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**The Volume Editor**

PHILIP MURPHY is Reader in Imperial and Commonwealth History at the University of Reading. He is author of *Party politics and decolonization: the Conservative Party and British colonial policy in tropical Africa 1951–1964* (Oxford, 1995), and *Alan Lennox-Boyd: a biography* (London, 1999)



## Central Africa

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been undertaken  
under the auspices  
of the British Academy.

To Christina, Alex and Nicholas

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE END OF EMPIRE

General Editor S R Ashton  
Project Chairman A N Porter

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**Series B Volume 9**

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# Central Africa

**Editor**  
**PHILIP MURPHY**

**Part I**  
**CLOSER ASSOCIATION**  
**1945–1958**

Published for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies  
in the University of London

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## Foreword

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The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by 1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain's position in these formal dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed an integral part of Britain's domestic affairs and international relations. In publishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a degree, the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning the end of British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh and Tinker respectively. The successful completion of *The transfer of power* and *The struggle for independence*,<sup>1</sup> both of which were based on British records, emphasised the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of the final stages of Britain's association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. These documents are crucial research tools for scholars both from sovereign independent states which emerged from colonial rule as well as those from Britain itself. BDEEP is also set in the much wider context of the efforts made by successive British governments to locate Britain's position in an international order. Here the empire, both in its formal and informal senses, is viewed as an instrument of the domestic, foreign and defence policy of successive British governments. The project is therefore concerned with the ending of colonial rule in individual territories as seen from the British side at one level, and the broader political, economic and strategic considerations involved in that at another.

Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major differences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of the twentieth century while having its roots in the Second World War and before. Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, varying in area, population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individual problems but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring territories and the

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<sup>1</sup> Nicholas Mansergh et al, eds, *Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power 1942–47* 12 vols (London, 1970–1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, *Constitutional relations between Britain and Burma: the struggle for independence 1944–1948* 2 vols (London, 1983–1984).

growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be encapsulated within a relatively straightforward 'country' study, in the case of the colonial empire the documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of territories and their scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the ending of colonial rule are not conveniently located within one leading department of state but rather are to be found in several of them. As the purpose of the project is to publish documents relating to the end of empire from the extensive range and quantity of official British records, private collections and other categories of non-official material are not regarded as principal documentary sources. In BDEEP, selections from non-official material will be used only in exceptional cases to fill gaps where they exist in the available official record.

In recognition of these differences and also of the fact that the end of empire involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents relating to the empire as a whole are published. Series B represents the country or territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British government perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their independence and countries which were part of an informal empire regained their autonomy. In addition to the two main documentary series, a third series—series C—has been published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former colonial empire which are deposited at The National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office). Series C consists of two volumes which form an integral part of BDEEP and also serve as guides to the records at The National Archives. Together they enable scholars and others wishing to follow the record of the ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their inquiries beyond the published record provided by the general studies in series A and the country studies in series B. Volume one of the handbooks, a revised and updated version of *The records of the Colonial and Dominions Offices* by R B Pugh which was first published in 1964, is entitled *Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and Commonwealth Office* (1995). It covers over two hundred years of activity down to 1968 when the Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volume two, entitled *Records of the Cabinet, Foreign Office, Treasury and other records* (1998), focuses more specifically on twentieth-century departmental records and also includes references to the records of inter-departmental committees, commissions of inquiry and international organisations. The two volumes were prepared under the direction and supervision of Dr Anne Thurston, at the time honorary research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the University of London, and more recently executive director of the International Records Management Trust.

In the two main series the research is organised in stages. Stage one, covering the years 1925–1957, is now complete and consists of three general volumes and five country volumes, collectively published in twenty-one individual parts. In series A there are volumes on *Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925–1945* in two parts (1996), *The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–1951* in four parts (1992), and *The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957* in three

parts (1994). In series B there are volumes on *Ghana* in two parts (1992), *Sri Lanka* in two parts (1997), *Malaya* in three parts (1995), *Egypt and the defence of the Middle East* in three parts (1998) and the *Sudan* in two parts (1998). Starting in 1999, the project began publishing volumes in a second stage which covers the period 1957–1964. Here there are five volumes, a general volume on the *Conservative government and the end of empire 1957–1964* in two parts (2000), and country volumes on the *West Indies* in one part (1999), *Nigeria* in two parts (2001), *Malaysia* in one part (2004) and Kenya. Research for a third and final stage, covering the years 1964–1971, began in 2000. It consists of a general volume—*East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964–1971* in three parts (2004)—and country volumes on *Central Africa* in two parts (2005), Southern Africa, the Pacific (Fiji), and the Mediterranean (Cyprus and Malta).

The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in individual volumes are explained in the introductions written by the specialist editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in previous series. Each volume also lists the sources searched at The National Archives. However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles which have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is first the end of empire in a broad high policy sense in which the empire is viewed in terms of Britain's position as a world power and of the inter-relationship between what derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. Here Britain's relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider defence, economic and foreign policy contexts of Britain's relations with the United States, with Europe, and with the Commonwealth and United Nations. Secondly, there is investigation into colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those areas which were specifically—but not exclusively—the concern of the leading department. In the period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s,<sup>2</sup> the leading department of the British government for most of the dependencies was the Colonial Office; for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its successor, the Commonwealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy included questions of economic and social development, questions of governmental institutions and constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning the future of the civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of transition from European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the development of political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and the transfer of governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its colonial dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the British government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not to document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major policy decisions made in Britain.

Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these var-

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<sup>2</sup> The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the Commonwealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ious lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters which will be fully documented in the country volumes but some especially significant documents do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive quantity of material devoted to appointments and terms of service—salaries, gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation—within the colonial and related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to address potentially significant issues because the information was not available. Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local information to London began to diminish.

Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the records at The National Archives. Unlike the India and Burma series and the current Foreign and Commonwealth Office series of Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO), BDEEP is not an official project. In practice this means that while editors have privileged access (in the form of research facilities and requisitioning procedures) to the records at The National Archives, they do not have unrestricted access. For files which at the time a volume is in preparation are either subject to extended closures beyond the statutory thirty years or retained in the originating department under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act of 1958, editors are subject to the same restrictions as all other researchers. Apart from cases where files or series of files are withheld, official weeding processes now tend to remove sentences or paragraphs from public view, rather than the whole document; such omissions are indicated in footnotes. To date access has not impeded the research undertaken by the project to any significant degree, and the project has been successful in securing the release of a number of hitherto withheld documents from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Records and Historical Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the sequence number, the file reference (in the form of the call-up number at the Archives and any internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document appear on the first line.<sup>3</sup> The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the document, the type of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator (person or persons, committee, department) and the recipient (if any). A subject

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<sup>3</sup> The call-up number at the Archives precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents from FO 371, the major Foreign Office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number of the file.

entry in a heading in single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it appears in the original. An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator composed by the editor. This latter device has been employed in cases where no title is given in the original or where the original title is too unwieldy to reproduce in its entirety. Security classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and receipt, have generally been omitted. In the headings to documents and the contents lists, ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not the title of the office (ie, Mr Lennox-Boyd, not secretary of state for the colonies).<sup>4</sup> In the same contexts, officials are identified by their initials and surname. In general volumes and where appropriate, ambassadors, governors, high commissioners and other embassy or high commission staff are cited in the form Sir D Jakeway (Fiji). Footnotes to documents appearing below the rule are editorial; those above the rule, or where no rule is printed, are part of the original document. Each volume provides an initial summary list of which principal offices were held by whom, and a separate series of biographical notes (at the end) for major figures who appear in the documents. Other figures are identified in editorial footnotes on the occasion of first appearance. Link-notes, written by the volume editor and indented in square brackets between the heading and the beginning of a document, are often used to explain the context of a document. Technical detail or extraneous material has been extracted from a number of documents. In such cases omission dots have been inserted in the text and the document is identified in the heading as an extract. Occasional omission dots have also been used to excise purely mechanical chain-of-command executive instructions and some redundant internal referencing has been removed, though much of it remains in place, for the benefit of researchers. No substantive material relating to policy-making has been excised from the documents. In general the aim has been to reproduce documents in their entirety but where available space is a major constraint on editors, a consideration which applies particularly in the case of general volumes, where the documentation is voluminous, this is not always possible, and some purely factual information may be omitted. It must also be emphasised in this context that the BDEEP volumes do not remove the necessity for researchers to study the original records themselves. The footnote reference 'not printed' is used only in cases where a specified enclosure or an annex to a document has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or note of explanation is provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents referred to in the text of the documents included have not been reproduced. Obvious typing errors in the original are in the main silently corrected, but abbreviations and contractions stand. Each volume has a list of abbreviations together with a consolidated index, and country volumes include a chronology of principal events.

One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and Burma series, is that BDEEP reproduces many more minutes by ministers and officials.

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<sup>4</sup> This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials.

Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a Project Committee chaired by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes professor of imperial history in the University of London. Professor Porter succeeded Professor Anthony Low, formerly Smuts professor of the history of the Commonwealth in the University of Cambridge, who retired in November 1994. Professor Michael Crowder became the first general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the University of London and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. Following his untimely death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general editor by Professor David Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at the Open University, who played a critical role in establishing a secure financial base for the project and in negotiating contracts with the volume editors and the publisher. His invaluable advice and expertise in dealing with the early manuscripts are acknowledged with particular gratitude. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Stephen Ashton who previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of the India and Burma series. Dr Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project director and general editor in 1993.

The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major projects. The Academy made a further award in 1996 which enabled the project to employ a research assistant on a fixed term contract. The Managers of the Smuts Memorial Fund in the University of Cambridge are also to be acknowledged. They made possible the workshop from which the project developed and they have since provided a further grant for work on two of the stage two volumes. The principal funding for the project in stages one and two has been provided by the Leverhulme Trust, and the early volumes are a tribute to the support provided by the Trustees. For the third and final stage beginning in 2000, BDEEP has been the beneficiary of a major research award from the Arts and Humanities Research Board. In making the award the AHRB made generous reference to the value of BDEEP, and the project is grateful for this support.

Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed encouragement. Professor Low, the first chairman of the Committee, made a singular contribution, initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985 and presiding over subsequent developments in his customary constructive but unobtrusive manner. Professor Porter continues in a similar vein and his leadership and experience are much appreciated by the general editor. The director and the staff of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative support and the congenial surroundings within which the general editor works. The editors of volumes in both stages one have benefited considerably from the researches undertaken by Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants which resulted in the publication of the two handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official project, the general editor wishes to acknowledge the support and co-operation received from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Historical and Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He wishes also to record his appreciation of the spirit of friendly co-operation received from the editors of

DBPO. Dr Ronald Hyam, editor in stage one of the general volume on the post-war Labour government and co-editor of the stage two volume on the Conservative government, played an important role in the compilation of the house-style adopted by BDEEP and his contribution is acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are due to The Stationery Office for assuming publishing responsibility and for their expert advice on matters of design and production. Last, but by no means least, the contribution of the chief executive and keeper of the records and the staff, both curatorial and administrative, at The National Archives must be emphasised. Without the facilities and privileges afforded to BDEEP editors at The National Archives, the project would not be viable.

S R Ashton  
Institute of Commonwealth Studies  
February 2005



## Central Africa

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## Abbreviations: part I

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ACCORN	Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
AGC	African Governors' Conference
AMW(T)U	African Mine Workers' (Trades) Union
ANC	African National Congress
ARNI	Association of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Industries
ASB	African Studies Branch (CO)
AUSS	assistant under-secretary of state
BCA	British Central Africa (Company)
BDEEP	British Documents on the End of Empire Project
BESL	British Empire Service League
BPPS	British Protected Persons Status
BSAC	British South Africa Company
BSAP	British South Africa Police
CA	Central Africa
CAA	Central Africa and Aden (Dept, CO)
CAB	Cabinet
CAC	Central African Council
CDC	Colonial Development Corporation
CDFC	Commonwealth Development Finance Company
CD&W	Colonial Development and Welfare
CEPS	Central Economic Planning Staff
CIC	Central Intelligence Committee
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIGS	chief of the imperial general staff
CM	Cabinet conclusions (minutes)
CMG	Companion of St Michael and St George
CO	Colonial Office
COS	Chiefs of Staff
CPP	Convention People's Party (Gold Coast)
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Department
DC	district commissioner
DO	district officer
DPS	Defence Planning Staff
ECA	European Co-operation Administration
FISB	Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau
FOA	Foreign Overseas Assistance/Aid
HMG	His/Her Majesty's Government
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation

IMF	International Monetary Fund/International Mineworkers' Federation
ISD	Intelligence and Security Department (CO)
LANCOM	Land Commission
MASA	Mines African Salaried Staff Association
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MLC	member of Legislative Council
MP	member of parliament
NA	National Archives
NDP	National Democratic Party
NLM	National Liberation Movement (Gold Coast)
NORCOM	Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines
NR	Northern Rhodesia
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
OBE	Officer Order of the British Empire
PIC	Provincial Intelligence Committee
PUS	permanent under-secretary (of state)
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAFVR	Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve
RAOC	Royal Army Ordnance Corps
RASC	Royal Army Signal Corps
REME	Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
RRAEA	Rhodesia Railways African Employees' Association
RRAF	Rhodesian Air Force
RST	Rhodesian Selection Trust
SAATC	South Africa Air Transport Conference
SEATO	South-East Asia Treaty Organisation
SLO	security liaison officer
SMCS	Southern Rhodesia Standing Ministerial Committee on Security
SNA	secretary for native affairs
S of S	secretary of state
SR	Southern Rhodesia
TUC	Trades Union Congress
TGWU	Transport and General Workers Union
Tsy	Treasury
UAC	United Africa Company
UCAA	United Central Africa Association
UFP	United Federal Party
URP	United Rhodesia Party
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNO	Union Nations Organisation
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VCIQS	vice chief of the imperial general staff
WP	Welensky papers
ZANC	Zambia African National Congress
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

# Principal Holders of Offices 1945–1958

## Part I

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### UNITED KINGDOM

#### 1. *Ministers*

##### (a) *Labour governments 1945–1951*

Prime minister	Mr C R Attlee (26 July 1945)
Chancellor of Exchequer	Dr H J N Dalton (27 July 1945) Sir Stafford Cripps (13 Nov 1947) Mr H T N Gaitskell (19 Oct 1950)
S of S foreign affairs	Mr E Bevin (27 July 1945) Mr H S Morrison (9 Mar 1951)
S of S colonies	Mr G H Hall (3 Aug 1945) Mr A Creech Jones (4 Oct 1946) Mr J Griffiths (28 Feb 1950)
S of S dominion affairs (Commonwealth relations from 7 July 1947)	Viscount Addison (3 Aug 1945) Mr P J Noel-Baker (7 Oct 1947) Mr P C Gordon Walker (28 Feb 1950)
Minister of state, CO (junior minister)	Earl of Listowel (4 Jan 1948) Mr J Dugdale (28 Feb 1950)
Parliamentary under-secretary of state, CO (junior minister)	Mr A Creech Jones (4 Aug 1945) Mr I B Thomas (4 Oct 1946) Mr D R Rees-Williams (7 Oct 1947) Mr T F Cook (2 Mar 1950)
Parliamentary under-secretary of state, dominions/CRO (junior minister)	Mr J Parker (4 Aug 1945) Mr A G Bottomley (10 May 1946) Mr P C Gordon Walker (14 Oct 1947) Lord Holden (2 Mar 1950) Lord Ogmore (5 July 1950) (formerly D R Rees-Williams) Earl of Lucan (2 June 1951)

(b) *Conservative governments 1951–1958*

Prime minister	Mr W L S Churchill (KG 24 Apr 1953) (26 Oct 1951) Sir Anthony Eden (6 Apr 1955) Mr M H Macmillan (13 Jan 1957)
Chancellor of Exchequer	Mr R A Butler (28 Oct 1951) Mr M H Macmillan (20 Dec 1955) Mr P Thorneycroft (13 Jan 1957) Mr D Heathcoat Amory (6 Jan 1958)
S of S foreign affairs	Mr R A Eden (KG 20 Oct 1945) (28 Oct 1951) Mr M H Macmillan (7 Apr 1955) Mr J S B (Selwyn) Lloyd (20 Dec 1955/14 Jan 1957)
S of S colonies	Mr O Lyttelton (28 Oct 1951) Mr A T Lennox-Boyd (28 July 1954/14 Jan 1957)
S of S Commonwealth relations	Lord Ismay (28 Oct 1951) Marquess of Salisbury (12 Mar 1952) Viscount Swinton (24 Nov 1952) Earl of Home (12 Apr 1955/14 Jan 1957)
Minister of state, CO (junior minister)	Mr A T Lennox-Boyd (2 Nov 1951) Mr H L D'A Hopkinson (7 May 1952) Mr J H Hare (20 Dec 1955) Mr J S Maclay (18 Oct 1956) Earl of Perth (17 Jan 1957)
Parliamentary under-secretary of state, CO (junior minister)	Earl of Munster (5 Nov 1951) Lord Lloyd (18 Oct 1954) Mr J D Profumo (18 Jan 1957) Mr J Amery (28 Nov 1958)
Parliamentary under-secretary of state, dominions/CRO (junior minister)	Mr J G Foster (3 Nov 1951) Mr A D Dodds-Parker (18 Oct 1954) Mr A H P Noble (20 Dec 1955) Lord J Hope (9 Nov 1956) Mr C J M Alport (18 Jan 1957)

2. *Civil servants*

(a) <i>Secretary to the Cabinet</i>	Sir Edward Bridges (1938–1946) Sir Norman Brook (1947–1962)
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(b) *Colonial Office*

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| (i) Permanent under-secretary<br>of state   | Sir George Gater (1942–1947)<br>Sir Thomas Lloyd (1947–1956)<br>Sir John Macpherson (1956–1959)   |
| (ii) Deputy under-secretary<br>of state   | Sir Arthur Dawe (1945–1947)<br>Sir Sydney Caine (1947–1948)<br>Sir Charles Jeffries (1947–1956)<br>Sir Hilton Poynton (1948–1959)   |
| (iii) Assistant under-secretary<br>of state, responsible for the<br>Africa Division (1947–1954)<br>and the Central African<br>Departments | G H Creasey (West, East, Central Africa,<br>(1944–1946)<br>G F Seel (West, East Central Africa,<br>(1947)<br>A B Cohen (Africa, 1947–1951)<br>W L Gorell Barnes (Africa, 1952–1954)<br>W L Gorell Barnes (Central African and<br>Aden, 1955–1959)   |
| (iv) Assistant secretary, head of<br>Central African Departments  | A B Cohen (East and Central Africa,<br>(1945–1947)<br>J H Wallace (East and Central African,<br>1948)<br>C E Lambert (Central African, 1948–1949,<br>Central African and Aden, 1950–1952)<br>J E Marnham (Central African and Aden,<br>1953–1954)<br>W D Sweaney (Central African and Aden,<br>1955)<br>J C Morgan (Central African and Aden,<br>1955–1960) |

(c) *Dominions/Commonwealth Relations Office (from July 1947)*

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| (i) Permanent under-secretary<br>of state | Sir Eric Machtig (1939–1948)<br>Sir Archibald Carter (1947–1948)<br>Sir Percivale Liesching (1949–1955)<br>Sir Gilbert Laithwaite (1955–1959)  |
| (ii) Deputy under-secretary<br>of state   | Sir John Stephenson (1945–1947)<br>Sir Cecil Syers (1948–1951)<br>Sir William Croft (1947)<br>Sir Gilbert Laithwaite (1948–1949)<br>Sir Cecil Syers (1949–1951)<br>Sir Stephen Holmes (1951–1952)<br>A C B Symon (1952–1953)<br>Sir Saville Garner (1952–1956)<br>H J B Lintott (1956–1958)<br>H A F Rumbold (1958–1961) |

**THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF CENTRAL AFRICA***(a) Southern Rhodesia*

Governor	Sir Campbell Tait (1944–1946) Sir John Kennedy (1946–1954) Sir Peveril William-Powlett (1954–1959)
UK high commissioner for Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953	I M R Maclennan (1951–1955) M R Metcalf (1955–1961)
Prime minister	Sir Godfrey Huggins (1933–1953) Mr G Todd (1953–1958) Sir Edgar Whitehead (1958–1962)

*(b) Northern Rhodesia*

Governor	Sir John Waddington (1941–1947) Sir Gilbert Rennie (1948–1954) Sir Arthur Benson (1954–1959)
Chief secretary	H F Cartmel-Robinson (1945–1947) R C S Stanley (1947–1952) A T Williams (1952–1957) Evelyn Hone (1957–1959)

*(c) Nyasaland*

Governor	Sir Edmund Richards (1942–1947) (Sir) Geoffrey Colby (1948–1956) Sir Robert Armitage (1956–1961)
Chief secretary	F L Brown (1945–1951) G W F Footman (1951–1960)

*(d) Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*

Governor-general	Lord Llewellyn (1953–1957) Earl of Dalhousie (1957–1963)
Prime minister	Sir Godfrey Huggins (1st Viscount Malvern cr 1955) (1953–1956) Sir Roy Welensky (1956–1963)

*(e) Central African Council*

Chief secretary	W A W Clark (1945–1948) F H N Parry (1948–1949, acting) A E T Benson (1949–1951) F H N Parry (1951–1953)
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## Chronological Table of Principal Events: Parts I–II

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### 1939

Mar Bledisloe Commission finds against amalgamation for Northern and Southern Rhodesia

### 1944

Oct Announcement of plans for a Central African Council

### 1945

Apr Opening session of the Central African Council

Oct Strike by African railway workers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia

### 1946

Apr Sir Godfrey Huggins's United Party loses its overall majority in Southern Rhodesian general election

### 1947

June Southern Rhodesian government raises loan for the nationalisation of Rhodesia Railways

### 1948

May National Party victory in South African general election

July Talks in London on the Northern Rhodesian constitution

Sept Huggins regains overall majority in Southern Rhodesian general election

Sept–Oct Roy Welensky visits London and is told that amalgamation will not be implemented by either major British party

### 1949

Feb European settlers hold conference on federation at Victoria Falls

Aug Settlement of the issue of the British South Africa Company's mineral rights

### 1950

Apr Appointment of first UK high commissioner to Central Africa

**1951**

- Jan–Mar Patrick Gordon Walker visits Southern Africa  
 Mar Conference of officials on federation ('Baxter Report')  
 Sept Victoria Falls conference on federation  
 Oct Conservatives win British general election  
 Nov British government announces support in principle for federation

**1952**

- Mar Geoffrey Colby, the governor of Nyasaland requests that his colony be excluded from federal negotiations  
 Apr–May London conference on federation

**1953**

- Jan Final London conference settles federal constitution  
 Apr Southern Rhodesian referendum approves federation  
 July Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation Act receives Royal Assent  
 Sept Federation formally inaugurated under interim government  
 Dec Federal Party wins first federal election

**1954**

- Feb Opening of federal Parliament  
 Mar Salisbury is selected as the location of the federal capital  
 Nov Rhodesian Selection Trust gives six months notice of the termination of its agreement with the Northern Rhodesian Mine Workers' Union

**1955**

- Mar Federal government announces work will proceed on Kariba hydro-electric scheme  
 Sept Rhodesian Selection Trust and Anglo–American reach a joint agreement with the European mine workers

**1956**

- Mar Lord Malvern (formerly Sir G Huggins) demands full self-government for the Federation  
 June Sir Arthur Benson writes to London denouncing the policies of the federal government  
 Major industrial action by African workers on the Copperbelt  
 Sept State of emergency declared in Northern Rhodesia  
 Nov Sir Roy Welensky succeeds Malvern as federal premier

**1957**

- Apr Joint Declaration on future of the Federation  
 Sept United Rhodesia Party and Federal Party combine to form United Federal Party  
 Nov Federal Constitutional Amendment Bill receives Royal Assent

**1958**

- Feb Sir Edgar Whitehead succeeds R S Garfield Todd as prime minister of Southern Rhodesia  
 July Return of Hastings Banda to Nyasaland  
 Sept White Paper on Northern Rhodesian Constitution published in London  
 Nov United Federal Party wins federal general election

**1959**

- Feb Emergency declared in Southern Rhodesia  
 Mar Emergency declared in Nyasaland  
 July Announcement of Monckton Commission and publication of Devlin Report

**1960**

- Jan Harold Macmillan visits Federation  
 Apr Release of Hastings Banda  
 June Belgian Congo becomes independent  
 Aug New constitution agreed for Nyasaland  
 Oct Publication of Monckton Report

**1961**

- Jan–Feb Talks in London on Southern Rhodesian constitution  
 Feb White paper on Northern Rhodesian constitution  
 British military planners devise ‘Operation Kingfisher’ for intervention in Northern Rhodesia  
 June Revised white paper on Northern Rhodesian constitution  
 July New constitution for Southern Rhodesia approved in referendum  
 Aug Banda’s Malawi Congress Party wins Nyasaland general election  
 Sept UN forces in the Congo launch ‘Operation Morthor’ against Katanga  
 Dag Hammarskjöld dies in plane crash in Northern Rhodesia  
 British government announces its intention to reopen talks over the Northern Rhodesian constitution

**1962**

- Jan–Feb Revised constitutional proposals for Northern Rhodesia  
 Mar Creation of Central Africa Office under R A Butler  
 Oct–Dec Elections in Northern Rhodesia place Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP in a position to form a government  
 Dec Rhodesian Front defeats United Federal Party in Southern Rhodesian election. Winston Field succeeds Sir Edgar Whitehead as prime minister. Butler announces Nyasaland’s right to secede

**1963**

- Feb Internal self-government in Nyasaland with Banda as prime minister  
 Mar Butler announces right of all territories to secede  
 June–July Winding-up conference at Victoria Falls  
 Dec 31 Federation formally dissolved

**1964**

- Feb Internal self-government in Northern Rhodesia with Kaunda as prime minister
- Apr Ian Smith replaces Winston Field as Southern Rhodesian prime minister
- July Nyasaland becomes independent as Malawi
- Oct Labour wins British general election  
Northern Rhodesia becomes independent as Zambia

**1965**

- Jan Ian Smith visits London for Sir Winston Churchill's funeral
- Feb–Mar Arthur Bottomley and Lord Gardiner visit Southern Rhodesia
- May Rhodesian Front wins Southern Rhodesian general election
- Oct Smith visits London for talks  
Harold Wilson visits Southern Rhodesia  
Wilson publicly rules out the use of force against Southern Rhodesia
- Nov 11 Ian Smith makes unilateral declaration of independence (UDI)

# Introduction

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## *The documents and their selection*

This volume traces British policy towards Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Nyasaland (Malawi) from the end of the Second World War to Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in November 1965. The principal focus of the volume is the rise and fall of the Central African Federation, which from 1953–1963 brought these three territories together in an unhappy and ill-fated marriage.

Until 1962, when British policy towards the Federation was rationalised by the creation of a separate Central Africa Office, responsibility was split between two different departments. The protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were administered by the Colonial Office (CO). Meanwhile, the virtually self-governing crown colony of Southern Rhodesia, and the government of the Federation itself, were the responsibility of the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO). The sheer volume of documentation relating to Central Africa produced by these departments in the period under discussion makes the tasks of analysing the material and selecting a representative sample far from easy. The Colonial Office series CO 1015 covering Central Africa and Aden from 1950–62 numbers no fewer than 2645 files. The CRO produced a comparable number of files. Much of this material is scattered across DO 35, a series covering the affairs of a number of Commonwealth territories from 1915–1971. The series DO 183, consisting of material generated by the Central Africa Office, is slightly more manageable, but still totals 935 files.

There is a considerable amount of duplication of material across the files. Copies of documents relating to the Federation were often (although by no means always) exchanged by the CO and CRO. In addition, as decolonisation in Central Africa moved towards the centre stage of British politics, an increasing number of documents were copied to the Prime Minister's Office and the Cabinet Office. When the affairs of neighbouring states impinged on British policy towards the Federation (as they did with particular intensity in the case of the Belgian Congo) material might also be copied to the Foreign Office. Hence, copies of a single document relating to the Federation can potentially appear in the files of at least five separate departments.

The situation is further complicated by the existence of an extremely extensive private collection containing a large amount of official correspondence on federal affairs.<sup>1</sup> The papers of Sir Roy Welensky, prime minister of the Federation from 1956–1963, constitute the nearest we have to an archive of the federal government itself. They were spirited out of Southern Rhodesia in 1977 with the help of one of Welensky's long-standing supporters in the business community, and are now held by Rhodes House Library in Oxford.<sup>2</sup> They were not made generally available to scholars until cataloguing had been completed in the mid-1990s. By that stage, however, material from the collection had already appeared in books by at least three

authors who had been granted privileged access. The most notable of these is *The Welensky Papers* by J R T Wood, which summarises in minute detail a large proportion of the collection's contents.<sup>3</sup> In marked contrast to the material in the National Archives (NA) there are few restrictions on access to the records in the Welensky papers for the period 1945–65.<sup>4</sup>

The dispersed nature of the records on end of empire in Central Africa presents challenges to the researcher. Yet it also provides opportunities. At the most basic level, the large volume of material and the widespread duplication of documents make the records difficult to censor. Over the previous decade, those responsible for vetting the files have made increasing use of the practice of 'blocking'. Whereas in the past, the presence of any sensitive material in a file would lead to it being withheld in its entirety, it is now more usual for the file to be released, with sensitive documents either removed or sanitised. Yet copies of these documents are sometimes freely available in the files of other departments.<sup>5</sup> The Welensky papers have also, needless to say, proved a fruitful hunting ground for items of correspondence between the British and federal governments that are currently closed or available in a redacted form in the NA.<sup>6</sup>

Along with cross referencing, use has also been made of the 'Open Government' initiative to gain access to material previously regarded by the government censors as too sensitive to release. When work began on this volume in 2001, a surprising number of files relating to Central Africa in the 1950s and early 1960s were embargoed beyond the standard 30-year closure period. A decade earlier, there would have been little choice but to accept these prohibitions as an immovable fact of life. In July 1993, however, the Major administration published a white paper on open government—the so-called 'Waldegrave Initiative'—which appeared to signal a more liberal approach to the vetting of official documents. Its specific impact remains a matter for debate.<sup>7</sup> Yet it offered an open invitation to historians to request the review of files previously considered too sensitive to release.<sup>8</sup> Taking advantage of this, the volume editor asked for 48 files to be reviewed. Of these, the vast majority were declassified in their entirety. Another 6 were declassified with minor 'blocking'. Only 6 of the 48 files were still judged to be unsuitable for declassification, and one of these has subsequently been released after a 50-year closure.<sup>9</sup> Many of the newly released files relate to the monitoring of communists, trades unionists and African nationalist movements.<sup>10</sup>

The selection of documents in this volume involved a process of balancing various essentially irreconcilable concerns. The attempt to provide roughly equal representation of the affairs of all three of the British Central African territories had to be balanced against the need to focus upon those issues which caused particular concern in London. Insofar as it has been possible to reconcile these considerations across the volume as a whole, it has been far more difficult to achieve a geographical balance on a year-by-year basis. Southern Rhodesia provides the greatest problem. For most of the period under consideration, its internal affairs rarely attracted the attention of the British Cabinet. The territory was, after all, essentially self-governing. Whereas in the two northern territories, the British government was actively engaged in all aspects of internal policy-making, in the case of Southern Rhodesia, its role was generally relegated to that of an observer. Indeed, reports by British representatives in Salisbury on developments in the territory often resemble little more than the detached musings of relatively well-informed newspaper

correspondents. Southern Rhodesia was a concern for British policy makers during this period largely in terms of its relationship with the two northern territories and its ultimate constitutional status. The creation of the Central African Federation in 1953 settled the first of these issues (at least notionally), and pushed the second into temporary abeyance. From 1963, however, the future status of Southern Rhodesia became a major issue of British government policy, and came at the very top of its agenda in terms of Central African affairs. With the fate of the Federation sealed and only the details of the transfer of power in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland left to be settled, an immense amount of official and ministerial energy was devoted to Southern Rhodesia. Although there remained severe practical and constitutional restrictions on Britain's ability to intervene in the territory's affairs, the government sought to exert all the influence it could to prevent a breach with the Southern Rhodesian settlers. As such, both in terms of the priority the British government devoted to Southern Rhodesia and the inherent interest of the documentation available, it seems reasonable that the territory should be most heavily represented in the later documents in this volume.

A second task is to represent as wide a range as possible of economic, social and political issues while still preserving a sense of narrative progression across the volume as a whole. To some extent, this is eased by the nature of closer association in Central Africa. The rise and fall of the Federation provides the volume with its principal narrative thread, one that links not merely the three territories, but also a variety of different issues. Throughout the Federation's lifetime, political developments in one territory were almost always considered in the context not only of developments in its neighbours but of the future of the Federation itself. Likewise, labour relations on the railways and in the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia impinged directly on the politics of federation. So too did the question of the allocation of funds for political and social development. Even the activities of the British intelligence community in Central Africa became inextricably linked to the federal government's struggle for survival.<sup>11</sup>

So far as possible the use of Cabinet minutes and memoranda in the CAB 128 and 129 series has been avoided. This has both a practical and an intellectual rationale. In purely practical terms, it is relatively easy for academic institutions to obtain copies of these papers on microfilm or CD-ROM. A substantial number of Cabinet minutes and memoranda relating to Central Africa are also available in the 'general volumes' of this series.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, even a number of files on this subject from the Prime Minister's Office are now available commercially.<sup>13</sup> The intention here has been to highlight documents from some of the more obscure runs of files in the NA that would not otherwise be easily available to researchers, particularly those working outside the United Kingdom. In terms of the historical value of particular types of documents, Cabinet minutes enable historians to identify the precise moment when a particular policy was adopted by the British government. Yet their actual content can be relatively bland, their essential purpose being to provide clear instructions to civil servants rather than to offer a precise record of the arguments surrounding an issue. By contrast, the minutes left by officials in the files of the departments dealing directly with Central African affairs often provide a far more candid expression of the considerations driving British policy. For the period from the 1960, however, as Central African policy came to involve the prime minister and his senior colleagues on an increasingly regular basis, it has been necessary to make ever greater use of the

Prime Minister's Office files and, indeed, to include some material from the CAB 128 and 129 series.

There is one final point, which, however obvious, probably needs to be stated explicitly. It is in the nature of these documents that they largely express the viewpoint of white, male politicians and officials. Despite their virtual exclusion from the policy-making process for much of this period, Africans actively sought to shape events and to make their grievances heard. A striking example of this, included in the volume, is an early intervention in the debate over Nyasaland's future by Hastings Banda in June 1946 (12). It would be a mistake, however, to seek to reconstruct the history of African nationalism from British official documents. This task requires quite different sources and methodology.<sup>14</sup> The authorities in Central Africa certainly kept a close watch on African politics, sometimes resorting to quasi-historical analysis to explain the character of the movements that confronted them (394). Yet the nature of this surveillance and the conclusions the authorities reached were ultimately shaped by their desire to exert the maximum control over events and to justify the exercise of that power. As records of African political activity the documents they generated therefore need to be treated with considerable caution. What these papers can and do illustrate is how European perceptions of Africa and its peoples served to legitimise the colonial power structure and to delay the transfer of power to Africans.

This volume builds upon many existing accounts of British Central Africa in the era of decolonization. In particular, the meticulous scholarship of J R T Wood and Colin Baker has spared the editor of this work many hours of additional research, as has the excellent catalogue of the Welensky papers compiled by James Hargrave. Ronald Hyam and Wm Roger Louis kindly made available to me a large quantity of photocopied documents gathered during the course of their research for their own volume in this series. Ronald Hyam also read through an early draft of the introduction with great care and attention and made many valuable comments. In the final stages of editing, David Laven, Joanna Lewis and Patrick Higgins answered a series of increasingly obscure questions. I am grateful to John Pinfold, the Librarian of Rhodes House, Oxford, for permission to quote from the papers of Sir Roy Welensky and Sir Robert Armitage and to Lady Gorell Barnes for permission to quote from the papers of her late husband in Churchill College, Cambridge. An unbroken period of work on the project was made possible by the generous award of a research fellowship by the Leverhulme Trust for the academic year 2001–2, and by the award of an additional term's leave under the Arts and Humanities Research Board's research leave scheme. My colleagues at the University of Reading and my wife, Christina, proved extremely supportive during the period when I was absorbed in this enterprise. I am grateful to the advisory board of BDEEP and to Mandy Banton at the National Archives for their encouragement and advice. I am also grateful to David Murray for valuable advice and painstaking assistance with proofs. My greatest debt of thanks, however, is to the general editor of the series, Stephen Ashton, for his unflinching patience, diligence and efficiency.

*The policy making process: ministers, officials and administrative structures*

Perhaps the principal feature of politics in Central Africa during this period was the fierce suspicion that characterised relations not only between the different ethnic groups but also between European officials and European settlers. The British

government's relations with the settler leaders of Southern Rhodesia were, at least until the end of 1962, rather more relaxed than those with the Northern Rhodesian Europeans. This owed much to the fact that, unlike their northern counterparts, the Southern Rhodesian settlers negotiated with Britain from a position of relative strength. They had their own armed forces (although these were subsumed within the federal forces between 1953 and 1963) and a history of qualified internal self-government dating back to 1923. Roy Welensky and his fellow Northern Rhodesian elected members, by contrast, spoke for a European population of only 37,000 in 1951, and were not even regarded by the Colonial Office as being properly representative of that constituency. As its prime minister from 1956, Welensky imported into the Federation's relations with Britain something of the fiercely defensive style of negotiation he had developed in Northern Rhodesia. Commonwealth secretary, Duncan Sandys accused Welensky to his face of being 'almost pathological' about the prospect of an African elected majority in the Northern Rhodesian legislature.<sup>15</sup> Iain Macleod, recalling his time as secretary of state for the colonies, noted that negotiating with Welensky was a 'weary routine', with the federal premier initially dismissing any proposal 'fundamentally unacceptable' before finally making concessions.<sup>16</sup>

The approach of African leaders was also marked by intense suspicion and defensiveness. The firm control exercised by Southern Rhodesian settlers over the instruments of state security allowed little room for the emergence of a coherent and effective nationalist challenge. In the two northern protectorates, however, proposals for closer association of the Central African territories inspired profound alarm among Africans, since such a move threatened to bring with it the political and economic trappings of Southern Rhodesian white minority rule. The reality of Federation from 1953 did virtually nothing to assuage those concerns, and by the end of the 1950s, the administrations of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were facing opposition from powerful African nationalist movements.

It is against the background of these tensions that the shortcomings of British policy towards Central Africa can best be understood. In the years before the creation of a unified Central Africa Office in 1962, the British government's policy-making structure was a recipe for conflict and confusion. As has already been noted, Southern Rhodesia conducted its relations with London through the CRO, which also had overall responsibility for relations with the federal government. At the same time, Britain remained directly responsible for the administration of the Federation's two northern territories, which came under the authority of the Colonial Office. Over time, this geographical division of responsibility gave rise to a distinct ideological cleavage between the two departments. While the CRO, which also handled Britain's relations with South Africa, showed a marked sympathy for the concerns of the European settlers, the Colonial Office tended to display far greater sensitivity towards African political aspirations. In the specific context of Central African affairs in the 1950s, this led to the CRO and CO defending sets of principles that were virtually incompatible. The CRO was keen to reassure the federal government that full self-government was within its grasp. While it sought to avoid specific commitments as to the date by which the British government would finally relinquish its responsibilities in the region, it wished to offer the prospect of a steady movement towards greater autonomy. This approach culminated in a joint communiqué from the secretaries of state for the colonies and Commonwealth relations in April 1957, which is discussed below. Conversely, the CO staunchly defended the government's

commitment, made at the inception of the Federation, that protectorate status and hence British control would not be withdrawn from the northern territories against the wishes of their inhabitants. Yet so long as protectorate status remained, the Federation could not be fully independent; and unless it was fully independent it could not aspire to full Commonwealth membership. The specific commitments made by the British government to both the settlers and the Africans were, as we shall see, sufficiently vaguely worded to allow for what Whitehall euphemistically called 'stretching'. Yet the British government had, in effect, allowed the principal victims and the principal beneficiaries of imperial rule in Central Africa separate representation around the Cabinet table. Hence, the Federation was a unique case in which local conflicts over decolonisation were duplicated at the highest levels of British policy-making.

This problem was recognised by ministers and officials at the time. In October 1959, for example, the parliamentary under-secretary at the CRO, C J M 'Cub' Alport, noted that the divergent policies of the CO and CRO meant that they were sometimes 'unconsciously working against each other'.<sup>17</sup> The sense of working at cross-purposes inevitably led to inhibitions about the sharing of information. Among the recently declassified files is one marked on the cover with the arresting classification 'Colonial Office Eyes Only'. It concerns one of the Colonial Office's periodic exercises in 'thinking the unthinkable'; considering what might be done if federal leaders launched a 'Boston Tea Party' and attempted to assert the Federation's independence by taking over the two northern territories by force. The discussion occurred in the autumn of 1958, during a bitter dispute over the terms of the Northern Rhodesian constitution. In setting out for his colleagues at the Colonial Office what options might be open to them, J C Morgan noted, 'I do not need to stress that at the present stage we cannot share our thinking on this subject with any other Department of H.M.G., including the Ministry of Defence, and least of all the C.R.O.' (162).

Divisions within the policy making machine in Whitehall were reflected in the structures of British administration and representation within Central Africa. The two northern protectorates were administered by the British colonial service under governors answerable to the secretary of state for the colonies. The administrative service of Southern Rhodesia was an entirely separate organisation, under the direct control of the Southern Rhodesian government. There was also, from 1953 to 1963, a smaller federal government bureaucracy. Southern Rhodesia had a British governor and also, from 1951, a UK high commissioner. The decision to establish the latter post was prompted by fears that the governor's status as the king's representative in Southern Rhodesia made it difficult for him constitutionally to provide sufficiently candid appraisals of developments in the territory (47). From 1953, the duties of the high commissioner in Salisbury were extended to cover the whole of the newly-created Federation. September 1953 also witnessed the appointment of the first governor-general of the Federation.

This bewildering proliferation of posts ensured that London was provided with widely divergent advice by its representatives on the ground. A marked characteristic of communications from British governors in Southern Rhodesia was their tendency to view the world from the perspective of the Southern Rhodesian government. Equally marked was the hostility displayed by leading British officials in the northern territories towards the federal government. By contrast, the two incumbents of the post of governor-general of the Federation from 1953 to 1963 tended to provide the

CRO with highly sympathetic accounts of the policy and aims of the federal government. As relations between the federal government and the administrations of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland deteriorated, this almost inevitably led to tensions between British personnel in Central Africa. These emerge clearly from the communications sent to the CRO by Lord Dalhousie, governor-general of the Federation from 1957 to 1963. Dalhousie's constant theme was the need to reassure European opinion. Even before Macleod became secretary of state, Dalhousie had complained of the general drift of British policy. Ironically, only a week before the declaration of the Nyasaland emergency, he characterised the territory's governor, Sir Robert Armitage, as someone who 'avoids action like the plague' and condemned the 'wet and defeatist attitude of the Colonial Office'.<sup>18</sup> In November 1960, Dalhousie accused Macleod of having caused a rapid deterioration of relations between Britain and Salisbury by implementing his plans for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 'without adequate liaison with the federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments' (261). The following September, Dalhousie characterised the policy of the governor of Nyasaland as being to 'suck up to the Malawi Party' (307). In June 1962, he complained to R A Butler, the minister responsible for the Central Africa Office, about the lack of support for the Federation on the part of British officials in the northern territories—from the governors down.<sup>19</sup> In December, he effectively accused the British high commissioner in Salisbury of acting behind the backs of Southern Rhodesian ministers—or 'my Ministers' as he referred to them.<sup>20</sup>

If the conflicts within the machinery of British policy making reflected the racial tensions and political divisions within Central Africa itself, these very tensions made it extremely difficult to rationalise the administrative structure. The idea of a unified administrative service, serving all three of the federal territories, had been put forward by the Southern Rhodesians in 1952 during negotiations to establish the Federation. This was bitterly opposed by officials at the CO who regarded it as an attempt by European settler leaders 'to get rid of the influence of the Colonial Office in Northern Rhodesia and to gain complete control for themselves of the Civil Service'.<sup>21</sup> Proposals for administrative reform at the metropolitan level met similar objections. From 1957, the federal prime minister, Sir Roy Welensky, made repeated calls for the creation of a single department to deal with the affairs of the Federation. Yet this, again, was seen by the CO as another stage in the federal government's bid for complete autonomy, and a further attempt to undermine the few safeguards enjoyed by the Africans of the northern territories. It was only after the fierce disputes of 1961 between the CO and CRO over the Northern Rhodesian constitution that the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, was convinced of the need for rationalisation. His initial instinct was to transfer the Federation's affairs entirely into the hands of the CRO.<sup>22</sup> He was persuaded by the Cabinet secretary, however, that such a move would provoke consternation, not only among Africans but also among members of the colonial service in the northern territories.<sup>23</sup> The solution to this dilemma, which was announced in March 1962, was to merge the Central Africa departments of the CO and CRO to create a separate Central Africa Office. Ministerial responsibility for the department was given to Butler who until July 1962 combined this post with that of Home Secretary. In unveiling the new arrangements, Macmillan publicly admitted that the secretaries of state for the Commonwealth and the colonies had hitherto been 'apt to be regarded in some quarters as identified with conflicting sectional interests in the Federation'.<sup>24</sup>

Even in East and West Africa, the CO could seldom make policy for particular territories in isolation. Proposals for constitutional advance for one colony were likely to be met by objections from the governors of its neighbours that this would raise African expectations and so upset the political balance in their own territories. The existence of federation in Central Africa greatly added to these problems of co-ordination. The federal government proved itself a consistent opponent of African political advance in the northern territories. It could usually point to some development elsewhere in the Federation as a pretext for delaying change. Hence, one of Welensky's objections to the modest increase in African representation contained in Lennox-Boyd's proposed constitution for Northern Rhodesia in 1958 was that this would prejudice his party's chances in the 1958 federal elections. He subsequently argued, among other things, that the release in 1960 of the Nyasaland nationalist leader, Hastings Banda, would prejudice the work of the Monckton Commission, that there should be no talks on the Nyasaland constitution until the federal review conference had taken place, and that Macleod's proposals for the Northern Rhodesian constitution in 1961 would, if accepted, have a damaging impact on the constitutional referendum in Southern Rhodesia.

The distinct and competing interests within the Federation required the British government to be able to give clear priority to some demands over others. Yet the divided nature of the policy-making process up to 1962 made this extremely difficult to achieve. If Welensky was generally unsuccessful in obtaining substantial delays in the granting of political concessions to the Africans, the CRO was usually on hand to suggest that countervailing concessions should be made to European interests in order to 'send Welensky home happy'. This tendency to 'balance' concessions to the two communities in Central Africa continued until relatively late in the life of the Federation, and ultimately exacerbated the government's problems in seeking a viable political settlement in the region.

Where the concerns of one community could not be allayed by concrete concessions, the gap was often filled by 'assurances'. These always had to fall far short of outright pledges, which would bind Britain's hands. They had to be seductive, but at the same time either sufficiently vaguely worded to allow the government some plausible escape-route or informal, private and, hence, ultimately deniable. A recurring theme in documents discussing how to deal with Nyasaland from 1960 onwards, for example, was the need to 'play Banda long': to allow him to feel that he was making progress without giving any firm commitments on the date of independence. Meanwhile, every step forward for Nyasaland had to be accompanied by corresponding assurances to European settler interests in the Federation that independence was further away than Banda believed it to be. Given such tactics it should perhaps come as little surprise that, as the principal losers in the decolonisation process, settler leaders should have characterised British policy largely in terms of 'betrayal'.

*Part One: The origins and early years of the Federation of  
Rhodesia and Nyasaland*

*The campaign for the amalgamation of the Rhodesias*

In a White Paper of 1923 on Kenya—the so called 'Devonshire Declaration'—the British government asserted that 'the interests of the African natives must be

paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail'.<sup>25</sup> By failing to disallow Southern Rhodesian legislation that was clearly detrimental to African interests, L S Amery, secretary of state for the colonies from 1924 to 1929, clearly established that the doctrine of 'paramountcy' did not apply south of the Zambezi.<sup>26</sup> Some element of doubt remained, however, as to how far it applied to Northern Rhodesia. That doubt was dispelled in 1930 by Amery's Labour successor, Lord Passfield, who explicitly reiterated the doctrine in the context of Northern Rhodesia.<sup>27</sup>

Perhaps the most important consequence of the 'Passfield memorandum' was that it gave a tremendous boost in the north to the cause of the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. Only by thus freeing their territory from Colonial Office control did Northern Rhodesian settlers believe that they could establish full control over their own affairs. The British government's response to demands from the elected members of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council for amalgamation was a parliamentary statement on 2 July 1931. While this did not rule out amalgamation in principle, it claimed that conditions in the two territories were not yet propitious and made specific reference to the need, in any subsequent scheme for amalgamation, to safeguard native interests. Despite the attitude of the British government, pressure for amalgamation from the settlers of both Northern and Southern Rhodesia continued to mount. In January 1936, the elected members of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council and representatives from the three parties in the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly held a conference at Victoria Falls and passed a resolution strongly in favour of amalgamation. This resolution formed the basis for a motion which was carried in the Southern Rhodesian Assembly in May 1936.

Following a visit to London in 1937 by the Southern Rhodesian prime minister, Godfrey Huggins, the British government appointed a royal commission to consider closer association between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland 'with due regard to the interests of all the inhabitants, irrespective of race, of the Territories concerned, and to the special responsibility of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the interests of the Native inhabitants'.<sup>28</sup> As these terms of reference implied, the British government saw little chance of being able to reconcile the doctrine of paramountcy with the settlers' goal of amalgamation. Given, however, the prominence that the question of amalgamation enjoyed, the government did not feel able to prevent discussion of it. The royal commission, chaired by Lord Bledisloe, reported in March 1939. Its majority report recognised the desirability of closer cooperation between the Central African territories and recommended that the British government accept in principle the aim of ultimate 'political unity'.<sup>29</sup> It recommended the creation of an inter-territorial council to facilitate political and economic cooperation. Yet it ruled against immediate amalgamation, principally on the grounds of the wide divergence in 'native policy' between Southern Rhodesia and the northern territories. The commissioners also noted the strength of African opposition to amalgamation. They suggested that the Africans had, in general, 'an imperfect appreciation of the issues involved'. Nevertheless, they noted 'the striking unanimity in the northern Territories, of the native opposition to amalgamation'.<sup>30</sup> The commission ruled out federation as impractical given the difficulties of bringing together three territories at very different stages of constitutional development. It did, however recommend the immediate amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia and

Nyasaland, a development that would facilitate the more efficient use of resources by abolishing the current duplication of administrative structures.

The British government was unwilling to commit itself to a formal declaration in favour of amalgamation, and the outbreak of the Second World War curtailed further discussion of the Bledisloe Report's recommendations. The government did, however, win Huggins's support for the proposal that, in the course of his general examination of British administration across Africa, Lord Hailey should undertake a special study of the feasibility of coordinating 'native policy' in Nyasaland and the Rhodesias. Hailey's subsequent confidential report of 1941 offered little comfort to advocates of amalgamation.<sup>31</sup> He concluded that the differences in policy across the Central Africa territories were substantial, and that there was no guarantee they would decrease with the passage of time.

Yet despite British reluctance to concede amalgamation, there was a widespread recognition within government that London had to make some positive gesture in the direction of closer association. The principal reason for this was the strength of the pressure for amalgamation from the European settlers. In June 1943, an official brief for the secretary of state for the colonies, Oliver Stanley, predicted that a negative response from the British government 'would cause intense disappointment and dissatisfaction among the European population of the two territories' and might lead some Europeans, particularly those on the Copperbelt 'to take the law into their own hands'.<sup>32</sup> It would certainly embitter relations with Southern Rhodesia and lead to a breakdown of cooperation with the Europeans of Northern Rhodesia. The brief warned that unrest in the Copperbelt, where a significant number of Afrikaner workers were employed, might also serve to draw the South African government into Central African affairs, and that lack of progress might in general increase South African influence over Southern Rhodesia and ultimately threaten its absorption into the Union.

The solution favoured by Stanley's officials—one that had originally been formulated under the previous secretary of state, Lord Cranborne—was to offer some concrete steps in the direction of closer union. The governor of Southern Rhodesia would also become high commissioner for Northern Rhodesia and as many as possible of the secretary of state's existing powers would be devolved to him.<sup>33</sup> He would also chair an inter-territorial council along the lines suggested by the Bledisloe Commission. Officials were keen, largely on economic grounds, that Nyasaland should be included in any mechanisms for closer association. They argued that

Nyasaland is small and poor, and would benefit not only from the resources of her neighbours but also from the power to call on technical and other advice and assistance which she herself has been unable to afford in the past.<sup>34</sup>

A similar approach was favoured by Evelyn Baring, the governor of Southern Rhodesia. In November 1943, he warned London that if they failed to take the initiative, they would be faced with a stark choice between amalgamation on terms which would threaten to spread the Southern Rhodesian colour bar to the Northern territories, or Southern Rhodesia's absorption into the Union. Baring recommended the adoption of a series of policies for closer cooperation, so as 'to avoid the development of a straight choice of this nature'.<sup>35</sup>

The idea of creating a high commissioner was not pursued further at this time; but

on 18 October 1944, following talks with Huggins, Stanley announced plans for the creation of a Central African Council. The statement represented a double blow for Welensky and the Northern Rhodesian unofficial members. On the one hand it explicitly ruled out amalgamation as impractical under the current circumstances. At the same time, constitutional changes were announced for Northern Rhodesia that fell far short of the settlers' ambitions. The territory was to be given an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council. This was to be achieved, however, not by increasing the number of elected (European) members, but by adding four additional nominated unofficials, two of whom would represent African interests. A European, Stewart Gore-Browne, already performed that function on the Legislative Council. It was intended, however, that the two new representatives would, as soon as possible, be Africans, drawn from a newly created territorial African representative council.<sup>36</sup> The proposals therefore failed to offer representative government on Southern Rhodesian lines; and since the Bledisloe Report had explicitly ruled out federation on the grounds that the three Central African territories were at such different stages of constitutional development, the new constitutional proposals did little to bring forward the prospect of significant political unification.

Huggins managed to persuade Welensky not to reject the proposal for the Central African Council, on the grounds that it might help the cause of amalgamation, and was, at the very least, unlikely to hinder it. Indeed, there was, from the very beginning, a fundamental difference between the attitude towards the Council on the part of the British government and of Huggins and Welensky. British officials had envisaged the Council as a means of deflecting pressures for amalgamation. In his statement of October 1944, Stanley was careful not to suggest that the Council was either a substitute for amalgamation or an impediment to the achievement of that goal.<sup>37</sup> In private, however, British officials were less circumspect. Setting out the advantages of a formal agreement on the general nature of the Council in February 1945, Andrew Cohen, the highly influential CO official (then assistant secretary), noted that, far from being a step towards it, the Council represented 'a bulwark against amalgamation, in that it would give formal expression to the alternative policy suggested by H.M. Government'(1). Huggins and Welensky, by contrast, saw the Council as potentially laying the basis for amalgamation, as they made clear at the opening session on 24–26 April 1945 (2).

This essential divergence of approach between the British government and the settlers provided the Council with particularly flimsy foundations. Additional problems were created by the attitude of the governor of Nyasaland, Sir Edmund Richards. While his counterpart in Northern Rhodesia, Sir John Waddington, welcomed the decision to create the Council, Richards saw few advantages in it from the point of view of Nyasaland. Once the Council was established, Richards was reluctant to see its remit expanded. Waddington, by contrast, with one eye clearly on the need to mollify the leaders of his territory's settler community, was keen that the scope of its activities in the provision of 'joint services' should be enlarged to cover European education in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and ultimately Customs and Posts and Telegraphs. He was supported in this by Andrew Cohen who argued in June 1946 that co-operation in Central Africa would serve as a 'counterweight to the Union' and would encourage liberal influences in Southern Rhodesia (11).

That the Council's relatively modest role was not outstripped at an even earlier stage by Huggins and Welensky's amalgamationist ambitions probably owed much to

the electoral situation in Southern Rhodesia. In the general election of 1946, Huggins's United Party lost its overall majority. Huggins formed a minority government with the support of the main opposition group, the Liberal Party, which opposed amalgamation. His personal support for the amalgamationist cause did not, however, cease. Instead, it assumed a more discreet form; and when, in 1948, the United Party regained its parliamentary majority, pressure for closer association once more began to build.

*Constitutional developments in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia*

Shortly after the end of the war, discussions began about drafting a new constitution for Nyasaland. The issue presented policy makers with two significant questions: how were European representatives to be selected, and was there to be an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council? In 1944, there were 2,140,000 Africans in Nyasaland, 2,200 Asians, 1,850 Europeans and 1,800 Anglo-Africans. Under the constitution that operated at the beginning of 1946, there were twelve members of the Legislative Council: six officials and six unofficials. Five of the six unofficials were nominated by the Nyasaland Convention of Associations, the main body representing European interests in the territory. The sixth unofficial member represented missionary—and by extension African—interests. There were no African members of the Legislative Council. Early in 1946, both the Convention of Associations and the Nyasaland Chamber of Commerce submitted proposals for the introduction of an element of election into the choice of unofficial members. Given that recent splits within the European community had undermined the ability of the Convention of Associations to claim to speak for Europeans as a whole, the governor of Nyasaland saw some merit in these proposals.<sup>38</sup> The Colonial Office was, however, implacably opposed to the idea of direct election. On Cohen's calculations only around 1,000 Europeans in the territory were qualified to vote, and around half of these were missionaries or officials (7). The problem was not merely the size of such a potential electorate but also how it was to be defined. If the vote were open to all British subjects, a substantial number of Asians would also be eligible. Their exclusion, or the creation of a separate Asian roll, was likely to create further difficulties. For all these reasons, election did not appear a viable option. In the event, when constitutional changes were introduced in 1949, the method of selecting European representatives remained largely unaltered. The small size of the European population in Nyasaland was to prove a major problem for British policy-makers in subsequent years when seeking to chart a course of constitutional development there. While it was manifestly unjust that Nyasaland's Europeans should have greater representation than the African population, the introduction of an African majority among unofficial members was likely to be viewed with dismay by settler leaders in the Rhodesias.

During constitutional talks in 1946, the Colonial Office had favoured the concession of an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council, and this remained the position until the arrival in Nyasaland in 1948 of a new governor, Geoffrey Colby. Colby expressed some sympathy for European concerns that the simultaneous introduction of both African representation and an unofficial majority represented a 'rather sudden' change.<sup>39</sup> This reflected Colby's low opinion of both African and European leaders in the territory (32). He preferred to leave the constitution unaltered, and the balance of power between officials and unofficials unchanged,

while introducing non-white members to the legislature. The CO accepted the logic of Colby's new proposals, while impressing upon him the need to introduce a new constitution in the near future.<sup>40</sup> Hence, in November 1948, the Nyasaland government announced that two African and one Asian unofficials and three officials would be added to the Legislative Council.<sup>41</sup> The African representatives were to be chosen indirectly via a system of provincial and national councils established in 1945. These reforms created a Legislative Council of nine officials and nine unofficials. In announcing the changes, the Nyasaland government promised that the establishment of an unofficial majority was its ultimate aim and that a new constitution would be considered once experience had been gained of working the current system. In the event, it was not to be for some years that the subject again came under sustained consideration.

In the summer of 1946, following talks between the secretary of state for the colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, the governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir John Waddington, the leader of the Northern Rhodesian unofficials, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, and his colleague, Roy Welensky, some changes were agreed to the Northern Rhodesian constitution (13). The reforms, which were to be implemented after the next general election, gave the European settlers an additional two elected members in the legislature. But the European elected members could still be outvoted by the combined strength of the officials and nominated members. The changes were not sufficient to retain Welensky's good will. By November 1946, he was threatening to resign from the Executive Council and 'to make the present constitution unworkable with the idea of obtaining constitutional advance or, better still, amalgamation' (19). As the issue of amalgamation gained momentum, Gore-Browne's joint role as leader of the unofficials and nominated representative for African interests, became untenable. Despite the fact that the majority of his colleagues supported it, African hostility to amalgamation led Gore-Browne to oppose it. In November, he was replaced by Welensky as leader of the Northern Rhodesian unofficials. The following month, on 21 December, Welensky carried out his threat of resignation from the Executive Council. Another unofficial, T S Page, followed Welensky's example.

The elected members' frustration with what they regarded as the negative attitude adopted by the Northern Rhodesian administration over the issue of amalgamation encouraged their demands for a greater say in the territory's affairs.<sup>42</sup> In January 1948—some months before the implementation of the constitutional package agreed in 1946—Gore-Browne issued a call for 'representative government'. This was followed in February by Welensky's announcement of specific proposals under which elected Europeans would occupy half the seats in the Legislative Council and three out of seven seats on the Executive Council, including the post of chairman (27).

The governor, Sir Gilbert Rennie, was not prepared to accept these proposals, but recognised that if his administration was merely condemned them and suggested nothing in their place, 'we shall spend all our time here squabbling with the unofficial members instead of getting on with the thousand and one urgent matters that need attention' (25). Rennie proposed a number of concessions, which would have allowed elected European members a greater role in government. Although officials at the Colonial Office voiced reservations about some of Rennie's specific proposals, there was general agreement about the need to reach an accommodation with the European settlers. It was hoped that this would enable the Northern

Rhodesian administration 'to harness to its service the vigour and drive of the best of the Unofficials whose activities are at present unfortunately directed towards opposition of [sic] the Government' (30).

Rennie's approach succeeded in regaining the cooperation of settler leaders. A delegation from Northern Rhodesia, including European unofficial members and two Africans selected by the African representative council, arrived in London at the end of July 1948 to discuss the territory's constitution. The talks turned out to be among the most even-tempered of any constitutional discussions during this period. The Northern Rhodesian unofficial members immediately dropped their demands for responsible government, ostensibly on the grounds that the Africans opposed them. In reality, the unofficials had been under no illusions that their own proposals had little chance of being accepted by the British government.<sup>43</sup> They were more than happy to accept instead Rennie's proposals for an expansion of unofficial representation on the Executive Council. The talks also witnessed something of a breakthrough over the question of closer association.

### *The emergence of federal proposals*

On 28 May 1948, D F Malan's National Party won the South African general election and established the Union's first ever all-Afrikaner Cabinet. In the longer term, this development would give the Central African settlers a powerful weapon in their campaign for closer association, one that was to carry considerable weight with the British government. Initially, however, Cohen was cautious about investing the result with too much significance. Writing the day after Malan's victory, he suggested that it was too early to say whether this would 'give a fillip to the movement in Southern Rhodesia for amalgamation' (26). He argued that the government could not diverge significantly from its current position on closer association until the Africans of the northern territories were 'sufficiently advanced' to offer 'a really valuable opinion' on the matter. Since he thought that this stage might be 'a considerable time off', he felt that the government should confine itself to working for closer co-ordination through the CAC.

By the time of the Northern Rhodesian delegation's visit to London two months later, however, Cohen's attitude had undergone a significant change. This seems to have had much to do with signs from Central Africa that settler leaders were prepared to embrace a more 'realistic' model of closer association. During the early months of 1948, with his relationship with the Liberal Party still hanging in the balance, Huggins remained cautious about throwing his weight entirely behind the amalgamationist cause. An important indication of his private commitment to it, however, came in February 1948 when his former minister for agriculture and close friend, F E Harris, visited Lusaka along with Stanley Cooke, a Southern Rhodesian businessman who had already made clear his intention to create a committee to promote amalgamation. The two held talks with Welensky and the other Northern Rhodesian unofficials, who endorsed the idea of establishing such a committee (24). Christened the United Central Africa Association (UCAA), the organisation formally came into being on 31 March with Harris as its president. Its stated purpose was to campaign for the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias followed by the creation of a federation in Central Africa.<sup>44</sup> Early in June there was a meeting in Lusaka between a delegation from the UCAA and unofficial members of the Northern Rhodesian legislature. This concluded that federation was the only form of closer association

which was likely to be acceptable to the British government.<sup>45</sup> Shortly afterwards, Welensky announced in the Legislative Council that he would welcome the opportunity to discuss federation during his forthcoming visit to London. He later specified that he essentially wished to express his personal views on the matter.<sup>46</sup>

Huggins's obvious role in this new development made a strong impression on Cohen and caused him to revise the view he had expressed in May. He wondered whether the time might not be right in the fairly near future 'to attempt to step forward towards federation (perhaps on the lines of the East African High Commission)' (29). Two further developments gave encouragement to the cause of closer association. On 12 July, the acting chief secretary of the CAC, H N Parry, circulated a memorandum to all Council members, outlining the advantages of federation. Three days later, in a more significant step, the Huggins government was brought down on a relatively trivial administrative issue. The nature and timing of the defeat was, as Wood has noted, no accident. Huggins was keen to escape the straitjacket of having to govern with Liberal Party support. He also wished to protect a pet scheme for the cultivation of sugar, which had come under fierce criticism from a select committee on public accounts. By effectively engineering the defeat of his own government on an issue relating to Southern Rhodesia's membership of the CAC, Huggins was thereafter able to claim that the organisation had become a political liability.<sup>47</sup> His return to power in the general election of 16 September with a safe majority was to offer a major boost to the cause of unification.

At an inter-departmental meeting, chaired by the secretary of state for Commonwealth relations, Patrick Gordon Walker, on 22 July, shortly before the arrival of the Northern Rhodesian delegation, officials from the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices discussed how the question of closer association should be handled. There appears to have been general agreement that the CAC could not continue for much longer in its current form, and that some further concession to settler demands was necessary. One model discussed was that of the East African High Commission with a central executive and a central assembly. Cohen, who supported this idea, raised the long-standing British concern (given a sharper focus by recent events in South Africa) that 'the border of countries accepting the UK Government attitude towards native problems should be as far south as possible' (31). Yet he also employed an argument similar to that used to justify constitutional concessions in Northern Rhodesia. Cohen suggested 'that the agitation for a federation or amalgamation from Europeans in Northern Rhodesia came from a sense of frustration and that this would expend itself if the Europeans were playing a useful part in a Central African Assembly'.

As Whitehall had anticipated, Welensky raised the issue of closer association during his visit to London. At a meeting with Creech Jones and some of his officials on 30 July, Welensky claimed that he 'had come to the conclusion that nothing was to be gained by pressing for amalgamation', and that, instead, he was in favour of some form of federation (33). In reply, Creech Jones stated that the government did not as yet have a position on this issue. Personally, however, he felt that some form of closer association—short of amalgamation—was desirable. He hoped that greater use could be made of the CAC. In a significant concession, however, he added that 'if the present organisation was proving inadequate then we must investigate the possibility of setting up some form of machinery which, while retaining local autonomy and safeguarding the interests of each territory, would provide for the

surrender of some powers to a central authority for the sake of the advantages to be gained from joint action in certain spheres (as, e.g. in East Africa)'. While this statement was hedged about with further conditions, it can only have encouraged the settlers to declare the CAC moribund and to press for a system more to their tastes.

Welensky admitted in his meeting with Creech Jones that 'it was a waste of time discussing the question further if Southern Rhodesia was not in favour of it'. Huggins's return with a working majority at the Southern Rhodesian general election in September thus provided a vital precondition for Welensky's plans. Indeed, Huggins immediately followed his victory at the polls with an announcement that he would use his visit to London in October to press for the 'marriage of the Rhodesias'.<sup>48</sup> At the time, however, Huggins was still talking in terms of unification. It was not until October, when Huggins was visiting London for the dominions prime ministers' conference, that he and Welensky both came out firmly in favour of federation. Welensky had arrived in London the previous month for a conference on the Colonial Office's territories in Africa. He used the conference to launch a vigorous defence of the role of Europeans in Africa, threatening to resign from the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council in protest at the way in which he and his fellow European delegates had been treated.<sup>49</sup> Outside the conference, he took the opportunity to obtain final confirmation from both Creech Jones and Oliver Stanley, who spoke for the Conservatives on colonial affairs, that there was no possibility of either of Britain's major parties supporting amalgamation.<sup>50</sup> On that basis, Welensky approached Huggins and drew from him a firm declaration in favour of federation. The prospect of gaining access to the mineral wealth of Northern Rhodesia was no doubt in the Southern Rhodesian premier's mind when he decided to throw his weight behind a more limited form of closer association.<sup>51</sup>

Faced with the prospect of a joint approach from Huggins and Welensky, the Colonial Office considered its response. Senior officials were broadly positive about this development.<sup>52</sup> They favoured initiating local discussions within the Central African territories but with the proviso that the British government should set some guidelines for these talks. To this end they suggested that the government should make a statement to the effect that 'there were strong arguments in favour of federation, provided that certain difficulties could be overcome, and then ask that local representatives should consider these difficulties'. Creech Jones, by contrast, was far more cautious about the government appearing to take the initiative in this matter. 'The political stuff is dynamite' he warned, and 'must be handled with great care. We must go slow with such discussions'.<sup>53</sup> When he saw Welensky towards the end of October, he warned him that the British government could not initiate discussions. Yet he implicitly invited Welensky and Huggins to take the initiative themselves.<sup>54</sup>

This settlers' response was not long in coming. On 20 December, Welensky announced that a conference on closer association would be held at the Victoria Falls. This took place on 16 and 17 February 1949. Each of the three Central African territories was invited to send four representatives. There were, however, no Africans in any of the delegations, and one of the Nyasaland representatives, M P Barrow, complained that he had received so little notice of the conference that he had had insufficient time to hold consultations. The Southern Rhodesians dominated the proceedings, and the scheme agreed upon by the conference would have left Central Africa firmly under their control. The proposals followed the model of the Australian

federation. There was to be a bicameral parliament consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Real power rested with the latter, which was to have no African members. The seats were to be allocated to each territory according to their population, following an explicitly discriminatory formula under which 100 Africans were to be considered equal to one European. In a chamber consisting of 48 seats, this would have given Southern Rhodesia 30 seats, Northern Rhodesia 12 and Nyasaland 6. Only a relatively limited range of powers was to be left with the territorial governments, which would not even be responsible for all aspects of 'native affairs'. A strong indication that Huggins's enthusiasm for federation was premised on the redistribution of Northern Rhodesian mineral wealth was that the vast majority of territorial revenues would go to the federal government, with Northern Rhodesia retaining less than 20 per cent of its existing income.

The proposals were never published. Indeed, they were not even formally submitted to the British government, although Whitehall quickly learned of their nature. The very fact that the conference had been conducted in some secrecy, however, was enough to arouse African concerns. The Victoria Falls proposals were accompanied by unmistakable signs that Welensky and Huggins were prepared to use every means available to them to get their way. Visiting Central Africa in late February 1949, R J Vile from the Colonial Office had talks with Welensky. Welensky warned that if the secretary of state did not support plans for federation, he would lead a boycott of the legislature by unofficial members and would do everything possible to disrupt government in Northern Rhodesia.<sup>55</sup> Vile was also warned by Parry, the chief secretary of the CAC, that if the government did not accept federation, Southern Rhodesia might not only adopt a policy of non-co-operation towards the Central African Council but could actively 'apply economic pressure on Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland primarily by increasing chrome output and reducing the number of railway wagons available for the transport of copper' (37). Parry stressed that the government had to make some response to the settlers' federal proposals. The chief secretary of Northern Rhodesia, R C S Stanley, was also keen that the government should respond as quickly as possible. Stanley was candid in describing the current situation in Northern Rhodesia—under which European representatives were constantly threatening to withdraw cooperation—as 'government by blackmail'.<sup>56</sup> He was equally candid that a Central African federation would be 'a "White Man's Country" in the sense that the Africans will never be likely to achieve full political equality in any foreseeable time'. Yet he was adamant that the British government had to take the initiative if they wished to retain control of the situation.

Amongst officials at the CO, there was considerable sympathy for this view (38). Ministers were, however, reluctant to commit themselves, even in principle, to any further measure of closer association. Hence, when in April 1949, Creech Jones held talks with Huggins and Welensky during a tour of Central Africa, he merely reiterated the government's earlier position that it would not put forward ideas of its own but was prepared to consider any new proposals from Central Africa. The failure of Welensky and Huggins to reach agreement on a form of closer association meant that the British government's approach succeeded in delaying progress on the issue. There was, however, growing pressure from settler leaders on the government to take the initiative. During meetings with ministers and officials from the CO and CRO at the end of November, the Southern Rhodesian minister of justice, T M W

Beadle, had given warning of what was to be the Southern Rhodesian government's preferred method for forcing London's hand: to threaten the very existence of the CAC. He told a meeting on 29 November that 'if federation seemed a remote prospect, they would have to reconsider whether continuation of the Central African Council was worth while' (44). In January 1950, the Southern Rhodesian government acted upon this threat, placing on the agenda of the CAC a motion calling for its abolition in twelve months time. At that point, Southern Rhodesia would quit the organisation. In July, Arthur Benson, the chief secretary of the CAC, warned Creech Jones that the government of Southern Rhodesia had no intention of co-operating with the Council (49). He urged the government to seize the initiative, warning that if it failed to do so 'Southern Rhodesia would be driven into the arms of the Union and he felt that if this were to happen it might be very difficult to prevent Northern Rhodesia, at least, from being absorbed into this larger unit'. This appeal to Britain's geopolitical interests in the region was one that was to be echoed with increasing force in documents prepared in Whitehall.

Indeed, a related concern had already entered the policy-making arena: that of Afrikaner immigration into Central Africa. Welensky played a significant role in encouraging Whitehall to pay attention to the issue. He raised it during his talks with Cohen in London early in August 1949, suggesting that immigration from South Africa to Northern Rhodesia was taking place at an annual rate of 7,000. Following this discussion, Cohen wrote to Rennie requesting further information.<sup>57</sup> In response Rennie noted, 'Some of us have been worried about this question, which needs a great deal of investigation and consideration.'<sup>58</sup> Yet the information he provided suggested that the figure of 7,000 was an exaggeration and that other pieces of information advanced by Welensky to prove the growing influence of the Afrikaners were incorrect (43). Welensky persisted with his alarmist reports. In November 1949, he warned Cohen that one of his fellow unofficials on the Northern Rhodesian Executive Council had predicted that after the next general election in the territory 'the majority of Members of the House will be Afrikaans'.<sup>59</sup> The following month, Rennie reiterated this warning, adding that it 'would be a calamity, in view of the trend of events in South Africa' (45). Significantly, however, while he expressed pessimism about Northern Rhodesia's ability to stem this flow from the south, Rennie did not suggest at this stage that the solution lay in closer association.

It is difficult to assess whether Welensky and Huggins promoted the issue of Afrikaner immigration *principally* as a means of preparing the ground for their federal proposals. There is good reason, however, to suspect that they did. Certainly from 1949 onwards, Welensky (whose own mother was an Afrikaner) never lost a chance to impress on the British government his fears of the consequences of unrestricted Afrikaner immigration into Northern Rhodesia. Yet he was reluctant to support specific measures to address the problem. In 1950, along with other European elected members, he resisted the introduction of immigration controls along the lines of the Kenyan Immigration Control Ordinance of 1948. He advocated instead 'a scheme of his own for counterbalancing the inflow of Afrikaners by the introduction of white farm labourers from Europe'. The Colonial Office regarded this as having more to do with building up the overall strength of the European population of Central Africa and maintaining the colour bar, and would have nothing to do with it.<sup>60</sup>

It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the issue of the Union's influence over

the rest of Southern Africa was a mere smoke-screen in the debates over federation. It was a long-standing British concern, one that cast a particularly long shadow over the question of the ultimate fate of the 'High Commission' territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.<sup>61</sup> What does appear to be the case is that as the federal cause gained momentum, the geopolitical argument for the scheme was progressively fore-grounded, and the issue of settler pressure sidelined. Both settler politicians and pro-federal British civil servants clearly recognised that the Afrikaner threat was the sort of thing that played well with Labour ministers. It was also, crucially, a means of seeking to persuade those in Britain who were sympathetic towards the plight of the Africans that, far from federation being an instrument of European oppression, it was a means of blocking the northwards spread of apartheid.

One can see this process in operation in the early months of 1951. Two developments during this period served to advance the cause of federation: the visit to Central and Southern Africa by Gordon Walker from 18 January to 3 March, and the conference of officials from Britain and Central Africa which met in London from 5 to 31 March. Gordon Walker returned from his tour of the region convinced of the reality of the South African threat to the Rhodesias and persuaded of the benefits of federation.<sup>62</sup> Meanwhile, under the chairmanship of G H Baxter from the CRO (and the guidance of Cohen), the conference in March produced an outline for federation which, in many of its principal features, closely resembled the scheme that was ultimately implemented. A number of the recommendations in the report of the officials' conference (the 'Baxter Report') were geared to making federation more palatable to the Africans. Matters directly affecting the lives of ordinary Africans were to remain, so far as possible, in the hands of the territorial governments. There would be an African Affairs Board, the members of which would include an African from each of the federal territories. The Board would be responsible for vetting federal legislation, and it could, if it objected to a bill, refer it to the United Kingdom parliament. There would also be a minister for African affairs who would sit in the federal Cabinet and chair the African Affairs Board.<sup>63</sup> He would be responsible to the governor-general of the Federation and, ultimately, to the British government. The Baxter Report was produced in a form suitable for publication, but it was accompanied by a confidential minute from Baxter and Cohen, which was far more explicit in relating closer association to the threat from South Africa. Although the minute was intended to be shown only to the British and the Central African governments, its exposition of the 'Afrikaner danger' was also intended for private circulation as a means of softening opposition to the federal proposals (57).

Even within the CRO there was a certain amount of scepticism about the reality of the Afrikaner threat and uses to which it was put by settler politicians. Assistant under-secretary, Saville Garner, commented that 'Sir Godfrey Huggins is not averse from "making our flesh creep" over this possible danger' (59). Nevertheless, Baxter and Cohen's confidential minute clearly made an impression on Gordon Walker, and reinforced the impressions he had gained from his recent visit to Central and Southern Africa. The Cabinet memorandum he produced for his colleagues in April describing his visit placed a great deal of emphasis on the danger from South Africa. Yet it was also extraordinarily frank in admitting that the British communities in Central Africa were likely to become 'potential American colonies' over which Britain could exercise very little control.<sup>64</sup> The following month, Gordon Walker and Creech Jones's successor, James Griffiths, submitted a joint Cabinet memorandum inviting

their colleagues to endorse the broad terms of the Baxter Report.<sup>65</sup> They included as an appendix Baxter and Cohen's confidential minute. The memorandum was as notable for what it did *not* say as for what it did. In contrast to Gordon Walker's April memorandum, it contained no comparable acknowledgement of the force of settler pressure. Rather it placed enormous stress on the threat from Afrikaner immigration.

This shift in emphasis, which set the pattern for subsequent Cabinet memoranda on the federation, had extremely important implications for the way in which the settlers of Central Africa were constructed in official discourse. The settlers were increasingly conceived as upholders of British values, under threat from an illiberal alien culture.<sup>66</sup> This gave Huggins and later Welensky enormous moral leverage in their subsequent dealings with the British government. Both exploited it consistently in their attempts to block political advance for Africans. Their argument was that the maintenance in power of their Federal—later United Federal—Party was essential to the preservation of British influence in Central Africa. Any concessions to the Africans would be resented by the largely European electorate of the Federation and might result in a victory for the right-wing Dominion Party—which would in turn open the gates to South African influence. Conversely, concessions to white settler demands—as Welensky argued when pressing for dominion status for the Federation in May 1956—would be a way of keeping Afrikanerdom at bay.<sup>67</sup> Welensky even attempted to suggest in March 1956 that his desire to restrict the vote in federal elections to federal citizens—thereby excluding most Africans—was a means of keeping Afrikaners off the electoral roll (116). In a more profound sense, settler leaders, including later Ian Smith, were able to play on this powerful notion of being representatives of British values in Central Africa. Their underlying argument was that in betraying them, the British government was in a sense betraying Britain itself.

Despite the best efforts of the advocates of federation within Whitehall, the Labour government remained highly cautious about endorsing any scheme that was likely to encounter concerted African opposition. The proposals of the officials' conference were published as a white paper in June 1951. Yet the government went no further than to commend them as a basis for further discussion. Without a firm commitment to federation, it was difficult to make progress. A conference at Victoria Falls in September 1951, although it was attended by both Gordon Walker and Griffiths, achieved very little. Its chances of success were almost certainly undermined by the announcement on the second day of Attlee's intention to hold a general election.<sup>68</sup> The possibility that the Labour government might be replaced by a Conservative administration considerably more sympathetic to the federal scheme provided little incentive for any of the delegates from Central Africa to make concessions. Griffiths's apparent preoccupation with African objections enraged settler politicians. Huggins compared the conference to 'a native benefit society meeting'.<sup>69</sup>

On 12 October, less than a fortnight before Britain was due to go to the polls, Gordon Walker and Griffiths submitted a new joint memorandum to the Cabinet.<sup>70</sup> It recommended that, as soon as possible after the general election, the government should announce that it endorsed the conclusions of the Victoria Falls conference, including the proposal to resume the conference in London around the middle of 1952, and that it would favour in principle the federation of the three central African

territories. At the same time, however, the two secretaries of state declared themselves to be 'strongly opposed to any attempt to force the federation proposals through in the face of solid African opposition'. Since the last Labour Cabinet meeting was held on 27 September, there was no prospect of the proposals being endorsed. According to Cohen, the joint memorandum was written by himself in consultations with officials at the CRO 'on the instructions of Mr Griffiths and Mr Gordon Walker with the object of leaving their views on record for whatever Government was returned after the General Election'.<sup>71</sup> In practice, however, it is difficult not to believe that the joint memorandum served a rather more definite purpose. At the very least, it was an attempt by the advocates of federation within Whitehall to ensure that the British general election did not delay progress on that issue. As Baxter assured Ian Maclellan, the British high commissioner in Salisbury, two days before polling, 'We have not ... stood still' (66). Baxter was confident that a statement on the lines of that recommended in the joint memorandum would 'transform the situation'. A more cynical way of looking at the joint memorandum is as a means of ensuring that maximum advantage could be taken of the advent of what might be a far more amenable Conservative administration. Whatever the case, once the Conservatives had won the October general election, Cohen and Baxter wasted no time in pressing their new ministers for an early initiative on federation, using the joint memorandum as their template.

Within two days of the announcement of their appointment on 28 October, officials had arranged for Lord Ismay and Oliver Lyttelton, the new Commonwealth relations and colonial secretaries, to be shown the recent joint memorandum by Griffiths and Gordon Walker. In a minute to Ismay, Baxter noted 'The fact that further progress was not made at the Victoria Falls Conference was largely due to the failure of the late Government to take a more definite line in favour of closer association last June when the Report was published' (68). He argued that, so far as it was possible to retrieve the situation, this could best be done by making a public statement on the lines recommended in the joint memorandum. By the morning of 31 October, Lyttelton had already indicated to Cohen that he supported the general line taken in the document.<sup>72</sup> Ismay and Lyttelton discussed the terms of a statement on 6 November, and in the light of their discussions a revised draft was produced by officials. Officials also produced a draft Cabinet memorandum by the two secretaries of state. It was as brief as they could make it, with the gist of the argument in the opening paragraph so that, in Baxter's words, 'the Prime Minister, for example, may be able at once to see the nature of the proposals and the reasons for their urgency' (69).

The joint memorandum by Ismay and Lyttelton was submitted to the Cabinet on 9 November and approved six days later.<sup>73</sup> There was some pressure from senior British officials in Central Africa—notably Rennie and Parry—to delay the government's statement until Southern Rhodesia had clarified its position on the terms of the 'Baxter Report'.<sup>74</sup> Officials in Whitehall, however, resisted this suggestion. They feared, in Cohen's words, that if 'the statement were deferred we should lose the initiative'.<sup>75</sup> Talks with the Southern Rhodesians might make it necessary to alter the terms of the statement and might thus lead to suspicions that London was negotiating behind the backs of the Africans. In the event, the proposed statement was delivered in the Commons by Lyttelton on 21 November. In announcing his government's belief in the need for federation, Lyttelton also promised that the protectorate status of the two northern territories would be maintained.

In the final days of 1951, Parry delivered a devastating blow to those in Whitehall who still hoped that African opposition to federation in the two northern territories could be allayed. Reporting on the views expressed in a recent meeting of the Central African Council, he concluded that there no longer remained any chance of achieving this (71). Officials at the Colonial Office recognised that if African opposition was indeed implacable, the government would soon be forced to decide whether or not it was prepared to press ahead with federation in the face of this (72). It was feared, however, that a decision to defy African opinion was likely to create difficulties not just in terms of the passage of any legislation through Parliament and, of course, in Central Africa itself, but also in other British territories. To dismiss African objections to federation in Central Africa would strengthen the arguments of the South African government that the inhabitants of the High Commission territories were not competent to judge the merits of incorporation in the Union (74).

Despite such reservations, January witnessed a growing acceptance within Whitehall that the government *should* press ahead with federation regardless. Conservative ministers, who were privately dismissive of African objections, needed little convincing that this was the right course of action.<sup>76</sup> A logical corollary of this position was that the British government was increasingly willing to offer concessions to Huggins. With not only the chance of winning African support, but the very legitimacy of African objections effectively discounted, everything now hinged on whether proposals could be sold to the Southern Rhodesian government, and ultimately to its European settlers who had been promised the right to vote on them in a referendum before federation was implemented. Since it was assumed that Africans would reject federation whatever form it took, it became less important if the proposals appeared to be weighted towards Southern Rhodesian demands. Huggins was known to be strongly opposed to the proposal for a federal minister for African interests. This aspect of the 'Baxter Report' had been represented in the joint Cabinet memorandum of the two secretaries of state the previous month as a major safeguard of African interests. Yet during talks in London with Colby, Rennie, Huggins, and his finance minister, Edgar Whitehead, between 22 January and 1 February, British ministers agreed to drop the proposal for a minister for African interests. They also agreed to a number of proposals from Huggins regarding the composition and powers of the African Affairs Board, including the provision that the three territorial secretaries for native affairs should be excluded from membership of the Board.<sup>77</sup>

The principal counterbalance to this tendency to gear concessions towards the European settlers was provided by the British Labour Party. On 5 March, the House of Commons divided on a Labour motion tabled by James Griffiths, which was critical of the government's handling of the federal negotiations. Although the motion was defeated, it signalled the breakdown of the previous bi-partisan approach to Central African policy, and a decisive move by Labour to back African critics of federation. Any further concessions to Huggins were likely to alienate Labour still further and remove any chance of re-establishing a consensus.

Aside from African opponents of federation and their sympathisers in London, the other major obstacle to the creation of a federation was the attitude of the government of Nyasaland. As early as May 1946, the Nyasaland government was expressing some suspicion towards the notion of developing joint services between the three Central African territories.<sup>78</sup> In the summer of 1948, as the idea of

federation began to take root in the CO with the vigorous encouragement of assistant under-secretary Cohen, both Colby and Rennie told London of their doubts about the specific proposals that were emerging. Thereafter, the positions of Rennie and Colby began to diverge. This is probably best explained by their countries' very different internal political make-up. Rennie was faced with an increasingly truculent European settler community. At the very least, federation promised to divert the energies of settler leaders into more constructive channels and take some of the pressure off the Northern Rhodesian administration. Rennie himself made clear to London in March 1949 that in principle at least, he saw 'many advantages' to closer association between Northern and Southern Rhodesia.<sup>79</sup> He continued, however, to object to the *specific* proposals put forward by settler leaders which, he felt, gave too much power to a federal government and offered insufficient representation to Africans.

Colby, by contrast, did not even regard his territory as being part of a natural Central African regional grouping, and he opposed federation at every turn. As the negotiations leading to federation gained momentum, so Colby's warnings to London became ever more shrill. At the end of November 1951, shortly after the Conservatives took office, he told Cohen, 'I feel very strongly that we should take the initiative and pull out'.<sup>80</sup> These warnings culminated in March 1952 in an explicit recommendation to the secretary of state 'that Nyasaland should not be included in any Central African Federation and that consideration of its participation should be postponed indefinitely' (79). Nyasaland's European settler population was much smaller, had less economic leverage and was less politically assertive than that of Northern Rhodesia. As such, federation would do little to ease the political pressures on Colby's administration. Indeed, rising African hostility to the scheme promised to make them a great deal worse. Colby was also extremely sceptical about the British government's stress on the value of federation as a barrier to the northwards spread of Afrikaner influence. Indeed, he saw the Afrikaner issue as another powerful reason for Nyasaland staying out. He believed that the combination of the two Rhodesias would actually increase the chances of merger with the Union. If Nyasaland were included in the federation, Colby argued, it might well 'share the same fate'.

On the economic side, Colby suggested that attempts at joint planning by the Central African Council had been hampered by the uncooperative stance of the Southern Rhodesian government. He saw little likelihood that the advent of federation would alter Southern Rhodesian attitudes towards Nyasaland. The other economic arguments in favour of federation related, he suggested, essentially to the closer association of the two Rhodesias 'and there seems little which could be added by the participation of Nyasaland'. Colby was not alone in this view. Few within the Colonial Office predicted significant economic benefits to Nyasaland from federation (at least in the short term) and some pointed to positive disadvantages. An interesting insight into thinking within the CO on this matter is the response to an article in *The Times* in January 1952, setting out the economic arguments in favour of federation.<sup>81</sup> P Selwyn, a principal in the Economic Department of the Colonial Office, wrote a long internal memorandum, demolishing each of the arguments set out in this piece (75). The response of the advocates of federation within the office to Selwyn's intervention was remarkably ineffectual. Their essential point was that, if not enough to justify federation, the economic arguments were either marginally in favour of it, or at least neutral.

If the economic arguments for federation were hardly convincing, there was an assumption within the Colonial Office, at least in the earlier stages of planning, that there would be considerable fiscal benefits to Nyasaland from the redistribution of revenue from the far wealthier territories of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. This may have played a part in London's insistence that Nyasaland be included in the federation, since the territory had recently proved an insistent supplicant for metropolitan aid.<sup>82</sup> Yet H T Bourdillon, the civil servant at the Colonial Office most closely associated with the fiscal aspects of the federal negotiations, believed that the benefits of federation in this regard were by no means self-evident. Under the proposals outlined in the Baxter Report, the federal government was to receive all customs revenues from the federal territories. Since Nyasaland's population was made up almost entirely of Africans who did not pay income tax, a far higher percentage of the territory's total revenues came from customs duties than did that of either of the Rhodesias. Hence, Bourdillon noted, Nyasaland, as the poorest of the three territories, 'so far from giving up the least, gives up the most'.<sup>83</sup> He warned that disappointment over the distribution of federal revenues might fuel African opposition to federation.

As representatives of the Central African and British governments met in London in April 1952 to attempt to devise more detailed proposals for federation, the implications of the problem identified by Bourdillon became clearer. The conference agreed that in order for federation to work effectively, the federal government should have the power not merely to raise revenue for its own needs, but to tax above its requirements and redistribute the surplus according to the needs of the individual territories. It was also agreed that an expert fiscal commission should be appointed to recommend how this would operate in practice. As Bourdillon noted in June, this presented the British government with a dilemma: a strong federation would increase Southern Rhodesian influence and hence threaten African interests. Yet a weak federation might fail to bring substantial financial benefits to Nyasaland, which would itself embitter African opinion (86). In the short term, Bourdillon was pessimistic about whether Nyasaland would experience such benefits as a result of federation.

The report of the Fiscal Commission in October 1952 served to allay some of Bourdillon's doubts. It recommended that customs and excise duties and income tax from the three territories should be collected by the federal government, which would retain 60 per cent of the revenues and give 17 per cent each to Northern and Southern Rhodesia and 6 per cent to Nyasaland.<sup>84</sup> In terms of the extremely small contribution Nyasaland would be likely to be able to make to federal revenues, this was a generous proposal and one that represented a genuine redistribution of funds in Nyasaland's favour. Furthermore, it came at a time when the price of two of Nyasaland's principal exports – tea and tobacco – were suffering a serious decline. Bourdillon was confident that if the Fiscal Commission's recommendations were adopted, Nyasaland would, in any case, 'be placed in a sound revenue position' (87). His colleague, William Gorell Barnes, was, however, less optimistic. He thought it unlikely that the recommendations of the Fiscal Commission would facilitate an increase in the pace of development sufficient for 'the ordinary African' to be conscious of much improvement.

In short, there was an undercurrent of doubt within the Colonial Office about whether Nyasaland would make significant economic or financial gains from

membership of the federation. Nor was it clear that there was much immediate likelihood of Britain making significant savings from the entry of Nyasaland into the federation. Like Northern Rhodesia, the territory would continue to benefit from Colonial Development and Welfare funds; and on past form, Colby's demands were unlikely to be any more modest. Since their protectorate status would probably remain for many years to come, it was envisaged that both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would also probably benefit from any successor Colonial Development and Welfare Act. The one significant saving the Treasury identified when reviewing the white paper that emerged from the London conference on federation in January 1953 was in the area of defence. The assumption of responsibility by the federal government for the armed forces of Nyasaland would, it was calculated, lead to an annual saving in the order of £270,000 on the Colonial Service vote (91). Yet even this saving was offset by the fact that, under the same arrangements, Britain would lose the £100,000 Northern Rhodesia contributed annually to general imperial defence.

With economic and financial arguments playing such a marginal role in the discussions, and the 'Afrikaner threat' to Nyasaland far from obvious, the question remains why London was so keen to include Nyasaland in the federation. Perhaps the most basic reason was that Nyasaland was needed both to make federation look like federation and in the hope that two administrations under Colonial Office control would offset the disproportionate political influence of Southern Rhodesia. Any form of association purely between the two Rhodesias would have appeared too much like the settlers' long-standing ambition of amalgamation—or at the very least an obvious first step towards it. Cohen virtually acknowledged this point as early as October 1948. He noted that 'Nyasaland would have to come into the federation in order to justify its setting up'.<sup>85</sup> Gorell Barnes made a similar point in 1956 when discussing whether there were any circumstances in which Nyasaland might be allowed to secede from the Federation.<sup>86</sup>

At a more practical level, there came a point when, to exclude Nyasaland from the federal negotiations on the grounds of African opposition would, it was feared, damage British prestige not only in Nyasaland but also elsewhere in Africa. By the end of 1952, both Rennie and Colby had reached the conclusion that, far from making their lives easier, the failure of the federal scheme would probably increase unrest in the long term. Colby warned that the rejection of federation would be a major boost for the Nyasaland Congress Party.<sup>87</sup> In the same month, Rennie sent a similar message to London, adding that the abandonment of federation would also enhance hostility towards the Colonial Office on the part of European politicians.<sup>88</sup>

If Nyasaland proved the most recalcitrant of the Central African territories, a potential headache was provided by Barotseland in Northern Rhodesia. Barotseland's constitutional status was a complex one.<sup>89</sup> During the period when the British South Africa Company was consolidating its control over the area of what was to become Northern Rhodesia, Barotseland had retained a high degree of autonomy. Its special status was recognised by successive orders-in-council, both before and after Northern Rhodesia passed under the control of the Colonial Office in 1924.<sup>90</sup> Restrictions were placed on prospecting and European settlement, and the 1936 Barotse Native Authority and Native Courts Ordinances had given the traditional authorities in the province more extensive powers than those enjoyed by their counterparts elsewhere in Northern Rhodesia. The Lozi of Barotseland were fiercely

protective of their special status, and were quick to object to any political developments that might threaten to undermine it. From late 1947, the related settler demands for responsible government and closer association, and attempts to question the doctrine of paramountcy, caused particular concern (40). Lozi leaders also resented what they regarded as excessive governmental interference in their institutions and felt that they received an inadequate share of resources for development. There were calls from the Lozi for the complete removal of their territory from the authority of the Northern Rhodesian governor, and the appointment instead of a resident commissioner with more limited powers.

In response to these demands, the British and Northern Rhodesian governments offered Barotseland leaders a series of assurances that they would be consulted about any changes that might affect their special status. In April 1949, during a visit to Northern Rhodesia, Creech Jones apparently told the paramount chief that the British government would 'not commit you to any constitutional changes which may be proposed as a result of present discussions without full consultation with you and your agreement (93)'. As Rennie pointed out four years later, on the very eve of the birth of the Central African Federation, this specific undertaking appeared to give Barotseland the power to opt out of the federal scheme. Officials in London were less disturbed than they might otherwise have been by this news, since the paramount chief was one of the very few African leaders who appeared likely to accept federation. They feared, however, that the undertaking might enable him to extract further concessions in return for a declaration in favour of federation.<sup>91</sup> In the event, this 'nasty scare' had a 'happy ending' so far as officials at the CRO were concerned. It was not clear whether the Lozi ever had an accurate record of Creech Jones's undertaking, and the Barotseland council ultimately gave its consent to federation (although the majority of council members voted against).

A major conference to determine the final shape of federation took place in London in January 1953. Among other matters, it settled the allocation of powers between the federal and territorial governments. Government activities were divided between those that would be under the exclusive control of the federal government, those which remained the sole responsibility of the territorial administrations, and those on a 'concurrent' list over which the federal and territorial governments would share control. In deference to African concerns, those activities judged likely to have the greatest impact on African daily life remained entirely under territorial control.<sup>92</sup> In some areas, however, ambiguity remained. An important example was that of internal security. The specific and limited subject of 'security information' was listed as a 'concurrent' item.<sup>93</sup> Yet at the insistence of British ministers and colonial officials, 'law and order' remained a purely territorial responsibility. Hence, the existing security organisations—the special branches of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the Security Branch of the BSAP—came under local control. Finally, the 'defence' of the Federation became the responsibility of the federal government. Major disputes were to arise between the federal and territorial governments over the extent to which the responsibility to 'defend' the Federation gave the federal government the right to intervene in cases of serious internal unrest.

The role of the African Affairs Board was further weakened. British ministers conceded Huggins's demand that, instead of being an entirely separate body, the Board should be a select committee of the federal parliament. Huggins had argued that such a concession would assist him in the forthcoming Southern Rhodesian

referendum on the federal proposals.<sup>94</sup> The fact that the Board was to be composed of federal MPs rather than fully independent members opened the possibility of its becoming the creature of the federal government, a fate that was, indeed, to befall it after the federal general election of 1958.<sup>95</sup> The conference also limited the Board's ability to refer to the UK parliament any measure it considered to be 'differentiating', that is to say specifically disadvantageous to Africans. The governor-general was given the right to override any decision he considered to be ill-conceived or against the public interest.<sup>96</sup>

One particular aspect of the January conference was to return to haunt the British government. It was decided that there would be a conference to review the federal constitution between seven and nine years after the inception of the Federation. Settler leaders were keen to obtain assurances that this review conference could not be used to dissolve the federation or grant secession to any of its component parts. British ministers sought to reassure them by suggesting that such an outcome was highly unlikely. Lyttelton went furthest, claiming that his understanding of the position was that 'without the unanimous consent of the four Governments [of the Federation] in fact the Constitution could not be liquidated'.<sup>97</sup> The clear implication of this—that the federal government had an effective right of veto over the dissolution of the Federation—was one that Welensky was later understandably keen to publicise.

If the January conference appeared to many critics of the scheme as representing a further weakening of safeguards for Africans, the need to secure a positive vote in the Southern Rhodesian referendum on federation stifled efforts to allay those concerns. The CRO was keen to suppress any statements that might indicate that federation threatened settler privileges.<sup>98</sup> Yet this approach came under pressure when the Labour Party managed to secure a debate on the federal proposals for 24 March. Earlier in the month, a leader in *The Times* had supported the Archbishop of Canterbury's call for 'imaginative action' to persuade Africans of the benefits of federation.<sup>99</sup> It was expected that Ministers would be asked in the course of the debate whether any such measures were contemplated. A list of possible measures was produced, and R L D Jasper at the CRO warned of the possibility that if action was not taken to win African confidence, success in the Southern Rhodesian referendum would mean that federation would start 'in an atmosphere of unrelieved hostility'.<sup>100</sup> His colleague Baxter, however, was adamant that it was undesirable, before the referendum, 'to hold out the prospect of *any* specific amelioration of the position of Africans as such as the result of federation'.<sup>101</sup> Following the 62 per cent vote in favour of federation on 9 April, Baxter underwent an abrupt change of heart on the question of pro-federal propaganda aimed at Africans.<sup>102</sup> By this stage, however, one of his colleagues was prepared to question whether there was any point in such propaganda (95). African hostility to the Federation had already established itself as an immutable fact of life.

### *Economic issues*

#### *(i) The British South Africa Company*

Running parallel to the campaign by Central Africa's settlers for closer association and (in the case of the Northern Rhodesians) self-government, efforts were made by them to establish greater control over the economy. Indeed, these different elements

of the struggle for settler autonomy were closely intertwined. The principal economic target for the Northern Rhodesian settlers was the British South Africa Company (BSAC). The 'treaties' with traditional rulers which between 1890 and 1909 helped to secure BSAC's control over Northern Rhodesia, also granted the Company sole ownership of mineral rights over large areas of the territory. They were confirmed by the British government in the Devonshire Agreement of 1923, shortly before the Colonial Office assumed responsibility for Northern Rhodesia. The royalties BSAC was able to extract on the basis of those mineral rights increased dramatically in the years after 1923 as large-scale investment in the Copperbelt boosted production. This investment came, principally, from two international conglomerates: Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST), formed by the American financier Chester Beatty, and the South African-based Anglo-American Corporation. The validity of BSAC's claim was reaffirmed in 1938 by the secretary of state for the colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, following a challenge by the Northern Rhodesian government. The campaign against the Company's rights was, however, taken up with vigour by the Northern Rhodesian settlers.

As the Second World War drew to a close, settler pressure increased. Worryingly, for London, the campaign against the Charter Company became bound up in the wider question of settler nationalism. Welensky raised the suggestion that the only way in which Northern Rhodesia could escape the strangle-hold of BSAC was by the attainment of self-government through amalgamation with its southern neighbour.<sup>103</sup> Indeed, in Cohen's view, the matter was 'entirely political' (9). He suggested that failure to act on this matter could only increase settler ill-will towards the British government. The Colonial Office was therefore keen to resolve the issue (6). Creech Jones regarded the issue as 'of vital importance both for the political & economic development of N[orthern] Rhodesia'.<sup>104</sup> Yet the Colonial Office had little room for manoeuvre. In 1945, it had asked the Treasury to buy out the Charter Company's mineral rights. Not surprisingly perhaps, given the state of Britain's finances at the end of the war, the Treasury did not regard this as an appropriate use of the country's limited resources. It was not even prepared to guarantee a loan for the purpose, or to offer to loan the money itself. Without this assistance, there seemed little possibility that the Northern Rhodesian government would agree to purchase the rights.

Salvation (at least in the short-term) came in the unlikely shape of Welensky. In March 1949, he steered a motion through the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council, calling for mineral royalties to be taxed.<sup>105</sup> Creech Jones was prepared in principle to allow the tax to be imposed. This latest stage in his campaign against BSAC served to bring the Company to the negotiating table. Talks opened in London in July under the chairmanship first of Cohen and then of the secretary of state himself, and a settlement was reached the following month. Under the agreement, which was implemented in 1950, the Charter Company's rights were confirmed up to 1986. Until that time, the Northern Rhodesian government was assigned 20 per cent of the net revenue from BSAC's rights. The British government undertook to secure those rights for so long as it was formally in control of Northern Rhodesia and to ensure that any successor government would respect the agreement 'so far as it is possible to do so'.

Another economic legacy of Charter Company rule was the railway system in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. BSAC had a

controlling interest in the parent company of Rhodesia Railways Limited, which owned the system. During the Second World War, the Southern Rhodesian government had called for Rhodesia Railways to be nationalised and brought under the control of the governments of the three territories in which it operated. The response of the British Government was, in May 1945, to appoint Sir Harold Howitt to investigate the matter. Howitt recommended that a decision on nationalisation be deferred for five years. His reasons for doing so were partly economic and partly political. On the economic side, he recognised that Northern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland would not be able to afford to play their part in the nationalisation. The only solution would be for the British government to guarantee the necessary loans. This, however, would require an Act of Parliament, something that might violate the self-governing status of Southern Rhodesia. On the political side, difficulties were caused by the existence of a colour bar on the railways. If this was maintained, it would create considerable embarrassment for the governments of Northern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland. It seemed unlikely, however, that any nationalised body would wish to challenge it and risk incurring the wrath of the European Rhodesia Railways Workers' Union. The secretaries of state for dominions affairs and the colonies submitted a joint memorandum to the Cabinet in which they accepted the logic of the Howitt report and, indeed, went further, recommending that a decision on nationalisation should be deferred for ten years rather than five (14).

The Southern Rhodesian government remained adamant that nationalisation should go ahead. Although Huggins objected to nationalisation in principle, the inadequacies of the existing rail system seemed likely to impede post-war economic growth, and its current owners were unable to provide the necessary investment to rectify the situation.<sup>106</sup> His government therefore broke the impasse by raising a loan of £32 million on the London stock exchange, all but £2 million of which was intended to cover the costs of nationalisation.<sup>107</sup> Northern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland were nominal co-guarantors of the loan, although it was expected that they would probably never have to meet their commitments. In 1947, Rhodesia Railways became a statutory corporation, notionally responsible to all three of the governments involved. Yet Southern Rhodesian leadership in the nationalisation process had, as Huggins's biographers note, provided his territory with 'a decisive grip over Central Africa's transport system'.<sup>108</sup> As we have already seen, Huggins was quite prepared to use this as a political bargaining counter. At the insistence of the British government, a railway commission was established to facilitate African advancement. Yet shortly before the incorporation took effect, Huggins gave the general secretary of the Rhodesia Railways Workers' Union what was in effect a private undertaking that the colour bar would be maintained.<sup>109</sup> Even after the federal government took over responsibility for Rhodesian Railways, the privileges of the European workforce were maintained and, indeed, buttressed by the recruitment of Italians and Greeks to perform jobs which might otherwise have gone to Africans.

*(ii) Unions, industrial unrest and the colour bar*

In the industrial, as in the political sphere, the European settlers of Northern Rhodesia consolidated their privileges during the 1940s. Nowhere was this more true than in the mines of the Copperbelt. White labour was represented by the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union, established in 1936. The union's twin strategy for fending off the threat from cheap African labour was to defend the principle of equal

pay for equal work, and to demand a closed shop.<sup>110</sup> Britain's heavy reliance on Northern Rhodesian copper supplies during the war (by 1945 it was supplying 67.9 per cent of her needs), greatly enhanced the bargaining position of the European union.<sup>111</sup> A strike by Europeans in March 1940, which triggered a separate dispute by African workers, demonstrated the union's potential for disruption. The mining companies were unwilling to deny themselves the right to undertake 'dilution'—employing Africans to do jobs which were in practice reserved for whites—while the war lasted. They did however reach an agreement with the union in July 1940—brokered by Welensky—that after the war, 'working conditions on each of the individual mines will revert to the practice at present existing'.<sup>112</sup> This was, in effect, a promise that the existing *de facto* industrial colour bar would be re-imposed at the end of the war. In 1946, a revised formula was drawn up—'Clause 42'—which had the same effect of blocking African advancement.<sup>113</sup>

Following the end of the war, official support was given to the creation of African trades unions. The catalyst for this came in October 1945, when a strike broke out among African railway workers in Southern Rhodesia, and spread to Northern Rhodesia. The strike was organised by the Rhodesia Railways African Employees' Association (RRAEA), a trades union which had been formed in March 1944 and which was not recognised by the management of Rhodesia Railways. British observers were impressed by the orderly way in which the strike was conducted (4). On the question of African trades unions there was a rare convergence of interests between settler leaders and the British authorities. European workers had a strong interest in encouraging organisations that would help to drive up African pay and hence reduce the competition from cheap, unorganised labour.<sup>114</sup> The British, by contrast, wished to create a counterbalance to the power of the European unions and to guide nascent African trades unionism along 'moderate' lines. In 1947, William Comrie, a Scottish official from the Transport and General Workers' Union, was sent to Northern Rhodesia to assist in this process. The transformation of African works committees in the mines into proper trades unions began in 1948, and the following year the African Mineworkers' Union was established.<sup>115</sup> In 1950, the African Railway Workers Trades Union was founded. This merged with the RRAEA in 1955.

Yet despite their success in this regard, the British authorities were slow to make significant inroads into the working practices that condemned African workers to far lower standards of living than those enjoyed by their European counterparts. The bargaining power of the two communities was fundamentally unequal. Africans enjoyed no direct representation in the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia. By contrast, European mineworkers and railwaymen dominated the electoral rolls of four of its ten elected seats in 1948. Among the unofficials were not only Welensky but fellow trades unionist, Brian Goodwin, president of the Mine Workers' Union. A strike on the mines by Europeans meant that African employees also ceased to work since there was no-one to supervise them. This gave European politicians a pretext for intervention in industrial disputes. In August 1946, during a dispute between the European union and the mining companies, Welensky urged the Colonial Office to assist in settling the matter, citing the possibility of unrest among African workers if the strike continued (16).

Instances of disputes involving Africans, although they were often violently suppressed, tended to be followed by enquiries that served to highlight African complaints. The African strike on the Copperbelt in 1940 led to the appointment of a

commission under Sir John Forster to investigate conditions. The Forster Commission recommended improvements in African pay and conditions, and identified the industrial colour bar as a legitimate source of African grievances.<sup>116</sup> Following the African railway strike of October 1945, separate commissions of enquiry were convened in Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Both were chaired by the Southern Rhodesian high court judge and leading liberal, Robert Tredgold. The Southern Rhodesian Commission's report, which was presented in late November 1945, was particularly critical of the standard of accommodation of African workers and their families. It expressed general sympathy for the right of Africans to organise themselves into trades unions, while stopping short of calling for the recognition of the African Employees' Association. Like the Forster report, it was critical of the colour bar.

The reaction of British officials was, like the report itself, characterised by a mixture of old-fashioned paternalism and genuine outrage at some aspects of the treatment of Africans, particularly their accommodation (5). There was also, at least initially, a sense that African advancement was inevitable, and that a more liberal spirit was taking hold. In March 1946, the chief secretary of the Central African Council noted that the findings of two other recent reports—those of the Commission of Enquiry into the Mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia, and of the Building Costs Commission—had also criticised the restrictions imposed on the employment of Africans (8). He felt confident that, in the long term, a variety of economic and political pressures would serve to undermine the colour bar. This optimism proved to be unfounded; and the approach of closer association did nothing to advance the process.

The major initiative in this field during the 1940s was the Dalglish Report. Andrew Dalglish, a British trades unionist who had served on the Forster Commission, was sent to Northern Rhodesia in April 1947 to initiate talks on Forster's recommendations. A conference convened in May, which brought together the Chamber of Mines, the Mine Workers' Union and the Northern Rhodesian government, made little progress.<sup>117</sup> Following the failure of this initiative, the government decided to convene a commission of enquiry with Dalglish as its chairman. The Dalglish Report was published in February 1948. It recommended that Africans should immediately be eligible for employment in twenty-seven types of job from which they were currently excluded, all of them connected with the mines (39). It identified some further posts which Africans would be capable of filling in the near future, and others for which they might be suitable after training. The report recommended that as Africans progressed in industry, their method of remuneration should change from a mixture of wages and rations to an all-inclusive wage. It rejected the European demand of 'equal pay for equal work'. Finally, it urged all parties to consider what changes could be made to Clause 42—the 'colour bar clause'—that would 'permit the African to advance to more responsible work' in the mining industry.

The report came under heavy attack from European unofficials in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council. A conference convened in August 1948 by the Northern Rhodesian government failed to make any progress on the implementation of the report. The whole issue effectively stalled. The mining companies were reluctant to engage in a confrontation with the European mineworkers without the full support of the government. Yet the constitutional changes agreed in 1948, which gave greater

power to European unofficials, made it all the more difficult for the Northern Rhodesian government to legislate on the issue. The British government was faced with a dilemma. They regarded the African trades union as having made a strategic error in supporting the European union's call for 'equal pay for equal work', since this was a thinly disguised attempt on the part of the Europeans to preserve the colour bar. Officials at the Colonial Office recognised, however, that to draw the Africans away from this demand would be difficult without appearing to endorse the notion of African inferiority.<sup>118</sup> Indeed, Gorell Barnes questioned whether the government should even support the mining companies' demand to be able to pay African workers less than Europeans for the same job: 'Race relations in Africa are not unfortunately so good that they could stand the strain of an injustice of this order'.<sup>119</sup>

By the early 1950s, no significant progress had been made on the implementation of Dalglish, and the issue became caught up in the politics of federation. RST gave increasing signs of being prepared to take on the European union, but still wanted government support. Anglo-American was more cautious. Both sides in the dispute sought to turn the creation of the federation to their advantage. In February 1952, the Chairman of RST, Ronald Prain, suggested to the Colonial Office that if progress could be made to break the colour bar, this would do much to reassure critics of federation both in Africa and London (77). Within the Colonial Office, it was recognised that once a decision had been made to disregard African opposition and impose federation, it would be difficult to persuade the settlers of Northern Rhodesia to make concessions over the implementation of Dalglish (78). This proved to be the case; and the problem was, indeed, compounded by the decision to allow Southern Rhodesia to decide in a referendum whether it wished to join the federation. Both Huggins and Welensky made it clear that they feared any confrontation with the European union would damage the chances of a positive outcome from the referendum (90). This view was supported by the British high commissioner in Southern Rhodesia (94). Yet the removal of official controls on copper production gave the mining companies greater room for manoeuvre, allowing them to risk the interruption of production in any dispute with the European mineworkers.<sup>120</sup> By the beginning of 1954, there were clear signals that Prain's patience with the authorities was nearing exhaustion, and that he was reconciled to confrontation. He suggested to Gorell Barnes that any clash with the European miners would be a serious one, but might produce a permanent solution (99).

In July 1954, negotiations on African advancement between the African and European unions, the Chamber of Mines and the European Salaried Staff Association broke down. In November, RST gave six months notice of the termination of its agreement with the European union. This was the first public split between RST and Anglo-American, the latter taking a less aggressive stance towards the European workers. This split appeared in danger of being institutionalised when, at the end of July 1955, Anglo signed a separate agreement with the European union. Under the new agreement, twenty-four categories of job would be opened to Africans. The agreement, made against the background of rising fears of major unrest, gave the union the power of veto over the transfer of European job categories to Africans.<sup>121</sup> RST refused to concede this point and after a further six weeks of negotiations achieved a settlement of its own which omitted the veto. On 27 September, these two separate agreements were replaced by a single one between RST, Anglo and the union. Again, the right of veto was not included.

Attention was already turning towards the activities of the African union. Despite having played a part in its foundation, the Northern Rhodesian government increasingly came to view the African Mineworkers' Union with intense suspicion. This was, in part, because of the close links that had emerged between the union and African nationalism. Parpart notes that by 1956, 'twenty out of a total of fifty-nine branch officials of the African union were officers in [the African National] Congress and thirty-two were full members.'<sup>122</sup> The African Mineworkers' Union found itself confronted with an industrial application of the political philosophy underlying the Federation: the attempt to create an African elite, immune to the blandishments of radical agitators. The clearest manifestation of this was the emergence of the Mines African Salaried Staff Association (MASA), established in 1953 with considerable encouragement from the mining companies, to represent senior African workers. It was hoped by the companies that as the Africans advanced into more skilled jobs, the size and influence of this more 'moderate' organisation would increase. The African Mineworkers' Union resisted this attempt to poach its members. In January 1955, the union called a strike demanding an across-the-board increase for all African employees. This was an explicit refusal to play the game according to the rules set down by the government and the companies, under which the African union was expected to seek increased wages by lobbying for the opening up of jobs previously reserved for Europeans. During the 1955 dispute, the union demonstrated its influence, bringing all but 4,115 of the 34,000 African workers out on strike.<sup>123</sup> It also earned it the enmity of the Northern Rhodesian government and the companies. The latter intensified their efforts to encourage the growth of the MASA.

The AMU made its greatest show of strength in the August and September 1956, when it organised a series of rolling strikes across the Copperbelt. The Northern Rhodesian government identified this as an essentially political challenge engineered by African nationalists, and it took the opportunity to initiate a clamp-down. On 10 September, it declared a state of emergency. Martial law was imposed and the union's leaders arrested and banished from the Copperbelt. An inquiry into the disturbances, led by Sir Patrick Branigan, considered the extent to which the ANC was behind the unrest. The Branigan Report, while noting the strong links between the ANC and the AMU, concluded that the evidence did not prove 'that the activities of any persons or organizations outside the mining industry have had the effect of producing unrest within the mining industry'.<sup>124</sup> It did not raise the controversial issue of African hostility to Federation. In a meeting with officials at the Colonial Office, however, Branigan noted that like 'Sinn Fein in Ireland in the period 1919 to 1923 nationalism dominated all other issues' (138). The 1956 strikes represented the high water mark of African industrial militancy. Thereafter it was increasingly in the political arena that African resistance to settler control made itself felt.

### *The early years of the Federation*

#### *(i) Kariba and economic development*

The most serious early dispute between the territorial and federal governments came in the area of economic policy and specifically over the respective merits of the Kafue and Kariba hydro-electrical projects. Although highly significant in itself, this controversy provided a focus for broader Northern Rhodesian resentment over resource allocation under the federal system. The customs and excise duties of the

federal territories were retained in full by the federal government. In addition, it retained the majority of the money raised in the direct taxation of incomes and profits in the federal territories. The rest was distributed to the three territories according to a set formula. Until mid-1957, the federal government retained 64 per cent, Northern Rhodesia received 17 per cent, Southern Rhodesia 13 per cent and Nyasaland 6 per cent. Thereafter, the federal government retained 62 per cent, Northern Rhodesia received 18 per cent, Southern Rhodesia 14 per cent and Nyasaland 6 per cent.<sup>125</sup> Yet rising copper prices in the first half of the 1950s (prices peaked in 1956), meant that during the first four years of the Federation's existence, Northern Rhodesia was contributing a disproportionately large amount of direct taxation to the federal budget and receiving disproportionately little back. In 1956, the yield in direct taxation was £24 million from Northern Rhodesia, £11 million from Southern Rhodesia and £1.7 million from Nyasaland.<sup>126</sup> Even given the fact that Southern Rhodesia raised a far larger amount in indirect taxes than Northern Rhodesia, the latter's overall contribution to federal revenue in 1956 (once its share of the revenues from direct taxation had been deducted) was £22.7 million, compared with £16.2 million from Southern Rhodesia. The relative contribution of the federal territories was not reflected in the patterns of federal expenditure. This was due in large part to the racially-based nature of the distribution of federal and territorial responsibilities. Two of the federal government's major responsibilities were for non-African primary and secondary education throughout the Federation and non-African agriculture in the Rhodesias. Together, these made up 32 per cent of the federal government's current expenditure in 1955.<sup>127</sup> Inevitably, these priorities ensured that federal expenditure tended to be concentrated in the territory with the largest white population, namely Southern Rhodesia. Hence, in 1956, federal current expenditure in Southern Rhodesia was £24.8 million (or 63 per cent of the total), in Northern Rhodesia £10.7 million (27 per cent), and in Nyasaland £3.6 million (9 per cent). Overall, redistribution of funds under the federal system in 1956 entailed a net loss for Northern Rhodesia of 29 per cent of its territorial revenue.<sup>128</sup> This figure did not remain constant. Falling copper prices after 1956 and the growth of the more diversified Southern Rhodesian economy meant that in 1959, Northern Rhodesia's net loss was only 3 per cent (although with the recovery of copper prices it was to rise again to 19 per cent in 1961 and 21 per cent in 1963). The fact remains, however, that in the formative early years of the Federation, Northern Rhodesia had good reason to believe that it was subsidising its southern neighbour.

It was against this background that the choice between two rival hydroelectric schemes turned into such an impassioned and politicised dispute. A series of finely balanced economic judgments came into play in assessing the relative merits of the Kafue scheme based in Northern Rhodesia, and the Kariba Gorge scheme, the plant for which was to be based on the Southern Rhodesian side of the border. Based on 1954 estimates, it was expected that the Kafue scheme would cost around £30 million and would have an initial capacity of 257–340 megawatts. The Kariba scheme would be more expensive—around £50 million—and construction would take longer to complete. Yet it would have a significantly greater generating capacity than Kafue (103). Predictably, however, support for the respective schemes developed on narrowly territorial lines, with the Northern Rhodesian government backing Kafue and the Southern Rhodesian government backing Kariba.

Since the finance was not available to begin work on both schemes, one had to

take precedence. The pressing need of the copper mines for energy initially settled the matter in favour of Kafue. An agreement to proceed with Kafue was reached between the Northern and Southern Rhodesian governments on 3 September 1953, a day before the formal inauguration of the Federation.<sup>129</sup> The decision was endorsed by a bill which passed through the federal Parliament in March. This was quickly followed, however, by renewed pressure from the Southern Rhodesian government in favour of the Kariba scheme, and by signs that the federal government was reconsidering the earlier decision in the light of new calculations. In June 1954, Huggins announced that the question of whether to proceed with Kafue had been reopened and that a firm of French consultants had been appointed to consider the respective merits of the two schemes.<sup>130</sup> The view in Whitehall was that the appointment of the consultants was essentially an evasive tactic aimed at delaying the political consequences of a decision.<sup>131</sup>

The French consultants' report, which was made available to the federal government in December, favoured the Kariba scheme. At the urging of Sir Arthur Benson, the governor of Northern Rhodesia, the federal government delayed announcing a decision. Yet opinion within the federal Cabinet had begun to turn decisively in favour of Kariba. On 1 March 1955, Huggins announced that his government had reversed its earlier decision, and would now proceed with the Kariba scheme. After an angry debate on 16 March, the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council unanimously accepted a motion expressing disappointment at the decision. A particular cause of concern in London was the fact that R A Nicholson, Benson's financial secretary and chairman of the Kafue River Authority, and A T Williams, Benson's chief secretary, used the debate to attack the federal government. They effectively implied that in adopting the Kariba scheme, it had torn up a legally-binding agreement with Northern Rhodesia made in September 1953.

The bitterness with which this announcement was received in Northern Rhodesia has to be seen in the light of another decision: to locate the federal capital in or around Salisbury. This had been made by the federal Assembly in March 1954 (188). The location of the capital had considerable symbolic importance. Those supporters of Federation who still hoped to convince African opinion that it represented something quite distinct from the Southern Rhodesian regime, worried about the impression that would be created by having both capitals in Salisbury. More tangibly, however, the decision ensured that still more federal investment would be concentrated in Southern Rhodesia. It was this aspect of the decisions both about Kafue/Kariba and the federal capital that Benson sought to impress upon London at the beginning of April 1955. He noted the disappointment within his territory that it was to be denied the knock-on economic benefits of an investment of £30 million in Kariba, just as it had been denied those associated with the construction of a federal capital. Benson relayed—without contradicting it—the 'common' accusation that Southern Rhodesian politicians appeared determined 'to transform the wasting mineral assets of Northern Rhodesia into new assets on the ground in Southern Rhodesia' (107).

Benson's outburst caused understandable concern in London, particularly within the CRO (108). He was, however, unwilling to drop his support for the Kafue scheme. He was given fresh ammunition when, in November 1955, the federal government received revised estimates for the cost of the first stage of the Kariba scheme. This was considerably more than had originally been envisaged.<sup>132</sup> Writing to London the

following month, Benson effectively accused the federal government of calculated deception, in allowing the financial backers of the project to become so deeply committed that when the true cost was revealed they could not withdraw (112). The Colonial Office refuted Benson's suggestion that the federal government had concealed from London the revised estimates.<sup>133</sup> Nor did officials welcome the idea that the debate about the respective merits of Kafue and Kariba should be reopened. Indeed, by the time negotiations opened in May 1956 between the federal and British governments and the International Bank with a view to finalising the financing for the scheme, the Colonial Office had concluded that it was 'now too late to think of an alternative to Kariba' (117). Nevertheless, although the Colonial Office was reconciled to the Kariba scheme going ahead, they viewed with considerable concern its broader economic and political implications.

*(ii) Deteriorating relations between the federal and territorial governments*

The dispute surrounding Kariba also served as a focus for grievances within the Nyasaland administration over the distribution of resources within the Federation. These were conveyed forcefully to London in January 1956 by Geoffrey Colby in one of his final communications as governor of Nyasaland. He pointed to the immense difficulties he had had in persuading the federal government to direct development money towards his territory. Echoing Benson's sentiments, he complained that under the federal system, revenue from the Northern territories had been 'devoted to bolstering a bankrupt and under-taxed Southern Rhodesia and the major part of the federal government's share of loan funds raised since federation has been spent or earmarked in Southern Rhodesia' (114). Colby was also critical of the federal government's campaign to extend its control over non-African agriculture in Nyasaland. He saw it as a 'soft spot to attack', in what was merely the first stage of a gradual push towards full amalgamation. Colby claimed that African opinion in Nyasaland was 'hardening all the time' against federation and, unless corrected, this was likely to lead to 'a dangerous security situation'.

When, in March 1956, Gorell Barnes reported on his recent visit to the Federation, his remarks echoed many of Colby's criticisms of the federal government. He described the Federation as being in 'a dangerous state of drift'. While the worst fears of Africans had not been realised, the reality of Federation offered them few causes for satisfaction (115). Indeed, for some months a feeling had been growing within Whitehall that the federal government had failed to appreciate the urgent need to win over African opinion. This was even true within the CRO, the department of state which displayed the greatest sympathy for the viewpoint from Salisbury. In October 1955, following a particularly alarming intelligence report, W S Bates, an official at the CRO, commented on what appeared to be a general deterioration in race relations. The signs were that 'the policy of partnership, at any rate in the Northern Territories, simply is not working' (111).

Bates and Gorell Barnes arrived at the same conclusion: that the best hope of persuading Africans of their good intentions was for federal leaders to make a bold and imaginative gesture on the question of the federal franchise. The negotiations leading to the creation of the Federation had left open the questions of federal citizenship and the federal franchise. The qualifications for voting in the first federal general elections in December 1953 had been those that currently applied to territorial elections. This meant that British Protected Persons—the vast majority of

Africans in the two northern territories—were denied the vote, restricting the total number of registered voters to 67,039. Gorell Barnes and Bates both felt that the extension of the federal franchise to British Protected Persons who met the other necessary qualifications would be an important confidence-building measure. The idea was supported by the Northern Rhodesian administration and by the Southern Rhodesian premier, Garfield Todd. Benson was particularly concerned that if this point was not conceded in federal elections, it would be all the more difficult to persuade European leaders to accept the enfranchisement of British Protected Persons in Northern Rhodesia's territorial elections (115). Yet the federal government resisted this idea, and sought to make enfranchisement dependent upon federal citizenship. The exact form of this citizenship had yet to be decided, but early indications were that it would only be conferred on inhabitants of the Federation who were deemed to be 'civilised men' (109).

During a meeting with Lord Home and Lennox-Boyd of the CRO and CO respectively in March 1956, Welensky defended the federal government's position. Invoking the South African bogey that had proved so effective during the campaign to create the Federation, he argued that the link between citizenship and the franchise would prevent the federal electoral roll being swamped by large numbers of Afrikaners (116). He also argued that no-one should be allowed to vote who was not prepared to make the commitment to the Federation implied by the acceptance of citizenship. Home and Lennox-Boyd pointed out, however, that Africans valued the security offered by their status as British Protected Persons and were unlikely to wish to renounce this in order to acquire federal citizenship. The implication of this was that any system that was restricted to federal citizens would effectively exclude the vast majority of Africans in the northern territories. The ministers explained that they regarded the extension of the franchise to British Protected Persons as 'a dramatic gesture' which would demonstrate the federal government's commitment to making partnership a reality.

While the debate on the franchise proposals was proceeding, the federal government's principal efforts were being aimed not at political liberalisation, but at achieving a further loosening of control from Whitehall. The Federation was established in 1953 on the basis that no major constitutional changes would be enacted before a federal review conference in eight to ten years time. Developments elsewhere in Africa, however, generated impatience among federal leaders at the restrictions on their power. The prospect of the Gold Coast's becoming independent proved a particular source of grievance. As early as October 1954, Lord Swinton, the Commonwealth secretary, presented the Cabinet with a memorandum in which he anticipated that the Gold Coast's achievement of full membership of the Commonwealth would prompt demands for an enhancement of the status of the Federation.<sup>134</sup> He pointed, in particular, to the right of the federal prime minister to attend meetings of Commonwealth premiers. Over Huggins's long period in office as Southern Rhodesian prime minister, a convention had developed whereby he was invited to these meetings.<sup>135</sup> These invitations continued to be extended to him after he became federal premier. Formally, however, the federal prime minister did not attend as a matter of right. Swinton felt that, were the Gold Coast to achieve Commonwealth membership, the British government would find it difficult to refuse Huggins or his successor a formal agreement on this matter. It might also be necessary to devolve some responsibility for external affairs. At a meeting with

Huggins (who had recently been awarded a peerage and had adopted the title of Lord Malvern of Rhodesia and Bexley) in February 1955, Swinton and Lennox-Boyd informed him that the government's goal was to allow him to attend Commonwealth prime ministers' meetings 'as a right instead of as a courtesy, and possibly to make other changes which would accord to the Federation, *within the limits set by its Constitution*, the practical substance of full Commonwealth membership'.<sup>136</sup> This qualification effectively ruled out both the withdrawal of the northern territories from Colonial Office control and the attainment of *de facto* Commonwealth membership, without the consent of the majority of the Federation's inhabitants.

In a series of letters between March and May 1956, Malvern put forward his own ideas for enhancing the status of the Federation. These amounted to full independence. His initial letter to Home on 12 March came a month after a constitutional conference in London had agreed the aim of Malaya's achieving its independence in August 1957. Malvern noted this development and pointed to the prospect of Ghana's achieving full self-government around this time. He predicted that if the Federation was left with a status inferior to these countries, there would be a constitutional crisis and an adverse result in the 1958 federal elections.<sup>137</sup>

Malvern argued that the current reservations in the federal constitution should be removed by order-in-council, thus allowing the Federation to become fully self-governing. The existing safeguards for Africans should be incorporated into a treaty between the British and federal governments. In two subsequent letters to Home, on 5 April and 10 May, Malvern fleshed out these proposals (118). He noted that they would require a British Act of Parliament granting independence to the Federation. He also specified that among the constitutional amendments he was seeking was the removal of the African Affairs Board. Although his current proposals did not involve the removal of the northern territories from Colonial Office control, Malvern made it clear that he regarded this as a desirable goal. Welensky was prepared to go further. When he visited London in early May, he argued that Colonial Office control should be withdrawn but that the inhabitants of the northern territories should retain the right of petition to the Privy Council against the decisions of the federal government.<sup>138</sup> Welensky repeated Malvern's apocalyptic warnings of a right-wing backlash if the Gold Coast received dominion status before the Federation.

The efforts of Malvern and Welensky to press for independence aroused an angry response from Benson and from Sir Robert Armitage, who had replaced Colby as governor of Nyasaland. Copies of Malvern's correspondence with Home were forwarded to them by Gorell Barnes on 23 May (121). Both responded with dismay. Benson took particular exception to the implication in Gorell Barnes's covering note that his administration could do more to win over African opinion. He claimed that provocative remarks by federal ministers had played a major part in hardening that opinion against the Federation (122). For his part, Armitage predicted that any premature move towards dominion status might well 'stimulate early and violent African opposition, which would at the best discredit Federation and at the worst break it' (123).

For Benson, the revelation of Malvern's bid for independence appears to have been the final straw. On 6 June, he sent Lennox-Boyd what was to prove one of the most explosive single pieces of correspondence in the history of the Federation. In his letter, he set out a trenchant analysis of the origins of the Federation. Benson portrayed it essentially as the product of a ruthless drive by Malvern for amalgamation with

Northern Rhodesia (124). The Europeans of Northern Rhodesia, meanwhile, had seen federation as a means of blocking 'almost indefinitely' the British government's policy of 'giving Africans a greater share in the control of affairs'. Benson claimed that Malvern 'never had the faintest intention of making federation a success'. Instead, he and his federal party colleagues had a secret agenda to take every opportunity to centralise power—in effect, to achieve amalgamation by stealth.

Benson's analysis struck at the very heart of the British rationale for federation, and was all the more damning coming from someone who had played a central part in the process. The despatch caused consternation at the CRO. The Office had already been warned by Rupert Metcalf, the UK high commissioner for the Federation, about the attitude towards the Federation of some British officials in Northern Rhodesia.<sup>139</sup> In May 1956, following a visit to Central Africa, the permanent under-secretary at the CRO, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite had complained to the Colonial Office of the attitude of two senior Northern Rhodesian officials in particular: the attorney general, Edgar Unsworth, and the financial secretary, R A Nicholson (119). Having seen Benson's June despatch, Home took up the question of the attitude of Northern Rhodesian officials. He suggested that a 'very definite directive should be sent to Northern Rhodesia that federation has come to stay' and that 'certain civil service moves should be made of those whose heart is not in the task'. On the specific question of Benson's future, Home suggested that 'his transfer ought to be considered' (129).

Even more damagingly for Benson, a copy of his despatch was fairly quickly seen by the federal prime minister, Lord Malvern. How Malvern was able to obtain a copy remains something of a mystery. Wood suggests that it was Home who passed it to him.<sup>140</sup> He does not, however, provide a reference for this information and no supporting evidence appears to exist in the British files. Laithwaite maintained that the Colonial Office was to blame 'for having it printed and circulated'—the implication being that with a number of copies in circulation, one was almost bound to find its way into the hands of the federal government.<sup>141</sup> When, in October 1956, Whitehall learned of the leak, it was faced with the question of how to smooth over relations between the federal and Northern Rhodesian governments (130). Benson himself was not informed until Lennox-Boyd visited Northern Rhodesia in January 1957.<sup>142</sup> There followed a sharp exchange of correspondence between Benson and Welensky in which the latter expressed his bitterness at what he regarded as a personal betrayal.<sup>143</sup>

Against the background of this controversy, the federal government continued to press for a firm promise from the British on the issue of dominion status. The response of Britain, and more specifically of the CRO, was to play Malvern and Welensky long: to resist their specific demands and avoid specific commitments while offering the prospect of a steady movement towards greater autonomy. This approach culminated, after much hard bargaining with Welensky (who had succeeded Malvern as federal prime minister on 31 October 1956), in a joint communiqué from the British Commonwealth relations and colonial secretaries of state in April 1957. It contained two important elements: first a commitment 'that the British government would not initiate any legislation to amend or repeal any Federal Act except at the request of the Federal government'. Second, it contained an undertaking that the statutory conference to review the future of the federation would be held in 1960 and would 'consider a programme for the attainment of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth'.<sup>144</sup>

To the untrained eye, this might have appeared like the promise of independence for the Federation shortly after 1960. It also appeared to contradict earlier undertakings by the British government that protectorate status would not be withdrawn from the northern territories without the consent of their inhabitants. Although at some level they clearly *were* at odds with one another, both sets of undertakings were sufficiently vaguely worded to allow for what Whitehall euphemistically called 'stretching' (145). For all its wilful ambiguity, however, the 1957 joint communiqué raised European hopes just as it heightened African fears. It was rapidly followed by two pieces of federal legislation—the 1957 Constitutional Amendment Act and the 1958 Federal Electoral Act—which appeared to provide further evidence that, far from conceding power to Africans, the Central African Europeans were seeking to entrench their dominant position. The former Act provided for the enlargement of the federal Assembly from 35 to 59 seats. In the old Assembly there were 26 'ordinary' members (European), 3 European members representing African interests, and 6 specially elected African members. In the new assembly there would be 44 'ordinary' elected members, 3 Europeans representing African interests, 6 specially elected Africans, and an additional 6 Africans who would be directly elected by both electoral rolls. Hence, although the number of members representing African interests would increase, the increase would come in the form of 6 members who might well (when the two rolls were combined) be chosen by an electorate which was predominantly European. Furthermore, since provision was made for the African seats to be gradually abolished as Africans began to win ordinary seats, there was no prospect of an early redress to this stark imbalance in racial representation.

The Federal Electoral Act provided for the creation of 'ordinary' and 'special' electoral rolls. Property and literacy qualifications would ensure that the former would be predominantly European and the latter African. British Protected Persons would be able to register for the vote, although the minimum qualification of £150 per annum plus literacy for the 'special' roll promised to exclude the majority of Africans. Furthermore, whereas 'ordinary' roll voters would also be able to vote for an African elected member, 'special' voters would not participate in the election of 'ordinary' roll seats. Outside Nyasaland, this opened the prospect of African members being chosen by a predominantly European electorate.

When the Constitutional Amendment Act was passed by the federal Assembly at the end of July 1957, it was immediately declared by the African Affairs Board to be a measure which 'differentiated' against Africans. It therefore had to be placed before both houses of the British Parliament before royal assent could be granted. The British government was thus placed in the embarrassing position of having to persuade the Commons to accept a bill that had effectively been judged to be racially discriminatory. Lord Home told Welensky that some reduction in the qualifications for 'special' voters would make this task somewhat easier. Yet the federal government refused to give any ground (149). Nevertheless, Home was still prepared to defend the act as a liberal advance, and commend it to Parliament on that basis. In November, a Labour motion seeking to deny royal assent to the act was defeated, and the act duly became law. The affair had served, however, further to heighten the British left's suspicion of the Federation.

In February 1958, the notion that Central Africa's settlers might be prepared to concede greater political influence to Africans took a further blow. Garfield Todd,

who had succeeded Malvern as Southern Rhodesian prime minister in 1953, was removed from office by his own party and replaced by Sir Edgar Whitehead. Todd's record had been far from radical, but his relatively liberal stance on the issue of the Southern Rhodesian franchise and his failure to vote with the other members of his Cabinet on a proposed amendment to the 1916 Immorality Act (which prohibited sexual relations between black men and white women outside marriage), were sufficient to lose him the confidence of his senior colleagues. The fact that as recently as September 1957, Todd's United Rhodesia Party had fused with Welensky's Federal Party to create the United Federal Party (UFP), stoked suspicions that the federal premier might have played a part in Todd's fall.<sup>145</sup> The circumstances of Todd's removal could not but cause further damage to the Federation's reputation.

*(iii) Constitutional reform in Northern Rhodesia*

Despite Benson's fierce attacks on the behaviour of settler leaders, his own approach to African political advancement was profoundly paternalistic. This acted as a brake on constitutional development not only in Northern Rhodesia but also in Nyasaland. When, early in 1954, Colby indicated that he was prepared to concede racial parity on Nyasaland's Legislative Council, Benson objected to this, claiming that it would have harmful repercussions for his own territory. Gorell Barnes sided with Benson in this dispute. He believed that, while the concession of parity might indeed have a destabilising impact on Northern Rhodesia, it would be insufficient to reconcile Nyasaland's Africans to the Federation. Benson was also unhappy about Colby's intention to appoint an African to the Executive Council of Nyasaland. In February 1955, he told Gorell Barnes that it would be 'many years' before he could recommend the appointment of an African to his territory's Executive Council.<sup>146</sup>

Benson's pessimism about the ability of the Africans of his territory to participate in Western-style political institutions was accompanied by what the Colonial Office regarded as a misplaced faith in the efficiency of native authorities. In January 1956, Benson sent London a record of a recent conference of provincial commissioners, and a copy of his own position paper on the native authorities, which had formed the basis of much of the discussion at the conference. The gist of Benson's argument was that a fierce conflict had commenced between the chiefs and 'the force of extreme African nationalism'; and that every effort should be made to support the cause of the former (113). Within the Colonial Office, there was considerable concern at what a number of officials regarded as an anachronistic and unrealistic approach.

Even as Benson began to move towards a greater acceptance of African participation in the central legislature, his determination to protect the influence of the traditional elite created problems for Whitehall. In September and October 1957, Benson held negotiations with John Roberts, the leader of the Northern Rhodesian UFP, about constitutional changes in the territory. The existing constitution had last been revised in 1954, when two further African representatives were added to the Legislative Council. It was due to expire in 1959, and the task of framing a replacement was therefore of some urgency. The Legislative Council currently consisted of twenty-six members. Eight of these were officials and twelve were elected Europeans. In addition, there were two appointed unofficials and four Africans elected by the African representative council. After some tough negotiations with Roberts, the outlines emerged of a new constitution, details of which were published in a white paper by the Northern Rhodesian government in March 1958.

There would be a Legislative Council of thirty members plus a speaker. Twenty-two members would be elected, fourteen of whom would probably be European and eight African. In addition there would be six official and two nominated members. Behind these bare details of racial representation lay a hugely complicated system of cross-racial voting. Twelve of the fourteen seats expected to go to Europeans would not be specifically racially reserved but would be elected from 'ordinary' constituencies, formed largely from the principal areas of European settlement. Likewise, six of the eight seats expected to go to Africans would be elected from 'special', largely rural constituencies.<sup>147</sup> There would also be two specifically European representatives elected from 'special' constituencies and two specifically African representatives elected from 'ordinary' constituencies, an arrangement designed to provide representation for rural Europeans and urban Africans. The franchise would follow the federal model, with a lower set of qualifications for the 'special' vote. 'Special' votes cast in ordinary constituencies or in elections for the two reserved European members in the special constituencies would not count for more than a third of the total. The same was true for 'ordinary' votes in special constituencies or in elections for the two reserved African members. Just to complicate matters further, in what was a clear attempt to buttress the influence of the African traditional elites, candidates with special qualifications standing in special constituencies would have to obtain the approval of two-thirds of the constituency's local chiefs. The Executive Council would consist of ten members: the governor, four other officials and five unofficials, four of them elected. It was expected that only one of the ministers would be an African. For this reason two assistant ministers were appointed. At least one of them would also be an African, and would provide the African minister with an opportunity to discuss the council's affairs with a member of his own 'race'.

Welensky attacked the proposals on a number of grounds. His jibe that 'Lawyers long learned in constitutional theory and practice have been known to burst into tears at the sight of this White Paper', was not without some justification.<sup>148</sup> He objected in particular to the vetting of 'special' candidates by chiefs, both in principle and because of the likely difficulties in practice of carrying out the necessary consultations. He was able to portray the increase in African representation as a betrayal of the principle of multi-racial partnership. Above all, the proposals ran directly counter to Welensky's longstanding aim to secure for Northern Rhodesia self-government under European control. By the time direct talks took place on the proposals in July 1958, the federal prime minister was able to point to a further objection to them: that they were likely to prejudice his party's chances in the impending federal general election. Nevertheless, the proposals had also come under fierce criticism from the Labour Opposition in Britain and from African leaders for offering such a modest increase in African representation. As such, the Colonial Office was reluctant to make significant concessions to Welensky. It did concede that the 'ordinary' votes should not be devalued in 'special' constituencies. Yet this was coupled with a significant further concession to the Africans: that there should be two African ministers on the Executive Council rather than one as had originally been proposed. It was subject to these changes that the proposals were finally published in a British white paper on 17 September.

In seeking to reach some agreement on the Northern Rhodesian constitution, the Colonial Office faced a number of problems. First, Roberts and Welensky adopted significantly divergent positions on the proposals (as they would, to some extent, also

do during negotiations on a new constitution in 1961). In particular, whereas Roberts saw some merit in the suggestion that chiefs should vet 'special' candidates, Welensky was fiercely opposed to the idea (163). Secondly, Lennox-Boyd was by no means assured of the support of his own Cabinet colleagues. Home was keen that some further concessions should be made to the Europeans. Welensky's decision to come to London in November to hold face-to-face discussions on the matter triggered a sharp debate within the government over both the feasibility of the proposals and the future of the Federation in general. The idea of vetting by the chiefs appeared to be the obvious weak-point in the proposals, and both Home and Macmillan were persuaded by Welensky's arguments that it should be dropped (166). In a broader sense, there was a feeling among some of Lennox-Boyd's colleagues that with the federal review conference fast approaching, the British government would have to decide whether it was going to side with the Europeans or the Africans. It could not ultimately honour all of the conflicting undertakings it had made on the Federation's future.

Over the previous months, Welensky had been busily seeking to persuade London that the Federation was crucial to the West's struggle to contain the spread of Soviet influence (157). His efforts certainly made an impression both on the deputy Cabinet secretary, Burke Trend, and on Macmillan himself (165). The notion that a European-led bloc in Central Africa might be an important ally in the Cold War encouraged the view in Whitehall that Welensky's anger over the Northern Rhodesian constitution might be assuaged if he could be offered some more definite prospect of the Federation achieving full Commonwealth status. To do so, however, the pledges to the Africans would have to be 'stretched'. Both the euphemism, and the obvious intention behind it, aroused fury in the Colonial Office (164). Suggestions that the pledges to Africans might effectively be broken also caused concern amongst British officials within Northern Rhodesia.<sup>149</sup>

In fact, the federal government gained ground neither over the Northern Rhodesian constitution nor over the question of Dominion status. On 19 December, in response to a parliamentary question, Lennox-Boyd confirmed that the government remained committed to the constitutional proposals set out in its September White Paper.<sup>150</sup> Welensky continued his protests against vetting by chiefs up to the very eve of the Northern Rhodesian general election in March 1959. Ironically, Welensky's UFP performed well, taking thirteen of the twenty-two elected seats, including two of the special seats reserved for Africans. Yet by that stage, a new sense of crisis reigned in the Federation, one that would overshadow all earlier disputes and which would ultimately spell the end for the Federation itself.

### *Part Two: Crisis and Dissolution*

#### *The Nyasaland Emergency*

Perhaps more than any other event, the declaration of a state of emergency in Nyasaland in March 1959 marked a turning point for the Federation. The reasons for this action were the subject of fierce controversy at the time, and certain elements of the British government's role in the affair remain obscure.<sup>151</sup> It is therefore worth setting out the evidence we do have in some detail. Hastings Banda returned to Nyasaland in July 1958 and was elected president-general of the Nyasaland African Congress at the beginning of the following month. He embarked on a round of

speeches denouncing the Federation and demanding African majority rule. His meetings were sometimes accompanied by demonstrations and disorder. The administration of Sir Robert Armitage was concerned not merely at the existing level of unrest but at the prospect that Banda's activities would spark more serious violence.<sup>152</sup> The situation placed both Armitage and the British government in something of a dilemma when considering what changes to propose to Nyasaland's constitution. A fairly generous measure of constitutional advance, combined with the promise that Nyasaland would ultimately become an African government within the Federation, seemed to some within the Colonial Office to be 'the best political means of pricking the bubble of Dr Banda's reputation' (168). Nevertheless, it was recognised that this would prejudice the work of the 1960 federal review conference, and that the federal government would use any such concession as an opportunity to demand, in return, an extension of its own powers. More significantly, as an official at the CRO pointed out, major constitutional advance would, in effect, 'hand over Nyasaland to Dr Banda' and the Nyasaland African Congress, and the 'secession of Nyasaland from the Federation would become almost inevitable' (171).

In the event, the constitutional proposals Armitage put to the Colonial Office at the end of January 1959 fell far short of an elected African majority. He envisaged a Legislative Council in which only 14 of the 29 members would be elected. The operation of a dual-roll voting system would mean that of the 14 elected seats, eight would be likely to won by Africans and six by Europeans.<sup>153</sup> Armitage was keen that Lennox-Boyd should come out to Nyasaland in February to engage in more detailed constitutional discussions. Lennox-Boyd initially agreed, but subsequently had to cancel his visit. Instead, he agreed to send his minister of state, Lord Perth. The date of Perth's arrival in the Federation was set for 27 February.

The growth of violent unrest in Nyasaland made a policy of simple repression appear increasingly attractive. This was certainly the preferred option of the federal government.<sup>154</sup> While the British and Nyasaland governments were keen to keep the option of negotiation open for as long as possible, they too began to see advantages in adopting a hard line against Banda and his followers.<sup>155</sup> What essentially divided them from the federal government was the question of whether federal forces should be involved. While Welensky was keen to introduce federal troops, Armitage and the Colonial Office feared that this would merely exacerbate tensions. They were also concerned that unrest in Nyasaland should not be used by the federal government either as a means of establishing *de facto* control over law and order in the territory or of justifying a *de jure* transfer of powers ahead of the 1960 federal review conference.

The arguments for repression were considerably strengthened when information reached the Nyasaland government which purported to show that there was a 'plot' by Congress to murder Europeans. The plot was supposedly hatched at a 'meeting in the bush' on 25 January attended by senior figures in Congress, but not by Banda himself. Early reports of this gathering appear to have been discussed by Armitage at a meeting with his provincial commissioners on 7 February.<sup>156</sup> By 10 February, the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau (FISB) had compiled its own preliminary report on the affair, and the matter was discussed by Welensky and senior federal intelligence and military personnel later that day. The FISB's report claimed that 'The assassination of [W M] Chirwa, the "quislings" and Government officials was discussed as was also the spread of violence and riots.'<sup>157</sup> The head of the FISB

suggested that the Nyasaland government was reluctant to take action for fear of compromising its sources.<sup>158</sup> Welensky invited Armitage to a meeting on 16 February to discuss the security response to this intelligence. Armitage was, however, reluctant to be rushed into action, and declined the invitation.<sup>159</sup> He was keen that Lord Perth's planned visit to discuss constitutional progress should go ahead.

It was not until 13 February that the process of collating the intelligence was completed by the Nyasaland authorities, and Philip Finney, the recently appointed head of the Nyasaland Special Branch, was able to produce a proper assessment. He reported that the gathering on 25 January had decided on 'a widespread campaign of assassination of Government officials, murder of European men, women and children and wholesale sabotage'.<sup>160</sup> Finney's report incorporated the account of an informer, which suggested that the programme of violence would be activated by one of two developments: either Banda's arrest or his rejection of new constitutional proposals. In the event of the former development, a committee of four would take over the direction of Congress, and would fix a day —'R-day'—on which a programme of mass sabotage and murder would be carried out. On 18 February, the FISB submitted to Welensky's office an abridged version of a report on the 'meeting in the bush' which they had just received from the Nyasaland Special Branch—presumably the report compiled on 13 February (173). The FISB expressed its frustration at the Nyasaland government's apparent determination 'to avoid the arrest of Dr. Hastings BANDA at all costs' and accused it of abrogating 'its powers in respect of law and order for fear of a violent reaction which it is unable to meet.' While Armitage was confident that the plot would only be carried out if action were taken against Banda, the FISB pointed out that the mere rumour of Banda's arrest might be enough to spark violence. Also on 18 February, Armitage discussed the intelligence on Congress with his commissioner of police, who confirmed that the information was correct and should be taken seriously.<sup>161</sup> Nevertheless, writing to Welensky the same day, Armitage reiterated his reluctance to act against Congress (174). He believed Banda intended to participate in the forthcoming talks, and was therefore unlikely in the short term to do anything that might lead to his own arrest and hence 'spark off violence'. Presciently, Armitage also warned Welensky that the report compiled by Special Branch on 13 February was based on the evidence of informants who had not been present at the 'meeting in the bush', and correctly predicted that if Banda were arrested, 'it might be very difficult to establish how much of the violence programme ... he knew'. In the light of the general rise in unrest in the territory, however, he asked Welensky in a separate message that day for the first battalion of the King's African Rifles to be sent to Lilongwe at the earliest opportunity (174). Informing the Colonial Office of this request on 19 February, Armitage claimed that it was in response to an organised Congress programme of disruption 'now known to have been determined at a meeting in [the] bush on 25 January' (175).

On 20 February, Armitage, Welensky, Benson, Dalhousie and Whitehead met together for a heads of government meeting in Salisbury. According to Benson's account of the meeting, Armitage briefed the other leaders on 'The R Plan' (176). Recent attacks on federal installations suggested that the plan might have 'gone off at half cock'. Benson's impression, however, was that Armitage 'was very worried about the situation but that the position was not desperate.' Whitehead expressed concern at the prospect of troops being moved from Southern Rhodesia to assist the

authorities in Nyasaland. He revealed that he was considering declaring a state of emergency in his territory and, according to Benson, suggested that the solution was 'for him to clean up all the subversionists in Southern Rhodesia first and get them inside, at which time he would then be able to agree to further reinforcements going to Nyasaland'. Benson told the meeting that although there was a threat of the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) disrupting Northern Rhodesian elections on 20 March, there was 'no question whatsoever' of declaring an emergency in his territory. He intended instead to arrest a number of the ZANC's leaders on 23 or 25 February on charges of sedition and conspiracy. The meeting adjourned for lunch. Ten minutes after lunch, Armitage and Benson both had to leave to catch a plane. At this point, so far as Benson was concerned, although the meeting had agreed with his decision to arrest the ZANC leaders, no decision had been reached about Whitehead's proposal for a state of emergency. Indeed, both he and Armitage thought it unlikely that the federal government would agree to such a proposal. Hence, the declaration by Southern Rhodesia of a state of emergency on 26 February came as a surprise to him. If Benson's account is correct, the minutes of the meeting drafted by the federal government are seriously misleading. They record that the meeting agreed that the ZANC leaders would be arrested on 23 February and that Whitehead would declare a state of emergency on 27 February (176).

Neither the material currently available in the National Archives nor that in the Welensky Papers provides much help in establishing when Whitehall first learned of the 'murder plot' intelligence or what precisely it made of this.<sup>162</sup> It is clear, however, that MI5's Security Liaison Officer, David Driver, received a copy of Finney's report of 13 February at some point between 13 and 18 February, and the assumption must be that he immediately relayed this information to London (174). The decision then seems to have been taken to send Richard Posnett from the co's Intelligence and Security Department to Nyasaland to assess the material. His report to his superiors apparently suggested that the Nyasaland Special Branch was probably correct in believing that a plot existed.<sup>163</sup>

Despite the Nyasaland administration's confidence in the veracity of their intelligence about the plot, Armitage remained in no hurry to declare a state of emergency and he came under no pressure from London to do so. He also resented moves by Welensky that seemed calculated to accelerate a confrontation. On 24 February, he described as 'very embarrassing to us' a statement by Welensky the previous day that the Southern Rhodesian-based Royal Rhodesian Regiment had been called up for training in the light of the unrest in Nyasaland.<sup>164</sup> Armitage continued to look forward to Perth's impending visit to the Federation. On 25 February, however, the situation changed dramatically. Welensky cabled his High Commission in London asking that a request be made to Home for Perth's visit to be deferred in view of the security situation.<sup>165</sup> He noted that he had not yet consulted Armitage about the matter. Armitage's initial response the same day was to suggest to London that the security situation made it preferable Lady Perth should not accompany her husband to Nyasaland.<sup>166</sup> By the evening, his position had changed yet again. He told Lord Perth, 'Situation now makes early declaration of State of Emergency inevitable ... I am forced to suggest that your visit should be postponed.'<sup>167</sup> The following day, Armitage told Perth that the declaration would probably be made at midnight on 2-3 March.<sup>168</sup> The delay was necessitated by the need to complete the process of moving reinforcements into Nyasaland.

The declaration of the emergency on 3 March was followed by 1,322 arrests including those of Banda and other Congress leaders. According to the subsequent commission of inquiry, between 20 February and 19 March, 51 people lost their lives, all of them Africans. Of these, 48 were killed by gunfire and another three by baton or bayonet. At least another 79 people were injured by bullets. Defending Armitage's actions in the Commons just hours after the emergency had been declared, Lennox-Boyd claimed that the clampdown was necessary to prevent a 'massacre' which was being planned by Congress. The parliamentary under-secretary at the Colonial Office, Julian Amery, spoke even more chillingly of a 'blood bath', invoking the memory of Mau Mau and claiming there might have been 'a massacre of Africans, Asians and Europeans on a Kenyan scale'.<sup>169</sup> Armitage, later confessed to having been 'staggered' when he heard of these statements.<sup>170</sup> He had made no reference to a massacre in his broadcast announcing the emergency. He had declared the emergency to avert the rising tide of violence, not because he believed that there was any imminent threat of a 'murder plot'.

The public statements by Lennox-Boyd and Amery raised the political temperature and made it more difficult to deal with the mounting political controversy surrounding the emergency. Leading Labour spokesmen voiced the widespread assumption among critics of the Federation that Armitage had been pressed into action by the federal government. The British government was keen to be able to demonstrate that Armitage had acted of his own accord on the basis of specific intelligence. Ministers were concerned, however, that any enquiry into the affair might serve to highlight African grievances, and might even prejudice the work of the federal review conference. The government sought to keep the issue of the emergency separate from that of the future of the Federation. On 17 March it decided to create two quite distinct commissions. The first would consider the specific events leading to the emergency. A second commission would consider the broader workings of the Federation and its future (182). The Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, chaired by the high court judge, Lord Devlin, was officially appointed on 6 April. It arrived in Nyasaland five days later.<sup>171</sup>

If ministers had hoped that the report by Devlin and his three colleagues would exonerate the British and Nyasaland governments, they were to be gravely disappointed. By 13 July, Lennox-Boyd was able to report to Armitage that it was 'very hostile' (201). It proved damaging to the government on three main counts. First, it highlighted the fact that the overwhelming hostility among politically-conscious Africans in Nyasaland had been a major factor behind the unrest. Secondly it expressed considerable scepticism about the evidence indicating that there had been any 'murder-plot' as such. Thirdly, it criticised the way in which the Emergency had been enforced, and concluded that 'illegal force' had been used. In its most stinging phrase, the report noted that 'Nyasaland is – no doubt temporarily – a police state'.<sup>172</sup>

The government decided to postpone the publication of the report until 22 July, both to limit the time in which it could be debated before the parliamentary recess, and to give itself time to frame a response. This response came, once again, in the form of a published despatch by Armitage. It did so because the British government did not wish to appear to be directly critical of a commission it had itself established. Nevertheless, Macmillan was determined that the despatch should, where necessary, subject the Devlin Report to 'merciless ridicule' (203). To this end, a formidable collection of ministers and officials was assembled at Chequers on the weekend of 18–19 July to

assist in the drafting process. The parliamentary debate on the Devlin Report on 28 July came only a day after the government had faced fierce criticism in the Commons over the deaths of eleven detainees in the Hola detention camp in Kenya. Once again, Lennox-Boyd received a hostile reception. Although the Conservatives survived these controversies and emerged from the general election of October 1959 with an increased majority, the convergence of the Devlin and Hola affairs helped persuade both Macmillan and Lennox-Boyd's successor as secretary of state for the colonies, Iain Macleod, that the political price of maintaining settler privileges in East and Central Africa was one their government could no longer afford to pay.<sup>173</sup>

*The release of Hastings Banda and the Nyasaland constitution*

Although concrete moves to negotiate Banda's release did not begin until after the 1959 general election, a debate about the issue had already been going on for some time within the Colonial Office. It was initiated by Lord Perth at the beginning of August 1959, in the immediate wake of the parliamentary debate on the Devlin Report. Perth was responding to a suggestion by Donald McLachlan, the deputy editor of the *Daily Telegraph*, that a British minister might visit Banda in jail. Perth thought the possibility of a rebuff made this option difficult. He was, however, in favour of preparing the ground for some kind of initiative (205). At the time, however, the feeling among Perth's officials was that even an informal approach to Banda was premature. Before they had the chance to discuss the issue with the secretary of state, Macmillan announced that the British general election would be held on 8 October. This decided matters for the moment. Lennox-Boyd directed that a decision would have to wait until the election was over. He did, however, ask his officials to explore the legal feasibility of releasing Banda from detention while at the same time declaring him an illegal immigrant from the Federation.<sup>174</sup>

The advice Macleod received from his officials and from Armitage immediately on assuming the post of secretary of state for the colonies, was that the time was still not right for Banda's release. They argued that any discussions with Banda would inevitably open the issue of secession. This, in turn, would seriously undermine the chances of success of the advisory commission on the future of the Federation, which was about to begin work under the chairmanship of Walter Monckton (207). Macleod, however, was unhappy with this approach. He described Nyasaland as 'probably the most difficult single problem that we will have to discuss in the Colonial Policy Committee' (211). He felt the release of those detained under emergency powers was proceeding disappointingly slowly and expressed the hope that the 470 currently in detention could be reduced to a 'hard core' of around fifty. He was emphatic Banda should *not* be part of that hard core. Indeed, he saw clear advantages in distinguishing between Banda and 'his young extremist lieutenants'.

Macleod was also keen to be able to promise early constitutional advance for Nyasaland, and suggested initiating discussions there in May, as soon as the Monckton Commission had finished taking evidence. Lord Home's initial response to this important intervention was to agree with Macleod that the pace of releases should increase, but to question whether the early release of Banda was justified (212). He discussed the issue on 11 December with his officials and with Alport, his parliamentary under-secretary. Concern was expressed at the effect the promise of constitutional advance in Nyasaland might have on the other territories of the Federation and that it might also be perceived as prejudging the findings of the

Monckton Commission (213). Home remained cautious about the wisdom of releasing Banda while acknowledging 'it was impossible to keep Dr Banda locked up for ever and that it was unrealistic to think that by doing so we should encourage the emergence of alternative leaders in Nyasaland'. Alport appears to have taken a particularly tough line over the issue.

Home's formal response to Macleod's memorandum on Nyasaland came on 21 December. He claimed to see no objection to the opening of constitutional talks after the Monckton Commission had left Nyasaland. As to the release of Banda, he identified as the key question 'with whom can we talk?' On that basis, he offered cautious support for Macleod's approach. He was adamant, however, that Britain's handling of Banda should not follow the 'familiar sequence violence—detention—release—parley' that had 'done us great damage in Africa' (214).

Having won the grudging approval of the CRO for his approach to the question of Banda, on Christmas Eve, Macleod submitted to the Cabinet a memorandum setting out his dissatisfaction at the speed at which Armitage was releasing detainees and discussing the timing of Banda's release. He made clear that, although he favoured an even earlier date, he would be satisfied if Banda could be released as soon as the Monckton Commission left Nyasaland (215). On 4 January, Macleod persuaded the Cabinet that Banda should be released on the final day of that month, and that the rate of release of the detainees should be so increased as to leave only twelve by the end of April.<sup>175</sup> This was much faster than Armitage or his Executive Council were prepared to go, and on 7 January he wrote to Macleod warning him of the security implications of Banda's release. Fears about the repercussions of this move were shared by the governor of Northern Rhodesia, Evelyn Hone.<sup>176</sup> The extent of the gap developing between Macleod and Armitage became clear to Macmillan when he visited Nyasaland later that month in the course of his African tour. His general impression of the territory was that its officials were dispirited, and the visit helped to persuade him it had been a mistake to seek to associate Nyasaland with the Rhodesias.<sup>177</sup>

In a development which was to come back to haunt both Macleod and Macmillan, an indirect approach was made to Banda at the time of the prime minister's visit. Banda's legal adviser, the Labour MP, Dingle Foot, had talks with Banda, and two of his leading colleagues in Congress, D K Chisiza and H B M Chipembere, in Gwelo prison where they were detained. Foot immediately reported back to Macmillan at a reception on the evening of 25 January. Banda had made it clear to Foot he was prepared to engage in constitutional talks and was opposed to violence, but remained implacably hostile to the Federation, and would not agree to be released unless his colleagues were also promised their freedom.<sup>178</sup>

Macmillan was not impressed by Armitage, and their discussions about Banda's release were acrimonious. By the time of their talks, Macleod had already indicated, in deference to Armitage's wish to keep Banda in detention until 25 February, that he was prepared to accept a compromise date of 15 February for his release.<sup>179</sup> Despite his generally poor impression of the governor, Macmillan was impressed by the concerns of both Armitage and Hone about the security implications of Banda's being at liberty in Nyasaland during the visit of the Monckton Commission (220). In response, Macleod suggested that Banda's release could be delayed further until 25 February, with constitutional talks commencing very shortly afterwards (221).

Meanwhile, Welensky and Whitehead stepped up the pressure on the issue of Banda's release. While Welensky would probably have opposed the move under any

circumstances, his resentment over Macmillan and Macleod's policy was no doubt heightened by his knowledge of what Dingle Foot had told Banda. Their conversations had secretly been recorded by the BSAP Security Branch, which had bugged Banda's cell (219). Having been presented with a transcript, Whitehead passed it straight to Welensky. Foot was recorded as suggesting that Macleod was keen to release Banda. He also told Banda he believed Monckton, 'was not going to be restricted' by his commission's terms of reference. This appeared to suggest, despite Macmillan's assurances to the contrary, that the commission might consider the right of individual territories to secede from the Federation. The hard line adopted by Welensky and Whitehead over Banda was also informed by the hope that in return for his release they could gain concessions over Southern Rhodesia's constitutional status.

The attitude adopted by Welensky and Whitehead resulted in further 'slippage' in the planned date for Banda's release (226). At the Cabinet meeting on 23 February, however, Macleod made a decisive stand against the suggestion Banda might have to remain in detention after the Monckton Commission had left Nyasaland. Although Macmillan was prepared to concede this, Macleod threatened to resign if that further delay was approved.<sup>180</sup> Two days later, after more negotiations, a compromise deal was reached: Banda would be released on 1 April—considerably later than originally planned but still in time to allow him to give evidence to the Monckton commission as a free man.<sup>181</sup> The date of Macleod's visit to the Federation was correspondingly postponed and eventually took place between 24 March and 8 April. It was, according to the UK high commissioner in Salisbury, a public relations success for the secretary of state.<sup>182</sup> Banda's release on 1 April passed off without violence. Banda was immediately taken to Government House for talks with Macleod and Armitage. At the conclusion of his visit, Macleod announced that constitutional talks on Nyasaland would take place in London in the summer.

As the talks approached, some of the more incendiary public comments of Banda and his colleagues caused concern within the Colonial Office.<sup>183</sup> Officials took encouragement, however, from Banda's assurances to Armitage that he was in charge of his party, and that its members would accept any deal he reached (244). The Nyasaland constitutional conference took place in London from 20 July to 5 August. It agreed on the introduction of an African elected majority in the territory's Legislative Council (five officials, eight higher roll members and 20 lower roll members), and the creation of an Executive Council consisting of five official and five elected members.<sup>184</sup> Elections took place a year later on 15 August 1961. Banda's Malawi Congress Party (MCP) won an overwhelming victory, taking all of the lower roll and three of the higher roll seats. The extremely poor performance of the UFP under the leadership of Michael Blackwood made the allocation of seats on the Executive Council a particularly sensitive issue. The UFP were eventually offered only one of the five elected seats. Blackwood rejected this, leaving the way open for the MCP to occupy all five when the new government was finally appointed on 2 September. With Banda's party so firmly entrenched in power, the major question for the government was how long they could resist pressure from the MCP for the secession of Nyasaland from the Federation.<sup>185</sup>

### *The Monckton Commission*

As the Devlin Report appeared in the summer of 1959, the British government was still grappling with the issue of what form the federal review commission should

take. The decision to establish the commission had been taken by the Cabinet on 17 March (182). After some tough negotiations between Lord Home and Welensky a basic outline was worked out, which was approved by ministers on 6 April: the commission would include representatives of the governments of the UK, the Federation and the three federal territories.<sup>186</sup> The remit of the commission would be 'to advise the Governments concerned in preparation for the 1960 review on the further steps necessary towards achieving the aims and objects embodied in the Annex to the Order in Council of 1953' (184). The commission would be supplied with material by a separate group of officials drawn from the five governments. Yet the precise nature and composition of the commission remained for some months a matter of fierce controversy between the various governments involved. Its final shape was not agreed until 8 July.<sup>187</sup> Federal and territorial representation was set at 4:3:3:3 respectively (198). In addition to these thirteen local members there would be another thirteen from Britain and the Commonwealth (including the chairman), bringing the overall size of the commission to twenty-six. Whitehead was pressed to appoint an African as one of Southern Rhodesia's three representatives, and told that if he failed to do so, Britain would appoint coloured representatives of its own. He agreed under protest.

The commission also proved controversial in terms of British domestic politics. In a series of meetings with Macmillan, Gaitskell and other senior Opposition spokesmen between 7 May and 4 June, it became clear that Labour opposed the idea of drawing commissioners from Central Africa and the Commonwealth, and wished instead to see a British parliamentary commission (192, 193). Despite the government's desire to forge a bi-partisan approach to the future of the Federation, its refusal to abandon its proposals effectively ruled out Labour participation. A further problem related to the terms of reference of the commission. Welensky was adamant the commission should be explicitly prohibited from considering the question of the secession of any territory. In mid-June, however, Jo Grimond, leader of the Liberals, indicated that his party would only be prepared to co-operate with the commission if it was free to consider this issue. In conversation with Perth, Lord Home apparently expressed the view that the government could 'fudge' this aspect of the commission's remit (194). This, indeed, was to prove the government's tactic. The announcement of the commission was made to their respective Parliaments by the British and federal prime ministers on 21 July. In his announcement, Welensky referred to the rejection of secession in the 1957 joint declaration and stated that his government would not have been party to any initiative that brought the maintenance of federation into doubt. Macmillan made no reference to the declaration and in answer to a question on secession, said merely the commission would be free to hear all points of view on whatever subject.<sup>188</sup> He repeated this formula in the debate on the Federation the following day.

The chairman of the commission remained to be selected. After the long months of wrangling over the shape of the commission, this question was solved remarkably easily. On 4 September, Macmillan told Whitehead and Welensky that Viscount Monckton of Brenchley had agreed in principle to head the commission. Monckton, an experienced barrister and politician, who had represented Edward VIII during the abdication crisis of 1936, had a reputation as a conciliator. Both the Southern Rhodesian and federal prime ministers endorsed his appointment, which was announced two days later.<sup>189</sup> Macmillan was less successful in persuading the Labour

Party to participate in the commission. He continued his efforts after the October general election, but lost his final chance to secure co-operation when in November, under pressure from Welensky, he refused to appoint James Callaghan to the commission.<sup>190</sup> After that, Labour's declaration on 4 December that it would not participate in the commission's work was something of a formality. In a desperate attempt to create some semblance of bi-partisan support, Macmillan did manage to persuade the independently-minded Labour peer, Lord Shawcross, to participate. He achieved this, however, only by giving Shawcross a private undertaking that the commission would be free to consider all solutions to the Federation's problems, including secession.<sup>191</sup> In a statement to Parliament on 24 November, while studiously avoiding mention of secession, Macmillan went out of his way to suggest that the commission's remit was extremely wide and that, if it thought 'it could not fulfil its task to its satisfaction within the terms of reference no doubt it would say so'.<sup>192</sup> The following day, however, he reassured Welensky he had not yielded and would not yield an inch on the commission's terms of reference. It was this tendency to massage the truth in order to mollify his intended audience that more than anything else assured Macmillan his place in the demonology of white settlerdom.

The Monckton Report was completed at the beginning of September 1960 but was not finally published until 11 October. In many respects it made uncomfortable reading for the federal government. Like the Devlin Commission before it, it acknowledged the strength of African opposition to the Federation. It also concluded that insufficient had been done to win the confidence of Africans. The report noted the economic benefits of federation and concluded that it was in the interests of the region for these to be maintained. Yet some of its specific recommendations seemed likely, if accepted, to spell the end of the Federation, at least in its current form. By the time the report was published, an African majority had already been conceded in the Nyasaland. The report recommended that rapid steps should be made to do the same in Northern Rhodesia. Such a move was guaranteed to increase pressure for the latter's withdrawal from the Federation. The commission also wished to see a broadening of the Southern Rhodesian franchise. Most damagingly of all for the federal government, the report argued that no form of federation could survive if its people felt they were being held in it against their will, and it therefore recommended that 'under certain conditions there should be an opportunity to withdraw from the association'.<sup>193</sup>

Welensky's reaction to the report focused in particular on the question of secession. He claimed he had been given a firm assurance that the question of any territory having the right to secede from the Federation would be beyond the remit of the commission. Yet public statements by Shawcross and, indeed, the findings of the commission itself, suggested that Monckton and his colleagues had not regarded themselves as bound by any such restriction. Welensky launched his public accusation of bad faith against the British government through Lord Salisbury, his leading supporter in the Palace of Westminster. He supplied Salisbury with copies of his original telegrams from Macmillan.<sup>194</sup> Salisbury agreed that these constituted a firm pledge on the issue of secession.<sup>195</sup> On 20 October the *Daily Telegraph* published a letter from Salisbury demanding to know 'what were the exact terms of the assurances to which Sir Roy Welensky has referred'.<sup>196</sup> The implication was clear: Welensky had been tricked into agreeing to the commission. In response to intense pressure from the federal premier and his allies, Macmillan told Welensky that he

was prepared to publish relevant sections of his messages to him in the form of a white paper. He pointed out, however, that to do so 'would be the first breach in the long and valuable tradition of personal and confidential communications between Commonwealth Prime Ministers'.<sup>197</sup> On this occasion, Welensky backed down and the white paper did not appear. Yet as relations between the British and federal governments deteriorated in the course of 1961, Welensky's accusations of bad-faith became more insistent. He continued the practice of supplying large amounts of confidential information to his supporters in London, who from February 1961 choreographed their activities through a Watching Committee on Central Africa.<sup>198</sup>

### *The Southern Rhodesian constitution*

On 15 October 1959, a week after the Conservatives were returned to power in the British general election, Sir Edgar Whitehead wrote to Home suggesting that he visit London to discuss the reserved powers in the Southern Rhodesian constitution. These reservations broadly stipulated that Southern Rhodesian legislation which was either deemed discriminatory against Africans or which sought to amend the 1930 Land Apportionment Act required the approval of the British secretary of state. Home agreed to talks, although he stipulated that they should be of a purely 'exploratory' nature.<sup>199</sup> Whitehead followed this invitation with another letter to Home in which he made clear that his aim was to achieve for Southern Rhodesia 'full self-government within the framework of the Federal Constitution' before the federal review talks began in 1960.<sup>200</sup> Discussions between Whitehead and Home took place in London in November. They ended with a statement saying merely that suggestions had been made that were 'regarded as worthy of further examination', and that the Southern Rhodesians had been invited to prepare more detailed proposals in the New Year.

