial organised element of the community.

6. You will note that with the consent of the Governor I have not insisted on a non-elected majority in the Council if its constitution is revised.

7. In discussion you should state my views as in the foregoing, omitting paragraph 5 which is for your information.

Cost of telegram £20. 16s. 0d.

Minutes on 291

Sir Hilton Poynton

You have not, I think, come as yet into this tiresome business of the proposed constitutional changes in St. Helena.

The existing Advisory Council (N.B. it is purely advisory) is somewhat unsatisfactorily constituted. It was due to be dissolved in August last year and the proposal was that it should be reconstituted with some provision for properly elected members. Mr. Ward, the very strong-minded secretary and organiser of the General Workers Union, was not prepared to accept anything less than a wholly elected body (apart from two ex-officio members) and the Governor could not persuade his Executive Council to take any contrary view. With a great deal of reluctance, therefore, we eventually acquiesced in a Council with 8 elected members and 2 ex-officios. (The life of the existing body had to be continued for a year and it now expires in August this year).

When, however, this proposal was put by the Governor to his Executive Council just before he came on leave they had plucked up sufficient courage to say that they disliked this idea very much indeed. It is satisfactory that they should at last have had the guts to formulate a view of their own. Strengthened by this the Governor, with whom we have discussed matters, now advises that the Secretary of State should insist on the inclusion of 4 nominated members and if it seems that this is going to arouse a great deal of local controversy then they will jolly well have to stick to the existing constitution of the Council.
A slightly complicating factor is that the number of elected members may be reduced to 6 if 2 new constituencies are not created; in that case there will be only 2 nominated unofficial members.

I agree with the attached draft telegram, with which the Governor agrees, and recommend it for the Secretary of State's approval.

I would however recommend that the Secretary of State should first have a short talk with Sir Robert Alford. He has not yet met him and he ought to make his acquaintance. His three years appointment expires early next year but it is proposed that he should carry on for about another year. There are separate papers about this.

C.G.E.
24.6.60

I think this represents about as good as we can do given that local public opinion is as it is.

A.H.P.
27.6.60

We only agreed to the proposal at 8—no nominated members—with great reluctance because we were advised by the Governor that there was no alternative. Now the Executive Council has shown 'guts' the whole position is changed and we can revert to what we always wanted.

I therefore agree the procedure proposed in the draft telegram which means we may face trouble but have local support & do not have to capitulate to Mr Ward.

The 'Advisory Council' is in fact a good deal more than advisory.

P.
27.6.60.

292  CO 1036/612, no 58  12 July 1961
[Fiji: a formula for pace of constitutional advance]: minute by Sir H
Poynton (CO)

The Governor of Fiji\(^1\) is asking for a formula which will reassure the Fijians in Fiji that they will not be forced to go faster than they wish towards internal self-government or independence. The formula already used for this purpose in paragraph 3 of (19) reads:—

"There is no intention of forcing the pace of constitutional advance in Fiji and H.M.G. will only decide on any major changes after full consultation with representatives of the various communities in the Colony".

I gather that the Governor does not think this goes far enough and indeed as Mr. Hall says in his minute of the 5th July what the Fijians really want is to be able to veto indefinitely changes which they do not like.

One can do a great deal by clever draftsmanship but there are some points of principle that cannot be “fluffed” by draftsmanship. This question of “imposed

\(^1\) Sir K Maddocks, since 1958, formerly deputy and acting governor, Northern Nigeria, 1956–1958.
constitutions” versus changes made by consent is a common feature of almost all our recent constitutional discussions. The doctrine of consent is an admirable one if you can get consent; but if you cannot then the Secretary of State cannot escape the responsibility for taking a decision. To give one community in a colony a power of veto over constitutional changes even when that community is the indigenous race in a multi racial community, is tantamount to an abdication by the Secretary of State of his responsibility to Parliament for the orderly constitutional development of the territory. The point of principle is just the same whether we are talking about the Fijians in Fiji, the Dominion Party in Rhodesia or the late Group Captain Briggs in Kenya.

I conclude therefore that it is impossible by any feat of draftsmanship to give the Fijians (and therefore the Governor) a formula that will satisfy them. That being so I would far rather stand on the formula already used in (19) which was approved by Mr. Fraser, than to start glossing it by new variants such as that suggested in Mr. Hall’s minute of the 10th July at ‘A’. And indeed if the Governor doesn’t think that even this will go far enough to reassure the Fijians I see no purpose at all in putting it forward. I recommend that we should tell the Governor quite candidly that it is not possible to go beyond the formula already approved in (19) [tel to gov, 18 Nov 1960].

2 Mr Fraser, after talking with the governor, felt they should say they hoped to give some measure of increased responsibility to unofficial members as soon as they were ready to accept it, though the timing would take into account the need to safeguard legitimate Fijian interests. Poynton commented: ‘If Ministers feel that we must go beyond the formula used in (19) . . . [I think this] is as good as we can get & I would not wish to oppose it. 13.7.61’.

293 DO 161/53, nos 49 & 64 15 & 19 Sept 1961
[British Guiana: constitutional development and American anxieties]: minutes by Mr Macleod to Mr Sandys & Mr Macmillan (PM(61)72)

[The British Guiana constitution was suspended in 1953 after less than six months, to prevent ‘the subversion of government’ by the majority party, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), led by Dr Cheddi Jagan and appealing mainly to the Indian community (D Goldsworthy, ed. The Conservative government and the end of empire, 1951–1957 (BDEEP), part II, nos 336 (Cabinet memo) and 337, Cabinet conclusions). After the PPP gained a majority in the elections of 1957, a closely supervised return to partly elected government was allowed. Jagan was gradually re-introduced into political society, and Jaganite ministers were thought on the whole to have been reasonably responsible, so that by Mar 1960 Macleod was prepared to regard Guiana as having ‘purged its offence’ (PREM 11/3666, minute to Macmillan, 7 Mar 1960). At a Lancaster House conference, the majority of delegates pressed hard for independence within the Commonwealth. The Cabinet decided there was no question of that for the near future, but backed a degree of constitutional advance leading to full internal self-government in Aug 1961, with independence following in two or three years (CAB 128/34, CC 15(60)7, 8 Mar 1960).

Jagan was a self-styled Marxist. His American-born wife Janet had been a member of the Young Communist League in Chicago. It was hardly proven that either were ‘proper’ communists or that communist bloc countries (or Castro) were much interested in them; but they undoubtedly had communist and fellow-travelling contacts outside Guiana. Opposition parties, such as Burnham’s People’s National Congress and D’Aguiar’s United Force Party, were unsympathetic to the communist leanings of the PPP leadership. Elections in August 1961 were again won by the PPP (DO 161/53, no 16, CO briefings, 1961).]
In your minute of the 31st August you asked me to let you have some ideas about the future constitutional development of British Guiana. Our basic policy is stated in the following paragraphs. You will however recognise that the fulfilment of this policy may be affected, in timing at any rate, by the degree of co-operation shown by the new British Guiana Government and by external pressures including that from the Americans, who are anxious lest Castroism, if not communism, should take root in an independent Guiana. We shall need a little time to gauge the weight of such factors.

2. At the British Guiana Constitutional Conference held at Lancaster House in March 1960 (Cmnd. 998) the constitutional future of British Guiana was provided for in two stages. A new internal self-governing constitution was to be established in time for the August 1961 elections: independence was conceded in principle but there was to be a waiting period of two years from the August elections after which the local legislature could call on me to summon a conference “to consider when it would be practicable” to implement the promise of independence. If independence were meanwhile granted to The West Indies Federation this waiting period would be reduced to one year. The British Guiana general elections have just been held and the new Government under Dr. Jagan is expected to take office under the internal self-governing constitution within the next few days. One of the first acts of the new Government is expected to be an approach for “immediate independence” and in this it is expected to have the support of the principal opposition party. I doubt if immediate independence is either practicable or desirable but the Lancaster House formula may be difficult to adhere to and the result may be a compromise that the Colony may have its independence in 1962. I should not however wish it to be earlier than the date on which the Federation of The West Indies is to have its independence, which is the 31st May, 1962.

3. According to public pronouncements, there is no question but that Dr. Jagan seeks to lead British Guiana to independence within the Commonwealth. The first request of the British Guiana legislature in June 1958 was for full self-government within the Commonwealth and this was reiterated by Dr. Jagan as leader of the British Guiana delegation at the Lancaster House Conference in March 1960. It would be wrong however to present this as a point of policy on which Dr. Jagan and his party have nailed their colours to the mast. My expectation is that they will in fact seek independence within the Commonwealth if their path to it is made congenial; but, if otherwise, they may be inclined to break away.

4. British Guiana is not strategically placed, nor has it any corner in strategic products. With only about half a million population its present importance in world affairs turns on the question whether, given its independence under a leader who if probably not a Communist in the real sense, is a theoretical Marxist, it might become a potential pawn of Castroism, if not communism, in the Western hemisphere. Our policy is of course to steer it clear of this. We will have to work closely with the Americans in all this, and I am in fact seeing the Ambassador and some representatives of the State Department this week.

---

1 Sandys minuted: ‘I assume that the acceptance of British Guiana as a member of the Commonwealth cannot be taken for granted. I am not at all sure that she would be an asset to us? . . . D.S. 7.9.61.’
(2) 19 Sept 1961
On the initiative of Dean Rusk2 an official American team was over here all last week to discuss the situation in British Guiana following the return of Jagan and his People’s Progressive Party at last month’s elections. The Ambassador came to see me twice during the week but, that apart, the discussions were with my officials and representatives of the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office.