The question was revived by a typical piece of horse-trading over the issue of Banda's release from detention. In February 1960, to the dismay of the Cabinet secretary, Sir Norman Brook, Welensky suggested that his own objections to Banda's release, and those of Whitehead, might be assuaged if the British government promised to surrender its reserved powers over Southern Rhodesia (224). Brook felt that such pressure should be resisted. Nevertheless, when the Cabinet met on 18 February, Home suggested to his colleagues that the promise of a conference to discuss the withdrawal of reserved powers over Southern Rhodesia might persuade Welensky and Whitehead to display greater flexibility over Nyasaland (225). During Home's subsequent talks in Salisbury, he asked Whitehead 'whether European confidence could be restored if as part of a comprehensive plan the restraints could be lifted from Southern Rhodesia' (227). Whitehead replied that it 'would make all the difference in the world', but stressed the need for swift action. At a press conference on 26 February (by which time a release date for Banda had already been secretly agreed), it was announced that Whitehead had accepted an invitation to visit London for talks in April.<sup>201</sup>

The talks in London between 25 April and 2 May made some progress. As Whitehead had already intimated during his discussions with Home in February, he proved open to the idea that half the members of a proposed second chamber of the Southern Rhodesian Parliament should be black or coloured. In return, he wanted a statement from the British government that agreement had been reached in principle to remove the remaining restrictions. The Colonial Policy Committee was

unwilling to concede this point, both because a number of substantive issues remained undecided and because of the effect any such statement might have on the Monckton Commission.<sup>202</sup> Whitehead threatened to ask for an immediate dissolution of the Southern Rhodesian Parliament if his request for a statement was not met. In the light of this threat, it was argued in Cabinet that, although there should be no agreement in principle to the withdrawal of the reserved powers, Whitehead should be offered 'as much satisfaction as possible' (237). The statement Home finally made in the Commons on 9 May stressed that the government's 'ability to accept a scheme which would reduce or withdraw the powers vested in the Secretary of State' would be conditional on the achievement of adequate safeguards.<sup>203</sup>

When the conference on the Southern Rhodesian constitution opened in London on 16 December, talks were impeded by the lack of any representatives of African interests. More progress was made when the conference resumed in Salisbury on 30 January 1961, with Joshua Nkomo's National Democratic Party (NDP) in attendance. The extent of African political advancement agreed at these talks was less than some in Whitehall had thought possible. Nevertheless, a degree of African support appeared to be forthcoming. All parties involved, except the far-right Dominion Party, acquiesced to the final deal. This had a number of key elements. There was to be a sixty-five member legislature composed of fifty representatives elected by a largely white upper roll, and fifteen elected by a mainly African lower roll. Voters on each roll would have a 25 per cent influence over the election of the other roll's candidates. There was to be a declaration of rights to protect against racial discrimination, and this was to be overseen by a constitutional council composed of members of all races. Britain agreed to a convention whereby it would only legislate for Southern Rhodesia at the request of the territory's government.<sup>204</sup> This provisional agreement formed the basis for a white paper published in February.<sup>205</sup> Shortly after its publication, African nationalist leaders began to distance themselves from its terms.

Before these proposals were put to a vote of the existing Southern Rhodesian electorate it proved necessary to agree certain outstanding elements, and to publish a more detailed account of the new constitution. Quite *how* detailed was a matter dividing the British and Southern Rhodesian governments. The Commonwealth relations secretary, Duncan Sandys, favoured keeping any new white paper as short as possible. He felt 'the more surface that is exposed, the greater risks we shall run in Parliament – e.g. of criticism of the extent of the surrender of powers' (287). He also feared it might not be possible to agree the final wording of the declaration of rights before the Southern Rhodesian referendum. Whitehead, however, wanted the maximum amount of detail. Having observed the British government's negotiating tactics over the Northern Rhodesian constitution, the Southern Rhodesians did not want to leave areas of ambiguity, which the British could subsequently exploit in an effort to draw from them further concessions (288). A further area of difficulty for Whitehead was the fact that under the February agreement, the British government formally retained the unqualified right to legislate for Southern Rhodesia. The CRO had been advised by the attorney-general that there should be no legal qualifications placed on this power until Southern Rhodesia was fully independent.<sup>206</sup> Whitehead feared that this point would be seized upon by European opponents of the agreement in the forthcoming referendum campaign. In the event, the two British white papers on the Southern Rhodesian constitution (Cmnd 1399

and 1400) which were published in June following a final round of negotiations in Salisbury, did not refer to the very extensive powers Britain retained over Southern Rhodesia. Reference to this did, however, appear in the bill which was subsequently tabled in the House of Commons. While some commentators sympathetic towards the Southern Rhodesian settlers have presented this as a political sleight of hand, it is worth noting that the matter was raised by opponents of the new constitution in the period leading up to the referendum.<sup>207</sup> It is therefore difficult to argue that Southern Rhodesian voters were kept in ignorance about key implications of the new constitution.

The difficulties in framing a policy which would be acceptable to both the Southern Rhodesian electorate and the British Parliament extended to the results of the referendum itself. While the British government was keen to secure a positive vote, officials feared that if the majority in favour was overwhelming, it might bolster the case of critics in Britain who accused the government of having conceded too much to the Rhodesian settlers (288). In the event, the referendum on 26 July approved the constitution by 41,949 votes to 21,846.

### *The Northern Rhodesian constitution*

The relatively straightforward negotiations with Whitehead over his territory's constitution were in marked contrast to the fierce battle that raged over constitutional advance in Northern Rhodesia. In seeking some room for manoeuvre on the question of the Nyasaland constitution, Macleod had assured Evelyn Hone that he would attempt to protect Northern Rhodesia from any knock-on effects. He claimed he would counter pressures for further concessions with the line that Northern Rhodesia had only recently undergone constitutional advance, and that the new constitution should be given a fair trial (225). A breach, however, quickly opened up between the secretary of state and the governor. At the end of March 1960, following a visit to Central Africa, Macleod told Macmillan he had found the situation in Northern Rhodesia 'puzzling and worrying' (234). Ronald Prain, the Chairman of RST, impressed upon Macleod that developments in Nyasaland and the Congo made it imperative that some further constitutional reform be promised in Northern Rhodesia. Together with the Revd J L Pretorius, chairman of the African Affairs Board, he had argued that the failure to offer concessions would result in Kenneth Kaunda being replaced as leader of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) by more extreme nationalists. Despite the fact that, during his visit, Macleod merely reiterated the government had 'no plans in contemplation for Northern Rhodesia', these voices appear to have made a greater impression on him than those urging restraint. Macleod also gained a first-hand impression of Kaunda's ability to control his supporters, something he found 'rather impressive'. He left the territory 'by no means sure that we can hold the position of refusing to have constitutional talks until after the Federal Review.' Hone, by contrast, remained keen to rule out further constitutional changes in 1960 and to state that self-government was not likely to be granted 'for some time to come' (236).

Macleod's sense that Kaunda might be a force for moderation was reinforced when the two men met in May (240). Hone himself showed signs of moving away from his earlier hard-line position. He opened the new session of the Legislative Council in June with a speech that signalled the possibility of further constitutional talks following the outcome of the federal review conference. Hone's suspicion of Kaunda

had not appreciably softened; but he claimed that 'responsible opinion' in the territory no longer considered it realistic 'in the Africa of 1960' for the current constitution to survive for another four years (242). Welensky, however, predictably opposed any promise of further revisions to the Northern Rhodesian constitution, and his view received support from Lord Home.<sup>208</sup>

The appearance of the Monckton Report gave renewed impetus to the question of the Northern Rhodesian constitution. It recommended an immediate conference on the subject and the concession of an African majority in the Legislative Council. In September, having seen the report prior to its publication, Macleod told Macmillan that very shortly after it was published he wished to make a statement to the effect that the governor would be initiating informal talks, with a view to holding a formal conference after the federal review (254). He also wished to pass a 'private holding message' to Kaunda, in order to encourage him to urge restraint on his followers until the Monckton Report appeared. At a meeting between Macleod, Macmillan and Sandys the following day, it was agreed that Hone should inform both Kaunda and John Roberts (leader of the Northern Rhodesian UFP) of the government's intentions.<sup>209</sup> Once again, a breach opened up between the Colonial Office and Hone. In line with Macleod's wishes, Hone publicly announced on 28 September that he was beginning informal talks about the constitution. Privately, however, Hone complained to London that the Monckton Commission's recommendations with regard to the Northern Rhodesian constitution were unhelpful. One official at the Colonial Office described this as 'worrying' and expressed the fear that 'we are not in fact "on the same net" with Sir E. Hone at the moment...' (258).

In December, Macleod had a discussion in London about the Northern Rhodesian constitution with an uncharacteristically even-tempered Welensky (265). In describing this encounter to Macmillan, Macleod sketched out his own tentative plan to offer 'the appearance of an African majority'. In a Legislative Council of 30 elected members, there might be 16 African and 14 European representatives, with a speaker and perhaps 4 officials. The outline provided by Macleod to the prime minister in December provided the template for the government's first 'bid' to Welensky in January 1961. There would be 30 elected members, returned by upper and lower rolls 'that would in practice produce parity between Africans and Europeans' (267). Macleod thought it would be better to tell Welensky bluntly that the government envisaged a bare African majority of 16:14 amongst the elected members of the Legislative Council. This Macmillan did in his telegram to Welensky on 9 January setting out the proposals.<sup>210</sup> Welensky rejected the plan, telling Macmillan that the 'surest way' of breaking up the Federation was to devolve power prematurely to Northern Rhodesia's African nationalists.<sup>211</sup> Hone was also sceptical about the wisdom of Macleod's plan for a bare African majority, fearing it would lead to a walk-out by European delegates.<sup>212</sup> On 26 January, Welensky threatened that the Northern Rhodesian UFP would boycott the constitutional talks unless the government's plans were revised.<sup>213</sup> The following day he confirmed he had advised the delegation, led by John Roberts, not to attend. Macleod regretted the failure of the UFP to attend the conference, but felt that the presence of Kaunda, and the leading European liberal, John Moffat, made the conference viable. In fact, although the UFP formally boycotted the proceedings, both Roberts and Welensky's minister of home affairs and law, Julian Greenfield, were in London during the conference and available for informal consultations. For Macleod, Roberts himself was also a source of

frustration. Macleod sensed that he was personally 'on our side', but not in a sufficiently strong position in relation to Welensky to be able to make a deal on his own.

By the beginning of February, Macleod remained committed to conceding a bare African majority (270). He was prepared, however, to see a considerably lower number of Africans enfranchised by the proposals than had originally been envisaged. He was also prepared to entertain the idea of a voting system which would retain a bare African majority, but ensure that around four of those African members would be from the UFP. A week later, the conference had made little progress and the British government had yet to table its own formal proposals. Macleod remained outwardly confident that history would repeat itself, and that after a series of 'bluffs and blusters', Welensky would give way as he had done over Banda and the Monckton Commission (271). Macleod was, however, coming under pressure from his critics on the Conservative back benches, and beginning to exhaust the patience of his Cabinet colleagues. At the same time, delegates to the constitutional conference—and Kaunda in particular—were becoming increasingly frustrated at the government's failure to present proposals of its own. During his talks with the prime minister and Sandys on 8 February, Macleod introduced a new element into the search for a formula: that in addition to seats elected by upper and lower rolls, there should be a number of seats elected by both rolls with a minimum qualifying percentage for both. A proposal along these lines was one of two alternative schemes suggested to Welensky by Macmillan on 11 February. Under this scheme there would be forty-five members of the legislative assembly, fifteen elected by the upper roll, fifteen by the lower roll and fifteen by both rolls combined. For this third category of seats (which eventually became known as 'national' seats) the percentage of votes cast by each roll would be averaged (something that would, in practice, devalue the votes of the far more numerous, and largely African lower roll). It would be necessary for successful candidates to achieve a minimum percentage of votes from each roll (275).

Welensky's initial reaction was to dismiss both this and the alternative scheme. On 13 February, however, he suggested that he was prepared to enter into further talks on the 15:15:15 proposal.<sup>214</sup> The proposal offered an escape from the stalemate that had hitherto characterised the talks. It only did so, however, because it promised very different things to the various parties involved. So long as Welensky believed that the composition of the upper roll would remain broadly unchanged, and that the upper roll would play the dominant role in electing the national seats, he could accept the proposal without having to abandon his aim of achieving an elected European majority.

Macmillan was keen to keep Welensky in play and to avoid a confrontation. He therefore wished the white paper on the Northern Rhodesian constitution to be as vague as possible over possible areas of contention (277). Macleod, by contrast, felt he had already committed himself on the question of how the national seats should be elected in his statement to the constitutional conference on 14 February, and he was determined that the objective of parity or a bare African majority be maintained. On 17 February, when Macmillan pressed his objections to the Colonial Office draft of the white paper, demanding significant deletions, Macleod threatened to resign. He apparently complained that the government was 'constantly giving in to Sir Roy Welensky and that he was not being allowed sufficient freedom in his own sphere of responsibility' (277). Macmillan persuaded Macleod to continue to chair the

conference. The following day, however, at a meeting between Macmillan, Macleod, Sandys, Home and Kilmuir, it was clear Macleod's senior colleagues remained sceptical about the wisdom of even publishing a white paper (279). Yet Macleod stood his ground, and when the issue was again discussed in Cabinet on 20 February, a decision was finally made to authorise the publication of the white paper.<sup>215</sup> It appeared the following day.

Negotiations on the white paper continued in March during Welensky's visit to London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting. There were further low-level discussions over the subsequent weeks, culminating in what appeared to be a final agreement in June 1961. The federal government was granted two significant concessions: the creation of a separate Asian seat, and the stipulation that, as well as securing '12½ per cent or 400 votes, whichever is less' of the votes cast by both rolls, successful candidates in national seats would also have to obtain at least 20 per cent of the votes of either the upper or lower roll. Both these provisions were intended to make it more difficult for African nationalists to obtain a majority. The June agreement was widely perceived by Africans in Northern Rhodesia as a sell-out to the federal government, and in July serious rioting broke out in the territory. This unrest, combined with signals that Kaunda might be prepared to agree to some form of modified plan, persuaded the government in September to announce that when violence had ceased, it would be prepared to reopen talks on the scheme.

Throughout the various stages of the struggle over the Northern Rhodesian constitution, Macleod was the target of some very personal attacks from Welensky and his supporters in England. A particularly sinister aspect of this campaign was the use made of the interviews between Banda and Dingle Foot in January 1960, which had been secretly recorded and transcribed by the Security Branch of the BSAP. Late in February 1960, during a visit to Salisbury by Lord Home, Welensky had supplied him with a summary of the talks.<sup>216</sup> Perhaps Welensky suspected that Home had not been fully aware of this approach. Early in January 1961, Welensky sent Macmillan a far longer account of the meetings with verbatim extracts<sup>217</sup>. Macmillan, clearly rather bemused, asked his private secretary 'Is it supposed to be got by Secret Service means? What does it amount to?'<sup>218</sup> In the summer of 1961, Welensky tried to revive the issue by sending a copy of the Foot-Banda transcript to one of Macleod's fiercest opponents on the Tory back benches, the MP and journalist Lord Lambton.<sup>219</sup> Lambton was seen by the chief whip, who told Macmillan the MP was 'determined that Macleod must be moved from his present Office' and that he might be prepared to release the transcript in order to achieve this (298). When Lambton saw Macmillan shortly afterwards, he appears to have withdrawn this threat. Welensky no doubt took some comfort from the fact that in October 1961, Macleod was moved; but whether the two events were connected is far from clear.

If Welensky had hoped Macleod's successor, Reginald Maudling, would prove more pliable over the Northern Rhodesian constitution, he was to be disappointed. Indeed, in January 1962, when Maudling tried to make some concessions to the African nationalists, Macmillan complained that he was '*plus noir que les nègres*, more difficult and intransigent than his predecessor.'<sup>220</sup> In putting forward his revised proposals, Maudling found himself not only under attack from the CRO but almost entirely isolated in Cabinet. Even Macleod, then leader of the house, complained to R A Butler that he 'failed to understand how Reggie Maudling had taken such an extreme view'.<sup>221</sup> Maudling's attempt to persuade his colleagues of the necessity for

further revisions to the Northern Rhodesian constitution—the details of which had been agreed with Welensky after tough negotiations the previous June— were hampered by the widespread feeling within Whitehall that the government could not simply tear up this earlier agreement in response to violent pressure from African nationalists. Referring to the June talks, Macmillan argued that, whether or not the earlier agreement with Welensky was legally binding, it was ‘certainly morally binding’ (317).

Maudling’s essential aim was to reverse the concessions made to Welensky the previous June. Yet faced with both considerable opposition from his Cabinet colleagues and the threat of Welensky making a dramatic flight to England, he was forced to accept a compromise. The Asian seat conceded in June (which served to keep around 2000 Asian voters off the upper roll, thus strengthening European influence) was to remain. Maudling did, however, secure a lowering of the percentage of votes candidates in national seats were required to obtain from both rolls, and the removal of the numerical alternative.<sup>222</sup> This concession was enough to secure African nationalist participation in elections later that year. When both rounds of the election were completed in December 1962, the UFP had obtained 16 seats, the UNIP 14 and the ANC 7. This, so far as the British were concerned, was a satisfactory result, forcing the UNIP to enter government in coalition with another party.<sup>223</sup> Yet following the Rhodesian Front victory in the Southern Rhodesian elections on 14 December, it meant that the governments of all three federal territories were controlled by anti-federal parties. The Federation was effectively doomed.

### *British plans for military intervention*

A largely hidden aspect of the tense constitutional negotiations between London and Salisbury over the Northern Rhodesian constitution was the question of what would happen if the federal government sought to enforce its will through the illegal use of force. The issue had been raised within the Colonial Office as early as the autumn of 1956, following a particularly inflammatory speech by Malvern which had threatened a ‘Boston Tea Party’ in order to attain federal independence.<sup>224</sup> There was general support within the Colonial Office for Arthur Benson’s dictum that ‘it is inconceivable that any British Government would ever send British troops to fight against British people (white) in Africa; the corollary being that H.M.G. *must* gain their political aims in Central Africa by political means’. Indeed, this had been conventional wisdom within Whitehall ever since the Devonshire Declaration of 1923, and it remained, in effect, the British government’s position throughout the period under consideration.<sup>225</sup> There were, however, a number of serious attempts to explore the feasibility of using force. The matter was raised again at a meeting of officials within the Colonial Office in early September 1958. As on the previous occasion, no further action was taken. Again, a key question was whether British troops would remain loyal under the circumstances of a European insurrection, and the conclusion reached by officials was that there was a ‘real risk that British troops would not obey’ (162).

Such was the atmosphere of mistrust that subsequently developed between the British and federal governments, that even more routine questions regarding the reinforcement of Central Africa for internal security purposes could prove extremely contentious. During the constitutional negotiations over Nyasaland in the summer

of 1960, for example, Welensky resisted the deployment of British troops in the territory, fearing they might be used to impose a political solution against the wishes of the federal government (245). Hence, when in February 1961 the British government began to draw up contingency plans to deal with any outbreak of unrest in Northern Rhodesia as a result of negotiations over the territory's constitutional future, the line between 'reinforcement' and 'invasion' was far from clear. Operation KINGFISHER, which emerged in response to this crisis, was described as a plan for the reinforcement of Northern Rhodesia. Yet in two respects, particularly in its later stages, it more closely resembled an invasion plan. First, depending on the final outcome of constitutional talks, the British government was as likely to be directing its forces against European settlers—who would probably enjoy the active or tacit support of the federal government—as against Africans. Secondly, the guiding assumption of planning throughout was that the 'reinforcement' of Northern Rhodesia would have to be undertaken against the wishes of the federal government.

The planning process for KINGFISHER appears to have been set in motion by a memorandum from Macleod to the prime minister on 6 February. Macleod's initial view was that Northern Rhodesia could be reinforced with no more than three battalions of British troops. In a series of memoranda to the prime minister three days later, the minister of defence, Harold Watkinson, set out his department's preliminary thoughts on the matter (272). Many of the problems he identified were to remain relevant for some years to come. His guiding assumption was that he did not see 'how we can face a situation where British Troops would have to be sent to fight Federation Troops in the Rhodesias.' Even passive resistance to troop deployments by federal forces—for example the blocking of airfields—might necessitate Britain firing the first shots.

Macmillan discussed the matter with Watkinson, Brook and the chief of the imperial general staff the following day, 10 February (273). Both Macmillan and Brook endorsed the notion that it would not be feasible to undertake military operations against Europeans. Nevertheless, they agreed that the reinforcement of Northern Rhodesia might be necessary for internal security purposes. Welensky, however, was in no mood to surrender control of the territory to British forces. Two days later, the federal Cabinet ordered the mobilisation of the Northern Rhodesian territorial battalions.<sup>226</sup>

A meeting of the Africa Committee on 14 February, authorised the minister of defence to press ahead with preparations for KINGFISHER.<sup>227</sup> Early in the morning of 23 February, Hone warned London that the federal government might be considering 'a physical *coup d'état* backed by military forces' (280). At its meeting the same day, the Chiefs of Staff Committee had to deal with embarrassment caused by the fact that the federal government had detected some of the preparations for KINGFISHER.<sup>228</sup> They decided to respond by sending a message to the federal military authorities via their Service Liaison Staff 'that there was not and never had been any plan to intervene in Northern Rhodesia against the wishes of Sir Roy Welensky'. Yet that very evening, a committee of ministers invited the minister of defence 'to report on the military problems which would arise if, as a result of some unconstitutional and extreme action on the part of the Federal authorities it became necessary to reinforce Northern Rhodesia in support of the Governor in the face of active Federal opposition'.<sup>229</sup>

The following day, Watkinson ordered Sir Francis Festing, the acting chief of the

defence staff, to produce a plan covering that scenario. This was drawn up by the Joint Planning Staff over the weekend of 25–26 and was discussed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 28 February (283). The plan assumed that troops could only be introduced into Northern Rhodesia by air. This carried with it some important implications. First, it could only be done under two circumstances: if there was an undertaking that the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) would not intervene, or, in the absence of any such undertaking, if the entire operational strength of the RRAF was destroyed and Lusaka airport taken by paratroopers at the outset of the operation. Secondly, ‘political preparations’ aimed at winning over world opinion would be necessary in order to guarantee access to the air route over Libya, the Sudan and the Suez Canal. This would remove any element of surprise and allow the federal authorities to disperse their aircraft, thus making a single ‘knock-out blow’ more difficult.<sup>230</sup> Thirdly, even if that ‘knock out blow’ was achieved, it would take 48-hours of post-strike reconnaissance before troops could safely be introduced into Northern Rhodesia. Again, federal forces would have time to prepare for their arrival.

A revised outline plan for intervention incorporating these and other points was approved by the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on 2 March.<sup>231</sup> By that stage, however, the Colonial Office representative on the Committee was able to report a significant reduction in tension between London and Salisbury.<sup>232</sup> At the meeting on 7 March it was decided to scale down preparations for KINGFISHER.<sup>233</sup> The decision was also made to recall all papers relating to armed intervention in the Federation.

The process of working through the grim practicalities of any intervention in Central Africa had a sobering effect on politicians and military chiefs alike. On 3 March, Watkinson warned Macmillan that the success of the operation depended on the opposition being ‘ruthlessly eliminated’.<sup>234</sup> By the time he passed on to Macleod the latest military appreciation on 16 March, Watkinson had concluded that while the plan was militarily feasible, it was ‘politically practically impossible’.<sup>235</sup> When, on 13 June, renewed tensions over the Northern Rhodesian constitution led to the Chiefs of Staff Committee considering this issue again, chief of the defence staff, Lord Mountbatten, reminded his colleagues that they had already concluded that military intervention would only be feasible if it took the form of ‘a savage and ruthless attack, amounting to a full-scale operation of war, without regard to the loss of civilian lives.’<sup>236</sup>

A decision had effectively been reached in 1961 that armed intervention in Central Africa in the face of opposition from local European troops was not politically feasible. This formed the basis for the government’s approach to the use of force for the rest of the lifetime of the Federation and, indeed, during subsequent discussions of how it should react to an illegal declaration of independence by the Southern Rhodesian settlers.

### *The Congo crisis*

It is beyond the scope of this collection to provide a detailed survey of the British government’s response to the crisis in the former Belgian Congo, which erupted in July 1960. In so far as it had—because of its shared boundary—a significant impact on Britain’s relations with the federal government, however, the subject deserves some consideration. Rioting, which broke out in the Congolese capital, Leopoldville, in January 1959, dramatically transformed the political climate. Previously, Belgium had proved highly reluctant to involve Africans in the political process, to encourage

the emergence of an educated African middle-class or to Africanize the officer corps of the Congolese army (the *Force Publique*). From the beginning of 1959, however, Belgian disengagement came at a dizzying speed. On 13 January, in the immediate wake of the riots, King Baudouin of Belgium promised independence for the Congo at some unspecified point in the future. A year later, a conference was held to agree the terms of independence, the date of which was set for the end of June. Elections to the provincial and national assemblies were held in May. Patrice Lumumba's *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) emerged as the largest party in the national House of Representatives, although it lacked an overall majority. The Democratic Republic of the Congo was born on 30 June 1960. Joseph Kasavubu, founder of the pioneering nationalist movement the *Alliance des Bakongo* (ABAKO) became the country's first president, and Lumumba its prime minister. Within days, the African troops in the *Force Publique* had mutinied against their European officers. Lumumba's government supported the troops and encouraged the appointment of African officers. On 10 July, Belgian troops, who had remained in the Congo under the terms of the independence agreement, intervened. While this was represented by the Belgians as a measure to restore order, it was widely perceived as a hostile act against the Lumumba regime.

Western investment in the Congo was heavily concentrated in the mineral-rich province of Katanga. Mining there was controlled by the Belgian-based company, the *Union Minière du Haut-Katanga*. Britain also had financial interests in the province. The British company, Tanganyika Concessions ('Tanks') held 14.5 per cent of the *Union Minière's* shares, and the railway linking the Katangan capital, Elizabethville, to the Angolan coast was British-owned.<sup>237</sup> Once independence had been mooted, Belgian businessmen began exploring ways to protect their investments in Katanga. Among the options available was some form of association between Katanga and the neighbouring European-controlled territories of the Federation. Welensky made little effort to disguise from London either that discussions along these lines were taking place or that he regarded access to the mineral wealth of Katanga as an attractive prospect. In December 1959, Macmillan received a report from an MI6 officer who had recently visited Central Africa. The officer noted having been told by Welensky 'that he had recently received a secret delegation from the Katanga area...'<sup>238</sup> This delegation had asked him 'whether, if certain political developments take place in the Congo, the Katanga area might be received into the Central [sic] Federation!' These discussions received greater publicity when in February 1960 Welensky revealed their existence to Rene MacColl of the *Daily Express*.<sup>239</sup> Hopes that Katanga might detach itself from the rest of the Congo were given a boost by the provincial elections of May 1960, which allowed the strongly regionalist *Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga* (KONAKAT), led by Moïse Tshombe, to take control of Katanga's provincial legislature.

The prospect of some sort of association between Katanga and the Federation was one that, at least initially, held some attractions for policy-makers in London. In Macmillan's eyes, the contrast between Tshombe and Lumumba could not have been clearer. In an entry in his diary on 10 July, Macmillan described the former as a 'moderate' and the latter as 'a Communist and probably a Russian agent'.<sup>240</sup> Katanga's mines produced more than 60 per cent of the world's cobalt and around 10 per cent of its copper, and had been a vital source of uranium for the United States' wartime atomic weapons project.<sup>241</sup> Association with the Federation could provide a

means of sustaining Tshombe's regime and thus keeping Katanga's resources firmly in pro-Western hands.

The outbreak of unrest following independence and the subsequent Belgian military intervention provided Tshombe with both the excuse and the opportunity to break away from the rest of the country. The heavy presence of Belgian troops in Katanga—along with Belgian officers of the *Force Publique*—effectively shielded it from the forces of the central government. Confident that Lumumba's troops could not intervene, Tshombe's government announced Katanga's secession from the Congolese state on 11 July. Although the Belgian government did not formally recognise Katanga, it acted quickly to consolidate the province's resistance to the central government. Meanwhile, Lumumba appealed for help to the United Nations and, far more worryingly from London's point of view, to the Soviet Union, to restore order and expel the Belgians.

There was a considerable amount of support for the Katangan cause within Whitehall. On 13 July, Macmillan's private secretary, Philip de Zulueta, noted that, although it would be safer not to come out publicly in favour of Tshombe, 'it would be annoying if Mr Tshombe were to collapse for want of a little encouragement from us' (246). He also felt that Britain's unspoken objective should be to prevent any UN operation being used to help the Congolese government to establish its authority over Katanga. This latter sentiment was reflected in the discussion in Cabinet the following day. The meeting took place in the immediate wake of the adoption by the UN Security Council of a motion calling for the withdrawal of Belgian forces and authorising the provision of UN military assistance. Britain had abstained along with France and nationalist China. In Cabinet, fears were raised of the Federation providing military assistance to Katanga, and of federal troops coming into direct conflict with UN forces.<sup>242</sup> Nevertheless, a UN presence appeared less of a danger than independent forces coming to Lumumba's aid. Concerns were expressed about the specific threat of Ghanaian troops clashing in the Congo with those of the Federation. The Cabinet therefore decided to support UN intervention. Summing up the discussion, Macmillan stressed that the UN force should be 'primarily directed to the re-establishment of law and order, and it should not be used for the internal political purposes of the Central Congo Government' (ie, to launch an attack on Katanga). It was decided that this point should be emphasised to Welensky. The discussion set the pattern for British policy in the Congo crisis. The government regarded the UN force essentially as a means of preventing Soviet intervention and was keen that, far from being an instrument by which the central government could reconquer Katanga, it should serve to frustrate that process.

Britain remained keenly aware of the danger of the Federation being drawn militarily into the Congo crisis and, indeed, of either London or Salisbury appearing to back the Katangan cause. Following the Cabinet meeting on 14 July, Macmillan told Welensky 'in these early days I am sure that we must give no grounds for any accusation that we are assisting to break up the Congo' (247). Yet despite the British government's public commitment to non-partisan UN intervention, influential voices continued to urge a more positive line in support of Katanga. The chairman of Tanks, the former Conservative MP, Charles Waterhouse, played a particularly active role in promoting the Katangan cause.<sup>243</sup> Business support for Katanga, however, went well beyond Tanks. The companies which controlled mining in the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt were linked to the *Union Minière* through a complex network

of overlapping directorships and shareholdings.<sup>244</sup> Since Katanga and the Rhodesian Copperbelt were directly contiguous, the mining companies operating on the Northern Rhodesian side had good reason to fear that instability in Katanga would cross the border. As early as July 1959, Harry Grenfell, a director of the British South Africa Company, had approached Welensky's private secretary, suggesting that the mining interests on both sides of the border might discreetly explore the possibilities of Katanga being associated with the Federation.<sup>245</sup> Ronald Prain of RST also promoted the Katangan cause (248). Particularly strong support for a firmer line on Katanga came from Macleod's parliamentary under-secretary, Julian Amery, himself a former member of the BSAC board (252).

On 5 September, President Kasavubu, acting with the acquiescence of UN secretary general, Dag Hammarskjöld, and his staff, dismissed Lumumba. Lumumba threatened to challenge the decision in Parliament. Nine days later, however, on 14 September, a young officer, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, who had been the recipient of considerable covert support from the United States, led a coup.<sup>246</sup> Mobutu ordered the expulsion of Eastern-bloc personnel. He also attempted to arrest Lumumba but was prevented from doing so by UN troops, who surrounded Lumumba's residence. Hammarskjöld was, by this stage, keen not to appear an American or Belgian stooge. Yet with the UN initially unwilling to recognise the legitimacy of the new regime in Leopoldville, Katanga protected by mercenaries, and Lumumba still enjoying considerable support, a dangerous *impasse* appeared to have been reached. In December, following Lumumba's escape from his residence and his subsequent capture by Mobutu's forces, Lumumba's supporters in their stronghold of Stanleyville, led by Antoine Gizenga, declared themselves the legitimate government of the Congo. When, the following month, the Organisation of African Unity recognised Gizenga's regime, the prospect appeared of a damaging split within the Commonwealth. There also seemed a chance that Lumumba (whose captors had begun to show distinct signs of sympathising with their prisoner) might return to a position of leadership. This possibility was, however, violently removed in mid-January when, probably with the connivance of the Belgian government, Lumumba was transferred to Katanga and murdered by Tshombe's forces.<sup>247</sup> British officials had themselves been prepared to contemplate the advantages of Lumumba's 'elimination' (257). The evidence currently available, however, does not suggest direct British involvement in his subsequent death.

The murder of Lumumba served to create major difficulties for the British government. It caused outrage among Eastern-bloc and Afro-Asian nations, which was translated in the UN into a powerful desire for action against 'colonial' interests in the Congo, specifically in Katanga. This coincided with the inauguration in the United States of President Kennedy, whose administration was to prove far less sympathetic than its predecessor had been to European interests in the Congo. The first major result of these developments was a UN Security Council resolution passed on 21 February 1961, which authorised the 'use of force, if necessary, in the last resort' to ensure 'that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the UN command and mercenaries'<sup>248</sup>. The resolution also called for the end of military rule. Mobutu stepped down under pressure from the Americans and was replaced by a civilian government under Joseph Ileo. Resentment at what the resolution might mean for the military forces of

both the Leopoldville government and Katanga led to a temporary rapprochement between Ileo and Tshombe. This broke down in April, and Tshombe was arrested by Ileo's troops. He was released two months later when he agreed to end Katanga's secession, but reneged on this promise on his return to the province. In July, the United States managed to engineer the election of Cyrille Adoula as prime minister of the central government, with Antoine Gizenga as his deputy. Gizenga's inclusion in the administration ended the defiance of Lumumba's followers and left Katanga exposed to the attentions of the UN.

On 28 August, the United Nations force initiated an operation to remove foreign officers and mercenaries from Katanga. Although this passed off without bloodshed, it aroused fears in London that the organisation was exceeding its mandate and that its actions threatened to destabilise the province. British concern focused in particular on the activities of the UN's local representative, the Irish diplomat, Conor Cruise O'Brien, who was suspected of being over-zealous in the execution of his instructions.<sup>249</sup> The conflict in Katanga again threatened to draw in the Federation. On 6 September, Welensky wrote to Macmillan warning him that the United Nations was about to undertake a further escalation of action against Tshombe's regime and criticising O'Brien's role in the affair (305). In reply, Macmillan assured Welensky that the British government shared both his concerns, and his assessment of O'Brien (306). At the same time, however, he urged that federal forces should not be deployed on the Katangan border, noting that this would 'certainly be misrepresented by ill-wishers'. In private, the British government was not only concerned that a federal deployment would be seen as interference in the affairs of the Congo. The recent outbreak of unrest in Northern Rhodesia was also a consideration. Any movement of federal troops there under the pretext of defending the Federation from incursions across the border was likely to be regarded by Northern Rhodesian Africans as a means of tightening internal security in the colony.

As this exchange of correspondence was taking place, UN personnel on the ground were discussing a more far-reaching plan to neutralise the Katangan forces and arrest leading figures in the regime. 'Operation Morthor', as the plan was called, was launched on 13 September, without the final approval of the UN secretary general. It led to fighting between UN and Katangan forces, with the former running into difficulties as they came under fire from Katanga's lone fighter aircraft. There was great alarm in Whitehall, and a planned visit to the Congo by Lord Lansdowne, a junior minister at the Foreign Office, was brought forward. Hammarskjöld agreed to cease-fire talks with Tshombe. On his way to the meeting on 18 September, he was killed as his plane approached Ndola in Northern Rhodesia. The circumstances of his death have generated controversy ever since. In talks with Tshombe in Ndola the day after Hammarskjöld's death, Neil Ritchie, an MI6 officer attached to the UK High Commission in Salisbury, persuaded the Katangan leader to cease using his aircraft against UN forces. The following day, a ceasefire was agreed.<sup>250</sup>

Throughout the various twists and turns in the Congo affair, a broad pattern of behaviour by the British government emerged. Despite considerable pressure from the 'Katanga lobby', there was a general recognition that a fully independent Katanga was neither feasible nor desirable. The government was keen that the federal government should not give, and, in particular, should not be seen to be giving assistance to the province. At the same time, however, the government was reluctant to give its support to military action against Katanga, regarding it as the most stable

and pro-Western part of the Congo. This meant that it was increasingly at odds with the Kennedy administration, which favoured a more aggressive approach to Katangan secessionism.<sup>251</sup> Ultimately, however, it was force that served to resolve the crisis. On 28 December 1962, after having been fired upon, the UN launched an offensive against Elizabethville. Eighteen days later, Tshombe announced the end of Katangan secession.

### *The future of the Federation*

Constitutional change in the two northern territories served to heighten the British government's dilemma over the future of the Federation. The federal review conference, which opened in London on 5 December 1960, proved a stormy affair. After less than two weeks, the government announced that it was being suspended to await the outcome of negotiations on the territorial constitutions. The failure to reach agreement on the Northern Rhodesian constitution meant that, by the beginning of 1962, it had still not been reconvened. By then, Banda's success in the Nyasaland election of August 1961 increased the pressure on the British government to revive talks on the Federation's future. Yet the ultimate solution to the region's problems remained obscure. If the review conference were to await the results of elections in Northern and Southern Rhodesia (something that would place it on a sounder footing), it would probably be delayed until the end of 1962. Yet it seemed unlikely that Banda's ambitions for the secession of Nyasaland from the Federation could be contained until then.<sup>252</sup> At the same time, it was clear that any acknowledgement of Nyasaland's right to secede would be fiercely resisted by the federal government. A suggestion raised by Sandys was to offer the federal government full independence after a certain period of time, but with the proviso that, the constituent territories would then be allowed to secede. This did not prove attractive to the Colonial Office, which foresaw problems over the choice of a date for federal independence. Sandys's proposal also raised the theoretical possibility of the federal government being granted full independence while some of its constituent territories remained British dependencies. Sandys himself saw nothing logically incompatible in this. His officials, however, identified serious practical difficulties in the proposal, particularly in terms of the ability of an 'independent' Federation to obtain membership of the United Nations (318).

Talks with Banda in February 1962 appear to have convinced Sandys that more immediate action was necessary. Banda made clear he had no intention of negotiating any revised form of association with the two other federal territories, even in the event of some prior acknowledgement of Nyasaland's right to secede. Impressed by the force of Banda's determination to extricate Nyasaland from the Federation, Sandys suggested to the Cabinet the best course might be to try to persuade Welensky to take the initiative and declare that he was inviting the British government to arrange for Nyasaland's secession (321). The Cabinet secretary, Norman Brook, objected, however, that this would effectively mean 'the end of the Federation', and Sandys was persuaded to postpone any such initiative (322).

Banda's uncompromising attitude served to revive interest in the idea of some more systematic redesign of the Federation's frontiers. In its various forms, the essential objective was to dismember Northern Rhodesia, leaving Southern Rhodesia in control of the Copperbelt, while allowing Barotseland, north-eastern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, some form of satellite status. A scheme along these lines had been floated

in the late 1950s by the right-wing Dominion Party. In February, following Sandys's talks with Banda, the British high commissioner in Salisbury, Lord Alport, advanced his own version as 'the only possible alternative to the break-up of the Federation' (323). It envisaged the transfer of the north-eastern part of Northern Rhodesia to Nyasaland and the establishment of Barotseland as a self-governing protectorate within the Federation. The new, enlarged Nyasaland would be linked to the Rhodesias by a customs union and would be free to negotiate the provision of common services. On 3 March, Whitehead publicly announced a version of his own—a plan for a new state of Central Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia from which Barotseland and north-eastern Northern Rhodesia would be free to secede.<sup>253</sup> The Colonial Office, however, remained hostile to the basic idea behind these various schemes, fearing that it would create impoverished African protectorates and that it might spark a revolt among the Africans of the Rhodesias (324).

Sandys's own attention remained on the immediate problem of maintaining Banda's cooperation. On his return to London following discussions with Banda in Nyasaland, he told his colleagues that a statement from the British and federal governments acknowledging Nyasaland's right to secede would be necessary by mid-March if Banda were to be persuaded to come to London for talks in April.<sup>254</sup> Indeed, Sandys appears to have offered Banda a private assurance that a decision on secession would be made prior to the visit.<sup>255</sup> Nevertheless, it was clear some senior ministers were reluctant to admit that the Federation was beyond salvation. In an extraordinary aside, Home even appeared to suggest that it could be held together by force, claiming that 'The Nyasas were a docile people and respected firmness'.<sup>256</sup>

By the beginning of March, Welensky had adopted a firm line of opposition to any acknowledgement of Nyasaland's right to secede.<sup>257</sup> Given Sandys's private undertaking to Banda, this appeared to set the British government on a collision course with the federal government. Fresh room for manoeuvre was provided by the appointment of R A Bulter on 15 March as minister responsible for Central Africa. During talks with the governor of Nyasaland, Sir Glyn Jones, in late March and early April, Butler refined his own policy. Although he was to dignify this with the term 'composite solution', it was essentially the familiar tactic of 'playing the situation long'. An attempt would be made to postpone both talks with Banda and a firm statement on secession, in the hope that Welensky could, in the meantime, be persuaded to accept the inevitability of sweeping reforms to the Federation.<sup>258</sup> The holding device arrived at by Butler was the announcement on 8 May of the appointment of an inquiry into both the consequences of Nyasaland's withdrawal from the Federation and also 'possible forms of association with the other two territories'.<sup>259</sup> When, in late June, Butler obtained the Cabinet's permission to offer Banda a constitutional conference on Nyasaland in the autumn he still maintained that a firm statement on secession should be postponed until after elections had been held in Northern Rhodesia.<sup>260</sup> By late October, however, Butler had concluded that constitutional talks would achieve little unless secession was conceded immediately before the conference began work.<sup>261</sup> This was despite the fact that the conference was due to begin on 12 November, and the final stages of the Northern Rhodesian general election would not be completed until December. Butler's plan was strongly resisted by Welensky who both denied the British government's right to grant secession unilaterally, and claimed that a statement would have a damaging impact

on not only the Northern Rhodesian election but also on that in Southern Rhodesia, which was also scheduled for December. In deference to these objections, the constitutional conference took place in advance of a formal acknowledgement by the British government of Nyasaland's right to secede. This was finally made by Butler on 19 December. It was not until 29 March 1963 that Butler finally acknowledged the right of *all* federal territories to secede. Yet the declaration on Nyasaland the previous December had made this little more than a formality.

In response to Butler's statement in December, Welensky launched perhaps his most dramatic revelation of supposed duplicity by the British government. He lined up an impressive list of Tory grandees—including three former secretaries of state for the colonies—to claim that in negotiations on the establishment of the Federation in January 1953, British ministers had given assurances that the Federation could only be wound up with the consent of all of its four governments. He also published a white paper on the matter. The British government responded with its own white paper, which took the highly unusual step of reproducing the relevant sections from the verbatim minutes of the January 1953 conference. It did so, however, with considerable reservations. Having looked through the record of the January 1953 talks with a view to publication, Burke Trend reported back gloomily to Macmillan that it was 'not entirely satisfactory from the Government's point of view'.<sup>262</sup> Once again, the practice of making 'assurances' to the various parties in Central Africa had come back to haunt the British government.

#### *The approach of independence in the northern territories*

Although Nyasaland's right to secede from the Federation had been acknowledged in December 1962 and Northern Rhodesia's in March 1963, firm dates for their independence were only agreed in September 1963 and May 1964 respectively. The transfer of power in the northern territories raised problems that were already familiar to British policy makers elsewhere in Africa. Both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland faced difficulties in Africanising the civil service owing to a particularly acute lack of properly trained local personnel. In 1960, A L Adu, head of both the Prime Minister's Department and the civil service in Ghana, was seconded by his government to Nyasaland to chair a special committee on the localisation of the civil service. Having completed his review, Adu warned the Colonial Office that the implementation of his committee's recommendations was likely to be hampered by the severe financial limitations on the Nyasaland government. He complained of the 'woefully low' secondary school output, something he regarded as 'a serious bottleneck' in any programme of advancement.<sup>263</sup> At the same time, the territory's capacity to make rapid improvements in this area was far from clear. The prospect of Nyasaland's withdrawal from the Federation raised serious concerns about its financial future. There had, as we have seen, been little optimism in Whitehall that the economic benefits of federation would be sufficient to overcome African opposition to the scheme, at least in the short term. Nevertheless the territory had undoubtedly benefited, both in terms of its share of federal revenues and its access to loans raised by the federal government. In January 1963, the Central Africa Office estimated that whereas in 1952 government expenditure in the territory—both capital and recurrent—amounted to only £4.5 million, by 1961–1962, territorial and federal government expenditure was around £10.5 million (344). Since this was £5 million more than the revenues actually raised in the territory, Nyasaland's

departure from the Federation threatened to leave 45 per cent of its current expenditure uncovered by the revenues available to it. This was a particularly worrying prospect, given Banda's ambitious plans for development. Having given up any idea of using Nyasaland's economic plight as a means of persuading Banda to keep his territory in the Federation, the British government sought to encourage him to scale down these plans. It also persuaded him to retain a British minister of finance right up until independence. Nevertheless, the British government was reconciled to the fact that the territory would continue to be heavily dependent on assistance from the UK. Indeed, in the years immediately after independence, British aid was supplying about 50 per cent of Malawi's recurrent expenditure.<sup>264</sup>

In Northern Rhodesia—despite the country's far greater revenue-gathering capacity—the feeling on the ground as independence approached appears to have been even more gloomy. At the end of July 1964, J A Molyneux, the recently appointed deputy governor of Northern Rhodesia, asked London whether it was an 'over-statement' to say that no British colony had previously been granted independence with such a deficit of locally trained manpower (386).

A problem common across much of Africa was that of how to control the use of violence and intimidation by the party about to assume power. Once the dominant nationalist movement of a territory had won control of the Legislative Council, it was difficult to deny its leaders whatever concessions they demanded—or to question how they exercised their new-found responsibilities—without running the risk of plunging the territory into anarchy. In the intervening period before full independence, the British were therefore faced with the worst of both worlds: they were formally responsible for what went on in the territory but, in practice, had little ability to curb abuses.

In both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, the British administration found themselves virtually obliged to turn a blind eye to a considerable amount of low-level violence by followers of Banda and Kaunda in the period leading up to independence. In Nyasaland, the long period between the MCP's sweeping victory in the general election of August 1961 and the eventual transfer of power three years later meant that this problem was particularly pronounced. Indeed, as early as October 1960, Glyn Jones had reassured Macleod that his district commissioners appreciated the need 'to play the situation along as gently as possible to the elections, even if it means having to condone certain political offences committed by Banda and other leaders'.<sup>265</sup> Officials at the Central Africa Office displayed what can only be described as a 'relaxed' attitude to reports of violence and intimidation on the part of Banda's cronies. Writing in July 1963, a year before the transfer of power, one civil servant suggested both that it was unrealistic to expect 'a highly sophisticated concept of national behaviour to appear overnight', and that Banda should take some credit for the fact that Europeans had not been victims of violence (358). Jones himself tended to play down intimidation by Banda's supporters in his despatches to London. At one level this was understandable. There was, in effect, no realistic alternative to transferring power to Banda and his supporters, and there was little to be gained by increasing the unease already felt by British politicians at this prospect. Furthermore, until the end of 1963, both Jones and his Northern Rhodesian counterpart were fully aware that the federal government would make enormous play out of any reports of unrest in the northern territories. Yet as independence neared, Jones could no longer disguise his apprehension. In May 1964, for example,

he complained to London of a series of attacks against Jehovah's Witnesses by youths associated with the MCP. Jones noted that he had considered stripping Banda of his responsibility for public order, but had concluded that 'such action would lead to serious estrangement between me and the Prime Minister, and thus to a worsening of the situation' (377).

The approach of independence in Northern Rhodesia posed two particular problems for British policy-makers: the relation of Barotseland to the new state, and the question of the mineral rights of the British South Africa Company (BSAC). During negotiations over the Northern Rhodesian constitution in 1961, the Colonial Office, while keen to reassure the paramount chief of Barotseland, had been cautious about incorporating any guarantee of Barotseland's rights in an order-in-council. Officials feared that this would open some awkward questions about the territory's ultimate future: would it be allowed to secede from an independent, nationalist-led Northern Rhodesia; and under what circumstances would Britain withdraw its protection? (286). Instead, in April 1961, Macleod simply made a statement reiterating Barotseland's existing protected status.

The federal government recognised that Barotseland represented a potential obstacle to the introduction of majority rule in Northern Rhodesia. In October 1961, Greenfield paid a private visit to the province. According to information received by the British government, he offered the federal government's assistance in any attempt by the territory's leaders to demand secession from Northern Rhodesia, so long as their intention was to become a separate state within the federation (309). Welensky's supporters in England, notably the Conservative MP Patrick Wall, took up the campaign for Barotseland to be allowed to secede.

The solution to the problem of Barotseland for the British government came, ultimately, through the democratisation of the administration of the territory. In 1962, a former secretary for native affairs, R S Hudson, was commissioned to advise on the future of Barotseland. His report, which was delivered in November 1962, stressed the need for a widening of popular representation in the Lozi traditional institutions and recommended an officer be seconded to assist in the process of reform.<sup>266</sup> Far from wishing to undermine those institutions, Hudson (who was regarded by the Central African Office as being excessively pro-Lozi) saw democratisation as the only means of preserving them.<sup>267</sup> Hence, British support for democratisation was more than simply a cynical ploy to undermine the autonomy of Barotseland. Nevertheless, the fruits of that process provided Britain with a valuable resource in its efforts to disengage from Barotseland. In January 1963, the Central Africa Office agreed with the Northern Rhodesian Government to institute political reform in advance of any agreement over Barotseland's constitutional status.<sup>268</sup>

Officials in London and Northern Rhodesia hoped that democratisation would weaken resistance in Barotseland by allowing UNIP supporters greater influence over the protectorate's institutions.<sup>269</sup> In July 1963, for the first time, twenty-five members of the Barotse National Council—roughly half of the total membership—were due to be directly elected on the basis of a wide franchise.<sup>270</sup> As one official at the Central Africa Office noted towards the end of May, a strong showing by the UNIP would place pressure on the Litunga (paramount-chief) and his councillors to conduct relations with the Northern Rhodesian government 'in a realistic spirit' (356). With this aim in mind, the Northern Rhodesian government resisted attempts

by the Barotseland authorities to prevent the UNIP registering branches for the elections.

During talks in London in July, the British effectively deferred a decision on Barotseland's future by persuading the Litunga to hold separate talks with the Northern Rhodesian government. By the time these talks took place in September, the elections in Barotseland were over, and the UNIP had won all twenty-five of the elected seats. The Litunga's bargaining position was thus considerably weakened. Although he mounted a strong defence of Barotseland's special status, he did agree that it would take part in the forthcoming general election. The UNIP performed extremely well in Barotseland in the election which was held in January 1964. In March, in order to remove any remaining inhibitions the Litunga might have about reaching an agreement with the Northern Rhodesian government, the Central Africa Office advised that he should be acquainted with the 'hard fact' that 'it would be quite impossible for the British government or the Crown to maintain special and direct relations with one province within an independent sovereign State' (373).

The issue of BSAC's mineral rights proved an even more worrying one for the British government as Northern Rhodesian independence neared. It was clear that after independence, Kaunda's administration would not honour the 1950 agreement under which the Chartered Company was to retain the rights until 1986 subject to a 20 per cent payment to the Northern Rhodesian government. BSAC had been offered a relatively generous deal during talks with the Northern Rhodesian government in October 1963, at a time when the UNIP held only 3 out of 10 portfolios. BSAC was offered the chance to transfer its rights to the Northern Rhodesian government on 1 January 1964 in return for 22½ annual payments amounting to around £35 million. The Company declined this, largely because the British government refused to guarantee the deal. The emergence of an exclusively UNIP government after the general elections of January 1964 ensured that the offer would not be repeated. During the constitutional conference in May 1964, the UNIP made it clear it was not prepared to include a provision in the independence constitution guaranteeing BSAC's rights. There were signs that Kaunda's government and the Chartered Company might still be able to reach an agreement, although both sides were some distance apart. BSAC had estimated the value of its rights at £44 million, but indicated that it was prepared to be bought out for £27 million. Kaunda's government, however, was determined to acquire them with an *ex gratia* payment of no more than £5 million (392, 397). The Northern Rhodesian government commissioned a firm of economic consultants, Maxwell Stamp Associates, to investigate the validity of BSAC's claim. The firm's report challenged the original basis of the 1950 agreement and argued that the responsibility for compensating BSAC lay with the British government. In the light of this, Kaunda's administration formally requested in early September that Britain relieve it of all obligations towards Chartered before independence on 24 October.<sup>271</sup> In subsequent talks with the British government, the Northern Rhodesian finance minister made it clear that his administration was now prepared to offer no more than £2 million as a 'goodwill contribution'.

One of the worries of the British government was that if the Northern Rhodesian government succeeded in appropriating BSAC's rights without compensation, this might merely act as the '*hors-d'oeuvre*' before a move to nationalise the copper companies themselves (397). In the longer term, officials at the Central Africa Office

envisaged a doomsday scenario under which the appropriation of BSAC's rights without compensation would make it difficult for British ministers to defend additional aid for an independent Zambia. This might weaken the ability of Kaunda to resist Eastern bloc influence, with the consequent threat that the country's copper mines might ultimately fall under communist control (399).

In the weeks leading up to independence, BSAC began to drop its asking price from £27 million to £18 million and then to £8 million. The offer from the Northern Rhodesian government, however, remained £2 million, and it looked to Britain to make up any shortfall. Yet the British government remained uneasy at the precedent that would be set if it offered compensation to a British company for expropriation by another government. The outlines of a deal were only finally worked out a matter of hours before the formal transfer of power after face-to-face negotiations between the British Commonwealth relations secretary, Arthur Bottomley, the Zambian finance minister and BSAC executives. BSAC accepted £4 million compensation—£2 million from the Zambian government and £2 million from Britain (406). When placed beside the £35 million offer in October 1963, this sum did not reflect well on BSAC's negotiating tactics. In their defence, the company's executives argued that the October offer would not necessarily have been honoured by subsequent Zambian governments, and pointed out that between 1 January 1964 and independence the company had received £8.5 million in royalties, which it would have foregone under the October deal.<sup>272</sup> Nevertheless, the whole episode had distinct echoes of the Siblyline Books about it.

#### *The future of Southern Rhodesia, December 1962–October 1964*

A full appreciation of the dilemma that would be posed by the future of Southern Rhodesia once the Federation had gone dawned on British ministers only gradually. A major turning-point came with the Southern Rhodesian general election in December 1962, when Whitehead's UFP government was ousted from power by the Rhodesian Front (RF), led by Winston Field. If there had been any doubt left that the Federation was doomed, this effectively dispelled it. It also made it more likely that the territory would request full independence at an early date. Shortly after the result had been announced, Sir Roger Stevens, deputy under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office, pointed to one of the central problems this would pose for Britain, and identified what was to be the British government's preferred tactic for dealing with it (341). To grant independence in the near future would attract a storm of international condemnation. Yet to remain responsible for the territory would associate Britain with systematic racial discrimination for a potentially unlimited period. The 'solution' Stevens identified was to avoid reaching any decision until circumstances seemed more propitious. The government had still not given up hope of negotiating some form of revised association between the three federal territories, and it was with this objective in mind that Butler visited the Federation in January 1963.<sup>273</sup> As a result of Butler's talks, it became clear that before any progress could be made on this front, it would be necessary to dissolve the existing Federation. The priority, then, came to be to persuade the leaders of the federal territories and the federal government to take part in dissolution talks. Preliminary discussions were arranged in London for late March, first with Field, then with the Northern Rhodesians and finally with Welensky. Initially, the major problem appeared to be that of agreeing the terms for the discussion of some future association. Field

indicated that he was interested in exploring the maintenance of economic links with Northern Rhodesia, and it seemed possible that the Northern Rhodesians would agree to enter into such talks. Yet both parties were keen that any future form of association should be on an entirely new basis. Welensky, by contrast, wanted the issue of the maintenance of existing political and constitutional links between the two Rhodesias to be discussed (348). It seemed unlikely, therefore, that an agenda could be devised which would be acceptable to both the Northern Rhodesians and Welensky. Faced with a choice between the two, Butler felt that the priority was to bring the Northern Rhodesians into talks with Field. Butler clearly found the mechanics of working out a settlement burdensome and was worried about the domestic implications of the affair, comparing it with the political crisis over the Government of India Bill in the 1930s (347).

The talks with the various parties ended on 29 March with a statement by Butler that the British government accepted in principle the right of all federal territories to secede. This came in response to threats from the Northern Rhodesian representatives that they would not attend any dissolution conference unless they received in advance an undertaking on secession. Butler anticipated that in making this concession, the government was likely to prompt Field to raise the question of Southern Rhodesian independence.<sup>274</sup> Indeed, on being briefed about Butler's statement on the final day of talks, Field warned that his government would participate in the dissolution conference only if he received a written undertaking that his territory be granted independence as soon as Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland had been allowed to secede or granted independence. He was invited by Butler to put this demand on paper, and duly did so later that day (351). Despite Stevens's predictions in December 1962, Field's demand took the government rather by surprise. Although Field had mentioned independence in his earlier discussions with Butler, his priority appeared to be that of working out new forms of association between the Rhodesias. Butler's reply to Field on 9 April failed to give him the undertaking he required.<sup>275</sup> It did, however 'recognise the desire of the Southern Rhodesian Government' that full independence should be reached as soon 'as was practicable', and accepted in principle that 'Southern Rhodesia, like the other [federal] territories will proceed through the normal processes to independence'.<sup>276</sup> In his reply, Field stood firm for an 'unqualified recognition' of his country's right to full independence.<sup>277</sup> A further letter from Butler to Field on 2 May, offered slightly more to the Southern Rhodesian premier. It suggested that if Southern Rhodesia co-operated in sorting out those issues which currently stood in the way of independence (and it was implied that the Federation was the most important of these), talks on this matter would begin at least as soon as those on the independence of the northern territories.<sup>278</sup> Field replied on 9 May proposing discussions on the issue of independence later in the month. In the process, probably inadvertently, he gave Butler the room for manoeuvre he needed. In place of his demand on 20 April for an 'unconditional recognition' of Southern Rhodesia's right to independence, he now asked for discussions 'on the terms on which Southern Rhodesia should proceed to independence'.<sup>279</sup> Replying to Field on 16 May, Butler agreed that talks on independence should begin prior to the dissolution conference on condition that the conference itself should not have to await the successful resolution of those talks, which would continue afterwards if necessary, 'at the earliest convenient date'.<sup>280</sup> He added that if a basis for Southern Rhodesian independence could be negotiated

successfully, the government would allow independence to coincide with the dissolution of the Federation. Butler's letter was, in effect, a classic example of the negotiating tactic employed by the British government throughout this period. On the basis of a superficial reading it appeared to offer the settlers a rapid transition to independence. On closer inspection, however, it allowed the government scope to draw the issue out indefinitely. Most importantly, it provided a formula which would ultimately bring Field to the dissolution conference.

The issue of independence for Southern Rhodesia split both the parliamentary Conservative Party and the Cabinet. Towards the end of April, Macmillan told the Australian prime minister, Sir Robert Menzies, that, while there were perhaps as many as 200 Tory backbenchers who supported the immediate recognition of Southern Rhodesian independence, any such move was likely to be opposed by a significant number of their colleagues (352). Within the Cabinet, Butler regarded Britain's inability to exercise effective control over Southern Rhodesia as a strong practical reason for granting *de jure* independence (354). Nevertheless, he recognised there were strong practical and moral arguments for refusing a rapid transition to independence. He appreciated that the Cabinet would not grant it unconditionally. Indeed, he felt some of his colleagues, most notably the leader of the house, Iain Macleod, did 'not really want to grant it at all'.

If there was any consolation to be drawn from this situation it came, perhaps surprisingly, from the personality of the Southern Rhodesian premier himself. From the earliest days of the Federation, Malvern and Welensky had used the prospect of a 'right-wing' victory in Southern Rhodesia as one of their most powerful bargaining counters. This apocalyptic fate having finally befallen the territory, however, British representatives on the ground found it relatively agreeable. Alport, in a report on the first months of the Rhodesian Front government, was scathing about some of Field's colleagues. Yet he judged the RF to be 'fortunate in its leader', and the British government to be fortunate in having Field as a negotiating partner (353).

The dissolution conference took place from 28 June to 2 July at Victoria Falls and succeeded in reaching agreement on all the outstanding issues. One aspect of the conference (and of a special meeting in September which determined the fate of the federal armed forces) that has attracted criticism was the decision to hand the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) to Southern Rhodesia virtually intact.<sup>281</sup> Yet the RRAF had grown out of the Southern Rhodesian Air Force and was stationed entirely in Southern Rhodesia. It was an almost exclusively European force, and it seemed unlikely that its personnel would wish to serve in the northern territories if the RRAF was partitioned.<sup>282</sup> The principal question that confronted British policy-makers was whether Southern Rhodesia would be able to bear the cost (357).

With the dissolution conference completed, the issue of Southern Rhodesian independence loomed ever larger. The British government was keen to hold consultations between Field and other Commonwealth leaders.<sup>283</sup> It was far from clear, however, that Field would co-operate in any consultations or that the process could be reconciled with the government's acceptance in principle that the territory would proceed to independence through the 'normal processes'. In the meantime, events in East Africa in January 1964 gave a considerable boost to the Southern Rhodesian case. A *coup* in the newly-independent state of Zanzibar overthrew the Sultan, and British troops were called in to suppress a rising in Tanganyika and an army revolt in Uganda. When Field met Sir Alec Douglas-Home (by then prime

minister, having renounced his peerage) and Sandys for talks in London at the end of that month, he argued that the avoidance of a premature hand-over of power to Africans 'was all the more important in the light of events in East Africa' (368).

With no significant breakthrough at the end of these talks, Whitehall began to give detailed attention to the options open to it if Field attempted a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) (369). A preliminary study of the financial and economic implications of UDI was ready for ministers by the end of February. Its findings did not make encouraging reading. The efficacy of a number of economic sanctions was doubtful, and in the longer term some of them were likely to do more damage to Britain than to Southern Rhodesia. Retaliatory action by Southern Rhodesia could have serious consequences not just for Britain but for neighbouring states in Central Africa. There was a particular threat that Northern Rhodesian copper production might be hit (371).

Conservative ministers were, in any case, eager to avoid any form of confrontation with Southern Rhodesia. Sandys and Douglas-Home were instinctively sympathetic towards the plight of the Rhodesian settlers. Despite urging Field to expand the 'A roll', in private, Sandys was far from convinced that it was either necessary or wise to push the Southern Rhodesians too far. A month after the talks with Field, he suggested to his colleagues that, in the light of events in East Africa, it would be 'morally wrong' and 'indefensible' 'to press the Southern Rhodesian Government to move faster towards majority rule than the pace already set by the existing constitution' (370). Sandys's view was essentially that things should ideally remain largely as they already were, with the Southern Rhodesian constitution functioning in its current form and Britain continuing to regard the territory as dependent. The proposal that Douglas-Home and Sandys put to the Southern Rhodesian high commissioner on 28 February was not far removed from Sandys's largely 'passive' position. It suggested that Britain might make a statement confirming the convention whereby the government did not interfere in Southern Rhodesian affairs and combine this with the offer of financial aid aimed at expanding African secondary education. The possibility was also raised of Southern Rhodesia making some reciprocal moves on the issues of the Land Apportionment Act and racial discrimination (372). The Southern Rhodesian high commissioner understandably regarded this approach as 'very helpful'. He was concerned, however, that the policy might not survive the election of a Labour government.

The air of relative optimism that, if not a deal, then some form of *modus vivendi* might be within reach, took a serious blow on 13 April when Field was ousted as premier and replaced by his finance minister, Ian Smith. As the British high commissioner in Salisbury, J B Johnston noted, the reasons for Field's removal offered little comfort to the British government. Field had previously been portrayed as someone who could exercise a restraining influence on more right-wing colleagues. Now it appeared those colleagues had concluded they were not being taken into the prime minister's confidence and had lost patience with his attempts to secure independence (382). Johnston's conclusion, that there was now no realistic prospect of a negotiated settlement with the Southern Rhodesians, was reinforced by his personal opinion of Smith as an overgrown 'schoolboy' (387).

Smith certainly wasted little time in reiterating his country's demand for immediate independence. In a letter to Douglas-Home on 6 May, he claimed the Southern Rhodesian electorate had only accepted the 1961 constitution because

Whitehead had assured them he had been promised complete independence for the territory if the Federation collapsed. That acceptance now placed the British government under an obligation to grant independence.<sup>284</sup> Indications that Smith was likely to increase the pressure for independence encouraged the British to step up their preparations for dealing with UDI. In June, the governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, requested firm instructions from London on the actions he should take in this event (381). The same month, the Defence Planning Staff (DPS) drew up a detailed assessment of the feasibility of military intervention in Southern Rhodesia. With the approach of Nyasaland's independence on 6 July 1964, it was feared in London that Southern Rhodesia might use the date unilaterally to announce their own independence. The report of the DPS echoed the terms of the 1961 discussions on intervention in Northern Rhodesia, stopping little short of concluding that military action was not an option. Indeed, it made more explicit than before that even if British politicians were prepared to engage in a major conflict, British soldiers might not be. Intervention in the face of opposition from the Southern Rhodesian Regular Army and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force 'would not only place an unacceptable strain on the loyalty of British troops but would also prove militarily impracticable' (384).

Smith came to London for talks in September. In preparing for these discussions, the principal concern of officials and ministers was (as so often in the past) to postpone any confrontation for as long as possible (388, 389, 393). In this respect, the talks with Smith, which began on 7 September, represented a modest success for the British government. There was no break with Smith, and the Southern Rhodesian premier was even prepared to put his name to a joint communiqué. In the longer term, however, the talks saw the emergence of a new complication. Smith had undertaken to consult African opinion on the issue of independence. Yet he proposed to do this through a series of tribal meetings or *indabas*.<sup>285</sup> There was no question of a referendum among Africans, and African nationalist parties were not to be consulted. British officials had a fairly low opinion of African nationalist leaders in Southern Rhodesia (394). Yet the Cabinet recognised that any consultations which did not involve 'the politically-minded urban Africans' could not form the basis for a solution.<sup>286</sup> In the joint communiqué, which was issued on 11 September, both sides accepted that independence should be granted on a basis that was 'acceptable to the people of the country as a whole.' The British government, however, 'reserved their position' on whether any test of African opinion employed by Smith would be able to demonstrate this.<sup>287</sup>

The unexpected achievement of a joint position with the British government—however vague—strengthened Smith's hand domestically. Smith's failure to press ahead with the threat of a unilateral declaration of independence, effectively deprived the recently formed 'moderate' Rhodesia Party, led by Welensky, of its platform. In a by-election on 1 October, Welensky was convincingly defeated by Clifford Dupont, Smith's deputy prime minister (400).

### *The future of Southern Rhodesia, October 1964–November 1965*

As leader of the opposition, Harold Wilson had gone on record demanding that Southern Rhodesia should not be granted independence 'until the country has a constitution which enables the mass of the people there to govern themselves'.<sup>288</sup> Yet following the victory of the Labour Party in the general election of October 1964, his

government carefully refrained from giving any indication that British policy towards Rhodesia had changed. Indeed, in February 1965, officials in London noted that nothing the new government had said was technically incompatible with Rhodesia achieving independence on the basis of the 1961 constitution.<sup>289</sup>

On taking office, Wilson almost immediately had to deal with indications Smith might be preparing for UDI. At his government's first Cabinet meeting, concern was expressed that Smith appeared determined to hold an *indaba*, in defiance of the views of the British government (402). Shortly afterwards, news reached the British high commission that General Anderson, the commander of the Rhodesian army, was being removed because of his known opposition to UDI (404). The government was sufficiently alarmed by these signals to issue a statement on 28 October warning of the consequences of an illegal declaration of independence.

Concerns began to mount about the impact economic sanctions might have across Southern Rhodesia's north-western border. Worried he would come under domestic pressure to take action against his southern neighbour, Kaunda was afraid Rhodesia might retaliate by starving the Zambian copper mines of coal supplies (407). Six days later, along with Prain and Sir John Maud, he urged the British government to do nothing that might give Smith an excuse for UDI. In particular, he hoped that a speech shortly to be given to the UN by Lord Caradon, the minister of state for foreign affairs, would offer no such pretext (408). Prain was keen to impress on Whitehall that any disruption to the Zambian copper industry would have damaging repercussions for British industry. A report by a committee of British officials subsequently concurred with Prain's warning (414). At a time of severe economic strain for the British economy, this was certainly a powerful consideration. Yet it merely exacerbated the dilemma faced by British policy makers: on the one hand they recognised the wisdom of avoiding any action that might provoke UDI. On the other, however, they worried about the reaction of Southern Rhodesian Africans and of the international community if they appeared to be doing nothing to advance political reform.<sup>290</sup>

If the course of economic sanctions appeared a dangerous one, the option of military intervention, even on a very limited scale, was one that British planners were no longer prepared to give serious consideration. In February 1965, the directors of defence plans reported on the feasibility of an operation to seize the Kariba dam in the event of Southern Rhodesia threatening to cut off the electrical supply to the Zambian copperbelt. A familiar list of objections was advanced, including that the operation 'would impose an almost intolerable strain on the loyalties and morale of the British forces involved'.<sup>291</sup> By the beginning of October 1965, when the Joint Intelligence Committee produced an assessment of the likely consequences of UDI, it was taken for granted that government policy in such an event was 'to take no military action against Rhodesia other than the imposition of a ban on the supply of arms or military equipment'.<sup>292</sup>

The funeral of Winston Churchill in January 1965 provided Wilson with the chance to hold an informal discussion with Smith with a view to exploring the possibility of further initiatives. The meeting on 30 January did not prove particularly fruitful. Towards the end, Wilson concluded that 'the views of the two Governments were almost irreconcilable' (415). He was also dismissive of Smith's use of the *indaba* as a test of African opinion, commenting that 'the last General Election in the United Kingdom might have turned out differently if it had been conducted on the basis of an

indaba of Lords Lieutenant'. He did, however, obtain Smith's grudging assent to the idea of a small ministerial mission to Southern Rhodesia. This took place from 21 February to 3 March and consisted of the Commonwealth relations secretary, Arthur Bottomley, and the Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner. One of the central objectives of the trip was to administer some 'shock treatment' to Rhodesia's African nationalists. This involved spelling out the severe limitations on British intervention in Rhodesia, including the government's unwillingness to use military force (417). The ministers also expressed their disappointment at the African nationalists' failure to participate in the 1961 constitutional machinery, and they noted that the British government 'had nowhere ... put into power persons who had served no political apprenticeship'. These points were repeated in their public statement at the end of the visit on 3 March. This noted nationalist leaders had been told 'that Britain could not herself act unconstitutionally, whether by armed force or otherwise, to change the Constitution'.

Bottomley and Gardiner's talks with Smith suggested there might still be room for a negotiated settlement. This had two essential features: 'B roll' elections would be conducted on the basis of 'one man one vote', and 'B roll' representation would be increased from 15 to 26 seats, giving Africans a 'blocking minority' of one-third plus one against further changes to the constitution. In addition, the process by which Africans would qualify for the 'A roll' would be accelerated, and the Land Apportionment Act would be liberalised. When the matter was discussed in the Cabinet's Southern Rhodesia Committee on 25 March, there was some optimism that Smith might be prepared to implement these reforms in return for independence. There was also little sympathy for the aspirations of the African nationalists for immediate majority rule. Indeed, Gardiner claimed that 'the Nationalist leaders were at present quite unqualified to govern' (419). Nevertheless, it was feared that if details of negotiations on these lines became public, Britain would be accused by African governments of the 'betrayal of Africans in Southern Rhodesia.' It was therefore decided 'any such negotiations should be conducted orally and that there should be nothing in writing'. Meanwhile, Lord Caradon would take discreet soundings among the leaders of African states.

In the spring of 1965, largely at the suggestion of Johnston, the government developed what was to become one of the central planks in its negotiations with Salisbury: the so-called 'five principles'. The idea was that the government should spell out to Smith the broad principles informing its approach to Southern Rhodesian independence, leaving Smith to make specific proposals that might satisfy them.<sup>293</sup> In the form in which they were eventually published, they were as follows:—

1. The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 constitution would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrospective amendment of the constitution.
3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
4. There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
5. The British government would need to be satisfied that any real basis for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.<sup>294</sup>

In May, Smith's Rhodesian Front won a decisive victory in Southern Rhodesia's general election, taking all 50 of the 'A roll' seats. In the immediate wake of this result, Johnston was keen to stress Smith was still ready to negotiate. It was clear, however, that the political concessions London would now be able to wring from Smith's government were likely to be extremely limited. This appeared particularly ominous in the light of the impending meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers. Trend, now Cabinet secretary, felt that the best course was to attempt to persuade Commonwealth leaders to endorse the five principles, while leaving it up to Britain how they should be implemented (421). He also felt Smith might be swayed by the threat of a UN armed intervention in the region, something that could be sparked by an appeal by Kaunda to the Security Council to protect the Zambian copper mines and the Kariba dam. Trend was less sanguine about rumours that, if Britain herself did not intervene in the event of UDI, African Commonwealth countries might retaliate by nationalising British businesses.

Smith was persuaded to visit London for talks in October 1965. The government had virtually abandoned hope these might achieve a settlement. The most ministers imagined possible was that Smith could be deterred from UDI. The threat of UN intervention was a cause of particular concern, and it was suggested in the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee that, in the event of UDI, Britain should take the initiative in bringing the issue to the UN (429). Talks between Smith and British ministers ended on 11 October without agreement. In an attempt to forestall immediate UDI, Wilson approached the Australian prime minister, Sir Robert Menzies, and asked whether he would be prepared to lead a Commonwealth mission to Southern Rhodesia. Menzies 'audibly groaned' at the suggestion, but agreed to consider it (434). At the same time, Wilson took the opportunity to remind the foreign secretary, Michael Stewart, that it was the Cabinet's agreed policy to rule out the use of military force against Southern Rhodesia. On 19 October, British representatives around the world were circulated with a brief, reminding them that at a news conference on 23 August, the Commonwealth relations secretary had stated publicly the British government had no intention of using force against Southern Rhodesia (436). They were told not only that this continued to be the government's position, but there was also no question of Britain participating in any UN force. The brief suggested that Britain had 'never in recent history contemplated invasion by British forces of a colony which would be opposed by the armed forces of that country'. In the case of Central Africa, the accuracy of that statement rather depends on how the word 'contemplated' is defined.

By coincidence, it was also on 19 October that the Rhodesian Security Council decided to proceed with UDI. Ken Flower, the head of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) warned the meeting it would be unwise entirely to discount the possibility of Britain using force in certain circumstances. Smith, however, appeared far more confident that this was not a realistic prospect.<sup>295</sup> He appears to have been confirmed in this view both by his talks with Wilson earlier in the month and by reports from Rhodesia's high commissioner in London, Andrew Skeen. Skeen seems to have offered a far more accurate assessment than Flower of the intentions of the mood of the British military, based on an underlying assumption that ties of 'kith and kin' would preclude any attack.<sup>296</sup>

Whether or not Wilson had received any hint of this specific development, there were sufficient other indications that UDI was imminent to persuade him of the need

for one final, dramatic gesture. He decided to fly to Salisbury in an attempt to prevent a final breach. A broader aim of the visit was to canvas as wide a range of opinions as possible, so as to 'outflank' Smith and seek support for a new approach to Rhodesian affairs.<sup>297</sup> At the same time, the hope was also of 'holding Smith in the centre', by keeping him engaged in talks. Hence, Wilson spent his time in Rhodesia from 25 to 30 October in an extensive round of meetings. As he made clear to the Canadian and Australian prime ministers on 20 October, his intention was as much to persuade African leaders to participate in the 1961 constitution as to reason with Smith (437). An important element of that process was to leave the Africans in no doubt that the British government was not about to underwrite what it regarded as their unreasonable demands. During a meeting with a ZAPU delegation led by Joshua Nkomo on 27 October, Wilson stated frankly 'that it was not the United Kingdom Government's policy to agree to independence on the basis of immediate majority rule' (438). He was also equally frank in stating that 'British public opinion would not tolerate the use of force in this situation.' Against this background, the most perplexing move made by Wilson becomes slightly more intelligible. On 30 October 1965, at the end of his mission to Southern Rhodesia, Wilson told a press conference,

If there are those in this country who are thinking in terms of a thunderbolt, hurtling through the sky and destroying the enemy, a thunderbolt in the shape of the Royal Air Force, let me say that this thunderbolt will not be coming, and to continue in this delusion wastes valuable time and misdirects valuable energies.<sup>298</sup>

A number of those involved in the negotiations subsequently blamed Wilson for throwing away this final bargaining counter and thus opening the way for UDI.<sup>299</sup> The statement makes more sense, however, if it is seen as part of a broader strategy by Wilson to encourage African leaders to reduce their demands to a level where it might have been possible to reach a deal with 'moderate' European leaders.<sup>300</sup>

Wilson may well have succeeded in disabusing African leaders of any lingering hopes they may have had in the British government, but his talks with Smith failed to make any progress. On his return to Britain, the government geared up its preparations to deal with the now virtually inevitable breach with Salisbury. Various sanctions were contemplated. Officials remained pessimistic, however, at the probable efficacy that economic measures alone would have in bringing the Southern Rhodesian government to heel.<sup>301</sup> Yet just as all hope of averting a crisis appeared lost, there was a tantalising glimpse of movement from Smith. The Southern Rhodesian government proposed the appointment of a royal commission on the future of the country. The British government was initially cautious about the idea. When Smith talked to Johnston on the morning of 6 November, it seemed, however, that he was prepared to be sufficiently flexible on the proposals to give them some prospect of being accepted (440). Further talks between Smith and Johnston appear to have made some progress. It was therefore to the subject of the royal commission that Wilson turned when he spoke to Smith on the telephone on the morning of 11 November. Smith, his mind clearly on other matters, barely said a word for the first few minutes, as Wilson delivered a commentary on the points that appeared to be at issue (442). In the middle of this anxious flurry of detail about the royal commission, Smith quietly signalled that the matter under discussion was irrelevant, and he came as close as he perhaps ever would do to expressing regret for what was about to happen. Wilson returned the compliment, noting 'I believe that you throughout have negotiated in

good faith, as we have.’ Having exculpated each other for what was about to take place, the conversation reached an awkward conclusion. At 11.00 am (wringing some rather heavy-handed symbolism from Armistice Day), Smith made his Unilateral Declaration of Independence. A new phase had opened in Rhodesia’s relations with Britain and the rest of the world, one that would only properly end with the Lancaster House agreement in 1979 and full independence for the country (renamed Zimbabwe) under black majority rule a year later.

P Murphy

## Notes to Introduction

- 1 This sort of problem for those vetting papers relating to British colonial policy is not, of course, restricted to Central Africa. The national archives of the former colonies themselves sometimes contain material not available in the NA. See for example Richard Rathbone, ‘Police intelligence in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* vol 21 (1993) pp 107–128. Rathbone draws heavily on a series of intelligence reports, which had survived in the Ghana National Archives.
- 2 J F Hargrave, *The papers of The Rt Hon Sir Roy Welensky KCMG, 1907–1991: Catalogue, Vol 1* (Oxford, 1995) pp vi–vii.
- 3 J. R. T. Wood, *The Welensky papers: A history of the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (Durban, 1983). See also Anthony Verrier, *The road to Zimbabwe 1890–1980* (London, 1986); Philip Murphy, *Party politics and decolonization: the Conservative Party and British colonial policy in tropical Africa 1951–1964* (Oxford, 1995).
- 4 Those documents that are still closed tend to relate to the private affairs of Welensky’s correspondents.
- 5 See, for example, PREM 11/5048, Trend to Home, 1 June 1964 (doc 380).
- 6 See, for example, Welensky to Macmillan, 6 Sept 1961, papers of Sir Roy Welensky, Rhodes House Library, Oxford (hereafter ‘WP’) 258/6, ff 31–2. This letter and Macmillan’s reply of 8 Sept (docs 305–306) appear to be among items that have been removed from PREM 11/3187 and closed.
- 7 Richard J Aldrich, ‘Did Waldegrave work? The impact of open government upon British history’, *Twentieth Century British History* vol 9 (1998) pp 111–126.
- 8 *Open Government* (Cm 2290, July 1993) paras 2.59 and 9.28.
- 9 This is PREM 11/523. It relates to the activities of Michael Scott and was released on 1 Jan 2004.
- 10 For a fuller discussion of this subject see Philip Murphy, ‘Censorship, declassification and the end of empire in Central Africa’, *African Research and Documentation* vol 92 (2003) pp 3–26.
- 11 See Philip Murphy, ‘Intelligence and decolonization: The life and death of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau, 1954–63’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* vol 29 (May 2001) pp 101–130, and ‘Creating a Commonwealth intelligence culture: The view from Central Africa, 1945–1965’, *Intelligence and National Security* vol 17 (Autumn 2002) pp 131–162.
- 12 See R Hyam, ed, *The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–51* (BDEEP: London, 1992), part IV, 417, 418, 433–436, 444; D Goldsworthy, ed, *The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957* (BDEEP: London, 1994), part II, 302–312; R Hyam and Wm R Louis, eds, *The Conservative government and the end of empire 1957–1964* (BDEEP: London, 2000), part II, 492–527; S R Ashton and Wm R Louis, *East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964–1971* (BDEEP: London, 2004), part II, 192–243. For a useful collection of documents published outside the BDEEP series see A N Porter and A J Stockwell, eds, *British imperial policy and decolonization 1938–1964* (London, 1989). In addition to these volumes there are other, earlier collections containing documents that pertain to Central Africa. Their editors were not, however, able to draw upon material from the National Archives for the period under consideration in this volume. See A F Madden, ed, *Imperial constitutional documents, 1765–1965: a supplement* (Oxford, 1966), and Elaine Windrich, *Rhodesian problem: a documentary record, 1923–1973* (London, 1975).

- 13 See, for example, M Jarvis, M Kandiah, R Lamb, P Murphy, J Turner, eds, *Macmillan: Cabinet papers, 1957–63 on CD-ROM* (Marlborough, 1998).
- 14 For an excellent recent example dealing with the rise of nationalism in Zimbabwe, see Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Terence Ranger, *Violence and memory: one hundred years in the 'dark forests' of Matebeleland* (Oxford, 2000).
- 15 DO 21/4625, Sandys to Macmillan, 6 Feb 1961.
- 16 Iain Macleod, 'Welensky's world: or the cops and robbers theory of history', *Spectator*, 29 May 1964.
- 17 DO 35/7679, memorandum by Alport, 21 Oct 1959.
- 18 DO 35/7540, Dalhousie to Home, 26 Feb 1959.
- 19 FO 1109/540, Dalhousie to Butler, 19 June 1962.
- 20 FO 1109/540, Dalhousie to Butler, 6 Dec 1962.
- 21 CO 1015/614, minute by Gorell Barnes, 26 Apr 1952.
- 22 PREM 11/3814, Bligh to Brook, 23 Jan 1962.
- 23 PREM 11/3814, Brook to Bligh, 26 Jan 1962.
- 24 *H of C Debs*, vol 655, cols 1545–1553, 15 Mar 1962.
- 25 *Indians in Kenya: memorandum* (Cmd 1922, 1923), p 9. See also Patrick Keatley, *The politics of partnership* (Harmondsworth, 1963) p 407. For a more detailed discussion of this topic see Ronald Hyam, 'Bureaucracy and "trusteeship" in the colonial empire', in Judith M Brown and Wm Roger Louis, eds, *Oxford history of the British empire, Vol IV: The twentieth century* (Oxford, 1999) pp 268–271. See also Claire Palley, *The constitutional history and law of Southern Rhodesia 1888–1965 with special reference to imperial control* (Oxford, 1966) pp 236–271. Palley takes rather more seriously than does Keatley the restraining impact of the reserved clauses in the Southern Rhodesian constitution.
- 26 Keatley, p 408
- 27 *Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa* (Cmd 3573, 1930). See, however, document 48 for later qualifications to the doctrine of paramountcy.
- 28 CO 967/184, 'Historical note on the question of closer union of the Central African Territories', Colonial Office brief (undated, Feb 1951).
- 29 *Rhodesia–Nyasaland Royal Commission: Report* (Cmd 5949, Mar 1939) paras 471–477.
- 30 *Rhodesia–Nyasaland Royal Commission* para. 485.
- 31 *Note on the Bearing of Native Policy on the Proposed Amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland* (London, 1941).
- 32 DO 35/1390, 'Future policy in Central Africa', Colonial Office memorandum for Oliver Stanley, June 1943.
- 33 Wood, p 90.
- 34 DO 35/1390, 'Future policy in Central Africa', Colonial Office memorandum for Oliver Stanley, June 1943.
- 35 DO 35/1391, Baring to Cranborne, 15 Nov 1943.
- 36 Wood, p 92
- 37 CO 967/184, 'Historical note on the question of closer union of the Central African Territories', Colonial Office brief (undated), Feb 1951.
- 38 CO 525/205, 44248/46, Richards to Hall, 15 Feb 1946.
- 39 CO 525/205, 44248/48, Colby to Cohen, 27 Apr 1948.
- 40 CO 525/205, 44248/48, Cohen to Colby, 11 June 1948.

- 41 *Manchester Guardian*, 29 Nov 1948.
- 42 Wood, pp 104–109.
- 43 Wood, pp 111–112.
- 44 Wood, p 114.
- 45 *Northern News*, 10 June 1948.
- 46 CO 537/3608, Rennie to Creech Jones, 18 June 1948.
- 47 Wood, pp 120–121.
- 48 Wood, p 124.
- 49 CO 795/156/6, extract from letter from Welensky to Lambert, 22 Oct 1948 (see doc 34, note).
- 50 Sir Roy Welensky, *Welensky's 4000 days: the life and death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (London, 1964), pp 22–25.
- 51 Wood, p 125.
- 52 CO 537/3608, minute by Cohen, 12 Oct 1948.
- 53 CO 537/3608, minute by Creech Jones, 21 Oct 1948.
- 54 CO 537/3608, minute by Creech Jones, 28 Oct 1948.
- 55 CO 537/3647, minute by Vile, 7 Mar 1949.
- 56 CO 537/4687, Stanley to Vile, 26 Feb 1949.
- 57 CO 537/4691, Cohen to Rennie, 4 Aug 1949.
- 58 CO 537/4691, Rennie to Cohen, 27 Aug 1949.
- 59 CO 537/4691, Welensky to Cohen, 20 Nov 1949.
- 60 DO 35/3433, note on 'Control of Afrikaner immigration into NR' forwarded by Sedgewick to Baring, 13 Nov 1950.
- 61 See Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw, *The lion and the springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War* (Cambridge, 2003).
- 62 CAB 129/45, CP(51)109, 'Visit by the secretary of state for Commonwealth relations to the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the three High Commission Territories of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland', Cabinet memorandum by Gordon Walker, 16 Apr 1951, reproduced in Hyam, *The Labour government*, part IV, 433.
- 63 R Hyam, 'The geopolitical origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1948–1953', *Historical Journal* vol 30 (1987), p 158.
- 64 Hyam, *The Labour government*, part IV, 433; Hyam, 'The geopolitical origins', 153–6.
- 65 CAB 129/45, CP(51)122, 'Closer Association in Central Africa', joint Cabinet memorandum by Mr Griffiths and Mr Gordon Walker. *Annex*: confidential minute by G H Baxter and A B Cohen to the secretaries of state, 31 Mar 1951, with appendix on immigration policy, 3 May 1951, reproduced in Hyam, *The Labour government*, part IV, 435.
- 66 Hyam, *The Labour government*, part IV, 435.
- 67 CO 1015/998, minute by Lennox-Boyd, 5 May 1956.
- 68 Hyam, 'The geopolitical origins', p 160.
- 69 Hyam, 'The geopolitical origins', p 160.
- 70 CAB 129/4, CP(51)265, 'Closer association in Central Africa': joint Cabinet memorandum by Mr Griffiths and Mr Gordon Walker on the Victoria Falls Conference, 12 Oct 1951, reproduced in Hyam, *The Labour government*, part IV, 444.

- 71 CO 1015/59, minute by Cohen, 31 Oct 1951. It was not usual practice for an incoming government to see papers generated by the previous administration.
- 72 CO 1015/59, minute by Cohen, 31 Oct 1951.
- 73 CAB 129/489, C(51)11, 'Closer association in Central Africa', joint Cabinet memorandum by Lord Ismay and Mr Lyttelton, 9 Nov 1951, reproduced along with Appendix II in Goldsworthy, *The Conservative government*, part II, 302.
- 74 CO 1015/59, minute by Cohen, 13 Nov 1951; DO 35/3600, Rennie to Cohen, 13 Nov 1951.
- 75 CO 1015/59, minute by Cohen, 13 Nov 1951.
- 76 DO 121/146, Ismay to Kennedy, 9 Feb 1952.
- 77 Wood, pp 236–237.
- 78 CO 537/1518, Richards to Gater, 30 May 1946.
- 79 CO 537/4687, Rennie to Creech-Jones, 8 Mar 1949.
- 80 Colin Baker, *Development governor: a biography of Sir Geoffrey Colby* (London, 1994) p 290.
- 81 *The Times*, 22 Jan 1952.
- 82 CO 1015/655, 'Sir Geoffrey Colby's request for further financial assistance from HMG', 17 Oct 1951.
- 83 CO 1015/88, minute by Bourdillon, 19 Feb 1952.
- 84 Wood, p 308. The final constitutional conference in Jan 1953, however, decided that the federal government should retain all customs and excise duties. It also altered the allocation of revenues from income tax.
- 85 CO 537/3608, minute by Cohen, 12 Oct 1948.
- 86 CO 1015/913, minute by Gorell Barnes, 28 Nov 1956.
- 87 DO 35/6790, Colby to Gorell Barnes, 5 Dec 1952.
- 88 DO 35/6790, Rennie to Gorell Barnes, 9 Dec 1952.
- 89 DO 183/102, 'Memorandum on the Lewanika Concession and the basis of the Crown's original assumption of jurisdiction in Barotseland', undated.
- 90 Lord Hailey, *An African survey: a study of problems arising in Africa south of the Sahara* (London, 1938) pp 456–60; David C Mulford, *Zambia: the politics of independence 1957–1964* (Oxford, 1967) pp 211–212.
- 91 DO 35/6801, minutes by Baxter, 15 & 16 Mar 1953 and Liesching, 16 Mar 1953.
- 92 Welensky, p 61,
- 93 Wood, 325–327.
- 94 Wood, p 331.
- 95 Keatley, p 440.
- 96 Wood, p 333.
- 97 Welensky, p 63.
- 98 DO 35/6808, minute by Baxter, 3 Mar 1953.
- 99 DO 35/6725, minute by Jasper, 6 Mar 1953.
- 100 DO 35/6725, minute by Jasper, 12 Mar 1953.
- 101 DO 35/6725, minute by Baxter, 16 Mar 1953.
- 102 DO 35/6725, minute by Baxter, 24 Apr 1953.

- 103 CO 537/2118, minute by N D Watson, 23 Oct 1946.
- 104 CO 537/2119, minute by A Creech Jones, 5 Feb 1946.
- 105 Wood, p 147.
- 106 L H Gann and M Gelfand, *Huggins of Rhodesia: the man and his country* (London, 1964) pp 195–199.
- 107 *The Times*, 25 June 1947.
- 108 Gann and Gelfand, p 199.
- 109 Elena L Berger, *Labour, race and colonial rule: the copperbelt from 1924 to independence* (Oxford, 1974) p 191.
- 110 Berger, pp 49–50.
- 111 Berger, p 54.
- 112 Berger, pp 60–61.
- 113 Berger, p 100.
- 114 Kenneth P Vickery, ‘The Rhodesia railways African strike of 1945, Part II: cause, consequence, significance’, *Journal of Southern African Studies* vol 25 (1999) p 70.
- 115 Berger, pp 91–92.
- 116 *Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Disturbances in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia, July 1940* (Lusaka, 1941).
- 117 CO 795/143/1, Dalgleish and Smith to Waddington, 16 May 1947.
- 118 CO 1015/338, minute by N D Watson, 7 Dec 1951.
- 119 CO 1015/338, minute by Gorell Barnes, 11 Jan 1952.
- 120 Jane L Parpart, *Labor and capital on the African copperbelt* (Philadelphia, 1983) p 137.
- 121 Berger, p 129.
- 122 Parpart, p 148.
- 123 Parpart, p 144.
- 124 Cited in Berger, p 154.
- 125 Arthur Hazlewood, ‘The economics of federation and dissolution in Central Africa’, in Arthur Hazlewood, ed, *African integration and disintegration* (Oxford, 1967) pp 208–10.
- 126 Hazlewood, p 209. The table giving these figures refers to them as the yield ‘from federal income tax’. The term ‘taxes on income’ was, however, interpreted in Chapter VI of the federal constitution as including taxes on profits (see Wood, p 334) and it is to the yield from both forms of direct taxation that the figures presumably refer.
- 127 Hazlewood, p 207.
- 128 Hazlewood, p 210.
- 129 Wood, pp 407–408.
- 130 Wood, p 414.
- 131 CO 1015/944, minute by Morgan, 21 June 1954.
- 132 Wood, p 463.
- 133 CO 1015/943, minute by Baxter, 3 Jan 1956.
- 134 CAB 129/71, C(54)307, ‘Commonwealth membership’, Cabinet memorandum by Lord Swinton, 11 Oct 1954 in Goldsworthy, *The Conservative government*, part II, 192.

- 135 This did not apply, however, to every meeting. He was not invited to the 1949 meeting to discuss India. Furthermore, until 1948, the Southern Rhodesian prime minister had only observer status. See Palley, p. 224.
- 136 Goldsworthy, *The Conservative government*, part II, 306.
- 137 CO 1015/998, Malvern to Home, 12 Mar 1956.
- 138 CO 1015/998, minute by Lennox-Boyd, 5 May 1956.
- 139 DO 35/7629, Metcalf to Maclennan 16 Dec 1955; Metcalf to Maclennan, 30 Dec 1955.
- 140 Wood, p 473
- 141 DO 35/7629, Laithwaite to Metcalf, 17 Dec 1956.
- 142 Wood, p 516
- 143 CO 967/289, Benson to Welensky, 31 Jan 1957; Welensky to Benson, 4 Feb 1957.
- 144 Welensky, p 77.
- 145 Wood, p 576.
- 146 CO 1015/1014, Benson to Gorell Barnes, 7 Feb 1955.
- 147 Wood, p 591.
- 148 Welensky, p 89.
- 149 DO 35/7553, Report by J C Morgan on a visit to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Jan 1959.
- 150 Welensky, pp 107–108.
- 151 The best existing accounts of the emergency are John Darwin, ‘Central African emergency, 1959’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* vol 21 (1993) pp 217–234, and Colin Baker, *State of emergency: crisis in Central Africa, Nyasaland 1959–60* (London, 1997).
- 152 Colin Baker, *Retreat from empire: Sir Robert Armitage in Africa and Cyprus* (London, 1998) p 217.
- 153 Baker, *Armitage*, 221.
- 154 Murphy, *Lennox-Boyd*, pp 203–4.
- 155 CO 1015/1520, Perth to Macmillan, 10 Feb 1959.
- 156 Baker, *State of emergency*, p 19.
- 157 WP 239/9, ff 47–51, ‘Minutes of meeting held in the prime minister’s office’, 10 Feb 1959.
- 158 WP 239/9, ff 47–51, ‘Minutes of meeting held in prime minister’s office’; Welensky, p 117.
- 159 Welensky, pp 117–118.
- 160 *Nyasaland: State of Emergency* (Cmnd 707, Mar 1959) para 25.
- 161 *Nyasaland: Despatch by the Governor Relating to the Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry* (Cmnd 815, July 1959) para 37.
- 162 The files of the Colonial Office Intelligence and Security Department are currently closed. They are located at CO 1035.
- 163 Baker, *State of emergency*, p 20.
- 164 WP 240/2, f 7, Armitage to Welensky, 24 Feb 1959.
- 165 WP 240/3, f 12, Welensky to Rennie or Barratt, 25 Feb 1959.
- 166 WP 240/3, f 15, Armitage to Welensky, 25 Feb 1959.
- 167 CO 1015/1977, Armitage to Perth, 25 Feb 1959.
- 168 CO 1015/1515, Armitage to Perth, 26 Feb 1959.

- 169 *H of C Debs*, vol 601, cols. 290 and 337, 3 Mar 1959.
- 170 Brian Lapping, *End of empire* (London, 1989), p 563.
- 171 Baker, *Armitage*, p. 229.
- 172 Murphy, *Alan Lennox-Boyd*, p 217.
- 173 Robert Shepherd, *Iain Macleod: a biography* (London, 1994), pp 159–161.
- 174 CO 1015/1519, minute by Lennox-Boyd, 11 Sept 1959.
- 175 Baker, *Armitage*, pp 243–244.
- 176 Baker, *Armitage*, p 245
- 177 Alistair Horne, *Macmillan, 1957–1986* (London, 1989), pp 192–193.
- 178 Baker, *Armitage*, p 250.
- 179 Shepherd, p 191.
- 180 Shepherd, pp 197–198.
- 181 Shepherd, p 200.
- 182 CO 1015/2439, ‘Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Fortnightly Summary, Part 1’, 11 Apr 1960.
- 183 CO 1015/2440, minute by Monson, 1 July 1960.
- 184 Colin Baker, *Sir Glyn Jones: a proconsul in Africa* (London, 2000) pp 69–70.
- 185 Baker, *Jones*, pp 102–103.
- 186 Harold Macmillan, *Pointing the way 1959–1961* (London, 1972), p 136.
- 187 Macmillan, *Pointing the way*, p 137.
- 188 Wood, pp 676–677.
- 189 Wood, pp 692–693.
- 190 Horne, p 185.
- 191 Horne, p 186
- 192 Welensky, p 156–158.
- 193 *Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (Cmnd 1148, 1960) para 82.
- 194 WP 665/3, Welensky to Salisbury, 10 Nov 1960.
- 195 WP 665/3, Salisbury to Welensky, 21 Nov 1960.
- 196 *Daily Telegraph*, 20 Oct 1960.
- 197 PREM 11/3080, ‘Monckton Commission’: note forwarded by Macmillan to Hailsham, 9 Nov 1960.
- 198 Murphy, *Party politics*, p 210.
- 199 DO 35/7558, ‘Southern Rhodesia: constitutional discussions’, CRO memorandum, Feb 1960.
- 200 DO 35/7558, Whitehead to Home, 22 Oct 1959.
- 201 Wood, p 759.
- 202 CAB 134/1559, CPC 4(60), 27 Apr 1959.
- 203 *H of C Debs*, vol 623, col 31, 9 May 1960.
- 204 Wood, p 870.
- 205 *Report of the Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference in Salisbury* (Cmnd 1291, 1961).
- 206 DO 35/7561, attorney-general to Hone, 21 Nov 1960.

- 207 Kenneth Young, *Rhodesia and independence* (London, 1967) pp 54–55; DO 158/15, Scott to Shannon, 17 Apr 1961.
- 208 Shepherd, p 207.
- 209 Shepherd, p 209.
- 210 PREM 11/3485, Macmillan to Welensky, 9 Jan 1961.
- 211 PREM 11/3485, Welensky to Macmillan, 14 Jan 1961.
- 212 PREM 11/3485, Macleod to Macmillan, 17 Jan 1961.
- 213 Wood, p 867.
- 214 Wood, pp 877–878.
- 215 CAB 128/35/1, CC 8(61)1, 20 Feb 1961; see Hyam and Louis, *The Conservative government*, part II, 502.
- 216 PREM 11/3496, Cole to Bligh, 29 Feb 1960.
- 217 PREM 11/3496, Welensky to Macmillan, 7 Jan 1961.
- 218 PREM 11/3496, note by Macmillan, 11 Jan 1961.
- 219 WP 635/9, Welensky to Greenfield, 1 Aug 1961.
- 220 Horne, p 408.
- 221 PREM 11/3942, Butler to Macmillan, 18 Jan 1962.
- 222 CAB 128/36/1, CC 17(62)5, 27 Feb 1962.
- 223 Lord Alport, *The sudden assignment: being a record of service in Central Africa during the last controversial days of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1961–63* (London, 1965) pp 219–220.
- 224 Goldsworthy, *The Conservative government*, part II, 312.
- 225 Hyam, ‘Bureaucracy and “trusteeship”’, p 271.
- 226 Wood, p 875.
- 227 PREM 11/3949, Macmillan to Watkinson, 14 Feb 1961.
- 228 Specifically, Welensky had learned of the build up of troops and aircraft around Nairobi (Welensky, p 305).
- 229 This detail is contained in the revised ‘Outline plan for deployment in Northern Rhodesia’ discussed by the COS Committee, 2 Mar 1961 (DEFE 32/17).
- 230 The tactical possibilities offered by dispersal were, however, limited. The RRAF could conceivably have moved their forces to South Africa, but this would have left them unable to defend Lusaka; see DEFE 4/134, confidential annex to COS(61)16th meeting, 2 Mar 1961.
- 231 DEFE 32/17, ‘Outline plan for deployment in Northern Rhodesia’, note by the secretary, 2 Mar 1961.
- 232 DEFE 4/134, confidential annex to COS(61)16th meeting, 2 Mar 1961.
- 233 DEFE 4/134, confidential annex to COS(61)17th meeting, 7 Mar 1961.
- 234 PREM 11/3949, Watkinson to Macmillan, 3 Mar 1961.
- 235 CO 967/364, Watkinson to Macleod, 16 Mar 1961.
- 236 DEFE 4/134, confidential annex to COS(61)37th meeting, 13 June 1961.
- 237 Alan James, *Britain and the Congo crisis, 1960–63* (London, 1996) p 31.
- 238 PREM 11/2585, ‘Notes on a visit to Africa’, 11 Dec 1959.
- 239 Keatley, p 454.
- 240 Horne, p 206.
- 241 James, p 31.

- 242 CAB 128/34, CC 42(60)2, 14 July 1960.
- 243 See James, pp 32 & 137; Murphy, *Party politics*, pp 112–116.
- 244 Keatley, pp 462–465.
- 245 WP 274/1, Grenfell to Parker, 13 July 1959.
- 246 David N Gibbs, *The political economy of third world intervention: mines, money and US policy in the Congo crisis* (Chicago, 1991) p 96.
- 247 For the latest research on this issue see Ludo de Witte, *The assassination of Lumumba* (London, 2001). For a further selection of documents on the Congo see Hyam and Louis, *The Conservative government*, part II, 392–403.
- 248 Gibbs, pp 125–126.
- 249 James, pp 100–101.
- 250 PREM 11/3191, Alport to Sandys, 19 Sept 1961.
- 251 PREM 11/3628, note by Lord Dundee, ‘Tripartite talks on the Congo, May 15 and 16’, 17 May 1962.
- 252 DO 158/27, ‘The federal problem in Central Africa’, memorandum for Sandys, Jan 1962.
- 253 Wood, p 1019.
- 254 PREM 11/3943, note for the record of ministerial meeting, 22 Feb 1962. See Hyam and Louis, *The Conservative government*, part II, 505.
- 255 Baker, *Jones*, p 124.
- 256 PREM 11/3943, note for the record of ministerial meeting, 22 Feb 1962. See Hyam and Louis, *The Conservative Government*, part II, 505.
- 257 Wood, pp 1017–1018.
- 258 Baker, *Jones*, p 126.
- 259 R A Butler, *The art of the possible* (London, 1971) pp 210–211.
- 260 CAB 128/36/2, CC 43(62)3, 28 June 1962; see Hyam and Louis, *The Conservative government*, part II, 508.
- 261 CAB 128/36/2, CC 64(62)2, 29 Oct 1962. See Hyam and Louis, *The Conservative government*, part II, 510.
- 262 CAB 21/4846, Trend to Macmillan, 16 Jan 63.
- 263 CO 1015/2619, Adu to Poynton, 31 Oct 1960.
- 264 Hazlewood, p 248.
- 265 CO 967/353, Jones to Macleod, 28 Oct 1960.
- 266 DO 183/102, ‘Future relations between Her Majesty’s Government and Barotseland’, Nov 1962, paras 33–4.
- 267 DO 183/102, minute by Hudson, 29 Nov 1962.
- 268 Mulford, p 312–3.
- 269 DO 183/102, record of discussions about Barotseland at Lusaka, 26 Jan 1963.
- 270 Mulford, p 313.
- 271 CAB 129/119, C(64)2 ‘Mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia’, memorandum by Bottomley, 19 Oct 1964, Annex: ‘The History of the Chartered Company’.
- 272 *Financial Times*, 23 Dec 1964.
- 273 CAB 128/37, CC 4(63)5, 17 Jan 1963.

- 274 CAB 128/37, CC 20(63)2, 28 Mar 1963.
- 275 Wood, pp 1185–6. This letter and Field's response on 20 Apr were published in *Correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Southern Rhodesia* (Cmnd 2000, 1963).
- 276 Butler to Field, 9 Apr 1963, published in *Correspondence between Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom and Her Majesty's Government of Southern Rhodesia* (Salisbury, June 1963).
- 277 Young, pp 78–79
- 278 Wood, p 1191.
- 279 Young, pp 78–79.
- 280 Butler to Field, 16 May 1963, published in *Correspondence between Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom and Her Majesty's Government of Southern Rhodesia* (Salisbury, June 1963).
- 281 Verrier, p 154
- 282 DO 183/153, 'Dissolution of the Central African Federation: "Blueprint" for the future of the federal forces', 24 May 1963.
- 283 CAB 21/5063, Trend to Home, 3 Dec 1963.
- 284 PREM 11/5048, Smith to Home, 6 May 1964.
- 285 CAB 128/38, CM 47(64)2, 10 Sept 1964.
- 286 CAB 128/38, CM 47(64)2, 10 Sept 1964.
- 287 Young, pp 154–155.
- 288 *H of C Debs*, vol 675, col 1455, 11 Apr 1963.
- 289 DO 183/586, Allan to Fingland, 26 Feb 1965. Allan added, however, 'one is very doubtful whether the 1961 constitution could really be the basis on which independence is granted to Rhodesia'.
- 290 CAB 148/19, OPD (65)10, 'Southern Rhodesia': memorandum by Bottomley, 19 Jan 1965, reproduced in Ashton and Louis, eds, *East of Suez*, part II, 193.
- 291 DEFE 32/17, 'The Kariba Dam', note by directors of defence plans, 22 Feb 1965.
- 292 CAB 158/60, JIC(65)69 (final), 'The likely effects in Africa of a Rhodesian declaration of independence (UDI)' JIC report, 1 Oct 1965.
- 293 Richard T. Coggins, 'Rhodesian UDI and the search for a settlement, 1964–68: failure of decolonization', (Oxford DPhil thesis, 2002) pp 103–4.
- 294 Young, p 216. A sixth principle, added in February 1966, was that neither the majority nor the minority population should be oppressed by the other.
- 295 Ken Flower, *Serving secretly: an intelligence chief on record. Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981* (London, 1987) pp 47–9, 283–285.
- 296 Flower, pp 47, 49–50.
- 297 PREM 13/542, 'Visit to Rhodesia: October 1965': minute by Wright, 22 Oct 1965, reproduced in Ashton and Louis, *East of Suez*, part II, 201.
- 298 Elaine Windrich, *Britain and the politics of Rhodesian independence* (London, 1978) p. 49. Wilson repeated this statement two days later in the House of Commons.
- 299 Denis Healey, *The time of my life* (London, 1989) p. 332; Flower, p 51.
- 300 I am grateful to Richard Coggins for suggesting this interpretation to me. While it has been difficult to find any documentary corroboration for it, this reading of the broadcast is perhaps the only one that really makes sense of it.
- 301 CAB 130/244, MISC 84/18, 'Southern Rhodesia: action in the event of a UDI', meeting of officials, 5 Nov 1965, reproduced in Ashton and Louis, *East of Suez*, part II, 203.

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**1 DO 35/1161, R208/24**  
**[Central African Council]: minute by A B Cohen**

28 Feb 1945

[On 18 Oct 1944, the secretary of state for the colonies, Oliver Stanley, announced plans for the creation of a Central African Council. This was a limited concession to settler leaders in Central Africa, whose ultimate objective was the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. For the background to Stanley's announcement, see S R Ashton & S E Stockwell, eds, *Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice 1925–1945* (BDEEP: London, 1996) part I, 75.]

Sir George Gater asked that I should set out briefly the arguments in favour of an Agreement between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland for the establishment of a Central African Council and Inter-Territorial Secretariat, on the general lines which Sir John Waddington has proposed.

As I see the position, the arguments are as follows:—

(1) The Central African Council was, as I understand it, intended as H.M. Government's concrete alternative suggestion to amalgamation. The Council has been accepted by the Southern Rhodesia Government with some reluctance and has been welcomed by the unofficials in Northern Rhodesia, although there is considerable suspicion as to the sincerity of H.M. Government's intentions. I do not think that it is quite correct to say that the Council is experimental; still less that the decision of H.M.G. amounted simply to giving the existing Governors' Conference a permanent Secretariat. The new Council goes very considerably further than any Governors' Conference, in that it includes unofficials, and we have been at pains to make it clear that the unofficials will play a full part in it. That being the case, it is of the first importance, in my view, that we should show quite clearly that H.M.G. means business about this Council. We have been accused in connection with it by critics of our policy of mere window dressing. It is most important to show that we really do intend co-ordination between the Territories to be a reality, as it certainly has not been in the past. From this point of view there appear to be good grounds for having an Agreement between the three Governments, which would of course be published.

(2) I do not think that the proposed document can be regarded as a step towards amalgamation. With the amendments which we are proposing to suggest, it would be very similar in form to the existing Inter-Territorial Migrant Labour Agreement. As regards its substance, it deals merely with the membership and meetings of the Council, the establishment of a permanent Secretariat and the drawing up of its estimates, the subjects to be discussed by the Council, the setting up of standing committees and the holding of *ad hoc* conferences. It keeps entirely within the four walls of the announcement of the 18th October, 1944. So far from being a step towards amalgamation, I should have thought that an Agreement would be a bulwark against amalgamation, in that it would give formal expression to the alternative policy suggested by H.M. Government.

(3) From the practical point of view it appears necessary to have some document covering all the matters covered by the proposed Agreement. The wording of the draft is quite informal except in the preamble. In practice therefore it seems that a document very much like the present one is essential.

(4) It has been noted that, as explained at the beginning of Sir J. Waddington's letter at No. 11, he has discussed the necessity for a draft constitution with Sir G.

Huggins, who agreed that the Northern Rhodesia Government should prepare one. We do not of course know how far Sir J. Waddington explained to Sir G. Huggins what he had in mind, but it is quite possible that if we insisted on a radical modification of the draft this might be embarrassing to Sir J. Waddington and might arouse suspicions as to the sincerity of our motives over the Council.

(5) The only decision which is required at the moment is whether the draft should be circulated for discussion at the preliminary meeting of the Council. We are not asked to agree to any document until the views of the whole Council, including the Southern Rhodesia members, have been expressed at the meeting.

(6) It is suggested that no objection should be raised from here to the circulation of the document, but that in order to make this less formal we should make four suggestions as to its form, two of which have already been suggested and two of which are new. They are as follows:—

- (1) The document should be an Agreement and not a Convention.
- (2) The document should not be signed by the two Secretaries of State.
- (3) The references to approval by H.M. Government in the preamble and Article XIV should be excluded.
- (4) The wording of the preamble should be somewhat less formal.

The first two suggestions are more important and it is felt that we need not press the third and fourth suggestions if the Council feels strongly that in these cases the original form should be retained.

## **2 DO 35/1161, R208/24, no 51**

13 Aug 1945

**[Central African Council]: letter from Sir C Tait to Lord Addison.**

***Enclosure: extracts from minutes of first Council meeting***

I have the honour to forward the verbatim Report of the Inaugural Meeting of the Central African Council held in Salisbury on the 24th, 25th and 26th April, 1945.

2. I was, as Governor of Southern Rhodesia, ex-officio Chairman of the Council, which also had as ex-officio members the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.

3. My chief impression on the opening day, which was confirmed on the two succeeding days, was the evident desire on the part of all concerned to make the Central African Council a success. This was particularly noticeable on the part of the Prime Minister and other Southern Rhodesia delegates, all of whom were still feeling sore at the recent decision of His Majesty's Government not to approve at present of the amalgamation of the three territories.

4. I had been in the Colony only two months when the Council met for the first time, not nearly long enough for me to understand, as I should like to have done, the matters likely to be discussed. On my arrival I found, in addition to the feeling of soreness, an impression among the public that the British Government had not only shelved amalgamation but had fobbed off the Colony with a grand sounding Council which was never really meant to achieve anything.

5. To counter this impression, and to show that the British Government was sincere, bearing in mind that it was now six months since the Secretary of State had

announced the formation of the Council with His Majesty's Government's blessings, I felt the first meeting should not be delayed and accordingly summoned it.

6. The question of a Chief Secretary to the Council was discussed by me before leaving London, but no decision as to an appointment had been arrived at. A first-class man was essential, but all first-class men were already doing jobs of first-class importance. The first meeting of the Council was held without a proper Chief Secretary, my own Secretary deputizing in a most efficient manner. It was rather embarrassing for me therefore to hear a proposal followed by a unanimous favourable vote that the Council should meet every six months instead of every twelve as had been suggested originally. At that time the proposed Chief Secretary was setting out for San Francisco and I very much doubted if he would arrive much before the next meeting. However, I did not wish to damp down the rising enthusiasm of the meeting so accepted the motion.

7. For that reason I trust Mr. Clark's<sup>1</sup> departure from Great Britain will not be delayed. There is a lot of work accumulating for the October meeting.

8. As regards the Minutes themselves. The views expressed by the Prime Minister on amalgamation and on the attitude of the British Government thereto, are, like all his views, frank and interesting. It should be noted that this speech was read from a prepared paper which was given to the Press.

9. After such remarks as the rest of the members of the Council felt themselves called upon to deliver, talking sense for the most part, if at times prolix (Sir William Tait-Bowie), the Council proceeded to discuss the Draft of the Constitution of a Central African Council, which had been prepared by Sir John Waddington. With few alterations this draft was accepted. I am very grateful to Sir John for this thorough and understanding piece of work.

10. Having settled the Constitution the Council proceeded to appoint Standing Committees to investigate certain problems. Some of these Committees have already reported; others are still sitting, but will at least submit an interim report before the next meeting of the Council. This is one of the reasons why I am anxious that Mr. Clark should not be delayed. These reports *must* be followed up.

11. The main interest of the Council's proceedings was undoubtedly in the recruitment, treatment and disposal of Native labour. I had early sensed that some discussion on this matter would be demanded, and I accordingly invited the Governor of Nyasaland to prepare some remarks on these subjects, his country being the principal supplier of non-indigenous Native labour to the farms, mines, factories, gardens and domestic houses of Southern Rhodesia. He accordingly did so, and read the statement which begins on page 47.

12. The Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, followed in reply. Later, various members of the Council intervened on small points, but the main discussion was carried on by these two. Sir Edmund Richards' declarations were always firm and clear, while Sir Godfrey Huggins was equally clear and most pithy, his asides being sometimes delightfully frank in his views on white and black labour.

13. It was of course realized that the Council was in no position to make any decision on Native labour questions, and so it contented itself with recording the fact

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<sup>1</sup>W A W Clark, Colonial Administrative Service, 1931; served in Kenya, 1931–1941; seconded to Dominions Office, 1940; chief secretary, Central African Council, 1945–1948; chief secretary to the high commissioner for Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland; 1949–1950; assistant secretary, CRO, 1950; assistant under-secretary of state, 1954; deputy high commissioner, New Delhi, 1956–1958.

that it had discussed various aspects of the matter. All the same, it was felt by members generally that this very free discussion had been an enormous help to them all, and I know they were grateful to the main participants accordingly.

14. I venture to recommend the remarks of Southern Rhodesia's Prime Minister on Native affairs for special study. They give a clear indication of the views he has adopted on these matters, views he does not hesitate to put before the public. I may here say that I believe these opinions to be substantially those of the leaders of all political parties in the country. There is no pro-Native or anti-Native party, the only difference between them being the speed at which the rank and file are prepared to bring the Native on to better conditions of work and living. The party led by the Prime Minister is the most progressive in this respect.

15. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the High Commissioner for Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.

## Enclosure to 2

### *The prime minister of Southern Rhodesia*

Your Excellency:

I would like to thank you for your opening speech and to add a word of welcome on behalf of the Colony to the distinguished visiting delegates.

As you state, Sir, the Southern Rhodesia view is that amalgamation of the three territories is essential if co-operation and development of South Central Africa are to be brought about in the simplest manner and within a reasonable space of time.

A certain delay for consideration is inevitable when numerous interests are concerned. On the other hand human individuals are not on this earth for long and, therefore, there must be a limit to procrastination if anything is to materialize in our time. For this reason, if there are two ways of doing anything that matters, an easy and a difficult way, I have a natural predilection for the simpler method.

However, the Powers-that-be in London have decided otherwise and presented us with a scheme which is certainly better than nothing, but which belongs to the difficult rather than the easy from the point of view of achieving much in regard to our desire. Although difficulties are a challenge to human ingenuity, this Council can in no way replace amalgamation but I hope and believe that with goodwill we may progress along the right path.

I agree that the Chief Secretary to this Council may make a success of it. The wrong man could certainly ensure its failure.

The somewhat minute differences in Native Policy are the reasons given for not sanctioning Amalgamation. Fortunately the people realize that the African is not responsible for that and so no sign of resentment against the African has been seen, and we shall continue to take what steps we believe to be in the African's interest in our own way, by methods which have been and will in the future be decided by trial and error. Conditions are not the same in the three territories, and what is more important, Native Policy must always be in a state of flux so that adjustments can be made from time to time to meet changing conditions. We appreciate that a considerable improvement in the mental make-up of the African entailing education, is required before he can be expected to understand what is ultimately in his best interest.

Our Africans, for instance, resent the influx of raw labourers from the other

territories. They think that it keeps wages down and to a certain limited extent it does. They fail to realize that such openings as do exist for them to improve their lot would never have been created and would largely disappear if our development had not been greatly assisted by the immigration of Africans from other territories.

These immigrants enable us to create the necessary wealth to pay for administration, social services and the development which is necessary if unemployment is to be avoided.

For climatic and other reasons most of the industrial development will be in Southern Rhodesia, but that does not mean that important industries cannot be developed in the other countries represented on this Council. Indeed, it would be disastrous if that were not so. Decentralised industry contributes more to the well-being of a larger number of people than large aggregations in one country or one town.

Now, Sir, I have not been very fulsome in my welcome to this Council because I am genuinely disappointed at the action of the people in London. Therefore I would like to say that so far as I am concerned—and I believe the majority of the civilised people in the Colony would agree with me—we will do all in our power to make the work of this Central African Council a success and what is just as important, we will leave nothing undone that might contribute to the successful co-operation and development of the three countries represented at this Conference.

There is one other word I would like to add. It must be understood that with our difference in Constitution, after a General Election the attitude of Southern Rhodesia to anything decided by this Council may completely change. At the present time the Colony is represented by three members of the Government and by the Leader of the largest party in opposition to the Government, so I have tried to make it as representative as I can from the political angle, but it must be liable to change from time to time, otherwise it would be completely out of touch with the people who elect the Government. (*Applause*). . . .

*The Honourable R. Welensky*

Your Excellencies, Mr. Prime Minister and Gentlemen: I shall be very brief. I do want to thank you for the welcome that has been extended to us. There are two points I want to make, and I shall make them briefly. First of all, I am very pleased to hear the Prime Minister's address this morning, because he expresses my own views very strongly. I was extremely disappointed in October, 1944, when I found that amalgamation had been shelved.

I must offer some explanation as to why I am appearing here. I believe this Council can be used as a yardstick to judge the co-operation that can exist between the territories; and if it is a success, it can be the beginning, or foundation, of amalgamation between the territories. (*Applause*). . . .

**3** CO 537/1514, no 1

2 Oct 1945

[Northern Rhodesia: unrest on Copperbelt]: inward telegram no 512  
from Sir J Waddington to Mr Hall

Your telegram No. 460.

Copperbelt.

I have considered the matter very carefully in the light of your telegram. As intervention by the Government at this stage on the Colour Bar issue would be

regarded by Trades Union circles in the United Kingdom as an infringement of normal practice in industrial matters, and therefore unwarranted, I agree with the conclusion in paragraph 1 of your telegram. I do so with regret, because I feel that we will be very vulnerable in failing to bring up the recommendations of the Forster Report<sup>1</sup> when the termination of hostilities allowed us to do so. But the main consideration is that the matter should be tackled in a manner most conducive to the fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of the African, and his interests would clearly be better served by avoiding a clash with the Mine Workers' Union on the Colour Bar issue in a set of circumstances which might prejudice Africans' case in circles outside the territory.

2. In order to see clearly the position that will arise if the Companies are informed as proposed in your paragraph 2, I will state my views as to the probability of their raising the issue on their own initiative and as to the position of the Government in either event.

3. I think that there is a division of opinion in the Companies' ranks. On the one hand, it is held that the Companies were pressed by the Government to continue copper production after the 1940 strike, that the only method of so continuing was by acceptance of the Union's demands for a Colour Bar Clause and that, therefore the Clause came into being by Government intervention and should be removed on the initiative of the Government. On the other hand, it is thought that matters are working up to a crisis in the industry in any event and, if there is to be a major clash, the Colour Bar issue should be raised by the Companies (in default of Government intervention), so that the issues on which the clash occurs should be comprehensive. If the latter view prevails, I think that the Companies will ask for an assurance from the Government that they will receive support on the Colour Bar issue.

4. If the Companies decide not to raise the issue and negotiations between the parties lead to a further agreement for two years, it would seem to me difficult for the Government, having remained silent during the negotiations, to raise the issue during the period of agreement. I think it most likely that the Africans themselves would, during this time, raise the issue themselves in a forceful manner, and this is more probable owing to the early return to the mines of ex-Askaris,<sup>2</sup> whose views have naturally become more advanced. It is possible that the Mine Workers' Union will endeavour to form African Union under their aegis and to appease African labour by demanding a general rise in African wages, which the Companies would probably resist unless the Colour Bar issue is considered at the same time. If the clash should occur on this, or if there should be disturbances arising spontaneously from Africans, the Government will be in a very weak position in having failed to implement the Forster Report.

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<sup>1</sup> A commission under Sir John Forster was appointed following the strike by African mineworkers in 1940. Its findings were published as *Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Disturbances in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia, July 1940* (Lusaka, 1941). The report recommended a number of specific improvements in African pay and conditions. In a more general sense it identified the colour-bar as a major source of African resentment and urged all parties to facilitate African advancement. Elena L Berger, *Labour, race and colonial rule: the Copperbelt from 1924 to independence* (Oxford, 1974), pp 56–57.

<sup>2</sup> *Askari* (East Africa): a soldier or police officer.

5. If the Companies propose to the Union, in connexion with the new agreement, that the Colour Bar Clause should be abolished I am sure that European workers would be unanimous in the opposition which they would instrument to the virtual extreme [sic]. Three years ago, Maybank,<sup>3</sup> in conversation with Provincial Commissioner who was talking of the Forster Report, stated that discussion of the Colour Bar Clause would unite all European workers firmly. I think it most unlikely that the Union would agree to conciliatory proceedings and the opportunity for Government intervention, as suggested in your paragraph 2, would therefore presumably not arise. Government would then have to choose between leaving the position in state of deadlock or intervening, without the consent of the parties, by the institution of an enquiry on the issues raised in the Forster Report.

6. In mentioning these alternatives, very difficult situations that will probably arise, I do not wish to appear to go back on my views expressed in paragraph 1, but merely to lead on to a suggestion which seems to me to offer some hope in certain circumstances. On receiving the Union's proposals for amendment, the Companies might reply that they are prepared to consider the proposals, but that they are writing to the Government to consider at the same time the implementation of the recommendations in the Forster Report. If that should happen, perhaps Government acquiescence would not be adversely criticised by Trades Union circles in the same way as direct intervention might be, especially in view of the fact that Africans, although not parties to the agreement, are vitally interested in its terms and look to the Government to protect their interests. The intervention might not be at the request of both parties, but it would be at the request of a party in furtherance of the recommendations of a public Commission. I shall be grateful to know if you think this course would be possible. If the assurance mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph 3 is in fact asked for, I find it difficult to see how we could abstain from committing ourselves to some extent, as we could not reply that it was a matter in which the Government was not concerned.

7. In order that I may know if I have the support of the Executive Council in the opinions that I have expressed, I would like, if you agree, to discuss the matter with them at an early date and before the Companies are informed of our intentions in the matter.

8. With reference to your paragraph 4, I would warmly welcome the appointment of an officer with wide experience of industrial relations in the United Kingdom provided that he is a first-class man who would command the confidence of Trade Unionists in the United Kingdom and provided that he could reach this territory in the next month or so. I would like to discuss in the Executive Council, however, before the appointment is made.

9. As to the security aspect, I have received demi-official communication saying that no troops are available, and that the Police Force is so short-handed that it is most improbable that any could be sent. Official letter in confirmation will probably arrive in the course of a few days. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief told me that he discussed with Huggins, who said that he would find it very difficult to send assistance. I think that we must rule out assistance from that source. As a result of

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<sup>3</sup> Frank Maybank, general secretary of the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union. His militancy had led to his arrest and deportation in 1942. He was not allowed to return to the Copperbelt until the end of the war in Europe.

my discussions in Nairobi, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has stationed a squadron of armoured cars at Lusaka; they have African personnel, but the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief proposes to fly European personnel here in case of need. Only other possible assistance would be from the Middle East. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief would require at least fortnight's preliminary notice to get them from the Middle East to East Africa, where they would remain until definitely asked for by me. As I would not probably be in a position to give preliminary notice until matters were fairly serious, we would have to depend on the armoured cars to large extent. These would probably be effective as a show of force to prevent disturbances, but difficult to use if action were required.

10. I am letting you know by separate telegram about the position at Mufulira. I understand that the men are returning to work today, but I am not certain of the nature of the agreement reached.

#### **4 DO 35/1169, 380/2, no 4**

**2 Nov 1945**

**[Railways strike]: letter from Sir C Tait to Lord Addison**

I have the honour to inform Your Lordship of a strike of the African workers of the Rhodesia Railways which occurred last week in this Colony. The facts appear to be as follows.

2. In March 1944 a Trades Union, called the Rhodesia Railways African Employees' Association, was formed and applied, in June of that year, for official recognition by the Rhodesia Railways Administration. The Association asked for:—

- (1) The recognition of the Association.
- (2) The grant of a cost of living allowance.
- (3) The provision of leave with pay and sick pay.

Correspondence continued in a desultory fashion for some considerable time, the general tenor of which was that the Rhodesia Railways Administration was not prepared to grant any of these requests.

3. The precipitating factor seems to have been an announcement made by certain Europeans in the Receiving and Forwarding Sheds at Bulawayo on the 19th October that a new flat rate of overtime pay for Africans of 3d. an hour was being introduced. The effect of this flat rate was that the lower paid men would have an increase in overtime pay but that the higher paid Africans would lose.

4. The Africans in the Receiving and Forwarding Sheds at Bulawayo went to see the Railway Supervisor of Natives and asked to see the General Manager. On Saturday morning, the 20th October, they attended outside the Administrative Offices. The General Manager, however, felt obliged to refuse to see them. In consequence of this all African employees of the Rhodesia Railways in Bulawayo struck over the week-end, in spite of an address made to them by the Native Commissioner, Bulawayo, on the afternoon of Saturday, the 20th. The Native Commissioner, Bulawayo, at a further meeting on Sunday, the 21st, attempted to read a statement to the strikers by the General Manager. The strikers were, however, inclined to be noisy and troublesome and the Native Commissioner reluctantly gave up the attempt. By Monday, the 22nd October, about 3,000 Natives in Bulawayo were 'out' and all trains

arriving at Bulawayo Station were met by pickets who removed native employees and escorted them out of the Station.

5. On that day the General Manager addressed a mass meeting of the strikers and agreed to meet a deputation provided that the strikers returned to work. The General Manager stated that the strikers had submitted no case to the Railways Administration. On Tuesday, the 23rd October, a deputation of twenty-three natives waited on the General Manager and handed him a written statement of their requests. The General Manager repeated that the natives must return to work before the requests could be dealt with. No promise was given that in that eventuality anything would necessarily be done to meet the demands of the strikers. In the afternoon, at a meeting of the strikers, it was decided to maintain the strike.

6. The memorandum of claims submitted by the strikers demanded:—

(1) An increase of wages to a scale of from 5/- to 7/6d. per shift (£6.10.0d. to £9.15.0d. per mensem on the basis of a twenty-six day month).

(2) Revision of the system of overtime payments.

(3) Repudiation by native employees of rations provided by the Railways.

(4) The abolition of the office of Supervisor of Natives and the substitution of direct dealing between the various sub-departments of the Railways and their native employees, with the exception of the Chief Engineer's branch.

7. No incidents were reported from Bulawayo.

8. On Wednesday, the 24th October, 1,000 native Railway employees in Salisbury struck. No incidents were reported. On Thursday, the 25th October, the strike became general throughout the Colony and had extended to the Railway native employees at Broken Hill in Northern Rhodesia.

9. On this day the Chief Native Commissioner addressed a mass meeting of the strikers in the Railway Compound in Bulawayo and conveyed to the meeting the Government's offer to set up a Commission to enquire into the causes of the strike and the Railway native employees' grievances immediately the strikers returned to work. Spokesmen for the strikers stated it was thought it would be better if they remained 'out' until the Commission had been set up and its findings announced. The Chief Native Commissioner told the strikers this was out of the question and advised them to accept the Government's offer without further delay. The meeting was most orderly throughout. The offer was repeated by Native Department officials to strikers throughout the Colony. At Wankie the offer was accepted and the strikers there returned to work but elsewhere the offer was refused. In Umtali the coal position was prejudiced and the Electricity Supply Commission curtailed its output in consequence.

10. In Bulawayo on Friday, the 26th October, a deputation of the strikers' leaders called upon the Chief Native Commissioner at the office of the Provincial Native Commissioner and informed him that as the Government insisted upon a return to work before the Commission of Enquiry was set up, the strikers had decided to decline the offer. The Chief Native Commissioner said he would not accept the decision as final, and gave them up to 6 p.m. on Saturday, the 27th October, to reconsider the decision. The Chief Native Commissioner strongly advised them to accept the Government's offer.

11. It was apparent at this stage that a more favourable attitude had been created, and at noon on Saturday, the 27th October, the strikers' leaders again

interviewed the Chief Native Commissioner in Bulawayo and informed him that the strikers would accept the Government's offer if they could be given a letter setting out the Government's promise. The Chief Native Commissioner gave them the letter. The deputation then informed the Chief Native Commissioner that the strike would be called off and work would be resumed on the morning of Monday, the 29th October. The Chief Native Commissioner stated that in the meantime all pickets must be removed and the strike leaders should notify all other centres where railway workers were on strike of the Headquarters (Bulawayo) decision to resume work on the following Monday. It appears that after the interview with the Chief Native Commissioner trouble arose between a minority of the strikers in Bulawayo and their leaders and it was not until noon on Sunday, the 28th October, that all pickets were removed and telegrams sent in terms of the leaders' undertaking to advise other centres. In most cases the telegrams and the reports in the Press of the acceptance by the strike leaders in Bulawayo of the Government's offer were mistrusted, and arrangements were then made to send delegates from Bulawayo to prove the *bona fides* of the announcement.

12. By Monday morning, the 29th October, all native Railway employees in Bulawayo had returned to work and those in most other centres followed suit on Tuesday, the 30th. In Salisbury a minority, stated to be Portuguese natives, prevented the return to work of Salisbury strikers until Wednesday, the 31st, and the Umtali natives had still not returned to work on that day.

13. A feature throughout of the strike has been its efficient organisation and the orderliness of the strikers.

14. The publicity given to the native strikers on the Railways had encouraged attempts by natives in isolated industries to try their hand. In most cases sober counsels prevailed but, as the result of a strike in one brickyard in Bulawayo, 200 odd natives were charged under the Masters' and Servants' Act and all except seven juveniles were convicted. Of the remainder 192 elected to go to prison rather than return to work. By the next day, however, all save 4 had reconsidered their attitude and returned to work, arrangements being made for the payment of the fines imposed.

15. The Commission of Enquiry set up in terms of the Government's offer commenced its sittings in Bulawayo on Wednesday, the 31st October, with the following terms of reference:—

- (1) to investigate the grievances which gave rise to the strike amongst the African employees of the Rhodesia Railways and the conditions of employment incidental to such grievances;
- (2) to make recommendations for the elimination of any grievances proved to be well-founded; and
- (3) to consider machinery for dealing with future industrial disputes in which strikers are involved.

16. The personnel of the Commission consists of the Honourable Mr. Justice R. C. Tredgold, C.M.G., the Reverend Percy Ibbotson, O.B.E., and Mr. B. L. Gardiner. The Reverend Mr. Ibbotson is well-known for his interest in native welfare, particularly that of natives in urban employment, and a very interesting memorandum on conditions among Africans in urban areas prepared by him was forwarded to Viscount Cranborne under cover of Sir Evelyn Baring's despatch No.

292 of the 19th November, 1943. Judge Tredgold is also known for his sympathy with the native races. Mr. Gardiner is General Manager of Willoughby's Consolidated Company, Limited. He is a prominent Bulawayo business man.

17. I am at present not in a position to discuss the merits of the case and a further despatch will be addressed to Your Lordship when the Commission has made its report.

18. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the High Commissioner for Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.

## **5 DO 35/1169, 380/2, no 10**

**2 Jan 1946**

**[Railways strike]: letter from Sir C Tait to Sir E Machtig**

I attach for your information a copy of the African Railway Strike Inquiry Commission Report.<sup>1</sup> I consider the Report is a model of its kind. Its recommendations have been accepted in principle by the Railway Company and by the African employees, so that in that respect the crisis caused by the strike is a thing of the past. Its implications, however, must be obvious to all thinking European minds, but I think it as well to give you some of my own thoughts and comments on the report.

The Commission was very wisely chosen. The Chairman, Mr. Justice Tredgold is a Rhodesian greatly respected by Europeans and Africans alike. He himself is a Rhodes scholar and descended from missionaries on both his father's and mother's sides, one of his grandfathers being a brother to that Miss Moffat who married Dr. Livingstone. His interest in and knowledge of native customs and ways of thought are therefore obvious.

The second member was Rev: Percy Ibbotson, a Methodist clergyman and ex-missionary. He knows the native language well, is a prominent member of the Native Welfare Society and is the author of many books and papers on African affairs. Mr. Gardiner is a prominent business man in Bulawayo.

*Paragraph 10.* I agree the Africans had every reason to think their grievances were not receiving proper attention. In fact they were *not* receiving proper attention.

*Paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14.*<sup>2</sup> Although there was an Acting Supervisor of Natives, a Railway official, who is supposed to understand Africans, it was never realized by any responsible European that the untaught and unlettered Africans neither grasped their old rates of overtime nor understood what the new ones meant to them. Practically every European connected with Africans knows that there are no words in the African language for figures above ten, and yet these employees were expected to be able to do their own mental arithmetic. I cannot help feeling that all Europeans concerned from the General Manager downwards showed in this respect a want of appreciation towards their employees mounting almost to indifference.

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<sup>1</sup> The report to which Tait refers was presented on 27 Nov 1945 as *Report of Commission Appointed by His Excellency the Governor to Investigate the Grievances which gave rise to the Strike amongst the African Employees of the Rhodesia Railways and certain other matters affecting Africans employed in industry.*

<sup>2</sup> paras 11–14 noted that the strike had been sparked by the introduction of a new system of overtime for Africans, and suggested that this system had been poorly explained to employees.

*Paragraph 28.*<sup>3</sup> I agree with the Commission.

*Paragraphs 35 and 36.*<sup>4</sup> Here the Commission touches on an issue that I know is a matter of considerable thought and concern to the Department of Native Affairs, and a measure to deal with it is being brought before Parliament on January 15th.

*Paragraph 37.* Certain firms in Salisbury and Bulawayo are paying £8 a month to their lorry drivers in addition to finding them food and accommodation.

It has often struck me as it has struck the Commission that there is a great waste of labour on the railways. Some months ago I commented on the complete absence of cranes in the goods yards at Salisbury to the General Manager, and to the corresponding necessity of having natives swarming all over the place like ants, but unlike ants getting in each other's and everybody else's way. The reply I got was that the first cost of mechanical appliances was heavy and that native labour was cheap. Since that day I have had little sympathy with Europeans who complain that industries in the country are being starved for lack of labour. Available labour is not being properly used.

*Paragraph 39.*<sup>5</sup> The wages and conditions of Africans on the Railways are likely to become 'yardsticks' for the measurement of wages and conditions for unskilled native labour throughout the Colony.

The last sentence in this paragraph deserves to be pondered by all the European artisan class. I had a talk with some of these people a few days ago who were insisting that all sorts of trades and employments must be made reserves for Europeans. I asked them how they proposed to effect this. They replied that it could and should be done by regulations. I then reminded them of the story of King Canute whose courtiers proposed by regulations to keep back the tide.

*Paragraph 48 etc, seq: Rations.*<sup>6</sup> I entirely agree with the Commission. If left to himself in a town the African is only too likely to buy tasty but un nourishing food and to become even more physically weak than he is at present. As regards meat, it must be realized that from his youth up the native in the Reserve gets very little meat. 3 lbs. per man per week is a generous scale and is probably as much as in ordinary times an English working man gets although there is no comparison in the climate.

*Paragraph 63.* The present Supervisor of Natives at Bulawayo is not popular with the Africans.

*Paragraph 66 et seq.*<sup>7</sup> One of the difficulties of dealing with the Africans in this strike was that no European knew, or yet knows, which men were organizing it and what they really wanted. I consider, and so does the Prime Minister (Minister of Native Affairs) that the suggestion in paragraph 71 is a sound one.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>3</sup> para 28 noted that prior to the strike, African employees had gained the impression that their grievances had not been taken sufficiently seriously by the Railway Administration. The Commission concluded that this impression was 'not entirely without foundation'.

<sup>4</sup> paras 35–6 noted that the SR economy 'has been built up on (sic) the assumption that the African employee is to be treated as a single man.' The report pointed out that many Africans had dependants, and that the African wage 'buys somewhat less than half what it did before the war.'

<sup>5</sup> The last sentence of para 39 reads: 'Greater attention will have to be paid to the opening up of avenues of useful employment other than those in which it is now possible for Africans to find work.'

<sup>6</sup> para 48 rejected African demands that they be given pay in lieu of rations.

<sup>7</sup> paras 66–68 were broadly in favour of the principle of African trades unionism.

<sup>8</sup> The suggestion in para 71 was for the creation of African Councils to enable grievances to be articulated.

*Paragraph 69.*<sup>9</sup> Here is the practical difficulty regarding all African unskilled labour. The African gets bored with his job and often leaves it after a few months, perhaps to return, perhaps not. He can always scrounge about for food somehow, he has little need of clothing or heating, and in the last resource can return to his kraal where his women folk will work for him while he sits placidly in the sun.

*Paragraph 73.* Housing conditions vary from the 'very good to the unspeakably bad'. I can add nothing to this. I quite agree. What amazes me is the little attention the Press has paid to this matter. I received a copy of the Report in advance and imagined the newspapers would certainly take the matter up with energy. But it has been dismissed with little comment, nor have letters from the public appeared.

*Paragraph 80.*<sup>10</sup> This is already being done.

*Paragraph 84.* I have not seen the worst compound in Bulawayo, but I went over one which I thought so bad that I requested Sir Henry Chapman<sup>11</sup> to see me about it. I said it was obviously grossly overcrowded and asked him why more houses were not being erected in the vacant land alongside it. The Commission says 'it was suggested to us that the completion of the building programme necessary to cope with the situation might be held up by the insistence of the Rhodesia Railway Workers Union upon the use of European skilled labour in construction'. Note the word 'suggested'. I understand that for various reasons no actual evidence was tendered on this point. Months ago however, Sir Henry assured me that he had been obliged to stop building operations for the lack of white labour, and when he asked the Union to permit the use of native labour for native housing he was met with the threat of an immediate strike on the railway. The Prime Minister is a little sceptical whether this was the only reason for stopping building, observing that the cost of white labour has increased tremendously during the last few years, till now it costs more than three and a half times as much to build a house with white labour as it does with black labour. If the Railways had asked priority for white labour they could have got it, but no such request was put forward. And no wonder perhaps with the huge housing programme in front of them!

As regards Native Urban Areas (Municipal Areas) the new Bill dealing with accommodation of Natives makes the employment of Natives in building houses for Natives in a Native municipal location permissive, under rates of wages and conditions without reference to the Industrial Conciliation Act. This is a real step forward.

*Paragraph 89.*<sup>12</sup> The Railway Company have accepted this recommendation.

*Paragraph 96.* Proposals for the establishment of a sub department of Native Labour, under the Department of Native Affairs had already been approved by the Government before the strike. Lack of staff, however, prevents it being implemented immediately.

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<sup>9</sup> para 69–70 qualified the preceding section, noting that since much African labour was transitory, those workers interested in union organisation were not necessarily representative of the workforce as a whole. Para 70 suggested that this was probably true of the Rhodesia Railways African Employees' Association, and that it should not, for the time being, be treated as the sole representative of African workers on the railways.

<sup>10</sup> para 80 called for 'an immediate and complete survey' of all railway housing in SR.

<sup>11</sup> Resident director and technical adviser to Rhodesia Railways Ltd.

<sup>12</sup> para 89 recommended that during periods of absence due to illness or injury, Africans should receive payments and other benefits due under the Masters and Servants Act.

*Paragraph 97.*<sup>13</sup> Last sentence. The Chief Native Commissioner is now drafting proposals for his Minister.

*Paragraph 98 et seq.*<sup>14</sup> All these recommendations are being treated by the Law Officers and the Native Department as urgent matters on the instruction of the Prime Minister.

When the strikers at Bulawayo decided to return to work pending the Report of this Commission they sent telegrams to that effect to the sympathetic strikers at Salisbury and Umtali. At both these places the strikers refused to accept these telegrams on the grounds that they might be fakes. They did not return to work till delegates from Bulawayo had actually visited them and vouched for the accuracy of the telegrams. To me this suspicion and distrust of the European discloses a state of mind in leading Africans on the Railway which is about the most disturbing thing I have met with since I arrived in the Colony.

Another thing which disturbs me is the lack of an obvious stirring of the public conscience on the revelations contained in this Report.

Except for the farmers the majority of the white population is of the artizan class either actual or a generation removed. This class lives extraordinarily well and does not realize it only does so because of the relative abundant and startlingly cheap labour of the Africans. It reminds me of a people used to travel third class now finding itself travelling first class, and not knowing quite how to behave towards porters.

I attach Leading Articles from the Press.<sup>15</sup>

I am sending a copy of this to the High Commissioner in the Union.

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<sup>13</sup> para 97 invited consideration of the establishment of Labour Boards, composed of employers and employees, for African labour. The final sentence states, 'This might initially be effected by officials, but an early representation by Africans themselves should be envisaged.'

<sup>14</sup> para 98 *et seq* recommends the creation of a body to which industrial disputes involving Africans could be referred.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

## **6** CO 537/2119

11 Jan 1946

### **[BSA Company royalties]: minute by A B Cohen**

['Treaties' made with traditional rulers in what was to become NR by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) between 1890 and 1909 helped to secure it the sole mineral rights over large areas of the territory. They were confirmed by the British government in the Devonshire Agreement of 1923, shortly before the CO assumed responsibility for NR. By the 1940s, BSAC's mineral rights had become a prime target for settler leaders in NR, who demanded that these be nationalised. Arthur Creech Jones, parliamentary under-secretary of state at the CO, commented on this matter, 'I regard it as of vital importance both for the political and economic development of N. Rhodesia' (minute, 5 Feb 1946).]

*Mr. Caine*<sup>1</sup>

*Sir G. Gater*

Mr. Creech Jones has spoken to me about the telegram at No. 1. He has read some of the papers on 45367/45 and I have explained the background to him briefly. He wishes us to consider what, if any, action should be taken on the question of the

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<sup>1</sup> As assistant under-secretary of state, 1944–1947, Caine was responsible for the Finance Dept of the CO.

British South Africa Company's mineral rights and I suggested to him that I should circulate a minute on the subject prior to a meeting with him, at which I thought that Mr. Caine would wish to be present.

You are of course familiar with the past history of this question. We asked the Treasury to agree last year that H.M.G. should buy out the B.S.A Company's mineral rights and we discussed the matter at a meeting with them at the official level. They refused to agree (No. 18 on 45367/45) and the matter has not been pursued further as far as Northern Rhodesia is concerned. Colonel Stanley did, however, take up with the Chancellor of the Exchequer the question of H.M.G. agreeing to buy out the U.A.C's half share of the mineral royalties in Northern Nigeria, but this the Chancellor was unwilling to do. Negotiations are now in progress for the purchase of these rights in Nigeria at the Nigerian Government's own expense.

The Northern Rhodesia position is set out in the memorandum at No. 16 on 45367/45. Apart from the equitable and political arguments for suggesting that H.M.G. should finance the purchase of the B.S.A. Company's mineral rights (about which I know varying opinions are held), there is also a strong practical ground for the Government owning the rights. The present law in Northern Rhodesia is based not only on the ownership of the mineral rights by the B.S.A. Company, but also on the administration of the country by the Company, since it dates from 1912. In the early thirties we negotiated a new and much improved law with the Company, with the assistance of Sir Arnold McNair.<sup>2</sup> Necessarily this was still based on the ownership of the mineral rights by the Company, since that is the existing position. It was never passed into law because the unofficial members in Northern Rhodesia do not recognise the 1923 Agreement and are still, as the latest press cutting shows, arguing that the Company do not own all the mineral rights. The result is a quite absurd one. We cannot amend the law because the unofficial members will never accept a new law which states that the Company owns the mineral rights and we have therefore got to retain an antiquated law very unsatisfactory in a number of respects from the point of view of the Government and the public, which dates from the period when the Company not only owned the mineral rights, but administered the country. Clearly we cannot allow this situation to go on indefinitely.

There appear to be three possible courses open to us:—

- (1) To refuse to take up the question at all. This will become increasingly difficult and embarrassing in view of the attitude taken in Northern Rhodesia.
- (2) To proceed as proposed last year to attempt to buy out the Company's rights at a commercial price. It is certain that the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council would never vote the money for this, holding the views which they do about the rights and wrongs of the position. It follows therefore that this could only be done if H.M.G. were prepared to pay. As explained at the end of the memorandum referred to, the cost of the mineral rights at fifteen years' purchase on the basis of an annual royalty of £150,000 would be £2,250,000. Whether the rights could be secured for as little as this on a commercial basis it is impossible to say.
- (3) In view of the differences of opinion on this subject; as between ourselves and the Treasury, between the statement by H. M. Government published in 1939 (No.

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<sup>2</sup> Whewell professor of international law, University of Cambridge, 1935–1937; vice chancellor of Liverpool University, 1937–1945.

7A on 45105/39 flagged X) and the views held by the unofficial members in Northern Rhodesia; and probably between the Government and the B.S.A. Company, for H.M.G. to appoint a Commissioner to enquire into the whole subject. I do not think that it would be practical politics to hold a judicial enquiry into the Company's rights. The Secretary of State (Mr. Macdonald) in 1938 laid it down that H.M.G. would not be justified in challenging the Company's title (in the despatch referred to) and in a personal and confidential letter to the Chairman of the Company on the 2nd December, 1938, Mr. Macdonald stated that the Law Officers' opinion which had been received was generally in favour of the Company's contentions in respect of their claim to the ownership of the minerals (No. 36 on 45105/38 flagged Y). In the circumstances it would probably be difficult now to hold a judicial investigation into the rights and still more difficult to contest them.

At the same time there do seem to me to be grounds for considering whether a different sort of enquiry ought not to be held. It is most unsatisfactory leaving the position unsettled, not only from the practical point of view, as explained above, but also from the point of view that there is felt in Northern Rhodesia to be something rather unsavoury about the past history—a feeling which inevitably detracts from H.M.G.'s good name in a country. Such feelings are not dispelled by a despatch like that of the 31st December, 1938. This records the advice given to H.M.G. (by the Law Officers), but the full facts on which the opinion was based are not stated or published. Such facts can only come out as a result of a judicial or other enquiry. We are now faced with a position in which the Legislative Council by a majority has refused to accept the Secretary of State's opinion expressed in 1938. Would it not be reasonable therefore to appoint a Commissioner to enquire into the whole position, in the light of the Legislative Council motion, and to make recommendations for action. Alternatively, and I think preferably, it might be desirable to be more precise and to make the terms of reference to enquire into the whole position in the light of the Legislative Council motion, to consider whether the B. S. A. Company's mineral rights ought to be purchased by Government and, in the event of an affirmative view being taken, to make recommendations as to the price (or the basis of valuation). If such a step were to be taken, the Treasury would of course have to agree (since they would have to pay if the rights were purchased). The Company's agreement would also be required and would probably not be given willingly. It might be necessary to consider what measures of compulsion should be taken if they were not willing. Finally, it would be necessary to lay it down clearly that the whole of the past history and all the numerous documents would be available to the Commission, who should be allowed to quote them, if necessary, in their report.

The advantage of appointing such a Commission would be that it would either come down against the Northern Rhodesia contention or establish clearly that H.M.G. could not leave the situation as it is in the light of the past history. It might also possibly establish that the mineral rights should be bought out at something less than the commercial price. I do not think that a Commission could do any harm from our point of view. As matters stand at present, in view of the despatch of 1938, the rights if they are to be bought out can only be bought out at a commercial price. The effect of the Commission could not be to increase this and might be to reduce it.

I suggest that (3) above is worthy of serious consideration.

**7** CO 525/205, 44248/46

7 &amp; 20 Mar 1946

**[Nyasaland constitution]: minutes by A B Cohen**

[On 15 Feb 1946, the governor of Nyasaland, Sir Edmund Richards, wrote to the secretary of state for the colonies, George Hall, conveying constitutional proposals from the Nyasaland Chamber of Commerce and the Convention of Associations. Under an agreement reached in 1944, the Convention nominated candidates for five of the six unofficial members of the legislative council. Both the Convention and the Chamber of Commerce advocated the introduction of elections for the selection of European representatives in the territory's legislative council. The Convention also proposed the introduction of an unofficial majority. Richards indicated that he would not oppose an unofficial majority and would be prepared to consider an arrangement whereby unofficials would be partly elected and partly nominated. Creech Jones also proved sympathetic to the idea of an unofficial majority, although he was uncomfortable with the current system of nomination (minute by Creech Jones, 18 Apr 1946, reproduced in R Hyam, ed, *The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–51* (BDEEP: London, 1992), part III, 196).]

*Mr. Cartland*<sup>1</sup>

Many thanks. I have read this with interest and would like to discuss with you. Perhaps I may set out the main points which seem to me to require consideration:—

(1) *Unofficial majority*. This has been granted in Northern Rhodesia and the last Secretary of State was prepared to contemplate it for Nyasaland (see No. 24 on 1944 file). My own view is that we can certainly agree to this, especially if it is achieved by including Africans on the Council. We might have to find out from Tanganyika whether it would be likely to cause embarrassment there, but I should hope not.

(2) *Constitution of new Council*. Personally I think that the suggestions of the Convention of Associations are reasonable except that:—

(a) I would agree with the Governor not to have a member specifically nominated to represent the Anglo–Africans. I doubt whether these people ought to be recognised *constitutionally* in this way.

(b) I would substitute for the two unofficial members under (d), the one under (f) and the one under (h), four unofficial members to be nominated by the Governor without specifying whom or what they would represent.

(c) I would increase the number of Africans under (g) from two to three and would have them all nominated from the Protectorate African Council. I see no special reason for representing the African Congress.

(d) I would not provide for panels of three names, but let both the Indians and Africans put up their own members. We must after all take some risks and not keep everything under the hands of the Government.

(3) *Question of election of European members*. I see no objection to this in principle, but should have thought that it would be much better to stick to the original idea discussed with Sir E. Richards in 1944, namely that these members should be nominated either by the Convention of Associations or some other responsible body. The objections in practice to election in Nyasaland seem to be in the first place that the numbers of Europeans are so small, in the second place that I can see no very strong grounds for differentiating between the Europeans and other communities and thirdly that if you have election for Europeans you can

<sup>1</sup> G B Cartland, principal, CO, 1944–1949.

only justify confining this to Europeans if there is another electoral roll for Indians, which there would not be under the proposals. In other words would you not have to have all British subjects voting, including some Indians? I think that the proper solution would be to make the Convention of Associations put up two members, the Chamber of Commerce one and the Northern Province Association one instead of the four elected members proposed by the Convention of Associations. We ought to try this on, I think, but it may be resisted by the Europeans largely on psychological grounds.

(4) *If there is election, should voting be confined to British subjects?* I think that this is the rule applied in other Colonies in East Africa, but this had better be looked up.

(5) *Should Civil Servants be allowed to vote?* Sir E. Richards says they can elsewhere, but in your note at (17) on the 1944 file you say that they can't in Northern Rhodesia. This is a question of fact which we had better clear up. I am sure the proper course is to adopt the same arrangement as applies elsewhere.

When you have looked up these points and considered, perhaps we might have a talk with Mr. Barton, who was very closely concerned with the previous correspondence and would be interested to read this despatch.

A.B.C.  
7.3.46

*Sir G. Gater*

I have discussed the Governor's despatch with Mr. Cartland and also with Mr. Juxon Barton<sup>2</sup> who knows the background and was closely concerned with the earlier correspondence on this subject. In order to crystallise our views for consideration, I have incorporated them in a draft reply to the Governor, which is submitted herewith. I do not think that I need add much to this in a minute. The main points are:—

(1) There can be no objection to an Unofficial majority accompanied by the usual safeguards provided that this is secured as is intended by the addition of African Members. This has always represented our policy and is the logical conclusion of the developments represented by the creation of Provincial African Councils and the recently established Protectorate African Council. It will also be necessary to have one or two Indian Unofficial members. This has been accepted by the Secretary of State (see No. 16).

(2) We should, I feel sure, oppose the introduction of election for Europeans in Nyasaland. Both Mr. Cartland and Mr. Barton agree strongly with this. The electorate would consist of about 1,000 European British subjects of whom more than half would be missionaries and Officials. This seems quite a ridiculous electorate and nomination should be adhered to as in Tanganyika and Uganda. The introduction of election would also cause complications in connection with the coloured people and the Indians, which ought to be avoided.

Subject to the above two points and also to certain points of detail which I think we should put to the Governor in connection with the composition of the new Council, I think that we can safely let the local Committee go ahead with its recommendations.

A.B.C.  
20.3.46

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<sup>2</sup> Chief secretary, Nyasaland, 1941; officer administering government, 1942–1944; temporary administrative officer, CO, 1945–1958.

**8 DO 35/1169, 380/4, no 1****19 Mar 1946****[Railways strike]: letter from W A W Clark to Sir E Machtig**

In my letter No. 701/170/45 of the 5th November, 1945, I ventured to comment on the Strike of African employees of the Railways which occurred soon after I arrived here. Most of what I said in my letter is borne out in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, copies of which have already been sent to you by the Governor with his letter of the 2nd. January.

To my mind, the most important passages in the report are the references to the effect upon the African in industry of the colour bar, and certain provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act. There is a direct reference in paragraph 101, but the last sentence of paragraph 39 is more significant:—

‘Greater attention will have to be paid to the opening up of avenues of useful employment other than those in which it is now possible for Africans to find work.’

I agree that this does not go very far. But it must be taken in conjunction with similar references in other reports of recent date. The Commission of Enquiry into the Mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia was much bolder. In paragraph 229 of the Chapter on Native Labour (which was written largely by Gemmill, the head of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association), they said:—

‘Finally, your Commissioners beg to draw attention to the fact that in the last resort the productivity and income of the European workers and inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia are inextricably bound up with the increase in the productivity of the Native. This principle applies with equal force throughout all industries in the Colony, and as much to mining as to any other industry. Measures under which Native workers are prevented from (1) acquiring skill, (2) exercising skill, (3) obtaining the full reward for the exercise of skill, whether such measures operate through agreement, custom or law, are therefore in the highest degree detrimental to the expansion of the income-creating potentialities of the Colony. In the opinion of your Commissioners, all sections of the European population of Southern Rhodesia should face the fact the whole level of production costs in all industries is directly dependent on the willingness of the Rhodesian people to develop to the full the potentialities of all workers in the Colony. The danger in a Colony like Southern Rhodesia is that Europeans will fail to exploit the resources of the territory because of their unwillingness to improve and utilise the potential income-creating powers of all sections of the community.’

The Building Costs Commission were not quite so courageous, but they too made quite specific suggestions:—

‘The principle of equality of opportunity applies equally to African labour. The African must eventually have an opportunity to qualify for registration as a fully trained artisan. Nor need the cultural and economic interests of the different races clash. It will be a generation at least before fully qualified African artisans are registered in any numbers. Such an event awaits a large extension of secondary education and apprenticeship facilities in the African

community. When trained they will have a vast field for building employment in the African areas. In the meantime a body of semi-skilled labour is being developed which can perform tasks which are now classified as skilled, but only under very close European supervision.' (Paragraph 264).

and

'The standard of work (i.e. amongst Africans) varies widely because of the absence of standards of training. . . . Your Commissioners are therefore of the opinion that as in the case of artisan standards, some common target should be aimed at for this type of labour. We recommend

- (1) that the minimum test should be that laid down at Domboshawa (Government African school);
- (2) that provision should be made for all African schools which provide building tuition to submit Africans for the Domboshawa building test;
- (3) that increased facilities should be provided for schools to give the necessary training;
- (4) that those Africans who satisfy the test should be provided with certificates, and registered as semi-skilled workers, and that only those Africans should be eligible for employment as semi-skilled workers by the National Building Commission.' (Paragraph 270).

It is no mere coincidence that three important Reports in turn should have criticised with a varying degree of courage the disabilities imposed upon the African, and upon industry, by the colour bar, and some provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act. I am convinced that enlightened opinion is on the increase, although it is proceeding rather cautiously for fear of losing votes, and is rather swamped at the moment by the vociferous, who always seize a pre-election period to indulge in the soap box type of oratory, and fill the correspondence columns of the press with a lot of near-nonsense. But economic pressure is also building up. It is the same sort of fortuitous alliance of philanthropic and economic interests as occurs so often in America when the Empire is under fire there. But, in this case, the aims and objects of the alliance are wholly laudable.

This trend of enlightened opinion should be of the greatest interest, I suggest, to us. The main stumbling block in regard to Southern Rhodesia's native policy is the existence of a colour bar in employment, which is also written into legislation. Besides ruling out any possibility of amalgamation with territories at present under the administration of the United Kingdom Government, this complicates the position in many other directions, e.g., Howitt's inability to recommend joint state ownership of the Railways, owing *inter alia*, to the anomalous position which would arise from the operation of the colour bar in an undertaking in which a Colonial Government was part-owner.

Direct references in reports such as Howitt's,<sup>1</sup> to the wide repercussions of this aspect of Southern Rhodesian native policy, will all help to increase the body of opinion growing up against it. I am not so optimistic as to expect any startling development in the near future, but there are grounds for hope that the defences of the colour bar will be weakened by a process of gradual infiltration. The process has begun, and will go on, whatever happens in the election. But, while it would be hastened under a United Party Government returned for another period of office, it is

unfortunately unlikely to be expedited—to judge by election manifestos—under a Government of any other political complexion.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Gater.

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<sup>1</sup> See 14, para 4.

## 9 CO 537/2119

7–8 May 1946

### [BSA Company royalties]: minutes by A B Cohen and S Caine on discussions with Treasury officials

Mr. Caine and I discussed the question of Northern Rhodesia mineral rights with Sir B. Gilbert and Mr. Winniffrith at the Treasury on April 25th. Sir B. Gilbert promised to think over what we said but his letter of the 4th May indicates an entirely negative attitude on the part of the Treasury.

The case for U.K. assistance towards the purchase of these mineral rights is an entirely political one. It turns on the question whether H.M.G. should help to rescue Northern Rhodesia from a position in which they have been placed by H.M.G.'s past actions. Treasury refuse to accept this contention and in the last resort the question is one which can only be settled as a matter of high policy. I do not believe that any amount of argument would ever move the Treasury officials on the subject. I have set out the case as I see it in my note of the 5th March at No. 2 and in the draft letter at No. 3.

I do not believe that we can let matters rest as they are. Clearly the B.S.A. Company's mineral rights ought to be bought out. I think therefore that the choice lies between trying to persuade the Governor and his unofficials to buy them out entirely at Northern Rhodesia's expense<sup>1</sup> or going back to the Treasury at a ministerial level and trying to secure the Chancellor's support for the very limited assistance which we have now failed to get the Treasury to agree to. This limited assistance was to be either an Imperial guarantee for a loan to cover the purchase price, thus materially reducing the rate of interest on the loan, or a loan from the Exchequer at a low rate of interest and repayable over a long period. The Treasury objection to the former is that it would require legislation, to the latter that the transaction should be a good one commercially from Northern Rhodesia's point of view and that no assistance should therefore be given.

I think that it is very unfortunate that the Treasury have rejected this compromise which would probably have succeeded in bridging the gap between their view that no assistance should be given and the Northern Rhodesia view that the whole cost should be borne by H.M.G. One point which is ignored in Sir B. Gilbert's letter is that, although Northern Rhodesia's financial position at the present time is fairly good they have a very heavy loan programme apart from this question. Also if they have to invest a considerable part of their comparatively limited resources in copper royalties, this will allow far too much for putting all their eggs in one basket. Both these points were made at the meeting in the Treasury.

I do not believe that the Northern Rhodesia Government or unofficials will be prepared to agree to finance this purchase wholly from funds raised by Northern

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<sup>1</sup> Cohen added a marginal note, 'I very much doubt they would agree'.

Rhodesia without assistance. I think that they will object to this both on principle and because of the heavy additional investment in copper prosperity which would be involved. If they refuse and if the Treasury conclusion is to stand the result will be that no purchase will take place. This would have several disadvantages, first that the highly desirable objective of Government ownership of the mineral rights would not be achieved, secondly that the Government would not secure property which may turn out to be profitable and thirdly that there would be an enduring sense of grievance in Northern Rhodesia against H.M. Government. I think therefore that we ought to consider very seriously a further approach to the Treasury at a ministerial level and Mr. Creech Jones will probably wish to discuss before any decision is taken. If such an approach is to be made it ought to be made soon in readiness for the discussions with the Governor and Mr. Welensky, which I am afraid will be rather awkward if we have to approach them on the basis of the conclusion in the Treasury letter at No. 4.

A.B.C.  
7.5.46

I share Mr. Cohen's disappointment with Sir Bernard Gilbert's reaction. The trouble is that on the cold financial merits of the business, it is very difficult indeed to contest his arguments. What we are looking for is a little bit of political oil to ease the acceptance of responsibility by the Northern Rhodesian people. The case for any kind of Exchequer assistance is, therefore, as Mr. Cohen points out, entirely political, and I think the only hope of getting it is to take the matter up at the Ministerial level. It must, however, be pointed out to Ministers that so far as we can see at present, there is no way of getting any kind of Exchequer assistance without legislation, and in the crowded state of the legislative programme, it may be necessary to think several times before embarking on a policy involving still another Act, however short.<sup>2</sup>

S.C.  
8.5.46

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<sup>2</sup> Creech Jones minuted (10 May): 'I think this matter is so important that we should have a conference with the S. of S. & decide what future steps should be made. The Treasury attitude is so discouraging that I doubt if any progress at the ministerial level with the C of Exchequer will be possible. But then we have to adjust ourselves to the conversations with Welensky & the Governor when they arrive. An early date with the S. of S. should be arranged.'

## **10 DO 121/99**

**10 June 1946**

**[Aftermath of Southern Rhodesian elections]: letter from Sir C Tait to Sir E Machtig**

I expect you have been wondering what has happened to me. I have had a flabby heart. It is a disgusting term but I am told a medical one. This showed itself by my being overtaken at times with an unaccountable breathlessness, and the doctors prescribed physical rest. I had to nominate a deputy, therefore, for opening Parliament and another out-door function which I had promised to attend. My heart is now no longer flabby, but I am ordered to rest for a bit longer in order that the heart muscles may regain their tone. The doctors tell me I am merely paying for the

very strenuous life I led in the Navy for a good number of years.<sup>1</sup> Looking back on it, I *was* worked hard. From 1931 until I retired to come out here, I went from one appointment to another without a holiday.

But as regards Southern Rhodesia. My secretary brings me all the papers. The more important ones I have dealt with myself as I daresay you have noticed, and my excellent deputy and good friend signs the routine ones. Ministers, particularly Huggins and Guest frequently come to see me, so I am well in touch with events.

The new Parliament has assembled, and the general opinion is that it is a better one than the last. Certainly the new Ministers inspire more confidence than their predecessors.

Two days after the opening the Budget was introduced by Guest.<sup>2</sup> It proposed reduction of taxes all round, and so touched the hearts of the Opposition that speaker after speaker congratulated the Finance Minister on framing a Liberal Budget! To this Guest and Huggins replied that they had always promised a reduction of taxation as soon as the war was over and pointed to their election speeches as witness. Even so, I think few observers were prepared for the affable manner in which Smit<sup>3</sup> tossed his bouquets into the lap of the Finance Minister! And this reception of the Budget by the Liberals only goes to show that the line dividing the Liberals and the United Party is very vaguely drawn. The Liberals are a little further to the right, and inclined to be a bit suspicious of Huggins' Native policy, thinking, as many of them do, he is going too far and too fast.

Smit, the Opposition leader, has to live down his speech made during the war in which he advocated immediate amalgamation with the Union. He accordingly worked a statement into his speech on the Budget, that the policy of the Liberal Party was the development of Southern Rhodesia without leanings towards union with South or North.

This definite declaration against union with South Africa has cleared the air for the Liberal Party and soothed the slight misgivings of many of those who voted for it, except of course among the Afrikaners in the country districts who, practically to a man, supported the Liberals, openly against Huggins' native policy, and in their heart of hearts in the hope of amalgamation with a country which 'really understands how to treat natives', and in the expectation—supported publically by the Dutch Reformed Church—of bi-lingualism in Government schools. Regarding this latter matter, the Liberals sent Afrikaans lecturers around the Afrikaner districts, and it is being freely alleged that these people, though not as far as is known any actual candidate, more than hinted at such a possibility.

The reference to union with territories to the north is probably put in as a steadying reminder. It also appeared in the Liberal election manifesto. Besides it being the duty of the Opposition to oppose, there is a feeling in the country that to increase the black population under the Southern Rhodesian Government before steps were taken to limit in some way the number of Africans who might come on to the voters role would be a terrible mistake. I have referred to this matter before.

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<sup>1</sup> Tait's doctors were right to be concerned about his health. He was to die less than a month later, on 7 July.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Ernest Guest, SR minister of finance, defence and air.

<sup>3</sup> Jacob Smit. A former minister of finance under Huggins, Smit had resigned from the SR government in 1942, accusing it of having drifted to the left. He joined the Liberal party in 1944 and subsequently became its leader.

The Labour rump criticised the Budget on the grounds that there was no mention of Social Security. These presumptions [sic] wretches were turned upon by both Liberals and Uniteds who pointed out that already there were old age pensions, and that with reduced taxation for the smaller income groups Labour had nothing to complain about.

Several Liberal speakers have emphasized that they have no wish to turn out the present Government as long as a policy 'in conformity with Liberal ideals' is pursued. Huggins tells me he has no intention of precipitating matters by deliberately provoking the Opposition. Whether the Liberals will maintain their lofty and highminded attitude and resist the temptation to combine with Labour on some point and throw the Government out is another question. The King's visit is undoubtedly having its effect on the Liberal rank and file. The Liberal leader Smit, is at times hardly intelligible in English, and I know his followers feel that it would never do, in this most loyal British Colony, to have as Prime Minister a man whom the King might have difficulty in understanding. It has even been said to me that the Liberal leaders have already considered this very point, and should the occasion arise would be prepared as a temporary measure to demote Smit and to elect as Party Leader one of the undoubtedly able men they possess. I take this with a large grain of salt, however. If I were Smit I should wonder how, once I had vacated the Party Leadership, even to my best friend, I could get it back again.

Regarding some of the lessons of the General Election. It is generally believed that the defeat of Danziger<sup>4</sup> was the result of a wave of anti-Jewish feeling that is enveloping the country. During the war Jews from the Union bought up much property here and have installed as managers, and probably as actual owners, their sons or nephews who of course were not silly enough to go to the war or indulge in any nonsense of that sort. Now Rhodesian ex-service men returning home find Jews who were not here six years ago in possession of nice little businesses they would have liked for themselves. These cases, while not numerous, have been enough to make an outcry. Hence the number of anti-Semites I meet. Rhodesia is getting quite like the Union. At any rate the ablest and clearest thinker in the last Cabinet has lost his seat and I fancy it will be many a long day before another Jew is elected to Parliament. In one way the electors have relieved Huggins of an embarrassment. He told me before the results came out that to put Danziger back in his Cabinet would be a most unpopular move in the Party, yet to overlook him would be exceedingly awkward.

The defeat of Colonel Walker<sup>5</sup> was a real surprise. Everybody misses him. He was defeated by a young Liberal, part owner of a small garage and haulage business in the constituency. The Liberal Party accepted this young man as a forlorn hope, no one else caring to take on the job in a constituency mainly composed of poor whites who for years had fed out of Colonel Walker's hand. And a lot he had done for them too. These poor whites are mainly Afrikaners, sons of farmers who have tried to make a

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<sup>4</sup> Max Danziger, SR minister of finance, 1942–1946. Danziger was regarded as a progressive in the field of African labour rights.

<sup>5</sup> Col G Walker, leader of the Rhodesia Labour Party. Shortly before the April general election, Walker had led a split from the Southern Rhodesia Labour Party (which had itself only existed since early 1944, following a split in the old Rhodesia Labour Party) over the issue of African membership. Walker reformed the Rhodesia Labour Party with a colour-bar, and both it and the Southern Rhodesia Labour Party fielded separate candidates in the 1946 general election.

living off an inadequate piece of land, knowing no trade, and whose great fear is that the increasingly trained and educated native will take away what few miserable jobs are left in the towns. Labour Party under Colonel Walker did not offer them much; all those aristocrats were concerned with was keeping the native out of skilled and semi-skilled occupations in unionized trades. The poor white has not got a trade. The United Party was openly proposing schools for natives in the town native locations and thus ultimately aiming at producing a native who not only would be of some use but who would probably compete on more than level terms with the poor whites. What then was to be done? Mr. Paul, the Liberal candidate is a recent importation from the Union and is bi-lingual. His wife is more at home in Afrikaans than English. Together they talked to these wretched poor whites about the natives in a way they could appreciate, with the result that poor old Colonel Walker went into the wilderness and Mr. Paul became the marvel of the hour.

To show how this young hero is appreciated, I am told that he was put up for membership of the Salisbury City Club last week with his honours fresh upon him, and heavily blackballed by a crowd which included many well known Liberal supporters.

You will recollect that the Southern Rhodesia Labour Party managed to get a telegram of approval for their policy out of the British Labour Party. Few people out here realize the difference between the British Labour Party and the British Labour Government. In fact on some platforms it was announced as a message from the British Labour Government. At once arose the cry 'Interference', and the message was not used again. It is thought, however, that the incident lost the party more votes than it gained.

I hope I have given a little light on Rhodesia party politics at the beginning of the new Parliament.

Politics apart, a rather significant thing has happened this week. The British Empire Service League has held its first annual conference since the war. This League, founded in the Dominions by Lord Haig, is the counterpart of the British Legion to which it is affiliated. It is very strong in Rhodesia. At this conference it was proposed from the floor of the hall that the B.E.S.L., should establish a Coloured Section and an African Section. The proposal was carried and it was decided that the Coloured Section should have full control of its own affairs, approaching the European committee for assistance when necessary. Regarding the Africans it was decided that the Chairman of the League should be chairman of the Section and that the Chief Native Commissioner should be on the committee with the remainder African ex-soldiers.

That such a decision as this could be taken without any prompting from above I think shows that the feeling of the younger Europeans towards their black brethren is undergoing a change for the better, and the future is brighter than many believed.

**11** CO 537/1518

12 June 1946

[Future of Central African Council]: minute by A B Cohen to Sir G Gater

At No. 1 is Mr. Clark's memorandum on Joint Services and the future of the Central African Council which has been mentioned in other correspondence. I have kept it

for discussion with Sir John Waddington and have now had a preliminary talk with him on it. Both Sir John Waddington and I would appreciate the opportunity of discussing the next step with you on this somewhat delicate matter, which also concerns the Dominions Office, and if, as I have suggested to Mr. Osborne, it is possible to arrange a talk towards the end of this week, this would be one of the subjects which would come up then. Meanwhile you will wish to read the memorandum.

Sir John saw the memorandum in draft, although he did not collaborate in its preparation, and he is in general agreement with its terms, as I am myself.

I do not propose to comment at length on the memorandum which I think speaks for itself. But the following background may perhaps be useful. When we were discussing with Sir John Waddington and Sir Edmund Richards in 1944 the policy of closer co-ordination which led up to the formation of the Central African Council, both Governors expressed the view in discussion that the unification of services between the three territories would be impracticable. It is to some extent on this that Sir E. Richards now bases his opposition to joint services. The position altered when the constitution of the Central African Council was under discussion at the preliminary meeting of the Council. Sir S. Gore Browne<sup>1</sup> and Mr. Welensky then proposed that joint services should be included among the subjects to come within the purview of the Council. This was supported by Sir J. Waddington and accepted by Sir E. Richards. It was approved by the Secretary of State at the time. I gather from Sir J. Waddington that Sir E. Richards regards this term 'joint services' in the constitution as covering services existing in Southern Rhodesia of which the Northern territories can make use, i.e. the Currency Board, the Court of Appeal and Civil Aviation. I can see little grounds myself for this restriction of the term.

It is clear that Mr. Clark, Sir J. Waddington and Sir C. Tait all consider that the future utility of the Central African Council depends to a very material extent on the question whether the unification of certain existing services can be a subject for discussion. The Central African Council up to now has owed its good start to the lead given by Sir J. Waddington, the co-operative attitude of Sir G. Huggins and his Ministers and the skill and diplomacy of Mr. Clark. I am afraid that it must be recorded that Nyasaland have not adopted such a co-operative attitude and I think that there is little doubt that Sir E. Richards' heart is still in the North rather than the South.

My own view, which coincides with that of Sir J. Waddington, is that both from the narrower point of view of the interests of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and from the broader point of view of Imperial policy in South Africa it is essential that we should not allow cold water to be thrown on this particular essay in regionalism. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland stand much to gain economically and in other ways from making use of the more highly developed economy of Southern Rhodesia. From the broader point of view the Liberal party in Southern Rhodesia, which has almost the same strength as Sir G. Huggins' party in the new Parliament, has relied to a considerable extent on the Afrikaans vote and adopts a much less enlightened policy than Sir G. Huggins in its attitude to natives. We have thus two strong interests in encouraging Central African co-operation, first to establish a

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, member of the Executive Council, NR, since 1935.

counterweight to the Union and secondly to give what support we can to liberal influences as regards native policy in Southern Rhodesia. In this connection I think that there can be little doubt that we shall never solve the colour bar issue with complete success in Northern Rhodesia until Southern Rhodesia itself takes a more liberal attitude towards Africans. There are plenty of signs in Southern Rhodesia now of this more liberal attitude and it is up to the Colonial Office to do everything we can, admittedly by indirect means, to encourage this tendency, and to discourage the forces in opposition to it which unfortunately still exist.

That seems to me very briefly the broad political background. What actually is proposed by Mr. Clark and Sir J. Waddington is something of very limited scope in itself, although psychologically it is of very considerable importance. They do not want to amalgamate any of the major services of Government, but they do want to investigate the possibility of running joint services in some of the minor technical departments. Sir J. Waddington has advised Mr. Clark to concentrate on those departments which raise the fewest political issues in the first instance and this advice is undoubtedly sound. It has already been agreed that the possibility of unifying the Northern and Southern Rhodesia European Education Departments should be investigated by a local committee, an obvious step seeing that secondary education for Northern Rhodesia European children will have to be conducted in Southern Rhodesia. Nyasaland have quite unnecessarily at the moment refused to come in—not in itself a serious matter except from the psychological point of view. Sir J. Waddington would like to see Customs tackled also, and also possibly Post and Telegraphs at a later stage. Such unification would not of course in any sense involve the spreading of Southern Rhodesia social custom (e.g. with regard to the employment of Africans) to Nyasaland. On the contrary it would increase the chances of convincing Southern Rhodesia of the advantages of the Nyasaland custom with regard to the employment of Africans as postmasters etc. This is a case where parochialism is likely to pay few dividends. I think that we ought to throw our weight in favour of the line taken by Mr. Clark and supported by Sir J. Waddington.

I ought to add that I understand that the Dominions Office, on a first examination of Mr. Clark's memorandum, have some doubt about the practicability of joint services where one of the territories is self-governing. Neither Sir J. Waddington nor I believe that this is in any sense an insuperable obstacle. It would not be difficult to set up a joint commission as part of the machinery of the Central African Council to cover the services which are jointly run. However the question does not really arise at the present stage, as the practicability of establishing these joint services would be a matter for Mr. Clark to investigate with the people concerned in Central Africa.

As regards procedure Sir J. Waddington and I are agreed that before any conclusion is reached on this matter Sir E. Richards' views ought to be obtained, and I attach a draft telegram for this purpose. To delay discussion of the subject until the reply is received would be extremely inconvenient and after the telegram has gone I suggest that this is a matter which the Secretary of State and Mr. Creech Jones will wish to discuss with Sir J. Waddington. I think that we should obtain the views of the Secretary of State on this matter before entering into discussions with the Dominions Office. Perhaps the procedure could be briefly discussed when you have your first meeting with Sir J. Waddington.

**12** CO 525/199, 44379/46, no 1 14 June 1946  
[Nyasaland]: letter from Hastings K Banda to Mr Creech Jones

Last year, I wrote to you to the effect that the Africans of Nyasaland had organised a political body, under the title of Nyasaland African Congress. I believe I also sent the constitution of the organisation and the minutes of the first conference held in 1944. In October of last year the Executive Committee of that Congress appointed me their representative in this country.<sup>1</sup> My duties are to bring the attention of the Imperial Government to the desires and grievances of the Africans of Nyasaland, whenever necessary.

At the conference of the Nyasaland African Congress, held in October 1945 many problems, affecting Africans were discussed. I have recently received instructions from the President of the Congress, acting on the authority of its Executive Committee, to bring to the attention of the Imperial Government, the most urgent of these problems. These relate to political representation, land policy, the Central African Council and education.

With regard to political representation, the Nyasaland African Congress feels that the time has now arrived when Africans should have direct representation in the Legislative Council. According to Lord Hailey, there are, in Nyasaland, 1,603,257 Africans and 1,781 Europeans. The Legislative Council of the country consists of twelve Europeans, six of whom are official and the other half non-official. Of the six non-official members, five represent European commercial interests and the sixth member, missionary interests. The missionary representative is charged with the duties of representing African interests, in addition to his primary functions.

In the opinion of the Nyasaland African Congress, this arrangement is grossly unfair to Africans, as it leaves them unrepresented in the law-making body of the country. As a country or a state Nyasaland is, chiefly, the 2,000,000 odd Africans and not the 2,000 Europeans. Congress feels that by any and every standard of political justice the Africans of the Protectorate are entitled to direct representation in the Legislative Council and in all other Governmental bodies, formulating policy in the country. They are entitled to both civil and political rights, because they are native-born Nyasalanders, for the greatest part; they are loyal to the King, to the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Nyasaland. Above all, twice in less than fifty years, they have contributed to the defence of the Empire with their blood, labour and treasure, both in Africa and outside. It is not political justice to deny the 2,000,000 Africans direct representation while allowing it to the 2,000 Europeans.

It is often stated that the Africans are represented in the Legislative Council by the official members of that Body. Congress does not accept this view. The six official members are, for all practical purposes, the Government of Nyasaland itself, since they include the Governor, the Chief Secretary and the Heads of all Government departments in the Protectorate. These members are in the Council to speak for and support the Government. Their interests and desires are the interests and desires of the Nyasaland Government and not those of the Nyasaland Africans. The interests and desires of the Nyasaland Government can not be said to coincide with those of

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<sup>1</sup> Banda's London address was 18 Ridley Road, Harlesden, NW10.

the Nyasaland Africans at every turn. Nor is the Government of Nyasaland infallible. No Government ever is in any country. This being the case, it is imperative that the Africans of Nyasaland should have direct representation in the Legislative Council.

Similarly, Congress does not accept the Missionary representative as a representative of African interests: as stated above, the Missionary representative speaks, primarily, for the Missionary interests and not for the Africans of Nyasaland. In the opinion of the Nyasaland African Congress, there must be persons in the Legislative Council of Nyasaland, who shall be in the Council for the express purpose of representing and speaking for the Africans. These persons must be Africans. In Nyasaland, as in any other country in Africa, only Africans can fully understand and appreciate the feelings, desires and aspirations of the Africans. Europeans, however benevolent and well-intentioned can never effectively represent and speak for the Africans, because they have never been subjected to the same discrimination, disabilities and humiliations to which Africans are subjected. Therefore, they cannot feel as Africans feel on most subjects affecting their interests.

The position of the Africans in Nyasaland, to-day, may be likened to that of the common people of Britain, before 1832. Then, Liberal M.P.s affected to represent the common people of Britain. To-day, few people in this country, Liberals not excluded, can claim that the Liberal Party effectively represented and spoke for the toiling masses. The growth and success of the Labour Movement is an eloquent testimony to the fact that Liberal M.P.s did not effectively represent the common people in Parliament. If indirect representation failed in Britain, where those who govern and those who are governed belong to the same race and colour, can it succeed in Nyasaland, where those who govern differ in race and colour from those who are governed?

It is often stated that direct representation is impossible in Nyasaland, because there are no Africans capable of representing their people. Congress flatly rejects this contention. In the opinion of the Nyasaland African Congress, enough educated, capable Africans can be found, who could represent their people in the Legislative Council. Congress can submit a list of names of such Africans.

Equally unacceptable is the claim made in certain quarters that Provincial Councils constitute adequate substitute for the Legislative Council. Congress does not look upon Provincial Councils as representative of the Africans of Nyasaland. These Councils are composed, mostly, of chiefs or their nominees. Therefore they are representative not of the Africans of the Protectorate, but of Native Authorities and their respective local administrations. They do not express the feelings, desires and aspirations of the Africans of Nyasaland any more than dukes, earls and barons or county and municipal councils express the feelings, desires and aspirations of the British people in Britain.

Moreover, the Provincial Councils do not legislate for the country; they are nothing more than debating forums. What is true of the Provincial Council is equally true of the Protectorate Council, since it is not a legislative body.

Like many other colonial governments, the Government of Nyasaland has, on many occasions, alienated land to Europeans. According to Lord Hailey 15% of the total land area of Nyasaland has been alienated to Europeans. In the Blantyre and Zomba districts, as well as other parts of the southern province, many Africans have been deprived of their land. Most of them are now living as tenants to Europeans on land which they or their ancestors once called their own.

Recently the land affected has been along the lake shores. Tracts of land along the lake shore have, of late, increasingly been given to Europeans. This has led to the removal of African villages, which have been forced by the authorities to move to make room for Europeans. For example, a village at Momkey Bay was removed to make room for Europeans. Other villages along the lake shore have, similarly, been moved. This has produced a feeling of uneasiness among the people, not only along the lake shore but in other parts of the country as well.

Congress is gravely concerned about the land policy of the Government of Nyasaland. At the Annual Conference of last October it passed the following resolution: 'Resolved That Congress is greatly alarmed to observe that more land along the lake shore is being acquired for European settlement without consultation with chiefs and their people and as a result of this, many villages have been removed from the lake shore places. As the lake has been the only source for the lake shore people to make their living from catches and sales of fish, Congress requests the Government not to grant further licenses for settlements, as these settlements are depriving the Africans of the sources from which they have been obtaining their livelihood. The fishing industry, now taken by non-Africans is an example of the effects of these settlements.'

This resolution was passed after a lengthy discussion, in which, practically, all the delegates took part. Congress has no intention of raising the question of land already alienated to Europeans. It is, however, strongly opposed to any further alienation of the remaining Native Trust or Crown land. Already many Africans are landless. Congress does not want the rank of landless Africans to swell in the Protectorate.

Even more objectionable to Congress are the methods by which land has been and is being alienated. In the early days, the authorities simply issued certificates of claim to Europeans. Later the method of issuing certificates of claim was discontinued. Instead, securing the assent of individual chiefs to give legal effect to the alienation of land, intended or effected, became the usual practice. This is now the method commonly employed. Chiefs are asked to sign documents alienating land or to give verbal consent to any proposed or effected alienation.

Congress is opposed to this method. In the early days, the Government may have been justified in alienating land merely by securing the consent of individual chiefs, because in those days, the authorities had no knowledge of African land laws and usage. This is not the case to-day. Most colonial administrators to-day have some knowledge of anthropology. They cannot, therefore, plead ignorance of African land laws and usage. The authorities in Nyasaland know that chiefs have no right to alienate land, because they have no individual proprietary rights in the land, which is the common property of various tribes.

In point of fact, even early administrators knew that chiefs, in Nyasaland at least, had no right to alienate land. Speaking on the power of chiefs to give land away in Nyasaland, Lord Hailey says: 'It is noteworthy that Sir Harry Johnston, when issuing certificates of claim, admitted that it was doubtful if chiefs could be said to have the power to alienate tribal land.'

The fact is that chiefs have no power to alienate tribal lands, because tribal lands are not the personal property of individual chiefs, but the common property of various tribes, over which chiefs are merely trustees.

Under tribal custom and usage, chiefs did assign land to individual families, but such assignment did not confer any individual proprietary rights on the assignees, as

is the case with the Europeans who receive their land from the Government to-day. Moreover, such assignments were never made without consultations with head-men, who represented the people and who were the accepted advisors to chiefs, whereas chiefs to-day act without consulting either the people or their head-men.

Under these circumstances, Congress requests that the practice of ordering or asking chiefs to sign documents, alienating land or giving verbal assent to the alienation of land, be discontinued. If any further alienation of land becomes necessary in the future, Congress requests that such alienation shall be effected only with the free consent of the people. By people, Congress does not mean chiefs alone, whether as individuals or as Native Authorities, but the people as a whole. At present Congress is the only body in Nyasaland truly representative of the people of the whole Protectorate, since it derives its membership from every tribe and almost every district in the country. This being the case, Congress requests that in any future alienation of land anywhere in Nyasaland, it (Congress) shall be consulted by the authorities on the basis of absolute equality with chiefs. Further, Congress reserves the right to repudiate any chief or group of chiefs, who sign documents alienating land or give verbal consent to the alienation of land without consultation with the people, through their recognised and accepted representatives.

In taking this step, Congress is actuated by no desire to defy either the Native Authorities or the Central Government. Rather, it is prompted by a desire to protect the Africans of Nyasaland against slow but certain dispossession, consequent upon the action of chiefs. It is a known fact that most chiefs sign documents alienating land or give verbal consent to the alienation of land, purely out of fear of the District Commissioners. An incident which occurred at Lilongwe recently will illustrate the point.

Early this year, the District Commissioner at Lilongwe told three chiefs to remove their villages from where they stood, the sites where the villages stood being required by the Authorities for a Tobacco Experimental Station. The three chiefs, without consulting either the people or the village head-men, consented to the removal of the villages. When the people of the three villages concerned learned of the proposed eviction, they became resentful and openly objected. As a result, some of the head-men took the case to local Congress leaders. The local Congress leaders approached the District Commissioner and apprised him of the true feeling of the people in the matter, whereupon the District Commissioner dropped the subject. Immediately after the District Commissioner had dropped the subject the village chiefs, who had consented to the removal of the villages, came to local Congress leaders and admitted to them that they had given their consent to the removal of the villages out of fear of the District Commissioner.

The 'Lilongwe incident' is not an isolated one. Most chiefs regard the District Commissioner's request for anything as a command. Equally, few District Commissioners want or expect chiefs to take their requests any otherwise.

At the conference of the Nyasaland African Congress, held last October, Chief Mwase, one of the most important chiefs and one who is highly respected by the Government, admitted, during the discussion on land policy, that District Commissioners order chiefs to sign documents, alienating land and that chiefs sign such documents without consideration and without knowing for what purpose the land is required.

Incidentally, the case at Lilongwe raises one of the most important questions in

British Colonial Africa. That is, how far can chiefs be taken as true representatives of, and spokesmen for, their people. Colonial administrators, naturally accept chiefs as true representatives of and spokesmen for the people. They take chiefs' views as expressive of the people as a whole. In point of fact, this is far from being the case. Chiefs often express, not the will of the people but their own views, and are motivated, in expressing such views, by a desire to please the District Commissioner. They will say 'Yes' when they should say 'No' because they think the former will please him while the latter will displease him. And few chiefs dare risk the displeasure of the District Commissioner.

I have, somewhat, digressed, from the main subjects of this letter. But the digression is not without justification. You will recall that last year, you were kind enough to allow Dr. Hinden<sup>2</sup> to send me a copy of a letter written to you by Colonel O. Stanley, then Secretary of State. In his letter, Colonel Stanley stated that the Nyasaland African Congress represented no one. He implied that chiefs were the representatives of the people. In saying this, Colonel Stanley was, of course, only conforming to the traditional official policy. The truth is that, in Nyasaland at least, chiefs do not always express the true feelings of the people. They tell the Government Officials what they think will please the Government Officials. In the incident I have related, had Congress leaders not intervened, the District Commissioner at Lilongwe would have reported to the Provincial Commissioner that the people of the three villages had consented to their removal; the Provincial Commissioner would have reported the same to the Chief Secretary, who in turn, would have conveyed the message to the Governor. Finally, the Governor would have reported to the Secretary of State that the people of the three villages at Lilongwe had been removed from their villages with their consent. This, as you can clearly see, would have been far from being the true state of things.

The truth is that the Nyasaland African Congress represents and speaks for a very large body of Africans. Though organised by educated Africans, whom Colonel Stanley deprecated, Congress speaks for all the Africans of Nyasaland. It is far more truly representative of the people of Nyasaland than any chief or group of chiefs can claim to be. What is even more, it is an independent body, whereas chiefs are paid servants of the Government of Nyasaland.

With regard to the Central African Council, the Africans of Nyasaland are apprehensive. They fear that it is a thin end of the wedge of amalgamation. At the annual conference of the Nyasaland African Congress held October 1945 the following resolution was passed: 'While accepting the views that the Central African Council is a consultative body for co-ordinating existing policies, and that amalgamation is not at present practicable, Congress requests that notwithstanding any progress which may be reached, Nyasaland shall not be drawn into amalgamation with any other state without consultation with the Africans themselves, through the Nyasaland African Congress, which is the only organisation representing, and expressing, the true wishes of the people of Nyasaland, and further requests His Excellency, the Governor, to submit this resolution to the Secretary of State.'

The Africans of Nyasaland are strongly opposed to any form of union, whatsoever, with Southern Rhodesia. The recent segregation law passed by the Parliament of

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<sup>2</sup> Rita Hinden, co-founder in 1940, along with A Creech Jones, of the Fabian Colonial Bureau.

Southern Rhodesia, now under consideration by the Imperial Government, will only serve to intensify the Nyasaland Africans' opposition to amalgamation.

With regard to education Congress greatly appreciates the generosity of the Imperial Government in allocating £345,000 for education in Nyasaland. Congress feels, however, that the whole educational system in Nyasaland needs drastic reorganisation. In the opinion of Congress, there should be an enquiry made into the educational system of the country, before any part of the £345,000 is expended. Therefore it requests that the Secretary of State send a Royal Commission to Nyasaland to enquire into the following:—

- (1) The standard of African education.
- (2) The scale of African teachers' salaries.
- (3) The training of African girls.
- (4) Vocational training for Africans.

Congress believes that there has been a retrogression rather than progress in African education in Nyasaland. During the first two decades of British administration in Nyasaland, the missionaries set a fairly high standard of education. Africans were taught academic, as well as technical subjects, ungrudgingly. English was taught with zeal in the training institutions, notably, at Livingstonia, Likoma and Blantyre, as were also, technical or vocational subjects, such as typing, telegraphy, carpentry, brick and stone masonry.

As a result, the Africans of Nyasaland enjoyed a high reputation for education and intelligence in all neighbouring territories, where they were to be found employed as clerks, telegraphists, brick and stone masons. In many of the neighbouring territories, Nyasalanders were, invariably, preferred to local Africans because of their education. In support of what I have stated the following students of African affairs may be quoted. Professor Macmillan, in his book 'Africa Emergent',<sup>3</sup> speaking on the intelligence of the Nyasaland Africans says: 'It is dangerous to generalise about the qualities of native tribes, but it is certain that, whether merely by long contact with Arabs or slave traders, or thanks to the efficiency, number and longstanding of missions, education is on the whole more widely spread among these people than is usual. Nyasas (Nyasaland Africans) of one sort or another are widely and favourably known in all neighbouring territories as exceptionally intelligent and unusually venturesome.' (Africa Emergent', p.207.)

Speaking on village schools Miss Margaret Wrong, in her book 'Five Points for Africans'<sup>4</sup> says: 'The establishment of such schools (village schools) by missions has resulted in a high rate of literacy in many districts and in winning for Africans of that territory a reputation for intelligence and education in many parts of Africa.' (Wrong, 'Five Points for Africa', p.83).

Unfortunately, the fairly high standard of education, introduced by the early missionaries, and which won the Africans of Nyasaland such a high reputation for education and intelligence, was not maintained. To-day, educationally, Nyasaland finds herself overtaken by her very neighbours who once looked up to her. For

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<sup>3</sup> W M Macmillan, *Africa emergent: a survey of social, political, economic trends in British Africa* (London, first published, 1938, revised and expanded, 1949).

<sup>4</sup> Published in 1942.

example, Southern Rhodesia has now a much higher standard of education than Nyasaland. This is not explainable merely on the grounds of superior economic and industrial development in Southern Rhodesia as compared with Nyasaland. It is even less explainable on the educational philosophy governing the educational system prevailing in the two countries. For some time now, the teaching of English in Nyasaland has not been what it was originally. Less emphasis has been placed on English as a subject in the schools. Moreover, an inferior qualification for African teachers, known as 'Vernacular Teachers Certificate' has been introduced. This qualification confers upon its holders, who know not a word of English, the same professional standing as those African teachers, who have had some instruction in the English language. Congress believes that the introduction of this qualification had decided effect [sic] on the standard of education in the country. Therefore, Congress requests that this qualification should be abolished forthwith.

In Nyasaland, teaching is one of the worst paid of all occupations. The standard of qualification in the Protectorate is the 'English Grade'. Teachers holding this qualification receive £18 a year. In Southern Rhodesia teachers holding similar qualification receive from 70/- to 80/- a month.

Here, again, the difference in material prosperity between the two countries does not alone explain the disparity between the scale of teachers' salary. Government clerks in Nyasaland receive much higher salary than teachers. For example, a friend of mine now employed by the Public Works department in Nyasaland receives £7 a month. I know of no single teacher in the Protectorate, with any length of service, who receives that sum a month.

The low scale of teachers' salary has led to the desertion of the teaching profession by a large number of African teachers to other occupations. Every year many teachers in Nyasaland leave teaching for clerical, medical and other occupations. A large number of Nyasaland African teachers are now employed as clerks, hospital assistants or police detectives in the Rhodesias and the Union of South Africa.

Nyasaland is one of the British territories in Africa, in which the education of girls has been neglected. When I left home, not a single girl in my own tribe, could read or write in any language. Recent communications from home support the impression that things have changed very little since.

In other parts of Nyasaland, things are better, but only slightly better. Recently, I had a discussion with a Scottish friend, who is a missionary in Nyasaland and who is in charge of Overton Institution at Livingstonia, the oldest and most famous of all training institutions in Nyasaland. According to my Scottish friend, neither in his own institution nor in any other in the Protectorate, are girls taught beyond the third or fourth standard.

Congress is deeply concerned about the state of girls' education in the country. In all countries, the influence of women in the home and over children is great. In Nyasaland, it is greater, because many tribes are matrilineal. This being the case, Congress feels that it is of the utmost importance that girls should receive identical education with boys, since it is they that are to be the mothers and home-makers of the Nyasaland of to-morrow.

Nyasaland is primarily an agricultural country. Vocational training, therefore, should be an integral part of the school system. At present vocational subjects are taught as part of the regular school or teacher training course. Boys who take teaching as a career are required to learn vocational subjects as well. When they

finish their course of study they are required to teach vocational subjects in addition to academic subjects. In the opinion of Congress this system should be replaced by one that establishes vocational training as an independent course. There should be created a vocational qualification, entitling its holders to a professional status independent of the academic diploma or certificate. The teaching of all vocational training should be confined to the holders of such a qualification. This would make for efficiency and would allow the academic teacher a certain degree of leisure, which he could use for self improvement.

I must apologise for the length of this letter but it could not have been any shorter.

P. S. While this letter was being typed, I read in 'East Africa And Rhodesia' about the answer, given by the Secretary of State, to Mr. George Thomas' question in the House of Commons, on the land policy in Nyasaland.<sup>5</sup> After reading the Secretary of State's answer, I thought it best to send you the exact communications I have received from home, so that you may read for yourself the discussion on the land question, as well as other subjects, as they were actually discussed by the Africans in Nyasaland.

The communications include the Memorandum, presented to the Governor of Nyasaland, on education, by Congress leaders; a letter by the President of the Congress to the Bishop of Nyasaland, in his capacity as a representative of the Africans in the Legislative Council, as well as the Bishop's reply; and the Minutes of the annual conference, which was held in October, 1945.

I realise you have very little time to read all that you are called upon to read. But I am asking you, if at all possible, to read those parts of the communications that I am enclosing that are immediately relevant to the subjects dealt with in my letter.

The subject of political representation is dealt with, in more detail, in the letter which the President of the Congress wrote to the Bishop of Nyasaland. Education is discussed both in the Memorandum, presented to the Governor and on page 24 of the Minutes. Land is discussed on page 16 of the Minutes. On page 30 of the Minutes, will be found the discussion on the Central African Council.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Thomas had failed to extract from the secretary of state an undertaking that no more licenses would be granted for European settlement on the shores of Lake Nyasa. He also had sought clarification of the basis on which land could be alienated from Africans in Nyasaland. At the end of his answer to the second of these points, Hall revealed that questions of land tenure in the territory were shortly to be investigated by Sir Sidney Abrahams (*H of C Debs*, vol 423, written answers, cols 194–195, 29 May 1946).

<sup>6</sup> The reply that was sent to Banda by the secretary of state's private secretary, I D Robertson, on 5 July 1946 said merely, 'Mr Creech Jones has asked me to acknowledge your letter of 14th June concerning various questions connected with the Nyasaland African Congress, and to inform you that it is receiving attention.'

## 13 CO 795/156/3

8 & 13 July 1946

### 'Constitutional and administrative development in Northern Rhodesia': minutes by A B Cohen

Attached opposite are:—

- (1) A paper by Sir Stewart Gore-Browne and Mr. Welensky setting out certain proposals for administrative and constitutional development in Northern Rhodesia.

- (2) Record of a discussion on the 26th June between Mr. Creech Jones, Sir John Waddington, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne and Mr. Welensky on this subject.
- (3) A note on the proposals written by me after discussion with Sir John Waddington and Mr. Hudson,<sup>1</sup> which Sir John Waddington subsequently used as a brief for further discussions with the unofficials.
- (4) Copy of a minute to Mr. Creech Jones recording the results of these discussions between Sir John Waddington and his unofficials.

The position has now been further discussed by Mr. Creech Jones with Sir John Waddington, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne and Mr. Welensky and virtual agreement has been reached on all material points. Mr. Creech Jones said at the meeting that the conclusions would have to be submitted to the Secretary of State for his approval and I am summarising these in the following paragraphs.

### *Administrative*

The proposal put forward by the unofficials was for the grouping of departments under members of the Executive Council on similar lines to that recently adopted in Kenya. This process has already gone some way in Northern Rhodesia where they have, besides the Chief Secretary and Financial Secretary, a Secretary for Native Affairs dealing with that side of the work. As a result of the discussions it is now proposed to add a Secretary for Natural Resources (covering agriculture, etc. and economic subjects) and also to put the Administrative Secretary (no.2 in the Secretariat) on to the Executive Council (which Sir John Waddington wants to do in any case) with responsibility for the major part of the group of miscellaneous departments referred to under heading 6 in the unofficials' note. The departments relating to law and order would be taken out and placed under the Attorney General as in Kenya. There would be no Secretary for Internal Affairs and the Director of Medical Services would remain on the Executive Council at any rate until the present holder retires at the end of this year (when the matter will be reviewed).

Sir Stewart Gore-Browne and Mr. Welensky have dropped their proposal that the members of the Executive Council should be called ministers which was clearly unacceptable. Indeed they have made it clear that what they are aiming at in these proposals is greater administrative efficiency and not constitutional development.

I think that these proposals and the solutions found may be regarded as very satisfactory. Devolution of the Central machinery of Government is badly required in the larger territories like Northern Rhodesia and the change will make for greater efficiency. The addition of a Secretary for Natural Resources is most necessary and I had already, before I was aware of the proposal by the unofficials, suggested to Sir John Waddington that such an appointment should be made and he had said that he agreed. I have mentioned the matter to Mr. Caine and Sir F. Stockdale<sup>2</sup> who also agree.

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<sup>1</sup> R S Hudson, secretary for native affairs, Northern Rhodesia; from 1949, head of CO African Studies branch.

<sup>2</sup> CO adviser on development planning, 1945–1947; formerly (1940–1945), comptroller for development and welfare, West Indies.

## *Constitutional*

### *(a) Membership of Legislative Council*

The proposal of the unofficials was that there should be an additional elected member so as to give another seat on the Copperbelt and Sir S. Gore-Browne further proposed that one African should be brought onto the Council while retaining the three European representatives of African interests. Sir S. Gore-Browne also proposed that these European representatives of African interests should be elected by the African Provincial Councils and the new African Central Representative Council.

In the course of the discussions we have taken the line that constitutional changes ought not to be piece-meal but ought to be made at periodical intervals as a result of deliberate policy. The last change was made in 1945 and we have urged that any new changes should be deferred until 1948, which Sir John Waddington considers to be the first suitable date for bringing Africans onto the Legislative Council (i.e. two years after the setting up of the African Representative Council).

The agreed conclusions are:—

- (1) There should be no changes until 1948 but the intention to make these changes in 1948 should be announced after the Governor's return.
- (2) The two European nominated members of the Council (other than the three representing African interests) should be abolished in 1948 and replaced by two additional elected members with a re-distribution of constituencies.
- (3) The number of representatives of African Interests should be increased from three to four, two of whom would be Africans, the remaining two being Europeans as a purely temporary expedient. [There is still a slight difference of opinion here. Mr. Welensky would prefer only one African in 1948. He does not think that the Africans are yet ready to be on the Council and feels that he could persuade his colleagues to accept one but is more doubtful about two. He will however I think be quite prepared to acquiesce if two are insisted on as I certainly think that it ought to be. Sir J. Waddington does not feel strongly on this point. Sir S. Gore-Browne would prefer two but was prepared to defer to Mr. Welensky.]
- (4) Sir S. Gore-Browne has dropped his proposal that the European representatives of African interests should be elected and is prepared to agree to continue nomination by the Governor.
- (5) Under the above proposals the composition of the new Council other than the President, would be eight official members, ten European elected members and four representatives of African interests, two of whom would be Africans. The majority of Government plus African representatives over European elected members would be preserved and this is the important point. The Governor of course has full reserve powers under the Constitution.
- (6) The present Council's life comes to an end next year and it is proposed to extend its life for one year until 1948. This could be done under the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Ordinance.

Few comments on the above are needed. The position of the Government is fully safeguarded and would be as strong as it is at present. Provision is made for increasing the African representation and for bringing on Africans. The total European unofficial representation is not increased at all, although the number of

elected members is increased. Thus the local demands are met without actually increasing the number of European members. I think that these proposals may be regarded as very satisfactory from our point of view.

(b) *Presidency on Legislative Council*

The unofficials want to have a Speaker instead of the Governor and the Governor agrees in principle. There is some doubt however whether suitable persons can be found, although Sir S. Gore-Browne and Mr. Welensky maintain that they can. The Governor himself suggested that the proposal to have a Speaker should be | accepted in principle, on the understanding however that it would only be | X brought into force when the Secretary of State could be satisfied by the Governor | that suitable persons to fill the post were likely to be available from time to time. At the last meeting it was agreed to recommend this solution and I feel that it can safely be accepted.

(c) *Financial motions*

This has not yet been discussed with the unofficials as there was not time at the last meeting. Mr. Welensky wants the Constitution amended so that the unofficials no longer have to get the agreement of the Governor to the introduction of financial resolutions and motions. The present arrangement is however an invariable one in Colonial Constitutions and represents the practice in this country. We can see no way in which Mr. Welensky's point can be met and do not consider it desirable to meet it. The point will come up at the next meeting with Mr. Creech Jones when the proposal will no doubt be turned down. There is no need to hold up this minute pending that discussion.

(d) *Status of Africans in Northern Rhodesia*

The first unofficial proposal was for the annexation of Northern Rhodesia so that the natives may become British subjects. The unofficials have realised that this is not practical politics and in any case such an arrangement would lead to difficulty since all Africans with the necessary qualifications would then get the vote, thus cutting completely across the system of Provincial Councils etc. Sir S. Gore-Browne has said that he would be satisfied by the amendment of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act which has been under discussion for years and is now under active discussion again and which would make residence in a Protectorate the same qualification for naturalisation as residence in a Colony has at present. If this amendment is carried through persons of all races (including coloured persons and Africans) would be eligible to apply for naturalisation, although Africans would no doubt only do so rarely since there is a fee of £10 attached. This particular point need not therefore be further discussed.

If the Secretary of State will approve the proposals set out above no further meeting to discuss them will be necessary. But if the Secretary of State would like to discuss the proposals with Sir John Waddington, Sir S. Gore-Browne and Mr. Welensky the subject could no doubt be taken at the final meeting which we hope to arrange towards the end of this week.

A.B.C.  
8.7.46

This matter was discussed by the Secretary of State with Sir John Waddington, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, Mr. Welensky and myself on the 12th July and the Secretary of State after going into the main points raised asked that a draft despatch should be put up for his consideration setting out the conclusions reached in the discussions with the Northern Rhodesia representatives with which he expressed himself as generally satisfied. I duly submit a draft and I need only make two comments on it.

(1) The Secretary of State expressed some doubt about the suggestion at X in my minute of the 8th July that on the question of appointing a Speaker, while this should be accepted in principle, it should be on the understanding that it would only be brought into force when the Secretary of State could be satisfied by the Governor that suitable persons to fill the post were likely to be available. When it was explained that this would have to be announced publicly, the Secretary of State said that he thought this might give offence in Northern Rhodesia. In the despatch and the proposed draft announcement therefore a different form of words has been used which I think overcomes the difficulty and which is agreeable to the Governor and the unofficials.

(2) The despatch encloses an announcement to be made by the Acting Governor on these changes at a session of the Legislative Council which is likely to be held in the fairly near future and before the return of either the Governor or the two unofficials. I had originally thought that the announcement would be deferred until the budget session in November when Sir John Waddington will be back. But Sir Stewart Gore-Browne and Mr. Welensky are most anxious, and I think quite understandably so, that some of the fruits of their mission should be made known quickly. They point out that until an announcement is made they will not be in a position to talk about these results to their colleagues or others. This is an embarrassing position to place them in and I do not think that we ought to do so. I can see no reason why a statement should not be made early and the Governor is anxious that we should agree that one should be made. It can easily be arranged, through the good offices of Sir S. Gore-Browne and Mr. Welensky, that there should be no debate on the statement at the time and that any discussion should be deferred until the next session in November. The Governor and the unofficials agree with the draft statement proposed.

A.B.C.  
13.7.46

**14** DO 35/1404, CP(46)282 18 July 1946  
**‘The Rhodesia railways’: joint Cabinet memorandum by Lord Addison  
 and Mr Hall. *Annex*: draft statement**

We feel that it is desirable to consult our colleagues with regard to a question which has been under consideration as to the acquisition by the Governments of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate of the equity of the Rhodesia Railways Limited.

2. The Rhodesia Railways Limited own the railway system through the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Southern and Northern Rhodesia, as well as a small section of line which is in the Union of South Africa. The nominal share capital of the

company is £500,000 and there is also a 4¼ per cent debenture stock of about £20 million which the Company has the right to repay on the 1st October, 1947. The share capital of the Company is wholly owned by the Rhodesia Railways Trust Limited, an Investment Company of whose share capital 82 per cent is held by the British South Africa Company. The three Governments already have a considerable degree of financial control over the Railway Company, including limitation of dividend, the purposes to which revenue may be applied and changes in rates.

3. In 1943 a proposal was received from the Southern Rhodesia Government that the principle should be accepted of the desirability of the Governments of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate obtaining control of the railway system in their territories, and that with this object steps should be taken with a view to the purchase of the share capital of the Rhodesia Railways Limited if satisfactory terms could be arranged. Our predecessors felt that this proposal raised important financial and economic issues, affecting Northern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, which required special examination, and arrangements were made to appoint a Commissioner to advise on these issues.

4. After some delay, owing to war-time conditions, Sir Harold Howitt was appointed in May 1945 to advise His Majesty's Government on the question. His report was completed last December and was subsequently published as a Stationery Office Paper.<sup>1</sup> The effect was to suggest that the question of the advisability of the Government acquisition of the equity of the Rhodesia Railways should be deferred for at least five years and that in the meantime the Governments should consider various difficult issues involved, to which he called attention in his report. In arriving at the view that the time is not yet ripe to propose the immediate acquisition of the equity (which he suggests might involve a payment of £2½ to £4 million), he was influenced largely by the consideration that such acquisition would inevitably involve the Governments in the guarantee of the large debenture issue, and that, having regard to the financial position of the territories and the uncertainties of the post-war period, this would be a serious matter. Indeed, so far as Northern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate are concerned, their Governments would not be able to guarantee their share of the debenture interest without the backing of the United Kingdom Government. Sir Harold Howitt felt, therefore, that the only workable scheme would be for His Majesty's Government to give a guarantee to the whole issue of debentures. This, however, would require legislation in this country, and it was pointed out in the report that a United Kingdom Government guarantee for the whole issue would involve conditions which might not be found to accord with the position of Southern Rhodesia as a self-governing Colony.

5. It should also be pointed out that, in addition to the renewal of some £20 million Debentures next year, a sum of from £6 to 9 millions is needed for re-equipment.

6. Apart from this aspect, there are considerations of a political character, viz.: (1) the difficulty of setting up a State Organisation which would successfully control a Government Railway serving three territories with very different political status, and (2) the policy to be adopted with regard to African labour on the railway. The position in this respect is that, although there is no *legal* colour bar applicable to the

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<sup>1</sup> *The Rhodesia Railways Ltd: Report on State Ownership* (London, HMSO, 1946).

railway in any of the three territories, an effective colour bar is imposed by the European Railway Workers' Union. In view of the attitude on this question in Southern Rhodesia generally, it would be very difficult to secure a modification of this position if the railway came under the ownership of the three Governments, and its maintenance in such circumstances would implicate directly the Governments of Northern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate and indirectly the United Kingdom Government.

7. We have recently had the advantage of discussing the matter with the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, who is at present in this country, and, in view of the difficulties mentioned above, and particularly those referred to in the preceding paragraph, as well as the fact that, as already mentioned, the three Governments already exercise a considerable measure of control over the railway, we have come to the conclusion that an immediate decision in favour of the acquisition by the Governments of the equity of the railways cannot be regarded as practicable at present. Whereas, however, Sir Harold Howitt suggests that the matter should be deferred for at least five years, we feel that it would be better that the matter should be regarded as definitely postponed for a period of ten years in order that the present uncertainty should be removed and a start made with the necessary renewals and improvements.

8. On this basis we have prepared the annexed statement, which, if the Cabinet agree, would be forwarded confidentially to the Southern Rhodesia Government with an enquiry whether they would agree to a communication being made to the British South Africa Company in the sense indicated in the statement. An offer would, however, be made to the Southern Rhodesia Government to discuss the matter with them here if they would wish to send over a Minister to this country for the purpose, though in view of the urgency this would have to be done quickly.

#### Annex to 14

His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to the report presented by Sir Harold Howitt on the question of the state ownership of the Rhodesia railways, and have had the advantage of discussing the matter with the Governor of Northern Rhodesia during his present visit to this country.

2. Sir Harold Howitt indicated in his report that the matter was a complicated one on which the decision was not easy. While expressing the view that Government ownership is bound to come and that there were various considerations in favour of this course, he pointed out that there were many factors which weighed against an immediate decision to acquire the equity of the railway. Sir Harold Howitt pointed out in particular the uncertainty of the future earning capacity of the railway system from the point of view of the possibility of a decrease, and also of a diversion, of the copper traffic. This point is one which particularly concerns the Government of Northern Rhodesia whose financial interests are already largely bound up with the copper market. To increase the dependence on copper by adding a railway risk would, in the view of the Northern Rhodesia Government, be a dangerous financial step particularly at a time when they propose to embark on a very necessary and large development programme.

3. It is felt also that considerable weight should be attached to the possible effect of state ownership on the question of the outlet to Beira. If the Beira railway and port

were acquired by the Portuguese it might be possible for them to impose considerably higher rates and the Governments would have no effective counter, as the haulage through British territory to South Africa is too long to be seriously contemplated as an alternative to Beira. The question arises therefore whether it would not be desirable to clarify the position by an agreement with the Portuguese before a decision in favour of state ownership of the Rhodesia railways is taken.

4. The financial considerations involved are also serious. Northern Rhodesia might afford to pay for its share of the equity of the undertaking: Bechuanaland Protectorate certainly could not. As regards loan capital, the continued existence of debentures charged on the undertaking might not be regarded as compatible with public ownership. If so, neither Northern Rhodesia, nor Bechuanaland Protectorate has the financial resources with which to assume responsibility for any share of the existing loan capital, or of the substantial amount of fresh capital that must be raised in order to carry on the undertaking. Sir Harold Howitt suggests indeed in his report that His Majesty's Government might guarantee the existing and the new loan capital. But such a guarantee could not be given without the authority of an Act of Parliament. His Majesty's Government are not satisfied that there are grounds on which they would be justified in asking Parliament to impose this liability on the U.K. taxpayer. Finally, as pointed out in paragraph 117 of Sir Harold Howitt's report, if powers of guarantee were conferred on the U.K. Government, they could only be exercised on conditions that enabled that Government to supervise the loan so as to protect the U.K. taxpayer against the risk of default and to recover any monies paid in the event of default—conditions that might well be inconsistent with the self-governing status of Southern Rhodesia.

5. There are many other matters which would clearly require long and careful study before a decision to acquire the equity of the railways could be taken. There is for instance the difficulty in arranging for a suitable system of joint control by three administrations of different constitutional status and there is also the important and difficult question of arriving at an agreed policy with regard to the employment on the railway of African labour.

6. All these considerations point to the fact that an immediate decision in favour of the acquisition by the Governments of the equity of the railways cannot be regarded as practicable. Sir Harold Howitt recommended in his report that the question of the advisability of Government acquisition should be deferred for at least five years. An early decision whether there should be a definite period of postponement is desirable since the British South Africa Company, as explained in the attached memorandum\* which has recently been received from them, will be involved in early discussions with the Portuguese Government and also must start arrangements not later than October of this year for raising the necessary loan of about £26 million required to pay off the outstanding debentures and to provide fresh capital for the business. It will be remembered that in the Company's previous memorandum they suggested that if the Governments contemplated acquiring the equity in about five years' time they might wish the new loan to be raised on terms which included an option to repay at the end of 1950. His Majesty's Government are advised that the inclusion of such an option in the prospectus would introduce an element of uncertainty which might make the raising of the necessary money more

\* Not printed.

difficult. There is also the consideration that to leave the British South Africa Company for a short time in the position of caretakers would make it difficult for them to take the necessary action to carry out the programme of reconstruction on the railways which is so urgently required, so that it would, in the interests of the three Territories as well as of the Company, be desirable either that negotiations with a view to the acquisition of the equity should be undertaken at once or that there should be a definite decision against the acquisition for a substantial period of years. The conclusion which has been reached by His Majesty's Government is that in the circumstances the British South Africa Company should be advised that they should raise the necessary loan on a ten years' basis without including any provision giving an option to repay at an earlier date, and that the question of the State acquisition of the equity of the railways should be regarded as definitely postponed until the end of that period. Having regard to the considerable degree of financial control over the Railway Company already provided for in the existing legislation, including limitation of dividend, His Majesty's Government feel that the delay should not entail substantial disadvantages. The local Governments will, however, no doubt consider whether steps should be taken to create an advisory Transport Authority of the character suggested in Sir H. Howitt's report. It has been suggested as a result of a discussion between the Governor of Northern Rhodesia and the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia that a Transport Adviser to the three Governments should be appointed as Chairman of such an Authority. His Majesty's Government would be very glad to help in securing a suitable person for this appointment if the three Governments so desire.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> When this matter was raised in Cabinet on 25 July, the idea of making an announcement on the lines proposed was opposed by Dr Dalton, the chancellor, who supported nationalisation. He pointed out that, 'Most of the railways in the Empire were already Government-owned and the United Kingdom Government were about to embark on the nationalisation of railways in this country' (CAB 128/6, CM 73(46)6, 25 July 1946).

## **15** CO 537/2118

27 July 1946

### **[Closer association in Central Africa]: minute by N D Watson**

The Secretary of State saw Sir Stewart Gore-Browne and Mr. Welensky yesterday. Mr. Welensky referred to the question of the future of the Central African Council. As a member of the Council, he considered that it had achieved valuable results, which were to a great extent due to the efforts of Sir G. Huggins and Sir J. Waddington. Since the last general election however the situation in Southern Rhodesia has changed and the Government there was not in such a secure position as before; he feared therefore that the Southern Rhodesia representatives on the Council might not in future be assured of the backing in Southern Rhodesia for their actions on the Council which they had previously enjoyed. In these circumstances, and in the light of possible further changes in the political situation in Southern Rhodesia, he felt that there was an inherent weakness in the machinery of the Central African Council, which might eventually reduce to ineffectiveness its avowed aim of co-ordination between the Central African territories. He therefore wondered whether it was in fact completely impracticable at present to consider any other form of amalgamation or

federation which would enable Northern Rhodesia to attain the status in association with neighbouring territories which he considered essential for its development.

The Secretary of State asked Mr. Welensky whether he could say what form of federation he had in mind and what territories he envisaged coming within it. Mr. Welensky intimated that what he felt to be essential was an organisation which had legislative and constitutional standing. He made it quite clear that in his opinion the two Rhodesias must look to the north for their future development, and that he would be opposed to closer association with the Union of South Africa in any form. He appreciated however that his ideas at this stage came up against the geographical facts which separated the Rhodesias from East Africa, and that it was impracticable to consider federation with the Belgian Congo or Portuguese territories which were geographically allied to the Rhodesias.

The Secretary of State said that the unofficials in Northern Rhodesia could be assured that full weight was attached here to their views on this subject and every help would be given them in the solution of the problems affecting their country to which they attached so much importance. It was however essential that they should know that any proposal which would have the effect of bringing Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesia into the framework of a constitution similar to that at present enjoyed by Southern Rhodesia would be open to a degree of criticism in this country which could not lightly be contemplated. His Majesty's Government could not set aside their responsibility for the interests of the inhabitants of these territories.

Mr. Welensky and Sir S. Gore-Browne said that they fully appreciated the position; and they appeared to be satisfied with this opportunity of expressing their views. Sir S. Gore-Browne added that his support of Mr. Welensky on this issue must of course, in his position, be conditioned by his views on the important question of the advancement of the African. If he was satisfied on the score of the African's interests, he would support Mr. Welensky to the full in his views on amalgamation. In this connection, he said that he wished to hand to the Secretary of State a copy of a letter from the Bishop of Northern Rhodesia, in which it was reported that at a recent meeting of the Western Provincial Council in Northern Rhodesia the African members had passed a resolution to the effect that they wished to impress on the Secretary of State, in connection with the visit of Sir John Waddington and the Unofficial Members of Legislature to the United Kingdom, that no decision which would involve the amalgamation of the Rhodesias should be taken without the Africans of Northern Rhodesia first having been consulted. The Secretary of State said that he would let Sir S. Gore-Browne have a written reply in regard to this letter (I have filed the letter at (5) opposite. The resolution has apparently not yet been forwarded to us by the Northern Rhodesia Government.)

The Secretary of State instructed me to make a record of this conversation and to prepare a draft letter to Sir S. Gore-Browne, which I now submit.

I am however somewhat diffident in regard to the terms of this letter. As it appears that the resolution of the Western Provincial Council has been formally submitted to the Northern Rhodesia Government for transmission to the Secretary of State, it will be necessary to make a formal reply thro' the Acting Governor; and the Secretary of State may wish the reply to be considered and this action to be taken before communicating with Sir S. Gore-Browne. I have drafted the letter on this basis but, since we have not heard from the Acting Governor on this subject, I submit also a

draft telegram, the reply to which I suggest might be awaited before the letter is sent to Sir S. Gore-Browne.

**16** CO 537/1515  
[Copperbelt strikes]: minutes by N D Watson

29 July–2 Aug 1946

*Mr. Seel*

I spoke to you last Thursday about the strike in the Northern Rhodesia Mines. The strike, which arose out of a demand by the Mine Workers Union for an increase of 10s. a shift in the pay for artisans, started on the Copper Belt on the 16th July, and has now spread to Broken Hill. The strike declaration covered all daily paid European employees; but it appears that the artisans only are on strike as a body. Daily paid non-artisans have apparently continued to work where work was available, and to maintain essential services with the agreement of the Union. There is a suggestion at (19) that the Union might withdraw men from essential services, though the General Secretary has said that for the time being he will maintain such services.

As regards African labour, the Acting Governor reports that they seem to be taking little interest in the dispute and will probably remain satisfied, so long as work can be found for them. The latest position apparently is that work is available for all African workers on the Copper Belt and for about half the Africans employed at Broken Hill. At paragraph 2 of (18), the Governor reports the possibility of a certain amount of resentment among African workers at Nkana towards the Mine Workers Union for stirring up trouble.

I have had an opportunity of discussing the strike with Mr. Welensky, who has, of course, a thorough knowledge of the labour situation in Northern Rhodesia and is receiving information about the strike from his own sources. He said that the offer of the managements to give the artisans an increase of 3s. a shift and to couple this with a general adjustment of wages, including the contract rates for rock-breakers, and revision of the pension and cash bonus schemes was obviously an attempt to cause a split between the various sections of the workers. At first he thought that this attempt was not likely to succeed; but now he thinks there is just a possibility that the Union may have over-reached itself. He believes that the artisans by themselves would accept the increase offered; and this, together with the fact that there are no strike funds available, may sway the Union, although only at Broken Hill are the artisans in the majority. The testing time on this issue will obviously come soon, as the strike is now at the end of its second week. Should the Union executive decide to hold out, they might then attempt to strengthen their hold on the situation by calling out the men employed on essential services.

As regards the Africans, Mr. Welensky is sure that they are taking more than a little interest and that, if the European artisans get something out of the managements as a result of their strike, a move among the Africans may be expected. He agrees that the Africans at Nkana are probably rather chary, because there are still memories of the serious trouble there in 1940, but this does not apply to the African workers on other mines. This view accords with the Acting Governor's own prognostications at paragraph 3 of (13).

The Union has rejected arbitration, but Mr. Unsworth, the Crown Counsel, who

attempted conciliation before the strike was declared, is remaining on call at Ndola. I do not think that at this stage there is any assistance which we can give or any comment which we can usefully make to the acting Governor. The strike is now reaching its crucial period and developments one way or the other may be expected at any moment. Should the Union decide to hold out and withdraw all labour, and if as a consequence work cannot be provided for a large number of Africans, the situation will need careful watching. It will be seen from (13) that the Acting Governor has the security situation well in mind, and I do not think the situation warrants any action on that score at this end at present.

N.D.W.  
29.7.46

Mr. Welensky came to see me today after receiving a telegram from Mr. Maybank, the General Secretary of Mine Workers Union, a copy of which I have placed at (20) opposite. He asked if he could have an immediate interview with the Secretary of State or Sir G. Gater on the subject. I spoke to Mr. Rogers who told the Secretary of State of Mr. Welensky's request, but the Secretary of State was unable to see Mr. Welensky in view of his preoccupation with Palestine affairs. Sir G. Gater was similarly engaged.

I discussed the matter with Mr. Welensky. He interpreted (20) as intimating that the Mine Workers Union were anxious to re-open negotiations but dare not risk loss of face by making the move themselves. He considered that the crucial stage of the strike had been reached, and thought that a renewed offer of conciliation by Government might now break through the deadlock and offer hope of a settlement. He therefore wished to ask the Secretary of State if he would telegraph to Northern Rhodesia suggesting that such a move might be made.

On consideration I felt that Mr. Welensky's estimate of the position was probably accurate. I think (20) is obviously a sign that the Union are beginning to feel themselves on weak ground locally. The situation in which they have placed themselves as regards reopening negotiations is hinted at by paragraph 1 of (15), and I think Mr. Welensky is probably right in thinking that initiative by Government might have fruitful results. There is of course no suggestion of Government intervention beyond an offer of renewed conciliation, which would appear to be a perfectly proper course, and which the parties to the dispute would be perfectly free to accept or reject. I therefore told Mr. Welensky that I would submit the matter urgently for consideration; and I think that perhaps the suggestion might be put to the Acting Governor. I therefore submit a draft telegram for considn.

I should add that, despite the attention which I gave to him and the mollifying explanations which I offered, I am afraid that Mr. Welensky was somewhat displeased that he was unable to bring this matter personally before the Secretary of State.

N.D.W.  
30.7.46

The Secretary of State saw Mr. Welensky this morning. Mr. Seal and I were present.

Mr. Welensky made it clear that he was not seeking to intervene through any desire to help the Mine Workers Union out of their present difficulties. That, he felt, was their own affair. What did concern him was the fact that, according to the most

recent reports, the deadlock had now reached the stage where the Companies were apparently contemplating placing the mines on a care-and-maintenance basis and gradually dispersing both European and African employees. This would mean a most serious situation from the point of view of the African labour, who according to his information were already becoming disturbed; and he felt that the general responsibility for African interests called for some intervention by the Sec. of State at this stage. He therefore suggested that the Colonial Office should invite the mining companies in London to a meeting with himself, to discuss the possibilities of a solution.

The Secretary of State said that of course it was not possible to take any action without reference to the Acting Governor and those responsible on the spot; and that therefore such a meeting could do no more than explore further means of procedure which might lead to a settlement, which might then be suggested to the Northern Rhodesia Government. He asked whether Mr. Welensky had any line of procedure in mind. Mr. Welensky said that it was somewhat difficult to advise, as it was not yet known whether there had been any outcome of the suggestion made to the Acting Governor that the Government should make a further offer of conciliation. He knew that the Boards of the Mining companies in London were also disinclined to take matters out of the hands of their local managements. He suggested however that it might help considerably if the Secretary of State could see his way to inform the N. Rhodesia Govt. that, if they felt it would be of value, it could be made known that the Secretary of State would attempt to make available as soon as possible the services of an arbitrator from the United Kingdom. He had been in touch with Mr. Prain,<sup>1</sup> and he felt sure that the companies would be agreeable to such a move. He explained, in connection with the fact that the Union had refused a local offer of arbitration, that the Union was averse to submitting its case to a local arbitrator because on previous occasions they had always been defeated on arbitration, only to have the companies make concessions shortly afterwards. He was not sure whether they would risk accepting even an arbitrator from the United Kingdom; but, if such a move were made by the Colonial Office, it would be a useful gesture, and he felt that it might influence the Union to accept the local offer of conciliation.

The Secretary of State said that he would have no objections to making this move; and suggested that it would be sufficient if Mr. Welensky were himself to see Mr. Prain, inform him of the results of his conversation with the Secretary of State, and put this proposal to the companies. Mr. Welensky agreed, and said that he would see Mr. Prain this afternoon and inform Mr. Watson of the outcome.

The Secretary of State directed that in the meantime thought should be given to the possibilities of obtaining a suitable person as arbitrator from this country. He mentioned the name of Mr. Dalgleish.<sup>2</sup> I suggested however that it might not be desirable for Mr. Dalgleish to undertake this task in view of the possibility of his being called upon in the near future to act as Chairman of the proposed joint conference to examine the question of opportunities for advancement of the African in industry.

N.D.W.  
2.8.46

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<sup>1</sup> Ronald Prain, chief executive of the Rhodesia Selection Trust (RST) international group, 1943–1968, chairman, 1950–1977.

<sup>2</sup> Andrew Dalgleish, a British trades unionist who had served on the Forster Committee.

**17** CO 537/2117

31 Aug–18 Sept 1946

**[Political developments in Northern Rhodesia]: minutes by N D  
Watson, G F Seel and A B Cohen***Mr. Seel*

You asked me to place on file the personal letter from Sir S. Gore-Browne opposite.

Shortly before he left this country, Mr. Welensky intimated in conversation with me and afterwards to you that, after giving the matter careful consideration for some time, he had finally reached the conclusion that his position as an Unofficial Member of the Executive Council in the present awkward stage of constitutional development was not supportable and that he had decided to resign from the Council. He added that he was writing to Sir John Waddington to advise him of this decision, though he did not propose to take any action until after Sir John had returned to the territory. He added that he had discussed this matter with Sir S. Gore-Browne, who was inclined to the same conclusion, and that he intended on his return to Northern Rhodesia to call upon the other Unofficial Members of Executive Council to follow the same line, although he could not be sure that all of them would agree to do so. He was however certain that the present system whereby Unofficial Members were associated with the Executive but enjoyed no real constitutional power was unworkable, and the final reason which he gave for his decision was that he considered that the Unofficial Members would be far more likely to achieve the aims which they had in view for the development of the territory by direct opposition to Government rather than by the present system of unsatisfactory cooperation.

I ventured to suggest to Mr. Welensky that possibly he underestimated the influence which he and his colleagues exercised on the affairs of the territory, and said that I thought the extent of that influence had been amply shown in the recent discussions here. I suggested also that, if there were in fact matters in which he and his colleagues felt that they were not making the progress which they desired, the reason was that these were all matters of long-term policy and considerable complexity, in regard to which in the very nature of things progress could not be hasty; and I wondered whether it was in fact a justifiable conclusion that progress on such matters was more likely to be achieved by Unofficial opposition rather than by cooperation. I also recalled to Mr. Welensky the views expressed by Mr. Creech Jones at one of the meetings in July, at which Mr. Creech Jones said that, while he appreciated the difficulty in the position of the Unofficial Members at the present stage of constitutional development, these difficulties were in fact inherent in the natural processes of colonial evolution; in the meantime, the position of the Executive Council in the process of development towards responsible Government was important and it was most desirable that Unofficials should increasingly be associated with the executive side of Government and be prepared to take upon themselves increased executive responsibility.

When Mr. Welensky raised the subject with you, you also said that we should certainly view with concern the withdrawal of all Unofficial Members from the Executive Council, and that we could not but regard this as a retrograde step in the process of constitutional development. I understand that Mr. Welensky mentioned this matter also in his final talk with Sir George Gater, and he told me afterwards that Sir George Gater had suggested to him that he should at least hold his hand

until the way could be seen more clearly through the present difficult period, with all its suggested enquiries and conferences on several major issues affecting the future of the territory. Mr. Welensky said that this was a point which had not in fact occurred to him, but he did not indicate that his views had been materially affected.

It will probably be desired to discuss this matter with Sir John Waddington on his return to London next month, and I submit for any instructions on this point. I will let Mr. Cohen see these papers on his return.

N.D.W.  
30.8.46

Sir Stewart Gore-Browne came to see me this morning to talk about this.

He appears to be equally determined with Mr. Welensky not to continue the present position whereby non-officials are associated with Executive Council but have no control in framing policy. I said that this did not strike me as particularly welcome news, since the last thing we would want would be to go back to a powerful official Executive Council with non-official opinion continually ranged in opposition. Sir Stewart Gore-Browne then sketched out the kind of plan which he has in mind, but he was careful to say that he was not putting it forward officially and did not want any use to be made of it for the moment, as he wishes to confer further with Mr. Welensky on return to Northern Rhodesia. He would like to see a Governor-General for the three territories, whose functions in each of the territories would be different and correspond with those at present exercised by the Governors. This would ensure some co-operation between the three territories in the absence of amalgamation, which he realises is out of the question. In Northern Rhodesia itself he would have a Legislative Council with ten elected Europeans as at present, five Africans elected by the five Provincial Councils and three nominated Europeans to provide additional representation of native interests, together with two officials, the Financial Secretary, and the Attorney-General. There would be a speaker appointed by the Governor-General from outside with a casting vote. As regards the Executive Council, the leader of the majority party of the elected members would have the power to nominate three members besides himself and there would be the two officials mentioned. Sir Stewart seems to think that under this arrangement the inclusion of one of the African representatives, or at first of the nominated members, would be assured, since the leader of the majority party would depend upon the non-elected side to a great extent for support. The Governor-General would have 'fairly substantial' reserve powers.

Sir Stewart Gore-Browne only sketched these ideas, but he has evidently given a great deal of thought to the subject. I confined myself to saying that obviously any such scheme would be examined from here from the point of view of what part it allowed to Africans, and what provision it made for developing African political capacity and extending a bigger share to Africans as that capacity developed. Sir Stewart appreciated that it would have to be admitted at the outset that in course of time African participation would come about on the same basis as European, but he considers with some truth that any idea of direct election of representatives by Africans is out of the question in the near future.

It is perhaps doubtful whether Mr. Welensky will be able to agree to anything of this kind, which does seem to take African interests into account to an appreciable extent. If, however, we are confronted with a situation in which non-officials refuse to work

the existing system any longer, we may be driven to consider something of this kind. At present we can only wait to see what emerges. Sir Stewart Gore-Browne repeated the promise which Mr. Welensky made to me that nothing precipitate would be done and that in any case the Governor's return to Northern Rhodesia would be awaited.

Sir Stewart Gore-Browne is hoping to see Mr. Creech Jones next week before he sails on the 7th of September, and Mr. Creech Jones may like to glance at this minute.

G.F.S.  
31.8.46

I should record that I had a long talk with Sir S. Gore-Browne before he left. We discussed at considerable length the possibility that he and Mr. Welensky might resign from the Executive Council. I said that I was particularly sorry about this, since it appeared that their view on this matter had been formed immediately after, and possibly as a result of, our discussions during June and July. These had seemed to be extremely successful and it was a great disappointment to us that they should have been followed by this idea of resignation.

Sir S. Gore-Browne assured me that the conclusion which they had formed was in no sense the result of the discussions. They had been thinking about this for a long time and it was merely a coincidence that they had reached a conclusion while they were in this country. (I do not think that this is really quite accurate; Mr. Welensky's view was, I am sure, formed—at any rate partly—as the result of discussions here.) Sir S. Gore-Browne was extremely friendly and again he promised that they would do nothing until they had had an opportunity of discussion with the Governor after his return.

I also expressed the hope that, if after this talk they still adhere to their intention, they would at any rate give the Secretary of State an opportunity of considering the position before they took any action. Sir S. Gore-Browne quite agreed to this and I have told Sir J. Waddington.

Sir S. Gore-Browne also talked about his proposals for further constitutional reform and wrote out his ideas on the attached sheet. He emphasised that they were purely personal and he did not want any official use made of them. I elicited from him that these are not intended in any sense as a substitution for the 1948 Scheme now announced. They are his idea of the next step, say in 1951. I asked him whether he really thought that it was logical for him and Mr. Welensky to resign now if he was in favour of a Scheme of this sort. My own opinion is that Sir S. Gore-Browne will not resign, although it may be that Mr. Welensky will.

The Governor is fully aware of the position and will discuss it with Sir S. Gore-Browne and Mr. Welensky on his return and let us know.

A.B.C.  
18.9.46

**18** CO 525/205, 44248

3 Sept 1946

[Nyasaland constitution]: minute by N D Watson to A B Cohen

At (35) Sir E. Richards forwards the Report of the Select Committee which he appointed to draft recommendations for the reconstitution of Legislative Council. This arrived just before your departure for East Africa, and it was some time before I

was able to study the subject, to which I was new. Subsequently, I obtained Mr. Barton's reactions to the Committee's proposals; and I also discussed the subject in very general terms with Mr. Barrow<sup>1</sup> when he called on the Department early last month. I told him that when the Committee's Report had been fully considered here I was sure that we would wish to have an opportunity of discussing the proposals further with him. He himself was leaving for a holiday in Ireland and did not propose to return to London until some time this month. I therefore thought that the matter might await your return, and that after the general line to be taken on the Committee's proposals had then been decided we would be able to see what points might usefully be discussed with Mr. Barrow.

In all but one major particular, the Committee has in fact closely followed the lines of guidance set out in the Secretary of State's despatch at (29).

(a) The Committee supports the principle of an unofficial majority, accompanied by the granting to the Governor of the usual reserve powers under the constitution—vide para. 3 of (29).

(b) The Committee is in general agreement with the composition of the Council suggested at para.4(e) of (29), so far as the unofficial members are concerned, i.e. they accept that there should be

(i) four members nominated by the Governor, not to represent sectional interests but by virtue of their general experience and qualifications;

(ii) two members to represent Asiatics, to be selected by suitable Indian bodies without recourse to the submission of a panel of names; and

(iii) three African members to be selected by the African Protectorate Council.

In the place of four members as proposed by the Secretary of State to represent the European community, the Committee suggests six members, thus giving an unofficial total of 15 instead of 13; but this suggestion arises from their proposals in regard to the method of selection of the European representatives (on which I shall comment below) and I do not think that the Committee is wedded to this suggestion from the mere point of view of numbers. The actual numbers are of course not of great significance once the principle of an unofficial majority is established.

(c) The Committee also agrees that there should not be specific representation of the Anglo-African community, but that the interests of this community can be secured through the medium of the four additional members nominated by the Governor—vide para 4(b) of (29).

(d) The Committee also suggests that to the ten official members proposed by the Convention of Associations should be added the Labour Commissioner. This is a proposal which I think we should welcome.

(e) The Committee also agrees that the constitution of the Council should be a matter for periodical review, and suggests that the present proposals if implemented should be reviewed after a period of not more than five years. I think this may be accepted, and it is in line with the thought in the Mr. Creech-Jones minute of 30th April, on this file.

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<sup>1</sup> M P Barrow, member, Executive Council, unofficial member, Legislative Council, Nyasaland, 1941–1953.

So far there is agreement. We now come to the innovation in the Committee's proposals. The Committee rejects the suggestion of the Convention of Associations and the Chamber of Commerce that an electoral system should be introduced for European members, for reasons similar to those adduced at para. 5 and 6 of the Secretary of State's despatch at (29). They feel however that the existing machinery for choosing members for nomination has been rendered unsatisfactory by the secession of the Chamber of Commerce and the Northern Provinces Association from the Convention of Associations. They therefore propose the establishment of 'European Political Associations', each covering an area of the territory, of which all adult European British nationals resident for not less than 12 months in the Protectorate would be eligible for membership. The Associations would be free to choose whatever method they thought fit for selecting their members.

Mr. Barton feels strongly that this proposal should be resisted. Everyone concerned with the problem has admitted that there is obviously no adequate basis for a European electoral system and that in the circumstances the introduction of a franchise in any form is not likely to serve the interests of the territory. The aim should therefore be the creation of a legislative body which will regard itself and act as a Council of State, with the broad territorial outlook which is described at para.4(a) of (29); but the creation of 'political' associations seems least calculated to forward this end. Mr. Barton points out that the division of the country into the five areas suggested, which conform with no particular entities, will in practice mean that European representation will consist of at least five planters to one other member. It was precisely to avoid purely sectional representation of this kind that the Nyasaland Government recommended at (10) on the 1944 volume that the Convention of Associations should continue to be used as the selective body for Legislative Council. It is unfortunate that as a result of local differences the Convention is no longer fully representative of the territory, and therefore has ceased to provide the machinery for selection on a broad basis which is desired; but it is precisely in order to enable the Legislative Council to rise above such local differences that it is essential to maintain a selective body of the kind which the Convention formerly represented. To adopt any other means would be to encourage the sectional differences which have split the Convention to prevail also in the selection of members for Legislative Council, which is the last thing that we should want to see happen. That the Convention should be the best selective body for Europeans is obvious; and Mr. Barton feels that it might be well to adopt the attitude that the Secretary of State hopes it may be possible for the differences which have disrupted the Convention to be healed so that nomination to Legislative Council can be made on the broad country-wide basis which is desirable, and not on the basis of artificial geographical areas with a scanty European population. This would be an appeal to common-sense, pending the results of which he feels that we should go no further with the proposed constitutional amendments.

I asked Mr. Barrow in conversation whether he thought there was any hope of the split in the Convention being healed. His reply was to the effect that, although the withdrawal of the Chamber of Commerce was due to rather petty matters of personality and local differences of opinion, he did not think that the Chamber would come back into the fold. I mentioned that my first personal reaction to the suggested new political associations was that they seemed to be subject to most of the objections which had been raised against the creation of an electoral system. Mr. Barrow's answer was that

the Convention was no longer sound as a selective body and that some alternative method must be devised; he fully agreed however (within the four walls of the Colonial Office) with all the objections against the introduction of a franchise.

I share Mr. Barton's dislike of the proposed new alternative method for selecting members of Legislative Council which is now put up. The machinery of political associations seems to have all the disadvantages of a completely artificial system, in addition to involving all the difficulties foreseen in the introduction of an electoral system. I am not clear precisely how the proposed associations would be constituted; but obviously conditions of membership and eligibility for voting etc. would have to be laid down and this seems to me to amount to all the machinery for establishing a franchise, saving only the legal form. Further, who is to take the initiative in forming the association? Some spontaneous form of organisation is essential if an appearance of the creation of informal electoral areas and electoral rolls by Government is to be avoided; but if the suggestion first appears in a Government statement on constitutional development and as arising from the recommendations of a Government Committee, there can obviously be no appearance of spontaneity and Government must take responsibility for seeing that the idea is effectively carried out. . . . having regard to the difficulties which are seen in the creation of any form of electoral system in the present state of the Territory, the Secretary of State is convinced that representation on the broad territorial basis which is desired can best be achieved by the system of election by the Convention of Associations which has hitherto prevailed; that he therefore regrets the situation which has been created by the withdrawal of the Chamber of Commerce and the Northern Provinces Association from the Convention, and hopes that in the general interest of the territory it may be possible for the bodies concerned to renew their association at least for the purpose of selecting members for Legislative Council; but that, even if such a step should unfortunately prove to be impossible, he considers that it would be preferable to continue to rely on the existing representative bodies rather than to resort to some newly devised system of selection which clearly would not provide balanced representation; he would therefore suggest in that event that the Convention should select two members, and the Chamber of Commerce and the Northern Provinces Association should select one each. The latter suggestion, which was made at X of your minute of 7th March,<sup>2</sup> was hinted at in para. 6 of (29)<sup>3</sup> but not specifically stated.

In general, the line to be taken seems fairly clear, but it might be useful to find out from Mr. Barrow more about what the Committee had in mind as regards the political associations, whether they went closely into the organisation involved, and what his reactions are to the difficulties which are seen here and to the line which we have in mind to follow. It may be difficult to fit in a meeting with Mr. Barrow, but if you agree I will try to get in touch with him immediately and find out when he will be available.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> This stated 'I think that the proper solution would be to make the Convention of Associations put up two members, the Chamber of Commerce one and the Northern Province Association one instead of the four elected members proposed by the Convention of Association'.

<sup>3</sup> This (Hall to Richards, 4 May 1946) stated that European members should continue to be selected by representative bodies, and that it should be a matter for the European community how this selection should be done.

<sup>4</sup> Creech Jones subsequently told Richards that he was opposed to the method of selecting European members recommended by the Commission (Creech Jones to Richards, 21 Oct 1946).

**19** CO 537/1516, no 37

11 Nov 1946

**[Copperbelt strikes and politics]: letter from H F Cartmel-Robinson to A B Cohen**

I have just returned from a ten day tour of the Copperbelt and you may like to have some of my impressions while they are still fresh in my mind.

The general feeling seemed to be that prospects for better relations between Chamber, Union and Government were brighter than for some years. But most people outside the Union were apprehensive that Maybank would foster trouble if he possibly could and that he would probably find opportunities to do so. The chairmen of the branches at the various Mines were at pains to tell me that the Union was now on a democratic basis and that they were not going to be led by the nose by two or three men. They all assured me that if the closed shop issue could be settled there would be peace in the industry for two years. They made such a point of this that I could not resist the impression that they had all agreed to say so beforehand.

I was received in a most friendly spirit by all the Union's members except Maybank and—indirectly—Goodwin. Maybank's behaviour was atrocious and I think you should know about it at the C.O. I was giving sundown parties at all centres for representatives of the various sections of the community and I had especially told the District Commissioner, Kitwe, that Maybank was to be asked to the one at Nkana as General Secretary of the Union. But Maybank was quite certain that he was not going to be asked and was openly talking of breaking the party up. He woke the D.C. up at 1.30 in the morning demanding very noisily to know why he had not received an invitation. The D. C. told him that he had already been invited and that if he had not received a card it must be still in the post. Maybank, who has been drinking heavily lately, was extremely offensive and said he would not come. A few days later he rang up the D. C. and told him that I was a 'mongrel'. The D. C. put the receiver down before he could elaborate. (I am flattered at the improvement in the status which he now awards me after his last meeting with me!) On the night of the party, which was held at the Hotel, Maybank was drinking noisily in the bar with Goodwin and Mills, who had accepted my invitation, but evidently were deterred from coming. No attempt was made to break up the party till after I had left, when Maybank picked a quarrel with the Underground Manager and said that we had been celebrating the death of a man who had unfortunately been killed on the Mine that day.

This behaviour cut no ice with the rest of the Union, who, as I have said, received me in a most friendly way. I only mention the incident to show what an impossible person he is to deal with. The latest news is that he has quarrelled again with Goodwin.

The arbitration awards have been very well received by the men and with good grace by the Chamber, though one Manager told me that they feared there would now be demand after demand for arbitration. There probably will be unless the Chamber improves its technique in negotiation. I am sure the men do not want any more fights. Maybank proposed raising the Union subscription from 5/- to £1. per month in order to build up a fighting fund. But the most he could get the men to agree to was 10/-. They are in low funds but the Christmas bonus would put them in a better position to fight the closed shop issue.

It is a pity that Doughty<sup>1</sup> opened his mouth about closed shop and indicated that he might well be on the Commission of Inquiry. That may be partly responsible for the change of attitude by the Union towards a Commission. But I think the main reason is that Maybank is getting nervous about the attitude of the men towards one Union for the whole industry. Many are known to favour the A.E.U. He may find that if the Commission gives publicity to this feeling the fight for closed shop for one Union for the industry may go against him, in which case he has said that he would leave the country. If the Chamber have heard this it may harden their hearts, for they are quite convinced that there will never be any peace with Maybank in charge. I cannot help thinking myself that they are right in this last respect. As I have reported, two Managers said that they would not be intransigent about closed shop and would be guided largely by the Brighton decisions.

At an interview with the Salaried Staff Association, which represents 40% of the European employees in the industry, they impressed very strongly on me the need for a Commission of Inquiry. They said they were quite unanimous about this and that, though relations were better for the moment, experience had shewn that feeling could soon be worked up again. They cited a number of points about which Maybank was already agitating.

The Winding Engine Drivers had a number of grievances at their interview. The only one they seemed to feel strongly about was the Government Regulation that they should be medically examined once a year. They pointed out that no other body of men anywhere was subjected to this examination, except Railway Engine Drivers, who were tested for eyesight only, and that they had decided not to present themselves for examination in December. They also read out a letter from the strong Rand Association promising them full support. I did not much like going back on what was regarded at the time as progressive legislation, but I must confess I did not relish the prospect of Inspectors and Police dragging the men away from their engines. After consulting Welensky and authorities in the South I have decided to suggest to them that the Regulation should be amended so as to make periodic examination only compulsory after a certain age—say 50. I have not yet heard their reaction. The Union are behind the drivers, the Chamber are indifferent, and the Officials Association like the present Regulation. I don't think any trouble will come of this.

The interview with the Chamber about African trades unions went off well, although the Chamber wished to reserve final decision till after discussions on labour in Johannesburg on November 19th. We are sending you the papers this week. In the meantime there is not much time to spare. I hear Maybank and Goodwin have already got three communist supporters up from the South and that they propose getting up some communist Africans, whom Goodwin would endeavour to get into his gang. I don't yet know how much truth there is in the report, but there may well be something in it. It is worth mentioning that the Compound Managers thought the Africans were more interested in further opportunities than in trades unions.

In the meetings with Local Authorities (European) I found a general feeling of frustration and irritation at Government financial control. It is a fact that most of them are not in a financial position to progress much. In some cases this is because they do not like rating themselves. But in other cases rates are near the legal limit and still the Authorities cannot afford loans from Government at the present rate of

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Charles Doughty, chairman of the General Council of the Bar, and a veteran in the field of industrial arbitration.

interest to finance much needed improvement in essential services. The Commissioner for Local Government is going into this whole question.

I was pleased with the new African Towns in spite of much criticism by the European township authorities and even some officials. They cannot believe that the Africans can manage their own affairs, and, indeed, they will need supervision for some years. But they were leading a natural life and seemed far happier than in the compounds. The fact is that the African likes to get away from the European in his home life just as much as the European likes to get away from the African. The African towns are making a real contribution to the solution of the housing problem. It is surprising how many have from £15 to £35 for the initial purchase price of a house and some furniture. Some of the houses were very neat and well furnished. The African woman soon learns to be house-proud.

I have had several talks with Welensky and am rather worried at his political attitude. He talks of resigning from Exco and urging the other Unofficials to do the same. I asked him what other form of prior consultation between the Government executive and the Unofficial majority he had in mind in order to prevent nugatory planning, and eventually he admitted that his real intention was to make the present constitution unworkable with the idea of obtaining further constitutional advance or, better still, amalgamation. Gore-Browne and Page are at present quite cold about leaving Exco. There is almost certain to be a break between Welensky and Gore-Browne in the near future over leadership of the Unofficials. Welensky will probably demand that Gore-Browne should give up his anti-amalgamation attitude or resign leadership. Gore-Browne evidently knows what is in the wind. He told me he had been thinking of retiring to Shiwa but was worried as to who would give proper guidance to the new African members of Legco, when they materialise, if he did so. I am quite sure second thoughts will prevail.

Dr. Fisher<sup>2</sup> will be back in time for Legco, but his Mine Manager says that it will be quite impossible for him to attend owing to pressure of work awaiting him. Fisher would have to resign if he absented himself from the coming meeting. We shall see.

Before closing this long letter I should like to say how greatly I have appreciated the ready help and advice of the Secretary of State and the officials at the Colonial Office, especially during the recent crisis. The general public will not realise what a tremendous advantage it is to have the wisdom and experience of the C.O. behind the Government, but we are only too grateful ourselves. In a couple of weeks Sir John will be back and I shall be able to say 'Ichabod'<sup>3</sup> with a sigh of relief. We are going to have a tough time in the next few months and it will need all Sir John's accustomed skill to steer us through.

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<sup>2</sup> A C Fisher, surgeon; member, Legislative Council, Northern Rhodesia, 1944–1946.

<sup>3</sup> Hebrew: 'the glory is departed' (1 Sam: 4, 21).

## **20** CO 537/2112

8–9 Jan 1947

### **[Nationalisation of Rhodesia Railways]: minutes by N D Watson and A B Cohen**

*Mr. Cohen*

There is to be an inter-departmental meeting with the Dominions Office and the Treasury at 3 p.m. on Tuesday 14th January in Sir E. Machtig's room, to consider

further action in regard to the suggested nationalisation of the Rhodesia Railways. You have asked for a resumé of the subject, for the information of Mr. Ivor Thomas.

The background of the subject and the questions arising from Sir Harold Howitt's Report are summarised in your note at (19), which was prepared for discussion with Sir John Waddington, Sir S. Gore Browne and Mr. Welensky last June. As a result of these discussions and in consultation with the Dominions Office the memorandum at (28) was prepared for submission to the Cabinet.<sup>1</sup> In view of the financial liabilities involved (for which Northern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland in particular could not assume responsibility without U. K. assistance), and also in view of the difficulties likely to arise from State ownership by a Government responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies of an undertaking on which an effective colour-bar was maintained, the memorandum recommended the conclusion that an immediate decision in favour of State acquisition of the Railways could not be regarded as practicable and that the question should definitely be postponed for a period of ten years. The record of the Cabinet meeting on this question is at (31). The Chancellor of the Exchequer saw great difficulties in announcing a decision to postpone nationalization at the present time, and the Ministers concerned were accordingly invited to consider the possibility of devising some alternative solution of the problem.

As a result of further inter-departmental discussions, it was agreed that no alternative solution could be considered without consultation with the Southern Rhodesia Government. The communication which it had been proposed to the Cabinet should be sent to Southern Rhodesia was accordingly made in the modified form of the despatch at (39), which referred to the difficulties in the way of an immediate decision in favour of State acquisition and invited the views of the Southern Rhodesia Government. In the meantime, the British South Africa Company were informed that, pending consultation with the Governments concerned, H.M.G. was not in a position to reach a conclusion on the Howitt Report and that therefore the Company must continue to carry on the undertaking as at present; as regards the conversion of the existing debenture issue and the raising of a new loan for re-equipment, the Company were advised to proceed with arrangements for raising a ten-year loan on their own credit. The communication to the Southern Rhodesia Government made clear the difficulties which were foreseen by H. M. G. in the proposal to acquire the railways, and the only modification of substance rather than of approach made at this stage was that the Treasury on reconsideration did not feel certain about subscribing to the view that the continued existence of debentures charged on the undertaking might not be regarded as compatible with public ownership. This view, which appeared in paragraph 4 of the annex to the Cabinet Paper at (28), was accordingly omitted from the despatch at (39). This change however did not affect the existence of a moral obligation on the Governments concerned to safeguard the outstanding debentures in the event of nationalization and the impossibility of Northern Rhodesia or Bechuanaland facing such a liability without United Kingdom backing. Earlier discussion with the Treasury had shown that they would be most reluctant to guarantee the loans of the undertaking; further, such a guarantee could not be given without the authority of an act of Parliament

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<sup>1</sup> See 14.

and the latter might give rise to conditions which would not be consistent with Southern Rhodesia's status as a self-governing Colony.

The next move in the matter was a visit to this country by Sir E. Lucas Guest, Minister of Finance, Southern Rhodesia. At a meeting at the Dominions Office last September (record at (52)) Sir E. Guest made it plain that public opinion in Southern Rhodesia was pressing strongly for nationalization, and that the Southern Rhodesian Government were dissatisfied with the views expressed by H.M.G. and thought that the difficulties which had been raised could be overcome. Sir John Waddington reiterated the difficulties seen by Northern Rhodesia in regard to the financial liability and the colour bar. At the end of the meeting, Sir E. Guest was informed that the communication made to the Southern Rhodesia Government did not represent a final decision by H.M.G. and that, if the Southern Rhodesia Government could put forward a definite scheme for State acquisition which dealt with the problems involved in a practical and realistic manner, it would of course be considered. If they did prepare such a scheme, they would not doubt consult the Northern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland Governments before submitting it.

The Southern Rhodesia Government accordingly prepared the departmental memorandum at (67A) for discussion with Northern Rhodesia. This memorandum presses for immediate nationalization and asks that expert advice should be sought on the question whether the undertaking should be acquired by means of purchase of the equity, or of purchase of the operating assets and assumption of the liabilities of the undertaking, including debentures. On the financial problem, the memorandum envisages that, in the event of purchase of the equity, the conversion of the debentures would be carried out by the new owners and guaranteed by H.M.G. on behalf of the three Governments concerned. The memorandum however emphasises that Southern Rhodesia cannot undertake liability in excess of the 60% recommended in the Howitt Report and admits that, unless H.M.G. is prepared to assume responsibility for the remaining 40%, the whole question of State ownership will perforce have to be postponed. As regards the colour bar question, the memorandum rather blandly suggests that, if HMG wishes to issue instructions that there shall be no colour bar on the Railways in Northern Rhodesia in the event of nationalization, no difficulties need arise!

In his reply to this memorandum, a copy of which is at (67B), Sir John Waddington reiterated his view that Northern Rhodesia could not undertake the financial liability involved on its own resources and said that, so far as the financial side of the problem was concerned, the whole question therefore depended upon the possibility of U.K. assistance, which was a matter for H.M.G. to decide. On the colour bar issue, Sir John Waddington commented that the Southern Rhodesian approach to the problem did not appear to be realistic. It did not take into account the dilemma in which the Northern Rhodesia Government and H.M.G. would be placed in the event of nationalization, i.e. of deciding between (a) allowing the existing colour bar to continue and so being placed in an indefensible position politically or (b) attempting to put an end to the colour bar on the Railways with the probable risk of a direct conflict with the European workers of the Railway Union.

The Southern Rhodesia Government have not felt able to pay regard to these further objections from Northern Rhodesia, and have now in the despatch at (70) asserted their determination to obtain control of the Railways. In order to achieve this, they suggest that H.M.G. should purchase the equity and the debentures of the

Railways on behalf of the three Governments, and that the latter should liquidate the total liability in the proportions suggested by Sir Harold Howitt by repayments to His Majesty's Government over a period of 50 years. I read this as a tacit admission that their enthusiasm has outrun their capacities, and that they have realised Southern Rhodesia itself cannot meet the financial liabilities involved without U.K. assistance. As regards the colour bar question, the Southern Rhodesia Government suggests that the problem will be solved if it is made clear after nationalization that the engagement of employees will be governed in each territory by the local laws in force.

On the financial side, the whole question therefore now rests with H.M.G. Even if Southern Rhodesia can face with equanimity the prospect of meeting the financial liability involved over the period of 50 years, nothing has transpired since the earlier discussion to suggest that Northern Rhodesia could safely take this burden upon herself in view of the joint dependence of both the Railways and the Territory itself on the prosperity of copper. The suggestion made by the Southern Rhodesia Government at X of (70) that Northern Rhodesia would be in a happier position in the event of nationalization, because any loss to the Railways resulting from a drop in copper traffic would be spread over the whole undertaking, appears to me to be specious. Such loss would equally be spread over the whole undertaking if it remained a private concern, and the point is that Northern Rhodesia would have to face the results of that overall loss as part owner, in addition to facing the results of a copper slump on her territorial revenues.

On the colour bar issue the final comment is made in Sir John Waddington's letter to Sir Godfrey Huggins at enclosure (B) to (71). This is not a question of legislation, but of the practical difficulties arising from ownership by H.M.G. of an undertaking in which the colour bar is in fact strongly entrenched. The Southern Rhodesia Government has clearly not faced up to this problem. The point is that, while something may eventually be done about the colour bar on the Railways by means of patient approaches of the kind which are now contemplated in connection with African labour on the Coppermines, an immediate solution of the problem (likely to lead to direct conflict with the European workers) will be necessary if the Railways are nationalised, unless H.M.G. as owner is prepared to acquiesce in a position which is clearly indefensible on political grounds. The inference is obviously that nationalization should wait until a more delicate approach has brought a solution of the colour bar problem on the Railways more closely into view.

To complete the picture, I should draw attention to Sir Dougal Malcolm's letter below (60) in which it is stated that the sum required to be raised for purposes of re-equipment on conversion of the debentures must now be taken as nearer £30,000,000 than the £26,000,000 originally estimated. In view of the urgency of proceeding with this transaction, Sir Dougal Malcolm<sup>2</sup> has asked that a definite decision may be taken by H.M.G. this month. It is clearly necessary that the undertaking should be placed in a position to put its house in order as soon as possible; and I feel that the Southern Rhodesia suggestion at paragraph 1 of (70), that the Company have sufficient reserves for immediate requirements and that the raising of new capital could without damage be postponed until the question of acquisition is settled, is rather superficial.

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<sup>2</sup> See 42, note 3.

I have not commented in this minute on the question of the relationship with the Portuguese Government in the event of nationalization. In the meantime, the British South Africa Company have had conversations with the Portuguese authorities, and it will be seen from (59) that it is thought to be improbable that the Portuguese Government will exercise their option to acquire the Company's holdings in Portuguese territory at the end of 1946.

N.D.W.

8.1.47

*Mr. Thomas*

Sir E. Machtig and Mr. Bottomley are to have a meeting on Tuesday January 14th at 3 p.m., at which the Department and Treasury officials will be present to discuss policy with regard to Rhodesia Railways in preparation for the forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. The subject is highly political and if you could spare the time I think that it might be useful if you could attend the meeting. Presumably the meeting will formulate agreed recommendations for submission to the two Secretaries of State and also to the Chancellor.

The subject is a complicated one and at my request Mr. Watson has summarised the recent developments in his minute of the 8th January. In this he refers to seven flagged documents on the file which I hope that you may have time to glance at.

In principle there is a case for the State acquisition of the Rhodesia Railways, which would then be run by a joint commission representing the Governments of Southern and Northern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. On the other hand the practical advantages to be derived from this have never been demonstrated to the full satisfaction of the Colonial Office and from the point of view of Northern Rhodesia, two strong practical objections have hitherto been seen to the proposal. These are:—

(1) *Financial*. The receipts of the railways as far as Northern Rhodesia is concerned are very largely derived from copper traffic or coal traffic connected with the copper mines. If there was a slump in copper there would be a disastrous short fall in receipts and this would come exactly at the moment when Northern Rhodesia's Government revenues would have slumped equally, since they also depend very largely on copper. The Northern Rhodesia Government already has all its eggs in one basket; this proposition involves carrying a basket of eggs in each hand. At the same time the financial commitments involved in nationalising the railways are very great in relation to Northern Rhodesia's revenues. The actual cost of buying the equity would only be about £3 million or £4 million, but debentures amounting to about £30 million would have to be taken over as well and the total potential Northern Rhodesia commitment would be about £10 million. The Northern Rhodesia Government's annual revenue is only £3½ million. Their development programme for ten years is £13 million, £5 million of which is to be raised by loan. They are likely to require £4 million or £5 million for nationalising the mining royalties, which is a far more important and far more advantageous proposition than nationalising the railways. From the financial point of view the arguments against nationalisation are very strong.

(2) *Colour bar*. There has always been a colour bar on the Rhodesia Railways maintained by the white trade union and operating to prevent Africans from rising to skilled or semi-skilled jobs. The union has its headquarters in Southern Rhodesia and the Southern Rhodesia attitude towards African labour prevails. This

makes it all the more difficult for the Northern Rhodesia Government to do anything effective to alter the situation and it has always been held that it would be gravely embarrassing to H.M.G. to have a State-owned railway in Northern Rhodesia with a colour bar. The Southern Rhodesia Government now blandly suggests that the matter could be disposed of simply by the Northern Rhodesia Government insisting on whatever arrangement they want. Southern Rhodesia have in fact suggested no solution to this side of the problem.

When the matter was considered last summer at a meeting at which Lord Addison, Mr. Creech Jones and the Governor of Northern Rhodesia were present, the conclusion of everybody was that nationalisation of Rhodesia Railways was not practical politics and this recommendation was put up by the two Secretaries of State to the Cabinet. The Cabinet were not however prepared to accept this conclusion and suggested that some alternative way out should be found. I think that we can now say that there is no alternative way out and that the proposition will probably have to be put up to the Cabinet again in the same form.

I wonder whether, if you could attend the meeting, Mr. Watson and I could have a talk with you beforehand?<sup>3</sup>

A.B.C.  
9.1.47

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<sup>3</sup> Later in the year, the SR government solved this problem through its own initiative. It raised a major loan on the London stock exchange to cover the costs of nationalisation, with the government of NR and Bechuanaland acting as nominal co-guarantors.

## **21** CO 525/207, 44332/1

20 Jan 1947

[Nyasaland—land]: minute by N D Watson

[In 1946, Sir Sidney Abrahams was appointed to investigate African grievances over land. These were most acute in the 'Shire highlands', an area covering the Cholo, Mlanje, Chiradzulu, Zomba and Blantyre districts of Nyasaland, dominated by European-owned estates.]

At (94) the Governor of Nyasaland reports that the Executive Council has now considered the report of Sir Sidney Abrahams' Land Commission. With their agreement, he now seeks approval (a) to publish the Report (b) to seek from the Legislative Council agreement in principle with its recommendations and (c) to set up the Planning Committee recommended by Sir Sidney Abrahams.

I am afraid that I have not had time to study Sir Sidney Abrahams' Report in detail. The following summary of his recommendations is confined to parts I-IV of the Report, which deal with the problems of congestion on native trust lands and of resident natives on private estates. It is only necessary to consider this section of the Report in connection with the questions of procedure which are raised at (94) and parts V-X of the Report, which deal with such matters as land tenure and the alienation of native trust land, can be left out of account for the time being.

In regard to the relief of congestion, Sir Sidney Abrahams finds that there is undoubtedly serious congestion of population in certain areas, particularly in the Shire Highlands, and that the pressure of population on native trust land is greater than it is on private estate land.

As regards natives on private estates, Sir Sidney Abrahams considers that there is a widespread sense of grievance amongst the natives, and that trouble is likely to arise if a solution of the problem is not found. Previous approaches to the problem have not appreciated the fundamental conflict of ideas between the landlord, who is convinced of his right to require work or rent from resident natives as consideration for their residence, and the native, who sees no reason why he should not be permitted to live on estates under precisely the same conditions as he would enjoy on native trust land. The problem admits of no compromise and cannot be adjusted by statutory means, such as the Natives on Private Estates Ordinance, 1928. The broad solution of the problem suggested by Sir Sidney Abrahams is (a) to abolish the legal status of 'resident native' and (b) to give all resident natives the choice of leaving private estates or staying there on terms mutually satisfactory to themselves and to the estate owners. In the case of those who elect to remain on private estates, a contractual status should be substituted for the present statutory status.

The problem to be solved is therefore threefold, namely (a) the relief of congestion on native trust land, (b) the political problem of satisfying the sense of grievance that Europeans are holding large tracts of undeveloped land while natives go short and (c) the 'emancipation' of resident natives. Acquisition of undeveloped land on private estates would settle the first two problems and go far to solving the third. Contrariwise, acquisition is the only practical method of emancipating resident natives and would in itself solve the other two problems.

Sir Sidney Abrahams therefore puts forward a detailed scheme which in broad outline is based on the following principles:—

- (i) Undeveloped land on private estates to be acquired (as native trust land) in cases where this would relieve pressure on neighbouring native trust lands or provide room for settlement of 'emancipated' resident natives from nearby estates (and provided of course that the land can be made habitable);
- (ii) Each estate owner to be approached and invited to place all his resident natives on a contractual footing. If he agreed, his estate would be excepted from the operation of the Natives on Private Estates Ordinance, and the natives concerned would be given the option of staying on the contractual basis proposed or moving to native trust land (where accommodation could then be found on the strength of the acquisition of undeveloped land proposed under (i)).

This is of course a very general outline of the scheme, which would involve a number of permutations and combinations explained in detail by Sir Sidney Abrahams. Sir Sidney Abrahams consulted both European and African opinion, official and unofficial, in regard to these proposals and they met with general approval.

A corollary of the scheme would be the need to establish effective control in order to prevent indiscriminate settlement and unsupervised cultivation of any acquired land, which would merely lead to a repetition of the problem of congestion. It would be necessary for the Government to devise a scientific scheme for calculating and limiting the number of natives who could be settled on any block of acquired land. Sir Sidney Abrahams' suggests that acquired lands should for this reason be treated as reserved land in the first instance, in order to ensure complete control, and converted to native trust land only when full settlement has been carried out and the position has been stabilised. A strong executive team

would clearly be required to carry out this controlled settlement and the incidental preliminaries, such as the ascertainment of the number of resident natives who wish to leave any estate.

Sir Sidney Abrahams recommends that, if his proposals are accepted, an Inter-Departmental Planning Committee under the Chief Secretary should be appointed to consider what lands should be acquired, the priority of acquisition, the method of settlement, the payment of compensation to resident natives, the staff required for the scheme, etc. etc.

Sir Sidney Abrahams has of course not attempted to make any estimate of the amount of land which it will be necessary to acquire or of the financial commitment involved. As regards the latter, he has merely noted that he considers that it would be neither fair nor practicable either to require landlords themselves to compensate resident natives leaving their estates under the scheme for loss of houses and gardens, or to require natives resettled on acquired land to pay rent over a certain term of years. He does however suggest that, on the owners side, the expense of acquisition might be lessened if owners could be invited to exchange the land acquired from them under the scheme for a plot of reserved land or for a right of occupancy of native trust land without rent. And also, that a contribution from native sources towards the expenses of the scheme might be the possibility of obtaining a sum of money from the Native Development and Welfare Fund.

While Sir Sidney Abrahams' recommendations obviously offer a radical solution of this long-standing problem which it would be most desirable to implement, it is clear that before the recommendations are accepted the scheme must be worked out in greater detail, particularly as regards the probable cost. There would be no point in giving a blessing to the scheme, if it subsequently turned out to be completely beyond the bounds of possibility, having regard to Nyasaland's present and potential financial resources. It also seems clear that the best method of obtaining the additional information required will be to set up the Planning Committee recommended by the Commissioner. I therefore think that the further procedure suggested by the Governor at (94) should be approved. As however it appears that the S. of S. may be recommended to give approval in principle to the scheme, insofar as that is possible at this stage, without further delay, I think that the memorandum proposed at (95) to accompany the published Report might be better modified in certain respects.

## **22** CO 795/143/1

3 June & 17 July 1947

[Forster Report]: minutes by N D Watson

[The British trades unionist, Andrew Dalglish, was sent to Northern Rhodesia in Apr 1947 to initiate talks on the Forster Report's recommendations on African advancement in the mining industry. With him were James Kelly of the National Union of Mineworkers and H O Smith, a director of Imperial Chemical Industries. A conference convened in May, which brought together the Chamber of Mines, the Mine Workers' Union and the Northern Rhodesia government, made little progress. Dalglish and Smith accused the employers and the union of stone-walling: 'the Chamber because it wished to place upon Government the responsibility for the employment of Africans, and the Union because it wished to preserve for its members those posts now held by Europeans' (Dalglish and Smith to Waddington, 16 May 1947).]

*Mr. Cohen*

We had a discussion with Mr. Dalglish yesterday morning. Before the meeting we had received the letter from Mr. Cartmel-Robinson at (69) forwarding the Reports submitted to the Governor by Mr. Dalglish and Mr. Smith and by Mr. Kelly respectively.

Mr. Dalglish gave us a good deal of information about the background of the discussions in Northern Rhodesia, and left with us the enclosed rough copy of the verbatim record of the proceedings at the Conference.<sup>1</sup> All representatives both of the Chamber of Mines and the Mine Workers Union were apparently extremely careful in all that they said in the informal talks which preceded the actual Conference and gave no indication of the uncooperative line which they intended to take when the Conference opened.

Mr. Dalglish fully confirmed the impression that both parties had deliberately adopted stalling tactics. He had done his best to move them to discussion of the six questions which he had set out as the basic matters for consideration at the Conference, but they refused to budge from the attitude adopted in the joint statement which they presented at the outset. Mr. Dalglish agreed that the statement made by Mr. Watmore at the Conference (see page 13 of the verbatim record) contained in essence all that a Government declaration of policy could contain, and that for the rest it was a matter of getting down to practicalities, which both parties at the Conference had refused to do.

As for the next move, he agreed that the matter could not be allowed to rest and he thought that the only thing to do was to appoint the proposed Commission. He was obviously in some doubt however about the question of terms of reference. A Commission clearly could not deal with the social aspect of the question, which was not a matter which could be handled by direct action in any form, and he was very doubtful about the Commission being asked to cover the whole economic field of the Territory. He and Mr. Smith in their Report to the Governor (see paragraph 19 of the first enclosure to (69)) had suggested that the Commission might be asked to consider advancement of the African 'in defined industries in the Territory'. In suggesting this, they were of course thinking mainly of the railways; but, since writing the Report, Mr. Dalglish has had some second thoughts and is not at all certain whether it would be desirable to bring the railways into the question at this stage, particularly in view of the recent developments in regard to the acquisition of the railways and the position of the Southern Rhodesia Government. He also saw the point which you made that there might be a danger of throwing the mineworkers and railway unions into one another's arms by such a move. In brief, while he now agrees, I think, that the most desirable course would be to stick to the rails and to confine the Commission to the coppermining industry, he is obviously much influenced by the strong position in which the Mine Workers Union have now succeeded in establishing themselves and by the fear which he mentioned that they might refuse to attend before a Commission with restricted terms of reference. (This is obviously a point which will have to be considered very carefully, in consultation with the Governor.) Even if all parties agreed to give evidence, there was the obvious disadvantage from which the Commission would suffer of not being able to have the

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<sup>1</sup> Enclosures not printed.

various viewpoints corrected by round-table discussions. You suggested that the Commission might be given power to take evidence 'in conference', at it were, with the various parties present.

As regards the further proposal that there should be local members on the Commission, Mr. Dalgleish confirmed our view that it would practically impossible to obtain independent and impartial people. The only way of giving effect to this suggestion would be to introduce representatives of all the parties concerned. That would in effect mean representatives of the Mine Workers Union and the Chamber and, if that were done, the question of representation of African interests might constitute a new and awkward problem. You mentioned that Mr. Stubbs, the Labour Commissioner, with whom we discussed these matters the other day, had suggested the appointment of assessors to the Commission from the interested parties, and thought that it would be useful to have an underground miner with actual knowledge of working conditions as the Union representative. Mr. Stubbs rather surprisingly thought that it would be possible to arrange this with the Union.

As regards the constitution of the Commission, you put to Mr. Dalgleish the possibility of his accepting the chairmanship. He has obviously not made up his mind on this question yet but I think we may say that he would not be altogether averse to the proposal if the Secretary of State felt that he was the best person to undertake this task in the circumstances. We discussed the difficulties in regard to the other members. Mr. Dalgleish would obviously be reluctant to have Mr. Kelly with him a second time. Mr. Kelly has not swallowed the Mine Workers Union's arguments outright, but while apparently recognising the real motive for the Union's intransigency in the matter of African progression, he has not been able to see a way through the question of African wage levels as propounded by the Union. The inconsistency of view which results obviously casts very serious doubts on his further usefulness in this matter, and it seems most unlikely that Mr. Dalgleish and he would ever reach common ground. Mr. Dalgleish agreed that if Mr. Kelly were not invited, Mr. Smith would also have to be left out, although this would undoubtedly be a pity. Mr. Smith, he was sure, fully appreciated the position. You suggested that it might be possible to try to get away from the 'employer' and 'trade unionist' basis in connection with appointments to the Commission, and look for completely independent members; but the effect of this on the Mine Workers Union's attitude to the Commission would have to be considered.

All these matters have been left for further discussion with the Secretary of State at 3 p.m. on Friday the 6th June. Mr. Dalgleish and Mr. Smith will attend. Mr. Kelly has returned to the North of England but he indicated to Mr. Dalgleish before they separated that he was quite prepared to let Mr. Dalgleish explain his views to the Colonial Office and that he would not expect to be called in unless it were absolutely necessary. We agreed to defer the draft reply to (66) until after the discussion on Friday. In the meantime, you are sending a personal telegram to Sir John Waddington to let him know what is happening here.

N.D.W.  
3.6.47

At (85), the Governor has submitted his proposals for the terms of reference and the announcement in regard to the proposed Commission on African advancement. On the basis of our telegram at (79), the Governor has framed the terms of reference

suggested in paragraph 1 of his telegram on the assumption that the Commission will be confined to the copper industry. He goes on to say however that he thinks it extremely unlikely that the Mine Workers Union can be persuaded to modify their views in regard to the scope of the Commission; and therefore, although he would much prefer to confine it to the copper industry, he comes down finally on the side of broader terms of reference.

Before (85) was received in the Department, Mr. Cohen and I discussed this matter with Mr. Hudson, the Secretary for Native Affairs, who arrived in the United Kingdom yesterday. Mr. Hudson said that the Government had no information at all about any approach by the Chamber of Mines to the Union and so far as they knew no such approach had been made. Even if it were made however the Government felt certain that there was little hope of the Union being persuaded to change their attitude, or of their agreeing to cooperate with a Commission which was confined to the copper industry. The Commission could no doubt legally compel the Union to appear and give evidence, but it could obviously not hope to achieve any fruitful results without the goodwill of all the parties concerned. For this reason, it was the Governor's view that the terms of reference would perforce have to be widened. He thought that the terms of reference which the Governor was about to suggest would meet the point, without in fact compelling the Commission to deal with the question in detail other than in regard to the copper industry. The line of approach which he thought the Commission might take under these terms of reference was that the problem of advancement could be tackled satisfactorily in the first instance only in respect of the two main industries employing Africans at present, i.e. the copper mines and the railways; so far as the railways were concerned, the general principles in regard to African advancement set out by the Government in the Commission's terms of reference had already been laid down and accepted in the formula covering this matter to which the railway authority, when it was set up, would be committed; and until the railway authority had been set up under the nationalisation arrangements and had had time to consider the application of the formula in detail it would serve little purpose for the Commission to enquire further into African advancement in this field. If the matter were tackled along these lines, the result would be that the Commission would in effect confine itself to the copper industry.

Mr. Cohen suggested in discussion with Mr. Hudson that, with wide terms of reference, there was a danger of giving the Southern Rhodesia Government the impression that we were seeking to rush matters on the railways. Mr. Hudson agreed that it would be necessary to keep the Southern Rhodesian authorities informed, but thought that this possible difficulty could easily be settled by personal contact between Sir John Waddington and Sir G. Huggins.

The position in regard to the approach by the companies to the Union was clarified at an interview which Mr. Cohen gave this morning at their own request to Mr. Taylor and Mr. Prain. Mr. Taylor and Mr. Prain came to say that they had instructed their local representatives to take up the question of the scope of the Commission with the Union, in accordance with Mr. Taylor's undertaking to the Secretary of State. The local managements had however replied that they were doubtful about making such an approach, on the grounds that either the Union would refuse to consider the suggestion in the absence of information of the Government's further intentions or, if the Union were prepared to discuss the matter and this were followed by an early announcement by Government of the appointment of a Commission, the

Union might very well turn round and accuse the companies of having come to an arrangement with the Government behind their backs. Mr. Taylor and Mr. Prain said that they thought the attitude of the companies was understandable, considering that they did not have the background information which had been made available to themselves by the Secretary of State, and that there was considerable force in the managements' point that it might prejudice the attitude of the Union towards the Commission if the companies were to make the proposed approach to the Union before the appointment of the Commission was announced by Government. They emphasised however that they did not wish to go back on their undertakings to the Secretary of State, and suggested that, if Government would make an early announcement about the Commission, they would then instruct their managements to open discussion with the Union on the lines proposed.

Mr. Cohen informed them that the situation had now somewhat changed, in that the Governor had expressed serious doubts whether the proposed approach to the Union had any chance of success; and that therefore the Secretary of State would have to consider whether widened terms of reference might not after all be necessary. He explained that, even with widened terms of reference, it seemed likely that the attention of the Commission would in fact be confined to the Copperbelt; and Mr. Taylor and Mr. Prain intimated that the companies would still be prepared to cooperate with the Commission on this basis.

It therefore now remains to take the decision whether or not we are to accept widened terms of reference as proposed by the Governor at (85), and it will be desired to submit the papers to the Secretary of State on this point. If the Union is in fact adamant on the question of the scope of the Commission, it would appear that the only hope of achieving any useful results will be to meet them on the terms of reference. There would seem to be no advantage in postponing this decision any longer, and it is essential to go ahead with the arrangements for the Commission as quickly as possible. If the decision is to accept the Governor's recommendations, I do not think we could materially improve upon the terms of reference suggested in paragraph 1 of (85), modified in accordance with paragraph 2. I enclose a draft telegram for consideration on this basis.

As regards the personnel of the Commission, please see the letter from Mr. Dalglish at (84). I consulted Mr. Dalglish about the problem of re-appointing Mr. Smith without Mr. Kelly, and it will be seen that his only doubt is in regard to the possible reaction of the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers Union. We also mentioned this point to Mr. Hudson. His view was that the Union were not likely to raise any objection unless Mr. Kelly himself took offence at being dropped and communicated this to them. I must say that I do not think we can altogether rule out this possibility; I think Mr. Kelly's visit has strengthened the connection between the Northern Rhodesia Union and the National Union of Mineworkers (cf. the latter's attempt to champion Mr. Maybank's cause since Mr. Kelly's return) and Mr. Kelly has demonstrated over the matter of the slight delay in paying him his honorarium and expenses that he is perhaps quick to take a hurt. The Secretary of State will no doubt wish to consider this point also, and will perhaps think it desirable to consult the Governor as I have suggested in the enclosed draft.

Should it be decided that it would be advisable not to invite Mr. Smith again, Mr. Dalglish has suggested three other employers in his letter at (84). Particulars of Mr. Main and Mr. Gracie are given in the letter from the Ministry of Labour at (12)

herein. Mr. Main was in fact one of Mr. Dalglish's original suggestions for the Copperbelt Conference and this was endorsed by Mr. Bevan and Mr. Holloway at the Ministry of Labour. In point of fact we approached Mr. Main before approaching Mr. Smith. Mr. Main was very much interested, as will be seen from his letters at (22) and (25) herein, but was compelled to decline the invitation. I feel that there would be a fair chance of obtaining his services, if he is now free.

As regards the Trade Union member for the Commission, it will be seen that Mr. Dalglish now thinks that Mr. Gregory (whom on Mr. Dalglish's recommendation we had in mind to appoint to the Conference before it was decided to meet the Union's request for a representative of the National Union of Mineworkers) may not be *persona grata* with the T.U.C. on account of his supposed communist leanings. As we are in any event in a somewhat delicate position with the T.U.C., in that we propose to drop their previous nominee Mr. Kelly and make a direct appointment without consulting them, I think that it might be as well to avoid anybody to whom the T.U.C. might be able to raise a definite objection. Mr. Dalglish suggests as alternatives Mr. Young or Mr. Brotherton. Both of them were in fact approached by Mr. Dalglish for the Conference but were unable to accept. Mr. Young was Mr. Dalglish's first choice and was also recommended to us by the Ministry of Labour; his particulars are flagged in 45344/10/46 below. If the Secretary of State agrees, I suggest that we should ask Mr. Dalglish to approach Mr. Young again. Mr. Dalglish expects to return to England on the 2nd–3rd August.

N.D.W.  
31.7.47

**23** CO 537/4690, no 19

16 Feb 1948

[Northern Rhodesia—politics and personalities]: letter from R C S Stanley (acting governor) to Mr Creech Jones

I have the honour to refer to correspondence ending with your telegram No. 40 of 23rd January on the subject of the course of political events since the departure of Sir John Waddington, with particular reference to the recent statement by Sir Stewart Gore-Browne of the demand of unofficial members of Legislative Council for a form of 'responsible government'. I feel that it may be useful, on the eve of Sir Gilbert Rennie's arrival, to summarise, for the purpose of general record, the essential trend of these events against the background of existing conditions in this territory.

2. I have no wish to add to the already voluminous literature on the subject of economic and social conditions in Northern Rhodesia. This territory is already well documented. What is needed is a little time to get problems into perspective and to organise the machinery for dealing with them. In a word, the essential problems are inadequacy of communications, paucity of population to provide the needs of expanding industry, the lack of educated opinion among the indigenous population and with one or two exceptions (notably the Barotse) the weakness of the Native Authorities and the inadequacy of their resources in terms of money and talent. To these should be added the problem created by an obstreperous and for the most part colour conscious European minority, which exerts an increasing and more exigent

criticism and control over the plans and policies of government, to such an extent as to cause on occasion something approaching paralysis of normal administrative functions. No doubt the problem is no more complex or acute than those existing in other African colonial territories, but it is sufficiently serious to demand close and careful study.

3. It is the disproportionate influence that it exerts, as well as the ingredients of which it is composed, that necessitate the focusing of attention upon the European element. Although there have recently been great advances in African education, it must still be many years before a responsible body of African public opinion can emerge from the general mass of the population. From what I have been able to observe in the short time that has elapsed since my arrival in the country of the working and development of African local government I have no reason to suppose that the existing system of African administration and of African councils will not in time build up a sense of responsibility and confidence among traditional African leaders, and at the same time provide for the slowly emerging middle class a reasonable and adequate means for the expression of their aspirations. But it will be a slow progress [sic] requiring much patience and uninterrupted guidance by the administrative staff.

4. The main elements of the European community consist of the miners (about 4,000), the farmers (only some 600 but they exercise an influence disproportionate to their numbers) and the missionaries. There is also a sizeable and growing commercial community among whom, for convenience of classification, the managers and high executive officers of the mines may be included. Of these elements the missionaries require little comment. Except for an occasional misfit, representing the more extreme forms of ignorant evangelism, they are a worthy, loyal and devoted body of men and women whose presence contributes a great deal that is of value, not only in the practical instruction of the African but to the uplifting of moral standards and the maintenance of human dignity. They may be counted upon as the industrious and loyal allies of government in any task looking to the betterment of African social conditions. The farmers as a class are honest, decent folk, with a practical common sense outlook, but they are understandably interested primarily in obtaining the best prices they can for their produce. There is a steadily increasing Afrikaner farming population which has a developed South African Nationalistic outlook, and which contains many bad employers of labour. What I have described as the commercial community contains some of the more thoughtful and responsible element among the European population, but it is at best an element that will give no more than theoretical acknowledgement to the principles that should govern the administration of Africans in accordance with accepted British colonial policy. The Mine Managers, again understandably, for heavy financial issues are at stake, are for industrial peace at almost any price and, it may be assumed, would be reluctant to take any side likely to bring them into active conflict with either their European or their African employees. The European mine workers constitute the greatest single human problem in the territory. Many of them are of Afrikaner descent and their outlook towards the 'Native' is coloured accordingly. It would be true to say that they stand in fear of the African—it is mostly an economic but partly a physical fear. They are determined that their position shall not be usurped by the Africans and that prospects for their children shall not be diminished in the field of skilled labour. Many of them acknowledge no permanent stake in the

country, and a certain number are adventurers pure and simple who have no other desire than to make as much hay as possible while the sun shines. These mine workers are powerfully organised into a Mine Workers' Union which, while paying lip service to the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', has in fact no intention of allowing increased opportunities to Africans if thereby European workers will now or at some future time be displaced.

5. Against this human background two figures stand out in sharp relief—Mr. Roy Welensky, leader of the unofficials in Legislative Council, and Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, nominated member of Legislative Council representing African interests, and member of Executive Council. Both these gentlemen are well known to you. Mr. Welensky is a self-made man with a forceful, energetic and in many ways likeable character. He is always leading with his left and he enjoys a good fight. He is inordinately vain. That, and his inability to acknowledge himself to be in the wrong are his principal weaknesses. But the picture of him as a forthright, tub thumping, self-educated politician omits something for which it is necessary to look if he is to be understood. I might be thought guilty of fanciful language if I were to describe it as a mystical element, but be it what it may, it exists—and it is the secret of his genius. He would like to leave politics and Northern Rhodesia if he could obtain remunerative work to his liking in Southern Rhodesia.

6. Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, though a far more tortuous personality is, I feel, in some ways easier to understand. He too is a man of drive and energy who has succeeded, not without a hard fight, in his enterprises. His estate at Shiwa Ngandu, which I recently visited, is an example of what taste, ingenuity and vision can create out of the unpromising soil of the African bush. The estate is well organised and well managed, and his employees are contented. He has grown some magnificent timber and built a house in the baronial manner which needs only a roaring fire of logs and a great dane to complete the illusion of a medieval manor house. He has a wide acquaintance among the Africans of the middle class and a considerable influence over them, an influence which has, however, been seriously and perhaps irretrievably shaken by his recent speech demanding responsible government. He has moreover been unhappy in his private life—his wife is no longer with him—and it is easy to believe that this has engendered disappointment and bitterness. It is not only upon Africans that his peculiar fascination is exerted. He is a close political ally of Mr. Welensky, in whom one detects a happier and healthier frame of mind when he is not or has not recently been in close companionship with Sir Stewart. I would not go so far as to say that I believe Mr. Welensky would on any occasion let his personal ambitions stand before the welfare of the country but I am sure—and this opinion is held by many—that Sir Stewart would let nothing impede the satisfaction of his personal amour propre. Some of my advisers believe that Mr. Welensky is preparing to drop his political pilot, Sir Stewart, and there is some evidence to support this.

7. I have devoted some space to these personalities because an understanding of them is essential to the appreciation of the present political situation here. When Mr. Welensky was a member of Executive Council the administration of the government worked happily and smoothly. It was his decision to break out of the official fold that has been one of the main contributing factors leading to the recent deterioration in the political atmosphere. I had a long talk with him soon after my arrival in Northern Rhodesia, and he then told me frankly that his policy of attack was deliberate and that it was his intention if necessary to bring the administration to the point of

paralysis in order to compel acceptance of his policy of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. He added that he was only deterred in this by his realisation that a policy of obstruction might seriously impede the implementation of the important projects in the ten year development plan. He concluded by saying that even though in opposition he felt impelled by his personal regard for Sir John Waddington to give whatever assistance he could 'off the record', and that I might consider him at my disposal in a similar manner.

8. In fact this creates an extraordinary and difficult position. Mr. Welensky usually gives honest and valuable advice, but the situation is such that it is almost a waste of time for government to take any major decision unless steps have first been taken to ascertain Mr. Welensky's personal view as leader of the unofficial majority in Legislative Council. The obvious means for such consultation would be for Mr. Welensky to accept re-nomination to Executive Council but this, he has made it abundantly clear, he is not prepared to do. Although he has devoted time and trouble to assisting government in its problems this does not affect his general policy of attack in Legislative Council. During the last meeting of Council it is not unfair to say that the tactics of the unofficial members have been to criticise, chastise and embarrass government by whatever means they could find. It is, however, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne who has been the spearhead of this movement, and it was he who was responsible for the personal attack against me in reply to my address—an attack of which I have reason to believe some of the unofficial members feel a little ashamed. It was also Sir Stewart Gore-Browne who made the declaration on the subject of the unofficials' demand for responsible government. My comments telegram No. 22 of the 13th January and your reply to this statement has now been made public.

9. Public reactions to this demand have already been communicated to you in the form of reports and summaries under cover of my secret despatch No. 8 of the 7th February. Reports generally indicate that there has been less comment and speculation than might have been expected among Europeans, who, if not altogether apathetic, have displayed little disposition to express their views through the press or by other channels. It is, however, no doubt true that the majority of the white population would be on the side of the unofficials against the government on any constitutional issue because they believe that increased power for elected members would ensure the protection of their interests against African competition and generally because of a feeling of dislike against the imagined restraints of Downing Street. There have, however, been numerous indications that African opinion is far from happy at the latest developments. I have already transmitted to you a newspaper cutting containing a letter written by Godwin M. Lewanika,<sup>1</sup> who is prominent among the African intellectuals, and a despatch is now in preparation referring to representations made by the Paramount Chief of the Barotse that if responsible government is given to Northern Rhodesia Barotseland shall be given the status of a separate protectorate. There is no doubt that Sir Stewart Gore-Browne's statement has greatly shaken the confidence that the Africans had in him and that his position as their champion has been substantially weakened. It is reported that some Africans have said that he should no longer represent them in Legislative Council.

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<sup>1</sup> Godwin Lewanika, a member of the ruling house of Barotseland. Served as president of the Northern Rhodesian ANC.

10. The unofficials have made much of their unity in putting forward their demand for responsible government but there is reason to believe that this unity is not as real as they profess it to be. Mr. Norman Cook, nominated member of Legislative Council, has informed the acting Chief Secretary that he is not in agreement with the threat to paralyse government and I am given to understand that the Rev. E.G. Nightingale, nominated member of Legislative Council representing African interests, intends to dissociate himself at the next meeting of Council from certain parts of the statement and intends to offer his resignation to the unofficials' Association. Of the views of the Bishop, who as representative on the Council of African interests might also have been expected to take an independent line, I have no knowledge. But it seems most unlikely that unofficials will be able to maintain a united front in pressing home their demand.

11. It is easier to diagnose than to cure these political growing pains. It is understandable that unofficial members of Legislative Council, once given a taste of power, should feel the desire for closer control of executive policy. This could have been quite easily achieved by a more co-operative attitude, as for instance when unofficial members of Standing Finance Committee were invited by me to discuss the estimates round the table with the official members of Executive Council. I see no prospect that, even were it politically desirable, a sufficient number of Europeans with adequate qualifications could be found to form a government and an opposition under any form of responsible government; but apart from this it is difficult to feel that the establishment of responsible government would be justifiable for many years to come. The African population is not ready for such a step, and will not be ready until a body of educated African opinion has emerged, which cannot be for some years. Were such a form of Government ever introduced it would have to ensure adequate protection of African interests, and it is not easy to see how with the existing human material such a constitution could be devised. I feel that consideration might well be given to advancing to the stage of Unofficial 'Members' as contemplated in A.G.C.<sup>2</sup> paper No. 2, but I believe that it will be necessary, if political stability is to be achieved, for an announcement to be made in unequivocal terms of the limits to which unofficial members can expect constitutional progress to proceed within the foreseeable future. This is a matter to which Sir Gilbert Rennie will doubtless give consideration when he has had an opportunity of forming his own views on the situation.

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<sup>2</sup> African Governors' Conference, held in the UK in Nov 1947. For background papers and conference papers and meetings, see Hyam, ed, *The Labour government and the end of empire 1945-1951*, part I, 58-67.

**24** CO 537/3607

2 Mar 1948

[Campaign for closer association]: letter from Sir J Kennedy to Sir E Machtig

The question of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia appears to be coming to the fore again as you will see from the enclosed cuttings.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Enclosures not printed,

You will recollect that at the time of the General Election campaign in 1946 the United Party placed the question of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland prominently upon their programme. As a result of that election Sir Godfrey Huggins was placed in the position of having to form a minority government with the main opposition party (the Liberals) opposed to amalgamation and in consequence the question dropped from public notion until recently.

The Liberals, while openly opposed to amalgamation with either the north or the south, are strongly suspected of entertaining among their ranks several who would like to see Southern Rhodesia absorbed as a fifth province of the Union of South Africa. Fletcher,<sup>2</sup> as you may remember, voiced these suspicions most clearly in the closing stages of the debate on the Confidence Motion. Vide Hansard of 5th February transmitted under cover of my despatch No. 51 of 13th February.

Recently Captain F.E. Harris, who, after twelve years as Minister of Agriculture, has retired from active politics, and now fulfills the role of elder statesman, has after a flying visit to Northern Rhodesia where he met Mr. Welensky and unofficial members of the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council launched a committee in the Colony to promote the cause (see enclosure I). I have very good reason to believe that this move was, if not inspired by the Prime Minister, at least carried out with his blessing. I imagine that Sir Godfrey prefers, while the question of fusion with the Liberal Party is still undecided, not to place himself in the van of those who seek amalgamation.

Since the original announcement of Harris' plans Davenport,<sup>3</sup> speaking at Que Que on the 21st February is reported to have said that he believed Southern Rhodesia's immediate destiny is in amalgamation with the North and close-cooperation with the South leading to ultimate federation, a sentiment which he repeated in somewhat less emphatic terms at the banquet for the Federated Chambers of Commerce in Bulawayo two days later.

Huggins himself in opening the Congress of the Federated Chambers on the 23rd also declared himself in favour of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia and this declaration was enthusiastically endorsed by M.G. Fleming in his presidential address to the Federated Chambers.

Mr. Harris is now busy getting together his committee which is to embrace members of all political parties. He was seen to be having a very cordial luncheon party at the Salisbury Club a few days ago with Mr. Welensky and Mr. J.H. Smit, but I am inclined to doubt whether the latter is a convert to the greater Rhodesia idea.

It seems obvious that we shall see a quickening of interest in the amalgamation issue from now on. It is especially interesting to see that federations with our neighbours to the South, East and North are also being discussed, Davenport in his Que Que speech openly mentioning Moçambique, Angola and the Congo.

A copy of this letter is being sent to Sir Evelyn Baring.

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<sup>2</sup> P B Fletcher, SR minister of agriculture and lands, 1945–1951; minister of native affairs, 1951–1958.

<sup>3</sup> G A Davenport, SR minister of mines, commerce and transport, 1946–1948; minister of mines and transport, 1948–1953; minister of mines, lands and surveys, 1953–1956 & 1958.

**25** CO 795/156/4, no 28

7 Apr 1948

[Northern Rhodesian constitution]: letter from Sir G Rennie to A B Cohen. *Minute* by Cohen

In the long letter that I sent to you on the 6th April I referred to my proposal that the next constitutional step should be an increase in the number of Unofficial Members in Executive Council. At present we have seven Official Members in Executive Council—the Chief Secretary, Attorney General, Financial Secretary, Secretary for Native Affairs, Administrative Secretary, Economic Secretary and Director of Development—in my view two too many, but since the Administrative Secretary and Economic Secretary are both Secretaries in general control of certain departments, they must remain while the Secretary set-up remains as it is. Against the seven Official Members we have only one Unofficial Member representing African Interests. It is true that previously Welensky and Page were also members of Executive Council and that there were then three Unofficial Members. But even that number is too small and I myself would prefer to see it increased to four or even five, so long as the number of Official Members remains at seven.

I have informed the Unofficial Members of my views on this point and also made it clear that before the number of Unofficial Members could be increased to four or five His Majesty's instructions on the matter would have to be sought from the Secretary of State.

But that is only half the picture. As a corollary to such an increase as I propose it would be necessary to give Unofficial Members some assurance that the advice of the Unofficial Members on Executive Council would carry due weight. Their complaint is that under the present arrangement, even when they had three Members on Executive Council, their advice was not always sought on important matters and, when sought, it was not always taken. My own feeling is that we should go as far as we can to meet their wishes and their point of view. There is an Unofficial majority in Legislative Council and due regard must always be had to that fact during discussions in Executive Council—and elsewhere. It would be possible for Unofficial Members on Executive Council, in the event of a disagreement with their Official colleagues, to carry the argument to Legislative Council by means of a Motion, and to win the day in Legislative Council by means of their stronger voting power. (It would of course always be possible for the Governor to use his reserve powers when he considered it expedient to do so; I merely mention this point at this stage, to show that it has not been overlooked.) In the circumstances I consider that, if there were Unofficial Members in Executive Council in increased numbers or even on the former basis of three, their advice should normally be taken except in cases of the type where the Governor would use his reserved powers after debate in Legislative Council. I also consider that before Unofficial Members could be invited to return to Executive Council either on the former basis of three or on the proposed new basis of four or five, they should be given an assurance that, in the event of Unofficial Members returning to Executive Council, their advice would normally be taken save in the most exceptional circumstances. As the Chief Secretary suggested to Unofficial Members at the 'Hubert' meeting recently:—

'It might be possible to work out some formula with a view to reaching a "Gentleman's agreement" whereby what was already a de facto position in

most Executive Councils containing Unofficial Members might form the subject of an undertaking by the Governor, namely, that the Governor would not\* act contrary to the advice tendered by the majority of Unofficial Members on Executive Council. It was explained that consultation with the Secretary of State would be necessary before such an agreement could be entered into and that there could be no question of writing it into the Constitution, even if the Secretary of State agreed, until practical experience of working had been gained. It was made clear that the Governor would not accept the advice of Unofficial Members in any case in which it would be contrary to the Royal Instructions for him to do so, or in any case in which he would feel called upon to exercise his reserve powers.

The Chief Secretary also pointed out that much of the so-called interference by the Colonial Office was of an inter-national origin, and that this Government was repeatedly being called upon to carry out the provisions of International Conventions arising from U.N.O. and such organisations.'

My view is that in present circumstances here advance along the lines suggested above is more likely to lead to political peace and to greater efficiency in the Government machine than any extension of the 'Membership' system to Unofficial Members. As I mentioned in my letter under reference, Unofficial Members are at present strongly opposed to the 'Membership' system, so far as it involves bringing local people not members of the Government service, into the Government machine as Members of Executive Council in charge of groups of departments, and I do not consider that any useful purpose would be served at present by attempts to break down their opposition. I am hopeful that if Unofficial Members could be persuaded to serve on Executive Council under some such arrangement as I have suggested above, the next logical step viz., an extension of the Membership system to Unofficial Members, would soon commend itself to them.

I should be grateful for your comments on the above proposals. My feeling is that something on these lines might appeal to the Unofficial Members and give them a chance of dropping, for the time being at least, their Responsible Government proposals, which I think they now realise cannot be accepted in present circumstances. On the other hand, if we merely condemn their proposals and suggest nothing in their place, we shall spend all our time here squabbling with the Unofficial Members instead of getting on with the thousand and one urgent matters that need attention. A tremendous amount of useful preparatory work has been done here in recent years the results of which have not yet had time to show themselves; given a fair measure of political peace things should move fairly rapidly during the next few years. Let me make it clear that I am not out for political peace at any price, nor for a policy of appeasement. What I have suggested is in my view merely a fair deal to Unofficial Members, having regard to the fact that they already possess an Unofficial majority in Legislative Council. I am confident that with goodwill on both sides the proposal would be practicable. My experience as a Member of Executive Council in other Territories has shown me that it is seldom necessary to resolve any

\* The word 'normally' should have been inserted here in the Hubert note, I think, to make the position clearer, but clarification comes two sentences later.

question under consideration by vote, and I am advised that such is the position in this Territory.

To prevent any misunderstanding about my remarks in the second sentence of the preceding paragraph I should like to make it clear that, as I mentioned in my letter to you of the 6th April, there is not much prospect of the Unofficial Members, with the General Election before them, dropping their Responsible Government proposals before the Elections take place. When the new Council meets, however, Unofficial Members might be prepared to work on some such basis as I have suggested if their Responsible Government proposals prove to be unacceptable.

### Minute on 25

#### *Sir T. Lloyd*

The proposal put forward by Sir G. Rennie in his letter at No. 28 is a difficult one to deal with and I cannot pretend yet that either Mr. Burgess or I have reached a final view on the answer. In view, however, of No. 29, which requires an early reply, I am sending the papers on to you to read with such views as Mr. Burgess and I have in discussion been able so far to form. If we could have an early meeting to discuss the position I hope that we shall be able to come to it with rather more clear-cut ideas than we have at the moment.

No. 27 is an extremely useful background letter which I think is worth reading, with its enclosures, in spite of its great length. I do not propose to analyse it in this minute but it is clear that Sir G. Rennie had already made considerable progress in producing a more favourable atmosphere and introducing a few fresh ideas.

No. 28 contains Sir G. Rennie's proposals with regard to the Executive Council which, with his proposal regarding the Standing Finance Committee, represents his attempt to resolve the present deadlock with the Unofficial Members. Sir G. Rennie's proposals with regard to the Standing Finance Committee raise no difficulties for us and are obviously sound. As regards the Executive Council, he wants to bring on four or five Unofficials (these would include Sir S. Gore-Browne) *and* to bind himself to take their advice normally except where the use of the Governor's reserve powers was involved.

The first of these two proposals is less difficult than the second. Under the constitution shortly to come into force there will be on the Legislative Council ten European elected members, 9 Officials and 4 Unofficial Members representing African interests, of whom two will at present be Europeans nominated by the Governor and two Africans elected by the African Representative Council. It will, I think, be necessary in about three years' time to replace the two European representatives of African interests by two more Africans. It is these 14 Unofficial Members who are to be represented by four or five of their number on the Executive Council. It is clear that at least one of the four or five members must be a representative of African interests and I do not think that we can press for an African to be included at this stage. My own view would be that we should go for four Unofficial Members and insist on one of their number being one of the four representatives of African interests. At present it would be Sir S. Gore-Browne, but

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<sup>1</sup> C B Burgess, principal, East and Central Africa Dept, CO.

he may not of course stay on the Council after the election if he is not nominated by the Governor. I suggest that on the above basis we can accept this part of Sir G. Rennie's proposal.

It is the undertaking that the Governor would normally accept the views of the Unofficial Members of the Executive Council that gives rise to difficulty. This proposal is not formulated with absolute precision in No. 28. The Chief Secretary in his statement at the last meeting of the Legislative Council has talked of the Governor 'not acting contrary to the advice tendered by the *majority* of Unofficial Members on Executive Council'. This is not at all the same as the Governor binding himself not to go against the advice of *all* the Unofficial Members of the Executive Council. If it is merely the majority then in effect three Unofficial Members (i.e. the three representing European interests) would have a virtual power of veto only to be overridden on the very rare occasions when the use of the Governor's reserve powers would be justified. This might give the Unofficials if they so wished the power to paralyse the Government, which they certainly have not got at present and which, as you know, has been talked about earlier in these discussions.

Sir G. Rennie uses the argument on page 1 of his letter that the Unofficials, being in the majority on the Legislative Council, can beat the Government by means of a motion and that therefore there would be no objection to putting them into the same position in the Executive Council. This argument is logical if it applies to the opinion of all the Unofficials on Executive Council and I think we should insist on this rather than the majority. I am still not very happy personally about a formula of the kind suggested; but we have got to find some way out of the deadlock and I daresay that Sir G. Rennie is right in thinking that kind of arrangement the best way. At any rate we ought to do everything we can to support him.

As regards No. 29, the proposal is that the Governor and two or three Unofficial Members should fly to London as soon as possible after the meeting of the African Representative Council in July. This in effect probably means early August, a very inconvenient time. Sir G. Rennie thinks that it would be unwise to defer discussions until the Unofficial Members are in London for the African Conference or alternatively until the Secretary of State visits Northern Rhodesia towards the end of the year, if he does. Obviously we cannot clear this point up definitely until the Secretary of State is back. I cannot say that I am enthusiastic about seeing a delegation in early August. That is a point which I should very much like to discuss with you.

A.B.C.  
16.4.48

**26** CO 537/3647

29 May–1 June 1948

[Impact of South African general election]: minutes by A B Cohen,  
Sir T Lloyd and Mr Rees-Williams

[In the South African general election of May 1948, the National Party under D F Malan defeated the United Party and ended the premiership of Jan Smuts. This victory for Afrikaner nationalism threatened both a hardening of racial segregation and a deterioration in South Africa's relations with Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth]

*Sir T. Lloyd*

*Mr. Rees-Williams*

My own view is that it would be premature to consult Governors about the effect of the South African Election on our own territories. It is probable that no clear tendency will develop for some weeks or even months, and until we see what line the new South African Government is going to take I do not think that we shall get much useful information out of our Governors. The Commonwealth Relations Office, of course, receive regular reports from the High Commissioner in the Union and we get copies of these when they are of interest to the Colonial Office. Under the new machinery for collecting political information, moreover, we are to establish close touch with the Commonwealth Relations Office on Union affairs. I would therefore very much like to await these further reports before considering any special enquiries being sent to Governors.

As regards the specific points raised in Mr. Rees-Williams' minute I should like to make the following comments:—

(a) It is, of course, quite possible that the change of Government in South Africa may affect the attitude of the people in Southern Rhodesia, who will be more anxious than ever to maintain the United Kingdom and British as opposed to the South African and Dutch connection. Whether this is likely to give a fillip to the movement in Southern Rhodesia for amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia it is too early to say. At present this movement is very limited in Southern Rhodesia.

I should like to be allowed to wait for six months before expressing any opinion on this point. I do not myself believe that the change of Government will have any marked effect on opinion in Northern Rhodesia. The unofficials there are guided mostly by parochial considerations and they will keep up their pressure for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia irrespective of the change of Government in South Africa. We shall hear more about this when the Northern Rhodesia delegation comes here in July.

Mr. Rees-Williams refers in his minute to going ahead more speedily with our desire for the economic union of the Central African territories. I do not think that Government policy has yet gone quite as far as a desire for economic union. The declared policy which has been followed up vigorously under the ægis of the Central African Council calls for the closest possible co-ordination in *all* matters of common interest, including prominently economic affairs. We cannot, in my view, go further than this until Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are sufficiently advanced to express a really valuable opinion on the question of closer political union. At that stage, which may be a considerable time off, I think that we must look to some form of federation, but at present I think that we must confine ourselves to the working of the Central African Council and secure a closer degree of co-ordination.

(b) The Union Mining Industry cannot effectively carry on without labour from outside, including Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. If—and I think this most unlikely—the change of Government involves a change for the worse in policy with regard to labour in the mines, then we may have to reconsider the granting of quotas for recruitment in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. I do not believe that the Mining Industry, with their strong influence, would ever allow the Union Government to prejudice their labour supply. We must, however, wait to see how events move.

(c) I have no doubt whatever that the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff will be examining the defence position in the light of the change of Government. We shall no doubt be consulted as necessary.

A.B.C.  
29.5.48

*Mr. Rees Williams*

*S. of S.*

I agree with Mr. Cohen.

If we ask Governors for their views before we can give them any clear idea of the policy of the Union Govt. all that we could expect to get is personal speculation.

T.I.K.L.  
31.5.48

*S. of S.*

I am grateful for Mr. Cohen's views on the points I raised. As the minister responsible to the S. of S. for Intelligence I must however point out that the foundation of Intelligence is to make intelligent forecasts on the material available. The Geographical Departments wished to undertake this rather than have a separate department set up. We *know* what Dr. Malan's policy is. He fought the election on it. We can *estimate* to what extent he will be able to activate it. But the estimates made already by other people have had an economic and political effect as well as the actuality e.g. the marking down of stocks by £25 million in one day. I shall be interested to see an appreciation from the Commonwealth Relations Office and in the light of it. I suggest that we can communicate with the Governors. This, however, will not deal with their colony's internal reactions and I would have thought that we could now with profit ask them to observe or forecast the reactions of people in their territories and report them to us.<sup>1</sup>

D.R.W.  
1.6.48

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<sup>1</sup> Creech Jones minuted: 'Seen'.

## **27** CO 795/156/5

24 June 1948

[Northern Rhodesian constitution]: minute by C E Lambert

[In advance of talks on constitutional advance in London in July 1948, NR unofficials submitted proposals for the introduction of 'responsible' government.]

*No 43.* The intention behind the proposals of the unofficials is 'to make the Executive in Northern Rhodesia responsible to the legislature and through the legislature to the inhabitants of the country.' The set up of the proposed constitution is flagged A. in Part I. The Governor would be the link with the Secretary of State. He would have the power of veto. The Chief Secretary would be the link between the Crown and the Executive Council (or Cabinet). The *Executive Council* or Cabinet would be composed of the Chairman of the unofficial members of Legislative Council; two other elected members of the Legislative Council; one member of Legislative Council

representing Africans, to be selected by the African Members of Legislative Council and the European members representing African interests, who would for the time being, be a European; and three official members (the Attorney General, the Financial Secretary and one other official member of the Legislative Council). The Chairman of the unofficial members of Legislative Council would preside over the Executive Council and be a minister in charge of a group of departments, as would be the two other elected members. The member representing Africans would be the member for African affairs. The *Legislative Council* would consist of ten European elected members; three Europeans representing African interests; two Africans elected by the African Representative Council; one African representing Barotseland, i.e. 16 unofficial members of whom 6 would represent African interests: there would be 4 official members. The set up in 1948 is to be 14 unofficials and 9 officials.

The Governor is in favour of extending the responsibilities of the unofficials but does not recommend that their present proposals should be accepted. He has had full discussions with them, and as an earnest of his desire to secure their co-operation and to extend their responsibilities he suggested that the Standing Finance Committee should be enlarged to include four or five unofficials and that everything with financial implications should be referred to the Committee which would thus have a considerable influence on the framing of policy. He also suggested that the Executive Council should be enlarged by the appointment of four or five unofficials, and that it might be possible to have a 'Gentleman's agreement' under which the Governor would not act contrary to the advice tendered by the majority of unofficial members in Executive Council. There was no reason at all why the unofficials should not initiate policy. Sir Gilbert Rennie emphasised that his suggestions were without prejudice to the unofficials' own proposals and that they would have been made in any case. The unofficials rejected the Governor's suggestions.

The salient points in the Governor's despatch are:—

- (i) Africans are alarmed by the proposals which, if adopted, would, they consider, lead to amalgamation; and the bulk of African opinion is against the proposals;
- (ii) consideration might be given to the introduction of the 'Membership' system and this may be the ultimate solution, but the unofficials are opposed to it on the ground that they would become paid officials and would be required to 'cross the floor';
- (iii) less than two years have elapsed since the constitutional question was discussed at the Colonial Office with representatives of the unofficial members, and there has yet been no opportunity to judge of the effect of the changes agreed upon since they will not come into effect until after the forthcoming elections;
- (iv) the pros and cons of the proposals are set out in the document flagged B. (I do not attempt to summarise these, but the probability that the officials would be dragged into the political arena is most important—see para. 29 of the despatch);
- (v) the proposals are premature, and in certain respects impracticable. There is not a sufficient number of unofficials suitable for appointment to Cabinet rank; such unofficials as might be selected for ministerial posts lack adequate experience in the type of work they propose to undertake; Africans are not yet ready to play an appropriate part along with Europeans in any system of responsible Government; and the Governor is not satisfied that African interests would be adequately safeguarded; and it would be a mistake to embark on any form of responsible

Government before Africans are ready to share in the responsibility of administering the country.

(vi) the requirements of the situation will not be adequately met by a mere rejection of the unofficials proposals. The Governor doubts whether the unofficials expect them to be accepted and if they are rejected may be inclined to see what they can save from the wreck;

(vii) Sir Gilbert Rennie is considering whether an 'Unofficial Membership' system might be feasible. (I find it difficult to believe that you can have an 'Unofficial' Member paid from revenue).

The Governor will address the Secretary of State further as to the line of action which he recommends after he has had another talk with the unofficials. We can await his despatch which should arrive soon. Mr. Howard-Drake<sup>1</sup> will prepare a historical note.

*No. 49.* Mr. Welensky put a similar Motion in 1944. It was opposed by half the unofficials and was rejected. There is no objection to an extension of the life of the Council from three to five years—see S. of S's despatch No. 52 of 22nd April, 1944.

The answer the Governor is making seems suitable and I do not think that we need say anything on this telegram.

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<sup>1</sup> Assistant principal, CO.

## **28** CO 795/156/5

28 June 1948

### **[Closer association in Central Africa]: minute by A B Cohen**

I am sending on this file for information. Sir G. Rennie's despatch at No. 43, with its enclosures, is a valuable account of political developments in Northern Rhodesia up to the middle of May. It is a lucid document and does not require any further analysis than is made in Mr. Lambert's minute of the 24th June.<sup>1</sup>

We are expecting shortly to receive recommendations from the Governor as to the line to be taken with the delegation and in particular as to any concrete suggestions which might be made for resolving the present impasse. I must confess that at present I am not clear how the deadlock can be broken. I am quite clear that Sir G. Rennie is right in recommending the rejection of the Unofficials' proposals. At the same time, his own proposals for an increase in the unofficial membership of the Executive Council, with an understanding that the advice of the Unofficial Members would not normally be rejected, has been turned down by the Unofficials themselves. It is no use, I think, attempting to anticipate what Sir G. Rennie will recommend, specially before we know the results of the meeting of the African Representative Council.

One important factor in the situation is the report that as the result of meetings between Southern Rhodesia representatives (I think, but am not sure, unofficial representatives) and the Northern Rhodesia Unofficials federation has apparently been substituted for amalgamation as the political aim of the former amalgamationists. This is a highly interesting development and, I am sure, is in the right direction. I myself

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<sup>1</sup> See 27.

believe in the ultimate federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. This ought not, however, to come in my view until Africans of the two northern territories are in a position to take their part in the federal arrangements and to form a considered judgment on the question whether federation should be agreed to. Although the question of federation will not, I think, come up officially, Mr. Welensky is likely to put forward his views on the subject and we must clearly allow him to do so. In order to prepare for this part of the discussions I have to-day sent a telegram to Sir G. Rennie to ask for his comments on this subject and when we get them I shall discuss the matter with the Commonwealth Relations Office. I think it very important that Lord Elibank's motion on amalgamation in the House of Lords should not be taken before the discussions with the Northern Rhodesia representatives. I asked the Central African Department to see what they could do about this and Mr. Fraser has been in touch with Mr. Hendriks. Mr. Hendriks had previously himself approached Lord Elibank on the ground that it was undesirable to take this motion in the light of the South African election. We do not yet know what Lord Elibank is going to do but Mr. Hendriks thinks it very unlikely that the motion will in fact come on before the discussions with the Northern Rhodesia representatives.

As regards No. 49, I think that we ought to send a reply and I submit a draft herewith.

**29** CO 795/156/5

16 July 1948

**[Closer association in Central Africa]: minute by A B Cohen**

[Rennie had informed the CO on 18 June that Welensky wished to have a discussion with the secretary of state on the subject of 'federation' (Rennie to Creech Jones, 18 June 1948).]

*Sir T. Lloyd*

I hope that you will be prepared to write to Sir E. Machtig as in the attached draft and to take part in the meeting with him some time next week.

There has been what I believe will prove to be a very important development in political alignments in Central Africa. The United Central Africa Association has become active in Southern Rhodesia under the leadership of Captain Harris, formerly Minister of Agriculture in the Southern Rhodesia Government, a post which he abandoned some time ago on the ground of ill-health. He is a close friend of Sir G. Huggins and indeed the latter held down his portfolio of agriculture as well as his own for a very considerable time in order to keep Captain Harris in the Cabinet while he was away.

This association has, sensibly enough, seen that there is no chance of amalgamation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland being agreed to by H.M. Government in the near future, even if it was agreed to by everybody else concerned. They are therefore now putting forward federation as a political aim, thus seeking to find a way round the strong differences in native policy between the territories. They have been up to Northern Rhodesia and talked to the elected members and Mr. Welensky has now come round to the objective of federation. We do not yet know what Sir G. [sic] Gore-Browne's views are. He is always opposed to amalgamation and if he changed his view on this would lose whatever shreds of confidence the Africans

whom he represents may still have in him. He is probably for this reason not coming out too strongly in favour of federation since a large section of African opinion in Northern Rhodesia does not distinguish between it and amalgamation but I suspect we shall find when he gets here that he too favours federation as an aim.

I have asked Sir G. Rennie for his views on this subject but these have not yet been received. I will however send on before the meeting with Sir E. Machtig a statement of our views. We are having a domestic discussion on Saturday morning to formulate these.

As far as I am concerned personally, I have myself for some time taken the view that federation of the three territories should be the ultimate aim of policy—I have expressed that view in various minutes which I have written. I have felt, however, that federation could not come until the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had developed politically and were able both to take an intelligent decision on the question and to play an effective part in the federal arrangements. I am now, I must confess, beginning to wonder a little whether we are really right not to attempt to step forward towards federation (perhaps on the lines of the East Africa High Commission) in the fairly near future. The closer linking of a self-governing territory with two Protectorates would present very considerable administrative difficulties, but I do not believe that these would be insuperable.

There is clearly no possibility of getting a definite policy worked out before the discussions with the Northern Rhodesia delegation. All that Mr. Welensky wants to do is to put his personal views before the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State need, I think, only listen to them. But I do think it is rather important that we should clear our minds and discuss the matter with the C.R.O. before the delegation arrives and it is for that reason that we have raised the question. After the letter has gone off, if you approve, the papers should be recirculated urgently to Mr. Lambert for further consideration of the important letter at No. 52.

### **30** CO 795/156/5

20 & 21 July 1948

[Northern Rhodesian constitution]: minutes by C E Lambert and A B Cohen

In his despatch at (50) the Governor gave the reasons for his view that the Unofficials' proposals for the grant of what amounts to self-government should be rejected the most important of which are:—

- (a) they are strongly opposed by the African community;
- (b) the proposals do not provide satisfactorily for the care of African interests;
- (c) the administration of the Territory would be transferred from the hands of the Governor and his Executive Council to a Cabinet with an Unofficial majority, that majority being composed of Members who have had no real experience in the work they propose to undertake;
- (d) the proposals if adopted would involve permanent officials in politics.

We shall not know until after the elections (polling day is the 26th August) to what extent the electors agree with the Gore-Browne—Welensky proposals, but I imagine that they will secure a large measure of support.

I think that there is no doubt but that the Unofficials' proposals must be rejected, and our information is that they expect that this will happen. The Governor is, however, satisfied that in the interests of efficiency and good Government there is room for giving the Unofficial Members greater scope for assuming responsibility (though their complaint that they have no responsibilities at present seems to rest on their misunderstanding of their position on and the proper functions of the Executive Council) and he recommends that this be done. Sir Gilbert Rennie adds that the adoption of this course would be in the interests of political peace. It is, however, only 2 years since a reform of the constitution was agreed upon after discussions with the Unofficials and the reform does not come into effect until this year, so that we are faced with fresh demands even before there has been an opportunity to try out the new arrangements. If further responsibilities are granted to the Unofficials, how long will it be before they are agitating again for further reforms? However this may be, the Governor is satisfied that it would be in the interests of good Government to give the Unofficials greater responsibility. His proposals fall within the framework of present policy. They are:—

(1) There should be an expansion of the representation of Unofficials on Executive Council. At present there are 7 Official Members and 1 Unofficial Member representing African interests. Until recently there were 3 Unofficial Members but Mr. Welensky and Mr. Page have resigned. The Governor suggests that Unofficial representation should be increased to 4 or even 5 (the Department favours 4, of whom 1 should represent African interest) so long as there are 7 Official representatives. As a corollary to this arrangement, the Unofficials should be given an assurance that their views would carry due weight and the Governor feels that there might be a 'Gentlemen's Agreement' that he would not act contrary to the advice tendered by the majority of Unofficial Members of Executive Council.

(2) The 'Membership' system should be introduced but as the Unofficial Members would object to 'crossing the floor' by giving up their seats and becoming temporary Government officials, the Members should be 'Unofficial Members'.

Both these proposals have been discussed by the Governor with, and at first rejected by, the Unofficials, but Sir G. Rennie feels that they do not expect their request for self-government to be granted and he is hopeful that they would accept both (1) and (2) if the Secretary of State agrees that the proposed changes should be made.

As regards the proposals for the expansion of the Executive Council, the Governor has been informed (33 on Part 1) that the Department would be prepared to advise the Secretary of State to accept this provided that the 'Gentlemen's Agreement' would operate only when the views of the Unofficials were unanimous and in particular had the support of the Unofficial Member on Executive Council representing African interests. The Governor feels that this might raise difficulties as cases might well arise where it might be expedient to follow the majority opinion of Unofficial Members, even when not representing the majority view of the whole Council, subject to the safeguards that the Governor would not accept advice which was contrary to the Royal Instructions or on a matter in which he would, in the last resort, feel obliged to use his reserved powers or which was, in his opinion, prejudicial to African interests. I suppose that one reason for defining precisely a 'Gentlemen's Agreement' is that each party suspects that the other is not a

gentleman. It seems to me that a precise definition would be likely to lead to difficulties in practice. I doubt whether it is possible to produce a definition which would provide for every possibility and it would surely be best to have a simple 'Gentlemen's Agreement' to use every endeavour to make the new Executive Council function efficiently and harmoniously. As regards the proposal that there should be 'Unofficial Members' Sir G. Rennie does not say specifically what posts he has in mind but he refers to Agriculture and Natural Resources and adds that the Leader of the Unofficials might be a Member of Executive Council in charge of certain Departments. I consider that the introduction of the Membership system into Northern Rhodesia would be of advantage, in that it would enable Government to harness to its service the vigour and drive of the best of the Unofficials whose activities are at present unfortunately directed towards opposition of the Government. I should say that for the present the number of Unofficial Members should be restricted to 2. On reconsideration, I do not think that there are good reasons for not agreeing that the Members should retain their seats and be 'Unofficial Members'. Theoretically, it would be open to the Unofficials holding portfolio to criticize the Government but, as Sir G. Rennie says, it is impossible to provide against all eventualities and given goodwill, there is no reason why the arrangements should not work. If the holder of a portfolio felt very strongly that Government was failing in its duty to the country, he would presumably resign his portfolio and criticize Government as an ordinary elected Member. There is the position vis à vis East Africa to consider. There, the Members are, in fact, temporary Officials and are not elected Members of the Legislative Council. I have discussed with Mr. Wallace. He does not consider that the introduction of an 'Unofficial Membership' system in Northern Rhodesia would have undesirable repercussion in East Africa.

Sir G. Rennie mentions 3 further points which must be borne in mind in connection with any proposals for self-government:—

- (a) Northern Rhodesia is a Protectorate;
- (b) H.M.G.'s attitude to trusteeship as mentioned in paragraphs 65 to 67 of the Report of the Joint Select Committee on closer union in East Africa, and
- (c) the people of Barotseland would have to be consulted before any changes in the constitution affecting their position were made.

As regards (b) the Committee were of opinion that the trusteeship of natives must remain the function of His Majesty's Government but that the assistance of the non-native communities in carrying out this obligation should be encouraged to an increasing extent. Government should avail itself to the full of the local knowledge and experience of the Unofficial elements. In regard to (c), a despatch on 45080/1/48 shows that arising out of the demands of the Unofficial Members for self-government the Paramount Chief of Barotseland expressed anxiety concerning the position of himself and his people. They are apprehensive that the rights and privileges which they now enjoy by virtue of agreement would be imperilled by unofficial control of the legislature or by the amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia with the neighbouring territories. They want Barotseland to be proclaimed as a Protectorate. They have been assured that no changes in the constitution of Northern Rhodesia effecting Barotseland will be made without prior consultation and agreement with the Paramount Chief and his Council. If, as I assume they will be, the Unofficials'

proposals for self-government are rejected, then the points mentioned above do not give rise to any difficulty.

I consider that we should support the line which the Governor suggests should be taken by the Secretary of State. He suggests that the Secretary of State might consider it appropriate to open the discussions with an examination of the unofficials' proposals considered in the light of their further memorandum annexed as appendix 4 to the brief which has been prepared in the Colonial Office on this subject; the 'Pros and Cons' (appendix 3 to the brief) and para. 23 of the brief. Sir G. Rennie suggests that an early opportunity should be taken during the discussions to stress the fact that Northern Rhodesia is a Protectorate and to refer to H.M.G.'s attitude to trusteeship as mentioned in the Report of the Joint Select Committee. He suggests that there would come a point in the discussions when it would be appropriate to mention the new proposals with regard to the Executive Council and Unofficial Members, although he is anxious that the Delegation should not get the impression that their proposals were decided upon before they had had a chance to speak to them to the Secretary of State. The new proposals could be outlined by either the Secretary of State or Sir. G. Rennie and I suggest that it might be best to leave it to the Governor to introduce the new proposals. We cannot tell what course the discussions will take after this although as is said earlier in this minute, the Governor is hopeful that the new proposals will be acceptable to the unofficials. I do not think that it would be possible to go any further than the new proposals at present, but if they are rejected by the Unofficials it is probable that they will adopt an attitude of 'non-cooperation'; indeed, as we know, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne has stated in public that if their proposals are not accepted the Unofficials will take such steps as they can to paralyse the Government.

C.E.L.  
20.7.48

*Sir T. Lloyd*

You will wish to see Mr. Lambert's minute before the meeting to-morrow morning. You have already been provided with a copy of the long brief on this subject. It will have to be supplemented with something very much shorter giving the Secretary of State the substance of points for the discussions with the Northern Rhodesia delegation.

Briefly I think that the tactics should be as follows. Mr. Welensky, Sir S. Gore-Browne and Mr. Beckett should first be asked by the Secretary of State to develop the case for their proposals. The African representatives should then be given their say. After that the Secretary of State might raise some of the practical difficulties about the proposals which are set out in the second enclosure to the Governor's despatch at No. 43 (flagged B).

At a subsequent meeting the Secretary of State might ask Sir G. Rennie to put forward his proposals, which are:—

- (1) Strengthening and more effective use of the Standing Finance Committee.
- (2) 4 unofficials on the Executive Council, of whom 2 would have responsibility for groups of departments. These two members would not become temporary officials as in the Kenya system, but would retain their seats as unofficial members of the Legislative Council.
- (3) A general understanding that the officials and unofficials would work together on the Executive Council.

Having regard to the proposal to give two unofficials executive responsibility as Members, we must, I think, get away from the previous proposal for a gentlemen's agreement under which the Governor would be bound, except where the use of his reserve powers or the Royal Instructions were involved, to accept the majority advice of the unofficial members of the Council. Such an arrangement is not consistent with a system under which officials and unofficials both have responsibility as members of the Executive Council.

It is with regard to (2) that the obvious difficulty arises. It has hitherto been thought essential that, while the Governor retains the responsibility for policy, Members drawn from unofficial sources should become temporary officials. It is now proposed, however, in the Gold Coast not to raise this question in connection with the new constitutional proposals. The three African members of the Executive Council who it is proposed to make responsible for groups of departments would become in effect members of the Government but would not vacate their seats as elected members of the Legislative Council. Nor would they become officials. I suggest that we can accept a generally similar arrangement for Northern Rhodesia, provided that the unofficials are prepared to accept the spirit of (3) above and to agree that the officials and unofficials must work together on the Executive Council. It would not, I think, be consistent with the spirit of such an arrangement that unofficial members of the Executive Council *with* responsibility for groups of departments should be free to criticise their official colleagues.

Subject to what is said at our discussion to-morrow, I suggest that a brief note should be drawn up by the department before the meeting with the Secretary of State on Friday.

A.B.C.  
21.7.48

### **31** CO 537/3608, no 24

22 July 1948

#### **[Proposals for closer association in Central Africa]: CRO note of an inter-departmental meeting with the CO**

*Sir T. Lloyd* said that the delegation from Northern Rhodesia which would shortly be visiting this country would be certain to raise the question of some form of closer association with Southern Rhodesia. The Central African Council was a first stage in co-operation between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, but the Council could not remain as it was indefinitely and we should begin to think about its evolution. The Bledisloe Commission did not consider that a federation between a self-governing Colony and Protectorates was feasible but Sir Thomas Lloyd wondered if something could be devised on the lines of the East African High Commission with an Assembly which would have responsibility for common services.

The advantages and disadvantages of 'federation' were then discussed. It was generally thought that the chief difficulty was the fact that the U.K. Government would wish to keep control over native policy in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and that in any form of association Southern Rhodesia would have to give up some of her self-governing rights. It was agreed that the term 'federation' should be avoided as not being appropriate to the case.

*Mr. Gordon Walker* thought that the solution was to reserve to the local governments and legislatures certain subjects of which native policy was one, and for the United Kingdom Government to continue to exercise control over Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for these reserved subjects. The United Kingdom Government would no longer control subjects allotted to the Central Legislature.

On the question of the proposed new Assembly, *Sir Eric Machtig* enquired whether the Legislature would be purely European. If not, he thought that Southern Rhodesia would be unlikely to join it.

*Mr. Cohen* thought that our policy should not be determined by constitutional difficulties for which some solution could no doubt be found, but should look to the ultimate future of the territories. It was important that the border of countries accepting the U.K. Government attitude towards native problems should be as far south as possible. He thought that the agitation for a federation or amalgamation from Europeans in Northern Rhodesia came from a sense of frustration and that this would expend itself if the Europeans were playing a useful part in a Central African Assembly. He thought that an early move should be made to constitute an Assembly for a limited range of subjects.

*Sir Eric Machtig* pointed out that Southern Rhodesian concurrence could not be assumed and that Southern Rhodesian pressure was more likely to be for Dominion status. *Mr. Clark*<sup>1</sup> thought that probably the Northern Rhodesian move was not spontaneous but was largely due to the recent visit of the Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association delegates.

It was agreed that a further informal meeting should be held after the Secretary of State for the Colonies had met *Mr. Welensky* and ascertained his views. It would almost certainly be necessary to discuss future constitutional developments with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia if he came to the Prime Minister's Meeting in October, and this would afford an opportunity of sounding him as to the possibility of a change such as had been suggested.

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<sup>1</sup> W A W Clark.

## **32** CO 525/205, 44248/48, no 7

23 July 1948

[Nyasaland constitution]: letter from G F T Colby to A B Cohen

I am grateful for your letter No. 44248/48 of the 11th June. As I said in my telegram No. 371, I wish to submit some further views on the Constitution to the Secretary of State before any announcement is made in connection with the changes that are now contemplated, and I am afraid I shall have to write at some length and set out in detail the development of my own reactions to the problem.

2. You will recollect that we had some discussions on this subject in London and I also had the opportunity of seeing the Secretary of State on this matter. My preliminary reactions to the questions involved were inevitably coloured by experience in West Africa and I was naturally surprised that on the one hand there was no African representation in the Legislature, and on the other that there had been some opposition, on the part of the European community, to the creation of an unofficial majority. I informed both the Secretary of State and

yourself that I would endeavour to submit proposals to correct both these aspects of the Constitution as soon as I was in a position to do so after arriving in the territory.

3. I accordingly studied the papers here almost immediately I arrived, and gave you some preliminary views in my letter of the 27th April and recommended the appointment of two African and an Indian member as an interim measure. I should say now that I feel quite confident that that recommendation was sound and I wish to confirm it.

4. At the time I wrote my previous letter I had not had an opportunity of seeing anything of Africans who might be considered for appointment to the Legislative Council, nor of gauging the attitude of the European community in general. During the past three months I have had the opportunity of meeting both Africans and Europeans and have been able to form some definite impressions in that time.

5. I have been very surprised at the backward state of development of Africans in general and at the paucity of candidates capable of playing a useful part in the Legislative Council in particular. The Africans of this territory I find, on further acquaintance, are very much less advanced than I could have thought before I arrived here. This does not mean that I think that Africans should not be appointed to the Legislative Council; on the contrary, if they are not so appointed they will have no opportunity of acquiring experience. Their backwardness has, however, another aspect and it is my opinion that in the early stages at any rate, the African members likely to be appointed to the Legislative Council will not have sufficient education and background really to appreciate the full implications of many questions likely to come before the Legislature, and consequently it seems likely that they might well be influenced to vote against measures designed for the benefit of the African community.

6. I now propose to deal with my impressions of the European unofficial community. Before doing so, however, I should like to record that there are among the unofficial community a number, albeit a small number, of public spirited, liberal minded, honest and able individuals. The majority, however, I cannot so describe, and I must confess that, as a result of meeting a considerable number, I have been forced to the conclusion that there is an influential section of the European community which is reactionary and unsympathetic to African aspirations. While I have no wish to offer adverse comment on past administration, I have no option but to endeavour to describe the situation as it appears to me to exist at the present time, and I feel bound to say that I get the very strong impression that, in this territory, past policy has been devised very largely to the benefit of the Europeans, and that the African has not had his fair share of consideration or attention. As an instance of the attitude of the European community I should like to refer to the enclosure to my letter of the 21st May recording an interview with Kaye Nicol<sup>1</sup> and, as an instance of policy being directed to the benefit of the European community, I should like to quote the Fiscal Survey and the comments in my despatch No. 69 of 9th July, 1948. This reactionary section of the community has been content to keep in the

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<sup>1</sup> The local representative of the British Central Africa Company: a figure in whom colonial officials had little confidence.

background in the past, and it seems to me that the reason is fairly clear and is that they have had things their own way to a great extent.

7. The background to the constitutional question in this territory then appears to me to be:—

(a) a lack of capacity on the part of Africans to play a full part in the Legislative Council; and

(b) a European community which contains an influential reactionary section.

8. Against this background stands a territory which, after years of penury, now has its first chance of real development, and in which, before development can become a reality, there must be not only increases in taxation in order to provide and improve basic services—including the social services, but also substantial reforms particularly in the field of labour.

9. The unofficial side of the present Legislative Council contains the best of the unofficial element: in Barrow we have a man of quite outstanding capacity and integrity; he is liberal minded and far seeing and I find his advice and experience invaluable. Hadlow and [FD] Warren are also most helpful, liberal minded and sympathetic to African aspirations. With these men as unofficial members of the Council we can look forward, in the course of the next two or three years, to a broad-minded reaction to the measures which must inevitably be introduced with the object of raising the deplorably low standards of the Africans in this territory, and, although I have no doubt that from time to time they would oppose some of the measures likely to come before the Council, such as taxation measures, they would do so not always from conviction but sometimes with an eye to the European community in general. With the official majority we can look forward with confidence to laying down the foundations of African prosperity and paving the way for development in every direction, including political evolution. If we were to announce now that the constitution would be changed in a comparatively short time and an unofficial majority conceded, I should anticipate that the situation would develop broadly on the following lines. We should proceed with the present membership of the Legislative Council. During that time we should introduce a number of measures in the Council designed to the benefit of the African community. Some of these measures might be opposed by existing European unofficial members, but some of them would undoubtedly be supported. The reactionary element would become alarmed and, when the time came for the change in the constitution, I should anticipate that those members of the present Council who show a realistic and tolerant approach to African aspirations would be replaced by the more reactionary element, and this would mean that, when the new constitution was introduced, we should have a Council, in so far as the European selected members were concerned, which would consistently oppose any progressive measures. I realise that in the suggested constitution there is provision for nominated unofficial members, and it is, of course, extremely difficult to gauge what their reactions would be and they would, in any event, be placed in a most difficult position. On the one hand, if they supported Government they would be stigmatised as 'yes men' and the unofficial majority branded as a sham, and on the other, if they opposed Government, progress would be impossible. There would also be the African and Indian members. The Indian members, I feel sure, would, generally speaking, vote with the European unofficials. The actions of the African

members would be difficult to predict, but in their present state of development I feel that we could not rely, as I have already suggested earlier in this letter, on their support in introducing measures designed for the benefit of the African community. We should, therefore, have to face the possibility of being saddled with a Council which might well bring African progress to a standstill and result in a stalemate.

10. It is, perhaps, possible to look even beyond this stage to a time when the African members in particular, and African public opinion in general, would realise what had been happening, and it might be the signal for the development of bitter anti-European feeling in a country which, on standards in other parts of Africa, is singularly free from such feeling.

11. In other words, by granting an unofficial majority now—for which at present there is no strong demand and to which there is even opposition—we shall run the risk of making progress difficult and of creating political problems which may well impair relations between black and white.

12. Contrast the proposed interim constitution—African aspirations will be met, they will gain experience and will have a voice in affairs, they will have as their colleagues the best of the Europeans; we shall probably retain these Europeans on the Council who will be able, with an eye to the reactionaries, to vote against desirable measures in the certainty that those measures will be passed with the official majority and, above all, we shall have a breathing space in which to bring the Statute Book into line with modern thought and the territory into a state to assimilate a real programme of development.

13. In submitting these views I am alive to the fact that I am assuming a grave responsibility and I have not formulated them without very careful thought. Indeed, I felt bound to inform Barrow in strict confidence of my conclusions, and was much fortified by the fact that he told me at once he was in substantial agreement.

14. My firm conclusions are, then, that the time for an unofficial majority is not ripe, that we must give time for the political development of the African, that an unofficial majority, if granted now, would be, in effect, a European unofficial majority and that there would be a grave risk of it being used to stifle African development and progress on the southern model. I should perhaps add that in expressing these views I have the support of my official advisers.

15. I know you appreciate my desire to see constitutional reform and political evolution on sound lines, but I feel that the proposal to concede an unofficial majority here at present would result in placing the future of two million Africans in the hands of a small minority of Europeans, and would, in fact, be a retrograde step—there are perhaps lessons to be learnt from both Southern and Northern Rhodesia in this connection. My own view is that before an unofficial majority is conceded, we must be sure that the Africans are really capable of holding their own, and when we come to framing a new constitution, its membership must be such as to provide that the officials and the African members together can outvote the European and Indian unofficials.

16. If the Secretary of State sees his way to accepting these views, I would suggest that it should be announced that the existing council will be expanded at once by the appointment of two African and one Indian members and of three additional official members, and further revision of the constitution will be considered in three years' time.

**33** CO 537/3608, no 25 30 July 1948  
**[Proposals for closer association in Central Africa]: CO record of a meeting<sup>1</sup> with representatives from Northern Rhodesia**

The meeting had before it copies of a draft statement for publication which had been prepared in the light of the previous discussions by Sir G. Rennie, Mr. Welensky and Mr. Lambert.

The terms of the draft were discussed and certain amendments were agreed. It was decided that a paragraph should be added regarding the life of the Legislative Council.

*Life of the Legislative Council*

*Mr. Welensky* referred to the Motions previously put in the Legislative Council and explained that while one or two of the Unofficial Members had expressed a personal preference for a term of four years for the life of the Legislative Council, they did not wish to press their views in face of the general view that five years was more appropriate.

*The Secretary of State* said that he assumed that the change would take place as from the assembly of the new Legislative Council.

*Sir G. Rennie* confirmed this, and also the remarks of Mr. Welensky. He said that it was felt it would be appropriate if all Members representing African interests were appointed for a period of two and a half years in the first instance.

*Mr. Welensky* agreed.

*The Secretary of State* said that experience in the United Kingdom had shown that a period of three years was too short, as it gave Parliament too little time to put their programmes into effect. There was everything to be said in favour of the longer term. He agreed that it would be wise to have a shorter period for the Members nominated to represent African interests.

*Mr. Welensky* said that it should be understood that if these members proved to be satisfactory they should be eligible for further membership.

*Mr. Chileshe and Mr. Mubitana* said that they were in agreement with the proposed extension and the recommendation that members nominated to represent African interests should be appointed for 2½ years in the first instance.

*Mr. Beckett and Sir S. Gore-Browne* also agreed.

A copy of the agreed statement is attached.<sup>2</sup>

*Sir G. Rennie* recommended that the statement should not be made public before it had been fully explained to the Africans. *It was agreed* that a meeting of the African Representative Council would be called for the 16th August and the statement explained to them then. The Provincial Commissioner for Barotsoland would explain it to the Barotse on the same day, when it would also be released for publication in the United Kingdom. *Mr. Welensky* said he would follow this by a speech at Broken Hill on the 17th August.

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<sup>1</sup> This meeting, held at the CO, was chaired by Creech Jones. Present were officials (Cohen, Lambert and Howard-Drake), Rennie and his secretary for native affairs, R S Hudson, unofficial members of the NR legislature (Gore-Browne, Welensky and G B Beckett), and African representatives (E S Chileshe and M Mubitana).

<sup>2</sup> Enclosures not printed.

*It was agreed* that a press notice, in general terms, would be prepared for issue at the end of the delegation's visit, and that until the agreed statement was released on the 16th August, the proceedings at these meetings would be kept confidential.

#### *Additional seat for the Copperbelt*

There was a short discussion on this and *it was agreed* that it would be inappropriate further to increase the number of seats at present. A separate despatch on the question would be sent by the Secretary of State to the Governor.

#### *Paramountcy*

*Mr. Cohen* said that there had recently been a good deal of discussion locally on this subject and that it had been agreed at a departmental meeting to recommend that a statement should be made by the Government of Northern Rhodesia to clear up the current misunderstanding on the subject. A suggested statement was circulated and a copy is attached.

*The Secretary of State* asked whether it was desirable to make such a statement, but after discussion, agreed that there was a need to clarify the position and said he would study the proposed statement before the next meeting.

#### *Federation*

*Mr. Welensky* said he wished to put his personal views on this subject before the Secretary of State in what would necessarily be a purely exploratory discussion. He was asking for no statement of policy but would be grateful for an indication of the Secretary of State's own views. The need for a larger economic unit in Central Africa was obvious. For many years he had regarded amalgamation as the only solution, but realising the United Kingdom Government's special responsibility towards native interests on Northern Rhodesia, he had come to the conclusion that nothing was to be gained by pressing for amalgamation. He, therefore, now proposed some form of federation which would secure all the advantages of a larger economic unit, but which would not prejudice the advancement of the African population of Northern Rhodesia. Such a federation would be popular in Northern Rhodesia and the Unofficials in Nyasaland were in favour of closer union. The position in Southern Rhodesia was, of course, obscure at the moment; but some form of closer union was essential both for the full development of local resources and in view of the present trends in South Africa and the world generally. He thought that the initiative should come from the three territories concerned and he suggested an approach to Southern Rhodesia locally as it was a waste of time discussing the question further if Southern Rhodesia was not in favour of it.

*Sir G. Rennie* suggested some form of local study group.

*The Secretary of State* agreed that this was the best approach and instanced the similar procedure which had been adopted in the West Indies.

*The Secretary of State* said that he could not give the view of His Majesty's Government on federation, as the matter had not been considered by His Majesty's Government. Giving his personal views on the question, the Secretary of State agreed that some form of closer union was most desirable, but emphasized that the divergence of native policies in the territories ruled out any question of amalgamation. He thought that greater use could yet be made of the Central African Council but if the present organisation was proving inadequate then we must

investigate the possibility of setting up some form of machinery which, while retaining local autonomy and safeguarding the interests of each territory, would provide for the surrender of some powers to a central authority for the sake of the advantages to be gained from joint action in certain spheres, (as, e.g. in East Africa). The idea was worthy of the fullest consideration but three things should be borne in mind:— was this the right time for such a move; were the possibilities of the Central African Council exhausted and could a system be devised which would satisfy the Africans that their interests would not be prejudiced.

*Mr. Cohen* said that the points which would have to be gone into were first that Africans would find it difficult to differentiate between amalgamation and federation. Federation involved some loss of 'sovereignty' which might be objected to in Southern Rhodesia. The position of His Majesty's Government in respect of reserve powers for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland might cause some difficulty.

*Sir S. Gore-Browne* agreed that the divergence of native policy was the great obstacle to closer union and that Africans would find it difficult to differentiate between amalgamation and federation. He said that the Central African Council was only of very limited value, largely owing to the suspicion with which it was regarded in Southern Rhodesia. The immediate cause of the fall of the Huggin's Government in Southern Rhodesia was its loyalty to the Central African Council on a matter of detail.

*Mr. Beckett* thought that some form of federation was necessary to prevent Southern Rhodesia drifting into closer union with South Africa in view of the current policy there. There would, however, be a fear in Northern Rhodesia that, in any form of federation, Southern Rhodesia would impose her native policy on the North; and in Southern Rhodesia there would be a fear that federation would mean the return of Colonial Office control.

*Mr. Mubitana* said Africans feared that federation would eventually mean amalgamation. A demand for Dominion status might follow. Africans would then be at the mercy of the Europeans and discriminatory legislation could be introduced as in South Africa today. Africans would not feel safe under federation.

*Sir G. Rennie* said that no statement should or could be made at this stage but that the practical possibilities of the idea should be fully considered locally.

*Mr. Hudson* explained the special position of the Barotse who had submitted a petition claiming protectorate status similar to that of Bechuanaland. They wished the petition to be laid before the Secretary of State but did not ask that he should consider it until the Governor had spoken to them on his return to Northern Rhodesia.

*Mr. Welensky* thanked the Secretary of State for what he regarded as a very helpful Statement; he recognised that it represented the purely personal views of the Secretary of State.

**34** CO 795/156/6

26 Oct 1948

[Northern Rhodesian constitution]: minute by A B Cohen to Sir T  
Lloyd

[This minute refers to a letter from Welensky to Lambert (22 Oct 1948) in which Welensky complained of the 'different treatment meted out to the African and European representatives' by the CO at the recent 'Africa conference' in London. He threatened to

resign from the executive council and finance committee, and to devote his time instead to enlightening Europeans about 'the aims of C[olonial] O[ffice] Policy.'