2. As you know, the Americans have shown great anxiety about the way things are going in British Guiana. They are afraid that after independence (which under present arrangements should come around mid-1963 but could come sooner)—or even earlier—we shall see the emergence of a Communist or Castro type Government. We have done our best over a longish period to impress upon them that, while we too are much concerned with trends in British Guiana, we are not justified on the evidence in writing off the P.P.P. leaders as lost to the West; and that our best hope of deterring them from turning to the East is for the West to show them a friendly face and be prepared to offer economic aid towards the ambitious programmes which Jagan will put forward.

3. The Americans have clearly been doing a lot of hard thinking and their team came over with a carefully worked out programme to put to us. Briefly it can be summed up as a policy of cooperation with and economic help to Jagan but with “safeguards” in case what they regard as a gamble does not come off.

4. On the positive side they are prepared to show a friendly attitude, arrange for Jagan to meet the President when in the United States, and send an I.C.A.3 representative to Georgetown to discuss an Economic Aid programme up to $U.S. 5 m. in 1962. All this represents a big advance in their thinking and is wholly to be welcomed. They also propose to step up their Information Services. This is acceptable and could be useful provided it is circumspectly done.

5. On the “negative” side they have pressed us to agree to stretch the period up to independence for as long as possible, to insist on new elections before independence, and to use the powers which we have retained to suspend the constitution by Order-in-Council to prevent the establishment of a “communist or Castro type” regime. We have explained to them the limitations under which we operate at this advanced constitutional stage in British Guiana and the difficulties attached to these propositions, and they understand our position. We have agreed to keep in touch with them on all these matters as things develop. . . .

7. It is not our normal policy to allow covert activity in a British dependency. In cases where we have agreed to C.I.A. representatives, their appointments have been made known to the Governments concerned who have accepted them as a valuable addition to their own Special Branches and the U.K. Security Liaison Officers with both of whom the C.I.A. representatives liaise. In British Guiana, however, the appointment of a C.I.A. representative could not in the circumstances be made known to Jagan. Moreover, if it became known through an indiscretion that the United States were operating a secret intelligence source Jagan would assume that we had agreed to it. Our capacity through the Governor to influence Jagan for the

---

2 Secretary of state in Kennedy administration.
3 International Cooperation Administration (USA).
4 Para 6, approximately ten lines long, removed from PRO copy under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act (1958).
good would then be prejudiced if not destroyed, and with it our ability to steer things along a reasonable course up to independence.

8. On the other hand, the circumstances of British Guiana are very special. There can clearly be no question of introducing there at present (though maybe it could become possible later) the usual type of acknowledged C.I.A. representative since Jagan would not agree to it; there is a real danger of trends there developing into an alignment with the Eastern bloc; and the Americans naturally have a special interest in the country as being on the American continent. They have made it clear that their new programme must be considered as an integrated whole and that its positive aspects of political friendliness and economic aid will only be implemented subject to our acceptance of their covert proposal. I am satisfied that they are not bluffing in this. They have too many difficulties in Washington with Congressional opinion to be able to give aid to a country with British Guiana’s reputation without being able to satisfy themselves that they are at the same time taking precautions. It would be a great misfortune if now that after much heart-searching they have resolved upon a positive approach, they were to revert to the negative and unhelpful attitude from which we have helped to wean them. I should add that they have made it much easier for us to accept their proposals by having agreed that their representation in British Guiana would be governed by the provisions which govern C.I.A. representation in other dependencies, save only that the appointment would be covert. This would give us “controls” in regard to the appointment of individuals and their activities which our own Security Services consider satisfactory and reduce to a minimum the risk of embarrassment to us or the Governor…5

5 The remainder of the document removed from PRO copy under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act (1958).
1962 and on this basis, allowing for the necessary legal and other preparations, independence could take effect by mid-1963 or a little earlier.

2. Both houses of the local Legislature recently adopted a Resolution asking me to fix a date during 1962 for independence and Dr. Jagan in the course of discussions I had with him on the 13th December has pressed me to implement the Resolution. Publicly he has expressed the desire that British Guiana should attain its independence on the 31st May next.

3. The main argument for adhering to the formula is that we are under certain obligations to the Americans, who take a great interest in the affairs of British Guiana. In their eyes, the problem is of tremendous importance and in view of hostile public and congressional opinion towards any softening by the U.S. Government towards a "communist" country, it is a hypersensitive spot for the Administration. What happens in British Guiana is, therefore, not merely a matter of British colonial policy, but has a bearing on general Anglo/U.S. relations.

4. Shortly after the introduction of the present British Guiana constitution, an informal U.K./U.S. Working Party of officials reviewed the situation in the Colony and worked out an agreed approach to its problems. The U.S. representatives expressed the hope that the period prior to independence could be prolonged and that arrangements for another election as one of the steps towards independence could be made. In their view a longer period of internal self-government would provide needed additional time to show Dr. Jagan that the West meant well by him, and would also provide a better opportunity to evaluate the results of working with him. It was impressed on the Americans that developments in the Colony would have to be judged in the light of circumstances, and it was agreed with them that there should be further consultations as the situation developed. The report of the Working Party, which has been endorsed by Foreign Secretary, Commonwealth Secretary, and by me, set out *inter alia* that the United Kingdom would "endeavour to adhere to the London formula which would provide for a conference on British Guiana independence not earlier than August, 1962".

5. Although there is no firm commitment to the U.S.A. to adhere to the formula, there is a strong moral obligation to do our best to do so, and there is a clear obligation to consult with the U.S. authorities. To depart from the formula so shortly after the Anglo/U.S. discussions and so soon after the Americans have begun (however haltingly) to carry out their side of the bargain by inviting Dr. Jagan to meet the President and discussing future aid, would be contrary to the spirit of our many mutual dealings over British Guiana.

6. A subsidiary point is that the more time we have to settle the future relation of an independent British Guiana with the Commonwealth the better. Moreover, the Government of British Guiana so far have declined to agree to satisfactory compensation terms for certain categories of overseas officers for whom I have a special responsibility.

7. **Argument for departing from the formula.** On the other hand I can see good reasons for moving more quickly to independence.

(a) The Legislature has passed the independence resolution referred to above by a very substantial majority. Both Dr. Jagan's party and the main opposition party, which together polled some 85% of the votes cast at the August elections, supported it.
(b) We have no strategic or economic reasons for delaying independence. Nor is the internal situation such as to provide a cogent argument for the retention of U.K. sovereignty in the interests of preventing communal disturbances.

c) We should gain nothing politically from delaying; in fact to do so would be more likely to lead to souring relations between H.M.G. and Dr. Jagan’s Government.

d) Economically, so long as British Guiana remains under British sovereignty the tendency in the U.S. and elsewhere seems likely to be to regard this country as primarily responsible for aid to British Guiana. The aid is sought on a scale which is beyond U.K. resources, having regard to our other commitments. The sooner British Guiana is put in a position in which she can in her own right tap other sources of financial assistance, and in which the Americans have to recognise that British Guiana is more vital to their interests than ours, the better.

8. The Governor’s considered advice is that we should accelerate the pace towards independence. The representative of the Security Services in the West Indies is of like view. Having regard to the circumstances in British Guiana and to the advice which I have received, I am of the opinion that there would be no real advantage in refusing to agree to an earlier date for British Guiana’s independence. It seems to me that the best course to follow, taking into account my other commitments, would be for the independence conference to be held in May of next year (i.e., about three months sooner than the earliest date possible under the Lancaster House formula), and that we should be prepared to grant independence by the end of 1962 if, as I hope, this leaves time for the necessary legal drafting. I should be grateful for my colleagues’ agreement to this proposal.

9. While I should like to inform Dr. Jagan of the above as soon as possible, it is clear I cannot do so until we have consulted the Americans and, if possible, carried them with us. I hope to start consultations with the Americans soon, and if it appears clear that my proposal will create difficulties with them, I shall, of course, consult with my colleagues again. Otherwise, if the Americans accept our views, I propose to inform Dr. Jagan that I should be pleased to call a Conference in May, 1962 to discuss independence, but I may have to make it a condition that before the Conference is held the Government of British Guiana have agreed satisfactory compensation terms for certain categories of overseas officers for whom I have a special responsibility.

295 PREM 11/3666 26 Feb 1962

[British Guiana: policy differences with the Americans]: letter from Lord Home (FO) to Mr Dean Rusk (USA government). Minute by Mr Macmillan (M 51/62)

Thank you for your letter on British Guiana. From our past discussions we have known your pre-occupations and you have known the efforts which we have made despite setbacks to provide for the orderly development of this territory. We are studying what best to do now to discharge our responsibilities and when we have decided, we shall be glad to see in a more official way what can be done to concert our action and yours.
Meanwhile there are some general thoughts which I should like to put to you privately and with the same frankness with which you wrote. I do so not only because I think this is right between us, but because you have often shown in the conversations which the two of us have had, that you recognise the sustained efforts over long periods that we have made in our dependent territories to try to ensure that they have a reasonable chance of using and not abusing freedom when they get it. This must depend to a large extent on the progress of each different territory and its readiness to run its own affairs. But once this process has gone as far as it now has, there is bound to be an added risk over timing in the remaining dependent territories which are still either backward or have peculiar racial or other difficulties. This was inherent in the problem from the beginning.

Now it was your historic role to have been for long years the first crusader and the prime mover in urging colonial emancipation. The communists are now in the van. Why? Amongst other things because premature independence is a gift for them.

What I do not think possible is to beat them by cancelling the ticket for independence and particularly if this is only to be done in the single instance of British Guiana. You say that it is not possible for you “to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan” and that “Jagan should not accede to power again”. How would you suggest that this can be done in a democracy? And even if a device could be found, it would almost certainly be transparent and in such circumstances if democratic processes are to be allowed, it will be extremely hard to provide a reasonable prospect that any successor regime will be more stable and more mature.

So I would say to you that we cannot now go back on the course we have set ourselves of bringing these dependent territories to self-government. Nor is it any good deluding ourselves that we can now set aside a single territory such as British Guiana for some sort of special treatment.

This of course does not mean that we should not try to mitigate the dangers in British Guiana as elsewhere in the areas of the Americas and elsewhere. You will know our present concern over Kenya, the Federation and other territories in East Africa. I take comfort from your letter to think that you will be ready to understand and support us in solving these problems. I do not want to go into them further here.

But I should like to draw your attention to another territory in the area of the Americas, British Honduras. It will be difficult enough to provide for the future well-being of this territory. We now have in addition the President of Guatemala using language reminiscent of Hitler to press his claim. “The Guatemalans”, he said publicly on February 20, “would maintain their unshakeable determination to regain Belize.” As the present regime in Guatemala would hardly have come into being without your support in 1954 and since, I shall be asking you to use your good offices at the right time to prevent another possible misadventure on your doorstep.

Let us by all means try and do what is possible to prevent the communists and others from perverting our common aim of doing our best to assure a timely and orderly development of independence in the remaining dependent territories. But we must do this across the board and you will realise that while territories like British Guiana may be of special concern to you in your hemisphere, there are others of at least equal importance to us elsewhere.

---

1 See document no 435 in Part II.
Minute on 295

Foreign Secretary
I have just received a copy of a message to you from Mr. Rusk about British Guiana. I am bound to say I have read it with amazement. One or two phrases are incredible, for instance, “I must tell you now that I have reached the conclusion that it is not possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan” or “It seems to me clear that new elections should now be scheduled and I hope that we can agree that Jagan should not accede to power again”. I hope Sir Patrick Dean will be given these sentences.

How can the Americans continue to attack us in the United Nations on colonialism and then use expressions like these which are not colonialism but pure Machiavellianism. Of course, it is nice to feel that they are partners with us and have such confidence in you as to send you a letter of this kind but it does show a degree of cynicism which I would have thought Dean Rusk could hardly put his pen to. He, after all, is not an Irishman, nor a politician, nor a millionaire; he has the reputation of being an honourable and somewhat academic figure.²

H.M.
21.2.62

² The prime minister’s remarks no doubt strengthened Lord Home’s determination to address Dean Rusk plainly, but when they met in Geneva on 12 Mar 1962, Rusk said the President had wondered if Home’s letter was not a bit ‘sharp’ in tone; to which Home replied that Rusk could assure the President that frank and forceful writing was ‘the normal practice as between Oxford men’. Rusk said the Americans ‘were really terrified of another Cuba on their continent’. (Rusk had been at St John’s College, Oxford.)

For further documentation up to May 1966 when British Guiana became independent as Guyana, see Ashton & Killingray, eds, The West Indies (BDEEP).

296 CO 1036/775, no 8 19 June 1962 [Fiji: general observations on future of constitutional advance]: despatch (no 388) from Sir K Maddocks (Fiji) to Mr Maudling [Extract]

[This despatch—which the CO thought as depressing as it was important—began by analysing the ‘insurmountable obstacle’ to the introduction of local government: the fear of Fijians that any significant advance towards inter-racialism was a step towards Indian domination. The Europeans encouraged this view. Fijians adamantly opposed co-operation with Indians where they felt their fundamental interests were threatened. Fijian opposition had thus thwarted three attempts in sixteen years to start inter-racial rural local government.]

19. . . . [T]he Fijians regard the British Government as being committed to remaining in control of Fiji indefinitely to protect Fijian interests, or to handing over control in accordance with a constitution which will ensure the paramountcy of their interests. . . .

20. All I would say about these alternatives now is that they are both unattractive. For Fiji to continue indefinitely under British control is a disturbing prospect. The present constitution is suitable for conditions within Fiji only to the extent that it provides a modus vivendi between conflicting racial interests. The
modifications which are to be introduced next year, which include a greatly extended franchise and the increase in the number of members are designed to permit the introduction at an early date of a “member” system but until this is accepted the official majority is to be retained. Outside Fiji the constitution is likely to be increasingly subject to attack as being archaic. In its present form it leads to a racialistic and irresponsible approach by certain elected members of the Legislature, and makes it difficult to get controversial but necessary measures adopted. This latter defect impedes constructive government which is a serious disadvantage at a time when the problems here require forceful action if they are to be resolved. The alternative of handing the government of the country back to the Fijians sounds well as a rhetorical statement but appears somewhat unrealistic on examination. The Fijians show little sign of being able to accept the responsibility and it would lead to the peculiar position of the industrious and economically powerful majority being governed by the economically weak Fijians, most of whom live simply and under primitive conditions in the country. It is unlikely that the Indians would be prepared to accept this state of affairs.

21. I would mention, however, that the principle of Fijian paramountcy is supported by a number of senior Administrative Officers who have spent most of their service in Fiji and I feel that you should be aware of their views. They do not go so far as to say that Fiji should be “handed back” to the Fijians but they do maintain that to concede “paramountcy” to the Fijians is the only way in which the present deadlock can be broken without antagonising the Fijians to an extent which might be disastrous. They think, also, that there is a fair chance of the Indians accepting the principle, providing their own political status is improved in relation to that of the Europeans. What is visualised, in brief, is internal self-government on the basis of a Fijian racial majority on the Legislative and Executive Councils, with the Indians next in numbers, and the Europeans, combined with the other racial groups, coming last. The proposal is really a device to introduce greater flexibility into local affairs by forcing the local leaders to accept responsibility for government and, by doing so, overcome their racial prejudices. Although racial in conception, therefore, it might prove to be the best way of achieving inter-racialism. The proposal merits serious consideration, especially as more orthodox approaches appear unacceptable to the Fijians. My present view is that while the majority of the Indian community would be ready to accept it, Indian politicians and leaders of opinion would regard it as political suicide to do so. And I fear that even this solution would not make the Fijians any more enthusiastic about multi-racial local government. . . .

297  CAB 134/2370, OP(62)8  12 July 1962
[British Guiana: Commonwealth membership]: memorandum by Mr Maudling for Cabinet Oversea Policy Committee

I have had to postpone the British Guiana Independence Conference until after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting in September, as the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the disturbances in Georgetown in February last will not be available until mid-August. One of the items which the British Guiana
Government proposes for discussion at the Conference is the question of United Kingdom sponsorship of British Guiana's membership of the Commonwealth.

2. The policy of the British Guiana Government and of the Opposition parties is to seek membership of the Commonwealth. At the last Constitutional Conference in 1960 the British Guiana Delegation with one exception proposed, and the Conference accepted, the principle of independence within the Commonwealth for British Guiana. In October, last year, the territorial Legislature passed almost unanimously a Resolution requesting Her majesty's Government to grant independence within the Commonwealth this year. At the end of March, Dr. Jagan issued an official statement of his Government's intention to apply for membership of the Commonwealth. It is known that the British Guiana constitutional proposals for independence are being drawn up on the assumption that the territory will become a member of the Commonwealth. (The Constitutional proposals are, however, less dependent on this assumption than has been the case with most other countries since the local Government propose that British Guiana should become a Republic on independence).

3. The arguments against United Kingdom support may be summarised as follows:—

(a) the territory is small, has few natural resources, and has a population of less than 600,000;
(b) it will need substantial economic aid for many years to come;
(c) the main political parties are divided on racial lines and a bitter communal struggle between Africans and East Indians could develop;
(d) the leaders of Dr. Jagan's governing People's Progressive Party are widely believed to have communist leanings and associations and there is some foundation for this belief;
(e) an unstable political situation after independence could result in an embarrassing request for British troops.

4. As against that it should be pointed out that:—

(a) we have never yet failed to sponsor for membership any of our emerging territories which desired it;
(b) with the acceptance of Sierra Leone, Jamaica, Trinidad and Cyprus, it would be difficult to justify British Guiana's exclusion on grounds of size and lack of resources;
(c) to cold-shoulder British Guiana because of Dr. Jagan and his fellow-politicians would run counter to the argument that the Commonwealth is an association of peoples not governments, and would tend to drive British Guiana into the arms of Castro or Krushchev. (Communist influence is limited to a small group of Dr. Jagan's party and does not pervade even the party as a whole, let alone the general population; and my impression is that Dr. Jagan himself is an unpractical idealistic nationalist devoted to Marxist economics rather than a dedicated Communist).
(d) If British Guiana remains a member of the Commonwealth we may hope to have rather more success in encouraging her to turn to the West than to the Iron Curtain countries for the economic aid which she will undoubtedly continue to need for her development.
(e) There is a genuine attachment to the Crown and the Commonwealth among the great mass of the people of British Guiana.
(f) A refusal by the United Kingdom to support British Guiana would be likely to meet with resistance from many members of the Commonwealth and would in all probability be ineffective as Dr. Jagan could almost certainly rely on India or Ghana to sponsor his application if the United Kingdom did not do so.

(g) The Americans appear to attach great importance to keeping British Guiana within the Commonwealth.

5. I consider that the balance of advantage lies in our supporting British Guiana’s application for membership. On the general question of Commonwealth membership, in a recent discussion with some of my colleagues the view was taken that we might work towards a position in which any territory which sought membership on becoming independent would be accepted without question. In view of this and of the particular arguments set out above, I should therefore be glad to have my colleagues’ agreement to my informing the British Guiana Delegation at the Independence Conference that Her Majesty’s Government will be prepared to support an application by British Guiana for membership of the Commonwealth.

6. I do not consider that it would be necessary for me to indicate at the Conference what the attitude of the other Commonwealth Governments is likely to be; nevertheless it would be most helpful to my colleagues if, before the Conference opens, we could obtain some confidential indication of the likely reactions; and I would hope that it would be agreed to sound them now, or at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting, informally on the assumption that an official request would be forthcoming.