I spoke to you yesterday about Mr. Welensky's attitude as a result of the African Conference.<sup>1</sup> Here is an *extract from his letter to Mr. Lambert* to which I was referring.<sup>2</sup>

I am seeing Mr. Welensky at 10.45 to-morrow morning and, although I have not told him so yet, the reason why I suggested the meeting was to discuss this letter. As I am on good terms with him personally I propose to speak to him very frankly to find out exactly what he means by what he says, to attempt to demonstrate how totally unjustified his attitude is, and to say how deplorable I think it would be if he did in fact carry out his intention to resign from the Executive Council and Finance Committee as a result of this entirely incorrect interpretation of the attitude of the Colonial Office and the Government towards the European community in Northern Rhodesia.

I do not know how much good what I say will do but the attempt must obviously be made. I very much hope that the Secretary of State may be prepared also to speak to Mr. Welensky on this subject. I think that only the Secretary of State can really effectively bring home to him how utterly mistaken his attitude is towards Colonial Office policy. It is not so much the supposed attitude of the Colonial Office that Mr. Welensky is against, but the supposed attitude of H.M.G. If the Secretary of State can disabuse him of these extraordinary ideas it may do a great deal of good. If not, I am afraid that we shall have further trouble in Northern Rhodesia and that the successful discussions of July may be brought to nothing.

I have spoken to Mr. Norton<sup>3</sup> about the attitude of the European unofficial delegates to the Conference and he has, at my request, made certain discreet enquiries. He has told me this morning that none of the East African delegates with whom he has spoken would accept anything like to the full Mr. Welensky's opinion. They regard this as very exaggerated and some of them regard them as quite unjustified. One of the people to whom Mr. Norton spoke said that he had always expected the Africans to be made a fuss of at the Conference and quite realised the reasons why this was necessary. He had in fact expected even more to be done in this respect than had in fact been done. According to Mr. Norton's information none of the East Africans will go back with any feeling of resentment in this matter. The only criticism which has come to light as a result of Mr. Norton's enquiries is that made by one of the East African delegates, who rather resented that the back bench Labour M.P.s at some of the parties given to the delegates had spoken a great deal to the Africans but very little to the European delegates. Whether this criticism is in any sense justified I have no idea. I only mention it to show how very limited the East African criticism is on Mr. Welensky's point.

<sup>1</sup> This was held from 29 Sept to 9 Oct to discuss the affairs of the ten African territories under the control of the CO.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> E A Norton, East Africa Commissioner, London.

## **35** CO 537/3608, no 50

3 Nov 1948

[Proposals for federation]: letter from A B Cohen to G F T Colby

[As well as Welensky, who was in London for the 'Africa Conference', Huggins also visited the UK in Oct for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference and the

Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference. Officials at the CO anticipated that the issue of federation would be raised by the two men, and considerable thought was given to how the British government should respond (see minutes by Cohen (12 Oct), Lloyd (13 Oct) and Creech Jones (21 Oct), reproduced in Hyam, ed, *The Labour government and the end of empire 1945-1951*, part IV, 417. On 27 Oct Huggins announced at a press conference that he wished to see the creation of a federation in Central Africa and would convene a conference to discuss the issue. Welensky publicly endorsed this announcement.]

The Secretary of State has asked me to let you know the present position at this end with regard to the Central African federation issue. Welensky had some talks with Huggins when he was here, as well as with members of the Nyasaland delegation, and he subsequently asked to see the Secretary of State with Huggins; indeed Welensky came to the office and said that Huggins had asked him to arrange a meeting with the Secretary of State on this matter. Huggins himself, who was seeing the Secretary of State almost every day at the Commonwealth Conference, made no reference to this subject and, on the occasion when he had a talk with the Secretary of State at lunch on a number of matters affecting Africa, again did not refer to it. The Secretary of State felt strongly that it would be a mistake for him, or indeed any U.K. Minister, to take the initiative in approaching Huggins on this subject. He felt that it was for Huggins himself to raise the matter and to put before the Government here any suggestions which he had with regard to federation. As Huggins made no reference to the matter at any stage, it was not discussed with him at all; but the Secretary of State did have a longish talk with Welensky in a private interview a couple of days before he left.

This was on a most friendly basis and the Secretary of State explained to Welensky what is said above and suggested that, if Welensky and his colleagues wanted to pursue the matter, it was up to them, in consultation with people in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to think out their ideas in detail and then to put forward proposals which might be considered by the Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Governments and the U.K. Government here. It looks from a statement subsequently issued here by Huggins just before his departure, and after talking to Welensky, as though that is what they intend to do, and in a personal letter which Welensky wrote to me just before he left he says that he and Huggins are going to have a joint meeting in the near future, no doubt with others interested, to try and produce a scheme to put up to H.M.G.

The Secretary of State took the opportunity again to impress most strongly on Welensky what he had already said when this matter was raised at the end of July, that it would be essential before any scheme could be favourably considered to make sure that African opinion in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was prepared to accept it. Welensky is well aware of the intense suspicion of Africans in the two territories against Southern Rhodesia and of the fact that they may not at first find it easy to distinguish between amalgamation and federation. He therefore, I think, realises the difficulty of the task in front of him.

As regards the Nyasaland unofficial delegates, Barrow and his two colleagues spoke to me during the African Conference and asked me what was happening about amalgamation. I explained to them that Welensky had raised this matter informally when he was in London at the end of July and that he had now abandoned the idea of amalgamation in favour of federation. I told them very briefly what had passed at the

Secretary of State's informal talk with Welensky in July. I also advised them to discuss the matter with Welensky themselves if they wanted to find out what was happening now. I said that we were not doing anything and that there was no question, of course, of the Colonial Office taking any action without full consultation both with the Governor of Nyasaland as well as Northern Rhodesia. They subsequently did have a talk with Welensky, I gather, but I do not know what happened at it. Following on the issue of Huggins's press notice I have had an enquiry from Hadlow, who will be coming to see me this week, but I have already explained to him that we had nothing to do with the press notice and that the first I heard of it was when I saw it in the press.

The Secretary of State was anxious that you should know what had passed here and he also asked me to say that it was his feeling that the Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Governments should not at this stage take any initiative in connection with this question of federation. H.M.G. has had nothing official before it and has therefore not been able to consider its attitude in the matter. The whole issue is a highly delicate one and the talks with Welensky have been 'unofficial' and of a purely personal character. The Secretary of State feels that the initiative must for the moment rest with Huggins, Welensky and any other unofficials who are pressing the matter.

You will no doubt keep us informed of any developments at your end and if you have any comments on the above we should be very glad to have them.

I am writing in similar terms to Rennie.

### **36 DO 35/3681, no 7**

16 Feb 1949

**[Immigration into Southern Rhodesia]: letter from Sir J Kennedy to Mr Noel-Baker**

With reference to my Confidential despatch C. No. 2 of 1st February, 1949, I enclose herewith a copy of the Statistical Department's report on immigration for 1948, together with a newspaper cutting drawing attention to various details.<sup>1</sup>

2. Since the report is purely statistical, no official inferences have been drawn from the various trends, but certain points seem interesting.

3. (a) During 1948 over two thirds of the total number of immigrants declared Salisbury or Bulawayo as their destination. The majority of to-day's immigrants therefore appear to have an urban outlook. The populations of Salisbury and Bulawayo together amount to about half the European population of the Colony.

(b) The same trend to the town was observed in 1947. Out of 5800 adult male immigrants in 1947 (excluding R.A.F. personnel), 554 only declared for farming occupations, or just over 9%. In 1948 534 out of 6300 declared for farming, or just over 8%.

(c) In 1948, the largest proportion of immigrants (1,052 adult males) went into building and construction. Although this reflects the most pressing need in the Colony at the moment, viz, the need for more houses, it would appear that, at some future date when construction begins to meet requirements, it may be necessary to restrict immigration of building artisans in order to avoid flooding

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<sup>1</sup> Enclosures not printed.

that section of the labour market.

(d) Excluding R.A.F. and other service personnel, the total immigration for 1947 and 1948 amounts to about 26,000. So far as the economy of the Colony is concerned, however, the additional 4000 service personnel may be regarded as semi-permanent inhabitants, since the number residing here is likely to remain fairly constant. For all practical purposes, therefore, the total of immigration for the past two years has been 30,000.

(e) The decrease in the rate of immigration during the last three months of 1948 was probably due to the restrictions initiated in October, but if the rate for that quarter is maintained, there will still be an immigration total of over 12,000 per annum. This, coupled with natural increase, will still be in excess of the optimum rate of increase, which is generally considered to be about 5%.

(f) The amount of declared capital—£5½ millions—was a substantial increase on 1947 at £4½ millions. During 1948, the proportion of immigrants declaring capital to the extent of £100 or more dropped gradually from 24% to 11.7%. Immigrants in this category declared an average throughout the year of £2,148 per person. During the first six months this figure was exceeded in one month only, while in the last six months it was exceeded in five months.

4. In general, there seems to have been no discernible decrease in the popularity of the Colony for immigrants, and the existing restrictions on immigration are not likely to reduce the inflow below 12,000 per annum. I am informed by the Statistical Department that they expect the annual rate of increase to drop to a fairly constant figure, probably between the 17% recently experienced, and 10%. Natural increase will continue to represent about 2% of the total increase. If the total rate of increase were to be reduced to about 5% per annum, it would mean immigrants at the rate of 6000 per annum, and emigration at the rate of 1500 per annum, which latter figure was recorded between June 1947 and June 1948.

5. Although the Government is not yet contemplating more drastic measures to reduce immigration, it is becoming obvious that social services are being severely strained. Hospitals and maternity homes are working beyond their normal capacity both in beds and trained staff. The provision of food and water is already a considerable problem; and petrol is in relatively short supply.

6. There can be little doubt, however, that there is a strong feeling throughout Southern Rhodesia that every effort should be made to absorb as many immigrants as possible, in order that the European population may be augmented while the Colony is popular, and in order that progress in development of the country's resources may not be checked.

**37** CO 537/4687

26 Feb 1949

**'Central African Federation': report by R J Vile<sup>1</sup> on talks before and during the third SAATC meeting**

[Enclosing this report, Vile noted that in his conversations with Welensky during the air transport conference, the NR leader had given an indication of the tactics he would

<sup>1</sup> R J Vile, assistant secretary, CO, 1954–1961.

employ if federation was not approved by the British government: 'He said that he would first of all try to get all the unofficial members to boycott the Legislature and force a general election. He would then try to persuade no candidates to stand but he thought the Government might be able to produce enough "stooges" to make this impossible. Consequently, if this tactic did not appear to have any chance of success he would do everything to hold up the machinery of Government and would completely disregard the agreement for working the Northern Rhodesian constitution' (minute by Vile, 7 Mar 1949).]

Although I had no instructions or briefing before leaving the U.K. about the question of the federation of the Central African territories, and, in consequence, was unable to do more than listen to the views of the various people who spoke to me on the subject, I feel it necessary to report the trend of those conversations and in particular to emphasise:-

- (a) the need for an early decision on the attitude of H.M.G. to the federation proposals;
- (b) the need for a visit to Northern Rhodesia by the Secretary of State to discuss not only federation but also the question of the royalties of the B.S.A. Company.

2. In Salisbury, on the 19th and 20th February, I had two conversations with Mr. Parry.<sup>2</sup> He told me that he had already reported in semi official correspondence many of the facts that he had to tell me. He wished, however, in conversation, to elaborate the facts he had already communicated and to attempt to convey to me the general background in Southern Rhodesia. He said that when the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia went to London for the Commonwealth Conference in 1948, he had been prepared to accept something less than federation, probably on the lines of the High Commission in East Africa. Mr. Parry understood that in London a meeting had been arranged between the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, the Secretary of State and Mr. Noel-Baker. For some reason of which the Prime Minister was unaware, this meeting had been indefinitely postponed. Sir G. Huggins had formed the impression that H.M.G. would not treat with him and had returned to Southern Rhodesia holding the view that in these circumstances he must either go all out for federation and if this were not acceptable to H.M.G., must then take steps for Southern Rhodesia to enter the Union of South Africa.

3. Mr. Parry stressed that two main consequences were bound to ensue. The first was the disintegration of the Central African Council as the machinery for Central African co-operation. Although he did not think that the Southern Rhodesia Government would abandon the measures they had already agreed upon between the three Governments, he expected them to be dilatory in carrying out agreed schemes which were not primarily in their interest and that they would refuse to implement any further schemes of any nature whatsoever through the medium of the Council. A second consequence, which Mr. Parry has reason to believe will follow, is an attempt by Southern Rhodesia to apply economic pressure on Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland primarily by increasing chrome output and reducing the number of railway wagons available for the transport of copper. There are other economic measures which might also be taken, ostensibly in order simply to look after Southern Rhodesia's interest but at the same time designed to embarrass the other territories as far as possible. At the

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<sup>2</sup> F H N Parry, deputy chief secretary, Central African Council, 1947, acting secretary, 1948, chief secretary, 1951-1953; secretary to prime minister and Cabinet, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953-1963.

same time Sir G. Huggins has intimated that in the event of federation, he will be prepared to close down the chrome industry in Southern Rhodesia and to make every effort to supply all the transport needs of the Copper Belt.

4. Mr. Parry made it very plain indeed that in his view the Secretary of State could not avoid meeting the challenge of Sir G. Huggins and the unofficial members of the Northern Rhodesia Legislature. If no official pronouncement on the question of federation were made by H.M.G., this would be taken as a rejection of the proposals and in the absence of any counter proposals Mr. Parry was sure that Sir G. Huggins would go as far as possible in the measures mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Mr. Parry wondered if it were possible to delay matters by the appointment of a Royal Commission. He thought that in some ways the Central African politicians might prefer not to have a battle with the Secretary of State but he thought it was necessary to be very careful because they were spoiling for a fight and had publicly put themselves in the situation where they could not refuse to fight if the Secretary of State refused to treat with them.

5. On the 22nd and 23rd February I had a series of conversations with Mr. Welensky and Mr. Stanley about the federation proposals. Mr. Welensky began by emphasising that he had no personal ambition in sponsoring the federation proposal. He claimed that he already possessed enough power to satisfy any man and could make a very comfortable living from his newspaper in any event. It was because he firmly believed that a strong Central Africa was necessary in order to resist the domination of the Union of South Africa and the spread of the Union's native policy, and also because he believed that a large economic unit could be developed more effectively and quickly, that he wanted to see a Central African Federation. He emphasised that the most likely development in the federation would be that he and Sir G. Huggins would oppose each other bitterly. It was clearly his intention to form a Federation Labour Party within the Federation with himself at the head. I had a long discussion with him on the question of native policy and he took the view that he personally firmly believed that Africans must advance to full self-government and participation in the community. He could not, however, fail to appreciate the point of view of his own Trade Union which greatly feared African competition in the labour market. Apart from these personal remarks Mr. Welensky told me on the 23rd February after a visit he had paid to Johannesburg, that he had met several old friends in the United Party who had told him that they expected the Nationalist Party shortly to begin to make life very uncomfortable indeed for English people in the Union. They were therefore considering very seriously the prospect of early transfer to the Rhodesias and were prepared to accept a lower standard of life in order to be in British territory. I subsequently mentioned this point to Mr. Hunt of the High Commissioner's office who said that he had no information which could corroborate Mr. Welensky's story.

6. Mr. Welensky bore out what Mr. Parry had said about the attitude of Sir G. Huggins. Mr. Welensky also emphasised the view that the Secretary of State must reach an early decision and said that he hoped that such decision would be reached during the Secretary of State's visit in April. He also emphasised the need for a decision on the question of royalties at the same time.

7. Mr. Stanley took part in some of these conversations but not all. I have, however, kept him fully informed. Mr. Stanley's view is fundamentally that a decision must be reached quickly. He has no particular recommendation to make but gave me to understand that the appointment of a Royal Commission did not strike him as a

particularly useful device. He said that Mr. Welensky had threatened that the unofficial members in Northern Rhodesia would be prepared to hold up the work of the Northern Rhodesian Legislature if they could not get their way over federation, but he felt that there might be one or two members of the legislature who, if it came to the point, would hesitate to take any step seriously to dislocate the machinery of government. It was of course true that African opinion was hardening against federation, but it was still possible that Colonel Gore-Browne would be able to persuade the Africans to support federation. (In this connection I should note that Mr. Welensky believes that Col. Gore-Browne's standing with the Africans was not as high recently. Mr. Parry also mentioned the same point to me saying that the publication of a photograph of Mr. Welensky talking to the King and the recent receipt of a letter from the Secretary of State had materially enhanced his prestige among the Africans.) Mr. Stanley went on to emphasise the considerable difficulty in Northern Rhodesia of government by blackmail, saying that it appeared quite impossible to satisfy the demands of Mr. Welensky. In dealing with the questions of royalties and federation he felt that the time had come for a strong lead from the Secretary of State. He emphasised that these were his own views and should not be taken as expressing the Governor's opinion.

8. I have discussed these questions with Mr. Hunt of the High Commissioner's Office to whom a copy of this report has been given. He informs me that considerable interest in the federation proposals has been shown in the Union but that so far no intimation has been received from the C.R.O. of the line which the High Commissioner and his staff should follow in discussing the matter with questioners.

### **38** CO 537/4687

7–23 Mar 1949

#### **[Proposals for closer association]: minutes by A B Cohen**

[The conference promised by Huggins in Oct 1948 to discuss federation took place at the Victoria Falls on 16 and 17 Feb 1949. Each of the three Central African territories was invited to send four representatives. There were, however, no Africans in any of the delegations. The proposals that emerged from the conference envisaged a bicameral parliament consisting of a senate and a house of representatives. The senate would consist of fifteen members—five from each of the territories. In the house of representatives, however, seats were to be allocated to each territory according to their population, following an explicitly discriminatory formula under which 100 Africans were to be considered equal to one European. In a chamber expected to consist of 48 seats, this would have given Southern Rhodesian 30 seats, Northern Rhodesia 12 and Nyasaland 6.]

*Sir T. Lloyd*

Attached opposite are:—

- (1) a letter from Sir G. Rennie enclosing a report by the Provincial Commissioner of the Southern Province of Northern Rhodesia on the Victoria Falls Conference and certain other documents of the Conference (No. 13);
- (2) a summary of the proposals of the Conference by Mr. Williams<sup>1</sup> of the Central African Department (No. 16).

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<sup>1</sup> D Williams, principal, CO, 1949; secretary to Conferences on Closer Association in Central Africa, 1951 & 1952; seconded to CRO, 1953–1954; private secretary to minister of state, CO, 1955; colonial attaché, Washington, 1956–1960; assistant secretary, CO, 1961; transferred to Ministry of Overseas Development, 1967.

Mr. Lambert and I would have preferred to have submitted our comments after the mature consideration which the subject deserves and after receiving the comments of Sir G. Rennie and Mr. Colby which have been asked for in accordance with the Secretary of State's instructions in No. 10. But time presses, if the Secretary of State is to have an opportunity, as he told us he wished when the matter was briefly discussed, to consider in general terms the line which he will have to take on this subject during his Central African visit and to consult Mr. Noel-Baker and possibly other Ministers. We have arranged a preliminary meeting with the C.R.O. which will probably be held on Friday, March 11th. The purpose of this will simply be to have a preliminary inter-departmental discussion on the attitude to be taken up by H.M.G. in preparation for Ministerial discussions later. But it would assist us very much in our discussions with the C.R.O. if we could have some general indication before then of the Secretary of State's views.

It may be said that it is premature for H.M.G. to form any final view on these proposals. They are still subject to further consideration by those who took part in the Victoria Falls Conference. A committee of experts has been set up and there will have to be a great deal of consultation by the delegates from the three territories with those whom they represent. That is perfectly true and the Secretary of State will no doubt not wish to do anything more when he is in Central Africa than take part in very preliminary and informal discussions on these proposals. A good deal of opposition to them is to be anticipated from Nyasaland and from Africans both in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Clearly we should want to know the extent and nature of this opposition before H.M.G. formulated their final views.

At the same time I am quite sure that it will not be possible for the Secretary of State to avoid discussing this subject in a preliminary way both when he is in Salisbury and in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Mr. Welensky has already indicated to the Governor that he wants to discuss federation with the Secretary of State during his visit. If, as I feel sure will be necessary, H.M.G. in the U.K. is ultimately to tell the authors of these proposals that in their present form they are entirely unacceptable, it would clearly create a very bad impression if this were done at some stage subsequent to the Secretary of State's visit and he had not been in a position during his visit to give an indication of this probability. For this reason in particular I think that we shall have to form a fairly definite preliminary view at the Ministerial level before the Secretary of State goes out.

The proposals, which are clearly summarised by Mr. Williams, provide for a very strong federal machinery, so strong that Northern Rhodesia would apparently only retain as a state 20% of its existing revenue, the rest going to the federation. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would entirely lose their separate identity. A federal legislature would be established with a House of Representatives dominated by Southern Rhodesia; the criterion for representation being that 100 Africans equal one European—hardly a basis consistent with the currently accepted doctrine about the rights of man. Africans would not be admitted to the House of Representatives but only to the Senate. It is astonishing that Sir Miles Thomas,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Welensky and others should naively have assumed that, having given this limited representation to Africans in the Senate and made a declaration on African land which goes no further

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<sup>2</sup> Sir (William) Miles (Webster) Thomas, director of the Colonial Development Corporation, 1948–1951. Thomas was currently serving as SR's development advisor.

than existing pledges as far as the two northern territories are concerned, they have satisfactorily dealt with the so-called 'native question'. Incidentally I cannot refrain from remarking that it seems to me extraordinary that a person who is so prominently connected with two important United Kingdom public corporations should first have taken the chair at this highly political conference and subsequently have published his views on the subject in a London newspaper.

I do not believe that Nyasaland would ever accept this degree of subjection to Southern Rhodesia and I feel sure that African opinion in Northern Rhodesia would be exceedingly hostile. In fact Sir S. Gore-Browne may again have cooked his goose with African opinion, if indeed there is any goose left to cook. Mr. Lambert tells me that he is now engaged in stumping the country in support of the proposals.

To accept a constitution on the lines proposed at the Victoria Falls Conference would be contrary to many statements of policy by the present and previous Governments. It would be open to great international criticism and would be represented as a betrayal of African interests.

But what is the alternative? I think it extremely doubtful whether we can successfully handle the situation unless we ourselves are prepared to propose that some effective and substantial alternative proposition should be adopted. In my minute of the 12th October, 1948 I suggested that something on the lines of the East African inter-territorial scheme, suitably modified to meet Central African conditions, should be adopted for Central Africa. I was anxious at the time that it should be made clear to Sir G. Huggins and Mr. Welensky that there were definite limits beyond which H.M.G. was not prepared to go. I felt that unless such limits could be defined in advance there was a serious danger of their proposing something entirely unacceptable; but I must confess that I never expected anything quite so far-reaching to emerge. It was decided at the time that it would be wrong for H.M.G. to initiate discussions on the subject by stating the limits of what they were prepared to agree to. Now that the conference has taken place I am rather afraid that it may be more difficult to keep our limits as low as we might otherwise have wished. Mr. Lambert and I are not in a position at this stage to go into detail but we would like authority to have discussions with the C.R.O. on the basis of considering how far the East African model would be suitable to Central Africa or what modifications to it would be required. Mr. Lambert's own view is one of considerable doubt whether Southern Rhodesia would be satisfied with anything so comparatively limited as an organisation on the lines of the East African inter-territorial scheme. I share his doubts, but this seems to us to provide at any rate a suitable starting point for our discussions.

May we be authorised to proceed on this basis in preparation for submission to Ministers?

A.B.C.  
7.3.49

In accordance with the minutes ending with the Secretary of State's minute of the 10th March under 16, Mr. Lambert, Mr. Williams and I have had a discussion with Mr. Tait and Mr. Gandy of the Commonwealth Relations Office. As a result of this an agreed memorandum (No. 25) has been drawn up representing the joint views of the C.R.O. and ourselves at the official level. It is intended that this should be considered next week at a meeting of the two Secretaries of State and I understand that Mr. Watson has already taken steps to arrange such a meeting.

In putting up the papers I would suggest that the Secretary of State might read the very useful despatch from Sir G. Rennie at No. 22 and also Mr. Colby's letter at No. 19. Mr. Colby veers, as some of his predecessors have, towards closer association with East Africa rather than Central Africa. This is definitely not in accordance with the policy which we have been following over a number of years with regard to Nyasaland. It ignores the extreme importance of Nyasaland labour to Central Africa. It ignores communications and trade connections. I think that Mr. Colby ought to be strongly discouraged from this attitude and I hope that, if the Secretary of State agrees with this view, he will be able to do so during his visit to Nyasaland.<sup>3</sup>

Perhaps I may add one thing. I think that the Southern Rhodesia leaders and Mr. Welensky have very much overplayed their hand at the Victoria Falls Conference. The scheme as it has so far emerged would completely subordinate Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to Southern Rhodesia in a form of union which is very little short of amalgamation. As Mr. Lambert points out in the footnote to his minute above, the reserve powers at present ultimately resting in H.M.G. would under the scheme be transferred to the federal state. This is of course quite unacceptable. But I understand from private sources that there are many Europeans in Northern Rhodesia with whom the proposals in their present form are not going down too well. While, therefore, I very much hope that for the reasons given in the memorandum we shall be prepared to go as far as something on the lines of the East African inter-territorial scheme in meeting local opinion, I do not think that it need necessarily be too difficult to persuade them that the proposals in their present form are quite unworkable.

A.B.C.  
18.3.49

Attached opposite are two notes by Mr. Lambert covering the Secretary of State's points. Put very briefly the answers to these points are, I would suggest:—

(1) It was not considered at the time and is not considered now that there is a case for *amalgamating* Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The main arguments against this are first that there is a comparatively large European population in Northern Rhodesia and an effective colour bar at present on industrial labour; we do not want to import this into Nyasaland. Secondly the distance between the two main centres of population is an argument against amalgamation. The view has always been taken, and is still taken that the territories ought to have separate governments and legislatures; but that, of course, is not an argument against bringing Nyasaland into a *federal* scheme.

(2) The argument for being prepared to concede something now on the federal issue is that there are strong practical grounds for this from the economic, defence and communications points of view. Constitutional development is not a process which can stand still and we cannot in our view stand still on the Central African Council. To do so would alienate European opinion in Northern Rhodesia and a large section of opinion in Southern Rhodesia. We should lose the chance of influencing

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<sup>3</sup> Crech Jones commented on this, 'I think it sound that at this stage Mr Colby should express his scepticism and remind us of the degree of interest Nyasaland has in Southern Rhodesia and the degree of interest she might develop in Tanganyika. I will, of course, talk with him and put the problem in the terms as we see it' (minute, 22 Mar 1949).

Southern Rhodesian opinion on African questions in the right direction—an influence which has been exercised to some extent by the Central African Council in recent years and would continue to do so under a federal scheme.

A.B.C.  
23.3.49

### **39** CO 795/143/3, no 2 [The Dalglish Report]: CO summary

Mar 1949

The Dalglish Report on the advancement of Africans in Industry was published in February 1948. Its recommendations fell into five main parts, three of which were concerned with the specific problem of the advancement of Africans in industry, one with training facilities and one with wage structure.

2. The first category of recommendation referred to posts not now occupied by Africans, which, in the opinion of the Commission, they were capable of filling immediately. It listed 27 classes of appointment (with certain reservations), all connected with the mines, three of which were underground and twenty-four of which were surface jobs.

3. The second category consisted of posts which Africans would be capable of taking over in the near future after proper training and supervision. They were jobs of a semi-skilled character, unsuitable for Europeans 'whose aim should be to qualify themselves for better and more responsible work'. They were also mainly in connection with the mines.

4. The next category dealt with posts in the mines to which Africans might advance after a period of training. There were twenty-six jobs in this section, four of which needed, in addition to an intensive training, a long period of practical experience in the mines.

5. The Commission made it clear that they held strongly the view that no European at present carrying out the work of operations involved should be discharged in order to make way for an African. The African should only be promoted when the European ceases to be employed or is himself promoted (paragraph 270).

6. Training itself formed the subject of the fourth section of the Commission's recommendations—'what training facilities should be made available and how they should be provided'. These recommendations fall naturally into two parts—those dealing with the training of Africans already in industry and those dealing with young persons not yet industrially employed. For Africans already in industry, the Commission recommended that training must be given at the place where the individual was employed and with a particular job in view, but that it should be supplemented if possible by a general technical education (paragraph 160) under Government auspices. Provision for further training must also be made to help the African towards promotion (paragraph 163). The proposals for the training of young persons to enter industry are more far-reaching and indeed affect the whole educational system (paragraphs 165–174). In an ideal solution of the problem, children should start school at five or six and all progress to Standard VI. This should be followed by vocational training and a proper period of apprenticeship, Government controlled and assisted, (paragraph 275). The general standards of

education and training required would be the same as those for European apprentices.

7. The final section of the recommendations concerned the Wage Structure of Africans in Industry. This covered Wages, Rations and Housing, since so much of the present remuneration of Africans is on a 'truck and tommy' system. The general principle was laid down that as 'the African advances he should be given an inclusive wage covering all requirements'. For the time being, however, in view of present shortages, employers should in general continue to provide rations (paragraph 263), but as Africans advance to semi-skilled posts they should be given a wage covering rations. Various recommendations were also made for improvement of housing and compounds (paragraph 264).

8. The wage recommendations proper fell into three main parts and they touched the Mine Workers' Union (European) on a very sore spot. Firstly, as regards the lowest type of African labour, the Government should lay down a minimum basic standard wage and should stipulate minimum standards of housing and rations. This should be done in consultation with Industry and African Unions (if any) (paragraph 258). For Africans advancing to jobs now filled by Europeans, the rate should be fixed in accordance with 'the nature of the job, responsibility and the efficiency with which the work is performed'. The Commission maintained that, at present, any African performing work previously done by a European would do it less efficiently and that this decline in efficiency must be reflected in the wage rate. 'Equal pay for equal work' did not automatically mean 'European pay for European work'; and in this connection the Commission mentioned that in their opinion it would take 'three Africans to undertake completely the work of the European'. The final section of the wage recommendations dealt with the payment of apprentices under training (paragraphs 266–268) again proposing similar terms for African as for European apprentices.

9. Special mention must be made of paragraph 217 of the report, not only for its intrinsic importance but also because it featured so prominently in the subsequent Legislative Council debate and has been the subject of a query by the Fabian Colonial Bureau. Paragraph 217 recommends that 'earnest consideration be given jointly by the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union, the Chamber of Mines and the Government' to such alteration in Clause 42 of the agreement between the Mining Companies and the Mine Workers' Union as will 'permit the African to advance to more responsible work' in the mining industry. Under the agreement referred to, the Companies recognise the Union (in clause 1), 'as representing the daily paid *European* employees to whom its terms and conditions are applicable' and then, (in clause 42) bind themselves to ensure 'that work of the class or grade that is being performed or job that is being filled by an employer at the time of the signing of this agreement (6th March, 1947) shall not be given to persons to whom the terms and conditions of this agreement do not apply'. This clause effectively bars the advancement of Africans in the Mining Industry.

#### *Legislative Council debate on the Report*

10. The Legislative Council debated the report in March 1948. Unofficial members were highly critical and the report was subjected to a particularly fierce attack by Mr. Goodwin, at that time President of the Mine Workers' Union. (It will be recalled that the Mine Workers' Union objected to the composition and terms of

reference of the Commission and refused to cooperate with it). First Mr. Goodwin maintained that much of the report was out of date and that Africans were in fact already performing many of the tasks which the Commission recommended they should perform. Secondly he claimed that the idea that some of the semi-skilled jobs were unsuitable for Europeans 'whose aim should be to qualify themselves for better and more responsible work,' was absurd. The only way to qualify for any job in the mining industry was to work up from the bottom. Finally he fiercely contested the Commission's conception of 'equal pay for equal work'. He dwelt at length on Clause 42. This he said was the dilution of labour clause and as for the vital word 'European' in Clause 1, that had been inserted at the request of the mining companies, not at the request of the Union which was 'against all colour bar'. (This statement is confirmed in paragraph 215 of the Report).

11. As a result of this debate, the Legislative Council merely took note of the Report.

#### *Labour officers conference June 1948*

12. A special conference of Labour Officers discussed the report in June 1948 and made the following recommendations to the Governor:—

- (i) That a central training establishment for artisans in the building trade be set up by Government at the earliest possible date in view of the fact that in this trade any system of indentured apprentices was not yet possible.
- (ii) That an industrial training section of the Labour Department be set up to control (i) above and to provide trade testing on a territorial basis through a panel system with representatives of the building trade serving on local panels. This section would also deal with the indenturing where possible of apprentices.
- (iii) That it is not the responsibility of Government to provide training facilities for Africans who are to progress to posts of higher responsibility in the Mining Industry except to the extent that such assistance is given in the case of European apprentices.
- (iv) That no Wage Council be set up for the Mining Industry and that wages be left for discussion between the African Unions and the Mining Companies. The Conference envisaged the fairly early establishment of a Joint Industrial Council.
- (v) That wage rates for Africans in the lowest form of employment in the Mines should not be determined in the manner suggested by the Commission, but that they should be settled by discussion between recently formed African Unions and the Companies.
- (vi) That for the great mass of Africans in the Mining Industry rations should continue to be provided by the employer but that Africans now in the 'special' grade and those who may be advanced to skilled posts as a result of the Commission's recommendations be paid an all-in wage and that this should be paid weekly.
- (vii) That measures should be taken to improve the standard of housing by increasing the number of rooms but that the suggestion that compounds be limited to a smaller number of houses and that provision be made for additional land for cultivation is not practical; that electric light be provided as far as possible, in the first instance to the better class housing only, and that a charge may be made for it.

- (viii) 'Special' grade employees and those advanced to higher grades should be housed in a better type of house slightly separate from the lower grade accommodation.
- (ix) That the final decision on the ability of Africans to undertake the jobs listed must rest with the Mining Companies. In this connection the general line should be taken that most of these jobs are ones which do not require special training and should be regarded as African jobs; that certain Africans are already undertaking many of them and in this connection equal pay with Europeans has never been asked for.
- (x) That the deletion of the word European from Clause 1 of the Agreement would produce little or no real effect. (This is true. What is needed is some amendment to the Dilution of Labour Clause—Clause 42.)

*Conference with representatives of the Chamber of Mines, the mine officials. The Salaried Staff Association, the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union and of the government—August 1948*

13. This conference was called by Government to discuss with those chiefly concerned ways and means of implementing the Report. It was almost a complete failure and was summed up by the Governor in the following words:—

'While the representatives of all parties expressed their agreement with the general principle that the Africans must advance in industry, the Mine Workers' Union was not prepared to negotiate with the Chamber of Mines unless the latter dissociated itself from certain statements made by Mr. L'Ange, a senior employee of the Rhokana Corporation, during the General Election campaign. The Solicitor-General attempted to find a formula which would suit all parties, but, gaining the impression that their real wish was to put the blame on one another for not negotiating, he closed the meeting while the door was still open for further discussion. The parties indicated that they were prepared to negotiate with Government, but not, at this stage, with one another . . . At the conclusion of the Meeting three suggestions were put forward by the Government representatives for consideration by the parties concerned. Those regarding the establishment of a Juvenile Employment Committee and the increase in the responsibility of work done by Europeans resulting from the development of industry were well received; the suggestion of the establishment of a Joint Industrial Council for the mining industry did not meet with much support.

While the outcome of these discussions cannot be considered encouraging I am not unhopeful that progress may yet be made on the lines recommended in the Report of the Commission, and every effort will be made, by individual approaches at first, to bring the parties together again when conditions appear to be more favourable'.

*Subsequent developments*

14. The Secretary of State personally expressed his concern over the breakdown of this Conference. The Governor in his reply showed himself fully alive to the importance of the issues and indicated what his future tactics were to be. He proposed first to make separate advances to the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union in an attempt to secure their assistance in implementing the report. He had

fair hopes of success, since Mr. Goodwin had resigned from the Presidency and Mr. D. Welensky had been elected in his place. Later he proposed to hold a meeting with the representatives of the Union and of the Mine Managers and Salaried Staff. No report of these meetings has yet been received.

15. In the meanwhile the Governor had made some advances with the subsidiary issues of Housing and Training. He had approached various Mining Companies on the housing problem and obtained satisfactory assurances that housing would be and was being improved. On training facilities the large companies were not so encouraging, and so consideration was given to implementing the Labour Department's plan for the institution of Government-run technical training schools. As a first step Public Works Department are to conduct trade tests for their own employees in the building industry with the object of encouraging private employers to do the same. To increase the output of African artisans the existing technical training facilities are being expanded in 1949 by the creation of three junior trade schools at Livingstone, Broken Hill, and the Copper Belt and by enlarging Munalu. Meanwhile the Labour Department has made recommendations to the Executive Council for the setting up of a central establishment to give advanced training to Africans who have already passed earlier tests.

16. On 3rd March, 1949, the Governor sent a despatch enclosing a report on African Trade Unions by Mr. Comrie, Labour Officer. This report stated, among other things, that four African Mine Workers' Unions had been formed at Nkana, Mufulira, Luanshya and Chingola and that they shortly proposed to amalgamate. This should be complete in a month or two. They then propose to approach the Chamber of Mines to discuss the implementation of the Dalgleish Report. The Governor has promised a separate despatch on this subject which has not yet (26th March) arrived, but which may also give the results of the other proposed meetings referred to above.

### *Conclusion*

17. The crux of the whole problem would appear to be the attitude of the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers' Union. The Labour Department has worked hard for their cooperation, realising that without it nothing but trouble is ahead. Now, with the rapid developments in the African trade union movement, that trouble cannot long be delayed and it is to be hoped that the Governor's promised despatch will bring news of a change of heart.

## **40** CO 795/139/6

Mar 1949

### **[Political situation in Barotseland]: CO brief**

At the end of 1947 a number of reports appeared in the Northern Rhodesia press about demands by the unofficial members of the Legislative Council for various constitutional reforms which would give them a greater measure of responsible government. These reports aroused all the old fears of the Barotse Nation about their possible status under any Northern Rhodesia government dominated by an unofficial majority and led to a renewed demand that they should be proclaimed a separate British Protectorate. This was expressed in a letter from the Paramount Chief to the provincial commissioner, to which the acting Governor replied, with the

concurrence of the Secretary of State, by assuring the Paramount Chief that 'no changes in the constitution of Northern Rhodesia affecting Barotseland would be made without prior consultation with the Paramount Chief and his Council.

2. In June 1948, following press reports of the discussions in London between the Secretary of State, the Governor and unofficial members of Legislative Council on constitutional changes, the Paramount Chief renewed his representations. He asked to be allowed to send a delegate to this conference and also submitted a detailed memorandum, signed by himself and by members of Katengo and various Kutas, embodying their demands. As this memorandum later formed the basis of discussions between the Governor and members of the Barotse Council and the Kuta of Lealui and since it still probably gives an accurate picture of their demands, it is worth examining in some detail.

3. In the memorandum the Barotse declare themselves disappointed in the results of indirect rule but fear that there may be worse to come from any grant of responsible government to the unofficials of the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council. They therefore want to be declared a separate British Protectorate but are anxious at the same time not to lose the benefits of the 'Colonial Development Funds and Mineral Grants from Northern Rhodesia.' Their claim to a share of the latter they base upon the fact that 'the mineral wealth of Northern Rhodesia came under the British sphere of influence due to the part played by Lewanika.' They also claim that the Government have not fulfilled their obligations under clause 3 of the Lewanika concession, that is in assisting in 'the education and civilisation of the native subjects of the King by the establishment, maintenance and endowment of schools and industrial establishment etc.' They then submit detailed suggestions for the amendments they want made in Ordinances 25 and 26—the Barotse Native Authority Ordinance and the Barotse Native Courts Ordinance. They consider that these ordinances 'go too far in compelling the Paramount Chiefs, Chiefs, Indunas and people to concede their tribal powers to the Administrative officials of His Majesty's Government who exercise powers beyond the terms of clause 2 of the 1900 Concession'. (This clause said—among other things—that nothing in the agreement should effect Lewanika's 'constitutional power or authority as Chief'.) The Barotse then ask for the abolition of all the Governor's powers of intervention in their affairs and for the appointment instead of a Resident Commissioner to represent His Majesty's Government and to reside permanently with the Paramount Chief and advise him on technical matters. For example the Paramount Chief, and not the Governor or the Resident Commissioner, should determine what native authorities are to be recognised, exercise special powers in case of famine, have power to suspend native authorities 'unworthy or incapable of performing their duties,' control native treasuries and have full control over native courts. The Resident Commissioner would confine his activities to acting as direct link between His Majesty's Government and the Barotse Native Government and to assisting 'in technical matters towards the development of Barotseland.' He would have no power 'to interfere with the Native Constitution or with customs not repugnant to moral justice or humanity.' Certain other stipulations about land and mineral rights are also proposed.

4. At a meeting in London in July 1948, at which the Secretary of State, the Governor and Official and Unofficial members of the Legislative Council were present, Mr. Hudson, Secretary for Native Affairs, drew attention to this memorandum. He said that the Barotse had requested that it should be laid before

the Secretary of State as a petition but that consideration of it should be deferred until they had had an opportunity of discussing the whole matter with the Governor on his return to Northern Rhodesia.

5. Accordingly in September 1948 the Governor visited the Barotse and had two discussions—one in private with the Paramount Chief and his principal advisers and one with the Paramount Chief and the National Council. The Governor began by setting the Barotse minds at rest about the results of such constitutional changes as had been made in consequence of the discussions in London. He also repeated the Secretary of State's assurance that no change would ever be made which would affect the status of the Barotse without consultation with and prior consent of the Paramount Chief and his Council. The burden of the Barotse reply was that this assurance was not enough. They would feel safer if their separate Protectorate status were recognised forthwith. They complained moreover that development was not progressing as rapidly in Barotseland as in Bechuanaland. They repeated their dislike of the restrictions on the authority of the Paramount Chiefs. They demanded simultaneously both more assistance for development and more authority to manage their own affairs. The Governor in replying counselled them not to assume so rashly that if they acquired Bechuanaland's status they would necessarily acquire all its advantages. Development in the past had been retarded by lack of funds and this handicap was only now gradually being overcome. He advised them to remain part of Northern Rhodesia for a few more years and watch developments before deciding to press their request 'to cut adrift from a comparatively rich and developing territory.' In the meantime he suggested they might ask for Barotse Province to be renamed Barotse Protectorate to emphasise its special status. The Barotse agreed to think over this advice and let the Governor know whether they wished to proceed with the petition.

6. Nothing more has been heard of the final reaction of the Barotse on this issue. The reason for this probably lies in the internal political dissensions in Barotseland which have occurred since that date. In November 1948 the Governor reported that agitation for the removal of the Ngambela (Prime Minister) had broken out and that following an enquiry by the Paramount Chief and the Kata they had been dismissed. Public opinion had declared itself against them as being too modern and reformist and for allowing Government to push through changes not in accordance with Barotse custom. Further unrest followed, together with denunciation of the Paramount Chief, in the usual style of Barotse politics; but by January 1949 the situation had calmed down sufficiently for the new Ngambela to be installed without incident, though the purge continued with the dismissal of three Indunas (Headmen). Reports indicate, however, that interest in Barotseland's status has not abated and indeed the recent discussions on Federation are bound to bring the question once more to the fore.

7. It is clear from the expressions of Barotse opinion which we have had during the past twelve months that their discontents are focussed on three main topics, viz.

- (a) their Protectorate status
- (b) their economic and social development, and
- (c) the restrictions on the powers of their native authorities, particularly the Paramount Chief.

It is for consideration what attitude the Secretary of State should adopt to each of these three topics during his visit.

(a) *Protectorate status*

It is reported that only the educated Barotse are in favour of completely separate Protectorate status under a High Commissioner, but that nervousness about Barotseland's status is general and increases every time any mention is made of constitutional changes in Northern Rhodesia. The Provincial Commissioner, however, considers that a formal document guaranteeing the rights of the Barotse under their treaty would allay the present feeling of insecurity. This could certainly be considered as could the Governor's suggestion that the Province should be renamed the Barotse Protectorate; but as regards the latter some objection is seen to the suggestion on the ground that it would be inadvisable to do anything which would strengthen the feeling of the educated Barotses that the development of their land is not inextricably bound up with the development of the rest of Northern Rhodesia. In any case it is advisable that the Secretary of State should personally repeat the assurance that no changes in status will be made without prior consultation and consent of the Paramount Chief.

(b) *Social and economic development*

The Barotse feel they are not getting their fair share of social and economic development and compare themselves unfavourably with Bechuanaland in this respect. Partly this impression is due to misinformation. (Thus they recently complained that they were inadequately represented in the Munal Training Centre; investigation showed that a quarter of the places both in the secondary and the trades school were filled by Malozi.) The chief factor, however, is that funds for development have only recently been made available and their effect (in such establishments as the Development Centre now being started at Namushakende) is only just beginning to make itself felt. It is suggested that this fact should be impressed on the Barotse and used as an argument for their remaining within Northern Rhodesia for a few more years, after which time they might see less discrepancy between themselves and Bechuanaland. In this connection it might also be advisable to give them some firmer guarantee about their land, since rumours have repeatedly circulated that Development Schemes are only a disguise for European incursions.

(c) *Powers of Native Authorities*

Barotse demands under this head—namely complete transfer of the Governor's power to the Paramount Chief—are much too far-reaching and, it is suggested, cannot be accepted. Certainly, in view of the general state of Barotse politics, it is hardly possible to reconcile this demand with the one for increased economic and social development. Consideration might be given however to changing the title of the Provincial Commissioner to that of Resident Commissioner, thereby echoing the Lewanika concession of 1900, when this phrase was used. Steps might also be taken locally to see that he is more or less 'resident', since one of the Barotse complaints is that government officials in the province change too often. It is also suggested that the Governor might be asked to consider whether it would be possible and desirable to give the Barotse at any rate a greater semblance of autonomy in their affairs than they have at the moment, bearing in mind that already, under the provisions of the Barotse Native Courts and Native Authority Ordinances, there has to be consultation in most cases with the Paramount Chief before the Governor can exercise his powers.

(A note on the present Administrative System of Barotseland is attached as an Appendix.)

3. The Secretary of State is visiting Barotseland the day after his arrival at Lusaka and will no doubt wish to discuss this matter with the Governor before leaving for Mongu. Sir Gilbert Rennie will know what developments have taken place at Mongu in preparation for the Secretary of State's visit. Subject to what he may say, it is suggested that in reply to any representations that may be made to him the Secretary of State should:—

- (a) promise very careful consideration;
- (b) repeat the assurance that no changes in the status of Barotseland will be made without prior consultation with and the consent of, the Paramount Chief, and
- (c) draw the attention of the Barotse to the advantages to be drawn from remaining as part of the larger unit and assure them that the economic development of and provision of social services in Barotseland is regarded by Government as most important and that these matters will be given the same attention with respect to Barotseland as they receive in respect of the rest of Northern Rhodesia.

## **41** CO 525/208 44332/3, no 7A

17 June 1949

### **'Acquisition of estates of the British Central Africa Company': CO note<sup>1</sup>**

1. After considering the Abrahams Report<sup>2</sup> and the Report of the Planning Committee, Government issued a statement of policy in 1948.

This said that:—

- (i) A full solution of the problem on the lines recommended in the Abrahams Report was not possible;
- (ii) The following recommendations of the Planning Committee were accepted;
  - (a) Four 'Village area' blocks of land to be acquired for Africans in the Cholo district;
  - (b) Acquisition by Government of about 546,000 acres in all, of which 454,000 were for 'immediate purchase' at a cost estimated to be £275,000.
  - (c) Compulsory acquisition not to be resorted to except in cases of over-riding necessity.
- (iii) Until all freehold land was under full development or active preparation for development, and until the effect of the acquisitions proposed by the Planning Committee could be gauged, Government could not endorse the recommendation of the Planning Committee that it should announce that further large acquisitions of land were impracticable.

2. The acquisition now proposed of part of the B.C.A. Estates in the Cholo district is being undertaken in accordance with (ii) (a) above. The land is to be used for the

<sup>1</sup> This was prepared for A B Cohen in response to a request by C E Lambert (minute, 14 June 1949).

<sup>2</sup> See 21.

settlement of Africans who work in the neighbouring plantations and will be sufficient only for 'gardens'. It is not intended for Africans who wish to practice agriculture on their own account. The total area involved is about 20,000 acres, of which almost 9,000 acres are owned by the B.C.A. The Governor considers that the price accepted by the B.C.A. will have a decisive effect on the price which the other owners concerned are likely to accept: for this reason the B.C.A. is the first owner to be approached, and the Governor is anxious to buy at the lowest possible price. In this connection he has pointed out that:—

- (a) The fertility of the land in question has deteriorated so that it has little or no value from the point of view of European Agriculture;
- (b) Three companies—the B.C.A., A.L. Bruce Estates, and the Blantyre and East Africa Company—will get the lion's share of money paid for land acquisition, and he fears that much of the money will not stay in the country;
- (c) This is the first area of land to be acquired as a result of the Abrahams Report.

3. The local manager of the B.C.A. has valued the lands at £3 per acre; the Planning Committee, in their published Report, recommended £2. 15. Od. per acre; the Governor is prepared to pay a maximum of 10/- an acre. The Governor, in paras 19 to 26 of the despatch at (2), has summarised the arguments which the Company may be expected to put forward in support of a higher price, and has suggested answers to them. Briefly, they are:—

- (i) The Company has done pioneering work in the past and has plans for future development. The Governor states that 'the Company have had golden opportunities for development in the past; that they have not taken them and that as a result of their own neglect extensive development of their large landholdings has now become to a great extent impossible'.
- (ii) The land is valuable because it is suitable for the production of tea, tobacco and tung. The Governor states that it cannot now be used for these purposes because it has been overrun by tenants, whose incursion the company made no effort to prevent. Over 60% of the land is under native gardens.
- (iii) The land is valuable as a source of labour. Not so, since the number of tenants who work for the Company is exceptionally small.
- (iv) The land is valuable as a source of food supply. Not so, since the Company buy a negligible amount of food from their tenants and have no buying stations.
- (v) The open market price would be higher. True that prices are high—indeed inflated; but such sales are likely to lead to trouble when the new purchasers discover that Africans encumber the land. Such transactions are unethical and conflict with the interests and security of the Protectorate.

4. Mr. Nye<sup>3</sup> has stated that he doubts whether the land is worth more than 10/- per acre as it is heavily populated and the soils are degraded. If necessary, the Governor would be prepared to agree to a price of up to 10/- per acre for *all* the land which the B.C.A. is prepared to sell to Government. (The Planning Committee recommended the acquisition from the B.C.A. of 200,000 acres in all.) The Governor also suggests that, if the B.C.A. prove unamenable, reference might be made to the fact that a tax

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<sup>3</sup> G W Nye, deputy agricultural adviser, CO.

on undeveloped land is under consideration. (I doubt whether there is much force in this implied threat. The Governor advances as a reason for resisting a high price that because the land is encumbered by Africans it is useless for tea, tobacco or tung cultivation. But if the company cannot *now* develop the land, it would, to my mind, be highly immoral to tax the land because it *is* undeveloped.)

5. Compulsory acquisition. The Governor has not referred to the possibility of compulsory acquisition, but, in connection with the possible acquisition of the Bruce Estates, he has stated that he wishes to avoid it as it would involve too high a price. The relevant legislation is the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance, 1948, which empowers the Governor to acquire land upon payment of compensation. Compensation may be settled by agreement or, failing that, by submission to the High Court, from which there is appeal to the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Court of Appeal.

## **42** CO 795/145/6, no 93

22 July 1949

**[Northern Rhodesia mineral rights]: CO minutes of a meeting with Northern Rhodesian representatives and representatives of the British South Africa Company chaired by Mr Creech Jones**

[This was the second of three meetings on the issue. The first, on 20 July, was chaired by Andrew Cohen. At the third (which actually took place on 27 July rather than 26 as originally planned), Rennie put forward what was to be the agreed formula: that BSAC would enjoy its existing rights for another 37 years from 1 Oct 1949, but would, in the meantime, pay the Northern Rhodesia government 20 per cent of its net royalties. Britain undertook 'so far as it is possible to do so' to ensure that any successor government would respect that agreement.]

*The Secretary of State* opened the meeting by welcoming the Company's representatives. He said that he was pleased to have this opportunity of discussing the difficult problem of mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia, about which recently strong views had been expressed both here and in Northern Rhodesia.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Welensky's motion at the March meeting of the Legislative Council had brought the problem into the arena of immediate politics.<sup>2</sup> He hoped that some means would be found in the present discussions whereby the difficulties could be overcome. He understood that these difficulties had been fully discussed at the meeting on the 20th July, but that not much progress had been made. H.M. Government were very anxious that some solution should be found and that this problem should not remain a source of conflict for a long time to come. He understood that the discussions had proceeded on the lines that the Government of Northern Rhodesia might acquire the mineral rights within a reasonable period and that the Company had suggested that they should continue to enjoy the mineral rights for another fifty years. In his view public opinion would not accept so long a period and he understood that the Governor had proposed that the mineral rights should terminate when the land rights expired in April, 1965. He wanted to hear the Company's views on this proposition.

<sup>1</sup> A meeting had taken place in Bulawayo in May between NR unofficials and executives from BSAC to discuss on an informal basis the terms of a possible settlement.

<sup>2</sup> Welensky's motion had called for the imposition of a tax on the Company's mineral royalties.

*Sir Dougal Malcolm*<sup>3</sup> said that the Secretary of State had spoken of Northern Rhodesia acquiring the rights. If a solution was now proposed on the basis of the payment of a fair price for compensation, that was a different proposition from surrendering the rights for nothing. *The Secretary of State* said that purchase under present circumstances would present great difficulty. The proposal as he understood it at the moment was that the acquisition of these rights by Northern Rhodesia at the end of a given period would be subject to certain conditions which would be less onerous to the Company than certain other alternatives which it was open to the Government of Northern Rhodesia to adopt. *Sir Dougal Malcolm* asked what conditions the Secretary of State had in mind. *The Secretary of State* said that he understood that the proposal was that His Majesty's Government should bind itself not to interfere with the Company's enjoyment of these rights for a stated period and that it should also bind any future Government which might be responsible for the affairs of Northern Rhodesia to a similar obligation. *Sir Dougal Malcolm* said that that was correct and he explained how the suggestion had arisen out of the informal conversations at Bulawayo. The proposal was in essence that after enjoying the rights for a fixed period the Company should make a gift of them to the Government of Northern Rhodesia. *Mr. Welensky* said that he objected to the use of the word 'gift'. *The Secretary of State* said that, while it was impossible to bind future Governments absolutely, he appreciated the condition, which he considered a reasonable one, and said that if some agreement could be reached on the term of years, everything possible would be done to make the condition binding. The essence of the proposals now under discussion was the period during which the Company would continue to enjoy its mineral rights and he understood that little progress had been made on this matter at the meeting on the 20th July.

*Sir Dougal Malcolm* said that that was correct and that he wished to make the Company's view on this matter perfectly clear. Their view was that under existing agreements they had the mineral rights concessions in perpetuity and any limit now set to their enjoyment of these rights would obviously be a most important qualification of this position. It had to be remembered that in anything which was proposed the Board would have to carry the shareholders with them and for this reason the period could not be too short. In the Company's view the minimum period would be one of 50 years. They have, however, been prepared to discuss an immediate arrangement to give the Northern Rhodesia Government an interest in those rights which were at present unalienated. He might be able to persuade his shareholders to acquiesce in a fifty-year period, since the most important concession had been granted in 1900 and the effect would be to make the total period for the Company's enjoyment of the mineral rights one of 99 years, for which there were precedents; but he did not think that they would be prepared to consider a shorter period. There remained the question of the percentage of the royalties on rights at present unalienated which might be given to the Northern Rhodesia Government immediately. During the discussions on the 20th July this matter was not discussed, since the Government side refused to consider a period of fifty years. The Governor of Northern Rhodesia had suggested sixteen years, but such a period would be altogether unacceptable to the Company's shareholders. *Sir Dougal* also said that it

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<sup>3</sup> *Sir Dougal Malcolm*, president of BSAC, 1937–1955.

had been intimated to the Company's representatives by Mr. Cohen that, if some agreement did not emerge from the present discussions, the Secretary of State would consent to the introduction of what was in the Company's opinion a discriminatory tax on mineral royalties. *Mr. Cohen* explained that what had been said was that, if the present discussions broke down and Mr. Welensky proceeded with his proposal to introduce a tax, His Majesty's Government saw no reason why they should disallow it provided that it was not confiscatory. *The Governor* said that in his opinion the meeting on the 20th July had carried the matter further than was suggested by Sir Dougal Malcolm. He understood that the idea that the Company might depart from their fifty-year proposal had not been entirely ruled out; otherwise there would have been no point in having a further meeting.

*The Secretary of State* said that it might be convenient if at this stage he could clear up a few general points regarding the background of the problem. He was not concerned this morning with challenging the legality of what was done in the past. He was concerned to find a way out of the practical difficulties of the present. Whatever had happened in 1900, the world had radically changed since. The attitude of public opinion had altered and new demands were being made which could not be ignored. What was thought fit and proper in 1900 was not thought so now and those responsible for government must have regard to the strongly held views of the public. The basic factor in the situation now was that public opinion in Northern Rhodesia and the unofficial members of the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council did not accept the position that the mineral rights in the territory should be held by a Company. The Company must face the fact that public opinion was a force that had to be reckoned with and public opinion now held that every state should own its own mineral rights. As a result, in Northern Rhodesia there had been strong criticism of the fact that in the past these rights had been granted to the Company. The views held on this subject might be either right or wrong—that was not the question—but that they existed was a political factor that could not be ignored. In the last few years these rights had proved particularly profitable and were likely to continue to be profitable. This being the case, they were likely to be the cause of increasing bitterness among the public. Ultimately it might well be that public feeling on the matter would force the Company to surrender these rights and the Company must bear that fact always in mind. His Majesty's Government were most anxious to do something to meet the situation in a fair and proper way. The Northern Rhodesia Government was not in a position to acquire these rights by purchase. On the other hand, if the Company's last word on this subject was a fifty-year period, then there could be no further discussion, although he was most anxious to avoid a breakdown if possible. The Company must realise that no Government, in the face of the pressure of public opinion, would dare to make an arrangement whereby they bound themselves to agree that the Company should continue to enjoy its rights for another fifty years. He suggested that the Company's shareholders might recognise this fact. In the light of the political background, therefore, could not some suggestion be made more acceptable than fifty years?

*Mr. Cohen* pointed out that hitherto the public outcry against the Company's rights had come only from the European Community in Northern Rhodesia, but Africans were beginning to show an interest in this problem. If some arrangement could not be arrived at quickly, the problem would only embitter the political situation for years to come. *Mr. Beckett* interposed that European public opinion had

always challenged these rights and for that matter so did the Paramount Chief in 1923. *Mr. Welensky* said that as far as he was concerned any suggestion of fifty years would be impossible and that, if the present negotiations broke down, he would proceed with his tax. But he also pointed out that, even if he did this, there was no guarantee that within a very short time public opinion would not demand further action. *Mr. Cohen* pointed out that in any agreement made as a result of these discussions the Government would presumably have to bind itself not to agree to a tax on royalties. From the revenue point of view it was quite impossible for Northern Rhodesia to bind itself on this issue for a period of fifty years. The period in fact for which the Company would continue to enjoy its alienated rights was the kernel of the whole problem. *Sir Dougal Malcolm* said that in the Company's view any taxation of the kind proposed by *Mr. Welensky* would be discriminatory because it would be directed against the Company as such.

*The Secretary of State* said that he had hoped that the question of taxation could be left out of these discussions altogether, but, since the matter had been raised, he had to make it plain that, if a bill to tax mineral royalties were brought into the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council and if it were in a suitable and proper form, the Bill would be endorsed by the Governor of Northern Rhodesia and to that extent by His Majesty's Government. In the view of H.M. Government there were overwhelming social and financial arguments for some such tax. The territory was in vital need of new revenue and therefore all possible sources had to be tapped. He was anxious, however, that this aspect of the matter should be left on one side and that every effort should be made to reach an agreement. Could the Company therefore reconsider the period of fifty years?

*Sir Dougal Malcolm* said that the Company were already cutting perpetuity to fifty years, but he wished to know whether from the Government side sixteen years was the last word. *The Secretary of State* pointed out that the Government might even have considerable difficulty in persuading local opinion to accept sixteen years. *The Governor* said that, if the Company would agree to a sixteen year period, the Government would not ask for a share of the unalienated rights. If however there were an extension of the period beyond sixteen years, the Northern Rhodesia Government would wish to receive a share of the unalienated rights. *Sir Dougal Malcolm* said that the gap between sixteen years and fifty years was too large and he would never be able to persuade his shareholders to accept. In fact no reduction of the period below fifty years would be acceptable. The other representatives of the Company agreed.

*The Secretary of State* said that he hoped that the matter would not be allowed to end in a deadlock. The political situation in Northern Rhodesia was such that something had to happen on this issue very soon. He suggested that the Company might explore the possibilities of some other period in excess of sixteen years and might put forward another proposition. *Mr. Beckett* said that, although a fifty year period was out of the question, he would personally be prepared to go higher than sixteen years, but he could not commit his colleagues to such a proposition. *Mr. Welensky* said that for his part he had always preferred the proposal to tax the Company's royalties. The tax would give short-term advantages from the revenue point of view and within a few years he was certain that public opinion, both European and African, would force the Company to surrender their rights. *Sir Dougal Malcolm* said that *Mr. Welensky's* remarks did not encourage in him any

lively hopes of success but, in view of what the Secretary of State had said, the Company's representatives would like to have an opportunity of talking the matter over among themselves.

The meeting accordingly adjourned.

When the meeting resumed *Sir Dougal Malcolm* said that he hoped the Secretary of State would bear in mind that any proposal put forward by the Company's representatives would have to be endorsed by their shareholders. Subject to that proviso and after the discussion among themselves, the Company's representatives were prepared to suggest as a final settlement:—

- (a) that the Company should be allowed to enjoy their mineral rights for another 33½ years;
- (b) that the Government of Northern Rhodesia should be given a 33½% interest in all mineral rights alienated within that period: as from the date of the new agreement;
- (c) that an undertaking should be given that no 'special' taxation would be imposed during the period;
- (d) that the agreement should be made binding on any future Government that might become responsible for the Territory within the period.

He said that this was a final offer and that he considered that he would have great difficulty in persuading his shareholders to accept it.

*The Secretary of State* said that he feared that the period of 33½ years was too long to be acceptable to public opinion in Northern Rhodesia. If that was the Company's final offer then he feared that an agreement could not be reached. In considering this question of the period we had to take public opinion into account and to ask ourselves how long the public were likely to be willing to forego the benefits of the full mineral rights. If the present discussions broke down and as a result a bill to impose a royalties tax were introduced, H.M. Government would feel bound to support it provided the bill were in a suitable and proper form. He hoped, however, that the Company had not said their last word on this subject and that the matter could be discussed further at another meeting. *Sir Dougal Malcolm* said he saw very little prospect of reaching agreement, but if the Secretary of State invited the Company's representatives to another meeting they would naturally accept the invitation. *The Secretary of State* said that some progress had been made in the morning's discussions and that in his view the matters raised merited further consideration. He invited the Company's representatives to meet him at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, the 26th July, and the meeting accordingly adjourned until then.

## 43 CO 537/4691, no 2

18 Aug 1949

### [Afrikaner immigration]: note for the acting governor by the Chief Secretary's Office, Northern Rhodesia<sup>1</sup>

[Following a conversation with Roy Welensky in which the settler leader had raised the issue of Afrikaner immigration into Northern Rhodesia, Cohen asked the territory's governor for further information on this subject (Cohen to Rennie, 4 Aug 1949). Rennie noted that 'Some of us have been worried about this question' (Rennie to Cohen, 27 Aug

<sup>1</sup> The author of the document (the assistant chief secretary) is not identified in the correspondence.

1949). He enclosed the following document along with a note from his attorney general which suggested that the administration's forthcoming immigration bill would not give it powers to exclude South African nationals.]

You asked me to supply notes on Immigration trends with reference to immigration from the Union of South Africa. I have examined such statistics as are available and my reading of these statistics leads me to take a view which is the exact reverse of my former opinions. In consequence I regret that I shall be somewhat expansive in this note since justification is required.

2. The Special Branch of the Police is preparing a note but it will be delayed because they are involved in an Inter-Territorial Security conference. They point out, however, that they have very few statistics and will merely be able to make intelligent guesses. They are also doubtful as to the results which would follow a detailed investigation of the existing position, believing that the best they could do would be to collect information about a limited number of individuals. I have not asked the C.I.O. for information. You asked for an urgent note and the Immigration authorities have few additional statistics to work on and their only advantage is that their Immigration Officers actually see immigrants and their impressions would be based on personal contacts. They would, however, remain impressions.

#### *Statistics available*

3. Although I believe that we could, if S.R. would co-operate, get immigration statistics which would enable us to get some sort of a picture from the immigration figures, we have not yet got them. We can only assume that a fairly high percentage of the intake is off-set by emigration because accommodation is not coming forward at a rate which equals the immigration rates over the past year or two. The following statistics cover entries of *new-comers* who express their intention to remain. They are extracted from published returns.

	1946		1947		1948		1949 (six months)	
	<i>adults</i>	<i>minors</i>	<i>adults</i>	<i>minors</i>	<i>adults</i>	<i>minors</i>	<i>adults</i>	<i>minors</i>
UK born	846	128	1210	235	1636	345	960	148
Union born	1677	544	1750	611	1795	597	1029	436
Total of <i>all</i> immigrants	2980	888	3430	1001	4281	1235	2559	712

In view of the higher figures for Union born minors it is interesting to note that more Union born women seem to come to N.R. than women from other countries. The figures for 1948 show the following position:—

	<i>Adult Males</i>	<i>Adult Females</i>
U.K. born	1020	616
Union born	1066	729

4. For what it is worth, I interpret the above figures coupled with my own experience in N.R., as follows:—

(a) As shipping became easier in the United Kingdom figures have increased until, so far as adult males are concerned, the Immigration figures show little difference between Union and Home born.

(b) The S.R. statistics office does not supply employment details in respect of British immigrants, but I think it would be unwise to assume that the figure of U.K. born immigrants is inflated (in relation to Union born figures) as a result of post-war recruitment for Government service. A glance through the recent staff list reveals a fair proportion of Afrikaner names and my impression is that a considerable majority of appointments have been made from within Africa. This does not mean that all these people would be shown as 'Union born' but there have been many factors involved which have driven people North. The most important factor, at one time, was the inability of junior civil servants in the Union to get accommodation; thus making Government service here attractive.

(c) The number of minors coming from the Union can be explained in many ways. It is known that certain classes of the Afrikaner population marry early and raise considerable families and it appears that more Union born women have entered recently. It may also be assumed that the figures indicate, to some extent, that Union born immigrants are older e.g., experienced mine workers and established farmers.

(d) It is impossible to make an accurate estimate of the proportion of Immigrants who may be regarded as Afrikaner. Names and inability to speak English fluently are not effective tests in many cases. Having regard for the fact that the Afrikaner is the backbone of the farming community and supplies a high proportion of the lower grades of mine labour, it is probably safe to assume that the Afrikaner has provided 50% of the Union born immigrants. It is probably safe to say that every Afrikaner is at least out of sympathy with the British born section, and that South African nationals, generally, are inclined to view the future in the light of a link-up with Union systems and culture. Taking into account the unrestricted flow of labour between the Mines in N.R. and those on the Rand one can assume that more Union born immigration is off-set by emigration than is the case with immigration from Europe. Taking the 1948 figures for adult immigrants and assuming that as much as 50% of those classed as 'Union born' were Afrikaners the position is as follows:—

Afrikaners	898
Britishers	2534

I have reason to believe that unless subsequent enquiries confound this opinion the Security Branch will take 33% as being the percentage of Afrikaners.

#### *Effect of the proposed new Legislation*

6. I am doubtful whether the new Ordinance could be used to check the entry of any class of person on grounds of race or nationality. The criterion is to be 'Is the class of person required?' We will not be able to say 'We can take in Artisans but we do not want Asian or Afrikaner artisans'.

7. It cannot be ignored that political pressure is often brought to bear on immigration matters. You will recall the case of the Afrikaner who was deprived of his civic rights in S.R. and recently the Immigration Dept. declared an Afrikaner couple P.II. on the grounds that they could not comply with literacy requirements. They had failed a simple test set by the Predikant. Pressure was immediately put on Mr. Sergeant by his Afrikaner constituents and had the Magistrate not over-ruled the C.I.O. on appeal the matter would have gone further.

8. ...<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> There is no para 8 in the original.

### *Alternatives*

9. For what it is worth, it has been suggested that it is time N.R. followed the Union and S.R. and increased its residential qualifications for franchise. A lot of capital has been made out of the South African Nationality Act, but there seems to be a lot of good sense in it. In N.R. a man is entitled to register as a voter if he happens to stay for six months, has a few limited qualifications and is a British Subject. This gives the vote to people who have no real interest in the country and has hitherto prevented numbers of persons who have established themselves permanently in N.R. from taking any part in affairs.

10. If this suggestion is practical from a political point of view, franchise could be made to tie in with Legislation on the Kenya pattern. Franchise might be confined to persons qualified for permanent residents' certificates.

### *Footnote*

As regards a feeling that Afrikaners are flooding the farming areas, which is held in some circles, you will recall that we learnt that relatively little immigration had taken place in connection with land settlement and the Land Board's figures up to October, 1948 showed that only 288 persons had taken up land and many of those were existing farmers and local residents. A check of the Board's files has revealed that at the present time enquiries are coming in in the proportion of about 14 with Afrikaner names to 8 with British names. This may be an indication of future trends. I have, however, attempted to deal with the present position in my notes.

## **44** PREM 8/1307

29 Nov 1949

### **[Proposals for closer association in Central Africa]: CRO note of an inter-departmental meeting with Mr Beadle in the Commonwealth Relations Office**

[At his first meeting with Creech Jones and Noel-Baker on 23 Nov, T M W Beadle, the Southern Rhodesia minister of justice and internal affairs, asked the government to clarify its position on federation, claiming that there was little point proceeding with local talks on closer association if London was completely opposed. Creech Jones replied that the British government had not yet received from Southern Rhodesia a formal statement explaining why it considered the existing mechanism for inter-territorial co-operation—the Central African Council—to be inadequate. It was agreed that the Southern Rhodesia delegation should prepare a paper for this meeting setting out its objections to the CAC.]

*Mr. Creech Jones* referred to the letter from the Southern Rhodesian delegation giving details of the objections of Southern Rhodesia to the Central African Council and *Mr. Beadle* developed the arguments in that letter. He pointed out that the Central African Council was a purely advisory body and had no executive powers. The only joint services with executive powers were those which were administered by Southern Rhodesia, to which the northern territories made financial contributions. This seemed the best method of running the joint services and the Central African Council was not essential for this type of service. In fact there were no joint services in being which could not equally well have been achieved without the assistance of the Central African Council.

*Mr. Creech Jones* said that the advantage of the Central African Council was that it

avoided the necessity of summoning *ad hoc* committees and kept machinery in existence for discussion of matters of common interest. He thought that the Council had discussed a number of problems of very great importance to the three territories, and the number of items brought before it showed that benefits were being derived. He thought that the Southern Rhodesian statement did not give full credit to the work done by the Central African Council. Contributions by the northern territories to services administered by Southern Rhodesia were not the only form which co-operation should take.

*Mr. Beadle* replied that the organisation was far too expensive for the results obtained. The work of the Council was done mainly by small committees of permanent officials reporting to the Council; the same results could have been achieved without the Council.

*Mr. Noel-Baker* said that if Southern Rhodesia was looking forward towards a scheme of federation, her interest in the Council might tend to be lessened. It was true that certain work could proceed without a central body, but he wondered if the disadvantages were fully realised and instanced the situation of the railways in Europe, where about 17 different committees had been set up *ad hoc* to deal with different aspects of international railway control. He thought that it was advantageous to have a standing body to provide a standing forum for the discussion of common problems and which would be capable of being developed into a useful co-ordinating body for economic matters.

*Mr. Beadle* agreed that the Council had a certain value in co-operative work, but the cost (about £30,000 a year) was out of proportion. There could be no real economic integration without political integration, and in the absence of political integration, there would be a tendency to drift apart economically. Since the previous meeting he had consulted his Prime Minister, who was not prepared to agree to any proposal on the lines of the East African High Commission. Southern Rhodesia was proud of its Parliamentary system and would regard the superimposition of any body such as the East African High Commission as a retrograde step. He wondered whether the problem of the United Kingdom Government's obligations to Africans could possibly be met by reservations in the constitutions of the northern territories to safeguard native interests.

*Sir P. Liesching* asked whether it was intended, while the question of federation was being investigated, to maintain the Central African Council in being. *Mr. Beadle* replied that if there were prospects of federation in a reasonable time, they would probably agree that the Central African Council should carry on; but if federation seemed a remote prospect, they would have to reconsider whether continuation of the Central African Council was worth while. Their Treasury would certainly be opposed to it.

*Sir P. Liesching* asked if a series of independent meetings would not cost as much as the Central African Council and *Mr. Beadle* replied that the cost of independent meetings would be less, since the Central African Council had a paid Secretariat and was attended by senior officials. Normally there was very little discussion at the meetings of the Central African Council and these were to some extent a formality, as comprehensive documents had been prepared and circulated in advance. *Sir Percivale Liesching* said that this might be regarded as a tribute to the work of the Secretariat.

*Mr. Creech Jones* said that the existence of the Central African Council had

brought into being a small group of civil servants who were able to look at the problems of Central African as a whole. Referring to the possible danger of the territories drifting apart if the Council were abolished, he said that even if the political aims could not be reached the territories should work together, and this would probably lead to the evolution of other types of co-operation. There was danger in making political arrangements before the time was ripe and it was better to allow them to grow naturally. He appreciated the Southern Rhodesian view that the East African High Commission scheme might not be suitable, but this example suggested ways of co-operation which might be explored. If it was found that the Central African Council was falling short, it must be decided whether attempts should be made to improve the Council or whether it should be replaced by something else.

*Mr. Creech Jones* then referred to the practical difficulties in the way of political integration which he thought could not be easily overcome:—

- (i) the United Kingdom Government's responsibilities to the African population;
- (ii) the fierce antagonism of Africans to political integration;
- (iii) the differences of opinion about the political machinery needed to represent the population in the three territories.

Unless these difficulties could be overcome, it would be necessary to fall back on some other method of working together. He thought that it would be as well to start with what is already there and he questioned the view taken in Southern Rhodesia of the utility of the Central African Council. He detailed a large number of matters which had been successfully handled by the Central African Council and expressed the view that it should be possible to build on this and that increasing economic and technical co-operation could lead to giving the Central African Council new powers.

*Mr. Beadle* said that the main objection to the grant of greater powers to the Central African Council was that it cut across the Southern Rhodesian system of Parliamentary Government. To be really useful, the Central African Council must take more important decisions, but if it were empowered to take these decisions it ought to have a political mandate—important decisions ought to be taken by people responsible to Parliament.

*Mr. Creech Jones* said that the decisions of the Council were referred back to the three territories and that Southern Rhodesia, for example, had to ask Parliament to vote supplies. The Central African Council could not go forward on a common project unless the three territories were agreed and prepared to legislate accordingly. If the Central African Council were abolished, it would be found that as soon as questions affecting all three territories arose, it would be necessary to set up a body to carry out investigations and make technical enquiries, whereas now the body was in existence and had experienced staff who were capable of drawing attention to matters of which account should be taken.

*Mr. Noel-Baker* said that now-a-days all Governments were engaging in co-operation of the kind now questioned by the Southern Rhodesia Government. There were many inter-governmental bodies who took decisions *ad referendum* to each individual Government. These Governments then decided whether to accept or reject the recommendations, but in the vast majority of cases agreement was reached. The Central African Council is a less developed concept than federation, but it is a form of inter-governmental co-operation and it does give results. He agreed with *Mr. Creech Jones* that the difficulties in the way of political integration were considerable.

*Mr. Beadle* pointed out that when Central African Council decisions had to be referred to the Legislature the Minister had to say in effect, 'we have agreed to this and you must accept it without debate or amendment'. The analogy with inter-governmental bodies such as the I.L.O. was not complete, since recommendations from bodies such as the I.L.O. were mainly on specific subjects and did not cover the whole sphere of important services, such as health, education, transport, defence. He said that the United Kingdom seemed to favour the expansion of the Central African Council, whilst Southern Rhodesia felt that the Council had already gone as far as it could possibly go.

*Mr. Creech Jones* pointed out that the Central African Council was not a superimposed authority. Delegates went with instructions from their Governments with whom they continued in touch. A Government must govern, and on receipt of a recommendation from the Central African Council the Southern Rhodesian Government was presumably in the position of having to decide whether it would seek the approval of the Legislative Assembly or act and defend its action later should this be challenged. Supposing that political integration came about, the grounds of complaint would merely be transferred from the Central African Council to the new body, unless Southern Rhodesia was dominant in the federal body. If Southern Rhodesia were not dominant she would have surrendered some of her existing powers, and it seemed to him that the argument on this score against the Central African Council fell to the ground.

*Mr. Beadle* said that if the new body was a representative one the objections to its decisions would disappear. Southern Rhodesia did not wish to dominate the new body. The methods of electing representatives, and the decision to whom they would be responsible, would have to be considered later. He added that Southern Rhodesia would prefer a unitary system, i.e. amalgamation, but as at present that was not acceptable to the United Kingdom they were looking for an alternative and had therefore suggested federation. This was an exploratory talk and he did not wish at this stage to go into detail.

*Mr. Cohen* said that Southern Rhodesia wanted a federal Government with strong powers, but the indications were that not only were the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland opposed to this, but that the Europeans in these territories would strongly oppose any scheme which would reduce Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to provincial status. It seemed to him that the alternative might lie between a developed Central African Council and a loose federation. *Mr. Beadle* said that there was a long way to go before any definite steps were taken on federation and they were committed to a referendum, the result of which could not be foretold. There were certain isolationist elements which might come out against the proposal. The question of obtaining the views of the Africans was a very tricky problem.

On the question of representation on the Central African Council, *Mr. Cohen* said that Northern Rhodesia included leading non-officials in their delegation and as a result usually achieved agreed decisions. Could not Southern Rhodesia send, for example, an all party delegation? *Mr. Goodenough*<sup>1</sup> said that the rooted dislike of the Central African Council in Southern Rhodesia must be taken into account. The Liberal Party had objected to any representation on the Council.

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<sup>1</sup> K M Goodenough, high commissioner for SR in the UK, 1946–1953.

*Mr. Creech Jones* said that at the Victoria Falls Conference technical committees were asked to look into the difficulties involved. The terms of reference needed to be clarified to show what would be the powers of the central body, what would be the structure of the federation, and also what the financial implications would be.

*Mr. Beadle* said that before a draft constitution for federation was considered there must be constitutions for the constituent states. Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing Colony but Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were Protectorates. It would be very difficult to draft a federal constitution for three territories which were at different stages of Constitutional development. He thought that the first step to settle was the degree of autonomy of each of the Territories; on that basis there should be built up the federal Government—it would be impossible to apportion the responsibilities unless the powers of the local Government were clearly stated. Although the Committees at Victoria Falls had drawn up proposals purporting to provide for the setting up of a federal Government, their scheme really amounted to the establishment of a unitary constitution with a system of federal finance and block grants to the Provincial Legislatures. *Mr. Noel-Baker* pointed out that it would be impossible to give Nyasaland, with a handful of Europeans, a constitution similar to that of Southern Rhodesia and that Northern Rhodesia also could not expect a constitution on Southern Rhodesian lines.

*Mr. Beadle* said that there was no point in drafting a federal constitution if the United Kingdom Government felt that it was impracticable at this stage. *Mr. Creech Jones* said that, while he would not go as far as that, the political difficulties did appear very great. For example, there would not be agreement amongst the Europeans in the different Territories on some of the important points; the difference in constitutions between Nyasaland, which was a Protectorate, and Southern Rhodesia, which had responsible self-government, would be difficult to bridge, and to make an effective federation the central authority would have to have very considerable powers. The United Kingdom Government could not, however, surrender the responsibilities which they regarded as necessary to carry out their obligations to the Africans; these were laid upon them by treaties and other commitments they had entered into. It was a very difficult political dilemma and it would not be sufficient to put into a federal constitution that certain powers, including certain financial powers, would be reserved, as everything done by the Central Government must have some effect on the African communities. *Mr. Cohen* said that in spite of the difficulties some form of association was, he felt, essential. If the federal solution was impossible, some other scheme might have to be devised—possibly something quite new and without precedent—to achieve the object generally desired. Isolation would be disastrous. *Mr. Beadle* said that as it seemed that no federal scheme would be acceptable to the United Kingdom Government, a political association seemed impossible, but it might be worth making an approach for economic association.

*Mr. Creech Jones* said that the United Kingdom wanted to keep an open mind. So far they have not had a full and reasoned appreciation from Southern Rhodesia of the limitations and defects of the Central African Council and in the absence of this could not help feeling that the most promising course was to build up on the existing machinery. He very much hoped that an appreciation of the Southern Rhodesia Government's views on the working of the Council could be sent to the United Kingdom Government to assist them in getting a clear view.

Secondly, he thought that it would be desirable to have a statement of Southern Rhodesia's views on political integration short of amalgamation.

Thirdly, if it were impossible to reach agreement on some form of political structure it would be useful to have their views on the question how far it would be possible to go in constituting a body effective in the economic field. He realised that it was very difficult to draw a line between politics and economics. As he had said before, he would prefer an empirical build up from the Central African Council, but if this was not acceptable to Southern Rhodesia it would be necessary to try to find some other line of advance.

*Mr. Beadle* enquired whether it would not be possible for the United Kingdom Government to take the lead and call a conference in London later on, to which representatives of the three territories would be invited. He thought that this should be the next stage in the proceedings and that time should not be wasted at present in drafting constitutions or making preparations for a referendum. *Mr. Creech Jones* thought that this was a useful suggestion, and *Mr. Baxter* (in the absence of the Secretary of State, who had had to leave for another engagement) welcomed the proposal on behalf of the Commonwealth Relations Office, but stressed that it would be essential to prepare the ground thoroughly before the conference was held. In particular it would be necessary to have the views of the Southern Rhodesian Government on the points which *Mr. Creech Jones* had just mentioned.

## 45 CO 537/4691, no 10

3 Dec 1949

### [Afrikaner immigration]: letter from Sir G Rennie to A B Cohen

The question of Afrikaner immigration into Northern Rhodesia (your letter No. 45221/4/49 of the 13th of September refers) has been exercising my mind a great deal recently and Welensky,<sup>1</sup> Gore-Browne, Beckett and Wilson expressed to me their deep concern about the situation. They think that if Afrikaners are not to dominate the scene here in the near future, remedial steps will have to be taken without delay. They have no clear ideas what those steps should be, but suggest that the sooner Welensky, Gore-Browne and I have secret discussions at the Colonial Office on the subject the better. The suggestion they made was that Welensky and I should go to London as soon as possible (probably early next February) on some other pretext and discuss this matter also, and that Gore-Browne should arrange to be there on private business about the same time.

They also told me that the Government of Southern Rhodesia are gravely concerned about the problem as it affects them.

We discussed the question whether the proposed Immigration Bill would help to stop the inward flow of Afrikaner immigration and came to the conclusion that it could not be expected to achieve very much, since most of the would-be immigrants

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<sup>1</sup> Welensky had already written to Cohen in Nov, raising this very threat (Welensky to Cohen, 20 Nov 1949).

would be able to comply with the relevant conditions governing entry into this country. It might, however, keep out a few people who otherwise would drift in in the hope of finding work here.

It was suggested that it might be helpful if we could have a frank and confidential discussion with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. This would need careful handling.

I gather that Colby is also worried about the problem as it affects Nyasaland, and I have written to him on the subject.

It would be a calamity, in view of the trend of events in South Africa, if the Afrikaner element in Northern Rhodesia became so strong that most of the Elected Members returned after the next General Election were Afrikaners. Welensky assured me that things were shaping that way. It seems to me that we cannot risk such a development, but it is not easy to see what steps we can take. An influx of immigrants of the right type from the United Kingdom would help, and I propose to pursue one or two lines of thought in that connection that have occurred to me. Another possibility is to make the residential qualification for franchise more difficult. As you know, in Northern Rhodesia a man is entitled to register as a voter if he has been in the country for six months. When regard is had to the fluctuating population on the mines, the majority of whom come from South Africa, it seems to me to be questionable, to put it mildly, whether our present residential qualification is in the best interests of the country. Under present conditions very temporary residents who have no real interest in the welfare and future of Northern Rhodesia have a very large say in who will be elected to represent the European community in Legislative Council. Within a very few years, if present trends continue, that say will probably become predominant, and such a development would be very unfortunate. In the circumstances I am wondering whether it would not be wise to make the residential qualification two or even three years.

You will realise that our anxiety about the spread of Afrikaner influence is largely dictated (1) by recent events in South Africa and (2) by the nationalistic outlook of some of the leading Afrikaners in Northern Rhodesia. Some Afrikaners here are content to regard themselves as Northern Rhodesians and to work hard for the country. More and more it is becoming obvious, however, that many Afrikaners have political leanings and views that are not conducive to harmonious race-relations in this country, and in fairness to people of British stock who have made their homes in this country and in fairness to the Africans of this country, we must do our best to keep this a British territory deeply appreciative of the British connection and valuing highly the British way of life. We must also do our best, in fairness to the Africans, to maintain the 'partnership' policy between Europeans and Africans. Such a policy is likely to become increasingly distasteful to Afrikaners as their numbers here increase.

Since I drafted the foregoing Gore-Browne has mentioned to me that the residential qualification for franchise used to be eighteen months. I will try to find out why the change was made. Meanwhile I send this note to let you know how my thoughts are working. If you could tell me whether there is a residential qualification of two or three years in some other Colonial territories it would be helpful. You might also let me know what you think about the proposal to have secret discussions at the Colonial Office next February on the general question of Afrikaner immigration.

**46** DO 35/3681, no 22

11 Jan 1950

**[Opinion in Southern Rhodesia]: letter from Sir J Kennedy to Sir P Liesching**

In my letter L. No. 2 of the 10th January, 1950, I told you that I had had it in mind to write to you on the subject of relations between His Majesty's Government and the Government of this Colony. Although most, if not all, of what I am going to say, will be well known to you, I venture to think that it may be useful to you to have my impressions, based as they are on three years' residence in Southern Rhodesia, during which a great deal of development has taken place and a great increase in the European population.

As you are well aware, the people of Southern Rhodesia yield to none in the Empire in their affection for and loyalty to the old country, and I know that you will be the first to agree with me that it is tremendously important that these sentiments should be fostered and maintained, whatever may be differences of opinion on matters of policy. That there are and will continue to be such differences, we all know very well.

Over the past year or so, however, I have formed the impression that there has been a slight deterioration in the spirit of friendliness and I felt you would want to know about this, and to do what is possible to arrest it, as indeed we all desire to do here.

It might be useful to you if I were to attempt to analyse the sentiment of the people here, and to explain it, so far as I can.

First, then, we must put the overwhelming spirit of loyalty to the Throne and to Great Britain. This spirit, to which I have already referred, is universal among the white Anglo-Saxon population.

Next in importance, I think I would put their tremendous pride in what they have accomplished in adding this country to the Empire and in developing it so quickly and successfully by the sweat of their brows. And, with that pride, goes an extreme sensitivity in any matter that touches their strong belief in the soundness of their policies and the powers, which have been given them, of self-government.

Next, I think it would be right to put a very considerable sense of gratitude for all that has been done, and continues to be done for Southern Rhodesia, by His Majesty's Government. But, human nature being what it is, it would be unwise to rely too much in the stability of this sentiment, or to put too heavy a strain upon it.

The fourth point, which has to be taken into account, for the purposes I am thinking of now, is the firm belief of Rhodesians that most politicians of all parties and most civil servants in Britain, although sincere and well intentioned, know little or nothing of African conditions and of the native Africans. I will enlarge upon this later.

What I have said, so far, applies, in the main, to English and Scotch Rhodesians.

The Afrikaans Dutch now comprise about 14 per cent of the white population. They are coming up here from the Union in increasing numbers. The percentage of Afrikaans immigrants from the Union over the last year was 25.9 and over the last six months 26.2. No doubt, they are now being attracted to a great extent by the money to be made out of tobacco, and, whether the influx will continue at the present rate over a number of years, no one can say.

The Afrikaans people here are law-abiding and their influence in politics has, so far, been slight. They do not assimilate with the other Europeans at all. They live mostly in the country, and often in groups, where the farms are owned by them in great blocks. They show the strongest wish to preserve their own language, and to have their children segregated for education, and these objects they are fairly successful in achieving. There is a great deal of coming and going between them and the Union for higher education and so forth, and there is no doubt that their sympathies and loyalties are all with the Union.

As you know, they are great breeders and it is possible that, as their numbers increase, they will begin to appear in politics and in the Government, and make the task of maintaining friendly relations with His Majesty's Government considerably more delicate. However, that has not become a serious factor yet.

The Africans here are, as you know, in a state of flux, and the tribal system is disappearing with increasing rapidity. The Africans in the country have a strong feeling of loyalty to the Crown. But I should say that this loyalty is a good deal less among the Africans who have experienced, more strongly, the impact of industrialisation and life in the towns in closer association with the white man, and they are likely soon to form a fertile field for the Communist propaganda of which we already see signs. Their numbers have increased enormously with the advent of health services and with subsidisation in periods of famine.

One of the biggest problems before Southern Rhodesia now is the accommodation of the Africans on the land and in the towns. Huggins' policy, as you know, is to give the industrialised and town-dwelling Africans proper living quarters for themselves and their families, from whom they are now generally separated, and security for their old age; and eventually to create an agricultural native population, who will farm the land efficiently, and stay on it with their families. A very big proportion of the land in the hands of natives is now farmed very inefficiently by the wives and children of men who spend much of their lives in the towns, and in the mines, both here and in the Union, and on European farms. But the adjustment of this problem will take many years, and will, of course, entail the expenditure of a great deal of money both in the country and in the towns.

The other big problem, in the realm of native policy, is the political development of the Africans. They are being brought on here a good deal more slowly than in some other parts of Africa, but fast enough to give them what is sincerely believed to be a square deal. Huggins' policy is that they should be taught responsibility in administration by participation in simple forms of local government, and given greater responsibility when they show themselves fit for it, but not before. One of his difficulties here, as he has often explained to me, is to strike a compromise which will be acceptable to the Europeans, many of whom are—as he describes them—'diehards'. And it has always to be borne in mind that here we have a big and increasing European population who regard this land as their home, and the home of their children and grandchildren, and naturally, they are consciously or unconsciously influenced much by self interest.

Another difficulty is that a high standard of life has to be maintained for Europeans living in a tropical country like this, if they are not to degenerate quickly, and become 'poor whites', or intermarry with the natives.

To give you a true picture of feeling here on native policy—which is likely to be the greatest bone of contention in the future—I must, of course, be quite frank. I

must tell you what people think, and it is not the purpose of this letter to discuss whether or not their views are reasonable. Well, practically every European here considers the policy which is being pursued by the Colonial Office to be quite disastrous. People in Southern Rhodesia believe most firmly that native problems are not properly understood in London. They feel about Africa just as the early settlers in America might have felt if the Colonial Office of those days had insisted on North America developing into a Red Indian State, or as the first settlers in Australia, if the policy of the Home Government had been to set up an aboriginal Government there. They would not argue that it was right to have eliminated the Red Indians and the aboriginals, but would urge that their own liberal policy to the native was a great advance on that, and a more correct policy than that of the British Government. They would say that, if the Africans in other Colonies, in particular in Northern Rhodesia, were to attain full responsibility very much more slowly than seems at present to be contemplated, that would be a perfectly reasonable policy, and that in fact it would be far better for their development, their well-being and ultimate future. They would argue that the pace, which is now becoming uncontrollable in some Colonies, has been originally set not by the Africans but by the white man, and that we should take good care that the pace is not unduly and, as they believe, dangerously accelerated in Southern Rhodesia. And they most certainly feel that the immense work which is being done by Southern Rhodesia for the advancement and civilisation of the natives is not adequately realised in Great Britain. Although these views will be familiar to you from reading the speeches of politicians, I wonder if you realise they are strongly held by literally almost every man in the street.

The latest manifestation of feeling on this subject has been aroused by the recent talks on federation. Here the feeling is that the point of view of His Majesty's Government arises out of ignorance of the African. Huggins has not conducted the negotiations on orthodox lines because, as he has told me, he felt the prejudice in London was so strong that there was no chance whatever of achieving anything by orthodox methods. He said that, when he made his provocative speech at Gatooma in December last, many people did not remember that he had been struggling for some sixteen years for some sort of amalgamation and had made nothing of it. He believes most sincerely that his policy is the best for the Africans and for the Empire, and he considers that it would be perfectly possible to give it effect without opposition from the natives, taking into account that they are backward and primitive and easygoing in Central Africa.

I have said all this, much of which, as I realise, you will already know, in order to describe the sort of atmosphere into which communications from London are projected when they cross the equator. As time goes on, the greatest courtesy and consideration and tact on both sides will be needed if relations are to be maintained on the present friendly basis. I know you will be the first to agree that no effort should be spared to preserve the sentiments which unite this little but rapidly growing country to the mother country and which are, after all, of far greater consequence than the matters over which controversy is likely to arise in the future.

I would be the last to claim that there have been no errors, on the Southern Rhodesian side, in the exercise of courtesy and tact. But I know you will realise that any apparent bluntness is merely a symptom of youthful exuberance and has no malice behind it.

This letter is already getting much too long, but, before I end it, I must record my opinion, that we owe the greatest possible debt to Huggins for his great share in building up the close friendship which exists to-day. It is, I fear, too much to hope that the next Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, whoever he may be, will prove to be so broadminded, to be gifted in such a high degree with both commonsense and humour, and to be so slow to take offence when differences arise.

Please forgive me if you think I have wasted your time in writing all this, but I thought it right to give you my impressions as clearly and as dispassionately as possible.

## **47** PREM 8/1266

10 Mar 1950

[UK representation in Southern Rhodesia]: minute by Mr Gordon Walker to Mr Attlee

The existing arrangements for representing the views of the U.K. Government to the Government of Southern Rhodesia, and for the supply of information about Southern Rhodesian affairs, are not adequate and require reconsideration. The only instrument for both these purposes is the Governor. The Governor is handicapped in pressing the U.K. Government's views on the Government of Southern Rhodesia because he is the King's representative there as well as, in the field of reserved legislation, the representative of the U.K. Government. He does not fail to report from time to time on current affairs and special problems in Southern Rhodesia, but his sources are necessarily limited and it is not altogether fitting, in any case, that this work should be done in the Governor's name.

2. The lack of an adequate flow of information about affairs and personalities in Southern Rhodesia is particularly serious. The economic potentialities of Southern Rhodesia are great and rapidly developing and justify our taking a close interest in its affairs; its political problems are equally of concern to us, situated as it is between territories which are pursuing fundamentally different policies towards the African native. Southern Rhodesia also has a number of special problems with the neighbouring Portuguese [sic] territories.

3. The only satisfactory remedy for this situation is the appointment of an independent representative of the U.K. Government, who would discharge the functions performed elsewhere by a U.K. High Commissioner. There is no good reason why he should not have the title of High Commissioner. Since this would imply some recognition of the growing importance of Southern Rhodesia, it would no doubt be acceptable to Southern Rhodesian opinion; but, in fact, it would not (and we should have to make this clear) denote any change in the constitutional position of the Colony—which for some years has had its own High Commissioner in London.

4. The first step would be to obtain the goodwill of the Southern Rhodesian Government. Thereafter I think we ought to make the most strenuous efforts to avoid delay in setting up a High Commissioner's post in Southern Rhodesia (we might have to start in temporary premises).

5. Two recent developments make it desirable to consider this proposal urgently:

(a) Indications of increasing tension in the Southern Rhodesian Government's attitude towards us. In a letter dated 11th January<sup>1</sup> (copy attached) the Governor, Sir John Kennedy, draws attention to the feelings of irritation and frustration in Southern Rhodesia, and advises that special efforts will be needed if relations are to be maintained on a really friendly and satisfactory basis. Independent corroboration has been given in a personal letter received by Sir Percivale Liesching from Mr. T.S. Chegwidde, a former senior Civil Servant in this country, who is now serving the Southern Rhodesian Government as Chairman of their Public Services Board. I attach the relevant extract from this letter, in which he says that the prevailing mood is resentful and explosive.

This is just the field in which a good High Commissioner could be most useful.

(b) Forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to London. Sir Godfrey Huggins is expected to be in London (en route for a transport conference at Lisbon) on the 20th and 21st March, and again (after the Lisbon talks) in or about the first week in April. This visit would provide an excellent opportunity for putting the High Commissioner proposal to him, with the most favourable prospects of acceptance, and for using it as concrete evidence of our desire to avoid friction and misunderstanding between the two Governments.

6. I seek your approval, therefore, to the proposal being put to Sir Godfrey Huggins and his agreement sought in principle.

7. Had it not been for the General Election<sup>2</sup> this proposal would have been submitted to you some weeks ago. It was discussed with Mr. Creech Jones, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, and with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Both supported the proposal in principle. Mr. Creech-Jones desired to inform the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland of it by personal telegram, and to give them opportunity to express their views before it was mentioned to Sir Godfrey Huggins. This is an additional reason for obtaining an urgent decision on this matter well in advance of Sir Godfrey Huggins's arrival in London.

8. I attach a note<sup>3</sup> about some of the more detailed aspects of this problem which you may like to have for background information.

9. I am sending copies of this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Colonial Secretary.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See 46.

<sup>2</sup> A reference to the UK general election of Feb 1950, when Labour's 1945 majority of 146 was reduced to just 5.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Attlee commented on this 'I think that this is a good proposal. I am willing the S of S should raise the matter with Huggins' (minute by Attlee, 11 Mar 1950). On 6 Apr it was announced that I M R MacLennan, who was currently in charge of the South Asian Department of the CRO, would become the UK's first high commissioner to SR. He served in that capacity from 1951–1953, and as high commissioner to Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953–1955. He was assistant under-secretary of state, CRO, 1955–1957; high commissioner to Ghana, 1957–1959; ambassador to the Irish Republic, 1960–1963; high commissioner to New Zealand, 1964–1969.

**48** CO 537/5888, no 4

26 July 1950

**[Barotseland]: minute by A B Cohen on a meeting with Godwin Lewanika**

When we saw the Secretary of State yesterday with Mr. Benson he said that he would not have time to see Mr. Godwin Lewanika, about whom Mr. J.B. Hynd<sup>1</sup> had been talking to him, before Mr. Lewanika left for Northern Rhodesia on the 27th. He asked whether I should be able to see him and I said that I would.

I duly saw him this afternoon and had an interesting talk with him for about three-quarters of an hour. I need not record all that Mr. Lewanika said but I will mention the following.

The position of Barotseland in relation to Northern Rhodesia. Mr. Lewanika said that there were a number of people now who did not wish Barotseland to be separated from Northern Rhodesia, although there were others who out of fear of amalgamation or federation with Southern Rhodesia favoured separation as a High Commission Territory. I told Mr. Lewanika that I was glad to hear that there was a large body of opinion against separation. I referred to what Mr. Creech Jones had said when he visited Barotseland last year and said that I felt sure that separation from Northern Rhodesia would not be in the interests of Barotseland, which derived many benefits from being linked with Northern Rhodesia. Mr. Lewanika repeated many times during the conversation that the Africans in Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland, were entirely satisfied with the Northern Rhodesia Government and wanted to remain under it provided that it was an official Government responsible to the Colonial Office.

Mr. Lewanika said that if Northern Rhodesia were to be federated or amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia, Barotseland would want to become separate. The people of Barotseland hoped that H.M.G. would stick to the treaties. I said that there was no doubt whatever of this and I quite appreciated the point that the people of Barotseland wanted to stay under the Colonial Office. There was at present no concrete proposal for amalgamation or federation. I did not think that amalgamation was practical politics. No scheme of federation could be considered which subordinated Northern Rhodesia to Southern Rhodesia and no scheme would be considered which was contrary to the interests of the Africans of Northern Rhodesia. I went on to say, however, that it might be possible, while retaining Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland, under the Colonial Office, to devise some more effective means of co-operation with Southern Rhodesia which might not in any way prejudice African interests in Northern Rhodesia. If any such scheme were put forward in future I thought that Africans in Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland; ought to examine it and consider it before making up their mind whether to support it or oppose it. I did not think that they should make up their mind in advance to oppose any such scheme, since it might well be in their interests to accept it. Mr. Lewanika admitted that this was reasonable.

Mr. Lewanika mentioned the question of paramountcy, but merely for the purpose of explaining why the matter had been raised with Mr. Creech Jones in 1949. He subsequently gave me the paper which he had given to Members of Parliament of the Labour Party whom he met yesterday. I was interested in this, although of course I did

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<sup>1</sup> John Burns Hynd, Labour MP for the Attercliffe division of Sheffield since 1944.

not mention the point to Mr. Lewanika, because Lord Faringdon told me yesterday that Mr. Lewanika had told the group that the African Representative Council had been told by the Secretary for Native Affairs in Northern Rhodesia that paramountcy was dead. Page 5 of the note shows that this refers to a statement made in 1948 which was subsequently discussed with Mr. Creech Jones when he was in Central Africa. During the course of the conversation to-day I asked Mr. Lewanika whether the actual words 'paramountcy was dead' were used. He did not know whether they were or not. I pointed out to him that subsequently to the issue of the 1930 White Paper which propounded the doctrine of paramountcy there had been a re-definition of the position by an all-party Select Committee of Parliament in 1932, which stated that the doctrine of paramountcy should be understood as meaning no more than that the interests of the African population should not be subordinated to those of the immigrant communities, however important in themselves. This had been accepted as authoritative by the British Government at the time. The position had been re-defined in respect of Northern Rhodesia on several occasions in recent years. I asked Mr. Lewanika if the position was now well understood by Africans in Northern Rhodesia and he said that it was. I said that the policy was one of partnership and of not subordinating the interests of either community to the other. He asked what would happen if in respect of some question there was a difference of view between the Africans and Europeans. I said that it was hardly possible to give an effective answer without knowing the question at issue. It was the view of Government that normally there should be no conflict of interests. If there was a conflict of interests it would be a matter for statesmanship to resolve it and so to reconcile the two interests as to avoid subordinating either to the other. I also said that I thought that it would be extremely difficult on a major matter to go against a general African view and that it would also be difficult to go against a general European view. But I pointed out that the general European view in Northern Rhodesia was in favour of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia and of a form of internal self-government with the Europeans predominating. The African view was against this and in point of fact H.M.G. had respected the African rather than the European view. Mr. Lewanika fully admitted the force of this and said that Africans in Northern Rhodesia realised that H.M.G. would not put their view aside. I pointed out to Mr. Lewanika the difficulty of making general statements which were useful and said that I thought that Africans in Northern Rhodesia ought to judge H.M.G. and the Northern Rhodesia Government by their actions.

The whole conversation was exceedingly cordial.

I do not know whether any reply has been sent to Dr. Hinden about your suggestion that the Secretary of State should see Mr. Lewanika. If not, I suggest that a reply can be sent saying that he was unable to find the time before Mr. Lewanika left but that he arranged for me to see him, which I did.

**49** CO 537/5885

27 July 1950

[Closer association in Central Africa]: minute by C E Lambert on the future of the Central African Council

Mr. Parry's letter at (91) was discussed at a meeting with Mr. Benson and representatives of the C.R.O. on Monday 24th July. Mr. Gibson and Mr. Gandee attended for the C.R.O.

2. Mr. Benson also met the Secretary of State in his room at the House of Commons on Tuesday, the 25th July. Mr. Cohen and I were present at this meeting.

3. Mr. Benson made it clear at both meetings that, in his view, the Government of Southern Rhodesia had no intention of cooperating in the work of the Central African Council (Rhodesia/Nyasaland Conference) so long as they felt that His Majesty's Government were out of sympathy with Southern Rhodesia's views as regards amalgamation or, at any rate until they had a clear and definite idea of what H.M.G.'s attitude was towards closer union. Mr. Benson said that the feeling of the Southern Rhodesia Government was that H.M.G. expected Southern Rhodesia to put up ideas and proposals in regard to closer union only that H.M.G. might reject them. They were not prepared to act on this basis and moreover they considered that with the greater field of advice and experience open to them, H.M.G. were in a much better position to work out plans for the future than was Southern Rhodesia with its limited European population.

4. Mr. Benson went on to say that he was convinced that failing cooperation from H.M.G. on this matter Southern Rhodesia would be driven into the arms of the Union and he felt that if this were to happen it might be very difficult to prevent Northern Rhodesia, at least, from being absorbed into this larger unit. He felt that it was essential that every endeavour should be made to keep Southern Rhodesia looking north and that this could only be done if some means of closer association of the three territories could be found. What he would like to see would be an early statement by H.M.G. to the effect that they were prepared to consider ways and means of bringing the three Central African territories into a closer association with each other and that, to this end, they would be prepared to see held a conference of officials of the Governments concerned with a view to their tabulating the material relevant to this problem, examining the problem in all its aspects and formulating proposals which, in their view, might provide a form of closer association of the three territories, which would safeguard adequately African interests and which could be recommended by Governments to Africans for their acceptance. If the results of this conference were fruitful and were thought by Ministers to have sufficient possibility of acceptance by H.M.G. and by the local Governments, then the conference of officials could be followed by a conference to be attended by officials and unofficials. Mr. Benson had it in mind that the conference of officials should be held in Central Africa and it will be remembered that when Mr. Welensky was here his own proposal for a conference which would include unofficials was that it should be held in Salisbury with the U.K. in the Chair. The venue of any conference could, however, be considered later.

5. Mr. Benson said that if it were not possible to proceed on the lines suggested above, then he thought that H.M.G. should make a categorical statement to the effect that their advice was that the Southern Rhodesia Government had made no real attempt to make the Central African Council work and that, if Southern Rhodesia wished to entertain any hope of bringing about a closer association of the three territories, then H.M.G. would first require positive evidence of their desire to work for closer cooperation. This could be done by the Southern Rhodesia Government putting their heart into making a success of the Rhodesia/Nyasaland Conference and that it was through the workings of this Conference that H.M.G. looked to the building up of a greater degree of consultation and coordination between the three territories. This was the general tenor of Mr. Benson's remarks although he

appreciated that the language to be used to Southern Rhodesia might of necessity have to be not quite so blunt.

6. The Secretary of State said that he was glad to hear Mr. Benson's views on this important and complex problem and to have his up-to-date account of the general attitude of Southern Rhodesia. He said that he was himself in favour of the fullest possible development of cooperation between the three Central African territories but that he must make it clear that whatever action was taken to this end must have the fullest regard to the safeguarding of African interests. This was a responsibility for which H.M.G. must have the fullest regard and no U.K. Government whatever the party in power would agree to abrogate its responsibility for the welfare of the African populations of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to some other Government. He said that, provided this was kept in the forefront of our minds, he would himself see no objection to our submitting proposals on the lines suggested by Mr. Benson in paragraph 4 above. He made it clear, however, that he would want to talk over the whole problem with Mr. Gordon Walker when he returned from his tour of certain of the Dominions, and it was agreed that a meeting should be arranged with the two Secretaries of State about the third week of September which Mr. Benson would, of course, be invited to attend.

7. It was agreed at the meeting of the 24th July with representatives of the C.R.O. that as regards the proposals in Mr. Parry's letter at (91) on Part I Mr. Parry should be told that we considered that he should not himself take any initiative with the Southern Rhodesia Government in regard to delaying the calling of the winding up meeting of the Central African Council and the meeting to inaugurate the Rhodesia/Nyasaland Conference or that he should take the initiative in calling such a meeting, but that if any of the three Governments requested a meeting, then he should not take any action to delay its being called. If such a meeting were arranged then it would of necessity be devoted first to the winding up of the Central African Council and the inauguration of the Rhodesia/Nyasaland Conference.

8. I think that it would be as well to obtain the concurrence of the C.R.O. in the reply to Mr. Parry and I submit a draft for conson. together with a covering draft to Mr. Gibson.

**50** CO 537/5885

19 Sept 1950

[Closer association in Central Africa]: minute by A B Cohen

I send on these statements from Mr. Stanley and Sir G. Colby in preparation for tomorrow's meeting between the two Secretaries of State. The papers are already with the Secretary of State and in view of the short time available I have sent a copy of this minute and its enclosures to Mr. Watson.

The Acting Governor of Northern Rhodesia agrees with the proposal for an official conference. The Governor of Nyasaland is not in favour but would wish Nyasaland to be represented if the conference takes place. I think that Sir G. Colby has not correctly understood the position and has sent his telegram on the assumption that something in the nature of federation in the strict sense is likely to emerge. In fact the scheme we have in mind, as described in the memorandum, certainly does not go further than *confederation*, i.e. it would leave the existing Territories and

Legislatures quite intact. Perhaps we were at fault in not setting out our views more fully in the telegram of the 8th September attached below. I very much hope that Sir G. Colby's views will not be accepted as ground for not having the official conference proposed by Sir G. Huggins. If we do not have it the agitation for federation or amalgamation will not cease and we shall have to deal with it somehow. The contention in the memorandum is that, since the demands for some form of closer union are a fact which has to be dealt with, the conference of officials proposed would be the best first step.

## **51** PREM 8/1307

5 Oct 1950

### **'Closer union in Central Africa': minute by Mr Gordon Walker to Mr Attlee**

I am submitting this minute in consultation with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who agrees in its terms.

I attach<sup>1</sup> a copy of a telegram which was sent to you in my absence by Sir Godfrey Huggins on the 12th August. In it he proposes, as a sequel to discussions held in London last November with Mr. Beadle, then Southern Rhodesian Minister of Justice, that a conference of officials should be held in London as early as possible to consider the means of overcoming the difficulties hitherto experienced in promoting the closer association of the three Central African territories. He does not, indeed, supply the views of his Government which Mr. Beadle was asked to obtain, and confines himself to suggesting, as a basis for discussion, a list of functions that might be undertaken by a common organisation.

Mr. Griffiths and I are convinced that the proposal to hold a conference of officials should be accepted. We are already committed, by Mr. Noel-Baker's statement in the House on the 15th December last, to further discussion of the subject with the three Governments when they so desire. Apart from that, we see great advantages in subjecting this difficult issue to a joint discussion (for the first time) with official representatives of the three African Governments. The calling of the conference will remove the frequently heard reproach that His Majesty's Government are indifferent to the problem and have nothing to offer but destructive criticism of proposals that emanate from Central Africa for the closer association of the territories. Although we see no possibility of satisfying those Southern Rhodesian aspirations that look towards amalgamation with the northern territories we think it of prime importance to the future of the whole area to promote as far as practicable the association of Southern Rhodesia with her northern neighbours; the danger, accentuated by the steady increase of Afrikaner immigrants, that she may turn to association with the Union of South Africa is very real.

It will be necessary at the conference for the United Kingdom, Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland officials to have constantly in mind the special responsibilities of His Majesty's Government with regard to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the attitude of Africans in the two territories who are suspicious of closer political association with Southern Rhodesia. We are very conscious of the difficulties of the

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<sup>1</sup> Annexes not printed.

problem, and we do not see any prospect at present of complete political integration of the three territories. We hope however that a conference of officials, who should be free to examine the matter in all its aspects, will provide the Governments concerned with a full and objective survey and may succeed in formulating acceptable proposals for closer association between them in the ordering of matters of common concern. Our officials would hope also to bring home to the Southern Rhodesian officials, and through them to their Government, that the difficulties are not of our making but that there are real limitations imposed by the nature of the problem.

I attach a draft telegram which we propose, if you agree, to send to Sir Godfrey Huggins, telegrams to the same effect being sent to the other two Governments. It deals with the time for holding the conference (which we contemplate as being in next March), the terms of reference, and the text of an early announcement. You will see that this draft announcement makes the point that African opinion in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will be consulted on any proposals which emerge from the conference.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Attlee minuted, 'I approve. CRA, 6.X.50'.

## 52 DO 35/3433

7 Nov 1950

### [Afrikaner immigration]: letter from Mr Griffiths to Sir G Rennie

As you know, towards the end of 1949 the unofficial members of Executive Council expressed to my predecessor their concern at the growing numbers of Afrikaners who were entering Northern Rhodesia.<sup>1</sup> Since that time there have been discussions of the problem in the Colonial Office with yourself and with Mr. Welensky and Sir Stewart Gore-Browne.

2. While, owing to the absence of complete emigration statistics, it is not possible to ascertain precisely the numbers of Afrikaners who enter Northern Rhodesia year by year with the intention of becoming permanent settlers in the Territory, it is clear from the information contained in your letter of the 14th February to Mr. Cohen that they have reached proportions which must cause Government grave concern; and if the immigration of Afrikaans speaking persons from the Union should continue at the present rate this will create a potentially dangerous situation. It is, moreover, a problem which arises not only because of the permanent settlement of Afrikaners in the Territory. I appreciate that the turn-over of European labour employed on the Copperbelt and in industry is considerable, but it would appear that the turn-over is not so rapid as to preclude such labour from becoming eligible for inclusion in the voters' roll, since the residential qualification is six months' residence in the Territory and three months' residence in the electoral area, or from standing for election to the Legislative Council since the residential qualification for candidates is thirty months' residence in the preceding four years. Clearly, therefore, the temporary resident not only has a considerable say as to who

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<sup>1</sup> cf 43, 45.

shall be elected to the Legislative Council but may also provide successful candidates from among his own number.

3. In the light of the above, it would appear that, if Afrikaner immigration is allowed to continue unchecked, Government will have to face the possibility that there may be an Afrikaner majority among the elected members of Legislative Council and that at no great distance of time Afrikaners may form a majority of the settled white community. If either of these possibilities should materialise, I should regard it as a grave threat to the policy of His Majesty's Government, particularly in view of the agreements of recent years as a result of which, subject to your reserve powers, a considerable share of the responsibilities of government has been placed in the hands of the elected members who, again subject to your final decision, nominate those of their colleagues whom they would wish to see appointed to the Executive Council. It is not necessary for me in this letter to restate the policy of His Majesty's Government towards Africans, which differs fundamentally from the policy of 'apartheid' which is so largely supported by the Afrikaner population of the Union. It follows from this that effective steps must be taken urgently to restrict the immigration of Afrikaners into the Territory.

4. You are, of course, fully seized of the serious nature of the problem and of the urgent necessity for the enactment of immigration legislation which will provide you with the necessary measures of control. Indeed, to this end, legislation on the East African model was introduced in the Legislative Council at the end of 1949, but in view of the reactions which it provoked it was referred back to a Select Committee and the Bill was not proceeded with. The Select Committee recommended the appointment of a drafting committee whose task it would be to examine the evidence and memoranda submitted to the Select Committee and to settle the terms of a Bill to amend the existing immigration legislation in order to ensure that the number of immigrants entering the Territory will be sufficient to meet the demands of its expanding economy and that such control of immigration as is considered necessary and desirable will not be exercised in such a manner as to impede the development of the Territory. I am not aware whether the drafting committee have started work and I have asked to see their proposals before they are made public. In view of the rejection of the previous Bill I am inclined to doubt whether the Committee will propose amendments to the existing legislation which will provide an instrument the use of which will enable Government adequately to control immigration not only in the interests of the economic development of the Territory but also in such a way as will not prejudice the full application of His Majesty's Government's policy towards Africans. I do not consider that any legislation which does not at least provide measures of control as complete as those provided in the East African legislation is likely to meet the situation, and I attach particular importance to the provision that an immigrant may not change his occupation without the agreement of the Principal Immigration Officer. Such a provision would enable Government to control, and if necessary prevent, transfers from mining employment to agricultural settlement.

5. I must ask you to use all the means open to you to ensure that the amending legislation which is finally created provides Government with that measure of control over immigration, in particular over Afrikaner immigration, which will ensure that Government's policy towards Africans will be in no way prejudiced by the admission to the Territory of persons who would be likely to wish for a change of that policy; and you can be assured of my full support in your efforts to this end. I shall

wish to see the proposed amending legislation in draft form. You have indicated that you will also consider amending the franchise legislation by extending the residential qualification, and I should like to be informed of progress in this direction.

6. Legislation on the lines indicated above would not completely solve the problem since it would not be possible to include provisions discriminating against immigrants from the Union of South Africa or any other territory; but it would go a considerable way in this direction. In this connection you have asked in discussion here whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to say publicly that, in view of the native policy of the present Union Government, they must ensure that Afrikaner immigration into Northern Rhodesia is severely controlled in the future. You said you fully appreciated the difficulties in the way of such a pronouncement and I confirm that it would not be possible to make a public statement on these lines. There could however be no possible objection to your stating publicly at an appropriate time that immigration must be controlled in order that the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory generally will not be prejudiced and that persons will not be admitted who are not prepared to accept the Territory's institutions, and way of life.

7. You are aware that the Government of Southern Rhodesia are also concerned with the problem of Afrikaner immigration and you should know that they have recently expressed to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations their anxiety at the present trend whereby immigrants into Southern Rhodesia from the Union, largely Afrikaners, have come to out-number immigrants from the United Kingdom. It is understood that the Government of Southern Rhodesia are attempting to remedy this by removing from their Immigration Regulations a clause which requires persons migrating to the Colony from elsewhere than the Union and other contiguous territories to guarantee £200 for possible repatriation expenses, as compared with £100 from those from the Union, etc. It is very desirable, in these circumstances, that the Government of Southern Rhodesia should be kept informed of the action to be taken in Northern Rhodesia in regard to immigration legislation, and you will therefore no doubt continue to keep in touch with the Southern Rhodesian Government on this matter, preferably by personal contact with the Prime Minister.

8. I shall be grateful if you will keep me informed of progress towards the end which we both desire. I know that you share my view that a solution of the problem is an urgent necessity.

9. There is a further matter which I must mention. I have followed with interest the proposals which have been made in the Legislative Council for the establishment of a State-aided scheme to assist the immigration of Europeans into the Territory and I shall study carefully, in the light of your recommendations, the report of the Select Committee which is considering these proposals when it is received. But I feel that I should let you know at once that I have noted with concern the proposal to bring into Northern Rhodesia Europeans who would form a white farm labouring community. I recognise of course that there is a shortage of African farm labour, but I do not think that it would be possible for His Majesty's Government to countenance immigration of this nature even though the persons concerned would be employed on land held by Europeans. There could be no doubt that the introduction of European peasants into Northern Rhodesia would cause considerable repercussions not only among local Africans but also among Africans elsewhere. I very much hope

the proposal will not find a place among the recommendations of the Select Committee. It also seems to me that Welensky's ideas for European settlement generally are much too ambitious; but I must not anticipate the Committee's report. I hope however that Africans will have a full chance of giving evidence to the Select Committee.

10. A copy of this letter is being sent from the Commonwealth Relations Office to Sir Evelyn Baring for his personal information.

## **53** DO 35/3681, no 30

10 Nov 1950

### **[Southern Rhodesia—economic problems]: letter from Sir J Kennedy to Mr Gordon Walker**

I have the honour to refer to my despatch C. No. 2 of 1st February, 1949, and to submit for your information some further comments on the economic position of the Colony.

2. It is possible, I think, to define fairly clearly the main forces which are operating in the economy of the Colony today, and to divide them into two categories as follows. It seems likely that these forces will continue to operate for some time to come, although their relative importance will, of course, change from year to year.

#### *Beneficial forces*

- (a) The attraction of the Colony for immigrants and for capital investment.
- (b) The increase in volume and value of tobacco, chrome, asbestos and other primary products and also of secondary industries. (See Appendix I.)
- (c) The consequential rise in National Income and financial status. (See Appendix II.)

#### *Adverse forces*

- (a) The ultimate limitation imposed by the capacity of the Railways to transport goods in and out. (See Appendix III.)
- (b) The failure or inability of the food producing farmers to step up production in proportion to the increase in population. (See Appendix IV.)
- (c) External and internal inflationary pressure.
- (d) The steadily widening gap between the supply of and demand for native labour. (See Appendix V.)

3. It will be obvious that a strengthening of the beneficial forces does not necessarily mean a weakening of the adverse forces, but might in fact tend to aggravate them. It seems possible, therefore, that in the near future the Colony may have to retard the speed of its development and embark upon a policy of consolidation.

4. Since the war, the Government here has run substantial and worth-while risks in the development of the Colony and in most cases this policy has been successful, and this in spite of the fact that the weather, which is such a potent factor here, has, however, failed to come up even to moderate expectations. On the assumption that rapid development depends on a rapid increase in the European population, very little has been done to control or restrict immigration. At the same time, the fact

that there has been no shortage of capital has tended to accentuate a feeling of prosperity.

5. I mentioned in previous despatches that it might perhaps be judicious if the Government were to regard the future of the Colony with less unguarded optimism and a little more caution. It seemed to me then that a programme of unrestricted development and immigration might well have a snowball effect and get out of control. My arguments were based upon the cumulative burden of absorbing the rapidly increasing population and upon the physical difficulties of transportation. Certain other factors, such as the Korean War, have recently affected the position, and, perhaps, have aggravated it, and I am still of the opinion that progress is a little too rapid.

6. You will be aware that during the last four years there has been a wide gap in our balance of trade (see Appendix VI). The material gap has been filled by a gradual lowering of the standard of living due to increased costs and various forms of direct or indirect rationing. The financial gap has been filled by sales of tobacco and by the influx of capital belonging either to immigrants or to those seeking capital investment. During the current year, it is probable that the adverse balance of trade will be reduced but it is not yet possible to forecast whether this diminishing trend will be maintained. (See Appendix VI.)

Rationing has achieved its purpose up to a point, but in some cases it has now been replaced by acute shortages. Cement, steel, bricks and petrol are now in very short supply. The first three directly affect most development projects and the last affects the whole domestic economy.

7. Perhaps the most serious of today's shortages is that of petrol. Consumption of petrol has recently risen to a figure in excess of 2,700,000 gallons per month. This last figure is regarded as the maximum possible with the available number of tank cars. For a long time now the petrol companies have been unable to hold in storage more than a minute fraction of their turnover. Meanwhile, consumption has increased, and is increasing daily. For example, nearly 4000 new vehicles have been registered in Salisbury alone during the past year. The existing ration is adequate, but no more, and in order to supply that ration, the petrol companies exist on a hand-to-mouth basis, unable to build up a reserve against contingencies. The non-arrival of a tanker or a breakdown on the Beira Railway (always possible when the rains start), could have very serious effects, since it is true to say that the day-to-day economy of the Colony depends almost entirely on the internal combustion engine.

8. The principal weapon available to maintain a balance of trade—tobacco, has proved itself two edged. It has created immense profits both personal and national, but it is probable that less than half the personal profits have been ploughed back against a rainy day, (if I may use such a metaphor in a country where rain is in fact a blessing). The tobacco-producing community has absorbed labour, spent lavishly on luxury goods, and has been able to browbeat the Government into removing the one effective deterrent against a too rapid swelling of the bubble. Meanwhile, due partly to poor weather, the food farmers have been unable to increase productivity to any great extent. (See Appendix IV.)

9. In the background, all the time, is the problem of transportation. The railways will be faced, sooner or later, with a physical maximum which cannot be exceeded until a double track is laid or alternative routes are opened up. (See note to Appendix III.) Meanwhile, the quantity of imports to sustain the population is increasing as is

the quantity of exports to meet payments. At the moment, the railways keep in step by continual additions to the fleet of locomotives and to rolling stock. But, in the face of world-wide competition, and the possible delays caused by defence programmes etc., it would, I think, be rash to count upon any specific rate of improvement.

10. The snowball appears to be gaining momentum. It has recently been estimated, officially, that the rate of development of the country as a whole has been almost double that on which plans were based, and that this rate cannot be maintained. It seems possible, therefore, that in this time of international tension, this Government may well have to face up to one or more of the following measures:—

- (a) To restrict immigration and consolidate the existing position. Immigration may have to be made selective on a long-term basis. For example, an apparent shortage of housing may not necessarily be accepted as the signal for an unrestricted flow of building artisans.
- (b) To increase taxation, in order to reduce the amount of Loan Vote development.
- (c) To limit the tobacco target to a figure only moderately in excess of the guaranteed United Kingdom requirement.
- (d) To review all long term development projects in the light of existing capabilities, and not in the light of possible future potentialities.
- (e) To erect the plant to produce oil from coal with the minimum delay, if this project is proved to be sound.
- (f) To reduce profit margins and imports of luxuries.

Most of these moves might be unpopular locally. They would probably entail a reintroduction of controls and, would cut across the declared policy of keeping this an attractive country to people overseas.

11. There are indications that the Government is becoming increasingly aware of the danger, and that it intends to take action. The ultimate decisions may depend, to some extent, on personalities, since there seems to be no general consensus of opinion today on economic principles and remedies. The two Ministers, who between them largely control the economic situation, are the Minister of Trade and Industrial Development (Hon. R.F. Halsted) and the Minister of Finance (Hon. E.C.F. Whitehead), and they may well have a commanding influence on major decisions. The former is imbued with a spirit of infectious and optimistic enthusiasm, and the latter has great powers of persuasion (it will be remembered that he was the principal advocate of the return to free enterprise). I myself think it unlikely, therefore, that this Government will attempt anything more than piecemeal remedies.

12. I propose to send you a despatch, in the near future, on recent trends in immigration.

**54** CO 537/5895

20 & 21 Dec 1950

[Northern Rhodesia]: minutes by C E Lambert and A B Cohen on constitutional change

Mr. Cohen discussed the Governor's telegram of the 15th December with Mr. Hudson, Mr. Williams and me yesterday.

It will be recalled that the question of constitutional advance in Northern Rhodesia was discussed with the Governor on the 10th October and that the Secretary of State then said that he was inclined to agree that the appointment of a commission to consider future constitutional developments in Northern Rhodesia was necessary before he could make any statement on the future policy in Central Africa. It was agreed that on his return to Northern Rhodesia the Governor should discuss this proposal with the Members of Executive Council, urge on them the desirability of accepting the idea of a commission and report back to the Secretary of State. On the 26th October the Governor reported that there was opposition by Mr. Welensky to the proposal to appoint a commission and in a further telegram dated 10th November the Governor reported that he had discussed the proposal at an informal meeting with the Members of Legislative Council. With the exception of one of the African Members all the Unofficial Members expressed serious doubt whether any useful purpose would be served by the appointment of a commission. Their reasons were that racial relations were improving and the appointment of a commission might endanger this; it was premature at present to consider proposals for fundamental changes in the constitution; during the remainder of the life of the present Legislative Council (about three years) the Council should devote its efforts to constructive work on economic, social and general developments in an atmosphere of peaceful collaboration; and it was unlikely that a commission could offer better advice than could be furnished to the Secretary of State by the Government of Northern Rhodesia in consultation with the Unofficials. The Unofficial Members made it clear, however, that they did not regard their request for two additional portfolios as constituting a constitutional advance and would wish to press that request.

In his reply of the 22nd November the Secretary of State said that he was disposed to accept the Governor's recommendation that the proposal to appoint a commission should be held over for the time being but that he did not wish to take a final decision until the Governor had reported the results of his further discussions with the Unofficials. As regards the grant of additional portfolios, the Secretary of State said that nothing should be said which would lead them to suppose that the Secretary of State would feel able to accede to a request for additional portfolios, at any rate unless accompanied by a *quid pro quo* for Africans which was satisfactory to both the Governor and to the Secretary of State.

There is no doubt that the grant of two additional portfolios to the Elected Members of Legislative Council would represent a constitutional advance and as stated above this could not be accepted without a *quid pro quo* for the Africans. It will be seen from the Governor's telegram at (53) that he has sounded Mr. Welensky and through him the other Unofficials, on a proposal—the Governor made it clear that he was only exploring possibilities and had not consulted the Secretary of State—that two additional portfolios should be created but that while one would go to the Elected Members the other would be an 'African' portfolio held for the time being by a European Member of Legislative Council nominated to represent African interests. He accompanied this proposal with a suggestion that the additional portfolio for the Elected Members should be held by Mr. Welensky himself. Mr. Welensky, however, apparently with the full support of his Unofficial colleagues, would not be prepared to accept a portfolio and feels that he must remain as leader of the Unofficials. The Unofficials would be prepared to accept a proposal that the Member nominated to

represent African interests in the Executive Council should hold a portfolio. The Governor himself considers that an arrangement such as he proposes would be suitable in principle and he says that his official advisers and Mr. Nightingale (one of the European Members of Legislative Council nominated to represent African interests) consider that the creation of an 'African' Portfolio would represent an adequate *quid pro quo* for Africans but that as regards the probable view of the African community towards the proposal he is doubtful whether the Africans would like it altogether. On the other hand, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, the second European Member of Legislative Council nominated to represent African interests, with whom the Governor discussed the question, expressed the view that the Africans would probably accept it as reasonable; and the two African Members of Legislative Council, although disappointed that increased African representation on Legislative Council is not proposed at present, consider the proposal a great step forward and that it would be welcomed by sensible Africans.

We came to the conclusion that there was a great deal to be said for the Governor's proposal. While the award of an additional portfolio to the Elected Members would we consider represent a constitutional advance, we also feel that if it were accompanied by the creation of an 'African' portfolio this would represent an adequate *quid pro quo* from the African point of view. We also feel that the Governor's proposal not to renew Sir Stewart Gore-Browne's appointment to the Legislative and Executive Councils when his term expires at the end of February next year and to replace him in the Legislative Council by Mr. John Moffat and, if the proposal is approved, to appoint Mr. Moffat to the Executive Council as the holder of the 'African' portfolio is a move very much in the right direction. We have for some time felt that Sir Stewart Gore-Browne is not the right person to represent African interests. Mr. Moffat has served in the Northern Rhodesia administrative service since 1927 and is at present Commissioner for Native Development. He is retiring from the service in the near future and it is his present intention to settle on his farm in Northern Rhodesia. He is the son of a missionary<sup>1</sup> whose work in Central Africa is so well-known that there is no need for me to expand on it. Mr. John Moffat is a man of sterling character, an able administrator and greatly respected in Northern Rhodesia by Europeans and Africans alike. He is absolutely sound on native policy. We consider that while it would be essential at this stage of the development of the African in Northern Rhodesia for a European to hold the 'African' portfolio it should be made clear that the way is open for an African to hold this portfolio when a suitable African is ready for this highly important post. It will be remembered that when the 1948 announcement about the arrangement with the Unofficial Members was made it was stated that the door was being left open for the appointment of Africans to the Executive Council when they were ready for this. We feel that the appointment of an African to the Executive Council need not necessarily wait until one of them is ready to hold a portfolio. We consider that appointment as an Unofficial Member of Executive Council without portfolio might well be made when there is a suitable African ready for it even though there was already in Executive Council an Unofficial holding the 'African' portfolio, and we felt that it should be made clear that this possibility was left open.

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<sup>1</sup> Rev Malcolm Moffat (1870–1939), began his career as a civil servant in the Cape Colony. Ordained in 1907, he served at the United Free Church of Scotland missionary station at Chitambo from 1909 to 1930.

We also considered whether in addition to the creation of an 'African' portfolio it might also be desirable to recommend the appointment of two additional Africans to the Legislative Council. We considered, as stated above, that the creation of an 'African' portfolio was a sufficient *quid pro quo* for the present and that it would be a mistake to press the appointment of additional Africans to the Legislative Council until we were quite certain that the Africans were themselves ready for such advancement and that it would be possible to secure two really good appointments. We felt that any proposal on these lines would meet with powerful opposition by the European Unofficials and that we are not at present in a strong enough position to challenge their view that the African is not yet ready for this advance.

Although we came to the conclusion that the Governor's proposal should be supported we were somewhat uneasy about how it would be translated into practice. That is to say, in view of our knowledge that Mr. Welensky's present inclination would be to refuse a portfolio if it were offered to him, we were very doubtful about the appointment of any of the remaining Elected Members to Executive Council with a portfolio. The up-and-coming politician in Northern Rhodesia is Mr. van Eeden, the Member for the Midland Electoral Area. He, next to Mr. Welensky and Mr. Beckett (the Member for Agriculture), is the leading Unofficial and he might well be nominated by the Elected Members for the third portfolio. We could not recommend that this should be approved and we do not feel that any of the other Elected Members of Legislative Council has either the ability or the experience to take on a portfolio. We would therefore recommend that the Secretary of State's approval of the Governor's proposal should be conditional upon Mr. Welensky himself taking on the third portfolio (one of the advantages of this would be that it would not mean adding another Elected Member of Legislative Council to the Executive Council), and that if Mr. Welensky and his colleagues are not prepared to accept this together with the creation of an 'African' portfolio accompanied by the appointment of Mr. Moffat and a clear statement that the way will be left open to the appointment of an African to the Executive Council when there is an African ready for this appointment, then the Secretary of State would either have to decide on no changes now or proceed with the plan to hold an enquiry into the whole constitutional position by an impartial commission and on having their advice and recommendations before him before any further changes at all are made in the constitutional position. The African Representative Council would be consulted before any changes were made.

There is a further matter which should be considered as forming part of the present political situation in Northern Rhodesia. In his letter to Sir Thomas Lloyd at (1) on 45433/50 below the Governor says that Mr. Welensky has returned to the proposal that 'Members' should be called 'Ministers'. The previous correspondence on this subject is at 68-71 on 45433/48. I see very little in the argument that because Ministers in Southern Rhodesia are given a better precedence and better arrangements for their personal comfort at international conferences than are Unofficials and Officials from Northern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia 'Members' should be called 'Ministers'. In our telegram to the Governor at (69) on 45433/48 the Governor was told that the title of 'Minister' was inappropriate in the present constitutional set-up in Northern Rhodesia. While it is true that the title of 'Minister' is used in Trinidad and the Gold Coast the circumstances there are completely different in that 'Ministers' in these territories are fully representative of all sections of the local population. In Northern Rhodesia the Elected Members represent some

30,000 Europeans as compared with a population of 1,600,000 Africans. We consider that the proposed change should be rejected.

I apologise for the length of this minute.

C.E.L.  
20.12.50

*Note:* The Minister of State wishes to be kept informed on this matter.

*Sir T. Lloyd*

Mr. Lambert's excellent minute represents the agreed views of him and myself, Mr. Hudson and Mr. Williams, both of whom have recently been in Northern Rhodesia.

We are all agreed that it would be wrong to accept any material constitutional change at the present time and even the Governor's limited proposal seems to us to go too far. But our proposal that we should only accept the additional European portfolio if Mr. Welensky will take it would not, in our view, increase the power and influence of the European unofficials at the expense of the Africans, while the quid pro quo proposed seems to us valuable. The substitution of Mr. Moffat for Sir S. Gore-Browne and the assumption by him of a second African portfolio (in addition to the Secretary for Native Affairs) is clear gain. Mr. Moffat is a trusted and able officer whose family ties with Rhodesia will strengthen his position with Africans and Europeans alike. Mr. Welensky already has very considerable influence in all the affairs of Government and his assumption of a portfolio would not, we think, increase them. Indeed by giving him some direct responsibility his relations with the Governor and the Government generally would, we think, be easier to handle. On the other hand the introduction of another European unofficial instead of Mr. Welensky would involve having four instead of three European unofficials (in addition to Mr. Moffat) on the Executive Council. The only other unofficial who has the ability is Mr. Van Eeden, an Afrikaner, who we do not think could possibly be accepted. The other European unofficials do not, we believe, have the ability. The proposal, in short, amounts to giving portfolios to the two unofficial members of Executive Council who do not have them at present, namely Mr. Welensky and Mr. Moffat when he comes on. If the Secretary of State agrees to our proposal, we shall have to make it clear that the way is kept open for an African to come on to the Executive Council when ready and also that his agreement is subject to the proposals being accepted by the African Representative Council.

Before he reaches a decision on these proposals I think that the Secretary of State ought to see the excellent and most interesting note by Mr. Williams of the discussions which he had in Northern Rhodesia on political questions with the Governor and officials, with European unofficials and with Africans. If I may say so, Mr. Williams seems to have handled his rather difficult meetings with the unofficials admirably.

There are two somewhat disturbing points in Mr. Williams' notes. The first is on page 2, where the Director of Agriculture is recorded as complaining of the pro-European bias of Mr. Beckett, the Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources. This is a serious matter and I am sure that we ought to write to the Governor semi-officially to ask him for his comments on this point. But it does not, I think, directly affect the proposals discussed above. Mr. Beckett is already in his position and there can be no question at the moment of removing him from it. I have always found him reasonable and I do not believe that he would exercise this bias deliberately. I can,

however, believe—and Mr. Hudson confirms that this may be the case—that he may have got into difficulties through pressure from his European colleagues. Giving Mr. Welensky a portfolio will not alter the position.

The other disturbing thing in Mr. Williams' notes is his account of his talk with Africans on pages 7 and 8. The intense suspicion expressed by Africans of closer relations with Southern Rhodesia and of the official conference to be held in March bears out what the Fabian Colonial Bureau have told us and I have no doubt that their information comes from the same people whom Mr. Williams saw. It shows the necessity for great care in the handling of this problem. But we must, I suggest, not simply take the line which is likely to be most popular with Africans. It is also our business to do what we believe is in the genuine interests of Africans. In my view it is not Southern Rhodesia which Africans in Northern Rhodesia have to fear; the position in Southern Rhodesia is not materially different from that in Northern Rhodesia, with the single exception of the political representation of Africans in the latter territory. What Africans and we ourselves have to fear in Northern Rhodesia is increased influence by the Union. If the already very considerable influence of the Union in Northern Rhodesia becomes greater, the whole future of Northern Rhodesia from the African point of view may be endangered. A satisfactory arrangement with Southern Rhodesia covering the relations between the Central African territories would in my view be the best safeguard against increased Union influence in all of them. It must, of course, fully safeguard African interests, advancement and aspirations in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and there must be African representation on any central consultative or legislative body which may be set up. (I am not here referring to any executive itself). Mr. Williams thinks that, given such representation, the Africans in Northern Rhodesia might be satisfied for the time being.

The issue of federation does not arise directly on this paper, but all that Mr. Williams says and what Sir G. Rennie says in paragraph 5 of his telegram confirms the view which I expressed to them the other day that the Fabian Colonial Bureau are right in suggesting that from the point of view of reducing African fears and suspicions a statement by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons is necessary. We shall have to consider the timing of such a statement in relation to the African Representative Council towards the end of February and it may be that a statement cannot be made before then. But I am sure that in replying to this telegram we shall have to go into the question of a statement with the Governor.

We have not put up a draft reply to the telegram because we think that the Secretary of State will wish to discuss the position with the department before a reply is drafted. It is probably too late now for such a discussion to take place before Christmas, but the earlier we can let the Governor have our views the better.

A.B.C.  
21.12.50

**55** CO 795/168/4  
[Coal for Copperbelt]: minute by D Williams

8 Jan 1951

The question of coal for the Copperbelt, which has been a recurring problem since 1946, has again become acute. The history of this question up to August 1949 is

described in (86) on Part II of the 1949 papers (flagged 'X' attached herewith). A certain amount of subsequent history is described in (39) on Part I of the 1950 papers (flagged 'Y' attached herewith). Deliveries of coal up to September 1950 are set out at (110) on 1950 papers.

2. In the past, (as is set out in (132) on Part II of 1950 papers), a number of representations have been made to Southern Rhodesian Ministers and Officials on this subject and although promises of improvement have readily been forthcoming, little improvement has taken place in fact. Coal deliveries in recent months have been between 40,000 and 46,000 tons as compared with minimum Copperbelt requirements of 65,000 to 70,000 tons. Attempts have been made to make good the deficiency by burning wood fuel, but these have not been entirely successful and the essential fact in the present situation is that capacity on the new electrolytic refineries is lying unused for want of fuel. Any increase in coal deliveries therefore would lead to an *immediate* increase in copper production.

3. In recent weeks, two new factors have emerged. The first is that owing to a shortage of copper there is a serious danger that our rearmament programme will be slowed down. This aspect has led the Minister of Supply to write to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and an extract from his letter is given at (3) on this file. Hitherto copper has been important to the Sterling Area as a dollar-saver; but owing to the fact that during the next twelve months alternative supplies from dollar areas will not be available (apart from strictly limited quantities from Chile and Canada) the position is now that Northern Rhodesia is virtually the only source of supply for the U.K. and certainly the only source from which any increase in supplies can be looked for.

4. The second factor arises from the loan of £5m. which E.C.A.<sup>1</sup> proposes to make to the Rhodesia Railways from the 5 per cent. Counterpart Fund and negotiations about which have been proceeding for the past six months. This aspect is dealt with in the letter at (2) to the Chancellor from Mr. Batt, the new head of E.C.A. in London. As a condition of the loan, E.C.A. propose to insert a clause in the agreement binding the Southern Rhodesian Government to deliver certain percentages of Wankie coal production to the Copperbelt. The percentages are to be determined by a formula, the effect of which in terms of coal deliveries is shown in the table behind (4) on this file. This formula was provisionally accepted by the Southern Rhodesian Minister for Mines in a discussion with E.C.A. representatives at Johannesburg in November. In discussions which took place in Salisbury early in December, however, between the Northern and Southern Rhodesian Governments (at which Sir Godfrey Huggins was present), the Southern Rhodesian representatives suggested an alternative formula which was in fact more advantageous to the Copperbelt than the E.C.A. formula. Its effect is shown in the table behind (4) under the heading 'First Alternative Formula'. Later in December this formula was rejected by the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet (despite the fact that three of the seven Ministers had attended the meeting at which it was approved) who then put forward a third formula, less advantageous than the E.C.A. formula and which, as Mr. Batt's letter shows, is unacceptable to E.C.A. Its effect is shown under the heading 'Third Formula' in the table behind (4). We understand it will be rejected by the Copper Companies and probably by the Northern Rhodesian Government as well.

<sup>1</sup> European Co-operation Administration—an organisation established to administer the Marshall Plan.

5. The situation was discussed at two meetings held at C.R.O. on the 5th January and attended by representatives of C.E.P.S.,<sup>2</sup> the Treasury, the Ministry of Supply and ourselves. During the first of these meetings we were informed that a postscript to the letter from the Minister of Supply to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had suggested that this matter of coal for the Copperbelt should be placed upon the agenda of the Prime Ministers' Conference but that this suggestion had been rejected by Mr. Gordon Walker. We decided however to recommend that advantage should be taken of the presence of Sir Godfrey Huggins in London to discuss the matter with him once again. Our view was that the procedure should be that first the matter should be discussed at a joint meeting between the Chancellor, the Minister of Supply and Sir Godfrey Huggins at which the importance of the problem in the present circumstances should be emphasised and at which Ministers should say that in their view the present E.C.A. proposals offered a not unreasonable solution. Our reasons for recommending that the E.C.A. proposals are 'not unreasonable' are not only based upon the fact that these proposals are acceptable to the Copper Companies and to the Northern Rhodesian Government, but also on the fact that, on such calculations as we were able to make, the E.C.A. proposals would allow for a 15 per cent. increase over present consumption to the ordinary Southern Rhodesian consumers (Cf. paragraph I(a) of (147) on 1950 papers). Furthermore, we proposed that Ministers should emphasise to Sir Godfrey Huggins the desirability of coming to some agreement with E.C.A. on this subject, since we understood that, without such agreement, there was very little likelihood of E.C.A.'s making the £5m. available to Rhodesia Railways and that in present circumstances there was very little likelihood of H.M.G. making facilities available for raising such an amount on the London market if the E.C.A. negotiations broke down. The probable effect therefore of a failure to obtain satisfactory assurances from the Southern Rhodesian Government about coal for the Copperbelt would be a serious dislocation of the Railway's expansion programme owing to a lack of finance. We did not propose however that Ministers should argue details of formulae and tonnages with Sir Godfrey Huggins; instead we suggested that the interview with Ministers should be followed by a meeting between Sir Godfrey Huggins and Mr. Batt at which points of detail could be gone into if Sir Godfrey Huggins is in a position to do so.

6. It is desirable that the meeting between the Chancellor, the Minister of Supply and Sir Godfrey Huggins should take place early this week and we accordingly prepared a paper, a draft of which is at (4) for the guidance of the Chancellor and the Minister of Supply in their discussions. This paper will go forward as a C.E.P.S. paper and the aspects which it emphasises are primarily the concern of C.E.P.S., the Treasury and the Ministry of Supply. I am, however, forwarding the paper for comment which, if possible, should reach C.E.P.S. by 5 p.m. today, and for approval of Ministers.

7. Once these discussions have taken place interested departments propose to consider this matter further, particularly with a view to making recommendations regarding the curtailment of supplies of Wankie coal to other consumers in order to increase supplies of coal to the Copperbelt. Further meetings will be held shortly on this aspect of the matter.

? Approve draft at (4).

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<sup>2</sup> Whitehall's Central Economic Planning Staff.

**56** CO 795/167/13

5 Feb 1951

**[Implementation of the Dalglish Report]: minute by N D Watson**

As I see it, before any progress can be made towards implementing the Dalglish Report, there are two prerequisites:—

- (a) there must be agreement between the employers, the European workers, and the African workers; and
- (b) there must be a real change of attitude on the part of the European workers from that which underlies their present insistence on the 'equal pay for equal work' slogan.

2. From the point of view of (a), I would agree that, in principle and in the long term, the establishment of a Joint Industrial Council for the industry is a desirable development. I am certain, however, that whatever machinery may be devised for consultation within the industry, there is no hope of progress towards (a) until (b) is achieved.

3. From my past knowledge of this problem, I see no ground for supposing that the developments reported in (31) imply any change of attitude whatsoever on the part of the European union. I am virtually certain that they are still using the 'equal pay for equal work' slogan, deliberately, not for the good of the African but in their own interests; that is, with a view to maintaining, for as long as possible, the protected position which the European worker enjoys under the 'Colour Bar Clause' in the Union's agreement with the mining companies. In other words, the European workers mean, by using the slogan, that they will not agree to the appointment of any African to a job at present held by a European unless the African is paid what the European now gets for the job. Bearing in mind the general economic circumstances of the territory and the inflated wages of European workers on the Copperbelt, it is self-evident that no progress towards the advancement of the African can be made on these unrealistic terms. The European Union know this well enough. Paragraph 259 of the Dalglish Report makes it abundantly clear that the Commission did not contemplate any African being given immediately the 'European' rate for the job: yet the Commission has recommended that the African could take over immediately some jobs at present performed by Europeans and protected by the 'Colour Bar Clause'.

4. For these reasons, I thoroughly mistrust the agreements between the European and African workers which are reported in (31); and it seems to me that affairs are drifting in a dangerous direction. Let us consider the course of events which, in the light of past experience, is probable: and which, I suspect, the European Union envisages. The European Union, by professedly subscribing to the 'equal pay for equal work' slogan, have played a strong card for the goodwill and support of the African workers, for whom the slogan will clearly have a strong and simple attraction—the African cannot be expected to appreciate the complexities of the problem. Suppose the management, under Government persuasion, agree to set up an Industrial Council. It is one of the main objects of the Council, in accordance with the agreements reported at (31), to tackle the problem of African advancement. The three sides at last get down to brass tacks around a table—a good thing in itself. *But* the European and *African* unions are committed in advance to the 'equal pay'

principle. The interpretation of that principle will be left to the European Union, who will come out with the uncompromising line that that if an African is promoted to a 'European' job he must be given *at once* 'European' pay. The management will turn this down flat, and there will be a deadlock again; but the European Union will have cleverly worked themselves into the position of placing the onus of holding back the African on to the employers. There, I suspect, they would very much like the matter to rest.

5. At that stage, however, the Government comes into the picture. The Government has always regarded itself as under obligation to further the solution of this problem. If a deadlock is reached again, the responsibility falls back on Government. What is the only line then open to them? Obviously, to try to persuade the African Union, which has already been 'sold' a naive interpretation of 'equal pay' by the European Union, to adopt a more practical attitude on this issue. In other words, the European Union will have placed the Government, which heretofore has been able to claim it was watching African interests, in the position of arguing the employers' case and trying to break a solid front on the part of the workers.

6. I *may* be doing the European Union an injustice in these speculations: and I see from Mr. Williams' minute of 13/1 that Mr. Comrie thinks that, as a result of the resolutions in (31), the Africans have got their foot in the door. But I am surprised that there is no hint at all in Mr. Cousins's<sup>2</sup> letter of the doubts I have expressed: I should have thought they would have leapt to the local mind in Northern Rhodesia. I should like to have their views on these doubts, and I therefore suggest that, if you and Mr. Barltrop<sup>1</sup> agree, Mr. Barltrop should write to Mr. Cousins along the lines of the enclosed draft. The draft makes it clear, in view of Mr. Cousins' obvious nervousness about the propriety of this correspondence, that it is on a purely personal and confidential basis: and for these reasons too, it would be better if it were continued by Mr. Barltrop.

7. I agree that there is no need at this stage to ask for any official report from the Governor. As for the Joint Industrial Council, I would welcome this as a means of discussion of the 'colour bar' problem (and nothing will ever be achieved until the three sides get together round a table): but I do not like it resulting, as it seems to be, from dubious manoeuvres on the part of the European Union. On the other hand, it will not help matters forward at all if this joint proposal coming from the European and African workers is simply turned down by the managements. I should like to reconsider the point when we have Mr. Cousins' further observations. But I am sure that the basic problem to which I referred at the beginning of this minute, i.e. that of breaking down the attitude of the European Union, still remains.

8. I therefore think that, in any event, we shall presently have to revert to the idea of tackling the problem from the angle suggested by the Secretary of State, as recorded at 'X' of (28).<sup>3</sup> The Secretary of State, as I am aware, has not yet taken up

<sup>1</sup> E W Barltrop, CO labour adviser.

<sup>2</sup> Frank Cousins of the TGWU.

<sup>3</sup> At a meeting with Rennie and his officials in the CO on 10 October 1950, Creech Jones had expressed the view that it would be better for pressure to be placed on the Mine Workers' Union by other organisations rather than by the government. He had undertaken to raise the matter with Lawther to see what could be done through the Confederation of Free Trade Unions or through the International Mineworkers' Federation.

this matter with Sir William Lawther.<sup>4</sup> I suggest that we await Mr. Cousins' reply to our further enquiries and then immediately consider renewing this recommendation to the Secretary of State. What effect such an approach, if Sir W. Lawther found it possible to take the matter up, would have on the European Union is doubtful, but I feel that it will be necessary to do anything we can towards influencing their attitude. If there is no change of heart, a Joint Industrial Council will get no further than any other attempt to settle this long-outstanding business.

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<sup>4</sup> Sir W Lawther, NUM (see 138).

## **57 DO 35/3594**

4 Apr 1951

### **[Closer association in Central Africa]: note by G H Baxter on a conference of officials<sup>1</sup>**

*Permanent under-secretary of state*

*Secretary of state*

The Conference on Closer Association in Central Africa completed its work on Saturday, 31st March, after four weeks' strenuous work.

2. At the outset the Southern Rhodesians were obviously somewhat apprehensive that they were going to find here a spirit of stone-walling and procrastination. They quickly found that this was not so, and the Conference proceeded in an excellent atmosphere of cooperation and harmony. A noteworthy feature—unusual in conferences—was that everyone paid close attention to the points, and the points of view, of others; and even when there was a clash it took place in a spirit of understanding. All the territories had sent able men; and the ability and judgment of Mr. Benson of the Central African Council were also very valuable. The importation of Professor Wheare<sup>2</sup> proved a great success; with his high academic authority he combines obvious common sense, and members of all teams tended to look to him for guidance and as a touchstone of the wisdom or practicability of particular proposals. The secretarial work and the practical arrangements for the Conference evoked the admiration of the overseas officials.

3. As Chairman of the Conference and as the leader of the United Kingdom team, I am formally submitting to you herewith a confidential Minute signed by Mr. Cohen (Colonial Office) and myself, and addressed to our two Secretaries of State. Identical Minutes are to be submitted by the leaders of the other teams to their respective Governments. Under cover of that Minute we submit to you the main Report of the Conference which, for the reasons explained in the Minute, has been prepared in terms suitable (if the Governments concerned agree) for publication. There is an obligation to consult public opinion (including African opinion in the northern territories) before actual decisions are taken, and this could most conveniently be done if the actual Report of the Conference were published as a basis for it. Moreover there is bound anyhow to be some demand for the publication of our Report.

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<sup>1</sup> The conference of officials from Britain and Central Africa met in London from 5–31 Mar 1951.

<sup>2</sup> Later Sir Kenneth Wheare, Gladstone professor of government and public administration, Oxford, 1944–1957; fellow of Nuffield College, 1944–1958.

4. The Conference decisively recommends association on a federal basis. Previous suggestions in favour of federation have been objected to on the ground that they would produce a disproportionately topheavy organism. But what was then envisaged was something more like the 'league' solution which the Report rejects; our proposals would give the Centre sufficient scope and content to justify fully the establishment of a federal Government and Legislature.

5. An outstanding feature of the proposals is the way in which they provide safeguards for African interests. All the subjects that most closely affect the natives would remain 'territorial', so that in respect of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the Colonial Office's control would remain as at present. But it is recognised that in any field (e.g. customs or roads) matters may arise that in some degree affect African interests. To meet this the proposals provide, in the federal field, for African representation in the Legislature, for an African Affairs Board, and—above all—for a Minister for African interests who would be responsible to the Governor-General and through him to the United Kingdom Government. These measures of protection would (within the limited federal field only) replace the existing methods of exercising our responsibility towards Africans in the two northern territories, and though necessarily different in form should be equally effective in practice. And it is noteworthy that they would apply to the Africans in Southern Rhodesia, who would thus acquire a safeguard they have not now.

6. Some of the considerations leading up to the recommendations could not suitably be fully set forth in a document designed for official publication. To deal with them we had considered the submission of a separate confidential report. But the procedure we have adopted instead, of a confidential Minute addressed (in identical terms) to each Government on behalf of its own officials, accords more with the true position, viz. that—while the purpose of the Conference is to see whether concurrent recommendations can be made to all the Governments concerned—the duty of each team of officials is towards its own Government. The adoption of this procedure should moreover be of assistance to any of the Governments (notably our own) that might at a later stage be asked whether the whole Report had been made public, since it could readily admit that it had also received from its officials a fuller confidential account of the proceedings but could reasonably resist pressure to publish something passing between its officials and itself.

7. There are two aspects of the matter to which I would especially invite attention. First, all those taking part, including ourselves, were greatly impressed by the Afrikaner danger explained in the confidential Minute and by the consequential urgency of the need for closer association. I wonder whether it may be possible for His Majesty's Ministers to find some means of confidentially bringing this consideration to the notice of some discreet and sensible persons among those in this country who are concerned for the welfare of Africans in the northern territories, in the hope that they may come to realise that a continuance of the present situation is likely to involve much greater dangers to the welfare of the Africans than any that may arise from the pursuit of closer association, especially if the latter includes the important safeguards that we have recommended.

8. Secondly, we must recognise that if the Southern Rhodesian Government agree to the scheme recommended they will be accepting, within the wide range of subjects proposed to be made federal, the reimposition of a measure of control from London which would amount to an appreciable curtailment of Southern Rhodesia's

present degree of independence. From their standpoint this would be a very severe concession which it would require a great effort to commend to their legislature and constituents. As against this, I feel that the concessions that would be made by the United Kingdom Government in respect of its responsibility towards the Africans in the northern territories would be changes of form rather than of substance. The allocation of seats in the federal Legislature between the three territories was another matter that might well have produced an unbridgeable gap; but we were just able—with no margin—to find a basis that could be accepted by the whole Conference.

9. It has proved very difficult to bring the apparently conflicting requirements together; and on the main lines of the recommendations we feel that there is very little scope for manœuvre, and that any attempt from our side to push the Southern Rhodesians still further would probably wreck any hope of securing a practical outcome.

10. In the light of requirements in the countries concerned, the Conference thought that, assuming that it is decided to publish the Report for purposes of ventilation and discussion, a suitable date would be about mid-May. If this is to be aimed at, the two Secretaries of State will perhaps wish to have an early discussion with their respective officials, and then with each other, after which they may be in a position to present a joint Paper to the Cabinet.

11. This was intended to be a joint submission by Mr. Cohen and myself to our two Secretaries of State. But Mr. Cohen went abroad immediately after the Conference. I know that he is in agreement with the general lines of the present submission; and with his agreement a copy of it will be laid before the Secretary of State for the Colonies along with the Report and the covering confidential Minute.

**58** DO 35/3433

5 Apr 1951

[Afrikaner immigration]: minute by G H Baxter

[In the light of concerns expressed in London and in Northern Rhodesia itself over the political consequences of Afrikaner immigration, the Northern Rhodesian government proposed restricting its franchise to citizens of the UK and the colonies.]

*Mr Sedgwick*

On present inf. I agree that N. Rhodesia need not be deterred from the proposed action. I understand a decision about H.M.G.'s attitude can be postponed until the Governor's forthcoming visit.

2. Two additional points shd be borne in mind:—

(1) Such electoral measures are not an adequate substitute for control of immigration. An intolerable situation might arise if N. Rhodesia possessed a large disenfranchised white community. But electoral measures may provide a useful temporary expedient, to ease the problem pending a satisfactory solution of the immigration difficulties.

(2) Afrikaner infiltration is a powerful argument for the radical & salutary policy 'closer association'. The use of this argument may be weakened if, at the critical time, some piecemeal tinkering is going on which could be represented as sufficiently coping with the danger.

3. As regards the final sentence of your note opposite, I rather think the need of becoming U.K. citizens might have appreciable deterrent effect, especially as many of the immigrant Afrikaners do not settle permanently.

4. I wonder if the C.O. draft does not dismiss too easily the language test. Afrikaner immigrants tend to form linguistic as well as racial 'islands', & cd perhaps be more easily absorbed into the community, and its way of life, if they learnt to speak English.

5. The C.O. might let the Governor know the various points that have occurred to them & us, so that he can think (& talk) them over before his visit?

**59 DO 121/137**

**17 Apr 1951**

**'Closer Association in Central Africa': minute by J J S Garner to G H Baxter**

I have read with very great interest the papers on your recent Conference. I have no doubt that the solution you propound is the right one, but in reading the papers one or two questions came to my mind. They are all fairly obvious and I have no doubt that you have already thought of them. But for what they are worth I set them out below:—

*(A) The federal solution*

The obvious dangers in any Federal State are:—

- (a) wasteful duplication of effort and
- (b) conflict in authority between the Central and the State Governments.

No Federal system seems to work ideally and there has been a good deal of creaking in the working of the Constitutions of Australia and Canada.

Indeed if the plans for Southern Rhodesia mature I think there will be a lot to be said for bringing in an expert from Canada who has had experience of the working particularly of tax and economic relations between the Federal and Provincial Governments. I see that it is proposed that both the Federal and Territorial Governments should have the right to levy direct taxation: it seems to me that a very close degree of harmony and understanding between the two will be necessary if this is to work without friction. It is also suggested that the Federal Government should be responsible for economic planning throughout the whole area though it will largely be the responsibility of the Territorial Governments to carry out this planning. I wonder whether this also may not be a cause of friction. One wants if possible to set up Governments with a reasonable division of functions though I suppose it may be questioned whether the area of British Central Africa is really sufficiently developed to support four separate Governments.

*(B) Status of the new territory*

I see that it is proposed that the new Federal Government should have the same status as Southern Rhodesia has at present. This seems to me to be right. If we were now to give the new territory the full status of an independent Member of the Commonwealth, this would merely accelerate the claims from the Gold Coast and other territories and it would be very difficult to hold the position.

My doubt is whether in fact it will prove possible to hold the new territory with the same status as Southern Rhodesia. The more we make of the new scheme the greater is likely to be the demand for enhanced status and recent developments in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament seem to lend colour to this.

(C) *Relations with South Africa*

I have no doubt that it is true that the fear of Afrikaner infiltration is a very genuine one in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia and that it is a risk against which we shall have to guard. I notice that in his despatch No. 83 of the 12th March Sir Evelyn Baring,<sup>1</sup> while suggesting that the main reason for the movement of South Africans to the Rhodesias is economic, nevertheless confirms that it would be unwise to ignore the political dangers. At the same time I suspect that Sir Godfrey Huggins is not averse from 'making our flesh creep' over this possible danger.

Be that as it may what does worry me is the prospect of the new territory starting off with the idea of being a bulwark against Afrikanerdom. It seems to me that there will be great risks in letting the leaders of the new territory start off with this conception in their minds (and probably in their mouths) and it would be very dangerous to have a whispering campaign in this country and amongst the natives that we were guarding the future against Dr. Malan's machinations. The fact is surely that British Central Africa will be dependent for its existence on South Africa: it can only hope to prosper with the good-will and practical co-operation of South Africa. If the new country antagonises South Africa from the start the latter has it in its power to throttle the life out of British Central Africa with its control over so much of that country's vital transport and capital investment.

From this point of view I wonder whether it is wise to include in paragraphs 19 and 32 the rather strong references to South African native policy.

(D) *Miscellaneous*

(1) Minister for African interests

I think the suggestions for overcoming the difficulties of the native problem are ingenious and almost wholly admirable. My one question is whether the arrangement under which the Chairman of the Native Affairs Commission will be automatically a Member of the Cabinet will always work in practice. I dare say it will largely depend on personalities but if there were to be a change of Government (such a thing does not seem to happen in Southern Rhodesia!) I should have thought it might be rather awkward for one Minister to be ex-officio a member of successive Cabinets.

(2) High commission territories

We shall no doubt need to bear in mind the effect of all this on South Africa's demand for transfer of the Territories. On the face of it 'closer association' might be thought to lend some support to the Union Government's claim to round out its own geographical area.

Finally two minor questions:—

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Evelyn Baring, governor of SR, 1942–1944; UK high commissioner in South Africa, 1944–1951; governor of Kenya 1952–1959.

(a) I take it that the Governor-General will be appointed by the United Kingdom Government and will not be a Governor-General in the same sense as in independent Commonwealth countries.

(b) Is it intended that Ministers and Members of Parliament can have dual representation—e.g. could Sir Godfrey Huggins be simultaneously Prime Minister of British Central Africa and of Southern Rhodesia? If so it might help with the manpower problem!

If you see no objection I will circulate copies of this to those who will be attending the discussion with the Secretary of State.

## **60 DO 35/3594**

**25 Apr 1951**

### **[Closer association in Central Africa]: note by Mr Gordon Walker on a discussion with Mr Griffiths**

1. I had a talk with the Colonial Secretary about closer union. I developed my arguments in favour of it. He stressed the vital importance of African opinion.

2. He showed me a rough draft of a proposed statement (attached) to be made by him in the House. I said I must consider it carefully. I was strongly in favour of the passage on page 2 in square brackets instead of the alternative (at the end of the statement). He said Dugdale had proposed this amendment. I said (and he agreed) that Dugdale clearly didn't like the report or the idea of federation. We must make up our minds as a Government one way or the other and there could be no compromise between being for the report or against it.

I also said that the draft statement was clearly designed only for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. There was also Southern Rhodesia to consider and there would be many difficulties there. I must consider the statement from that point of view. I told him I also had a draft in mind. I might send it to him or suggest amendments to his own draft.

3. He agreed that we should go for federation if it is possible to get it. He agreed too that this would mean facing some degree of African opposition.

4. He agreed that he and I and the Foreign Secretary should meet early next week and agree on a paper to go before the Cabinet either next Thursday or the following Monday. This paper would propose a statement to be made in the House about a week after the Colonial Secretary's return from East Africa. The statement should coincide with publication of the report. We should also propose to the Cabinet that there should be a Ministerial Conference in the Autumn. (This, I suggested should go into the statement). The Colonial Secretary suggested that he and I should go to Central Africa, visit the Territories and take part in a Ministerial Conference there. This he thought would be far more effective than a Conference in London. I said I would consider this and was inclined to think it a good idea.

5. We also agreed on a campaign in the week after his return to convince Editors and some Labour Members that the report deserved serious consideration and that no hasty judgments should be made.

6. Please consider the Colonial Secretary's draft together with ours and suggest amendments.

7. Please draft a letter to Colonial Secretary confirming the time-table set out in

para. 4. The meeting with the Foreign Secretary could be confirmed by phone. Then set the necessary arrangements in train.

8. Before the Colonial Secretary's return I will have to arrange for meetings with Editors, Labour Members, etc. It would perhaps be wiser to leave 10 days after the Colonial Secretary's return.

9. We should discuss our tactics in the light of all this.

**61** CO 537/7206 2 & 3 May 1951  
 [Afrikaner immigration]: minutes by C E Lambert and A B Cohen

*Mr. Cohen*

The question of the amendment of the Northern Rhodesia immigration legislation in order to provide Government with adequate means of controlling Afrikaner immigration into the territory has been further discussed with the Governor.

The Secretary of State has agreed that the best way of dealing with this problem would be by the introduction of a quota system. In the annexure to the confidential minute to Governments (copy opposite) which accompanied the Report of the Conference on Closer Association, is a report of a working party set up by the Conference to examine this problem. In it the view is expressed that the extension of a quota system of the kind now contemplated by the Southern Rhodesian Government to the other Central African territories appears to be the best way of dealing with this problem and the Report gives reasons why action on these lines would be much more effective if operated on a federal basis. It is agreed, however, that the problem is so urgent that we cannot afford to wait upon the outcome of the federation recommendations before we take steps to control Afrikaner immigration. Indeed No. (21) on this file shows that the Southern Rhodesian Government is introducing immigration legislation which will provide for the fixing of quotas for numbers of immigrants from various countries. We discussed this matter with the Governor and he told us that it is his intention as soon as he gets back to study with his Legal Advisers the new Southern Rhodesian Bill with a view to adapting it to meet the needs of Northern Rhodesia. He then proposes to forward his recommendations to the Secretary of State together with the draft of an amending Ordinance. This is very satisfactory.

In addition to the question of the amendment of the immigration legislation, we have also to consider further the Governor's proposal contained in his letter to the Secretary of State at (11) to amend the franchise provisions of the Legislative Council Ordinance. The Secretary of State saw this on the 31st March and approved generally of the Governor's proposals with the exception of the proposal to amend the educational qualification. Since then, however, the Commonwealth Relations Office have drawn attention to the following point. One of the amendments proposed by the Governor is to make it necessary, before any person can be admitted to the voters' roll, for him to be registered as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies. This would mean that any South African national resident in Northern Rhodesia who registered as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies would lose his South African citizenship and his vote in the Union. The C.R.O. have pointed out that the proposal raises an important question of principle. The position in the older

Commonwealth countries has been, broadly speaking, that British subjects from other Commonwealth countries admitted as immigrants have the same legal rights within each Commonwealth country as citizens of the Commonwealth country itself. Thus in the United Kingdom all British subjects are regarded as equal and, irrespective of their place of origin, have the same rights in U.K. law, including the franchise. It is relevant to mention that there are exceptions e.g. in South Africa itself, Ceylon and Southern Rhodesia, but all these exceptions have occurred in self-governing countries. We feel strongly, and the Governor agrees, that the circumstances in Northern Rhodesia are exceptional and that it is essential to take such steps as are open to us to restrict the political activities of the Afrikaner community. We also discussed the point with officials at the C.R.O. and they expressed the view that the point was one for the decision of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and that they did not consider it a matter which they need refer to Mr. Gordon-Walker. See in this connection Mr. Williams's minute of the 20th April.

I suggest that the Governor's proposals to amend the Legislative Council Ordinance should now be approved, subject to the omission of the proposal to alter the educational qualification to read in terms similar to that provided in the recent amendment of the Southern Rhodesia Electoral Act. Sir Gilbert Rennie, with whom the point has been discussed, does not wish to press for the amendment of the educational qualification and is quite prepared to see it removed from the draft Bill.

I submit the draft of a letter which it is proposed that the Secretary of State should send to the Governor on this subject.

C.E.L.  
2.12.51

I agree entirely with Mr. Lambert's minute. Southern Rhodesia propose to take power to fix quotas for immigrants from Commonwealth countries other than the U.K. (they already have this power in respect of foreign countries), although they do not apparently intend to fix quotas at present (see No. 21). The Secretary of State agreed in conversation that the quota system was likely to be the most effective way of controlling Afrikaner immigration. He then made the point that in the best-known quota system (i.e. that in the United States) past performance is the criterion and that this might not be suitable to Northern Rhodesian circumstances. We have made this point in conversation to the Governor and I do not think that it need be repeated in the letter.

Although for the reasons given in the Confidential Minute on closer association and in a separate note which I drew up for the Secretary of State and the Minister of State in the discussions on that subject, I do not myself believe that it would be possible, acting on a purely Northern Rhodesia basis, to operate a quota system over a period of years which would limit Afrikaner immigration to the extent that we want to see it limited, and although I believe that the only effective way of handling the problem is on a Central African basis, yet at the same time I quite agree that in view of the urgency of the matter we must do what we can straight away. I therefore think that we ought to press Northern Rhodesia to pass legislation quickly. The Governor agrees that this should be done.

As regards the question of the franchise, the C.R.O. letter is at No. 24. It is quite clear to us, and accepted by them, that making it a condition of having the vote that the voter should be a subject of the U.K. and Colonies would in fact be a deterrent to

South African nationalists, since they would in many cases be unwilling to give up their South African citizenship. It is clearly very desirable in the interests of Northern Rhodesia to limit the South African and Afrikaner vote.

Subsequent to the receipt of No. 24 Mr. Lambert and I discussed the position fully with Sir C. Dixon, Mr. Baxter and Mr. Sedgwick of the C.R.O. After we had put our point of view they said that No. 24 had been sent because they thought that they ought to draw the general questions involved to our attention. They very readily recognised, however, our attitude in the matter and the interests of Northern Rhodesia and they said that if, having considered their point of view, we came to the conclusion that we should approve the Northern Rhodesia proposal, they would not wish to press their view further. We promised to put their point of view to the Secretary of State and asked whether they thought that their Secretary of State would wish to be brought into the matter. They said that they considered this unnecessary; in their view the matter was one for decision by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In the circumstances the way is clear for us to proceed as in Mr. Lambert's draft.

A.B.C.  
3.5.51

## 62 CO 1015/55

13 July 1951

### 'Minutes of a meeting with the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society': CO record<sup>1</sup>

*The Secretary of State* asked *Mr. Greenidge*, who wished to speak first, and *Mr. Greenidge*, after thanking the Secretary of State for receiving the deputation at such short notice, called upon *Sir Stewart Gore-Browne* to speak.

*Sir Stewart Gore-Browne* said that he was not a member of the Committee and he was not able to endorse all the opinions expressed in *Mr Greenidge's* letter to the Secretary of State of the 10th July. For his part he had long appreciated the advantages of some form of closer union and it would have been attained years ago but for one main issue, namely, the question of native policy. On this point he strongly questioned the conclusions of the report that there was no fundamental difference between the policy in Southern Rhodesia and that in the northern territories. The difference noted in Annex 2, paragraph 2(c) on page 28 of the report was, in his opinion, fundamental. Certainly the Africans appreciated the difference between the two policies and the enormous majority of them would be against federation in any shape or form. This was partly due, he admitted, to the tactless handling of this issue by unofficials at the time of the Victoria Falls Conference, but it was primarily due to the fundamental difference of policy. A large number of Europeans who had the interests of Africans at heart felt that federation could not be contemplated until the Africans were capable of playing a full part. He agreed that something had to be done about the danger of Afrikaner immigration but he could not see that the scheme proposed would deal with this problem any more effectively

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<sup>1</sup> Present: for CO, Mr Griffiths, A B Cohen, J S Gandee (CRO), D Williams; for Society, Henry Tapscott, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, Freda White, Maj-Gen W H Grey, Basil Brooks, Denis Buxton, Hastings Banda, Reginald Sorensen, C W W Greenidge.

than the three territories individually could deal with it. He did not agree with the suggestion in Mr Greenidge's letter that a series of ad hoc Conferences would secure the necessary measure of cooperation between the three territories. His own view was that a partition was the proper solution but he could get no support for this in any quarter. He therefore felt, as did several other members of the Committee, that the possibility of federation with the East African territories ought to be explored.

*Mr. Banda* then spoke and said that he was speaking not only as a member of the Delegation but as an African. He emphasised that the Secretary of State was the King's representative and had a special responsibility for protecting African interests and for looking at this problem especially from the African point of view. Economic, strategic and administrative arguments might be very convincing to a European but the Africans looked at this problem historically. They recognised that the Europeans themselves did not want closer association between the three territories until Lord Passfield's memorandum on the Paramountcy of African interests had been published in 1930; then the European settlers began to think of amalgamation so that they might escape from Colonial Office control and be placed in the same position vis à vis the Africans as were the settlers in Southern Rhodesia. This agitation never ceased; in 1949 there was a Conference at Victoria Falls. The Conference of officials in March 1951 was only one more episode in a very long story. Africans had noted that before it was held Mr Welensky had made a speech saying that the mistake the unofficials had made in 1949 was that they had not won the officials to their side. Apparently in 1951 they had succeeded in doing this. On the question of native policy *Mr Banda* said it was absurd to suggest that the differences were only differences of timing and method. Settlers in Southern Rhodesia believed firmly in racialism; they would never accept the Africans as the equals of Europeans politically and socially. Federation would be a complete reversal of previous British policy under which Africans had been led to believe that they were being prepared to stand on their own feet. Africans felt that they must remain directly under the Imperial Government until that stage was reached. Once any federation scheme had been pushed through the European settlers in Southern Rhodesia would insist on a strong Government and would over-ride all the safeguards in the way Europeans had done in South Africa. In any case safeguards never worked; they have not worked in the Southern Rhodesian Constitution because the Commonwealth Relations Office had never had the courage to impose the veto. Africans throughout Central Africa had been seriously disturbed that this report could be published at all and, above all, that it should be signed by Colonial servants. They were extremely bitter about it and it was very difficult to persuade them that the report represented proposals only and not a statement of His Majesty's Government's policy. *Mr. Banda* produced a number of letters to show that Africans were extremely disturbed.