298 CAB 134/2371, OP 5(63)1 28 May 1963
[Situation in British Guiana]: minutes of Cabinet Oversea Policy Committee meeting

[No agreement could be reached by the deferred constitutional conference held in October 1962. Dr Jagan’s government proved unable to maintain order unaided.]

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (O.P. (63) 9) on the situation in British Guiana.

The Colonial Secretary said that after five weeks of total strike the economy of British Guiana was at a standstill and the country on the verge of collapse. If the strike came to an end Dr. Jagan’s Government might be able to maintain themselves in office without further disorder until August or September, but there would then be a crisis over rice stocks. Either in the near future or in a few months time the possibility of serious rioting would arise, and if the police lost control it would not be tolerable to use British troops for any length of time to keep Dr. Jagan in power.

In such a situation the best course might be to suspend the constitution and resume direct rule, which would then have to be continued for several years to enable the political and economic life of the colony to be restored. The cost would be considerable.

1 Mr D Sandys.
Before adopting this course it would be essential to obtain an assurance from the United States Government that they would provide the Colony with substantial economic aid, even though it was under direct British colonial rule. We would also need to be assured of the wholehearted support of the United States and Canadian Governments in the United Nations where Dr. Jagan had many supporters.

In order to make it possible to resume direct rule at very short notice, if the need should arise, certain precautionary steps should be taken now. The secret draft Order in Council which permitted the United Kingdom Government to take over the powers of government should be brought up to date; a one-clause Bill should be drafted to remove from the British Guiana Act, 1928, the provision that an Order in Council suspending the constitution must lie before Parliament for forty sitting days; additional staff should be selected and an additional battalion held in readiness to reinforce the garrison if necessary.

In discussion the following points were made:—

(a) The inter-racial difficulties in British Guiana, which had largely led to the present situation, had existed in other territories—notably Trinidad. In their case, however, these difficulties had not been held to produce [?prejudice] the early attainment of independence; indeed the responsibilities of independence had induced a greater sense of unity in the population. The sole reason for not having allowed British Guiana to proceed to independence had been the objections of the United States Government to such a course, and to their fear that Dr. Jagan would become a focus for Communist ambitions in Latin America.

(b) Nevertheless, it was by no means clear that we should be any longer justified in withholding independence from British Guiana to meet the wishes of the United States Government. The colony was of no value to us economically or strategically, and represented a continuing and substantial liability. The United Nations were pressing us to grant it independence, and to resume direct rule would expose us to heavy criticism, to the danger of revolution, to the deployment of troops which were needed elsewhere, and to heavy expenditure.

(c) The early grant of independence might, however, lead to a situation analogous to that which had occurred in the Congo, which would also expose us to criticism. The United States Government would have the power, as they had the major interest, to avert such a situation by providing economic aid, and by reactivating their military bases in British Guiana. They would, however, be unlikely to do either so long as we continued to shoulder both the responsibility and the cost of maintaining law and order. There would also be likely to be difficulty in persuading the United States Congress to grant economic aid to a British colony.

(d) In all the circumstances it would be right to inform the United States Government that we were no longer able or prepared to accept continuing responsibility for maintaining colonial rule in British Guiana, and that we now saw no practicable alternative, taking into account the probable development of events both in British Guiana and in the United Nations, to the early grant of independence to the Colony.

(e) Our course of action would then be reviewed in the light of the reply of the United States Government to a communication in this sense.
CAB 128/38, CM 3(63)3 31 Oct 1963

[British Guiana: imposed solution after conference failure]: Cabinet conclusions

The Colonial Secretary informed the Cabinet that the political parties at the British Guiana Conference under his chairmanship, having failed to reach agreement between themselves, had remitted the questions involved to his arbitration and had agreed to accept his decision. He might find it necessary to announce the Government's intentions that day.

The most critical of the problems at issue related to a reform of the electoral system in the Colony. Under the existing system the Government Party, led by the Prime Minister, Dr. Jagan, had achieved a majority of seats which was disproportionate to the votes cast in their favour. Since the lines of party division in British Guiana coincided with the lines of racial division, this situation had created acute discontent; and any solution to the problem must seek to compel candidates in future to win support from all the main racial elements of the population. For this purpose it would be advisable to introduce a system of proportional representation. This would entail some risk of a proliferation of small parties; and it might be necessary, after the first elections under the new system, to try to limit developments of this kind by establishing certain minimum qualifying conditions which any candidate must satisfy.

Dr. Jagan's reaction to a decision to introduce proportional representation was unpredictable. But, if his Government resigned in protest, a critical situation might develop and it might become necessary to reimpose direct rule of the Colony. For this purpose the executive powers of the Government would need to be transferred to the Governor by Order in Council; legislation would have to be enacted rapidly in the Parliament at Westminster in order to invest him with legislative authority; and he would need to be reinforced by the despatch of additional administrative personnel from the United Kingdom.

If local disturbances developed, they could probably be controlled by the police, with the assistance, if necessary, of the two battalions of United Kingdom troops already in the Colony. It was unlikely to be necessary to reinforce these troops at the outset; but the situation would need to be kept under review.

Since it was clearly desirable that the first elections on the basis of proportional representation should be conducted while we retained control of the Colony, the issue of independence would have to be deferred until those elections had taken place. In the meantime any additional financial assistance which the Colony might require would be made dependent on the local Government's accepting the normal degree of financial control by the United Kingdom.

The United States Government would endorse a policy on these lines; and we could rely on their support if it became necessary to defend our actions in the United Nations.

In discussion there was general agreement with these views.

The Cabinet:—

Approved the policy proposed by the Colonial Secretary in relation to British Guiana.1

1 In spite of renewed disturbances during 1964, the elections were duly held under the proportional representative system in Dec 1964, as a result of which, Mr L F S Burnham, leader of the People's National Congress, formed a coalition government with the United Force.
This is not a comprehensive index, but a simplified and straightforward index to document numbers, together with page references to the Introduction in part I, the latter being given at the beginning of the entry in lower-case roman numerals. It is designed to be used in conjunction with the summary lists and chapter headings of the preliminary pages to each volume-part. It provides a quick finding-aid to the leading British policy-advisers and decision-makers. As far as persons are concerned, only in the case of key figures (Macmillan, Home, Lennox-Boyd, Macleod and Sandys) are the entries subdivided by subject; a preceding asterisk indicates inclusion in the Biographical Notes at the end of part II. Where necessary (eg, in particularly long documents), and if possible, paragraph numbers are given inside round brackets. The following abbreviations are used:

- A – appendix or annex
- N – editor's link-note (before main text of document)
- n – footnote

Documents are divided between the volume-parts as follows:

- nos 1–299 part I
- nos 300–583 part II

Abdul Rahman, Tunku lviii–lix, lxvii, 260 n 1, 261, 263–271, 451 n 3, 453, 454, 457, 564
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 20 n 2, 45, 109, 330, 347, 382, 451 n 2, 452, 457, 458, 524, 564
Adair, A R 82
Adams, Sir Grantley lx–lxi, 35, 273 n 4, 280, 540 n 1
Aden lv–lvii, 2 (134–165), 3 (12), 41, 50, 77, 80, 127, 188–215, 430, 545A
Adoula, C 395 n 6, 399–403
Adun, A L 138 n 3
aid policy lx–lvii, 2 (124), 17 (IV, 17–20), 20, 39, 156, 308, 317, 327–333, 374, 382, 389
al-Asnaj, A lv, 210 n 2
Alford, Sir R 291 N
Allen, M E 89, 103, 331, 332, 561
Allen, Sir R 223
*Alport, Lord (C J M) 37, 82 n 2, 88, 91, 95 n 1, 103 n 1, 302, 323, 327, 343, 475, 479 n 2, 531, 536
*Amery, J xxvii–xxxix, xlix, lvii, 35 n 1, 141, 191, 193, 194, 199 n 4, 202, 237, 248, 263, 264, 274, 277, 278, 280, 281, 434 n 1
Anglo-American relations xxxvi, lxv–lxx, 2 (311, 334–336), 4 (9), 13, 17, 55, 57, 71, 75, 76, 79, 80, 293, 294, 331, 370, 374–391, 426, 427, 535 (91), 541
Angola 383, 413 (see also Portuguese empire)
ANZUS Pact 391, 543, 548
appeal courts lxix, 103, 533, 537
Arden-Clarke, Sir C xxxi, lii, lxvi, 486 n 2
Armstrong, W 319, 327
Ascension Island 391
associated status lxix–lxx, 46, 49, 561, 565, 566
Astley, B A 357
Australia xxxii–xlv, lxvi, lxvii, 9, 11, 63, 90, 372, 373, 417, 453, 540, 543, 554–560, 565
Awolowo, O 2 n 3, 100 n 1, 105
Ayub Khan, M 260 n 2, 453 n 2, 457, 459
Azikiwe, B N 2 n 2, 100 n 2, 105, 330
Baharoon (Bahruran), Z A 210 n 1
Baker, H C 433, 434, 565
Banda, Hastings xlv–lxv, lxvi, 23, 494 n 3, 496, 498, 505, 507–512, 521, 523
Banda, T D T 494 N
Bandaranaike, Mrs S  lxvii, lxvi, 453 n 4, 457
Bank of England  300, 442, 516
Barhamos  lx, 50
Barber, A  401 n 1
Barclay, C P R  387
Baring, Sir E  xxxix
Barotseland  505, 506
Basutoland  xl, lxvi, 477, 478, 488, 491 (see also High Commission Territories)
Bates, J D  565
Bayoomi (Bayyumi), H  197 n 1, 203, 210 n 1
* Bennett, J S  xxxi, xl, 353, 355, 358 N, 361
Bermuda  lxvii, lxix, 2 (337), 46, 47, 54, 374, 545 A, 565
Birch, N  302
Bishop, F A (Sir)  59, 326 n 1
Black, Sir R  259
Blackburne, Sir K  280 n 2
Blair, O R  90, 334, 556
Bligh, T J (Sir)  xxxvii–xl, 42, 91, 254 n 3, 266 N
Blood, Sir H  36 n 4, 129 N, 246 n 1, 248, 249
Blundell, Sir M  29 n 3, 116, 160 n 1, 161 N
Boothby, E B  382, 393
Borneo, North  2 (298), 41, 262, 268 N, 308, 367 A

Colonial Policy  xxxi–xxxii
Aden  190, 192, 196, 200, 201, 205
aid  325, 327, 328
Basutoland  477, 478
Cyprus  217, 218, 224–226, 228, 532
East Africa  116, 117, 120, 121, 127, 129, 144, 146, 153, 157, 169, 172
general policy  3, 23, 24, 36, 37
Guiana, British  294
Honduras, British  433
Somaliland  184, 186
West Africa  100, 101, 107
West Indies  286, 288
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill  582
Defence  lvii, 58, 62–64, 67, 69, 70, 198
Defence & Oversea Policy  49, 51, 74, 76, 80, 81, 211, 247, 251, 263, 264, 552, 553
Economic Policy  xxv, lxv, lxvi, 301, 302, 350, 352
GEN  6, 10, 321, 395, 407
Oversea Policy  xxxii, 297, 298
Cabinet minutes (conclusions) and memoranda
Aden  202, 206, 210
Cameroons  113–115
colonial policy, general  45
Commonwealth policy  45, 303, 368, 370, 372, 373, 536
Congolese  296, 400–403
Cyprus  216, 219–222, 227, 229, 230, 232, 234, 236, 238–240
defence policy  53, 60, 72
East Africa  lii, 118 (see also Kenya)
economic policy  303, 322, 338, 346, 348
Europe  362–364, 366–373
future policy planning  17
Gambia  112
Ghana  106
Guiana, British  299
immigration to UK  571, 572, 576–581, 583
India  528
Kenya  158, 159, 162, 168, 170, 171, 173–180
Malaya/Malaysia  265, 271
Maldives  60
Malta  242, 243, 249, 254, 255
Nigeria  102, 104, 105
Overseas Civil Service  86
prime minister’s African tour (1960)  33
Singapore  256
Somaliland  181, 185, 187
South Africa  33, 447, 460, 463–465, 467, 470, 472
Soviet Union  379
Uganda  134
United Nations  413, 422, 467, 470, 472
United States  378
West Indies  284

Cabinet committees (see also Chiefs of Staff)  xxv
Africa  xxxii, xxxvii, lxvi, lxvi, 19, 416
INDEX 817

Caccia, Sir H 47, 410
Cameroons 2 (12, 18), 22, 100 (20), 113–115
Campbell, Sir J 274 n 1
Canada lix, lxvi, lxix, lxiii–lxiv, lxviii, 11, 22, 58, 90, 281, 364, 372, 373, 378, 389, 416, 423, 529
Carrington, Lord 271, 555
Carstairs, C Y xxxvi, 15, 16, 358 N, 361, 420, 426, 427, 565 N, 566 n 1
Casey, R G (Lord) 550
Castle, Barbara xlv
Central African Federation xxxii, lxx, 3 (4), 20 (59), 22, 31, 35–37, 42, 94, 95, 391, 423, 492–527, 545 A
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) lxxiv, 90, 304, 453, 457, 533, 542, 543
Chadwick (G W St) J xli, lxxx, 82, 258, 331, 332, 334, 385, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549
Chaplin, A G F lxxvi, 488
Cheslady, Lady 141 n 2
Chiefs of Staff llix–l, 61, 114, 183, 220, 264, 334, 510
China xxxix, lxvi, lxix, lxxv, 2 (243), 17, 26, 32, 55, 61, 353, 382, 394, 415, 420, 423, 541
Chipembere, H B M 36 n 3, 495 n 2
Chirwa, O E C 495 n 3, 496
Chirwa, R W M 494 N
Chisiza D K 495 n 2
Chiume M W K 496 n 3
Christmas Island 541, 555, 558, 559 n 3, 561
Churchill, Sir W S 477, 539
Clark, W A W (Sir) 438
Clarke, R W B 12
Clutterbuck, Sir A xl, 34, 99, 130, 336, 438, 480
Clutton-Brock, A G xlv
Cobbold, Lord lxv, 263 N, 266 N, 442
*Cohen, A B (Sir) xxxiii, lxiv–lxv, lxxiv, lxxx, 92 N, 136 (33), 256, 382, 405 n 2, 406, 416, 428
cold war xxxvii, lxiv, lxv, lxvi, 2 (243), 17, 26, 32, 55, 61, 353, 382, 394, 415, 420, 423, 541
Coldstream, Sir G 533
Cole, D L 103
Cole, J S R 141 n 5
Colombo Plan, as a model lxv, 20 (97), 260, 308, 331–340, 552, 564
Colonial Office (see also interdepartmental relations) advisory committees 355, 357, 359 organisation and future of xxxii, 88, 89, 99, 308 colonial representation at Westminster (see also Malta) 46, 565–567
Colonial Service: see Overseas Civil Service
Trade and Economic Conference (Montreal, 1958) lxii, lxiv–lxv, lxviii, 305, 307, 313, 336
appeal court lxix, 252, 533, 537
Europe lxiv, 362–368, 371–373
future evolution 4 A, 5, 11, 14, 17, 39 (37), 45, 48, 80, 91, 534–536, 540–553
links 531, 535, 552 (see also sport)
membership 102, 132, 187, 240, 257, 297, 532
smaller colonial territories lxix, 554–567
Prime Ministers’ Meetings xxvi, xlii, lxiv–lxv, 450 (May 1960), 457 (Mar 1961), 372, 373 (Sept 1962)
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia 423, 437, 445, 449–460, 525
Commonwealth Relations Office, future of 88–91, 98, 99
communism (see also cold war) xxxix, xlii–xliii, lxvii, 2 (11, 121, 335), 7 (9–10, 20, 39, 42, 44, 79, 131, 132, 227, 270, 293, 350, 376–391, 428, 463, 535 (99–101), 549
Cooray, E J 533 n 2
Corfield, F D 35 n 8
Costar, N E 334
Coutts, Sir W 119 n 3, 133, 136
Cowan, Prof D V lxvi, 475, 477, 486, 491
Cox, Sir C 356
Crawford, Sir F lxviii, 119, 124, 133 n 2, 143
Croft, Sir W D 276 n 2
Cumming-Bruce, the Hon A 436
David, E B 124, 125
Davies, J H V 314
Davies, M J 141 n 4
*Dean, Sir P xxxvi, xliii–lxiv, lxvi, lxviii, 4 N & n 2, 8, 12, 17 N, 18 n 1, 39 (56), 40, 420, 423, 426, 430, 468 N, 548, 556
defence policy xlii–lxiv, 5, 6, 8, 13, 16, 17, 20 (IV), 42, 53–81, 104, 165, 109, 110, 208, 250, 251, 267, 270, 271, 331, 332, 334, 476, 523, 528–530
De Klerk, J 462 n 2
Denning, Lord 533 N
Dept of Technical Co-operation  xxxiii, 43, 92–93, 99, 114, 308, 346
Dex, D J  559
Devlin, Lord  xlv, 23, 29, 494
Devonshire, Duke of  524 n 3
de Wet Nel, D C  444 n 3
De Winton, M G  208 n 3
de Zulueta, P  xxxvii, 21, 98, 114, 308, 346
Diefenbaker, J  336, 451, 452, 457, 543
Dilhorne, Lord  519, 526
Dorman, Sir M  lxxvi, 107 N
Dorman, R B  331, 332
Douglas-Home, Sir Alec: see Home, Lord
Drysdale, J G S  182 n 3
Duncan, P  444 n 5
Dutch empire  48, 427, 545 A
East Africa (see also individual territories)  xxxv, 2 (91–124), 65, 116–118, 123–128, 138, 139, 153, 177, 356, 367 A, 389 N, 412, 414, 415, 424, 545 A
east of Suez: see Indian Ocean
Eccles, Sir D  21, 364, 448
ecological issues  lxviii, 136 (29), 360, 545 A
economic policy, British domestic  lxvi, 3 (6), 5, 17 (II), 307, 308, 349, 359, 357, 437
economic policy, colonial  lxvi–lxvii, 300–326
Edinburgh, HRH Duke of (Prince Philip)  lxxxi, 9, 10, 308, 488, 531, 555
Egypt (see also Nasser)  lxvii–lxviii, 2 (103), 188, 348
Emmanuel, A  14, 291 N, 300, 314 n 1
English language  lxvii, lxvi (14), 6, 7 (6), 21, 260, 308, 535, 544, 553
Erasmus, F C  476, 479
Erroll, F  401
Ethiopia  liii, 2 (167), 56, 181 N
Evans, H  444 n 6
Ewart-Biggs, C T E  392
Exchequer loans  lxvii–lxvi, 306, 316, 342, 349, 351
Faber, R  393
Fairchild, R D  23 n 1, 159 n 2
federalism  lii, li, 50, 123, 124, 126, 188, 274, 372, 534, 544, 554, 559, 561
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: see Central African Federation
Fenner Brockway, A  2 n 5
Festing, F-M Sir F  61, 114, 183, 193 n 2, 247
Field, W J  462 n 3, 519 n 1, 520–526
Fiji  xlviii, 2 (337, VII), 46, 292, 296, 430, 545 A, 555–557, 559, 560, 565
Fisher, N  208 n 2, 215, 560
Fleming Report  36, 37, 124
Fletcher-Cooke, J  119 n 4, 141 n 4
Foggon, G  359
*Foot, Sir H  xxx, xlix–l, lxix–lxxi, 220 n 2, 222 n 1, 228, 231, 233, 406 n 2, 409, 417, 420, 428, 569
Foster, P M  468, 469
Foster Sutton, Sir S (W P)  100 (10) & n 4, 129
Franks Sir O (Lord)  341 n 1
Fraser, H C P J  72, 131, 166 n 2, 199, 283 n 1, 292 n 2, 361, 486 n 1
Fundikira, A S  143 n 3
Galsworthy, A N  312 n 2, 340, 349
Gambia  xxxv, xlvii, lxiv, 2 (78–89), 20, 41, 111, 112, 347, 534, 544, 545 A, 565
Gardiner, R K A  398 n 1
*Garnier, Sir (J) S  xxxvi, xlvii, 48, 99, 527 N, 546
Garson, A D  166 n 1
Gibbs, C G  359
Gibraltar  xlviii, lxii, 2 (195–198), 3 (12), 41, 290, 545 A, 565
Gichuru, J S  163 n 1, 383 (16)
Gilbert & Ellice Islands  xxxv, 2 (VII), 41, 545 A, 556, 559, 560 A
Giles, A F  488
Gizenga, A  lxvi, 395, 403
Godber, J B  382 n 1, 415
Goode, Sir W  xxxvi, lix, 87
*Gorell Barnes, W L (Sir)  xxxvi, xlviii, xlvii, 87, 141, 156, 182, 183, 188 N, 189, 191, 306 n 1, 307, 325, 358, 361
Gracie, A J  446
Gracie, D C P  78
Griffin, Sir A  323 n 6
Griffith-Jones, E N  165 n 1
Grivas, G T  217 n 2
Groher, J H  475
Guatemala: see Honduras
INDEX