*Mr. Greenidge* said that he shared Sir Stewart Gore-Browne's feelings that federation was theoretically desirable but, in his view, the territories were not yet ripe for it. There was a marked difference in Constitutional status. Africans in the northern territories knew that political dominance would pass into the hands of the Europeans. There was serious discrimination against Africans in Southern Rhodesia and the main African Organisations in all three territories were solidly against federation. As regards the threat from the Union, if peaceful penetration were all that was involved, each territory could deal with it separately just as well as the three territories combined.

*General Grey* said that the Aborigines Protection Society felt that it would be impossible to insert any safeguards in any Constitution that would protect the Africans in a federation. There was no distinction to be made between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa as regards native policy and the Europeans would never admit that it was possible to educate the Africans to the European level. *Mr. Sorensen* said that he doubted whether federation would provide a balance against South Africa; on the contrary, it might provide a larger unit for South African absorption. He emphasised, particularly for Mr Banda's benefit, that the scheme in question had not been sponsored by the Government but was only tentative proposals put forward by officials.

*Miss White* drew attention to what she considered to be a series of international aspects; we had to pursue a policy of trusteeship in all Colonial areas and the implementation of this scheme would do international prestige a great deal of harm. We had suffered a good deal of loss of face by our attitude over South West Africa and this scheme was just a new measure of appeasement to white settlers. It would play straight into the hands of communist propaganda and lead to an extension of colour bar policies.

*Mr. Tapscott* said that the countries concerned were the only homes to which millions of Africans could look; therefore their feelings had to be carefully considered and the interest of the Africans must be paramount. No solution that they did not approve of must be imposed upon them. *Mr. Basil Brooks* said that it was important to keep faith with the Africans.

*The Secretary of State* explained the Government's position vis à vis the report and how the Conference came to be set up. The Central African Council had proved to be a failure and was not making any effective contribution to solving the economic problems of the three territories. The economies of these territories were complementary and some sort of coordinating machinery was essential to secure the maximum economic benefit over the whole area. The East Africa High Commission had proved much more effective in this respect than the Central African Council. Everybody admitted that the area could benefit if there were some form of common economic planning. His Majesty's Government's policy in all Colonial areas was to develop self-Government, but self-Government, to be successful, had to be built on sound economic foundations. There was an urgent need for economically viable units. The report argued that the scheme it had recommended was the best available for this purpose. This report had only been published for public consideration and discussion; the Government were not committed in any way and were open to conviction about the whole matter. They fully recognised the absolute importance of keeping faith with the Africans and had promised fullest consultation with local opinion. For this purpose he proposed to make a visit to Central Africa to find out the reactions of the people and only when these had been ascertained would the Government consider the report in detail. *The Secretary of State* told Mr Banda that he could assure his fellow Africans that His Majesty's Government were not proposing to force this scheme on them.<sup>2</sup> They wanted to know their reactions to the

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<sup>2</sup> The fact that this could be read as an undertaking that federation would not be imposed against the wishes of Africans caused concern within the CO (minute by Lambert, 28 Jul 1951). Enquiries were made into whether copies of the minutes had already been sent to those present, and it was established that they had not (undated minute by Lambert). The passage was presumably altered in the version that was eventually circulated.

scheme as a whole and their views on particular details and during his visit he would be very anxious to speak to all those who wanted to speak to him. Nevertheless, whatever came of the present proposals the difficulties which had been facing the Central African territories in recent years would remain. Was it possible to secure the economic advantage of closer association without any politically undesirable effects? Had the officials in their report succeeded in doing so? He was very grateful to the deputation for giving him their views, to which he would give very full weight and he was also open to receive any suggestions regarding any other possible schemes that might secure desirable economic advantages to the whole area. He also drew their attention to the threat from the Union of South Africa and asked *Mr. Cohen* to speak on this.

*Mr. Cohen* said that he wished first to deal with the suggestion that had been made, that there should be a federation between Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the East African territories. In his view this solution was not feasible. Central Africa had very few economic links with East Africa and he did not believe that East Africa would agree to be associated, particularly with Northern Rhodesia. We had recently succeeded in achieving a delicate balance in the East African territories and the proposal to associate Northern Rhodesia with them would upset that balance. If the present scheme was rejected we were left with four alternatives. The first was to do nothing at all. In his view we could not stand still. The second was to continue with the Central African Council; this, unfortunately, would not work. The third was some solution on the lines of a 'League'; this had not been considered effective enough to deal with the problems of Central Africa and would, in any case, leave too much power in the hands of the territorial legislature. The fourth was amalgamation, which most people agreed was not possible in the peculiar circumstances of Central Africa. If the view were taken that there was no difference between Southern Rhodesia and the Union then, of course, it was hopeless to try to achieve any form of closer association. The officials considered, however, that this view was completely erroneous and that, in fact, in ultimate aim, the purposes of Southern Rhodesian native policy were the same as those in the northern territories. As regards the threat from the Union, this took three forms; firstly, economic penetration, secondly ideological penetration, and thirdly, immigration. To some extent it was possible to restrict Union influence by laws passed in the individual territories, but laws had to be administered and the psychological aspect of the whole matter was the most important. Political influence cannot really be opposed by Government action; it had to be opposed by force of public opinion. Africans themselves were not yet fully organised for political action but there was a sensible minority of Europeans in the territories devoted to the British connection and if their opinions were properly mobilised they would constitute a powerful factor against South African influence.

*Mr. Hastings Banda* said that the only effective counterpoise to Afrikaner influence was the influence of the Africans. The most effective step the Government could take in this connection would be to get rid of the pretence that Africans were protected persons and to give them full electoral rights. He repeated that there was no difference between Southern Rhodesia and the Union in native policy. Southern Rhodesia did not allow African Trade Unions; they were prepared to accept the federation scheme only as a stepping stone to Dominion status. The scheme would not prevent South African influence going north; it would only speed the process. The Africans prefer their freedom to economic prosperity and wanted the retention of

Colonial Office rule. He asked the Secretary of State for an assurance that this scheme would not be imposed upon the Africans and the Secretary of State assured him that it was not His Majesty's Government's intention to impose the present scheme on Africans against their will.

After some further discussion the meeting closed with *Mr. Greenidge* thanking the Secretary of State for having received the deputation at such short notice and the *Secretary of State* assuring the deputation that careful attention would be paid to their views.

## 63 CO 967/151

17 July 1951

[European settler leaders]: minute by Sir T Lloyd

Mr. Welensky asked that I would see him and a few others of the Europeans from East and Central Africa now over here as guests of H.M.G. for the Festival,<sup>1</sup> and I saw a party yesterday which consisted, in addition to Mr. Welensky, of Sir Alfred Vincent, Mr. Beckett, Mr. E.C. Phillips and Brigadier Scupham.

Mr. Welensky spoke first and complained that on this occasion, as at the Africa Conference of 1948, there was discrimination against Europeans in favour of Africans. When I asked him for examples of this he mentioned first that the Prime Minister seemed to him and to others deliberately to pass by all Europeans and to shake hands only with Africans when moving from the Hoare Memorial Hall to the refreshment room to take tea on the 10th of July.

Mr. Phillips supported this and said that even the Africans from Tanganyika—Chief Kidaha—had asked why West Africans were so much favoured.

Sir Alfred Vincent said (and was supported by someone else) that Mr. Fraser of Uganda had held out his hand to be shaken by the Prime Minister who however passed him by shaking hands with Africans on both sides of him.

All this seemed to me to be a little petty but my callers were obviously in no mood to be told that and I listened patiently and contented myself with asking what they suggested should be done about it. They exonerated all officials from their complaints and agreed that there was nothing to be done to counter what one of my callers (I think it was Mr. Beckett) described as the sub-conscious attitude of Ministers deriving from their feeling that Africans are downtrodden and must, on occasions such as this, be shown special favour.

A good deal of the trouble is, I think, due to the fact that at these mixed conferences and gatherings Africans receive far more publicity and attention generally than Europeans do from the Press and from outside V.I.P's. That, as I tried to make plain to my callers, is almost inevitable. It is only natural that the Press and prominent outsiders at these gatherings should be attracted by the novel and sometimes colourful dress of the West Africans and that Europeans in their normal attire should on these occasions have to take second place.

Some of this made a little impression on others but none did any good with Mr. Welensky who, towards the end of our meeting, said that if any similar mixed conference or other gathering is called in future, and Northern Rhodesia is invited to

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<sup>1</sup> ie the Festival of Britain.

be represented, he will get up in the Legislature and ask for a guarantee that there will be no discrimination at the conference against Europeans.

As Mr. Welensky once spoke to me in much the same strain about the Africa Conference of 1948 and I did not record that, and he harked back to that previous occasion yesterday, I thought it well to put on record this brief account of yesterday's talk. But it should not go on any registered paper, and after Mr. Cohen, Mr. Rogers and Mr. Lambert have seen, the note should be returned to Mr. Harris for him to keep.

## 64 DO 121/138

23 July 1951

### 'Closer association in Central Africa': notes prepared by Sir P Liesching after a visit to Southern Rhodesia, 26 June-12 July

It was much too early while I was in Southern Rhodesia to form any estimate of how opinion there will finally shape on the Closer Association proposals, but a great many people volunteered their views to me and I took advantage of every opportunity to elicit their thoughts so far as they have developed.

2. My impression is that the Report of the Select Committee on full dominion status, of which Mr. Stockil, the Leader of the Opposition, was Chairman, will not be a live and contemporary alternative issue to Closer Association. The Rhodesia (late Liberal) Party Convention, held while I was there, produced a completely vague resolution on Closer Association which left every door wide open. If the Closer Association proposals should fail, I think that, if there is not a complete relapse to the *status quo*, some form of 'amalgamation' with Northern Rhodesia might prove to be the first alternative objective locally. (I deal with this point further in para. 19). Sir Godfrey Huggins remains immovably opposed to any early advance to full dominion status.

3. The Prime Minister and most of his Ministers say that the Ministerial and Civil Service superstructure under the London proposals is top heavy. The Prime Minister would himself like to reduce the status of the Governors of the three component Territories so that they become Administrators. Mr. Chegwiddden, Chairman of the Public Service Commission, wants a very exhaustive exercise done on the sorting out of the Civil Service arrangements simultaneously with the drafting of any new Constitution. He has the reputation with the Prime Minister of making over-elaborate proposals on organisation. My conclusion is that comprehensive work will have to be done on the Civil Service organisation; but that popular opinion, which is healthily critical of bureaucracy, must not be alarmed by the publication of ideal arrangements on a large scale. Adjustments or expansions should be presented as modestly as possible in the first instance, and some parts of the re-organised Service could start rather on a skeleton basis.

4. Among those who have given serious study to the Report so far, the major doubts centre naturally on the arrangements proposed for dealing with native affairs—more properly perhaps described as race relations. I lost no opportunity of emphasising the delicate balance of the proposals and the fact that the scheme could easily be wrecked if people at either end thought lightheartedly that major adjustments could be made. I said, too, that we could not afford to have dual or triple

interpretations publicised on pivotal points in the proposals without endangering the whole project.

5. Some important people, specially those with legal background—Sir Robert Tredgold (a former Minister, now Chief Justice), Mr. Greenfield (Minister of Justice), Mr. Beadle (formerly a Minister, now a Judge) think that the scheme for the devolution to the Territories of all major matters affecting native interests, will probably make it unworkable, and will certainly make it unpalatable or indeed unacceptable to Southern Rhodesians. Mr. Fletcher, Minister of Native Affairs and Health, shares the view of those mentioned above, but on vague grounds which were quite unintelligible to me. This school of thought seems to me influential and the Prime Minister is worried. He has asked Sir Robert Tredgold for a full written memorandum. Those who hold this view would insist that all principal responsibilities in the field of native policy at present devolved to the Territories should be placed upon the Central Government.

6. I suggested frankly to these people that what they were saying was really that Southern Rhodesian native policy must prevail for the three components. They demurred without convincing me. Sir Godfrey Huggins does not associate himself with this view at present—not at any rate as a sticking point at the initial stage. Nor do I think he takes this attitude because he believes that the practical evolution of Federation will inevitably mean that Southern Rhodesian policy will prevail for the three. I believe his view to be that from the basis of the present proposals for devolving native policy to the Territories, the Europeans throughout the Territories and particularly in Southern Rhodesia, will be brought to see, before it is too late, that unless they so conduct their policy towards Africans that an acceptable life is produced for Africans as well as for Europeans, it will before very long not be a question of safeguards for Africans but of safeguards against the elimination of Europeans. This is the heart of the matter, and Sir Godfrey Huggins has no illusions about it. In talking to the Prime Minister I asked him to realise that any re-shaping of the proposals regarding the Minister of African Affairs, for which I think he will almost certainly have to press, must be such as will visibly produce an equivalent degree of safeguard for African interests.

7. The critics or opponents mentioned in paragraph 5 above, and no doubt many others whose reactions will be more instinctive and less based on thoughtful study, will take a less enlightened view than the Prime Minister on the necessity of finding an acceptable race relationship by providing for the advance of the African: nevertheless, theirs is a view that will find many supporters. Their attitude is quite frankly based on a pathological antipathy to the Colonial Office and a deep-rooted belief that its policy, conducted at what they regard as a fatally breakneck speed elsewhere and particularly in the Gold Coast, makes it impossible for Southern Rhodesia to federate unless Southern Rhodesian power at the centre can ensure a uniform and much more moderately paced advance in the political power of the African. For the thinking members of this school this does not mean stagnation, still less retrogression on South African lines. Sir Robert Tredgold, for example, is of Livingstone–Moffat missionary stock and said to me that while he was strongly opposed to anything approaching what might be called ‘Gold Coast speed’ for the two northern territories, he was quite ready to admit that there was room for quicker advance for the African in Southern Rhodesia. Yet a ‘Gold Coast speed’ would be possible, and in his view probable, if the present proposals were to be accepted as

they stand. In that event he believes that under Colonial Office auspices there would be dangerous speed in African advance in the two northern partners, which would, by infection, raise discontent and pressure by Southern Rhodesian Africans for similar speed. This would produce a strong reaction from the Europeans and a conflict in Southern Rhodesia, in which Europeans would not give way. The Federation might then break up and Southern Rhodesia, left with an intractable problem, might at that point throw herself into the arms of the Union. This last state would be intolerably worse than if Southern Rhodesia had never embraced the scheme in its present form.

8. If this is a correct analysis of the Tredgold school of thought, its appeal may prove very strong. Many of the older settlers of British stock came through to Rhodesia, as adults or children, from South Africa, and seem to me to have little appreciation of the surge of African nationalism with which their children will have to live. It remains to be seen whether the new settlers will retain the more enlightened view with which they arrived. It may be found that the present scheme cannot go through without amendments which would prove very difficult, or indeed impossible, in the balance of things.

9. A by-product of the general feeling under this head may be mentioned. Several people, including the Governor, put it to me that in one or two passages of the Report where the words 'Secretary of State' appear, they would feel a good deal differently if they knew which Secretary of State was meant. If it could read 'Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations', this would have a reassuring effect. I admitted the ambiguity, but said that I doubted very much whether this amendment could be made. I think that, given the pathological state of mind of Southern Rhodesians towards the Colonial Office, the text should read 'United Kingdom Government', so making any question referred to London a Cabinet matter, with no further revelation of the machinery by which decisions would be taken. The Governor attaches great importance to this point, and I think he is probably right. Another suggestion made to me was that the machinery for referring reserved questions to London should be defined as being the two Secretaries of State with some third balancing Minister—e.g. perhaps the Attorney-General, the Lord President of the Council or the Lord Privy Seal. There seems to me no doubt that the present division of responsibilities in London between two Secretaries of State, with its relevance to the acceptability of a scheme in which strong safeguards are embodied, may prove to be a serious stumbling block.

10. On the Minister for African Affairs I noted two points. First is the manner of his nomination and appointment. If I am right in thinking that the view taken here is that nomination by the Governor-General is important because it is equivalent to nomination by United Kingdom Ministers, then I think that there are rocks ahead both for the United Kingdom Government and the Governor-General. It seems particularly important that the Governor-General, as the representative of the Crown, should not be put in a dangerous or indeed perhaps impossible position over this. Surely the appointment must be made in accordance with normal constitutional convention whereby the Governor-General will be known to have acted on Ministerial advice. The holder of the portfolio is liable to become public target No. 1 at times of difficulty. Constitutional convention seems to require that the Federal Prime Minister should be the public defender both of the choice of the Minister and of his actions if friction arises. If this is correct it follows that the Minister must be appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Federal

Prime Minister. There ought, I think, to be a clear understanding on this point and not two or three voices about it.

11. The second point on the Minister for African Affairs is the belief, which seems widely held among those who have thought about the matter in Southern Rhodesia, that by the definition of his functions he is bound to find that he has the right to intervene on practically every other Federal Minister's business, since there are few matters which do not directly or indirectly affect the African. It was put to me that the burden would be impossibly heavy; or that, if carried successfully, the amount of interference would be intolerable. The Governor is among those who are strongly impressed with this point. He wonders whether these important responsibilities can in fact be carried at Ministerial level by anyone but the Federal Prime Minister himself.

12. I ran into quite a number of people among those engaged in industrial and commercial life who, without having done more than read the newspaper summaries, seem generally predisposed in favour of the scheme on the ground that good economic strength could be built and that they would in the process find markets and hopeful prospects. I tentatively tried out on them some questions about low-cost competition as between European-manned and African-manned industries, but got no very intelligent reactions. Given the Land Apportionment Act and the fact that the conditions for the successful establishment of African-manned industries are not normally present in the Reserves or Native Areas, the leaders of commerce and industry are probably right in not regarding the economic threat to their interests as serious.

13. The ascertainment of 'African opinion' is obviously going to be very difficult. Southern Rhodesians from the Prime Minister downwards consider that Westminster and Whitehall have some very unrealistic ideas on this subject. I did not meet anybody from the Prime Minister downwards who thinks that this complicated project can be put to Africans (except to very few) in a form simple enough to elicit a valid reaction, or that the response, if the scheme is somehow put to them with every objectivity and all possible simplification, will finally secure favourable reactions from Africans. Sir Godfrey Huggins said he was confident that this will be true not only of the two northern Territories but of Southern Rhodesia also.

14. I can report only three results from soundings so far taken of Africans.

(1) David Stirling, the organiser of the Capricorn Society,<sup>1</sup> tried a simple test on some selected Africans with whom the Society keep contact for such purposes. He was astonished and dismayed when they came back to say that they had no use for the scheme. They were apparently asked whether they did not think it was preferable to the native policy pursued in the Union. To this they retorted that they did not see why, because Africans in the Union were paid twice the wages obtainable by Africans in Southern Rhodesia, and moreover, Africans were employed as Assistant Native Commissioners (or equivalent posts) in parts of the Union, but there were no such appointments in existence or in sight for Africans in Southern Rhodesia. Stirling suggested that these Africans whom he had sounded had been got at by agents from the Union. This seems improbable but I suppose it is within the realm of possibility.

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<sup>1</sup> The Capricorn Africa Society was established in 1949 to campaign for the federation of Britain's East and Central African territories.

(2) In the Chipinga area in the south-east, one of the Native Commissioners told me that he had called a meeting of elders and had spoken to them of the scheme. These are more primitive Africans and their reply after deliberation among themselves was:—

‘When we go hunting lion we go in large numbers. We must have large numbers. This is a good scheme’.

In one area of the midlands, after the scheme had been put to them by a Native Commissioner, the only question asked was ‘If we have the scheme shall we still have the same Native Commissioners to look after us?’. On an affirmative answer being given, there were sounds of satisfaction.

15. It does not take much imagination or knowledge of the situation to foresee that while there may be many African *opinions*, there is no final channel through which African *opinion* can be successfully focused or represented in all its variety. The Prime Minister put it to me that if Westminster made ‘African approval’ a *sine qua non* and did not realise the impossibility of getting an African *opinion* for or against the scheme, then it might well be that a good scheme would founder for this reason and for the lack of that kind of clear verdict which could only be expected from a more advanced community.

16. I heard some doubts expressed by officials on the question whether Sir Godfrey Huggins was in fact committed to hold a referendum on Closer Association or whether he was only committed to do so on ‘Amalgamation’. The general view is that, though the point may be arguable, the Prime Minister is in fact morally committed to a referendum on Closer Association, and I found that the Prime Minister himself takes this view.

17. I took some soundings on the possibility, which I found was being canvassed in some quarters, that Closer Association ought to be an election issue rather than a referendum issue. Colonel Ferris, the Editor of the ‘Rhodesia Herald’, made a good point on this. He said that one must watch the Afrikaner vote which is mainly rural with rural constituencies weighted. He alleged that Afrikaners now represent thirty-six per cent of the electorate. (I cannot vouch for the accuracy of this figure.) Afrikaner opposition could be better discounted by a referendum. I believe that the Prime Minister himself and others who wish well to the Closer Association scheme are also averse from making it an election issue. The present Government naturally runs into unpopularity on other questions and the pendulum is likely to swing against it. Therefore it would be unwise to package Closer Association in a General Election with other issues where the Government has acquired unpopularity. If the popularity of the Government were on an ascending curve, it might be that Closer Association could be carried through on a wave of opinion favourable both on personal and policy grounds; but this is not the case. An important point made to me by Sir Godfrey Huggins is that he does not propose to hold any referendum (which incidentally will call for an Act to enable it) unless and until a Constitution has been drafted on which a verdict can be given.

18. If there is any hope of progress with Closer Association, Sir Godfrey Huggins will stay at his post, though he is genuinely anxious to pass increasing responsibility to his other Ministers and pave the way to an exit. He told me privately that he had been trying to do this during recent months, but his inexperienced Ministers had

made several nasty messes for him. This has convinced him that, as he had helped launch the present scheme and as the inexperience of his colleagues might be expected to guarantee its failure, he must carry on for the time being. He told me that though Mr. Davenport is generally liked, he is much too nice and innocent to deal with the cleverer men in the House; whereas Mr. Whitehead, though he has all the abilities, is very unpopular generally.

19. I am not sure, now that the difficulties of the Closer Association proposals are being realised, that the apparently simpler scheme for 'Amalgamation' between Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia, with Barotseland and possibly Nyasaland as associated native states in receipt of subventions from the 'Amalgamation', may not find some support. I seemed to detect some evidence of this in conversations with the Prime Minister and with one of his senior officers who was present at the London Conference. On the other hand Southern Rhodesians think that Mr. Welensky, given the sharp upward curve of Northern Rhodesia's revenues, may not be disposed to return to this idea. Among those—and they are numerous—who are really anxious for some larger Central African union, I think that, if Closer Association proposals should founder, the 'Amalgamation' idea, even minus Nyasaland, might make headway again as a preferable alternative to Mr. Stockil's 'full dominion status'.

20. I have discussed at an interdepartmental meeting with the Colonial Office various points made to me about the venue, agenda and other arrangements for the Ministerial Conference in September. Agreed suggestions will be coming forward to both Secretaries of State.

**65** DO 35/3598, no 24

4 Oct 1951

[Victoria Falls Conference]: minute by G H Baxter on a meeting with K M Goodenough

[A further conference was held at Victoria Falls in Sept 1951, to discuss federation. The talks achieved little, not least because a British general election was pending. Huggins complained of what he regarded as the British government's excessive concern to protect African rights.]

I asked Mr. Goodneough, High Commissioner for Southern Rhodesia, to lunch with me today for the purpose of talking about the Victoria Falls Conference.

I outlined to him generally what had happened at the Conference and took the occasion to express my own admiration for the patient and statesmanlike way in which Sir Godfrey Huggins had put up with what to him was a disappointing course of events, and had kept steadfastly in view the larger issues at stake. I said that, as I saw it, there had been—apart from the intangible advantages flowing from the discussion of these matters round a table by all concerned—at least four specific gains:—

(1) While the representatives of the Northern Africans had come with a completely negative mandate they had obviously been impressed by what they had heard and there was at least a hope that on resumption they would show a less unyielding or less unanimous attitude.

- (2) The representatives of Southern Rhodesia had agreed that amalgamation (unless subsequently desired by a majority in all three territories) was 'out'.
- (3) Our two Secretaries of State have for the first time publicly declared themselves favourable to the principle of federation.
- (4) All concerned have subscribed to the principle of economic and political partnership between Europeans and Africans.

Mr. Goodenough referred to the reports this morning of a speech by Dr. Stockil (Leader of the S. Rhodesia Opposition) describing the Conference as a failure and to a large extent going back on the resolution to which he, in common with others at the Conference, had agreed. Mr. Goodenough deplored this.

He went on to develop forcibly and at length his own opinion—with which I have myself some sympathy—that in view of the political immaturity of the Africans generally, it is unreasonable to refer this great and complex question to their arbitrament (without any positive guidance from us but with a free field for mischievous propaganda by agitators) and that if H.M.G. really believe that the proposals are in the best interests of the Africans we ought to give them guidance to that effect.

**66** DO 35/3600, no 5

23 Oct 1951

**[Closer association in Central Africa]: letter from G H Baxter to I M R MacLennan on the impact of the British general election**

You will have realised that the intervention of the General Election has caused some delay here in following up the results of the Victoria Falls Conference on Closer Association in Central Africa. We have not however stood still. The two Secretaries of State have been able to make a joint report to their colleagues on their visit to Central Africa and have agreed in formulating recommendations which we hope will receive early consideration from the new Government.

2. For your confidential information these recommendations are:—

- (1) that H.M. Government should publicly endorse the conclusions of the Victoria Falls Conference, including the proposal to hold a further representative conference in London about the middle of next year.
- (2) that H.M. Government should at the same time state publicly that it would favour in principle a scheme of federation between the three territories on the general lines recommended by the London Conference of officials and considers that such a scheme would be in the best interests of the Africans as well as of the other inhabitants of the territories; that it recognises that African opinion in the two northern territories has declared itself as opposed to these proposals; but that, in the light of the assurances agreed upon at the Victoria Falls Conference and of the economic and other advantages of closer association, it trusts that Africans will be prepared to give further and favourable consideration to the proposals. H.M.G. should also specifically endorse the statement in para 11(1) of the Victoria Falls Conference communiqué that any consideration now or in the future of amalgamation of the three territories is excluded unless the majority of the inhabitants of all three territories desire it and should make it clear that a similar

principle would apply to amalgamation of two of the territories or of any part thereof.

(3) that the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be authorised to arrange further discussions on the proposals with Africans in the two territories on the basis of H.M. Government's statement that they favour the scheme in principle and in the light of the assurances agreed to at the Victoria Falls Conference.

(4) that the discussions envisaged in paragraph 5 of the final communiqué of the Victoria Falls Conference between H.M. Government and the three Central African Governments, or between the three Central African Governments themselves, should be undertaken in due course with the object of elucidating points of detail in the officials' report in preparation for the London conference.

(5) that H.M.G. should regard the federation of the three Central African territories as an essential measure for preventing non-British influences from the Union of South Africa from encroaching on and eventually engulfing British Central Africa. The public statement referred to above should endorse the agreed statement of the Victoria Falls Conference that the British connection and British traditions and principles in the Central African territories should be so strengthened as to ensure that they continue to prevail.

3. We are very conscious of the need for the most thorough preparation in the intervening months—and for making full use of them by getting off the mark quickly—if the Conference is to be successful when it reassembles in London next year. All depends on the foregoing recommendations being approved. Once that has been done, and a public statement made on the lines proposed, the authorities in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will have the necessary backing for the campaign to win over African opinion to the cause of federation. Equally the way will be open for discussing with the Southern Rhodesian Government the modifications which they would like to see made in the proposals of the Conference of Officials.

4. The Secretaries of State have given thought to the attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government towards the proposals covering the number of nominated members in the federal Legislature, the creation of an African Affairs Board and the method of appointing a Minister for African Interests. The following—again for your confidential information at this stage—are the views which they have recorded for the information of their colleagues:—

(a) The Southern Rhodesia difficulties about the nominated members in the Legislature can to some extent at any rate be met. The Officials' Report (paragraph 90 and Annex VII) proposes that the federal Legislature should consist of 17 members from Southern Rhodesia, 11 from Northern Rhodesia and 7 from Nyasaland, three of whom from each territory would represent African interests. Of the 26 general members the 14 from Southern Rhodesia and the 8 from Northern Rhodesia would be elected, while the 4 from Nyasaland would be nominated by the Governor from a panel selected by the Convention of Associations (the body officially representing Europeans in the territory). The Southern Rhodesia Government take the view that on the basis of 22 elected members it would be difficult to operate a party system effectively. It should be possible to meet them over this by arranging for the four Nyasaland

representatives to be elected, either directly or indirectly. Of the African representatives those who are actually Africans could also be elected indirectly, leaving only three European representatives of African interests to be nominated.

(b) It is possible that Southern Rhodesia will suggest a bicameral legislature with a Senate consisting partly of members representing African interests as a substitute for the African Affairs Board proposed by the officials. As was made clear to the S. Rhodesian Cabinet by the Commonwealth Secretary, any such suggestion should be opposed, first because a second chamber would make the constitution cumbersome, and secondly because a second chamber, however composed, could not be as effective as a safeguard for African interests as the African Affairs Board proposed in the report. Powers of delaying legislation would not be sufficient, while it would be hard to secure a second chamber with an absolute veto.

(c) The Southern Rhodesia Government is likely to suggest that the Minister for African Interests should be appointed in the ordinary way on the recommendation of the Prime Minister rather than by the Governor General subject to the approval of H.M. Government. Such a proposal should be rejected, since a Minister responsible to the Prime Minister rather than to the Governor General and H.M. Government could not effectively exercise the safeguarding powers proposed for the Minister for African Interests in the report, which are the lynch-pin of the proposed federal safeguards. Such a change would moreover be strongly objected to by African opinion and would make it more difficult to convince Africans in the northern territories that the scheme does not prejudice their interests. Mr. Gordon-Walker has also recorded that he sought to persuade the Southern Rhodesian Government that with good will on both sides the appointment of a Minister for African Interests need cause no constitutional difficulties. They could be assured that H.M.G. would for their part work the system reasonably.

5. While you will naturally not be in a position to disclose the above to the S. Rhodesians, I hope that it will provide for you yourself the necessary background for any conversation you may have to sustain with them on the subject. If only the difficulties arising from African opposition can be overcome, it is to be hoped that the S. Rhodesians will not make sticking-points of any stipulations difficult of general acceptance. Otherwise we may find ourselves back more or less where we were before the March Conference.

6. You will realise that, great as is the weight attaching to joint conclusions reached by the two senior Ministers at present responsible, there can be no certainty that their recommendations will be approved by the new Cabinet. It is desirable that you should yourself know confidentially the position, at this intermediate stage, for your own guidance. But clearly nothing should be said to Huggins or his people at this stage which would disclose a change of mind, or would otherwise cause difficulty or embarrassment, in the event of a different decision being reached by H.M.G.

7. If, however, it is decided to make a public statement as described in para. 2 above, this should transform the situation. In the light of it we should be better able to deal with any points that the Southern Rhodesians may then desire to raise, and it might be that they would be less disposed to press for any substantial modifications of the federal scheme. This is of particular importance because the further approach to the northern Africans must be based on specific proposals, which on present

showing would have to be those in the Baxter Report; and it might have a very serious effect to introduce, in mid-career, major modifications of a kind regarded unfavourably by Africans.

8. One development since the two Secretaries of State formulated their views is that Huggins, in his recent speech, has recurred to the idea that, failing closer union of the three territories, the whole or a part of Northern Rhodesia might be tacked on to Southern Rhodesia on a 'Northern Ireland' basis. It seems to me that the advocacy, even as a second string, of an expedient which may be superficially attractive to some, but which holds out no prospect of solving the real problem, can only cloud the issue and divide opinion. Moreover the Colonial Office in particular are likely to be unalterably opposed to that expedient.

9. For the moment there is not much further that we here can do. Cohen will be sending a copy of this letter to Ronnie and (in Colby's absence) to Footman, for their own personal information. Perhaps you would shew it (on a personal basis) to Parry. We will keep you informed of any developments here.

**67 DO 121/146**

**29 Oct 1951**

**[British general election]: letter from Sir J Kennedy to Lord Ismay on the outcome**

My dear Pug,

I read your appointment in the paper this morning with so much pleasure, and Catherine and I send you every good wish for a very happy and successful tenure of office. It seems to me a most happy appointment, and one in which your gifts and your unique experience can be used with great effect for the Empire. Of course I need not tell you that for personal reasons nothing could have pleased me better.

Our first thought is naturally that you might find time, before very long, to pay us a visit in Rhodesia. We are your smallest baby, I suppose, but we have one little problem of federation which will no doubt be laid before you before one of these days. I know you will agree that it would be a help to see conditions at first hand, and if you can come out to look at them for a week or two I need not tell you how much I should love to see you again. And, moreover, a visit would be specially appreciated in Southern Rhodesia particularly when, after the muddle of the Falls Conference, the stock of the U.K. Govt. is rather low—though I may tell that the Conservative stock is a good deal higher than that of the Socialists which is very low indeed.

I am writing this letter from Hermanes where we are taking a short holiday at the seaside. I don't want to burden you with paper, but would you like me, when I get back, to send you a copy of a letter on the subject of federation which I wrote to Bobbety Salisbury a few weeks ago?

It may seem to you a somewhat unorthodox procedure for me to have been in correspondence with the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords! But it appeared to me—and Gordon Walker always said so—that this was a non-party matter, and I felt it would be helpful to keep Bobbety<sup>1</sup> in touch with our views because I have discussed it with him so often and I value his opinion so much.

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<sup>1</sup> Lord Salisbury.

**68** DO 35/3600

30 Oct 1951

**[Closer association in Central Africa]: minute by G H Baxter on the CRO view of policy**

It was arranged that for the purpose of informing the Secretary of State about this subject he should be provided with a copy of the 'Baxter Report' of March 1951, and of the paper<sup>1</sup> that was jointly submitted to the late Cabinet by the two former Secretaries of State after their participation in the Victoria Falls Conference of September 1951. These papers are attached.

The Colonial Office have already obtained from Mr. James Griffiths his permission for the joint Paper to be shown to the new Secretaries of State. Mr. Gordon Walker also has agreed. I have just been informed by the Colonial Office that they have now obtained the agreement of the Cabinet Office to the Paper (which was a Cabinet Paper) being shown to both Secretaries of State. (I understand that it was the view of the Cabinet Office that if the Paper should be circulated to the present Cabinet as an annexe to a new Cabinet Paper it might require some minor textual amendment.)

The fact that further progress was not made at the Victoria Falls Conference was largely due to the fact that the late Government did not feel able to<sup>2</sup> take a more definite line in favour of closer association last June when the Report was published. So far as it is possible to retrieve the situation this can best be done by His Majesty's Government making a public statement on the lines recommended in Mr. Griffiths' and Mr. Gordon Walker's joint Paper of 5th October.

If either before or after perusing these documents the Secretary of State wishes me to expound the matter orally, I shall be ready to do so at any time.

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<sup>1</sup> A joint memo by Griffiths and Gordon Walker (12 Oct 1951) on the Victoria Falls Conference is reproduced in R Hyam, ed, *The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–1951* part IV, 444. It was not discussed by Labour ministers and was left behind 'for the record'.

<sup>2</sup> Sir S Holmes changed the phrase 'failure of the late Government' in Baxter's draft to—the more neutral—'fact that the late Government did not feel able to'.

**69** DO 35/3600

7 Nov 1951

**[Closer association in Central Africa]: minute by G H Baxter on the CRO view of policy**

The draft statement to be made in the House of Commons about Central African federation has been revised in the light of yesterday's discussion between the two Secretaries of State. A draft memorandum by them submitting it to the Cabinet has also been prepared. These documents, which have been concerted between ourselves and the Colonial Office, are attached. They are being simultaneously submitted to the Colonial Secretary.

The draft memorandum is about as short as one could reasonably make the presentation of such a large topic (perhaps 2½ printed pages). Care has been taken to put the gist of it into the opening paragraph so that the Prime Minister, for example, may be able at once to see the nature of the proposals and the reasons for them and their urgency.

There are two possible points of criticism in the draft statement. It contains a reference to the fact that African opinion has expressed opposition to the federal proposals. I questioned the necessity of including this in the proposed statement; but Mr. Cohen feels very strongly that the omission of it would weaken the value of the statement with respect to the satisfying of Africans that their opinions are being taken fully into account. On this point I feel that we ought to accept the Colonial Office view.

Secondly, paragraph 4 may appear somewhat out of perspective. There is however no satisfactory half-way house between stating fully the assurances in question and merely referring to the existence of such assurances while leaving their nature to be ascertained from other sources. Here again the Colonial Office officials express very strongly the view that the citation, in the statement in Parliament, of those assurances should be of great value in helping to persuade the Africans of the Northern Territories to adopt a change of attitude. Although the statement is designed to be made in Parliament here its most important purpose is as a means towards persuading those Africans that the proposals are not adverse to their interests. I feel therefore that we should agree to the inclusion of para. 4 as it stands. Even so, the statement is not unduly lengthy considering the importance of the subject.

The Colonial Office's idea about the time-table is as shown in the paper at (77). In particular it is contemplated that the drafts should be submitted to both Secretaries of State in time to be cleared and sent to Cabinet Office tomorrow, 8th November.

We do not think that it would be appropriate to invite the concurrence of the S. Rhodesia Government in the proposed statement, though we should let them have a copy of it in advance. I have little doubt that they will greatly welcome it.

## **70** CO 1015/59

7–15 Nov 1951

### **[Closer association in Central Africa]: minutes by A B Cohen on the CO view of policy**

At yesterday's meeting between the Secretary of State and Lord Ismay it was agreed:

- (1) that the two Secretaries of State should propose to the Cabinet an early declaration by H.M. Government in favour of the federation of the Central African territories;
- (2) that the draft statement which I had prepared should be revised so as to give it more punch;
- (3) that a Cabinet memorandum should be prepared; the draft statement should be Appendix I to this memorandum and the report by Mr. Griffiths and Mr. Gordon Walker should be Appendix II;
- (4) that the draft Cabinet Paper and statement should be submitted to the two Secretaries of State not later than tomorrow morning, November 8th, and should if possible be cleared tomorrow and submitted to the Cabinet Office;
- (5) that arrangements should be made for the matter to be discussed by the Cabinet next week and that, if the Cabinet approve, the statement should be made in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State during the following week, i.e. presumably on Wednesday, November 21st;

(6) it would be necessary to give the three Central African Governments two or three days' advance notice of the statement, but it would not be necessary to consult them on its terms.

After the meeting Mr. Baxter of the C.R.O. and I agreed on a revision of the draft statement and on the general lines of a Cabinet Paper. I have now drafted the latter and submit both documents.

I have the following comments on the draft statement:—

- (a) The beginning has been revised to start off straight away with a definite statement in favour of federation.
- (b) Paras. 3 and 4 of the original draft (attached below, flagged X) have been retained as paragraphs 4 and 5, as I think was intended. The primary purpose of the statement as I understand it is as a first step in the campaign for persuading Africans to accept the scheme. Both these paragraphs are, I think, of much importance from this point of view and I hope that they can be retained in full.
- (c) The C.R.O. suggested that the reference to African opposition to the scheme which now appears towards the end of paragraph 3 should be omitted. My own view is that this would be a mistake, because it seems to me much better to face the fact that there is opposition and in spite of that make the declaration. If there is no reference to opposition the Government may be accused of ignoring it. I have made the point with the C.R.O. and I hope that they will accept our point of view.

I have asked the C.R.O. to let me know as soon as possible whether Lord Ismay approves the two drafts so that they can if possible be finally approved and sent in tomorrow.

A.B.C.  
7.11.51

The Cabinet paper is attached loose opposite.<sup>1</sup> It will be taken on Thursday.

Before the Cabinet meeting the Secretary of State should be aware of the most recent correspondence on the subject. We have received the following communications:—

- (1) Sir Gilbert Rennie's letter of 2nd November, urging that the statement about H.M.G. giving a lead in favour of federation should be made as soon as possible.
- (2) Sir G. Huggins telegram of 9th November suggesting that he should come here in January for discussions on the subject with United Kingdom Ministers.
- (3) Three letters of 2nd and 6th November from Mr. Parry, the Chief Secretary of the Central African Council and a telegram from the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Southern Rhodesia of 9th November, suggesting that, while a firm statement by H.M.G. in favour of federation would be very beneficial, this should not actually be made until we have been able to come to an understanding with Southern Rhodesia about their views on the federal schemes in the Officials' report of last March.

Mr. Lambert and I have discussed these latest communications with Mr. Baxter and Mr. Gibson of C.R.O. so as to put up agreed advice to Ministers. On the question of

<sup>1</sup> For the Cabinet paper, see D Goldsworthy, ed, *The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957*, part II, 302.

Sir G. Huggins' visit we agreed that this would be desirable although, as Sir G. Huggins himself proposes, the visit should not be announced as being for the purpose of discussing closer association. Some other pretext should be found.

As regards the suggestion that the statement by H.M.G. should be deferred pending clarification with the Southern Rhodesia Government of their detailed views on the federal scheme, we all agree that this would be a great mistake and that it is important to stick to the immediate announcement as proposed in the Cabinet paper. Our reasons are as follows:—

(a) If the statement were deferred we should lose the initiative. We think that the firm statement proposed would not only be of great value with opinion in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland but also with public opinion in Southern Rhodesia.

(b) If the statement were not made now it would clearly have to be deferred until after Sir G. Huggins' visit in January. If it were made shortly after that or even some weeks after that everyone in Central Africa would naturally assume that the firm line taken by H.M.G. had been inspired by Sir G. Huggins. This would do most serious damage to our chances of persuading Africans in favour of the scheme. It is essential that the statement should be regarded as being made purely on H.M.G.'s initiative, as it is.

(c) If we defer the statement and embark on correspondence or discussions with Southern Rhodesia about their criticisms of the scheme in the Officials' report we shall get into an impossible situation. We may probably have to resist firmly some of the changes which Southern Rhodesia suggest on points of detail; if so it might make it much more difficult after such discussions to proceed with the idea of a statement on the lines proposed. Much more serious, if as a result of such discussions we were to compromise with Southern Rhodesia on any point we should be accused of rigging the issue against Africans behind their backs. This would be seriously damaging.

(d) We must avoid getting confused between the principle of federation and the details of the Officials' scheme; the statement is designed to win support for the principle of federation. We must avoid at this stage being drawn into discussion of details. The time for discussion of details will be the London Conference next year. Southern Rhodesia may then put forward proposals for modification and it is quite possible that Northern Africans may do the same. We must then seek a solution acceptable by all parties. But the time for that is the London Conference.

We therefore strongly recommend that we should not be deflected from the plan proposed in the Cabinet paper. I have prepared and attached opposite a telegram to be sent to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, assuming the Cabinet approve the proposals. The C.R.O. are preparing a telegram to Southern Rhodesia. The C.R.O. officials with whom we have discussed the matter adhere to the view that it is not necessary to consult the Southern Rhodesia Government on the terms of the statement, which is a statement of H.M.G.'s views. Sir G. Huggins is not asking for consultation in (10), but only for the advanced [sic] information, although the United Kingdom High Commissioner has suggested consultation in (11).

A.B.C.  
13.10.51

We have had two important telegrams from Northern Rhodesia in the last few days, that marked 'X' immediately below the drafts opposite and the top telegram below the draft on CAA 157/4/02.

The first of these telegrams (the one on this file) was seen by the Secretary of State yesterday. It does not in fact add anything material to the telegrams from Mr. McLennan and Mr. Parry or affect the view expressed in my minute of the 13th October, with which I understand from Mr. MacKintosh<sup>2</sup> the Secretary of State is in full agreement.

We had a discussion yesterday with Mr. Baxter and Mr. Gibson of the C.R.O. and agreed to a reply to this telegram on the lines of the draft opposite (below the official draft). We also discussed yesterday the question of partnership in the light of Sir G. Rennie's telegram on this file and the Reuter reports at No. 3 on the file below. We had not then seen the latest telegram from Northern Rhodesia (No. 632), but broadly speaking this does not affect the issue. We were all agreed that we must strengthen Sir G. Rennie's hand by a strong telegram on the question of partnership and a draft has been prepared.

It is important, I think, to get the official telegram already agreed by the Secretary of State off immediately if the Cabinet approve the proposals. I should, however, like to alter one word in it as shown in pencil at the bottom of the first page. If we use the phrase 'as soon as' we are prejudging the later telegrams. If you agree to this very minor amendment, could this telegram be detached and sent back at once to Mr. Lambert so that after the Cabinet meeting he can arrange if necessary for it to be got off? We should like the two other telegrams if possible to follow later in the day, assuming that they are approved.<sup>3</sup>

A.B.C.  
15.11.51

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<sup>2</sup> Private secretary to the secretary of state.

<sup>3</sup> The telegram, sent on 15 Nov, immediately following the Cabinet's approval of Lyttelton's proposed statement, gave the text of the statement. The statement itself, which was delivered in the Commons on 21 Nov, announced that the government was 'convinced of the urgent need to secure the closer association of the three Central African territories', and believed that federation was the best means of achieving this. It also announced the government's intention that the Victoria Falls conference should reassemble in London the following year. The telegram conveying this text ended, 'My colleagues and I are most anxious that the best possible use should be made of London Conference in the middle of 1952 to win African support for the Federal scheme'.

**71** CO 1015/65, no 106

29 Dec 1951

**[Closer association in Central Africa]: letter from H N Parry to C E Lambert on the implications of African opposition to federation**

Yesterday's meeting of the Central African Council passed off quietly without any excitements of any kind. I shall be sending you in a day or two a copy of the draft minutes and so won't comment on the formal proceedings—which were over by 10 a.m.—except to say that at long last the Southern Rhodesia Government have agreed to the appointment of a Commission to make recommendations about African Higher Education.

2. For the remainder of the morning there was an informal discussion about

closer association. At the express wish of all members no record of any kind was kept. I am, however, sending you my impressions of the proceedings for your personal information so that you may know of the latest developments here.

3. A most important statement by those best qualified to know in the northern territories was that there was little or no chance now of persuading any appreciable number of Africans in Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland to accept the federal scheme, and that therefore any sort of campaign to convince Africans of the merits of the proposals would be a waste of time. In explanation, it was said that the African opponents of federation were successfully persuading Africans in all walks of life to reject federation, that the campaign was gaining in strength every day, and, having had such a good start, was unlikely now to be overtaken.

4. It was obvious that this statement was of the utmost significance, and, if correct, called for a reconsideration of the plans for a further conference next year in June or July. And it was, I think, accepted by nearly everyone that if anything was to be done, a decision whether or not to proceed with federation in the face of African opposition would have to be made by His Majesty's Government very soon and that the longer this decision was put off the more difficult it would become. In brief, that it was a question of now or never.

5. After the meeting, I had talks with a number of the representatives at the meeting. Moffat, Bush and Fox-Strangways<sup>1</sup> were quite definite in stating that in their opinion Africans in the north could not now be won over, and that every week that passed made matters more difficult. Welensky said he had always thought this. Colby said that so far as Nyasaland African opinion was concerned he had already reported his belief that a campaign would be useless. Barrow and Hadlow agreed with him. Rennie was less categorical but not I think any less pessimistic.

6. My own conviction, from listening to the discussion in Council and as a result of my talks afterwards, is that the chance of converting Africans to any effective form of closer association does not any longer exist.

7. I saw the Prime Minister this morning and was told that in his opinion the situation had been entirely altered by yesterday's discussion. He had agreed to postponing the Falls Conference until the middle of next year in the belief that Africans in the northern territories could be won over. Now this was said to be impossible. He therefore thought that a decision to go ahead with closer association, in spite of African opposition, would have to be taken immediately if the whole matter was not to be abandoned.

8. However much the situation has now altered, you will nevertheless wish to know the line taken in Council by the Prime Minister (no other Southern Rhodesia member spoke) when discussing Southern Rhodesia's objections to the Baxter proposals. According to him:—

- (a) the Minister for African Interests was unconstitutional and therefore unacceptable;
- (b) ways must be found of replacing as many of the nominated members as possible by properly elected members so that normal party government could be operated;

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<sup>1</sup> John Moffat, nominated unofficial member for African interests on the NR legislative council; R P Bush, secretary for native affairs, NR; Vivian Fox-Strangways, secretary for native affairs, Nyasaland.

- (c) the federal government did not have sufficient strength *vis-a-vis* the territorial governments; and
- (d) there were inadequate safeguards for Europeans.

9. I will not enlarge on (a). It is an old story and you must know by heart every criticism that has been levelled at the cuckoo. However, there was a general feeling that Southern Rhodesia might be prepared to accept the African Affairs Advisory Board, possibly even with enlarged powers, if the Minister for African Interests was jettisoned.

10. As regards the nominated members, a clear difference of opinion appeared between the representatives of Southern Rhodesia and those of the northern territories. Huggins argued that nominated members were impossible in any democratic government except as a temporary expedient, on which basis he was, however, prepared to accept them. He considered that the common voters' roll was the only hope there was of Africans and Europeans working out a common destiny together and thought that at some stage in the future when large numbers of Africans were on the roll it should be possible to negotiate a 'treaty' with them to ensure that no race should dominate the other.

11. The northerners clearly felt that this was poppy-cock and that if it was difficult to get African politicians to talk sense now about the political relationship between African and European, it would be impossible in the future. The common roll was thought to be entirely unsuited to Central Africa and to contain more grounds for future racial conflict than almost any other political device.

12. The discussion reached no definite conclusion (indeed I've had this argument myself several times with the Prime Minister without getting anywhere) and it was left that, for a start, Southern Rhodesia would not be averse to nominated members being on the federal legislature.

13. The last two Southern Rhodesia objections are really different facets of the same fear, which is that according to the present plan, an extremist government in the United Kingdom could push Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland along a path which could only end in the disruption of the federal ties. In concrete terms, the fear is that a strongly Fabian socialist government might force political reforms in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which would result in their developing into predominantly African states on the lines of the Gold Coast. So long as there is any possibility—however slender—of this happening, few in Southern Rhodesia will be found to support closer association.

14. A number of half thought out proposals were put forward by Southern Rhodesia to guard against this. It was proposed that the federal government should be indisputably dominant and so able to dictate the political path taken by the constituent units. The Canadian constitution was cited as an example of this type of federation. It was mentioned that in Switzerland the cantonal electoral laws and rights could not be altered without the consent of the federal government. It was suggested that the device of concurrent legislative powers might be used to give the federation the right to influence certain policies of the territorial governments. And finally (and I think most hopefully) it was put forward that the federal constitution might include a list of individual rights (a sort of bill of human rights) which could not be taken away by any government. Should these rights be infringed by any executive or legislative action of the state or federal governments, an appeal would lie to the federal courts.

15. So much for the wheat that emerged, after much wordy winnowing, from the chaff. I don't know at the moment whether the Southern Rhodesia case will be affected at all by the fact that African opinion in the north is now considered to be unbreachable. It is possible that the Prime Minister will argue that, since federation is wholly unacceptable to Africans, if anything is to be imposed it might just as well be amalgamation. Alternatively, he might agree in the circumstances not to make His Majesty's Government's decision more difficult. Welensky told me that after the Council meeting he and Beckett had a long talk with Huggins and urged him not to press for any serious departures from the Baxter report and that the Prime Minister was 'not unsympathetic'.

16. I am sending a copy of this letter to Baxter and to MacLennan.

**72** CO 1015/65, no 108

4 Jan 1952

[Closer association in Central Africa]: minute by W L Gorell Barnes  
on the implications of African opposition to federation

*Mr. Lambert*

Mr. Baxter telephoned this afternoon. He said that, in the light of Sir G. Rennie's latest telegrams and of Mr. Parry's letter to you (which I have not yet seen), it now seemed almost certain that there was no longer any hope of persuading the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to change their minds about federation, and that consequently H.M.G. would have to decide whether to abandon the idea of federation or to put it into effect without the agreement of the Africans. If this were so, then it seemed likely that the crucial decisions would be taken whilst Sir G. Huggins was here in January and not at a July conference, if indeed any such conference took place.

In the light of the above Mr. Baxter, with Sir P. Liesching's agreement, asked that we should consider the following two suggestions:—

- (1) that Sir T. Lloyd and Sir P. Liesching should take part in our discussion fixed for 2.30 on Wednesday, 9th January (a time chosen to suit Sir A. Cohen as well as ourselves); and
- (2) that we should think again about the desirability of inviting Sir G. Colby as well as Sir G. Rennie to be in London during Sir G. Huggins' visit.

As regards (2) above, Mr. Baxter pointed out that, if the question of imposing federation was going to arise, then H.M.G. would surely need not only the advice of Sir G. Rennie on the probable effects in Northern Rhodesia, but also the advice of Sir G. Colby about its effects in Nyasaland.

I said that I saw the point of both these suggestions and that we would consider them; but I did not in any way commit us.

I should be grateful if, in submitting the files with Sir G. Rennie's telegrams and Mr. Parry's letter, you would be good enough to take these suggestions of Mr. Baxter into account.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A meeting on this issue between the CO and CRO actually took place on 7 Jan. It endorsed Baxter's suggestion that, if the question of imposing federation against African wishes arose, it would be necessary to consult the governors of NR and Nyasaland.

**73** CO 1015/65

11 Jan 1952

**[Closer association in Central Africa]: minute by C E Lambert on the implications of African opposition to federation**

No. 118. In this letter the C.R.O. suggest that we should send an urgent communication to our two Governors asking that when they come to London next week they should be in a position to report what endeavours have been made to bring to the notice of the Africans the declaration by H.M.G. that federation would be in the best interests of the Africans, and with what result. They also suggest that they might send in advance by telegraph a summary forecast of their reports on the points. I understand that this suggestion has arisen out of a discussion which was held on this subject by Mr. Foster in the C.R.O. yesterday. Apparently he wanted to know (a) how representative the African Representative Council in Northern Rhodesia was of African opinion and (b) the answer to the point made in Mr. Baxter's letter. As regards (a) Mr. Williams has sent Mr. Gandee the necessary information.

The statement of the position contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and the first three sentences of paragraph 4 of (118) is correct but the correspondence on this subject does not end with our telegram to Northern Rhodesia of the 21st November referred to in (118). A brief history of this is:—

- (i) On the 13th November the Governor of Northern Rhodesia told us that it was in his view essential to try to reach agreement with Southern Rhodesia on the main difficulties before attempts were made to obtain African agreement to the federation proposals—flag 'A' in Part A.
- (ii) We replied on the 15th November giving reasons why we considered it would be a mistake to take no action vis-à-vis the Africans pending the result of attempts to reach agreement with Southern Rhodesia—flag 'B' in Part A.
- (iii) On the 18th November the Governor of Northern Rhodesia replied stating that he would hope that the way would be clear for discussions with the Africans very soon after preliminary discussions had been held with the Southern Rhodesians but that in any case, as soon as H.M.G's statement was published, immediate steps would be taken by the Northern Rhodesia Government to explain it fully to Africans as was done with the final communiqué of the Victoria Falls Conference. This would constitute the first stage of the talks—flag 'C' in Part A.
- (iv) We replied on the 21st November saying that his proposals did not differ in essentials from the programme we had contemplated in our telegram of the 15th November (flag 'D') and said that we were glad to know that his 'campaign' would begin as soon as possible after H.M.G's statement had been made. We added that it was most important not to leave the initiative to Zukas<sup>1</sup> etc.
- (v) A further complication arose when Sir G. Colby telegraphed on the 30th November saying that in his considered opinion there was no possibility in the next twelve months of getting Africans to change their attitude and that there was nothing to be gained and much to be lost by endeavouring to make them change their minds. He said that he felt strongly that Nyasaland should take the initiative and pull out of federation. He added that his Secretary for African Affairs was about

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<sup>1</sup> Simon Ber Zukas, an engineer and left-wing activist. Co-founder of the Anti-Federation Committee.

to go round the country to sound opinion, and he promised to telegraph again in about ten days' time—flag 'E' in Part A.

(vi) We replied on the 3rd December stating that we very much doubted if it was politically practicable to abandon the campaign of persuasion now and that it would in our judgment have disastrous consequences if Nyasaland were to pull out at this stage. We hoped that the Governor would take a less gloomy view after the tour made by the Secretary for Native Affairs—flag 'F' in Part A. We have had no further information from the Governor about African reaction.

We must I think take it that the preliminary campaign referred to in paragraph 2 of Sir G. Rennie's telegram of the 18th November (flag 'C') was put in hand soon after H.M.G.'s statement was made on the 21st November. We have had no confirmation that this was done although you will see that in paragraph 2 of his telegram of the 2nd January (flag 'G') the Governor says that all the information he has received is to the effect that Africans will not be persuaded to agree to federation in advance however much we may try to explain the proposals and safeguards to them. It also seems clear that in Nyasaland the Secretary for Native Affairs has stumped the country on behalf of federation although we have had no direct report on the results. It seems to be clear however from Mr. Parry's letter of the 29th December<sup>2</sup> (106) that nothing has happened to make the Governor of Nyasaland change his view that there is not the slightest hope of getting the Africans to change their minds on this matter. You will see that in paragraph 5 of that letter that Mr. Moffat (representing African Interests in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council), Mr. Bush, Secretary for African Affairs, Northern Rhodesia, and Mr. Fox-Strangways, Secretary for African Affairs, Nyasaland, are said to have been quite definite in their view that Africans in the north could not now be won over.

It does not seem to me that it is necessary to ask the two Governors to come here prepared to report what endeavours have been made to bring to the notice of the Africans the declaration made by H.M.G. on the 21st November and with what result. Such campaigns as may have been conducted in the two territories up to now (and I rather doubt whether in fact they will have amounted to very much) have undoubtedly been undertaken on the instructions of the Governors who will have full information about them and their results and I feel that they would regard it as a reflection on them if we were now to tell them that when they come here they must be prepared to give us information on this point. It remains for consideration whether we should ask them to telegraph the action taken and the result in advance of their arrival here. I also feel that it is unnecessary to trouble them to send this advance information which could not be of great help to us since the latest advice is that in the view of those best able to judge there is no hope of bringing about a change in African opinion in the two northern territories. Sir G. Rennie arrives on the 17th January and Sir G. Colby on the 18th—some days before the discussions with Ministers are due to commence.

I ought perhaps to add a few words with respect to the statement in paragraph 6 of Mr. Baxter's letter that Ministers will want to know to what extent we are acquainted with the views and feelings of the less organised and vocal sections of the native population. The whole object of Mr. Griffiths' and Mr. Cohen's visit to Northern

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<sup>2</sup> See 71.

Rhodesia and Nyasaland in September was of course to obtain just this sort of information. Their tours of the two Protectorates were extensive as the attached notes of their itinerary will show and they met all classes of the populations. Before their visit the whole question was discussed fully at special meetings of the Provincial Councils. I would say that as far as it is humanly possible to do so there has been full consultation with all classes of African opinion on this matter.

## 74 DO 121/158

14 Jan 1952

### 'Transfer of the High Commission Territories: effect of HMG's handling of African attitude to federation in Central Africa': note by W A W Clark<sup>1</sup>

H.M.G.'s handling of the African attitude to federation in Central Africa has a distinct bearing on the transfer issue and will affect African opinion throughout Africa.

2. It is true that there is a great difference between transfer of the High Commission Territories to a Government over which we have no control and agreeing to the inclusion of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in a Central African federation under safeguards, which would be firm at any rate for a time. But most of the public and press and almost all Africans will be un-influenced by such constitutional subtleties. They see the two things merely as questions of (1) handing the Bechuana, Basuto and Swazi over to Dr. Malan and (2) handing the Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Africans over to Southern Rhodesia.

3. If H.M.G. agreed to federation in Central Africa without the consent of the Africans concerned or against the wishes of a majority of them, the following consequences would follow:—

(1) The Union Government would be strongly encouraged to demand that the wishes of the native inhabitants of the High Commission Territories should similarly be over-ridden. Dr. Malan has already argued that Africans are not competent to judge the merits of issues like this. He resents and discounts the pledge to consult the inhabitants of the Territories before transfer.

(2) It would not be beyond the ingenuity of the Union Government to devise a constitutional umbrella with apparent safeguards or undertakings which could be described *mutatis mutandis* as something of a parallel to the Central African set-up. If H.M.G. put 5 million dissentient Africans under the latter, refusal to accept the South African proposition would be very damaging to our relations with the Union, which might from frustration back the Nationalist Government in drastic action to secure the Territories. South Africans think there is a virtual promise, dating back to 1909, to transfer the High Commission Territories. There is no similar undertaking or background to federation in Central Africa.

(3) The African inhabitants of the Territories would be so greatly perturbed and alarmed by the precedent and the danger it held for their own future that our continued administration of the Territories would be very difficult. Trust and

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<sup>1</sup> After serving as chief secretary of the Central African Council from 1945–1948, Clark was chief secretary to the high commissioner for Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland from 1949–1950. He then spent six years as an official at the CRO.

confidence would be destroyed. The resulting breakdown of administration in the Territories might be serious and an added inducement to the Union to act.

(4) The confidence of Africans everywhere in H.M.G. and in the European would be shattered and our hopes of keeping the African dependencies within the Commonwealth and well-disposed towards us destroyed. This confidence is already disturbed by the Seretse affair, largely because of our failure to publicise the real considerations behind the decision.

(5) Hopes of finding a solution to the white-black equation in East, Central and Southern Africa will recede.

4. This would be far too heavy a price to pay for federation. Even if only some of these consequences resulted, federation without African consent would still be too expensive to contemplate.

5. The price which H.M.G. is prepared to pay must be weighed against the advantages of federation in Central Africa. These can be exaggerated.

6. The economic advantages of federation are obvious, but, even as things stand, there is little to prevent the Rhodesias and Nyasaland co-operating to the limit, provided parochial jealousies are discarded, good-will is fostered and sincere intention exists. Co-operation and joint economic effort are attainable by a variety of alternative ways and machinery. Federation is perhaps the best method, but it is not the only one for this purpose.

7. The other main reason adduced for early federation is fear of South Africa. But this fear carried to such lengths is a strange and despairing doctrine for adoption inside the Commonwealth. (To fashion a 'cordon-sanitaire' around or to build a bulwark against the Union is the surest way of driving that country out of the Commonwealth and of provoking a bad internal explosion within it. Quite apart from other considerations, this would be a poor service to render its eight million Africans. South Africa is faced with a most difficult racial problem and is still only groping for a solution. To seal the Union off or make plain that we feel it necessary to build defences against it will not help South Africa to arrive at the right or a good solution.)

What have the Central African territories to fear from the Union? Territorial aggression is so unlikely that it can be completely discounted. Thanks to its resources and industrial activity, the Union enjoys an economic superiority. But the Rhodesians can withstand this without federation, as long as they have U.K. support. The danger of physical infiltration can be combatted by immigration control which could be almost as adequate and effective on a territorial as on a federal basis. The spread of ideas can only be countered by exposure of their unsoundness and the propagation of a better ideology.

8. Therefore, while federation in Central Africa is highly desirable, it is not essential. It should not be effected at too high a price. The consequences of overriding the wishes of the African inhabitants would be too costly. In particular we would gravely endanger our continued administration of the High Commission Territories and quite possibly but in a different way bring about the very consequence that we have been at pains to avoid by refusing to recognise Seretse.<sup>2</sup> To

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<sup>2</sup> Seretse Khama, titular ruler of the Bamangwato in Bechaunaland from 1923 during the regency of his uncle, Tshekedi (1905–1959). Western-educated, Seretse defied convention and tradition by marrying an Englishwoman in 1948. He was barred from Bechuanaland by successive UK governments between 1949 and 1956. At independence in 1966 he became the first president of Botswana.

sacrifice one irresponsible youth to safeguard a million of his fellows is one thing. To endanger the future of that very million allegedly to safeguard five millions from the tentacles of an imaginary octopus' genus Afrikaner would be madness.

9. Finally, Southern Rhodesia stands to benefit most from the present proposals which would enhance her stature and influence and bring balance to her economy, but ask little of her in return. The Africans in the north see this and fear federation may merely be the prelude to amalgamation and continued European dominance, which would halt their political progress indefinitely. The present proposals deliberately evade solution of the main issue—racial policy—by leaving 'native affairs' to the territorial governments. But federations are normally founded on a basis of agreement on the main and fundamental matters of common concern, leaving only the parochial to the constituent administrations. Southern Rhodesia could go a long way to solving today's dilemma by a single act demonstrating the sincerity of her approach to partnership between the races, if she agreed to representation of Southern Rhodesian Africans by Africans both in the territorial and the federal sphere or at least in the latter as a start. Similarly the Europeans in Northern Rhodesia could contribute by definition of partnership. If the Europeans of the two Rhodesias are not yet ready to make such concessions, then federation should wait or alternatives be explored.

## **75** CO 1015/65

22–29 Jan 1952

[Economic arguments for federation]: minutes by P Selwyn,  
A Emanuel<sup>1</sup> and Sir H Poynton

*Mr. Emanuel*

I have never been greatly struck by the economic arguments for federation in Central Africa, and the attached article from today's Times<sup>2</sup> does little to convince me. In the Closer Association Report itself (Cmd 8233) the economic arguments for federation were never really made. In paras 25 and 26 of the Report certain economic advantages of closer association are pointed out, but all of those mentioned could be achieved on a purely functional level, and the case of federalists versus functionalists has, as in W. Europe, never really been made out. An examination of Annex IV of the Report confirms this view. All of the economic functions which it is there suggested should be carried out the proposed Federal Government could equally well be carried out jointly without actual federation. It is therefore worth examining this Times article in some detail since it covers all the economic arguments which have at one time or another been put forward on this subject.

The argument in para 2 seems to be that the economy of each of the territories is somewhat unbalanced, and that they should therefore federate to achieve a more balanced economy. This argument is somewhat peculiar. Nobody (or very few people) suggests that, because the U.K. economy is unbalanced in the sense of being strongly dependent on industry and having to import its foodstuffs, it should therefore federate with, e.g. New Zealand or Argentina, which are equally 'unbalanced' in the other

<sup>1</sup> Selwyn was a principal and Emanuel an assistant secretary in the CO Economic Dept.

<sup>2</sup> On 22 Jan, *The Times* ran a story entitled 'The Rhodesian problem: economic arguments for federation'.

direction. Surely the whole point of international trade is that such 'unbalance' is made possible and, in many cases, advantageous. It is true that numbers of Nyasalanders emigrate to Southern Rhodesia for work, but I don't see there any argument for federation. After all, many others work in the Union of South Africa—about 40,000 were working there in 1950, compared with 87,000 in Southern Rhodesia. The real point of the argument seems to be in the last sentence, that 'to include . . . the Nyasaland labour potential within one political unit would undoubtedly increase confidence in Salisbury'. In other words, Salisbury would welcome some degree of control of the area from which much of its labour supply comes, but I can't see why Nyasaland should welcome it. In fact, such control might lead to policies designed to maintain Nyasaland as an area of labour supply at the expense of building up the local economy to a point where it can keep its population at home.

In paras 3 and 4, the point is made that federation would avoid uneconomic competition between the territories for services such as transport and power, and in markets. I do not see how the mere fact of federation will resolve the various conflicts of interest in the use of the limited transport and power facilities of the area. There will still be the rival demands for coal from the Copperbelt and from Southern Rhodesian industry. The railway will not automatically be able to carry more traffic. There will still be the conflict of view between the Northern Rhodesians who would prefer the development of the Kafue and the Southern Rhodesians who prefer the Kariba scheme. If there is one lesson to be learned from the history of the American Federation it is that the mere fact of federation does nothing to smooth over or reconcile these differences of local interest. It may enable one interest or another to get the upper hand, and the talk about 'planned localisation of industry and division of labour' in para 5 may in practice be a cover for the expression of some local interest or another.

Similarly, the fact that all three territories are 'marginal' as far as their food supplies are concerned will not be changed by federation. The economic pulls moving Northern Rhodesians to work on the Copperbelt or Nyasalanders to grow tobacco, cotton and tea or go to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa rather than grow food crops, will still remain. I can not see how a 'planned food, crop and marketing programme throughout the area' as proposed in the end of para 6, will alter these facts.

The advantage of federation according to para 7 combined with para 4 seems to be that it will prevent the development of manufacturing industries in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and will enable these territories to become markets for Southern Rhodesian industrial products. It is this very prospect which is likely to cause most heart-searching in the two northern territories on the subject of federation. In fact, it appears from the Closer Association Report itself that a customs union may not necessarily be an inevitable result of a federation, and that there are many practical difficulties in the way of such a union. However, such an industrial policy may be possible without a customs union, by the practice of restrictive licensing of industries. Para 7 suggests that this policy would be of advantage to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, since it would make the area less dependent on high priced and often scarce imports of consumer goods. On the other hand, it might involve the two northern territories in supporting high-cost and uneconomic industries in Southern Rhodesia.

Para 8 is most obscure. I don't see what is meant by the dangers of uncoordinated monetary and currency policies. The Southern Rhodesian Currency Board covers all

three of the territories already, and in any case can hardly have much of an independent monetary policy, although, alone among Colonial Currency Boards, it has a right to a fiduciary issue of 20% of its circulation. I just can't see what a Central Bank in Southern Rhodesia would do, unless, (a) it broke away completely from a sterling exchange currency and (b) the local banks were genuinely locally centred and ceased being merely branches of South African or British banks with their basic policy laid down in London or Cape Town. In present circumstances a central bank would merely be a fifth wheel in the currency and credit machine.

There may be something in the argument that a federation would attract more overseas investment than the present set-up. But it must be remembered that foreign investment in N. Rhodesia is already very high—it was running at about £4 m a year in 1949—and I shouldn't imagine that a federation would do much to attract investment to Nyasaland. The real limitations on investment in these two territories seem to me to be lack of basic facilities and natural conditions, and a federation would not do much to alter these.

The point seems to me, as is stated in para 9, that many of the alleged advantages of federation could be obtained as a result of cooperation on a functional level. I cannot, of course judge the political advantages or disadvantages of federation, but it does seem to me that, if the arguments in the attached article are the best that can be put forwards on the economic side, there is very little economic case at all.

P.S.  
22.1.52

*Sir H. Poynton (through Mr. Lambert)*

I think you will be interested to see Mr. Selwyn's thoughtful minute about the economics of Central African federation. It might also be read together with Miss Phyllis Deane's letter in today's Times.

I confess that I feel that with all the emphasis that there has been in recent months on the political side of federation the economic problems have not been given all the attention they deserve. They certainly are only touched upon in the White Papers. Although Mr. Gorell Barnes did take part in the discussions with the other Governments on the economic aspects, so far as I am aware there has been no attempt inside the Office to examine dispassionately the full economic implications of the federation both from the point of view of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and from that of the U.K. itself. Incidentally I don't think that the U.K.'s interests and those of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are necessarily in all respects identical. I am not at all sure how much attention has been given to the U.K.'s side, where there is a possible conflict of interests (e.g. the loss of such control as we possess at present over the development and use of the resources of the copperbelt).

My own impression (which may be wrong, since it is not based on direct knowledge of the negotiations) is that the arguments *pro* and *con* seem on our side to be mainly political, while Southern Rhodesia makes the economic running. This impression was reinforced very much the other day when I listened to Mr. Whitehead's statement at the Commonwealth Finance Ministers Conference. In that statement he drew attention to the advantages of Federation from the point of view of the sterling area as a whole, since, while Southern Rhodesia now has a deficit, which has got to be remedied, with Federation the surplus of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland could be used to bring the situation into balance. This was itself not a very

valid statement, since, in fact, it seems that Northern Rhodesia is also in deficit. But it did leave me with the impression that Southern Rhodesia looked forward to economic advantages which, to say the least, were onesided.

I do not say that I would go the whole way with either Mr. Selwyn or Miss Deane. In a sense all small units are, economically, nonsense. The larger a territory the greater the possibilities of specialisation and division of labour within it, and therefore the greater the possibilities of increasing the wealth of all the inhabitants. Just as Mr. Selwyn and Miss Deane do not see any positive economic arguments *for* federation so I think it could be maintained that there are also no economic arguments *against* federation. At least this is true in terms of pure theory. But there are of course many practical problems of an economic character which work both ways. On the one hand it is perfectly true, as Mr. Selwyn says that cooperation is the real means of smoothing over local differences and that federation does not itself enable these to be smoothed out. On the other hand, it is surely also true that territories with what are virtually unpoliceable common land frontiers cannot pursue fundamentally divergent policies. At the present time it is even being argued by Southern Rhodesia that that territory cannot take drastic measures to put its own balance of payments deficit right unless it has the full cooperation of Northern Rhodesia. It is clear that adequate cooperation may mean measures which an independent Northern Rhodesia is not likely to be willing to take.

I should not have thought that it was disputable that federation in Central African circumstances could bring about a 'better' utilisation of the joint resources than with separate Governments, however much they cooperated together. But all does turn on what is meant by 'better'. If the criteria adopted are principally those of the Southern Rhodesian European then one can well suppose that the measures they will adopt will not necessarily be 'better' for all the inhabitants of the region even though the production of the 'region as a whole' may be improved. By the same argument, even if the criteria were of a kind which may be more favoured by the Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (e.g. as Miss Deane suggests greater development of subsistence agriculture) it does not follow that all the other inhabitants of the region as a whole would be better off. Ultimately it therefore comes down to whether political arrangements will be adequate to guarantee proper observation of the individual interest of each part of the federation.

As I understand it African opinion objects to the idea of federation mainly because it fears that African interests will be neglected by a political machine which is bound to reflect the greater influence of the non-African element. I do not see how these fears could be removed by any political bargaining or negotiation. The only practical way seems to me to try to seek agreement as to what the main lines of economic policy should be in advance of federation, and to get some undertaking from each side that economic policy would follow agreed principles. I do not know whether such an idea would commend itself to the Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Governments, or Central African Department but if it did I wonder whether it would not be worth while initiating some kind of study inside the Office (perhaps with the assistance of other Departments) to work out more fully the economic implications of Federation with a view to showing how federation would deal with concrete economic problems.

A.E.  
25.1.52

I do not want to add to the paperwork more than is necessary. My conclusions from all this are:—

- (i) I agree with X of Mr. Emanuel's minute.
- (ii) The economic arguments, though not sufficient in themselves to justify Federation, operate in favour rather than against it;
- (iii) Any economic dangers lie in the way in which the new régime will operate rather than in the conception of Federation *per se*.
- (iv) The very fact that Mr. Gorell Barnes is now AUSS African Division will ensure that proper weight is given to economic problems if Federation goes through.
- (v) We had better await the outcome of the present discussions before embarking upon any 'study' of the economic implications within the C.O.

Mr. Gorell Barnes should see these minutes on his return.

A.H.P.  
29.1.52

## **76** DO 35/3602, no 208

2 Feb 1952

**[Closer association in Central Africa]: letter from G H Baxter to I M R MacLennan on talks in London with Sir G Huggins and Mr Whitehead**

I believe Gibson sent you last Saturday an informal account of the opening stages in the talks with Huggins and Whitehead. The talks are now over, except for a short meeting on Monday afternoon, but as the minutes of the latest meetings are not yet available I will try to bring you quite up-to-date. Rennie and Colby are flying back tomorrow and Huggins follows on Tuesday.

2. This past week saw a harder tussle than appeared in the opening meetings. We had thrown overboard the Minister for African Interests, and had given a pretty broad hint that if the two northern Governments and Legislatures and the Southern Rhodesian electorate were ready to accept the federal scheme as it emerges from the London Conference in April, and if the scheme had not been unacceptably amended, H.M.G. would be prepared to see the scheme through despite African opposition. But this did not deter Huggins and Whitehead from putting up a stiff fight to reduce the 'nominated' members to a minimum and substitute as far as possible an electoral system on party lines. (Their point was that a number of unattached M.P.s could by acting together, sway the boat this way and that and make stable government impossible. We pointed out why such a development was unlikely, and that similar results could in any case arise with a wholly party system if there were three or more parties.) They had to admit, of course, that it was impracticable to introduce at the outset a common roll for all the seats in the federal legislature. They professed themselves little satisfied with our efforts to devise a system of election (with special types of constituency) for the northern Africans and for the Europeans in Nyasaland. It was difficult to persuade them that it would be disastrous to attempt to apply the normal electoral procedure to Nyasaland, with its large Indian population. They took the matter so seriously that they interrupted the sequence of daily meetings to have a private talk on Wednesday with the two Secretaries of State, when they expressed the view that, since we could give no further ground in that sector, it would be

impossible for them to sell the scheme to their electorate and that the time had come when we ought to cut Nyasaland right out. This, of course, they were flatly told was unthinkable, and they were finally reconciled to agreeing to make the best of what Huggins professed to think a poor show! They would do their best to put the scheme over with their electorate; and Ministers here for their part would do their best to put it over with Parliament.

3. There is one aspect of this on which you may be able to do some unobtrusive good work in the course of conversation etc. Our aim, in getting rid of the stage of 'nomination' in the process by which representatives of northern Africans and Nyasaland Europeans will reach the federal Parliament, is primarily to provide S. Rhodesian Ministers with a telling point to satisfy the S. Rhodesian public who are supposed to dislike the presence of nominated members in a democratic legislature. Yet Huggins and Whitehead persist in referring to those to be elected by the proposed new procedure as 'nominated members'. If they retain this habit, they will spike the gun we have put into their hands to help them.

4. We spent the following two days in discussing other less contentious points in a more peaceable atmosphere, and we are now hoping to have a communiqué issued on Monday or Tuesday pointing the way to a full conference in London towards the end of April.

5. This will mean a good deal of hard work in the meantime. Our plan is to ask the Central African Governments to let us have by 1st March their criticisms and suggested modifications of the officials' scheme. (We have emphasised that these ought to lie within the general framework of our recent talks) and in the light of their replies we would draw up a federal scheme in as much detail as possible for consideration by the Conference. If the Conference agrees upon a scheme our hope is that the Central African Governments will support it before their legislatures and the Southern Rhodesian electorate.

6. Whitehead rather alarmed us by indications that he contemplated that his Government would submit to the referendum a scheme which they would describe as that of H.M.G. without committing themselves to it, but it was made clear to Huggins and him that we would expect the S. Rhodesian Government to pledge their support for it. I still think that, though the difficulties with his people are no doubt formidable, Huggins will in the end back a federal scheme as the only realistic objective for S. Rhodesia and Central Africa. I am afraid I have little hope that Whitehead will ever display any enthusiasm for a federal scheme of the kind we could accept, but the recent talks ought at least to be useful in letting him understand our point of view. To sum up, I think we have good reason to be fairly well satisfied with the outcome of the talks, and our Ministers have certainly shown their readiness to show the utmost patience and consideration to both Huggins and Whitehead.

**77** CO 1015/338

6 Feb 1952

[Implementation of Dalglish Report]: minute by D Williams

Mr. Prain of Selection Trust came to see Mr. Lambert at 5.30 p.m. on the 5th February to talk about the implementation of the Dalglish Report. Mr. Watson and I were present.

Mr. Prain wanted to talk about the attached letter from NORCOM to the Chief Secretary of the Government of Northern Rhodesia. A copy of this letter had been sent to me by Mr. Finn following a conversation I had had with him on Monday in which he had tried to discover what line we had taken with the Governor in any discussion about the Dalgleish Report.

Mr. Finn had already explained to me that in a conversation that Mr. Prain had with the Secretary of State on the 14th January Mr. Prain had urged that the time was now ripe for the Government of Northern Rhodesia to take some initiative in securing the implementation of the Dalgleish Report. Since that conversation had taken place Selection Trust in London had received the attached copy of the letter from NORCOM to the Northern Rhodesia Government in which NORCOM announced that the Copper Companies themselves intended to initiate discussions with the European Mineworkers' Union. Mr. Prain explained that he did not think this was the right way to proceed and that Selection Trust had notified the Chamber of Mines accordingly and the action suggested in the letter of the 23rd January would not proceed until the matter had been discussed further with us.

In Mr. Prain's view there were three reasons why Government could and should initiate a discussion with the European Union on the implementation of the Dalgleish Report. First, in Mr. Prain's view there had been a change in the feelings of the European Mineworkers' Union towards this matter. They had seen the strength of the African Union and realised that they could not maintain the colour bar clause very much longer. The main obstacle in the way of persuading them to acknowledge this fact publicly was Mr. Maybank. Secondly, the question of the colour bar in the copper industry was now becoming associated with various political questions, particularly federation. If the Government could secure the abolition of the colour bar in industry it would considerably weaken the case of the opponents of federation. Thirdly, such a move would be of considerable assistance in securing support in Parliament here for federation. Mr. Prain said that Mr. Griffiths in his speech in Chatham House recently had emphasised that in his view such obstacles to partnership as the colour bar in industry would have to be cleared out of the way first before federation could proceed. Mr. Prain suggested, therefore, that Government should take the initiative and get the credit for the move. In his view the method to be adopted was that someone in Government, preferably Mr. Welensky, should call a meeting between the European Mineworkers' Union and the employers and try to persuade the Union to agree to the abolition of clauses 1 and 42. Mr. Prain emphasised that in his opinion the need for some action on these lines was urgent if serious trouble on the Copperbelt was to be avoided and he maintained that it was as much a Government interest to avoid this trouble as a Copper Company interest. He also maintained that it would be more difficult for the Government to step in if conversations broke down after being initiated by the Companies.

We explained to Mr. Prain that we shared his view that there was an urgent need to do something about the implementation of the Dalgleish Report if the present explosive situation was to be peacefully resolved. At the same time we were anxious to avoid making any move which, if it failed to secure the end we had in view, might precipitate the very explosion we were trying to avoid. There was a further difficult point to be considered, namely that it would not be sufficient for Government to initiate discussions with a view to securing the abrogation of clauses 1 and 42 in the Mineworkers' Union Agreement. The Government would have to go forward with

some positive policy for securing that this interpretation of the equal pay for equal work principle should prevail. There was a danger here that in doing this Government might succeed in lining up the two Unions on one side against Government and the Copper Companies on the other.

We outlined to Mr. Prain, however, the plan which we had been considering for initiating discussions through a representative of the National Union of Mineworkers, and Mr. Prain agreed that this approach might not be so very far removed from the one which he had been considering and that it would be possible to combine the two. We emphasised that our plans at the moment were purely tentative and we agreed to let him know something more definite as soon as we were in a position to do so.

In our view the best policy would be for a representative of the National Union of Mineworkers to go out to Northern Rhodesia and by discussion to discover whether there was any possibility of the European Mineworkers' Union modifying its previous attitude to the advancement of Africans in industry. If the National Union of Mineworkers' representative reported favourably it might then be possible either for him to hold a conference of the interested parties in Northern Rhodesia, or to inform the Northern Rhodesia Government who could then step in and take advantage of the situation.

**78** CO 1015/553

22 Feb 1952

**[Closer association in Central Africa]: minute by W L Gorell Barnes on the relationship between policy towards federation and political issues in the two northern territories**

*Sir Charles Jeffries*

I should let you know, in case you should wish to join the party, that I have arranged to see the Secretary of State and the Minister of State with Mr. Lambert on February 27th at 4.30 pm., to discuss the interconnection of our policy on Central African federation with our policy on other political questions in the two Northern Territories.

The general line which I am intending to develop at this meeting for Ministerial consideration, and which I have already started to develop in minutes on individual questions, is roughly as follows.

Reading between the lines of the various minutes, etc. of recent discussions with Sir G. Huggins, it is my understanding that Ministers have more or less made up their minds that they will impose federation or at any rate that they will be prepared to impose it in certain circumstances. This will be a difficult political operation here. It will also be of great benefit to the European politicians in Northern Rhodesia and particularly to Mr. Welensky, in that federation will give them a wider field for their political activities and that Mr. Welensky looks like stepping into Sir G. Huggins' shoes if federation comes off. In these circumstances it seems only reasonable that Ministers should take what may well be the last opportunity to extract from the Northern Rhodesian Europeans (who, as a result of events over the last three or four years, have got much more real power than, in my view, they ought to have) agreement to, or help in, securing a number of things which we have been wanting

to get through during the last year or two, and which would help Ministers considerably in defending the imposition of federation both to critics here and to Africans everywhere. Examples of these things are the control of Afrikaner immigration into Northern Rhodesia and implementation of the Dalgleish Report.

In Nyasaland similar problems do not, so far as I know, exist, but, as a bait to Nyasaland, the Southern Rhodesians and the Northern Rhodesians should, in my view, be called upon to agree to the early setting up of a Revenue Allocation Commission on the lines of that which reported last year in Nigeria, with terms of reference designed to ensure that Nyasaland's financial position is improved as a result of federation.

Finally, I think we should consider whether we ought not to suggest to the Commonwealth Relations Office that they should think whether they should not try to extract from Sir G. Huggins some concession relating to the treatment of Africans in Southern Rhodesia (e.g. something on trade unions), which would also help to sugar the federation pill for Africans and their supporters. This, however, is admittedly more difficult; for the average European in Southern Rhodesia is much less keen on Federation than are the European politicians in Northern Rhodesia.

I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr. MacKintosh, who will no doubt let you know if there is any change in the time of the meeting.

**79** CO 1015/65, no 165

19 Mar 1952

[Nyasaland and federation]: letter from Sir G Colby to Mr Lyttelton.

*Enclosure: 'Central African Federation'*

[Given its trenchant criticisms of the federal proposals, officials at the CO were keen that Colby's letter be given only limited distribution within the CRO (minute by Lloyd, 3 Apr 1952). Both Lyttelton and Salisbury rejected the idea Nyasaland should be allowed to withdraw from the federal negotiations. Salisbury expressed the view that 'if Nyasaland were to be left out, there would scarcely remain any basis for a federal scheme, and the whole project would probably perish' (Salisbury to Lyttelton, 15 Apr 1952).]

For some time now I have had increasing doubts in regard to Nyasaland's participation in a Central African Federation. I had hoped that these doubts would be resolved but in fact they have been intensified and I have set out my detailed views in the enclosed memorandum which has the support of all the official members of Executive Council.

After long and anxious thought I feel that it is my duty to advise you that Nyasaland should not be included in any Central African Federation and that consideration of its participation should be postponed indefinitely.

If you decide not to accept this advice I can only say that I shall naturally accept the decision of Her Majesty's Government and do everything in my power to see that the decision is carried out with the minimum of friction and trouble: if on the other hand you are disposed to concur the method of proceeding becomes important; I suggest that the Nyasaland delegation should attend the April Conference as arranged, that a hint should be given to the Southern Rhodesians that they should repeat the suggestion they made in January that Nyasaland should be dropped and that Her Majesty's Government should accept the suggestion.

The wording of any announcement of such a decision would be of considerable

moment; in my view the essentials are that it should be made clear that the decision has been taken by Her Majesty's Government: that the reasons are varied—the underdeveloped state of Nyasaland resulting in the territory not yet being capable of playing a full part in the federation being the most important: it is of the utmost importance also that no impression should be created that the decision has been taken solely or even mainly because of African opposition and in order to counter any such impression the opportunity might be taken in any announcement of making a categorical statement regarding the future of Nyasaland to the effect that it will be developed for the benefit of all races in the Protectorate and specifically to rebut demands made by the African Congress and others for African self-Government.

If you wished to discuss this question before the April Conference I could of course readily come to London some days beforehand.

I have sent a copy of this letter and the enclosure to Sir Gilbert Rennie for his personal information.

### Enclosure to 79

Discussions on closer association in the Central African territories are approaching a stage when decisions will have to be made; I therefore feel that I should inform Her Majesty's Government of the views I have formed after four years' close study and almost continuous discussion of the problem.

2. It is with this object therefore that this memorandum has been prepared. I should emphasise that it is not written from the point of view of decrying federation, nor the principle of closer association which I regard as desirable in itself, nor is it suggested that the views expressed have any application to Northern Rhodesia, where circumstances are very different from those in this Protectorate. Rather it has been my aim to show that the recommendations in the Report of the London Conference are in fact appropriate to the two Rhodesias rather than to Nyasaland and that in so far as Nyasaland is concerned they are outweighed by considerations referred to below.

### *General*

3. The measure of the problem of closer association of the Central African territories, and indeed of the serious doubts which have been expressed as to its desirability, is to be found in the fact that discussions have been proceeding for 25 years or more and no solution has been found. It is suggested that the fundamental difficulty is to be found in the marked differences which exist not only in the constitutional status, population ratios and varying stages of economic development of the three territories, but also in the outlook on racial problems, and African policy generally, which is so noticeably different (at any rate as between Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia) as almost to nullify any theoretical or recorded similarities.

4. Federation implies the coming together of states of comparative equality and it seems to me very doubtful whether the word 'federation' can properly be applied to a constitution in which membership of the Federal Parliament is in the proportion of 17, 11 and 7. It is clear that under such a constitution the smallest member, Nyasaland, runs the risk of being constantly over-ruled; and indeed, the constitution would place this Protectorate, in so far as federal subjects are concerned, largely in the hands of the European elected members of Northern and Southern Rhodesia.

5. These are not the only difficulties which I see in such a constitution. In the present circumstances of Nyasaland there are hardly any persons (if indeed there are any) who would be able and willing to afford time to sit in a federal parliament which would not be in Nyasaland, and it is very doubtful whether anyone could afford to take ministerial office. In the present stage of Nyasaland's development members of Legislative Council are not salaried politicians and they would not be willing to relinquish their businesses or occupations to become such, with the danger of being left high and dry should they not again be returned to Parliament.

### *Geography*

6. The three Central African territories do not form a continuous bloc. Nyasaland has no boundary with Southern Rhodesia and is separated from it by a wedge of Portuguese territory 200 to 300 miles wide. Nyasaland has a boundary with Northern Rhodesia; the boundary however is undoubtedly in the wrong place. The narrow strip of inhabited country lying to the west of the boundary should, on all logical grounds, be part of Nyasaland; the boundary cuts tribal areas in two along practically its whole length and the Fort Jameson area of Northern Rhodesia uses the Nyasaland railway system for its imports and exports; at the northern end of the strip the natural outlet is to Lake Nyasa. (In parenthesis it should be made clear that these facts are not stated with any object of 'laying claim' to this strip of Northern Rhodesia, but merely to set out the position.) To the west of the inhabited strip of Northern Rhodesia lies the sparsely inhabited valley of the Luangwa River, and this, it is suggested, is the natural boundary between Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. If the eastern strip of Northern Rhodesia is ignored there is virtually no natural communication or community of interest on the Nyasaland-Northern Rhodesia boundary. It is therefore suggested that on geographical grounds the case for closer association is weak.

### *Communications* (paragraph 28 of Command 8233)

7. In so far as Nyasaland is concerned it is difficult to see what advantage (other than possibly financial) will result from a common federal authority to deal with the construction and maintenance of trunk roads: the general pattern of the trunk road network in each territory has taken shape and each territory is now faced with the task of construction and reconstruction: the task is herculean in its immensity and will thus justify and indeed necessitate a large administrative and design staff in each territory. To superimpose a federal road authority would appear to be extravagant and to serve little purpose and it would, it is suggested, be sufficient to set up machinery for liaison on technical problems.

8. In so far as rail transport is concerned it would certainly be advantageous and economical to integrate Nyasaland and associated Railways with Rhodesia Railways but federation is not a pre-requisite to this. The Rhodesia Railways higher authority could be extended to cover Nyasaland Railways.

9. The Central African Air Authority and Central African Airways already deal satisfactorily with air services.

### *Economic* (paragraph 25 of Command 8233)

10. The only real progress which has been made in the last 25 years in regard to closer association and economic planning was under the auspices of the Central African Council. This Council was however prevented from developing as it might

otherwise have done because it was felt by Southern Rhodesia to be derogating from the power of the Southern Rhodesian Parliament. Had that Government been able to take a wider and more realistic view with the natural concomitants of goodwill and co-operation I am convinced that the Central African Council could have been greatly developed, could in due course have been provided with legislative and executive authority, and that from it would have arisen imperceptibly, and with the approval of all concerned, a Central Government with limited but growing functions. This opportunity was however thrown away.

11. Reference is made to the present causes of friction. I have no desire to be provocative; but at this juncture it is necessary to speak frankly, and I think it would be fair to say that these causes of friction arise from the attitude adopted towards Nyasaland by Southern Rhodesian Ministers. If it is suggested that federation on the lines proposed would radically change this attitude and thus remove the friction, then I must say that I think this is highly improbable.

12. Other arguments in favour of the economic advantages of federation appear to me to refer more to the economic unity of Southern and Northern Rhodesia, and there seems little which would be added by the participation of Nyasaland.

*Administration* (paragraph 29 of Command 8233)

13. It is stated that certain public services, e.g. Posts and Telegraphs, are similar in character in the three territories and that unification would secure greater efficiency. This statement seems to need some qualification; actually though the services are obviously similar, the staffing procedure is very different. Here, there is a real danger of racial discrimination, and in spite of the assurances given by paragraph 3(vi) of Annex VIII to the Report, any advantages which might accrue to this territory from the unification of the Posts and Telegraph services (for example, in the standardization of stores and equipment) would be likely to be more than counter-balanced by continuing differences of policy and outlook. In Southern Rhodesia there is no opportunity for Africans to rise above a definite level, whereas in Nyasaland policy is directed to training Africans to take any post in the Posts and Telegraphs Department which they have the necessary capacity to fill. I feel therefore that under federation it would be inevitable that the essential character of the Posts and Telegraphs department of Nyasaland would be preserved (assuming that the Southern Rhodesian policy did not prevail with the result that Africans in Nyasaland were replaced by Europeans); in other words, unification of the Departments would merely mean that the Nyasaland Department, instead of being under the Nyasaland Government, would be under a Central Department administered by the Federal Government.

*Political* (paragraph 32 of Command 8233)

14. It is perhaps for political reasons that Her Majesty's Government are most inclined to favour Federation. It is held that without some form of union of the three Central African territories it is virtually certain that Southern Rhodesia will merge with the Union of Southern Africa, but that if federation came about a strong political unit would be formed which would be in a better position to resist the expansionist policy of the Union. This is a matter of speculation. It is however understood that the Afrikaner population of Northern Rhodesia is greater in proportion than it is in Southern Rhodesia and consequently it is arguable that a

combined Northern and Southern Rhodesia, while undoubtedly economically stronger, might be more likely to merge with the Union. My own feeling, for what it is worth, is that it can only be a matter of time whether federation comes about or not before both Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia are merged with the Union. However that may be, the presence or absence in the Federation of Nyasaland, which is territorially insulated from the Rhodesias and where there is at present virtually no Afrikaner influence, would not alter the position either way. But if the Rhodesias were drawn into the Union, Nyasaland under federation might suffer the same fate.

15. If Nyasaland remained out of the federation, the danger would not arise; and there seems no good reason why she should not, in due course, join the East African bloc. It is at least arguable that the general affinity of Nyasaland would, with improved communications at the North end of Lake Nyasa and particularly with the construction of the railway link from the Indian Ocean to the shore of Lake Nyasa, develop towards Tanganyika and the North rather than to Southern Rhodesia, though in view of the associations already formed by both Africans and Europeans in Nyasaland such a shift of relationship would no doubt take time. The fact is of course that, whether it looks north or south, Nyasaland must owing to its geographical situation tend to remain to all intents and purposes an isolated entity. It is perhaps worth noting however that association with Tanganyika would be infinitely more acceptable to Nyasaland Africans than association with Southern Rhodesia.

#### *Goodwill*

16. The case for the proposals in the White Paper and the successful achievement of Federation presuppose goodwill and a spirit of compromise on the part of all concerned; without goodwill these proposals cannot succeed. After meeting and conversing with Southern Rhodesian Ministers over a period of four years I have grave doubts as to whether in fact they would be able or prepared to extend and maintain the necessary goodwill towards Nyasaland.

17. The Southern Rhodesian Government have always wanted amalgamation. At the Victoria Falls they subscribed to a statement to the effect that amalgamation should not come about without the approval of the majority of the inhabitants of the three territories; yet in the recent discussions in London this statement was repudiated by them and the question of amalgamation was again pressed. Her Majesty's Government rejected amalgamation in categorical terms, and the Southern Rhodesians are now convinced that amalgamation cannot be achieved directly; nevertheless they are now clearly directing further efforts to securing amalgamation under the name of federation, since both at and after the London conference they have pressed for a greater range of activities to be brought within the orbit of the Federal Government.

18. Every contact that I have had with the Southern Rhodesian Government in recent months convinces me that to the Southern Rhodesians the Federal Government and the Southern Rhodesia Government are synonymous. In recent discussions the position of the Southern Rhodesia Government under federation has been ignored, and it is difficult to escape the feeling that the Southern Rhodesian idea of a Federal Government is merely the present Southern Rhodesia Government expanded to include representatives from the Northern territories the majority of whom (and particularly those from Northern Rhodesia) they hope will identify

themselves with Southern Rhodesian policy and aspirations. If this should come about, Southern Rhodesian ideas would in due course dominate British Central Africa.

19. I have never noticed in Southern Rhodesian Ministers any knowledge of or interest in conditions in Nyasaland; and though for four years I have done everything possible to encourage them to visit Nyasaland and see things for themselves only one has as far as I know entered Nyasaland during that time. It seems a reasonable conclusion that if they show so little interest now in one of the proposed federal partners they are not likely to show any greater interest or understanding if federation takes place.

20. At the present time, Southern Rhodesia has in Sir Godfrey Huggins a man of outstanding quality; but in spite of this they have adopted a policy directed towards uncompromising domination. Sir Godfrey Huggins is ageing and cannot for very much longer hold office; it is not easy to think of a suitable successor, since the remaining members of his Cabinet are men of little account and to put any of the fortunes of Nyasaland into their hands would, I feel bound to say, be little short of disastrous. If federation comes about, the Southern Rhodesians will feel that they have driven in the wedge of amalgamation and they will use every means at their disposal to exploit the advantage and to increase Southern Rhodesian domination of British Central Africa; this will inevitably result in considerable embarrassment to Her Majesty's Government since the greater the penetration the more difficult it will become to preserve and keep effective the essential safeguards for Africans.

21. During the discussions that have taken place on the question of Closer Association it has been stated with some frequency that under the federal scheme Southern Rhodesia will devote resources to the development of Nyasaland. In view of the general attitude of the Southern Rhodesia Government I find it difficult to visualise a situation in which Southern Rhodesia will sponsor capital development in Nyasaland when this can only result in greater opportunities for employment in the Protectorate and thus a reduction in the flow of African labour to Southern Rhodesia. It is freely canvassed by thinking people in Nyasaland that Southern Rhodesia has little interest in this territory save as a source of labour and that this is the only reason why they are considering closer association with Nyasaland, their whole motive being to secure control of labour in Nyasaland when substantially increased immigration into Southern Rhodesia will be encouraged and Nyasaland left as little more than a native reserve. In the light of Southern Rhodesia's recent statements and known attitude this view cannot be ignored.

22. Arising out of these remarks I feel that it is important to make it clear that if closer union were to result eventually in any repression or holding back of the African it would not be to the economic benefit of the community as a whole. In Kenya it has been suggested that one cause of the high cost of living is that until comparatively recently any job which required technical skill had to be done by a European. These Europeans had to be paid a sufficient salary to enable them to live like most other Europeans so that the European community would not be 'let down' and this had its inevitable effect on the cost of the work performed. It is suggested that any Government which indulged in a policy of keeping the African back and holding open the better paid jobs for white immigrants would perpetuate such a state of affairs.

*Reactions of Europeans in Nyasaland to Federation*

23. The European community in Nyasaland can, I think, be divided into four categories as follows:—

- (a) a considerable proportion who are apathetic and indifferent to Federation;
- (b) Missionaries who are solidly opposed to Federation;
- (c) the die-hards and people who come from Southern Rhodesia and the Union. They are in favour of Federation because they think 'they will then get the African where they want him';
- (d) the more informed and thoughtful members of the community. These are well aware of the dangers of domination by Southern Rhodesia and have very little faith in Southern Rhodesia's good will towards Nyasaland. They also realise the strength of African opposition and the justification for it. To that extent they are opposed to Federation. On the other hand the old parrot cry of 'Colonial Office control' pulls them the other way and there are certainly a number who would accept almost any sacrifice to get away from 'Colonial Office control'. This parrot cry is of course based on ignorance and prejudice and a moment's logical thought should convince them that Nyasaland has infinitely more to hope for from Her Majesty's Government than it could ever hope for from Southern Rhodesia. In spite of this however I am of the opinion that this will influence a substantial number in favour of Federation. A further factor in the situation is that in this territory with its predominantly African population many Europeans are thoroughly frightened of what has happened in the Gold Coast and they feel that if this territory remains under the Colonial Office a similar type of Government might come into being in Nyasaland. This of course ignores the realities of the situation and is based on a complete ignorance of conditions in West Africa and of the fundamental difference between West and Central Africa.

24. It is perhaps of interest to speculate what would happen if the decision of Nyasaland were left to a vote of Legislative Council. In my view the official members of Legislative Council should not vote on this issue. This would mean it would be left to the Unofficial members who consist of the following:—

- 6 Europeans,
- 2 Africans and
- 1 Asian.

Clearly the two Africans will vote against it and almost certainly the Asian will follow suit. One European member of the existing Legislative Council is, in accordance with precedent, representative of the Missions and he I know is very strongly opposed to the Federation proposals. This leaves five Europeans: it is probable that three would vote in favour of Federation since they probably fall into category (c) above: the other two, who are also members of Executive Council, would be placed in an extremely difficult position. Mr. Barrow at the Victoria Falls Conference stated that: 'It was the feeling of the European unofficial members of the Nyasaland delegation that they were only prepared to go ahead with federation subject to the agreement of the Africans in Nyasaland', a statement in which his colleague, Mr. Hadlow, concurred. If in spite of African opposition he voted in favour of Federation he would have turned a complete somersault. On the

assumption however that both Mr. Barrow and Mr. Hadlow voted in favour the majority would almost certainly be only 5 to 4 in favour which on an issue of this importance seems insufficient.

25. I have, of course, discussed Federation with Mr. Barrow and Mr. Hadlow on many occasions and at considerable length. While I cannot be certain of their views I consider that they have grave doubts about Federation but they lack the courage to come out into the open and say so since they fear the criticism of the more conservative members of the community.

26. I consider, however, that if Her Majesty's Government took the decision that Nyasaland should be left out of the Federation proposals the decision would be probably accepted without very much comment among the European community of Nyasaland and the feeling of a considerable proportion would be one of relief that the matter had been disposed of and that they had no responsibility for the decision.

#### *African reactions and objections*

27. The African attitude is already well known and will no doubt be reiterated in the Colonial Office in April, when a deputation of Nyasaland Africans is received by the Secretary of State. To re-state African objections in detail in this memorandum is unnecessary, as they have already been stated on numerous occasions and are on record. The fact is that Nyasaland African opposition to all idea of federation with Southern Rhodesia remains obdurate and indeed is hardening as realization of what is at stake spreads to the non-vocal masses. It is based on the following fundamental objections:—

- (i) fear that federation would result in the loss of, or prejudice to, the Protectorate status of Nyasaland, with a consequent progressive weakening of her link with the Crown and of the benevolent protection of Her Majesty's Government; and coupled with this, the fear that Nyasaland would lose her identity as a country, which Africans prize;
- (ii) fear of greatly increased non-African immigration into Nyasaland, with inevitable fresh inroads into African Trust Land, which Africans are convinced is already insufficient for their needs;
- (iii) fear of the gradual infiltration into Nyasaland, as the weakest member of the Federation, of Southern ideas and practices of native policy, with consequent prejudice to existing Nyasaland African institutions such as Native Authorities, Native Courts, etc. and to the general progress of African political development;
- (iv) a conviction that federation is only the thin end of the wedge of amalgamation, which would inevitably follow;
- (v) realization that adoption of the federation proposals would finally preclude all idea of eventual self-government, by Africans, in Nyasaland.

28. Running through all these objections is a deeply-rooted distrust of Southern Rhodesian native policy. It is true that African opposition to federation has been expressed principally by the vocal minority, who are not necessarily representative of the mass of Africans in the Protectorate and it is these people who are chiefly concerned with the question of ultimate self-government by Africans, and who seek to use the federation issue as an instrument for furthering their anti-Government and anti-European ideas. But this vocal minority has, by its incessant

propaganda, awakened a very large number of Africans to the importance of the issue; Chiefs, looking at Southern Rhodesia, fear for their position if federation should come about, while both they and their people are convinced that federation with Southern Rhodesia would not only open the door to vastly increased immigration, with further alienation of African Trust Land, but would also in the nature of things (as Nyasaland would be the weaker member of the federation) result in the gradual but inexorable imposition by Southern Rhodesia of her native policy and of what may be termed the Southern Rhodesian attitude to Africans. This is anathema to the Nyasalander who, it should be noted, has often said that he would have little or no objection to federation with Northern Rhodesia alone, or with Tanganyika.

29. This phobia of Southern Rhodesian policy is by no means based merely on hearsay. There are in Nyasaland very many thousands of natives who have spent part of their lives in Southern Rhodesia and who, while regarding it as a useful place in which to earn money, have personal experience of the attitude to Africans which obtains there and in consequence have no desire to see that attitude introduced into their own country. They are firmly convinced (as indeed are not a few members of the European community in Southern Rhodesia) that there is discrimination against Africans in Southern Rhodesian courts and that complaints made by Africans to the Police are often hushed up or disregarded, whereas complaints against Africans result in their punishment. They say that while some employers in Southern Rhodesia treat them fairly, many do not, and that the general attitude of the European in that territory is that the African must be kept strictly in his place and must not be allowed to rise above a certain level. It is this attitude which makes them fear for their land, their institutions, and their political future, should federation come about.

30. On all these fundamental points, Africans have been promised safeguards. But they do not accept them. They assert that while they are quite satisfied that Her Majesty's Ministers are perfectly sincere in giving these assurances, with the passage of time the safeguards would inevitably be whittled away and would become ineffective. In the light of experience of the working of the South African Constitution and the Reserve Powers under the Southern Rhodesian constitution there seems something to be said for this point of view.

31. I have often heard it stated by Southern Rhodesian Ministers that the Reserve Powers under the constitution have never been exercised by Her Majesty's Government, that when Reserve Legislation is in draft the draft is sent to the Commonwealth Relations Office for comment before publication. This, I know, is true but the fact remains that native policy in Southern Rhodesia differs widely from that in British Colonial territories in spite of these Reserve Powers and there is far greater discrimination against the African than would be possible under the direct control of Her Majesty's Government. The Nyasaland African is quick to sense this; he will never be persuaded that in Southern Rhodesia there is not one form of justice and treatment for the European and quite another for the African.

32. It appears to me that whatever may be the Reserve Powers in a constitution setting up a self-governing territory it is impracticable for Her Majesty's Government to use them effectively. If, for example, a fundamental difference of opinion arose on a specific piece of legislation in Southern Rhodesia, there would come a point when Her Majesty's Government had got to decide whether to exercise the Reserve Powers

or not. If such powers were exercised in the face of the unanimous opposition of the local government, the government would resign and an impossible situation would be created. In other words I think there is much to be said for the point of view that the effective exercise of Reserve Powers in so far as a self-governing Colony or Dominion is concerned is impracticable.

33. It follows from this that the exercising of any Reserve Powers in regard to the proposed Federal Government might be impracticable and, unless that Government adopted a far more tolerant attitude than has been adopted in Southern Rhodesia in the past the various safeguards devised would not be effective. It seems fair comment to observe that at the recent London Conference the Southern Rhodesians directed their efforts to securing greater control by the Federal Government and the whittling away of safeguards.

34. I appreciate that under the proposed Federal constitution the Federal Government will have little direct dealing with African affairs and consequently so long as the Protectorate status of the two Northern territories is maintained the safeguards will be effective. On the other hand the Federal constitution now proposed must only be a first step towards a still closer association. The Federal Government will not be static and it is inevitable that it will take over more and more functions as time goes on; indeed unless Southern Rhodesia were convinced of this I do not think they would have any interest in Federation as such. It follows therefore that if this is likely to be the sequence of events in the future the African fears in regard to the safeguards have considerable justification.

35. The strength of African opposition to federation, and the fact that this opposition has been maintained and indeed strengthened during the last twelve months has been a matter of surprise to me. As a direct result of the discussions on the subject the political situation has deteriorated noticeably in recent months and there is a display of increasing political and 'national' consciousness where none was apparent before.

36. It is I think important to consider the situation which would arise if Her Majesty's Government decided to impose federation against the will of the Africans. It is always difficult to prophesy in such matters; the African is quite incalculable and it is indeed possible that the change might be accepted quietly. But I feel bound to say that present indications are against this possibility. We know that in both the Northern territories the African Congresses are in close liaison, and that they have the backing of Communist organisations and the moral and financial support of elements of the Indian community. Declarations have been made that strikes and civil disobedience will be organised if federation is imposed; in such conditions, African excitability or racial feeling might easily precipitate incidents which would lead to very serious trouble. The Nyasaland Police Force is small in numbers, and most of its officers are comparatively new to tropical Africa and the Force is not equipped to deal with serious unrest. The strong feeling against federation is widespread, and the rank and file of the Police cannot but be personally interested in the outcome; it is probable that they could be relied on, but it would be unwise blindly to assume this, as it is known that attempts have already been made by Congress to influence them. Taking an objective view, it seems clearly possible that a situation might develop which was beyond the capacity of the Police to deal with, and which would necessitate military aid with all that that implies.

*Postscript*

37. In this Memorandum an effort has been made to state as realistically as possible the implications of federation so far as Nyasaland is concerned, and on balance it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. If in the light of that conclusion Nyasaland does not partake in any greater degree of closer association with the Rhodesias than exists at present, it is important to consider what Nyasaland's position would be having regard to the fact that it does not appear that Nyasaland can continue to stand alone indefinitely in present world economic conditions; Nyasaland must either industrialise or become an agricultural province of a larger industrialised entity if we are not to relegate our African wards to rural peasant slumdom in perpetuity. If we do not associate ourselves with the Rhodesias there is only one direction in which we can look, and that is northwards to the East Africa High Commission.

38. There are disadvantages in endeavouring to associate ourselves with East Africa—the barriers of geography and distance, the present absence of adequate communications between Nyasaland and the nearest East African territory of Tanganyika, the degree of financial stringency at present affecting the High Commission services which might make the East African Governments and the Central Assembly reluctant to take on a fresh burden in the shape of Nyasaland, the distance from Zomba to Nairobi, and the difficulties which Nyasaland might experience in paying its subventions under the East African inter-territorial set-up.

39. The advantages of participation in the East Africa High Commission are the marked degree of affinity between Nyasaland and the East African territories in the policies adopted towards the European and African communities, the generally happy race relations which exist in East Africa and the marked improvement in those relations which has come about since the East Africa High Commission was created, the broad and varied economic base of East Africa, the rapidly improving East African transport system, the similarity between the Civil Services of Nyasaland and East Africa, the markets open in East Africa for our products, our inclusion within the orbit of the relatively highly organised East African tourist industry, the advantages which we should derive from the East African research services which are dealing with problems identical or substantially identical with our own, and finally the ease with which Nyasaland could be represented on the East African Central Legislative Assembly without the complications of elections and party politics.

40. If, therefore, the conclusion is reached that Nyasaland's participation in Central African Federation should not be further pursued, and if it is accepted that Nyasaland cannot continue to stand alone in perpetuity, and if it is further accepted that the association with the East African High Commission offers the best hope for the future economic and social happiness of Nyasaland, then it is desirable that such association with East Africa should be actively examined in order that Nyasaland's future prospects may be clarified. The present is the time to make such a decision—a decision which would fill the vacuum created by the possible failure of federation discussions and a time when perhaps association with East Africa could be more readily arranged than in years to come when the East Africa High Commission might have evolved to a point where on political and administrative grounds it might be impracticable to incorporate another partner in that association.

**80** CO 1015/65

28 Mar 1952

**[Nyasaland and federation]: minute by W L Gorell Barnes on Sir G Colby's arguments***Sir Thomas Lloyd*

As you are aware, we are to discuss the attached letter<sup>1</sup> from Sir G. Colby with the Secretary of State on Tuesday, the 1st April, at 3.30 p.m.

This is not the first time that Sir G. Colby has advised that Nyasaland should pull out of federation. On the 30th November he sent a personal telegram to Sir Andrew Cohen stating that it was his considered opinion that there was no possibility, in the next 12 months, of getting Africans to change their attitude towards federation and that, if this assessment was right, he felt very strongly that we should take the initiative and pull out ((55) in CAA 19/1/08 of 1951). On that occasion Sir Andrew Cohen, with the approval of the Minister of State, sent a personal reply ((56) in the above quoted file), which made it abundantly clear that his telegram was considered embarrassing. So far as I know, Sir G. Colby did not reiterate his views during the London talks in January; and it is therefore perhaps surprising that he should, before mentioning them again or communicating with the Secretary of State, have gone so far as to have taken all the official members of his Executive Council into his confidence. It may well be, however, that he thought it right to test his own opinion against theirs before approaching the Secretary of State.

However that may be, I feel sure it will be agreed that, if Sir G. Colby holds these views, he is right to bring them frankly to the attention of the Secretary of State.<sup>2</sup> Nor do I think that, so far as the main question of substance is concerned, his case can lightly be dismissed. It is possible to pick holes in some of the individual arguments. But cumulatively they are fairly impressive; and I do not think we can ignore either the arguments themselves or the fact that they represent the views of the Governor of Nyasaland and his immediate official advisers. Some of them, particularly those based on fears about the political intentions of Southern Rhodesia, have probably been brought to a head by the attitude of the Southern Rhodesians in the latest round of consultations at Salisbury; and in this connection I would draw attention to the personal and secret letter at flag below which I recently received from Mr. Parry.

Whilst I think that on the main issue of substance Sir G. Colby has produced arguments which at least merit serious consideration, it seems to me that he has gone badly off the rails when he has gone beyond consideration of the interests of Nyasaland itself to consider the effect of a withdrawal by Nyasaland and the procedure for carrying out such a withdrawal, if it were decided upon.

To take the first point first, I think it is quite wrong to assume, as Sir G. Colby does by implication, that, if Nyasaland were to withdraw, closer association between the two Rhodesias could then proceed without difficulty. Firstly I think that federation with Southern Rhodesia alone would be much less attractive to the European politicians in Northern Rhodesia, since they would, under such an arrangement, be at the mercy of Southern Rhodesia, whilst, in a federation which included Nyasaland,

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<sup>1</sup> See 79.

<sup>2</sup> Lloyd commented here, 'Yes—but he sh[oul]d have done that again when here in January.'

they would be in a much more favourable political position. Secondly, as will be seen from what I say below, I doubt whether the withdrawal of Nyasaland could be justified publicly by any arguments which would not make it very much more difficult vis-à-vis the Africans and their supporters to proceed with federation of the Rhodesias.

As regards tactics, Sir G. Colby suggests that any announcement of Nyasaland's withdrawal should make it clear that the decision was taken by H.M.G. and that 'the reasons are varied—the undeveloped state of Nyasaland resulting in the territory not yet being capable of playing a full part in federation being the most important'. This seems to me an impossible suggestion. H.M.G. went on record last November as being in favour of federation of the three territories and became further committed to that view by the last debate. Moreover, the Secretary of State himself said bluntly to Sir G. Huggins during the recent discussions that, so far as H.M.G. were concerned, the inclusion of Nyasaland was an essential feature of federation. After all this, how could H.M.G. explain that they had suddenly become convinced that federation was not in Nyasaland's best interests?

It seems to me quite clear firstly that, if Sir G. Colby's arguments were to be accepted, there would then be very little prospect of going ahead with federation at all, and secondly that any decision either to abandon federation or to exclude Nyasaland, even if it were taken now, could not possibly be announced now but would have to be announced at some date after the April conference and to be defended on the ground that, after mature consideration, H.M.G., whilst still considering that federation was on balance in the best interests of all the inhabitants of the territories, including the Africans, was not prepared to push it through in the face of united African opposition. This is exactly what Sir G. Colby himself urges that we should not do. But I do not altogether follow his reasoning here; for such an announcement could quite well be accompanied by a clear statement to the effect that there was no question of political developments in Nyasaland similar to those in the Gold Coast; and that Nyasaland would be developed on partnership lines for the benefit of all races in the Protectorate.

If these latter arguments are accepted, then I think it is clear that, whatever Ministers may feel about Sir G. Colby's arguments on the main question of substance, the April conference must go forward, Nyasaland must play a full part in it, and no question of the withdrawal of Nyasaland must be allowed to arise, at any rate until after the conference is over and there has been some discussion in the territories of the draft federal instruments which it is hoped that the conference will produce.

**81** DO 121/165

8 Apr 1952

[Conference on closer association]: minute by R L D Jasper<sup>1</sup> on UK tactics at the conference

A brief for the Secretary of State on the resumed Closer Association Conference, which is to begin on April 23rd, is submitted in a self-contained form in this folder. It

<sup>1</sup> CRO, adviser to UK delegation to conferences on Central African Federation, Apr 1952 and Jan 1953; visited Central Africa during drafting of federal constitution, May 1953.

has been agreed with the Colonial Office at the official level and is being submitted simultaneously to the Colonial Secretary. Copies are being supplied to all members of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Conference.

2. It is suggested that the following points should be borne in mind in considering what tactics we should adopt at the Conference.

3. The Southern Rhodesians are likely to make the running from the outset. Sir G. Huggins has gone a long way to meet us in the last few weeks and is clearly of the view that, if Federation is ever to become a reality, it must be brought into being now. He is therefore likely to be prepared to consider any necessary compromise, but he may be inclined to be impatient of academic argument. On the other hand members of the Delegations from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (and particularly the Africans, if they stay on for the Conference) are likely to concentrate on the safeguards for African interests put forward in the draft Federal Scheme. Sir G. Huggins may not be too ready to spend too much time on this aspect.

4. It will be remembered that Sir G. Huggins has agreed that Africans from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland may be present at the Conference and be given an opportunity of stating their objections to Federation. But he makes it a condition that, if they do so, the Conference should nevertheless, go on to discuss the draft Federal scheme on [its] merits.

5. A cardinal point in our tactics should, it is suggested, be to persuade any Africans who may attend the Conference to stay at least until we can try to convince them of the essential fairness of the present proposals and of the adequacy of the safeguards for Africans embodied in them. If this is to be achieved it would be desirable to get down to the details of the draft Federal Scheme as soon as possible in the proceedings. During the discussion in January it was contemplated that the April Conference would start with an examination of the modifications to Cmd. 8235 put forward by the three Governments. The difficulty is that this procedure will focus attention on precisely these features of the Scheme which will arouse African suspicions. For this reason it is not proposed to circulate details of the modifications as a Conference paper, and it may be desirable to avoid all detailed discussion of them at the beginning.

6. It is therefore suggested that the Conference should open with a speech by the Secretary of State saying that we prepare to take the draft Federal Scheme as it stands, explaining its content briefly on the lines of the Index and drawing the Africans' attention to these chapters in which their interests are fully safeguarded. If desired the Department would provide a skeleton for the opening speech. The Conference might then go on to consider the draft Federal Scheme in detail, but if possible it should take first Chapters II and V (which contain the germ of the proposals) and leave the more technical and detailed questions likely to arise on the other Chapters until the end.

7. The Secretary of State will no doubt wish to take an early opportunity to tell Sir G. Huggins orally how much we appreciate the efforts he has made recently to meet us over the position of Africans. As suggested in the brief, however, Ministers may wish at the same time to ask that Southern Rhodesia should make more progress on the questions of an alternative educational qualification for the vote and the recognition of African Trades Unions.

8. The Secretary of State may wish to have a preliminary discussion of these papers now, or he may prefer to postpone discussion until after Easter. One decision

is, however, required urgently, namely whether the administrative arrangements outlined in paragraph 1 of Annex 1 are acceptable. If they are approved a telegram will be sent to Central African Governments before Easter, outlining what is proposed. The procedure outlined in paragraph 6 above should, it is suggested, not be mentioned until the Conference opens.

## **82** CO 1015/95, no 50

21 Apr 1952

### **[Conference on closer association]: letter from Lord Salisbury to Mr Lyttelton stressing why federation alone should be discussed at the conference**

[Lyttelton had written to Salisbury earlier that day noting that, in order to persuade African representatives from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to attend the forthcoming conference in London, he had been obliged to assure them they would be free to make clear their opposition to federation by walking out or signing a minority report. Further, he wished to be able to tell them that if they produced a constructive alternative to the current federal proposals, the government would be prepared to place this on the conference agenda.]

Thank you so much for your letter. You have my deep sympathy in your struggle to bring your Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans up to scratch. I know how wearisome these interminable negotiations can be. Actually, I see no difficulty in agreeing to your first point. They, like everyone else, have of course an absolute right to accept or reject the Federation proposals as they emerge from the Conference. No one will be committed by this meeting. All that we seek to produce is a scheme which produces the greatest possible measure of common ground, and it has always been contemplated that the results should be voted upon by the peoples, European and Africans, of the three territories. So you are obviously quite safe in giving your Africans an assurance to that effect, in writing if they want that.

Where I see far greater difficulties is over your second point. You will remember the genesis of this Conference. It arose from the Report of the Official Committee, which recommended a scheme of Federation as a solution to the problem of Closer Association. Then came the Victoria Falls Conference, at which certain strong criticisms were made of the Officials' Scheme. Arising out of this, we and the other three Governments concerned have been in constant contact to see how these and other criticisms could be surmounted; and the result is the amended scheme which has been worked out and which is to be discussed now. But, throughout, federation has been accepted by the three Governments as the basis of discussion. If we now suggest that that is not the only conception now to be discussed, we shall be cutting the ground from under everything that has been achieved up to now, with so much effort, and envisaging starting again from the beginning. I am afraid that if we were to propose that, even for the purpose of bringing in your Africans, we should kill the Conference stone dead. Huggins would undoubtedly draw the conclusion that we had no views of our own, that we could be swayed by every wind of African opinion, and he would either go straight home or lose interest in the whole business. There is of course no reason at all why the N. Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans should not express their views at the plenary session, even if these are hostile to federation. If they decide to come to the Conference, they have a perfect right to do this, and then

to depart or do what they can to improve the scheme by staying. They commit themselves to nothing by that. But, in my view, our federal scheme—and our scheme only—must be the terms of reference at this Conference. Otherwise, it might just as well not be held.

When the later stages come, a new situation may of course emerge. The Africans of the Northern Territories may go home, consult their constituents, and then turn down federation sans phrase. In that event we and the other Governments will have to consider whether to go ahead and impose it on them, or try and find another alternative, slim though the chances will be. But I am profoundly convinced that that stage has not been reached yet, and I urge most strongly that we go on with our original plan, whatever the Africans may say, though of course they reserve the right to dissociate themselves from the report or produce a minority report, if they wish. I should myself not be prepared to put any other course before Huggins. He would lose all faith in us; and his co-operation is essential, if Closer Association is to be achieved.

**83** CO 1015/95, no 57

24 Apr 1952

[Conference on closer association]: letter from Lord Swinton<sup>1</sup> to Mr Lennox-Boyd on the status of the African representatives

I have been reading with interest all your answers on Central African Federation. I shall probably be asked some questions at my next meeting with the Lobby on Tuesday. I would be grateful if you would let me know exactly the circumstances in which the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans came here. I appreciate that it was hoped they would take part in the Conference, which, as I understand it, is to draw up a final plan ad referendum. I also appreciate that when the Conference is over there will be a further statement, and I have no doubt that Bobbety and Oliver<sup>2</sup> would see the Lobby when that statement is made. What I would like to know now is how the Africans were chosen. Were they nominated by the Governors on the Secretary of State's instructions or were they appointed by a local African Association? If the latter, did the Secretary of State or the Governors invite the African Association to nominate?

A question I am almost certain to be asked is: Does the Colonial Secretary regard these Africans as representative of African opinion in the two Colonies? If he does, and these Africans won't look at Federation, what is the use of going on? If he does not regard them as representative, why are they here? I know these are half truths and that the reality is that the Secretary of State remains Trustee, and that the Governor probably has a much truer view of the opinion and interest of millions of non-vocal Africans. But so far as I get brought in, I want to be sure that I am playing the hand in the way you want it.

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<sup>1</sup> Lord Swinton, chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, Oct 1951–Nov 1952; secretary of state for Commonwealth relations, Nov 1952–Apr 1955. Swinton combined the largely honorary position of chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster with the posts of minister of materials, senior minister in charge of government publicity and de facto leader of the House of Lords (Anthony Seldon, *Churchill's Indian summer: the Conservative government 1951–55* (London, 1981), pp 98–99).

<sup>2</sup> ie Salisbury and Lyttelton.

**84** CO 1015/95, no 53

26 Apr 1952

**[Conference on closer association]: letter (reply) from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Swinton**

Many thanks for your letter of the 24th April<sup>1</sup> asking for some background on Central African Federation in case you are asked about it at your meeting with the Lobby on Tuesday. As you know, there is to be a debate in the House that afternoon at which most of what follows will probably come out in one shape or another, but I am replying now in case your Lobby conference happens first.

Your first question is: In what circumstance did the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans come here? The current conference, which as you say is drawing up a draft federal scheme for publication and discussion before decisions are taken, was envisaged from the start as a continuation of the Victoria Falls Conference in September, 1951 (see Cmd. 8411, Annex, para. 5) in which representatives of the African Representative Council in Northern Rhodesia and the African Protectorate Council in Nyasaland took part. It was therefore always contemplated that it would be open to Africans to attend the reassembled conference.

During the debate on the 4th March Oliver repeated that an invitation to the conference had been extended to the African Councils and was still open, though they had not yet accepted. He also said that he had asked the Governors to suggest to these Councils that they should send delegations to meet him and his colleagues ten days or more before the conference opened (Hansard, 4th March, col. 236).

Both Councils accepted the latter invitation, and Oliver and I had a series of discussions with both delegations during the week before the opening. We did our best to get them to come to the conference, but in vain. We made it clear that by coming they would not be committing themselves to support federation or anything else, and we offered to say so in writing. Oliver also said that if they put forward any constructive alternative proposals for closer association, he would do his best to see that the conference considered them. Despite this, the Northern Rhodesians declined on the ground that they had no mandate from their people to attend. The Nyasalanders also declined to attend as delegates, but asked if they could come as observers. Oliver said this was a novel suggestion and thought it would be very difficult, though he was careful not to close the door on it completely. On Tuesday evening, with the agreement of Huggins and the Governors, he told them that he would agree to their proposal; whereupon they withdrew it on the ground that, as they now learned that the conference was to be confidential, there might be leakages which they feared would be laid at their door. (There is an unfortunate history of a leakage at the Victoria Falls Conference which explains this.)

Secondly, you ask how the Africans were chosen. Oliver invited the African Representative Council and the African Protectorate Council, through the respective Governors, to send delegations, and the Councils chose their delegates.

Your last paragraph, of course, goes to the heart of the problem which will concern us when the times comes to decide for or against federation. Oliver and I are determined that no scheme shall emerge from the conference which we are not convinced will in fact be for the benefit of all in the territories, Africans and the rest

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<sup>1</sup> See 83.

alike. We are doing our utmost to see that this is not only so, but convincingly so, and there is just a chance that publication, followed by local discussions in which the Colonial Administrations would play a full part, may reveal some chinks in the armour of African opposition; but I am afraid it is all too likely that we shall in the end be faced with the alternatives of abandoning federation for the time being or imposing it in the face of vocal opposition. So my answer to 'Why go on?' is that the job of this conference is not to decide for or against federation but to prepare a draft scheme, and to call it off now would be to turn our backs on the fence while we were still only half way across the field.

The question 'How representative are these Africans?' is difficult and I am pretty sure you have hit on the answer. They are probably as representative as any you could get to come here; the true rural African would be lost and inarticulate, and yet it is he whose interests we are really trying to look after. Someone in Central Africa wrote here recently 'if anyone thinks that wherever two or three Africans are gathered together they are talking about federation, he could not be further from the truth; but if you press any six of them for an opinion they would say they are against it'.

It is vital to avoid in any way committing ourselves on the question whether or not we shall impose federation when the time comes. To answer this question in the affirmative would place us in a hopeless negotiating position vis-à-vis Southern Rhodesia. To answer it in the negative would be to give the Africans a veto.

As I said at the start, most of this will probably come out in Tuesday's debate, but I hope it may be of some help meanwhile. I am indeed grateful to you for giving us a chance to influence your play of the hand.

One last point, if I may: if the subject is not broached by the Lobby, it would be better from our point of view—and I think Bobbety would agree—that we should not broach it ourselves. The Conference is taking a lot of trouble over agreed publicity and, whilst they can't complain if information is dragged from you, the other Governments might feel a little pained if they thought we were volunteering it.

**85** CO 1015/59, no 113

1 May 1952

[Race relations in Northern Rhodesia]: letter from A T Williams to J E Marnham<sup>1</sup>

[During the Victoria Falls conference in Sept 1951, two junior Northern Rhodesia officials, S J H Upton (livestock officer in the veterinary department) and G D Pretorius (storeman in the public works department), left a government hostel in Livingstone when they learned that five African conference delegates were also to be accommodated there. Pretorius reportedly claimed 'he had been brought up in a certain way of life and it did not suit his ideas to live with Africans or under the same roof with them'. The incident attracted a parliamentary question in the House of Commons from Labour MP Reginald Sorensen. In forwarding his proposed reply to Rennie, Lyttelton, expressed the hope (in para 3) that it had been made clear to the two officials their behaviour was unacceptable, and asked (in para 4) whether steps could be taken to prevent the recruitment of officials with a similar attitudes (Lyttelton to Rennie, 7 Mar 1952). Sorensen's question actually lapsed due to the temporary suspension of parliamentary business following the death of George VI, and it does not appear in *Hansard*.]

<sup>1</sup> A T Williams, administrative secretary, NR, 1947–1952; chief secretary, 1952–1957; J E Marnham, assistant secretary, CO.

We are having some difficulty in framing a reply to confidential despatch No. 220 of the 7th of March on the subject of the two civil servants, Upton and Pretorius, whose action in leaving the Government hostel at Livingstone last September was the subject of a question in the House of Commons.

Personally I find the implications in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the despatch very disturbing and for reasons of conscience and expediency I find myself unable to accept them without protest. In fact I think it would be true to say that most officers who have spent the greater part of their working lives dealing with African affairs in this Territory would feel the same as I do in this matter. I have discussed the despatch with Stubbs who is now Acting Secretary for Native Affairs and who has had 28 years' experience in this Territory as District Officer, Labour Commissioner and Provincial Commissioner and he agrees generally with the views expressed in this letter. Both Stubbs and I served for many years on the Copperbelt where District Commissioners have perhaps a more difficult task than anywhere else in promoting good relations between Africans and Europeans. Few District Commissioners on the Copperbelt can avoid acquiring the label 'pro-African'. It has been attached to me and to Stubbs on many occasions. So much for our *bona fides*.

Pretorius, in spite of the views that he holds, is not the sort of European most likely to disturb race relations in Northern Rhodesia. He comes from a very respected Afrikaans family which has a very high reputation amongst Africans. I do not know this particular member of the family myself but I do know Pretorius's elder brother, known as Mike Pretorius, who was for some years a Livestock Officer in the Veterinary Department. Mike Pretorius joined the Veterinary Department in August, 1938, and was an Assistant Livestock Officer when he volunteered for the R.A.F.V.R. in October 1940. He served in the R.A.F. until March, 1942, when he was discharged with a very good character. He left the Veterinary Department for private reasons in 1947 and the Director was sorry to lose him. In fact the Director re-engaged him in 1947 and again in 1948 to undertake special duties. I particularly mention this man because his relations with Africans have always been excellent. I saw some of his work when I was a District Commissioner and he struck me then as being a very fine type of officer and most suitable for work in African areas. Since he left the Veterinary Department he has been living in the Barotse Province where he continues to be on excellent terms with the local Africans. Stubbs knows the father of the family—he is a farmer in the Kaprivi Strip—and considers him to be a good Afrikaaner of the old type. Good Afrikaaners of the old type are very fine people and they are hard to come by nowadays.

Judged therefore by the background of his family, there cannot be much wrong with the Pretorius who has now acquired such a bad reputation in the Colonial Office—merely because when he was pressed by a senior officer he told the truth. It would have been quite simple for Pretorius or Upton to have said nothing at all or to have given any old reasons that occurred to them, and I must emphasize that they were not required to give any reason for leaving Government quarters. Civil servants are free here, as I hope they are everywhere, to live where they like provided that they can reach their work at the proper time every day.

The Livingstone hostel is not an hotel. It is a building provided for European officers stationed at Livingstone. The Provincial Commissioner tries to keep a room or two free for other officers visiting Livingstone on duty but the hostel is not a

public place and no member of the public, European or African, would normally be allowed to stay there. It is in fact the home of the officers who live in it.

I should say that many senior officers of this Government would be very reluctant to accept Africans into their homes as guests. This has nothing to do with racial feelings. Very, very few Africans in this Territory have yet got to the stage where they can comfortably meet Europeans on equal terms socially and culturally. There are many who have one or more interests in common with many Europeans and it is on common interests and the other indefinable affinities that bring people together, that friendships between Europeans and Africans are based. I know many Africans in this country who greet me with great pleasure when they meet me and I for my part am equally pleased to see them. I regard them as friends and I hope they regard me as their friend. But if one tries to analyse why this friendship exists, it is difficult to find an answer. It arose out of hardships that we shared together and out of experiences that we enjoyed together.

I would reject friendship based on theory. I do not choose my European friends in that way and I refuse to choose my African friends in that way. In fact I think one naturally prefers to treat Africans as ordinary human beings with whom one establishes human relationships and not theoretical relationships. I do not make it a rule that all my European friends shall have access to my house. It would be nonsensical and it would possibly bring some of my friendships to an end because the common ground that I have with many of my friends is not in my house but elsewhere. Conversely, of course, one has friends whom one delights to honour and to entertain in one's home but whose company on a shooting trip, for example, would be abhorrent. But it should be unnecessary to explain any further.

We cannot hope in a country like Northern Rhodesia to maintain a pure European Civil Service living and thinking according to Government policy. That might have been possible thirty years ago; it may still be possible in some other African colonies but it is out of the question here. And any attempt to weed out people from our European Civil Service because of their private outlook on Africans could have disastrous effects and could set us back for years to come. What we are doing, and must continue to do, is to try to develop decent human relationships between the races. As many Europeans as possible must go on trying to meet as many Africans as possible on some common ground, but there is no reason whatever why that common ground should necessarily be either in a European home or in an African home. That will come but we cannot force it. The real danger to good race relations is not the Pretorius or the Upton or necessarily the Afrikaaner; it is the inexperienced, sentimental European or the ill-mannered European; and people of these types may come from Cape Town or from Clapham, from Pretoria or from Paisley, from Stellenbosch or from Swansea: and both types are dangerous.

Incidentally there is no mention in the despatch of the opinions of *African* civil servants. We have many African civil servants who harbour and indeed express thoughts on Europeans infinitely more venomous than anything Pretorius has said. Are we to have a purge amongst the African Civil Service too?

Finally, there is another side to this matter. Are we to assume that civil servants in the United Kingdom change their politics and their outlook with every change in the United Kingdom Government? Pretorius did not go out of his way to make a speech in repudiation of Government policy. We have no information to show that he ever expressed an opinion contrary to the Government's policy except in reply to a direct

question put to him by a senior Government officer—and the question was put to him in the privacy of what was his own home. I hope that we are not supposed to dictate what officers should think.

I expressed some of the foregoing opinions to Sir Gilbert Rennie before he left for London and he suggested that I should write demi-officially to you, as I have done, while he is available for consultation in London.

## 86 CO 1015/88

16 June 1952

[Nyasaland and federation]: minute by H T Bourdillon<sup>1</sup> to E Melville<sup>2</sup>

[As the process began of working out the specific terms of the fiscal system of a federation, the CO was initially optimistic about the immediate benefits this would bring to Nyasaland. In Mar 1952, Gorell-Barnes told Colby, 'We have to take into account that if Federation goes through in the reasonably near future, the financial settlement which will accompany it may mean a considerable windfall for Nyasaland. . . . In these circumstances it would be natural that such matters as the size of Nyasaland's loan programme on the London market and the merits for her claim for additional funds from the Colonial Development and Welfare reserves should come under review' (CO 1015/88, no 4, Gorell Barnes to Colby, 10 Mar 1952). Bourdillon, however, was keen to dampen such expectations.]

When the recent Conference on Closer Association in Central Africa came to a close, you asked me to place on record, for possible reference in the future stages of this affair, a brief account of the origins, progress and outcome of the discussions on the financial side. I am sorry that pressure of other work has prevented me from complying with this request sooner, but I trust that the following paragraphs will serve the purpose you had in mind, besides providing you with a brief against your talk with Sir Jeremy Raisman<sup>3</sup> this afternoon.

2. I have placed on the file copies of the documents which seemed to be of lasting importance. The Conference, of course, threw up a great mass of ephemeral papers which I have not kept. The one thing which is missing is a copy of the report of the Official Conference last year (Cmd. 8233). I do not delay the papers to attach this, particularly since the contents of its financial and economic passages are described in my memorandum enclosed with No. 8 hereon; but when the file goes to Central African Department, perhaps they could attach a copy of the Cmd. paper to complete the record.

3. Before the opening of the Conference on 23rd April, you were asked by Mr. Marnham (see his minute at No. 5) to study and comment on the existing proposals (essentially as they emerged from the Cmd. paper) for the division of economic and financial functions between the territorial Governments and the central Government in the proposed Federation. Mr. Selwyn commented in the first instance on the economic side (see No. 6), and I had a first shot on the financial side (see No. 8 and enclosure). Mr. Emanuel was good enough to express general agreement with my memorandum (see No. 9), but was of the opinion that the economic and financial aspects must be studied closely together and that some of my suggestions should be

<sup>1</sup> H T Bourdillon, assistant secretary, CO, 1947–1954 (head of Finance Dept, 1949–1954); assistant under-secretary 1954–1959 and 1961–1962.

<sup>2</sup> E Melville, assistant under-secretary of state, CO, responsible, *inter alia*, for Finance Dept.

<sup>3</sup> Sir (Abraham) Jeremy Raisman, vice chairman of Lloyds Bank.

broadened accordingly. Mr. Snelling of the C.R.O. had also produced some comments on the economic side (not attached), in which his main purpose was to establish the point that the economic *provisions* of the proposed Federation, as hitherto envisaged, were not sufficiently far reaching to achieve its economic *objects*. In other words, the Federation was not going to be a sufficiently strong economic unit to bring the advantages of cohesion and solidarity to which the Command Paper had paid such eloquent tribute. On the basis of these various documents you prepared the memorandum now registered at No. 10 hereon, in which you covered both the economic and the fiscal aspects.

4. This was the culmination of 'pre-Conference' thinking on the subject on the economic side of the Colonial Office. When the Conference assembled, one of its first acts was to appoint a Finance Committee, which was attended by you, Mr. Marnham and myself and on which the Colonial Office representatives played an important part throughout. It soon became evident that there was not going to be much room in the Finance Committee for the discussion of broader economic questions. The main attention was devoted to the more strictly financial questions discussed in the enclosure to No. 9, and throughout the Conference it was our object to ensure that these questions were properly tackled. In this I think we may be said to have succeeded, in that we secured the unanimous agreement of the Finance Committee, and subsequently of the Conference itself, on the two following fundamental points:—

(a) That if federation were to mean a real pooling of the resources of the whole area, the Federal Authority should not merely collect taxes for its own purposes but should have power, by collecting taxes over and above such requirements and distributing proceeds in accordance with need, to redistribute the wealth of the federal area on the basis of the needs of that area as a whole.

(b) That the working out of this principle must be entrusted to an expert fiscal commission, pending whose recommendations the federal scheme, on the financial side, must remain little more than a framework.

5. As we know, Sir Jeremy Raisman has since been appointed as Chairman of the Fiscal Commission. He will be assisted by two representatives from each of the territories (see No. 15) and he is to start work almost immediately. I suggest that you should use the enclosure to No. 8 as a brief for your discussion with him, supplemented by the report of the Finance Committee at No. 13 and the 'draft letter of invitation to the Chairman of the Fiscal Commission' at No. 14. You will remember that this latter document was prepared by me at the request of the Finance Committee for submission to the plenary Conference at one of its last meetings. So far as I know, the draft has in fact never been used, but it remains very much the basis of the Colonial Office idea of the way in which the Fiscal Commission must work. You will remember that we had some trouble with the Southern Rhodesian delegation on this matter. Mr. Whitehead in particular appeared anxious to decide in advance so many fundamental questions on the financial side that the Fiscal Commission would not really have had a job to do. He also appeared anxious to ensure that the territorial Governments, 'by means of their representatives on the Commission, could at all times bring political influences to bear during the course of the Commission's enquiry.' In the end I think we persuaded him that this was exceedingly dangerous, and the formula as finally agreed is contained in paragraph 6 of No. 14.

6. I am glad to see that Mr. Simmonds, the Financial Secretary of Nyasaland, is to be one of the Nyasaland representatives on the Fiscal Commission. He is an extremely able official, and we can trust him to put Nyasaland's case with clarity and force. I am only surprised that he can spare the time from his normal duties to undertake this task.

7. The most important point from the Colonial Office point of view on the financial side is, of course, that Nyasaland, already by far the poorest of the territories, must not be made poorer still as a result of the financial provisions of federation. Under the proposals set out in Cmd. 8233, this would undoubtedly have happened, since Nyasaland would have given up Customs revenue to the Federation (or else abandoned such revenue altogether as a result of Customs Union) and would have got nothing like comparable benefits in return. You will find a more detailed exposition of this point in paragraph 5 of the enclosure to No. 8. The point is of extreme political importance, since Nyasaland, while the smallest and poorest of the territories, has the largest African population. It is therefore essential for the sake of the continuance of a sound and progressive African policy in this vital African area that the federation should be strong enough on the financial side to make the Protectorate of Nyasaland richer rather than poorer than before. This fact may, I think, present something of a paradox to the Colonial Office in the latter stages of consideration of the federation proposals. I am certain it presents a paradox (hitherto quite unrecognised) to those members of the House of Commons who regard themselves as the guardians of African interests in this whole business. There may indeed be political dangers in a strong federation, in that this may mean an undue predominance of Southern Rhodesian European interests. As a result it may be difficult to maintain the stand on African policy which the United Kingdom has throughout resolutely maintained. On the other hand African policy is bound to suffer, at least in Nyasaland, unless federation is strong enough on the financial side to bring real benefits. If this is not done, African feeling in Nyasaland towards the whole project may become very bitter indeed. This is obvious enough, since one can imagine the political results if the first fruit of this great experiment in 'partnership' is to make the Africans of Nyasaland even poorer than at present. And the bitterness would no doubt be turned at least as much against the U.K.—who would be regarded as traitors—as against the Federal Government.

8. I do not want to labour this point, since I am sure it is fully realised here. Indeed, it was quite clear throughout the proceedings of the Conference that the Colonial Office were at one both in insisting that the federation must have real strength on the financial side and that the application of the financial arrangements must be left for an expert Fiscal Commission. We were in fact much indebted to Mr. Gorell Barnes' lead on this subject (see his minute of 19th February at No. 2 and his note to the Secretary of State at No. 77).

9. I do not think I need say any more. A copy of the draft federal scheme as drawn up since the Conference is attached at the back of the file. On the financial side it is, for the reasons already given, no more than a framework, and its main interest in this connection is that it contains the agreed terms of reference (flagged) of the Fiscal Commission. There are some papers (notably the memorandum on Income Tax Systems at No. 11) which I have attached for their general interest rather than for their exact place in the story. You may, incidentally, wish to refresh your memory on the Nyasaland position by a glance at the Nyasaland memorandum at No. 1. As I

have said, however, the essential facts about Nyasaland's financial position as it would have emerged from the original proposals are given in paragraph 5 of the enclosure to No. 8.

P.S. If I may add a postscript which is in the nature of a personal prophesy, I think we must be very modest in our hopes that federation, at least in the initial stages, will bring substantial financial *benefits* to Nyasaland, as opposed to ensuring that the Protectorate is not left actually poorer than before. We have in the past envisaged the possibility that federation would come to Nyasaland as something of a windfall, and you will remember that it was on these grounds that we told the Governor that his new C.D. & W. allocation would be subject to review if and when the federal system was established. It is clearly right to keep the possibility in mind, but for all that I do not think it is very real. All the representatives at the Finance Committee of the recent Conference accepted without question that there must be some weighting of the scales in favour of Nyasaland, but in my reading of the situation they were only thinking in terms of counteracting the initial ill-effects which would be caused by Nyasaland handing over all Customs revenue to the Federal Authority. I am pretty sure, at least, that the Southern Rhodesian attitude went no further than this. If something better emerges spontaneously from the Fiscal Commission's report and from the arrangements which are subsequently agreed, we shall of course have every reason to be satisfied; but I think it will be hard for H.M.G. to take a very strong lead in the matter without incurring the charge that their main interest in federation is to rid themselves of financial liabilities for the future. They may even be accused of insincerity in their insistence that the U.K. has a special role in this matter as the protector of African rights in the northern territories.

There is of course no need to volunteer this point of view in discussion with Sir J. Raisman. It is clearly right in principle that federation should bring immediate and positive benefits to the poorest part of the federal area, and we must not give up hope that this will indeed happen. I can readily understand, however, that federation might become quite unacceptable to the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia if they were to be told that the first result from their point of view would be the necessity to tax themselves more heavily, or develop themselves more slowly, in order to subsidize Nyasaland. If this forecast is justified, then perhaps the most we can expect of federation is that it will leave Nyasaland roughly where it is to start with and bring tangible economic and financial benefits later on.

H.T.B.

**87** CO 1015/655

1–8 Oct 1952

[Nyasaland and federation]: minutes by J E Marnham, H T Bourdillon, W L Gorell Barnes and Sir T Lloyd

*Mr. Bourdillon*

*Mr. Gorell Barnes*

I apologise for putting this up despite Sir T. Lloyd's clear directive on 29/8, but the story as shown on these papers is not quite complete.

The statement in the Minister of State's report from Nyasaland, sidelined in para. 4 of 48 and quoted in the draft opposite, arose from Sir G. Colby's remark to the

Minister in my presence that what was really wanted to make Federation palatable was that he should be able to say, immediately a decision to federate was announced, that as a result there would be a new school here, a hospital there, and so on. But he made it quite clear that for this purpose he would want a special grant from H.M.G. over and above anything at present in sight from C.D. & W. or elsewhere. He mentioned £1,000,000 as a suitable figure, and added (though I don't know how important he felt it) that it would have to be free of the procedural strings which govern C.D. & W. money. He admitted, as far as I remember, that this would not lessen opposition in the coming months, but it would be a major factor in getting Federation off to a good start.

Against this background of what the Governor had in mind, I wonder whether before urging him to submit plans we ought not to form some idea of the chances of our being able to meet his request when it comes. Presumably any such grant would have to come either from the C.D. & W. reserve or as a special *ad hoc* grant from the Treasury made on purely political grounds. What little I know of the state of the C.D. & W. vote does not conduce to optimism, and in the latter case I imagine a personal approach from the S. of S. to the Chancellor would be needed?

I have no doubt, nor I think had the Minister, that if anything of the sort is possible it will be a powerful help in the first difficult years of Federation, and I shall be delighted if we can go at any rate some way to meet the Governor's wishes. But he knows that we know what he has in mind, and a bald enquiry when we may expect his proposals may raise false hopes by leading him to think that we are confident of being able to do substantially as he asks. If that is so, well and good. If we can go some but not all the way, then to avoid waste of effort on unrealistic planning it would be useful to let him know the sort of thing we might be able to do.

But unless there is some real prospect that we can do something on a worthwhile scale it might be kinder to say so outright, or at least say nothing unless and until the Governor pursues the matter himself. I doubt if it would help to say that we agree that the inducement idea is good provided it can be achieved with funds already in sight. Nyasaland's financial plight is parlous: they are facing a calamitous deficit in 1953; I am pretty sure that their original C.D. & W. allocation is fully committed (Mr. Bourdillon can doubtless confirm); and their extra £500,000 has only been granted on condition that it is used for schemes of direct economic benefit. This condition might I suppose be relaxed in respect of part of the money, but I doubt whether it would be wise, in this way or by any other possible jugglery with existing resources, to let up on the bare minimum of desperately needed economic development which is all Nyasaland can afford at the moment.

(I think this is the wrong file for this discussion, but that can be put right later).

J.E.M.

1.10.52

I agree with Mr. Marnham, and I would recommend that we say nothing to the Governor unless and until he pursues the matter himself. On present showing, we certainly could not spare a further £1 million for Nyasaland from C.D. & W. reserves. The African reserve is fully committed, and we have nothing left except the remainder of the general reserve (something under £3 million) which is supposed to last us until 1956. We shall shortly be pursuing with the Treasury the question of future C.D. & W. assistance, and it may be that prospects will then improve. But

things will have to move quite a long way before we can cough up another million pounds for Nyasaland. Mr. Marnham is therefore right in saying that a personal approach from the Secretary of State to the Chancellor would be needed, and personally I very much doubt whether such an approach would have much chance of success, at least until the Governor had made an extremely strong case. If the financial basis of federation is anything like the recommendations in the Fiscal Commission's report, Nyasaland will in any case be placed in a sound revenue position (which, incidentally, will not be dependent on the maintenance of the present highly unwelcome export duties on tea and tobacco). The Treasury will be almost certain to argue that this alone should be enough to get federation off to a good start—in so far as that result can ever be achieved by mere financial concessions to Nyasaland in the opening stages.

2. Mr. Marnham is also, of course, right in saying that Nyasaland will be quite unable in present circumstances to undertake the additional developments noted by the Minister of State *without* further external assistance. Owing to the disastrous fall in the price of tea, the financial outlook is now bleak in the extreme—so much so that if federation does not come off it is doubtful whether Nyasaland will be able to remain outside Treasury control.

3. I confirm that the original Nyasaland allocation is fully committed and that the latest extra allocation has been granted on condition that it is used for schemes of economic benefit. Nyasaland has, incidentally, received *two* extra allocations of £500,000—one this year and one (I think) in 1949.

H.T.B.  
6.10.52

*Sir T. Lloyd*

On the 29th August you minuted that, if we had not by the 30th September received from Sir G. Colby the proposals referred to in paragraph 4 of (48), we should enquire.

The two preceding minutes argue strongly that we should rather wait to hear from Sir G. Colby. I agree and recommend accordingly.

I should, however, record the following comments on Mr. Bourdillon's minute:—

(1) I do not think, and Mr. Bourdillon to whom I have spoken agrees, that it is quite correct to say that the African reserve is fully committed. It is true that we know of a number of very important projects which are almost sure to mature and which are expected to eat up the whole African reserve and more. But I think I am right in saying that a substantial proportion of the African reserve remains uncommitted in the sense that it has not been allocated to Governments or schemes. I understand that Finance Department are at present reviewing the state of the African reserve and that the result of this work may well be ready by the time we have to take a decision about any extra allocation to Nyasaland.

(2) Whilst the recommendations of the Fiscal Commission, if they are adopted, should make it possible for Nyasaland under federation to proceed with her development as at present planned (which she is unlikely to be able to do otherwise), I do not think that they are likely to make possible much increase in the pace of development or, therefore, that the ordinary African is likely to be conscious of much improvement resulting from federation.

I should perhaps also mention here that there has over the last year or two been a good deal of discussion about the possibility of Northern Rhodesia surrendering some

£500,000 of her C.D. & W. allocation for re-allocation to Nyasaland. I gather, however, from Mr. Marnham that Sir G. Rennie, who was inclined to think that this was a feasible proposition, has now got cold feet. Officially the position is that Sir G. Colby is meant to be discussing the question locally with Sir G. Rennie; and Mr. Marnham has recently written to Sir G. Colby asking him what the present position is.

W.L.G.B.  
7.10.52

*Mr. Gorell Barnes.*

I have discussed this with the Minister of State who agrees that we should not press Sir G. Colby for proposals.

I have told the Minister that we will put this up to him again when he returns from New York about the 8th of November and that we will by then have ready for him the Finance Department's review of the state of the African reserve of C.D. & W. money. I have also said that we will find out by early November just what the position is about the possible surrender to Nyasaland of part of Northern Rhodesia's C.D.&W. allocation.

We should be ready for the Minister in both these respects by the time of his return.

T.J.K.L.  
8.10.52

## **88** DO 121/195

16 Dec 1952

### **'Federation': minute G H Baxter to Lord Swinton on concessions to Southern Rhodesia**

I understand that officials in the Colonial Office may be advising Mr. Lyttelton to take the line with you that, in view of the Labour Party attitude as disclosed at last Thursday's meeting, no concessions to Southern Rhodesia can now be made at the January Conference.

If Mr. Lyttelton should mention this to you, you will wish to have available the attached extract<sup>1</sup> from a letter of Lord Salisbury's to Sir Godfrey Huggins dated 29th October. This letter was agreed textually with the Colonial Office before issue.

You will see that both Lord Salisbury and Mr. Lyttelton committed themselves to give the most sympathetic consideration to any proposals which Sir G. Huggins might put forward 'within the limits imposed by the need to satisfy Parliament and public opinion in this country'. The major Southern Rhodesian amendments, details of which have already been brought to your attention, are all, in our view, comprised within the class of amendment 'which may make it easier for you (i.e. Sir G. Huggins) to achieve success at the referendum'. In our opinion, therefore, unless we are able to go some way to satisfy Southern Rhodesian views on these points, there is grave danger that the referendum will fail.

There is one other point which I feel I should bring to your notice, since it may affect discussion in Cabinet. It is the question of what attitude Southern Rhodesian Ministers and Mr. Welensky and his elected colleagues are likely to take up should

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

there be any difficulty in coming to agreement in January. You should, I think, be aware that both Sir G. Huggins and Mr. Welensky have said in public that, should it not be possible to agree satisfactory terms, they might be driven to a form of 'Boston Tea Party'. It is possible to dismiss this too readily as wild talk. While I do not for a moment think that either Sir Godfrey Huggins or Mr. Welensky intends this threat to be taken seriously, in present circumstances there is no doubt whatever that a threat on these lines would arouse very considerable enthusiasm among Europeans in Central Africa.

**89** D035/6763, no 14

24 Dec 1952

[London constitutional conference]: CRO memorandum for Lord Swinton. *Enclosure*: notes A & B

[The final revisions to these briefing papers for Lord Swinton were made by Baxter (minute, 24 Dec 1952), whose support for further concessions to the Europeans is made clear in document 88. The work of the London conference, which convened on 1 Jan 1953 and closed on 29 Jan, is too detailed and diverse for it to be adequately represented by a single document. For a full account of the conference proceedings, see J R T Wood, *The Welensky papers* (Durban, 1983) pp 314–349. These notes reproduced below do, however, provide an insight into the tactics adopted by the British government during the conference, and help to explain why ministers proved so ready to meet the objections expressed by Huggins and other European leaders.]

It has been provisionally arranged to hold on 31 December a meeting of Heads of Delegations, together with a few of their advisers—in effect the steering committee of the Conference. Meanwhile you may wish to have our tentative suggestions as to the manner in which the proceedings at the Conference might be tackled.

2. The following papers are attached below:—

(A) A note on suggested procedure;

(B) A note on the Southern Rhodesian attitude to the Conference as it has emerged in the course of the official talks, and in conversations which have taken place outside those talks.

3. The two main factors in the minds of Southern Rhodesian Ministers appear to be:—

(i) their strong fear that they will be defeated at the referendum and possibly lose their own internal political influence as a result.

(ii) the latent idea that the safeguards are not really taken seriously in the U.K., and that they can be reduced to the status of a convention as soon as the Federation begins to function.

4. There has been no time to concert these papers with the Colonial Office, but I am sending them a copy.

Note A to 89: conference on federation—suggested procedure

*Principal conference documents*

1. The main Conference documents will consist of:—

(a) A general paper containing the substantive amendments which have been proposed on the Preamble, Chapter I–IV and Chapter IX of the Draft Federal Scheme, which can conveniently be taken together.

(b) Separate papers dealing with Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII of the Scheme (African Affairs Board, Finance, Public Service and Judiciary).

In each case the important points will be picked out and focused, and suggested solutions (agreed in the preparatory meetings now taking place between officials of the four Governments) will be put forward without commitment, except on points where it has not been possible to reach such agreement.

2. Each paper (except public services) will have annexed to it a suggested re-draft of the relevant chapter of the Scheme itself, and a commentary bringing out the important provisions of the draft.

3. The major points of political importance will, with few exceptions, arise on the main paper dealing with the Preamble, Chapters I–IV and Chapter IX. Some of the points (e.g. amalgamation; second chamber; secession clause; temporary Ministry before there is a Parliament) may be most conveniently tackled in a sort of ‘Second Reading’ debate. For this we cannot perhaps spare more than one and a half days of plenary sessions at the beginning of the Conference. This procedure will have the following advantages:—

(a) It will enable the Southern Rhodesian Opposition to ‘blow off steam’ and no doubt ask for various impracticable amendments; and for reasoned replies to be made to them *by U.K. Ministers*

(b) It will enable U.K. Ministers to support Sir G. Huggins’ more moderate line.<sup>1</sup>

(c) At the same time U.K. Ministers will be enabled to express general sympathy with the fears and hopes of the European community, and to say that they have given the fullest consideration to these. Their rejection of amendments such as amalgamation, native policy to be federal, or any change in the distribution of seats in the Federal Assembly, is not inspired by neglect of this aspect. On the contrary, it is due to the fact that such amendments would in general have the effect of diminishing the extent to which H.M.G. could discharge her inescapable obligations to the Territories.

4. If Africans are present from the Northern Territories (which now seems very unlikely)<sup>2</sup> this stage of the Conference would also give an opportunity for Ministers to express their determination to secure those principles in regard to African interests which they have undertaken to secure in the past, and to consider any amendments to the Scheme which African representatives might put forward. (Under the terms agreed by Lord Salisbury with Sir G. Huggins, it is possible for members of the Conference to put forward *any* amendment which they consider desirable.)

#### *Setting up of committees*

5. At the first meeting of the Conference the presiding Secretary of State might, after welcoming the delegates, initiate a general discussion which would in effect be

<sup>1</sup> In the event, on the opening day of the conference, Huggins delivered a blistering attack on plans for an African Affairs Board and on the prospect of African representatives in the federal Assembly (Wood, pp 316–317).

<sup>2</sup> African representatives from the Northern territories did not attend the conference.

as to whether to proceed to examine the existing Draft Scheme and amendments proposed to it.

6. Next, he might suggest that the main paper referred to above should in the first instance be taken in plenary session. He might also wish to suggest that, from the outset, papers dealing with Chapters VI, VII and VIII should be remitted to committees. Chapter V (African Affairs Board) should, it is suggested, be kept in reserve by the U.K. delegation until it is clear whether any softening of attitude is to be expected from the Southern Rhodesian delegation in regard to Public Service matters (Chapter VII).

7. The following committees will probably be required to handle these matters:—

- (a) A Fiscal Committee (Chapter VI)
- (b) A Public Services Committee (Chapter VII)
- (c) A Legal and Judicial Committee (Chapter VIII and any drafting points raised by the Plenary Conference).

8. It is essential that S. Rhodesia should have ministerial representatives on all these committees, and the other Territories similarly authoritative representatives. Otherwise the committees will not be able to do more than cover ground which we have already covered during the officials' talks. The committees should be so manned that they can sit concurrently.

9. The intention would be that each committee should produce a report for the Plenary Conference by the beginning of the second week, i.e. by Thursday 8th January, in which they would indicate those points which they have been unable to resolve.

#### *Documents to emerge from the conference*

10. In addition to a final Draft Federal Scheme on the lines produced by the Lancaster House Conference in April, the present Conference is likely to produce a number of Conference Resolutions, some of them of major importance and some of them designed to help the Southern Rhodesians to get the Scheme across at their Referendum. In preliminary discussion it was envisaged that there would be two White Papers:—<sup>3</sup>

- (a) A White Paper consisting of a preface and the final Draft Federal Scheme itself;
- (b) A White Paper containing conclusions and recommendations not intended to be embodied in the Constitution; i.e., the Conference decisions on the reports of the Fiscal, Civil Service Preparatory and Judicial, Commissions, and any other resolutions which it may choose to pass.

It is suggested that we should work on this assumption. Two points should however be noted:—

- (i) Sir G. Huggins has suggested that a shorter and simpler explanation of the Draft Scheme will be required for consideration by the Southern Rhodesian

<sup>3</sup> Two separate white papers were indeed published. *Report of the Conference on Federation* (Cmnd 8753), was of an explanatory nature, setting down in some detail the background to federation and outlining some conclusions reached in the conference which were not included in the draft federal scheme. *Federal Scheme prepared by a Conference held in London in January 1953* (Cmd 8754) provided a detailed account of the scheme itself. Both were released on 5 Feb 1953.

electorate, although the actual vote would be on the lines of approval or disapproval of Federation on the terms set out in the eventual Draft Scheme.

(ii) Some of the Conference resolutions, e.g. that now proposed dealing with consultation with the Federal Government about amendments to Territorial constitutions, may be of critical importance in the Referendum campaign. Thus there may be pressure to incorporate them in the Draft Scheme itself and not in a separate document.

11. As regards these points:—

(i) The U.K. Government probably ought not to sponsor officially a shortened version of the Draft Scheme, which would be legally inexact and might be held to commit H.M.G. to interpretations of the Scheme itself which would prove embarrassing at a later stage. If a shortened version is required it must therefore be issued by the Southern Rhodesian Government. But unofficial help in drafting could be given by our people.

(ii) We should agree to the interpolation in the main White Paper of any Conference resolutions which are thought by the Southern Rhodesians to be so important politically that they must be read with it. The footnotes to the existing Draft Scheme already provide instances of the same kind.

### *S. Rhodesian points*

12. Comments on the individual amendments likely to be proposed by Southern Rhodesia have been submitted to the Secretary of State separately. In a separate note B below an attempt is made to summarise the attitude of mind with which the Central African Governments approach the Conference, and these points have been taken into account in making the above recommendations.

### **Note B to 89: Attitude of Central African governments to the January conference on federation**

#### *Southern Rhodesian government*

1. Southern Rhodesian Ministers appear to be influenced by the following main considerations:—

(a) The very strong opposition which they have found in all sections of public opinion in Southern Rhodesia to certain provisions of the existing Scheme, notably the African Affairs Board. There is no question about the strength of this opposition; the Referendum might easily be defeated merely on account of the existing African Affairs Board proposals.

(b) Their unwillingness to recognise that the Governor-General in the Federation will in some respects be in a different position from the Governor of Southern Rhodesia at present.

(c) The apprehensions aroused in Southern Rhodesia by any suggestion that that country may be swallowed up by the 'black north'.

(d) Their fear of their own Opposition. Sir E. Guest and Mr. Stockil,<sup>4</sup> and even the

<sup>4</sup> Sir Ernest Guest was a leading critic of federation within Huggins's own United Party. Raymond Osborne Stockil led the SR Liberal Party.

extremist Mr. Olley,<sup>5</sup> have made headway in recent months and have often secured a vote against Federation in public meetings.

(e) Their fear that their own Public Service will not cooperate unless it is given positive assurances against African encroachment, and unless in certain cases its members are compelled to join the Federal Service.

(f) Nervousness lest the rejection of the Referendum may endanger their own local majority.

#### *African Affairs Board*

2. As regards (a) above, there is no doubt that the existence of the African Affairs Board's proposals in their present form may by itself result in the rejection of the Referendum. There seems to be a fairly widespread feeling in Southern Rhodesia that these proposals are an insult to the Southern Rhodesian record, and to the reliability and public spirit of the Southern Rhodesian Parliament. While therefore Ministers may wish to keep a possible concession in regard to these proposals in reserve until a later stage in the Conference, the embarrassment in which Southern Rhodesian Ministers find themselves in regard to them should not be under-estimated. If the latter attempt to support the present proposals they will be playing into the hands of their own opposition.<sup>6</sup>

#### *Governor-general*

3. In private conversation with the Attorney-General of Southern Rhodesia it has become clear that Southern Rhodesian Ministers' attitude to the intended position of the Governor-General is not precisely that of U.K. Ministers. The Draft Federal Scheme, page 21, footnote 27, makes it clear that, in the exercise of powers described as discretionary, the Governor-General *is not obliged to act on the advice of his Ministers*, but is responsible to the Secretary of State and, subject to that, uses his own judgment. A general provision on these lines appears in the existing Southern Rhodesian Letters Patent and Royal Instructions, and it seems likely that, at the back of Southern Rhodesian Ministers' minds, there is an idea that the Governor-General's position in relation to these discretionary powers can from the outset be overridden by a convention, similar to that which now operates in Southern Rhodesia, that they will not be exercised except in regard to reserved legislation. U.K. Ministers' position is that, in view of H.M.G.'s responsibility for the Protectorates, and of the different political and economic standing of the three Territories, these powers will be permanent and substantive, unless and until a majority of the inhabitants of the three Territories ask for, and are granted, full and independent membership of the Commonwealth. This is one of the main means by which H.M.G.'s continuing responsibilities will be discharged. The U.K. position will be made clear in a paper to be circulated to the Conference, but it may be desirable to make sure at an early stage that our position in this matter is thoroughly understood and accepted.

#### *Fear of African influence*

4. As regards (c) above, this is a very real difficulty for southern Rhodesian Ministers, and it should be given due weight assessing their reactions to any difficult

<sup>5</sup> Charles Olley, former mayor of Salisbury and founder member of the Southern Rhodesian Liberal Party.

<sup>6</sup> The British government made a significant concession over the African Affairs Board during the conference. Rather than being an entirely independent body as had hitherto been planned, it was decided that it should instead be a select committee of the Federal Parliament.

proposal such as, e.g. proposal for a non-discrimination clause in regard to the Public Service. It is particularly widespread among the trade unions, and their point of view will no doubt be put forward by Mr. Keller.<sup>7</sup>

*Fear of parliamentary opposition*

5. As regards (d) and (f) above, this is also a very real difficulty. By misrepresentation of the Scheme Sir E. Guest and Mr. Stockil have created a climate unfavourable to the Referendum. In particular, Southern Rhodesian opinion is willing to listen to arguments that Southern Rhodesian native policy must prevail in the Federation, that she ought to have a majority in the Federal Assembly and so on. If the Referendum were heavily defeated that would be a victory for Sir E. Guest and Mr. Stockil which might result in Sir E. Guest returning to politics. Southern Rhodesian Ministers doubtless fear that their party might be beaten at a subsequent election.

*Southern Rhodesian public service*

6. As regards (e) above, Sir G. Huggins has already explained to the Secretary of State his difficulties in this matter. If large numbers of Southern Rhodesian public servants were to refuse to transfer to the Federal Public Service that would be embarrassing for all parties. It might encourage African civil servants in the Northern Territories to refuse to cooperate, and in an extreme case might hamstring the Federal administration at the outset. Whatever stand of principle U.K. Ministers may decide to make on the question of discrimination in the Public Service, it should no doubt have due regard to this difficulty.<sup>8</sup>

7. These factors, which are bound to make the Southern Rhodesian approach to the Conference somewhat uncompromising, should not obscure the enthusiasm for Federation which the Ministers who will represent Southern Rhodesia still feel. Mr. Greenfield, who voted for amalgamation with South Africa in 1923, is an exception. As regards the opposition members of the Southern Rhodesian delegation it is probable that none of them is really in favour of Federation. If therefore Southern Rhodesian Ministers are to be supported in their difficult task of getting across the Scheme, the most unequivocal rejection of anti-Federation arguments advanced by their Opposition is likely to be necessary.

*Attitude of the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland governments*

8. This is primarily a matter for the Colonial Office to analyse. Certain main points can however be put forward with some confidence:—

(a) The Northern Rhodesian unofficials are prepared to combine with Southern Rhodesian Ministers to extract a number of major concessions in regard to, e.g., agriculture, from the U.K. Government.

(b) The entire Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland delegations are believed to be now personally enthusiastic supporters of Federation.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> L J W Keller, Rhodesia Labour Party and trade unionist.

<sup>8</sup> The conference agreed terms for the compulsory secondment of public service officers to the federal public service, but not to their compulsory transfer. Incorporated in the draft scheme was the principle that racial discrimination should not play a part in appointments to the federal public service.

<sup>9</sup> In the margin, next to this rather dubious assertion, the name 'Colby' is written by an unknown CRO hand.

(c) The Northern Rhodesian delegation may still think that they can improve their bargaining position vis-a-vis Southern Rhodesia in respect of, e.g., the financial settlement. This would strike at the root of the very able composition produced by the Fiscal Commission, and it is suggested that disturbance of their major proposals should be firmly resisted.

(d) Both the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland delegations will understandably be influenced by their fear of African reactions if Federation is pressed through, and their knowledge that so far as African opinion exists it is either silent or opposed to the scheme. This may result in a demand for additional safeguards for Africans which would be politically difficult.

## 90 CO 1015/338, no 77

6 Jan 1953

### [Dalglish Report]: draft note of a meeting at the CO with representatives of the mining companies<sup>1</sup>

*Mr. Prain* led for the Companies and emphasised that their urgent need was to decide what tactics to pursue at the forthcoming arbitration. Thereafter they would have to face the advancement issue without undue delay. Their immediate difficulty was that whilst they did not want to prejudice federation they were anxious to see some progress made in the implementation of 'Dalglish'. It was true that the Secretary of State had recently said that federation should not be allowed to inhibit thinking on the 'Dalglish' issue, but, since Sir Godfrey Huggins was understood to be strongly averse to any action in this field on account of the Southern Rhodesian referendum, the Companies desired further clarification of the position. It was essential he continued, for the Companies to look beyond the present dispute, which whilst ostensibly a simple wage claim, was clearly derived from African frustration. It seemed to him, since it was imperative that progress on 'Dalglish' should not result from African initiative, that apart from continuing the present drift, which he felt would inevitably end with early African action, the only possible course was for the Companies to give notice to the European Union of their intention to terminate the existing Agreements; unless the Government of Northern Rhodesia was prepared to make some move itself. He feared that Company action on these lines would lead to a prolonged strike which would have a serious effect on the United Kingdom's copper supplies and because of this the European Union was obviously in a strong position.

*The Secretary of State* said that he had not spoken to Sir Godfrey Huggins again, but, that in any case he was quite clear that federation should not bedevil the advancement issue if a suitable opportunity arose to make real progress. Nevertheless he did not expect that this would occur prior to the proposed International Mineworkers' Federation mission and the difficulty over the Southern Rhodesian referendum was therefore unlikely to arise.

*Sir G. Rennie* observed that what the Government of Northern Rhodesia hoped to do was to offer the services of a high official to preside at a Round Table Conference if

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<sup>1</sup> Present: Lyttelton, Gorell Barnes, Marnham, Watson, Barltrop and Neale (CO); Rennie and Welensky (NR); and Malcolm, Prain, Lascelles, Finn, Clark and Wilson (Selection Trust and Anglo American mining companies).

this could be arranged with all the parties. *Mr. Watson* said that he doubted if 'Dalgleish' could be altogether avoided at the arbitration, and indeed it might properly be introduced as part of the general background to the present dispute. *Mr. Marshall Clark* agreed but insisted that in the absence of representatives of the European Union it would be impossible for the Companies to discuss this question which in his view was outside the terms of reference.

*Mr. Welensky* said that he agreed with Sir Godfrey Huggins that early action on 'Dalgleish' would react adversely on federation and that furthermore he was sure that it would consolidate the European Union's support for Mr. Maybank who was trying to extend the colour bar to other industries. He agreed however that the question of advancement would arise at the arbitration, but he thought that whilst the arbitrator might comment he could refuse to adjudicate on this issue. It would be better that it should arise there than that Government or Companies should take the initiative since such action could only strengthen Mr. Maybank's hand.

*Sir G. Rennie* said that there was not much chance for Government initiative, but that if the arbitration provided one, he would not neglect to follow it up on account of federation. The Government could not however go out of its way to create an opportunity in this matter. If the Companies saw some possibility of progress, the Northern Rhodesian Government would welcome it, but, he did not know what view the Ministry of Materials would take if a strike was precipitated by their action.

*Mr. Marshall Clark* added that Anglo-American would welcome a lead from the arbitration.

*The Secretary of State* summarised the position as he saw it:—

(a) There should be no Government action while the other approach was open—there were advantages in keeping Government in reserve.

(b) The Companies should not raise the issue at arbitration. If it should be raised by the other side, the Companies would decline to discuss it within the framework of the arbitration proceedings since the European Union, which was closely concerned, was not represented. At the same time they should offer to discuss it as soon as the arbitration was over.

(c) Even if the discussions were fruitless they would bridge the critical gap until the I.M.F. delegation arrived in Northern Rhodesia. This might provide another chance.

*Mr. Prain* said that the Africans would not be content to wait until April when the delegation was due but, *Sir G. Rennie* and the *Secretary of State* thought that since discussions would have been offered the Africans would not in fact have been asked to wait and that it was therefore likely that no strike action on their part would occur before the visit. *Mr. Watson* thought that the imminence of the visit would itself serve to restrain the African Union.

*Mr. Welensky* said that the I.M.F. visit would result in a consolidation of the European and African Unions' opinion against the Companies and that for this reason the issue should emerge from the arbitration and not from Company action. *Mr. Prain* said that the Companies would welcome that but if after the I.M.F. visit there was still no tangible progress they would be faced with the original alternative of African or Company action. The latter was clearly to be preferred, but the Companies must know what attitude the United Kingdom Government would take. They could not afford to wait for a copper slump. The Companies' position, he

emphasised, would be more difficult after the I.M.F. mission. *Mr. Marshall Clark* said that Anglo-American could not agree to giving notice to the European Union prior to discussion.

*The Secretary of State* said that he was sure that discussions should come first if they could be arranged and that if the European Union was under notice when the I.M.F. mission arrived, any hope of a helpful attitude by the delegation would be seriously diminished. The tactic should be to play the issue along until the I.M.F. arrived. If there was no result from this he agreed that Company action might then be essential but it was impossible to decide at this stage; the situation must be allowed to develop.