Hadow, Sir G 482 n 1
Halles, Lord lx–lxvi, lxvii, 35 n 2, 272 n 2, 273, 277
Hailsham, Lord xxviii, 531, 571
Hall, H P 558
Hall, Sir R 442
Hammerskjöld, D 381 n 3, 393–396
Hammer, E R 25
Harding, F-M Sir J dix–l, 220 n 2
Harrison, Sir E H 449
Harrison, Sir G 468, 469, 548 n 3
Hasluck, P M C 558
Head, Lord 40, 270, 382
Hickinbotham, Sir T 204
High Commission Territories (see also Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland) xxii, xxxi, 2 (VII), 41, 46, 94, 325, 407 n 3, 443, 444, 461–463, 469, 475–491, 545 A
Higham, J D 237
Hill, Dr C 531
Hilton, K J 457, 524, 553
*Home, Lord (Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 1963) xxix, xxxiii, xli, lxvi
Aden 210, 214
Africa, general policy 30, 34, 168 n 1, 389 N, 390, 414 n 3
Basutoland 476–478
Bechuanaland 483
Canada, visit to (1964) xli, lxix, 389 (‘sea-change’ speech)
Central African Federation liv–lvi, 492, 496, 498, 500–503, 506, 511, 524, 527
cold war 389
Commonwealth bxvii–bxix, 302, 550, 553
Commonwealth Relations Office 91, 549 n 3
Congo lxii, 394, 395, 397, 399–402
Cyprus intro l, 241
economic policy and aid 327, 336, 338, 350, 389
Europe 363
Falkland Islands 432
Ghana 327
Guiana, British 295
Honduras, British 435
immigration to UK lxvi, 569, 583
India 528, 530
Kuwait xlvi, 58
Malaysia 268
Maldives 60
Malta 247, 253–255
Middle East 71 n 7
Nigeria 40, 83, 88, 101
Overseas Civil Service 83
South Africa xl, lxvi, 438, 439, 446–448, 459, 462 n 4, 463, 464, 466 n 3, 467, 473
Swaziland 310, 311, 323
United Nations 408, 410, 411, 418, 420, 422, 423 n 7, 438
United States 389, 397
West Indies lx, 273 n 1, 277
Yemen 212 n 5, 214
Hone, Sir E D xxii, 96
Hone, Sir R 173
Hong Kong xliv, 2 (231–246), 9, 10, 41, 69, 258, 295, 367, 371, 545 A, 561
Hood, Lord lxiii, 380 n 1
Hopkinson, H L intro l, 193 n 3
House of Commons debates and statements 33 N, 98 n 2, 193 n 3, 329, 369, 474, 476, 483, 507, 540, 550, 577, 580–583
House of Lords debates 327–329
Houghton, H 357
Howick, Lord (Sir E Baring) 321 n 3, 323, 324 n 1
Hudson, R S 25
Huggins, G M 505 n 1
Huysman, N B J 245, 290, 565
Hume, Sir Nutcombe 309 n 3, 323
Hunt, J B 475
Hunt, D W S xliv, 444, 475, 479
Hurd, Sir A 128
Hyde-Clarke, E M 355 n 1
immigration to UK lxvi–lxviii, 285, 535 (76), 568–583
imperial preference 3 (6), 14, 437, 460 N
India lxvi, lxvii–lxix, 2 (13), 7, 45, 90, 305, 341, 342, 453, 454, 457, 528–530, 541, 563, 568–570
Indian Ocean, defence facilities xlvi–xlvii, 60, 72–76, 80, 205, 289
Indonesia (Confrontation) xlvi, lx, 73, 79, 267 N, 270, 271
Inman, J 357
inter-departmental relations xxv–xxvi, xxxii, lxvi, lxvi, 14, 82, 90–99, 308, 315–319, 355, 418–420, 555, 556, 558, 563
Iraq xlii, 4, 56, 59 (see also Kuwait)
Ireland lxvi, 11 A, 443, 561, 569, 581, 582
Jackson, Sir R 539
Jagan, C xlviii, lxvi, lxx, 45, 50, 276 n 1, 293 N, 294, 297–299, 367 A, 409, 410, 426, 542, 544
INDEX

Jamaica 276, 281, 284, 545 A, 573, 574 (see also West Indies)

James, J M C 82

Jamieson, G W 274–277, 280, 281, 514

Jebb, Sir Gladwyn xxxvi, 18

Jeffries, Sir C xxv–xxvi, 99

Jerrom, T C 426, 427, 434

Johnson, Sir A 309 n 1

Johnston, Sir C xxxi, lvii, 127, 199–208

Johnston, J B xxxix, 525

Kambona, O S 119 n 5, 145, 177 n 1

Karume, Sheikh 139 n 3, 390 n 2

Kasavubu, J lxxii, 392 N, 394

Kashmir lxxviii, 7 (15), 45, 457, 528

Katilungu, L 501 n 1

Kaunda, K D liii, 51, 127, 128, 150, 163 n 2, 164, 168, 175, 419

Kilimuir, Lord xxxii, 101, 115, 121, 162, 163, 169, 232, 242 N, 325, 328, 461, 505, 533 N, 537, 577, 578

Kiout, M 122 n 1

Kirkman, C A 197

Kirkness, D J 353

Kisch, J M 324

Kitcatt, P J 276

Kiwanuka, B K M 133 n 1

Kuwait xlii–xliii, lvi, 17 (III, 61), 58, 59, 68, 77, 188, 304


la Corbinière, Dr C 573 n 1

*Laithwaite, Sir G xxxiii, 88, 99, 103, 438

Lansdowne, Lord lxxiii, 490

Larmour, E N 561

Lee, Sir F xxxiv, 442

Lee Kuan Yew lviii, 261, 264 n 2, 268, 270

Lees, S L 319

legal matters (see also appeal courts) 103, 105, 535

*Lennox-Boyd, A T xxviii–xxix, xxxi, xxxv–xxxvi, xlv, xlv

Aden lvii, 190, 192, 195, 196

Bermuda 54, 354

Colonial Development & Welfare Acts xxviii, lviii, 312 n 1, 315, 316, 318

colonial policy, general xxv, xxxii, xlix, lv, 1, 21, 23, 24, 54, 302, 375, 377, 349

Cyprus intro i, 217, 222, 232, 237

East Africa xlviii, lii, 116, 157 N, 159

Falkland Islands & Antarctica 54, 432

immigration to UK lxxxii, 569

interdepartmental relations 88, 91

Malta 54, 242, 244, 254

New Hebrides 554

Nigeria xxviii, 82, 100–105, 330

Overseas Civil Service 82

Sierra Leone 107 N, 334 A

Singapore 256

Somaliland 184

Tanganyika lii, 141

West Indies 228, 273

Le Tocq, E G 138

Lewis, Sir (W) A 287, 357 n 1

Liesching, Sir P xxxi, 475, 476

Lim Yew Hock 256 n 1, 261 n 3

Lindott, Sir H 34, 103, 237, 327, 332, 336, 382, 438, 475, 479, 561, 562 n 1, 563 n 1, 564

Lloyd, G 531


Lloyd, Lord 2 (134, 168), 32, 38 N, 181, 193 n 5

local government policy 25

Longden, G J M 438

Louve, E H lvii, 444 n 2, 450 N, 475

Lovell, A H 442

Luce, Sir W lvii, 71 n 6, 77, 188, 193 n 5, 197, 198 n 1

Luke, S E V 275 n 1

Lumumba, P xxix, lxiii, 39 (57), 384 n 1, 392 N, 393, 394, 401

Lytton, O (Lord Chandos) 2 (15, 17, 94), 31, 100 n 1, 150 n 2

*Mclean, M J xxxii, xxxvi, lix, lxxi, lxix, 4 N, 7, 177, 341, 388 (8), 451 n 6, 481, 528