*Mr. Welensky* agreed that it was essential to examine the situation after the I.M.F. mission and that no one should be committed to any action at this stage.

*Mr. Prain* concluded by saying that the Companies were not committed in any way and they would not lightly decide on drastic action. Nevertheless they had to contemplate the possibility of this if they were to forestall African action. The Companies' major doubt was the attitude likely to be taken by the Ministry of Materials.

*The Secretary of State* said that it was not possible for the Companies to determine their action with such subtlety. Clearly the issue had to be settled some time and the Companies should not expect to carry the Ministry of Materials with them in this matter.

## **91** T 220/253, no 133

28 Jan 1953

### **'Central African Federation conference: proposed White Papers': Treasury note by S G Charles on the costs of the Nyasaland defence forces**

We have now studied the draft White Papers more closely.

2. I am able to confirm our first impression that there is nothing in them to which Treasury ministers need object. There has, however, emerged one additional point which must surely whet our appetite for Federation, which is that on the Defence side, H.M.G. will save the amount of our present subvention to the cost of Nyasaland's security forces. You have already covered the question of Nyasaland's contribution towards the cost of the 'Temporary Ministry' or pre-Federation machinery, and apart from this there is no sign of a call for money from the United Kingdom budget either as a substantial once-for-all endowment or a continuing subvention. This is plainly as it should be as the two major partners, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, have healthy budgets, sound credit and a good deal of untapped taxable capacity.

You are however aware that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are receiving benefit from the money provided under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. This will continue as their territorial allocations have not yet been consumed. We may have to consider whether they should benefit under any successor Act, and, if so, to what amount. *Prima facie*, I do not think that they could be excluded from benefit entirely as their status as Protectorates of the Crown remains unchanged.

3. Colonel Edmunds has supplied me with the following on the Defence side.

It has been decided that the Federal Government shall have the same responsibility in respect of Defence that the Southern Rhodesia Government now has.

This means that the Colonial armed forces in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which are now part of the East African forces' internal security arrangements would become a Federal responsibility. H.M.G. would no longer have to contribute to the upkeep of the Nyasaland Forces which would mean an annual saving of the order of £270,000 on the Colonial Service Vote.

4. There is, of course, a wider interest than charges on the United Kingdom budget, and that is in regard to Central Africa as an important producer member of the Sterling Area and as a field for investment. Similarly here, there is nothing that I can see to comment on adversely. H.F. and O.F.<sup>1</sup> might however like to be aware of the new Loans Council procedure. (See Appendix X.)

5. Unlike the Caribbean Federation proposals, finance is not the rock on which this scheme may founder. If necessary, Treasury ministers can be told that there are no Treasury comments on the two proposed White Papers.

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<sup>1</sup> Home Finance and Overseas Finance, departments within the Treasury.

**92 DO 35/6827**

**26 Feb 1953**

**[Conservative Central Office and propaganda]: minute by R L D**

**Jasper. Annexes**

On Mr. Foster's instructions I saw Miss Sturges-Jones of the Conservative Central Office this morning.

2. We concocted, for use in suburban and provincial papers, the three draft letters attached. They are addressed to a public which is not touched by argument, and in Miss Sturges-Jones' opinion will help to prevent misunderstanding among those sections of public opinion which are politically important to Ministers at the present stage. I have accordingly sent them to her for use as required.

**Draft A**

I have been watching with considerable uneasiness the discussions in the press about Central African Federation.

It seems to be widely assumed that we in this country no longer have a duty to the African. I should have thought that we had such a duty, that it was clear, and that we should not be afraid to do it. Parliament has rightly taken the line in major matters of this kind, that it should consult African opinion. But it has never been suggested until recently that Parliament should be bound to follow African opinion if to do so would be contrary to the real interests of Africans.

The Government have decided that the Federal Scheme is the only hope for Central Africa. I personally believe that this is so. We have great responsibilities in Africa, which the ordinary person in this country has only just begun to appreciate. For this reason people are easily misled by specious arguments, based

on false sentiment. This is a bold and imaginative step forward, to be taken in the interests of Europeans and Africans alike. The duty of the ordinary citizen is to support it.

### Draft B

Many of us have relations and friends in Africa and are therefore interested in the Government's proposals for a Federation in Central Africa.

We all understand that, in the present state of development of these overseas territories of ours, proper safeguards for the African inhabitants are essential. But I for one maintain that my people in Africa can be trusted to give Africans a fair deal both now and in the future, and I do not like to see them unjustly attacked as if their principles and sense of duty were less than ours in England. That is patently untrue.

A great step forward is proposed in Central Africa. Our relations and friends have a great part to play in it and we in this country have a great responsibility. The Government has decided that this is the only scheme which is fair to both Europeans and Africans in these Territories and that they must go forward. I think it is up to us all to support this bold and imaginative scheme.

### Draft C

On our behalf the Government is about to take a bold step forward in Africa with the proposed Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.

The creation of this great new area of British influence is one of the most important steps which this country has ever taken. It means prosperity and a higher standard of living for Europeans and Africans alike where there is no assured prosperity at present. It means new markets for goods from this country. It is a chance (perhaps the last chance) for Europeans and Africans to achieve between them a relationship of a quite new kind. It may solve the problem of race relations in Africa. It is the only hope for these three countries.

If this Scheme is to be fair both to Europeans and Africans, there are certain rights which must be protected. The Government has seen that the rights of Africans to their land and to special protection under the Crown are secure and cannot be taken away, while the white population are offered untold opportunities

It is a bold, fair and far-sighted Scheme. It seems to me that it is up to each one of us to support it.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Baxter minuted (27 Feb), 'This gap needed filling. And the 3 drafts strike me as v. good indeed. With one qualification: I don't like the implic'n in 'C' that Africans will get only static protection while Europeans will have untold opportunities. 2. Further letters and follow-ups may be required. One thing that might be brought in is a simple explan'n why a multi-racial community differs from West Africa.' In the light of Baxter's comments, the third paragraph of draft C was amended to read: 'If the Scheme is to carry out our obligations as trustees for the Africans, there are certain rights which must be protected. The Government has seen that the rights of Africans to their land and to special protection under the Crown are secure and cannot be taken away.'

**93 DO 35/6801****2 Apr 1953**

**[Barotseland and federation]: inward telegram no 7 from to Sir G Rennie to W L Gorell Barnes. *Minutes* by R L D Jasper, G H Baxter and Sir P Liesching**

[In earlier discussions with the CO, Rennie had expressed the opinion that Barotseland would be free to remain outside the Federation if its paramount chief so decided. He based this upon an undertaking made by Creech Jones in Apr 1949. The CO disputed Rennie's interpretation of this statement. They claimed that, since the current federal proposals explicitly preserved in its existing form Barotseland's protectorate status (a point stressed by Griffiths in Sept 1951), it was not open to the paramount chief to 'contract out' of the Federation (Gorell Barnes to Rennie, 23 Mar 1953).]

Your secret telegram Personal No. 8. Position of Barotseland in the Federation. Following for Gorell Barnes.

*Begins.* I have given further consideration to the question in the light of your comments, but I still consider Barotseland should also be free to decline to accept Federation if the Paramount Chief and the Council so desire.

2. The background to Creech Jones' undertaking in April, 1949, is contained in Stanley's despatch No. 27 of the 18th February, 1948, especially paragraph 4, and in the Secretary of State's reply in savingram No. 114 of the 13th March, 1948, assurance in which was transmitted to the Paramount Chief in April, 1948. In my view, the result of that assurance is that if the Paramount Chief did not agree to any of the proposed changes in the Constitution of Northern Rhodesia affecting Barotseland (repeating affecting Barotseland), then either changes could not be made (which would be an impossible position) or, if they were to be made, Barotseland would have to be given the opportunity of ceasing to be part of Northern Rhodesia and of continuing in some other form its special treaty relationship with Her Majesty's Government, for example as a separate protectorate with High Commission status.

3. Creech Jones' undertaking in 1949 (although made before the present proposals of Federation were prepared) envisaged the possibility of Federation. At a meeting with the Paramount Chief and the Council held at Mongu on the 6th April, 1949, Creech Jones is recorded as saying:—

'The Provincial Commissioner, the Governor and the Secretary of State have all given you solemn assurances that constitutional changes would only come in consultation with you and with your consent. Her Majesty's Government refused amalgamation. I understand the people are now discussing Federation, but so far no official representation has been made to Her Majesty's Government with regard to all this talk that is going on. Her [sic: His] Majesty's Government will not commit you to any constitutional changes which may be proposed as a result of present discussions without full consultation with you and your agreement, but we do not know what the suggestions are. I therefore repeat to you my solemn assurance that Her Majesty's Government will agree to no constitutional changes without full consultation with you and your consent.'

4. Statement made by Griffiths in 1951 which you quote was of more general nature and did not relate to the 1948 assurance. It qualified in no way either that assurance or that given by Creech Jones in 1949. The Paramount Chief could argue with considerable force that the proposals in the Federal Scheme would affect his

treaties since the proposals would mean that he would have to look to the Federal Government for those services, such as postal and telegraph, which the British South African Company, as agents for the Crown, undertook to provide in accordance with the provisions of the Lewanika concession.

5. As I think I told you, I propose to go to Barotseland on the 10th April for several days and I hope the Paramount Chief and his Council will agree to accept the Federal Scheme, under paragraph 139 of which treaty rights of Barotseland are preserved. *Ends.*

### Minutes on 93

*Mr. Baxter* You will remember that the Colonial Office were instructed by the Secretary of State to see how far the Paramount Chief's desire that Barotseland be declared a separate protectorate could be met. It was understood that if the point could be dealt with the Paramount Chief might well support federation and that might be important, if not decisive, in determining reactions of Africans over a large part of Northern Rhodesia.

The history of this case is summarised in the Colonial Office note at (2) in the file. The Government of Northern Rhodesia have pursued this question since the January Conference and it was discussed between Sir Gilbert Rennie and Mr. Gorell Barnes while the latter was in Africa. Sir Gilbert Rennie then expressed the view, which was quite new to the United Kingdom side, that Barotseland was free under its Treaty to remain outside the federation if the Paramount Chief so decided (Fifth enclosure to (6) in the file, Flagged A). After Mr. Gorell Barnes returned to the United Kingdom Sir Gilbert Rennie sent a telegram asking for approval of the amending agreement about protectorate status. He also justified, in a separate telegram (flagged B), his view that Barotseland could not be incorporated in the federation unless the Paramount Chief wished it.

The Colonial Office have now put forward the view that, having regard to the circumstances of Mr. Creech Jones' declaration on this question in 1949, the Colonial Secretary cannot (without much fuller consideration) admit that the Paramount Chief has any right to contract out of the federation.

Sir Gilbert Rennie is now in Barotseland discussing with the Paramount Chief his attitude to federation. I understand that the Paramount Chief's advisers are extremely shrewd and, if they have any idea of the difficulty in which Sir Gilbert Rennie is placed over this matter, they may well try to hold out for further concessions before promising the Paramount's support for the Federal Scheme. This will appear in due course. Meanwhile, you may think that the Secretary of State should know that the difficulty exists, that it was only put forward by Northern Rhodesia after the Federal Scheme had been finally agreed, and that the Colonial Secretary is not disposed to admit that it is insuperable.

R.L.D.J.  
14.4.53

*Sir Percivale Liesching*

*Mr. Foster*

*Secretary of State*

This is a disconcerting development.

2. Sir Gilbert Rennie has suddenly brought to light an assurance given in 1949 by Mr. Creech Jones (then Colonial Secretary) to the Paramount Chief of Barotseland which he thinks would give the Paramount the right to contract out of federation. I don't know whether the C.O. had this on record. But, so far as I know, neither they nor the N.R. Govt. have given any hint of it throughout all the Conferences & conversations of the last 2 years.

3. Any such idea is intolerable at this stage. The Colonial Secretary is disposed to take the view that the assurance is not applicable to present circumstances. Meanwhile he has instructed Sir Gilbert Rennie to endeavour to ensure in his discussions with the Paramount that the latter shall consent to federation and so the issue will not be raised.

4. There seems to be nothing that we can usefully do. I do not think that we should say anything to the Southern Rhodesia Government unless and until it is found that the difficulty is so acute that public ventilation cannot be avoided.

G.H.B.  
15.4.53

#### *Postscript*

You should be aware of the above. But it appears from a telegram just received from Sir G. Rennie that the story has had a happy ending.

He has obtained, on certain conditions which can readily be satisfied, the consent of the Paramount Chief and Council of Barotseland to the Federal Scheme so far as Barotseland is concerned. (That was the corporate decision, though a *majority* of the Councillors, numerically, were against). The Creech Jones assurance was not specifically mentioned, but since it hinged upon 'consultation and consent' it appears to present no further difficulty.

One of the conditions is that Barotseland, while still remaining a part of Northern Rhodesia as heretofore, shall be formally styled 'Barotseland Protectorate'. The Colonial Secretary had already agreed to this 'in principle'.

All of this is being announced in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council to-day. Apart from getting round the special awkwardness created by the Creech Jones assurance, it seems capable of being used to smash the legend of the universal African opposition to federation; not only should the consent expressed by the native authority of Barotseland be valuable in itself, but it may well lead to other leading Africans taking courage.

G.H.B.  
16.4.53

This has been a nasty scare. Mr. Creech Jones' pledge ought to have been disinterred & re-buried long before this late hour.

In his final dealing with this matter, Sir G. Rennie seems to have managed things excellently.

I doubt whether this incident can be used as a 'legend-smasher'. A 'corporate decision' in favour of federation when a majority of Councillors were opposed does not cut much Parliamentary ice.

P.L.  
16.4.53

**94** CO 1015/339, no 91

4 May 1953

[Mining companies]: inward telegram no 126 from I M R MacLennan to CRO

Paragraph 15 of my Opdom<sup>1</sup> No. 9 Part II refers to statement by Prain of Selection Trust about intention to raise with European Employees' associations question of advancement of African labour in copper mines. I learn from a reliable source that Prain is being urged strongly by his American associates to engineer a showdown, involving a strike if necessary, with European trades unions over this question. Anglo American on the other hand are determined not to become involved and two groups are at loggerheads. While we should naturally be glad to see progress being made towards implementation of Dalgleish Report, it seems to me that it would be most undesirable if first step were to be made by provoking a European mine workers strike at this juncture. Much use was made by Keller, Olley<sup>2</sup> and others during Federation campaign of argument that Federation was being engineered by big financial interests in order to increase their profits by diluting European workers with Africans. It is on this basis and not on one of long term desirability of advancing Africans that matter will be debated here if it comes to a head now. I do not know that there is any action which the United Kingdom Government can usefully take to influence developments, but I thought you should know what is in the air.

2. I am sending copy of this telegram by air mail to Governor Lusaka and should be glad to have his comments on position.

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<sup>1</sup> 'Opdoms' were regular surveys of Commonwealth opinion, usually based on newspaper reports.

<sup>2</sup> L J W Keller and Charles Olley played a prominent part in the campaign in SR against federation. Both stressed the threat the proposals posed to white, working-class interests.

**95** DO 35/6725

19 June–16 Nov 1953

[Federation, propaganda and African opinion]: minutes by D Williams and R G Chisholm<sup>1</sup>

[The idea of a major campaign to convince Africans of the benefits of federation was originally rejected by Baxter on the grounds that 'the prospect of *any* specific amelioration of the position of Africans' might prejudice the SR referendum (minute, 16 Mar 1953). With the referendum over, however Baxter underwent an abrupt change of heart, claiming a concentrated effort was needed to convince 'African opinion' (minute, 24 Apr 1953). By that stage, however, there were doubts within the CRO as to whether such a campaign might not prove counter-productive.]

*Mr. Jasper*

I have asked the Colonial Office what the form is about a reply to the letter of the 22nd May and they are finding out for me. It may be useful, however, if I record my general reactions to the proposal, both when you first put it to me and now after reading these papers.

2. The difficulty of conducting a propaganda campaign among the Africans in the Northern Territories on Federation matters, is that of deciding what the campaign is

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<sup>1</sup> Principal, CRO.

to be about. If it is to be about the merits of the Federal Scheme, the Africans are not only not interested in discussing it; they are even afraid to discuss it. The malaise which has been caused among the Africans by the discussion of Federation has nothing whatever to do with the merits or demerits of the Federal Scheme. Instead it springs entirely from their fear for the future—Federation or no Federation, and is really excited not by the Federal proposals as such but by day to day discriminatory practices and the periodic outbursts of Mr. Welensky and his colleagues about their desire to get rid of Colonial Office control.

3. What therefore do you suggest that the Senior Officer concerned shall 'propagand' about? For him to have any real success with the Africans, he would have to direct just as much propaganda towards Europeans, persuading them to adopt a more liberal attitude and drop a number of discriminatory practices, as he would have to direct towards the Africans persuading them of the merits of the Federal Scheme. In fact, to my mind, talking to the Africans about the Federal Scheme is now almost a waste of time. The safest thing is to persuade them to forget the Federal Scheme and direct their attention to other matters. For this reason I think we have cause to rejoice that Congress in Northern Rhodesia is now directing its attention to walking into European hotels as a protest against the colour bar, rather than to refusing to pay its taxes as a protest against Federation. The time has now come when actions must be allowed to speak louder than words, and these actions must be directed to removing the African sense of grievance at what they regard as the indignities to which they have been subjected in the past.

4. The other point I would like to mention in connection with these papers, is that they show very little evidence of what has already been done in the Territories to put across the case for Federation. A very great deal of Government propaganda has gone out through 'saucepan specials', district officers, Government African newspapers and through admirable little fables like Mr. Morris' fable about the bridge, which I think you saw. Much of this effort may not have been 'co-ordinated' but it had the great merit of being very well adapted to the local conditions in each area in which it was applied. At all stages, however, it was nullified not merely by Congress counter-propaganda, but by the simple fact that nobody was able to demonstrate to the Africans how Federation would contribute towards removing those things which were frightening and disturbing them.

5. With respect, therefore, I do not feel that any very useful purpose will be served by pursuing the idea mooted in paragraph 4 of Mr. Baxter's letter. Indeed at this stage I think that the appointment of a full time officer with such functions might lead to more harm than good. It would stir up a propaganda war about Federation just at the time when interest in Federation among the Africans is beginning to die down and their attention is being directed instead to their inability to enter European bars in Kitwe.

D.W.  
19.6.53

With reference to my earlier minute on the Powys-Jones Annual Report file (CA 19/8/1) I am much obliged to Mr. Williams for letting me see this file. It is satisfactory to note that the C.R.O. are speaking with one voice on this matter even if it is not that of the Colonial Office!

2. The general position appears to be that earlier in the year we in the C.R.O.

were satisfied that more could be done in Central Africa to educate the native in the positive advantages of Federation; that we were anxious to see more done if only to enable Ministers to fend off attacks during Parliamentary discussions of the Federal Bill; that we went as far as to get Mr. Foster to speak to Mr. Hopkinson about it and that the Colonial Minister of State appeared to agree that something should be done.

3. We, (Mr. Baxter) then wrote to the Colonial Office on the 22nd May setting out very fairly the case for reviewing our propaganda arrangements. To that letter we have received no reply.

4. The only information to be set against these considerations and weight of opinion is Mr. Williams' note of 19th June which, while most helpful in many ways, does not really rebut the *prima facie* case for at least reviewing our existing 'Information' set up in Central Africa. One can always find reasons for not doing something, but I feel a more positive approach to this problem is wanted on something like the following lines.

5. What would our propaganda campaign be about? It need not necessarily be a 'campaign'. What I should like to see would be a steady stream of simple information directed to the villages explaining:—

- (a) the background to the introduction of Federation.
- (b) What has happened, is happening and will happen, in connection with Federation, with special reference to Chapter VI of the Constitution.
- (c) The economic benefits to be derived therefrom.
- (d) The *United Kingdom* attitude in regard to everyday happenings whether of the nature described as 'Welensky outbursts' or otherwise (e.g. Mau Mau).
- (e) The answers to Congress propaganda, etc etc.

6. I am appalled at the suggestion that because the African is terrified to discuss the Federal Scheme we should do nothing about it. That seems to be the best reason of all for taking action and there are very many other things that a good Information Officer could make much capital of. Simple examples that come to mind are the increases announced yesterday in African wage rates, and developments in regard to the University College.

7. I confess I do not follow paragraph 4 of Mr. Williams' note since its opening sentences seem to conflict with what was said in paragraph 2, while its concluding sentences imply that all the efforts described were really a waste of time. Surely it is not beyond us to demonstrate in simple terms how Federation will benefit and is already benefiting the African. The Federal Development Plans alone offer a very fertile source of propaganda for dissemination and any imaginative Information Officer worth his salt ought to be able to produce examples of positive benefit for African consumption.

8. In short, everything I have read on this file strengthens the case for doing something about this matter. It is not merely to give the Government talking points to fend off attacks that something should be done, but to achieve the much greater purpose of converting millions of Africans into willing members of the Federation. It is surely a sad reflection on the Whitehall machine if interdepartmental rivalries and jealousies, if they exist, are allowed to vitiate constructive planning of this sort, more particularly if they are due largely to official incompatibilities.

R.G.C.  
12.11.53

There is not much in Mr. Chisholm's minute which makes me want to add anything to what I said in my minute of 19th June.

2. The short point is that I do not think any more can be done at this stage to convince Africans of the merits of federation by talking to them about it or by directing propaganda to them on the subject. My previous minute attempted to point out that as far as propaganda is concerned a great deal had been done already and that in my view it could not be done more effectively by the appointment of a super-Goebbels. In any case the effect of propaganda has been not to convince the Africans but to alarm them, and I am sure that the right line now—whatever may have been the right line six months ago—is to let everybody settle down so that the Federation, given time, may convince them of its virtues by its results. I am reinforced in this view by the following passage from the African Affairs Annual Report for 1952 from Northern Rhodesia:—

'African opposition to the Federation proposals continue to be strongly expressed whenever the subject is discussed. More especially on public occasions such as the visits . . . of the Rt. Hon. Henry Hopkinson and the Rt. Hon. Clement Attlee . . . but in between times when no political personages were about Africans seemed only too ready to forget the subject and turn to more domestic matters. Their attitude was: "It is not for us to speak of these things; they are matters for our chiefs."' '

3. I find nothing 'appalling' in this suggestion that we should let the matter lie for the moment. Nor am I recommending a policy of doing nothing for the sake of doing nothing. On the contrary, I suggest that what is called for is deeds and not words.

4. I also most strongly repudiate any suggestion that a difference of view of this kind is the product of 'inter-departmental rivalries and jealousies'. It is quite clearly nothing of the kind. There is a difference of approach here due, I would suggest, to the fact that certain information regarding the extent and effect of previous efforts in this connection had unfortunately not been made available to the C.R.O. by the Colonial Office, so that previous discussion of this matter in the C.R.O. had taken place on the basis of inadequate information.

D.W.  
16.11.53

**96** DO 35/6851

17 & 27 July 1953

[Possible prohibition against Hastings Banda]: minutes by D Williams and W A W Clark

*Mr. Clark*

You asked me about the case of Dr. Hastings Banda. I have been in touch with the Colonial Office about it and discovered that further telegrams have been exchanged with the Governor of which we did not receive copies. The reason was that this exchange took place on a Top Secret file and contained information derived from special sources. There is a standing order in the Colonial Office that in such circumstances communications are not circulated outside the Office without special authority. I have however now obtained copies which are attached to this minute but

I have had to give an undertaking that the information contained in them is not passed on outside C.R.O. without special reference to the Colonial Office.

The story that they tell is straightforward enough. Dr. Banda had planned to sail for the Gold Coast on the 16th July where he intended to set up in practice. During the past few months there has been clear evidence that he intended to close down his practice in this country and go to Africa. At one stage he made tentative enquiries about putting himself on the Medical Register in Northern Rhodesia, a process in which he received no encouragement. More recently there have been several reports of his intending to go to the Gold Coast where he has a number of friends among the Gold Coast Ministers. The Colonial Office telegram reporting his intention to leave for the Gold Coast on the 16th July adds that he had been urged to return to Nyasaland but had shown no intention of doing so. It also pointed out that it would not be possible to prevent or delay his return to his home country.

To this the Governor replied that the information about his returning to Nyasaland came from Dr. Banda himself. A further check of special sources then showed that Dr. Banda had cancelled his passage to the Gold Coast and had arranged for his correspondence to be forwarded to Johannesburg. It certainly looks therefore as though he is intending to head for Southern Africa rather than the West Coast.

On the legal questions you raised with me it is not possible to declare Dr. Banda a prohibited immigrant into Nyasaland. He is a British protected person and a native of that Territory. The Colonial Office lawyers are still examining for me the question of whether it would be possible to deport him once he got there but so far they have found no provision in the Nyasaland law under which it would be possible to do this; again for the reason that Dr. Banda is a British protected person born in Nyasaland. It would of course be possible if he went back to Nyasaland and misbehaved himself for certain restrictions to be placed on his movements.

Further I understand that, as a matter of policy, the Colonial Office would be most reluctant to encourage any suggestion that steps might be taken to prevent Dr. Banda's entry into Nyasaland at this stage. He has done nothing which would enable the Secretary of State to justify such a procedure to the House.

D.W.  
17.7.53

*Sir P. Liesching*

You asked me to keep a close eye on any possibility that Dr. Hastings Banda might intend visiting Nyasaland in the near future. I have done so and can now report as follows.

2. Some weeks ago, Dr. Banda did apparently contemplate visiting South Africa if not Nyasaland. There were rumours that he had booked an air passage to Johannesburg.

3. The Colonial Office were completely at a loss for powers to exclude him from Nyasaland, since as part and parcel of the policy initiated by the previous Colonial Secretary (Mr. Griffiths) Nyasaland was permitted to repeal in December last the comprehensive powers which it had had for many years of deportation and exclusion. You will recall that over a year ago when we had discussions with the Colonial Office about this policy, we warned them that they might well regret the abolition of such powers in a large number of Colonies which were then quiet. My recollection is that our language was 'what guarantee had the C.O. that these places might not be in

future troubled?' Within a couple of months they were faced with Mau Mau in Kenya, one of the Colonies in which they had proposed to abolish. Nevertheless, they let Nyasaland go ahead and abolish its powers with the result that while Nyasaland today can exclude or deport an undesirable European immigrant, it cannot exclude a Nyasaland native, as Dr. Banda is.

4. Fortunately such matters will be the responsibility of the Federation in future.

5. Equally fortunately, the latest information is that Dr. Banda has now cancelled his passage to South Africa and Blantyre. He is now expected to leave for Accra on the 15th August. For some time apparently it has been his long-term aim to go there to practise as a doctor and presumably to enter local politics. So Nyasaland may be spared his mischiefs.

W.A.W.C.  
27.7.53

## 97 DO 35/6851

25 & 27 Aug 1953

[Disturbances in Nyasaland]: minutes by D Williams and W A W Clark

[Paramount chief of the Ncheu Angoni, Philip Gomani, had been among a delegation of Nyasaland Africans who travelled to London in Jan 1953 to express their opposition to federation. In May he was deposed by the Nyasaland government, after having encouraged his people to engage in civil disobedience. This action led to unrest, and Gomani fled to Mozambique accompanied by Michael Scott, the director of the Africa Bureau. They were arrested by the Portuguese authorities. Gomani was returned to Nyasaland and Michael Scott was declared a prohibited immigrant.]

*Mr. Clark*

You should see these papers. It may be convenient if I set out this whole question of the troubles connected with Nyasaland into different phases as follows:—

(a) *Dr. Hastings Banda, Mr. Dingle Foot<sup>1</sup> and Chief Gomani.* On this matter please see my minute of the 31st July above. The position here is that Chief Gomani has now been remanded until the 29th September on the grounds of ill-health. Mr. Dingle Foot has confirmed that the object of his visit was to conduct Gomani's defence and since the trial has been postponed he will not need the pass for the present. The Colonial Office have told him that his present application for a pass can stand over until it is actually required.

As regards Dr. Banda, the C.O. information is that he did in fact leave for the Gold Coast as arranged on the 15th August. This may be the end of him as far as Nyasaland is concerned. The legal points discussed at (a) in my minute of the 31st July have been further considered by the C.O. legal advisers who are now of the opinion that the definition referred to does extend to conduct committed outside Nyasaland. It would, therefore, be possible under the Nyasaland Ordinance to take action of the kind proposed by Mr. Hobson.

(b) *The Disturbances at Cholo.* Items 101 to 106 on this file deal with the disturbances that took place on Wednesday, 19th August at Cholo in the Southern Province in the course of which the police made a baton charge and one African was killed.

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<sup>1</sup> Lawyer and former Liberal MP. Later became Labour MP for Ipswich, 1957–1970.

These disturbances in their origin have nothing to do with Federation though, of course, they might be exploited by the opponents of Federation as a means of further unrest. The origin of this trouble (I believe) lies in a Private Estates Ordinance that was passed by the Nyasaland Legislature at the end of last year and one of the provisions of which enabled estate owners to charge additional rent to African farmers farming on their estates. One of the largest estate owners in the Southern Province is the British Central Africa Company who appear to have proceeded in a somewhat inept way by telling the Africans on their land that the Company now had the power to charge additional rent without, however, having any intention to try to charge it. The information thus passed on to the Africans so alarmed them that in many cases they refused to pay any rent at all not only on the B.C.A. Company Estates, but also on some of the neighbouring estates. There has I believe been a good deal of correspondence exchanged between the C.O. and the Governor on the one hand and between the Company's London headquarters and its Nyasaland representatives on the other as to what the next move ought to be. Meantime, feelings have been running very high in the Southern Province and any small incident was likely to cause an explosion.

According to the telegram at (101) the explosion apparently took place not on a B.C.A. Company Estate but on the neighbouring estate of a man called Tennes who caught two Africans trying to steal his oranges. The result was a riot in which the police made a baton charge and one African was killed by stones thrown by his own side. The upshot is that the Governor of Nyasaland has asked the Governor of Northern Rhodesia for police reinforcements and has sent a warning order to the Governor of Tanganyika and the G.O.C. East Africa. According to the Times report at (106) the Northern Rhodesian riot squad (which is an extremely well-trained and well-equipped force) has already left Bwana Mkubwa in the Copper Belt on its way to Lilongwe. The Governor is considering proclaiming a state of emergency but is against it for the moment.

(c) *Operation 'Bessie'*. In the course of discussing the above yesterday with the C.O. I discovered that as a result of some initiative taken by Mr. Lyttelton at the time of the Gomani episode, there had been some top secret and demi-official correspondence between the C.O. and General Erskine<sup>2</sup> as a result of which General Erskine had laid on a complete operation, known as Operation Bessie, for flying a battalion of K.A.Rs. down to Nyasaland in case of trouble. He has agreed that the situation in Kenya is such that he could spare them if necessary. I understand that as a result of the telegram at (105) representatives of the C.O. were summoned yesterday afternoon to a meeting of the Vice-Chiefs of Staff who said they were becoming somewhat alarmed at the general spread of incidents over East and Central Africa and wanted assurances that everything would be done to put the Colonial Police Forces in order at an early date so that demands for troops would only be made in the last resort. I understand that the C.O. representative explained the situation about the Nyasaland Police and the steps that were being taken to improve it in the light of the available finances, etc., as a result of which an assurance was obtained from the Vice-Chiefs of Staff that nothing would be done which would prejudice Operation Bessie. The C.O. representative also said that the chances of serious trouble in Nyasaland in the immediate future were about fifty-fifty.

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<sup>2</sup> Vice-chief of the imperial general staff.

As far as I know this is the first we have heard of Operation 'Bessie'. Perhaps these papers should be put through General Bishop<sup>3</sup> to confirm the point. The reason for this is that probably it was all done by demi-official and top secret correspondence and that it is of no direct interest to us anyway. We ought, however, to make sure that Sir G. Huggins knows about it. The Governor of Nyasaland in paragraph 3 of (10) promises to keep the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia informed and it is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that he knows about it already. But once these papers have been through General Bishop, we should, I suggest, take suitable steps to get ourselves properly put in the picture and to inform the authorities in Central Africa. The point may already have been discussed of course during the recent defence talks in Salisbury though it was not, as far as I know, on the agenda.

(d) *Imprisonment of Congress leaders.* The Governor's telegram at (103) mentions a further matter that has nothing to do with the Cholo incident. This concerns the sentencing of three members of the Executive of the Nyasaland Congress Party (including the President of the Zomba Branch) to various terms of imprisonment for seditious talk for attempting to undermine lawful authority by urging people not to pay their taxes and for making public collections without Government consent. The matter was also referred to in the Times on the 24th August and a copy of the extract is at (106). With this situation, at any rate, the Nyasaland Government appears to have dealt firmly.

2. The general picture that emerges from all this is first that trouble seems to be largely confined to the Southern Province. Secondly, local resources for dealing with it, including the reinforcements from Northern Rhodesia, seem to have been mobilised with reasonable speed and there is every hope that they will prove effective. Something will have to be done, however, to secure a permanent settlement of the difficulties that are arising on the B.C.A. Company's Estates and I understand that the C.O. are in contact with Mr. Dodds Parker, M.P. who has an important interest in the Company, with a view to securing some solution. The trouble seems to be the vacillation of people on the spot who cannot make up their minds whether to press for evictions or to forego their right to the rent. Thirdly, it is comforting to know that a complete battalion could be made available from Kenya to deal with any serious trouble; but I think we ought to take steps to find out some of the details. Finally, the sentences passed on the Congress leaders for their 'passive resistance campaign' seem to me about right, i.e., they are what the offences deserved and are not savage enough to make martyrs of the men.

D.W.  
25.8.53

*Mr. Williams*

At the request of the Colonial Office I discussed with you, Mr. Baxter and Sir P. Liesching this morning, telegram No. 448 from the Governor of Nyasaland about the arrangements contemplated for reinforcements. The Colonial Office had expressed certain anxieties about the use of Southern Rhodesia police in Nyasaland, since this might be the spark that would touch off anti-Federation feeling throughout the African population.

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<sup>3</sup> Maj-Gen Sir Alexander Bishop, principal staff officer to S of S for Commonwealth relations, 1953–1957.

2. On Sir P. Liesching's instructions, I informed Mr. Marnham that our views were as follows:—

(1) we felt very strongly that all the resources of the civil authorities in the Central African and appropriate neighbouring territories should be used before there was any question of bringing in troops from outside the Federal area;

(2) the obvious thing to do before going further afield for reinforcements was to call on Northern and Southern Rhodesia police reinforcements to the maximum; in any case the B.S.A.P. reinforcements would be African police with European officers, and presumably consist of the very well trained and disciplined riot squads which we had already made use of in Bechuanaland most satisfactorily;

(3) further, we were prepared, if the Colonial Office agreed, to warn the High Commissioner for the Territories in the strictest confidence that he should make discreet preparations to send additional reinforcements from Bechuanaland if the Governor of Nyasaland so requested;

(4) we felt so strongly on this that Sir P. Liesching would wish to be consulted first if the Colonial Office intended to send any contrary instructions to the Governor of Nyasaland;

(5) although it was not strictly our concern, we felt compelled to point out that under the present political circumstances any decision to call in troops from East Africa demanded a Ministerial if not Cabinet decision and that we trusted that the Governor of Nyasaland would be apprised of this.

3. I put all this to Mr. Marnham who said he would report it to Sir T. Lloyd. On the last point, Mr. Marnham said that he believed that the Colonial Secretary had already given full thought to the matter and carried V.C.I.G.S. with him, but he undertook to see to it that our view was considered.

4. Mr. Marnham will let me know whether the Colonial Office desire us to warn the High Commissioner for the Territories.

W.A.W.C.  
27.8.53

**98** CO 1015/457, no 1

7 Sept 1953

**[Disturbances in Nyasaland]: inward telegram no 485 from Sir G Colby to Mr Lyttelton on the question of outside influence**

While the disturbances which have taken place recently are ostensibly the result of many months political agitation culminating in an incipient revolt of the Anguru tribe, it has been in my mind that there might be a deeper influence at work and that Congress and Anguru might be merely the tools of some dangerous anti-British organization inspired from outside Africa.

2. During the past week, particularly in two places where we have had serious incidents, certain tendencies have been observed which, combined with odd unexplained items of information, anonymous letters from informers and rumours over a period of many months are beginning to produce a vague pattern. This pattern has been discerned by the District Commissioner of Blantyre who has been present at all incidents in the past week. He is a very intelligent young officer who has during

the past two years built up an effective intelligence network with quite remarkable results. I saw him privately yesterday when he showed me a quantity of apparently disconnected but significant material from his reports over a long period. He also described to me his observations and suspicions. He is convinced beyond any doubt that we are up against something much more serious than nationalism or local agitation. Indians are heavily involved and possibly one European of Austrian origin: moreover, there appears to be some religious background.

3. After most careful thought I feel sure it is imperative that all available material should be examined by a high level expert from M.I.5, as soon as possible. In asking you to arrange this I realize that I am asking you to accept my judgment on trust. I earnestly hope you will be prepared to do this.

4. The Special Branch have no knowledge of this situation. They have neither the capacity nor the time to investigate it properly: They are flat out in coping with day-to-day security intelligence.

5. My idea is that investigator should come here with a cover story: I suggest Social Welfare would be appropriate and this could be arranged by a routine exchange of telegrams. (Social Welfare cover would enable him to associate closely with District Commissioner of Blantyre). After he has spent a short period here investigator could decide how to proceed and if he so wished I would naturally place at his disposal all our resources. In the meantime, his purpose in coming here should be known to minimum people. For the present, therefore, the contents of this telegram will be known to only four persons besides myself.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The CO consulted Sir John Shaw, a former governor of Trinidad and Tobago who served in MI5 from 1950–1954. Shaw did not believe a ‘dangerous anti-British organisation’ was behind the unrest in Nyasaland and suggested, in the first instance, MI5’s security liaison officer in Salisbury, Basil Maurice (‘Bob’) de Quehen, should be brought in to consider the evidence (minute by C J J T Barton, 8 Sept 1953).

## **99** CO 1015/339, no 131

7 Jan 1954

**[Mining companies]: minute by W L Gorell Barnes on whether government should intervene**

*Secretary of State*

Mr. Prain came to see me this afternoon and we talked for about three-quarters of an hour.

The present position is as follows:—

(1) A meeting between the Chamber of Mines and the European Union is due to take place sometime next week. This will almost certainly produce an immediate deadlock and if it does, the present intention of Mr. Prain’s group of companies is to send a letter, of which we have seen a draft, giving six months’ notice of termination of their Agreement with the European Union.

(2) Sir R. Welensky made a private offer to preside over discussions on the understanding that the companies agreed in advance to accept the Grenfell scheme for paying a substantial part of the wages of Africans promoted into ‘European’ jobs into a trust fund. This offer had been turned down for very much the reasons for which we criticised it to the Northern Rhodesian Government in the telegram of which a copy is attached to your brief.

The rest of our discussion was concerned with the question whether or not Government ought to intervene, e.g. by appointing a commission of enquiry. Mr. Prain was at pains to tell me that you would be urged by a great many people that Government should intervene. But when I asked him whether he wished me to tell you that this was his view, his reply was that he did not. His opinion was that, if things were allowed to take their course, there would be a really bad row which would last for a long time and might even be a danger to security: this might, however, result in a permanent solution of the problem, though it would undoubtedly leave a good deal of bitterness behind it. If, on the other hand, Government intervened by appointing a commission of enquiry or something of the kind, then there would be no immediate row but everyone would be confronted with roughly the same position about a year hence. Mr. Prain felt that it was not for him to judge which was the right course.

I have the impression that, in his heart of hearts, Mr. Prain feels that things have got to be brought to a head. On the other hand, he is clearly feeling in a somewhat exposed and lonely position: I notice in to-day's 'Times' that the Secretary of the European Union has suggested that he should be deported as a man who is likely to bring about racial strife! Mr. Prain ended by saying that if Government thought he ought not to bring things to a head, he would like instructions, not guidance, to that effect. If, on the other hand, his policy of bringing things to a head was thought right, he hoped that he would get some support and not be left to fight his battles all alone.

Like so many things in Africa, I think this is a question of timing. Government will be bound to intervene at some stage, if only because the whole prosperity of the area is so bound up with the copper industry. But I myself believe that some risks have got to be taken in timing; for there can be no hope of finding a solution for the industry's problem unless all concerned are given a sight, however short, of the ugly possibilities with which failure to solve it is fraught.

**100** DO 35/7521, no 3

16 Mar 1954

[Nyasaland—land]: despatch by Sir G Colby to Mr Lyttelton on African grievances

I have the honour to refer to my saving telegram No. 16 of the 14th January, with which I forwarded a copy of the record of a meeting of the African Protectorate Council held on the 15th of December, 1953, and to submit herewith a further copy of the memorandum on land matters which formed part of that record, together with my promised comments.

2. As you are aware, the memorandum derives from an interview, granted by you to Nyasaland African representatives in London in April, 1952, at which you suggested that as the question of land was a complex subject it would be convenient if the Africans would submit a memorandum outlining their representations in more detail. Mr. Gorell Barnes' letter to me, No. CAA.103/3/01 of the 22nd July, 1952 refers.

3. The grievances expressed in the memorandum will not be new to you; they were referred to in paragraph 8 of my telegram No. 558 of the 19th October, 1953,

and in your statement in Parliament on the 21st October 1953. They remain basically the same as those recounted by Sir Sidney Abrahams in the Land Commission report published in 1946. I would also refer to the report of the Planning Committee charged with investigating the recommendations of the Land Commission, and in particular to my demi-official letter No. LANCOM 14 of the 28th April, 1948, addressed to Mr. Cohen on the difficulties of fully implementing the action recommended. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties involved, it has been possible to acquire since 1948 some 300,000 acres of land out of the 546,000 acres recommended for purchase by the Planning Committee; the purchase of a further 21,000 acres has been agreed; negotiations are now in train for the purchase of another 4,000 acres; and in addition I hope to obtain further substantial acreages from the British Central Africa Company and certain other landowners in the future. You will be aware, also, that an attempt has been made to improve living conditions of tenants on private land by repealing the Natives on Private Estates Ordinance of 1928 and substituting for it the Africans on Private Estates Ordinance of 1952. It will be seen, therefore, that since 1949 considerable progress has been made, but despite this the basic problem remains, and the Africans' demand for more agricultural land and for 'emancipation' still persists; in fact since twelve months ago these feelings have become intensified.

4. Before recounting the action I have in mind to allay the grievances expressed in the memorandum I would like to offer some general observations on it. In the first place I would say that although I am sure that those subscribing to the memorandum are sincere in all that they have written, they have allowed their views on the matter to get out of perspective, and have overstated their case. Indeed it is easy for anyone unfamiliar with land problems in Nyasaland to gain the impression from the memorandum that all tenants on private land are living in a state of near servitude; that there are extensive areas of good land on private estates and in forest reserves, lying unoccupied and capable of making a substantial contribution to present problems of congestion if they are made available to Africans; and that this state of affairs is to a great extent attributable to the unscrupulous actions of the first European settlers who came to the Protectorate at the end of last century.

5. To examine these contentions I will first turn to the suggestion that tenants live in a state of near servitude. On some estates, chiefly those owned by the larger companies, there is certainly cause for discontent. In illustration, for example, of African grievances on British Central African Company land, I would quote paragraphs 13 to 16 inclusive of a report No. BCA/1 of the 22nd August, 1953, a copy of which was sent to you under cover of my saving telegram No. 454 of the 2nd September, 1953. But it is far from true to conclude that the same conditions obtain on all estates. The reverse is in fact the case, and on estates where landlords are tolerant and refrain from unnecessary interference with their tenants, the lot of tenants on private land is often better than that of their neighbours on Trust land. Planters and missionaries owning estates where such satisfactory relations obtain would, I am sure, deeply resent any suggestion that they treated their tenants in a manner approaching servitude. Out of a total Protectorate population of over 2,500,000 persons it is estimated that 170,000 reside on private land, and of this number it is estimated that not more than half are actively concerned in trying to secure a change in their status as tenants. That is not to say, of course, that some of those who resent the conditions under which they are now living do not constitute

an important and dangerous element, notwithstanding the comparative smallness of their numbers.

6. To take the suggestion that the acquisition of private land can make a material contribution to the relief of congestion, the total area of private land now held in freehold is 887,000 acres, or rather less than 4% of the total land area of the Protectorate. And of this it is estimated that 500,000 acres are already in occupation by African tenants. Acquisition of this 500,000 acres, if such were possible, would certainly do away with all troubles between landlords and tenants, because there would then be no tenants, but it would make little or no contribution to the problem of congestion. This leaves some 387,000 acres of private land not in use by Africans. 100,000 acres of this may be considered as actually under direct development by estate-owners, and a further 200,000 acres may be considered as appropriately kept under indigenous forest, or as being incapable of economic development, or as land which should not be developed. The total area, therefore, of land suitable for cultivation and not at present in use either by estate-owners or by Africans, is estimated to be well under 100,000 acres, and this is the only class of land which it is possible to put to the relief of congestion. It would be idle to suppose that acquisition of all of it would give any perceptible or permanent relief to the problem of congestion.

7. Nor would it be possible to give any relief to the problems of congestion by endangering the natural resources of the country and encroaching on forest reserves, as for the most part these reserves have been established for the protection of hills, steep slopes, and water catchment areas.

8. To turn to the question of the manner in which the early settlers acquired their land, I am informed that there was some division of feeling in the Protectorate Council on this point, and that the Northern and Central Province members did not feel so keenly in the matter as those in the Southern Province. It was not possible to convince the Protectorate Council as a whole (though there is little doubt several members were convinced), that the transactions investigated by Sir Harry Johnston,<sup>1</sup> and leading to the issue of Certificates of Claim in the 1890s, were recognised at the time and could not now be reopened. As regards the question of whether the chiefs of bygone days realised what they were doing in assigning the land, the fact is of course that at that time the population was very small, and in accordance with African usufructual<sup>2</sup> ideas they were only interested in such land as they required for their own use. The following extract (relating to private land in the Upper Cholo area to which local Africans recently laid claim), from a report by Mr. MacDonald, Land Settlement Officer, is in point:

‘In fact in 1890 there were no more than a few hundred Africans in this whole locality: and it was necessary for the early settlers to import labour from outside for their needs. And it was this paucity of population which enabled Mr. K.C.A. Sharrer, the most prominent pioneer at that time, to obtain without difficulty a certificate of claim covering all the northern part of the Cholo district. The truth is that European planters arrived before the vast majority of the African now settled in this area, and that these Africans followed in the wake of Europeans, search of employment being the

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<sup>1</sup> British commissioner, Nyasaland, 1891–1897.

<sup>2</sup> Usufruct: the right to enjoy the use of another's property short of its destruction or waste.

inducement. It is important to remember this when listening to the extravagant claims now being made by local African to ownership of land.'

9. But even supposing African claims to land were deserving of sympathy on ethical grounds, there is no doubt that any claims they might make in a court of law would not invalidate the titles now held by estate-owners. Any re-opening of the question of freehold titles which were recognised by Sir Harry Johnston in his Certificates of Claim can only lead to profitless acrimony, and cannot be contemplated.

10. From this factual background it can be seen that this land problem is essentially a political one. The Africans directly affected comprise a comparatively small population living in a comparatively small and compact area of the Southern Province, and the area of unoccupied land available for acquisition is such that it cannot have any perceptible effect in relieving the general problem of congestion. I have no wish however to minimize the dangers inherent in present African dissatisfaction but I am however concerned to put the matter in its proper perspective, and to emphasize that it is the political aspect of the problem rather than the congestion aspect which is important.

11. In my view the solution of the problem lies in the gradual adaptation of the use of land in private ownership so as to conform as closely as possible to African usufructual ideas, which are the only ideas they can understand. The principles of usufruct are as strong in the mind of the African today as they ever were, and close examination of African land grievances will reveal that at the base of them there is always the same factor, i.e. that ownership of land can only go with the direct use of it. For this reason they have never disputed the ownership of land in actual cultivation by estate-owners. Conversely Africans cannot see that any other person should have any rights to the land which they themselves are cultivating, and it is this belief which is at the bottom of their dislike of the tenant system. Nor can they see that any estate-owner has the right to prevent others from cultivating land which he does not require for his own immediate use, dissatisfaction on this last point being particularly dangerous in closely-populated areas.

12. To examine the question of the adaptation of the ownership of private land to African usufructual ideas it is necessary to view land on estates as being divided into four categories:—

- (a) land in direct use by the estate-owner (including land kept by him under temporary fallow).
- (b) land in the occupation of African tenants.
- (c) land appropriately kept under indigenous forest; land incapable of economic development; and land which should not be developed.
- (d) land of agricultural value, unoccupied either by the estate-owner or by African tenants.

13. There are no political difficulties affecting the land in category (a) because it is not in accordance with African principles to claim such land. Nevertheless I consider it of great importance that estate-owners should be encouraged to fence such land so as to leave no doubt in the African mind that it is in use.

14. In my view, whenever practical considerations permit, land in occupation by tenants referred to in category (b) should be acquired by Government for African use,

priority being given to those areas where tenants are most dissatisfied. Such action not only disposes of the difficulties of the tenant system, but it also prevents the sale of such land to Asians, a matter of complaint made in paragraph 8 of the memorandum.

15. The uncultivable land referred to in category (c) should in the interests of the country be preserved in a virgin state. This will not please Africans who will claim rights to it on the grounds that the owner is not using it. For political reasons it is desirable that any resentment about the preservation of natural resources should be directed against Government and thus in my view such land should be acquired by Government.

16. The unoccupied land of agricultural potential referred to in category (d) presents the most urgent problem at the present time. Although the extent of this land is not great, feeling about it is very high, and if serious political trouble is to be avoided all this land should be put fully under development in the course of the next five years, or else surrendered for African use: any such land which cannot be developed during the next five years should be surrendered now.

17. The above is a broad enunciation of the general policy which I consider should be pursued with a view to allaying African misgivings about the ownership of private land and their dislike of the tenant system. The implementation of such a policy will necessarily be protracted, but the fact has to be faced that grievances concerning the tenant system are not capable of quick solution. As you are aware, my own view is that the position will not be satisfactory until such time as the whole tenant system has been abolished, and estates are worked by resident labour who are wholly dependent on their wages for their living. Such a state of affairs cannot be achieved at once. I have hopes, however, that if the negotiations at present in train with regard to the acquisition by Government of further areas of land progress satisfactorily, more and more estate-owners will be brought to see the disadvantages of the tenant system, and the benefits which they would gain by surrendering land which they do not wish to put into direct use, and the merits of relying on permanent labour for the cultivation of their estates.

18. On the assumption that the negotiations at present being conducted with landowners turn out to be successful much detailed work will be involved in demarcating the new boundaries of freehold land. It will be understood that on most estates the general pattern of developed and unoccupied land in relation to land in use by tenants is necessarily a very untidy one, and to make the new boundaries of estates both simple and practical great thought and care will be necessary. On many estates the work will involve the removal of a certain number of tenants from one part of the estate to another. I shall require all this work to be done with the full co-operation and agreement of local Africans, as well as of their headmen and Native Authorities. And in return for the land that they will receive I shall require that in every case these persons shall sign a document signifying their recognition of the transaction as final. Such documents would have the effect of strengthening the hand of the administration in the future, and they would also have the effect of deterring Africans from making profitless pursuit of the manner in which original certificates of claim were issued.

19. To take the specific requests made by the African Protectorate Council in paragraph 5 of their memorandum, I have covered in broad outline the policy which I consider should be adopted to meet the demands in paragraphs (i) and (iv). With regard to land situated in the vicinity of townships referred to in paragraph (ii), this

can only have practical reference to the towns of Blantyre, Limbe and Zomba, and to places such as Luchenza, a railway station in the Southern Province, where appreciable areas of land are in the private ownership of the African Lakes Corporation, Blantyre and East African Ltd., the British Central Africa Company and others. The use of land in Blantyre and Limbe is, of course, controlled by the town planning scheme affecting those towns and an area surrounding them, and when in implementation of that scheme it has been necessary to acquire land for purposes of public nature, this has been done. It is not, however, normally practicable or even desirable to acquire privately owned land suitable now or in due course for commercial and industrial use merely in order to deprive the present owners of the financial benefits which would accrue to them from the future development of the towns. It will in any event be apparent that owing to cost, acquisition could not be justified in these circumstances.

20. To deal with the question of Forest Reserves referred to in paragraph 5(iii), the root of the complaint lies in the fact that it has not yet proved possible to impress on the great majority of Africans the necessity for establishing and maintaining Forest Reserves. Although most Africans admit that Forest Reserves are necessary they do not really believe it, and the land in Forest Reserves is always regarded with cupidity by the great majority living in the vicinity. Unlike the problem of tenants on private estates, this question is not confined mainly to the Southern Province, but extends throughout the Protectorate, feeling on the matter being equally strong in the Central and Northern Provinces. I fear that it is only education which will provide a solution to this problem.

21. There remains the question of land belonging to missionary societies referred to in paragraph 5(v) of the memorandum. Practically without exception tenants on mission land are not disturbed and their lot is almost identical with those living on Trust Land. Furthermore there is little mission land in the comparatively restricted area in the Southern Province in which real dissatisfaction on the land question is almost entirely confined. It is however a fact that the publicity recently given to African land grievances in the Southern Province has had repercussions in the north, and feeling once aroused is not easy to allay. For this reason I consider that any mission land offering at a reasonable figure should be bought by Government.

22. In conclusion I must emphasize that I regard African concern over the whole land question as being of great political importance; I am therefore anxious to receive your comments on the observations made in this despatch at any early date, particularly in view of your projected visit to the Protectorate when it will be desirable to make some reply to the memorialists.

**101** DO 35/7521, no 24

14 May 1954

[Nyasaland—land and constitution]: letter from W L Gorell Barnes to G H Baxter

As soon as we get the full records of the meetings which the Secretary of State had in Nyasaland we will send you the gist of the ones likely to interest you. I will also see that a draft comes over of the statement which the Secretary of State proposes to make in the House next Wednesday, though as it will be mainly about land I doubt

whether you will be immediately concerned or need to tell Maclennan in advance. Meanwhile you may like to hear briefly how things went.

2. On land, after some plain speaking to those who regard as 'appeasement' any attempt to settle an African grievance, the Secretary of State has left Colby to negotiate with the big estate owners, who have been left in no doubt (though the Secretary of State did not say so in terms) that compulsory acquisition will not be shirked if they are not prepared to sell voluntarily that part of their land which is irretrievably infested with African tenants or which, though unoccupied, they cannot develop within a reasonable time. Barrow supported this course.

3. On the constitution, we were brought up short on learning from Huggins and Barrow that the Federal Government has not even begun to think about the Federal franchise and is not likely to have anything like firm proposals worked out for two or three years. This put paid to any attempt to experiment with a common roll in the next phase in Nyasaland, since we felt it would be wrong even to experiment with one which might conflict seriously with Federal thinking. We therefore abandoned the ideas we had been toying with, which were roughly an unofficial element in Legislative Council consisting of 5 Africans, 1 European representing African interests, 1 Indian and 5 Europeans: 4 each of the Africans and Europeans being chosen roughly as now, and 1 African, 1 Indian and 1 European being elected on a common roll for the whole territory on a similar pattern to that devised by Mackenzie for Tanganyika.

4. Instead, we have fallen back more or less on Colby's earlier line of thought, namely one more African, (making 4), 1 European for African interests, and 5 non-Africans to be elected on a combined non-African roll but on a 'constituency' basis rather than by the present Heath Robinson method. It is not yet certain whether we shall retain the Indian; but we shall probably do so at this stage unless we can get the leaders of the Indian community to say that they are prepared to give it up in return for inclusion on a non-African roll (which is, however, most unlikely to give them a seat). Colby is working on these lines and will send detailed proposals later this year, possibly after further discussion while he is here during the summer.

5. We thought that, when the actual changes are announced later this year, something should be said about the need during the next few years to study the franchise problem and consider whether some system cannot be found which will escape the worst disadvantages both of separate racial electorates and of the common roll as hitherto understood. There should also be some reference to the fact that the same problem would, during the same period, be under consideration for the Federal Legislature.

6. All this, combined with the news that Federal thinking is not nearly so far ahead as we had imagined, gives us a chance to influence that thinking if we wish and in any case makes it incumbent on us to clear our minds with you. So when the records of the talks are available, perhaps we could put our heads together.

7. Apart from the Nyasaland Constitution, the main topic of conversation between my Secretary of State and Huggins was the federal public service. It appears that some teething troubles are developing and that, in particular, there is some disquiet among Northern officers, mainly because they are reading into Article 9(2) of the Order in Council a threat of what amounts to arbitrary dismissal at three months' notice—since that is what 'termination of secondment' would amount to if the Department had meanwhile become federalised. There has also been a good deal of heart-searching about discrimination in conditions of service, though I gather that everybody has now come to the conclusion that, if they are going to avoid a

complete upset either in the Northern Territories or in Southern Rhodesia, most of the present differentiations will have to be preserved at any rate for the time being; and the only question at issue is whether or not legislation can be avoided. We shall probably be writing to you separately about these points on which Huggins is, in my view, being as helpful and sensible as he could possibly be.

**102** DO 35/4778, no 9

18 June 1954

[Intelligence in Central Africa]: letter from I M R MacLennan to R W D Fowler.<sup>1</sup> *Enclosure*: letter from B M de Quehen to I M R MacLennan, 15 June 1954

[During the London conference on federation in Jan 1953, Huggins had raised the possibility of creating a federal security agency 'on the lines of the American FBI or the United Kingdom MI5' (CAB 133/97, pp 6-7, minutes of the second meeting of the conference on the Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 2 Jan 1953). Under an agreement revealed to the Federal Cabinet in Apr 1954, the British government allowed Bob de Quehen, MI5's SLO in Central Africa at the time of the Federation's establishment, to take on the task of establishing a Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau (FISB). It was originally envisaged that he would serve as the organisation's head for two years from its creation in June 1954, while remaining MI5's SLO in Salisbury. In fact, he left MI5 in 1956, but continued to act as head of the FISB until its dismantling in 1963.]

The question of a Security Report for Southern Rhodesia is one which has been mentioned to me from time to time by the Security Liaison Officer and I accordingly referred to de Quehen for his views a copy of your letter, CA.150/41/1, of the 29th May. I enclose a copy of his reply.

2. From this you will see, first, that Southern Rhodesia does not produce a Security Report but that the Security Liaison Officer is at work trying to establish the organisation which would generate the material required to produce one. By the time this object is attained, however, Territorial reports may perhaps be superseded by a comprehensive report on security in the Federation as a whole, which it will be one of the tasks of de Quehen, as head of the newly established Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau, to produce (a Southern Rhodesian report would of course be a necessary preliminary to a Federal report).

3. Secondly, you will see that de Quehen has very much in mind the danger that these political intelligence reports may give an unbalanced picture and that he regards it as one of the tasks of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau to see that the good is balanced against the bad.

4. In the circumstances you will perhaps agree that we can await the more comprehensive reports which are to be expected from the new Bureau once it gets into its stride.

Enclosure to 102

Thank you for your D.17/1 of 9th June 1954, and its enclosure.

2. I think your Head Office are probably quite right when they say that the

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<sup>1</sup> Assistant secretary, CRO.

Political Intelligence Reports from the Northern territories may have contributed to Federal anxieties. I mentioned this at a C.I.C.<sup>2</sup> meeting in Lusaka and also at Zomba, and stressed the importance when drafting these reports of indicating when action has been taken in any given situation. Otherwise people reading them think that nothing is ever done, and the malcontents are having it all their own way. Sir Godfrey is, I know, concerned that suitable action is taken for he realises the potential danger of these African Nationalist movements. One need only look 500/600 miles North of the Federation's Northern borders to see what can happen. It is now spreading to other tribes.

3. To those unaccustomed to reading political and security intelligence summaries, there is a natural tendency to feel that the security situation is gloomy. Whereas, to those who are used to this sort of thing it is probably no worse than usual. Such reports obviously highlight the bad spots, and so one tends to forget that 95% or more of the population are perfectly content and law abiding. I also raised this point at the Intelligence Committee meetings (where the reports are drafted) with the idea of getting them into proportion and balancing the bad with the good. They are improving in this regard, I think.

4. One of the tasks of the Intelligence and Security Bureau, as I see it, will be to evaluate all the material it receives with a view to presenting the Prime Minister of the Federation with as balanced a picture as possible. This we propose to do as soon as the Bureau gets into its stride.

5. Southern Rhodesia does not produce a Political Intelligence Report. I hope in time we shall get them to do so, but it is a slow process. I have put various suggestions on security subjects to various members of the Southern Rhodesia Standing Ministerial Committee on Security (S.M.C.S.), from the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia downwards. These take the line that Southern Rhodesia could with advantage form Intelligence Committees at provincial levels (P.I.Cs). We have had some success over this because Bulawayo has started one. Brigadier Magan<sup>3</sup> and I were able to 'sell' this idea just after the Wankie strike when the Committee was in a receptive mood. If and when they get these provincial committees working through the country, the S.M.C.S. could demand from them periodical reports compiled not only from C.I.D., and Police sources, but also from the Native Affairs Department, the Department of Native Labour and such other departments which are represented on the P.I.Cs. These reports should then be condensed and evaluated by the S.M.C.S. or at a working sub-committee of that body. Thus Southern Rhodesia would be in step with what is now done in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; but Southern Rhodesia is, as you know, sensitive to new suggestions, so we have to proceed slowly.

6. Meanwhile, I fear that you and the C.R.O. may have to be content with such local material as the Bureau can produce for you. It should, I hope, present a reasonably good picture. I have not yet decided whether we will be able to write a monthly summary in addition to 'Sitreps'. I hope we shall be able to when we have the staff.

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<sup>2</sup> Central Intelligence Committee

<sup>3</sup> Presumably Brig William Magan, head of MI5's 'E' branch, which was responsible for operations in the Commonwealth and the colonies (Tom Bower, *The perfect English spy, Sir Dick White and the secret war 1935-90* (London, 1995) p 144).

**103** CO 1015/944, no 67

24 June 1954

**'Economic development programme and the Kafue/Kariba problem':  
Treasury briefing paper**

1. The Development Plans for the Federation and for the three territories for the period to June, 1957 (3½ years) were discussed in London with Sir A. Strachan<sup>1</sup> in September, 1953. We accepted the plans, subject to a few points of detail, as satisfactory under the criteria for United Kingdom lending. The extent of London market borrowing over the period was not however determined, this being dependent on market conditions and on what other sources could be tapped, in particular for the Kafue hydro-electric project. A loan of £10 million was agreed for 1954, and will take place very shortly; but we were unable to enter into any commitments for London borrowing for 1955 and beyond.

2. The plans as originally submitted required £131 million over the period to June, 1957; £51 million was said to be available, leaving £80 million to be found from external sources. We subsequently amended these figures in certain respects, by reducing Northern Rhodesia's requirements, and by rephrasing the expenditure for the Kafue hydro-electric project on lines suggested by Northern Rhodesian representatives; according to our latest estimates, total requirements over the period are £122 million, of which £69 million is required from external sources. (Details in Annex A.)<sup>2</sup> Sir A. Strachan was informed of our calculations in a letter of 29th December, 1953 and has not challenged them.

*Requirements for 1954*

3. In the same letter of 29th December, 1953 we calculated the 1954 requirements alone to be some £16 million (see Annex B); this will be met by the London loan of £10 million, and it was hoped that an F.O.A. loan of £5 million for the Rhodesia Railways would substantially cover the remaining gap; however the loan has now been agreed at £3.6 million, and we do not know yet whether the Federation feel that they are adequately covered for 1954. This subject may come up; if the Federation should wish at the last minute to increase the amount of their London loan (presuming that it is still not floated), they might be told to raise the problem here in London.

*Kafue-Kariba controversy*

4. The development of hydro-electric power is important in the Federation, to relieve the growing strain which would be placed on coal and rail transport if increased demand had to be met from thermal supplies. Apart from the Shire project in Nyasaland, for which preliminary work is catered for in the Programme, the two major schemes which could serve the copper belt and the Southern Rhodesian industrial midlands, are the Kafue scheme in Northern Rhodesia, and the Kariba Gorge scheme in Southern Rhodesia. Earlier in 1953, Southern Rhodesian opinion was in favour of Kariba, the longer, costlier, but larger scheme, while Northern Rhodesian opinion (particularly in the copper belt) favoured Kafue, which can be brought into operation sooner, and at less cost, although with a smaller capacity.

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Andrew Strachan, secretary to Treasury, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953-1955.

<sup>2</sup> Annexes not printed.

Irrigation is a federal subject, and electricity is on the concurrent legislative list (overriding Federal jurisdiction); the Federal Government had therefore to decide on priorities, given that it was financially and economically impracticable to go ahead at full speed with both schemes simultaneously.

5. The Federal Government decided to give priority to Kafue, and we agreed with this decision. An I.B.R.D. loan is being sought for this project, and a Bank Mission is due in the Federation in the near future. It is at this unfortunate and late stage that the controversy between Kariba and Kafue has been reopened culminating with a proposal to employ independent French experts in reviewing the respective merits of the two schemes. The subject will certainly be raised with Sir L. Rowan,<sup>3</sup> and the following paragraphs set down the background facts and latest developments as the brief for these discussions.

6. The choice before the Federal authorities in 1953 was as follows:—

(a) *The Kafue scheme* is estimated to cost £30 million; it can be constructed to produce power by 1960 if it is started in 1954/55; it will have a capacity in its first stage, of 257–340 megawatts, (normally the higher figure); power will cost 0.25 pence a unit. The second stage would give capacity of 400–483 megawatts and take one further year to construct. Preliminary work has started.

(b) *The Kariba scheme* is estimated to cost £50 million for the first stage, which would provide a capacity of 400 megawatts at 0.25 pence per unit. It would take 7 years to construct, and construction could not start immediately, since many technical aspects are not yet settled. A new railway would also need to be constructed. The second stage would take a further few years to construct, bringing the total cost up to over £80 million, and capacity to over 1,000 megawatts, the cost of electricity at that stage dropping to the very cheap rate of 0.176 pence per unit. The site is on the borders of Southern and Northern Rhodesia. It will provide important water storage facilities for irrigation purposes, although it will create native resettlement problems in Northern Rhodesia when land affected is put out of operation.

7. Those in favour of the Kafue scheme argued that it could produce electric power by 1960, when it would be needed both in the copper belt in Northern Rhodesia, and by the Electricity Supply Commission in Southern Rhodesia. Thereafter, demand would go on increasing and could be met by the first stage of Kariba, the second stage depending on the growth of demand in subsequent years. Without Kafue supplies by 1960 the copper companies would be exhausting the supplies of timber on which they have been drawing to make good coal deficiencies; they would have to renew the agreement with the Belgian Congo (for the supply of power—58 megawatts capacity, agreed at present for the five years 1957–61); and they would have to maintain and expand their thermal plants. In Southern Rhodesia, additional thermal capacity would have to be constructed. Furthermore, the increased output of thermal electricity would require improvements in rail transport of coal. Altogether, it was estimated that the construction of Kafue would save £12 million expenditure on thermal plants and railways in the period to 1960. It was also said that, technically, Kariba was much less ready than Kafue, and that several more years of preparatory work were still necessary.

<sup>3</sup> Second secretary, Treasury, 1951–1958.

8. Those in favour of the Kariba scheme argued that Kafue alone was insufficient, but that Kariba alone would probably meet all demands, and at a cheaper rate. Some of the expenditure saved by Kafue (on thermal plants) would in fact only be postponed unless Kariba were also constructed. It would therefore be logical to look first to the bigger, more economic project, even though it would take longer to construct.

9. Before Sir A. Strachan's visit in September, 1953 agreement was reached between the Northern and Southern Rhodesian Governments that the former should proceed with Kafue, on condition that they would not obtain finance from London or the I.B.R.D.; this was intended to safeguard the finance needed for the rest of the Development Plans. Kafue was therefore catered for in the Plans, (on the 1960 timetable, involving construction work from 1955–1959), largely as a result of pressure from Northern Rhodesia and the finance required for it was excluded in consequence of this agreement between the two territorial Governments. The Development Plans also provided for preparatory work on Kariba, the intention being that construction should start in 1959, giving power, at the first stage in 1965 and in the second stage, if demand justified, by 1970. In presenting these plans to us, Sir A. Strachan was somewhat lukewarm in support of Kafue, maintaining that the project was no use unless the other ancillary services (i.e. the rest of the Development Plan) were expanded, and that rather than upset the balance if sufficient finance was not available, Kafue might well be postponed for a year or two.

10. At the time, we examined the case for proceeding on the lines laid down in the programme, in the light of estimated demand, and we concluded that Kafue power would be needed by 1960; we were less sure that Kariba power would be needed by 1965, but felt that it might be necessary by 1970. We made it clear however, in the course of discussion, that Kafue must be treated as an integral part of the development programme as a whole and Sir A. Strachan accepted this. Sir A. Strachan, in a letter of 13th November then reported that agreement had been reached with the Government of Northern Rhodesia for the scheme to be treated as a Federal project, and that only preparatory work (financed by Northern Rhodesia, and authorised by the 'Authority' appointed by that Government) would be undertaken until finance was secured. Negotiations were then opened with the I.B.R.D., our proposal being for a loan to assist the Development Plan, but attributable primarily to Kafue. The total amount proposed is £30 million, of which £20 million should fall in the period of the Development Plan. Of the £30 million, £10 million might be from the United Kingdom Sterling contribution. The I.B.R.D. was willing to consider this; there are various technical points to be discussed between the I.B.R.D. and ourselves (e.g. negative pledge) and a separate brief is being prepared on these. It has been agreed that a Bank Mission should visit the Federation shortly, although this Mission would not be sent until the technical negotiations with the United Kingdom are satisfactorily settled. The Colonial Development Corporation was also sounded, and reacted favourably to the suggestion of a £10 million contribution, but this is being taken no further until the possibility and size of the Bank's contribution are a little clearer.

11. The Federal Government then proceeded to take the necessary constitutional steps. In March, a Bill was passed by the Federal Parliament, enabling the Federal Government to act in the sphere of hydro-electricity; it was announced that Kafue would be declared a Federal project under this Bill; the Government also made out

its case for proceeding first with Kafue, despite opposition from Southern Rhodesian representatives. By passing the Bill, the House, in effect, endorsed this decision.

12. Meantime, the 'Authority' appointed by the Northern Rhodesian Government was still in control; it appointed Anglo/American as the main consultants, and the latter appointed Canthacks as the sub-contractors on the civil engineering side. The I.B.R.D. were reported at first to doubt the ability of Canthacks on the electrical side, but they felt that this would be left for further investigation, by their Mission later in the year. The Federal Government then had to consider setting up a new 'Board' under Federal Authority, but they were reported as having difficulty in finding a Chairman. The Northern Rhodesian Kafue 'Authority' ceases to operate when the Federal Board takes over (see paragraph 13 below). It has been reported that the project would be ready for tenders to be called for early in 1955; so far, only preparatory work on roads and buildings has been started.

13. The Southern Rhodesian opposition to Kafue having been defeated in the Federal Parliament in March, 1954 the next development was a speech in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament by Mr. Garfield Todd, Prime Minister of that territory, in which he claimed that new facts had come to light which would justify putting Kariba first.<sup>4</sup> This therefore reopened the controversy which had apparently been disposed of by the Federal decision to proceed with Kafue. The first to reply was Sir R. Welensky, acting Federal Prime Minister, (with Northern Rhodesian interests), who maintained that no change was contemplated in the Federal Government's decision to proceed with Kafue first. However, a few days later, the Federal Prime Minister, Sir G. Huggins, (with Southern Rhodesian interests), said that until it was known what capital would be available, it would not be possible to make a final statement on priorities between the two schemes, and that the Bank Mission would be looking into it. The Federal Minister of Commerce and Industry, Sir M. Barrow, is reported to have said that the Federal Government were setting up an undertaking to supply power from both Kafue and Kariba, and that investigations into the two schemes were not yet complete, but that there was no change in the Governments view (i.e. that Kafue should come first). It seems that this 'Undertaking' to which he referred is, in fact, the new 'Board' to be set up as the Federal successor to the local Northern Rhodesian Kafue Authority (see paragraph 12 above). It appears however that it is not confined to Kafue, but is designated as the 'Federal Hydro-Electric Board for Rhodesia and Nyasaland'; and according to the latest reports, the establishment of both Kafue and Kariba have been authorised. Thus any decision between the two projects has been effectively sidestepped in the creation of this new body. Press reports give 22nd June as the date from which appointments on the Board become effective; members are reported to be:—

Mr. J. H. Lascelles (Director of the Rhodesian Selection Trust) as interim Chairman;

Mr. A. B. Cowan (Chairman of the Southern Rhodesia Electricity Supply Commission);

Mr. P. H. Hayiland (formerly Director of Irrigation in Southern Rhodesia, now a civil engineering consultant); and

Mr. L. G. Hunt.

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<sup>4</sup> Todd's statement on the Kariba scheme was made on 6 May 1954 (J R T Wood, *The Welensky papers* (Durban, 1983), p 412).

14. This growing vacillation in public pronouncements has now been followed by a message from the Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir G. Huggins, addressed through us to the I.B.R.D., reporting that new calculations on both projects have been made, and that it is proposed to appoint two independent French experts to advise on the respective engineering aspects of the two schemes; and asking if the Bank approve the proposal in principle. (Federation Telegrams Nos. 167–169.) This message has been transmitted to Mr. Black. (Eager Nos. 75 and 76 to Washington.)

15. We have little doubt that this move is largely prompted by political considerations. We have seen no details of the new evidence on Kariba; and all that we have seen on Kafue is a statement that a relatively small increase in capacity could be expected (340 to 375 megawatts). No doubt there must be some new material on Kariba for Sir G. Huggins to have made his latest move, but it seems unlikely that it could advance the time-table for Kariba to produce power by 1960. Nevertheless we are not in a position ourselves to reach any final judgements on the relative merits of the two schemes from a technical point of view, and our previous acceptance of Kafue was based on the case then put forward by the Federal authorities; if those authorities now wish to reconsider their decision, for whatever reasons, we must leave the final decision to them, in the first place. There are however broader considerations in which we are directly affected and to which we are entitled to draw the Federation's attention. We have therefore telegraphed to the United Kingdom High Commissioner to the Federation, (Telegram No. 245) asking him to remind the Federal Government that previous discussions between us have been based on plans which gave priority to Kafue, and that any change in this assumption will involve a review of those discussions. The United Kingdom is also concerned in any material increase in loans sought from the I.B.R.D. by reason of the 'access to markets' clause in the Guarantee Agreement under which H.M. Government's liabilities would be correspondingly increased; and finally, the United Kingdom is also directly concerned in anything affecting a release of the 18% sterling. This reply is being repeated to Mr. Black.<sup>5</sup>

16. Meantime, Mr. Black's reply to Sir G. Huggins message has been received and is being passed on to the Federation (Washington Eager No. 86). Mr. Black has taken a line not appreciably different from our own; he refers first to the heavy physical and financial demands of either Kafue or Kariba, and suggests that the final decision must take account of both economic and technical factors; he then welcomes as sound the proposal to seek impartial advice as a first step, and one likely to assist the Bank. We interpret this broadly as meaning that the Federation are warned to pay regard to wider economic and financial considerations before stepping up their already heavy programme, although the Bank do not object to further technical investigations.

17. In discussing this subject with the Federation, Sir L. Rowan might take up the following points more strongly than we have attempted to do in our telegram to Sir G. Huggins. In particular:—

- (a) The Development Plans as submitted to us will need to be recast; our general approval of the Plans as meeting the criteria for United Kingdom lending, and as a

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<sup>5</sup> Eugene R Black, president of the Washington-based International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

sound basis for seeking external financial assistance will need to be reviewed in the light of the amended Plans. We assume that there will be no material alteration in the rate of expenditure during the calendar year 1954 (for which we have already agreed an approach to the London market for a £10 million loan), but there would presumably be changes thereafter, particularly for thermal electricity plans, and possibly for railway development (to carry increased coal for higher thermal production).

(b) The Federation will no doubt bear in mind the financial limitations on what they can hope to achieve. To the extent that they look directly (or indirectly, via the I.B.R.D. guarantee on access to the market) to London for loan finance, they are dependent on the private investor who may be expected to judge for himself whether the Federation's external debt position is a reasonable one.

(c) More immediately, our own judgment of what is reasonable in the way of direct market borrowing, or of liabilities via the I.B.R.D., is dependent on many factors, including market conditions, and the claims of other Commonwealth countries. The programme put forward to us in September, 1953 seemed a difficult one to cater for; any stepping up, even over a longer period of time, will only increase these difficulties.

(d) We understood from the discussions in September that 1960 was the vital year for the copper belt to obtain hydro-electric supplies. We are therefore interested to know how the new possibilities would fit into this timetable.

(e) We are somewhat disturbed at the possible effect of these developments on the I.B.R.D.'s willingness to lend. We realise that the I.B.R.D. will not move in any case until the separate technical negotiations with the United Kingdom are completed (on the negative pledge); these may be quickly disposed of, or they may drag on. But a review by independent experts would put yet another bar to progress unless it can be quickly done. We hope that it will not involve too much delay.

18. The following points are recorded for background information, but need not be raised with the Federation:—

(a) First reactions to the proposal to employ French consultants are naturally adverse. We are however satisfied that it would be undesirable to suggest calling in Sir W. Halcrow again (the original investigator of both schemes), since he has publicly expressed himself in favour of the Kariba project. Similarly, no other reputable United Kingdom consultant could be called on, since the profession was seriously affected by the decision to employ Anglo-American as the consultants-in-chief to Kafue, and would thus not be unbiased if asked to pronounce on the relative merits of Kariba, where they might still stand a chance of employment.

(b) In due course, the C.D.C. and Sir W. Halcrow will have to be informed of these latest developments.

(c) A report has been made that an unnamed industrial organisation has offered to finance the construction of Kariba in return for a franchise for the sale of electricity for 50 years. The report on this links the rumour up with the visit of Sir F. Pile and the consortium which he represents, but so far as we know, this consortium is interested in Kafue, and not Kariba.

(d) Another report states that German firms have offered to provide the equipment for Kafue with payment delayed for 10 years; the answer to this is that the I.B.R.D. might be prepared to accept selective rather than open tender; and

that for any United Kingdom sterling portion of an I.B.R.D. loan, we can reach an understanding to exclude transfers to countries which would cause us political embarrassment. But, nevertheless, the continued delay and apparent lack of decision in the Federation are increasing the scope for troubles of this sort to creep in.

18. The following material is attached:—

(i) A study of electricity production prepared by us during the September discussions—Annex C.

(ii) A note by Sir Gilbert Rennie on hydro-electric Power, prepared before the September discussions—Annex D.

(iii) The latest telegrams:—

Nos. 167, 168, 169 from the United Kingdom High Commissioner to the Federation.

Nos. 75 and 76 Eager to Washington for Sir E. Hall-Patch.

No. 245 to the United Kingdom High Commissioner to the Federation.

No. 86 Eager from Washington—Mr. Black's reply.

## 104 DO 158/75

27 Aug 1954

[Southern Rhodesian immigration legislation]: minute by  
W S Bates<sup>1</sup>

*Mr. Wickson*

*Mr. Ormerod*

At (1) we have a letter from Mr. Reed at Salisbury, with which he has enclosed a copy of a letter written by the Acting Secretary for Internal Affairs in Southern Rhodesia to the Chief Secretaries to the Governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. As you will see, the correspondence is concerned with the Southern Rhodesia Inter-territorial Migration Control Bill. I have discussed this briefly with Mr. Fowler, who has asked me to circulate the papers to you for your comments. At first reading we have come across two points, which, it seems to us, may call for comment and it may be that Mr. Wickson will be able to draw attention to others.

2. The two points which we have in mind at present are:—

(i) the blanket prohibition on the entry into Southern Rhodesia of Asiatics who were born or are resident in the two Northern Territories—(a) on the second page of the enclosure; and,

(ii) the intention to lay before the Southern Rhodesian Parliament a list of restricted persons—(1) on page 4 of the enclosure.

3. Of these the second is by far the simpler and perhaps it would be best to deal with it first before considering the more complicated problem which is presented by the intention to exclude Asiatics. So far as I am aware, it is not the practice in the Colonial Territories generally to publish lists of restricted persons, and certainly that

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<sup>1</sup> Principal, CRO.

is not done in this country. However, I see that this provision would merely repeat one which already exists in the present Immigrants Regulation Act and, as the Southern Rhodesians may have their own good reasons for adopting this procedure, I think that while it might be worth while to mention the point in our reply there can certainly be no question of our pressing for the provision to be deleted or amended.

4. As I have said, the provision which seeks to restrict all Asiatics from the Northern Territories from entering Southern Rhodesia presents us with a far more difficult problem. I think that there are two aspects of this question on which our criticism might be based. In the first place there can be no doubt that this amounts to specific and undisguised discrimination against one section of the lawful inhabitants of the Federation. Although the Bill itself has now apparently been published we have not so far received a copy. However, I see from the passage which I have marked 'X' on the Press cutting at (3) that the prohibition is now to be expressed in terms of 'Any person who is not a European or a Native'. I suppose that this is a little better than the positive form of words which was originally contemplated, but even so I cannot think that this alteration will deceive anyone, least of all the Asiatics themselves. Indeed, I have a suspicion that the change may have been made simply in order to ensure that Coloureds were also included under the ban.

5. There can be no doubt that this discrimination offends against what we would like to think is the true spirit of the Federation, but I am afraid that when we come to consider what protest we can make against it we find that the ground has already been cut from beneath our feet. I understand that during the Conferences which led up to the establishment of the Federation the Southern Rhodesians made it clear that they attached great importance to the retention by the Territorial Governments of the control of migration among the constituent territories; and that it was generally recognised at that time that the Southern Rhodesians were chiefly concerned with the control of Asiatic immigration from the Northern Territories. The control of voluntary movement of persons between the Territories is one of the items on the Concurrent Legislative List and therefore there can be no doubt that the Southern Rhodesia Government is quite at liberty to apply a restriction of this nature. I think that we could only take up this point if we thought that the interests of the Northern Territories were being seriously prejudiced and before doing so it would be essential to discover the attitude of those two Governments. Therefore, after discussion with us the Colonial Office have telegraphed to the Governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to ask for the gist of their comments in reply to the letter from Southern Rhodesia, and to ask whether they have any specific objections to the Bill. A copy of the reply will be sent to us in due course and we can then consider whether there are any criticisms on the part of the Northern Territories to which Her Majesty's Government ought to lend its support.

6. The second ground on which we might base our criticism of the Bill is concerned with the effect of this provision upon the relations between the Indian and Southern Rhodesian Governments and also between India and ourselves. I imagine that this provision is certain to provoke a torrent of criticism from the Indian Government. Indeed, the Colonial Office tell me that they have already received a telegram of protest from an Indian association in Livingstone and no doubt the telegram will have been copied to the local representative of the Indian Government. I suppose that, if and when a formal protest reaches us, our first line of defence will be to say that this is a matter which falls entirely within the competence of the

Federal Government and is therefore no concern either of the Indian Government or of ourselves. But it would obviously be far better to avoid giving occasion for a protest of this nature.

7. As Mr. Fowler remarks in his minute above, this is a matter on which we may reasonably offer advice to the Southern Rhodesia Government, but I do not think there is any point in our taking up the matter with them unless we have some practical alternative to suggest. To my mind the only possible way of avoiding this difficulty would be to maintain the present procedure as laid down in the Immigrants Regulation Act, under which control of Asian immigration is achieved by the application of economic and educational tests. But the objection to maintaining the present procedure is that the tests would have to be applied just as much to Europeans as to Asiatics and I feel quite sure that this would be unacceptable to Southern Rhodesian Ministers, since it would offer ready-made ammunition to the European opponents of Federation.

8. Therefore, I am inclined, with considerable reluctance, to conclude that there is little if anything that we can do about this unless we find that the Northern Territories themselves have raised serious objections.<sup>2</sup> I think, however, that it is only right that South Asian Department should be aware that there is gathering on the horizon another cloud which threatens the relations between ourselves and the Indian Government.

9. I am afraid that there is some urgency in this matter since we know that the Bill has already been published and the second reading may be taken at any time. Therefore if we have any points to make it is essential that we should reply to Mr. Reed's letter within the next few days, otherwise we shall miss the boat altogether. It would be most helpful therefore if the file could be returned to me on Monday, by which time we may reasonably expect the replies from the Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Governments to have arrived.

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<sup>2</sup> The governments of NR and Nyasaland did, indeed, object to this legislation (minute by Omerod, 30 Aug 1954). Nevertheless, the bill was passed. Fearing an influx of Asians, the NR government introduced restrictive legislation of its own in Nov 1954.

## **105 CO 1015/1010** **[Nyasaland constitution]: minute by J R Williams<sup>1</sup>**

**30 Dec 1954**

From Sir G. Colby's telegram at (91) it seems clear that we are now faced with a clash of interests between Sir G. Colby and Sir A. Benson over the Nyasaland constitutional proposals on which we shall have to seek the instructions of Ministers.

2. The present composition of Legislative Council in Nyasaland is 3 Africans, 5 Europeans, one 'missionary' and one Indian, balanced by 10 official members. The present proposals for the new constitutional arrangements in Nyasaland, which are designed to give effect to Lord Chandos's<sup>2</sup> statement to Parliament that African representation in Legislative Council would be increased, are set out in the draft

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<sup>1</sup> Principal, CO.

<sup>2</sup> The recently ennobled Oliver Lyttelton. Lyttelton had made his statement to the House of Commons on 24 May 1954.

despatch and memorandum at Flags A and B respectively. The proposal in the memorandum is to add two Africans in Legislative Council, making five in all, and to have five non-African unofficial members to be elected on a non-African common roll. If this proposal proves unacceptable to Asian opinion on the ground that their immediate effect would probably be to eliminate Asian representation entirely, it is proposed that this objection should be met by adding two nominated unofficials who would in fact be one Indian and one European nominated to represent African interests. Whichever proposal was adopted the official majority would of course be retained.

3. In his letter at (82) Sir A. Benson expresses very great concern at the effect which the grant of parity to Africans in Nyasaland would have on the political position in Northern Rhodesia. He goes so far as to say that he can think of nothing which is more likely to wreck all his hopes for the smooth development of a new system of franchise in Northern Rhodesia and of a move away from racialism in politics than the establishment now in Nyasaland of a system of parity.

4. A compromise proposal was put forward in Mr. Gorell Barnes's telegram at (84) but this has now been rejected by Sir G. Colby at (91). We are now left with the difficult problem of deciding whether the constitutional proposals framed on the merits of the position in Nyasaland should be modified because of the very serious repercussions which Sir A. Benson sees arising from them in Northern Rhodesia. If Sir G. Colby and Sir A. Benson are both right it seems that we are bound to face trouble in one territory or the other whatever solution is proposed.

5. It is a fine balance of advantages but I cannot avoid the feeling that Sir A. Benson has in his letter at (82) tended to overstate his case against the Nyasaland proposals. I quite see all the disadvantages of setting up 'parity' as an expressed aim of policy, but surely in Nyasaland we are, so to speak, arriving at parity by accident, and I do not see that the implementation of our present proposals would saddle us with a 'gross fixation'. Any 'increase in African representation in Legislative Council' important enough to be the subject of a statement to the House after a Secretary of State's visit and a matter involving seven months thought and consultation is almost bound to result in parity of one sort or another. This fact must have been obvious in Northern Rhodesia since May but no ugly repercussions have been reported to my knowledge. I take it that Sir G. Colby was thinking along these lines when he said in his telegram at (90) that in view of Lord Chandos's statements made in Nyasaland in May we are virtually committed to parity, because there was certainly no mention of 'parity' as such by the Secretary of State during his discussions with the various delegations he met in Nyasaland.

6. I have been considering whether there is yet another compromise that might be made and I have only one suggestion, which I hesitate to put forward because it is so similar to that put in paragraph 5 of (84). It is that instead of starting with a proposal to have five Africans and five non-Africans we should start discussions with the Indians on the basis of five Africans plus a missionary and six non-Africans elected on a non-African common roll. If the Indians accepted this all we would have done is to add two Africans to Legislative Council, which looks even more like a straightforward 'increase in African representation' than our proposal to have five Africans plus five non-Africans, which does carry with it a stronger suggestion of conscious striving after parity. This compromise proposal loses some of its attractions if the Indians refuse to accept it. I suggest that in that case we should

have to fall back on five Africans plus five non-Africans plus two nominated unofficials (i.e. a missionary and an Indian).

7. If this compromise proposal does not commend itself I would suggest that the present proposals as agreed with Sir G. Colby should be left intact at least until Sir G. Huggins has been consulted. If we are then faced with the combined weight of the strongly held views of Sir G. Huggins and Sir A. Benson against the proposals we could think again.

8. I have sent copies of Sir A. Benson's letter and the telegrams to C.R.O. and have had a word with Mr. Bates. The C.R.O. have already agreed our original proposals and as any departure from them could only be in favour of Sir A. Benson's view the C.R.O. are not likely to object to any line which is decided here. There is therefore no need to clear our final submission to Ministers with C.R.O.

9. I send the papers forward for instructions of higher authority.

## 106 1015/1011

25–28 Mar 1955

[Nyasaland constitution]: minutes by W L Gorell Barnes and Sir T Lloyd

[In the light of objections from Huggins and Benson to his earlier constitutional proposals, Colby was persuaded to abandon the idea of 'parity' and accept an arrangement of 5 Africans to 6 non-Africans among non-official members of the legislature. These revised proposals were published. Colby subsequently reported, however, that an inter-racial conference in Nyasaland was likely to recommend parity, and that he might propose, as a compromise solution, the concession of parity to be followed by a period of constitutional standstill (minutes by Gorell Barnes, 1 Mar 1955 and Williams, 8 Mar 1955).]

*Sir T. Lloyd*

*Secretary of State.*

Please see (165), (166) and the preceding minute by Mr. Williams.

I agree that we should not make up our minds what the next step should be until we have received the fuller report promised in paragraph 2 of (165); and that accordingly the only action necessary for the present is the despatch to Sir G. Colby of a short telegram on the lines of that submitted opposite. It may, however, be helpful if I record some preliminary and tentative observations at this stage.

In my view the two most important points for the political future of Nyasaland are, firstly, that, after the constitutional changes now pending, there should be a period of political and constitutional stability and, secondly, that during that period real thought should be given in Nyasaland, as in other parts of the Federation, to the possibility of devising a system of representation which, without resulting in the swamping of the Europeans by the Africans, would yet make at any rate a start with getting away from race as the whole basis of politics. So long as the Official majority is retained—and all are, I think, agreed on that—it seems to me to matter very little whether the six non-Africans are matched by five or six Africans, and that it is tragic that this not very important issue is bedevilled by the spell of the word 'parity' which is as attractive to the Africans as it is abhorrent to European politicians in the Rhodesias. However, we have presumably got to face the fact that this is the main issue.

In the light of the discussions between Sir G. Colby and Sir G. Huggins recorded in

the telegram at (110) and of Sir G. Huggins' remarks recorded in (156), it would have been extremely awkward if the Inter-racial Conference in Nyasaland had resulted in an agreed recommendation in favour of parity between African and non-African Unofficials in the Legislative Council, to which the Europeans had subscribed under pressure or at least strong encouragement from Sir G. Colby. That was why I recommended despatch of the telegram a copy of which is now at (163). Now, however, that the Conference has reached deadlock, there is no reason why, when we have received Sir G. Colby's fuller report, we should not consider whether we want to make any changes in our proposals and, if we do, put them to Sir G. Huggins. Further, we must remember that, though we are obliged to consult the Federal Government about constitutional changes in the two Northern Territories, we are under no obligation to take their advice, and the sole responsibility for decisions taken rests with H.M.G.

When we come to consider the main issue proposed in (166), we shall, I think, need to approach it in two stages, as follows:—

- (a) Would it be desirable to try to secure European agreement to parity in the Legislative Council if Nyasaland could be considered in isolation? and
- (b) If so, would the repercussions in the rest of the Federation, and particularly in Northern Rhodesia, of conceding parity in Nyasaland be so unfavourable as to make it undesirable to pursue the proposal?

As regards (a), my own thinking is somewhat affected by the procedure which has been followed in these negotiations. I believe that on merits parity on the Unofficial side (with, of course, an Official majority) and a standstill for a number of years would be the best solution for Nyasaland. Had Sir G. Colby merely used the proposals agreed between us as background for his own guidance in rather informal local consultations instead of tabling them and publishing them as the proposals of H.M.G. (a course to which we agreed in the telegram at (111/113), I would certainly now be in favour of at least exploring the possibility of a solution on these lines. In fact, however, the proposals have been tabled and published and defended by the Secretary of State in answer to Parliamentary Questions. I cannot help wondering therefore whether, if we were now to concede parity, even in return for agreement to a standstill for a number of years, the effect on the Africans might not be to make them feel that they had got us on the run and could safely start pressing some of their other demands such as that for parity, or at any rate a seat, on Executive Council or that for the election of African Members.

For this reason I am somewhat doubtful whether, from the point of view of Nyasaland policy alone, it would now be desirable to go for parity. If, however, it were to be decided that the best interests of Nyasaland lay in that direction, then, turning to point (b) above, I do not think it would be right to take the warnings from Sir A. Benson and Sir G. Huggins about repercussions in the Rhodesias too tragically. After all, Nyasaland would still be the only territory in Central Africa in which there was still an Official majority, and if there were parity between African and non-African Unofficials, there would in fact still be a large European majority. Moreover, a standstill for a number of years and some hint that an attempt would be made later to get away from a purely racial basis for politics without swamping the European might prove fairly attractive counter-weights.

If the decision were to be to proceed with the proposals already published, then I

am inclined to think that the sooner that decision is promulgated the better. If, on the other hand, it were decided to explore the possibilities of parity with a standstill for a number of years, a number of subsidiary questions would arise, e.g.:—

- (i) Should we sound Sir G. Huggins and Sir A. Benson first, or should our first step rather be to authorise Sir G. Colby to sound his European Unofficials privately?
- (ii) If the reactions of any or all of these were unfavourable, should we still go ahead with the idea?
- (iii) If a further conference were necessary finally to tie everything together, should the Secretary of State hold it or should the Governor be instructed to do so; and if the Secretary of State were to hold it, should it be here or in Nyasaland?

So far this minute has been concerned only with the main issue of the number of Africans on Legislative Council. As regards the Asian position, I am disposed to agree with paragraph 8 of (166).

I apologise for the length and indeterminate character of this minute; but I hope it may serve some useful purpose in drawing attention to some of the points which will need consideration when we have Sir G. Colby's fuller report.

W.L.G.B.  
9.3.55

I agree with the draft reply to No.166 and submit it for approval.

As the purpose of Mr. Gorell Barnes' minute was to bring to notice some important points to be considered when we have the fuller report promised at the end of No.165, I do not propose at this stage to go fully into all those points. But I think it worth while to record that my present views on the immediate Nyasaland problem are:—

- (a) that parity, coupled with a standstill agreement, is the best solution for Nyasaland;
- (b) that for the reason given at X in Mr. Gorell Barnes' minute, the adoption of that solution ought not to worry Southern Rhodesia unduly; but
- (c) that solution may considerably disturb Sir Arthur Benson since X opposite is no answer to the claim which would no doubt follow for parity between African and non-African membership in Northern Rhodesia.<sup>1</sup>

T.I.K.L.  
10.3.55

*Sir T. Lloyd*  
*Secretary of State*

At flag X opposite is submitted a memorandum on Nyasaland constitutional issues which has been prepared as a result of a joint C.O./C.R.O. meeting over which I presided. I am afraid it is very long but the conclusions are summarised on pages 16–17.

On the main issue—namely, whether or not our proposals should be amended to

<sup>1</sup> Lennox-Boyd commented, 'I agree to Draft reply. Despite the line I have already defended in the H of C, I incline to the views in Sir T Lloyd's minute' (minute, 12 Mar 1955).

provide for parity between African and non-African officials in the Legislative Council—you will see that we have felt obliged to come down against this proposal. So far as I am concerned, it is an unusual experience for me to find myself less liberal than a Central African Governor in a matter of this kind; and I think that I might well be prepared to advise that the repercussions in the Rhodesias be faced if I were satisfied that this proposal alone would satisfy the Africans and reconcile them to a constitutional standstill for a period of years. My own judgment, however, is that the Africans will not be satisfied unless they also get a seat on Executive Council; and, as no one seems to be prepared to face this possibility, I think that the best course is to hold firm by our existing proposals and not to give the Africans the impression that we are prepared to yield to pressure. Indeed, I myself would look with less misgiving at this stage on a decision to give an African seat on Executive Council than on a decision to go to parity in response to African pressure; for the presence of an African on Executive Council would at least bring him, and through him the African members, up against the real problems of government, whereas the addition of a further African to the Legislative Council would merely add to the number of those who, having no kind of responsibility, are virtually bound to become an irresponsible opposition.

There are, I am afraid, two other issues on which we do not agree with Sir G. Colby's recommendations.

The first of these issues concerns the question of Asian representation. As we rather expected, the Asians have accepted the common roll in principle, but, realising that they are unlikely to obtain a seat by elections on a common roll with any kind of qualifications, have asked for some arrangement which will assure them at any rate the one seat which they already have. We had thought that the Asians might take this line and it has always been our view that, if they did so, some way would have to be found of retaining for them their one seat (see, for instance, paragraph 2 of our telegram to Sir G. Colby at (111/113). As you will see from the memorandum, we still hold that view, whereas Sir G. Colby would like to make the Asians take their chance.

The second question on which we disagree with Sir G. Colby, and in this case also with Sir A. Benson, is that of the income and property qualifications for the electoral roll. Sir A. Benson would like Sir G. Colby to put these up from the Northern Rhodesian level, which is the same as the level which was adopted for the Federal elections in Nyasaland, to the Southern Rhodesian level; and Sir G. Colby is now prepared to agree to this. We feel that this would be regarded in Nyasaland as a further hit at the Asians (assuming that there is a common roll) and in this country as deliberate planning towards levels which, if and when a common roll including Africans is adopted, will make sure for a long time that the African vote has very little effect. When the problem of the franchise throughout Central Africa comes to be properly examined, it may well be found that a higher level of income and property qualifications is desirable than that which now prevails in the Northern Territories; but we feel that it would be quite wrong for Nyasaland alone to blaze the trail on this subject and to do so before there has been any kind of enquiry. (Under this last heading alone I should make it clear that 'we' excludes the C.R.O. because, although I do not think they feel very strongly on the subject, they were inclined to argue in favour of the higher qualifications).

I think that the Secretary of State may wish to discuss these matters with us, in

which case it might be as well for a representative of the C.R.O. to take part in the discussion. Meanwhile I suggest that the draft interim reply to (182), which is also submitted opposite, might be issued off the file.

W.L.G.B.  
28.3.55

## **107** CO 1015/946, no 214

1 Apr 1955

[Kafue/Kariba dispute]: letter from Sir A Benson to W L Gorell Barnes  
[Extract]

I have today signed to you a formal despatch enclosing the Hansard of the debate in the Legislative Council on the Federal Government's decision to build Kariba and to scrap Kafue.<sup>1</sup> Its genesis is the fact that I have had to forward for transmission to Her Majesty the Queen a petition signed by the Mayor of Lusaka. It is not possible in that despatch to give you a full account of all the intense political coming and going which the sudden announcement of the Kariba decision has caused between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and the Headquarters of the Federal Government, and this letter tries to give you as full a picture as possible.

I must start by saying that the depth and the intensity of the feeling caused by the decision cannot be overstated. It may have been less in Livingstone than it was in Lusaka, and it may not have had the keen edge in Abercorn which it had in Broken Hill, but it was, and I think it still is (though the first passion has died out) very intense indeed throughout the whole country. As we have already told you in our political intelligence report, and repeated in the despatch, my considered judgment is that the first passion was due to disappointment caused, particularly in Lusaka and in nearby areas such as Mazabuka, whose population expected that some thirty million pounds worth of works, to be constructed within Northern Rhodesia very close to where their farms and their businesses are situated, would bring them a big trade and farming boom. That disappointment was accompanied by bitter resentment that the boom was instead going to Salisbury and its neighbourhood, already enjoying a great boom because of the establishment of the federal Capital there. Common talk, and talk easy to deprecate but difficult to contradict, since Federation became a fact has been that Northern Rhodesia has saved Southern Rhodesia from bankruptcy, and is also paying for Nyasaland; and that the intention of the people in Southern Rhodesia has continually appeared to be to transform the wasting mineral assets of Northern Rhodesia into new assets on the ground in Southern Rhodesia.

With this background passion flared at once. The Mayor, Freer Payne, was compelled to take the chair at a public indignation meeting; and though I have told him that I thought it was a 'passionate' meeting, adducing as evidence therefore:—

- (a) the alleged fact that when one man proposed that no resolutions should be passed until they had had more time to think he was shouted down; and
- (b) that amongst other resolutions they resolved to petition Her Majesty;

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<sup>1</sup> On 16 Mar 1955, the NR Legislative Council unanimously accepted a motion expressing disappointment at the federal government's decision over Kariba. During the course of the debate, Benson's financial secretary, R A Nicholson, made a critical speech about the federal government's conduct of the affair.

he has taken me severely to task and declared to me that it was a very well-conducted and orderly meeting.

The Federal Government's decision was announced in the Federal Parliament on the 1st March. Welensky has told me that the decision to go ahead with Kariba was actually taken at a Cabinet meeting on Friday, 25th February. By the 28th February the Central African Post in Lusaka knew all about it and published a forecast of it. So it has been throughout: as I told you in my Secret and Personal letter No. SC. 107/3/P of the 31st December, when writing to you on the question of consultation and mutual confidence, the whole Kafue/Kariba controversy has been bedevilled throughout by the air of furtive secrecy with which it has been officially surrounded by the Federal Government, while at the same time very accurate accounts of every step taken have been common property to all men in the street. While all these rumours and stories (as I say most of them very accurate) have been assailing the ears of every member of this Government, no single word has been said officially to this Government. Huggins is going to claim that full consultation took place between him and me, and you will see this plan clearly developing in the last enclosure to my official despatch of today's date. I sent you with my Secret and Personal letter S/C. 107/3/P of the 31st December copies of correspondence which I had exchanged with Huggins, on an entirely personal basis, on the Kafue/Kariba business. Huggins's letter to me was dated 22nd December, and my reply went on 31st December. I now feel compelled to enclose for you a full set of all the correspondence I have had with him on the subject. My reasons for burdening you with these are, firstly, in order that you may see that when members of this Government stated in the Legislature that no consultation had taken place between the Federal Government and this Government before the decision was announced they were stating the objective truth; secondly in order that you may see from passages marked by me in red ink that I could have had no inkling that a decision was likely then to be announced; and thirdly because of what Huggins is alleged by a Lusaka delegation to have said, behind my back, about my letters to him on this subject at a meeting in Salisbury on the 21st of March.

You must know that immediately the decision was announced every member of this Government, official and unofficial, immediately came under a shower of questions from the press, from Members of the Legislative Council, and from other leading members of the public. The questions covered every field: those which were of a technical nature were not answered; those which asked flatly 'Was this Government consulted and did it agree on the Kariba decision?' were answered factually and quietly. Those which arose from some part of Huggins's statement in the Federal Parliament, and sought confirmation, or rebuttal, of something he had said, were turned away as deftly as possible. In a brief period of time the passion and bitterness to which I have referred as being the first cause of the reaction in this country, gave place to what I believe to have been, and still to be, a deep and genuine anxiety on this very fact of non-consultation over the Agreement. There was, I believe, a real sense of shock that, without the fullest consultation with and the consent of this Government, action could be taken *ex parte* in defiance of its terms. There has been talk about the Kaiser and his scrap of paper<sup>2</sup> even in the press. The

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<sup>2</sup> During talks with the British ambassador in Berlin on 4 Aug 1914, the German chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg had dismissed the treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality as a 'scrap of paper'.

result could only have been a belief that the decision was really due to the fact that there are forty-five thousand voters in Southern Rhodesia and only some ten thousand in Northern Rhodesia: in other words, that the politicians in power in the Federal Government were swayed by vested interest in Southern Rhodesia and were not prepared to face the disappointment which a decision in favour of Kafue would bring to the larger number of voters. I believe it to be now the honest fear of a vast majority of people in Northern Rhodesia that this sets the pattern for the future, and that the interests of Northern Rhodesia will always be subjected to those of Southern Rhodesia. The general comment which one is continually trying to avoid hearing these days is that people in Southern Rhodesia have never intended to work the Federation honestly as a Federation, nor have they ever understood anything by Federation other than that Southern Rhodesia will take over and run the two northern territories. If there were a vote in Northern Rhodesia today for unscrambling the egg, it would be virtually one hundred per cent; and that is why the clear statement by Her Majesty's Government, when Van Eeden hit the headlines, that there was going to be no unscrambling of the egg, was so very valuable indeed.

To make the picture complete I must tell you of other factors in the situation which have made the anti-Federal Government feelings throughout Northern Rhodesia much more acute. I have already referred to the indignation and fear caused by Huggins's casual dismissal of the agreement of September, 1953, as 'merely a joint declaration of policy'. People have bitterly resented various things said by Huggins in the Federal Parliament, and perhaps particularly his repeated interruptions of speakers who (particularly Moffat) questioned his setting aside of the agreement. (See Federal Hansard of the 7th March. Columns 3470 ff.) They have resented his accusations that Northern Rhodesia had failed to carry out its obligations under the agreement. They have been shocked by the resignation of Lascelles from the Federal Hydro-Electric Board. Lascelles has a very high reputation in this country both for integrity and ability, and it was common knowledge that he, as Interim Chairman of the Federal Hydro-Electric Board, and indeed that the whole Board, had repeatedly seen their recommendations for action, and their unanimous representations to the Federal Government that the French consultants' reports should be shown to the consulting engineers, rejected. The composition of the Federal Government's 'Working Party' was known, and it was also widely believed that C. H. Thompson, its Chairman, had blocked any representations which the Hydro-electric Board put forward. This I believe to be quite unjust to Thompson. He was acting under orders from Barrow and Huggins, but Barrow told me himself when he was up here a couple of weeks ago that Huggins had been handling this matter himself and that he had taken a second place. Further resentment was caused by the very careful editing in Southern Rhodesia papers and in the allied 'Northern News' (all of them controlled by the one group) of Lascelles's letter of resignation. But perhaps above all suspicion and indignation have been roused by the vicious smear campaign which has been conducted against the civil servants of this country, and to which I revert later in this letter. . . .

I revert now to the smear campaign against 'Colonial Office officials in the North'. You are aware that there have always been attacks on the civil servants in this country, which have sprung mainly from their identification with the Colonial Office and 'Colonial Office rule'. Over the past four months particularly there can be no doubt whatever that this campaign has been deliberately encouraged, and by those in

the highest places, in direct connection with the Kariba/Kafue controversy. The general public of this Territory holds its civil servants in very high regard indeed. You may like to know that I was presented two months ago with a formal document by the whole of the Standing Finance Committee stating their determination that the salaries of the administrative officers in this country should be immediately and considerably increased. It is quite natural that the general public should indulge very regularly in the sport of baiting and attacking its own civil servants on particular matters of domestic concern: but it is a very different thing when the attacks come from outside the territory. Then the public of Northern Rhodesia, while perhaps they feel unable to jump to their support in public because they must continue to say they want to get rid of Colonial Office rule, nevertheless feel intense resentment in private.

I have no time or space in this letter to give you more than an indication of the deep seriousness and intensity of this campaign, and of its very grave danger for Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. You see, I imagine, the Rhodesia Herald, the Bulawayo Chronicle, the Northern News, and the Central African Post. The first three are all controlled from Salisbury. You will know all about Huggins's 'pest' speech in London. That has been taken up, applied to civil servants, and run as a major factor in the Kariba/Kafue controversy. I enclose at P an extract from Legislative Council's Hansard of the 18th March when Williams, at my request, made a public statement on it. And at Q an extract from the 'Northern News' of the 1st April showing what Huggins is reported to have said in reply to a direct question from Dendy-Young on the subject. I shall be writing to you fully about this smear campaign as soon as possible, but for the moment the following is a quotation from Huggins's speech in the Federal Parliament on the 7th March (Hansard column 3532)

'Now as far as Meshi Teshi is concerned, there has been a horrible conspiracy in Lusaka. Some civil servants have been in this and also the Hydro-Electric Board, and they have been putting over to the public what is absolutely false.'

. . . Your telegram Personal No. 33 of the 29th of March arrived towards the end of all the above dictation. If you will read for yourself the whole debate in Hansard, that and what I have written will give you clearly the reasons why what was said by official Members of Executive Council in the Legislative Council had to be said, and said *by them*. It is quite clear to me from the terms of that telegram, however, that it was not, at the time it was drafted, realised that had the officials kept silent, and refused to give the facts so importunately demanded, there would have been a political storm inside Northern Rhodesia with limitless consequences. That political storm would have been directed against the Secretary of State's control of Northern Rhodesia. I must get this contribution into the bag, but I will try as soon as I can to dot the i's and cross the t's on this particular fact. In this territory we have two courses open to us: we can allow mistatements of fact made in Salisbury and in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt, damaging to the interests of Northern Rhodesia, and particularly to the public's faith in our administration, to be spread as gospel. We can refuse to accept any part of the burden, which our unofficial members of Executive Council will then have to carry themselves—and incidentally destroy all the mutual trust and confidence which we have been at such pains to build up: or we can do what I have understood throughout as being our duty: give every conceivable loyal and honest

support to the Federal Government in all its exclusive jurisdiction and in all its concurrent jurisdiction, while at the same time trying to secure that its decisions affecting this territory are based on truth and are soundly reached. Untruths in that case must sometimes be exposed, and sometimes that must be by officials whom our constitution has placed in ministerial and parliamentary positions.

It remains only to add, in case the Secretary of State's fears expressed in paragraph 3 of his Personal telegram No. 33 to me persist, copies of letters just exchanged in long-hand between Huggins and myself. These are R and S. I think the Secretary of State may question the propriety of my action in revealing to Huggins that I had had a personal telegram from him, and that he had told me of what Huggins had told Maclennan about staying with me in Government House. If so I would ask him to remember that I have got to get back into the completely frank, open, and friendly relations which I claim have existed on my side ever since I first took office under Huggins as Chief Secretary to the Central African Council; and which I believe always existed on his side also, right up to the present time when the intense political difficulties inherent in a decision either way between Kariba and Kafue caused him to lose balance and objectivity, and to make what he thought would be the most popular form of attack in order to create a diversion—an attack on 'Colonial Office officials in the North', an attack on 'Colonial Office rule in Northern Rhodesia', an attack thus on the Secretary of State himself, and through him on the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom which has decreed that this Government shall remain, for the time being at any rate, a Government in its own right with the balance held by official members on its, Executive and Legislative Councils.

## 108 CO 1015/946

21 Apr 1955

[Kafue/Kariba dispute]: minute by J C Morgan

[A reply to Benson's letter of 1 Apr (see 107) was drafted by the CO (Lloyd to Benson, undated draft, Apr 1955). It noted that the tone of the comments by Benson's ministers in the Legislative Council debate, 'which must have had your assent, was deeply offensive to Malvern'. It disputed the idea that the agreement with Northern Rhodesia in Sept 1953 was in the nature of a legally binding contract. It also suggested that if there was indeed a smear campaign at work, members of the Northern Rhodesian administration should do nothing to give credence to such allegations.]

*Mr. Gorell Barnes*

Please see opposite the draft letter to Sir Arthur Benson about the Kariba debate which, following our conversation on the evening of Thursday 7th April (before Easter) I submitted to Sir Thomas Lloyd on 13th April; together with my minute above of that date. Sir Thomas Lloyd spoke to me about this matter on Thursday 14th April, and, taking up the suggestion made in the last paragraph of my minute, said that he thought, on the assumption that Sir Arthur Benson would be visiting London, this was a matter far more suited for oral treatment with him than for further correspondence. He therefore asked me to discuss with the C.R.O. the line suggested in the memorandum at No. 216, as further expressed in the draft, but without attempting to clear the draft in terms with them, or giving them the full memorandum itself. If the C.R.O. agreed generally with our ideas, we should then prepare to discuss them with Sir Arthur Benson accordingly. I was unable to deal further with this (owing to C.R.O. absences) before I had to be away myself on

Monday and Tuesday 18th and 19th April, but I have today, Thursday 21st April, been to the C.R.O. about this matter, in the knowledge that Sir Arthur Benson will be in London for discussions next week. Incidentally, in his first telegram accepting the Secretary of State's invitation to come here for Nyasaland constitution talks, Sir Arthur Benson said that he wished to take the opportunity of discussing economic, political, etc. consequences of the Kariba decision.

2. Accordingly, I talked this morning with Mr. Curson (Head of C.R.O. Finance Department, which deals generally with the hydro-electric scheme), Mr. Fowler and Mr. Coe. I outlined generally the substance of the memorandum at No. 216, including its conclusions, and told them, on the lines of the draft opposite (a part of which I read to them) what generally we would propose to say to Sir Arthur Benson next week. They agreed generally with our conclusions, and that we should speak with Sir Arthur Benson on the lines proposed. The following additional points were made during the discussion, and, taken together with our own assessment of the position, represent the attitude of the C.R.O.:—

(1) A particularly unfortunate aspect of the debate and the other reactions in Northern Rhodesia is the risk entailed that the confidence of the International Bank may be undermined in the scheme itself, and also in the economic and political stability of the Federation. I think this is an obvious point, and Sir Arthur Benson must be well aware of the risks involved on that front, particularly at the time when the Bank Mission is in Central Africa.

(2) The existence of the so-called 'Agreement' constituted merely an *additional* reason why Lord Malvern ought, before making his announcement in the Federal Parliament, to have consulted Sir Arthur Benson: consultation was in the circumstances clearly within the purview of Article 42(2) of the Federal Constitution.

(3) There is an element of complete nonsense and unreality in the whole of the suggestion that the 'Agreement' was of such legal validity and status as completely to preclude the Federal Government from giving priority to Kariba. If that were so, the whole of the last two years' discussion and argument on the respective merits of the two schemes, both in Central Africa itself and in London, would have been utterly pointless, since it would already have been fully agreed that Kafue was to be built first. This must have been a fact well-known to all responsible people in Central Africa, including the Northern Rhodesia officials.

(4) Another unfortunate aspect of the public debate arises from the fact that the Governor himself must be held responsible for the actions of his officials, and that, in turn, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and H.M.G. as well may be held to be responsible for the actions of the Governor. This may give rise to allegations among the disaffected in Central Africa, and particularly among the Confederates, that H.M.G. is contriving in a subtle and indirect manner to oppose the legitimate decisions of the Federal Government.

(5) On the 'smear campaign' alleged to exist against the Northern Rhodesia officials, we still require further evidence from Sir A. Benson himself; but even when such evidence is produced the question will have to be asked as to the extent to which the public and private activities of the Northern Rhodesian officials may have been outside their duty in relation to the Federal Government, and such as to give ammunition to their ill-wishers (such as Sir Roy Welensky).

(6) The emphasis now must, however be on full cooperation between the two Governments, and all elements of those Governments, in the future. As in the recent telegrams sent to Lord Malvern and Sir Arthur Benson, the Governments must be urged to construct 'foolproof' machinery for the organisation of consultation and cooperation. This organisation must have particular reference to the handling of the resettlement aspect of the Kariba scheme on both sides of the Zambesi. In this connection, we took note of the recent information (No. 219) from Mr. Maclennan, relating to the setting up of a special Federal Ministry, under Sir M. Barrow, to deal with the hydro-electricity scheme; and we hoped that this Ministry could be made responsible for the organisation of proper relations between the Governments in respect of future cooperation.

3. Finally, and particularly in relation to headings (2), (3) and (4) above, the particularly delicate question was raised by the C.R.O., relating to the position of Mr. Nicholson in the whole of this affair, not merely in respect of the 'extreme' speech which he made in the Legislative Council, but in that of his previous activities on behalf of Kafue, and for that matter in respect of subsequent activities as indicated in No. 217. We all felt that an impression cannot be escaped that in some way Mr. Nicholson has constituted himself as a 'last ditch' opponent of Kariba, and thereby of the Federal Government; and that he has in some way exercised on the Governor an unfortunate influence in respect of this matter. I explained as tactfully as I could to the C.R.O. officials reasons why I would suppose that Sir Arthur Benson would not be unduly influenced by Mr. Nicholson in this or any other matter. Nevertheless the impression persists, and must undoubtedly be shared by Lord Malvern and his associates in the Federal Government (and I feel sure that in No. 217 and the previous effort Sir R. Welensky is 'gunning' particularly for Mr. Nicholson). We were therefore able to agree with the proposition that *if* Mr. Nicholson were able to go elsewhere, that fact might in itself do much to ease relations between Lord Malvern and Sir Arthur Benson, both in this respect and generally. But I pointed out that we should still need to be convinced that Mr. Nicholson's fault was of a degree such as to make a transfer essential; that in this we should need to have the full agreement of the Governor himself, who would otherwise be letting down a subordinate; and that in any case the removal of Mr. Nicholson at the present stage of his career was unlikely to be possible by any other means than his enforced retirement. I therefore held out no prospect that we should be willing even to consider the disciplining of Mr. Nicholson in such a manner; but I felt bound to agree that this aspect of the question should be broached in relation to the whole business with Sir Arthur Benson; and I did this in the light of my knowledge that even if we had no C.R.O. views to consider in this matter, it would have been necessary to touch on the conduct of Mr. Nicholson in this general connection. Finally I should record that the C.R.O. view is that whereas Sir Arthur Benson has consistently shown himself to be Federal-minded; Mr. Nicholson has equally been an inveterate opponent of Federation (which is indeed a fact).

4. In connection with our programme for discussions with the two Governors next week, I have provisionally arranged that you and I should discuss the Kariba debate and related matters with Sir Arthur Benson at 3.30 pm on Wednesday 27th April. I suggest that, if you agree, the 'drill' for this aspect of the matter might be for us to show Sir Arthur Benson the *draft*, as outlining as succinctly as is possible our

views; and then to go into a further discussion with him in the course of which all the points recited above would be brought out, including, as and when it most conveniently occurred, the question of Mr. Nicholson's conduct and Sir Arthur Benson's relations with him. I do not suppose that this discussion will be anything but a *mauvais quart d'heure* in Sir Arthur Benson's eyes; and I do not look forward to the discussion from our own point of view; nevertheless I have been encouraged to find that on their independent reading of the papers the C.R.O. have reached substantially the same views as are recorded in the memorandum at No. 216, and I think it would be quite wrong for us to fail to expostulate with Sir Arthur Benson on the course which he has allowed events to take—but of course solely with the view to hedging against any recurrence of such episodes, and to ensure the fullest confidence and cooperation between the two Governments in future. I shall have this minute ready for you tomorrow evening, to give you time to consider the matter, and if you think necessary to speak again with Sir Thomas Lloyd if you think the programme should be varied in any way.

5. By agreement, I have sent copies of this minute to the C.R.O., as a record of our discussion. I have told them that it is our wish to treat this matter as far as possible as domestic, and that we shall therefore not be inviting any C.R.O. representative to meet Sir Arthur Benson on this subject. I have, however, undertaken to inform them of the general outcome of the discussion.

6. The Secretary of State has not yet returned the copy of the memorandum at No. 216 which he took to read, nor has he expressed any further views on this matter himself.

7. The C.R.O. have now returned to me the original with enclosures of No. 214, which I have put in its place over the copy; and after our discussions with Sir Arthur Benson I have told them that they shall have (and also the Treasury) the doctored version.

8. I therefore now submit this for your consideration in preparation for meeting Sir Arthur Benson.

**109** CO 1015/992, no 9

10 June 1955

**'Federal citizenship and federal franchise': CRO note of an inter-departmental meeting with the CO**

The purpose of the meeting was to assemble the preliminary views of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office on the questions of citizenship and franchise in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was known that the Federal Government had set up a Working Party to study these problems and it was thought that they would aim to introduce legislation within the next twelve months or thereabouts. There were certain aspects of these matters on which the Federal Government might welcome advice, and in any case H.M.G. had a legitimate interest in them because of the effect which the decisions might have both in the two Northern Territories and also in other Colonial territories in Africa. How best the views of H.M.G. could be brought to the attention of the Federal Government was not yet clear and it was agreed that this question of tactics should be left for further consideration at a later stage.

2. Two major points arose on the question of citizenship. In the first place there had been some indication in a speech by Lord Malvern that the Federal Government were thinking in terms of a limited citizenship which would be open only to those who matched up to the Rhodes standard of 'civilised men'. It was thought possible that the Federal Government might then use the test of citizenship as the main qualification for the franchise. The meeting agreed that to proceed on these lines would be undesirable and illogical. The conception of a limited citizenship was alien to British tradition which held that all 'belongers' were entitled to normal civic rights. The qualifications required for citizenship and those to be applied in the case of the franchise were of an entirely different kind and it was important that they should not be confused. Standards of education, property and income, while appropriate in the case of the franchise, were out of place when applied to citizenship. It was noted incidentally that Southern Rhodesian citizenship is of this general as opposed to limited character.

3. Secondly, it was important to determine well in advance what effect the introduction of Federal citizenship would have upon the status of British Protected Persons who form the bulk of the African population of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. On the one hand, these people attach much importance to their special status and, if there were any question of depriving them of it, it would be essential to explain the position carefully to them and to prepare them for the change. It was imperative that this alteration of status should not come about, as it were, by accident. Present advice was that those concerned could at one and the same time be both British subjects and British Protected Persons. But it was felt that this should be carefully checked, if necessary by reference to the Home Office.

4. On the other hand, if those Africans in Northern Rhodesia who were now British Protected Persons became British subjects, whether or not they retained their present status, they would become eligible for the Territorial franchise. The effect which this might have upon the elections would have to be examined and European public opinion would have to be prepared for this development which the European community would certainly not welcome.

5. Turning to the questions of the Federal franchise, the meeting noted that the probable intention of the Federal Government was to extend the Southern Rhodesian system of the common roll to the two Northern Territories. It was agreed that so long as the provisions of the Constitution with regard to the specially elected and specially appointed members remained unaltered (i.e. at least until the Constitution came up for revision) there was no room for experiments on 'Mackenzie' or similar lines. Therefore, on the assumption that there would be a straightforward election on a common roll, the question for discussion concerned the type and standard of qualifications for the franchise. It might be assumed that as a basic qualification every elector would have to be a British subject. Some elementary education, amounting in practice to little more than literacy in English, would no doubt also be required. But the main regulating factor would probably be the means qualifications. It was noted that for the first election the qualifications required in the two Northern Territories were £250 property or £200 income whereas in Southern Rhodesia the figures were £500 and £240 respectively. It might be expected that the Federal Government would press for standards not lower than those now in force in Southern Rhodesia, and might well seek to raise them. In this connection it was recalled that Sir Arthur Benson would himself favour qualifications of £500 property or £500 income.

6. The levels at which the means qualifications were fixed would determine the number of Africans who were eligible to register on the roll of electors. It would not, of course, provide any sure guide to the number who would actually vote, bearing in mind that in Southern Rhodesia not more than 10% at most of those who were eligible were to be found on the roll and there was no certainty that by any means all of these had actually voted at the last election. But it could probably be assumed that in the Northern Territories a rather higher proportion of those who were eligible would in fact be registered.

7. Certain fundamental considerations would have to be kept firmly in mind when trying to decide whereabouts in the scale the means qualifications should be fixed. If they were set too high there would be serious criticism both among Africans in the Northern Territories and among their sympathisers in this country and elsewhere. This would not be merely inconvenient; far more important was the danger that a significant body of public opinion which had begun to swing in favour of the Federal experiment would be antagonised by this decision. On the other hand it would not do to set the level so low that the European electorate was in danger of being overwhelmed by African voters. There was no reason why in due course Africans should not be elected on the common roll; indeed, it was thought that H.M.G. would welcome such a development when the time was ripe. But particularly during the formative years of the Federation, political stability at the centre was essential and for this reason, if for no other, it must be assumed that the Federal Government would be firmly opposed to any arrangement which might result in Africans being returned by the common roll election. Moreover, it seemed right that when the time came for Africans to be elected in their own right, this should be accompanied by a gradual diminution in the number of seats reserved to them by the Constitution.

8. Probably the most difficult problem of all was to determine the effect in practice of setting the means qualifications at any given level. The necessary data was certainly not available in London and would have to be sought from the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. On the assumption that the educational qualifications amounted to little more than literacy, the Governors should be asked to provide an estimate of the number of Africans who would be eligible to vote if the means qualifications were to be set at various levels between £250 property or £200 income and £500 property or £500 income. They should also be asked to give the best indication they could of the distribution of these voters in relation to the known European electorate.

9. Other points made in the discussion about the franchise included the following:—

(a) Since the progress of inflation was likely to be even more marked in Central Africa than in this country, it would be wrong to suppose that any figures which were adopted in the next year or two would hold good indefinitely. Were it at all practicable, it would be desirable to write into the regulations a provision that the levels would vary with the buying power of the pound sterling in Central Africa.

(b) Even if the influx of a considerable number of Africans on to the common roll did not at once result in the election of African members, it would nevertheless have an immediate effect upon the composition of the House. Candidates, whether African or European, would have little chance of success if their programmes were not acceptable to both races.

(c) It was worth considering whether a reasonably high standard of education, perhaps the General Certificate of Education or its equivalent, could be accepted as an alternative to the means qualifications.

(d) It was not clear in what circumstances the wives of men who were eligible for inclusion on the electoral roll were themselves entitled to vote. It was assumed that this right would not be withheld from Europeans and, if there were to be a true common roll, it could scarcely be denied to Africans—or at any rate to those who lived under a system of monogamy. The effect was not likely to be very great as comparatively few of the African women would have the necessary basic educational qualification.

(e) The age qualification would also have to be settled, but in the absence of any overwhelming argument to the contrary it seemed that this should remain at 21.

10. In conclusion it was agreed that the Colonial Office, in consultation with the Commonwealth Relations Office, would prepare a memorandum for transmission to the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The paper should set out the various considerations recorded in these minutes. The Governors should be invited to comment and at the same time to supply the information which was needed about the effect upon the African electorate of various levels of means qualifications. Mr. MacLennan should also be asked to comment on his return. Since the Federal Government had already embarked on their study of these questions it was important that any views H.M.G. wished to offer should take definite shape with the least possible delay. The correspondence with the Governors should therefore be completed as soon as possible.

## **110** CO 1015/1129, no 9

4 Aug 1955

### **[European Mine Workers' Union]: letter from Sir A Benson to Mr Lennox-Boyd about a deal with Anglo-American**

I have the honour to inform you that the Anglo-American group of Companies has concluded a separate agreement with the European Mineworkers' Union about the advancement of Africans in the coppermining industry. As this event will mark an important stage in this long-drawn-out matter it will be as well to recapitulate the history, particularly of the last year's events.

2. You are aware that the European Mineworkers' Union (representing daily-paid workers) have an Agreement with the Copper Mining Companies (Anglo-American and Rhodesian Selection Trust), exacted originally at a time when Britain's need for an uninterrupted supply of copper as a sinew of war was most dire, one clause of which prescribes that jobs filled by members of the Union will not be filled by any non-member. Since no African is admitted to membership an effective colour bar has existed since the agreement was made. Another clause provides for six months' notice of termination of the Agreement.

3. During the past three years in particular every effort has been made by the Chamber of Mines, acting on behalf of both groups of companies, in patient consultation and negotiation, to induce the Union to accept a variation of this clause. Repeated guarantees have been given that no European would lose employment through such revision; but the Union has stood firm on the principle of equal pay for

equal work and no division of jobs, cynically pretending to ignore the fact that such a principle would always debar an African from employment, or would have a devastating effect on general African wage levels throughout Northern Rhodesia. Parties involved in the negotiations have been the Chamber of Mines, the European Mine-workers' Union, the Salaried and Staff Association (a separate trade union also containing only Europeans, which has on the whole throughout favoured revision, and has acted repeatedly as a mediator between the Chamber of Mines and the European Mineworkers' Union), and the African Mineworkers' Union.

4. Four-party negotiations finally broke down on the 24th of July, 1954. In anticipation of such breakdown I had already, with your assistance, prepared a Commission of Enquiry on the matter and its appointment was announced on the same day, and at the same meeting, as the deadlock was established.

5. A dangerous rift, because of a different approach to the problem, had already opened between the two groups of companies. Anglo-American have their major mining interests in South Africa, and they fear strong reactions amongst their white workers there to any liberal practices introduced here against local white opposition. On 3rd November, shortly after the Commission had announced findings in favour of division of jobs, a meeting was convened by the Chamber of Mines with the European Mineworkers' Union. At this meeting the Companies' representatives asked whether, having regard to the Commission's findings, the Union was now prepared to negotiate on the basis of division of jobs and differential rates to pay for Europeans and Africans, and were answered in the negative. The Union was then asked if they would meet the representatives of the two groups separately, and agreed. R.S.T. representatives then flatly announced six months' notice of termination of the Agreement, and withdrew from the meeting. Reaction was very bitter. They were followed immediately by Anglo-American who made it clear that they would not move further in the matter until the measure of such move had been agreed with the Union.

6. On 3rd January, 1955, the African Mineworkers' union began a strike, on an issue completely divorced from African advancement save for the fact that in most of their leaders' minds 'advancement' means more pay in existing jobs, and has nothing to do with opening the way to more responsible (and therefore better paid) jobs. They demanded, amongst other things, a flat increase for all African employees, whatever their job or length of service, of 10/8d. per shift, equivalent in the lower ranges of jobs to a 300% increase.<sup>1</sup> The European Mineworkers' Union leaders believed that this piece of African folly presented a fine opportunity to show the Companies and the public that their members were solidly behind them in resisting African advancement, and accordingly announced a compulsory ballot amongst all their members on that question. And at the same time certain leaders visited the Union of South Africa in the hope, which was realised, of enlisting the active support of Trade Unions there for continuance of their obdurate attitude. A Mr. D.M. Ellis, General Secretary of the South African Mineworkers' Union, gave voice in public and in the press to hardly-concealed threats that strike action by the European Union on the Copperbelt would be supported by sympathetic strike action particularly on the

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<sup>1</sup> The demand for an increase of 10s 8d per shift had a political dimension: it would have qualified many African miners for the vote under NR's franchise regulations (Jane L Parpart, *Labor and capital on the African Copperbelt* (Philadelphia, 1983), p 144).

Anglo-American group's extensive mining and other properties in South Africa; and that sympathetic action would ensue along the South African Railways, and thence along the whole line of Rhodesia Railways, in the form of a refusal to handle trucks containing copper on the southward run, or north-bound equipment for the Copper Mining Companies.

7. Meantime R.S.T. whose European workers had remained at work during the African strike and kept their mines in production, suspended the notice it had given of termination of the original agreement, in the hope that this action would induce once more a favourable and co-operative atmosphere in which to secure their object of African advancement.

8. By the end of January the European Mineworkers' Union leaders had suffered two serious setbacks. Their expectations of the ballot were belied. 1,916 voted for and 1,180 against African advancement, and this at a time when the African strike remained absolute on a ridiculous claim. And secondly reaction throughout the Federation to the South African leaders' statements was immediate. Any interference from outside—and speakers and writers took the opportunity to emphasise that this applied to the United Kingdom no less than to South Africa—was widely condemned, and Mr. Ellis and the local leaders concerned found themselves in the difficult necessity of having to say that they had been mis-reported and misrepresented. Nevertheless the interest of trade union leaders in South Africa remained and still remains today intense; and a return visit for discussions in South Africa was recently made by the Secretary to the local union.

9. The African Union leaders maintained their strike unbroken (in spite of an unwise ultimatum issued by the Mining Companies in January, as a result of which some 32,000 out of a total of 38,000 African mineworkers were publicly sacked) until 2nd March. It was then settled, when the African Union agreed to send the men back to work on condition that the companies continued to employ not only all the strikers but also some 9,000 additional Africans whom they had written on during the strike in place of the strikers.

10. European mineworkers' reaction against this settlement was intense. They had continued to work; they had raised production from nil on 4th January to 58% of normal at the end of February, doing African jobs (at European rates of pay) to achieve this; and they had themselves been branded consequently by overseas trade unions as 'blacklegs' and 'scabs'. Their Union leaders were convinced, therefore, that this time they were on a good wicket, and announced a second ballot on the question of African advancement: but believing that this time, in this atmosphere, only those who were anti-African would turn up, they declared that this one would be non-compulsory. They, and I, and all my advisers would have lost heavily on any wager: the results of this ballot, held at the end of March were almost farcical. Comparatively few votes were cast at all, and on a percentage basis increased majorities were recorded in favour of African advancement. At one mine so obvious was it that the result was going to be overwhelmingly wrong that the ballot box disappeared.

11. Matters rested uneasily until mid-June, when there began an exchange of correspondence between the Union on the one side and the Chamber of Mines on the other. The Union submitted a memorandum expressing its readiness to concede a total of 13 low grade jobs (mainly of the kind which are today performed at one mine by an European and at another mine by an African) on a number of conditions, chief

amongst which was that no further African advancement should thereafter take place for a period of three years, and that that period should be used to construct a complete analysis of all jobs, thus forming a basis for any future discussions on similar problems. But they insisted at the same time that they would take part in no further discussions on the problem unless they had first received from the Chamber a binding promise that no other African whatsoever would be advanced without the consent of the Union.

12. The differences which had been developing between the two groups of companies, and which alone had enabled the Union to hold out against the results of their ballots and general public opinion, became a clear split in this connection. Anglo-American saw no reason why this point should not be conceded. They argued that no other African would be fitted to advance unless he were trained to do so, and that the people who must train him are the very people with whom the dispute exists—the white mineworkers; that furthermore the Union could in any event bring the mines to a standstill at any time by striking; and that therefore nothing practical was to be gained by refusing to recognise the actualities of the situation. They claimed that in three years' time, when the recent very evident liberalisation of thought amongst Europeans on the Copperbelt will have intensified, the way ahead will be clear. R.S.T. on the other hand still argue that they must in the last resort be masters in their own house, and that to concede this right of veto to the Union would be to abdicate from managership: not only would the Union have the final say on how the mines were run but, because Northern Rhodesia and the Federation generally are so dependent upon copper production, they would thus be given powers which might constitute a serious threat to the authority of Government itself.

13. Late in June the Chamber of Mines replied to the Union's proposals agreeing to that for job analysis, counter-proposing an enlarged list of jobs, and stating that they were unable to offer any undertaking save of the fullest consultation, and if necessary negotiation, before further African advancement were introduced. A meeting held between the Chamber and the Union on 8th July resulted in deadlock on this demand by the Union for a right of veto. A succession of meetings ensued in Salisbury between Managing Directors of the two groups: but it proved impossible to align the different approaches in any compromise. Lastly Mr. Clarke, President of the Union and personally not in sympathy with the demand for the right of veto, visited Salisbury, ostensibly without the authority of his Union Executive, and had personal discussions with Mr. Prain, Managing Director of R.S.T. group. Mr. Prain undertook that no precipitate action would be taken by his group, whilst Mr. Clarke promised to do his best with all branches of the Union, and the more moderate members of the Union Executive, to get the demand for a veto dropped.

14. By the 28th July it was generally known by the managements of all the copper mines that Mr. Clarke had not succeeded, and I am informed that after reports had been made to Anglo-American's head office in Johannesburg the General Manager at Nkana received instructions to get the best agreement he could on behalf of his group from the Union, but to get an agreement without further delay.

15. He informed me on 29th July that an agreement had been concluded in broad terms; that it was then being drafted in formal terms, and that it would be signed within a matter of days. On the 1st of August the press announced that an agreement had been signed by which twenty-four jobs now held by Europeans would be thrown open to Africans. It was also stated that the guarantee insisted on by the

Union had been given by the Anglo–American group as a written pledge. An outside firm of experts would, during the next three years, examine the content of all other European jobs: and there would be further meetings at the end of that period to decide what further steps should be taken in the future. I am informed that the twenty-four jobs to be opened are now held by a total of 173 Europeans at all mines (including R.S.T. mines), and that by sub-division this might represent advancement in due course for something between 350 and 400 Africans. I have not yet seen the text of the agreement.<sup>2</sup>

16. R.S.T. are now in a difficult position. I have been told by Mr. Prain that in no circumstances will they concede to the Union the right of veto. Their course ahead is not clear but it would seem in that case that they can only move by giving once more six months' notice of termination of the existing agreement. Strike action by the Europeans employed on their mines would then be immediately talked of, but whether it would take place immediately, or towards the end of the six months period, or when for the first time thereafter the manager of an R.S.T. mine proposed to place an African in a job now held by a European, is still to be seen. A strike fund was begun early in July by the Union to be made up mainly by a 10% compulsory levy on the basic salary of all members (i.e. on about half a member's total earnings). Financial assistance, it is thought, would also be forthcoming from South Africa: but it seems at least doubtful, having regard to the very high wages paid to white workers on the Copperbelt, whether any really effective contribution could be expected from this source.

17. It remains to add that throughout the past twelve months the African workers, and indeed the African Union leaders, have appeared to be only faintly interested in the progress of events. As I have remarked before 'African advancement', in the sense of securing a more responsible or a harder job even at vastly enhanced rates of pay, has not interested them. By 'African advancement' they understand greatly increased wages in return for their present efforts and productivity.

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<sup>2</sup> Six weeks after this agreement, RST concluded its own deal with the European miners, along similar lines but without conceding to the union the right of veto. On 27 Sept these separate agreements were replaced by a single one between RST, Anglo and the union which, like the RST deal, did not concede the right of veto.

## **111** DO 35/4778

28 Oct 1955

[Race relations in Federation]: minute by W S Bates

. . . In general, I must confess that for me this whole report makes depressing reading.<sup>1</sup> Here in a survey covering only a month we have reports of:—

- (a) An African National Congress campaign against law and order (paragraph 251).
- (b) A further series of stone throwing incidents (paragraph 253). Incidentally, the period covered by this report was just too short to include the vicious riot at

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<sup>1</sup> Bates's gloomy assessment came in response to a NR political intelligence report for Sept 1955.

Nchanga when an accident resulting in the death of an African led to an entirely disproportionate outburst against Europeans in general.

(c) A concerted attempt to drive European traders from the Copperbelt fish markets; and this apparently in no way the result of normal commercial competition but directed against Europeans as such (paragraph 255).

(d) Mr. Van Eeden's<sup>2</sup> overwhelming victory at Kafue (paragraph 257).

(e) Various threats of violence against Europeans.

It is true that these security reports inevitably underline the black spots and tend to ignore the patches of light, such as in this case the recent labour agreement on the Copperbelt. But, reading them month after month, it is impossible to avoid the impression that race relations in Northern Rhodesia, and for that matter in Nyasaland as well, seem to be getting steadily worse instead of better. If this view is right, and what I have heard from Mr. Morgan since his return from Central Africa suggests that unfortunately it is, then it means that the policy of partnership, at any rate in the Northern Territories, simply is not working. If this is so, it is essential that those who have the future of the Federation at heart, and not least the Federal Government themselves, should be in no doubt of the position and, even more important, that they should take positive action to improve the situation.

As I see it, there is at any rate one forecast that one can make with certainty about future constitutional developments in Central Africa. It is that the present loose federal system cannot endure indefinitely, or indeed for long. Within a comparatively short time, I should say not more than 10 or 12 years at the most, it must either give way to a unitary form of government or be dissolved entirely. The Federal Government aim at amalgamation and we should like to see them achieve it. But I cannot conceive that any Government in this country would be prepared to countenance any further movement towards closer association in the face of continued African opposition. Therefore, whether they like it or not, the Federal Government have got to go out of their way to win over the African population.

Nor is it any use their deluding themselves that time is on their side. It is true that within the next generation Kariba and the industrial development flowing from it will bring within the reach of many thousands of Africans a standard of living at present beyond their dreams, and that these benefits will be the direct result of Federation. But the tide of African nationalism cannot be held in check while these new forces are harnessed. The emergence of the Gold Coast and of part at least of Nigeria to full self-government, followed by the constitutional advances which are certain to take place well within the next five or six years in other African territories, notably Uganda, will provide a fresh impulse to the movements now only just beginning to manifest themselves in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. I have no doubt whatever that if things are left as they are the next two or three years will see an enormous expansion in the membership and influence of the Congress parties in the Northern Territories and that, as now, the whole tenor of their policy and propaganda will be anti-European and anti-Federation. This in its turn will produce an equal and opposite reaction from the Europeans and will cause them to turn away from the conception of partnership and towards the theories of racial separation.

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<sup>2</sup> G F M van Eeden had been expelled from the Federal Party in Jan 1955 after advocating the partition of the Federation and the creation of a white-dominated dominion which would combine SR and the 'railway belt' of NR. He defeated the Federal Party candidate, G B Beckett, in the Kafue by-election on 6 Sept.

The only way in which the forces of nationalism can be defeated is by fighting them on their own ground. This means in practical terms that the first concern of the Federal Government should be to demonstrate unmistakably that they intend to make partnership a reality and not merely a catchword. Because the subjects for which they are responsible make little direct impact upon the every day life of the African population, the Federal Government's opportunities to give proof of their sincerity are severely limited. It is all the more important that they should take their chances when they can; and their present study of the franchise offers them an unrivalled opportunity. By throwing open the franchise to British Protected Persons they can show for all to see that in the federal experiment the African will be allowed to play his part on equal terms with the European. It will be a decision which the Northern Territories themselves have not dared to take, and the Federal Government will get the credit. It is imperative that they should seize this chance, for if it is lost it may never recur; and it is vital that we should impress this upon Lord Malvern.

## 112 CO 1015/943, no 1

23 Dec 1955

[Kafue/Kariba dispute]: letter from Sir A Benson to W L Gorell Barnes

This will, I fear, be a long letter. You will have seen my top secret and personal telegrams Nos. 52, 53 and 54 about the so-called 'gap' between the finances in sight for Kariba and the actual amount required, and the question whether this 'gap' is filled by a forced loan from the copper-mining companies or by discriminatory taxation on copper sold or exported. I very much hope also that the Secretary of State was able to see Prain and that you are, through conversation, more seized of all the cross-currents and implications than correspondence can make you in either telegraphic or letter form.

2. I must first set out certain figures. The gap is said to be £21,000,000 and it is calculated as follows:—

	<i>£m</i>	<i>£m</i>
Cost of first stage of Kariba . . . . .		77
Forthcoming from International Bank . . . . .	28	
Forthcoming from C.D.C. . . . .	15	
Forthcoming from C.D.F.C. . . . .	3	
Contribution from Federal Government Revenue, and from other loans raised internally (B.S.A. Co., Barclays and Standard Bank, etc.) . . . . .	10	
Total forthcoming . . . . .	<u>56</u>	<u>56</u>
Gap remaining . . . . .		<u>21</u>

3. The following are my comments: The cost of the first stage of the Kariba Scheme has now been re-estimated at £78.9m.<sup>1</sup> (not £77m.) This higher figure was extracted by me from Taylor who showed me the relevant page in the Accountants' final report. I do not know whether it includes either the cost of resettling Africans on the Northern Rhodesia side (estimate given by us to the Federal Government

<sup>1</sup> The figure of £78.9 m was thought in the CO to be a mistake. The correct amount was £77.9 m (minute by R L Baxter, 3 Jan 1956).

£2½m) or on the Southern Rhodesia side (I was told this was £800,000) or the sums expended on the Kafue Scheme (£0.5m) before the Federal Government reversed their previous decision in favour of Kariba. If these items are not included the figure of £77m, would become at least £82m.

4. Secondly the record of the discussions in the Treasury in London held on 15th November (page 7, paragraph 19) would indicate that though the International Bank is good for £25m. it is not yet certain (as I was informed it was) that £28m. will be subscribed. See also page 8, paragraph 23.

5. Thirdly, I must be most doubtful whether the Federal Government can raise £10m. from revenue and other internal loans. The record of the discussions held in the Treasury (page 3, paragraph 9) shows Taylor<sup>2</sup> as stating that all provision for hydro-electric schemes had been eliminated from the Federal Development Plan; and that a figure of £4m. for Kariba previously included in the Development Plan had been excised. I cannot tell, moreover, whether a loan of £10m. and an advance payment of £10m. (which, as Prain told me, will have to come mainly from funds held by Barclays Bank and the Standard Bank) will prejudice the chances of obtaining a separate additional contribution from these Banks. And in this connection also I cannot tell whether H.M.G. in the U.K. are aware that when the Federal Government floated its last local loan, and offered £1.75m. to the public, £510,000 was left to the underwriters; and the news of its failure was suppressed with the 'patriotic co-operation' of the underwriters. The local press announced that the loan had been fully subscribed within 24 hours.

6. Finally it appears to me that the discussions in London took place on the premise that the cost of the first stage of Kariba providing 500 megawatts would be £66m. You will remember that in my telegram Personal No. 46 I reported in paragraph 3(b) that Welensky had told me that the figure of £66m. had now been raised to £77m. and that this latest revised figure was as yet unknown in London. Welensky meant 'unknown to Lord Malvern and his advisers'. This seems to me inexplicable as Appendix B of Alexander Gibb and Company's report, of which I was sent a copy for my personal information in October, states that the figure of £66.3m. for 500 megawatts required upward revision on a basis which would bring it to £78.1m.

7. It has not hitherto proved possible, despite all endeavours, to obtain from the Federal Government any facts or figures about additional essential requirements which have come to light since last time the Federal and Territorial Development Plans were revised. I gave examples of this in the telegram I have just quoted but I should have made it plain that the total railway needs over the next five years were given to me by Welensky as £50m. (which figure he confirmed to me today), that is, I think, over £20m. more than the figures quoted in the most recently revised Federal development plan for the period ending in 1959. Lord Malvern was not prepared to discuss at our meeting on the 16th anything but the 'gap' in Kariba finances; and my subsequent questions to Taylor about other essential requirements were evaded.

8. I have told you in paragraph 10 of my telegram No. 54 that all Federal authorities are now proceeding on a policy of getting subscribers to their needs so deeply committed that, when their true needs are revealed, those who have lent

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<sup>2</sup> R M Taylor, federal secretary for the Treasury, 1955–1958.

money will have the choice of only two alternatives: either to accept the fact that there is little chance of getting their original investments back; or of providing new money to enable the projects to be completed at a much greater cost than that originally estimated. This is a very serious accusation to make in a matter of such magnitude and I have not made it without deep thought. But on two separate occasions (neither of them our last meeting) Lord Malvern has said to me—albeit jokingly—that this is a sound policy to adopt in the present stage of the development of the Federation; and I think it is the only conclusion that can properly be drawn from the fact that I and Colby and all others in the northern territories are rigidly excluded (save when the necessity arises as it has on this occasion) from any access to facts and figures about the Federal Government's general financial position. There is the further fact that, for all the Federal Government has yet permitted to be disclosed, the general public of the Federation are still under the impression that the first stage of Kariba will cost only £54.6m.

9. So much for what the Federal Government wish us to believe is the gap in Kariba finance and its effect (which they claim is nil) on other development generally throughout the Federation. I must say now a little about the factors mainly influencing them.

10. The truth is that none of them is prepared to face either a bye-election or a general election. They, like myself, doubt very much whether more than a few at most of the Northern Rhodesia Federal Party M.P.s. would get back if an election were held tomorrow. Even before the Kafue bye-election Federal Party stock was at a very low figure, and since that time each individual member of the Federal Party has been going through an attack of the jitters, with the result that all members in Northern Rhodesia anyway and all members of the Federal Cabinet have been running what amounts to an election campaign over the last five months. The fact that the elections are two and a half years off at least, and that any lost ground regained now by sheer electioneering must be lost again before election time comes round, does not weigh with them. Lord Malvern's oft-repeated strategy of doing all the unpleasant things in the third year, so that one may reap the benefit of them and have some prizes to hand out in election year, has continually gone for nothing.

11. Accordingly the Federal Government is not prepared now to levy a single extra shilling in taxation on any Southern Rhodesia taxpayer, the bulk of the taxpayers, of course, being in Southern Rhodesia. As an indication of the level of taxation I may say that a married man in Southern Rhodesia with two children receiving £3,500 a year pays a total in federal income tax and territorial surcharge of about £640. In Northern Rhodesia there is no surcharge and the same man would pay about £580. When I enquired why it would not be possible and preferable to impose some kind of excess profits tax, either on companies alone or on companies and individuals, I was told that the difficulty of collection would be insuperable.

12. I made it clear that I felt that there was a very sound case indeed for taxing the excess profits which the copper mining companies were now making but that I could not support any such tax if it were discriminatory: in other words, it should apply to all excess profits and it seemed to me that by adopting a scale system it should be simple to ensure that, while the copper profits remained so enormous, the copper mining companies would still contribute an enormous portion of the resulting revenue. The facts that the export tax proposed will reduce the copper bonus (100% of basic wages) by 25%, and will thereby hit most traders in Northern

Rhodesia, and may discourage further investment in Northern Rhodesia, carry very little weight because there are so many more voters in Southern Rhodesia, and northern M.Ps. will obey the whip.

13. In line with this is the fact that up to date there has been no single project yet started in Northern Rhodesia by the Federal Government which was not provided for originally in the Northern Rhodesia Development Plan and for which the money so provided did not pass to the Federal Government when Federation was introduced. On the contrary: there have been cuts in several parts of that plan, for example the disappearance of the planned new African hospital and extension of the Medical School (£493,000) in favour of improvements to the present hospital estimated to cost £60,000. We have in some cases been told that they are not cuts but deferment. The figures quoted by Mr. Macintyre the other day were most extraordinary and it will suffice to say at this stage (though I shall send you fuller details later) that he compared figures of actual expenditure in 1952 against his estimate of what would be expended in 1955/56, which is hardly a sound thing to do at any time, and particularly at a time when the most tremendous expansion in all services is taking place.

14. It is in the light of these remarks that I invite reference to the question raised in paragraph 13 of my telegram No. 54. At my meeting with Malvern I asked whether there should not be a territorial share of any loan raised from the copper mining companies. I received the correct answer: that as the copper mining companies were registered in Salisbury this would be an internal loan, and it is only loans raised externally which are, under the Constitution, subject to division between the Federal Government and the Territorial Governments. Had I thought of it at the time I might have pointed out that the loans which it is proposed to raise from the International Bank, the Colonial Development Corporation, and the Commonwealth Development Finance Company will, however, be external loans.

15. Naturally I should not even now have raised this question if the Federal Government had shown the faintest sign over the past two years of wishing to act in the spirit of paragraph 11 of the Fiscal Commission's Report (Cmd. 8672). But I cannot now ignore it because, as I have said, the Federal Government has made no effort to accelerate development in Northern Rhodesia and, as you yourselves have pointed out to us, the fact is that every contribution which may be made to Northern Rhodesia from external sources turns itself, under Federal Government financial arrangements, into a hidden subsidy for Southern Rhodesia. I write as one who had a great deal to do on the official level (without which level's support Federation could never have come about) with bringing the Federation into being: but if Federal financial arrangements are continually to be shaped for the benefit of Southern Rhodesia, and to be dictated by what it is thought the Southern Rhodesia voters' reactions will be, then I feel that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, which bears the ultimate responsibility for the welfare of the people of Northern Rhodesia, and a special responsibility for its African inhabitants, is immediately and directly involved. And I am reporting accordingly.

16. I have written about political motives and I now list what I believe to be facts:—

- (a) Kariba's first stage was originally estimated to cost £54.6m. as against the present figure of £78.9m. (or possibly £82m.);
- (b) the cost of power from Kariba was originally quoted at .286 of 1d. whereas now it seems likely to cost at least .6 of 1d; and

(c) these facts and figures have not yet been given to the general public of the Federation nor, so far as I have been able to ascertain, to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

17. I now revert to the two alternatives which have now been placed before the copper mining companies (though few details have yet been given to the copper mining companies of the export tax proposals). I enclose, for your information, a copy which I was handed by Taylor of a minute which is dated in the Federal Treasury on 9th December, 1955, and which was laid before the Cabinet. I do not need to say that this, like the whole of the rest of the contents of this letter, must be treated as a most secret and personal document: that is to say that if ever it were suspected by anybody in or working for the Federal Government, or living in the Federation (other than my official advisers), that I had passed on any of this information I should have to place my resignation in the Secretary of State's hands immediately.

18. Last May I handed to you two memoranda, the first of which discussed the Federation's public debt without reference to the cost of the Kariba scheme, and from which only one conclusion could be drawn: that the Federation could not afford the costly luxury of a scheme whose first stage was then estimated to be only £54.6m. The second memorandum showed that the Federation could not however afford to do without a hydro-electric scheme, and gave comparative figures of an apparently less flamboyant but just as efficient scheme at Kafue, which would not only be far less costly overall while producing the same amount of power earlier at all stages, but could be planned and constructed in easy stages to fit the estimated demand for power over the next seventeen years.

19. The final paragraph of the first memorandum made clear what I now repeat: that, being denied access to full facts and figures I could not discharge my responsibility to the people of this Territory or to Her Majesty's Government: and that I was therefore compelled to place such facts and figures as I had in your hands so that they might be transmitted to those in the Treasury who, without revealing their origin or basis, would nevertheless be enabled by them to know what actual facts and figures should be demanded from the Federal authorities before Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would agree to advance any money towards the Kariba Scheme. Baxter's letter to me No. CAA/42/2/02 of the 13th of September, refers. That first memorandum still holds good as regards its general representations but the new figures for the Kariba project make the prognosis very considerably worse.

20. I now attach for you a note<sup>3</sup> which shows the most recent costing available to us of the Kariba Project. The figures in Cols. (1)–(5) are taken direct from Messrs. Alexander Gibb and Company's September report. Cols. (6) and (7) have been calculated by us in accordance with the advice given in Appendix B of that report: that is to say we have added 12% on averaged cost of 'Initial Development' and 10% on Stage 1 Civil Engineering. The report gives no prognostication of cost corrections beyond 1965, but Taylor has told Nicholson that Messrs. Cooper Bros. in their most recent revision have given an end figure of £111.6m. This has been inserted in Col. (6).

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

21. In calculating what the increased cost of the Kafue Scheme might be, since it was last estimated in February last by the Consultants, we have preferred to be on the safe side and have therefore added a straight 20% to all previously estimated costs. No thorough revision of Kafue estimates, similar to that carried out by Messrs. Cooper Bros. for those of Kariba, has been made.

22. You will see that the first stage of Kafue would produce 300 megawatts in 1960/61 at an estimated cost of £38.6m.; which contrasts with a figure of 294 megawatts from Kariba in 1962 at a price of £78.1m. (including resettlement costs and money already spent on the Kafue Scheme); or with a figure of 142 megawatts from Kariba in 1960 for £66m. (inclusive). The second stage of Kafue would give 600 megawatts for £60m. as against some £88m. at Kariba; and the final figure of 1,200 megawatts at Kafue would be secured for £103m. as against the £111.6m. required for Kariba. The latter figures must be regarded as conjectural: they relate to a period so far ahead. The Kafue Consultants also proposed a special 'preliminary' Kafue scheme, designed to meet the 1959–1960 gap in power available, and which could be carried out as part of and without prejudice to the later stages. This was going to cost something in the region of £20m. only.

23. On 16th December I was given by Taylor, in reply to my question whether money either spent or committed on Kariba was in the neighbourhood of £4½m., the answer, 'much less'. Taylor has subsequently stated that the figure to date is about £2½m.

24. I am well aware of the grave difficulties of changing horses now that so much has been committed, and such momentum achieved in the preliminary phases of construction. I know too that however much they deplore the original decision against Kafue, the Copper Mining groups are predominantly concerned with getting their power with certainty by 1960. That the price will be over double that contemplated does not dismay them, but only because the new price will still be well below that of thermal power. What they are chiefly afraid of is having to fill a gap with thermal installations. But the point seems to me to be that, admitting that the interests of the Copper Mines are extremely important, they are not so important as the long term interests of the Federation which demand (in addition to such things as really cheap power) a balanced and steady development rather than a gamble which might see the whole Federation in Queer St. if private investment capital ceased, suddenly, to be attracted.

25. It is the politics of the matter which is the great stumbling block; but they are local politics. I believe that the Federal Party (to which I do not see any effective opposition arising anyway) would get away with it if Malvern, who took the Kariba decision himself and then informed his Cabinet, were to accept the blame and resign. In any event, in my belief, he must either retire of his own accord very soon or be requested to retire by Welensky and a number of his Cabinet colleagues. They would have the very hearty support of Garfield Todd.

26. Even at this late stage with a year wasted, is it beyond the bounds of possibility to hope that, if correct facts and figures are extorted from the Federal Government by those who are being asked to lend the money, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would not compel them to look at the matter objectively, and, if necessary, demand a full re-examination of the Kafue potential by independent experts—(the French consultants on Kariba were never that: witness their present appointment to the Kariba scheme and the fact that as consultants had

already been appointed for the Kafue scheme there was no opening there for them)—before it agreed either to sanction a loan of money from its own resources or to guarantee a loan from the International Bank?

27. I think I must at least ask, having as it were cleared my conscience by passing this burden on to the Secretary of State, that he consider now whether what I have said in my previous two memoranda, in my telegrams, and in this letter should not be laid before the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

## **113** CO 1015/1061, no 6

Dec 1955–Nov 1956

**'Native authorities and the general political situation in Northern Rhodesia': memorandum by Sir A Benson. *Minutes* by A J Chant<sup>1</sup>, W L Gorell Barnes and Sir J Macpherson**

[Benson read this paper at a meeting of his senior officials and provincial commissioners ('Note of a meeting held at Government House on Thurs 22nd Dec 1955'). E I G Unsworth, the acting chief secretary, raised the question as to whether it was too late to pursue the policy advocated by Benson. The general view of the meeting 'was that it was not too late and that everything should be done to increase the position and prestige of the Chiefs in the country'. Benson forwarded the document reproduced below to the CO on 27 Jan 1956 as an appendix to the minutes of the meeting on 22 Dec ('item I'). The reactions of civil servants at the CO to Benson's strategy were considerably more sceptical than those of the governor's officials.]

### (a) *Chiefs*

Since the dawn of history the greater part of Northern Rhodesia and the bulk of its population has been governed by, or through, its Chiefs. Long before Lugard coined the phrase 'indirect rule' the B.S.A. Company's agents ruled mainly by means of Chiefs who were loyal to them. Sometimes they made, or bought, special treaties with the Chiefs.

2. Even in the days of direct rule the people the B.S.A. Company and the Government's Native Commissioners dealt with were the Chiefs. Chiefs became Native Authorities. The addition of councils or counsellors to the Chiefs to make them into Native Authorities was in fact no more than a reversion to the position which existed (though it was not clearly recognised to exist) when first the British began to administer the Territory. Only when a Chief had abnormally strong personality and ability could he act as a dictator: in all normal circumstances the Chief's counsellors exercised a very great influence, and the system was an extremely democratic one.

3. Only because of one special attribute could the Chief have the final say, and then only in respect of certain matters: the Chief's special divinity, or superhuman quality—call it what you will. He was the special repository of religious knowledge and secrets, and, while partaking himself of the divine, was often also a Chief Priest. This position remains unaltered today, and manifests itself in two special ways in which we have preserved and enhanced the Chiefs' particular authority; in his judicial powers and activities, and in his special authority over land allocation.

4. Obviously there are shades and variations within Northern Rhodesia of the

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<sup>1</sup> An overseas service officer (Tanganyika) seconded to the CO.

above general statement. Some people were recognised as Chiefs by the Administration who were never Chiefs. Others failed to obtain recognition who might have had it. Some Chiefs are much more important than others. In some tribes the Chief is not also a Chief Priest. And above all the onset of civilization and education, and particularly of industrialization, has over the years considerably reduced that once-overwhelming degree of authority which used to flow from the divine characteristics embodied in Chieftancy. This is particularly the case in parts of Northern Rhodesia today, because the spiritual attributes are much tied up with that particular part of the land which the tribal or the clan's particular spirits frequent; and the establishment of a large European community in Crown Land areas, particularly on the railway line, have tended to create in the minds of Africans on the railway line the belief that the spirits (the vast majority of which have of course a malign influence which must be appeased) cannot get at them there. But still in all parts of Northern Rhodesia the fundamental source of authority remains, however much erosion has got at it.

(b) *Native authorities*

5. British Administration has concentrated on making the Chiefs and their Councils into effective instruments of local government. British Administration has, however, tended to ignore the spiritual qualities which a Chief possesses, and the powers which accrue to him therefrom, and to devote its attention rather to the qualities of character, intelligence, and ability which are needed in an administrator (and which are so seldom found amongst our Chiefs). Partly as a result of this approach, and partly owing to a failure to recognise the *supreme* importance of the Chief and his Council in the system by which we have hitherto governed Northern Rhodesia, the progress made by Native Authorities in developing their authority, their prestige, and their sense of responsibility for the good government of their area has, over the past ten years, been negligible.

6. The reasons cited are the main and basic reasons. There have been many subsidiary and contributory ones; first, and above all, shortage of staff, involving loss of contact not only with the people but with the Native Authorities themselves; the lust for personal power and prestige exhibited at times during the past fifteen years by certain European politicians; the ignorance demonstrated, and the opposition adduced by such politicians, to proposals to use money to enhance the prestige and increase the efficiency of the Native Authorities; the war, and the vital importance during it of concentrating money and effort on the sinews of war; the rapidly accelerating drain of manpower from the Native Authority areas to the railway line, and the consequent severance between the Chief and his people; the seven years without recruitment for the Colonial Administrative Service which created a vast gulf between those who received their training and absorbed their ideas from men who knew these things (having learned them at their senior officers' knee) and the post-war recruits who had very little such opportunity, and a number of whom had already absorbed other ideas (which are difficult to eradicate) from their own observations in under-developed territories far away and quite different from Northern Rhodesia, and even under British Military Administrations where the rule had to be much more direct. And finally the tremendous distractions which so-called European affairs create for people at Headquarters, from the Governor downwards, and make it so nearly impossible for them to concentrate enough on what is still the

most important job in the country and always will be—direct contact with the men whose job it is to be in contact with the people.

7. As a result of all these things Native Authorities today, in general, certainly have no more, and many have far less, prestige, authority, and sense of responsibility than they had ten years ago. But what is worse: other 'native authorities' have reared their heads, and have developed their own great prestige and authority during the past ten years. They are mainly imbued with a sense of irresponsibility, being motivated mainly by motives of self-advancement or profit.

(c) *The African nationalist*

8. The African Nationalist in Northern Rhodesia falls into one of two categories: either he is a sincere, deep-thinking, but semi-educated person who wishes to elevate his people to improve their standards of life and living, and to ensure that they have no genuine and justified grievances; or he is a man who pretends to be activated by such motives, but is in truth motivated by prospects of personal advancement or gain. As is natural the crook is a more energetic man than the honest man. And as is natural the honest man is apt to be at the mercy of the crook.

9. In Northern Rhodesia organisations like the African National Congress are composed firstly of the latter class—the self-seekers, but number amongst their ranks members of the former class to whom frustration, coupled with their lack of true education, has brought the belief that their objects can be attained only by unity with the agitators. Immediately outside, or on the fringes, of this membership there is a very large number of Africans who are still thoroughly well-disposed to British rule, and who are increasingly anxious to be presented by British rule with some alternative to throwing in their lot with the African National Congress. What alternative?

10. Even if it were possible and desirable, to give all Africans 'equal pay for equal work', the vote, and complete social equality in bars, and cinemas, and the like, with Europeans this would not be the alternative the vast majority of Africans in Northern Rhodesia are now truly seeking: because it would be entirely foreign to their own traditional ideas, and it would involve sweeping away the strongest subconscious tenets by which all men live—their particular 'religious' anchors.

11. The only alternative which we can provide for these people is that which they are still most predisposed to accept—government through their Chiefs and Native Authorities.

12. The history of all African nationalist movements is a history of an intense struggle by the African Nationalist against his own traditional Native Authority. This was the history on the Gold Coast, and the history in Nigeria. So long as the Chiefs and Native Authorities stood, so long could the African nationalist politicians, particularly the self-seekers amongst them, make no progress. Once the prestige and authority of the Native Authorities were impaired the politicians and the 'Nationalists' made ever quicker strides. And in the Gold Coast and Nigeria once the prestige and authority of the Native Authorities had gone effective British rule and control over all the things which affect the people most closely in their own homes and lives went with it, to the bitter grief and the grievous detriment of over thirty million people, who could not be made sufficiently aware of what was going on to protect themselves.

13. In Northern Rhodesia the African National Congress leaders have fully

realised these facts, and Congress is at present and has been over years engaged in a life and death struggle with the Native Authorities. Congress has sought to destroy them in two main ways: either by an outright attack upon them (where they are not very strong, and lack a long tradition of true Chieftancy behind them); or, where they have such a tradition, by flattery and by getting them into their pockets with the clear intention of destroying them when they have served their purpose.

14. This is the battle we are now fighting. In Northern Rhodesia we can still win it, and must win it. If we lose it everything is lost: either we go through a period of stress and storm when Europeans begin leaving the country because they see that the tide is set against them; or, perhaps more likely, local European indignation and influence is so strong that H.M.G. in the United Kingdom (which will in no circumstances send troops against Europeans) must hand over its responsibilities to a local Government whose policy will run along the South African pattern.

(d) *The strengthening of Native Authorities*

(i) *The positive steps to be taken*

15. The first small step has already been taken: Chiefs' subsidies have been doubled and are to be trebled. A second small step is following: some sixty thousand additional pounds a year will accrue from increased native tax to Native Treasuries, and this is to be spent on paying higher wages to Native Authority Civil Servants in the hope of attracting a better type of man to this job. The sums so far provided are insignificant in comparison with the needs. Chiefs' prestige must be built up in every possible way; and the prestige, and authority, and sense of responsibility of the Native Authorities must similarly be built up.

16. Over the next few years we shall have an increasing number of Africans coming back to Northern Rhodesia with degrees and diplomas, and others, perhaps more difficult, who have just failed to matriculate. Either these people must be absorbed into soundly-paid and satisfying jobs, or very many of them will become more able demagogues than any present Congress leader. Compare in this connection Harry Nkumbula himself. Precisely that history threw him up, as it did the main political leaders in Uganda, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria. A large field must be opened for them as Native Authority Civil Servants. In soundly-paid and satisfying posts there, their talents will work to our advantage: unemployed, or employed in unsatisfying jobs, they will be much more formidable opponents than any of the mediocre stuff that has yet come forward.

17. No money which we can pour into Native Authorities, and no prestige we can give them, will be of any avail unless simultaneously they are *compelled* to develop their sense of responsibility for the good government of their areas. They are generally poor material, but we must work with the tools we have. One thing we have done well, and that is our Native Courts. So well by comparison have we done it that if a Chief today lost his judicial powers he would have nothing left. In Northern Rhodesia, anyway, the separation of the executive and the judiciary would, for many years yet, be a disaster.

18. Native Courts are our one firm foundation, and we must build them up and ensure that they are used to the utmost, not only for civil, but particularly for criminal, work. For our special purposes it does not matter whether an offender is brought to book by criminal process or by civil process: but he must be brought to book *by the*

*Native Authority.* It is on this that the prestige of the Native Authority rests. The Native Courts Adviser has been asked to examine our laws and submit recommendations for increasing the jurisdiction of the Native Courts. Today any offence which appears in the Penal Code must be tried in a Native Court either as an offence against Native Law and Custom, or against a parallel Native Authority rule or regulation. This is not sound.

19. Some months ago, with the consent of the Native Authority, a forest protected area was declared near Lusaka. Harry Nkumbula cut down a few trees on it. The local Native Court had no jurisdiction to try the offence (though had the offence been committed within the Lusaka Municipal Area the Lusaka Urban Native Court *could* have tried it). No prosecution could be instituted, mainly because its only result would have been enhanced prestige, through martyrdom at the hands of the British, for Harry Nkumbula. Had the Native Court tried the case and fined him ten shillings the prestige and authority of the Native Authority would have advanced and that of the African National Congress would have been lowered.

20. Today Congress's activities in Native Authority areas are limited by Native Authority rules, purportedly made under Native law and custom. This is so far-fetched that it cannot hope to last. What Native Authorities need are powers comparable to those given to us against seditious practices.

21. We have found it impossible to kill the activities of Congress under our own laws, and it will remain impossible. And if this bald statement is true then we have only one alternative open to us: to use the Native Authorities and Native Courts to control, and eventually eradicate them. This we have been doing with conspicuous success, but our basis for doing it has been very shaky. Even while doing it we have been accused by African opinion locally, and by European opinion in the United Kingdom, of compelling Native Authorities to carry out our orders.

22. If we establish the Native Authorities in the rural areas in a complete position of prestige and authority, (and the essential corollary of this is that we compel them to carry out their full responsibilities), we shall still only have gone part way to achieve our full object. To achieve it fully we must restore as fully as possible the influence of Chiefs and Native Authorities over their people in the urban areas on Crown Land.

23. An increasing number of Africans are becoming entirely urban dwellers. Few as yet, and those mainly youngsters who have never lived in a rural area, will say that Kitwe or Broken Hill is their home for all time. The vast majority will say that they are in Kitwe or Broken Hill for a few years more, or until their working days are over, when they will return to their rural area. But an increasing number of these like the Europeans, are mistaken: many of them will stay there and die there. But they will not be content to stay there peaceably under a purely European Municipality and the Central Government. They must have as their direct local Government an Urban Native Authority.

24. One of the tragedies of the past ten years has been the disappearance of the Tribal Elders from urban areas, and thereby the complete severance of the town dweller from the influence of his rural Native Authority. By some means or other this vital link must be restored. By some means or other the present attitude of some town dwellers to their Native Authority—'he has nothing to do with me: I live in the chalo cha bazungu'<sup>2</sup>—must be changed. African town dwellers, when considering a

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<sup>2</sup> 'Chalo' is the Bemba language (Chibemba) term for 'country', 'land', or 'world'. 'Chalo cha bazungu' therefore literally translates as 'white man's country' or 'white man's land'. The editor is grateful for this translation to James R Brennan.

course of conduct, who are now apt to listen only to Matthew Nkoloma, or Dixon Konkola, or Robinson Puta, or Justin Chimba and such people, must be made to take seriously into account the reactions of the Chief and Native Authority by whom, before they became urbanised, their outlook on affairs was strongly influenced, and through whom all their moral sanctions came. Christianity was hitherto failed to provide the same strength of moral sanction amongst Africans as their own religions, and it will be many generations before it succeeds. The urbanised African of today who wished to pursue a bad course of conduct is not generally swayed by moral sanctions, but only by his fear of the police. No society can maintain law and order for any length of time if it depends only on the 'forces of law and order'. Societies stand because of the force of 'public opinion'. It is the 'public opinion' which flows from the Native Authorities, or can be made to flow from new urban Native Authorities soundly constituted, which alone can ensure that a sound course of action is followed.

25. All these things mentioned must be concentrated on as strongly as possible as positive steps to make the Native Authorities really effective instruments of Government, both in their own areas and over their people outside them, and to make them really effective instruments against the 'native authorities' which will otherwise usurp their powers—the African National Congress, the professional trade union leaders, and other nationalist politicians of that kind. By definition the danger is that the 'nationalist politicians' become anti-European. But the greatest and most important thing we must do is to make the Chiefs—the Native Authorities—appear in the eyes of their people to be much bigger and more important people than the African nationalist politician leaders. The place where we must make this first appear, both because that is where they are, and because that is where it is easiest to begin, is the Native Authorities' own areas. And it is with this in view that we have concentrated so determinedly over the last year on the possibilities of creating in the Native Authority areas the background which is an indispensable prerequisite if Native Authorities' prestige is to be raised to the necessary level. What kind of prestige can any man have in the eyes of an urbanised African, who has seen and lived amongst modern buildings and amenities, when that man lives in a pole and dagga hut, or at best in a ramshackle brick house, in the middle of a village as squalid and poverty-stricken as it was twenty or thirty years ago? Even if his own house is still in such a village he must have some imposing centre which his people can look at and talk about with pride, and which will appear in their eyes to be approaching in standards, if not in size, the modern centres which are found on the railway line. Hence the importance of, and the concentration on, the plan for developing, in the Native Authority areas, areas of intensive agricultural or other production, with towns of modern standards as their central focal points. Hence the fact that, whereas our best calculations show that since our Development Plan began eighteen shillings and eleven pence out of every twenty shillings has been spent on the railway line, our new revised development plan for the next four years provides that out of every twenty shillings a minimum of four shillings and tenpence will be spent in the rural areas. The figure is just less than six million pounds out of some twenty-four million pounds.

Only a very small part of this money is to be spent on what might be called 'urban' development—money provided for electricity supplies, for special water supplies, and the like. The remainder is for agriculture, fisheries, communications, education,

forestry, development of the cattle industry, and general rural development of every kind. We are looking outside our own finances for money to be specifically devoted towards town buildings, such as imposing Native Authority headquarters, shops, cinemas, tarred streets, clubs, hotels and the like, and I hope to raise this money from the copper mining companies. Hitherto the talk has been about *an* area of intensive development. This is only because we must start by enunciating the idea, and because in my approach to the copper mining companies I must put that idea over on them, and it must be also the idea of the most expensive operation which we have in mind. As is obvious one must get as many as possible of these intensive areas and focal points going as quickly as possible, and one or two will cost far less than others.

*(ii) The negative steps to be avoided*

26. By these are meant any steps which militate against the establishment of Native Authorities as instruments of prestige and authority, with full sense of responsibility, and satisfactorily discharging that responsibility.

27. It must be made to appear to all the people of a Native Authority area that it is the Native Authority which is governing, and not the Central Government through its District Commissioner. This is a far harder task for the District Commissioner than ruling directly, but it must be done. We could perhaps rule directly for another ten or fifteen years: but at the end of that time we should not rule at all, save possibly—if we had enough money—in the South African manner. The people must be with us, and it must, therefore, be their own institutions which govern them. District Officers must avoid letting it appear to the people amongst whom they work that things are done as a result of a District Officer's order. They must make every effort to make it appear that things are done because of the Native Authority's order, which, of course, the District Officer is pleased to see in force. Many tour reports continue to give entirely the opposite impression, and this is not only because the tour report is written for the eyes of Senior Officers. Such tour reports reveal the mental approach of the touring officer.

28. There has been a tendency over the past ten years to substitute direct Central Government control in a number of matters for indirect control through the Native Authorities. A case in point is the enforcement of Game and Fish Laws. We have tended to relieve the Native Authorities of their duties for ensuring enforcement; and in so doing we have ensured lack of enforcement. Either the Native Authorities must maintain law and order in the rural areas with their own resources, and with such added resources as we can give them (in which case they will be on our side against offenders); or we must enforce those laws ourselves (in which case the Native Authorities will be in collusion with the offenders).

29. If Native Authorities are to have a full sense of responsibility, and to discharge that responsibility fully, they must on no account be permitted to shift it on to the shoulders of somebody else. Africans, above all other people, are frightened to put the hard word on another African. Fear of poison, or of witchcraft, or of a malign attitude towards them, makes them most unwilling to 'get across' their fellows. The general hesitation to sentence a man to imprisonment does not flow *only* from the traditional practice of treating all offences as civil offences. The Moslems treat all cases essentially as civil cases, but they do not hesitate to imprison a man or to condemn a man to death if the injured party claims the eye for the eye.

30. It has been stated that our principal foundation is the Native Court, and it is so because we have insisted that they function. They must be made to function even more fully. If close to a Native Authority, or within reach of it, there are Northern Rhodesia Police, the whole tendency of the Chief and of his Counsellors is to say 'Glory be: we shall report to the Police that a crime has been committed, and we have discharged our full responsibility'. Native Authorities today are only too glad to say: 'This case is a big case, and I, therefore, need not take any part in its investigation: which means that I shall not have the frightening duty of bringing the offender to book'. Unless at all times the Native Authority feels it is *his* responsibility to bring the offender to book we are undermining that one foundation on which the strength of the Native Authority at present rests—the Native Court. Even if the case never comes to the Native Court all the preliminaries—the investigation, the pursuit, and the arrest are in African minds part of the judicial rather than of the executive functions of the Native Authority. As indeed—if you analyse it—in our minds also.

(e) *The aim of our policy*

31. All this falls on to the shoulders of the desperately over-worked and over-burdened District Officer, in which I include—as I include myself—Provincial Commissioners. Because this is the whole essence of the District Officer's job: the erection of the Native Authorities into a completely satisfactory instrument of sound local Government. The basic policy is contained in those few words. We must start again in the Native Authorities' own areas with tremendous concentration of effort and money; we must, thence, restore the Native Authorities' influence in the urban areas, firstly by raising their prestige amongst their own people—even if those people are urbanised—and at the same time, or as soon as we possibly can, by erecting Authorities in the urban areas which will have an ever-increasing Native Authority element in them. We must ensure, so long as the African Representative Council lasts, that the Members of the African Representative Council increasingly come forward as representatives of the Native Authorities. And when the African Representative Council disappears, as it will disappear, we must ensure that the Africans who come forward to the Legislative Council come forward as representatives of, and speak with the voice of, the Native Authorities. If we can achieve this we shall have achieved for Northern Rhodesia as a whole a system of Government based on two traditions—African tradition and British tradition—and we shall have laid the essential foundations for marrying those two traditions into a stable and steady administration which, having its roots in the past, can face and stand against any modern storm which may arise.

Minutes on 113

*Mr. Wallis*

You invited my comments on the note of the meeting held at G.H. Lusaka, on December 22nd last at which the position of the chiefs and native authorities vis-à-vis nationalism was discussed.

2. I have no personal knowledge of Northern Rhodesia so that it would be presumptuous for me to comment on those sections of the note which deal specifically with local problems. Item I, together with the supporting note on native

authorities, raises, however, certain issues which are, I think, of general relevance over much of East and Central Africa at least. I have concerned myself solely with these points—which boil down to the position of traditional authorities in the present political situation—and the observations which I make below should be construed as those of a serving D. O. from a neighbouring territory.

3. First, by way of general comment: I must admit that I find this discussion of the role of chiefs and native administrations in Northern Rhodesia somewhat disconcerting. This is doubtless in part due to the fact that it is, to me, 'out of context'. It is also I think, in part because the arguments advanced come from an environment very different from that in which I myself serve so that some of the arguments used and sentiments expressed are foreign to me. I must confess that there is much in the paper with which I cannot sympathise and not a little which I think borders on the naive. Nor do I think that this is because I happen to be one of the post war recruits who are 'written off' so casually in paragraph 6 of the appendix! My early environment was in the strictest sense one of 'indirect rule and native administration' and I learned my lessons at the feet of two such sound stalwarts as the brothers Pike! Nonetheless I find myself out of sympathy with much of this defence of native administration as a bulwark against nationalism and I cannot accept what to me appears to be the over simplification of a complex argument—upon which the paper is based.

4. The whole tenor of item I and of the appendix seems to be based on a somewhat emotional and arbitrary equation of 'nationalist' with 'bad' and 'traditional authority' with 'good'; although in paragraph 8 of the note it is conceded that a nationalist can be sincere. The whole analysis of the situation is made in these terms of 'good' and 'bad' and the impression thus conveyed is increased by the metaphorical use of the word 'battle' in paragraph 14. The net result is that the reader is left with a feeling that there is a clear cut dichotomy in this matter and that a 'last ditch stand' is being made in Northern Rhodesia. I suggest that this is an over simplification of a very complex set of factors and which might well obscure things yet further.

5. Having diagnosed the problem in these terms—that a life and death struggle is in progress between the nationalists and the native authorities—the paper advocates a twofold solution. This, as I read it, consists of (a) bolstering the native authorities up to the greatest possible extent and (b) turning away the wrath of the nationalist by presenting him with an opening in the field of native administration.

6. This twofold plan of campaign seems to raise several issues. In the first place the paper implies that the native authorities and chiefs of Northern Rhodesia are today in a fairly parlous state and one doubts if they are an altogether effective agency of government. One doubts the success of an attempt to *compel* (paragraph 17) a native authority to develop and I suggest that to do so might well be to pour money and energy into a totally unsuccessful venture. Moreover, as I see the paper, the suggestion is made that the Native authorities should form the essential basis of local government. I would content that we have in the past made this cardinal error of attempting to graft local government functions onto traditional authorities, that this cannot be done and that the role of the chief and the native authority is separate from and very different in character to that of the true local government institution.

7. Secondly, irrespective of the nature of the native authority—be it a purely traditional authority or one upon which unwelcome local government functions have been foisted—are we justified in using it as a 'stalking horse' against

nationalism? I am in full support of all possible endeavours to strengthen the native authorities in order to make them able to play effectively their legitimate role. Nothing but profit can accrue from this. But is it the role of the chief and the native authority to be the bulwark against nationalism? I think not and I further think that to make the native authorities undertake such a task, even with all out government support, would be to court the risk of their forfeiting yet more of the respect traditionally owed to them and to run the danger of precipitating a situation analogous to C. P. P. and N. L. M.<sup>3</sup> and *Uganda Congress v. 'Saza' chiefs*. I may be wrong, but I can think of few things more likely to encourage the nationalist attack on traditional authorities than to turn them into institutions which could be stigmatised and vilified as the 'stooges' of government. I appreciate that it can be argued that had we given greater support to the traditional authorities in West Africa the outcome might have been happier but this is, I think, also open to debate. In this context then can one really argue cogently that African representation in Leg. Co. should be representative of the native authorities? Surely African representation should represent African opinion in general and this is far from being the same thing as native authority opinion backed-up by the local D.O.

8. Thirdly, by backing up the native authorities and finding jobs for potential nationalists in their service we are not going to extirpate nationalism nor are we going to draw its teeth effectively. I have a feeling that the nationalist is a phenomenon who has come to stay and stay he will despite all efforts to the contrary. Surely, the right approach is to give him a forum wherein he can 'let off steam' and by exercising himself in the arts of government at a lowly level can either eliminate himself or develop his talents along lines which can be controlled. Such a forum might be provided by real local government institutions.

9. These observations can be summed up as follows:—

(a) I do not feel that the analysis given of the issues at stake does justice to the complexity of the problem.

(b) I do not agree that native authorities can, or for that matter, should be expected to become 'effective instruments of local government' in the fullest sense. Their role is a traditional one and of restricted function and it is injudicious to saddle them with tasks and responsibilities which they do not wish and cannot shoulder. In short, I think that 'local government' and 'native authority' are not synonymous.

(c) Irrespective of whether or not observation (b) is right or wrong I think that it would be inadvisable to bolster up the native authorities specifically as a bulwark against nationalism. I am all for supporting them in their traditional role but to go beyond this may be to mount a defence which is totally ineffective and to invite a renewed and more violent onslaught on the already weak institutions of chieftainship etc.

(d) I am not altogether sure that it is advisable to take up such obvious defensive postures against nationalism. I fear that if we endeavour to bottle up the heady wine of nationalism within the none too sound bottle of native authority the resultant explosion might well be calamitous.

A.J.C.  
27.2.56

<sup>3</sup> Convention People's Party and the rival National Liberation Movement representing the Ashanti in the Gold Coast, coverage in Richard Rathbone, *Ghana* (BDEEP: London, 1992).

*Sir J. Macpherson*

The subject matter of this file is not very urgent and indeed, if you are too busy, it is not essential that you should give it your attention at all. If, on the other hand, you have time to read the relevant documents, I should much appreciate your opinion and guidance.

With his letter at (6) the Governor of Northern Rhodesia sent to Mr. Morgan, amongst other things, a Note entitled 'Native Authorities and the General Political Situation in Northern Rhodesia'. This Note was carefully examined by African Studies Branch, all of whose members (including Mr. Hudson, himself an ex-Secretary for Native Affairs in Northern Rhodesia) were very critical of it. The views of the Branch will be found in the Note at (11), which was subsequently turned into the shorter Note at (12) which was prepared for the purpose of a communication to Sir A. Benson. I felt, however, that even this shorter Note might get the wrong reaction and eventually wrote to him the somewhat shorter letter at (14). This drew from Sir A. Benson the letter at (17) to Mr. Morgan with its enclosure by Mr. Stubbs, who was then Secretary for Native Affairs but has since retired. Unfortunately the file then became overlaid and I did not discuss the matter with Sir A. Benson whilst he was on leave.

The position in Northern Rhodesia is, of course, somewhat different from that in other territories; and I would not claim that elsewhere our Local Authority policy has been so outstandingly successful that we should wish it to be slavishly copied in Northern Rhodesia, even if conditions were more or less the same.

Nevertheless:—

(1) I must say that I think there is a good deal of substance in the critical comments in Mr. Chant's minute of the 9th November at (19) and the immediately preceding minute by Mr. Wallis.

(2) One cannot help being a little suspicious of the inflexibility of Sir A. Benson's approach to this subject and his lack of enthusiasm for any discussion of it.

I do not think we want to have a head-on collision with Sir A. Benson about this. As Mr. Wallis has said, we know that there is a good deal of doubt on the subject in his own Administration. I believe that Mr. Hall, the new S.N.A., is not at all certain that the present official line is the right one and that his main assistant is definitely of the same view as the African Studies Branch. I think, therefore, that the best course will almost certainly be to leave the argument to be pursued in Northern Rhodesia and then at the Cambridge Conference next year. I would, however, propose to take the opportunity of my forthcoming visit to Northern Rhodesia with the Secretary of State to keep my eyes and ears open generally in this connection and, in particular, to have some talk with Mr. Hall about it.

On procedure, I feel that you will agree that this is the best course. My main purpose in suggesting that you should read the papers is to ask whether you have any feelings on the subject matter. In this connection you may like to see the brief minute of the 22nd March in which Mr. Williamson throws doubt on the validity of Sir A. Benson's appeal to Nigerian example in paragraph 12 of his memorandum.

My own feeling, for what it is worth, is that there is common ground between us in the sentence which I have marked A on the first page of the enclosure to (17),<sup>4</sup> but

<sup>4</sup> This was a passage from an undated memorandum by Bill Stubbs, forwarded to the CO by Benson on 31 July 1956. It reads, 'Only by integrating the progressive elements with the traditional elements, can we hope to avoid disputes and dislocation of local government services'.

that it is extremely doubtful whether the integration can successfully take the form of putting the progressive elements to work for the old Native Authorities. In some places there has been far too great a tendency to try to do away with the Native Authorities or shove them into the background: what is probably needed is some new organisation appropriate to the circumstances of any particular area in which the traditional Authorities are given an opportunity, and indeed called upon, to play a considerable part, but in which progressive elements in their own right also play a considerable part.

W.C.G.B.  
15.11.56

*Mr. Gorell Barnes*

I am glad to have seen this file. Though I hadn't seen it before, not all of the enclosures are new to me. You will have noted, from a minute I wrote in the file about Special Branch arrangements in Northern Rhodesia, most of which would have been more relevant to this file, that I was, before I took up this appointment, aware of Sir A. Benson's views on the future of Chiefs and traditional authorities in this territory, and that, like the Department and A.S.B., I have some reservations on the subject.

2. What happened was that on his arrival on leave (in the latter part of July?) Sir A. Benson sent me a lot of papers (as doctination for the job I was to take up a few weeks later?!)—including the enclosures to (6) and (17). In sending the papers back I made some comments—very tentatively because of my lack of direct knowledge of Northern Rhodesia (two weeks in June last year—spent almost entirely in Lusaka and the Copperbelt). I recalled that Sir A. Benson and I had had some experiences in Nigeria of having to decide how far to prop up Native Authorities and loyal moderates against a rising tide of nationalism amongst the young educated people. I expressed sympathy with his objective but I added that while it is hard to contemplate being accused of letting down one's friends, if they, as one's chosen instruments, are going to break in one's hand when the test comes, it may be more damaging to them, and to the territory, to try to prop them up beyond the limit of their potentialities.

3. I also asked Sir A. Benson if it had to be 'war' against Congress—though I made it clear that I recognised the very different circumstances where there are white settlers, so that an organization like Congress, if it claims the territory for Africans, is opposing Government's multi-racial policy.

4. In reply Sir A. Benson said that his paper (second enclosure to (6)) on the position of Chiefs was a *bad* paper for consideration in this Office, having been written for his own officers and therefore assuming a wide knowledge of the background. He also said that it did *not* have to be war against Congress. This hadn't been expressed well in the papers.

5. After coming into the Office I saw Sir A. Benson only fleetingly (once in the Office and twice socially) and we didn't do more than refer briefly to this question. Frankly, I thought that it would probably be figuring largely in the Department's discussions with him. Had this been possible, and had I taken part, I would, I think, have tried to contrive, without upsetting Sir A. Benson, that he should know all that had been written here on the subject. That is easier in the course of discussion than by sending papers for criticism.

6. I don't necessarily agree with everything that is said by A.S.B. I feel sure you

are right in concentrating on A of page 1 of the enclosure to (17) as the main point of agreement. And I hope you will be able at least to put a foot in the door during your visit with the Secretary of State.

J.S.M.  
27.11.56

## **114** CO 1015/1002, no 1

24 Jan 1956

[Nyasaland and Federation]: valedictory despatch from Sir G Colby to Mr Lennox-Boyd

[This document became known within the CO as Colby's 'swan-song'. As with a number of sensitive communications from the northern territories, there was some debate within the CO as to how much of its contents could safely be revealed to the CRO. A principal soon to be seconded to the CRO suggested that they should see all of it, except perhaps para 11, noting 'The very fact that both Governors have addressed us so strongly and in such similar terms is in itself a powerful argument that all is not well in the Federation' (minute by R L Baxter, 9 Feb 1956).]

As I shall shortly leave this Protectorate on retirement I feel that I should not have discharged my duty to you if I did not invite your attention to tendencies and developments in the Federation which seem both to me and to my advisers to threaten the continued existence of the Federal state and if I did not place on record my views as to the action which is needed to check these tendencies and developments.

2. First I will deal with European immigration and the dangers inherent in the present policy of the Federal Government. I am of course in favour of European immigration and there can be no question that the future prosperity of the federation depends in large measure on European immigration—but they must be immigrants of the right type: at the present time this is not so and there are far too many low grade immigrants both from Europe and South Africa.

3. There is a great deal of misunderstanding in regard to the immigration problem: the position in Central Africa is often compared with the position which obtained in Australia, New Zealand and Canada 50 years ago: the comparison is however entirely false. In the three latter countries, the bulk of which lie in the temperate zone, there were vast empty spaces and a negligible indigenous population; in Central Africa, by comparison a small area much of which is quite unsuitable for permanent European settlement, there is a large, vigorous and growing indigenous population—a population with a growing political consciousness who will become increasingly insistent on their right to share in the prosperity of the country.

4. If low grade immigration into Central Africa continues, a serious clash between black and white is inevitable since the European and African will be in competition for the same jobs. It must be remembered that African education in the Central African territories is expanding at an accelerating rate. As an example of this no less than 3,278 Africans in Southern Rhodesia passed the Standard VI examination in 1954, while some 750 were receiving secondary education: this means that a class of African is growing up in Southern Rhodesia which has a better education than many European immigrants and yet in Southern Rhodesia the

African has virtually no opportunities in the Civil Service (outside the native reserves) the Post Office, the Railways and so forth.

5. The Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments pay lip service to the need to give opportunities to Africans and have shown no sign of action so far: the reply given to suggestions of this nature is that it is too early yet, it would be impossible politically, etc. But the fact is that the longer the tackling of the problem is delayed the more difficult it will be to tackle it. There is a steady flow of immigrants from Europe and South Africa many of whom are absorbed in jobs (at greatly inflated salaries) which could be performed just as well by Africans (at a fraction of the cost). All these immigrants are potential voters: the greater their numbers the more difficult it will be for any Government to introduce liberal measures in Parliament since a large body of voters is being built up who have a personal interest in opposing any measures which will throw open employment to Africans and thus limit European opportunities. Unless the present tendency is curtailed by a drastic change in immigration policy, i.e. to confine immigration to persons of much higher quality, it is inevitable and certain that the Southern Rhodesian policy towards the African will approximate even more closely than it does today to the policy of the Government of the Union. It is perhaps worth reflecting that the present policy of the Union Government derives in very large measure from the existence in the Union of a large 'poor white' population. If for example the Union Government adopted a policy of giving substantial opportunities to Africans the 'poor white' population would soon become completely submerged and it is largely for this reason that no Government in the Union, whether Nationalist or otherwise, could survive if it adopted a liberal policy in this respect. Southern Rhodesia is steadily building up a potential 'poor white' population: this will become very apparent if there is any recession in trade which will immediately cause a European unemployment problem with all that that implies.

6. It must be admitted that even today the difficulties which would face the Federal or Southern Rhodesian Governments in opening the lower grades of the Civil Service, etc., to Africans would be great but I can only repeat that if the present immigration policy continues, they will become greater with every year that passes and in due course will become insuperable as they are in the Union today.

7. The Federal Government recently had a great opportunity to initiate a policy of employing Africans in the lower grades: there was (and probably still is) a crisis on the Rhodesia Railways owing to the lack of firemen: instead however of seizing this opportunity, on the grounds of the public interest, to employ Africans they went to great expense to recruit firemen from Europe and South Africa many of whom, I am informed, have already left the Railway for more remunerative jobs on the copper belt and elsewhere.

8. In my demi-official letter No. 23720/17 of the 30th of August, 1955, to Gorell Barnes, I have already invited attention to the disastrous financial effects of the failure to employ Africans in the Federal Post Office in Southern Rhodesia: the effects are the same throughout the Civil Service, the railways, commerce and industry and there can be no doubt that failure to make full use of Africans is at the root of Southern Rhodesia's serious financial position today.

9. The attitude of the Federal and Southern Rhodesia Governments to this problem is not favourable. While Malvern might possibly be prepared to tackle it if he were remaining Prime Minister he will not do so now. His likely successor, Welensky, will certainly not touch it without the strongest pressure from H.M.G. His position

vis a vis both the Southern and Northern Rhodesian electorate is not likely to be strong and in order to strengthen it he will be tempted to become progressively less liberal in his approach to African problems: the remainder of the existing cabinet are thoroughly illiberal in their views. The rank and file of the Federal Parliament, and indeed the rank and file of the Southern Rhodesia Assembly, are even less tolerant than their masters, and I am afraid that it is true to say that public opinion in Southern Rhodesia generally is even less liberal in its approach to these problems than it was at the time that Federation was launched.

10. This is a problem which deserves the closest consideration of H.M.G.: if it is not successfully tackled now it will inevitably result in the failure of federation and the probable absorption of Southern Rhodesia in the Union since it is unlikely that a policy of apartheid in Southern Rhodesia could be enforced in the ultimate without the assistance of the Union Government.

### *Finance*

11. The Top Secret and Personal letter of the 23rd of December, 1955,<sup>1</sup> from Benson to Gorell Barnes on the subject of Kariba finances gives a very comprehensive review of the attitude of the Federal Government to finance generally. I can fully endorse the impression which that letter gives—an impression of irresponsibility amounting to something near dishonesty.

12. Macintyre and indeed Malvern have made a number of statements quoting figures showing the so-called benefits which Nyasaland has obtained from federation. All these statements are misleading and the impression conveyed by them is quite incorrect. It is of course a demonstrable fact that at the time of federation Nyasaland's finances were improving very rapidly, but after federation increases in the main items of revenue, i.e. Customs and Excise, Income Tax, and Posts and Telecommunications were skimmed off by the Federal Treasury. It is true that Nyasaland was better off after federation but not because of federation, post hoc not propter hoc. It would be a fruitless exercise to endeavour to prove that Nyasaland would have been better off financially now without federation—in fact it would not be possible to obtain the figures of federal revenue and expenditure accruing from and devoted to Nyasaland since these are completely and I think deliberately obscured in the Federal accounts. For example, the local heads of departments of Posts and Customs cannot give me their revenue figures because they do not know them themselves.

13. It is probably true to say that thanks to the price of copper which is reflected in Income Tax receipts, the territorial financial position has been reasonably maintained: little expansion is taking place, however: but Federal spending in Nyasaland, particularly on development, is most unsatisfactory. Like Northern Rhodesia no federal development money, which had not been committed before federation, had been or was to be spent in Nyasaland when the current federal estimates were prepared. I protested very strongly and as a result got the Federal Government to vote money for Federal projects in Nyasaland worth £207,000 in the current financial year, and £527,500 overall, but only by dint of bringing this money 2 years forward in the development plan. It was made very clear to me that as a result of this exercise there would be no money for Nyasaland in the last two years of the plan.

14. All this is against a background of an accepted obligation at the time of

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<sup>1</sup> See 112.

federation that a special effort would be devoted to the development of the Northern Territories. In fact of course the reverse has been the case: revenue accruing in Northern Rhodesia and to a very much lesser degree in Nyasaland has been devoted to bolstering a bankrupt and under-taxed Southern Rhodesia and the major part of the Federal Government's share of loan funds raised since federation has been spent or earmarked in Southern Rhodesia.

15. It has been repeatedly stated by Federal Ministers that the vast borrowings necessitated by Kariba will not affect the Federation's borrowing power for general development: this is patently not so, particularly having regard to the capacity of the London market to lend and to the balance of payments position in the U.K., and indeed the capacity of the Federal Government to service further loans. The planned normal borrowings of the Federation in the next four years are £10 million a year. Viewed against Rhodesia Railways' needs of £50 million in the next five years, the prospects of Federal development in the Northern Territories look poor indeed. When it comes to allocating Federal loan monies the Rhodesia Railways, and such Southern Rhodesian bodies as the Electricity Supply Commission, the Grain Marketing Board, the Dairy Marketing Board and the Cotton Industries Board receive first priority, second priority are Southern Rhodesia federal projects, and last are projects in the Northern Territories. That these are present facts and not vague fears can be substantiated by figures taken from the Federal Development Plan. During the first three years of the Plan, Nyasaland's share of the available loan funds was inflated by expenditure on projects committed before the Federal Government assumed responsibility. The amounts, though insignificant compared with sums spent elsewhere, and particularly on the Southern Rhodesia statutory corporations, were sufficient to maintain, if not to increase, the pace of development. But consider the figures for the two years 1957/59. During that period a sum of only £900,000 (which is inclusive of a residual part of the figure of £527,500 quoted above) is foreseen by the Plan as available for expenditure in this Territory on all projects. During the same period it is planned to spend no less than £2,790,000 on the Southern Rhodesia Electricity Supply Commission alone (at a time when Kariba is actually under construction). During the same period the Plan envisages the expenditure of £8,000,000 on the Rhodesia Railways, and it should be remembered that since the Plan was published the requirements of the Railways have risen by a further £18,000,000. If this policy is maintained and, having regard to the composition of the Federal parliament, it seems inevitable that it will be maintained, there is clearly another problem which requires the urgent consideration of H.M.G.

16. There is under the constitution no obligation regarding objects on which either federal revenue or the federal share of loan money shall be spent. There is nothing to prevent all federal loan money being spent in Southern Rhodesia. Unless H.M.G. intervenes it is evident from the figures I have quoted above that, speaking broadly, this will happen.

17. H.M.G. has only one sanction and that is to attach conditions to the raising of loan monies in the U.K. or from sources which the U.K. can exercise control or influence (i.e. the International Bank). These conditions should, I suggest, be one or other or all of the following:—

- (a) *Extraordinary external loans* (i.e. Kariba): The Northern territories should receive their statutory shares which they may, if they wish, re-lend to the Federal

Government to finance specific federal projects in the Northern territories. It is appreciated that the Northern Territories have a right to these shares but they could not exercise this right without the support of H.M.G.

(b) *General external loans*: Access to the London market should be conditional on specified sums from the federal share of such loans being spent in the Northern territories.

(c) Raising of loans on London market to be conditional on specified increases in taxation, particularly income tax.

I fully appreciate that, to attach conditions of this nature to the raising of loan monies will cause a crisis in the relationship between H.M.G. and the Federal Government and this is something which H.M.G. will be most reluctant to precipitate. Nevertheless I am convinced beyond a shadow of doubt that on a five-year view at the least, there is no prospect of worthwhile federal development in the Northern Territories unless action is taken on these lines. It will, moreover, be appreciated that the main justification for the inclusion of Nyasaland in the federation was the prospect of economic development: if such development does not materialise the justification for including Nyasaland in the federation falls away and the opponents of the inclusion of Nyasaland, both here and in the U.K., will not be slow to point this out to the great embarrassment of H.M.G. It must also be appreciated that unless every opportunity is taken to broaden and strengthen the economy of a country like Nyasaland the great majority of its rapidly growing population will be condemned to subsistence peasantry and will become a political and security liability to the Federal Government.

18. One last point in connection with Nyasaland's finances; up to the end of the last war, apart from Railway loans, no loan money had ever been made available for development. After the war, not only loan money but valuable C.D. & W. allocations were made available: these investments combined with a vigorous policy of developing peasant agriculture resulted in a quite remarkable economic advance: it is probable that a true comparison between revenue in 1947 and 1955 would show that it has increased at least fourfold and possibly more: moreover this increase is continuing. As indicated above much of the increase will be skimmed off by the Federal Treasury—as a small instance of this is revenue from investments in the Nyasaland Railways—before Federation Nyasaland never received more than 2½% on £3,200,000 Income Debentures, while in 1955 as a result of the economic advance made in Nyasaland in previous years the Federal Government not only received 5% on the Income Debentures, but for the first time a dividend, of 2½%, was declared on the Ordinary shares. The fact is that since the main item of territorial revenue is now a share of federal income tax, we no longer have a substantial stake in the prosperity of Nyasaland: we are on the other hand largely dependent on external factors such as the price of copper and this seems wrong. The measure of the prosperity of a predominantly African country such as Nyasaland is the yield of customs duties reflecting as they do African purchasing power and we have no share of these. This seems to me to be a defect in the constitution which should be remedied in due course. Another defect in the constitution is the lack of any obligation to show the territorial sources of federal revenue in the accounts and the territorial direction of federal expenditure: without figures showing this it would seem that periodic reviews of territorial tax and loan percentages can serve no purpose.

*The Civil Service*

19. It is evident that many members of the territorial civil service who are seconded to the Federal Government will not transfer to the Federal Civil Service. There are two main reasons for this—in the first place the majority of civil servants in the northern territories are based on the U.K. and do not wish to become Rhodesians—in the second place it is a fact that the Southern Rhodesian Civil Service from which the great majority of federal civil servants have and will be drawn is, generally speaking, very second rate. This view has been formed as a result of experience over the last eight years, and is shared by all my official advisers. Colonial civil servants are in many cases unwilling to join such a service where they doubt whether they will get fair treatment and where they know promotion is almost entirely by seniority. Moreover many Southern Rhodesian civil servants in federal departments have behaved very foolishly and have been at no pains to conceal their ambitions of ‘empire building’ in the Northern territories.

20. This reaction of Nyasaland civil servants seconded to federal departments is having a serious effect and the numerous transfers to other territories can only result in the substitution of inertia for development.

21. This tendency on the part of civil servants cannot be ignored when considering the possibility of federalisation of further territorial departments. At the time of Federation at least a proportion of the Civil Service were in favour of federation, and the majority were at least ready to judge it on its merits: today it is probably true that close on 100% are against it.

22. It is essential that the importance of this question of the Civil Service should not be underestimated. The federal machine is creaking badly, but it is at present functioning. That this is possible at all is due in a large measure to the efforts and loyalty of most of the seconded officers from the Northern Territories in key positions, and their personal contacts with their opposite numbers in the Territorial Governments. Were it not for this frank and continuous contact at the official level it is difficult to see how the wheels could go round, and if it is lost I believe that friction would build up so rapidly that the present machine would become unworkable.

*Amalgamation*

23. The aim of the Federal Government and a proportion of the European population in Nyasaland is amalgamation as quickly as possible: this attitude of mind on the part of Nyasaland Europeans is purely emotional—it is said that the European will have greater ‘security’ under a federal or unitary government. It is of course quite meaningless but even sensible people like Barrow not only subscribe to it but say so quite openly.

24. The agitation for the federalisation of European agriculture is an example of this emotional approach: I do not think that any sensible person really believes that it has any merit in itself; indeed, a great many European farmers—notably in the tea industry—are against it. It is merely that, as European agriculture has been federalised in the Rhodesias, it is the softest spot to attack. If federalisation were conceded, the attack would be shifted to another department and so on: it is already evident that the police will be the next object of attack. It is, in my opinion, essential that attempts to federalise non-African agriculture should be resisted for both political and economic reasons, I hope we can rely on the continued support of H.M.G. in this matter.

25. At a meeting of the Nyasaland Association on the 27th of September, 1954, Mr. Brereton, M. P. said,

'I am informing this Committee off the record that leading Europeans in the Federation and the Federal Government, ably led by Sir Godfrey Huggins, have only one object in view—that is, over the course of the next few years to federalise every department in the Territorial Governments and vigorous steps are being taken already to pave the way to complete amalgamation. It is a question of holding on until then.'

26. I believe this to be a true statement of policy. While a still closer federation or even amalgamation may be a desirable aim of policy, these tactics are those least calculated to bring it about. Federation was brought about against the wishes of the great majority of the African population who had valid objections to it: the first step towards an even closer association or amalgamation must be to convince the Africans by deeds that federation is beneficial, i.e. that economic benefits have accrued to Africans, that policy is becoming more liberal, that opportunities are being afforded to Africans, that the colour bar is being progressively abolished and regard is being had to such vital African needs as more education, and so on. If these things were done there might be a chance of African support. But none of these things have been done nor look like being done and at the same time European agitation for more federation is continuous. It is hardly surprising that African opinion is hardening all the time and men like Chirwa find it necessary to make public statements about African self-government.

27. The introduction of federation was attended in the Southern Province of Nyasaland with serious disturbances amounting to incipient revolt. These were very firmly handled and the effect was salutary: the effect is now wearing off as disillusionment over federation grows: political agitation is gathering momentum again and, unless it can be countered with some tangible act of good-will towards Africans on the part of Federal Government, it will undoubtedly continue to grow and again culminate in a dangerous security situation: this would clearly prejudice the whole future of the Federation.

28. I would request that this letter be read in conjunction with my Secret and Personal letter No.20, 976/1 of the 19th of March, 1952, to Lord Chandos.

29. I have sent a copy of this letter to Benson.

## **115** CO 1015/994, no 245

6 Mar 1956

### **'Citizenship and franchise in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland': note by W L Gorell Barnes**

#### *I. Introduction*

I attach a submission<sup>1</sup> to Ministers which has been prepared in agreement between officials of the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Home Office and the Colonial

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This proposed that ministers should seek to persuade the federal government that citizenship should not be made an essential qualification for the franchise. If they failed, it suggested, they should propose a compromise solution (set out in paras 13–15) whereby British Protected Persons in the northern territories would acquire the privileges of citizenship without actually becoming citizens. In para 24(e), ministers were invited to decide whether, if this also failed, they should propose a two-tier solution (set out in paras 16–18).

Office for the discussions, beginning with a meeting with Sir R. Welensky on the 13th March, which Ministers are to have with the Ministers of the Federal Government about citizenship and franchise in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

In so far as it makes recommendations, the recommendations contained in this brief are the agreed recommendations of the three Departments. It will, however, be seen from the conclusions in paragraph 24 that on two important points—those referred to in paragraph 24(e) and (f)—no recommendations are made. This is because there is disagreement between the three Departments. There is also disagreement between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office on one point which would otherwise have been covered in paragraph 12 of the brief. This minute is confined to the issues on which there is disagreement between the Departments. But, before I discuss those issues, there are one or two general considerations which I should like to develop.

## *II. General considerations*

From what I heard during my short visit to Northern Rhodesia and from the Nyasaland representatives at the Land Tenure Conference, it seems to me that the Federation is in a dangerous state of drift. The Africans in the Northern Territories have not found that the worst forecasts of the Congress leaders—e.g. regarding the loss of their land—have as yet been fulfilled, though they have heard one or two rather ominous things said about such matters as immigration and the possible use of the Shire Valley for European settlement. They have, on the other hand, seen little or nothing positive done to give equal opportunity for Africans; and they are now seeing continental artisans being imported to carry out at high rates of wages work on the railways which Africans could do. On the side of economic development they see all available resources being increasingly sucked into one major hydro-electric scheme which will no doubt in due course increase the resources available to the Federation for carrying out development of all kinds, but which can at present only appear to the African as a European scheme which brings him no benefit and of which, so far as he is concerned, the only immediate effect is that some 30,000 Africans have to be compulsorily removed from their traditional homes.

The only hope of arresting this drift seems to be for the Federal Government to make some gesture which will show that they really mean to make a reality of partnership. It is a widely-held opinion that the only really effective gesture of this kind which they can make is to introduce an electoral system which, whilst not being so liberal as to involve any danger of African predominance in the Federation as a whole in the foreseeable future, will yet be sufficiently liberal to make it clear that Africans, including British Protected Persons in the Northern Territories who reach a reasonable standard of civilisation, will be given the vote and thus be enabled to bring their influence to bear on the conduct of Federal affairs. The extreme importance of this step if taken in the very near future was emphasized to me in Northern Rhodesia not only by Sir Arthur Benson and his Officials, but also by Mr. Franklin, the Unofficial European who represents African interests in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council. In a recent conversation with Sir A. Benson, of which I shall be sending down the record separately, Mr. Garfield Todd made it clear that he and his colleagues in the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet share this opinion.

There is one further consideration which it is necessary to bear in mind in

considering this subject. It is clearly of the utmost importance that British Protected Persons who possess the necessary qualifications should be admitted to the voters' roll in the next elections to the Northern Rhodesian Territorial Legislature which are due to be held in 1959; and we know that Sir A. Benson is working on proposals under which, on the one hand this would happen and on the other hand there would be some increase in the income etc. qualifications and some change in the method of election of African members. Sir A. Benson is, however, firmly convinced—and he is probably right about this—that, unless British Protected Persons are given the franchise for Federal elections, his European Unofficials will oppose their being given the franchise for territorial elections. Further, he fears that, if that were to happen, the African Members of Legislative Council in Northern Rhodesia might join with the European Unofficials in opposing his proposals, though for the different reason that they would involve raising the qualifications for the vote. It thus appears that if the Federal Government are not now persuaded to give the franchise to British Protected Persons in the Northern Territories who otherwise qualify for it, we may be faced with a first-class crisis in Northern Rhodesia in the fairly near future.

### *III. The effect on federal politics of giving the franchise to British Protected Persons who otherwise qualify for it*

Paragraph 12 of the agreed brief sets out some arguments which Federal Ministers may advance in defence of their own position, and suggests how they might be answered. Another point which Sir R. Welensky is likely to make is that, if British Protected Persons in the Northern Territories who otherwise qualify are given the vote, the Federal Party are likely to lose European votes to such an extent that their position may be endangered.

I understand that the C.R.O. think that there is a danger that the Federal Party would lose European votes, and that their view is that the only answer to this argument is to point to the very small number of British Protected Persons who would be likely to qualify for the vote, at any rate for sometime to come. I take an entirely different view about this. I believe that those Europeans who are not in sympathy with the general idea of partnership, either because they believe in it or because they realise that it is inevitable, are likely in any case to vote for one or other of the Opposition groups which oppose Federation and favour some kind of apartheid. I also believe that a large section of the rest of the European population is becoming somewhat bewildered and disheartened by the lack of a definite direction in the policy of the Federal Government, and would welcome a step which would be a real sign of commitment to a reasonably, but not excessively, liberal policy. I do not therefore think that the Federal Party would lose many European votes by doing what we want. On the other hand, they would presumably gain the support of the new African voters, at any rate if, in public, they had taken the initiative in bringing them on to the voters' roll.

### *IV. If the first compromise solution fails, should the alternative of a two-tier citizenship be put forward?*

I agree with the main brief that, if Ministers do not succeed in persuading Federal Ministers that citizenship should not be an essential qualification for the franchise, then they should, as proposed in paragraph 24(b), next put forward the compromise solution discussed in paragraphs 13–15 of the agreed brief. If that fails, then I wish to

urge that Ministers should put forward the alternative compromise discussed in paragraphs 16–18 of the agreed brief—i.e. that they should answer in the affirmative the question posed in paragraph 24(e) of the agreed brief. There are some fairly formidable arguments of a general constitutional nature against this course. I know that Sir K. Roberts-Wray attaches overriding importance to these arguments, which are set out in paragraph 18 of the agreed brief, and that, for that reason, he does not agree with me about this. I am therefore sending him a copy of this minute in case he wishes to make separate representations. My own strong feeling, however, is that the great political importance of securing our object without a clash with the Federal Government, if that is at all possible, must be regarded as overriding.

*V. The courses open to H.M.G. in the event of disagreement*

In paragraph 24(f) of the brief Ministers are asked to decide whether, if all attempts to reach a compromise solution fail, they should:—

- (i) confine themselves to indicating that they see no prospect of being able to accept a Franchise Bill which makes it impossible for British Protected Persons to qualify for the franchise without giving up that status; or alternatively
- (ii) go further and state that they will take no action to secure the amendment of the Nationality laws of Commonwealth countries including the British Nationality Act, so as to confer the status of British Subject on Federal citizens.

Sir A. Benson feels most strongly that the second of these two alternatives should be adopted, and, although I realise that this will not be an easy line for Ministers to take, I am disposed to support him. My reasons are as follows.

Firstly it seems to me that, if the Federal Ministers reject all compromise solutions, this is the only step which is likely to bring them to their senses; and if they are not brought to their senses, then I feel fairly certain that the present drift will continue at an accelerated pace and will end up, not immediately but in a few years' time, either in violence or in an irresistible demand, backed by both Africans and Europeans, for partition and some form of apartheid on the South African model. Secondly it seems to me that to accept the Citizenship Bill unaccompanied by a Bill giving the franchise to British Protected Persons is to accept defeat. For the Federal Government, having got their optative citizenship recognised, will be able to sit tight and do nothing about the franchise. Thirdly it seems to me that H.M.G. have every right to lay down the conditions on which they will be prepared to introduce into the House of Commons the legislation which will be necessary to make effective any Federal legislation introducing the rather unusual feature of an optative citizenship. Indeed it can be taken as certain that, if and when such legislation is introduced into the House, questions will be asked about the effect on the franchise, and that there will be considerable opposition to the measure if it cannot be stated that British Protected Persons who otherwise qualify will be able to get the vote without giving up their protected status. It is true that the main reason for which citizenship is to be optative is that, owing to the views of the Africans and the pledges which have been given to them and to the House, the Africans in the Northern Territories cannot be compulsorily made into British Subjects. But the situation of the Federation, consisting as it does of one Colony and two Protectorates, is a very unusual one and the fact is that the only sensible and defensible solution of the citizenship and franchise problem is that which H.M.G. is urging the Federal Government to adopt.

If Ministers do take the line that they will take no action to secure the amendment of the Nationality laws of Commonwealth countries, including the British Nationality Act, unless and until the Federal Parliament has passed a Franchise Bill which gives the vote to British Protected Persons who otherwise qualify for it, the Federal Government will have either to give way or to adopt one of the following two alternative courses:—

- (a) they might refrain from introducing either a Citizenship Bill or a Franchise Bill; or
- (b) they might go ahead with their Citizenship Bill, in which case the result would be that Southern Rhodesians would become aliens in the U.K. and in any other countries of the Commonwealth which did not amend their Nationality laws so as to give recognition to Federal citizens.

The Federal Government are, however, fairly deeply committed to introducing a Citizenship Bill, and it seems unlikely that they would be prepared to face the situation which would arise under (b) above.

The C.R.O. are opposed to the course which I am here advocating owing to the serious effect which they think it would have on relations between H.M.G. and the Federal Government. Our view, however, is that, whilst there would be an initial explosion from Federal Ministers, either those Ministers would give way or there would be pretty widespread support in the Federation for what would after all be a very reasonable stand by H.M.G. on a matter of the first importance.

I understand that the Home Office are with the C.R.O. over this, mainly because of the complications which, as explained above, would arise if the Federal Government nevertheless decided to proceed with their Citizenship Bill. The consequences of that would, of course, be serious; but it is just because they would be serious that we believe that a stand by H.M.G. on this issue would be likely to be effective.

I attach a spare copy of this minute and of the agreed brief, as Sir T. Lloyd may like to keep them.

## **116** CO 1015/995, no 268

13 Mar 1956

### **[Federal citizenship and franchise]: CRO draft note of ministerial discussions with Sir Roy Welensky**

[A number of the constitutional proposals outlined by Welensky below were set out in a letter Malvern had written to Home on 12 Mar (CO 1015/998). Malvern also predicted that if the Federation was left with a constitutional status inferior to those of the Gold Coast and Nigeria, there would be 'quite a constitutional crisis'. He therefore proposed that all reservations in the federal constitution should be removed by order-in-council so that it could claim to be fully independent, and that the 'safeguards' for Africans should be incorporated in a treaty between the British and federal governments. Present at the meeting on 13 Mar were Home, Lennox-Boyd, Welensky and W S Bates.]

#### *I. Citizenship and the franchise*

*Lord Home* said that he and Mr. Lennox-Boyd were very glad to have the opportunity for a general discussion with Sir Roy Welensky. He suggested that they should talk first about citizenship and the franchise and he invited Sir Roy Welensky to open the discussion.

2. *Sir Roy Welensky* said that he had seen the correspondence between Lord Home and Lord Malvern. He did not underestimate the difficulties which faced the United Kingdom Government, but he wanted to explain the problems with which he and his colleagues had to contend.

3. The first point he wished to make was that one territory of the Federation, Southern Rhodesia, already had its own citizenship which carried with it the status of British subject throughout the Commonwealth. Therefore any Federal citizenship which might be introduced must be of equal standing. He understood that the United Kingdom Government saw no objection in principle to the Citizenship Bill as such; the difficulty arose because of the connection between citizenship and the franchise. He realised that the United Kingdom Government would be most reluctant to see the Citizenship Bill enacted without anything having been decided about the franchise, and it was not his intention that this should be done.

4. He went on to explain that the Federal Government were greatly concerned at the possible influx of large numbers of Afrikaners on to the Federal electoral roll. This was one of the reasons why they thought it essential to make Federal citizenship an essential qualification for the franchise, because Union nationals who wanted to take part in elections to the Federal Parliament would then be obliged to choose between Federal and Union citizenship.

5. Another difficulty was that many people in the Federation, including himself, thought it strange that the United Kingdom Government should be pressing for the enfranchisement of British Protected Persons for the Federal elections at a time when they still did not have the vote in either Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland.

6. In general, he felt strongly that no one should vote in the Federal elections who was not prepared to become a citizen of the Federation. It was necessary to make this stipulation in order to develop among the peoples of the three territories a sense of common loyalty to the Federation. It was not as though it would be difficult for the British Protected Persons to acquire citizenship; the procedure would be reduced to its simplest essentials.

7. *Sir Roy Welensky* concluded that he saw no prospect of persuading the party caucus and the Federal Parliament to agree that British Protected Persons should have the vote without having given proof of their willingness to accept the obligations of Federal citizenship. And if such legislation were put through it would ensure the defeat of the Federal Party at the next election.<sup>1</sup>

8. In reply, *the United Kingdom Ministers* said that the root of the problem was that the British Protected Persons were extremely reluctant to give up their protected status. They had been promised when Federation was introduced that the Protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would not be disturbed, and this guarantee had been written into the Preamble to the Constitution. If the Federal Government insisted that the franchise should be confined to Federal citizens and therefore to British subjects, the British Protected Persons could not get the vote without giving up their present status, no matter how well qualified they might be in other respects.

9. There was no getting away from the fact that the Northern Africans were by no

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<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that when, during discussions over the NR constitution in Sept 1953, Welensky had been asked by Lyttelton to consider the idea of enfranchising British Protected Persons, he had rejected it (Wood, *The Welensky papers*, 1983, pp 383–384).

means reconciled to Federation; indeed the signs were that if anything their opposition was increasing. If the Federal experiment were to succeed and, in particular, before the Federation could become a full Member of the Commonwealth, it was essential that the Africans should be won over; but to withhold the vote from them would have quite the opposite effect. The Federal Government had a splendid chance to make a dramatic gesture which would demonstrate their desire to make partnership a reality.

10. There was also the important point that the main features of the franchise for Federal and Territorial elections ought to be kept in line. It seemed inevitable that the vote would be made available to British Protected Persons for the next territorial elections in Northern Rhodesia. It would be desirable at the same time to raise the means qualifications and it would be much easier to do this if, in opening the franchise to British Protected Persons, the Federal Government had set high standards for the main qualifications.

11. Finally, *the United Kingdom Ministers* said that they must make it clear that they saw no prospect whatever of accepting Federal legislation under which British Protected Persons as such would be excluded from the franchise.

12. *Sir Roy Welensky* said that he thought the Government of Northern Rhodesia would have to face a bitter struggle if they proposed to enfranchise British Protected Persons for the territorial elections.

13. He said that he personally would not object to Africans retaining their full protected status side by side with that of British subject which they would acquire on becoming Federal citizens. But it was explained to him that this possible solution had been carefully examined but had been found to be impracticable.

14. *Sir Roy Welensky* then invited Ministers to consider new proposals which had been worked out in Salisbury and which he thought would help to overcome some of the difficulties to which the United Kingdom Ministers had referred. The main features of these proposals were:—

(a) The 26 ordinary members should be elected on an A roll with high means qualifications. The 9 special members, at least 6 of whom would have to be Africans, would be elected on a B roll for which the means qualifications would be comparatively low.

(b) All voters on the A roll would be included also on the B roll.

(c) Applicants for admission to either roll would be required to take a simple Oath of Allegiance.

(d) All those on the A roll would have to be Federal citizens and British subjects, but the B roll would be open to British Protected Persons.

15. *The United Kingdom Ministers* expressed interest in these proposals, but said that they would like to examine them more closely before expressing a view. They pointed out, and *Sir Roy Welensky* agreed, that their adoption would entail a major amendment to the Constitution.

16. After further discussion, it was agreed that a second meeting would be held on Friday, 16th March.

## II. *Future status of the Federation*

17. *Lord Home* said that in conversation earlier in the day *Sir Roy Welensky* had raised the question of what could be done to enhance the status of the Federation at

the time when the Gold Coast obtained full self-government. Lord Home said that he could not see how the Federation could become a full member of the Commonwealth while two of the territories remained Protectorates.

18. *Mr. Lennox-Boyd* pointed out that the Preamble to the Constitution made it clear that the Federation could go forward to full membership only when the inhabitants of the three territories so desired. This meant that the Federal Government must first win over the Africans of the Northern Territories, and he emphasised again that they were unlikely to do this if British Protected Persons were to be excluded from the franchise.

19. *Sir Roy Welensky* said that what the Northern Africans were really worried about was their protected status and, above all, their land rights. Would it not be possible for the Federation to enter into a treaty with the United Kingdom under which these rights would be guaranteed to the Africans?

20. *The United Kingdom Ministers* undertook to examine this suggestion, but expressed doubts about its feasibility and suggested that, even if something of this kind could be worked out, it would make for an uncomfortable and possibly an unhappy relationship between the United Kingdom and the Federation.

## 117 CO 1015/948

1 May 1956

[Kariba and future development in the Federation]: minute by W G Wilson<sup>1</sup>

As arranged, I attended the first meeting at Rhodesia House this afternoon between the secretary to the Treasury of the Central African Federation Government (Mr. Taylor) and the lenders who are expected to produce finance for Kariba—the IBRD, the CDC and the CDFC. The Tsy (Mr. Armstrong) and the CRO (Mr. Curson) were also present.

2. It became apparent from the IBRD statement about their aim at the negotiations over the next fortnight that in the course of this week and next HMG will be called upon to take its final decision on whether or not to permit the Kariba scheme to go ahead, by giving its guarantee to the IBRD loan to the Kariba Authority, and by giving capital sanction to the loans to be made by the CDC (£15m) and the CDFC (£3m). A decision will be sought from Ministers on the basis of a submission to be made about the 9th. May, and the purpose of this minute is to bring together, for the benefit of those concerned in the Colonial Office, the issues with which we shall be faced in advising the Secretary of State. I am sending copies of the minute to Mr. Emanuel (for the CDC aspect) and to Mr. Melville and Mr. Galsworthy.

### *The present negotiations*

3. In the course of this week and next the Federal representatives will be engaged in joint and several negotiations with the IBRD, the CDC and the CDFC with a view to agreeing the terms of the respective loan agreements. The IBRD will also negotiate with the Federal representatives and with the UK Treasury the terms of, respectively, the Federal and UK guarantees for the IBRD loan to the Kariba Authority. The IBRD

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<sup>1</sup> Principal, CO.

have said that it is their aim to bring these negotiations to a stage at which all the loan and guarantee agreements will be agreed in detail and brought to the point at which all that remains is signature. Thereafter they would submit their own agreements to the Bank management in Washington, and they have stated that they expect the approval of their management to be little more than a formality. They expressed the hope that the other lenders and the UK could bring their operations to a similar state in the next fortnight, and indeed made it clear that only when this had been done—i.e. when the other lenders were committed up to the actual point of formal signature of the documents and HMG had taken its decisions about the guarantee and the giving of sanction to the CDFC and CDC loans—would it be possible for the IBRD loan documents to be submitted to the Bank management.

4. These arrangements are in line with the Bank's usual procedures, and it is clearly desirable that all concerned should attempt to match the Bank's anxiety to bring matters to a conclusion and thus avoid the risk of delay in making a start on the project this coming season.

5. So far as HMG is concerned there are three tasks:—

(a) To negotiate the guarantee agreement on the assumption that UK Ministers will decide to approve its signature. This is in hand, and the Treasury are dealing with the IBRD on it. The CO is not directly concerned.

(b) To consider whether HMG is prepared to see the Kariba scheme go ahead. As to this there are certain conditions to be satisfied, and a submission will be made to Ministers concerning them. See 'Submission to Ministers' below. The CO has a very great direct concern here.

(c) To consider giving capital sanction to the CDC and CDFC loans. The CO is only concerned with the CDC loan, and when, at this afternoon's meeting, Mr. Rendell of the CDC pointed out that the question of whether the CDC could meet the IBRD timetable depended ultimately on the giving of capital sanction by the CO, I explained that the decision on this point would be bound up with the view taken by HMG on the scheme as a whole (i.e. it would depend on (b) above), that the intention was to obtain that view as soon as was feasible, and that therefore the CDC could assume that there would be no delay in the giving of capital sanction provided HMG were satisfied on the scheme as a whole and with the arrangements agreed upon in the course of the next few weeks. After the meeting I arranged with Mr. Prentice that he would send to the CO a copy of the draft loan agreement agreed between the CDC and the Authority, and also that he would send to us a 'blank' application for capital sanction in the usual form, leaving the figures for interest rates etc out pending final agreement on them. The suggestion is that these documents could be scrutinised in the CO and the Treasury in advance, so that when the complete and final application is received with the figures as agreed inserted, formal approval could be given immediately. Ministers have taken their decision as indicated under (b) above. I took this line because it has long since been agreed in principle that the CDC could enter into negotiation in connection with Kariba, and because it is clear that if HMG were satisfied with the scheme to the extent of being willing to guarantee the IBRD loan it is not to be thought that capital sanction for the CDC participation would be withheld. I have since confirmed with Mr. Harris and Mr. Rawlinson (Tsy) that these arrangements are satisfactory to them.

*Submission to ministers*

6. It will be apparent from the foregoing that next week HMG will be facing the Rubicon so far as the Kariba project is concerned. In February, 1955 the then Chancellor informed Lord Malvern that before firmly agreeing to the CDC participation in the Kariba finance HMG would require to be satisfied on four points:—

- (i) that the Kariba scheme is technically sound;
- (ii) that arrangements can and will be made for the copper companies of N. Rhodesia which will both ensure them the power supplies they need between now and the time when the new project comes into operation, and at the same time will not prejudice the full use of the power from the new plant when it becomes available;
- (iii) that satisfactory arrangements can and will be made for the resettlement of the Africans who will be displaced as a result of the project;
- (iv) that the Federation will not accept in connection with this project a loan specifically tied to expenditure in any country outside the sterling area.

To these conditions a fifth was tacitly agreed to be added, though (for obvious reasons) it was never expressed in writing:—

- (v) that at least a fair proportion of the Kariba contracts would come to UK contractors;

and, by dint of continual pressure from the CO in Whitehall and the Northern Governments in Central Africa, it has come to be accepted by the CRO and the Treasury:—

- (vi) that in considering their decision in regard to the implementation of the project Ministers should be aware of the consequences of the scheme for the level of other general development in the Federation, and particularly in the Northern Territories.

7. The submission to Ministers will consist essentially of a report on all six points. It will be drafted in the course of this week, considered at an interdepartmental meeting of officials probably on Monday, 7th. May, and thereafter submitted, if possible as a joint departmental paper, to Ministers. Because of the time factor the Tsy hope that it will suffice to put the paper to the four Ministers directly concerned (the Colonial Secretary, the Chancellor, the Commonwealth Secretary, and the Minister of State, Board of Trade) rather than to Cabinet. But it may be that the issues at stake for the CO are so important that they should be taken to Cabinet. Much will depend on what the other departments are prepared to see put in the submission on our points.

*Colonial Office Interests*

8. Condition (i) is not of direct concern to the CO. The present official feeling is that it is satisfied by reason of the IBRD willingness, after a thorough technical appraisal of all aspects of the project, to provide a loan.

9. We have been assured by the Federal Govt. that, so far as condition (ii) is concerned, the companies are satisfied that they can make do with their existing or other temporary plant. We have no direct knowledge of the attitude of Anglo-American, but Mr. Prain has told us that he is taking steps to arrange for

temporary plant at his Companies' expense if it is required. The implication of this (and also of the fact that the Companies have provided money for Kariba) is that he acquiesces in the plans for Kariba so far as the date for providing power is concerned. It is doubtful whether we can, or should, check the Federal assertion that this condition is satisfied and the implication of Sir A Benson's letter and (iii) is that he accepts the Federal assertion.

10. On African resettlement (condition (iii)) the Governor, Northern Rhodesia, has told us that it is impossible to say whether satisfactory arrangements can and will be made because it is not yet known how the water line of the lake will run. The Federal Govt have assured us that sufficient funds have been included in the estimates for the scheme to cover African resettlement, and this is probably true. The provision is of the order of £3 m, which covers the estimate drawn up by the Northern Rhodesian Govt. But for safety's sake the Governor has suggested that HMG should require of the Federal Govt an undertaking to provide for African resettlement such sums as HMG, in consultation with the N. Rhodesian Govt, consider to be necessary for this purpose. It is for decision in the CO, this week, whether we should seek to get this view written into the submission to Ministers. It will certainly be strongly opposed by the CRO. We must also decide the length to which we are prepared to press the point if we are unable to make it at the official or Departmental Ministerial level.

11. It is clear from the arrangements for financing Kariba that condition (iv) is satisfied.

12. Condition (v) is the concern of the Board of Trade and the Treasury, who are in touch with the Federal representatives about it. It is likely to be satisfied.

13. Point (vi) is the heart of the problem for the CO. It is essential for the future of the copper mines that some new and large source of power should be available by the end of 1961. For better or worse, no scheme but Kariba can be mounted in time to meet this need, given the problems of investigation, construction and hydrological research involved. Whether we like it or not it is now too late to think of an alternative to Kariba. But the drain on the economy of the Federation, in terms of finance and physical capacity, of constructing Kariba is so great that other fields of development must inevitably be restricted—in other words, there is a limit to the total amount of development which can be carried out in the Federation. The greater the cost of Kariba, the less that can be done in other spheres and in particular in the economic development of the Northern territories.

14. It is now clear that with the resources at present and likely to be available to it the Federation cannot construct Kariba and at the same time maintain a rising, or even a level, rate of works in other spheres of development. This means that the rate of expenditure on general development will decline in the years 1957/59. In the Northern Territories this amounts, in the case of Nyasaland, to a failure to honour the assurances given at the time of Federation by UK Ministers that Federation would bring increased economic development to the territory; and in the case of Northern Rhodesia it will lead to unfavourable comparisons between what is being done under Federation and what would have been done if N. Rhodesia had remained separate. In either case, it is likely that African opinion will be confirmed in its opposition to Federation. Undoubtedly this would have happened whatever power scheme had been mounted. But there can be no doubt that the problem has been exacerbated by the fact that Kariba is such an expensive scheme.

15. The IBRD has said that the Federation can only just do Kariba and complete its existing (i.e. 'dipping') general development plans, and it will require of the Federal delegation at the present negotiations a statement (as part of the loan documents) embodying, among other things, an undertaking that there will be no further major increases in the general development plan and no expansion, other than normal expansion, in the basic recurrent services of Govt. The statement must also include some assurance that after the present plans end in 1959 general development will not be expanded beyond the 1954 level. As an additional protection for the Federation economy the statement must also include an undertaking to restrict immigration. Thus the IBRD considers that the 'dip' in general development must be accepted.

16. The Northern Governments have exacted from the Federation an assurance that the implementation of Kariba will not lead to any curtailment of the present development plans, and that to this end immigration and the expansion of secondary industry will be slowed down. This assurance was demanded and given in the knowledge that the undertaking sketched above would have to be given to the IBRD, and one of the points which the CO must watch this week is that the Federal delegation does not so frame its statement to the IBRD as to prevent itself from honouring its undertaking to the territorial Govts. We have been promised the draft of the Federal statement and will have a chance to comment upon it before it goes to the IBRD.

17. In taking their decision, therefore, UK Ministers will have to be aware that the implementation of Kariba means certainly that general development in the Northern territories will fall away—i.e. that the promises made at the time of Federation will not be honoured. The two Northern Governors take a most serious view of the effect of this on African opinion.

18. On the other hand, there is no escape from Kariba. It is in fact inconceivable that the UK should prevent its implementation on this count alone. The problem for the CO is thus whether HMG can be, or should be, led to do what it can to ensure that the impact on general development is lessened, this could be done in two ways: by requiring the Federation to conserve its internal resources of finance and capacity in such a way that they are redirected to general development without increasing the total demand on resources; and by itself making an addition to those resources in the way of grant or interest free loan sufficient to ensure that general development, at least in the North, continues at at least a level rate. The first of these could be achieved if the Federal Govt were to restrict its immigration programme to the minimum of the best type of immigrant and if, as a corollary, it were to replace European staff in Govt services such as the Railways and Post Office with Africans in the posts which they fill, for example, in East Africa. The IBRD has requested a reduction in immigration, the Federal Govt has given a general undertaking to the North to do so, and it would thus not be unreasonable for HMG to reinforce the point by itself making such a reduction a condition of allowing Kariba to proceed. Whether, having secured HMG's blessing for Kariba, the Federal Govt would honour such a condition is doubtful. But we can do no more.

19. It is unlikely that the Chancellor would agree to any assumption on the part of HMG that it must be prepared to step in to fill the dip in general development. The Treasury are already on to this possibility, and have been instructed to see that a statement is included in the submission to Ministers to the effect that HMG's

acceptance of Kariba and of the dip in general development does not imply any undertaking on the part of HMG to fill in that dip. I have argued with them that this is not a line the Colonial Secretary could accept, and that the question of UK assistance should be left to be settled on its merits if and when it actually arises. I suspect that the Tsy will accept this view, if only to avoid the submission of the point to Cabinet. But we might consider ourselves whether to insist on the inclusion in the paper of some general statement to the effect that Ministers must recognise that the dip in general development is likely to have political repercussions and that HMG may have to accept some responsibility for minimising its effects.

20. One incidental, but hitherto unmentioned, consequence of the freeze on general development is that the Shire scheme in Nyasaland<sup>2</sup> will certainly not get beyond the minimum first stage of putting the cork in the bottle.

21. This minute will serve to prepare for the consultation we shall have to have during the course of the negotiations. In the next few days I hope I may consult you on the following:—

- (a) the Federal draft of their undertaking to the IBRD on general development (para 15).
- (b) the content of the submission to Ministers on African resettlement and general development. It is possible that the CO will be asked to draft these passages.
- (c) Interdepartmental agreement on the submission to Ministers, including the meeting next Monday.

and it might be useful for us to have a CO domestic meeting later this week to consider where we stand on these and other points. This will depend mainly on the stage reached on (a) and (b) above, and I will report as necessary on them.

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<sup>2</sup> A scheme for a hydro-electric project on the Shire river. The energy was required to enable Nyasaland's bauxite reserves to be exploited.

## **118** CO 1015/998

10 May 1956

### **[Federal constitution]: letter from Lord Malvern to Lord Home**

When I wrote to you on 12th March I made the preliminary suggestion that the time had now come when independent status should be given to the Federation. At that time I merely suggested that the reservations should be removed from the Constitution.

A more detailed examination, however, showed me that this would not be enough but that an Act of Independence passed by the U.K. Parliament would be essential

I have had a preliminary examination prepared of what would be necessary and I now attach for your consideration a draft of three documents:—

1. An Act to be passed by the U.K. Parliament granting the Federation independence.
2. Amendments to the Federal Constitution consequent upon this Act to be brought into force by Order in Council.
3. The outline of a Treaty containing undertakings to be given by the Federal Government and to be entered into simultaneously with the granting of independence to the Federation.

These three documents largely explain themselves but I will comment briefly upon each one.

1. *The draft Act*. Submitting our proposals for independence in the form of a draft Act was the easiest way of doing this. We took as our model the Act granting independence to Ceylon (although in view of recent events this may not exactly commend itself to you).

2. *Amendments to the Constitution*. The principle on which we worked was so to amend the Constitution as to make it one suitable for a country with sovereign independence but not to weaken the existing safe-guarded position of Africans or, for that matter, of the Territories. We suggest achieving this by suitable provisions in the Treaty.

You will observe that I suggest the removal of all provisions relating to the African Affairs Board. I do this because:—

(a) The main object of the Board is to draw attention to 'differentiating measures'. This safeguard can be achieved by an undertaking in the Treaty that the Federal Government will not introduce such measures.

(b) Experience over two years has shown that the African Affairs Board is a completely useless body for achieving such an object. In any case it has not had occasion to draw attention to any measure, nor would it ever be likely to do so.

(c) The constitution of any body such as the African Affairs Board would be affected by what we eventually decide on the question of franchise, size of the Federal Parliament, etc.

(d) I can discuss with you the set-up of a body within Parliament charged with any specific functions. I have had in mind for some time that one major defect of the African Affairs Board was that it effectively prevented the Prime Minister or Ministers from having any contacts with the African Members of Parliament.

You will note that our suggested new Clause 97 will effectively let the Territories veto any proposed constitutional amendments which interfere with the rights or privileges of the legislature or Government of any Territory or which attempt to increase the legislative powers of the Federal Government at the expense of the Territories.

3. *Draft Treaty*. We have tried to insert in the Treaty all the necessary provisions which are at present contained in the Constitution and which would provide safeguards equally as effective as those at present. It would of course mean that you would rely upon the good faith of this Government and its successors, but I assume you would have no difficulty in doing this.

I have one or two general comments.

Firstly I think I can fairly claim that our proposals are quite reasonable from your point of view. In fact I can foresee great difficulty in persuading the electorate here that what we propose does in fact constitute complete independence. Our opposition will undoubtedly claim that we are no more independent than we were previously. I think however we ought to be able to overcome this.

Secondly you will observe that our proposals are entirely without prejudice to the position of the Territorial Governments. We do not propose entering into any argument

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

as to whether or not it is possible for independence to be granted to the Federation whilst two of the Territorial Governments remain protectorates. We merely propose taking the action suggested and let any arguments take place afterwards.

I shall be available to start discussing these matters with you from Monday June 11th onwards.

## **119** CO 1015/996

11 May 1956

[Attitude of officials in Northern Rhodesia]: minute by Sir T Lloyd

*Mr. Gorell Barnes*

Sir Gilbert Laithwaite has returned from his visit to Central Africa with the, to me, surprising impression that the principal officials whom he met in Nyasaland were, on the whole, well disposed towards the Federation and felt that the territory was getting certain considerable benefits out of it. This impression may be no more than a reaction from the one which he got in Northern Rhodesia where he felt that most officials (but not the Governor) were definitely antagonistic to the Federation and withheld co-operation when that ought to be, and could reasonably be, given. As usual, the main complaint lies against Mr. Unsworth and Mr. Nicholson, with the former of whom Sir Gilbert had a long talk. I told him that Mr. Unsworth was being offered transfer to Nigeria (which he might well refuse) but that I could see no prospect of a move for Mr. Nicholson.

Sir Gilbert illustrated his case by mentioning the action of Mr. Unsworth in speaking in a Working Party on citizenship in a sense contrary to instructions sent out from here. I seem to recollect (though I did not mention this to Sir Gilbert) that we felt that some Northern Rhodesian officials had shown too great a disposition to express personal views and since, as Sir Gilbert pointed out, the fact that they were not then complying with instructions would be known to others, e.g. the Italian delegates, at the meeting, this would certainly create a bad impression.

Sir Gilbert freely admitted that there are faults on both sides—i.e. that a considerable part of the trouble derives from Salisbury. He said that it was the intention of the C.R.O. to brief their Secretary of State (after his return from Canada) to speak fairly plainly to Lord Malvern on this point, and I said that if he would let us see their brief in draft we would certainly consider whether we could advise our Secretary of State to speak in a similar sense to Sir Arthur Benson. When the brief has been prepared Sir Gilbert may ask for a further talk with me and I said that I should wish you to be present at that.

## **120** CO 1015/996

16 May 1956

[Nyasaland constitution]: minute by W L Gorell Barnes

*Sir T. Lloyd*

I have been thinking a lot lately about Nyasaland. There certainly seems to be a feeling of frustration amongst the Africans there. The leaders, or potential leaders, obviously feel that there is no future for them in the Federation or in the unitary state which they expect to take its place.

Sir G. Colby would have liked to have dealt with this by preserving the communal system of franchise and giving the Africans parity with the non-African officials in the Territorial Legislature, and then, presumably, hoping for the best. This kind of policy might have worked for a time if Nyasaland had been kept out of the Federation (a policy which Sir G. Colby himself admittedly favoured); but for a Nyasaland which is part of the Federation, I believe it to be a completely sterile policy.

We must, I believe, follow some other policy, and some other policy which will appeal to the African leaders. My own view is that the key to such a policy is to be found in the kind of franchise arrangements which are now beginning to be discussed for the Federation. For a time—at any rate up to the review of the Federal constitution—there must continue to be some seats reserved for Africans in the Federal Legislature and some for both Africans and non-Africans in the Territorial Legislature. But I am sure we must move over gradually, both for the Nyasaland seats in the Federal Legislature and also, though more gradually, for the unofficial seats in the Territorial Legislature, to the filling of the main body of seats by a system of elections on a common roll with high qualifications. If such a policy is applied to Nyasaland, then we will have to expect that in the foreseeable future most of the Nyasaland seats in the Federal Assembly and nearly all the unofficial seats in the Nyasaland Legislature will be filled by Africans. I believe, however, that, in a territory in which there are 2½ million Africans and only 5,000 Europeans this is inevitable. Is it not better that it should come about through the automatic operation of a qualitative franchise system such as I have described above, rather than by a series of probably unwilling decisions by H.M.G. made in the face of Federal protests? And is it so very dangerous, provided that we hang on to the official majority in the Territorial Legislature and given the fact that Nyasaland only has a small proportion of the seats in the Federal Legislature?

What I am sure will not work is to keep Nyasaland in the Federation but to apply different representational and franchise arrangements to that territory in order to prevent the operation of the system adopted for the rest of the Federation leading to the results which it is bound to lead to in the foreseeable future in Nyasaland.

We have already asked Sir R. Armitage to let us have his views on the Nyasaland situation and the means of improving it by the middle of next month. But Lord Malvern will be here by the end of the first week of next month. If it is thought that there is anything in the ideas set out in this minute, I should like authority to discuss them with the C.R.O. and then, if they see no objection, by telegram with Sir R. Armitage, and so prepare the way for Ministers to speak on these matters in a tentative way with Lord Malvern during his visit.

**121** CO 1015/998, nos 38/39 23 May 1956  
 [Federal constitution]: letter from W L Gorell Barnes to Sir A Benson  
 and Sir R Armitage

I enclose for your information copies of some recent correspondence<sup>1</sup> between Lord Home and Lord Malvern about some new constitutional proposals for the Federation.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

2. You will see that in the second half of his letter of the 12th March Lord Malvern proposes that in order to give the Federation a status equal to that of the Gold Coast and Nigeria in the Commonwealth when they attain self-government, all the restrictions on the Federal Government which are now contained in the Constitution should be transferred to a 'Treaty' between the Federation and the United Kingdom. Malvern later explained to Metcalf that he did not contemplate any change in the division of legislative powers between the Federal and the Territorial Governments, and he confirmed that he did not intend to interfere with the direct relationship between the Governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

3. The Colonial Office view is as follows. In the first place, such a move towards self-government and Dominion status would, unless a majority of the Africans in the Federation supported it, be a clear contravention of the pledges given at the time of Federation, not only in the Preamble to the Constitution but also in the debate in the House of Commons. But secondly, even if Lord Malvern's proposals were accepted, his object would not be achieved; for so long as two of the three territories in the Federation are Protectorates under the special responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Federation could not be regarded as fully self-governing or admitted as a member of the Commonwealth. It is, however, desirable that something should be done to enhance the prestige of the Federation when the Gold Coast becomes a fully self-governing member of the Commonwealth. It has, therefore, been decided that a study should be made of the means by which this could be done within the limits set by the Constitution so as to accord it as much as possible of the practical substance of full Commonwealth membership; and this is now in hand.

4. The whole matter is to be discussed with Lord Malvern in London in June. Meanwhile there are indications that his thoughts are turning towards an even greater measure of independence for the Federation than he proposed in the enclosed correspondence. We shall be in touch with you further about this in due course.

5. When Welensky was here at the beginning of this month he put forward a different constitutional proposal, which was even less acceptable. He urged that the two Northern Territories should sever their link with the Colonial Office and retain only a right to petition the Privy Council against decisions of the Federal Government in much the same way as (he said) the Canadian Provinces can. The Secretary of State told him of the pledges which made this impossible.

6. Lord Malvern's proposals are to be discussed with him when he comes to London in June, by which time Lord Home will have returned from Canada. Meanwhile, you will see that Lord Malvern agreed in his letter of 5th April that nothing should be said about them in public. For these reasons I am heading this letter 'Secret and Personal', and must ask you to show it to nobody but your very closest official advisers.

**122** CO 1015/998, no 49

2 June 1956

[Federal constitution]: inward telegram no 38 from Sir A Benson to  
W L Gorell Barnes

[Gorell Barnes followed his letter to Benson and Armitage of 23 May (121) with a tel to them on 31 May in which he noted ministers would be advised to reject Malvern's

proposals. He added, however, 'in view of impending independence of Gold Coast, Italian Somaliland etc. we agree with C.R.O. in thinking that we ought not to advise a wholly destructive attitude. Do you agree that Ministers might be advised to tell Malvern that they would be very ready to discuss with Federal Ministers what can be done to try to create among Africans a climate of opinion which would make constitutional advance possible later on—by the time of the review if possible—and also to ask you to do the same?']

Following for Gorell Barnes.

*Begins.* Lord Malvern's proposals would directly contravene pledges given at the time of Federation. In addition to matters mentioned in paragraph 3 of your letter CAA 75/2/09 of the 23rd May, I invite reference to the Report of the Conference in London in January 1953, Volume IV (Official Drafting Party Memoranda pages 1 and 2) and Volume III (Verbatim Record of Proceedings), ninth meeting, page 18.

2. If by phrase 'and also ask you to do the same' you mean we here should try to create among Africans climate of opinion making constitutional advance possible, answer is that we have been straining every effort to do this on behalf of Federal Government for past four years. I should strongly deprecate any suggestion of request to us which might suggest the opposite. If you mean we should discuss with Federal Ministers what can be done to this end, we have been doing so for past two years with little success.

3. Hard fact is your proposal is contradiction in terms. If Federal Ministers had been content to proceed quietly, concentrating on measures to help Africans, instead of regularly indulging in public declamations that present constitution is 'shocking', that they must take over responsibility for African affairs; that four Governments are unworkable; that Civil Servants in Northern territories in whom alone Africans retain any trust are 'pests'; and that Governors of territories should disappear leaving one Queen's representative only, then climate of opinion among Africans would by now have become far more favourable to constitutional advance. As direct result of above, position is that African opinion in Northern Rhodesia has hardened over past two years despite continual harping by us on benefits which Federation has brought.

4. For above reasons I cannot see that any discussions which Ministers hold with Federal Ministers along lines you suggest could be anything but string of criticisms which however ought to be made.

5. For above very reasons also, I consider that establishment of inter-Governmental Committee would be most dangerous, as it would inevitably become known that it was formed with a view to constitutional alterations and this would have most serious repercussions in Northern Rhodesia. Malvern clearly for party political reasons would wish it to become known. *Ends.*

**123** CO 1015/998, no 50

3 June 1956

[Federal constitution]: inward telegram number 174 from Sir R Armitage to W L Gorell Barnes

Following for Gorell Barnes.

*Begins.* Your telegram No. 125.

Consolidation of Federation and maintenance of its credit in the outside world can only be achieved by establishing confidence of all (repeat all) communities within the

Federation. Implication of Malvern's suggestion is that failure to move for Dominion status would sooner or later break the Federation, as Europeans would seek their security by amendment of the constitution to assure European domination. Equally, Africans would see the move towards a Dominion status as securing domination to Europeans. It follows that premature move towards dominion status may well stimulate early and violent African opposition, which would at the best discredit Federation and at the worst break it.

2. It is *not* merely a question of African climate of opinion but Europeans must be prepared to make an irrevocable demonstration of readiness to concede Africans a substantial and increasing freedom in Federal Government and administration. In considering this it is important to recognise that Africans in Nyasaland consider Federation deprives them of the expectation of self government with African domination. Current citizenship and franchise proposals redesigned to preserve Government 'in civilised hands' can hardly be regarded by Africans as conducive to climate of opinion suggested and will inevitably be construed as device to introduce European domination.

3. I feel therefore that any discussions with Federal Ministers must take account of above, and that it is not solely issue of African climate of opinion. If this is accepted no objection to discussions which would have to range over economic development as well. But unless you can get unqualified acceptance of first sentence of paragraph 2 it would be disastrous to establish a committee. If inter-governmental committee resulted I assume Federal and Rhodesian Governments would be represented at Ministerial (repeat Ministerial) level. *Ends*.

## 124 CO 1015/1129, no 13

6 June 1956

[Northern Rhodesia]: letter from Sir A Benson to Mr Lennox-Boyd attacking the centralising federal policies of Lord Malvern. *Appendix*

[Despite its harsh words, this despatch received a remarkably warm welcome in the CO. Lennox-Boyd described it as 'Excellent but very depressing reading' (CO 1015/1003, minute, 14 June 1956). There was some debate about whether to print it. Gorell Barnes was in favour and noted, 'No susceptibilities of the CRO should be accepted as a good reason for concealing from the Cabinet what the Governor believes to be the trouble on a very important issue' (CO 1015/1003, minute, 12 June 1956). Lloyd agreed, but stipulated that it should only be printed for UK ministers and should not be given wider distribution abroad (CO 1015/1003, minute, 13 June 1956). The decision to give the document wider circulation was one officials were subsequently to regret.]

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland came into being on the 3rd of September, 1953, with, at first, an Interim Federal Government composed of the Governor-General, Sir Godfrey Huggins from Southern Rhodesia, Sir Roy Welensky from Northern Rhodesia, and Sir Malcolm Barrow from Nyasaland. Elections to the Federal Parliament were then held, followed by elections to the Southern Rhodesia Parliament and to the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council, in all of which, by the end of March 1954 the Federal Party gained large majorities. It is now just two years since the present Federal Party Government assumed control with the four governments embarking on the task of making federation the success which Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hoped for.

2. The constitution granted by Her Majesty to Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a

federal constitution. There is no set form for federal constitutions, and the particular form of this one had been worked out over a period of some three years in a series of conferences and discussions. The final form differed very considerably indeed from the form proposed at the March 1951 conference of officials (at which the Southern Rhodesia Government under the Prime Ministership of Sir Godfrey Huggins was fully represented); and each successive conference at ministerial level changed in some particular or another the form of constitution emerging from the last one. But throughout the whole series of these conferences Her Majesty's Government had refused to permit anything more closely knit than a federation to be discussed. Her Majesty's Government had pursued a consistent policy in this regard ever since the mid-thirties, when Sir Godfrey Huggins first began pressing for the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Rhodesia. In 1938 the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission had found against amalgamation; the question was 'by gentleman's agreement' dropped during the war years; and when Sir Godfrey Huggins again began pressing for amalgamation at the end of the war he was told quite firmly by Her Majesty's Government that it could not be contemplated. He was not prepared to consider a minority suggestion of the Royal Commission that the possibilities of federation should be investigated: and, with his agreement, the advisory Central African Council was established.

3. Sir Godfrey Huggins was however in a strong position and he did not hesitate to use his strength. Northern Rhodesia, depending solely on copper, could not produce it without coal and Southern Rhodesia controlled the coal. It also in practice controlled the Railways. The Central African Council had been specially established to solve this amongst other economic problems, and to help in the solution of all common problems; but it could not work for one reason only: Sir Godfrey Huggins was determined that it should not. He did not delay long before stating publicly that he had wanted amalgamation and had been 'fobbed off' with the Central African Council. If it worked there could be no need for closer union between the governments. Repeated representations by Her Majesty's Government in respect of Northern Rhodesia's coal and import needs met with scant success.

4. In due course very great pressure indeed was put upon Sir Godfrey Huggins by Southern Rhodesia public opinion and by the Northern Rhodesia electorate, led by Sir Roy Welensky, to recognise that amalgamation was just not on the cards, but that there might be a hope of federation. This pressure, alone, would not have been enough. What was gradually borne in upon him was the stark fact that Southern Rhodesia, which had embarked on extravagant capital projects such as steel works, cold storage enterprises, and the like, and which had small prospects alone of securing the large capital sums needed to prevent a complete breakdown in the Railways, was near bankruptcy. He was not therefore in a position to resist the proposal put forward by Her Majesty's Government that a body of officials from the three territories should examine the question of the closer association of their governments in a federation and he, reluctantly, agreed. On the eve of the conference of officials in March 1951 he told me that it was unthinkable that any agreed recommendations could come out of it: any form of closer association which would be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government would fall far short of what he and the Southern Rhodesia electorate would demand. Southern Rhodesia was quite prepared to take over Northern Rhodesia and run it; but it was not prepared to have its own freedom of action circumscribed in any way.

5. Two years ago, as I have said, the four governments of the Federation appeared to the world to have set themselves to the task of making a success of federation. It was a difficult task; and it was made much more difficult by the fact that the Federal Government under Sir Godfrey Huggins (now Lord Malvern) never had the faintest intention whatsoever of making federation a success. It regarded the Federal Constitution as what Lord Malvern has frequently called in public 'a shocking constitution' (and in a letter to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 'an impossible constitution'), and as a mere springboard on which to rest briefly until full amalgamation could be achieved. The local chairman of the Nyasaland Federal Party Executive (Mr. Brereton) was guilty of a breach of party security rules when he said to a meeting of the Nyasaland Association on 27th September 1954:—

'I am informing this Committee off the record that leading Europeans in the Federation and the Federal Government, ably led by Sir Godfrey Huggins, have only one object in view—that is, over the course of the next few years to federalise every department in the Territorial Governments and vigorous steps are being taken already to pave the way to complete amalgamation. It is a question of holding on until then.'

6. It is important here to remember what was the mental approach by Sir Godfrey Huggins, and by the vast majority of the electorate and of the Civil Service of Southern Rhodesia, when federation was being advocated. During my time as Chief Secretary to the Central African Council I and my staff, and the governments of the two northern territories, made many suggestions for a closer association of the three governments in the handling of many different problems. It fell to me to make the approach to the Minister of the Southern Rhodesia Government concerned, and (always) to the Prime Minister. The response was invariably couched in these terms: 'Yes: I think we would be prepared to take that over and run it on behalf of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland—provided they paid of course'. What Sir Godfrey Huggins meant at that time by amalgamation was the absorption of Northern Rhodesia by Southern Rhodesia. There was no such wish to absorb Nyasaland, about which practically nothing was known save that it exported a great amount of much-needed agricultural labour. Northern Rhodesia's Copperbelt, however, represented the windfall needed to save Southern Rhodesia, financially embarrassed as it was, from the only alternative—that of becoming a fifth province of the Union of South Africa.

7. In Northern Rhodesia the attitude amongst the electorate had been different. A majority would have hesitated to accept amalgamation even on a free merger basis of departments and institutions. It would have strongly resisted any form of 'hand over to the Southern Rhodesia Government'. But the vast majority of the electorate favoured federation because it had responded to the heavy attack, launched and maintained in succession and together by Sir Stewart Gore-Browne and by Sir Roy Welensky, on the Colonial Office; and on what they were pleased to call 'Colonial Office rule'. Had the electorate of Northern Rhodesia at the time been offered a choice between federation, with Northern Rhodesia still falling within the responsibility of the secretary of state for the Colonies, and self-government for Northern Rhodesia alone on the Southern Rhodesian model, it would have rejected federation out of hand. It saw in federation one thing: the probability that, if Her Majesty's Government pursued its liberal policy of giving Africans a greater share in the central of affairs, the Southern Rhodesian influence on any federal government

would be strong enough to retard the process almost indefinitely. It was on this platform that the Federal Party swept into power both in the Federal Parliament and in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council early in 1954; the theme in elections throughout Southern Rhodesia being that no black state must be allowed to erect itself on Southern Rhodesia's borders.

8. Immediately upon taking office the Federal Government began its set campaign to take over control of as much as possible, paying scant regard even to the restrictions which staff and money laid upon them. Very little time was available before the 1st of July, 1954, (the first day of the new financial year) which became immediately the date by which as much as possible should have passed into Federal Government hands. I reported to you at the time the succession of important Bills received by this Government from the Federal Government 2, 3, or 6 days before their introduction into the Federal Parliament; which deleted existing territorial legislation; and which gave the Federal Government complete control over their subject matter. I reported that when we protested about the complete lack of consultation, and about the impossibility of preparing views in the time allowed, such protests were answered with regret but with no action; and that in reply to a personal letter which I sent to Lord Malvern I was told that the Bills were *not* sent to my government for comment, but only to my law officers for checking of the legal drafting.

9. The several Bills went through the Federal Parliament before the end of August and Federal Ministers turned then to other matters which even they had not been able to have ready for that meeting. It rapidly appeared that the view taken by this Government and by the Federal Government of the concurrent list, and of the reasons for a concurrent list, were quite different: Federal Ministers were determined that all territorial jurisdiction over subjects on the concurrent list should disappear as early as possible, and that the concurrent list should, in fact, cease to exist.

10. There ensued great trouble over the erection of the Federal Supreme Court. The Federal Minister for Justice, Mr. Greenfield, not only pressed for agreement to a most unsatisfactory bill, which would seriously have curtailed the effect and influence of British law and British legal practice throughout the Federation; he attempted to pack the Federal Supreme Court Bench with Roman Dutch lawyers with little or no experience of British legal practice. A satisfactory outcome to these troubles was achieved mainly through the influence of the Chief Justices of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland supported by the Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Robert Tredgold, Chief Justice designate of the Federal Supreme Court, who responded admirably to the strong representations made by myself and Sir Geoffrey Colby and our two Chief Justices.

11. By the end of 1954, the concurrent list subjects enumerated in the Appendix to this despatch had either been removed from territorial jurisdiction or announced for such removal at the earliest possible date. The concurrent list of subjects runs from item 45 to item 76 and it will be apparent from the Appendix that the Federal Government's determination to transform it into an exclusive Federal list is well on the way to realisation.

12. But it has not been only on concurrent list subjects which the Federal Government has developed its attack. In October, 1954, Sir Roy Welensky and his Under Secretary put to me the proposal that a Roads Corporation should be established under the direction of himself, with exclusive jurisdiction over all roads

in the Federation. It was put to me as an obvious desirability, and only in regard to the question whether all the money now spent by Northern Rhodesia on roads, and to be spent in the future, would be placed at the disposal of the Federal Government. I was discouraging. My attitude at that time did not arise from my present knowledge that all such proposals were part and parcel of a set plan, but solely from my disbelief that roads were likely to be either more efficiently or more economically maintained and constructed throughout so vast an area (an area greater than the Union of South Africa) by a central body sitting in Salisbury, than by the present de-centralised system. This subject is, however, by no means dead.

13. Even more ambitious and much more sinister was the attack which opened early in 1955. The Federal Government proposed to assume control of the entire Building Construction Branch of the Northern Rhodesia Public Works Department. This Government had gladly agreed that an inter-governmental working party should consider how best to ensure the construction and maintenance of the Federal Government's works in Northern Rhodesia. Our department has a building capacity of some £6m, and had been energetically expanded over the proceeding five years to cope with the accelerating development of the territory, and to implement this Government's ten year development plan. We had agreed to act as agent for the Federal Government, whenever so requested, for the construction and maintenance of federal works.

14. The committee met, and our representatives were alarmed to find that what they were discussing was the earliest date and the most suitable methods for handing over control of the Northern Rhodesia department to the Federal Government. From that time on intense pressure was put on us to hand over control. Apart from pressure at a lower level I received three separate visits from Sir Malcolm Barrow (the Minister most closely concerned) and the matter was pressed on me also by Mr. Macintyre, Sir Roy Welensky, and Lord Malvern. The proposal amounted in fact to nothing less than that this Government should hand over entirely to the Federal Government its major piece of machinery for ensuring the development of Northern Rhodesia. Some three months ago I was compelled to write a letter to Lord Malvern telling him that he must accept as final what his representatives had already been given to understand: that in no circumstances could I agree to the Federal Government's request.

15. Because the Federal Party in Northern Rhodesia naturally takes its orders from the Ministers of the Federal Government (Mr. John Roberts is the personal protégé of Sir Roy Welensky) there was no possibility of preventing the transfer of control of European Agriculture and Animal Husbandry. There was much bitterness both south of and inside Northern Rhodesia at my refusal to permit the transfer of Animal Health on the grounds that such services for Africans must remain under this Government's control, and that it would be farcical to differentiate between bugs attacking cattle owned by Europeans and those whose target was African-owned livestock.

16. During the past six months the campaign has continued, but on more subtle and insidious lines. A multiplication of inter-governmental committees have [sic] been proposed and created under federal chairmen. Each such proposal is entirely reasonable: labour matters are strictly territorial, but the Railways (which are federal) are large employers. The inter-governmental committee proposed by the Federal Government and, naturally, agreed to by this government has attempted

already to go much further than it should, and a new term of reference has been inserted: 'to explore and report on the possibility of unifying all labour legislation within the Federation'. This permits discussion of all attempts to influence this Government's basic policy regarding such matters as African advancement, Trade Unions, and the like. As I have said this is only one example of a dozen or more such inter-governmental committees which have shown in their approach to their various subjects the set determination which is behind their establishment; and it is in line with this that Sir Roy Welensky in a public speech recently made in Northern Rhodesia claimed that the Federal Government was already responsible for 66% of the public affairs of Northern Rhodesia, and that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would very soon have to recognise that the present Constitution could not continue unchanged until the revision date.

17. The procedure which will be adopted is clear. In due course Sir Roy Welensky's utterances will be repeated formally to Her Majesty's Government accompanied by, or after, similar utterances locally, designed to secure great publicity in the press. Every such utterance, and every advance of the kind I have described into what, in most federations, is regarded as the territorial government's domain, has naturally magnified the intense fears which the African population of Northern Rhodesia had about the results to them when Federation was being introduced; and has hardened their determination to resist by whatever means possible any extension of the process.

18. Entirely in line with the policy and the tactics Lord Malvern has followed over the past twenty years, we now have the Federal Government seeking from Her Majesty's Government a revision of the Constitution by which those safeguards which were deliberately planted in it would disappear, to re-appear in some form of treaty; and whereby (Lord Malvern suggests) the Federal Government would then become self-governing before any further constitutional advance is granted to the Gold Coast. While I have no doubt that Her Majesty's Government will be unable to meet them in any respect on any such proposal I mention it here as the latest demonstration of what I have tried to bring once more to your attention in this despatch: the fact that Lord Malvern has never wavered in his determination to get amalgamation; paid lip-service only to the idea of federation even when he was signing his agreement to a federal constitutional form; and is now more intent than ever on wrecking what Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agreed to, and on erecting in its place a unitary Government over an amalgamated Central Africa. Any such proposal (as, I judge, Lord Malvern himself has shown he realises) would involve treating the solemn preamble to the constitution as 'a scrap of paper'.

#### Appendix to 124: Concurrent list of subjects removed from territorial jurisdiction or announced for such removal before 31 December 1954

- 45. Deportation.
- 48. Central of movement of goods and animals between territories.
- 49. Development of industries.
- 52. Bankruptcy and insolvency.\*
- 53. Hire Purchase.
- 54. Road, other than those covered by the Federal exclusive list.\*

- 55. Road rail crossings.
- 57. Electricity.
- 58. Research.
- 59. Service and execution of civil and criminal processes, etc.
- 60. Prisons.
- 64. Health (other than silicosis)
- 65. Promotion of tourist traffic.
- 66. Team Planning.\*
- 67. Geological surveys.\*
- 69. Broadcasting, etc.\*
- 70. Archives.
- 71. Census and statistics.

\* Concurrent subjects not yet removed from territorial jurisdiction.

## 125 DO 35/7629

14 June 1956

[Despatch by Sir A Benson]: minute by R W D Fowler

[In marked contrast to its reception within the CO, reactions in the CRO to Benson's despatch of 6 June (see 124) were extremely hostile. Home's permanent under-secretary, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite noted 'Sir A Benson spoke to me much on these lines but I attributed that partly to his health. It is far from satisfactory, whatever Lord Malvern's weak points, that a Gov[ernor] s[hould]d criticise him in these terms & it illustrates the tension between N[orthern] R[hodesia] and the Fed[eratio]n' (minute, 14 June 1956). Home himself commented, 'L[or]d Malvern certainly got under his skin. But to have him there in this mood is not good. It will be contagious' (minute, 14 June 1956).]

Please see the attached despatch of the 6th June from Sir Arthur Benson to the Colonial Secretary and Mr. Coe's minute. I do not think there is any need for the Secretary of State to read through this despatch before his first meeting with Lord Malvern this evening. The despatch is rather an unfortunate document, and I do not think the Secretary of State will find the analysis which it contains at all to the point in the negotiations which he will be having with the Federal Prime Minister.

Sir Arthur Benson has always shown himself to be in favour of Federation. His relations with Lord Malvern have always appeared to be most satisfactory. It is highly disturbing therefore to see a despatch sent over his name which contains many bitter attacks on Lord Malvern's policies and on his honesty of purpose. The P.U.S. came back from his tour of the Federation with the impression that it might be helpful if Sir Arthur Benson were to be transferred elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> He would almost certainly regard this despatch as providing very strong evidence in support of this. I suggest that, before the despatch is examined in detail, it might be sent forward to the Secretary of State with the recommendation that he might arrange a private discussion with Mr. Lennox Boyd, and perhaps the two Permanent Under-Secretaries, to consider its implications. We could then, before the meeting, provide a more detailed commentary on the various points which Sir Arthur Benson makes in his despatch.

<sup>1</sup> Laithwaite commented here, 'but on *promotion*. I think he's of v. good quality: but what with health troubles and the atmosphere of Lusaka he seems to have lost a little balance on this issue' (minute, 14 June 1956).

**126** CO 1015/998, no 75

15 June 1956

**[Dominion status for Federation]: CRO note of a meeting at the Commonwealth Relations Office between Mr Lennox-Boyd, Lord Home and Lord Malvern**

1. The object of the meeting was to discuss proposals put forward by Lord Malvern in letters of 12th March, 5th April and 10th May, 1956 to Lord Home for constitutional changes in the status of the Federation.

2. *Lord Home* referred to the fact that the earliest date on which the Federal Constitution could be reviewed was 1960 and that it would be very difficult indeed to contemplate fundamental changes such as those proposed by Lord Malvern before that time.

It did not however appear that the proposals themselves would in fact achieve Lord Malvern's purpose, for they left undiminished the ultimate responsibility of the United Kingdom Government for a large part of the government in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Federation could not, in such circumstances, be regarded as self-governing and thus could not become a Member of the Commonwealth.

3. *Lord Malvern* agreed that he did not want or expect a change in the existing distribution of authority between the Federal and Territorial Governments before 1960. He had hoped that the combined effect of his proposals would nevertheless entitle the Federation to be recognised as self-governing, or at least to have a status not inferior to that of the Gold Coast in 1957. The only major change he was in fact suggesting was that the Federal Government should have complete responsibility for the conduct of its external relations.

Indeed, but for the speed with which events were moving in the Gold Coast and elsewhere, he would not be anxious to have any change at all; but it was essential that the Federation should not be left behind in the race, and 1960 would be too late for an advance in the status of the Federation.

4. In reply to a question by Lord Home, *Lord Malvern* said that pressure in the Federation for constitutional advance was great and would increase, and that the United Kingdom Government would without doubt be faced with a demand for self-government and dominion status in connection with the 1958 elections in the Federation. He could not see that any political party in the Federation could afford not to make such a demand one of the planks in their election platform.

If these demands were not met the sort of government which would come into office in the Federation could not be expected to preserve any sort of stability, economic or otherwise.

In reply to a question by Mr. Lennox Boyd, *Lord Malvern* said that it would not be possible to persuade any significant body of European opinion in the Federation that it would be a wise policy not to campaign for constitutional change at an early date.

5. *Lord Malvern* drew attention to the fact that the possible future political situation in the United Kingdom underlined the urgency of doing something for the Federation earlier rather than later. If his proposals or something like them were not accepted now, who could guarantee that the government in power in 1960 would be willing to consider adequate constitutional changes then?

6. *Lord Malvern* stressed that the situation was made the more unfortunate when one considered the position of Southern Rhodesia, which, but for federation, might

reasonably have been expected to have achieved dominion status now or very shortly. During the debates about federation in the Southern Rhodesia Assembly it had been stressed that if Southern Rhodesia supported the idea of federation that would not damage the prospects of attaining dominion status as part of the Federation as a whole; it was now beginning to look as though this promise was not to be fulfilled. He quoted a passage from the speech he made in the Southern Rhodesia Assembly on 12th February 1953 (extract attached)<sup>1</sup> which had some bearing on the point he had made and also on the theory that if the responsibility of the Colonial Secretary remained undiminished then the Federation could not be regarded as self-governing. *Lord Malvern* went on to point out that the position of the Canadian provinces and the Australian states did not prevent them from being full Members of the Commonwealth. *Lord Home* and *Mr. Lennox Boyd* said that the United Kingdom Government fully appreciated the difficulties confronting the Federal Government and sympathised with the peculiar position of Southern Rhodesia, but it would hardly be possible for Southern Rhodesia to become a Member of the Commonwealth in its own right for that would make a nonsense of federation itself.

7. *Lord Home* said that he would have the implication of the statement quoted by *Lord Malvern* investigated. But that for the moment he could not think that where there were in fact considerable limitations on the authority of any government that government could be regarded as self-governing. *Lord Home* added that there was a considerable difference between the position in the Federation and that in Canada and Australia.

8. *Mr Lennox Boyd* referred again to the point made by *Lord Home* earlier, namely, the great difficulty there would be about what amounted to a review of the Constitution before 1960. He understood that legally it would be possible to have such a review at an earlier date, but morally and politically it would be very difficult indeed to do this. African opinion in the Federation was such that it would be contrary to the spirit of the Preamble of the Constitution and to the pledges given to Parliament at the time of federation to embark on major constitutional changes; such changes would require the approval of the inhabitants of the Federation—and the vast majority were, of course, Africans. However much the United Kingdom Government might sympathise with the aims of the Federal Government, they could not overlook the fact that, while in the Gold Coast the question would be one of putting authority into the hands of a government which represented the majority of the inhabitants, in the Federation this would not be the case. The Colonial Secretary added that if the Federal Government could put through liberal measures relating to the citizenship and franchise that would have a considerable effect in winning over African opinion, and the difficulties the United Kingdom Government foresaw in accepting proposals such as those put forward by *Lord Malvern* would then be lessened.

*Lord Malvern* replied that if constitutional advance were made to depend on the approval of the majority of Africans, then he feared it would be long delayed unless some changes could be made meanwhile, for the present distribution of powers between the Federal and Territorial Governments left the Federal Government with little or no contact with the Africans in their every-day life. Many of the things the Federal Government had done for the benefit of Africans were never represented to Africans in that light. So long as the present position in the Federation was

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

maintained there would never emerge that common loyalty to the Federal Government which was so essential.

9. *Lord Home* said that he and the Colonial Secretary now had a clear idea of the problems confronting Lord Malvern and hoped that Lord Malvern equally appreciated the difficulties facing the United Kingdom Government. *Lord Home* put forward for consideration by Lord Malvern the following tentative sequence of events and action to be taken which might form the basis of further discussion:—

(i) Let it be assumed that the Gold Coast would attain self-governing status in the spring of 1957;

(ii) the Federal Government might then request a greater degree of self-government and Membership of the Commonwealth;

(iii) the United Kingdom Government might respond by explaining the difficulties arising from the Preamble to the Constitution and from pledges given in Parliament and might make the following proposals:—

(a) There should be a full review of the Federal Constitution in 1960 which would include detailed consideration of proposals such as those now put forward by Lord Malvern.

(b) As an interim measure the United Kingdom Government would suggest a number of ways in which it might be possible to enhance the status of the Federation at once.

*Lord Home* assumed, for example, that when regrettably the time came for Lord Malvern to retire it would be expected that his successor would still continue to attend meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. The interim measure mentioned above would include some formalisation of the position in relation to attendance at Prime Ministers' meetings.

10. *Mr. Lennox Boyd* welcomed Lord Home's proposals as a basis for further discussion and explained the probable course of events in the Gold Coast. He said that he would hope and expect the elections in July this year to open the way for the grant of full self-government to the Gold Coast and for Membership of the Commonwealth. It was, of course, possible that the result of the elections might be different, and in that case the advance towards self-government might be delayed.

11. In reply to a question from Lord Malvern, *Mr. Lennox Boyd* said that the course of events in Nigeria was less easy to forecast.

12. *Lord Malvern* agreed that he would like to see some amplification of the tentative proposals described in paragraph 9 above.

It was agreed that Lord Home would let Lord Malvern have a paper for this purpose. Lord Malvern would no doubt then have a number of comments to make and questions to ask and there could be another discussion at a time mutually convenient to those concerned.

**127** CO 1015/998

20 June 1956

[Dominion status for Federation]: minute by J C Morgan to W L

Gorell Barnes

[The sentiments of this minute were broadly endorsed by Gorell Barnes, who suggested, 'If the European leaders try to force through something like Dominion status, I believe

the only result can be the break-up of the federation' (minute, 21 June 1956). He argued it was vital 'that Malvern should go home with the firm conviction in his mind that H.M.G. stand by their pledges and that consequently neither amalgamation nor Dominion status will be possible either now, or in 1960, or indeed at any time, against African wishes.' Lloyd endorsed this point.]

The attached record of the meeting between the two Secretaries of State and Lord Malvern on Friday 15th June<sup>1</sup> came in last night, and you asked me to let you have it with a minute to follow up the file which you sent yesterday through Sir T. Lloyd to the Secretary of State, with a draft letter to Mr. Shannon, C.R.O., referring to the paper on the future programme, referred to in para. 12 of this record.

2. With reference to para. 12 of the record, as you know, Lord Malvern has received the paper or draft programme from the C.R.O; and a meeting between him and the two Secretaries of State to talk about it has been arranged for Friday 22nd June. This paper is broadly on the lines of what is set out in para. 9 of this record.

3. If I may say so with respect, the Secretary of State appears to have put the actual situation to Lord Malvern, in para. 8 of this record, with crystal clarity. It is therefore the more unfortunate that Lord Malvern appears on this occasion, as on others, to be unable to grasp the simple and fundamental point that the only road to full self-government and Dominion status for the Federation lies through the genuine and complete reconciliation to the Federation of the African majority. Each of the statements which Lord Malvern is recorded to have made at X/ para. 8 of the record is an evasion of this issue, and in itself only a half truth.<sup>2</sup> In the attached I have numbered each part of the statement and comment as follows:—

(1) The length of the delay in winning the approval of the majority of the Africans depends entirely on the effort made by the Federal Government itself, supported of course by the Territorial Governments. If the Federal Government prefer to 'play politics' instead of getting on with the necessary effort to win over the Africans, it is their own fault. To ask for 'some changes meanwhile' is merely to evade the issue and to try to go back on the bargain struck with H.M.G. and the Northern Territories when the Federal Constitution was agreed in 1953.

(2) It is true that the powers of the Territorial Governments are those related most to the day to day life of the Africans, and at the time of the pre-Federal debates, it was frequently stressed that this would be so. But the actions of the Federal Government do in fact, as Lord Malvern well knows, directly affect Africans, and this must necessarily be so. For example the fiscal policy of the Federation which has resulted in an increase of Customs tariff in Nyasaland and the northern part of Northern Rhodesia, and consequential rise in African cost of living, has already caused trouble in the Federation.

(3) It is quite untrue to suggest that activities of the Federal Government

<sup>1</sup> See 126.

<sup>2</sup> Morgan refers here to that section of para 8 of document 126 beginning, '*Lord Malvern* replied that if constitutional advance . . .' The four points which follow in Morgan's minute analyse the four statements made by Malvern in para 8 of 126 about (1) constitutional advance being dependent upon African approval, (2) the distribution of powers between the federal and territorial governments, (3) actions by the federal government said to have benefited Africans, and (4) a common loyalty to the federal government.

beneficial to the Africans have been misrepresented or disguised. The trouble is that the Africans themselves feel, and owing to the short time that has elapsed this is probably the case, that the benefits which have been given for example in the field of Health would have been received in any case from the Territorial Governments without Federation. The Federal Government have in fact made no special efforts directed precisely towards the increased welfare of the Africans as such; and their lack of interest in this aspect of their responsibilities is extremely well illustrated by the report flagged in the issue of 'East Africa' for Thursday 14th June, attached, page 1452, of Lord Malvern's own summary of the achievements of the Federal Government during the last three years. Of the eight fields of achievement which he has singled out, six are primarily of benefit to the Europeans and the European economy. Of the other two, Health and Education, the latter is almost entirely European, except for the 'Rhodesia University' (a misnomer); Health is certainly a field where Africans have benefited, but it only gets three lines in the statements.

(4) This statement entirely begs the whole question. The Africans can only be expected to contribute a common loyalty to the Federation if they are accorded a common participation. This can best be done if the Federal Government will agree to a common roll franchise for the Federal Parliament, coupled with every possible reduction of economic and social discrimination in the economy and in Government services. 'The present position in the Federation' is no bar to this being done, and, on the contrary, the Constitution was so drawn up that it could be done. The suggestion that further centralisation or amalgamation will help to bring about a common loyalty is unfounded.

4. The attitude of Lord Malvern and his associates revealed in this record, in the whole present series of discussions, and very specially in the note of discussions at a dinner party on 17th June, give rise to a grave anxiety as to whether the Federal Government are not about to take the wrong turning. If they persist in their present attitude of pressing for Dominion status with self-government in the near future, and do not succeed in keeping that issue out of the elections in 1958, they cannot fail to stimulate the most extreme reaction among the Africans, particularly in Nyasaland, who have not yet had time to recover from the blow of having Federation imposed upon them against the expressed wishes of the vocal minority, and the general feelings of cautious conservatism of the majority. If the Federal authorities can keep the Federation going on its present constitutional basis up to the review of the Constitution in 1960 or 1961, there is a small but reasonable hope that, with goodwill and the special efforts to which I have referred, a genuine multi-racial state can be achieved and thus the conditions of genuine self-government and Dominion status be brought into existence. But the present game is likely only, in my humble view, to lead to the break-up of the Federation and to make necessary the giving of serious consideration to conceptions of territorial separation (usually associated with the name van Eeden) against which H.M.G. has so far resolutely set its face.

5. I hope that when the Secretary of State next speaks with Lord Malvern he will tell him how deeply he feels that the course which he appears to be setting, in present circumstances, is a most dangerous one, and likely to lead to the disruption of the Federation.

**128** CO 1015/1007, no 1

4 July 1956

**[Nyasaland]: letter from Sir R Armitage to Mr Lennox-Boyd giving his initial impressions of the territory**

In another connection you recently suggested that I might write to you on any matter of importance here. There are not really many problems with which I wish to trouble you but we have, as you are most fully aware, our greatest problem in the attitude of the Congress African to the Federation. I have done my best since I have been here to make an early appreciation of why the Federation is so unpopular in Nyasaland, because make no mistake, it is not the African only who has cause to criticise Federal policies.

I have certainly encountered a great sense of frustration here because the Federal Government—and that includes Ministers, Heads of Departments and departmental staff, obviously make no attempt to understand our special problems here in Nyasaland and they certainly make no attempt to approach the Africans in Nyasaland. Lord Malvern is distrusted generally in African opinion and I think is regarded as a complete cynic by a number of Europeans. Neither group consider that he really has any intention of giving the African a chance. I do not get the same view expressed to me about either Sir Roy Welensky or Garfield Todd; I think that both of them are regarded as more liberal by the European contacts I have made both here and in Southern Rhodesia.

I am also getting curious sidelights from European circles on the views of the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. As you are aware all the politically minded Africans here regard the white Rhodesian as public enemy No. 1 and it is very largely to avoid his domination that the request is made for Nyasaland to withdraw from the Federation. I am beginning to find that Europeans draw a distinction between Southern Rhodesians of the old brigade and the younger generation. I get the impression that the older generation in Southern Rhodesia are quite die hard in their opposition to African advancement but that the younger generation is being brought up with much more liberal views. I think that in Garfield Todd one has at any rate partial confirmation of this. He told me himself that he regarded Nyasaland as the main danger point to the success of the Federation in that if the Africans in Nyasaland could not be persuaded to acquiesce in the idea of federation then the Federation could not hope to be a success. I think one has only to look at some of the measures taken by his Government, for instance the African housing scheme at Highfield outside Salisbury, the Land Husbandry Act 1951 (although of course this must have been on the statute book before he took over as Prime Minister) and the recent recommendation that Europeans and Africans should both be members of the same trade unions, to realise that in many ways Southern Rhodesia is prepared to let the African advance to a greater extent than the Federal Government is prepared to do.

So we are now in this position, with the Federal Government not yet three years old, and there is this demand by Lord Malvern to amend the constitution by administrative action if not by actual process of legislation. We have an extremely strong dislike by the African in Nyasaland of Federation and all it stands for including the multi-racial state; we need a breathing space to try and show such African opinion here as is prepared to listen to reason that Nyasaland has a far greater future within the Federation than outside it. But we are getting no breathing space and

everything that is done in the constitutional field by the Federal party politicians makes it more difficult for us to have any influence with our African politicians.

I am all out to help the Federation and the federal idea but we cannot do this unless the federal people are prepared to meet us half way. You have no idea how unpopular they are with our European politicians because they will not tackle the development of Nyasaland, with our civil servants for the quite incompetent way that the Interim Public Services Commission and the personnel branches in the ministries handle civil service affairs (Lord Llewellyn can tell you some home truths about the Interim Public Services Commission), with our Africans, and I am sure with quite a lot of Europeans official and unofficial, for the lack of any attempt to advance the African in the Federal Civil Service. Unless the Federal Government gives us some practical examples of how they propose to promote the wellbeing, socially and economically, of the African in Nyasaland, I can see no hope of eradicating the present distrust of the Federal Government, its administration and all its works.

I believe it to be quite remarkable what a different outlook we would attain if the Federal Government announced that it would use Africans as firemen and engine drivers on the trains and as employees in the Post Office, that the ratio of Africans to Europeans in the police force would be quadrupled, and that a training college for European and African police inspectors would be established. This type of thing would have an electrifying result here. I know that the European politicians in the Federal Government, to a large extent in the Southern Rhodesia Government and to a considerable extent in the Northern Rhodesia Government, would say that this sort of thing was impossible. I am not sure whether they do not want to keep it impossible until the inevitable breakdown in good race relationships occurs and we get back to another state of violence as in 1953. I have little doubt that the opportunity to use extreme physical force to crush violence in Nyasaland would be very welcome in certain quarters.

You may feel that I have written in a very depressed state of mind. I am not depressed—I have not been here long enough for that—it is merely that I am beginning to realise the tremendous sense of frustration that has undoubtedly afflicted a great number of people here and I must also give you my early views as to what I think are the chances of turning the main body of intelligent Africans from believing that the first thing they must do is to get out of the Federation.

**129** CO 967/295

31 July 1956

[Despatch by Sir A Benson]: letter from Lord Home to Mr Lennox-Boyd

I have been thinking quite a lot about this difficult problem of relations between Northern Rhodesia (and to some extent Nyasaland) and the Federal Government at Salisbury, and naturally Benson's very outspoken Despatch No. 336<sup>1</sup> which recently circulated in print has been very much in my mind.

From what I have seen of Benson and from all the accounts I have of him, I have no doubt that he is a person of very high quality and an excellent Governor, and I would be the last to wish to suggest anything that might be of disadvantage to him. On the other hand after reading Despatch No. 336, I cannot feel any confidence that

<sup>1</sup> See 124.

his heart is in the business of furthering the progress of Federation. That, after all is the declared purpose of United Kingdom policy and it is the business of Governors and officials to carry it out.

The point as I see it is this. We have got to get relations between Northern Rhodesia in particular and Nyasaland and the Federation on to a more co-operative basis. But every witness who has been out there, whether political or Civil Service, brings back the same story that relations are bad and strained. There are faults on the Federal Government's side with which I deal in a moment, but I think that two things ought to be done very soon by the Colonial Office:—

- (1) A very definite directive should be sent to Northern Rhodesia that federation has come to stay, is a matter of settled United Kingdom Government policy and has got to be made to work.
- (2) Certain civil service moves should be made of those whose heart is not in the task.

I fully accept at the same time that faults are by no means on one side and that if we are to get the whole-hearted and active (and I would repeat the word active) co-operation of the Northern Rhodesian Government in selling Federation to the Africans and for that matter to Europeans, we must look for a corresponding sensitiveness and readiness to respond on the part of the Federal Government.

I have already talked rather on these lines to Malvern and I am perfectly ready to do so again, and I will do so also to Welensky in September. When the latter takes over we can get him here before very long and talk to him on the same lines and tell him quite definitely the steps which are necessary on his part.

Benson's despatch and the extent to which he has become personally involved in the bad feeling within the Federation, makes me wonder whether he would accept a directive such as I propose and be prepared to see moved the small number of civil servants concerned.

I hope he would. If not I feel that his transfer ought to be considered. A more important Governorship would be justifiable as it is solely this blind spot he seems to have on the subject of Federal advance which I find so very disquieting.

These are disturbing thoughts of mine which I send you personally now. I will try and form a fair estimate of affairs when I am in the Federation and visiting the various places, but the evidence of a non-co-operative attitude by a few highly placed officials is over-whelming and I thought I had better let you know of it now. (It comes to me from all who return). You will then be able to consider what importance you attach to my points and be able perhaps to send me a tentative reply before I go.

**130** CO 967/295

21–23 Aug 1956

[Despatch by Sir A Benson]: minutes by J O Moreton<sup>1</sup> and W L Gorell Barnes on Lord Home's letter

*Mr. Gorell Barnes*

I now attach the letter<sup>2</sup> from Lord Home to the Secretary of State about relations

<sup>1</sup> Private secretary to secretary of state.

<sup>2</sup> See 129.

between senior officials in Northern Rhodesia and the Federal authorities which has up to the present remained in the Secretary of State's possession.

The Secretary of State does not wish this letter to be registered, but at the same time he wishes it to be seen by yourself and the department and would be grateful for official comments on it.

The Secretary of State discussed this with Lord Home last Saturday and I understand that the contents of the letter should not be taken too tragically.

J.O.M.  
21.8.56

I am myself absolutely certain that Sir A. Benson's views about Federation, of which he was one of the main initiators when he was Secretary of the Central African Council, are as follows:—

- (1) He believes utterly in Federation and has given everything he has in him to try and make a success of it.
- (2) He is utterly convinced—and I must say that I myself over the last two years have been driven to the same conviction—that Lord Malvern and Sir R. Welensky have made the task of selling Federation to the Africans well-nigh impossible.
- (3) He is opposed to amalgamation.
- (4) He is opposed to taking the safeguards out of the Federal Constitution and giving the Federal Government real independence in its own sphere now—i.e. before the confidence of the Africans has been won. He has, however, never been opposed to giving them any position within the Commonwealth circle which was compatible with the present Constitution. Nor has he ever been opposed to the idea of trying to win the Africans to a frame of mind in which they were prepared to accept an advance of the Federal Government to real independence within its own sphere.<sup>3</sup>

In his despatch at (38) in CAA. 75/2/013, Sir A. Benson expressed his views and his suspicions of the Federal leaders very frankly. Whether or not he was wise to do so in his own interest is a matter of opinion. Personally I think that, if he held those convictions, it was his duty to set them before Her Majesty's Government. It may be said that the assurances given by Lord Malvern in the course of the first of his recent outbursts are proof that Sir A. Benson was wrong in his suspicions that Lord Malvern and Sir R. Welensky were out after amalgamation. They had, however, certainly given a good deal of cause for suspicion by their pronouncements up to that date, and it is at least arguable that the assurances given in Lord Malvern's speech may be the result of his becoming convinced while in London that he had no chance of getting away with amalgamation.

If Sir A. Benson were removed from the Governorship of Northern Rhodesia because of his opposition either to amalgamation or to taking the safeguards out of the Federal Constitution at this stage, I personally should regard this as a grave injustice and something like a surrender to blackmail.<sup>4</sup> It is also my view that Central

<sup>3</sup> A passage here of approximately 6 lines has been retained until 2007 under section 5.1 of the Public Records Act.

<sup>4</sup> Macpherson minuted here, 'And I. Any value that I may have to this office—*vis à vis* the Service Overseas—would be finished.'

Africa would be deprived of someone who, though he may not always be good at expressing himself either moderately or altogether clearly, is for all that one of its most fundamental and constructive thinkers, and certainly a leader of men.

As regards other officials in Northern Rhodesia, I believe the chief targets of criticism are Mr. Unsworth and Mr. Nicholson. The criticism against Mr. Unsworth has been in my view totally unfair. Fortunately, however, it does not matter as he has recently been promoted to be Attorney-General in the Federation of Nigeria.

There is in my view more substance in the criticism of Mr. Nicholson. Mr. Nicholson's appointment as Financial Secretary was pressed upon us by Sir G. Rennie shortly before he retired and approved only with the greatest reluctance; and I happen to know that Sir A. Benson himself was not at all pleased when he heard of the appointment. I am not competent to say how well he has done in the financial field. I am afraid, however, there is no doubt that in the political field he is very indiscreet and has given some good cause for criticism. I am pretty sure that Sir A. Benson would not be at all sorry to see him moved. We did in fact look into the possibility of moving him about a year ago but came up against the usual difficulties of it being impossible to find any new home for him. I am passing the papers through Mr. Thomas so that he can advise whether the situation is still as difficult. If not, perhaps Mr. Thomas would say whether it would be possible for Mr. Nicholson to be compulsorily retired and to take his pension. If so, this is a possibility which I think we may have to discuss with Sir A. Benson.

In this connection you may wish to glance at the attached papers and, in particular, at Sir A. Benson's Secret and Personal letter of the 20th August to Mr. Williams.<sup>5</sup>

W.L.G.B.  
23.8.56

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<sup>5</sup> Macpherson agreed with Gorell Barnes that Nicholson had behaved 'very badly' and he asked Lennox-Boyd whether 'you would like us to follow up with Sir A. Benson the question of parting with Mr Nicholson?' (minute, 29 Aug 1956).

**131** CO 1015/930, no 45

8 Sept 1956

[Unrest on the Copperbelt]: inward telegram no 346 from A T Williams<sup>1</sup> to Mr Lennox-Boyd

[Major industrial unrest began on the Copperbelt in June 1956, although this had been preceded by trade boycotts organised by the Northern Rhodesian ANC. The African Mine Workers' Union (AMWU) claimed that the initiation of a training programme for Africans at Nkana Mine was an attempt by management to undermine its authority, since Africans who achieved promotion to supervisory grades were automatically transferred to the rival Mines African Salaried Staff Association (MASA). The union called a general strike on 22–25 June. There were further strikes in July and Aug over the issues of the use of protective clothing and the attempt by the management of the mines to transfer African supervisory staff to monthly contracts. In early Sept, the AMWU instructed underground workers to report for work without protective clothing. They were refused entry to the shafts, and the danger grew of serious confrontation. The Northern Rhodesian government declared a state of emergency on the Copperbelt on 11 Sept. Early the following day, 32 African leaders were arrested.]

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<sup>1</sup> A T Williams was acting governor.

Developments on Copperbelt reported in my telegram No. 343 have created most dangerous situation. Workers in large numbers present themselves daily at shaft heads and, because in accordance with instructions of Supreme Council they are not equipped for work underground, they are turned back and they march in columns to compounds chanting songs of defiance. Europeans are very apprehensive and indeed any spark may set off explosion. Scare headlines in newspapers are adding to feelings of disquiet. Union leaders are rude and capricious in conversations with Labour Officers and some are reported to be drunk whenever they are seen.

2. I had hoped that Katilungu<sup>2</sup> would bring sanity to union's deliberations and that some kind of truce could be arranged in anticipation of investigation by commission,<sup>3</sup> but Katilungu has had little effect and his absence from Railway Arbitration proceedings (on which, incidentally, depends the possibility of railway strike in near future) has left Nkoloma a free hand. If situation does not improve within next few days, I shall have no alternative but to proclaim State of Emergency in Copperbelt area or in part of Copperbelt area under Emergency Powers Orders in Council 1939 and 1956. I am making preparations accordingly. State of Emergency might have to be proclaimed subsequently in other areas (such as Broken Hill). Immediate action after declaration of emergency would be detention of Nkoloma<sup>4</sup> and others: order to workers either to go to work properly equipped or to remain in their houses: prohibition of assemblies of more than specified numbers of persons etc.

3. Of course if situation should improve I will reconsider, but it would be quite wrong to allow crazy men now in charge of union to continue to impose their will on industry and people in Copperbelt. With reference to your telegram No. 243, real reasons for developments are not easy to ascertain or define. Briefly, my own view is that Nkoloma and others (having convinced themselves that companies wish to destroy union) are blindly determined to keep all the power that they have acquired or to pull down industry in ruins. Their minds now seem to have turned in the direction of chaos—as they did during the 1955 strike—but on this occasion the dangers in the situation are much greater.

4. I consider that at the best we shall have nothing but turmoil on copperbelt, and that Commission will not be able to help us, so long as Nkoloma's dictatorship persists. I believe that though firm action on lines indicated in paragraph 2 might be followed by some disorder at first (but this is not inevitable) the ultimate result would be to re-establish respect for the law and to make possible orderly settlement of industrial disputes in which Africans are concerned.

5. I will keep you informed of developments and unless my hand is forced by events, I will notify you before I proclaim State of Emergency

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<sup>2</sup> Lawrence Katilungu, president of the AMWU.

<sup>3</sup> A commission of enquiry under Sir Patrick Branigan, QC, Solicitor-General of NR from 1938–46, had been announced on 11 Aug.

<sup>4</sup> Matthew Nkoloma, general secretary of the AMWU. Nkoloma was among those arrested on 12 Sept.

**132** CO 1015/930, no 46

10 Sept 1956

[Unrest on the Copperbelt]: outward telegram no 77 from Mr Lennox-Boyd to A T Williams

Your telegram No. 346.<sup>1</sup>

Copperbelt Situation.

I saw Prain today. His account of events corresponded with yours except that he said that at meeting with Managers on 6th September Government representatives said that they had reason to believe that present activities of Union were second phase in programme of which third phase was sabotage. Grateful for your comments on this.

2. Companies must clearly insist on observance of safety precautions and have right to expect backing of Government in doing so. In this issue Union are on a very bad wicket and, other things being equal, there would be much to be said for letting events take their course without declaring an emergency unless and until it becomes clear that outbreak of disorders is certain and cannot be prevented in any other way. I realise however that you have to bear in mind both the danger of sabotage (if you confirm Prain's information) and danger that nerve or patience of Europeans may snap. We must certainly not take any serious risk of letting situation get out of hand and you may count on my full support if and when, after bearing all these considerations in mind, you decide that your right course is to declare an Emergency and detain Nkoloma and others.

3. Please keep me informed.

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<sup>1</sup> See 131.

**133** CO 1015/930, no 51

11 Sept 1956

[Unrest on the Copperbelt]: inward telegram no 57 from A T Williams to Mr Lennox-Boyd

Your telegram Personal No. 77.<sup>1</sup>

I confirm that Government representatives made statement to managers as reported to Prain. Programme drawn up secretly by Supreme Council of Union on 26th July had as first phase refusal to co-operate with members of African Staff Association employed in hospitals, welfare halls, etc. This went off at half-cock, but second part of programme which set out dates of projected series of short strikes was carried out to the letter, with exception of strike planned for Kansanshi on 23rd August. Third part of programme, as reported, reads 'Finally, and subject to interim decision by the Supreme Council of the A.M.W.T.U., the Council and other Executive Committees would be dissolved, wives and families of Union members would be returned to their villages to avoid the consequences of the 'serious labour unrest'

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<sup>1</sup> See 132.

that would follow. Violence to persons and mine property would likely take place during this period and the Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines and the Northern Rhodesia Government would be held responsible'.

2. Perhaps I ought to have been more precise in my telegram No. 346 but I was pressed for time and I thought I could best describe attitude of leaders by saying that their minds seemed to have turned in the direction of chaos. My own opinion is that programme of planned sabotage would be unlikely to be followed at next stage if we allowed it to develop. But there would be violence and there would almost certainly be sabotage because once that stage was reached the Union Leaders could not control or direct events even if they wished to.

3. Nkoloma has formally notified Labour Commissioner that African Union will not give any evidence to Commission of Enquiry. He remains arrogant and there is no knowing what he will do next. Nothing in situation today influences me to reconsider decision to proclaim state of emergency tonight. I am satisfied that if I do not take emergency powers immediately there is most serious risk that situation will get completely out of hand and it may be very difficult to control Europeans, who cannot be expected to stand very much more.

4. Having taken full account of the considerations mentioned by you (in addition to many other considerations) have decided, with the unanimous agreement of my advisers, that the right course is to declare an emergency. I am most grateful to you for your support.

## **134** BARN 3/4

18 Oct 1956

### **[Unrest on the Copperbelt]: letter from W L Gorell Barnes to A T Williams**

[This private and personal letter is taken from the private papers of William Gorell Barnes in the archives of Churchill College, Cambridge.]

I am so glad that we have, without any difficulty, reached agreement on the action to be taken about your detainees when the State of Emergency is lifted.

I hope you did not think that, because we probed you rather deeply and thoroughly on this, we had lost any of our admiration for your handling of the Copperbelt situation. One or two of our labour people were rather worried about the proposal to detain or even rusticate so many trade union leaders for so long until the fuller information about the state of affairs on the Copperbelt before the Emergency was declared came in. But I think I can safely say that the material you have sent us has satisfied them pretty fully about this, and that all of us here feel that you have done extraordinarily well to get through this affair without loss of life. We realise, however, that it is bound to take you a little time to rebuild confidence in the Copperbelt: I know only too well what a filthy and effective thing intimidation of Africans by Africans can be.

Looking back over the past few months of territorial affairs in Northern Rhodesia, I think the only thing that really worries me is the fact that it had proved impossible over some two years to put right what appear to have been fairly genuine African grievances in the towns which the Congress boycotts succeeded in getting put right in almost no time at all. I have no doubt that this has caused you as much concern as it has to us, and that you are working out ways of making sure that this sort of thing

can be effectively dealt with without the help of Congress in the future. I should be very interested in anything you can tell me about this: I meant to mention it to Arthur on his last day, but got kept at a meeting and missed saying goodbye to him.

Now I have to congratulate you on your new appointment.<sup>1</sup> I am really tremendously pleased about it in so far as it represents promotion for you and recognition of all your good work in Northern Rhodesia. I could wish, however, that it did not mean your departing out of my sphere of activities.

With all good wishes.

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<sup>1</sup> Williams had been appointed governor and commander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands.

## 135 CO 1015/1003

26 Oct 1956

[Despatch by Sir A Benson]: minute by W L Gorell Barnes

*Secretary of State (through Sir J. Macpherson)*

This minute refers to your minute to me of the 24th October about your conversation with Lord Llewelin, which I return herewith.

I am grateful for the invitation to lunch on November 6th and shall be very glad to do so. I should like, if I may, to suggest that, particularly as the personal position of Sir A. Benson and in a way of the Oversea Service in the area is involved, it would be very appropriate if you were to ask Sir J. Macpherson also. If you wish to have anybody else from the Department, the Assistant Secretary concerned is Mr. Morgan. I should have thought, however, that, if you invite Sir J. Macpherson and myself, it would be rather overloading things to have a third official.

It is shocking and very serious news that Lord Malvern and Sir R. Welensky should have seen Sir A. Benson's famous despatch.<sup>1</sup> The original of the despatch is at (37) on CAA. 75/2/013 and a copy of the print at (38) on that file, which I ventured to rescue from Chapel Street this morning. The decision to print it and circulate it to U.K. Ministers and officials only (and not to Ambassadors, U.K. High Commissioners, etc. overseas) was taken by yourself on advice from the Minister of State, Sir T. Lloyd and myself (minutes ending with your minute of the 14th June—flag X). You will see from his minute of the 12th June that Mr. Morgan had the foresight to suggest that this should not be done, at any rate without consultation with the C.R.O. I feel, however, that it would be impossible to take decisions about the printing of despatches for circulation to U.K. Ministers and officials if such decisions had to be taken on the assumption that those with whom H. M. G. was negotiating about the subject matter of a secret despatch would be allowed to see the contents of that despatch. Indeed, quite apart from the personal position of Sir A. Benson, it seems to me to be a very serious matter indeed that a copy of this despatch should have been seen by Lord Malvern and Sir R. Welensky, and I venture to suggest that a searching enquiry ought to be conducted as to how this happened. I believe that when such an enquiry seems necessary the normal course is to ask the Cabinet Office to conduct it; but that would need looking into.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See 124.

<sup>2</sup> There was little appetite within the CO for an enquiry and Lennox-Boyd eventually ruled against the idea (minute, 9 Dec 1956).

Another question which arises is whether or not we should tell Sir A. Benson that we understand that Lord Malvern and Sir R. Welensky have seen his despatch. If we do so, I fear that there is quite a possibility that he may resign on the grounds that this leakage in London has made his position impossible. On the other hand, if we do not, he will be at a great disadvantage *vis-à-vis* Lord Malvern and Sir R. Welensky in any future discussions, since they will know what he said in his despatch but he will not know that they know it.

I feel that you will wish to discuss this situation with Sir J. Macpherson as well as with me, and I am submitting this minute through him.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In the event, Benson was only told about the leak on 22 Jan 1957, towards the end of Lennox-Boyd's visit to NR, some three months after the CO first learned about it. Benson told Welensky that he considered the delay 'shocking', as it had denied him the chance 'of doing what I immediately would have done—come through Salisbury on my way back to Northern Rhodesia in the hope of seeing you; and that I thought the result would be that in the interests of Rhodesia and Nyasaland generally I should probably feel compelled to resign my office here' (CO 967/289, Benson to Welensky, 31 Jan. 1957). Welensky replied that he had felt 'particularly bitter' about the despatch, and suggested that his initial enthusiasm for Benson's appointment to the NR governorship had been misplaced (CO 967/289, Welensky to Benson, 4 Feb 1957).

**136** CO 1015/1008 20 & 21 Nov 1956  
 [Dominion status for Federation]: minutes by J O Moreton and W L  
 Gorell Barnes

*Mr. Gorell Barnes*

The Secretary of State expects to have the following argument put to him during his Rhodesian tour.

He expects people in Southern Rhodesia to say to him that since we were prepared to override the interests of the Northern Territories and Ashanti in the Gold Coast in order to bring about a unitary self-governing state, we should similarly be prepared to override the views of Africans in the two Northern territories of the Central African Federation and incorporate them willy nilly into a self-governing dominion of Central Africa.

The Secretary of State realises that the two cases are quite dissimilar and that there are some fairly obvious answers, but he would be grateful if the arguments could be marshalled for his use before he leaves.

J.O.M.  
20.11.56

*Mr. Morgan.*

I should be grateful if you would ask Mr. Webster to prepare a note on this in consultation with West African Department, and if the note so prepared could then be submitted through Mr. Eastwood to me.

The following preliminary comment may be of assistance.

This is obviously a possible, and indeed a likely, line of criticism and it is one with which we tried to deal when preparing the guidance telegram which was sent out when H. M. G.'s decision to grant independence to the Gold Coast next March was announced.

In Nigeria we have not only set up a federal form of government (obviously a much easier operation in a country the size of Nigeria than in one the size of the Gold

Coast), but have also said that we will not grant independence to the Federation as a whole so long as a substantial part of its population (i.e. the North) do not want it; and it is possible that, if the opposition in the Northern Territories and Ashanti to an independent unitary State had manifested itself rather earlier, the Secretary of State would have insisted as a condition for granting independence that it should be voted for by a reasonable majority of each main region of the Gold Coast as well as by a reasonable majority of the Gold Coast as a whole.

The first point to remember, however, is that those in the Northern Territories and Ashanti who have come out against the grant of independence in March on the basis of the present unitary State have made it clear from the beginning that they would welcome independence under a federal constitution, and more recently have stated that they would be content if a greater degree of regional devolution were written into a unitary constitution. At the worst, therefore, we can in the Gold Coast be said to have imposed on the majority opinion in the Northern Territories and Ashanti a specific form of unitary constitution and cannot be said to have imposed independence itself.

Furthermore, there are other very great differences in the two cases:—

(a) In the Gold Coast the differences in race, culture, development, etc. are nothing like as great as they are between the Europeans and the Africans in Central Africa.

(b) In the Gold Coast a very considerable majority of the population as a whole, voting under universal adult suffrage, had voted in favour of independence under the present constitution and quite a substantial minority of the inhabitants of the Northern Territories and Ashanti had done the same. In the Federation, however, it is doubtful whether at present a single African could be found in the Northern Territories to vote for independence for the Federal Government, let alone independence for Central Africa as a unitary State.

(c) In Central Africa definite promises have been made by H.M.G. that the Protectorate status of the Northern Territories will not be abandoned unless and until the majority of the inhabitants desire it. So far as I am aware no such promise has ever been made in the Gold Coast.

(d) I think I am right in saying that the Gold Coast has been a unitary State for some time now. In Central Africa the three territories were completely separate until they were joined together in the Federation three years ago.<sup>1</sup>

W.L.G.B.

21.11.56

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<sup>1</sup> There was nonetheless considerable disquiet in the CO, expressed especially by Lennox-Boyd and Gorell Barnes, about what they viewed as authoritarian tendencies within Nkrumah's CPP government in the Gold Coast. Richard Rathbone, ed, *Ghana*, (BDEEP: London, 1992) part II, provides documentation

**137** CO 1015/913

21 & 26 Nov 1956

[Constitutional development in Nyasaland]: minutes by J C Morgan  
and W L Gorell Barnes

*Mr. Gorell Barnes*

*Means of dealing with the political aims of the African National Congress in Nyasaland*

You have it in mind to submit these papers for the information of, and perhaps discussion with, the Secretary of State, in advance of our attempt to prepare a brief on this subject, on the basis of the papers, for his forthcoming visit to Central Africa. The leading document is now the note or memorandum by Sir Robert Armitage entitled 'The African National Congress Problem in Nyasaland', the enclosure to No. 99. It is clear that the S. of S. should have this note among his briefs, and a photostat has already been taken. With No. 99 goes No. 100, which embodies Mr. Williams's comments on the enclosure of No. 99, which are not necessarily precisely the same as those which may later be expected from Sir Arthur Benson.

2. The background to any future study of the aims and methods of the Nyasaland African Congress must be the paper, prepared by the Nyasaland LIC, the enclosure of No. 1 on ISD/N.6 attached; with that in turn goes the supplementary paper to the enclosure of No. 3 on that file, entitled 'Appreciation of the attitude of Chiefs towards the Congress and of Congress towards the Chiefs'. Both these papers are extremely detailed, and I do not suggest that the Secretary of State should necessarily read them in full, although he should be aware of their existence. They have been examined by ISD and CAA Departments, and we have found nothing in them which requires criticism.

3. It would be found convenient to read A/ of No. 100 together with the sections to which it refers in the enclosure of No. 99. It will thus be seen that there is a fair measure of agreement between the attitude of Sir R. Armitage in respect of the aims of the Nyasaland Congress, and that of Mr. Williams in respect of those of the Northern Rhodesian Congress; while at the same time there are differences of emphasis both in the aims and methods of each Congress, and in the attitudes of the two Governments. But the main object at the present stage is to have, as Sir Robert Armitage says at X/ of No. 99, 'a starting point in the discussions on the future political and constitutional policy which (he hopes) the Federal Government will institute with the Territorial Governments'—and this no doubt will be one of the most important topics for discussion during the whole of the Secretary of State's visit to the three Territories and the Federal capital.

4. It would also be useful to read with No. 99 here and its enclosure the letter from the Chief Secretary of Nyasaland to the Secretary to the Prime Minister, at No. 10 on CAA 75/2/017 attached. That letter is copied to the Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia, and to me, and defines the attitude of the Nyasaland Government to the Federal Government's proposals for the enlargement of the Federal Parliament; this too will also be a topic of discussion during the Secretary of State's visit, but we are not yet bound to define a positive attitude towards the proposals, since it is considered necessary to reach a satisfactory understanding with the Federal Government on the Federal citizenship and franchise as a preliminary to considering constitutional changes involving a fundamental alteration in the size and therefore probably the balance of the Federal Parliament. But this letter is extremely relevant in connection with the topic of the future constitutional and social development in Nyasaland, since, first, it reflects the same idea as is embodied in the conclusions in paras. XIV to XVI of No. 99E here, viz. that there should be an early declaration that each of the Territorial Governments can develop in future on their own lines within the Federation, and secondly, it is significant that the date of that letter is 23rd October and No. 99 here 24th October; it is therefore clear that the Nyasaland Government were considering these two different subjects together and as closely related, as indeed they are, with one another.

5. The leading paper, enclosure of No. 99, is a most acute and detailed analysis of the whole political situation in Nyasaland. If any criticism at all is possible, it could only be, I think, on two particular points: viz. first, the paper may slightly overrate the influence of the Congress on the Chiefs, especially if it be compared with the enclosure of No. 3 on ISD/N.6; and, second, there is a rather bland assumption in para. XV(b) that, as matters develop, the Chiefs could be 'instructed' to support the policy which Sir Robert Armitage advocates, since they might very well have their own 'Chiefly' ideas whether or not they agreed with the Government on the one hand or Congress on the other. But the particular value of this paper is that it brings out with absolute clarity that between now and 1960 H.M.G. will have to make up their mind as to the future direction of Nyasaland's constitutional development; and that further the choice will have to be between three main courses:—

(1) Leaving Nyasaland in the Federation but in a Federation becoming more and more unitary as Territorial functions get progressively taken over by the Federal Government. This is clearly the solution which the Europeans in Nyasaland would favour, and one likely to be pressed for by the Federal Government itself.

(2) Taking Nyasaland out of the Federation, and setting it up as a self-governing African 'Uganda' state. This is clearly the solution which the political Africans and the Congress support.

(3) To arrange for Nyasaland to achieve territorial self-government inside the Federation; having regard to the slight numbers of Europeans and Asians as compared with Africans in Nyasaland this would have to mean African self-government, even if the Federal Government remained predominantly under the control of the Europeans of the Federation as a whole, including Nyasaland. This is the solution which Sir Robert Armitage recommends, and it may be regarded as a kind of Capricorn compromise, since he evidently supposes that in time both the Europeans, for the sake of some economic security, and the Africans, for the sake of political and social advancement, would fall in with it.

6. The specific ground on which Sir Robert Armitage bases this opinion is, as he states in para. XIII of the paper that 'Nyasaland is not essential to the Federation but the Federation is in my opinion essential to Nyasaland'. It is note-worthy that this position differs fundamentally from that put forward by Sir G. Colby from time to time, and that which he seems to have held when he finally left the Territory, which might be put that 'Nyasaland is neither essential to the Federation nor is the Federation essential to Nyasaland'. I believe there to be strong grounds for holding that Nyasaland is in fact not essential to the Federation, since its main contribution, labour, would enter the Federation for employment whether or not there were a political link between it and Nyasaland, in the same manner as they do at present enter the Union of South Africa. The question whether the Federation is essential to Nyasaland requires a more extended analysis. The opinion is clearly based on the view that as the Federation's economy develops with the completion of Kariba and other schemes, more and more resources will become available for the essential development of Nyasaland, e.g. in the Shire scheme, which would not be available from any other source. But if it were possible to see some other source of finance and physical resources for that development, as might for example be achieved through some closer association with East Africa, the consequence would not follow that association of Nyasaland with Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia was

essential for its development. But, in any case, the fact that these three territories have already been closely associated for three years, and will presumably become more and more linked together economically, will gradually assume a greater significance, and may become a determining factor in 1960. Nevertheless, I think it worth while to recite these considerations now, since I believe that the way must be kept clear for a considerable time yet for the possible adoption of the first of the possible solutions set out above viz. removal of Nyasaland from the Federation.

7. I also think it worth pointing out that if Sir Robert Armitage's solution were to be achieved for Nyasaland, claims would very quickly be staked by certain parts of Northern Rhodesia for a similar solution. I refer particularly and obviously to the Barotseland Protectorate, which is similar in many respects; and less obviously to the Northern Province of Northern Rhodesia. If claims by these areas were granted on the basis that they ought to have no less favoured treatment than Nyasaland, the upshot would be a solution not very unlike that propounded by Mr. Van Eeden,<sup>1</sup> viz. a kind of partition of the Federation (although remaining a Federation) between 'black' and 'white' areas.

8. When these papers have been considered, we have it in mind to prepare a brief on the subject for the Secretary of State's visit. Meanwhile, there is also on CAA 23/448/02 attached a draft letter on lines which you agreed in your minute there of 15.11.56. to send to Mr. Shannon in the C.R.O., enclosing copies of the three documents to which I have been referring on this file and CAA 75/2/017 attached. That file, CAA 23/448/02, could readily be detached for the sending of that letter. I am placing copies of this minute on that file, and also on CAA 75/2/017 and ISD/N.6.

J.C.M.  
21.11.56

*P.S.* As regards Mr. Footman's letter at No. 10 on CAA 75/2/017 I have considered whether the attitude expressed there of the Nyasaland Government towards the question of the enlargement of the Federal Assembly accords with the attitude which they formerly expressed in telegraphic correspondence at the time when Lord Malvern was here in July. That telegraphic correspondence is at Nos. 10c and 10b on the file. I consider that the advice proffered by the Governor of Nyasaland at that time is not out of accord with that which he later expressed on 23rd October to the Federal Government.

*Sir J. Macpherson*  
*Secretary of State*

The enclosure to (99) is a very important paper. You and the Secretary of State will, I think, want to read it in full, together with Mr. Williams' comments at (101) and the immediately preceding minute by Mr. Morgan.

2. Whether or not the Federation is essential to Nyasaland depends on one's conception of what Nyasaland's essential needs are. As a separate State, Nyasaland could exist at some level without outside help. It would, I imagine, be at a level as high as, or higher than, the High Commission Territories, the Gambia and perhaps even Tanganyika. It would not be a very satisfactory level by modern standards and, unless Nyasaland were heavily subsidised, it would not make possible the sort of

<sup>1</sup> See 111, note 2.

social and economic conditions and standard of living generally to which a limited number of Africans now probably aspire. On the other hand, it would be the sort of level to which a majority of Africans are at present accustomed.

3. For the reason given by Mr. Morgan I agree with Sir R. Armitage that Nyasaland is not essential to the Federation—economically. Politically, however, I believe that Nyasaland *is* essential to the Federation if the concept of federation is to continue to be reasonably acceptable to the middle-of-the-road opinion in this country. If Nyasaland were to leave the Federation, what remained of the Federation—if the Federal form of Government could survive at all, which is doubtful—would be very heavily dominated by Southern Rhodesia. Further, there would be very pressing demands for Barotseland, and probably also other African areas of Northern Rhodesia, similarly to hive off; and if they did so, all that would be left would be a State consisting of Southern Rhodesia, the line of rail and the Copperbelt. This is the dream of Mr. van Eeden and other separatists; but I doubt whether it would be a solution acceptable to this country, involving as it would the siphoning off into a European-dominated State, of which Southern Rhodesia formed by far the greater part, the wealth derived from the copper mines situated in the north of Northern Rhodesia in land held under concessions obtained originally from Lewanika.

4. These reflections lead me to the conclusion that it must continue to be our main objective to keep the Federation in being and to keep Nyasaland in the Federation. The only alternative to this which would be reasonably fair to the Africans of the area would be to return to the State of affairs before Federation; but that is now hardly an economic possibility, seeing that everyone concerned is now fully committed to the Kariba scheme which ensures that from 1960 onwards the Copperbelt will be increasingly dependent for its power on facilities situated within Southern Rhodesia.

5. For my part, therefore, I am disposed to accept Sir R. Armitage's analysis, though for slightly different reasons. Broadly speaking, I agree with the whole of Sir R. Armitage's paper up to and including the first of the two sets of propositions in paragraph XIV. I also agree with Sir R. Armitage that some early steps will have to be taken to give, so to speak, a sign to make it clear to the Africans of Nyasaland that it is really proposed to pursue the policy of equality of opportunity for all races in Nyasaland, and that it will be possible for the Nyasaland Government eventually to reach self-government within the Federation. I am, however, rather doubtful about the suggestion that we should lay down, at any rate in public, a sort of time-table; and I am also doubtful about some of the specific proposals in the second set of propositions put forward in paragraph XIV of Sir R. Armitage's paper. My detailed comments on those propositions are as follows:—

(a) Here my sympathy is with Sir R. Armitage rather than with Mr. Williams. I do not pretend to know whether there is in Nyasaland now an African who could at a pinch make a worthy Member of Executive Council or even a worthy Minister in charge of a Department; and I am clearly in no position to judge when there will be one. I am pretty sure, however, that no European will in fact ever be ready to say that this or that African is fully up to the standard required, and that at some stage it will be necessary simply to take an arbitrary decision to the effect that there is to be an African Member of Executive Council or (if a Ministerial system has come

into existence by that time) an African Minister. Whether that should be done in 1957 or 1958, or much later, is clearly a matter for discussion.

(b) I am all for making a move away from communal elections. I am doubtful, however, whether it would be practicable to move right over from communal elections to a common roll for all seats at once. I should have thought that in 1960 the appropriate course would be to add to the present seats a few additional seats which might be filled by elections on a common roll.

(c) Here my sympathy is with Mr. Williams. If parity between African and non-African Unofficials or a majority of African Unofficials over non-African Officials is reached as the result of a deliberate decision by H.M.G., I am sure there will be repercussions in the Rhodesias which will seriously endanger the future of the Federation. It will in my view be very much better if the change in the balance of Unofficial representation can come about, through the operation of a common electoral roll for a certain number of seats, as a natural result of the increase in the numbers of Africans with certain qualifications.

(d) I myself would be hesitant to make promises or prognostications as far ahead as 1970.

(e) I agree with this proposition.

6. The above, and particularly paragraph 5, represents very provisional first reactions to Sir R. Armitage's paper. The Secretary of State will clearly wish to discuss these matters both with him and with Sir A. Benson during the course of his visit to Central Africa. Indeed it seems to me essential that such a discussion should take place before the Secretary of State goes to Salisbury; and for this and other reasons I shall be proposing on other papers that Sir R Armitage's visit to Lusaka should take place during our first visit to Northern Rhodesia instead of during our second visit, as proposed by Sir A. Benson—unless, of course, both can be arranged.

7. Meanwhile I should be glad to know whether higher authority has any comments on the issues discussed in this minute so that they can be taken into account in the brief on these matters which the Department will need to prepare, in consultation with the Commonwealth Relations Office.

8. I am placing copies of this minute on CAA. 23/448/02 (which I have detached in order to despatch the letter to Mr. Shannon submitted thereon by Mr. Morgan) and on ISD.N/6.

W.L.G.B.

26.11.56

**138** CO 1015/933, no 16

18 Dec 1956

[Unrest on the Copperbelt]: note by Miss B M Turnell<sup>1</sup> of a meeting with Sir P Branigan at the CO

[The results of Sir Patrick Branigan's enquiry were published as *Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Unrest in the Mining Industry in Northern Rhodesia in recent months* (Lusaka, 1956). The report itself concluded that although there was significant ANC influence within the African union, the evidence did not prove that the unrest had been the result of political agitation (Elena L Berger, *Labour, race and colonial rule: the copperbelt from 1924 to independence* (Oxford, 1974), p 154).]

<sup>1</sup> Assistant principal, CO.

Sir P. Branigan's impressions from his recent enquiry into the Copperbelt unrest were discussed. The following points may be noted:—

(i) The Commission had closely examined witnesses to find whether the motive behind the strike was political rather than industrial (para. 161 of the Report). Sir P. Branigan said that there was close liaison between the Mineworkers Union and the African National Congress and the A.N.C. welcomed the strike but there was no evidence that the A.N.C. had instigated it.

(ii) The Mineworkers Union leaders were motivated partly by personal animosity and partly by their feeling of insecurity as a Union and consequential resentment of a Staff Association. Mr. Parry<sup>2</sup> pointed out that the latter was understandable and in this country it was only when industrial unions were firmly established that they had admitted Staff Associations.

(iii) Sir P. Branigan explained that the fear of a rival association was all the deeper in the Northern Rhodesian case because of the position between Africans and Europeans. Although he had not made this point in his Report he thought himself that the root of the problem was nationalism in a racial form, African resentment going back to the original cession of their land to Europeans and exacerbated by incidents such as the difference in the price of beer as sold to Europeans and Africans and, above all, the establishment of the Federation. Like Sinn Fein in Ireland in the period 1919 to 1923 nationalism dominated all other issues. The only outlet the African had for it was the African National Congress.

(iv) Sir P. Branigan agreed that the calibre of the leaders of the Mineworkers Union was very low. Katilungu was not sufficiently powerful a personality to control the Union but he did affect its policy and more men like him were needed. Unfortunately although his faults were small ones he was unstable and not likely to last long. Asked if the trial of Nkoloma for misappropriation of Union funds was likely to involve Katilungu Sir P. Branigan replied that he had discussed this with the Attorney General just before leaving the territory and gathered that there was not even prima facie evidence against Katilungu. Mr. Parry added that it was a pity that U.K. Trade Union leaders, e.g. Sir Vincent Tewson, had to do the work for African advancement which the Mineworkers Union ought to be doing: the trade union movement in Northern Rhodesia lacked both men of high principles to direct it and the example and assistance of an African middle class.

(v) Sir P. Branigan said that the Company had aggravated matters by the rapidity of their recognition of the Staff Association, the unfortunate drafting of the circular in May about monthly pay and the tactlessness of the African Personnel Officers.

(vi) Sir P. Branigan reiterated his high impression of the Northern Rhodesian Labour Department and its officers. He explained that in para. 166 of the Report he was recommending four more officers altogether (not two more each).

(vii) Asked about negotiating machinery, Sir P. Branigan said that what was wanted were regular meetings, weekly or twice weekly, in which both sides would be represented and in which a negotiating spirit would develop. This would mitigate such legitimate grievances as the complaints about leg-guards and discs: these were first brought to the Company's attention when the Commission sat, the matter not having been brought up before even at the African Personnel Officer level.

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<sup>2</sup> See 37, note 2.

(viii) Mr. Morris said that Sir William Lawther<sup>3</sup> in discussion with Lord Lloyd had been unhappy about the idea of shop stewards; in the United Kingdom only full-time officials were encouraged to speak for Unions and shop-stewards were regarded as left-wing. Sir P. Branigan said that shop-stewards would be preferable to Union officials who had no contact with the actual work of mining. The Commission had left the idea of shop-stewards for the Companies and the Unions to work out between them. The Union had at first been against the idea but they were now willing to try it.

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<sup>3</sup> Sir William Lawther, former president of National Union of Mineworkers.

**139** DO 35/7629, no 9 19 Dec 1956  
**[Benson and the Federation]: letter from M R Metcalf<sup>1</sup> to Sir G Laithwaite**

I seem to be for ever sending you private letters containing criticism of leading personalities in the Federation, but I am sure you would soon let me know if you thought it was improper for me to write to you on these ticklish matters.

The present criticism concerns Arthur Benson. When I was discussing last week's meetings with Welensky and later with Parry they both complained bitterly about Benson's unco-operative attitude. They said that throughout the meetings he took every opportunity to score debating points and that his automatic reaction on all the items discussed was to oppose the Federal Government's suggestions. There was no complaint, of course, against his opposition on important matters of principle such as giving the vote to British Protected Persons, but Welensky objected to his unhelpful attitude on all sorts of minor points. He was surprised too that on the question of enlarging the Federal House Benson introduced fresh proposals to raise the African membership by a bigger proportion than in the case of European members although he had, I understand, agreed some months ago that the proportions should stay the same. Benson also objected to a harmless suggestion which was made as a result of the experience of the Emergency in Northern Rhodesia. This was to appoint one of the Security Officers in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as Liaison Officers with the Federal Security people. Armitage and Todd agreed at once but Benson took a lot of persuading. I am told that Armitage was far more co-operative throughout the proceedings.

From my letter to you of the 10th December you will know that Welensky is already suspicious of Benson and their contacts last week seem to have strained the relationship still further. Parry is extremely gloomy about the effect this will have on relations between the Federal and Northern Rhodesia Governments generally. He does not see how Welensky and Benson will ever be able to work together. He finds this particularly depressing after the period when Williams was in charge. He and Williams worked together with complete trust and confidence during the difficult early days of the Emergency, and he says that the atmosphere with other senior officials had been steadily improving during the past few months—even Nicholson has been more helpful!

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<sup>1</sup> UK high commissioner to the Federation, 1955–1961.

I had a long chat with Benson in his room at Government House and I found him more relaxed than before he went on leave. He is, of course, acutely suspicious of the Federal people. He sees some sinister reason behind every move they take. Some of this suspicion is no doubt justified, but I think he carries it much too far and unfortunately shows it at every turn in his dealings with them. They somewhat naturally have therefore come to think that he is working against them instead of with them.

Incidentally, I have learned from Parry now that the despatch I wrote to you about criticised Lord Malvern and not Welensky. It says a good deal for Welensky's loyalty to his late chief that he should have taken the matter so personally. I understand that Lord Malvern also saw the despatch and when on his retirement he received a gushing message from Benson he turned to Parry and said, 'You know what I shall do with this', and promptly tore the message into small pieces; I gather he did not reply to it.

I should very much like your advice on a point that arises on all this. Benson has started repeating his telegrams to the Colonial Office on the franchise question to me and I want to encourage this. But how far should I reciprocate? For example I saw his No. 103 of 17th December to the Colonial Office but I decided not to repeat my No. 430 to the C.R.O. to him, although it covered much the same ground. For one thing my telegram was in reply to No. 729 from the Secretary of State which had not been repeated to the Northern Governors. But apart from this I feel uneasy about passing on to them all that Welensky tells me. Much of what I said in my telegram would only confirm Benson's suspicions and yet there is nothing sinister in Welensky's tactics. He is playing a political game which he is entitled to do and the fact that he is so open about it with me confounds any suggestion that he is being dishonest or cunning. But as you will know my position in this odd set-up is a bit tricky and Welensky's confidence in me would be immediately shattered if he suspected that I was passing on to Benson what he tells me of his thoughts and plans. I do not, of course, let him know what I learn from Benson. It is equally important that there should be no leakage back to the Governors via the Colonial Office but I know you have a very good understanding with them about the handling of specially confidential material from this post.

I hope I am not blowing this up too much but relations between the Federal Government and the North are likely to become more and more delicate and I shall have to tread very warily if I am to keep in with all the forces that are at play. I am sure you would wish me at all costs not to prejudice my relations with the Federal Government.

**140** CO 1015/997, no 448

27 Dec 1956

[Dominion status for Federation]: letter from Sir A Benson to J C Morgan

[The Federal Heads of Government meeting in Salisbury on 13–14 Dec 1956 considered a series of proposals from the federal government for revisions to the federal constitution. These had already proved unpopular in the CO. Two aspects attracted particular criticism: the effective exclusion of British Protected Persons from the upper roll (A roll) in federal elections, and the raising of the means qualification for the B roll to a level which would lead to it being dominated by Europeans in Northern Rhodesia (CO 1015/997, minute by J C Morgan, 7 Dec 1956).]

Will you please refer to the fourth paragraph of my Secret and Personal Telegram No. 103 of the 17th of December (repeated to Armitage as No. 193 and to Metcalf in Salisbury as No. 194)? In that paragraph I hazarded a forecast of what the Federal Government would now do, suggesting in particular that it would get it bruited abroad throughout the Federation that its own most liberal proposals for dual roll franchise had met with strong opposition from the northern Governments.

During the actual meeting in Salisbury Welensky suggested that, as the dual roll proposals were to all intents and purposes dead (he said they had been working on the problem for eighteen months and now they wanted to sit back and let somebody else have a go) it would be as well if it were publicly announced what those proposals were. Garfield Todd agreed at once (I have told you before I consider him basically very honest, but basically and fundamentally incredibly naive) and neither Armitage nor I made any demur. A little stupid of me, I think, but I had not expected Welensky immediately to give a press interview himself on the whole subject. Which in fact he did, and it was reported in the papers here the day after the end of the meeting.

I now enclose an extract from the 'Rhodesia Herald' (which has the biggest circulation in the Federation) of the 17th of December. This extract is in fact its leading article.<sup>1</sup>

You will know that the 'Rhodesia Herald' is owned by the Argus Press which also owns the 'Bulwayo Chronicle' and the 'Northern News'. There are only two other papers printed entirely in English which have any circulation at all in the two Rhodesias: one of them is 'The Citizen' which is a bad type of gutter newspaper published in Southern Rhodesia periodically, of the 'down with the nigger' variety; and the other is the 'Central African Post' printed and published in Lusaka which has virtually no circulation south of Mazabuka or north of Broken Hill. That also, under the editorship of a man called Barton, is a bad newspaper which keeps its circulation up locally only because it borrows from the technique of the 'Daily Mirror' and the 'Daily Sketch'; but it is virtually the only paper in the Federation which is not controlled by the Argus Press.

The Argus Press has consistently over the last fifteen years been in the pocket of Lord Malvern, and it is now very definitely in the pocket of Welensky.

Sometime ago I made strong efforts with the actual owners of the 'Central African Post', who are Rhodesian Selection Trust, Anglo American, Imperial Tobacco Company, and the B.S.A. Company, to persuade them to bring out the Westminster Provincial Press to the Federation. My main object was to provide an alternative newspaper in Northern Rhodesia to the 'Northern News'; but those four owners also own, through a subsidiary, the 'African Eagle' (successor in Northern Rhodesia to the Government controlled 'Mutende') and we are all unhappy about the 'African Eagle'.

I got a very long way with these owners, particularly with Ellis Robins of the B.S.A. Company, and with Harry Grenfell who is related to the owner of the Westminster Provincial Press. However, on the 15th of December in Salisbury Oliver Woods told me that he had heard that the Federal Government were putting obstacles in the way of the Westminster Provincial Press; that he had been out that morning for an hour's talk with Welensky, and that Welensky had confirmed to him that the Westminster Provincial Press would not be permitted to establish itself in the Federation. I do not

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<sup>1</sup> The article, entitled 'The shadow of Whitehall' denied suggestions that SR premier, Garfield Todd, had defeated the federal government's dual roll proposals, claiming that 'those mainly responsible for this were, of course, the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.'

know, of course, precisely how Welensky achieved this definite result, but I know very well that if he said to the B.S.A. Company, to Anglo American, and to R.S.T. that he did not want the Westminster Provincial Press here then all three of them would accept his wishes.

There could not be a more clearly inspired leading article than the one I send you, nor a clearer indication of the bad faith and the crooked dealing which inspires Welensky's tactics and strategy. The fact that I have foretold it all to you in my telegram under reference and in much previous correspondence (including my 'rough' despatch of the 6th of June, 1956) does not affect the issue: an objective observer of sixteen years of age could have done precisely the same. But there has been a great reluctance, I think, both in the Colonial Office and in the Commonwealth Relations Office, to believe that these are the tactics which Welensky and his Ministers intend to pursue in order to obtain something approaching dominion status from Her Majesty's Government well before the review of the constitution takes place in 1961 or '62; and that this inevitably involves removing the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies over Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Whether this is an object which could find any place in the policies of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is not a matter for me; but it is my duty to ensure, to the best of my ability, that Her Majesty's Ministers, in their consideration of all these problems, do not suffer from any lack of any information which I can send them.

Finally, I enclose also a copy of a letter<sup>2</sup> which I have today addressed to Welensky enclosing a draft letter to the Editor of the 'Rhodesia Herald'. I have no high hopes of any concrete result from this, save that it will either put Welensky into a position where he has to acquiesce; or that it will be a further clear indication of the kind of men we are dealing with. Welensky's influence over the Argus Press is, of course, such that he could ensure either that they suppress the letter or print it in the ordinary correspondence columns with no comment. In any event the outcome will be interesting to watch.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures to Armitage, and I shall take the earliest possible opportunity to let Metcalf see a copy.

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

## **141** CO 1015/1584, no 5

11 Jan 1957

[Dominion status for Federation]: letter from Sir A Benson to J C Morgan

I enclose a copy of a saving telegram<sup>1</sup> which was sent by safe bag to Metcalf on the 8th January, as a message to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. I shall try, though the pressure of events is heavy on me, to write my comments on Metcalf's despatch No. 19 as soon as possible.

My reason for sending this immediately to the Secretary of State was that I have the impression, and have had it for many months, that opinion in the United Kingdom is that it would be a disaster of the first magnitude if the Federal Party were

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

not returned in overwhelming strength at the next Federal elections at the end of 1958 or the beginning of 1959. I do not agree. I believe that it is in any event inconceivable that the Federal Party should lose more than half of all the European elected seats in the Federal Parliament (whether the size of that Parliament remains as at present or whether it be enlarged).

What I did not put in the attached telegram, but have previously put in telegrams to the Secretary of State in London and discussed with the Secretary of State here, was what Metcalf and I appear to agree is a probability: that Welensky will not wait until the end of 1958, but will go to the country sooner. If he does so he will go on the one platform of 'Get rid of the Colonial Office'. I think he will be returned in that case with as big a proportion of the seats as he now holds. I do not think that result will represent the true opinion of the majority of those Europeans in Northern Rhodesia who have any present intention of spending more than another five or six years here. You know that 40,000 of our 66,000 European people in Northern Rhodesia are on the Copperbelt; that in seven years' time if present graphs and trends remain fairly constant, at least 35,000 of the 40,000 will have left Northern Rhodesia; and that a much greater number of new people will have come in.

If Welensky goes to the country this year or early next on the 'Get rid of the Colonial Office' platform Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will not, of course, be in the strong position which I have suggested they would be in, in other circumstances at the end of 1958, in the attached saving telegram. They would then be in the same position as they are now, with Welensky and his party claiming that the electorate had shown absolutely decisively that they must have at any rate complete and exclusive control of the two subjects mentioned in Metcalf's despatch: labour relations and internal security. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would have two courses open to them: to abide by the promises given to Africans; particularly in the northern territories at the time when Federation was introduced (which promises the Secretary of State has publicly reaffirmed here), and to continue to return a quiet but firm 'No' to the then Federal Government's demands; or to go back on the promises given and to hand over to the Federal Government the two subjects which are the basic and vital ones affecting the interests of Africans in Northern Rhodesia today.

Needless to say, as we see it here, a firm 'No' has got to be said. If the promises to Africans are not upheld, I would not forecast that there would be any immediate or long-lived revolt on the part of the African people in Northern Rhodesia: the Federal Government control the military forces and, if I were still in control of the Police, I would naturally have to order the Police to restore order, which would mean a rapid blanketing of any flame that might have flared. I should almost certainly have to declare a state of emergency for the purpose. I have every confidence that any trouble which did break out could be put down by my Police Force, assisted possibly by reinforcements as on the last occasion from Southern Rhodesia, within a matter of hours. What could not be extinguished would be the hot smouldering anger against this Government and the United Kingdom, and this would spread beyond our borders to the north. The result in the Federation must be more and more repressive measures until a situation indistinguishable from that in South Africa is achieved.

As I say, I shall try to get my comments on Metcalf's despatch to you as quickly as possible but I fear you must not expect them for at least another fortnight.

This letter goes to you in duplicate, with copies to Armitage and Metcalf.

**142 DO 35/4675****28 Feb 1957****[Ministerial responsibility for the Federation]: minute by H J B  
Lintott to Lord Home**

[On 15 Feb 1957, Welensky wrote to Home proposing the creation of a Central Africa Department in Whitehall which would oversee the affairs of the Federation as a whole. He also suggested that the civil service in the northern territories should become locally-based, as it was in Southern Rhodesia (Wood, *The Welensky papers*, pp 519–20).]

I talked to Sir Norman Brook last night about Sir R. Welensky's administrative proposals.

Sir N. Brook appreciated the force of Sir R. Welensky's arguments for a re-arrangement which would take Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland out of the direct administration of the Colonial Office. But he disliked very much the idea of a separate department, both on the grounds that it would be wasteful and inefficient and, even more, because of the precedents it might create for Singapore, Malta, Nigeria, etc., etc. He said that he would not rule out this solution in the last resort, but the political arguments would have to be very strong indeed for that, as opposed to any other, solution.

On the other hand, he thought the idea of transfer of responsibility for the whole area to the C.R.O. entirely sound. He appreciated that this would create political difficulty and that the Colonial Office tended to be regarded as the guardian of the rights of the natives, both by African opinion and by the Opposition in the House of Commons. But he thought it wrong in principle that it should be argued that one particular Department has the monopoly of exercising a responsibility which is that of H.M.G. as a whole; and he also felt that our administration of the High Commission Territories provided a valid precedent. He thought it most reasonable that you should press for this solution if you felt that it was proper and desirable to give weight to Sir R. Welensky's arguments for a change.

He was, on the other hand, more doubtful about Sir R. Welensky's other administrative proposal, namely, for the creation of civil services in the two Northern territories which were entirely locally based. He thought that this ran counter to the efforts that had been made in recent years to set up an Oversea Civil Service which should be freely mobile. I said that I thought that, as a final objective, Sir R. Welensky's proposal was reasonable, since in fact, if the Federation is ever to be independent, the component States must have their own civil services; but I thought that acceptance of this as an objective would be sufficient and that the methods and timing would have to be considered very carefully. I said also that I thought that the real problem was that of certain senior officers in the Northern territories who were not being helpful towards the development of federation.

I understand that you are seeing the Colonial Secretary to-morrow. I imagine that you will put to him the idea of transfer of responsibility to C.R.O. and that he will probably react against it. I would suggest that it might then be left that officials should examine the implications further, and also, of course, the other proposals in Sir R. Welensky's letter, and provide a paper setting out considerations and alternatives, which could perhaps be sent to the Colonial Policy Committee or the Cabinet when you return. In this official consideration, it might, I think, be quite

useful for myself and Sir John Macpherson to have a talk with Sir N. Brook, who said that he would be very ready for this if asked.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Home commented (1 Mar) on this, 'Good so far. Certainly, H.M.G. or Whitehall should be looked upon as the protector of the natives and not one Department only'.

**143** CO 1015/1584, no 84 5 Mar 1957  
**[Ministerial responsibility for the Federation]: letter from W L Gorell  
 Barnes to Sir A Benson**

I was most grateful for the prompt replies which you and Armitage sent me to the various questions I had to fire off at you at short notice about the proposals in Welensky's letter of the 15th February.<sup>1</sup>

2. You may well have wondered why there should have been so much hurry. The explanation is that Lord Home left for a visit to Australia yesterday and was most anxious to get some agreement with our Secretary of State before he left, at any rate as regards the general lines on which Welensky's proposals should be considered during his absence. In the end the two Secretaries of State, accompanied by officials, met on the morning of Friday, 1st March, and the main object of this letter is to give you some account of the upshot of their meeting.

3. The Secretaries of State first discussed the proposal for a separate Central African Department. Our Secretary of State made it clear that he could not agree to anything which would be inconsistent with the statements he made during his visit to the Federation to the effect that he had no intention of abandoning his responsibilities to the Northern Territories as Secretary of State for the Colonies until he was satisfied that the confidence at present placed in London had been transferred to Salisbury and the Northern capitals. It was agreed, however, that officials of the two Departments should explore the following three possibilities:—

(a) that there should be established a small joint Department under an official (probably an Assistant Secretary) responsible to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations for Federal and Southern Rhodesian affairs and to the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the administration of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland;

(b) that a Department should be established under a junior Minister who would similarly be responsible to both Secretaries of State, but who, with his Department, might also deal with the affairs of some other territories in special positions such as the Eastern and Western Regions of Nigeria, Singapore, and possibly others. Alternatively, the junior Minister might, in addition to being responsible to the two Secretaries of State for the joint Department, also undertake other duties on behalf of either or both of them; and

(c) that there should be established a separate Department for African Affairs under a Minister of State responsible to both Secretaries of State, as appropriate. This Department would deal not only with the Federation but also with Nigeria, the High Commission Territories, and possibly also other dependent African territories.

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<sup>1</sup> See 142.

4. On the proposal for locally-based Civil Services in the Northern Territories, the Secretary of State said that it was not in his view possible, at this stage of the development of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to contemplate introducing any system under which either existing members of the Civil Services there or new recruits to them would be forced to join a locally-based Service. He agreed, however, to arrange for the examination by the Colonial Office of a suggestion put forward by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations that new entrants to the Civil Services in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia might be given the option of joining either H.M.O.C.S. or a locally-based Service.

5. The two Secretaries of State did not think that any difficulty should arise over the subject of external affairs. It was pointed out, however, that the upshot of discussions at official level in November 1956 between Federal officials and the Commonwealth Relations Office had been an undertaking by Federal officials to draft a new delegation of authority for the C.R.O. to consider. No such draft had yet been received.

6. The two Secretaries of State agreed that it was most desirable, if at all possible, to avoid at the present time the introduction into Parliament of any legislation affecting the Federation. It was felt that, with the possible exception of the proposal to give the Federal Government the right of extra-territorial legislation, all Welensky's proposals for legislation were either objectionable or likely to defeat his own ends. In any case the introduction of any legislation concerning the Federation at the present time was likely to provide an occasion for unnecessary and harmful controversy. The two Secretaries of State accordingly agreed that officials should consider how far the objectives lying behind Welensky's proposals for legislation were unobjectionable and, in so far as they were not objectionable, how far they could be achieved otherwise than through legislation.

7. The two Secretaries of State then discussed Welensky's proposal for a declaration and agreed that at the right time a proposal might be made to Welensky to the effect that H.M.G. and the Federal Government should join together in a declaration on the following lines:—

'Article 99 of the Federal Constitution provides that not less than seven nor more than nine years from the date of the coming into force of the Federal Constitution, there shall be convened a conference consisting of delegations from the Federation, from each of the three territories and from the United Kingdom, chosen by their respective Governments, for the purpose of reviewing that Constitution.

It has been agreed that this review should begin in 1960.

During the review it will be open to any of the five Governments to raise any matters affecting the future of the Constitution, including the question whether it is possible to fix a date for attainment of full self-government within the Commonwealth or the conditions under which it might be achieved. But H.M.G. in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Federation have already made it clear that no proposal either for amalgamation or for the secession of any of the territories is contemplated.'

8. You will see that this proposed declaration is almost identical with that suggested in your telegram Secret and Personal No. 29; 'full self-government within the Commonwealth' has, however, been substituted for 'full membership of the

Commonwealth' since the latter is a matter for the existing members of the Commonwealth as a whole, and not for H.M.G. alone.

9. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations raised the question whether, as it was not going to be possible to meet some of Welensky's proposals, it might be advisable to take the initiative in suggesting that a preparatory commission to prepare the ground for the 1960 Conference might visit Central Africa in 1959. In discussion it was suggested that this might be undesirable, even from the point of view of the Federal Government. Clearly such a commission could not take decisions or do much to enable decisions to be taken more quickly in 1960 or afterwards. On the other hand, would not the result of the appointment of such a commission be that African leaders would be given an additional opportunity for propaganda against Federation and be less likely to settle down to trying to get the most they could out of Federation? Might it not be a better course for the various Governments concerned to press forward, in advance of the Conference, with their own consideration of the problems which were likely to arise at the Conference? The two Secretaries of State eventually agreed to consider this matter further at a later date.

10. Finally, there was a good deal of discussion on procedure. Our Secretary of State, who attaches great importance to getting a satisfactory franchise settlement, urged most strongly that, as Welensky was insisting on playing package deals, we must do the same—i.e. that we must not make any concessions we considered it right to make before getting the Federal Government committed to sensible franchise arrangements, and in particular to some scheme which will enable British Protected Persons to get the vote without abandoning their status as British Protected Persons. He felt that it would be very difficult to avoid making premature concessions if the negotiations were conducted by correspondence. On the other hand, both Secretaries of State felt that, if Welensky were to come here, this would create suspicion in African minds and raise undue hopes in European minds. It was accordingly decided that we should take up the suggestion that discussions might be between officials in the first instance and try to steer things so that the next move after the official discussions was a visit by Lord Home to the Federation (he is hoping to pay such a visit in May), and not a visit by Welensky to London.

11. We shall no doubt be consulting you further on some of the points mentioned in this letter during the course of the next few weeks. In the meantime this letter is for your information and that of any of your advisers to whom Macpherson eventually finds it possible to authorise you to show Welensky's letter. If, however, there are any thoughts which you or Armitage would like to put into my own mind in advance of any specific enquiries, I hope that neither of you will hesitate to let me know.

12. I am sending a copy of this letter to Armitage.

**144** DO 35/7552, no 430

18 Apr 1957

[Talks on the Federation]: outward telegram nos 70 & 154 from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Sir A Benson and Sir R Armitage

[Welensky arrived in London on 11 Apr accompanied by J M Greenfield, his minister for law, and held talks with ministers which concluded on 18 Apr. The text below gives the bulk of the communiqué issued at the end of the discussions.]

My immediately preceding telegram.

Talks with Welensky.

Following is text, omitting paragraph 1, which is simply introductory:—

2. They reviewed the progress made by the Federation since it was established in 1953. They agreed that this progress had justified the hopes of its founders and provided a sound basis for further development of the policy of partnership between races which the Federation is pursuing.

#### *External affairs*

3. The Federal Constitution provides that matters of External Affairs may, from time to time, be entrusted to the Federation. The Federal Prime Minister represented that the time had come for the Federation to assume more responsibility in this sphere, particularly in the field of relations with other countries, and the appointment of representatives of the Federation in such countries. The United Kingdom Government have agreed to entrust responsibility for external affairs to the Federal Government to the fullest extent possible consistent with the responsibility which Her Majesty's Government must continue to have in international law so long as the Federation is not a separate international entity.

#### *Direct access to the Sovereign*

4. In recognition of the constitutional position of the Federation, H.M. the Queen has been pleased to approve that in future the Prime Minister of the Federation should have direct access to the Sovereign on Federal subjects affecting the Sovereign personally, on the award of Honours for services to the Federation, and on a number of ceremonial matters.

#### *Administrative arrangements in the United Kingdom*

5. There was discussion of a proposal by the Federal Prime Minister that a separate department of the United Kingdom Government, responsible to the Secretaries of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies jointly, should handle relations both with the Federal Government and with all three Territorial Governments. United Kingdom Ministers explained that this was part of the general question of the responsibility of different Ministers for relations with the various parts of the constantly evolving Commonwealth. The whole question would have to be examined and in this examination Sir Roy Welensky's suggestion would be borne in mind.