MacKenzie, K W S 353 n 2

Macleman, I M R 106 N

*Macleod, Iain N xxviii–xxx, lxix

Aden lxvii–lviii, 198, 200–202

Africa, general xl–xlii, xlvii, lv, 29, 36, 360

aid policy 92 N, 306 n 1

Cameroons 113, 115

Central African Federation 31, 35–37, 495, 496 n 1, 502, 503, 521

colonial policy, general 35, 36, 360, 361 n 3

Commonwealth Relations Office, future of 91

Cyprus 35, 239

East Africa, general 31, 117, 118, 123, 125–128

economic policy 306 n 1, 321, 322, 337, 340 n 2

Europe 367

Gambia 111, 112

Guiana, British 293

immigration to UK lxxxii–lxxxiii, 578
Malta 31, 35–37, 246, 248, 249
Nigeria lxviii, 86 N, 109
Overseas Civil Service xxxiii, 35, 85–87
Sierra Leone 35, 108, 335
Somaliland 35
South Africa xl, 441
Tanganyika l, 31, 35–37, 124, 144–148, 150, 152, 153, 154 n 2, 156
Uganda 31, 35–37, 120, 121
West Indies lx, 35–36, 64, 279, 281–284
Zanzibar lxxii, 31, 35–37, 129, 130

*Macmillan, Harold xxix–xxx
Aden xlii, lxx, 192, 198 n 1, 201
Algeria and French empire xxvii, xxviii, lv, 216–220, 224, 225, 227, 229, 232–234, 532
cold war lxix, 32, 457, 541
colonial policy, general xxvii, xxxiv, lxiii, 1, 35 n 12, 85 N, 86 N
Commonwealth lxii–lxiiii, 303, 373, 531, 536, 537, 539, 541, 546, 549, 577, 578, 582
Commonwealth Relations Office, future of xxxii, 91
Congo lxii, 398, 399 n 1, 401, 403
defence policy xxviii, xlii–xliv, 4 N, 56, 61, 62, 66, 72
East Africa 117, 121, 124 n 3, 125, 128 n 2, 146, 156 n 3, 159, 164, 168 N, 169, 180
economic policy 308, 337, 338, 366, 368, 370, 373
future policy, general planning xxxv, 1, 4 N, 8, 21, 42, 561 N
Ghana 539
government departments xxxiii, 91, 93, 95–98, 346
Guiana, British lxx, 295, 398
High Commission Territories xxxii, lii, 428 N, 483 n 2
Honduras, British 435
Hong Kong 9, 10, 258
India 7 n 3
Ireland lxx, 582
Kenya xxviii, xl, lii–liii, 24, 85 N
Malta 247, 250
New Hebrides 554
Nigeria 109 n 3
Pacific Islands lxxix, 9, 10
Somaliland lxxxii, 184–186, 187 N
South Africa 32, 33, 414, 424, 443, 445 n 2, 449, 450, 452, 454 n 2, 455–458, 461, 467, 479 n 2
Cape Town speech (1960) and its impact xcvii, xxx, xxxviii–xl, lii, liii, lxii, lxv, 27, 28, 32, 33, 147, 160, 197, 260 N, 444, 446, 454, 480 n 3, 481, 499, 549
South-East Asia lxix, 260, 264–267, 269, 308
Swaziland 310 N & 3
United Nations 407 n 3, 410 n 2
United States lxvii, 370, 374, 375, 398
West Indies lx, lxxxii, 273 n 2, 282 n 1, 283 n 3

*Martin, Sir J xxxi, lxxi, 131, 147, 151, 197, 199, 203, 237, 406, 420
Maud, Sir J xxxviii–xl, lxvii, lxxiv–lxxvii, 438, 450 N, 451, 462, 463, 479, 482, 490
Mauritius lxxx, 2 (VII), 41, 75, 367 A, 545 A
Mboya, T J 31 n 5, 116 n 1, 123, 124, 160, 163, 173, 177
Meadows, P H 161 n 1
Melville, E 197, 199, 245
Menon, V K K lxxi, 528 n 1
Menzies, Sir R 336, 451, 457, 524, 540, 541, 543, 549, 555, 557
Middle East, general policy 55, 57, 69–71, 80, 188, 212
Miles, F S 138
Milvertton, Lord (Sir A Richards) 327 n 3