#### *Legislation*

6. The Federal Government having represented that the Federal Legislature should have the power to legislate with extra-territorial effect, the United Kingdom Government have agreed that legislation for this purpose will be introduced into the Parliament at Westminster at a convenient opportunity.

7. The federal Prime Minister drew attention to doubts which had arisen in regard to the purpose and effect of Article 29(7) of the Federal Constitution and to the subject of legislation in the United Kingdom for the Federation. United Kingdom Ministers made it clear that the United Kingdom Government recognise the existence of a convention applicable to the present stage of the constitutional evolution of the Federation, whereby the United Kingdom Government in practice

does not initiate any legislation to amend or to repeal any Federal Act or to deal with any matter included within the competence of the Federal Legislature, except at the request of the Federal Government.

*Public Services in the Federation*

8. Public service questions were also considered. The United Kingdom Ministers said that in principle it was accepted that all Civil Services in the Federation, whether Federal or Territorial, would eventually be locally based and look for their future to the Federal area.

9. Accordingly steps would be taken to work towards this objective and in particular the question of interchangeability of officers would be examined in consultation with the four Governments of the Federation.

*Enlargement of federal assembly and the federal franchise*

10. The Federal Prime Minister informed United Kingdom Ministers of the position reached in his discussions with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in regard to the enlargement of the Federal Assembly and to the Federal franchise. United Kingdom Ministers accepted in principle proposals for the enlargement of the Federal Assembly. The Federal Prime Minister stated that he would not be able to inform Her Majesty's Government of the Federal Government's definite proposals for the franchise, or to present a Bill on this subject to the Federal Legislature, until further discussions had been held in Salisbury. Meanwhile, however, he could assure United Kingdom Ministers that a Franchise Bill would be introduced and would ensure that British Protected Persons otherwise qualified would not be required to change their status in order to be eligible for the Federal franchise, and that the qualifications for that franchise would permit of a reasonable number of such persons acquiring the franchise.

11. United Kingdom Ministers took note with satisfaction of these assurances.

*Review of the constitution*

12. The Federal Constitution provides for a review not less than seven nor more than nine years from the date when it came into force (October, 1953). In this connection the two Governments have agreed on the declaration annexed.

Following is Declaration referred to in paragraph 12:—

*Declaration*

1. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland have already made it clear and take this opportunity of reaffirming that they are opposed to any proposal either for the amalgamation into a unitary state of the Territories now composing the Federation or for the secession of any of those Territories from the Federation.

2. Article 99 of the Federal Constitution provides that not less than seven nor more than nine years from the date of the coming into force of the Constitution there shall be convened a conference consisting of delegations from the Federation, from each of the three Territories and from the United Kingdom, chosen by their respective Governments for the purpose of reviewing that Constitution. The Constitution came into force in 1953, and it is agreed that the conference shall be convened in 1960.

3. The purpose of this conference is to review the Constitution in the light of the experience gained since the inception of federation and in addition to agree on the constitutional advances which may be made. In this latter context the conference will consider a programme for the attainment of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth.

## **145** DO 35/7552, no 431B

18 Apr 1957

[Talks on the Federation]: minute by Lord Home to Mr Macmillan.

*Note* by CO and CRO officials on paragraph 3 of the declaration

The Secretary of State for the Colonies and I concluded our discussions with Sir Roy Welensky today. They proceeded on the lines agreed with you and I hope you will feel that the results, which are set out in the attached communiqué, are satisfactory.<sup>1</sup>

2. We have been successful in obtaining Sir Roy Welensky's assurances on the points to which we attached particular importance. You will find the main point we wished to secure in paragraph 10 of the communiqué. Here Sir Roy Welensky has said that he and his Government will stand by the promises he makes about the franchise in the Federation. He will have to obtain the approval of his party caucus and when he returns to Salisbury after Easter he will put the results of our talks to the meeting. On the assumption, about which he is fully confident, that they prove acceptable, he will then inform us so that we can arrange simultaneous publication of the communiqué—we hope on 27th April.

3. There is only one other point to which I should draw your attention and that is the last sentence of the Declaration on the last page. The Socialists in Parliament here might say that if they formed a government before 1960 they would set up a Constitutional Review with much more restricted objectives and terms of reference. This would be quite unrealistic and if they carried out the threat the Federation would break away from us. The Constitutional Review, if it is to proceed at all, could not conceivably do less than is expressed in the last four lines of the Declaration. I feel absolutely confident in view of the pace of change in Africa that we are on the best of ground if we have to answer an attack of this sort.

4. I do hope that Welensky can get this agreement through his Party caucus. If he can, we will be quit of the agitation for increased status for two of three years. If he cannot we shall have given nothing of substance away.

5. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Minister of State for the Colonies.

### Note with 145

The relevant passage from the preamble to the Federal Constitution reads as follows:—

'And whereas the association of the Colony (Southern Rhodesia) and territories aforesaid (Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) in a Federation

<sup>1</sup> Home's comments relate to the text of the communiqué reproduced in 144. The officials involved in drafting the attached note appear to have been H J B Lintott from the CRO and W L Gorell Barnes from the CO.

under Her Majesty's sovereignty, enjoying responsible government in accordance with this Constitution, would conduce to the security, advancement and welfare of all their inhabitants, and in particular would foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants and enable the Federation, when those inhabitants so desire, to go forward with confidence towards the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth;

Subsequent statements by U.K. Ministers about the time when federation was established made clear that H.M.G. interpreted 'inhabitants' as meaning all the inhabitants including Africans and not just the electorate; and that H.M.G. would not give up their protection of the Northern Territories until a majority of the inhabitants were ready for them to do so. On the other hand no specific pledge was given about a method for ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants and it was made clear that something of the nature of a plebiscite was not necessarily in mind.

During his recent tour of the Federation the Secretary of State for the Colonies also said on a number of occasions that he would do everything he could to encourage the Africans in the Northern Territories to look to Salisbury and their territorial capitals in the way in which they all at present look to London, but until they were able to transfer their loyalty in this way he would not abandon his responsibilities.

If, therefore, the Declaration committed H.M.G. to fixing a date for abandoning protection of the Northern Territories, it would be contrary to the pledges which have been given, since we cannot know in advance how soon African opinion will be reconciled to the withdrawal of protection. But the actual phrase used in the Declaration, so far from committing H.M.G. to fixing a date, does not even commit H.M.G. to *agreeing upon* a programme. All it commits them to do is to *consider* a programme. It can be taken as certain that the Federal Government *will* put forward a programme at the Conference, and it does not seem conceivable that H.M.G. should refuse even to consider it.

If the Opposition suggest that the Declaration goes beyond existing pledges the answer is as in the sidelined passage above.

There is a danger that if the matter is discussed in Parliament the Opposition may be led into unwise and unhelpful statements about the line they would adopt in 1960 if they were in power at that time. This was pointed out to Sir R. Welensky who nevertheless said that a declaration in these terms was essential if he was to sell the package as a whole (and particularly the admission of British Protected Persons to the franchise) to his supporters.

**146** DO 35/7552

17 June & 21 Aug 1957

[Future of the Federation]: minutes by W L Gorell Barnes and J C Morgan

*Mr. Morgan*

Well before the 1960 Conference it will be necessary for us to get our own views clear about the future of the Federation. Even when we have decided in general terms what we think should come out of the 1960 Conference, a great deal of detailed work, in which we may need professional outside help, will still be necessary before the

U.K. Brief can be written. Further, we shall have little prospect of getting our own way if we have not made up our own minds and started to lay ground bait some time in advance of the Conference.

2. I had not intended to ask that the work should start on this for a little time yet. However, I now understand that Sir R. Welensky intends to raise the question of the future of the Federation in the corridors of the forthcoming Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, if not in the Conference itself. I think, therefore, that a general note on the subject will have to be submitted at any rate to our own Secretary of State before the Conference; and my own view is that other Ministers to whom Sir R. Welensky is likely to speak should also be given some general brief on the subject.

3. The following seem to me the fundamental considerations which must govern our thought on this matter:—

(a) H.M.G. are heavily pledged by a large number of statements by Ministers—the most recent made by our Secretary of State during and after his recent visit to the Federation and by Mr. Allport in the recent debate, not to withdraw our protection from the Northern Territories until the majority of their inhabitants, including the Africans, are ready to transfer their loyalties to Salisbury and their territorial capitals.

(b) Even if this pledge had not been made, it seems to me that it is in the interests of all concerned that H.M.G. should retain ultimate control of the Northern Territories for a pretty long time to come. It is, in my view, impossible to think of an independent Nyasaland Territorial Government dominated by the handful of local Europeans. On the other hand, the Nyasaland Africans will not for many years to come themselves be ready to take control of the independent Territorial Government. If H.M.G. can remain in control of the Nyasaland Territorial Government, it will, I suggest, not be possible for them to cease maintaining sufficient control of the Northern Rhodesian Territorial Government to hold the balance between the two main races; and they have in fact been asked to do so in the Moffat Resolutions which were passed by the Northern Rhodesian Territorial Legislature with only two dissentient votes.

(c) On the other hand, by all normal criteria—wealth, size and capacity for responsible government—the Federation is well qualified for full membership of the Commonwealth and better qualified than one or two existing members.

4. In these circumstances it seems to me that our main object must be to seek a way of making it possible for the Federation to become a full member of the Commonwealth without making it necessary for H.M.G. to abandon control of the two Northern Territories.

5. As you know, the Foreign Office legal advisers have advised that it would not be a constitutional nonsense for the Federation in the shape of the Federal Government to be admitted as a full member of the Commonwealth provided that the Federal Government in their own sphere and the Southern Rhodesian Government in their territorial sphere were fully independent. The C.R.O. legal advisers are, I understand, disposed to disagree with this advice. My own view is that it is essentially a political question which could only be decided by a conscious decision of the existing members of the Commonwealth when it arose. And I submit that the policy of H.M.G. should be to work towards persuading the Federal

Government that H.M.G. must stay in the Northern Territories (my own impression is that because of the Nyasaland position they may be already beginning think that way), and on the other hand to lead the rest of the Commonwealth towards the view that it would be sensible to stretch the Commonwealth conception to admit the Federation to full membership while two of its Territorial Governments are still under H.M.G.'s control, just as it was stretched to admit India as a Republic.

6. Other points which occur to me are:—

(a) At the 1960 Conference it might be wise, while aiming at a conclusion of this kind, also to try to define the terms and conditions under which it would be reasonable to expect H.M.G. eventually to remove control from the Northern Territories. In Nyasaland this would I think certainly involve a form of constitution which, if it did not provide for universal adult suffrage, would place ultimate control in the hands of a predominantly African electorate. Per contra, it would certainly be necessary to introduce into the constitution solid safeguards for the continuation of the Federation, the rights of private property including those of freehold estate owners, and so on. These safeguards would presumably have to be secured by giving the Federal Government a veto over certain types of legislation and executive action.

(b) One of the objects which the Federal Government will certainly pursue at the 1960 Conference, if not before, is to get law and order made a Federal subject. I am disposed to take the view that so long as H.M.G. is in ultimate control of the Northern Territories she must retain responsibility for law and order. Indeed, I doubt whether it could be said that these territories were still under the protection of H.M.G. if H.M.G. were not ultimately responsible for law and order in them.

(c) If the Federal Government is to be made independent in its own sphere, it will be necessary to build in to the Federal constitution some local safeguards for African interests to take the place of those safeguards which at present depend in the last report on the vote of H.M.G. Our thoughts have hitherto been based on the assumption that this could best be done by making certain matters subject to the veto of either the African Affairs Board or two-thirds of the Members of the Federal Assembly representing African interests. It seems doubtful, however, whether in view of the terms of the Bill for the enlargement of the Federal Assembly, it will still be possible to rely on any provision of this kind. Maybe we should think in terms of something like a Second Chamber which would be entirely or reasonably representative of the population as a whole and would have certain vetoes.

7. I should be grateful if you would bear these points in mind in considering with the C.R.O. what kind of brief on this subject should be prepared for Ministers for the Commonwealth Conference.

8. I attach a spare copy of this minute in case you should wish to let the C.R.O. have it.

W.L.G.B.  
17.6.57

*Mr. Gorell Barnes*

Your series of minutes No. 4, 5 and 6; the missing piece at X/ of No. 6 was a manuscript minute in which Sir J. Macpherson authorised and required me to open up 'exploratory conversations' with the C.R.O. on the aims and objects of H.M.G. at

the 1960 Constitutional Conference, coupled with the possible necessity of Ministers having to make some pronouncement as to their 1960 intentions in connection with the now almost inevitable debate in about December on the draft Order in Council whereby Her Majesty would assent to the Federal Constitution Amendment Bill. In accordance with that authority, Miss Turnell and I therefore had a rather discursive discussion on the afternoon of Tuesday 20th August with Mr. Hunt and Mr. Kirkness in the C.R.O. and now *ad interim*, I report the outcome of this discussion.

2. The distinction which I drew in the last paragraph between real aims and objects of H.M.G. in 1960, and some attitude which Ministers might have to strike in relation to their intentions, corresponds to what may be termed the *long term* and the *short term* aspects of this exercise. I represented to Mr. Hunt, on the *short term* that we must anticipate a situation in which the scope of the Parliamentary debate on the Order in Council to approve the Constitution Amendment Bill would be almost certain to produce a situation in which Ministers would be faced with the necessity of making some declaration as to their intentions in 1960, whether or not with reference to pledges given at the time of the Federal debates in 1953; I based my argument for this on the fact that reference will have to be made by Ministers to that part of the announcement of their discussions in April with Sir R. Welensky which relates to the proposals for the enlargement of the Federal Assembly and their acceptance in principle of those proposals (as you know we are doing a separate exercise related to the definition of what Ministers meant by that acceptance in principle at that time). I therefore argued that in as much as the debate would be on the general merits of approving the Constitution Amendment Bill, and would also be taken in the light of Sir R. Welensky's public statements about the aspiration of the Federal Government towards independence as early as 1960, it would be inevitable for the whole of the April agreement, including the declaration, to come under review; and therefore Ministers would be challenged as to what they had meant when they had said that 'the Conference [would] consider a programme for the attainment of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth' at that time. Mr. Hunt agreed generally with the force of this argument but said that he hoped that the scope of debate would be restricted as much as possible by the Parliamentary rules (but I pointed out that there would also be Questions at the time, and quite possibly a parallel debate on the adjournment) and that if Ministers were pressed on this aspect of the April announcement and declaration he would hope that they would do their best to rest their case on the fact that they were pledged to do no more than *consider* a programme for the attainment etc., and that it was far too early for them to prejudge the course of the Conference, particularly in the absence of knowledge of the intentions of the various other parties concerned. I said that no doubt every effort would be made to reduce the risk to Ministers of being cornered as to their 1960 intentions, but that nevertheless they would be in a much happier position if they could make some statement which while on the one hand reiterating their pledges on the African side, would indicate on the other some reasonable hope of progress on the advancement of the status of the Federation. I therefore urged that it was important to make progress as fast as possible on the *long term* question of what H.M.G.'s attitude should be in 1960.

3. On the *long term* aspect we reached an under-standing on three points, at least to the extent of allowing further work to proceed at a pace which may allow

some kind of conclusions to emerge in time for Ministers to guide themselves by these conclusions if they have to strike some attitude in the debate on the Order in Council:—

(1) We looked again at our report of the Working Party on the Federal Constitution (No. 9/E on CAA 75/2/024) and noted that in para. 4 we had set down two essential conditions to be fulfilled before the scheme embodied in the report (the Radclyffe type two-thirds majority) could be adopted. These were that (a) the Federal Assembly must have passed a reasonably liberal franchise law and (b) that the composition of the Federal Assembly and the franchise, taken together, must be such that certain members of the Assembly can be said genuinely to represent the Africans. So far as we could judge today, and making every kind of assumption about the course of events over the Constitution Amendment Bill and the franchise, we thought that by the end of this year Ministers might reasonably hold that the condition (a) was either fulfilled or on the way to being fulfilled; but on the other hand the condition (b) would probably not be fulfilled, because the extent of the genuine representation of Africans as such is deliberately to be reduced *pari passu* with the extension of a non-racialistic form of representation in the Assembly. We shall therefore have to consider whether Ministers will not have to be asked to agree to substitute for this condition a rather different type of condition which takes account of a less racialistic form of representation in the Assembly.

We agreed that further study would have to be given to this aspect, as events developed, but that it was too early as yet to reach conclusions.

(2) We reminded ourselves of the position which had been reached on the question of the extent to which other countries, including primarily Commonwealth countries, would recognise the Federal Government as sovereign and independent if H.M.G. still retained control of the Governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland regarded territorially. We understood that the Foreign Office lawyers had, subject to a large number of reservations and very tentatively, expressed the view that other countries could recognize the Federal Government as independent and sovereign if:—

- (i) all vestiges of H.M.G.'s controls over the Government were removed; *and*
- (ii) all vestiges of H.M.G.'s control over the Southern Rhodesian Government were also removed; *but*
- (iii) if, nevertheless, H.M.G. retained some degree of control over the Governments of the two Northern Territories, e.g. by the retention of law and order in the 'Territorial' Legislative List, and having a Constitution which still maintained the ultimate authority for law and order with the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

We understood, however, that Sir R. Hone<sup>1</sup> and lawyers on our side generally were doubtful of this view, and were inclined to think that the necessary recognition could not be obtained unless H.M.G.'s ultimate control of the Northern Territories was also sacrificed. We therefore agreed that it was necessary to probe this question further, and I undertook that we shall draft here a letter to be sent to the Foreign Office on this question, although the question will actually be put by the C.R.O.

(3) We agreed that it would be advisable to begin to seek a definition of the limits

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<sup>1</sup> Assistant legal adviser, CO/CRO.

to which H.M.G. should be prepared to go at the 1960 Conference in giving up the ultimate controls *in the Northern Territories*. Mr. Hunt suggested that the direction in which H.M.G. ought to be going by that time might be to bring the Northern Territories into the pre-independence position of Southern Rhodesia, but he recognized that while this would probably mean a white or a khaki type of Government in Northern Rhodesia, it would have to mean a black Government in Nyasaland. But this conception (and we are as yet a long way from deciding to accept it) at least brings up the point as to the difference of what H.M.G. might concede to the two Southern Rhodesia type new entities in the North, regarded as 'States', and what they might concede by shifting of functions from the States (Territorial) Lists to the Federal Government. We are therefore agreed that the Colonial Office would now attempt to set out a reasoned statement of the limits of concessions to be made under the two separate heads of (1) Powers which could be given to the Northern Territories as States but *not* to the Federal Government and (2) Powers to be given or not to be given to the Federal Government.

4. The foregoing is an outline of the extent to which we were able to take the matter forward on this occasion, and it at least sets out the basis for some further work which there is time to complete before the likely date of the debate in December. I should be grateful for any further comment or guidance, but I very much doubt whether we can get it much further forward at the moment.

I am sending copies of this minute to Miss Turnell, to show to Mr. Webster on his return, to put copies on the various files (which I do not submit) and to start work on the two projects outlined in para. 3(2) and (3) above. I am also sending a copy of this minute to Mr. Hunt as a record of our discussion.

J.C.M.  
21.8.57

**147** CO 1015/1758, no 6

20 Aug 1957

[Northern Rhodesian Action Group]: letter from E D Hone to J C Morgan

[A Northern Rhodesia intelligence report for June 1957 had caused some alarm within the CO. There was particular concern at the suggestion that the Action Group of the Northern Rhodesian ANC might be contemplating the establishment of 'Hate Squads' which would 'harass the European [sic] until the British Government had no alternative but to grant African self-government' (Morgan to Hone, 9 Aug 1957).]

Your letter of the 9th August refers to a feeling of serious concern which you have about the current and threatened activities of the Congress Action Group. This concern, as you realise, is fully shared here. At the last meeting of the Central Intelligence Committee, the enclosed paper on the Action Group was considered.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The report (entitled 'Northern Rhodesia: African National Congress: The Action Group', July 1957) hardly made reassuring reading. It concluded: 'The Action Group is used by Congress as a bludgeon to persuade the African public to the Congress way of thought in opposing and discrediting Government [sic] in every possible way. It is no exaggeration to say that the Action Group is being developed into a "near" terrorist organisation, which if not checked, may well lead to conditions developing in Northern Rhodesia on much the same lines as they did in Kenya which led up to the Mau Mau emergency in that country'.

The Committee came to the conclusion that there was a need to know more about how the groups were organised, how they worked and who were members, and in consequence the paper is being circulated to Provincial and District Commissioners who have been asked to submit their comments and to provide any additional information which they can produce. I also attach a copy of the Constitution of the Action Group which is referred to in paragraph 2 of the main memorandum.

We have decided that as soon as Leighton arrives, he, the District Officer seconded to the Special Branch, and the Assistant Secretary in charge of police and security matters in the Secretariat, should be formed into a sub-committee of the Central Intelligence Committee and should meet twice a week in order to examine the latest reports on the activities of the Action Group and to recommend what counter-measures should be considered or taken by the Government. In addition it was agreed by the Central Intelligence Committee that the Special Branch paper which is enclosed should be amended every month and should be attached to each of the monthly Intelligence Reports.

We are fully alive to the possibility that this particular manifestation of Congress activity might at any time blow up into a first-class parliamentary or press row. You have suggested that we should consider letting you have a fortnightly special report by telegram on Action Group activity. As you will see from the preceding paragraph you will be receiving with each monthly Report an up-to-date appreciation on the Action Group. As regards the suggestion that we should telegraph fortnightly, I feel myself that a more flexible arrangement is desirable. What I have in mind is that we should undertake to telegraph to you immediately there is any development of interest or importance concerning the Action Group. We shall be in very close touch with such developments through the sub-committee of the Central Intelligence Committee to which I have referred. The danger of having a fortnightly report is that we might tend to forget that an important development ought to be reported to you immediately it occurs and not on the next occasion when a routine telegram is due. Alternatively it is conceivable—for these things have their ups and downs—that there might be periods when the Action Group was dormant and when there was nothing particular to report. In view of these considerations I hope you will agree that we should try out the arrangement that I have suggested, namely that you receive a full appreciation every month with the monthly Intelligence Report, and that in addition we telegraph you immediately anything of significance affecting the Action Group occurs.

In the final paragraph of your letter you have suggested that we should consider finding an occasion to bind over Sipalo,<sup>2</sup> Mwanza<sup>3</sup> and some of the other firebrands. I am giving this suggestion further thought and will consult the Attorney-General as soon as I have received an up-to-date report on these gentlemen from the Special Branch. My present feeling is that we may encounter some difficulty as we have done previously in securing the evidence necessary to enable us to bring these gentlemen before the courts. Furthermore what we here are hoping for is that Sipalo in

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<sup>2</sup> Munu Kayumbwa Sipalo had returned to Northern Rhodesia in 1957 after studying in India. He joined the ANC's executive and attempted to create a national youth movement. He was suspended from the executive by Nkumbula in September 1957, and expelled from the ANC itself three months later. In 1958, along with Kenneth Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe, he founded the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC).

<sup>3</sup> D C Mwanza, provincial president of the ANC in Lusaka.

particular will commit himself in such a way that we shall be able to take action against him which will result in his going down for a very long stretch indeed. I will write again later on this point as soon as our enquiries into and examination of your suggestion have been completed.

## 148 CO 1015/1617, no 58

2 Oct 1957

### [Northern Rhodesian constitution]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Sir A Benson

[Following talks with John Roberts, the leader of the Northern Rhodesian elected members, Benson's ideas for a new constitution had evolved along the following lines. The Legislative Council would consist of 30 members. There would be 14 'ordinary' (in effect, European) members, and eight specially elected African members. In addition there would be six official and two nominated members, the latter figure a concession to Roberts who had objected to Benson's original plan to have four nominated members. Benson originally envisaged that the Executive Council would consist of ten members: five of them officials and five unofficials.]

I have now been able to study recent correspondence about your proposals for constitutional changes in Northern Rhodesia, particularly your letters of the 8th August (to me) and of the 6th and 20th September (to Gorell Barnes). I have done so with the greatest possible interest and much admiration for the way in which you are finding your way through these difficult discussions.

You asked for early reactions and I think it will in fact be helpful to you to have some provisional views from me at this stage. But the last thing I want to do is to try to tie you down too closely at this comparatively early stage when Federal Party Members have not yet finally declared themselves on one or two points, e.g. African membership of Executive Council and the level of the special qualification, and when you have not even started discussions with the Africans. I hope therefore that you will regard what follows as provisional guidance and not as unalterable instructions.

In general, and subject to further consideration of one or two points which I will discuss later in this letter, the outline scheme described in Annex D of your letter of the 20th September appears to me in essence to be the sort of scheme which should suit the emerging circumstances of Northern Rhodesia very well. I agree with you that it is most encouraging that, after consultation with Welensky, Roberts and the other Federal Party Members should be ready to go along with a scheme of this kind. I know how much this is due to your tact and skill.

In commenting on the proposals set out in Annex D to your letter of the 20th September. I will use the headings used in that Annex. I think, however, that it will be more convenient to take them in a different order.

#### *Composition of Legislative Council*

I agree with your judgment that the figures which have now emerged are more favourable to the Africans than those in your original proposals—provided, of course, that at least one of the Nominated Members is an African. I think you were right to accept the view of the Federal Party Members that it is not necessary to have as many as 4 Nominated non-Official Members. On the other hand, it is quite essential to have one or two (as becomes clear as soon as one begins to think of Executive Council), and I am glad that the Federal Party Members now seem disposed to agree.

The only point which bothers me here is the suggestion in the latest proposals that, before nominating the two Nominated Members, you should consult with the leader of the Party returned with the greatest number of seats. As the object of nomination may, to some extent at any rate, be to give you an opportunity of correcting balances resulting from the election, is not this inappropriate? It seems to me that the best thing would be if you could be left free to consult anybody you liked. Failing that, I should have thought your original proposal to put yourself under obligation to consult various people, including the spokesman of the African Members, would be next best.

### *Constituencies*

I think it is right to have 14 ordinary constituencies, as for the Federal elections. It is not clear to me how it is proposed to find the two additional constituencies, but I doubt whether that is a question with which we here need to concern ourselves. I also think it is right not to try to relate the 8 special constituencies to anything but the circumstances of Northern Rhodesia itself. The original Federal Party ideas about the special constituencies were, of course, in some respects impracticable, notably the suggestion that the municipal areas of Livingstone and Lusaka should form one constituency. I must confess that, when I first read their proposal, I was a little attracted by the idea of dividing the African constituencies into rural and urban constituencies and so making fairly certain that both the tribal and the évolués Africans would be represented; and I think it might be easier to defend here an arrangement on these lines than it would be to defend the latest proposal under which, if I understand it aright, no African, unless he were one of the very few who will be ordinarily qualified, will be able to be a candidate unless he has the approval of the Native Authority Councils. I am sure that it is right to give the Native Authorities some influence on at any rate some seats; but it might be awkward if things were so to work out that it could be represented that all seats were being completely controlled by the Native Authorities, and that no évolué had a chance. I do not at all mean by this that I am necessarily against a constituency arrangement for the special seats on the lines now proposed. All I want to do at this stage is to put in your mind my slight worry about this one possible consequence of the idea, so that you can bear it in mind in your further thinking on this question of special constituencies which seems to have been left fairly fluid in your discussions with the Federal Party Members.

One point affecting both the composition of Legislative Council and constituencies which is not clear to me is whether or not the Federal Party Members have abandoned the proposal that, when an African wins an ordinary constituency seat, the number of special seats should be reduced by one. I imagine that at some stage an adjustment of this kind will have to be introduced into Northern Rhodesia's constitutional arrangements, for, looking to the distant future, it would be absurd to have reserved African seats at a time when African voters were in a majority in ordinary constituencies. If the Federal Party Members are not pressing this matter now, I think there is a good deal to be said for leaving it to be dealt with later. If, however, you come to the conclusion that it ought to be dealt with now, I hope you will be able to avoid the procedure laid down in the Federal Constitution Amendment Act under which, when an African wins an ordinary seat, the number of ordinary seats is increased by one as well as the number of special seats being reduced by one.

This was inevitable in Federal circumstances owing to the need to preserve the balance of representation between the three territories but would, I think, be inappropriate in Northern Rhodesia.

This is perhaps the appropriate point at which to say a word about the African Representative Council. I agree that this Council should no longer be used as an electoral college for the Northern Rhodesian Legislature. My understanding is that it is your intention to go further and abolish this Council altogether. A similar step has been taken in Nyasaland and, although the African Representative Council in Northern Rhodesia has, I believe, more prestige than the Nyasaland body ever had, I would not necessarily object to its being abolished in due course, though I would want to know before a final decision was taken what other body you would propose to name as a body representative of African interests for the purpose of the election of the specially elected Members in the Federal Assembly. Abolition of African Representative Council might, however, cause eyebrows to be raised here and I wonder whether it would be wise to announce its abolition when announcing your eventual constitutional proposals. Might it not be better to let it run on for a while, and then abolish it as a separate exercise later? I assume that, at any rate at this stage, it is not your intention to abolish the African Provincial Councils.

### *Franchise*

I agree that the ordinary qualifications should be on the level set by the Federal Government and the Southern Rhodesian Government. I am glad to see that it is now proposed that the special qualifications should be 'generally in line with Federal Government and Southern Rhodesian Government proposals'. I would find it difficult to defend special qualifications higher than those adopted by the Federal Government. I agree that the votes of ordinarily qualified voters should not be devalued in special constituencies. The proposal to devalue the votes of specially qualified voters in ordinary constituencies will no doubt give rise to some criticism, but I feel confident that it can be defended and indeed that even this partial participation of specially qualified voters in elections in ordinary constituencies is, and can be represented as, a liberal concession. Any proposal which involves refusing the franchise to people with the same qualifications as other people who have the franchise will be more difficult to defend. Much depends on the rate at which numbers of Africans having various levels of qualification are likely to increase. Subject to further consideration when fuller statistics on that are available, I think that your proposal to raise the special qualifications gradually over a period of years could be defended, provided that nobody who once got the vote would be required to give it up. I am very doubtful, however, whether the original proposal of the Federal Party Members that the special qualification should operate for one election only could be defended, at any rate if it were intended to apply to elections in the special constituencies as well as in the ordinary constituencies.

I take it that there is no intention to tinker in any similar way with the level of the ordinary qualifications—except possibly in the event of a substantial fall in the value of money. I see that the Federal Franchise Bill contains a clause providing for some adjustment from time to time after enquiry by a commission, in accordance with movements in the value of money. Is it your intention to have any provision of this kind?

I see that the proposal of the Federal Party Members for transferable votes is not

included in the latest proposals. I would have been prepared to give this proposal consideration but assume that it is not now necessary for me to do so. If it is revived, you will no doubt consult me, letting me know what you yourself think about it.

### *Executive Council*

I am inclined to think that we must insist firstly that there should be at least one person on Executive Council other than Officials who is either an African or is not mainly or wholly dependent for his seat in Legislative Council on European votes; and secondly that the ordinarily elected Members should not be in a majority on Executive Council. I would be happiest with parity between Officials, on the one hand, and the rest, on the other, but, if you recommend it strongly, would probably agree to parity between Officials and ordinarily elected Members, the Member or Members of neither of these two categories being, so to speak, odd man or odd men out; but if we had to agree to this latter arrangement, the nature of the odd man or odd men out would, of course, be that much more important.

You have rightly recalled the remark which I made to the Federal Party Members in January that I should find it hard to defend a position where, in the next Constitution, there was no African Member in Executive Council, and I shall be glad if your eventual proposals provide for an African Member. I agree with you that a single African Member who could not discuss Executive Council business with any other African would be too lonely, and I think we must probably accept that it would be premature to have two African Members at this stage. I therefore very much like your idea of having an African Member and one or two Assistant African Members who would not attend Executive Councils except when their Members were away but would receive all papers so that the single African Member could discuss Executive Council business with them without being guilty of a breach of security. I hope you will be able to secure the agreement of the Federal Party Members to an arrangement of this kind; but if you cannot, my mind is not closed to an arrangement under which the odd man out would be a Nominated Member who was not an African but was known to be sympathetic to African interests, provided that there were at least two African Assistant Members. In the last resort, I would probably be prepared to accept and defend such an arrangement, provided the settlement was in other ways entirely satisfactory.

One other small point. As you apparently may want to appoint an African Civil Servant to Executive Council, you will I think need some phrase other than 'nominated unofficials' to describe those who are not either ordinary elected members or *ex officio* members.

### *Dyarchy suggestion*

I see that in their memorandum the Federal Party Members reverted to the idea of a division between 'local subjects' and 'House of Commons subjects'. As you know, I do not consider that a division of this kind would be in any way appropriate for Northern Rhodesia, at any rate in present circumstances. If the Federal Party Members put this idea forward publicly, I am sure it will arouse African suspicions and opposition, and I greatly hope, therefore, that you will be able to keep this question out of your negotiations. Before 1960 at any rate there seems to me to be no question whatsoever of my being able to give up my ultimate responsibility for the conduct of all the affairs of the Government of Northern Rhodesia. This does not, of course, mean that

it is my desire or intention that I or the Colonial Office should interfere in the day-to-day management of Government business in Northern Rhodesia. Indeed I am, as you know, extremely anxious that the responsibility of the Northern Rhodesian Government and Legislature in local affairs should be fully recognised and understood, not least at Westminster; and I shall continue to do my best, as I am doing at present, to deal with Parliamentary Questions and other enquiries in such a manner as to make clear the very considerable extent to which I consider it appropriate to leave the conduct of local affairs to you and your Government. What it does mean is that, in the conduct of those affairs, Officials responsible through you to me must continue to hold the balance, and that I cannot negotiate with a view to the definition of some area of 'self-government' in the territorial sphere.

So much for the substance of your proposals, as they are beginning to emerge. Finally, a word about procedure. Although I realise that you are not through with Federal Party Members yet, I think you have done extremely well to have brought them along so far already. I do not imagine that you will have as easy a time with the Africans, advised as they will no doubt be by Franklin, with his passion for parity. (Is it impossible to get him to see some sense on this? Can I help—probably not but I'd gladly try). I understand and entirely agree with the method which you are intending to follow—namely to present the Africans with something a good deal less favourable to them than the scheme which you believe to be fair and to be acceptable in the last resort to Federal Party Members. You will no doubt then make what will appear to be a series of concessions to the African point of view with a view to securing agreement on the 'fair' scheme. If you succeed in that attempt, you will have secured the best possible answer—namely a scheme substantially agreed between the Government, the Federal Party and at any rate the more reasonable Africans. That would leave as local critics only Gaunt and Derby, on the one hand, and the African National Congress, on the other—an ideal position.

I imagine, however, that the odds against the Africans being sufficiently reasonable to enable you to end up in this position are fairly heavy; and that they may even refuse to budge from their demand for parity. In that event I take it that there will be no alternative to my intervening and holding a conference either here or, perhaps preferably, in Lusaka, and giving an 'award', very much as my predecessor did in 1953. If that unfortunately happened, it would be very important that I should be able to give a 'reasonable' award without appearing to come down too heavily on either side. You will no doubt have this in mind during your continuing negotiations. What it means, I think, is that, until the African position becomes clear, it would be unwise for you or the Federal Party Members to disclose how far the Federal Party Members are prepared to come to meet the Africans.

Two further points of procedure:—

- (a) I imagine that you are keeping Bob Armitage in touch with the progress of your discussions. If not, I think it would be helpful if you could do so; and I am enclosing a spare copy of this letter in case you should wish to send it to him with copies of your letters; and
- (b) Although you have reported that Roberts has been in touch with Welensky, it will be necessary for us, when your proposals are in final shape but before we are finally committed to them, to inform the Federal Government of your proposals and to give them an opportunity to comment. (There is, of course, no obligation

on us to accept any suggestions they may make). At a later stage we shall have to consider precisely how and when this should be done.

I hope you will find this letter helpful. If there is anything in it which is not clear to you or about which you are not happy, please do not hesitate to 'quiz' me.

It only remains for me to wish you the best of luck in your further discussions.

**149** PREM 11/2477

16 Oct 1957

[Constitutional Amendment Bill and franchise]: inward telegram no 439 from Lord Home to Mr Lennox-Boyd<sup>1</sup>

[During their talks in Apr 1957, British ministers had accepted in principle Welensky's proposals for an enlarged federal assembly. These proposals were given concrete form by the Constitutional Amendment Act, which the federal assembly passed on 31 July, but this was immediately declared to be a 'differentiating measure' by the African Affairs Board, chaired by Sir John Moffat. As a consequence, Royal Assent could only be given to the act by an Order in Council, a draft of which had to lie before both Houses of Parliament for 40 days. It could be debated and potentially defeated. This action also delayed the bringing into force of the Federal Electoral Bill, incorporating the federal government's franchise proposals.]

To Governor Nairobi Secret and Personal for Colonial Secretary from Commonwealth Secretary repeated Commonwealth Relations Office for Prime Minister.

I have now completed my conversations with all and sundry on the Constitution Amendment Bill and franchise proposals.

2. It has become clear that Constitution Bill cannot be held to be differentiating.

(a) It provides for a larger Federal House which retains the six specially elected Africans for which the constitution provides and it adds another and new category of Africans six in number who will be elected by the A and B rolls combined. African M.P.s are thereby increased to 12 and African influence in the Federal Parliament doubled. It is possible to argue that the new six ought to have been elected on the same basis as the old six but nowhere does the Constitution say so and there is a great deal to be said for avoiding any action which increases the purely 'racial' M.P.s

(b) It paves the way for a franchise for the enlarged house. It is true that the Federal Government's franchise proposals are (? one) method but the Bill is so drafted that it could cover other electoral methods.

3. As the African Affairs Board have linked the Constitution Amendment Bill with the particular franchise proposals it is necessary for us to consider whether the two Bills taken together are a liberal advance. As my conversations have proceeded it has become clearer and clearer that they are:—

(a) The qualified African gets a full value vote on the General Roll.

(b) The enlargement of the House is absolutely necessary for the efficient conduct of business and for better representation of the electors. It will give more Africans

<sup>1</sup> Lennox-Boyd was currently in Nairobi negotiating the terms of the new Kenyan constitution. Home, meanwhile, was conducting negotiations in Salisbury. This tel was copied to the CRO and to Macmillan.

more experience and more influence in Parliament and should there be an evening of balance between the two main parties that influence would be very (? real).

(c) British protected persons are given the vote which has never been the case before in any of the three territories.

(d) The lowering of the qualification to £120 and 2 years secondary education will bring a responsible type of African voter on to the roll which elects the new category of African M.P.<sup>2</sup>

(e) The qualification of £150 plus literacy will bring in numbers which will be large. In calculating income, allowance is made for the value of food and accommodation provided by employers. This may be worth as much as 30 shillings a week in which case a man receiving actual wages of only £72 a year would qualify. A wife, if literate, will get the vote on the strength of her husband's earnings. All this can legitimately be seen against a background of African wages which are rising steadily.

4. It is impossible to argue that there are not substantial advances on the present situation.

5. The point on which the African Affairs Board seized and which attracted the attention of our M.P.s was the preponderance of European voters when both rolls are lumped together for electing the new category of African M.P., (the new six). But I doubt if Moffat or our Parliamentarians realised the likely results. In Nyasaland it seems certain that there will be a substantial *African* majority. Armitage thinks it may be as high as two to one. In Northern Rhodesia the forecasts vary between 50–50 and 60–40 in favour of Europeans. The African influence is clearly going to be very substantial and even if there is not an African majority at this election there clearly will be one at the next. In Southern Rhodesia there will be a very large addition of Africans to the special roll. The contention then that there should not be a great preponderance of Europeans on the special roll is answered completely in Nyasaland and may be answered in Northern Rhodesia even at this election.

6. I have tried to get the Federal Cabinet to make sure of the Northern Rhodesia majority by lowering the figure of £150 to £120 but they refuse absolutely. They have come down twice and their supporters, they say, will not stand for another fall which would bring in a lot of Africans who are really not desirable and cannot (? be) said to be responsible.

7. Todd is also much against a further lowering.

8. I have pressed Federal Cabinet for a further gesture which would present the African Affairs Board with a compensating factor and allow Moffat a let-out and I have stressed the importance of not doing anything which will harden African opinion against Federation between now and 1960 but they are not willing either to go to the figure of £120 or to add a fraction of the special roll on to the general roll. They are unanimous that either concession would lose them the election and that the Dominion party would get in.

9. If we were to turn down the Constitution Amendment Bill I am quite clear that Welensky would go to the country on a platform of:—

(a) confirming that his franchise proposals are the limit for 20 years and indeed lower his sights and withdraw the vote from B.P.P.S.<sup>3</sup>

(b) 1960 Dominion status.

<sup>2</sup> Both this and (e) refer to 'Special' or B roll voters.

<sup>3</sup> Sic. Presumably British Protected Persons.

10. The hardening of race relations which would follow from that would be worse than the risk of a row over franchise now which would, I think, at worst mean a boycott of the special roll (which might happen anyway under Congress direction).

11. I think therefore that we should lay the Constitution Amendment Bill early as possible and also before debate lay a White Paper on the franchise as far as we know it before the debate in the Federal House. We would say 'this is a considerable advance. It may be it will emerge from the Federal House different. We cannot forejudge that but we can say that we recommend these proposals as a notable liberal advance. Only the next election can prove whether the balance of racial representation on the special roll is fair and that can be reviewed in the light of experience.'

12. Two difficulties must be faced:—

(a) our Parliamentary situation which I don't think will be too bad (see Alport's telegram);

(b) dealing with Moffat and the African Affairs Board. It is the first time they have used the machinery provided in the Constitution. We must turn them down as gently as possible. Even so we must anticipate a strong reaction.

13. This is very long but I wanted you to have the full picture and my conclusions as we only have a short time together at Nairobi.

## **150** BARN 3/6

30 Dec 1957

### **[Federal politics]: letter from Sir A Benson to W L Gorell Barnes**

[Both Benson's letter and the reply (see 151) are taken from the private papers of Gorell Barnes.]

There is no copy of this letter which is personal and private to you and is written at this season of good cheer and goodwill towards men to tell you that I am thoroughly depressed and more miserable than I remember being since I first started to work for H.M.G. And I have deferred writing it for more than six months.

I now write because of the Secretary of State's telegram Secret and Personal No. 170 of the 19th December.

We were none of us born yesterday and we all know both that politics is the art of the practicable and that the practicable can only be practicable if one gets one's politics right. But if one is thinking of this proposition in terms of pure Party politics; or if one is thinking of a given problem as an academic exercise only, instead of one whose result vitally affects the present and future welfare and prosperity of some millions of people, then it is liable to become a false theorem.

Two years ago you and I saw coming quite clearly situations which would not only adversely affect the lives and prosperity of those people; but would at the same time put our masters (if they did not seize time by the forelock) into an extremely awkward political situation. You sat down in my house here and you drafted a telegram which eventually went as from Gorell Barnes and Benson.

It started from that and our lack of success in persuading our masters of the course that was not only right to follow but also would have saved them subsequent severe embarrassment.

From that time on the position has deteriorated virtually every month. Things which you and I have known to be wrong—and I am using ‘wrong’ both in its moral and in its practical and in its political sense—have remorselessly followed in a chain of cause and effect. We all know precisely what was the spirit in which H.M.G. agreed to the federal Constitution; and we all know precisely what were the intentions of Her Majesty’s Ministers at that time. Not only do you and I know this but the people of this country, particularly the African people who are not very recent newcomers, also know this. The spirit was one which was difficult to express in words but if one wants to see it in words one can look at the Preamble to the Constitution.

We have now being forced through the Federal Parliament a federal electoral law which Moffat truly (but in my view most mistakenly) described as ‘evil and unholy’. You know that it is wrong and I know that it is wrong and what is more our masters know that it is wrong. But they don’t give a damn. They *choose* to accept the completely false contention (which you know to be false and I know to be false and which the people who so contend know to be false) that any measure which contained more ‘right’ in it could have no hope of getting through the Federal Parliament. They blind their eyes to the fact that this measure is being got through the Federal Parliament with the support of the very people who (Welensky keeps shouting at Home and Lennox-Boyd) would bring less liberal policies into the Federation if any more liberal measure were proposed; and against the more numerous votes of the more liberal men. Welensky has reached an accommodation with the Dominion Party (which Party may, of course, sell him down the river if they ever thought it was to their advantage to do so) not to oppose the federal electoral law because the more liberal men are going to oppose it.

One earlier telegram which I received from the Secretary of State ended with the suggestion that he hoped I would do nothing henceforth to encourage Todd in his more liberal policies to the embarrassment of Welensky. I now have a telegram which tells me that the Secretary of State feels that it would not be wise or right to suggest Tredgold as a Chairman for a possible Franchise Commission here. You know and I know and Welensky knows and Todd knows and all the people of the Federation know that Tredgold, in addition to being a man whose feet are firmly planted on the ground, is one of the most upright men which any country in the world can produce today. And the word ‘right’ is used in this telegram to me.

The second paragraph of the telegram talks about the fraction and this is a mere matter of arithmetic. I enclose a copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> (which you need not keep private and personal if you do not so wish) which does the sum for you. I shall be writing officially about paragraphs 3 and 4 and I now come on to paragraph 5. I recognise my clear duty—and I have recognised it very fully I assure you over the past miserable months—so to proceed in my attempts to govern this country as not to embarrass the Secretary of State politically. So to proceed as not to create any unnecessary difficulties for H.M.G. in the U.K. I have, with very much misgiving, closed my conscience at the time when the Resolution in favour of the Constitution Amendment Bill was taken though the territorial Legislative Council here as a necessary preliminary to its introduction into the Federal Parliament. I have made my conscience almost inactive with drugs during the past few months when it was

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

always possible for me and my official colleagues on the Executive Council here to make pronouncements on the general principles which will have to govern our franchise arrangements in this country which would have ensured that the Federal Electoral Bill never even reached the Federal Parliament. I have taken and kept as much as possible to myself the utter cynicism and complete lack of interest in the welfare either of the Federation or of Africa as a whole or of Britain's position in Africa in the future which Home displayed during his enforced stay away from his grouse moor in this country. Unfortunately Home did not only see me. He saw a number of my senior officials and about half a dozen Africans in the whole of Northern Rhodesia as well as men like Tredgold and Moffat. I have to tell you that Moffat's most impolitic and unwise outburst on the second reading of the federal electoral law was directly due to the fact that he had met Home.

I can lull my conscience to sleep in matters which are outside my jurisdiction; in which my advice may quite properly be regarded as only one bit of unwelcome advice which can if need be be ignored. But in matters which are my responsibility at any stage—they are not my final responsibility and far be it from me ever to suggest that they are; they are H.M.G.'s responsibility—there will come a time when no drug will have any effect on my conscience whatsoever.

If the future welfare of Northern Rhodesia's two million people appears to me to be being very seriously jeopardised (after I have taken into account to the best of my ability every conceivable extraneous consideration) by the mere fact that the present Government in Britain might face a difficult time in the House of Commons, then I shall have to make my position clear. I shall do so.

I hope you will believe that before writing this private and personal letter I have not only waited for nearly six months, but that I have done my best to remove from my make-up any starry-eyedness that may be in it, and for which it certainly has not been noted in the past. In the past you have been very kind on occasion, and told me that you have thought I was sometimes prompted by right ideas. Have I suddenly changed out of your recognition? Or have you? Very little which comes to me out of your department these days is recognisable as having your stamp on it. I have sent you a telegram today asking if you can possibly come out here, and to Lusaka, a few days before your conference is due to open in Ndola. I confess I was staggered to see today your letter of the 19th December to Evelyn Hone (who has been away on leave and has only just seen it himself). It had never occurred to me that you would contemplate for one moment coming out here and not coming first to Lusaka, though some time ago I wrote to Roland Hudson asking if he could not come a bit earlier, so that I would not miss him.

I think it very probable that our master, like Welensky and Home, would welcome a change here. Well, I shall be very happy to agree, but not before I have taken this franchise business a bit further—far enough to ensure that the people of this country are not sold down the river if there is the slightest thing I can do to prevent it.

If you cannot get here a bit earlier than your conference I would, if you would wish me to do so, cancel the provisional plans I have made to take a few weeks leave this year. I cannot just postpone it, because I cannot wreck Evelyn Hone's plans. Failing which, if you cannot get here, I will do my best to meet you at Ndola when you arrive.

This is private to you and I trust you to keep it so at this stage anyway.

All the very best for the New Year.

**151** BARN 3/6

6 Jan 1958

**[Federal politics]: letter (reply) from W L Gorell Barnes to Sir A Benson**

I have just received your personal and private letter of the 30th December.<sup>1</sup> This is a hard letter and has caused me much distress. But I cannot say how glad I am that you decided to write it and not to go on bottling up the feeling which it represents.

2. I am sure you have not changed, bless you. I do not think I have. But at either or both ends we may have made mistakes; and we have certainly been getting out of touch.

3. May I say in parenthesis here how glad I am that it is going to be possible after all for us to meet in Central Africa before your leave. By now you will know from a letter which I sent off a day or two ago that I am planning to arrive in Lusaka on the 5th February and that it was only because I thought you were going to be on leave before as well as after the Ndola Conference that I wrote to Evelyn Hone suggesting that I should come down to Lusaka after it.

4. Now a word about the substance of your letter. The right way to deal with it I am sure is by tiring the sun with talking and sending him down the sky whilst I am enjoying your hospitality at the beginning of February. But I am not sufficiently immune from sensitiveness to be able to withhold all comment until then. I hope, therefore, you will forgive me if in this letter I try to give you as briefly as possible some advance indication of how I feel about the issues in your letter.

5. First of all, the Federal franchise and the Constitution Amendment Bill. Of course I remember our discussions two years ago in Lusaka. The telegram you refer to is, I think, your Personal telegram No. 14 of the 27th February, 1956, which conveyed a personal message from me to the Secretary of State. That message was concerned with the question of the relationship between Federal citizenship and the Federal franchise. It put forward the proposal of a two-tier citizenship of which the second tier would not technically be Federal citizens but would have all the rights and obligations of Federal citizens except that to become a British Subject. If my memory serves me correctly, it was the Federal Government and not our Masters who rejected that particular idea. But it was in any case only put forward as one alternative to either getting the Federal Government to agree that British Protected Persons otherwise qualified should be given the franchise without having to become Federal citizens or British Subjects, or going for a straightforward two-tier citizenship scheme such as was known to be acceptable to the Federal Government. Actually, right up to the April discussions with the Federal Government I was still arguing (against opposition from the other Departments concerned and our own Legal Advisers) the case for going for an arrangement of this kind, if we failed to get Federal agreement to the other alternative. In the event, however, we did not fail in this; and I venture to suggest that, now that it is in the bag, you are discounting too easily not only its value in the Federal sphere, to which I will return later, but also the advantage which it gives you in your discussions about the Territorial Constitution.

6. At this point you will probably be saying to yourself, as you read this letter, that this concession was bought at too high a price or at an unnecessarily high price,

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<sup>1</sup> See 150.

or both; and you may be thinking of a secret and personal letter which you wrote to me on the 2nd March, 1956, in which you reported, and up to a point supported, certain fears which Edgar Unsworth expressed of what the upshot would be if we indicated any willingness to consider an amendment of the Federal Constitution. You will note, however, that at that time your view was that the price that we should have to pay for admitting British Protected Persons to the Federal franchise would be that *all* the African Members from the Northern Territories should be elected by the ordinary common roll. At that time that would have meant in Southern Rhodesia a roll including about 600 Africans and in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland a roll containing an unknown number but certainly far fewer than those who will be contained on the B roll now proposed by the Federal Government for electing only the *additional* African Members.

7. At this point I must, I think, make it quite clear that I cannot go along with you in regarding the Federal franchise scheme as 'evil and unholy', or even as necessarily 'wrong'. I think it would be better if it contained some provision to give B roll voters a small say in the election of Ordinary Members, and I am prepared to believe that the Federal Government could have got such a provision across if they had wanted to, although I am doubtful whether it would ever have been possible to persuade them to want to get across a combination of a provision of this kind with the essential element of the dual-roll scheme—namely, the giving to the votes of B roll voters their full value for the election of the additional African members and the European member from Southern Rhodesia representing African interests. I do, however, think that the Federal scheme in its present form is on the whole advantageous to Africans as compared with the present position. It is true, of course, that the admission of British Protected Persons otherwise qualified to the franchise will make eligible for A roll only about 85 Africans in Nyasaland and about 450 Africans in Northern Rhodesia. But you yourself have many times pointed out that the number will grow pretty rapidly, and indeed it is for this reason that you have always held that the permanent qualifications for the vote must be set at a high level. Moreover, this provision seems to me to have very great importance in principle, since it, so to speak, recognises the Protectorate status of the Northern Territories and will make it possible for the increasing number of Africans who will later obtain the necessary qualifications for inclusion on A roll to get a full vote however long the Northern Territories remain under the ultimate control of Her Majesty's Government.

8. I realise that, if the position of the Northern Rhodesian Africans be considered in isolation, then the admission of British Protected Persons otherwise qualified to the franchise is the only concession to set against the fact that in Northern Rhodesia (as opposed to Nyasaland where the Africans will be in a substantial majority) two of the four African Members will be elected by a common roll on which, to begin with, Africans are likely to be slightly in the minority. But I submit that in this matter of the Federal franchise it is not right to look at the position in any one territory in isolation; if we consider the effect on Africans throughout the territory as a whole, it is my feeling that this disadvantage for Africans in Northern Rhodesia is pretty fully offset by the tremendous advantage gained by Africans in Southern Rhodesia, even if one forgets for the moment altogether about the admission of British Protected Persons otherwise qualified to the franchise.

9. On balance, therefore, I myself feel that the present Federal scheme is

advantageous to Africans in the Federation as a whole as compared with the previous position. I feel bound to point out also, that it is more favourable to Africans than the so-called compromise scheme which the Federal Government originally put before the Federal Assembly, which was advocated by Armitage in his Secret and Personal telegram No. 134 of the 1st April and which, in your Secret and Personal telegram No. 42 of the 1st April, you said you had told Welensky you would accept if it was approved by H.M.G. Although you also made it clear in that telegram that you had told Welensky that you would recommend against this scheme, there was no intimation that you thought it 'evil and unholy', even though it was less satisfactory from the African point of view than the scheme which you now say is truly described in this way by Moffatt.

10. I remember well that, after the two telegrams I have referred to above had been received, there was a feeling in some quarters here that we ought to press Welensky to adopt the so-called compromise scheme; and Metcalfe afterwards reported that when Todd was handed the confidential note, he expressed relief and some surprise that we had not done so. In fact, as you know, what we did was to make it clear that we must insist on certain points—i.e. the admission of British Protected Persons otherwise qualified to the franchise, qualifications to be not higher than the Tredgold qualifications, either the electorate to elect Africans to be predominantly African or the provision in the present constitution for the election of the existing four African Members from the Northern Territories not to be changed and the Northern Territories to be left freedom of action in their own sphere—and for the rest to refuse to express a preference between the various alternatives.

11. As I have already said, I think the Federal scheme would be better if it provided for B roll to have some small say in the election of Ordinary Members (difficult though that would be to provide for without its having too drastic an effect in Nyasaland); and, for your strictly personal and confidential information, I think it is right to tell you that Lord Home has twice unsuccessfully urged on the Federal Government the desirability of liberalising their scheme a little further either in this way (which I personally would very much prefer) or by reducing still further the qualifications for B roll. Maybe we should have urged Ministers to do this in April. Maybe we should have done so if we had had more time to think for ourselves as well as digest all the material before us and if there had not been so many other things on which we considered it absolutely necessary to urge Ministers either to press or to resist Welensky. But even if we had done so and Ministers had accepted our advice, I doubt very much whether Welensky would have agreed; indeed, during the ensuing weeks it was only with great difficulty that Ministers succeeded in holding him down to the figure of £180 for the B roll income qualification and in preventing him from putting in a requirement to take an oath of loyalty to the Federation. Nor does the fact that I think the scheme would be better if modified in the way I have indicated affect my view that as it is it is on balance more advantageous to Africans than the present set-up.

12. The next point with which I should like to deal is your reference to paragraph 3 of the Secretary of State's Secret and Personal telegram No. 94 of the 13th May, 1957. Although this paragraph was not worded quite in the same way as your reference to it, I can understand your having been annoyed by it. But I think you will realise that the sort of dark thoughts to which it seems to have given rise in your mind are not really justified, if I explain the strands of thought which to the best of

my recollection, combined to influence those who were responsible for drafting it. They were roughly as follows:—

(1) I think the danger with which we were all impressed at that moment was the danger that Welensky might fail to introduce any franchise legislation and then use the transitional provisions in the constitution amendment Bill (to which we were by then pretty deeply committed) to create a crisis by advising the Governor-General to make regulations which did not provide, e.g. for British Protected Persons otherwise qualified to get the franchise.

(2) The Southern Rhodesian scheme already looked like taking something like its present form which Armitage had repeatedly told us would be disastrous for Nyasaland in that the Nyasaland B roll voters would, from the beginning, be far in excess of the upper limit. (Incidentally, I do not think that the Southern Rhodesian scheme could work in Northern Rhodesia either.) There were also rumours coming out of Salisbury about other objectionable features which might be introduced into the Southern Rhodesian scheme—one of these (the refusal of votes to men with more than one wife) was as you know very nearly adopted, Todd only being pressed off it at the last moment, I understand by Fletcher. We were therefore by no means certain that, if Welensky were persuaded by Todd to abandon the idea of a dual-roll scheme, what we should get instead would not be very much worse.

13. Finally I come to the Secretary of State's Secret and Personal telegram No. 170. This telegram was drafted in a great hurry, so that it might reach you in good time before your meeting on the 20th December; and I am inclined to think that our doubts about the fraction were expressed in rather too dogmatic fashion. In fact, as you will see from paragraphs 2 and 7 of my letter of the 3rd January, we have a pretty open mind on this subject. I would only say here that I hope you will not take either our doubts on this subject as a symptom of moral degradation, or our worries about the composition of Executive Council and the drill for choosing nominated members of Legislative Council as evidence of our intention to join the inner councils of the Africa Bureau. Like you, we want to arrive at a sensible and fair scheme. I hope you will not mind our expressing views from time to time, especially when you have asked for our reactions. I also hope that you realise how much we admire the way in which you have carried on your negotiations.

14. As regards the idea of appointing a commission with Tredgold as Chairman, I would, if I were drafting the telegram again, omit the word 'right'; I would, however, retain the word 'wise'. Of course, we all know here that Tredgold is a most honourable and upright man. But we do have a slight feeling that in this matter of the franchise he may have become unconsciously a little wedded to a type of scheme which he himself had devised and which is particularly suited to the Southern Rhodesian conditions which he was then considering; and that for this reason he may have been a little blind to the good points in the Federal franchise scheme. However that may be, there is no doubt that for those in the know he has become very much identified with a particular point of view and that for this reason alone, if for no other, his appointment as Chairman of such a Commission would, in the light of recent history, be regarded as a challenge by the leaders of the Federal Party; and we all of us here shared the view that it would not help towards the achievement of our goal in Northern Rhodesia to throw out such a challenge at the present moment. If we were wrong—and I myself am not at present persuaded that we were—then we were mistaken, not cynical.

15. Finally, there is the question of the timing of the publication of your proposals, which was referred to in the last sentence of the Secretary of State's Secret and Personal telegram No. 170. The reasons for what the Secretary of State said about this are more fully explained in paragraph 12 of my letter of the 3rd January. We do not yet know in what shape the Federal franchise Bill will emerge from the Federal Assembly or what the state of public opinion here or in the Federation about it will be when it does emerge. Whatever the situation with which Ministers are faced when it does emerge, I do not think it is unreasonable that the Secretary of State should ask to be given an opportunity to consider the timing of any announcement about your Northern Rhodesian proposals, when you are ready to make it, in the light of that situation and any other relevant considerations, including of course the position in Northern Rhodesia. On this particular point I think a clear conclusion emerges—namely that if there are any Northern Rhodesian arguments which appear to you to be of importance in settling the timing of an announcement, you should bring these out quite clearly when you are ready to propose a timing to the Secretary of State.

16. I am afraid that this has become a very long letter. If here and there in it I have expressed my views with some force, I beg you not to interpret this as meaning that I am complacent and feel that we at this end cannot possibly have made any mistake in the handling of these extremely difficult questions or that I am not very fully conscious of the difficulty of your position or of the fact that at any particular moment things may look different at one and the same time in London and in Lusaka and again in Zomba. What I do ask you to believe is that we here are still trying to the best of our ability to put such weight as our views and opinions carry in favour of solutions to the Federation's many problems which we believe to be fair to all concerned.

17. Your letter will be kept unregistered in the most private recesses of my steel press. Please treat this reply similarly—unless you prefer to burn it.

**152** DO 35/7531, no 1

14 Jan 1958

[Federation]: despatch no 1 from M R Metcalf to Lord Home on developments during 1957

I have the honour to submit a review of the major events in the Federation during the year 1957. Separate despatches have already been forwarded on the visits of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, of Your Lordship, and of the Secretary of State for the Colonies; on the death of the first Governor-General, Lord Llewellyn, and the arrival of his successor, Lord Dalhousie; on the Third Session of the Federal Assembly; and on the budgets of the four Governments. It is my purpose in this despatch to give a more general picture of the past year—the first since the retirement of Lord Malvern—in the Federation as a whole, excluding, of course, those matters of purely Territorial concern in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

*Economic*

2. The most important event was in the economic field. The price of copper continued to fall drastically throughout the year and at the end of December was

only £180 per ton as against £250 in January and £435 at the high-water mark of March 1956.

3. This fall in copper prices underlined the warning which all four governments had received in February from a powerful Fiscal Review Commission which reported that 'estimates for the current year and projected estimates for some years ahead . . . envisage an expansion of expenditure, based largely on policies already adopted, which we do not feel can possibly be sustained by revenue likely to be forthcoming'. In round figures a fall of £10 per ton in the price of copper involves a reduction of over half a million pounds in the revenue accruing to the various Governments, and although the full impact of the fall will not be felt until next year they all found themselves forced to spend less than would otherwise have been desirable, on political as well as on economic grounds, on such things as the improvement of communications and the development of health services. While the value of the main export was thus declining considerably, consumption in the Federation showed no signs of decrease. Indeed agents in Bulawayo, who handle the bulk of orders for the Copper Belt, and who might therefore be expected to be among the first to feel the effect of the drop in copper, reported in December an increase of up to 20% in orders placed, by comparison with the previous year. The effect of the decrease in export unmatched by a decline in consumption was shown in the balance of trade figures, where an adverse balance of £2.6 million was recorded in the first nine months of 1957, in contrast to a favourable balance of £29 million in 1956 and £41 million in 1955.

4. The drop in copper prices was, however, offset to a slight extent in that the other main products of the Federation did noticeably better during 1957 than in recent years. The total realised by tobacco sales was greater than in 1956, which had itself been a record, and was produced by a considerably smaller quantity of tobacco, thanks partly to an improvement in the standard of tobacco produced. Production of various minerals in Southern Rhodesia also showed progress, totalling £24.7 million in value in the twelve months ending in September against £22.7 million (itself a record) in the previous period. In particular much larger quantities of chrome were shifted from the mine sites as a result of better performance by the Rhodesian Railway system.

5. The lengthy negotiations aimed at removing the effects of the so-called Congo Basin Treaty of 1885 from parts of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, were finally concluded in March. The effect of this was to remove an artificial customs barrier which had previously stretched across the middle of the Federation, and the change was welcome particularly in Nyasaland, which now came to benefit from the preferential duties applicable to imports from other parts of the Commonwealth.

6. Of other economic affairs, the Kariba project continued to make satisfactory progress. Successive stages in the work on the main dam were concluded on time, earning substantial bonuses for the Italian contractors, although work on the excavations for the power station has fallen somewhat behind schedule owing to the difficult nature of the rock, to sickness among Italian workers during the hot weather, and a shortage of African labour. Italian economic penetration of the country became increasingly evident also in other fields. A Trade Mission visited the Federation; an Italian Chamber of Commerce was set up under the Chairmanship of the former Italian Consul-General in Salisbury; and an Italian merchant bank set up a local branch.

7. The Federal Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland began to function as the Reserve Bank of the country during the year. The authorities showed considerable confidence when they decided to maintain the existing bank rate and not to follow the United Kingdom when the bank rate in London was raised by 2 per cent. in November. This confidence has so far been justified, for the inflow of overseas investment, mainly from the U.K., has continued unabated, despite the differential in interest rates, and is officially estimated to be running at the rate of some thirty million pounds a year. This inflow has helped to support the economy against the effect of low copper prices.

8. The various Chambers of Commerce and Industry which had existed in the three Territories before Federation re-formed themselves on a nation-wide basis during the year as the Association of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Industries (A.R.N.I.) and the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (A.C.C.O.R.N.) thereby not only adjusting their organisation to the new political set-up, but also recognising the differing and sometimes incompatible interests of industry and commerce in this country.

9. In February the Southern Rhodesia Government succeeded in engaging the participation of steel firms in the United Kingdom and the local mining companies in taking over the management and financing, at a cost of £8m., the further development of the steel works at Gwelo, now known as the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company.

### *Political*

10. At long last the two Government parties in the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Parliaments (the Federal Party and the United Rhodesia Party respectively) agreed late in the year to merge into the United Federal Party. Since the opposition party, the Dominion Party, had already been organised as a single unit to fight both Federal and Territorial elections, there were obvious incentives for the other two parties to make an equally united front, but the fusion had several times been postponed. One of the basic factors underlying these difficulties was the personal lack of a sympathy between the two leaders, Sir Roy Welensky and Mr. Todd. Another equally potent factor was a deeply-held difference of view about the franchise. It was only after Southern Rhodesia had passed its Electoral Act and the terms of the Federal Government's electoral proposals had been made public that the two parties were able to agree to ignore their differences on this subject and to plan unity for the future. The first Congress of the new party will not be held until April 1958 and at, or before, that time there may well be resignations from various groups. The Chairmen of two African branches of the United Rhodesia Party have already declared that they cannot support the United Federal Party on account of the allegedly less liberal policies of Sir Roy Welensky and his followers, to whose influence they attribute certain remarks made by Mr. Todd since the fusion of the parties which the Africans consider unacceptably unsympathetic towards their race. To offset these defections, the Federal Party achieved a notable success when they persuaded Mr. Lewanika, a member of the Royal Family of Barotseland and leader of the Mines African Staff Association of Northern Rhodesia, to join the Party and to speak at the Party Congress in November in favour of the grant of dominion status to the Federation. On the other wing, the M.P. for Umtali in the Southern Rhodesia Parliament, Mr. Wightwick, who has long been very critical of Mr. Todd, has resigned

from the United Federal Party and announced his intention of sitting as an Independent. How much this will affect Mr. Todd's position is not yet apparent, but with his New Zealand upbringing and missionary background Mr. Todd does not fit easily into Southern Rhodesia politics, and if anyone chose to offer him a serious challenge he might well lose the leadership in the Colony. His great achievement (and it is an important one) is that he in Southern Rhodesia has won and retained the confidence of moderate Africans to a far greater extent than any other politician in the Federation. But amongst the electorate as a whole he has not been nearly so successful in consolidating in Southern Rhodesia the position inherited from Lord Malvern as has Sir Roy Welensky been in consolidating the position inherited in the Federal sphere; and on two occasions Members of the Southern Rhodesia Cabinet both spoke and voted in the Assembly against their Prime Minister.\*

11. The Dominion Party won the only by-election in the Federal field during the year when Mr. Winston Field, leader of the Party, beat a strong opponent in the by-election for the Mrewa constituency. If the Dominion Party had followed up this success by other victories they might well have started a wave of sympathy throughout the country but this was not the case. Through remarkable incompetence they threw away their chances in two Territorial by-elections in Northern Rhodesia, on the first occasion choosing a candidate who declared from the start that he would be absent from the country throughout the election campaign since he would be captaining a shooting team at Bisley, while on the second occasion the candidate failed to present his registration papers to the Registration Officer in time. Various intrigues within the Party led to the resignation in October of Mr. John Gaunt, M.L.C., the most colourful of the leaders in Northern Rhodesia. Despite the setbacks, some observers believe that if a Territorial General Election were held in Southern Rhodesia tomorrow the Dominion Party would win it because of the fears which Mr. Todd's fairly liberal attitude arouses amongst many Europeans.

12. The crop of new parties opposed to the Government, which had been a feature of the Huggins era, continued during the year. In January a Labour Party announced its formation in Bulawayo; to be followed in August by a Conservative Party in Northern Rhodesia whose aims were really a reflection of those of the defunct Confederate Party which had been annihilated at the last elections in Lord Malvern's time. In October a group of European liberals, including the Independent Member for Lusaka in the Federal Assembly, Dr. Scott, with some African support, formed a Constitution Party whose policies are closely linked to that of the Capricorn Africa Society.

### *Defence*

13. Following Staff talks between the R.A.F. and the R.R.A.F. in January, the Prime Minister, in his capacity as Minister of Defence, announced that the Federal Government intended to equip two squadrons with Canberra aircraft (made available by the United Kingdom on very generous terms). He announced also that a squadron of the R.R.A.F. would take its place early this year with squadrons of the R.A.F. serving in the Arabian Peninsula. The last battalion of the Federation land forces which has been serving in Malaya is due to return home shortly, and Sir Roy

\* Since this despatch was drafted, the remainder of his Cabinet have resigned, as a gesture of non-confidence in their Prime Minister.

Welensky made it plain that he now intends the R.R.A.F. to provide a continuation of that contribution to the defence needs of the Commonwealth which had already been in existence since the first volunteers from Southern Rhodesia went to Malaya at the beginning of the emergency there.

14. The land forces of the Federation were reorganised during the year, and now comprise four regular infantry battalions (African troops with European officers), an Engineer Corps, a Signal Corps, a Medical Corps, and a Services Corps (discharging the functions which in the British Army are discharged by the R.A.S.C., R.A.O.C. and R.E.M.E.) Negotiations with the War Office about the supply of equipment for the land forces continued to move slowly, but after a visit to London by the C.G.S. in July it now seems likely that details will be settled satisfactorily in due course.

### *Legislation*

15. Bills were at last produced dealing with two of the most intractable problems that have faced the Federal Government since its inception—citizenship and the franchise—though the solutions adopted fall short of the expectations of some people. It was clearly time that, four years after its inception, the Federation should pass legislation defining who were its citizens. And it was equally desirable that the General Election to be held in 1958 should be held on the basis of a single Federal law instead of, as in 1953, being held under makeshift arrangements based on the differing electoral arrangements of the three Territories.

16. It proved impracticable just to grant citizenship to anyone who 'belonged' to one of the three constituent Territories, including both British subjects, as are the majority of Southern Rhodesians, and British Protected Persons, as are the majority of Northern Rhodesians and Nyasalanders. The reason for this was that, since in U.K. law citizenship of another Commonwealth country brings automatically the status of a British Subject, British Protected Persons who became Federal citizens would thereby cease to be 'protected' and become 'subjects'. In practice such a change would not have made one iota of difference, but the change was unacceptable on political grounds because of the hostility and suspicion of African opinion. Consequently the Federal Citizenship Act as finally passed does not grant Federal citizenship to British Protected Persons. It thereby excludes from citizenship the vast majority of the country's inhabitants, though things are made very easy for a British Protected Person of either of the Northern Territories to become a Federal citizen (and consequently also a British subject by United Kingdom law) when he wishes.

16.[sic] All four Governments have, both before and during 1957, been considering modifications in the existing arrangements for electing members to their respective legislatures, though fresh proposals for the two Northern Territories have not yet been published. The problem is basically the same in each case—how to enfranchise enough Africans to satisfy the reasonable demands of emergent Africans in the Federation and of liberal opinion overseas, while ensuring that the interests of the other communities and the economic stability of the country are not jeopardised by the grant of political power to the irresponsible and backward masses of Africans. The Southern Rhodesia solution, which became law in August, is that in addition to the register of persons in the 'ordinary' category of voter, for which the financial or educational standards are now considerably higher than those in force at the General Election of 1954, there should also be a register of a 'special' category of voter, from whom much lower qualifications are required. These 'special' voters will have the

same rights as any 'ordinary' voter, but when—if ever—the total number of voters on the 'special' roll amounts to 20% of those on the 'ordinary' roll, the 'special' roll will be closed and no-one will thereafter qualify for the vote who does not meet the higher requirements of the 'ordinary' roll. There has so far been a disappointingly small number of applications for registration by Africans enfranchised under this Act. The Federal Government, faced with the additional complication that one quarter of the seats in the Federal Assembly are, under the Constitution, reserved for persons specially selected to represent African interests, followed the Southern Rhodesian Act in having a category of 'special' voter with lower qualifications than usual, but guarded against these people gaining excessive influence by providing that they should not vote for those members of the Federal Assembly who were not specially selected to represent African interests. 'Ordinary' voters are however eligible to vote for the 'special' as well as for the 'ordinary' Members of Parliament. Since almost all responsible opinion throughout the Federation unites in stressing the desirability of the principle of a 'common roll' open to persons of all races, and further in stressing that 'government must remain in responsible hands', and since both the Federal and the Southern Rhodesian schemes comply with these criteria, it is surprising that such impassioned views have been expressed about their relative merits and demerits. Nevertheless, the special African Members for the two Northern Territories, together with the two Europeans nominated from the Northern Territories to represent African interests, have protested vigorously against the Federal Government's proposals as 'differentiating' to the detriment of the Africans. The Dominion Party also opposed these proposals.

16.[sic] Under another Act, passed before the Electoral Bill was introduced, the original Constitution was amended so as to provide not only for the enlargement of the Federal Assembly (where one constituency now covers a larger area than the whole of England) but also for the progressive elimination of the special Members representing African interests as Africans came to be elected for ordinary constituencies. This proposal, coupled with the indication of the broad outlines of the Federal Government's electoral law, led the African Affairs Board to use for the first time the procedure contained in the Constitution for ensuring the maximum consideration in the United Kingdom of a Federal measure, as the Board, by a majority, declared this Bill, the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, to be a 'differentiating measure' and harmful to African interests. Her Majesty's Government upheld the view of the Federal Government that this measure did not in fact damage African interests and ought consequently to receive the Royal Assent which, after a debate at Westminster, was duly given by Her Majesty in Council on 12th December.

18. No other legislation passed by the Federal Assembly during the year calls for comment, and of Southern Rhodesian legislation that which dealt with the franchise was the most important. There were, however, in Southern Rhodesia a number of other bills passed which gave some practical recognition to the advances being made by the African population. Africans will no longer require passes to seek work except in large urban areas, while the more advanced African will be able to obtain a special identity card exempting him from all the provisions of the pass laws in the Colony. European light wines and beer may now be sold to Africans, and, pending a review of the whole question of the supply of spirits to Africans, provision has been made for African M.P.'s and professional people with university degrees to obtain hard liquor also. Another measure of greater intrinsic importance was the Native Councils Act,

which introduced new machinery for African local government in all areas except those urban areas at present administered by European local authorities: under this Act Native Councils will be able to take over progressively all the functions of local government in the areas they control.

### *African affairs*

19. In Southern Rhodesia an African National Congress was inaugurated in September. This body was severely criticised by Mr. Todd in the closing weeks of the year, possibly because of a desire to reassure the Southern Rhodesian electorate that in spite of his liberal views he could also be tough when the occasion warranted it. So far, the Congress appears to be considerably less extreme than its counterparts in the two Northern Territories, and, in particular, there has been no indication that the Southern Rhodesian body will make a serious attempt to achieve the dissolution of the Federation.

20. Conditions in Northern Rhodesia were more settled during 1957 than during 1956, and the Governor was able to claim that '1957 had been a bad year for extremists of both races'. Nevertheless, Europeans in the South continue to express anxiety about the security situation, particularly on the Copperbelt, and after the Prime Minister had visited the Copperbelt he gave directions that steps should be taken to try to bring the European Territorial Force Battalion in that part of the Territory up to strength.

21. Sir Roy Welensky visited Nyasaland in October. This was the first occasion on which a Federal Prime Minister had been in that Territory and, although his visit was boycotted at Nkata Bay by the leaders of the African National Congress there, the visit seems to have done some good. It is said that some of the Africans were impressed by his mere size! There has, however, been no diminution in the fierceness of the opposition to Federation expressed by the leaders of the Nyasaland African National Congress. African Members of the Federal Assembly and of the Territorial Legislative Council boycotted functions arranged in Nyasaland for the new Governor-General's first visit to that Territory, as a token of their continuing opposition, and the Congress demanded that the two specially-elected African Members from Nyasaland in the Federal Assembly should resign their seats for the same reason. The two M.P's, mindful no doubt of the large salary attached to their parliamentary functions, declined to comply, but this split within the Congress does not seem to have weakened the movement seriously. For his part, the Prime Minister returned from Nyasaland with increased determination to try to persuade the Africans there to accept the fact of federation. After his return to Salisbury he announced that an Office of African Affairs would be established in the Federal Government under his personal direction.

### *General*

22. There has been a marked improvement in the understanding by the general public that 'dominion status' is not just round the corner, and an equally marked contrast between the speeches of Federal Ministers on this subject at the beginning of 1957 and those made in recent months. It is now fairly well understood that there can be no advance in the constitutional status of the Federation until after the Constitutional Review of October 1960, and, further, that that Conference will 'consider a programme' and not just 'grant Dominion Status'. Indignation that

Ghana should outstrip the Federation on the road to independence has died away, and the independence of Malaya aroused relatively little interest. But I have no doubt that by the time the Conference meets in 1960 there will be very strong pressure indeed for speedy results to follow from it.

23. This increasing readiness to wait until 1960 for the next constitutional move is found also in the main opposition group, the Dominion Party, and it thus seems more likely than before that the timing of constitutional advance will not be the major issue in the General Election which has to be held in 1958. The Dominion Party are switching their emphasis away from 'Dominion Status' and are concentrating more on the 'danger of premature advancement of the Africans'. A catch-phrase is that 'dominion status might be obtainable only at too high a price', by which is meant that, if Her Majesty's Government were to demand the establishment of universal adult suffrage as a condition for the grant of full independence, the Federation should refuse the offer. The fact that both Cabinet Ministers and leading Members of the Opposition in the United Kingdom have declared, both in Britain and in this country, that they do not favour universal suffrage in the foreseeable future is easily forgotten; and the utterances of less responsible groups in the United Kingdom are given wide publicity in the Rhodesian press—probably much wider than they get in their own country. These irresponsible utterances provide the European man-in-the-street here with a convenient scapegoat and a diversion to prevent him facing up to his own continued failure to make practical contributions towards the goal of 'partnership'.

24. There is indeed distressingly little to record, at any rate in the South, by way of improvement in race relations during the year. Having declared that the economic development of the country must inevitably bring benefits to the African (which is true, so far as it goes) the European presses on with the economic development and enjoys the much larger benefits which this automatically brings to himself. Houses, flats and fourteen-storey blocks of offices, financed from private funds, rise in the European sectors of Salisbury in an apparently endless stream, while the backlog of African housing, which is becoming all the more serious as more and more Africans pour into the urban centres to find work, grows steadily worse because of lack of public funds for this essential work, and the still more vital problems of human relationships remain neglected. Much has, of course, been done to advance the African during the past year. The Southern Rhodesia five-year development plan for African education which was launched in 1956 has got well under way, and a special effort is being made to increase the number of trained African teachers. An African is to take charge this year of a 'Primary Teachers' Higher Course' near Umtali and will have European staff working under him. In the closing days of the year a substantial rise from £4.15s.6d. per month to £6.10s.0d. was promulgated in the minimum wage payable to Africans in industry in Southern Rhodesia. In the Federal field, certain categories of African and other non-European professional men have now been admitted to what was formerly the exclusively European top grade of the Federal Public Service, and serve on identical terms with Europeans in similar appointments. African workers from the Kariba Dam site travel with their wives to Salisbury and Lusaka on holiday in the same aircraft as Europeans. The multi-racial University College has made an excellent beginning in its first year, and, despite the persistently unhelpful attitude of the local press, is developing a society in which the colour of the individual's skin becomes an insignificant detail. Even the strict segregation in

its halls of residence is being broken down, since because of an unexpectedly large demand for accommodation some of the new European students will only be able to live in College if they live in the African block. An Interracial Restaurant at the Salisbury agricultural Show in September was well patronised and led to no incidents. But on the other hand racial discrimination continues in full force in Southern Rhodesia in restaurants, hotels, cinemas and clubs. Consequently, the opportunity for leading Africans to get to know and become known by their European fellow-citizens hardly exists. Various organisations and individuals are doing their best to increase the opportunities for personal contact between the Europeans and the emergent Africans, but their work hardly scratches the surface. Between the two racial groups there is still a great gulf, and abysmal ignorance of the thoughts and aspirations of the other group. With each month that passes this problem grows more urgent, and it would be well if the elected leaders in this country realised much more fully than they do that the overcoming of this problem ought to be their paramount task during the year that lies ahead.

25. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the United Kingdom High Commissioners in the other Commonwealth capitals and, on a secret and personal basis, to the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

**153** CO 1015/1620, no 104

10 Feb 1958

[Northern Rhodesian constitution]: letter from Sir A Benson to Mr Lennox-Boyd

I know that on this matter, the most important and far-reaching matter which has been on my plate during my Governorship here, you will not mind my writing direct to you and making a *cri de coeur* for help which only you personally can give: our constitutional proposals, and the discussions on them which you and your people in the Colonial Office will have with John Roberts in London in the period beginning on about the 23rd of February and ending on about the 15th of March. I shall be in London for the end of that period from the 7th of March onwards. Gorell Barnes will not arrive back in the office until about the 3rd of March.

James Morgan has all the back history up to the beginning of this letter. Broadly, Roberts and his Federal Party Members in the Legislative Council have been, and have said that they are, content with the latest proposals save on three points. He had gone through them in complete detail with Julian Greenfield (about a month ago) who pronounced them to be 'a most ingenious and good scheme'; and had, of course, before that discussed them all with Welensky. There is very good reason to believe, and considerable evidence to show, that Welensky has counselled Roberts to adopt, and will himself adopt, an attitude of extreme difficulty towards them for fear that too forthcoming an attitude might dispose me, or particularly you, to agree with the Africans that certain features of the scheme should be made more liberal. The assent to the Federal Electoral Law has accentuated this, as will Todd's defeat. In other words, we are at the horse-trading stage; and Welensky's special predilection for agreeing to nothing without a *quid pro quo* is very likely to figure largely in the picture of the next few weeks.

Roberts came to see me after a long first meeting on the subject with his Northern

Rhodesia Federal Party Executive on 7th February. This contains Beckett (fanatical in his hatred of the Colonial Office), Kemp (Mayor Broken Hill, and much under Welensky's influence), two Mitchley brothers (lawyers, one of them a youngster just qualified) and Mrs. Elvidge (a housewife who treats her African servants admirably with excellent results, and is under the impression, therefore, that there is no problem in dealing with any African so long as you are just, kind *and maternal*). As you will see—a job lot. All Federal Party M.L.Cs. are also members of the Executive.

As you will be aware Roberts and his M.L.C. colleagues had previously formally registered reservations on three points:—

- (a) the fraction to be applied in the devaluation of votes;
- (b) the proposed devaluation of ordinary votes in any circumstances; and
- (c) the proposed composition of the Executive Council.

Evelyn Hone and I had two hours with him, Dunlop, and Watmore immediately after his meeting. I need not burden you with a full account. For the purpose of this letter it will be enough to say that Roberts started by saying that in addition to those three points the Federal Party Executive had convinced him and his colleagues that there were others which presented great difficulty. Yet, this morning, Evelyn Hone and I agree that in point of fact there were no more points at all—save one which did not amount to more than a general dislike of the idea of having any nominated members at all; and another which did not come from the Federal Party Executive, and with which I need not trouble you personally in this letter because I think it is likely to work as much to advantage as to disadvantage.

At the end of our meeting Roberts was at great pains to make me understand that it would be disastrous if he showed himself to the white electorate of Northern Rhodesia (or indeed of the Federation) to be in favour of the plan at all. He must, he said, be very critical of it (to put it at its lowest). On the other hand he must be careful not to alienate sound moderate African opinion.

Roberts is eminently suggestible: Gorell Barnes roared with laughter when I reported this to him and told me that the latter part was a word-for-word repetition of what he, Gorell Barnes, had told Roberts the previous day.

Not only is Roberts eminently suggestible, but he is still very raw and inexperienced. Also he is lacking in guts. He was tired and worn out after his talks with his Executive, and I had a most amused sympathy with him because there he was, having just emerged from the first struggle with his people, in precisely the same state as I was when I had my first similar struggle with Roberts himself and his Federal Party Members of Legislative Council.

My *cri de coeur* is this: in your very kind letter to me of the 2nd of October last you said you understood and entirely agreed with the general tactics I had proposed to follow, first with the Federal Party people and subsequently with the Africans. Will you please adopt the same tactics, and start by giving Roberts the impression that you see the greatest difficulty in accepting my proposals unless they are made more favourable to the Africans in a number of ways? I would emphasise to you, with what I believe to be absolute truth; that 'my proposals' as they stand will have to be imposed firmly on the Africans, and will meet in public nothing but outright African opposition. We can ignore, though we cannot discount, the latest African Congress demand for 21 reserved seats for Africans against 14 seats for Europeans and universal adult suffrage: but we cannot ignore the almost general demand by

Africans for 'parity', by which they mean an equal number of seats for Europeans and Africans, coupled with a substantial number of seats for Officials. This is a genuine demand, and it is beyond the capacity of almost all Africans here to understand why, having regard to the comparative sizes of the African and European populations, such an arrangement cannot easily and immediately be granted.

I believe it is important that you should take the initiative with Roberts rather than let him come on immediately to a discussion with him on his 'three points'. I would very respectfully hope that you would start by referring to parity, and by taking the line that, whilst that is of course out of the question, the arrangement of 14 seats for Europeans as against only 8 for Africans would be a most difficult reduction from parity for you to accept. (Counting in the present nominated Members to represent African Interests our proposals do in fact merely give both races an additional two seats over what they have at the moment.) You would recognise fully that Africans are going, for the first time, to play a part in the election of the 14: but would point out that so, for the first time, are Europeans going to play a part in the election of the 8 Africans. And it might be suggested at this stage that, obviously, the size of the part the Africans are going to play in such elections cannot fail to have a bearing on the question of the actual distribution of seats between the races.

Would you possibly consider also placing great emphasis on the overriding necessity for you, as Secretary of State, to be able to ensure in all circumstances that in the last resort Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom can have the last word *without instructing the Governor to create a political crisis by using what would amount to reserved powers?* Which would apply, you might say, to the Legislative Council (in which we propose to reduce the number of Officials from 8 to 6); but which might apply with even greater force to the Executive Council (where we propose for the first time to put Unofficials into a majority over Officials). This count, of course, excludes the Governor, but again the point which might be made is that a Governor cannot go against the advice of a majority of his Executive Council either without a firm assurance of public opinion behind him, or upon repeated occasions, even on minor matters. I think it would be for *you* to emphasise (because I shall not be Governor then) that you have to look not only at the next elections here, but at the elections after that: and while everything would be lovely if we could guarantee the continued return of Roberts, we have to guard against the possible return of the Dominion Party. Which would lead on to the difficulties you feel about our proposals for Executive Council: the very most you could consider, if our proposals for only 4 Officials against 4 elected Unofficials are to stand, would be that the ninth Member (the African) must be appointed by the Governor in his complete discretion, and without consultation with anybody save, probably, the elected African Members.

This last question is one (the most important) of 'the three points'. Roberts will seek an Executive Council containing only 3 Officials, 4 elected Europeans, and an African to be nominated by the Governor after consultation with himself, Roberts. As regards the other two of the 'three points' I believe some concession might be made on one or possibly both of them *in due course*: but I must advise that it would be most unwise to make any concession on these until we get everything else fairly and squarely buttoned up; and until Roberts has committed himself (to you) to a course of action and speaking in public which will, in the last resort, mean that Federal

Party spokesmen do urge the white electorate to accept this scheme as a sound compromise, even though there are some details of it which fall short of what a given individual Federal Party spokesman might have desired.

If we do not secure this undertaking it will mean that a scheme of some kind will have to be imposed by you, not only on the Africans, but on the Federal Party also; with the Dominion Party once again urging all Europeans to unite and have a Boston Tea Party.

On reading through the draft of this letter I am horrified at the presumption which some of it would indicate; and which I know would have brought forth from your predecessor in office his initials at the bottom followed by 'Born 1893' in brackets! I am going to let it go and face your wrath when I see you. My excuse is that I do firmly believe that I have got Roberts and all his Federal Party Members of the Legislative Council sewn up on all essential points of this scheme; that there will be very great pressure brought to bear on him and all of them from Salisbury; and, of course, overriding most things, that in my honest belief anything less favourable to the Africans at this stage would be wrong, and would inevitably create very great racial troubles for the future. The dismay—the hatred even—would be directed more against H.M.G. in the U.K. than against the Federal Party or the 'white settlers' out here.

Because Gorell Barnes is out here I am going to take the liberty of letting him see a copy of this letter, so that—if he disagrees with me on any point—he can send something to you at once. (He is 300 miles away and I am unable to show it to him in draft before it goes).

And finally why do I ask you to do even more emphatically what I have, of course, done myself in endless discussions? Roberts says: 'The Secretary of State will attach great weight to what the Governor says.' If the Governor argues against me on the three points (or on any others) in our discussions with the Secretary of State, the Governor will be giving no credit to the showing I and my colleagues have made over the past four years in our approach to African affairs. The Secretary of State will have turned us down because the Governor recommended him to do so.

If you leave me here I have to continue to work with Roberts during the next year—election year both for us, in Southern Rhodesia, and for the Federation as a whole. If Roberts comes back from London hating my guts because he thinks that, but for me, he would have got further concessions, it will be bad for all of us here, and bad too for H.M.G.

This is the crux of my *cri de coeur*.

## **154** DO 35/7545

Mar 1958

### **'Film censorship: creation of a Federal Board': memorandum by the government of Northern Rhodesia for a federal heads of government meeting**

On the 24th November, 1956, the Southern Rhodesia Government, on learning that the Northern Rhodesia Government had made a formal approach to the Federal Government for the establishment of a Federal Board of Censorship, approached this Government with a request for a statement of the reasons for its request. The Southern Rhodesia Government said that it had been considering the suitability of

control on a Federal basis and could not see, as far as Southern Rhodesia was concerned, that there was any necessity to alter the existing arrangements which were working perfectly satisfactorily. The Southern Rhodesia Government was however prepared to give further consideration to the whole matter in the light of any difficulties which this Government might be experiencing. The Southern Rhodesia Government acknowledged that informal discussions had been taking place on a departmental level with the Federal Government regarding the possibility of the setting up of a Federal Board of Film Censorship to replace the various territorial arrangements; and that representations to this end had been made by African Films Corporation who found that the existing arrangements were anomalous as far as they were concerned and led to a great deal of administrative trouble for the Corporation.

2. A reply was sent to the Southern Rhodesia Government on the 27th May, 1957, setting out this Government's case for the establishment of a central Federal Board of Film Censorship and explaining that the position in this territory was extremely unsatisfactory in regard to film censorship. Copies of this letter were sent under demi-official cover to Mr. A.D. Evans, C.B.E.,<sup>1</sup> Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Federal Government, and to the Chief Secretary of Nyasaland.

3. On the 11th October, 1957, the Southern Rhodesia Government replied to the effect that, while they were in agreement that the establishment of common standards of film censorship between the governments concerned was a matter of urgency, they did not consider that the creation of a Federal Board of Control would necessarily be a satisfactory solution to the problem.

4. On the 10th October, 1957 [sic], Mr. A.D. Evans wrote demi-officially to say that he had been pressing directly and through the Prime Minister and Cabinet Office for the creation of a Federal Board, but that it had become apparent that the Government of Southern Rhodesia was not at present prepared to accede to the Northern Rhodesia Government's request, although this was supported by the Federal Government.

5. Negotiations are still continuing between the Federal Government and the Government of Southern Rhodesia, but so far nothing definite has emerged.

6. The views of the Government of Nyasaland on this matter are not known to the Northern Rhodesia Government. It is understood that in practice no film censorship is carried out in Nyasaland where it appears that opportunities for showing commercial films to Africans are very scarce throughout the country. Such films as are shown always come to Nyasaland from Southern Rhodesia and it is understood that the Government of Nyasaland has hitherto relied on the Southern Rhodesia censorship and has found that the system works satisfactorily from their point of view.

7. As stated in the letter of the 27th May, to the Government of Southern Rhodesia, the setting up of one Federal Board to censor films which, once passed, would be available for showing to audiences of any race, subject only to age limits, would, it is suggested, solve many current difficulties and do no harm. There is already a multi-racial cinema in Lusaka (and others can be expected to follow) which is in constant difficulty in finding good films which have been approved for showing to Africans as well as to Europeans. For some time now there has been pressure from members of the public, from members of the Legislative Council, from film distributors, from bodies such as the mining companies and from the press for action to be taken towards the unification of film censorship within the Federation, and

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<sup>1</sup> A D Evans, federal secretary for home affairs, 1953–1963.

more recently there has been some rather unfavourable publicity regarding the rigidity of the rules applied by our own African Film Censorship Board. The African population sees discrimination in our perhaps rather old-fashioned efforts to protect them from the moral harm of seeing films which, they observe, European children are allowed to see, and scenes and pictures which Africans can see in a number of magazines and papers freely displayed for sale. Forbidden fruit is always attractive and the fact that any African who can afford the money can join a cinema club and see films which are not censored for Africans makes this type of censorship a farce. Admittedly this Government can make what alterations it wishes in its film censorship arrangements to obviate these difficulties, but it is felt that there would be great advantage in having uniform film censorship all over the Federation. There would be great administrative advantages in centralising film censorship and the cost of one board would be much less than the cost of three. Indeed, if this Government is to maintain its own film censorship arrangements, it will be necessary to establish a separate cinema, apparatus and staff, since the Information Department which has been providing the necessary facilities can no longer cope with the growing number of films which are coming forward for censoring.

8. On the 1st February, 1958, the Federal Government, at the suggestion of the Southern Rhodesia Government, once more invited this Government to send representatives to purely exploratory discussions regarding the desirability of establishing a single joint Board (not a Federal Board) containing Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland representatives in its membership. This invitation has been accepted, but it remains the view of the Northern Rhodesia Government that the establishment of a Federal Film Censorship Board would be the better solution.

**155** CO 1015/2116, no 13

2 Apr 1958

[Nyasaland and the Federation]: letter from Sir R Armitage to Sir R Welensky

When I was in Salisbury recently I had a brief word with you on the subject of Nyasaland's position and prospects within the Federation. I know you are much concerned with the problem of what we can do to bring about a change in the climate of opinion before 1960. So too am I and that is my reason for writing personally to you now in the hope that a full and frank exposition of the position as we see it may be of some assistance to you and to us. What follows is the result of discussions with my official advisers at which we were fortunate enough to have George Hodgson<sup>1</sup> sitting in. He will be able to elaborate a good deal of what I now say.

As we see it there are three major hurdles to get over in respect of the attitude of the public to Nyasaland's part in the Federation: the attitude in Nyasaland, the attitude in the rest of the Federation but mainly Southern Rhodesia, and the attitude in the United Kingdom.

Here, as you know, the widest propaganda is being given to the financial and economic benefits flowing from Federation, centering on Henry Phillips's<sup>2</sup> speech at the recent meeting of the Legislative Council. Further opportunities will be taken in

<sup>1</sup> Provincial commissioner, Nyasaland.

<sup>2</sup> Development secretary, Nyasaland, seconded to federal government, 1954.

the future to extend the sphere and scope of this type of propaganda and it will doubtless have some effect both in the United Kingdom and on thinking Africans in Nyasaland.

However that may be, it is a well-known fact that the financial benefits alone have not provided the complete answer to the anti-Federation platform of the African politicians and their well-wishers in the United Kingdom. Something more on the emotional plane is needed and this, both for the African locally and for his United Kingdom audience, suggests the need for an indication of the social and political horizon to which the Nyasaland African can look.

The fact is that, despite assurances repeatedly given, the African labours under the deep suspicion that Federation is a device designed to perpetuate European domination—a suspicion which can be dispelled only by our indicating to him how he can hope to develop constitutionally in his own country. His attitude is necessarily reflected in the considerable volume of U.K. opinion which seems to support him.

So far as this is concerned, all our information is that there are a number of bodies at work in the U.K. fomenting and exploiting an intense suspicion of the Federation timed to reach its climax in 1960. Here, as in Nyasaland, there is a gap on the emotional side which needs to be bridged. I know you are fully aware of this danger from the United Kingdom, as is evident from the formation of Baxter's committee<sup>3</sup> in London. I feel however that this opposition in the U.K. cannot be effectively countered other than by some statement of the future political development of Nyasaland both territorially and within the Federation.

But anything which we as a government could say and which would at the same time acknowledge the constitutional development of the African within the federal framework would carry no weight whatsoever unless it could be endorsed by the Federal Government. Indeed, it would be better if you came in first. But what bothers me, in this general election year, is what you may feel constrained to put in your election manifesto.

From the conversations which I have had with you, I feel sure that you recognise—as we do—that *eventually* Nyasaland can only be an African organised territory within the framework of Federation. It is a statement of this nature which would do most to reassure African opinion here. Could you possibly make it? I realise your difficulties full well. I know that any such statement will have to be designed to displease the Rhodesian electorate as little as possible and to please African opinion (and incidentally U.K. public opinion too) as much as possible.

Are these two objectives necessarily incompatible? I hope not. I am inclined to think that a compromise may be possible by approaching the matter from the standpoint of the Federal Constitution, viz. recognising that territorial political advancement should be accelerated rather than impeded by Federation, the Federal Government welcomes the opportunity held out by the Constitution for territorial political advancement which would in turn ensure the training of more experienced Africans for the Federal Parliament who, as time went on, would be able and expected to take an increasing share in the administration of affairs over an area much wider than that offered by the territorial sphere.

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<sup>3</sup> The Rhodesia and Nyasaland Committee, established in 1957, which served as a pro-federal pressure group. It had as its secretary G H Baxter, the former assistant under-secretary at the CRO who had played such an important role in bringing federation to fruition.

With some Africans I am already developing an argument of this sort by indicating that territorially the sphere in which Africans could seek self-government was limited by the Federal Constitution but that nevertheless a regional autonomy, though circumscribed, would be more effective than a wider but much weaker territorial self-government.

If, on the one hand, you feel reluctant on the federal plane to come out into the open with sentiments of this nature, you may, on the other hand, remember we discussed briefly the Dominion Party's programme for retaining Nyasaland as a Protectorate. I said that it was not inconceivable that their plan might appeal to some Africans. Indeed, certain Congress members have already indicated that if they were to stand they might as well do so as Dominion Party electoral candidates! Could you not get your own oar in first?

That, in broad outline, is the trend of our thought in this matter and I have thought it right to let you know our views. The crux of the problem at the moment is that the Federation issue *is* driving a wedge between the African and the European.

I have said enough about the African. The European is now becoming alarmed in his turn and is showing it in a refusal to contemplate further African political advancement before 1961 and in the persistent clamour of certain sections of the community that non-African agriculture be federalised.

As far as this latter vexed question is concerned, I need not rehearse the pros and cons from the technical aspect, but I must tell you what I conceive to be its position as a factor in securing the position of Nyasaland in Federation. It is, in my opinion, crucial. If we agree to federalise non-African agriculture I think that we cook our own goose. Haskard<sup>4</sup> had recently toured the Central Province with the more reasonable of our African M.L.Cs. and he says, and I believe him, that the Africans feel so strongly on the subject of agriculture that to federalise non-African agriculture would quite definitely put paid to any hopes we have, or may have, for the cause of Federation, and to the idea of partnership and would confirm the Africans' worst fears for their land. Others are of the same opinion.

I cannot discount the advice of experienced officers whose job it is to know these things. What then of the Europeans who press for it? The responsibility for the decision is not theirs. It is ours, and rightly so. The matter is on the political plane. Both Europeans and Africans say they fear for the land; the European says he will get more security by federalising. Surely their security lies in the Federal settlement and *not* in one particular aspect of it? The whole is greater than the part.

I write in this vein deliberately because the Farmers' Union want the question decided at a higher level. That level must be the overall interests of Federation. I personally believe those interests are best served by seeking to obtain African acquiescence in Federation and by avoiding action which will, I fear, put paid to any hope we may have of achieving this.

What would a refusal to federalise mean now? Would it mean the loss of European support for the Federal Party in Nyasaland? I cannot believe that, as I think that M.Ps here are fully in support of Federation, although not necessarily very politically minded. You alone know the answer to this, but I very much hope that you will be

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<sup>4</sup> C D P T (Cosmo) Haskard, acting secretary for African affairs, Nyasaland, 1957–1958; secretary for labour and social development, 1961, for local government, 1962, for natural resources, 1963; governor of Falkland Islands, 1964–1970 (knighted 1965).

able to see that this matter is not raised in connection with the coming election; and if it was, it would help the cause still more if you could take our side.

I have written at length, but I must put to you frankly the position as I see it. Many of the answers of course lie with you, but, believe me, what I have said is in the sincere and single-minded wish to do all I can to support the Federation.

To sum up then, we think this. If the maintenance of the Federal scheme is to receive the blessing of whatever Government is in power in 1960 in the U.K., and if there is to be any hope of advanced status for the Federation, then we must lose no opportunity to win over African opinion. We think that it is not impossible to make headway with him provided that we do not further upset him and provided also that we can give him something to bite on in the political and constitutional sphere. We think that between us we could give him something to bite on provided that you can reconcile this with your party programme for the general election. Even if you cannot do this, and we have to wait until after the election to utter something positive, then at all costs let nothing be done in connection with the election campaign to render either impossible or worthless such a positive statement of policy thereafter. In particular let nothing be said about the federalisation of non-African agriculture up here.

What can we ourselves do to help? You have yourself been giving much thought to 1960 and to the way in which certain incompatibles will have to be married if you are to achieve the declared object of your policy. May I now suggest that if you could take us more into your confidence and share your ideas with us we, for our part, can keep secrets and we may be able to help you solve some of these difficult and delicate problems. I have in any case to consider the constitutional advancement of this Territory and I have already initiated discussions to this end. The two exercises would dovetail into each other. How does this appeal to you?

This will probably be my last letter to you before I go on leave and I send you all my best wishes for a speedy and complete recovery. Footman will be acting as Governor in my absence and is fully *au fait* with my thinking in these matters.

**156** DO 35/7532, no 1

6 May 1958

[Southern Rhodesian politics]: letter from M R Metcalf to Lord Home

A chaotic state of affairs has been caused by the defeat of Sir Edgar Whitehead in the Hillside by-election and the decision to hold an early General Election in Southern Rhodesia.<sup>1</sup>

2. For one thing fusion between the Federal and United Rhodesia Parties was not complete at the time of Whitehead's defeat and the new United Federal Party was awaiting its first Congress to approve a Constitution before it was formally launched. Now that Todd and his followers have broken away and adopted the title of the old United Rhodesia Party (U.R.P.) it is easy to imagine the confusion that reigns in local branch organisations. Where fusion had not taken place meetings of U.R.P. branches

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<sup>1</sup> In Feb 1958, Whitehead was recalled from Washington, where he was serving as minister for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to replace Garfield Todd as prime minister of SR. The Hillside by-election was an attempt to provide him with a seat in the SR legislature. He would ultimately win election for the Salisbury North constituency in the general election of June 1958.

have had to decide whether to stand fast and become Todd supporters or change themselves into United Federal Party (U.F.P.) branches. In some cases they have unanimously decided to follow Todd; in others they have unanimously gone over to the U.F.P. and in a great many there has been a split. In a number of cases where fusion had already taken place, some of the branch members have defected and formed U.R.P. branches. There must have been many heated arguments about what was to happen to the branch funds (the central U.R.P. funds have been frozen by the Treasurer) to say nothing of the arguments over personalities and policy.

3. But the more interesting aspect is the behaviour of the leaders. First, why did the U.F.P. choose Hillside for Whitehead? It may have been intended as a gesture to Bulawayo, the main rival to Salisbury. But the people of Bulawayo reacted differently. Whitehead was, as Prime Minister, at once regarded as a Salisbury man who had been thrust upon them by the U.F.P., and when it was put about that Hillside was a 'safe' seat I think many people decided to show Salisbury that they could think for themselves and could not be written off as being safe stooges. Whitehead irritated them further by threatening to try again at Umtali, his home district, if Hillside would not have him. There he would have had to fight the somewhat formidable (by Southern Rhodesia standards) Wightwick, who has recently defected to the Dominion Party and who made the most of Whitehead's gaff. Added to all this people have not forgotten that Whitehead introduced some unpopular measures when he was Finance Minister in the Southern Rhodesia Government, e.g. the tobacco tax, and he is regarded by some as being rather 'long-haired' and is alleged (inaccurately) to have studied at the London School of Economics. Also, he is not popular with the ladies because he is a batchelor [sic] and lives in rather squalid conditions on his farm and is not at all easy socially!

4. The most important point appears, however, to have been the growing feeling of resentment among U.F.P. supporters over the way in which the electorate had been completely ignored by the politicians during the January crisis. The first burst of gratitude which greeted Whitehead when he made his spectacular return from Washington and succeeded in patching over the divisions in the U.F.P. was not proof against this feeling. It also soon became clear that the division between the Todd group and the Fletcher group had gone very deep and was only thinly veiled by the solution Whitehead had found. (Incidentally, Welensky told me that Fletcher was only persuaded to stand down by a promise from Whitehead that he would strongly recommend to Welensky that he (Fletcher) should succeed him at Washington. Welensky said he could not consider him for this post but he was not going to tell Fletcher so until after the Hillside election!)

6. There is still a suspicion in the minds of many people that Welensky has taken a hand in the process of squeezing out Todd as it is well known that he has no love for Todd. It is, in fact, now being said that this was one of the main purposes of the fusion of the two parties, although at the time it seemed that it was Todd who was pressing for fusion against the reluctance of some at least of the Federal Party leaders and notably Lord Malvern. At the time of the January crisis Welensky refused to declare publicly where his sympathies lay. Of course, he had the excuse that he should not interfere in Territorial politics but this, after fusion, was not altogether valid. If, in fact, the first U.F.P. Congress had been held while Todd was still Prime Minister and leader of the Southern Rhodesia division of the U.F.P. he would no doubt have been elected Vice President and one would have then definitely expected the President (Sir Roy) to support him.

7. Since the present crisis, apart from describing Todd as a 'leftist', welcoming a three-party system, and announcing that he believes in a 'tough but moderate' policy, Welensky has made no reference to the political situation in Southern Rhodesia. Instead, he has launched out in his first three speeches since his illness in attacks on:—

- (a) Russian penetration in Africa;
- (b) the African National Congress, and
- (c) the Labour Party in Britain.

This has puzzled many thinking people and nobody seems to be quite sure what his motives are. It seems as if he is simply playing the old game of trying to sidestep the immediate political issues and divert attention by beating unpopular dogs. Because of his aloofness from the domestic battle he has had to refute a rumour that he is not behind Whitehead. He has said that he intends to demonstrate during the course of the election campaign that he is in fact 100% behind Whitehead and I see to-day that he is to appear on the same platform with Whitehead later this week.

8. First because of his holiday, then his illness and finally the present crisis I have seen very little of Welensky since I got back. I believe his health is still a cause for anxiety. He was to have taken a week's holiday before he returned to the office but cancelled this when Whitehead was defeated and seems to be almost in full harness again. But so far there is no sign of real leadership and I am beginning to wonder whether he will be able to rise to the occasion when the much more important Federal election takes place.

9. Whitehead has made little impression on the public and following his defeat in Bulawayo seems to have lost a good deal of ground personally. His first speeches in this General Election have been disappointing. At one moment Todd and his followers have been described as 'leftists' and at the next Whitehead has emphasised that there was no difference in principle between his Party's policies and those of the U.R.P., and all that divided them was the method of presentation and the evidence of a personality cult centred in [sic] Todd.

10. In the short time since the election campaign started there is no doubt that Todd has stood out among the leaders of the three main parties. He has attracted bigger audiences than anyone else and has made the most constructive speeches. He has also, on the whole, refrained from attacking leaders of other parties and has repeated his earlier admission that he must take some share of the blame for the split. If there was more time before the election I think the U.R.P. might have been quite a strong challenger. But they are having to build up an organization from scratch, and so much depends on Todd personally—he is already said to be very tired.

11. Winston Field and the Dominion Party Territorial leaders have so far been very silent but they are putting in a lot of solid organising work. Many people think that they will come out on top at the elections but not with an overall majority (Winston Field told me they were certain of success in this election but they could not hope to win the Federal election). It is somewhat alarming to contemplate what sort of Cabinet they could produce. The Territorial leader, Stockil, is the only member of the party who has had previous Cabinet experience and all but three Dominion Party candidates have never even had any Parliamentary experience.

12. I doubt whether it will be possible even up to the last day of this campaign for anyone to make more than a wild guess at the possible result. I have said nothing of

the other two parties which are fielding candidates—Confederate Party and Constitution Party—but when you take these into account, the small number of voters, and the system of preferential voting, the picture is bound to be very confused. The U.F.P., of course, has the oldest established organization and tradition and Welensky and Whitehead may have several good tricks to pull out of the hat—there is a month to go still. They also have the advantage of being the centre party with two parties on either side of them, and the middle of the road has always appealed to the Southern Rhodesians. But even if they manage to get home it seems at the moment unlikely that they will have an overall majority and Todd may hold the balance of power. Some people are in fact already saying that a second General Election will probably be necessary fairly shortly after the June election in order to return a Government with the necessary overall majority.

13. The public are bewildered. They have been spoiled for so many years by having a leader in Lord Malvern who took charge of the situation in a crisis and whom they trusted. Now they have to choose between a number of leaders and shades of policy—I think the personalities play a much more important part than the policies. There is still no satisfactory explanation from the public's point of view of why the leaders have fallen apart. The whole thing seems to them an unnecessary muddle. They are worried too about the affect on African opinion and on overseas opinion, particularly on investment in the Federation. It really is very sad that the few politicians who have come to the top and have some experience, and who have a great deal in common, should not have been able to settle their minor differences and stay together. May be in the end they will be driven to do so, but not at this election.

**157** CO 968/698

16 May 1958

[African defence pact]: letter from Sir R Welensky to Mr Macmillan

I am writing to you on a matter of grave importance on which I would be grateful to have your considered opinion. I have read with deep interest and growing concern a number of valuable papers which have come to us from your J.I.C. and other Intelligence organisations on the subject of Russla's plans for the subversion of Africa. Furthermore, my principal Air Adviser has reported to me upon a tour of the Middle East which he made recently, and from all these sources I have gained a much clearer picture of what I believe to be the real Soviet intentions towards Africa. Nothing could have served more strongly to confirm my assessment of the situation than the events of the past few days in the Middle East.<sup>1</sup>

The trend is a dangerous one and you will be aware that I have a special and immediate interest in halting this trend. We in the Federation are trying to put racial partnership into practice and we are sincere in this attempt; but to bring real partnership into being will take time, and, even without this encroachment of Russian influence, time is not on our side. I consider therefore that we are facing a real danger which requires urgent action if it is to be stemmed. The U.S.S.R. is

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<sup>1</sup> A reference to rioting in Lebanon and a gathering crisis in Iraq which led to the overthrow of the pro-western Hashemite monarchy in July. Following the Iraqi revolution, American and British troops were landed in Lebanon and Jordan respectively.

evidently spreading its influence Southwards by trade, diplomacy, and propaganda, and by support of the so-called Liberation Movements from the most suitable bases which she can find. Nasser's growing strength and popularity amongst the Muslims has immediately been seen as a convenient vehicle for the Soviets to use. His influence over the Horn of Africa, supplemented now by his base in the Yemen constitute a danger of subversion of vital Western influences on the African continent. This trend could easily be continued into East and Central Africa from Somalia, once Somalia has gained her independence and should she than fall under Egyptian/Soviet domination. A young independent state would find it extremely difficult to resist Nasser and the United Arab Republic.

I wonder whether the independent States and the NATO Powers with a stake in Africa are taking the threat sufficiently seriously, I am sure that both the Metropolitan and Territorial Governments concerned are individually doing their best to counter Communist influences, especially where these are directed towards African Nationalist Movements; but I am not convinced that we could not do more by pooling ideas and working more closely together.

I am not suggesting anything more than exploratory thoughts at the moment, although I believe that the independent states together with the NATO Powers with interests in Africa, and some of them have considerable interests, would benefit by standing more closely together, and perhaps even an African Treaty Pact on the lines of SEATO might prove to be a practical proposition. It is quite clear, of course, that a large amount of economic aid would be required to cement any alliance of this kind and to make a really lasting appeal to African hopes and aspirations.

I am aware that many complications and difficulties are inherent in this suggestion, but I am conscious of the present developing threat to stability. Indeed, I already see the threat of an ever increasing air barrier stretching across the Middle East and North Africa. These trends and the fact that time is dangerously against us, compel me to write to you on this subject and to seek your views.

**158** DO 35/7532, no 3

27 June 1958

[Southern Rhodesian politics]: despatch from M R Metcalf to Lord Home

I have the honour to submit this report on political events in Southern Rhodesia over the last three months, which ended in the return to power at a General Election of the United Federal Party (U.F.P.) with a greatly reduced majority, and the total rout of the former Prime Minister, Mr. Todd, and of all his parliamentary supporters.

2. When I last reported on the political situation in the middle of March the position was that both the supporters of Mr. Todd and his opponents in the Government Party (U.F.P.) had agreed to serve under the leadership of Sir Edgar Whitehead, although the latter had no seat as yet in the Legislative Assembly for himself. It was intended to find a seat for him through a by-election in the Hillside Division of Bulawayo and to defer a General Election in Southern Rhodesia until the end of 1958, but these plans broke down on 16th April when the electors of Hillside returned the Dominion Party candidate by a majority of 70 votes. The defeated Prime Minister could hardly try his luck again in another by-election, and in any case he

had declared during the contest at Hillside that if he were not returned he would promptly ask for a dissolution of Parliament so that the country could express its views on the political upheavals of the previous months. This he did. Parliament was dissolved on the day after the Hillside by-election and the Dominion Party, who were holding a Party Congress at the time, swept into action with their tails up.

3. On the Government side, however, the situation was not so simple. A definite decision had to be taken whether the electoral prospects of the United Federal Party would be improved if they retained Mr. Todd and his strong following (no less than 129 of the 322 delegates at the February Conference had voted for him against Sir Edgar Whitehead as the future leader of the party), or whether his retention in the United Federal Party would drive so many people to vote for the Dominion Party, out of hostility and fear of what Mr. Todd was alleged to stand for, that the party would do better without him. No authentic account has been made public about the details of the discussions held within the United Federal Party after the defeat at Hillside, but it has been established that Sir Edgar Whitehead asked how many of the party members of the Legislative Assembly would continue to support his Cabinet if he continued to include Mr. Todd in it. The outcome was that 12 members said they would support him and 8 said they would not. The Prime Minister did not consider this majority in favour of retaining Mr. Todd to be sufficiently large to ensure unity in the Party. There followed a long wrangle about whether the liberal or the reactionary wing should give way. Finally a motion was put forward by one of the liberals that the newly-fused U.F.P. should split again. This was agreed. On the face of it, to have taken the initiative in recommending a split would seem to have been a major blunder on the part of the Todd group as it made it easy for them to be pushed out of the U.F.P. But I think it must have been made very clear that Sir Edgar Whitehead (and there is some evidence that Sir Roy Welensky was behind him in this) had made up his mind that he must at all costs off-load Mr. Todd and retain the Right wing in the party, if it was to have any chance of victory. Nevertheless, there are those who feel that Todd and his group should have stuck it out even to the point of Mr. Todd agreeing to stay in the party as a back-bencher. The effect of the breakaway was, of course, to split the liberal forces by compelling any would-be liberals to choose between the traditional 'middle way' beloved by Southern Rhodesians and something that could be described as 'Leftist.' It also left the way open for the U.F.P. to pose as the moderate centre party aiming at 'stable government.' As soon as the decision to split was taken, Mr. Todd and his followers revived the title of 'United Rhodesia Party' which had long been associated with Lord Malvern, and went into opposition.

4. The Government party, the United Federal Party, chose the electoral slogan 'Not Left, not Right, but Straight' which was about as good as any they could have found. It was hard to rely on their past record since the man who had led them during almost the whole of the previous Parliament, Mr. Todd, was now opposing them and the former Deputy Prime Minister, Sir Patrick Fletcher, was not standing for re-election. Most of the problems which lay ahead involved doing more to benefit the African, yet it was partly through fear of proclaiming this that the party had split with Mr. Todd and his followers. The party organisers reckoned that the serious threat came from the Dominion Party, and the easiest ground on which to attack the Dominion Party was the claim that unless the U.F.P. were in power both in the Federation and in Southern Rhodesia in 1960 the prospect of getting 'Dominion

Status' would be destroyed. The electorate still does not appreciate the differing roles of the Territorial and Federal Governments in this newly established Federation, and was easily led away from the stubborn problems of African affairs (with which the Territorial Government is under the Constitution bound primarily to concern itself) into the more exciting though irrelevant discussion of a vaguely understood 'Dominion Status.' Sir Roy Welensky and almost all his Federal Cabinet campaigned actively on behalf of Sir Edgar Whitehead and the United Federal Party candidates—in marked contrast to the silent neutrality which had been observed when Mr. Todd was Prime Minister a few months earlier—and some pretty unhelpful things were said, such as Sir Roy Welensky's comment at a large Salisbury meeting when referring to the 1960 conference on the Review of the Constitution that 'I personally would never be prepared to accept that the Rhodesians have less guts than the American Colonists had'—which produced a spontaneous roar of applause.

5. Towards the United Rhodesia Party (U.R.P.) on their left, the U.F.P. candidates paid little attention, and on numerous occasions speakers made no reference at all to the U.R.P. until pressed to do so at question time. They did, however, make much play with the (untrue) claim that 'a vote for Todd is a vote for the Dominion Party' and emphasised the dangers that could result to the Colony from a split in the 'liberal' vote. This deprived the U.R.P. of many votes, despite the fact that, as a result of the introduction of preferential voting by the Electoral Amendment Act, 1957, there was no reason whatever why in a three-cornered fight a first-preference vote for the U.R.P. candidate instead of the U.F.P. should lead to the election of a Dominion Party candidate, provided the second choice of the liberals was given to the second liberal party.

6. Two factors contributed much to the ultimate success of the U.F.P. The first was a tactical blunder by the Dominion Party who, since they stood to gain very little by the preferential-voting system, magnified the 'uncertainties' inherent in the system to such an extent that they finally petitioned the Governor to suspend the Constitution of the Colony and to invite Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to provide by Order in Council that the election should be held under the old electoral system which had been replaced as a result of the recent Electoral Amendment Act. The Governor, on the advice of his Ministers, dismissed the petition, but the Dominion Party's request was portrayed throughout the Colony as a dangerous precedent and as a sign of willingness to knuckle under to rule from Whitehall, and to be tantamount to sacrificing the hopes of the country for independence in 1960. United Federal Party candidates also made much play of the willingness expressed by Dominion Party spokesmen to consider the continuance after 1960 of a special status for the Protectorates of Barotseland and Nyasaland whereby the United Kingdom authorities would continue to have some unspecified amount of control in the administration of these Territories. Against this alleged 'subservience to the Colonial Office' the United Federal Party portrayed itself as the only party genuinely seeking to achieve full 'Dominion Status in 1960.' The second major factor in their success was the intervention of Lord Malvern in the campaign, which both showed to the public that (reluctantly or not) he could not support the Todd party and also put fire into the U.F.P.'s attacks on the Dominion Party in whose ranks, as he declared, he saw once again all the old enemies who had opposed him throughout his 23 years in office. Once again the electorate finally decided that

'Huggy knows best,' and voted for the party of his choice—though in view of the rapid influx of new Rhodesians who did not know him when in office I doubt if his spell will automatically prove effective ever again.

7. The United Rhodesia Party campaigned under the slogan of 'Forward without Fear,' pointing out that the African would inevitably move forward, and that the only question to be solved was whether he would do so with encouragement from the Europeans or in opposition to them. They roundly accused the U.F.P. of being in this respect as wrong as the Dominion Party, and dubbed the Government 'the group of frightened men.' Despite the short time at their disposal the United Rhodesia Party set up an effective and enthusiastic organisation throughout the Colony; they put forward a number of able candidates, and they secured as their Chairman, Sir William Murphy, who last year had acted both as Governor of Southern Rhodesia and also as Governor-General of the Federation. Unlike the other two parties the United Rhodesia Party really did campaign on subjects which concerned the Territorial Legislature, whereas both the Dominion Party and the United Federal Party urged the electorate to vote for them because of their attitude to various Federal issues. The meetings of the U.R.P. attracted great interest, particularly those addressed by Mr. Todd, who had a 'full house' wherever he spoke; and in numerous cases audiences which had begun by being fairly hostile had become, by the end of the evening, attentive and apparently sympathetic to the liberal policy of that party. It cannot often happen that £300 is taken for party funds in a collection during a political meeting, but this was achieved at a meeting held by Mr. Todd in Salisbury.

8. The Dominion Party published quite a reasonable-sounding programme, and succeeded in getting at least one African to declare his public support for the party, but the rank and file contained large numbers of reactionaries and some of the speeches made in the smaller centres were openly hostile to the Africans. The Duke of Montrose, for example—who 'as a gesture to democracy in a democratic Colony' persistently declines to call himself anything other than Lord Angus Graham—declared that there were 40,000 unemployed Africans in Salisbury alone (a gross exaggeration); that the Dominion Party would gather these people into labour camps ('which, to please the British, we shall call "hostels"'); and that any farmer or employer who needed labour would be able to get as much as he needed just by making application to these 'hostels'. The Dominion Party benefited from the natural swing away from the Government Party which had been in power for so long and which had been discredited by the squabbles of the last few months. They also attracted much support among Afrikaner farmers and still more among the European artisans whose fear of competition from the advancing African had been heightened by the current economic recession. One of the few specific proposals put forward by the party was the repeal of those provisions of the Electoral Amendment Act, 1957, which allowed 'special' voters (in practice almost entirely Africans) to qualify on a fairly low qualification until such time—if ever—as they totalled 20 per cent. of the number of 'ordinary' electors.

9. In addition to these three main parties three other parties contemplated taking part in the election. On the left was the African National Congress, but as any of their candidates would clearly have lost his deposit it was not surprising that no more was heard of them. Nevertheless, the fact that this Congress publicly contemplated taking part was a welcome contrast to the threats of complete boycott

of all elections put forward by the Congress Parties in the two Northern Territories. The Constitution Party, which had established a few branches in Southern Rhodesia after its formation some months ago in Northern Rhodesia, talked of putting forward a number of candidates, but finally decided against this course on the grounds that such an action would 'split the liberal vote'. It is noteworthy, incidentally, that Mr. Todd decided to start his own party after leaving the U.F.P. and did not associate himself with the Constitution Party. On the extreme right an attempt was made to revive the Confederate Party on a policy which resembled in all material respects the apartheid policy of the South African Nationalists. However, despite considerable newspaper propaganda and claims that this party alone could safeguard the interests of the White Rhodesian, the Confederate Party, through lack of support, also decided to put up no candidates for the election. Its supporters presumably voted for the Dominion Party.

10. As Election Day approached it was generally felt that the Dominion Party was losing some of the ground it had gained in the early stages, and by the eve of the election it was generally expected that the Dominion Party and the United Federal Party would be fairly equally matched in the new Assembly and that consequently Mr. Todd might hold a position of great power. Very few people dreamed that his liberal group would be wiped out, and it was with astonishment that the Colony learnt the result, namely:—

	<i>Seats</i>	<i>First Preference Votes</i>
U.F.P.	17	16,840
Dominion Party	13	18,142
U.R.P.	nil	4,663

Of the 22 U.R.P. candidates, all but two came at the bottom of the poll in three-cornered fights. It was consequently mainly the U.R.P. supporters whose second preferences were taken into account, and it emerged that of those U.R.P. voters whose second preference was counted 93 per cent. gave their second preferences to the United Federal Party. The distrust of Mr. Todd among sections of the United Federal Party was, on the other hand, illustrated by the fact that in the two constituencies where the preferential votes of the United Federal Party were effective only 71 per cent. used their second vote to support the United Rhodesia Party, while 29 per cent. supported the Dominion Party.

11. The new Government, which was announced on 11th June, is as follows:—

Sir Edgar Whitehead	Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs (as in the last Government).
Mr. C.J. Hatty	Minister of the Treasury (as in the last Government) and of Mines (as in Mr. Todd's first Government).
Mr. R. Knight	Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs (as in the last Government).
Mr. A. E. Abrahamson	Minister of Labour and Social Welfare and Housing (formerly Minister of the Treasury in Mr. Todd's second Government).
Mr. R. M. Cleveland	Minister of Local Government and Native Education.
Mr. A. R. W. Stumbles	Minister of Roads, Irrigation, and Lands (formerly Minister of Justice in Mr. Todd's first Government).
Mr. H. J. Quinton	Parliamentary Secretary, Minister of Native Affairs (as in the closing months of Mr. Todd's first Government).

12. The European community as a whole seem fairly satisfied with the outcome of the election, although some supporters of the U.F.P. regret the disappearance of Mr. Todd. Amongst the Africans it is naturally different. The leaders of the African National Congress are jubilant, and claim that in Salisbury alone fifty-four new candidates had applied for admission to the party within the first thirty-six hours after the election results were known. But this may only be a flash in the pan. Amongst the moderate Africans the first reaction was one of disappointment. Some of these had originally joined the Capricorn Africa Society in the belief that this would lead to genuine partnership. That hope faded when Capricorn Africa virtually disappeared from the Federation. Many more had joined the old U.R.P. because of their belief in the image created by Mr. Todd. The total failure of the Todd group represents, therefore, to moderate Africans the failure of the second foundation on which they had hoped to see built a real 'partnership'. The fact that U.R.P. speakers proclaimed themselves to be the only true friends of the Africans must make their rejection by the European electorate all the more serious in African eyes. The African newspapers, however, have been urging their people not to despair but to watch for hopeful signs that the U.F.P. will still follow a liberal policy. They are also urging all those who have the necessary qualifications to register for the vote so that they may take the opportunity that has been offered to them to exercise a direct influence in future elections.

13. One other feature of the election, which will greatly influence the future, although its exact strength is still hard to calculate, was the emergence of the Dominion Party as something like a 'class party' attracting to itself the support of the European artisans. Hitherto it has been difficult to say that any particular part of the Colony was 'safe' for one party or another; and the Hillside by-election showed that it is certainly hard to find a 'safe' seat for the United Federal Party. On the other hand, the artisan suburbs around Salisbury which rejected the former Minister of Housing, Mr. Ellman-Brown (a great loss), seem likely to vote for any candidate who wants to put the brake on African advancement. The numbers of these artisans have increased, and are increasing, rapidly as the result of immigration. Their hostility to African advancement will become all the more formidable if the present economic recession continues. It seems likely therefore that the Dominion Party will always be able to rely on a strong element in the electorate. (Incidentally, as a result of differences in the residential qualifications, the power of these newly-arrived artisans will be greater in Federal elections than in the recent Territorial elections.) If the Dominion Party had any leaders, therefore, they would constitute a very real threat. On the other hand, the fact remains that they failed to win this last election and are unlikely ever again to be helped so noticeably by dissension within the opposing camp.

14. Sir Edgar Whitehead has already given an assurance to Africans that there will be no change in the policy for African advancement, and although in the face of the Government's narrow majority this might appear to be a rash assurance, I do not believe there has been any basic change of heart in Southern Rhodesia towards the African. Superficially there always have been much the same outward and visible signs of segregation and discrimination as exist South of the Limpopo, but, whereas in the Union apartheid is the declared policy of the Government with the force of law behind it all the way, in Southern Rhodesia it is still much more a matter of custom and habit. The habits of segregation and discrimination have been gradually becoming less rigid over the years and I do not think this natural process will be

checked. (One of the first acts of the new Cabinet was to approve the proposals for multi-racial hotels in Salisbury and other centres.) Nor is there any indication that the Government will be pressed to reverse any of the important legislation in the realm of African affairs which was passed by the Todd Administration. This legislation has already carried advancement for the African quite a long way, *e.g.*, the Native Land Husbandry Act, the Native Councils Act, the expansion of educational facilities, home ownership schemes in urban areas, loan facilities for middle class Africans to build their own better type houses, the amendments to the Pass and Liquor Laws, and a more liberal franchise. Only a beginning has so far been made to implement much of this progressive legislation and as the advantages to the African take shape the credit will automatically go to the Government of the day. The only outstanding measure of importance from the Todd Administration is the Industrial Conciliation legislation which the Prime Minister intends to introduce early next year if he can get sufficient agreement among the interests concerned.

15. My reason for taking this fairly optimistic view is that I believe the success of the Dominion Party was first and foremost due to a reaction against one man—Todd—and not, to a significant extent, against African advancement. I said in my despatch of 19th March that it was hoped that Mr. Todd had learnt a lesson from the shaking he was given in the January crisis which ended in his dismissal as the head of Southern Rhodesia affairs. But throughout the election campaign, brilliant though his performance was, he still gave the impression of being too much the autocrat and the self-appointed saviour of all sections of the community. He could see so clearly the road to partnership that he could not wait to map it out and march along it. He would probably still be Prime Minister if he had been more patient with his colleagues and more considerate of their views, which were at variance with his own mainly over the method of presentation of Government policy. But he was driven on by his astounding energy, his weakness for personal publicity and a firm conviction that time is not on the side of the European. That is only too true, but he was apparently given many warnings during the past six months in office that, if he was to carry the country with him, he should not proclaim the cause of the African so loudly nor identify himself so exclusively with that cause. He did not heed these warnings and thereby defeated his own ends by making the Europeans suspicious of him and more cautious in their attitude, and by bringing disillusionment to the African, to say nothing of having interrupted a most promising career and denied the country for the time being his undeniable qualities. He will now have to work his passage back if he wishes to re-enter public life, and it will be a long, hard road.

16. I do not want to give the impression that the new Government will have an easy task. They are not a particularly impressive body, and in ability overall they compare unfavourably with the original Todd Government. Admittedly, Sir Edgar Whitehead had little choice, as more than half the Government members in the new House have had no previous parliamentary experience. What he has done is to select six of the only seven who had been M.P.'s before and to try to appoint to the Ministries most concerned with African affairs those who had liberal leanings, such as Mr. Abrahamson and Mr. Cleveland. The Government owe their victory at the polls to the fact that in four critical constituencies sufficient U.R.P. supporters gave their second preferences to the U.F.P. to enable the U.F.P. to overcome the majority secured by the Dominion Party candidate at the first count. Even so, their majority is only four, and it is public knowledge that at least that number of the successful

U.F.P. candidates toyed with the idea, before the election, of transferring to the Dominion Party.

17. Much will depend on Sir Edgar Whitehead himself. He has been absent from the public life of the Colony for five vital years during which the situation has changed considerably and in which in particular the composition of the population has altered. He has great ability and self-confidence, and there is no doubt that intellectually he will tower above his colleagues in the Cabinet and in Parliament. This conscious superiority, combined with his deafness may easily lead him to behave almost as autocratically as Mr. Todd, and indeed one of the factors which seem likely to leave him in command of the United Federal Party in the Southern Rhodesia House is precisely that which for so long helped to keep Mr. Todd there—namely that there is no possible alternative to him. He is at present unknown by the large number of newcomers to this country. (One-third of the electorate have come to live here since the days when he last held office.) Amongst those who do remember him, however, he is far from popular, and it was noticeable during the election that not even the strongest supporters of his party had much to say, in private conversation, in favour of him. Indeed, a large section of the party regard his economic ideas with suspicion. Few farmers will ever forget the tobacco levy which he tried to impose when Finance Minister of Southern Rhodesia and he is widely, though inaccurately, alleged to have studied at the London School of Economics (which is enough to damn any public figure in Southern Rhodesia). It may have been in the hope of diverting attention away from these criticisms that he laid so much emphasis, both during the election and immediately afterwards, on 'Dominion Status' (which is not primarily the concern of the Government of Southern Rhodesia). If this is so, his efforts were quickly rewarded, for already the (non-parliamentary) Chairman of the Southern Rhodesia branch of the Dominion Party has transferred his allegiance to the U.F.P. in protest against the weakness of the Dominion Party's attitude towards the continuance of Colonial Office influence in Nyasaland and Barotseland.

18. The Prime Minister seems confident that there will be no need for his new Government to pander to their Right wing in order to retain power: in fact he goes so far as to say that the Dominion Party has shot its bolt and that it is more likely that there will be one or two defections from the Dominion Party to his side than the reverse. One would feel happier about the future if two or three of those members who constituted the Left wing in Mr. Todd's time had survived the elections to act as a ginger group and as a constant reminder to the Government that they owe their victory to the U.R.P. supporters who gave them their second votes as well as to the many liberal-minded electors who voted for the U.F.P. because they thought this was the surest way to defeat the Dominion Party and not because they were against the policy of the Todd Government. I believe that the pattern set by that Government in the field of African affairs would still be acceptable to the majority of Europeans so long as it was worked out at a steadier pace and without so much trumpeting. I am also not unhopeful that if Sir Edgar Whitehead will keep broadly to this pattern he will gradually attract the support of moderate Africans who, now that they are recovering from the shock of losing Mr. Todd, are beginning to be more optimistic that African advancement under the new Government may not, after all, receive a serious check.

19. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the High Commissioners in other Commonwealth capitals.

**159** CO 968/698

28 June 1958

**[African defence pact]: letter (reply) from Mr Macmillan to Sir R Welensky**

In my letter of May 20 I promised to examine urgently the ideas which you put forward in your letter of May 16 for coordinating action against Russian penetration in Africa.<sup>1</sup>

My colleagues and I recognise your own very direct concern with this question and we do not underrate the gravity of the threat posed by Russian and Egyptian activities throughout Africa.

We have been, and are, watching this with the closest attention and have given a great deal of thought to the most effective means of countering it.

We have already considered, for example, the possibility which you yourself mention of setting up an African organisation on the lines of SEATO. But we have come to the conclusion that such a solution is not practical politics at the present time. There are both military and political reasons for this. Militarily the defence of Africa must, in our view, be carried out in the Middle East, and for this reason United Kingdom participation in a regional defence organisation concerned with the defence of Southern Africa only would be regarded elsewhere as implying doubts as to the efficacy of the Baghdad Pact and would weaken the alliance. Politically it would clearly be out of the question to set up an organisation consisting only of the NATO Powers with interests in Africa, or of these Powers together with the Union of South Africa, since this would be bound to raise suspicions in the minds of the independent African countries. Indeed, by underlining the exclusion of these countries from our counsels it would have the very opposite effect on them of that which we all desire. Yet, however desirable it might be to include both the NATO Powers with interests in Africa and the independent States, it is hard to see how they could all be welded into an effective organisation in present circumstances.

I share your view that we should pool ideas and see whether we cannot work even more closely together. I agree that this task needs tackling urgently. At the present stage I believe that the best results will come from bilateral discussions to be conducted in the first place between experts. I should be glad to see the threat of subversion included among the subjects to be dealt with in this way. A recent example of what I propose is the visit which the Deputy Director-General of the Security Service paid to Salisbury in February. I believe that, if we can get full and frank exchanges of this nature going between us, they will provide us both with the kind of information which is most needed and will have the added advantage by their secrecy of not drawing attention to the close nature of our collaboration.

Before taking matters further, I should much value an opportunity of learning rather more fully what you have in mind so that we can have a clearer idea of the most useful way to proceed. I would like to suggest that you should talk this over with our High Commissioner who will be in a position to expand on any of the matters dealt with in this letter. When we have your views in more detail, we should be very happy to send officials from the United Kingdom to support him in further discussions, if you and he thought that this would be helpful.

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<sup>1</sup> See 157.

Of course, diplomatic and military cooperation cannot in itself be a sufficient protection for the African countries, many of whom are only in an early stage of development. Your letter refers to economic help, and mentions the need for a large amount of aid in connexion with an African Treaty Pact. Although, as I say, we do not think that an African organisation on the lines of SEATO is a practical possibility at present, we all have very much in mind the need to use the economic and technical assistance which the West can afford in the best possible way to help the free and the uncommitted countries to resist Russian or similar penetration.

This was, indeed, one of the main subjects which I discussed during my recent visit to the United States and Canada. If, as I hope, I can gradually carry forward this concept of coordinating the economic activities of the free world, no doubt Africa will be one of the important areas which we shall have to consider.

**160** DO 35/4637, no 407

2 July 1958

[Northern Rhodesian constitution]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Home

My Department have been keeping yours in touch with developments about the Northern Rhodesian constitutional proposals, and your people will probably have told you that I have been thinking of paying an early visit so as to get things settled. I have now decided that, if Benson can undertake to have the debate in his Legislative Council finished in time, I will fly to Lusaka on the 18th July. If you agree, I would propose to call in at Salisbury on the way back so that I can put the Federal Government in the picture and give them an opportunity to make any representations they may want to about such conclusions as I come to as a result of my visit to Lusaka. I would hope to be home again on the 25th July, and would thus have a week to discuss the situation with you and, if necessary, with our colleagues so that decisions can be taken, and possibly announced, before I go to Canada on the 1st August.

I think you are au fait with the position. The present Legislature which flowed from the constitutional decisions taken by Oliver in 1954 expires early next year and, when Oliver announced his constitutional decisions, he let it be understood that there would be no further changes during these five years and, by implication, that there would be some changes at the end of them. Indeed, he gave some very broad hints that he would expect there to be changes in the franchise arrangements designed to make a start at any rate of getting away from racialism.

All the time Benson has been in Northern Rhodesia he has been working away on what he understood to be Oliver's remit to him in this respect, and, at the end of March, published with my approval a White Paper containing proposals for the amendment of the Constitution. I enclose a copy of this Paper for convenience of reference.<sup>1</sup> Both Roberts, on the one hand, and Franklin,<sup>2</sup> on the other, had their own reservations on certain points; but Executive Council as a whole agreed that the proposals should be described as the proposals of the Northern Rhodesia

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Harry Franklin, nominated member for African interests in the NR legislature.

Government which were being published as a basis for public discussion. I had an understanding with Roberts that he would confine his criticism to three or four of the most important points in which these Government proposals differed from the proposals of the Federal Party, and there was an implication that he would in the end agree somewhat reluctantly to co-operate in working the proposals if I, on my side, adopted them more or less as they are and, in particular, did not insist on making them more favourable to the Africans on one or two points where I knew they would be open to attack here, and on which I myself was not altogether happy. Perhaps the most important of these points was that the proposals provide that there should be only one African Minister in Executive Council, whereas experience in Kenya has taught us that an African placed in such a position is apt to be a lonely figure, and that it is better to have two.

After publication of the proposals Roberts did not altogether stick to his side of the bargain, though Benson and the other members of the Federal Party on Executive Council have from time to time succeeded in bringing him back to it. At the other end of the scale both the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and the Labour Party here have condemned the proposals and I had a rather uncomfortable meeting about them with Creech Jones, James Johnson and Eirene White the other day. The Federal Government have also sent a letter to the Northern Rhodesian Government criticising a number of points in the proposals—a letter which the Northern Rhodesian Government have answered point by point.

In 1954 Oliver had to dictate a Constitution for Northern Rhodesia. His decisions were criticised from both sides and Welensky took all the European Members out of Executive Council and Government bodies. In the event, however, he found that the European community did not support him, and within two months Oliver was busy finding a face-saving formula which conceded nothing to Welensky but enabled him to come back without too much loss of face. I think that once again in Northern Rhodesia there is no chance whatsoever of constructing anything which will be acceptable both to the Labour Party here and to the Federal Government. My object should be, I think, to approve something which I myself consider fair and which, though it will probably be criticised publicly by Welensky and Roberts, will be tolerably acceptable to the ordinary run of European in Northern Rhodesia. I think that I shall probably come to the conclusion that this something is something very little different from the proposals in the enclosed White Paper; but I may want to make one or two alterations to make them a bit more favourable to Africans and acceptable to the Labour Party if I think I can do that without really antagonising the general run of Europeans in Northern Rhodesia.

One more point. I think that Welensky, if he fails to convince me that the conclusions I reach in Lusaka should be altered to make them more favourable to the Europeans, will press me very hard to postpone any announcement until after the Federal elections. This would not, I fear, be possible. The timetable is already pretty tight and, if a decision is not reached by the beginning of August, the life of the present Legislative Council would have to be extended. This would not only be undesirable in itself but would also be a clear sign to everyone that we were unable to make up our minds because of pressure from the Federal Government. That, as you can imagine, would make my position in the House here exceedingly difficult, particularly after all I have said about federation not standing in the way of constitutional development in the Northern Territories.

Incidentally, I have reason to believe that, although Welensky and Roberts will, as a matter of policy, almost certainly be very critical of any conclusions on the lines of the White Paper in public, the ordinary run of European in Northern Rhodesia at any rate is pretty satisfied—as indeed he should be—with the White Paper proposals. They were also given a pretty good welcome in the Southern Rhodesian press—though funnily enough the Northern Rhodesian press was rather more critical. At the other end we know that, although the African National Congress are conducting an all-out public campaign against the White Paper proposals, they are making secret preparations to fight elections under them if they are adopted.

P.S. I don't want the Federal Government, or indeed anyone, to know what I have in mind until the debate in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council has reached a point where it would appear reasonable for Benson to have asked me to come.

**161** DO 35/4637, no 500 12 Sept 1958  
 [Northern Rhodesian constitution]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to  
 Lord Home

Now that the die is finally cast in regard to the Northern Rhodesian Constitution,<sup>1</sup> I should like to send you this line to tell you how very grateful I am for your forbearance during these last few days, when you have been under such heavy pressure from the Federal Government. I would like to have been able to do something to help you. But to do any good, it would have had to have been something pretty drastic which would have considerably altered the balance of the scheme (which, I must say, I think is pretty fair to all as it stands), and would also have got us into even greater difficulties in the House of Commons than we may in any case have to face.

As promised, I put to Arthur Benson the question of dropping the second African Minister. It was, as you know, I—and you agreed—who originally felt that we ought to have two African Ministers, and Benson in his reply has said that, if there were any question of reverting to one, it would also be necessary to have the two Assistant Ministers as originally proposed and to revert to the proposal to devalue the ordinary vote. I am sure that if we had made these changes, the Federal Government would have attacked us at least as strongly as they will now; and I must say that I believe that responsible government in Northern Rhodesia would be better served by having two African Ministers and not devaluing the ordinary vote than it would be under the original proposals.

I have also thought a lot about your idea of reducing the number of Officials in Executive Council by one. This would, however, involve jettisoning the Secretary for Native Affairs and presumably handing over his duties to the African Ministers. This is something which will have to come in due course, but the Governor feels most strongly—and I very much agree with him—that it would be a very unwise step to take at the present time. I know also that he felt that he and his Officials would be very over-burdened in attempting to guide this first experience in a very

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<sup>1</sup> A White Paper on the constitution had been published in NR on 11 Sept.

experimental form of government if he had only three Officials in Executive Council compared with six Unofficials. I feel convinced, therefore, that on merits it is right to keep four Officials. I should also add that, when it was agreed that there should be a second African Minister, there was very definitely an understanding between me and Benson that this would mean an Executive Council of ten, including four Officials, and not of nine, including three Officials. In any case it would have been too late to try to re-open this with him at the eleventh hour.

I know that the repercussions of this may well cause you a lot of trouble; but I fear that this sort of thing is practically inevitable when responsibilities are divided as they inevitably are in the present set-up in Central Africa.

Thank you so much.

## 162 CO 1015/1598

13 Oct–11 Nov 1958

[Boston Tea Party]: minutes by J C Morgan, A Campbell,<sup>1</sup> N D Watson and A Carstairs

[This file was, until 2002, retained under section 3.4 of the Public Records Act. This was not the first time the question of a revolt by the Central African settlers—possibly necessitating the use of force by Britain—had been raised in the CO. It was discussed in the autumn of 1956, following an inflammatory speech by Lord Malvern (for extracts from the relevant file—CO 1015/1009—D Goldsworthy, ed, *The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957* (BDEEP: London, 1994), part II, 312). On this earlier occasion, officials decided against initiating any inter-departmental study of the feasibility of military action and, indeed, came close to endorsing the notion that there were no circumstances in which British troops could be engaged against white settlers.]

About five weeks ago we had a meeting among ourselves, at which Mr. Webster was also present, to discuss the question of what Ministers in the United Kingdom might have to be advised to do in the event of either the Federal Government or some rebellious elements in the Federation, particularly in Southern Rhodesia or the Copperbelt, in fact attempting to implement the threat which has been made from time to time by public characters, including Lord Malvern, that in the event of H.M.G. not acceding to the demand for 'Dominion Status' for the Federation in 1960, they would carry out a kind of 'Boston Tea Party' and unilaterally declare their independence of H.M.G. in the U.K, albeit ostensibly still 'within the Commonwealth'. I told the meeting that Mr. Gorell Barnes had suggested that we ought to be prepared with some plans to meet such an eventuality. At the end of the meeting we asked Mr. Webster to prepare a note of our discussion, and to circulate it to those concerned for further consideration of the problem. Unfortunately, owing to extreme pressure of work on the Northern Rhodesian Constitution, Mr. Webster has been unable to do this; and I am therefore, instead, sending each of you this minute, prepared entirely from my memory of what took place, for the same purpose. You will each probably find considerable gaps in what I am recording below. I do not need to stress that at the present stage we cannot share our thinking on this subject with

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<sup>1</sup> Campbell was assistant secretary and head of the CO Defence Dept. Carstairs was assistant under-secretary of state whose departmental brief included defence, intelligence, security and the police. Watson was currently serving as the head of the CO's Intelligence and Security Department (ISD).

any other Department of H.M.G., including the Ministry of Defence, and least of all the C.R.O. The file which I am opening with a copy of this minute is therefore not only Secret but marked 'Colonial Office Eyes Only'.

2. The peculiar difficulty with which we felt ourselves faced in tackling this problem is that of defining exactly what in fact the Federal people could or would attempt to do in the circumstances envisaged. If they simply sat up and said that they were independent, no one would necessarily take any notice; this would certainly have the opposite effect from that desired in the Foreign Offices of other Commonwealth countries, and they would either receive no recognition at all from foreign powers, or, on the contrary, recognition from 'undesirable' foreign powers such as Egypt or the Algerian Government in exile! We thought therefore that to make their gesture in any way effective, they would be bound simultaneously to seek to achieve actual physical control of the Government in the Northern Protectorates. And, if they did that, we also thought that they would have to do it through the agency of the defence forces of the Federation itself, in particular the 'Territorial Army', which almost entirely consists of Southern Rhodesian Europeans or like-minded people in the Northern Territories. We therefore thought that if there were indeed such a conspiracy, there might be at least a few days' notice of it, because of the actual calling up of the Territorial forces, and any unusual movements by them, even if ostensibly for 'manoeuvres'. Although all this seems absurd, we cannot entirely rule out the possibilities, when we remember that there was about 1925 an actual plot among the settlers in Kenya to capture and imprison the Governor! It is on the assumption that there would be at least some overt signs in advance of the development of a conspiracy such as we have in mind that we have based what little thinking we were able to do on the military side of the problem.

3. Our consideration of possible counter-measures, so far as we were able to take it, fell roughly under three heads:—

#### *A. Constitutional*

If the Federal and presumably also the Southern Rhodesian Governments in collusion with them were suddenly to declare themselves 'independent within the Commonwealth', H.M.G. in the United Kingdom could immediately take one or both of two constitutional steps. First, they could by an immediate Order in Council cancel or suspend the Federal Constitution, so that the situation would revert to that which existed before September 1953, when there were entirely separate Governments in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, subject only to H.M.G. in the U.K., and exercising all functions of government, including those now entrusted to the Federal Government. Additionally, or alternatively, the Governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland could, under directions from H.M.G. in the U.K., declare a state of emergency under the U.K. Emergency Regulations of 1939 (as we claim to be within their power) which would have the effect of suspending all Federal laws and activities. If there were any real risk of a rebellious movement taking place, surreptitious preparation should be made in London for the required Order in Council, if thought advisable at the time. No special preparations would be necessary for the declaration of a state of emergency in the Northern Territories.

At the same time steps could be taken in international circles to make the Federal representation on international bodies and in foreign capitals of no effect.

### B. *Military*

On the assumption that there would at least be some notice of the insurrection, we were all agreed that it would be essential that key points, and in particular aerodromes in the Northern Territories, should be secured in advance. Even for this purpose, the introduction of a state of emergency would probably be required, since it would involve the introduction of troops from outside the borders of the Federation. These would be presumably, as things stand at the moment, British troops from the Command in East Africa. A difficult psychological problem would arise as to whether it would be preferable to employ African soldiers to oppose the Europeans in this situation, or whether only British troops should be used. The Africans would presumably obey the orders of their officers and of H.M.G. There would be a real risk that British troops would not obey when pitted against e.g. the European mineworkers on the Copperbelt. I personally doubt whether this particular problem could ever be determined in advance since so much would depend on the state of feeling both in the Federation and the U.K. itself at the time. But the essential point is that, if the insurrection were to be defeated the key points and aerodromes must be seized at least a few days in advance of the actual outbreak.

### C. *Sanctions*

We considered that, simultaneously with providing military protection for the Governments of the Northern Territories, it might be possible for H.M.G. in the U.K. to impose certain other sanctions on the Federal Government, or on people within the Federation who might be tempted to support the Federal Government or the other 'rebels' at the time.

(1) Financial. All loans to the Federation could immediately be dried up, in so far as they depend on British sources or British guarantees. It would of course be essential to ensure that such monies as were needed for the development of the Northern Territories continued to flow towards them—but this should impose no difficulty.

(2) It would be advisable, on the outbreak of the insurrection, and if possible in advance of the insurrection as one method of preventing it, for H.M.G. to announce that any person within the Federation who supported the activities of the rebellious Government in any way would, quite apart from and additional to the hazard of being brought to trial subsequently for high treason, in any event be deprived of any pension rights deriving ultimately from H.M. Treasury to which he had previously been entitled. This is an extremely important point because a very considerable number of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia are in fact post-career settlers who derive a substantial part of their livelihood from pensions which come from the U.K. or e.g. the old Indian Government.

4. I would at this point express my personal opinion that the whole of this nonsense could be stopped, if it were to develop, by H.M.G. making a declaration well in advance to the effect that any such activity as we imagine would in fact be tantamount to high treason, that the full penalties for high treason would be exacted after due trial, and that in any event the sanction of denying pensions, or any other similar financial sanctions, would be exercised.

5. One point which we might consider at a further meeting, is whether we could in the strictest confidence associate the C.O.S. Secretariat and Joint Planning Staff

with our thinking, in order to produce a kind of advance or skeleton plan for dealing with the situation.

6. I suggest that, after reading this minute, Mr. Campbell and Mr. Watson may wish to consider their side of the matter further, and perhaps make some discreet enquiries. When they have done that, I suggest we hold a further meeting. I should of course welcome any comments on this minute.

7. As indicated in paragraph 1 I have opened a file and I have also sent a copy of this minute to Mr. Gorell Barnes to show what progress (or lack of progress) we have made.

J.C.M.

13.10.58

The kind of operation which would be required to secure the two Northern Territories against forcible take-over by Federation or Southern Rhodesian insurrectionists would not be a particularly difficult one to plan, but I am quite sure that no planning for it could be done until we had political clearance here. At present there are of course no plans of this nature in existence at all: there are not even plans for reinforcing any of the territories in the Federation with United Kingdom troops for internal security purposes. With the return of the First Battalion Rhodesia African Rifles from Malaya this year, the requirement for reinforcement by this country lapsed at the instance of the Federation defence authorities. There would therefore have to be planning from scratch, but this would not be difficult granted the political clearance.

2. The possibility of our having to take arms against our countrymen in Central Africa because (and I think this is what it comes to) we felt that we had a duty to the Africans to see that they were given a fair deal by them is one that fills me with distaste. Such an operation could not, I suggest, be pursued if it came to actual fighting in Central Africa, since I doubt whether the United Kingdom would be united on this issue. But until we have some kind of policy guidance from the Cabinet it would be quite impossible to do any planning for it, even if it amounted only to planning for the seizure of airfields and maintaining a generally defensive posture in the two Northern Territories. The size of the forces that were to be sent in, their objectives and the instructions which they were to follow if attacked, even the nature of the forces, that is whether white or black, would depend on Cabinet decisions.

3. I therefore think that if events in Central Africa are showing signs that we may be faced with a proposition of this kind we should brook no delay in getting the policy cleared in Whitehall so that planning can proceed against the basis of agreed objectives. I think that to proceed without bringing in the C.R.O. opens up the prospect of a war in Whitehall on this matter, and we shall have quite enough on our hands in other directions without incurring this.

A.C.

31.10.58

On the intelligence side, keeping a watch on this possible development is a chancy business, because (i) more of our intelligence organisations have got this as a 'target' and (ii) the material preparations would be mainly made in S. Rhodesia where we have no intelligence 'jurisdiction'.

2. I feel however that we should get general political warning of any likely drift in this direction: and, with that, we ought to be able to get some advance notice of any actual coup. H.M.G. has an intelligence representative in Salisbury in the person of the

S.L.O., although of course we should have to have pretty firm preliminary indications before we could turn him onto 'spying' on the Federal Govt to whom he is accredited. In this as in other matters, a high-level policy decision would be a prerequisite.

3. On the military side, I agree with Mr. Campbell that the prospect is distasteful: but I certainly think that H.M.G. would have seriously to consider meeting with force, if necessary, a forcible renunciation of its political policies in Africa, if it is thereafter to maintain any authority in the continent at all. I entirely agree that it is not possible for the C.O. at this stage to initiate any planning for this contingency 'on the quiet' with the C.O.S. Secretariat. And I wonder if the whole business is not too speculative at present to put forward for high-level political guidance. (I believe that Sir R. Welensky, since our meeting, has himself publicly deflated some of the wilder ideas of this kind?) I agree with para. 4 of Mr. Morgan's minute that any such nonsense should be stoppable by a firm statement from H.M.G. Such a statement would have to be based on prior decision as to the extent to which H.M.G. would, if necessary, be prepared to translate words into action. But I am doubtful whether in present circumstances Ministers would feel able to consider these possibilities.

N.D.W.

3.11.58

*Mr. Gorell Barnes*

I am sorry to have held on to this file for so long. The subject is an intricate and distasteful one; but for what they are worth I have the following brief comments at this stage.

First, I think it would be a mistake to assume that Sir R. Welensky's (and Lord Malvern's) repeated declarations regarding their determination to achieve independence for the Central African Federation in 1960 should not be taken at their face value and are merely bluff. I regard the former as quite capable of taking whatever action he thought fit, whether constitutionally defensible or not, when the time comes.

Secondly I am quite sure that military counter action to any such move on the part of the Government of the Federation would be inoperable, and furthermore that any steps for planning consideration of it would carry a risk of leakage to the Federation sufficient to make it highly undesirable even to go to the planning stage. It should be borne in mind that relations between the Federal and the United Kingdom Service Departments are close.

In short, it seems to me that should we come to this pass, our counter-measures will have to be political & legal—or none at all.

A.C.

26.11.58

**163** DO 35/4638, no 574

22 Oct 1958

[Northern Rhodesian constitution]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Home

I have been giving careful consideration to the suggestions in Cub Alport's letter of 17th October about the communications which we must now make to Welensky and Roberts about the Northern Rhodesian Constitution.

As I said in my letter to Rab, the arguments of substance on the question of the vetting by Chiefs of candidates for the special seats seems to me, as far as I can judge from here, to be rather evenly balanced—though, as you know, the Governor and his official advisers attach very great importance to the provision, and on matters of this kind it is taking a big risk to go against official advice. But it seems that Roberts is in favour of retaining this provision and I am sure it would be a mistake to concede to Welensky something which Roberts does not want conceded. All in all, therefore, I think that, much as it would help me in the House of Commons, I should not make this change, at any rate at this stage.

I do, however, agree with Cub that our communications to Roberts and Welensky should be simultaneous. The difficulty we had seen about this—and it is a real one—is that we are concerned here with the Northern Rhodesian Constitution and that, although we are obliged to consult the Federal Government before reaching our final decisions, and in any case would want to do so, the Federal Government ought not, strictly speaking to come into the picture until I have completed my consultations with those concerned in Northern Rhodesia. However, I think we can meet this point sufficiently by careful wording of the two communications which will have to be on slightly different lines.

I enclose two drafts<sup>1</sup> which represent my idea of the sort of message you and I should now send to Welensky and Roberts simultaneously and should be glad to know what you think of them.

There is one point which requires explanation. We originally had it in mind that we should not reject the proposal for an inter-governmental conference outright but should ask Welensky to agree that it was unnecessary having regard to the concessions we are prepared to make. But the more I have thought about it, the more I have felt that this would be a mistaken approach. Although the supplementary despatch will no doubt help Welensky, there is I fear no possibility at all that he will regard the concessions in it as adequate, or at any rate that he will be prepared to say he does. If we do not make it clear that a conference is out, he is sure to renew this suggestion, which he has already made public, most forcibly. If, as I think you agree, we must not on any account either have an inter-governmental conference or make major changes of substance which are not agreed by both Europeans and Africans, then I feel sure that the more firmly we make this clear to Welensky from the beginning the less will be the danger that he will take action which will be tantamount to staking his reputation on getting us to do one or both of these two things.

I have also made one or two slight alterations in the formulae to be incorporated in the despatch since I wrote my letter to Rab. These are, I think, fully explained in telegraphic correspondence with Benson of which copies have been sent to your Department. You will see that I have also fallen in with Benson's suggestion (which I am sure is right) that the idea we had in the Colonial Office of communicating the full text of the draft despatch to Welensky and Roberts would be a mistake.

I am sending a copy of this to Rab.

*P.S.* When we have reached agreement on the messages to be sent to Welensky and Roberts, I think it would be a good idea if we were to send them through Metcalf and

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Benson; give the two of them an opportunity to consult quickly together and, if they consider it necessary, to make quick suggestions to us for amendments, if they think it necessary to do so; and ask them to coordinate timing of the delivery of the two messages. If you agree, I will ask my people to make the necessary arrangements with yours.

## **164** CO 1015/1696

14 Nov–11 Dec 1958

### [Future of the Federation]: minutes by W L Gorell Barnes, Sir J Macpherson and Lord Perth

The attached brief by Mr. Morgan, which I have not thought it necessary to get fair-copied, on the memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations about the future of the Federation (C. (58)232) should be read together with the minutes on CAA.75/2/031 below, with which we have submitted a memorandum analysing the pledges given in 1953 and discussing their interpretation.<sup>1</sup>

In my view there arise here both an issue of conscience and an issue of policy.

I realise that the issue of conscience may be posed with particular severity for me because I am the only U.K. person still dealing with Central Africa who was present throughout all the 1952 and 1953 conferences and took part in all the work of trying to 'sell' federation at that time. I believe, however, that there are also many others who were not so intimately concerned, who also feel this as an issue of conscience. It is just not possible to get away from the fact that federation was adopted because it had been accepted that amalgamation and/or withdrawal of Protectorate status from the Northern Territories against the desires of their African inhabitants was an impossibility, and federation was considered to be the only way of getting the economic and other benefits of size and of encouraging Southern Rhodesia to keep out of the South African orbit. It was only afterwards (lamentably soon afterwards) that those who thought it right and necessary to stick to this bargain began to be dubbed from Salisbury as opponents of federation.

The issue of policy is really a two-fold issue. Firstly, is it right to withdraw our protection from the Northern Territories and, against the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants, to hand them over to independent Governments who would represent only a very small fraction of the population? Secondly, if it is right, is it wise, having regard to modern opinion on these matters in the Western world, particularly America, and the probable effect on our position in East Africa and on our relations with countries within and without the Commonwealth who are inhabited and governed by coloured people? I must say that, even if I did not feel the issue of conscience, I should be at least doubtful on the issue of policy.

What are the alternatives? There seem to me to be a number, as follows:—

(1) To insist that the present arrangements should be made to work and should not be changed until they have been made to work and reasonable people, such as, say, Sir John Moffat, have been made to feel that the Federal Government are sincere about partnership. This is a line which, in my view, H.M.G. can quite well take. On the other hand, if one must judge by past performance, I myself feel very

<sup>1</sup> See 165 for the context of this discussion.

little hope that Sir R. Welensky would agree to play the game in this way or that, if he did, he would then play it successfully.

(2) We could work for a solution whereby the Federation was kept in being but the areas in the north, where there is little or no industry or European settlement, would be recognised as areas which were to develop towards becoming predominantly African States within the Federation. If this were to have any chance of being acceptable to both Europeans and Africans, it would, I think, be necessary to give the Federal Government independence within its own sphere fairly soon and the predominantly European State or States a prospect of independence under European leadership before too long, and to limit severely the number of Federal subjects so that the Africans in the embryo native States would feel that there was in fact a prospect of their being really in control of all the things they really mind about. This solution would be difficult to work out, particularly in relation to certain areas like that of southern Nyasaland where the European stake is important but not predominant. But I myself am inclined to think that it may hold the best possibilities of a solution acceptable to most reasonable people.

(3) To dismember the Federation and create in its place a predominantly European State of Southern Rhodesia, the line of rail, and the Copperbelt, and two or three native States consisting of the rest of the north. This solution would involve either unfairness to the Africans or a great financial burden on H.M.G. unless there were then some very firm arrangement for financial support to be given to the native States by the European State, which would of course continue to have to draw most of its labour from the native States. It would in my view be a sad development but I think it would be preferable to the withdrawal of our protection from the native areas in the north against the wishes of the Africans in them.

Clearly it is not possible for the Cabinet to reach a snap judgment on all this on Tuesday. Indeed I doubt very much whether even a Cabinet Committee can successfully tackle the issue with advice only from the normal staffs of the Departments concerned. It seems to me that it will be necessary either to set up some form of impartial commission or else to detail some Government officers to work particularly on this subject for a period, paying visits to Central Africa as may be necessary.

I am sending a copy of this minute and its enclosures to the Minister of State.

W.L.G.B.  
14.11.58

*P.S.* Although I know the Legal Advisers do not agree with me on this, I think it would be a mistake to rule out in advance all possibility of a federation some of whose member States were not independent in territorial matters becoming a full member of the Commonwealth. It is after all for the existing members of the Commonwealth to decide what new members should be admitted, and it is conceivable that all existing members might think it on balance right and wise to admit a federation some of whose States were still under the ultimate control of H.M.G., provided that the Federal Government was independent in its own sphere (except possibly as regards power to amend its own constitution) and at least one of its State Governments was independent in its own sphere. But the great danger of any such solution of the issue of membership of the Commonwealth is that afterwards the Federal Government would make great play with the thesis that H.M.G.'s ultimate

control of any of the State Governments was incompatible with independence. In other words they might do once again what they did after the establishment of Federation—use what was understood to be a firm deal as a jumping off ground for the exercise of further pressure.

W.L.G.B.  
14.11.58

I agree.

In conversation with Sir Gilbert Laithwaite earlier today (before these papers reached me) I asked him bluntly what was meant by 'stretching' the pledges. He replied that it meant interpreting them 'in a white way'. I remarked that resignation by a civil servant was an empty gesture (more particularly if he was within months of retiring!) but that I personally would not want to have any part in such a sell-out.

J.S.M.  
14.11.58

*Secretary of State*

I do not have a great deal of first-hand experience on this issue, but have of course read a good deal.

If one is to stretch the interpretation of the 1953 pledges to give control to the Federation so that it can become independent in 1960 and a full member of the Commonwealth, then surely the stretching would be to breaking point—breaking our word.

The various ideas thrown out by Gorell Barnes in his memorandum of November 14th are surely worth further study (in particular I have a liking for and sympathy with the P.S.).

The whole matter is so difficult and so important that the idea of a Royal Commission has an appeal. Before such a stage is reached, some sort of preliminary inter-departmental (Cabinet?) committee might be set up to advise.

P.  
17.11.58

*Secretary of State*

When I was with Alec Home the weekend we talked, amongst other things, about the idea of a study being started now by someone such as Bridges. Home rather favoured the idea of one official from each Government or Department concerned (presumably the C.R.O., C.O., Federation, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) meeting and seeing whether they could find a common basis for progress. If they ran into difficulties then might be the time to bring in an outsider. One of the reasons which led him to believe that this line might prove fruitful was the hopeful talks that he had had with Welensky the last day. Those seemed to lie somewhat in the following direction, that while the Federation should have some say in internal security, it would on the other hand accept that certain legislation (which might affect our pledges) could not be introduced into the Federal Legislature without the approval of Parliament here. I told him that the idea of 'stretching' worried me. One way or another I think we probably should start on the constitutional studies now when there is perhaps some measure of goodwill after the Northern Rhodesian excitements.

P.  
11.12.58

**165** PREM 11/2477

17 Nov 1958

**'The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Northern Rhodesia': note by B StJ Trend for Mr Macmillan**

[C (58) 231 and C (58) 232 were Cabinet memos on the forthcoming talks with Welensky about the Northern Rhodesian constitution by Lennox-Boyd and Home respectively (C(58)232 is reproduced in R Hyam & Wm R Louis, eds, *The Conservative government and the end of empire 1957–1964* (BDEEP: London, 2000) part II, 492). The Cabinet discussed the issue on 18 Nov. In summing up the discussion, Macmillan echoed the sentiments of Brook's note. He argued 'that the Federation could make a very important contribution to our position in central Africa and that we should seek to avoid as far as possible, any action which might seriously prejudice its interests. If it proved impossible to persuade Sir Roy Welensky to acquiesce in the course proposed in C (58) 231, it might be necessary for the Cabinet to reconsider the issues involved' (CAB 128/32/2, CC 81(58)8), 18 Nov 1958.]

The fundamental dilemma which underlies the relations between the Federation and Northern Rhodesia is summarised in paragraph 4 of C(58) 232—'If we withdraw from the Northern Territories before we have built up Governments and Legislatures there that the Africans support, we shall be accused of disregarding our pledges. If we hang on in the Northern Territories, the Federation will not attain sovereign status and full membership of the Commonwealth'.

The reasons why this dilemma has become acute at this moment are as follows:—

- (a) We are publicly committed to review the Constitution of the Federation in 1960 and to consider at that point 'a programme for the attainment of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth'.
- (b) We published in September the White Paper enclosed with C.(58) 231, describing certain proposals for constitutional advance in Northern Rhodesia. These proposals are summarised in paragraphs 22–25 of the despatch at Appendix I of the White Paper. They will need to be debated in Parliament in the near future in order that elections may be held in Northern Rhodesia next spring.
- (c) The proposals are being contested by Sir Roy Welensky, who will probably urge 'either that there should be no change in the Constitution of Northern Rhodesia before the 1960 review of the Federal Constitution or that we should drastically amend our scheme in a manner disadvantageous to Africans'.
- (d) The Colonial Secretary proposes that we should make no concessions to such criticism apart from publishing a supplementary despatch clarifying our views on two particular items in our proposals. The Commonwealth Secretary accepts this suggestion.

The issue is clearly bound up with our whole policy towards 'black' Africa and its gradual attainment of independence. It is difficult to quarrel with the Colonial Secretary's conclusions; but you will remember your recent correspondence with Sir Roy Welensky in which he has repeatedly emphasised the risks of an Egyptian and Soviet drive towards Southern Africa and the importance of creating a politico-military *bloc* in the heart of Africa which could withstand pressure of this kind.<sup>1</sup> It is implicit in his thinking that the leadership of such a *bloc* would be white, not black.

<sup>1</sup> See 157 & 159.

If we accept his views in principle—and, given the increasing strategic importance of the air reinforcement route across Central Africa, it is difficult to contest them—we should surely lean as far towards him as is possible without compromising the discharge of our responsibilities towards the black peoples.

**166** CO 1015/1629, no 686

25 Nov 1958

[Northern Rhodesian constitution]: minute by Lord Home to  
Mr Lennox-Boyd

[Welensky arrived in London for talks on the Northern Rhodesian constitution on 18 Nov. In the course of those talks, Lennox-Boyd refused to drop the most controversial aspect of the proposals, namely that African candidates should require the endorsement of tribal chiefs.]

We now have two chances to send Welensky home comparatively calm about the new Northern Rhodesian Constitution.

The first is to drop the proposal that two-thirds of the Chiefs should approve a political candidate. The more I look at this the more I am in favour of getting rid of it altogether.

Welensky tells us that the African Congress propoganda is spreading and influencing the Chiefs and that a mixture of threats and bribery would induce them to veto Federal Party candidates so that his party would be at a disadvantage and African Congress would prosper. I am inclined to think there is a good deal in this and that a move which you designed to secure moderate African candidates may now work the other way.

Also it seems too complicated. Your negative procedure where one-third of the Chiefs can veto is certainly an improvement on the previous ideas but even so it would mean in a country of wide communication that the processes would have to be begun months before an election. Vetoes would be applied and parties would have to find new candidates, with no guarantee that the individual would not be vetoed all over again. There could be months of delay and frustration. Also who is to lay down the tests which the Chiefs will apply? I fear it couldn't be just an 'I don't like your face' principle.

I should really like to see this dropped as you indicated might be possible in your Cabinet paper.

If you did away with this, I think you might reasonably retain 'nomination' for the Executive Council for the first election, saying in a supplementary despatch that it would be abolished in favour of an election as soon as the new Constitution was seen to be working well.

If you cannot drop the Chiefs then I am sure we will have to concede the election of two more Africans, which is more difficult for you, I would think, than the Chiefs. You would certainly have to consult the Northern Rhodesian representatives as it would be a change from the 'Chequers' agreement and there is a chance they might not agree.

Perhaps we can have a talk before we next see Welensky. If we get stuck we shall have to go back to Cabinet but I hope you will feel able to do one or the other without that.

I am sending a copy of this to the Prime Minister.

**167** DO 35/7514, no 683

8 Dec 1958

**[Northern Rhodesian constitution]: letter from Sir R Welensky to Lord Home**

[The Northern Rhodesian constitutional proposals were debated in the Commons on 27 Nov and carried. Welensky continued to maintain that vetting by the chiefs would not be feasible.]

In pursuance of our understanding on our return from London, we had a meeting with the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Arthur Benson, and Mr. John Roberts, M.L.C., Leader of the Unofficial Members, on 2nd December, 1958. I attach draft minutes of this meeting. These have not yet been agreed with Sir Arthur who may wish to make changes in them.

I will not pretend that the meeting was in any way a satisfactory one as far as we were concerned. We had hoped that the Governor might be persuaded to drop the idea of the Chiefs 'vetting' the candidates for the six special seats, and also the nominated members, but we were disappointed.

As regards the first point, we are more than ever convinced that the scheme is wrong in principle and that its practical working will militate against the working of political partnership. As to principle, the Governor admitted the possibility that in Barotseland only one candidate would have his candidature approved, or even that no candidate would be approved. As to practice, after hearing the Governor we are still certain that the scheme will break down and that in any event it will impose an intolerable burden on candidates and give endless opportunities for procrastination, partiality and other abuses. The Governor did not attempt to show that the procedure could be carried through in the period allowed by the Electoral Ordinance, i.e. the interval between the Proclamation and nomination day, which is a maximum of 28 and a minimum of 14 days. He relied on the period between *dissolution* and nomination day which can be stretched to 69 days by taking the maximum period allowed up to nomination day on the one hand, and the minimum period between nomination day and polling day. Obviously in practice one could not adhere to a maximum on one side and a minimum on the other.

The Governor admitted that it would be impossible in the time available for a party to fill the gaps which might be caused in its team by death, withdrawal or disapproval of its candidates. The only remedy he suggested was for a political party to put up several alternative candidates for each seat or to invite the Chiefs themselves to suggest suitable candidates!

He suggested that the approval of Chiefs might be obtained by post but then stressed the advantages of the Chiefs meeting *coram publico* to consider candidates! He also stated that a certificate given could be withdrawn at any time up to polling day!

Roberts admitted that the objections to the scheme in principle were valid, but he felt that the advantages of bolstering up the authority of the Chiefs justified giving them this extraordinary power. He went on, however, to say that he was very disturbed by the practical difficulties to which we had called attention, and asked that an attempt should be made to overcome these. This request met with no response. Roberts also considered that the Chiefs should be circumvented in their powers by being required to confine themselves to the question of whether candidates had certain qualifications. None of us was able to think of a way of doing this.

I must emphasise that we are still vehemently opposed to the 'vetting' by the Chiefs and we will be very disappointed if our objections, to which no satisfactory answer has been given, are not sustained.

As regards the second point, the view Roberts took was that if it was certain that the two nominated members would be Africans in any event, he would prefer to have two extra African reserved seats in lieu of the nominees. The Governor, however, insisted that if suitable African Ministers were available from the elected members the nominated members need not necessarily be Africans. We had gained a different impression from our discussions in London, but in view of the Governor's statement, Roberts was not disposed to prefer the substitution of two additional reserved seats for Africans for the nominated members.

I must stress that the Federal Government is still strenuously opposed to the inclusion of any nominated members.

You know how strongly we object to the scheme as a whole. If the United Kingdom Government are determined to go ahead with the scheme, of course, we cannot prevent your doing so. In regard to the matter of African ministers and nominated members, our differences cannot be reconciled. In regard to the vetting of the Chiefs, however, I believe that the United Kingdom Government recognises the validity of our objections and I think it would only be graceful if you could abandon this part of the scheme, which, as you know, has been objected to by others besides the Federal Government.



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The following abbreviations are used:

- A — appendix or annex
- E — enclosure
- N — editorial link note (before main text of document)
- n — footnote
- † — included in list of office holders in one or both parts

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