INDEX
821
INDEX

Mintoff, D 31 n 1, 242, 244, 245 N, 254
missions (Christian) lxviii, 2 n 8, 21, 32, 559
*Monckton, Sir W liv, 4 N, 33, 35, 121, 146 n 2, 495 n 1, 496, 499, 500, 506
*Monson, (W B) L (Sir) xxxi, lxxxiv n 78, 27, 119, 121, 130, 131, 133, 135, 141 N, 147, 149, 151, 155, 276, 353, 361, 426, 488–490
Mooring, Sir G 31, 124, 127, 129–132
Mordecai, J S 275 n 6
Moreton, J O 245
Munster, Lord 36 n 1, 122 n 2
Mutesa II, Kabaka (see also Buganda)
Mwakangale Mugogo, J B 141 n 3
Nash, W 451 n 5
Nasser, G A xliii, lvii, 2 n 1 (225), 51 n 2, 55, 71, 78, 188, 213, 383, 391
nationalism, policy towards in colonies xxvii, xxxviii, 2, 17 (I), 19, 20, 25–27, 31, 32, 39, 44, 51, 65, 100, 116, 172, 188, 200, 359, 382, 383, 415, 525, 542 (for Arab nationalism, see Nasser, Aden, Zanzibar; see also Central African Federation)
Nauru 417 n 1
Nehru, J xxix, lxvii–lxviii, lxviii, 7 n 1, 260, 383, 423, 450, 452 N, 457, 542, 549
Newfoundland 563
New Hebrides lxxvii, 41, 49, 545 A, 554–560
New Zealand lxxx–lxxxi, 2 (VIII), 11, 49, 52, 79, 90, 372, 373, 453, 545, 560, 565
Ngala, R G 127 n 1, 164, 166
Ngei, P 173 n 2
Nkomo, J M N 421 n 1
Nkrumah, K xlvi, lxv, lvii, lxvi, 20 n 1, 30, 34, 39 (34), 52, 106, 327, 338 N, 339, 382–384, 423, 451 n 1, 457
Nyasaland (see also Central African Federation) xlvi, lii–lv, 31, 405, 495, 496, 505, 508–513
Nyere, Julius K xlvi, ii–lii, lv, lviii, 31 n 2, 35, 116, 126, 127, 140 n 2, 144–154, 177, 405 n 3, 409, 521, 522 n 1, 525, 548
Obote, M 133 n 2, 136, 138 N
O’Brien, C C 395 n 5
O’Brien, T J 28
Ocean Island 560 A
Odehijy, J A O 330
Odinga, A O 124, 173 n 1, 175 n 1, 387, 390 n 3
oil lv, 2 (135, 296), 17 (III, 61), 51, 71, 77, 80 (27), 188, 304, 391
Okotie-Eboh, F 330
Olivier, B 252 n 2, 254, 255
Ormsby-Gore, D (Sir) 187 n 1, 423
Overseas Civil Service xxv–xxvi, xxxiii–xxxiv, 82–87, 136 (35), 142, 149, 340, 342, 509
Pacific Islands (see also individual territories) lxix–lxxxi, 427, 554–560
Padmore, Sir T 309
Pakistan lxiv, lxvii–lxviii, 58, 82, 90, 103, 110, 334, 415, 452, 453, 457, 529, 568–570
Pandit, Mrs V L 453 n 3
Papua, New Guinea xlvi, 545 A, 558, 559, 561
Parsons, M H 442
Pearson, Lester lxvii, 524, 548
Peck, A D 314, 319, 562 n 1
Perham, Margery 393
Persian Gulf xliv, lvi, 57, 68, 77, 78
Petitt, R G 567 n 3
phosphate 560
Pike, Sir T 182
Pink, I T M 404
Pitcairn Island lxxxv, 556, 557, 559
Platsky, L 333
policing and colonial security 23, 24, 26, 100 (6), 103, 105, 115, 116, 141, 179, 199, 212, 246, 270, 294, 334, 389, 393, 505, 512, 521, 539, 560, 562, 570, 572, 583
Portuguese empire 19, 21, 39, 40, 155, 380, 382–384, 403, 408, 412, 413, 428, 566
Powell, J Enoch 310 n 3
Prain, Sir R 495 n 4
press xxviii, 29 N, 36, 37, 42, 233, 351, 384, 444, 469, 474, 525, 527, 529, 543, 549, 564, 568
Price, G 431 N 433
Prince Philip: see Edinburgh, Duke of
Pritchard, N (Sir) 131 n 2, 382
Profumo, J lxvii, 115, 531, 568 n 1, 570
publicity lxvi, 347, 351, 374, 531, 572, 574
Queen Elizabeth II and the Commonwealth 103, 384, 443, 539, 541, 547
race relations lxvi, 2 (VII), 3 (14), 20 (IV & V), 32, 130, 292, 295, 354, 393, 438, 457, 541, 554, 568–583 (see also South Africa)
Radcliffe, Lord intro l, 2 n 6, 216 n 2, 217–219, 229, 234
railways lxiii, 310, 311, 325
Raisman, Sir J 105 n 1, 124 n 1, 126, 489
Ramage, Sir R 140, 141 n 7, 143, 144
Ramsbotham, P E xxxiii, xxxv–xxxvi, 4 n 1, 13 n 1, 26 N, 562 n 1
Reid, Lord lxv, 101 n 3
Reilly, Sir B 197 n 3, 294
Reith, Lord lxv, 309 n 2, 327
Renison, Sir P 31 n 6, 87 n 1, 124, 152, 164 N
Rennell of Rodd, Lord 327 n 2
research, colonial xxxv, lxvi, 306, 312, 330, 332, 360, 535 (57)
Rhodesia, Northern (see also Central African Federation) lii–lvi, 488, 502–504, 506, 513, 520
Rhodesia, Southern (see also Central African Federation) xlv, xlvi–xlvii, 488, 502–504, 506, 513, 520
Rickett, Sir D 308 n 5, 333
Robertson, Sir J W xlvi–xlvii, 104, 109 n 2, 132
Robertson, J H xxxviii–xl, 289
*Rogers, P lx–lxi, 80, 272, 274, 275, 280, 281, 434, 559, 568, 569, 575
Rolfe, B E 130, 360
Rose, C M 436
Rowan, Sir L 304 n 1
Rumbold, (H) Algernon (F) (Sir) 323, 327, 331, 332, 446
Rusk, D Dean 74, 293 n 2, 295, 397 n 1, 408, 427
Russell, John bxviii
St Helena xlviii, bxx, 2 (VII), 41, 291, 314, 565
Salisbury, Lord xxx, xxxi–xxxii, bxxiv n 82, 1, 38 216
Samoa, Western bxx, 46, 48, 49, 534, 545
Sandys, Duncan E xxx–xxx, xxxiii–xxxiv, bxxiv
Aden 190, 206, 208–211
Africa, general 382
Central African Federation lv, 502–506, 511, 526, 527 N
Colonial Development & Welfare Acts lv, 349
colonial policy, general xli, 51, 52, 417
Commonwealth 547, 582
Cyprus 217, 230
defence 53
Europe 365, 368, 371
Ghana 384
Guiana, British bxx, 293 n 1, 294, 298, 299
High Commission Territories 325, 491
Kenya 178, 179
Malaysia 265, 266 n 1
Malta 252, 254, 255
Nigeria 104, 110
Somaliland 181
South Africa 465, 471
South-East Asia 345
Tanganyika 156
United Nations bxx, 407, 417, 429
West Indies 50
Zanzibar 137, 139 n 1
Sarawak lix, 2 (298), 268 (see also Malaysia)
Sauer, P 462
Sayers, G 356
Scott, D A 525
Scott, Sir R xxxviii, 70 n 2
Scrivenor, T C (Sir) 310 N, 475 n 1
Selkirk, Lord lix, 260, 262, 269, 308 n 1 & n 6
Selwyn, P 14
Senanayake, D S 535 (55)
Seretse Khama bxiv, 476 n 1, 483 N
Seychelles 2 (VII), 41, 75, 289
Shannon, G B 34, 475
Sierra Leone xlvii, 2 (57–73), 14, 20, 22, 35, 107, 108, 324, 335, 465
Simpson, J T 133 n 3
Sinclair, Lord lxv, 306, 321 n 1
Singapore xlii–xliv, bxi–lx, bxvii, 2 (254–262), 3 (12), 16, 17 (III, 86–87), 69, 79, 80, 246, 256, 260, 261, 264, 268, 269, 534, 545 A
smaller colonial territories: see Commonwealth
Smuts, J C 32, 382 n 21
Smith, Ian 524, 525, 527
*Sneling, Sir A xxxviii, bxx, 34 n 2, 103, 331, 382, 384, 417, 561, 562 n 1
Soames, C 364, 365, 368, 371
Sobhuza II bxiv, bxxvi–bxxvii, 310 N, 484 n 1, 486, 487
Solomon Islands xxxv, xlvii, 2 (VII), 9, 10, 41, 545 A, 555, 556, 559, 560 A
Somaliland xlvi, lii, 2 (167–173), 20 (51), 35, 126, 181–187
South Africa bxxiv–bxxvii, 11 (13), 437–474
apartheid xxxi, xxxii, 20 (63), 47 (VII), 405, 447, 448, 457, 462, 463, 471, 473, 474
arms sales to 44, 460, 463–470, 548 n 3
High Commission Territories (transfer) 475, 476, 479, 485
Simonstown Agreements 44 (9), 439, 460, 467, 468
South-West Africa 438, 450, 463 (14), 468, 474
and Southern Rhodesia 499, 503, 510, 520, 521, 525 (26)
South Arabian Federation: see Aden
South-East Asia xxxviii, lix, bxx, 63, 73, 79, 80, 263, 269, 308, 341, 345, 388, 391
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page(s) or Section(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>lxiii, 29, 379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spack, P H</td>
<td>219 n 2, 233, 401, 403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sparks, J A</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sport</td>
<td>lxii, lxviii, 335, 550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stacpoole, J W</td>
<td>119, 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephenson, Sir H</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sterling area</td>
<td>lxiii–lxiv, 2 (28, 117), 4, 5 (10), 17 (II), 300–305, 437, 442, 445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevens, Sir R</td>
<td>71, 382 n 2, 410, 508 n 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevenson, Allal</td>
<td>423 n 4, 521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stirling, D</td>
<td>29, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strickland, Mabel</td>
<td>253 n 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strijdom (Strydom), J S</td>
<td>119, 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>20 (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suez crisis, effects of</td>
<td>xiii, bx, lxvi, 4 n, 11, 12, 53, 55, 161, 193, 212, 300, 374, 379 n 3, 404 (12), 528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukarno, President</td>
<td>bx, 45, 73, 79, 270, 391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surridge, Sir R</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swabey, C</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>xxxvi, xl, bxii, lxvi–lxvii, 310, 311, 323–326, 414, 444 (12), 461, 484, 486, 487, 489, 490 (see also High Commission Territories)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sykes, E L</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symon, Sir R A</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symons, R S</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahourdin, J G</td>
<td>382, 410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, A W</td>
<td>156 n 4, 304, 333, 442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temple, Sir G</td>
<td>55 n 1, 536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, A R</td>
<td>27, 565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson, J K</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson, J</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thorneycroft, P</td>
<td>lxii, lxxiv, 67, 69, 72, 74, 76, 83, 206, 253, 301, 368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornley, Sir C</td>
<td>431 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thorpe, J R K</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todd, C F</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todd, Sir R G Garfeld</td>
<td>499 n 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>14, 48, 545 A, 556, 559, 560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torry, Sir G</td>
<td>262 n 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tourism</td>
<td>lxii, lxvi, 50 (A), 54, 136, 254, 287, 289, 290, 312, 354 n 1, 360, 535, 565, 579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trades unions</td>
<td>lvi, lxvi, 2 (91), 127, 291 N, 355, 358, 359, 361, 376, 535, 541, 573 (see also Aden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>xxx–xxxvi, xxxii, xxx–xxxvi, lx, lxiv–lxv, lxvi, 12, 300, 304, 305, 309, 314–320, 327, 333, 335, 377, 422, 446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tredgold, Sir R</td>
<td>499 n 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Trend, Sir B</td>
<td>xxx–xxxii, xxxvii, 4 (11), 19, 81, 181 N, 410, 416, 466, 497, 515 N, 551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tres, Prof R C</td>
<td>489 n 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevaskis, Sir K</td>
<td>xxix–xxx, lviii, 199 n 1, 211, 215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>lx, 35, 50, 283, 286, 288 (see also West Indies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian trusteeship</td>
<td>xxxiv–xxxvi, lxvi, 2 (VIII), 3 (16), 15, 16, 20, 420, 501, 554, 556, 558, 561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tsetse eradication</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshekedi Khama</td>
<td>476 n 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshombe, M</td>
<td>lxii–lxiii, 392 N, 395–403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Turnbull, Sir Richard</td>
<td>xxxi, li–lii, lxvi, 124, 125, 140–146, 148, 152–154, 361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twining, Sir E</td>
<td>140 N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilever</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations resolutions</td>
<td>1514 (XV) (1960) lxxi, lxxx, 46, 47, 397, 406 n 1, 407, 420, 430, 436, 438, 538, 545, 566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>2, 283, 285, 374–391, 404, 566 (see also Anglo-American relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasey, Sir E</td>
<td>148 n 1, 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vile, R J</td>
<td>16, 315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgin Islands</td>
<td>41, 47, 545 A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Service Overseas scheme</td>
<td>550, 551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorster, B J</td>
<td>462 n 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wachuku, J</td>
<td>423 n 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall, P H B</td>
<td>128, 521 n 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallis, C A G</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh Atkins, L B</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward, W A</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warner, Sir F</td>
<td>lxix, lxviii, 67, 68, 112, 201, 202, 205, 247, 469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson, J H Adam</td>
<td>40, 382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watt, I B</td>
<td>xxxiv, 197, 199, 203, 204, 533, 568–570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webber, F D</td>
<td>119, 122, 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welensky, Sir R</td>
<td>xxxviii, lv, lxii, 35, 56, 409, 423 n 1, 458, 492, 496, 502, 503, 505–513, 516, 519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster model</td>
<td>xxxvii, 25–27, 122, 197 (11), 385, 353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

Wheare, Sir K 25 n 1
Whitehead, Sir E 160 n 4, 496 n 2, 497, 499, 500, 502, 510, 521 n 2, 526
Wild, J V 31 n 3, 35, 119 n 1, 121, 488 n 3
Williams, Dr Eric lx, lixxi, 50, 64 N, 275 n 3, 276, 277, 281, 284, 288
Williamson, T B 14, 340
Willink, Sir H lxvii–lxviii, 27, 103 n 2, 105 n 2
Willis, M 432
Wilson, A D 427, 548 n 1
Wilson, Harold 463 n 2
Windley, Sir E 111 N, 382
Winnifrith, A J 319
Winterbottom, F S 347 n 1
Woodfield, P J 458
Wright, Sir D 386 n 1
Wright, J O 212, 213, 389 N
Wyndham, J E R xxxix–xl, 29 n 6
Yemen lvi–lviii, 2 (143, 165), 50, 188, 208 N, 212–214, 391
Young, W H 463 n 3
Zafrulla Khan, Sir M 423 n 5
Zanzibar xl, xlvii, 2 (103), 31, 35–37, 41, 45, 116, 124, 127, 129–132, 135, 137, 139, 253 n 2